Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Tuesday 9th June 2020
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The first duty of any Government is to protect the public from harm. Combating the unprecedented threat of coronavirus has, of course, been the focus of our energies over the last few months, but as our country begins to open up once again, it is crucial that we maintain our vigilance towards the all too familiar threat of terrorism. As the House will recall, there have been a number of devastating incidents in recent years. The appalling atrocities at Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November last year and in Streatham on 2 February this year, barely two months apart, were brutal attacks on innocent members of the public just going about their day-to-day lives. Those incidents drove home some hard truths about our approach to managing terrorists in the justice system, with each committed by an offender who had been released automatically halfway through their sentence, with no involvement from the Parole Board. We cannot allow that to happen again.
Following the Streatham attack, we acted swiftly to introduce the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which ended the automatic early release of terrorist offenders and ensured that any release before the end of a sentence is dependent on a thorough risk assessment by the Parole Board. I was extremely grateful for the co-operation we received from Members on both sides of the House on that vital piece of legislation, and I was proud of how quickly this place acted to get it on to the statute book. That piece of legislation built on the Government’s plans to bolster the United Kingdom’s response to terrorism and to ensure that we have some of the strongest measures in the world to tackle that threat.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
The Lord Chancellor mentions the importance of speed in dealing with these situations. Does he agree that we have perhaps not moved fast enough in, for example, proscribing some organisations? I am thinking particularly of extreme right-wing organisations that target the black community, other people of colour, the Jewish community and the gay community. It took years to get System Resistance Network and Sonnenkrieg Division banned by the Government, and there are other organisations out there, such as the Order of Nine Angles, that need to be banned. Does he agree that we need to move further and faster on proscription so that people involved in those organisations can receive the sentences that he is talking about in this legislation?
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman knows that the function of proscription is for the Home Secretary. From my knowledge of it, which is not as close as that of my colleague, proscription is a device that should be applied equally, without discrimination. He is absolutely right to talk about the rise of far-right extremism. At this Dispatch Box and elsewhere, I have readily acknowledged the fact that out in our community, sadly, and in our prison system, we have a proportion of far-right wing terrorists who have been convicted and brought to justice. What I would say about those individual examples is that wherever there is evidence of activities that amounts to grounds for proscription, I know that this Home Secretary—indeed, like her predecessors—will act with alacrity. Of course, her predecessor did in the instances that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, so I assure him that the Government will work within the law and apply it equally to all groups and organisations that pose a direct threat to our way of life. That is what we are talking about here.
I was dealing with the measures that we announced in the aftermath of the atrocity at Fishmongers’ Hall. In the current financial year, 2020-21, we have increased funding for counter-terrorism policing by £90 million. We announced a review for the support for victims of terrorism, with a further £500,000 being provided to the Victims of Terrorism Unit. We then announced our plans to double the number of counter-terrorism specialist probation staff. We are also working to increase the places that are available in probation hostels, so that authorities can keep closer tabs on terrorists in the weeks after their release from prison. Of course there is also the independent review—led by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall, QC—of the way in which different agencies investigate, monitor and manage terrorist offenders. This was just the first stage of our response, because these attacks clearly demonstrated the need for terrorist offenders to spend longer in prison and to be subject to more stringent monitoring in the community.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I am very conscious that although we are looking at the recent period, at those who were involved in ISIS and Daesh attacks in London and elsewhere, IRA terrorism is clearly a strong issue, as was illustrated last week when there was a bomb and arms find in Londonderry. When it comes to sentencing, I ask that those who are involved in IRA terrorism, who are convicted in this jurisdiction—on the mainland—will not receive any reduction in the sentences that they receive if they are transferred back to Northern Ireland, for instance. I seek that assurance from the Secretary of State—that IRA terrorists will get the full brunt of the law and not get away with a reduced sentence if they are sent back home.
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman can be reassured that the whole purpose of this UK-wide legislation is not to discriminate between different types of terrorists. It would be wholly wrong for this legislation, for example, to focus on so-called Islamic terrorism, as opposed to far-right terrorism, the Provisional IRA and irregular republican, or indeed, irregular terrorism of a general nature within Northern Ireland or any other part of the United Kingdom. This is not discriminatory legislation. It is designed to deal with terrorism in all its forms, and I believe that this legislation is also agile when it comes to dealing with and anticipating the enduring challenge of how to manage terrorists in whatever form they might come. As we know, terrorism is evolving and taking different forms all the time.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
My right hon. and learned Friend mentions a couple of cases, including Fishmongers’ Hall. Does that not illustrate the great range of problems that have to be addressed? In recent times, was there not a case where someone had to be released even though people were sure he would reoffend at the first opportunity—he did so, and had to be trailed and stopped by an MI5 team—whereas at Fishmongers’ Hall, was the problem not that the person had claimed to be reformed and that there was no reason, apparently, not to release him? It will have to be a very comprehensive piece of legislation to cope with such a wide range of problems.
Robert Buckland
I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend, who speaks with experience of these matters. He helps me to outline the point I was about to make about the complex and evolving nature of the threat. He is right to talk about different types of threat: superficial compliance, which we saw, sadly, with regard to Fishmongers’ Hall; and known threat, but with an inability of the authorities, due to the current regime, to manage that within custodial settings, and the paraphernalia, cost and sheer planning that has then to be undertaken to try to deal with and manage the threat in the community.
I must pay tribute to the teams who worked so hard at Streatham to minimise what could have been an even more horrific incident on that Sunday afternoon on Streatham High Road. I well remember looking at the detail of what the teams did that day and being lost in sheer admiration for their bravery and professionalism in dealing with a terrible incident that could have involved very serious loss of life. The work of looking at the detailed facts will go on by way of an independent inquest. We will, of course, look precisely at the outcome of that, and at the serious further offence reviews, which are ongoing but will conclude very shortly. They will help to supplement the excellent work done by Jonathan Hall in his review of MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements.
I was explaining that the announcements we made some months ago were but the first stage of our response. The step-up response to counter-terrorism is very much at the heart of what I and the Government are about. The legislation we are now introducing will ensure that the process for how we at each stage deal with both convicted terrorist offenders and those who pose a concern of becoming terrorist offenders will be strengthened. We are determined to ensure that those who commit serious acts of terror and put members of the public at risk serve sentences that properly reflect the harm they cause.
The Bill will reform the sentences which can be handed down to terror offenders by introducing a new category of sentence. The serious terrorism sentence, for the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders, will carry a minimum period of 14 years of custody, with an extended licence period of up to 25 years. That sentence will apply to only the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders who would otherwise receive a life sentence: those who have been found guilty of an offence where there was a high likelihood of causing multiple deaths.
The Bill also introduces further provisions for terrorist offenders who have been assessed to be dangerous, and who have committed a sufficiently serious offence, to spend the entirety of their sentence in custody without the prospect of early release. In addition to spending that full term in prison, the courts will be able to apply longer extended licence periods of up to 10 years for those offenders, so we can continue to supervise them once they are allowed back into the community. Any breach would put them straight back into prison.
In February, I announced that the Government would review sentencing for terrorist offenders, including whether current maximum penalties for terrorist offences were sufficient. Following that review, the Bill proposes to increase the maximum penalty for three specific terrorism offences: first, membership of a proscribed organisation; secondly, supporting a proscribed organisation; and thirdly, attending a place used for terrorist training. The maximum term is currently 10 years, but will be increased to 14, which sends a clear message about how serious the Government consider that type of offending and is consistent with existing penalties for similarly serious terrorist offences.
Another outcome of the review included in the Bill is an amendment to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which will enable the courts to find any offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years to have a terrorist connection. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation noted that that would be a useful change. It will give the courts more flexibility to reflect the facts of each case fully in the sentence that they may wish to pass.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
Order. The hon. Gentleman disappoints me. We had all this yesterday. The hon. Gentleman cannot address the Minister as “Minister”; he has to address him in the third person. It is my ambition that the hon. Member for Strangford will get that right.
Jim Shannon
Madam Deputy Speaker, I endeavour to follow your instructions and I will do my best.
I seek assurance that those who are involved in terrorist activity, be it providing safe houses, physical assistance, cars or weapons, and who play a smaller role will also feel the brunt of the sentencing for their minor role in a bigger terrorist atrocity.
Robert Buckland
I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. As he knows, there have been developments in terrorism law since the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which he will remember, then the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Acts that followed the atrocity of 9/11, which saw a development and evolution in the law that allowed a wider penumbra of people who supported, encouraged or facilitated that type of serious offending to be brought before the courts.
I was explaining that the particular measure to which I was drawing the House’s attention allows the courts to find a terrorist connection in offences that are not specifically terrorism or terrorism-related; they might be offences under a different type of Act, such as an offence of violence or an acquisitive crime. If there is enough evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof that there is a terrorism connection, the court can use that as an aggravating factor in increasing the level of sentence given to that particular offender.
That will result in more offenders being managed through the registered terrorist offender notification requirements and will ensure that operational partners can effectively manage that risk on release so that no terrorism-connected offender should fall through the cracks. Taken together, the sentencing provisions will reduce the threat posed to the public by incapacitating dangerous terrorists and will maximise the time that the authorities have to work with offenders, giving offenders more time in which to disengage from their dangerous and deeply entrenched ideologies.
The recent terror attacks demonstrated the importance of improving and maximising our capability to monitor offenders in the community. The Bill introduces a range of measures to allow the Government to intervene more effectively where required. Time spent on licence is crucial in monitoring and managing offenders in the community, and also in giving them the opportunity and support to change their behaviour to desist and disengage from terrorism.
Right hon. and hon. Members were rightly concerned during the passage of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 that terrorist offenders released at the end of their sentence would not be subject to licence supervision when released. This legislation takes vital steps to extend the scope of the special sentence for offenders of particular concern to cover all terrorist offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years. That will mean that any terrorist offenders convicted of an offence covered by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act will no longer be able to receive a standard determinate sentence, but will instead face a minimum period of supervision on licence of 12 months, even if they are released at the end of their custodial term.
The Bill will also strengthen the licence conditions to which terrorist offenders are subject by making available polygraph testing as a condition of their licence. We believe that that will help probation staff to monitor compliance with the other licence conditions—such as contact with named individuals, entering exclusion zones or accessing material that promotes or relates to acts of terrorism—imposed on offenders. Research has shown that mandatory polygraph testing for adult sexual offenders can be an effective risk-management tool; extending that to certain terrorist offenders will therefore enhance our ability to monitor them in the community.
In addition, the measures in the Bill will maximise the effectiveness of the existing disruptions and risk-management toolkit available to counter-terrorism policing and our security services. That toolkit can be used alongside licence conditions for those serving a licence period after sentence, or with individuals of terrorism concern who have not otherwise been convicted.
Prosecution and conviction are always our preference for dealing with terrorists, but in the limited instances in which we cannot prosecute, deport or otherwise manage an individual of terrorism concern, terrorism prevention and investigation measures—known as TPIMs—are a crucial tool for protecting the public. The Bill makes a number of changes to TPIMs to increase their value as a risk-management tool and support their use by operational partners in cases when it is considered necessary. The changes include lowering the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM notice, specifying new measures that can be applied to TPIM subjects, and removing the current two-year limit from which a TPIM notice can last, to ensure that we are better equipped to manage individuals of significant concern who pose a continued threat.
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)
Is the Secretary of State aware of cases in respect of which he, the Home Secretary or others think that a TPIM should have been granted but could not be because the burden of proof was set at the wrong level?
Robert Buckland
I am sure the right hon. Lady will understand that it would be a little invidious of me to go into individual cases, but she will know from her long experience of this issue, and control orders previously, that TPIMs and control orders are complex and resource-intensive mechanisms that require a high degree of planning and continued monitoring, so decisions made to apply for them are never entered into lightly. By returning the position on the standard of proof to the one that existed some years ago, the Bill creates a more flexible means of monitoring, rather than a system that does, and did, require a higher standard of proof. It is not my wish or the wish of the Government to see an overdependence on TPIMs to the exclusion of other types of disposal.
It is still very much the Government’s view that prosecution and conviction is absolutely our priority, but experience has shown that the judicious use of this type of measure is not only lawful and proportionate but necessary when we cannot meet the high standard of proof that the right hon. Lady knows exists in criminal prosecution. It is my view that although TPIMs have never been the complete solution to the problem, they are an invaluable additional tool that the security services and all of us need when it comes to managing this complex problem. The right hon. Lady will be reassured that according to the latest published figures the number of TPIMs in force is currently five. I do not believe that the changes we bring in will act as any incentive or artificial stimulus to a sudden change in the way that the measures are used.
Forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, if I dwell at length on the point made the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee. I have noticed, certainly from my time as a Law Officer, that from the middle part of this decade we saw a welcome increase in the number of prosecutions, particularly of returning foreign fighters. That showed that where we put the resources and the will into investigation we can make the prosecutorial system work well. Maintaining that focus, but then adapting, refining and modernising the system as we are doing in this Bill, strikes the right balance in terms of the need to protect the public and to adhere to those principles of liberty, the individual and the rule of law that all of us in this House share.
Sir Robert Neill
I have a lot of sympathy with the point that my right hon. and learned Friend makes about the value that TPIMs can have as part of the armoury, so to speak, in dealing with these matters. May I draw him back to the point about the change in the burden of proof? The increase in the burden of proof to the current standard was specifically in response to a recommendation from the then independent reviewer, Lord Anderson. The current independent reviewer, Mr Hall QC, has made no such recommendation to reduce the burden proof, as is proposed here. That is a striking difference. What we are trying to get to is this: what is it that triggers this change in the burden of proof without some evidence, either by way of recommendation or some hard fact to demonstrate it?
Robert Buckland
I absolutely accept and understand the motivation behind my hon. Friend’s intervention, and he makes such a recommendation not just as Chair of the Select Committee, but as a guardian of the principles of the rule of law, which, after all, is what we, as a nation, are trying to defend against those who would kill, shoot and bomb their way into power and influence. He can be reassured that this—if you like—reversion to the previous standard of proof is all about making sure that we have as agile a tool as possible, bearing in mind the rapidly changing nature of the terrorist threat that we face. It is vital that we make sure that, when applications for TPIMs are made, they can be done not only in such a way that there is clearly an evidential basis and those grounds exist, but in a way that means they can be effective and as rapidly implemented as possible. The focus of the TPIM and the number of people on it will change, adapt and evolve according to the constant and the changing nature of the threats.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. The point made by the Chair of the Justice Committee is very well made. Not only has the current independent reviewer of terrorism, Jonathan Hall QC, not recommended the change, but he has specifically questioned the basis for the change. So again, is the Lord Chancellor able to clearly articulate for us why this change in the burden of proof is necessary?
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her question. Indeed, in the lengthy answers that I am giving, I am trying to do just that. What I am trying to explain is—I know that she knows this—that the TPIM mechanism is not something that is entered upon lightly. It involves a high degree of resource and a high intensity of resource management. It is a self-evident truth that the resources of the state, however large they may be, are not infinite and therefore choices and priorities have to be allocated. What I can assure the House of is that of course every time we assess that the grounds are met and that there is a risk, we will act. That is what our security services do, day in, day out, for us. What I am saying is that the change in the threshold creates that greater agility. I accept that it will be a lower standard, yes, but the reason for that is to allow for greater flexibility when our operational partners come to apply them.
I was talking about the importance of TPIMs’ use being proportionate. I believe that the annual review of TPIMs, which is going to be part of this process to qualify the question about their indefinite duration, strikes the right balance between the need for vigilance and control against the need for those basic civil liberties that we all guard jealously to be maintained. Let us not forget that where it is no longer necessary or proportionate to extend a particular TPIM for the purposes of public protection, that TPIM will be revoked. That check and balance is very much at the heart of the regimen that we are proposing in the Bill.
The Bill also amends legislation governing serious crime prevention orders. Those are civil orders imposed by the courts that protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting an individual’s involvement in serious crime, which of course includes terrorism. The Bill supports the use of these orders in terrorist-related cases by allowing counter-terrorism policing to make a direct application to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order. We are therefore streamlining that process. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has noted that these mechanisms are at the moment an under-utilised tool in terrorism cases, and I believe that by streamlining the process we will see a greater reliance upon them.
We are also adding the offences of breaching a TPIM notice and breaching a temporary exclusion order to the list of relevant terrorism offences that can trigger the registered terrorist offender notification requirements. Again, the independent reviewer has publicly confirmed his support for that change. The regime requires individuals aged 16 or over who have been sentenced to 12 months or more in custody for a relevant terrorism offence to provide certain information about changes in their circumstances, such as their address, to the police and to notify them of any foreign travel plans. Together, these changes strengthen our ability to manage the risk posed by those of terrorism concern in our community, including those who have been released from prison without a period on licence.
The Bill also reforms how we deal with terrorist offenders under the age of 18. We recognise, of course, that there is a separate sentencing framework for that category of offenders, and that it has distinct purposes and aims that differ from those relating to adult offenders. We have carefully considered which measures it would be appropriate to apply to under 18-year-olds in developing this proposed legislation. Although we remain firm in our aim to ensure that custody should be used only where absolutely necessary, it is a sad and inescapable fact that some young people are susceptible to radicalisation or to the adoption of extremist views, and that among those, there are a few who pose a very serious threat to the public.
The Bill will therefore ensure that the courts have the right range of tools at their disposal to deal with those under the age of 18 who commit serious terrorist or terrorist-related offences. We will do that by introducing a youth equivalent to the special sentence for offenders of particular concern. This will mean that, if convicted of terrorist offences serious enough to warrant custody, these offenders will serve a fixed period on licence once they have been released into the community. This will ensure that they receive an appropriate level of supervision. We are also replicating the changes to the extended determinate sentence to ensure better public protection from young terrorist offenders who have been assessed as dangerous. This removes Parole Board consideration of the two-thirds point for the most serious terrorism offences, and in the interests of public protection, it gives the courts the option to apply an extension period of up to 10 years on licence. I accept that this is an exceptional series of measures, but we are dealing with an exceptional type of offending.
Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)
Can the Secretary of State explain, first, what additional resources will be made available within the prison system to ensure that those who commit terror offences are not then left there to radicalise other young offenders? That has been a huge concern, and the Government have been pretty lacklustre in dealing with it. Secondly, when they are released, what resources and support will be made available to local authorities and other partnerships to ensure that other young people are not susceptible to their influence? It is one thing to sentence, but quite another to deal with the underlying challenges in communities.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for raising that issue. I can give her the strongest reassurance that, though at times it might appear, from some of the coverage of how terrorism is monitored in prison, that our system is failing, it is not. There are many aspects of the counter-terrorism regimen in our prisons that are world leading and which other countries are learning from and coming to us for help and advice on. I can say this about our recent announcement: the doubling of the number of specialist probation officers, and imams with specialist training, will further improve the way we deal with terrorism both inside prisons and in the community.
I can reassure the hon. Lady that, after 2017, when the Home Office and my Department came together with the joint extremism unit that deals with terrorism, a visitor to a prison with a particular specialism—Belmarsh, for example—would have seen embedded in the command and control structure police officers, probation officers, all parts of the system working jointly around a particular offender: not just monitoring but anticipating and understanding the trends, themes and information emerging. A lot of this is of a sensitive nature and it would be wrong of me to dwell too heavily upon the detail, but I can say that we have created separation centres. Those are challenging, as one should not use them on a whim and there needs to be a clear basis on which to separate individuals of known extremism from the rest of the prison population. Otherwise, there is a danger of creating an even more worrying unit or cadre of individuals who feed off each other and whose agenda of hate and terror is only entrenched by their being separated from the rest of the prison community.
The hon. Lady is right to say there is a challenging balance to be reached between separation and the danger of the proselytization of these views among other more susceptible members of the prison community, but we have the resources and are ploughing them in. The Bill is only part of the step-up approach I announced earlier this year. She can be reassured that not only is the work being done in prisons but—to deal with her point about the community—the specialist probation officers will have a community role as well. Furthermore, as I will refer to shortly, the statutory review of Prevent will give us all an opportunity to hone, improve and refine our approach to terrorism within the community.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
When I was Prisons Minister between 2010 and 2012, we abolished control orders, to which we are returning, because of the inflexibilities they created. I will speak on that in my main remarks. Will not the inflexibilities and the mandatory elements in the Bill make significantly more difficult the job of those most brilliant people in the Prison Service engaged in the rehabilitation of this most difficult class of offenders?
Robert Buckland
I pay tribute to the work my hon. Friend did in my Department at the beginning of the coalition Government. He is right that in many instances the removal of flexibility in sentencing can pose huge challenges, but we are dealing with an exceptional cohort—a small group of people whose type of offending is very different in my view from the mainstream of other types of offender. As he knows, I have worked in the system for many years, and I have seen individuals capable of the most astonishing rehabilitation, who have turned away from crime and gone on to lead blameless lives, but I am afraid that within this cadre of people there is a stubborn minority who are not capable of rehabilitation, who might show superficial signs of co-operation but whose agenda remains unchanged and undeterred and whose chosen path remains the same, even many years later. That is the sad reality of terrorism and I make no apology for taking an exceptional course to deal with an exceptionally difficult, troublesome, and dangerous group of people.
Stephen Doughty
The Lord Chancellor is being incredibly generous in giving way. He will be aware of the tragic circumstances in which young people in my constituency were recruited to Daesh/ISIS, and that the perpetrator of neo-Nazi actions a couple of years ago in Grangetown was only 19. It is right to focus on issues that relate to young people, but will the right hon. and learned Gentleman say a little more about the specialist probation officers, and about what training skills they will be given to look at the increasingly sophisticated way that some of these individuals engage online? As he said, they might be superficially engaging in face-to-face conversations, but then having a completely different set of conversations online, including through gaming platforms.
Robert Buckland
I know the hon. Gentleman’s community very well through my work in the criminal justice system. It sounds as if his community has particular criminal justice problems—that would be an insult, as it is a diverse and lively community that I know very well indeed. From that knowledge, I know that he represents a wide and wonderfully diverse range of cultures and views in the great city of Cardiff. He can be reassured that online work is as important as any offline interaction. I am impressed by the constant attention to renewal when it comes to the training of probation officers, and there is an acknowledgement that the threat is constantly evolving. The sad reality of the tender ages of some of these perpetrators is something we had to acknowledge in the Bill, hence the measures we are taking.
I was talking about the statutory review of Prevent. As we know, there was a deadline in statute for the completion of that review. We are having to change that, which is unfortunate and not something we wanted. We know there was a difficulty with the process, and Lord Carlile had to step down. We are engaging in a full and open competition to appoint the next independent reviewer, which is what the House would want; it has to be open and independent. We want to give the new reviewer the time necessary to carry out the review, so the statutory deadline will be removed. That does not in any way diminish my commitment, or that of the Home Secretary, to the success of the review, or our determination for it to be done properly and at speed. Our aim is for the review to conclude, with the Government response, by August next year.
In response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) I made the point that, perhaps unusually for a criminal justice Bill, this Bill has UK-wide application, because of the devolution settlement and the question of reserved matters when it comes to counter-terrorism. We have committed to ensuring that the seriousness of terrorist offending is treated equally across the three jurisdictions of the UK, and that we are able to protect all our citizens. We owe it to the people of Northern Ireland, of Scotland, and of England and Wales, not to discriminate in any way or to create false and unhelpful distinctions between all corners of our kingdom. To that end, the provisions will apply equally to the three jurisdictions. That includes applying the measures that we took in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, in full, to Northern Ireland.
Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)
Does the Lord Chancellor recognise that, despite supporting the Bill overall, the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland has expressed some concerns about the extension of those provisions to Northern Ireland, and raised some potential inadvertent and unintended consequences that would be undesirable?
Robert Buckland
The hon. Gentleman was good enough to write to me and I can reassure him that I have spoken directly in an official capacity on several occasions to the Justice Minister, who was of course a distinguished Member of this House in the 2010 Parliament. I know she is a dedicated public servant who is reviving the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland in an important way. I have of course discussed these matters carefully with her and considered them. She makes some important points about the sensitivity of polygraph testing, which I well understand, and the regime for youth offenders, which is a particular passion of hers.
The hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) will know that when I considered retrospective application to Northern Ireland in February, I was careful not to rush into doing that in an emergency Bill. That was because I respected the devolution settlement and some of the differences in our approaches in various parts of the kingdom. I assure him that, having reflected, taken the appropriate steps and considered the matter in the round, I now believe that the provisions of article 7 of the European convention on human rights will not be affected by the measures I wish to take. It is important that we ensure that there is equal treatment of all types of terrorist offender throughout the kingdom.
Earlier, I made the point that I do not want the legislation to be discriminatory. That underlies my approach and I therefore intend to move ahead. Of course, it is a matter for the Administration in Stormont, but I very much hope that they will grant legislative consent. That is what I am seeking and that applies to the Scottish Government as well. My discussions with the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland and the Justice Secretary in Scotland, with whom I have a good professional relationship, will continue so that, with the consent of both legislatures, we can press forward with what I hope will be UK-wide legislation. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
We know all too well the consequences that face us when terrorists are given sentences that are just not long enough, when they are released too early or when the arrangements to supervise them in the community are not robust enough. It is abundantly clear that the law failed the victims of Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham. I believe that the comprehensive set of measures in the Bill helps to put that right. By strengthening our hand at each stage of the process of dealing with terrorist offenders, it represents our determination to do everything in our power to ensure that the public are protected.
Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)
I apologise to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to the Chamber for arriving late. I was at a Defence Committee meeting. My right hon. and learned Friend will know that the post-covid world we enter will be very different security-wise from the one we left. That distraction is being used by our adversaries, including terrorists, to regroup, rearm and retrain. Does he agree that this is not the time to reduce our security or defence budgets and that we must remain on our guard?
Robert Buckland
My right hon. Friend is right to remind us all of the need for constant vigilance. He described the current covid crisis as a distraction; it is a serious and grave crisis and all Governments must give their energy, heart and soul to dealing with it. However, he is right that there is a risk that we take our eye off the ball when it comes to security and defence. We are not doing that. At no stage are the Government doing that. That is why we are putting more resources into counter-terrorism and the Bill is just part of that.
The rapid passage of the emergency Bill a few months ago represented Parliament at its best: acting swiftly to take the urgent steps necessary to keep all our constituents safe from harm. That legislation was a necessary step then, but now we must finish the job. I hope that the Government will have the full support of hon. Members across the House in doing just that.
Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)
The point of terror attacks is to make us despair, but the public’s response to them shows us why we are still right to believe in hope. We saw that clearly in the attack on Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November last year. I will not name the attacker, but I will praise the bravery of the Polish porter, Łukasz Koczocik, who risked his own life to help overpower the terrorist with a narwhal tusk. Two former offenders, James Ford and Marc Conway, also became heroes when they helped tackle the attacker to the ground. I also pay special tribute to Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, who dedicated their young lives to seeing the best in people, working in offender rehabilitation only to be killed in the most bitter twist of fate.
That terrorist attack, like another on Streatham High Road on 2 February this year, was committed by an individual who was already convicted as a terrorist offender, but who had been released automatically at just past the halfway point of their sentence. They were neither de-radicalised nor deterred by their time in prison. In fact, their time at Her Majesty’s pleasure may have made them worse.
There are two possible conclusions we can draw from those harrowing stories. First, prison sentences for terrorists are not long enough and, secondly, deradicalisation programmes in prison are not working. The Government, with the support of the Opposition, went some way to addressing the first of those concerns with emergency legislation passed earlier this year. The Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 ensured that terrorist offenders sentenced to a determinate sentence could not be released before the end of their custodial sentence without the agreement of the Parole Board.
The measures in today’s legislation build on the emergency legislation. They, too, are based on the conclusion that there remain some terrorism offences where the maximum penalty is not sufficient for the gravity of the offence. The Opposition will not be seeking a Division on Second Reading, but we will scrutinise the Bill as it moves through the House into Committee and on Third Reading.
We understand that the terrorism threat level in the UK remains substantial. We also note that the threat does not come from Islamic extremists only. As Britain’s top counter-terrorism police officer, Neil Basu, has warned, the fastest-growing terrorist threat comes from the far right. Of the 224 people in prison for terror-related offences, 173 are Islamic extremists and 38 are far-right ideologues. Of the 16 plots foiled by the end of 2018, four were from the far-right community. In a world that is increasingly tribal, the Opposition believe that the broad thrust of these changes is needed. Labour’s priority is to keep the British public safe.
Stephen Doughty
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way, and I completely agree with his comments. Does he agree that the particular threat we face from far-right organisations is put in stark relief for us by the fact that we have just passed the 21st anniversary of the London nail bombings, which were done by an individual who targeted the black community in Brixton, the Bengali community in the east end and then the LGBT community at the Admiral Duncan pub. The trial judge at the time said it was unlikely that he would ever be able to be released safely, given the awfulness of the crimes he committed. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is why we need to go after these organisations, such as the Order of Nine Angles and others who have the same ideology?
Mr Lammy
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the interest that he takes in these issues and the seriousness and expertise with which he brings them to the House. He is absolutely right. This is incredibly serious and, unfortunately for us, here in the UK we have a number of groups that are globally connected to very dangerous far-right movements. He will know also that sadly, as has already been indicated by the Chair of the Defence Committee, when we come out of the coronavirus period, partly because of the recession and the tough economic times that are likely to follow, there will be individuals who seek to exploit increased hardship and poverty with very extreme rhetoric. Indeed, sadly, in our own country we can see one particular individual taking to social media to whip up a storm in relation to the Black Lives Matter campaigns that we are seeing at the moment.
It is our job in the Labour party to fulfil our role of scrutinising every line of this legislation. First, we want to ensure that the changes balance the threat of terrorist offenders with the rights and freedoms on which our society is built. Secondly, we seek to square the importance of punishment with the necessity to rehabilitate. Some Members may be sceptical about whether it is possible to deradicalise terrorist offenders, but we in the Opposition believe that we have a duty to try—if not for the sake of the offenders, for the sake of the public we must protect.
Even with the extensions to sentences that the Bill proposes, terrorist offenders will be released at some point from our prisons. There is little use increasing sentences for terrorists if we are to release them just a few years later, still committed to their hateful ideology, still determined to wreak havoc. If we are to honour the lives of the young people killed at Fishmongers’ Hall, we cannot give up on rehabilitation. We must not lose faith in the power of redemption—the ability of people to renounce the darkest chapters of their lives and move towards the light.
Let me start by outlining the most significant measures proposed in the Bill that the Opposition support. Next I will explain those areas that we have concerns with. Finally, I will explain the Opposition’s greatest problem with the Bill: not what is in it, but what is not.
The elephant in the room this afternoon is the Government’s failure to announce a coherent deradicalisation strategy to go alongside the Bill. We accept the creation of a new serious terrorism sentence which ends loopholes in the current laws. We support increasing the maximum penalty from 10 to 14 years for certain terror offences, to better reflect their gravity, although we think that further pause must be taken to consider the warning in the impact assessment that
“Longer periods in custody could disrupt family relationships which are often critical to reducing the risk of reoffending.”
We also believe that it is wholly right to make it possible for any offence with a maximum penalty of two years or more to have terrorism as an aggravating factor. Although not all the details of those specific reforms are perfectly drafted, in spirit they are proportionate and fair.
Amid changes that are fair and reasonable, there are others that will need serious scrutiny. As the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, has pointed out, the removal of the Parole Board for serious terrorism offenders is a “profound” and, we would argue, problematic change. No one on either side of the House wants to see terrorists getting out before they have served their time, but we must not allow our anger to distort the lessons from Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham.
This House expressed dismay that both those terrorists were released without ever coming into contact with the Parole Board. The laws in place failed to use the expertise of the Parole Board to understand the risks of their early release and to make the necessary assessments. The Parole Board is, of course, sceptical when these individuals come before it, and its record of release is very low indeed in these sorts of cases. So why are the Government planning to remove the Parole Board for serious terrorism offenders now? Surely we want terrorists to be assessed by the Parole Board more often, not less.
Removing the Parole Board for serious terrorism offenders is not only a problem in terms of monitoring the threat level of convicted offenders and the ability to use the intelligence gleaned; it could also actively undermine these offenders’ incentives to abandon their ideologies. When prisoners know that they have to behave well in order to get out earlier, this engagement can have a transformative effect. Without the extra incentive, we reduce the chances of engagement in rehabilitation. That is particularly concerning when we consider young people under the age of 21 who have been convicted of terrorist offences. Whatever they have done wrong, those seduced by dangerous ideologies in their teenage years must be given every opportunity to change.
Dr Julian Lewis
I strongly endorse what the right hon. Gentleman has just said about the distinction between young people and people of mature years who embrace extremist totalitarian ideologies. Looking back to the time of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism, we see that very few people who embraced it as adults ever gave it up or could have been de-radicalised, but that there are countless examples of young people who went through a phase of addiction to it and then rejected it completely. So he is absolutely right to focus on this age distinction.
Mr Lammy
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his careful and considered observations. Of course he is right in what he says, because when we are talking about this category of offender we are often talking about gross immaturity, and with appropriate intervention and the appropriate assessment it is possible to effect de-radicalisation. The removal of the Parole Board in this means that that assessment is not made at all. I think that behind the Secretary of State’s words and this Bill is the understanding that we will put this cohort automatically on licence, but of course that comes at a cost. Notwithstanding that, we want the intensive scrutiny of the Parole Board, with it looking once, twice, three times at this cohort of this offender. Removing that is a profound decision, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation suggested. For those reasons, I hope that the scrutiny that is required of that decision is undertaken carefully in Committee.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation also rightly raises concerns about extending the maximum licence period for serious terrorism offenders to 25 years. We have concerns about both the proportionality and the cost of this reform. Even indeterminate sentences for public protection prisoners have the prospect of their licence period being terminated when they are no longer considered a risk. Importantly, the Government have not gone into sufficient detail about how they will pay for the heavy administrative burden this will place on probation services, coming after a decade of austerity and cuts, where we have seen changes that the Government are now determined to change once again. As we plunge into the deepest recession of our lifetimes, how does the Secretary of State propose to pay for this massive growth in the number of those under licence?
In addition, there are specific circumstances in relation to Northern Ireland that of course require scrutiny and discussion as we move forward. In terms of sentencing, these are the Opposition’s major concerns that we plan to address in Committee, but we also share the concerns raised by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation when it comes to the changes of monitoring tools available to the security services and counter-terrorism police.
As the Secretary of State will know, he puts me in a strange position with his proposals relating to TPIMs. He will remember that it was a Labour Government, in 2005, which I served in, that first introduced control orders. Back then, in order to impose a control order, a Secretary of State needed only “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the individual was or had been involved in terrorism-related activity. In 2011, the coalition Government raised the standard of proof, by replacing Labour’s control orders with TPIMs. The Secretaries of State could impose these controls only if they “reasonably believed” that the individual was or had been involved in terrorism-related activity. In 2015, the Conservatives raised the standard of proof even higher to require the Secretary of State to have evidence that on the balance of probabilities an individual was or had been involved in terrorist offences, but in the proposed changes we are debating today, the Government propose lowering the standard of proof from the balance of probabilities back to reasonable grounds for suspecting. The Conservative Government seem to have taken nine years to move away from Labour policy and then to return full circle back to it.
Whether or not it can be justified, lowering the standard of proof inevitably increases the chances of innocent individuals being subjected to serious constraints on their freedom. Given that the courts found no problems with the current threshold, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation notes, what are the reasons for this U-turn? As has been suggested by the Chair of the Select Committee and the spokesman for the SNP, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), I do not think the House has yet heard the reason for this U-turn, given that it was not indicated in February, and given that the independent reviewer does not support it and the last one certainly did not support it. Were the Conservative Government wrong when they raised the standard of proof in 2011 and then again in 2015, or are they wrong today when they propose lowering it?
An additional and significant issue about which the reviewer has raised concerns is the removal of the two-year limit on TPIMs, allowing them to be renewed indefinitely. Let me remind the House what a TPIM can involve: overnight residence requirements; relocation to another part of the country; police reporting; an electronic monitoring tag; exclusion from specific places; limits on association; limits on the use of financial services; limits on the use of telephones and computers; and a ban on holding travel documents. This would mark an unprecedented restriction of rights for individuals who, we must remember, have not been convicted of any crime. It raises significant issues, and for that reason I suspect that it will occupy the Bill Committee. It is entirely right when the Secretary of State says that we must be strong on dealing with terrorism—of course, that unites the House—but because we believe in the rule of law and the democratic traditions that we inherit in this House, it is also right that we have the right safeguards, and it is those safeguards that we will very definitely want to scrutinise.
Rushanara Ali
My right hon. Friend makes a very important point about the balance between security and liberty. It is not easy for any Government to strike the right balance, but it is very important that this Government recognise that we cannot afford to lose the wider community—we must ensure that people are not wrongly convicted and there must be assurance that there are safeguards in place to protect innocent people while we go after those who are dangerous and who are committing crimes and acts of terror.
Mr Lammy
My hon. Friend is right to raise the question in the manner that she does, because fundamental to our policing model in this country, even where it relates to terrorism, is the consent model. We must take the consent of communities with us, and when we lose consent, we get disorder. One might say that, in parts of the United States at the moment, one can see the loss of consent from particular ethnic communities. The point she raises is fundamental, and it is why we would not be doing our job properly if we did not scrutinise these changes carefully.
In 2015, the then Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Michael Gove), commissioned a report by former prison governor Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. The report found evidence of growing Islamist extremism in prisons and called for
“a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy”
to fix it. Acheson proposed 69 recommendations, which were consolidated into a total of 11, eight of which we were told would be followed.
It is unclear, however, how many of his recommendations have been implemented and what effect any changes have had on de-radicalisation. Indeed, last year, when Acheson published a report for the Centre for Social Justice, he did not seem confident that much had changed. He wrote:
“Our unsafe prisons provide a fertile breeding ground in which predators, peddling extremist and violent ideologies, can prey upon the vulnerable, creating significant risks to national security and the public at large…On the present trajectory, it is all too conceivable that a future terrorist will have been groomed and radicalised within our prison estate.”
How can the Government justify their failure to include any new policies on rehabilitation or de-radicalisation? Where is the new funding for de-radicalisation in our prisons? Where is the extra support for our probation services? We know that the Government believe in stricter sentences, but what do they have to say about defeating the ideology of hate? Only one part of this package touches on this question, and even it does not attempt to solve it. It instead pushes back the legally binding deadline for the completion of an independent review of Prevent. That review was supposed to be completed by August 2020, and yet this summer it will be further delayed until next year.
We will not seek a Division today because we recognise that there must be progress on this issue, but we are very disappointed by the lack of focus on de-radicalisation. Indeed, some of the Government’s plans, including removing the Parole Board, may actively reduce the chances of rehabilitation in prison. Defeating the ideology, not merely imprisoning those hypnotised by it, is what is necessary if we are serious about preventing reoffending.
After Jack Merritt was killed in Fishmongers’ Hall, his father Dave wrote poignantly about how his son would have perceived the political reaction to his own death. Dave wrote:
“What Jack would want from this is for all of us to walk through the door he has booted down, in his black Doc Martens.
That door opens up a world where we do not lock up and throw away the key. Where we do not give indeterminate sentences, or convict people on joint enterprise. Where we do not slash prison budgets, and where we focus on rehabilitation not revenge. Where we do not consistently undermine our public services, the lifeline of our nation. Jack believed in the inherent goodness of humanity, and felt a deep social responsibility to protect that.”
Jack Merritt’s death was cruelly ironic, but it is a further bitter blow that in its wake, punishment for the offenders he sought to help will become more strict. It is undeniably true that Jack’s murderer never rehabilitated. He maintained his twisted ideology to the very end. However, we must not let this nightmare blind us into believing that second chances exist only in dreams. The murderous terrorist who took Jack’s life would no doubt like us to lose our faith in humanity. But Jack would like us to keep it. The very least we owe him is not to forget this.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the speeches by both Front Benchers, who were serious and thoughtful, and rightly so. Any criminal justice Bill is important, and any Bill touching on sentencing powers is particularly important. The really difficult balance between public protection and rehabilitation—not just for the sake of the individual but for the sake of the broader societal good—is perhaps one of the most difficult with which sentencers, judges, lawyers, Ministers, prison governors and parliamentarians, who make the rules, have to grapple. If ever there was an area where we ought to seek to achieve maximum consensus, it is one as important as this, particularly given that it deals with sentencing and rehabilitation in relation to such grave and serious threats.
I remember as a young barrister talking to the late James Crespi, who survived the bombing of the Old Bailey. I remember, when I lived in Canary Wharf, my newsagent and his assistant being killed by the Canary Wharf bomb. This is something that has affected many of our lives, but the insidious nature of the radicalisation of politicised Islam has brought a new dimension to it.
Mr Lammy
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. He allows me to say that I, too, lost a very dear friend—James Adams—in the bombings in July 2005. I will never forget James. He was a great Conservative and debating partner at school. That is why I, like the hon. Gentleman, take these issues so seriously.
Sir Robert Neill
That is very generous—characteristically so—of the right hon. Gentleman. This is something that, as he rightly observes, has nothing to do with party. Any of us who has lived in any of our great cities has lived with the reality of that risk from time to time. That is why, to return to my point, we must try to get the detail right as well as the broad thrust.
There is much in the Bill that I support, and I shall certainly support it on Second Reading. I think we all accept that, precisely because of the particular nature of Islamist terrorism, the threat of which we now have to confront—the way it seems to warp an ideology even more particularly and more deep-rootedly than many other political motivations—it requires particular care in its handling.
There is no doubt—we have seen it in some of the cases that have been referred to, and it is well established by those who have researched these matters—that those who have been attracted to that ideology frequently present as particularly manipulative and are sometimes adept, as the Lord Chancellor has observed in previous debates, at hiding their motivations for a considerable time. It is therefore is all the harder for the authorities to make an assessment about when it is safe for them to be released, so it is not at all unreasonable that we should have particular types of regimes for sentencing, rehabilitation and release to deal with the particular types of threat that can arise from this particular class of offending.
That said, there are legitimate concerns, which must be raised, about whether we are still getting this right. I do not think any Government have ever got it wholly right. We always have to learn as we go along, as greater awareness and understanding become apparent. That is no criticism of anyone in this context.
I agree with the point that the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) made about the work of Ian Acheson. Mr Acheson’s report was most important and significant and, I think, extremely valuable. He gave compelling evidence to the Justice Committee at the time he brought it out. I have always regarded it as a matter of regret that that report was not more fully implemented. Much of it was, but I still think that there may be bits that we ought to look at.
Robert Buckland
I am extremely grateful to the Chair of the Justice Committee for giving way. He is helping to develop the debate in an extremely productive way. I can assure him that I have engaged regularly with Ian Acheson, whose work I respect hugely. Eight of those 11 recommendations were carried out. There was one in particular, with regard to Friday prayers, that we did not think was necessary. However, things have moved on considerably in the four years since that important report. I speak with the benefit of having been into some of these institutions, of engaging weekly with members of JEXU and of getting frontline information that gives me a higher degree of confidence that there is indeed a plan, a strategy and an approach that is yielding benefits. There is more to do, but there is far more out there than perhaps is fully appreciated.
Sir Robert Neill
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for that intervention. I know that he takes this immensely seriously on a personal level as well as an official level. We ought to be prepared to engage with all expertise in this field. He is right to keep things under review, and I hope that he will continue to use the expertise of Mr Acheson and others who worked with him on that report to inform our best practice.
I visited a young offenders institution where a young girl who had been suborned into this dreadful ideology was being held on remand. She was no doubt going to receive a very substantial sentence, such was the gravity of the matters in which she had become involved, but because of her age, it was inevitable that at some point she would have to be released. Having a means of doing that safely is profoundly important, but I accept also that it is profoundly difficult because it is well established that the pre-indicators that we find in relation to general criminality are often not available to be picked up in this type of case. So I totally understand where the Government are coming from in that regard. That is why, as I said, I do not have a problem with the basic thrust of the changes to the regime that the Bill proposes.
The other point, which has been picked up in the debate by Members on both sides of the House and in interventions, is that the whole purpose of our standing up against terrorism, from whatever source it comes, is to protect our basic values as a society, which are underpinned, perhaps more fundamentally than almost anything else, by a commitment to the rule of law. Anything that seeks to drive us away from that, or inadvertently causes us to move away from that, ironically serves in its own insidious way to assist the terrorist cause rather than our own. I do not think for one second that any Government—none of the Governments who have had to confront this going back to the time I was talking about when I was a young man—have ever sought to do that deliberately.
We have to be particularly alert to that risk, and that is why I hope that when we look at the detail of the Bill we will take on board the need to ensure that we continue safeguards in this regard. That is one reason why it was a good thing that we appointed an independent reviewer of terrorism in the first place. I am a great believer in independent inspectorates, be they of the Prison Service, probation, the Crown Prosecution Service or education services. The same applies to the desirability of having a robust independent reviewer, and we have always had those in the shape of distinguished lawyers. That is why I have a concern about the burden of proof in relation to terrorism prevention and investigation measures. The initial changes were driven, as has been pointed out and I said in my intervention, in response to specific recommendations from the independent reviewer.
The current independent reviewer, Mr Jonathan Hall, QC, supports and endorses a number of changes that the Bill makes, and I think that is powerful evidence in the Lord Chancellor’s favour in relation to many elements of the Bill. But that actually makes it all the more striking that the change to the burden of proof in relation to TPIMs does not arise from anything that the independent reviewer has sought, or anything that the independent reviewer has advocated. His silence on that point, as opposed to other areas where I would suggest that he has given valuable external support to the Government’s position, is therefore striking, and that is why we must be particularly careful about how we deal with this matter. It is a little bit like putting the other side to proof, if I can put it that way.
There may well be a good reason for that, and I am sure that the Lord Chancellor would not reinforce the proposal unless he genuinely believed there was, but I think we have to be able to set a reason before the public as well. I accept that there are pressures in terms of resource and the amount of time it takes to bring forward one of these measures. I accept, too, that the Lord Chancellor observes that it is therefore not done lightly. That is all perfectly fair, but if we are going to make that change—after all, I was a junior member of the coalition Government who made the change in the opposite direction, away from control orders, as has already been observed—we ought always to be able to do it on the basis of the clearest evidence. With every respect, I am not quite sure that we have yet got the clarity of evidence that I would like to see to satisfy me on that point.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Select Committee for his indulgence. I was talking about the need for flexibility. That is why we are making the change. I served on the Committee that considered the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill in 2011, and I followed the developments in the law very carefully, but it is right that we act on the advice and support of the security services and all those involved in the monitoring of offenders, and it is because of that need for flexibility that we judge it right to make the change now. I hope that that is clear.
Sir Robert Neill
The Lord Chancellor makes the point very clearly, and I fully understand that, but I do just juxtapose it with the observation by Mr Hall, QC, in his note dated 2 June, in which he says:
“In these circumstances it is not clear why there is any need to change the law in the manner proposed. Steps to reduce the resource burden of obtaining TPIMs are already in hand. The courts have not found that the current approach is wrong.”
There may be an argument for flexibility, but we cannot say that it comes from the independent reviewer, so I wonder where it does come from.
Mr Lammy
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that when the Secretary of State talks about flexibility, it would be helpful if there were some evidence, given that the cases that have been discussed—Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham—certainly do not relate to the TPIM regime? Perhaps the Secretary of State might want to consider whether he ought to ask those who engage with these things to provide some of that evidence, at the very least on Privy Council terms.
Sir Robert Neill
I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman says, and I know that the Secretary of State will as well. We all want to get this right for the sake of the national good. Flexibility and agility are perfectly legitimate considerations, but it is not unreasonable for us to have some sense of whence they come if we are going to make the case for doing something that would go against the run of our normal approach to the rule of law and safeguards. That is sometimes necessary for the greater national good, but we ought to have a pretty clear basis for doing it.
Crispin Blunt
Does my hon. Friend share my anxiety that the resource issue—the difficulty of setting TPIMs up in the first place—combined with the roll-over factor in the Bill means that the default position on a reduced balance of proof will simply be that the two-year TPIM will be replaced constantly? That will become the default position based on the difficulty of producing resources to effect a proper prosecution, which is the standard we want to achieve.
Sir Robert Neill
My hon. Friend, who has much experience in these matters, makes a very good point.
Ultimately, most of us who believe in the rule of law will always prefer to see prosecution and conviction as the best possible means of dealing with this issue. It is not always possible, but we still need to have important safeguards in whatever regime there is. I am sure the Government recognise that, but we really do need to get it right, for everybody’s sake. I hope that the Lord Chancellor will reflect on how best to make the case for this and to justify what is, on the face of it, a change that may well have much merit—one wants to give the benefit of the doubt—but that could perhaps do with a little more amplification as the Bill progresses.
The other matter that I hope that the Lord Chancellor might bear in mind as the Bill goes forward is the need for some form or other of proper judicial scrutiny of these matters. I recognise that there are plenty of safeguards in the regime that is proposed in the Bill. However, Mr Hall makes another interesting point in one of his notes: that there has been a rather troubling development of the opting out of judicial review by some suspects subject to TPIM orders. That provision was intended to ensure that there was some oversight. It is up to them whether they do that. They may not do it necessarily for the very best of motives, given the rather warped ideological nature of what drives them, but it does ironically remove a means by which best practice can be brought in hand.
That is why Mr Hall suggests that a solution would be for the Secretary of State to seek the High Court’s permission for any extension beyond a two-year length of the TPIM, in the same way that he currently does when the TPIM is first made. It would be perfectly proper to make that longer TPIM, and I can quite conceive of many circumstances when it is, but perhaps the modest requirement of an application to the Court would not be onerous in the circumstances but would put in a sensible safeguard for all such cases.
If we go beyond the two-year length of a TPIM, perhaps we should also be looking at thinking again, at some point, about what is the burden of proof. The greater the level of restriction, as the Law Society has observed in one of its briefings, perhaps the greater the burden of proof that should be required. For example, if there is a set of conditions that includes relocation, is it perhaps reasonable to expect a greater degree of care to be taken on the burden of proof in a matter of that kind, as with other matters?
Those are matters of important detail. I am sure that they need not detain the progress of this Bill on Second Reading, but they are not, I submit, something that we should lose sight of.
Finally, on polygraphs, I accept that they have been used in relation to the release of sexual offenders, but the science on them is still very uncertain. There remain concerns among lawyers and other practitioners as to their dependability in all circumstances, which is why, after all, they are not used as evidence in criminal cases for understandable reasons. I would be worried if we became over-reliant on polygraphs without some sort of proper check and balance. When they were brought in, certainly in England and Wales, in relation to sexual offenders, they had been piloted first. It will not be possible to pilot them in this case, so is there not a strong case for post-legislative scrutiny? That is the view of the independent reviewer in his note, and it seems to fit with good practice in terms of legislation as well.
Those are my points, which I hope will be taken in a constructive spirit by the Government. As someone who supports the Bill, I want to get it right. We probably do not want to have to revisit burdens of proof and mechanisms any more than we need to in future. It must be in everybody’s interests to get it right this time and make it stick for as long as this awful threat persists. I will certainly support the Bill on Second Reading, but I hope that we can have constructive engagement on the detail as we go forward.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
We in the Scottish National party take our duty to protect the public from all serious crime, including terrorism, very seriously, as our record in government in Scotland shows. We have a number of reservations about the Bill, which I shall outline, but like the official Opposition we do not intend to divide the House. We intend to take a constructive but critical approach. To that end, we will play a full part in the Bill Committee.
I thank the Lord Chancellor and his colleagues for the engagement that we have had to date on the Bill. I look forward to further discussions about the Scottish National party’s and the Scottish Government’s concerns. I also thank the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) for the constructive discussions that we have had prior to Second Reading. It is fair to say that the Scottish National party shares many of the official Opposition’s concerns about the Bill. We note that those concerns relate to matters about which the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has also expressed reservations. That is to say, they are responsible concerns.
No discussion about terrorist legislation in this House should take place without parliamentarians taking the opportunity to extend their deepest sympathies to all those who have suffered bereavement or injury as a result of terrorist acts. I look back to the past, particularly in Northern Ireland and indeed the whole island of Ireland in that respect. On behalf of the SNP, I also pay tribute to the brave members of our police and security services, first responders, those in the Prison Service, probation officers and those who work in rehabilitation. All those people have to deal with the consequences of terrorism. We have heard some moving tributes to them. I also pay tribute to the brave bystanders who have intervened to help others in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks.
Many of the provisions in the Bill relate to sentencing, which is of course a devolved matter. Discussions are ongoing between my colleague Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Secretary, and the Lord Chancellor. Of course, there will need to be a legislative consent motion. I will outline the concerns that I share with the Scottish Government and my colleagues in the Scottish Government about the sentencing aspects of the Bill, as well as the use of polygraphs, the changes to TPIMs and the provisions regarding the review of the Prevent strategy. I want to make it clear that I do so from this viewpoint: it is the Scottish National party’s aim that our communities in Scotland are inclusive, empowered and resilient, so they can resist those sowing the seeds of division that can lead to radicalisation and terrorism.
The Bill has some far-reaching changes in it, with implications for human rights as well as policy, and the Scottish Government have already expressed their concerns directly with the Lord Chancellor, as I have done with his junior colleagues. I know that the UK Government, in relation to this Bill at least, realise that they need to work closely with Members of all parties and with the devolved Administrations, because that is what is necessary to ensure effective counter-terrorism measures across the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland. I hope that this consideration will be at the forefront of the Minister’s mind as the Bill pilots its way through the House.
On the issue of sentencing, I am pleased that the UK Government are following the Scottish Government’s lead in ending automatic early release for the most serious offenders. Some time has now passed since the Scottish Government introduced a change to the effect that no long-term prisoner—four years or over—would be eligible for automatic early release after two thirds of their sentence. However, I am far from convinced—as I know others are far from convinced—that simply locking up terrorists for longer and then providing longer supervision on release is going to do much to deradicalise terrorist offenders.
The Bill will require the courts to ensure that certain terrorist offenders receive a custodial sentence of a certain minimum length and that a minimum length of supervision applies on release. In that respect it is a form of minimum mandatory sentencing, which is against the general approach in Scotland. However, it is not completely new to the justice system in Scotland, and that is why discussions are ongoing with my colleague, the Scottish Justice Secretary.
Sentencing is only a small part of the answer to terrorism, however. What happens during the sentence also matters, and, to date, deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have been largely underfunded and poorly executed. That is not my view; that is the view of Nazir Afzal, the former chief Crown prosecutor for the north-west of England. He is an experienced lawyer and a prosecutor worth listening to. He says that this has happened as a direct consequence of the decision by successive Conservative Governments to cut funding to probation and other rehabilitation programmes. The costs of extensive post-release surveillance far outweigh the costs of adequate funding for preventive measures and deradicalisation. I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor agrees with me and Mr Afzal on that point, and whether he is in a position to assure the House that sufficient funds and resources will be made available to deal with preventive and deradicalisation programmes in prison.
Can the Lord Chancellor also assure me that the Bill will not turn out to be counterproductive by leading to less parole, less offender management and less incentive to behave well during a sentence and to attempt deradicalisation? In this respect it will be interesting to hear what the professionals who work in the area of offender management and parole have to say about the Bill, and I look forward to the Bill Committee’s evidence sessions. I am pleased that will there be more than one of those—
Joanna Cherry
Three? Excellent.
The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the issue of polygraphs. He will be aware that in Scotland’s justice system, polygraph testing is not used as a mechanism to monitor compliance with licence conditions or any kind of orders. Indeed, it is not used at all. The reason we have chosen not to use it is the lack of evidence of its effectiveness. If the provisions of the Bill were to apply in Scotland, that would require a significant shift in policy and practice and could also have significant implications for investment in infrastructure. In Scotland, we already have mechanisms in place to monitor compliance with licence conditions and conditions associated with statutory justice orders. These include supervision by justice social workers and the use of electronic monitoring for high-risk offenders. There is a multi-agency public protection arrangement—MAPPA. Under that procedure, those assessed as high or very high risk and who require multi-agency management are subject to a regular review. In Scotland, individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences can be managed under that MAPPA approach, and there are indeed a small number of cases that have been managed in this
More generally on the issue of polygraph testing, I note, as has already been said, that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation expressed some concerns about the lack of pilots and emphasised that there would therefore be a very strong case for very thorough post-legislative scrutiny of the measures. I look forward to hearing what the Minister summing up has to say in response to that point.
On TPIMs, much of what I have to say has already been canvassed. Clearly, the amendments would: reverse the changes to the burden of proof, lowering the burden of proof; reverse changes to the curfew provisions to allow for what is effectively home detention; and allow us to make the orders potentially indefinite. I am not convinced that the changes are necessary and nor are my colleagues in the Scottish Government. We are fortified in that view by the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who is also unconvinced of the necessity of the changes. To be frank, I have heard nothing so far this afternoon to convince me that our reservations are wrong. Those reservations are really important because of the human rights implications, the lack of safeguards built into the Bill, and the lack of any review mechanism.
I am not going to go through what Jonathan Hall, QC said in his two very detailed notes, but he has tackled, in some detail, both the reduction of the standard of proof and making the orders potentially indefinite. He has been very clear that he is not convinced of the case for change, so my questions for the Minister are these. Can we hear more clearly why? Can we see an example of what justifies both the reduction in the burden of proof and the need for the orders to be without time limit? Can we hear why, in the face of such potentially draconian powers, there are no safeguards in the Bill? Would the Government be prepared to consider an oversight mechanism or a review mechanism?
Finally, on Prevent, it is important to remember that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved and that while national security is referred to the UK Government, the way the Scottish Government deliver the Prevent strategy in Scotland reflects Scottish differences and is unique to the challenge faced by Scottish communities. I think it is fair to say that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland has not encountered the same community resistance and community impacts as it has south of the border. Because of the problems encountered in England, the Scottish National party supported the call for a review of the Prevent strategy, but we also shared the very widespread concerns about the Government’s initial choice of reviewer. We believe now that it is very important that a new reviewer is found quickly, and that lessons about impartiality and the important appearance of impartiality are learned from the debacle over the previous putative appointments, so that the review can be seen as genuine and robust. We are a little concerned that the time limit for the review has been removed. I heard what the Lord Chancellor had to say about that, but it is very important that the removal of the time limit does not simply become an excuse to kick this into the long grass. That is the final point on which I seek reassurance from the Minister in his summing up.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
We conduct this debate at a time when we are fighting a virus—an invisible enemy—and we are told perpetually that the virus might mutate, as viruses are inclined to do. Of course, terrorism mutates, too: terrorism is not a static thing; it metamorphosises, both in character and in method. That is precisely what has occurred as we have gone about fighting the prevailing terrorist threat in this country. It makes the challenge of counter-terrorism acute, because countering something is usually about anticipating and predicting what might happen next.
As terrorism metamorphosises and becomes less predictable, it becomes increasingly hard to counter. That is precisely what has occurred in this country and in other countries that have suffered the effects of terrorism in recent years. Terrorists have become more adaptable and more flexible. Their methodology has changed, and a key part of that has been the use of modern communications in the recruitment, indoctrination and radicalisation of terrorists, particularly using the internet.
I wish to talk about the character of that radicalisation. It is much like the kind of grooming with which we are tragically familiar in respect of children who are drawn towards paedophiles. People are groomed on the internet, and the method is disarmingly and shockingly similar. A lonely individual will be identified and told that at last they have a friend. That person will not reveal—indeed, will conceal—any connection to an extremist cause. Gradually, over time, that individual will be turned into the kind of person who will do almost anything for a cause and for their friends. That is made much easier in the modern age: the character of the way we communicate has altered, so this will happen in people’s homes, in their bedrooms, perhaps unknown to their family, certainly unknown to others and, of course, by definition therefore unknown to the security services and those who might do something about it.
Because of all that, our response has constantly to be reviewed, which is precisely what the Government are in the business of doing, and that is why over the years, including the time that I was the Minister responsible, the Government have looked again at whether they have the mechanisms in place and the resources and powers necessary to deal with the changed threat. The Bill goes about that in a number of ways, and I wish to draw out some particular aspects of it for closer consideration, if I may.
On the issue of TPIMs, they are always a contentious matter, and indeed it was a contentious matter in the days of control orders, which some of us will remember, under a previous Government of a different colour. It is vital that we use the powers that we have to restrict the activities of those who might do harm. The question becomes where we fix the bar. The Bill lowers the bar and, in my judgment, rightly so.
Perhaps I ought to admit that I was not a particularly vehement critic—in fact, I was not a critic at all, so I am understating it a bit—of control orders and the methods used by a previous Government. I do not know if it is quite polite to say that, but I am sure it will please one or two Members on the other side of the Chamber—although I am not sure it will please too many on the Front Bench. I saw the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in her place and my remarks were half directed towards her. The right hon. Lady made the point that in changing the bar—in altering the criteria—it is right that we do so with care and that there is appropriate scrutiny.
I heard and read the remarks of the independent reviewer, but I simply add another point, which in a way mitigates the counterargument—if I can put it in those terms—and that is on the use of polygraphs, which have been used in other countries, particularly the United States. I am not making any great claim for them, and certainly no greater claim than the Government are, but it seems to me that testing the process of deradicalisation, assessing how far it has gone, and gauging whether someone has changed or simply seems to have changed, is vital as we gauge what should happen if they are not incarcerated—what should happen once they are out of prison and they are not in a secure location. The Government are right to explore that in the Bill. I suppose that one would say in truth that it is a work in progress. We, as a Parliament, as well as the Government, will have to consider how that goes. I know the Select Committee will do that in due course, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) mentioned. But mindful of that determination, illustrated by the provision in this legislation to look carefully at the character of the effectiveness of de-radicalisation, it is perfectly reasonable to introduce the changed measures on TPIMs.
Sir John Hayes
I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman and, in doing so, apologise for not being here for his opening remarks.
Mr Lammy
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. On the issue of polygraphs, does he note that the independent reviewer also says that there is an absence in the Bill as to how they will be used? Are they to be used against high-risk offenders, or very high-risk offenders, or are they to be used against low-risk offenders to assess their tendency to re-offend or offend?
Sir John Hayes
I should reveal to the House, for those who were not here yesterday, that I had a charming exchange with the right hon. Gentleman, where I described him as a “dear friend” and he described me as a “kind of friend”. I was rather slighted actually, but he made up for it later by saying that it was offered in good humour, and I took it in the same spirit, I have to say.
The right hon. Gentleman is right. One of the things that is important about debates on terrorism in this House is that they do not follow narrow party lines. We try to build consensus, as we face common threats and shared challenges. He is right. Rather like Prevent, we do need to be scrupulous about analysing effectiveness. It is right that the Government should do that and, again, without putting words into the mouth of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, still less provoking action on his behalf, the Select Committee will look at that, together, I imagine, with the Home Affairs Committee and others. There are all kinds of bodies in this august establishment that will play a role in ensuring that the application of what is a new development is effective. So I do not think that that is an unreasonable point, and I am more than happy, in the spirit that I have just described, to amplify it. However, I think that the Government are on the right track and I praise the Lord Chancellor for this in recognising that the bar did need to be lowered for TPIMs.
The other point that I want to make is in relation to Prevent and Channel. This is a complex area because, as I described, the character of terrorism is complex, as is our response to it. I am a pretty robust supporter of Prevent. It has critics; it has always had critics. It is certainly right that we have good oversight of Prevent—I tried to bring that about while I was the Minister and I do not think that that was always the case in the past—and that we measure its effect, too. I am not sure that that was always done as well as it could have been, and I am speaking about Governments of all colours here.
Having met Prevent co-ordinators and seen their work at first hand in various parts of the country, I know how much difference they make. It is not just about Islamist terrorism, although I suppose that is what most people will think that we are focused on today. It is much more broad than that. It is identifying problems of all kinds. I was proud, as the Minister, to introduce the Prevent duty, as some here will know, which engaged the various public bodies that are at the frontline of radicalisation—I am thinking of health professionals, schools and others—and also engaged communities and provided them not only with a responsibility, but, I hope, extra support in identifying those people, particularly young people, as it is often young people who are corrupted in this way, and in trying to act before they did something horrible, dreadful or shocking. I do support Prevent and, while I think that it should be reviewed, I also support the provision in the Bill to extend the review process. I make no comment on who should do it—that is for others to comment on—but I note that the Bill extends it and I think that is the right thing to do.
I come to the part of my speech that will perhaps be more challenging for some here—I hope not too challenging. None the less, I would rather be straight- forward, as I always try to be. It is about the issue of sentencing. Public order and faith in the rule of law depend on popular confidence in the justice system. The justice system is in part retributive. We have fallen into the trap of believing that the only purpose of criminal justice is to rehabilitate. Of course, that is a purpose—in the case of terrorism, as I have made clear, de-radicalisation is crucial—but public sympathy for all we do, and all our security and intelligence services and the police do, depends on people believing that justice is being done, and is being seen to be done. That is hard to reconcile with early release at all.
If we spoke to our constituents about early release, I suspect a very substantial number would find it pretty hard to cope with in the case of serious crime at all—or what they perceive as serious crime—and all the more so with terrorism. I think our constituents, whether they are in South Holland and The Deepings or Tottenham, or any other part of this kingdom, and regardless from which community they come, would be surprised if they knew we were releasing so many people who have committed those kinds of offences.
I am going to draw my remarks to a conclusion shortly—I can see you, with typical charm, combined with authority, moving to the edge of your chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. I particularly welcome the Government’s approach to early release. It seems to me that the various provisions in the Bill that increase minimum sentences and provide the courts with the ability to look again at the tariff, and in some cases, increase maximum sentences, are entirely in tune with popular sentiment and the threat we face.
Let me end by saying this: the Bill, in my judgment, is apposite and appropriate. We are speaking of those whose purpose is to murder and maim—let us be under no illusion and have no doubt about that—and in the struggle for civilised life, in the cause of virtue, on our side there can be no fear, no guilt and no doubt.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
Before we move on, we will now have to have a time limit. It will initially be 10 minutes, but I warn hon. Members that that is likely to reduce significantly in the near future.
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) , and he is right: this has been a thoughtful debate, often in a cross-party spirit.
Terrorists want to destroy our way of life, divide our communities and undermine our democracy and our values, and we can never let them succeed. We rightly pay tribute across the House to those on the frontline, fighting terrorism, preventing and tackling attacks, in our police forces and security services, those in local government and communities who work so hard on prevention, and those in faith groups and our prisons. We remember, too, those who have lost their lives or who have lost loved ones to appalling terror attacks.
We face threats not just from Islamist extremism and terrorism, but from far-right extremism and terrorism, where the threats have grown in recent years. We have to always be vigilant, to ensure that those extremists and terrorists can never succeed in dividing our communities and undermining the democratic values for which we have fought for so long.
Many of the challenges relating to this legislation are the same ones that we have addressed and dealt with for many years—how to deal with people who have such warped ideology that they are determined to wreak huge destruction, including killing children; how to deal with people who have become so dangerously radicalised that they may be hard to address through traditional criminal justice system measures; and how to ensure that while we protect our national security, we also protect our democratic values and our freedoms and sustain justice, the rule of law and community cohesion. To do so, we need strong powers to tackle terrorism but also strong safeguards and strong checks and balances.
I want to talk specifically about some of the Home Office measures in the Bill, particularly around TPIMs and the Prevent programme. TPIMs came in after control orders, which were introduced to deal with difficult situations where perhaps the evidence relating to dangerous terrorist suspects depended on intelligence that could not be dealt with in the same way through the courts. There were similar approaches in cases where someone had become so dangerous and still proved dangerous even after their sentence had been served. Those were very difficult circumstances that only applied to a minority of cases.
Control orders were not perfect, and they were applied in those limited circumstances. Long-standing Members will know that I have spent almost a decade arguing with the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) about the decision made in 2011 to end control orders and replace them with TPIMs, rather than simply amending control orders to deal with some of the areas that needed improving. I thought it was wrong to make the decision to downgrade some of the powers in the TPIMs that were introduced. It is worth briefly addressing why, because it has an impact on the decisions that Ministers are making today.
First, I thought it was wrong to remove the ability to relocate dangerous terror suspects and to remove any possibility of doing so, to remove them from dangerous networks. The consequence was that two people who were on TPIMs managed to abscond—something that had not happened in relocated cases. The Government’s independent reviewer, Lord Anderson, recommended that relocation be reintroduced, which eventually happened in 2015.
My second concern was about preventing the ability to constrain some communications for dangerous terror suspects. Again, many of those measures have been changed since, because the Government have recognised that some restrictions need to be in place for online or phone communications where there is significant evidence that someone poses a danger to the public.
My third concern was about the two-year limit set for TPIMs. Control orders were set for a year but could be renewed. TPIMs were fixed at two years. I raised questions in 2011 about what that would mean for the small number of people who might still be extremely dangerous after two years and what provisions would be in place to ensure that the public were protected. Again, Ministers have now recognised that issue and are changing it back.
In many ways, we have had an unnecessary 10 years of administrative going round in circles and changing the burdens on the Security Service and police forces, when we could have made more sensible amendments at the beginning to address those issues. It would be interesting to know whether Ministers now recognise that those changes were wrong and that we should not have made them in the first place.
Yvette Cooper
I do recognise that these are always difficult judgments, and I say this in a cross-party spirit. These are always difficult judgments and difficult cases to deal with. It is because I have spoken consistently about the importance of having strong powers that I say to Ministers now that it is hugely important to have strong safeguards and strong checks and balances. That is where I think Ministers are getting some of the provisions wrong in the Bill. They will know, with my record of arguing for those powers, that I say with the greatest sincerity to the Secretary of State that he is getting the judgments wrong on the kinds of safeguards that might be needed, because the flipside of those strong powers is having the checks and balances to make sure that they cannot be abused or misused. That is why I asked him specifically what the evidence was for changing the burden of proof and for not having safeguards in place at the two-year point as well. The Bill does not include any safeguards requiring judicial scrutiny after two years. That was a weakness in the original control orders as well: those sorts of independent safeguards were not in place, where they could be continued.
Chris Philp
The right hon. Lady raised the issue of safeguards, which I had intended to address in my wind-up. Section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 contains a provision whereby when the Home Secretary makes a TPIM order she has to go to the High Court to seek permission and the High Court must find that it is not “obviously flawed”. In addition, the subject has the ability to judicially review the decision, so there is that automatic safeguard in the form of High Court permission under section 6 of the 2011 Act.
Yvette Cooper
There is when the TPIMs are first set out—the hon. Gentleman is right about that. My argument about the control orders at the beginning, where I thought they should have been amended back in 2011, was for introducing stronger safeguards. I have always believed that we need stronger safeguards in place, but the Bill does not include any safeguards for judicial scrutiny after two years if these measures are going to be extended—if they are going to be for longer. The independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, has suggested a solution would be to require the Secretary of State to seek the court’s permission for any extension beyond two years, in the same way that she currently does when a TPIM is first made. That would seem to be a sensible additional safeguard to put in if those TPIMs are to be extended.
In addition, no explanation has been given about the burden of proof. I asked the Minister to tell me, hand on heart, whether he knew of cases—I do not ask for the detail—where he believes the wrong decision has been made not to put somebody on a TPIM because of the burden of proof, and he was not able to do so. I am therefore really concerned that there is not the evidence to justify lowering the burden of proof in this way. He referred to the idea that we somehow need greater “flexibility”. I hope he will reconsider his use of that word, because the powers are flexible; they can be used to apply to all sorts of different circumstances and different kinds of threats that an individual might pose. He should not use the word “flexibility” to apply to the burden of proof. We do not apply flexibility to proof, just as we do not apply it to truth.
Robert Buckland
I did not mean it in those terms. Clearly where we have a regime specified by statute, it needs to be applied rigorously. I was talking about operational flexibility, bearing in mind the complexities of these orders, and the fact that they are not obtained lightly and there has to be a very good operational case for them. That is what I meant, and I am sorry if there was any ambiguity in my remarks.
Yvette Cooper
I appreciate that, but I think that also makes clear the gap in the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s case, because operational flexibility still should not apply to the burden of proof—the evidence required in order to justify applying measures that are for particularly extreme circumstances. The independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, has said that
“administrative convenience does not appear to provide a basis for reversing the safeguard of a higher standard of proof.”
We cannot justify saying that in order to somehow reduce the paperwork, we want to reduce the burden of proof to use such measures. His predecessor, Lord David Anderson, who argued for bringing back relocation and who has been a supporter of strong powers, has agreed with him on this matter. Initially he argued for increasing the burden of proof, and he has said that the Home Secretary should at least have to “believe” someone is a terrorist, not just “suspect” it. That is the important criterion if these powers are to be used. I urge the Government to rethink these safeguards. If we are to have these strong powers to keep us all safe, prevent terrorist attacks, and protect us from people who may be immensely dangerous, we should also ensure the right kinds of safeguards to make sure that those powers are not misused, abused, or used in the wrong cases.
On the Government’s Prevent programme and the review of it, I am disappointed that there is now no date in the Bill—it has been removed altogether. It is clear that we still have no reviewer in place for the Prevent programme, so they will obviously not complete the review by August, but that in itself is a huge disappointment. The timetable has been extended again, as has the application process. There is no deadline at all, and it is immensely important that the review is not just chucked into the long grass. Will the Minister include an alternative date? A date was included for a good reason, after debates about previous legislation, to ensure that the review happened. A programme that is so important and has had different questions about it raised, should be effectively reviewed to see how it should work.
Finally, we should also be looking at deradicalisation more widely, both as part of the Prevent programme and in our prisons, as well as at how we can do more to prevent extremism and radicalisation, and at how to turn people back towards a better course once things have gone wrong.
Jacob Young (Redcar) (Con)
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and to follow the constructive and knowledgeable contributions that have been made so far. I will start by extending my condolences, and those of the people I represent, to all those who have lost loved ones to terrorism. May they rest in peace.
There should be no tolerance towards anyone who is a threat to our national security, and I know that many people in my constituency, and across the country, will be relieved to see the Government take serious action against those who seek to spread fear. Despite the current pandemic, the memories of the appalling attacks on London Bridge last November, and just a few months ago in Streatham, are still vivid. Terrorism is yet another disease that has claimed so many lives, and we should do everything within our power to eradicate it.
The past three years alone are testimony to the unprecedented level of threat that this country faces from a deadly ideology. Even here, in one of the UK’s more secure buildings, we saw terror enter through our gates and take the life of PC Keith Palmer, who died protecting our democracy. That democracy was embodied by the late Jo Cox, whose tragic murder illustrates how forces seek to strike at the heart of our system and threaten our values.
Nothing can ever justify terrorism. No one should have to go through such horrors, and the Government have a duty to protect the public from the terrible harm and fear that terrorism causes. It would be easy to assume that terror comes to us from beyond our shores, but the uncomfortable truth is that the most recent attacks were all perpetrated by home-grown terrorists who were radicalised online or in our prisons. That raises serious questions about the ability of our system to deter those individuals from turning extremist ideas into action. It is not just those who strap bombs to themselves or attack the innocent with guns and knives; those who use online platforms to advocate violence and incite others are just as guilty. They use, misinform and manipulate often vulnerable youngsters so as to create chaos on our streets, and we must do all we can to root them out.
We need only to remember the horrific murder of Lee Rigby to understand that these groups intend to shock and terrify the greatest numbers. Only last year, two more victims lost their lives in a knife attack on London Bridge, and it later emerged that the perpetrator was known to authorities and wore an electronic tag. In February this year, a further two people were stabbed by an individual who had also been released early. The public understandably feel that the system has failed to protect them, which is why the Bill is so important. Not only will it prevent another terror offender from being automatically released at the halfway point of their sentence, but it will also prevent the release of those who show no sign of deradicalisation.
Most perpetrators of terror acts are killed as part of the attack, or shot at the scene, which unfortunately means that they can never be brought to justice. That is why it is crucial to ensure our security services have all the necessary tools and funding properly to monitor and investigate potential terror plots. For that reason, I am pleased that the Bill looks to strengthen the terrorism prevention and investigation measures available to the security services and the counter-terrorism police.
With this Bill, the Government are taking all of the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist threat is treated as seriously as it should be and that offenders are punished accordingly. This Bill will help to keep the public safe, and it has my full support. As we celebrated the D-day anniversary over the weekend, let this be a reminder that this country will always stand up against those who seek to rule by fear.
Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)
Our overriding aim must always be to keep the British public safe and to ensure that horrific terrorist attacks, such as the ones at the Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, cannot be repeated. We were all shocked and horrified by the attacks, and we mourn the death of Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, who were killed on that day.
Of course, as has already been mentioned, over the years we have witnessed so many terrorist attacks, with so many lives lost and so much suffering, and it is vital that we have a set of policies to ensure that those who commit such atrocities are prosecuted. However, we must also make sure that we take action to do the prevention work to deal with the underlying causes. There must be proper investment in our schools, our local authorities and our communities, so that we can ensure that young people in particular are protected from the dangers of radicalisation, of being groomed online and of being prey to extremists, whether religious extremists or far-right extremists.
As we have heard, there is a growing threat of both kinds, and the mutually reinforcing threat of violent extremism from the far right and from the religious right—religious extremists—is going to pose an even greater danger to our society. It is therefore right that Opposition Members support the actions to ensure that sentencing is improved, but that has to come with proper safeguards, as my hon. Friends have already highlighted in this debate. That means that we have to question why it is that the Government have lowered the standard of proof for suspected terrorist activity, replacing it with “reasonable grounds”, which is a relative term, as we have heard.
We have already heard about some of the risks and dangers of doing that. We have heard about what that could mean in operational terms, and we have seen that many mistakes can happen despite the valiant efforts of our security, police and other services. Mistakes can happen at the operational level, which is why checks and balances have to be put in place to ensure that we strike the right balance between the liberty of people who have not done anything wrong but who may be suspected, and our security services and police having the right legal framework to work within in relation to those who are committing crime. This particular change is actually not going to make matters better, and it is likely to create greater resentment if mistakes are made, which is why I appeal to Ministers to reconsider it.
On my other major concerns, we need to make sure that, alongside the sentencing changes and ensuring proper checks and balances, the Government set as a matter of urgency a deadline for the review of the Prevent strategy. Without action on prevention, we will deal with only one side of the coin. I know all too well the dangers of Prevent not working. Although I recognise that many interventions over the years have had some significant success, the review is critical for us to learn the lessons of what does not work and what needs to be reformed and improved. We need radical action on supporting the young and those at risk, and on looking at online threats and the new threats that are emerging, particularly from the far right. I therefore hope that the Minister can say today when the review will be completed. I recognise that there is a delay, but we need an urgent response and we must ensure that the delay does not continue.
Another issue is how we resource our public services. Sections 36 to 41 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 place a duty on local authorities and partners to provide support for people who are vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism. Yet local authorities were already facing cuts. My local authority, despite some support from the Government, will face a deficit of about £50 million. At a time of great pressure, local authorities should be properly supported when they have a duty around this agenda. I hope that the Minister will say what additional resources will be given to them, and also to schools to provide proper training and support for our teachers who are being expected to take action without proper support. I raised that issue previously after the three girls from Bethnal Green in my constituency went to Syria. That was years ago and I am not yet convinced that the Government have seriously taken on board the need for investment and support in our schools, local communities and youth services. Indeed, youth services have experienced dramatic cuts over the years. I therefore hope that the Minister will look at the wider agenda as the review takes place.
Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady concur with me, as a former citizenship teacher—a great subject that her party introduced—that although citizenship is statutory, it does not have to be taught in lesson format and that it should be given greater emphasis in the curriculum to tackle the difficult stuff that she mentions?
Rushanara Ali
I agree and it is disappointing that the coalition Government made those changes. The important thing now is to look forward to see how we can make improvements. That requires the Government to focus not only on being tough on terrorism once an act of terror has happened, but on the causes. That means proper partnership and proper investment, which we have not seen in recent years.
It is not difficult for Governments of any party to introduce tough legislation. The heavy lifting is done in communities, schools, youth centres and places of worship. That is where we need to redouble our efforts alongside what is happening today so that we can genuinely work together as a society to prevent terrorism and extremism of all forms, far right as well as religious extremism. That is missing and I hope that Ministers will heed our advice, focus on the Prevent agenda and get it right so that others, particularly young people, are not at risk as my constituents were. They left the country and, as we all know, it ended terribly.
Matt Vickers (Stockton South) (Con)
I will be brief. The Bill is in many ways a seminal step in strengthening public confidence in our criminal justice system, tackling radicalisation and ensuring that justice is done with regard to those who commit these most heinous crimes. A single terrorist attack undertaken by a known terrorist automatically released early from prison is way too many. Many of us will remember the undeniable feeling of injustice and frustration when we think back to 2 February and the Streatham attack—an attack that should and could have been prevented. It was someone known to the authorities who should have been behind bars. It beggared belief and flew in the face of justice and everything we know to be right.
I therefore welcome this Bill, the largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing and monitoring in decades. It includes tougher sentences, an end to automatic early release and an improved ability to manage and monitor terrorists, and it should be welcomed by all. It tackles terrorism and does justice for heroes who have lost their lives at its ruthless hands. Every day, people entering this place walk past a memorial to a hero, Keith Palmer, who gave his life fighting against terrorism. Nothing equates to the loss of the lives of such heroes, but it is right that we will see prison sentences more befitting the evil acts undertaken by terrorists. Justice must be done.
When the evils of terrorism appear, this Government must be able to look into the eyes of the public and tell them that we gave those charged with keeping us safe the resources and powers they needed to get the job done. Rightly, the Bill builds on increased investment in counter-terrorism policing, doubling the number of counter-terrorism specialists in the probation service and creating a network of counter-terrorism specialists throughout our Prison Service, as well as offering greater support for victims of terrorism. Terrorism is an abhorrent evil and this robust approach gives our courts, the Prison Service and the police the powers they need to protect lives, protect our way of life and improve confidence in our criminal justice system.
Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers) and to hear his remarks, and it is a pleasure to participate in this debate.
At the outset, I place on record my appreciation for the considerable and considered engagement from the Minister. I have appreciated the discussions that we have had and that he has taken on board the concerns that we have expressed. I appreciate that engagement. I have also appreciated the engagement I have had with the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland, Naomi Long. In listing and highlighting the successes and good engagement, it would be wrong of me not to place on record my congratulations to the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) on assuming a shadow Justice role. He and I come from opposite ends of Ulster and from different perspectives within Ulster, but it is great to see him assume the role and we look forward to his contribution later on.
There has been a lot of focus in this debate on terrorism in England and terrorism coming from Islamic and far-right extremism. There have been a number of references to Northern Ireland, but it is always good to commence a contribution such as this by reminding Members that I have been in this place for a short five years, and within that five-year period I have seen three constituents of mine murdered by terrorists. Often in this Chamber, it is easy to believe that the issues that plagued our society in Northern Ireland have gone away, but they have not. The threat to our society in Northern Ireland remains substantial. It is severe.
In those three years, Kevin McGuigan was shot dead in 2015 by mainstream republicans. Adrian Ismay, a serving prison officer, was killed by an under-car booby trap bomb in 2016 by a dissident republican, Christopher Robinson. Last year, Ian Ogle was stabbed to death by loyalist terrorists at the end of his street in my constituency.
During the course of those five years, many more have been targeted. I have had serving police officers who have survived. Many others within our communities feel under the cosh of paramilitaries who have not moved on and who continue to seek control. It is on that basis and that basis alone that our party would always support the Bill. Our party will support its Second Reading, but I will raise some issues.
Sir John Hayes
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. He will know, as he said, that the Bill grows the capacity of the system to deliver extended sentences and cuts early release, but will he invite the Minister to consider the greater use of whole-life sentences, where a judge makes it clear at the time of sentencing that the person should never be released, because I certainly would?
Gavin Robinson
I am grateful for the contribution. I will touch on sentencing in a moment. I am not sure if the clock gets adjusted for that intervention; I was happy to receive it, but I would be even happier to receive the additional time.
I say to the Minister for reference—he will know why I raise this—that I was pleased to see, in paragraph 9 of the explanatory notes, the reference to counter-terrorism legislation being a reserved matter. He will understand the importance of why I raise that and go no further.
On TPIMs, it is important to say that the Law Society has raised concerns about control orders, how they were brought to an end, how there was a difficulty in engagement with human rights legislation and how the imposition of a control order may not have been proportionate, given the risk of the individual, which is why they were changed. It has raised concerns that the changes to TPIMs will take us back to that control order phase. It is for the Minister, in summing up, to assuage those concerns and to outline how the changes can proceed properly.
On sentencing, I am delighted that Northern Ireland is now included in the provisions. When we considered the Sentencing Act 2020 in February, I was not only concerned that Northern Ireland was left out, but somewhat perplexed by the reason given that article 7 and compliance issues with human rights legislation did not apply in England and Wales, but somehow did in Northern Ireland. We do not need to pursue that, because the Government have changed their position. I still have not got a satisfactory explanation, but we do not need one; I am grateful for the conclusion. It will engage some operative issues in Northern Ireland, some of which I know the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) wants to focus on as well. I think it can be appropriately defended and it is appropriate in the circumstances that we are included.
On a wider point that the Minister will not like, I am pleased that the Government are now engaging with the notion of mandatory minimums. I know that the Minister will indicate that that is not a change in policy generally and that mandatory minimums will not become the norm, but it is an important step forward. I have always railed against the view that there cannot be a mandatory minimum for any crime because it interferes with judicial independence. It is not our role to determine what a judge will ultimately decide, but it is our role as legislators to outline what we think any given offence should attract by way of a sentence, so I am pleased to see that.
On age, concerns have been raised about the application of the legislation, particularly to minors. I will not engage in the debate about the age of criminal responsibility, which is not for today and is not going to change. There are concerns, however, that young children—I say children and teenagers; minors—who are encouraged, abused or coerced into carrying out activity on behalf of older individuals who know better and who will not get caught themselves, will be considered under terrorism legislation. I ask the Minister whether in proposed new article 13A(6) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, inserted by clause 7, the requirement for the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to designate for anyone under the age of 21 at least injects a bit of flexibility where our local devolved Department will have the opportunity to decide whether it will apply.
I am grateful for the way in which the polygraph section is constructed in the legislation, in that it is permissible but not forced on us in Northern Ireland. I see no practical benefit in it and I would not encourage our justice system in Northern Ireland to engage in polygraph testing. I am concerned about how it is creeping in continually, first for sex offenders on licence, then in the Domestic Abuse Bill for those on licence at the start of this year, and now in counter-terrorism legislation. It is easy to pick those three, because very few people will say, “I want to stand up for or defend sex offenders, domestic abusers or terrorists on licence”, but I still believe in the rule of law and I still have fundamental objections about the rigidity and the validity of polygraph tests. I do not think they are safe or secure.
When I consider offenders of those three offences, they tend to be the least likely to live in the real world and understand the difference between right and wrong or truth and untruth. They are probably the least likely to be susceptible to polygraph testing. We do not need Jeremy Kyle-style show trials in this country. If there are to be real-world consequences for breach of licence, we need to at least assess them robustly and in a way in which we can defend.
My time has elapsed. I look forward to engaging further with the Minister on these considered issues. In giving support on Second Reading, I look for further progress.
Laura Trott (Sevenoaks) (Con)
This is a very good and important Bill. I would like to single out one aspect in particular.
I have long-standing concerns, which I have spoken about before in the House, about the use of standard determinate sentences for serious crimes. The idea that terrorists would be let out of prison automatically, with no Parole Board involvement, is unacceptable. I am pleased that that has been rectified by this Bill and that terrorist offenders will no longer be eligible for SDS. I urge the Government to take a similar approach to other serious crimes, such as rape, and I hope it will be included in the forthcoming sentencing review.
I want to raise two other points. First, there is a risk to keeping terrorists in prison for longer—namely, that they radicalise other prisoners. This is clearly a lesser risk than having them out on the street, but none the less it is one that we must be cognisant of and manage. The Bill’s impact assessment recognises the risk of offenders radicalising others during their stays in custody but suggests that the containment practices currently in place will minimise that risk. Those containment practices stem in part from an excellent review carried out by Ian Acheson in 2016, which recommended containment of known extremists in dedicated specialist units. Those specialist units have now been created, and I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed that they have the capacity for the increased number of terrorist offenders who may be incarcerated for longer as a result of this Bill. It is critical that we do not allow the increased time that terrorists spend in prison to be used by them as a means of turning it into a training ground for new recruits. It would be helpful to fully understand the measures that Ministers will put in place to ensure that that does not happen.
My second point, which has been raised frequently today, is about rehabilitation in general. The right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) spoke movingly at the beginning of the debate about the dedication of Saskia and Jack to rehabilitation. To support this Bill is not to throw away the belief in rehabilitation but to emphasise the need for it while the terrorists are in prison. I was pleased to hear my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice refer in his opening remarks to the increased sentence maximising the time that authorities have to work with offenders. It will be critical—and this is very important to all supporters of this Bill—to use that time productively, to make sure that the people in prison are being worked on, talked to and spoken through this process so that we rehabilitate those who can be rehabilitated, and do not let back on to the streets those who cannot. I think that is at the heart of what this Bill is trying to achieve, and it is what every Conservative Member who supports it wants.
Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott). I will not take up much of the House’s time.
I am sure that all of us in this place wish that this Bill was not necessary and that we could be sure that our towns and cities will never again have to fear attacks like the horrors of Fishmongers’ Hall last year, Streatham earlier this year, the Manchester Arena bombing, and the attack on Parliament, which was referred to earlier. All of us want to better protect the public and to somehow find the time and the means to rehabilitate those who want to visit that violence on our society, and to persuade them of a better way. Although I wholeheartedly agree with and support that motive and aim, I cannot agree that parts of this Bill will be effective in doing that.
As the hon. Lady said, keeping people in prison for longer will not de-radicalise them. It may, in fact, radicalise them further or give them the opportunity to radicalise others in prison. Keeping them off the streets for longer will certainly succeed in keeping them off the streets, but will that actually be effective if, in fact, they become more radicalised or radicalise others so that they are even more dangerous when they come out?
There are other flaws in that approach. If we are to prevent people from reoffending after they leave prison and encourage them back on to a lawful path away from terrorism, they need to feel the security of a home and a job. However, the release on licence, which is vital to that, will be shortened by this Bill. Similarly, probation is currently under-resourced, and it would be undermined by the Bill in its ability to de-radicalise.
Sir John Hayes
I do not know the answer to this, but I am extremely doubtful whether there is any reliable correlation in respect of the known terrorists that have committed such awful crimes in this country over recent years and unemployment or their family situation in terms of homes; in fact, I rather suspect the opposite. We need to be careful about making such correlations unless there is really strong evidence to suggest that they are meaningful.
Christine Jardine
I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but I was going to come on to a different correlation. Surely, we want to stop terrorism happening in the first place. Longer sentences only happen after the fact. Surely, what we want to do in this country is root out of the causes of terrorism—to make people feel secure, to give young people an alternative, to keep them away from radicalisation and, if they are in prison for another reason, to ensure that they are not radicalised by someone who is in there on a long sentence and has the ability to radicalise them.
I believe that the key is reaching young people to prevent them from going down the wrong route in the first place. That is why I believe that we have to strengthen the licensing system, strengthen probation and look at ways of ensuring that our young people, whether they get into trouble or not, have the security of a job and a way of seeing their future positively. That way, we can identify those who might go on to threaten our way of life. We should work with the education system and agencies. We should tackle inequalities. Longer sentencing will do none of that.
There is also a dangerous assumption that one size fits all. As in other areas, that cannot be the case. It is vital that we recognise in the way we proceed that there is a different dynamic in Northern Ireland. In clause 30, there may be an implication that people already serving sentences will have their terms changed retrospectively and will have grounds for challenge at the European Court of Human Rights. We have to be very careful how we proceed.
Although we all desire a way of limiting the threat of terrorism and de-radicalising our young people, simply acting with more force—longer sentences—after the fact will not be enough. We have to get to the root cause first.
Robbie Moore (Keighley) (Con)
We have seen some dark, dark days. On 2 February 2020, a terrorist attacked two people with a knife in Streatham. That terrorist had been released from prison just a month earlier, having been convicted of terrorism offences just two years before that. On 30 November 2019, a terrorist killed two people at Fishmongers’ Hall near London Bridge. That terrorist had been released from prison only 11 months earlier, having been convicted of terrorism offences in 2012. Between March and June 2017, there were four terrorist attacks in London and Manchester, in which vehicles, knives and explosives were used to kill and injure innocent members of the public. Thirty-six people were killed in those attacks, and more than 200 were injured.
I do not mention those terrorists by name as, in my view, they do not deserve the efforts of my breath, let alone to be mentioned in this place. However, I wish to recognise, as my constituents would, all the members of the emergency services and passers-by who courageously helped people in those terrorist attacks. Each and every one of those attacks causes profound, unimaginable heartache to many friends, families, colleagues and neighbours, and to the communities of those who were killed, injured or impacted by those acts of evil.
MI5 and counter-terrorism police have said in evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee that 2017 represented a step change, with a significant shift in the threat from terrorism, largely due to developments in Syria and Iraq, combined with the speed of the radicalisation process. Of course there are also other sources of threat.
According to the latest Government statistics, 280 arrests were made in 2019 for terrorism-related activity, and I am informed that 25 terrorist attacks have been foiled since March 2017. Those who seek to destroy and damage lives need to know that the Government will do whatever it takes to stop them. The shocking attacks at the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham revealed serious flaws in the way terrorist offenders are dealt with, and for that reason I very much welcome this Bill, as it bolsters the country’s response to terrorism, building on the emergency legislation that we passed in February, which retrospectively ended automatic release for terrorist offenders serving standard sentences.
Let us not forget that we are talking about terrorists—individuals who go out of their way to cause harm and destruction and to massacre, and who wish to spread evil. That is why I very much welcome the measures that the Bill promotes—a new type of sentence, a minimum of 14 years in custody and a seven to 25-year period for extended licence. While I agree entirely with the increase of the minimum sentence to 14 years personally, I would have no issue with agreeing to longer.
I also welcome the removal of the possibility of release at the two-thirds point of the custodial part of the extended sentence. I want to see a tougher stance when it comes to law and order and a clear intention from Government that when it comes to dealing with the most serious terrorist offenders, a no-nonsense approach will be taken and that they will stay in prison for longer. The Bill achieves this. After all, the primary role of any Government is to keep us safe. To that end, I very much welcome the fact that the Bill revises the scheme for imposing TPIMs on those suspected of involvement in terrorism by lowering the standard of proof required, extending the range of measures available to police and removing the two-year time limit within which investigations can take place. This to me all makes perfect sense, as we must have the ability to quash any threat, and I believe that this Bill aids that process, bolstering the counter-terrorism police’s ability to monitor those in the community who pose a threat.
This country is full of good, decent, honest, hard-working people who need to be assured that when it comes to acts of evil, the justice system is on their side and the police have the tools available to do their job. I believe that it is our duty to legislate to enable threats to be investigated and tackled appropriately and in a timely manner, while aiming to keep our communities safe. Mr Deputy Speaker, I believe that this Bill delivers that, protecting the public from terrorism by strengthening the law, which governs the sentencing, release and monitoring of terrorism offenders.
Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Keighley (Robbie Moore). I am generally supportive of this Bill and I recognise that we need to strengthen the UK’s approach to combating terrorism and keeping communities safe. It is also important to recognise that increased sentencing powers are only one part of a wider strategy to tackle terrorism. We also need to address terrorism at source and prevent people from entering that path.
There are many attractions to taking a uniform approach across the UK and avoiding any two-tier system. However, it is important none the less to recognise that there are different dynamics in the nature of the terrorist threat in different parts of the UK, and that a one-size-fits-all approach may not always be appropriate.
In that regard, I want to focus on clause 30 and explore some of the potential unintended consequences of the extension of the provisions of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 relating to the removal of the automatic right to early release for terrorist-related offenders who are currently serving either determinate or extended custodial sentences in prison in Northern Ireland. As Members have said, there may well be a legal challenge—or, indeed, multiple legal challenges—to that provision on the ground of compatibility with the European convention on human rights, and particularly with article 7. Some Members—and, indeed, the Government—say that that risk has now been reduced or eliminated, but there are others who dispute that analysis. Time will tell. Any successful legal challenge in Northern Ireland could have wider repercussions for the rest of the UK, and it is important to bear that in mind. This approach also erodes the principle of judicial discretion to set appropriate custodial and licence periods.
Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, there is a danger that these measures could inadvertently lead to unintended consequences and be counterproductive. The provision of longer, tougher sentences at the time of conviction is one thing, and I would certainly support it. However, the application of retrospective measures to what is currently a very small cohort of prisoners in Northern Ireland runs the risk of providing a propaganda opportunity for dissident republican terrorists to argue that the goalposts have moved and that terrorist prisoners have somehow, in their minds, become political prisoners and a propaganda tool.
Over the past 50 years in Northern Ireland, prisoners have, sadly, been used by terrorist organisations and their supporters for propaganda, radicalisation and recruitment in parts of the community, and this has led to greater violence being practised on wider society. For example, Members will be familiar with how the introduction of internment without trial in early 1970s and the hunger strikes in the early 1980s were manipulated to great ends, bringing even greater disruption to our society. At present, both the Police Service of Northern Ireland—my emphasis on “Northern Ireland” is deliberate, and will be understood by many people back home at present—
Stephen Farry
You’re welcome.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Security Service are doing an excellent job in combating the terrorist threat, and I want to pay tribute to them in that regard. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland remains severe and there is a need for constant vigilance. The threat of violence should never be used to determine policy, but it is nevertheless sensible to reflect on the potential consequences relative to the benefits. In addition, retrospectively implementing the proposed changes for individuals who are currently serving determinate custodial sentences has the potential to undermine the current public protection measures in Northern Ireland, rather than enhance them. That applies in particular to post-release monitoring. This could have the unintended consequence in Northern Ireland of terrorist offenders being released without any requirement to be on licence, which would be dangerous to the wider community.
Points have been made by others about the implications for young people and about the question marks around mandatory polygraphs. I am not going to repeat those points; suffice it to say that I concur with them.
My final point would be to encourage both the Secretary of State and the Minister to continue to engage in dialogue with my party colleague, the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland. I know that they have had correspondence and discussions to date, as the Secretary of State has acknowledged. There are genuine concerns about how this could play out in practice in Northern Ireland, and while we all fully respect the need to be tougher in how we deal with terrorists, it is important that the approach we take is ultimately effective and that the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland are taken into account as the Bill proceeds through this House and the other place.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
It has been a real pleasure to sit through the debate and listen to the quality of the speeches. I cannot help but reflect that both the Lord Chancellor and his shadow, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—both good men and good lawyers, and a fine reflection on our profession—probably, if left to their own devices, would not have wanted to deliver quite the speeches they gave. The shadow Lord Chancellor’s speech flew when he talked about the duty to try to rehabilitate and to deradicalise, and quoted Jack Merritt and considered what he would have wanted. Then, when he got into the detail, he was pulling his punches on some of the issues in the Bill that are singularly problematic. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chairman of the Justice Committee, gave a very good and wise summary of the challenges in the Bill.
My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Robbie Moore) gave, in a sense, the speech designed to give the public reassurance that we are going to be tough on terrorists and unyielding in our approach. I say to him that it is so much more complex than that. There are so many balances that have to be struck. We need to understand what we as a society now are competing with as far as the apparent terrorist threat is concerned. The hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) pointed out that our overreaction in Northern Ireland—internment, Bloody Sunday and the injustice seen in what carried huge popular support to tackle the murderous wickedness of the then Provisional IRA—meant that the terrorists were able to enjoy significant support from their own community. There is a real battle to be won against those who want to engage in murder and mayhem, perhaps for reasons that are wholly unrelated their ideology. As a society, we have to detach them from their support base, so that the community is on our side. In the end, we are engaged in a battle to protect our society’s liberal values, so we must not take measures that are plainly unjust.
On imposing mandatory 14-year sentences, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) made the point that it is our job to impose a sentence. No, it is not. It is our job to decide what the maximum sentences ought to be, and the Sentencing Council then gives recommendations to the judiciary about the appropriate tariff. There should always be room for judges to be able to come to their own judgment about the appropriate sentence in the circumstances of the individual case that is presented to them. I have the gravest reservations about apparently securing public support by having ever longer mandatory sentences. We will do an injustice and find that we have given the opportunity for that injustice to be exploited by these people. They will then get a level of support from the communities they come from. We are working so hard with such communities, with the Prevent programme and all the other aspects of policy, to convince them that they will not be the continuing victims of injustice, and that, as a society, we are trying to address the issues that lead them in a direction where they might be minded to give some support to people who are turning on our society.
Of course, it is even more complicated than that: there is religious faith. The perversion of Islamic faith sits behind some of the violence and the motivation of some of these people, so that they think they are acting with some perverted form of God’s truth on their side. I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and others to turn the board around—understand why people are coming from the place they are and why they have these attitudes. Then we will get to a better place where we are able to understand the injustice that they perceive, and we will have a chance of beginning to address it. We must address it by not betraying our own values. If we betray our values by the justice measures that we take, we might find ourselves on the wrong end of the European Court of Human Rights because we have taken measures that are manifestly unjust and unable to be reversed by our own court system, and those measures will then be reversed by the convention to which we must remain attached—we will create a further set of problems for ourselves.
I urge Ministers to consider some of the wise words of the Chairman of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, the shadow Lord Chancellor and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). There is a degree of unanimity about the very careful set of balances we have to find here, and we need to make some changes to the Bill in Committee to get those balances right. We have to carry public confidence; I understand that. If we cannot carry public confidence, we will set up problems for ourselves. But we continue to swing back and forth on this—we abolished control orders in 2011, and here we are putting them back again nine years later—and this pendulum is not doing any of us any favours.
James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)
The first duty of any Government is to keep our country safe. In 2020, the world in which we live has become ever more congested, confused and competitive. The threats to our democracy are many, and we must do whatever is necessary to preserve the sanctity of life, protect the freedoms that we have and deter those who seek to do us harm. If our enemies do slip through the net, we must act swiftly to bring them to justice and impose sentences that fully befit the crime.
As the party of law and order, it is right that the Conservative Government should do everything possible to fulfil this most fundamental of all duties, and I welcome this Bill. Back in December 2019, the Conservative party was elected on a manifesto that promised to get tough on crime. There were no frills in the manifesto, no hidden meanings and no ambiguity—simply an undertaking to deliver what the British people had asked for. This Bill is another example of the Conservative Government delivering on their promises, as part of an ambitious policy agenda, to put the pride back into Britain and to do what is right.
In the Queen’s Speech in December 2019, the Government said that they would legislate to ensure that the most serious terrorist offenders stay in prison for longer. Following the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019 and at Streatham, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 was passed as emergency legislation, to change release arrangements for certain terrorism offenders in England, Wales and Scotland. At that time, the Justice Secretary said that wider measures would follow, and here they are. This is another key moment in British politics, as we seek to reinforce our covenant with decent, hard-working and law-abiding people, as they themselves seek to go about their daily lives freely, safely and without fear of indiscriminate violence.
As for the brave men and women of our police and security services, the Government will always back them and empower them to do their job. They will be given the powers they need to combat new threats and the political support to know that they are valued and trusted. But none of this will be viable without a more robust justice system—one that stands for the law-abiding majority, not the criminal minority. It is therefore incumbent upon this democratically elected Administration to pass sentences that serve to recompense, deter, rehabilitate and deliver what it says on the tin.
This Bill proposes an overhaul of the sentencing and monitoring of terrorist offenders and suspects and will lead to increased jail terms for the most dangerous offenders. Not only will the sentences be proportionate, but the Bill will enhance our ability to monitor those in the community who might still pose a threat. When used alongside our whole-society approach and Prevent strategy, it will also be more decisive in diverting people from violent extremism and in rehabilitating and de-radicalising. I am reassured that the Bill will allow the time needed for the independent review of the Prevent strategy to consider its impact and deliver an outcome that will strengthen our first line of defence against terrorism.
We have heard the detail of what the Bill provide. To those who might suggest that it is just another example of a large Conservative majority pushing aside human rights, the answer is, of course, no. This is actually about the rights of ordinary people who just want to go about their lives. It is about the rights of the families who have suffered the indiscriminate and appalling effects of terrorism, and those who might otherwise be affected. Critically, the Bill is compatible with both the European convention on human rights and the Good Friday agreement. Above all, it reflects a wider determination right across the UK to tackle terrorism, and gives the public confidence that the Government can and will intervene more robustly when required.
I say to those politicians who listened to the electorate: this is what we promised and this is what we will deliver. History is littered with examples of what Governments have failed to honour, but here we are on the road to law. I again commend the Home Office and Ministry of Justice for what has been achieved in a short space of time. Not only does the Bill fulfil the pledges that were made, but it allows our independent nation to evolve, as we must, to protect our freedoms. As contentious as the Bill might be to some, it is what many in Britain have asked for, and it is what they voted for in 2019.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I rise to speak in strong support of the Bill. First, I should first declare my interests: until my election I was a magistrate member of the Sentencing Council, which was considering the sentencing guidelines for terrorism, and I was also a non-executive director of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service.
As we have heard from the Lord Chancellor and other Members, the first duty of any Government is to protect their people. One of the most marked threats against the British people is terrorism. It is a particularly heinous offence, its perpetrators motivated by perverted ideologies, driven to cause indiscriminate carnage, demonstrating a callous distain for the loss of human life and revelling in the fear that they provoke among decent citizens. Those who contemplate committing such atrocities must be in no doubt of the revulsion that right-minded people feel towards them. They must know that the law will categorically and clearly condemn their acts.
I welcome the end-to-end provisions in the Bill that will keep us all safer: strengthened TPIMs to scrutinise potential terrorist offenders; longer prison sentences, physically served in custody in their entirety, to keep convicted terrorists off our streets and provide time for deradicalisation and rehabilitation; and stricter licence conditions for terrorists when they are released from prison, including the use of polygraphs.
First, let me focus specifically on the serious terrorism sentence. A minimum period of 14 years’ imprisonment strikes me as wholly justified, and I consider it right that the entire period should be spent in custody. I have said before in this place that I am a firm believer in rehabilitation, and I pay tribute to all those working in HMPPS who strive to engage with terrorist offenders and provide tailored interventions and programmes with the aim of promoting a fundamental change, but we must recognise that deradicalisation programmes have not enjoyed as much success as we would have hoped. I am pleased that there is to be further investment in this area of work, with the recruitment of additional staff, but where terrorist offenders are concerned there can be no room for error.
Because there can be no room for error, I wonder—and I put it no more strongly than that—whether consideration should be given to the introduction of a new sentence of indefinite detention for public protection from terrorism. I recognise that the idea will raise many legitimate concerns given the previous experience of imprisonment for public protection sentences, which resulted in a high number of people spending many years in excess of their tariff in custody through no fault of their own. Indeed, I have met a number of them, and the injustice done to them is palpable and wrong. But that does not have to mean that it would be impossible to design a different system with all the necessary safeguards in place that would ensure that terrorist prisoners, solely and specifically, would be detained without a determinate date on which their sentence would end. I would be interested to know whether Ministers believe that this could be feasible.
It will be evident from what I have said so far that I very much welcome the broad contents of this Bill. However, there are one or two areas where I would ask the Government to consider the scope for possible refinement, particularly in the area of younger offenders. I know from my time at the Youth Justice Board that, tragically, a very small number of children are ensnared into terrorism. It is therefore right for this Bill to address those offenders, but it is also right to ensure that the sentence remains very much tailored to the individual, as is the case throughout the youth justice system, and that there is appropriate provision and resource to maximise the opportunity for rehabilitation. There must remain, surely, some hope that these young people under 18 can be reformed and then lead law-abiding lives.
For young adults—those aged between 18 and 20—there is essentially no distinction between older adults in terms of the sentencing provisions in this Bill. However, it is now well established that neurological development is not complete until the early to mid-20s. Indeed, maturity based not purely on chronological age is now a factor in sentencing decisions, to reflect the science. In addition, young adults are generally seen as more likely to reform. Consequently, I would respectfully suggest that it might be expedient to give additional consideration to the sentencing regime for those aged 18 to 20, specifically, to ensure that the minimum period spent in custody is indeed commensurate with their culpability.
As the Bill progresses, it is imperative that we always ensure that the will of Parliament is unambiguously clear to those who later have to interpret this legislation, particularly the Sentencing Council in the formulation of its guidelines and any interim guidance that may be required, and judges who will ultimately pass sentence. This is in no way to say that I believe that politicians should interfere with the independence of the judiciary, but a minimum sentence of 14 years is exactly that—a minimum, from which it will often be appropriate to move up. To my mind, it is also plain that the intention of this Bill is to broaden the scope to ensure that where there is clear evidence of a terrorism connection, that can be reflected in the sentence, irrespective of the index offence, with very few exceptions. The consequence of that is that the sentence passed must reflect the link to terrorism as a prime factor.
On a similar theme, for those offences where a new maximum penalty is introduced in this Bill—namely, membership of a proscribed organisation, supporting a proscribed organisation, or attending a place used for terrorist training—it is important that the guidelines are updated promptly to ensure that the will of Parliament is quickly reflected in sentences of the court. The message must surely be that the will of Parliament is that terrorist offenders should face the harshest of sentences, that punishment for them is served only by an extremely long period in custody, and that this country, led by this Government and backed across this Parliament, will relentlessly and remorselessly take every possible action to protect the public from the horror of terrorist atrocities.
David Johnston (Wantage) (Con)
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, in which there have been very thoughtful contributions on both sides of the House, particularly from my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) and the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson).
I grew up in east London, and I felt the windows shake when the Canary Wharf bomb went off in 1996. That was not the first terrorist attack that had happened in my lifetime, but it is the one I remember feeling most vividly a proximity to. Unfortunately, there have been quite a number since that time that I have, like all of us, watched on the TV screens in horror, recognising places that I have been to many times before—Fishmongers’ Hall was about three minutes from where my office was at the time—and feeling that I could have been there. I think we have all experienced the feeling of being somewhere in the days afterwards and wondering if there might be another attack—being on a tube or a bus after those attacks, or being at a crowded event after the Manchester Arena attack. When the stories fade from the headlines in the media, they also fade for us and are no longer uppermost in our minds, but people who lose someone in one of those attacks have their lives changed forever. It is they who are in my thoughts as I speak in support of this Bill today.
I welcome the minimum sentence of 14 years for the most serious terrorism offences, which, in the end, is what we are talking about, and ending the prospect of early release. It is right that TPIMs should be able to go on for longer than two years if we believe that, at the end of those two years, that person is still dangerous. Of course that should be subject to the right safeguards and should have to be renewed. I have heard an important debate in this House today about whether and how we should lower the standard of proof and I think that those are the answers that my colleagues still need to provide.
When it comes to these offences, I also welcome the ability to apply for serious crime prevention orders. It is hugely important that we monitor and disrupt the actions of those who we feel may be doing us harm. We should, of course, continue our efforts at deradicalisation; it is absolutely right to do so and to put more money into that. We should keep refining our approach to that process, but it is fair to say that this is not something that we have mastered. I think we all have the view that there may be some people who are beyond deradicalisation.
Jim Shannon
Does the hon. Gentleman feel that those who radicalise young people and specifically try to put them on a path of destruction and terrorism should also bear the brunt of the law? Perhaps they should be getting a sentence of 14 years or more.
David Johnston
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Having spent my life before entering politics working with children and young people, I can say that this is child exploitation, the like of which we see in a whole range of other fields. There cannot be many worse crimes than exploiting children in that way, radicalising them, taking advantage of their vulnerabilities, and setting them on this path—a path that those people might not often go on themselves, but that they encourage others to go on—so I completely share his sentiment.
The final thing I want to mention is in relation to the police, intelligence and security services. When there is an attack by someone who has been on our lists, who has perhaps been in custody and then released, there are veiled, and not so veiled, suggestions that those services have failed. I am sure that in one or two cases they think they could have done better, but they do an outstanding job all year round to thwart plots that we will never hear of, and they do it at great risk to themselves. What we should do in this House is what we are doing today, which is to support legislation that helps them to keep us all safe.
Mr Richard Holden (North West Durham) (Con)
I broadly welcome the Bill that the Government have brought forward today, but that welcome does not come without reservation. When the state acts, it is really important that when dealing with matters of criminal justice, it does so carefully and it treads carefully because its power is enormous.
I was a child when my mum heard about the Warrington bombing. I remember it well. You had been elected for six months or so—perhaps slightly longer—Mr Deputy Speaker, and we were living in your constituency. The anger and the fear that she felt, with three young lads of her own of around the same age, will never leave me.
Growing up in the north, I also remember the Manchester bombing of the mid-1990s and the Canary Wharf bombing by the IRA in 1996, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston) also referred. There has always been a suggestion that the Red Action far left extremists were connected with the Warrington bombing.
As a teenager, I also remember seeing the far right attacks on the Admiral Duncan pub in London and the bombing in Brick Lane. I lived in both of those areas as a student and have visited them frequently since. I also remember the recent terror attacks—as I think we all do—by so-called Islamic extremists on London Bridge, which is near where I live, and at Manchester Arena, which I visited two years before the attack to see Peter Kay, a great man who I hope will return to our stages again soon. More recently, there was the Fishmongers’ Hall attack as well.
I mention those different terrorist attacks from different factions to reinforce what the Secretary of State said during his opening speech: we do not know where future terrorist attacks will come from. I am glad that the Bill does not discriminate on the basis of where terrorists come from, and that it covers all equally. All terrorist acts are equally despicable, and it is right that they are all treated equally before the law.
I am glad that the Bill has been brought forward because it contains some important provisions. I am glad about the increase in minimum and maximum sentences, which is sensible. I am glad that the Government have already moved to end the early release of terrorist offenders, and the Bill goes further with that today. I do, however, have some concerns. The UNESCO constitution states that
“since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defences of peace must be constructed.”
That is one of the things that we must ensure we get right with licensing. I am glad that we now have licensing conditions for everybody who is to be released, but that must be used constructively to build peace for the future.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler), who made an important point about the development and condition of young people, and the issues around early sentencing. I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). He made excellent points about the use of TPIM and polygraphs, and that is something the Government should also consider as the Bill goes through Committee. Broadly, the Bill has my support. I am glad that the Government are bringing it forward. When we act in this area we must tread incredibly carefully, which I think the Secretary of State is doing.
Aaron Bell (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Con)
It is a pleasure to contribute to such a thoughtful debate, which was epitomised by that speech by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Durham (Mr Holden). Terrorism poses a unique challenge to any political and justice system. Its purpose is found not simply in the violence of the act itself, but in the fear that it seeks to spread among the population, and in the subversion of the normal political processes—in places such as this, but also the normal political process of protest. Attaching violence to your cause with terrorism undermines everything that we do in this place, and everything that people do in the political process.
In addition to the death and destruction of individual incidents, and the pain that causes for victims and their families, there is a much wider price that society pays for terrorism. It is paid by all our constituents in terms of their mental health, the economic cost, and all the little inconveniences that soon mount up. Terrorism also poses a specific challenge with respect to motive, and the practical difficulties of rehabilitation—my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott) spoke well about that earlier. We have also seen evidence of offenders who are clearly not de-radicalised being released and committing fresh atrocities. That is what prompted some of the earlier legislation, and as I said when contributing to that debate in February, we may need to look again at our treason law in such circumstances, or at the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) about indeterminate sentences, although measures in this Bill give our justice system much stronger tools in that area.
I thank the Lord Chancellor for his opening remarks setting out all the elements of the Bill. As he said, the first duty is to protect the public from harm. So I was pleased that the House reacted so quickly in February, and that we are now bringing forward this Bill. As Members have said, the Bill strengthens our response to terrorism in three main areas: sentencing, release and monitoring. All those measures in conjunction will improve public confidence in our response to terrorism and that will bring greater confidence to my constituents in Newcastle-under-Lyme.
I do not intend to go through every aspect of the new laws, but I welcome the new serious terrorism sentence. In answer to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), I reiterate what the Lord Chancellor said: this applies to a very small cohort of offenders. The two tests that the judge must apply before imposing the 14-year sentence is, first, whether there is a risk of further offences of that nature, and secondly, whether the offence committed involved a risk of multiple deaths. I think that is a reasonable test to apply before imposing a minimum sentence of 14 years. As has been said, that is just a minimum sentence. It does not mean that the justice in the relevant case does not have the capacity to impose a different sentence if he considers that more appropriate. It is a minimum.
I welcome what we did in February on early release and what the Bill does, with no automatic release at the two-thirds point and no automatic release in the custodial part of a serious terrorism sentence. Again, this speaks to public confidence and what people expect, and it gives more capacity for rehabilitation in the justice and prison systems. I also welcome the fact that the Bill allows the justice system to recognise terrorist motivations elsewhere in that system, where someone may have been charged with a different offence. It allows judges to find that other offences may have a connection to terrorism, and that may be useful in dealing with offenders and monitoring them in future.
I turn to monitoring. Clearly, not everybody of concern to the security services will have been convicted. There may be reasons why we have not been able to bring a trial. There may be other reasons why things cannot be done at a particular time, and those who have served their sentences and have been released may also remain of concern. However, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) said, prevention is a key duty of the state, too, so I know that my constituents will welcome the fact that the Bill strengthens our ability to manage the risks and improve our ability to prevent terrorism.
I hear the concerns of many hon. Members and hon. and learned Members about TPIMs. I recognise that there is a balance to strike and that balance has changed over time. There was a balance to strike with control orders, but in striking this balance, any Government need to take account of the threat level at the time. I believe that that is the sincere motivation behind the Bill and that is what the measures will deliver. This may be considered further in Committee, because we have had reservations from Members on both sides of the House, but I believe that the motivations of the Government are very sincere and a reflection of the threat that we face in this country from terrorism.
In conclusion, I go back to what I said at the start: terrorism poses unique challenges to our political and justice system and it therefore needs bespoke solutions, bespoke laws and bespoke sentencing. That is the way to establish public confidence in our judicial, security and political systems. I commend the Bill to the House.
Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)
One of the greatest fears that I have in life is following my good friend and neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell), who is far too good at public speaking and will therefore put me to shame. However, I will attempt to round off in the constructive way that the House has conducted itself today. It is a shame that we live in a world that is about the 30-second social media clip, because this is exactly what the House of Commons does at its best: we stand here, discuss, agree and work on consensus. Like many Members, I can see that there are tweaks and twinges that will be made in Committee, but I will be giving my full support to the Lord Chancellor’s proposal on Second Reading.
We have heard people mention across the House the idea that we have seen a radical, politicised Islam, but we have also heard mention of the far right. The epitome of that is that during our debate, four members of the National Action group have been convicted at Birmingham Crown court, and I absolutely welcome that. Having worked in the London borough of Bexley, not far down the road from the scene where Stephen Lawrence tragically lost his life, having seen the area that the British National party and the English Defence League saw as a hotbed, and having taught students who walked into school with an EDL badge, not being aware of what its dangerous ideology was pushing, I think that that was a signal to those who wish to live on the far right that they have no place in the streets of Stoke-on-Trent and across this country. We will never allow those people to get into the minds of young people.
Turning to the comments that have been made, I thought that the Lord Chancellor made some excellent points. As for the shadow Lord Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), I have seen a very different side to him—there is the one I see on Twitter and the one I see at the Dispatch Box. I wish to see the Dispatch Box person much more, because I would certainly like to have cup of tea with him, rather than angrily tweeting him back. I have the great honour of speaking before the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), whom I hold in great regard—I have enjoyed working with him on the all-party group for the coalfield communities. Finally, I commend the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who speaks with absolute authority. Members on both sides of the House thoroughly enjoy listening to and learning from him, and I certainly feel slightly more intelligent, having sat next to him every time we are in the Chamber.
Back to the point, which is that what we saw happen at Fishmongers’ Hall last November and in Streatham this February shows that, tragically, the United Kingdom continues to be threatened by those with extremist ideology who wish to harm the lives of innocent men, women and children. Those who commit such heinous acts do not speak on behalf of their religion, community or family. Those individuals act on their own, speaking for no one but themselves, and it is our job to not give them the attention they crave, but instead to look at community leaders who work to unite, rather than to divide.
The Government’s plan to increase the minimum sentence for terror offences to 14 years, to double the number of specialist counter-terror probation officers and to remove the opportunity for early release for anyone given an extended determinate sentence should be praised across the House and across the country. This is what the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke expect. Strengthening our approach to the sentencing and release of terrorist offenders, alongside the management of the risks posed while they are incarcerated and in the community, is absolutely the right thing to do.
The most dangerous offenders and plotters will spend longer behind bars, reflecting on the severity of their actions, but I absolutely concur with Members across this House that, while they are reflecting on their actions, rehabilitation must be invested in. We must tackle the reasons why people are led to this dangerous ideology. We can no longer just simply put them behind bars and hope for the best, because they are infiltrating the prison population and radicalising within prisons, which means we then have new challenges and new people to de-radicalise once they leave those prisons.
Although the rest of the sentence will be carried out under probation supervision, as we have seen for the most serious offenders, that is not always enough, and there is no room for error in matters as grave as this. The Bill will remove the possibility of releasing offenders whose sentences carry the maximum penalty of life, a move for which I wholeheartedly praise the Lord Chancellor. The passage of this Bill will send a message loud and clear to members of the public and to those who wish to harm them that we will not tolerate terrorism and those who engage with its ideology, and that for these acts they will be punished severely.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) in particular, and to close this debate on behalf of the Opposition. I think this has been a serious, reflective and responsible debate about the matter of primary importance for us all, which is the security of the public and the country. My overriding message and that of the shadow Home Secretary and colleagues on these Benches is clear: this Labour Opposition believe it is our first responsibility to keep our citizens, their families and our communities safe. We will be forceful and robust in supporting the fight against terrorism, and we will do everything required to keep our country safe from those who seek to attack our way of life and our values, or to do us harm. That is why we do not propose to divide the House on this matter tonight.
The tone of this debate was set by the Lord Chancellor and the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy). The contributions were characterised by the wisdom and expertise of the Chairs of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), and of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and the intervention of the former Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), but also by the experience of former Ministers who brought their recent expertise to bear. I also think, and I say this as a relatively newly elected Member, that it is hugely impressive that so many new Members who came into this House after the last election chose today to make what I think were very considered, serious, thoughtful and non-partisan speeches. I congratulate them on that and I very much welcome it.
Events at Fishmongers’ Hall last November and on the streets of Streatham in February showed the very worst of humanity, but in the face of great darkness, we also saw the best of us shine through. I know we all commend the bravery of those who risked their lives to apprehend the attacker that day. Like others, I want to pay particular tribute to Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, who dedicated themselves to help, support and rehabilitate others, and who are remembered by all of us in this House today for their inspirational work and their selfless service to others.
We think also of the victims of the Streatham attack, and indeed of all victims of terrorism. We thank our remarkable police officers, security services and other emergency services for their swift action at these and so many other incidents of terror, when they put themselves in harm’s way to protect us, and for the incredible and dedicated work they do every day, right now, to foil other nefarious plots that never come to fruition.
These events show the need for legislation. That the perpetrators in each case had been automatically released halfway through their sentences, with no mechanism in place to protect the public, showed that there were major holes in the legislative framework in this area that needed to be filled. Of course, this was to be done by emergency legislation earlier this year to prevent the imminent release of dozens of offenders without appropriate assessment of the risk they posed and now this wider piece of legislation before us today.
There remain a number of issues of concern that we wish to draw out during the passage of this Bill to ensure it does not fall short of what is require, because, as I believe the hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) said, this is more complicated than just rhetoric. First, I entirely accept that there is a cohort of offenders who should serve their full custodial sentences. What I do not accept is that at that point of release, even if moving on to an extended licence period, they should not have the fullest possible expert assessment of the risk they pose by the Parole Board or a similar review mechanism. In February, when we, as the Opposition, supported the then Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill, the Lord Chancellor said this about the Streatham attacker:
“The automatic nature of his release meant that there was no parole oversight and no decision as to whether he posed a risk to the public. No one could prevent his release. It is purely thanks to the swift intervention of our incredible police officers that he did not go on to commit even more harm before he was stopped with necessary force.”—[Official Report, 12 February 2020; Vol. 671, c. 863.]
My contention is: why can the Parole Board or a similar mechanism not do this, instead of being locked out of decision making for this category of offender? At the very least we will require an explanation of what is, in effect, a proposal from government to void an important part of the current process.
Secondly, on TPIMs, the Government are changing the qualifying threshold by lowering the standard of proof from “on balance of probabilities” back to “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. This is the third change by the Government since 2010. They also propose removing the two-year limit on TPIMs. As has been said, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, has said:
“TPIMs are an exceptional and valuable means of mitigating the terrorist risk posed by a small number of individuals in the United Kingdom. But there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point in time.”
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford and the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, this seems rather anomalous. We will, of course, listen carefully to the operational case the Government set out in Committee, but we will be pressing them on the appropriate safeguards, limits and oversight. We will also want to see evidence that they have taken into account the points raised by the hon. Members for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) and for North Down (Stephen Farry) on how this applies in Northern Ireland, and by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) in respect of Scotland.
There is woefully little in this Bill on the Prevent strategy or how we counter extremism, radicalisation and hatred more widely, including how we work with and in communities. Those points were eloquently made by my hon. Friends the Members for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali) and for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), and the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). There is a lack of direction, purpose and, above all, clarity on the independent review of Prevent, which the Government are legally bound to present to this House in August. It should already have reported to government this month and the Minister should now be composing his response to that to present to the House in August. The review was introduced in the last counter-terror Bill, so we have now arrived at another one that is not only seeking to remove a statutory deadline, but that gives very little indication of when we are now to expect the review’s completion, which leaves the door open to yet more delay. We need some clarity on that, because otherwise the effectiveness of the entire programme, and the community’s confidence in it, is at risk.
Finally, as many hon. Members have alluded to, the Government need to focus on the dire situation in our prisons. Sadly, the perception, and in some cases the reality, is that they are taxpayer funded breeding grounds for terror. That cannot continue. It requires serious, effective investment in de-radicalisation strategies, including more prison and probation staff and wider and more comprehensive reform, a point made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. Again, we will seek clarity about that in Committee.
In conclusion, we do not propose to divide the House. We accept the need for clear and comprehensive legislation, so we will work with the Government to try to improve the Bill as it proceeds. We on this side of the House, as Opposition Members, are firmly committed to our first duty to protect the public and to show those who seek to attack our way of life, threaten our safety, and drive us apart with their intolerance and hatred that they will not succeed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure to speak on Second Reading of this Bill. As Members have said, at the heart of the Bill is a desire to protect the public, which is our first duty as Members of Parliament and as a Government. There is no duty more important than protecting our fellow citizens.
It is right that, as we debate the Bill, we remember and pay tribute to the members of the emergency services who have put themselves in harm’s way defending the public, in particular, of course, PC Keith Palmer, who gave his life just a few yards from where we now stand. We remember and pay tribute to those people who have sadly and tragically lost their lives to terrorism of many different kinds over the past few years. As I look across the Chamber, I see the shield of Jo Cox, one of our own Members who was brutally, savagely and disgustingly murdered a few years ago.
In the spirit of the duty of public protection that binds us all together, the spirit in which the debate has been conducted is heartening. Of course, as the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) said, I am sure that there will be points that we will debate forensically in Committee in the coming weeks, but the broad principles that we are debating command cross-party support and are an example of the House at its best. For people who think that British politics is broken, the debate this afternoon proves them categorically wrong.
The speech given by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), was statesmanlike in its quality and I greatly enjoyed listening to and learning from it. The speeches from the Chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, and from long-standing and experienced Members such as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), gave us all great pause for thought, as did the speech from the SNP Front-Bench spokesperson, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry).
Like the hon. Member for St Helens North, I was struck by the enthusiasm, force and thoughtfulness of Members of the 2019 intake, all of whom made tremendous contributions and, more importantly, will continue to do so in the years ahead. The House is richer for their presence.
Of course, I welcome the hon. Member for St Helens North to his place. I am delighted to see him on the Front Bench. We worked together on Helen’s law which, without his work, would not be on the statute book. I know that Marie McCourt and many victims are grateful to him for that work, which will now continue from his deserved and rightful place at the Dispatch Box.
I will turn to some of the specific points that have arisen in this afternoon’s debate, starting with TPIMs, which were the most extensively debated of the measures. I thank the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) for the consistency with which she has advocated on that point. I note that the consistency from 2005 does not quite extend to the burden of proof, but it seems to extend to most other elements.
Let me start with the burden of proof. Many hon. Members have asked why we are returning to the burden of proof of “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that was contained in the Labour Government’s original 2005 legislation. It is a delicate question, as Members have said. As we consider the burden of proof that is appropriate, we have to balance and weigh the rights of the subject, whose liberty is being curtailed to some extent, with our duties to protect the public. We have spoken this afternoon about the victims of these terrible terrorist offences. We in public office—Members of Parliament and those in government—have a duty to think very carefully about our duties to protect people who might become victims of these terrible offences.
In answer to the question about why we are proposing this burden of proof, it is because it gives the Government the maximum reasonable ability to introduce TPIMs where they are necessary to protect the public. Setting the burden where we have suggested—a reasonable suspicion, rather than a reasonable belief or on the balance of probabilities—gives the Home Secretary the ability to act more widely than would otherwise be the case when public safety is at stake.
Yvette Cooper
Can the Minister tell us how many cases in the last two years have not met the current threshold but would meet his lower threshold?
Chris Philp
As the Lord Chancellor said, we will not comment on individual cases. As the right hon. Lady knows, the number of TPIMs in force is very low—it is only five currently. We are not just talking about what may have happened historically; we are looking prospectively at what measures we may need to take to protect our fellow citizens.
Members have asked what the safeguards are. The first safeguard is that the Home Secretary—who I see is now in the Chamber, and who is a doughty defender of public safety and public protection—does not act without fetter, because when a TPIM order is made by the Home Secretary, it is reviewed by the High Court under section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The High Court has to give permission before that TPIM can come into force, and if the High Court finds that it is “obviously flawed”, permission is not granted, so there is a judicial safeguard inherent in the structure of TPIMs. If the subject of the TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, they may go to the Court for a judicial review. There are significant safeguards inherent in the structure of TPIMs.
As I said a moment ago, the Government use these measures extremely sparingly. Our preference, of course, is prosecution, as it should be. We only use TPIMs where absolutely necessary to protect the public, and we make no apology for doing so. Only five are in force at the moment, which is evidence of how carefully the Government apply these measures. Since 2011, despite the judicial mechanisms I have described, not a single TPIM has been overturned. I hope that that gives Members confidence that there are safeguards and that these measures are being used in a thoughtful way.
Reference has been made to the opinion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Of course, we listen carefully to what Jonathan Hall QC has to say. We study his advice carefully, and we often follow his advice. It is for this House and for us as Members of Parliament to reach our own decision, which may in many cases accord with the independent reviewer, but in some cases it may not. Where our judgment differs, we should exercise our independent judgment, as we are doing in this case.
Dr Lewis
In the Minister’s references to TPIMs, he may have answered a question that I was hoping to ask him a little later: what do we do about that category of people who have gone abroad to fight for terrorist-backing organisations and return to this country, where there is not enough evidence to prosecute? I think that the Bill does not say a lot about that. If I am wrong, will he correct me? If I am right, surely that is an area where TPIMs might be relevant.
Chris Philp
Indeed. In relation to people who go overseas to assist terrorist organisations, we deprive them of their citizenship where we can, if it is lawful— if they are, for example, dual nationals—to prevent their return here in the first place. It is right that we do that. Secondly, on their return, it is our strong preference, if there is sufficient evidence, to prosecute them under the criminal law, as we very often do. However, if there are evidential difficulties and we cannot meet the burden of proof required by a criminal court—beyond reasonable doubt—but we do have a reasonable suspicion, we can use TPIMs to protect the public, should the Bill be passed in this form. The excellent example from my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) illustrates exactly why TPIMs could help us in those cases where we cannot achieve prosecution. Evidence from Syria, for example, is very hard to gather, but in cases where we have a reasonable suspicion, we must act to protect the public.
Yvette Cooper
Let me stress this point again: the Minister has still not given us any reason why the current system is no good and why it does not work. He has mentioned independent judgment, but he is giving us no evidence on which to make our independent judgment that is different from the reviewer.
Chris Philp
We are returning to a situation that was enshrined originally in 2005, which Members opposite strongly supported at the time. I have made the case already that the Bill gives the Home Secretary an ability to take a rounder judgment with the proof threshold set at reasonable suspicion, rather than reasonable belief or the balance of probabilities. I have made the case that we need to be mindful of protecting potential victims. We need to think about this not just retrospectively, as a historical review of case studies, but prospectively and how we may need the power in the future. I have explained the safeguards in place and I have proved that the Government use the powers sparingly. I think I have made the case for the legislation as currently drafted.
Let me turn now to the question of de-radicalisation and reducing reoffending, which the shadow Lord Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Tottenham, referred to very powerfully in his speech. Let me be clear that we are not giving up hope on any people who are convicted as terrorist offenders—especially young people, but frankly, we are not giving up hope on anyone. Although these cases are hard and rehabilitation is very difficult, we will never give up hope. There are cases such as that of Maajid Nawaz, the founder of the Quilliam Foundation, who harboured extremist ideologies, but is now fully reformed and is a powerful and moving advocate for tolerance and moderation. I look to examples like that for hope—and they give me hope.
It is in that spirit that the Government have been investing in this area. It is fair to say that there is more we need to do to meet our aspirations, but in January we announced an additional £90 million for counter-terrorism policing. We have doubled the number of counter-terrorism probation staff serving and we have introduced new national standards for monitoring terrorist offenders on licence, which includes work with psychologists to try to address any mental health issues that may relate to this sort of offending. We are also involving imams to try to explain in the case of Islamist offending that Islam is a peaceful religion and that the interpretation that some offenders have is a perversion of the true meaning of that great and peaceful religion. We are involving them in our work.
Things such as the theological and ideological interventions programme, the healthy identities programme and the desistance and disengagement programme are all designed to do the same thing. I do not pretend that those systems are working as fully effectively as we would like. I acknowledge there is more work to do, but that work is happening and being invested in. As I said a moment ago, I have hope that people can be turned on to a different path, and that ultimately must be our objective.
I turn now to the question of the removal of the Parole Board’s function in relation to people who will now serve their full custodial term in prison—those most serious offenders. It is right that we do that for the reasons that have been laid out. The most dangerous offenders should serve their full prison sentence, and the public expects that. We have acknowledged that rehabilitation needs to be taking place subsequently in the extended licence period provided after their release.
Although there will be no Parole Board intervention, as the shadow Secretary of State pointed out in his speech at the beginning, plenty of other intervention will take place. For example, very extensive mapper work will take place throughout the custodial sentence. The Prison Service and prison governors, including excellent governors, such as the governor at Belmarsh, will do enormous amounts of work with prisoners during their custodial sentence. The probation service, in the way that I described a moment ago, will work with the offender in their extended licence period afterwards.
Although the Parole Board will not make the release decision—that is effectively made by the judge at the point of sentence in handing down a sentence of this nature —a huge amount of work will none the less be done to manage, help, monitor and, where appropriate, intervene during the prison sentence and during the licence period subsequently. I am therefore satisfied, as is the Lord Chancellor, that these arrangements are comprehensive and will be effective.
Let me say a word about polygraphs, which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) referred to. It is important to stress that the use of polygraphs that we are proposing here is the same as the use currently deployed in relation to sex offenders on licence. These polygraph results, because they are not entirely accurate—they are quite accurate, but not entirely accurate—do not create any binding consequence. If somebody fails one of these polygraph tests on licence, further investigatory work is done by the police or the probation service. It triggers further work, which will then produce a conclusion one way or the other. It does not produce a binding result, but it serves as a trigger.
If we look at the way polygraphs have been used in relation to sex offences, we find that the level of disclosure of relevant information by those sex offenders to whom polygraph tests are applied has increased, since the introduction of the tests, from a 51% disclosure rate to 76%, so they have been helpful. They are not a panacea—they do not tell us everything and we cannot wholly rely on them—but they do yield some information, as a result of which further investigation can be conducted.
Some questions were asked about the Prevent review. We are very close to appointing a new chairman of that review, which is overdue, as Members rightly said. Members asked, again quite rightly and fairly, what our revised target date is for that review to report. Our target date is August 2021. That is a year later than originally anticipated, but Members will understand that the resignation of the initially appointed chairman and then the coronavirus outbreak have, unfortunately, caused that one-year delay. That is the timetable we are now working to.
Finally, the hon. Member for Belfast East and his colleague the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) made reference to the application to Northern Ireland of the ending of the automatic early release of terrorist offenders. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Belfast East welcomes that application. We thought very carefully about the legal implications, because the structure of sentences in Northern Ireland differs from that in the rest of the United Kingdom. That is why we did not act in February. We have now thought about it very carefully, we have taken extensive legal advice, and we are now wholly satisfied that it can properly be applied to Northern Ireland without any article 7 or, indeed, common law retrospectivity infringement. That is why we now include Northern Ireland in these provisions—and of course, because we want the United Kingdom to act as one in these terrorist-related matters, it is proper that we do so.
Terrorists seek to divide our country, they seek to divide our community and they seek to create hatred among us, but I think that in the conduct of our debate this afternoon we have demonstrated that, no matter what our differences may be in day-to-day political matters, we will stand together in solidarity and in unity, as a House of Commons and as leaders of our various communities, against all those from all different wings of the terrorist fraternity. We will unite against hate, and we will keep in mind Jo Cox’s words in her maiden speech, which I remember listening to five years ago from the Back Benches. She said that there is more that unites us than divides us. Let us keep those words in mind and let us fight terrorism of all kinds wherever we find it.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 14 July 2020.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Eddie Hughes.)
Question agreed to.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (First sitting)
Thursday 25th June 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 June 2020 - (25 Jun 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a couple of housekeeping points to make. Please make sure that electronic devices are on silent. I am afraid that tea and coffee are not allowed; water is, along as it has not been near a tea bag or any coffee granules. Social distancing must be observed. Our Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please do remove jackets at any point under my chairmanship as we proceed through the Bill.
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to allow us to deliberate in private briefly, before moving to the oral evidence session. I hope we can get through these first bits without too much debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion that was agreed by the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
I beg to move, Day Time Witness Thursday 25 June Until no later than 12.30 pm Jonathan Hall QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Thursday 25 June Until no later than 13.00 pm The National Police Chiefs’ Council Thursday 25 June Until no later than 14.30 pm Prison Reform Trust Thursday 25 June Until no later than 15.00 pm The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Thursday 25 June Until no later than 15.30 pm Law Society of Scotland Thursday 25 June Until no later than 16.00 pm Professor Donald Grubin, Newcastle University Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 9.55 am The Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 10.25 am The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change Tuesday 30 June Until no later than 10.55 am Professor Andrew Silke, Cranfield University
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 25 June) meet;
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 June;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 30 June;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 2 July;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 7 July;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 9 July;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following table:
TABLE
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clause 2; Schedule 2; Clause 3; Schedule 3; Clauses 4 to 6; Schedule 4; Clauses 7 to 19; Schedule 5; Clauses 20 and 21; Schedule 6; Clauses 22 and 23; Schedule 7; Clauses 24 and 25; Schedule 8; Clauses 26 and 27; Schedule 9; Clause 28; Schedule 10; Clauses 29 to 36; Schedule 11; Clauses 37 to 45; Schedule 12; Clauses 46 to 48; Schedule 13; Clauses 49 to 53; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 14 July.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I have one point of clarification to make. Yesterday, in the Programming Sub-Committee, we discussed whether we should invite the Prison Officers Association or the Prison Governors Association. On further investigation, it transpires that the Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers is in fact the Prison Officers Association—that is its full name. We will therefore see the Prison Officers Association on Tuesday at 9.25 am. We had contacted the Prison Governors Association, but I am told that, rather surprisingly, it did not reply. That should satisfy the request that the shadow Minister made yesterday.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Chris Philp.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Chris Philp.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Jonathan Hall QC, who is the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Welcome, and thank you very much for coming. I think I am supposed to ask you to introduce yourself, but I have just done that, so we will go straight into questioning.
Chris Philp
Q
I am sure we have all read the notes that you very helpfully prepared on this legislation and published on your website at the end of May and the beginning of June. I have them in front of me and have read them with great interest. To start, I want to ask about TPIMs—terrorism prevention and investigation measures—which were the subject of some debate on Second Reading. I want first to ask about the current circumstances in which a TPIM expires and has to be reapplied for from scratch without it being possible to use the previous evidence from two or more years before. Do you think there are circumstances in which public safety may still demand a TPIM beyond the two-year period? Are these proposals a better way of handling it than the current method?
Jonathan Hall: The answer is yes, there are be circumstances in which someone ought to be subject to controls for longer than two years. Yes, there will be circumstances in which it will be appropriate to rely on terrorism-related activity that predates the imposition of the first TPIM. I understand the business case, if you like, for allowing an extension beyond the two-year period. However, the reason I question in the first instance whether it is justified is that it is none the less possible, as the law currently stands, to extend beyond two years. There are two current examples—I will not go into the details—of where a second and fresh TPIM has been imposed.
The practical consequence of the current regime is that some will come off controls, and if they have literally lain doggo and have done nothing for that two-year period, the police and MI5 will have to start assembling a new case, assuming that the person re-engages with terrorism-related activity. There could be a gap period during which that terrorism-related activity is going on, during which the case is being built when they are re-imposed.
If TPIMs were currently imposed against attack planners, I would have fewer observations to make about the ability to extend further. However, in practice, as I said in my note, having spoken to officials, TPIMs are really currently used against radicalisers. It is certainly the case that public safety is not helped by radicalisation activities, but as things currently stand, people subject to TPIMs are not the attack planners, who, if they are free from restrictions, might go and do something very violent. More likely, they will re-engage in radicalising activities. As shown by the fact that two new TPIMs have been imposed, it is currently possible to manage that risk.
I understand the business case, more than I do for the lowering of the standard of proof, which we can come to separately. At the moment, I do not understand why it is needed as TPIMs are currently used.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, I have worked it out. In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: What I would say is that the risk was managed, as the law currently stands. There was a gap, but in fact, it is not as if something very bad happened from those sources in that period, as far as I can work out, having read the materials that I have read.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The latter. I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: You asked me about the current TPIMs. I cannot speak for all the uses of control orders and TPIMs that have happened before my period. There is a risk that mistakes can be made about assessing intelligence. I have reason to believe that. My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered. It is a fairness issue based on the authorities having all the cards.
The point that you make, which is that the authorities can be generally trusted to make TPIMs against the right people, to my mind rather demonstrates that a change is unnecessary. The authorities have been able to impose TPIMs, as far as I can see, where they have wanted to. I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower—where they could say, “We think this person’s a terrorist, but they may not be and we’d like to impose a TPIM, but we can’t, because we cannot show on the balance of probabilities.” I am not aware of that sort of case. So I agree that the authorities can be trusted and, at the moment, I think things are working okay.
The regime of control orders and TPIMs has fluctuated over the years since it was introduced. It has been subject to a lot of scrutiny and consideration by my predecessors and by the courts. It has landed in a reasonably good place. The danger about changing unnecessarily is that, maybe not now, but in a few years’ time, you might provoke an overreaction.
I will give an example of that. When the control order regime came in, it was seen as a bit illiberal and that led to the removal of the power to relocate individuals when the TPIM regime was introduced. Eventually, my predecessor David Anderson, the Government and Parliament agreed that it was necessary to bring back that power of relocation. So if you like, there was a period when the public were less safe because the ability to relocate had been removed, and the reason why that ability to relocate had been removed is that it was the reaction to what had been seen as a slightly illiberal measure. If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, but of course if the standard of proof is lowered, the extent of judicial protection is lowered, because the judge will not be asking him or herself, “Was the Secretary of State right to be satisfied on the balance of probability that this person is a terrorist?” The judge would have to say, “Well, in theory, they may not be a terrorist, but the Home Secretary’s view that they may be a terrorist is reasonable,” so you would remove the judicial protection.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am not aware of any misuse, but I am aware of circumstances in which the intelligence was misunderstood.
Chris Philp
Q
On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) raised the question of someone who had been a member of Daesh returning from Syria. Of course, if somebody has been circulating in Syria, it is very hard to establish their activities on the balance of probabilities. It is hard to get witness testimony and there will be no intelligence surveillance, but the fact remains that they have been to Syria and done whatever they have done over there. In those circumstances, is it conceivable that, when British citizens who are members of Daesh return from somewhere like Syria, the lower burden of proof might be helpful, or in fact necessary?
Jonathan Hall: I have thought a little about this. It is certainly the case that evidential coverage of what goes on in Daesh-controlled areas will be limited, which is why prosecution is particularly difficult. Intelligence coverage might be more, but it might be patchy. I think that if someone has been in Syria for a long time, it is a pretty obvious inference that they have been up to no good, so I do not think that you would need the lower standard of proof. You would not say, “I reasonably suspect that because you spent five years in Syria, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” My own view is that a judge would say, “On the balance of probabilities, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” Of course, there will always be some coverage. I do not think that what you said is right, although I see where you are coming from.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, but I think that, with respect, what you are missing out is the big factual matter, which would be undisputed, that they were in Syria. The Secretary of State’s starting point would be, “Here is a matter of fact, undisputed, that somebody spent all those years in Syria.” I think that that would provide a fairly good jumping-off point for an inference that they were engaged in terrorism-related activity.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think that judges, when they come to consider these matters, are prepared to draw robust inferences. They are not fools. No doubt the Secretary of State would also not be fooled by someone who simply claimed that they were there for humanitarian reasons.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The difficulty with terrorism risk is that it is quite difficult to measure. You have actuarial tools to look at whether people who have committed burglary will reoffend, and they are reasonably robust. You do not have those sorts of tools for terrorism. As I probably said in my notes, some of the factors that you normally associate with reoffending—for example, not having a stable family background—do not tend to work so well with terrorism offenders. You find terrorism offenders who come from a stable background and have a job, so it is inherently difficult to identify the probability that someone will reoffend.
The approach that I took when I did my MAPPA review was that the more information, the better. I agree that the probation service, the police and MI5 will be carrying out assessments, but you lose the confrontation that takes place at a Parole Board hearing. As you have probably done, I have attended such a hearing, where there is an opportunity for the chairman to speak to the offender in quite a formal setting. It brings something different to the table, which you would obviously lose. You would definitely have covert intelligence sources, and you would have overt management in the sense of the police being able to speak to the offender, but you would lose the opportunity for a confrontation before they have been released. You are losing something—that is probably how I would put it.
Chris Philp
Q
Jonathan Hall: The Parole Board has two choices: it could release early, but it could, and often will, decide not to release early and say, “Actually, you’re far too dangerous.” That additional source of information about their risk will then be very useful to the security services when they are eventually released.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
I, too, am grateful for the work that you do, Jonathan. I want to ask you a number of questions away from TPIMs; my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North will deal with that issue. You have produced three notes on the Bill, and I want to address questions from two of them—it might be helpful for the notes to be entered as written evidence.
Point 10 of your first note states:
“The requirement of a minimum mandatory sentence for all adult offenders, however young, puts in doubt whether judges can properly reflect the fact that an adult of 18 years and one month may not be any more mature than a child of 17 years and 11 months (for whom these sentences are not available). Age may or may not result in ‘exceptional circumstances’ being found, which is the only basis on which the 14-year minimum can be avoided.”
That strikes me as a cautionary note, and I invite you to talk a bit more about that. How specifically will this piece of legislation be different for younger offenders?
Alex Cunningham
I am referring to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s “Note on Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (1)”.
Jonathan Hall: I have identified what is really a policy choice for Parliament. As a matter of fact, I can say that an increasing number of quite young people are being caught up in terrorism, including new forms of terrorism—not just conventional Islamist, extremist or right-wing terrorism, but other new emerging forms, such as the incel movement or even things at the very boundaries of what you might consider terrorism that are very violent. It is not impossible that young people will be caught up in this.
The point I am making—I have referred to an authority from England and Wales and I think I have also referred to the approach in Scotland—is that there is recognition that people who are young and immature are probably more susceptible to change than adults. I suppose it is a choice for Parliament, but the age for a mandatory minimum sentence—meaning no prospect of early release, and effectively putting to one side the possibility of reform—might be raised to 21, rather than that being for those in the 18-to-21 bracket. I understand that in Scotland there is a debate over whether it should be as far as 25.
All I can do is identify the choice that has been made and point out that when it comes to sentencing, traditionally it is recognised that people are not necessarily that different when they are one month over 18 as opposed to one month under 18.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: That is what judges are increasingly finding.
Alex Cunningham
Q
“Conversely, determining whether a 7-year, 15-year or 25-year licence is appropriate at the point of sentencing for dangerous individuals who have committed the most serious offences may be asking courts to engage in guesswork.”
What would be your advice to the Committee on that particular issue?
Jonathan Hall: I have imagined putting oneself in the position of the sentencing judge, who is faced by someone who has carried out a very serious attack planning offence, risking multiple casualties, and let us say they are 25 or 30. As I think I have said before, it is very hard to judge terrorist risk. It is particularly hard for sentencing judges, because they operate on an open basis; they are not going to look at secret intelligence, for good reasons. So the judge’s task is particularly difficult at the point of sentence, and it seems to be quite difficult for a judge to work out sentencing for a 25-year-old who has committed a really serious attack planning offence. When they are released from prison, are they going to be worth monitoring for seven or for 25 years? Again, it is a choice for Parliament.
What I have identified, I suppose, is that if one were going to impose a mandatory sentence, there might be thought to be more sense in imposing an indeterminate sentence—in other words, where someone has fallen into this category of really serious offending, realising that they could be a risk for life and keeping them in prison for life, unless and until they are seen as safe to be released, and then once they have been released, keeping them on licence for life and giving the flexibility to the authorities, which includes, I should say, where eventually someone, one hopes, is no longer a threat, to roll that up and bring that licence to an end; because there is a slight risk of storing up trouble for future generations if you have increasingly long periods for licences. When they are no longer necessary, how do you bring them to an end? I do not think there is that scope at the moment. To answer your question—I am sorry to have gone on so long about that—
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: Very much. One of the final points I make in my note about removing the Parole Board’s role is that, again, if it is right that children are more likely to change, and as a matter, perhaps, of fairness, one ought to give them the opportunity, then removing the opportunity to say, at the halfway or two-thirds point, “I have now genuinely changed; that was me then and this is me now,” where it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Parole Board, does seem a little bit—I would not necessarily say “unfair”, but it fails to recognise the difference between adults and children.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not want to get into the role of persuading anyone. If you like—
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: The practical point is one I have addressed, which is that identifying terrorist risk is really difficult. The role of the Parole Board is quite an important part of identifying terrorist risk, and if you don’t have that role then you lose that insight.
Alex Cunningham
Q
“an offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—
(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or
(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
Do you think that is clear enough to aid the courts, or do the Government need to provide more clarity in the definition?
Jonathan Hall: I think it is clear enough. It is taken from the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It is now being incorporated into the new sentencing code and it has worked well.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: It is consistent with my point about not losing sources of information. Because it so difficult to identify whether someone will commit a terrorist offence, and as the Usman Khan case perhaps demonstrates, there are difficulties in managing released terrorist offenders or predicting what they might do. Polygraphs provide an additional source of information.
I came at this subject reasonably fresh; I read the literature on the use in England and Wales with sex offenders. I can see that the number of clinically significant disclosures is really material, and it seems to me that it would be very sensible to use that in the same way—so you ask, “Have you been on the internet?”, as a closed question—for terrorist offenders.
So, it is an additional source of information, which I think it would be sensible to use. It would do two things. One is that in certain cases it would allow the authority to find out when they are being gamed and played by manipulative and deceptive dangerous offenders. On the other hand, to some extent it would reduce the burden of the authorities. That is because the police and probation service face really difficult choices in this area. There will be a natural caution, for example, about removing someone’s licence condition. However, if you can use a polygraph test and satisfy yourself that someone is telling the truth, then it may allow you to remove some conditions and allow someone to normalise. And although that sounds odd in the context of terrorist offenders, ultimately you want people who are released to engage in a normal way in society—in other words, allowing them to get jobs and to live in their home area, and the like.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: I know, from when I did the review of the multi-agency public protection arrangements, that a lot of resources are being put into this area, and there are special probation officers trained in counter-terrorism. I do not think I can comment on how much resource you need for 25 years, but a lot of resource is being put into the area, which is to be welcomed.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: I have not seen them.
Alex Cunningham
The question is probably useless, then. I was going to ask whether they had reassured you that things had changed for the better, but clearly you have not seen them.
Jonathan Hall: No. I am sorry; I have not seen them.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
Q
I will start by asking you a couple of questions about the effect of the proposed sentencing changes in Scotland. You have produced a “Note on Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (3)” that deals with the effect of the proposed sentencing changes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In particular, in paragraphs 8 and 9, you raise the question of how what is proposed for Scotland under clause 6 of the Bill impacts on the existing sentence in Scotland called an order for lifelong restriction. Can you tell us about that?
Jonathan Hall: Scotland has a unique sentence. It has a very respected body called the Risk Management Authority, and if a risk assessment is made under the auspices of the authority that shows that someone is a real risk, the High Court in Scotland can pass an indeterminate sentence with a punishment part, but with the consequence that someone is liable to be detained until they are safe enough to be released, when they are released but very carefully monitored.
I do not know whether this was intended or an oversight, but it seems paradoxical that, as things currently stand, if a judge in Scotland found that the criteria for a serious terrorism sentence were made out, he or she would have to pass a determinate sentence, if they did not otherwise pass a life sentence, even if ordinarily they might want to pass one of these orders for lifelong restriction. One would have thought that an OLR would provide more protection for the public than a determinate sentence. I do not know whether that has been dealt with in the amendments that have just been referred to.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: It is the fact that risk changes. You want to make a decision about when someone is going to be released in the light of all the information at the point of time at which release becomes an issue. People might become more radical in prison, and it seems to me that allowing a body to make a decision on whether they are safe in the light of all the information is preferable to a decision to impose a determinate sentence taken by a judge, who does not know, actually, whether in the 14 years or 16 years imposed that person will be safe.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think it is carried out not by the Risk Management Authority but by assessors who are certified by the authority. I am not a Scottish lawyer, but that is my understanding.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, it is. One of the things that I discovered when I did my MAPPA review is that there is probably work to be done to ensure that where a dangerous offender is considered by a Parole Board, whether in Scotland or in England and Wales, all the information relevant to the question of risk—including, in certain circumstances, sensitive information—is brought to the attention of the Parole Board. There are ways and means of doing that. So there are certainly improvements that can be made about the way in which the Parole Board can operate, but yes, that is right: the Parole Board would have a role.
Joanna Cherry
Q
“It would be preferable if Clause 6 was disapplied where an Order for Lifelong Restriction is passed. This also raises the question of whether a more flexible indeterminate sentence, such as the Order for Lifelong Restriction, is not preferable generally to the inflexibility of a serious terrorism sentence.”
Those are your views. Have you seen anything to change your mind since you wrote the note?
Jonathan Hall: No, those are my views. It is obviously for Parliament. As I say, I do not know whether the position with orders for lifelong restriction was an oversight in the drafting of the Bill. In Northern Ireland, there is something called an indeterminate custodial sentence, and certainly that can be passed in priority to a terrorism sentence. On the question whether a lifelong restriction is better in principle, I have made my views known. The reason, in a nutshell, is that it is a very difficult to judge risk at the point of sentencing.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not think I can comment on that.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: I have obviously had discussions, but I have not been able to identify a cogent business case. Reference has been made to reducing the administrative burden. I do not fully understand that point because, as I said in my note, there are cases in which what you might call a new variant or a light-touch TPIM has been made. The courts have yet to say that those are not an acceptable way of proceeding, so it seems to me that there are options already on the table.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: No. What has been communicated to me is that this is something for the future. There is a phrase that counter-terrorism officials like to use: “having a tool in the toolbox”. You could probably summarise this by saying that it will be another tool in the toolbox. They cannot necessarily say when they would use it, but it might be beneficial in the future.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: I should start by saying that when the control order regime was in force, and the standard was reasonable grounds to suspect, that was not found to be unlawful. I cannot and do not put forward the suggestion that this change would be unlawful; it is a legislative choice.
As far as safeguards are concerned, you will probably have seen from my notes that here you have a double whammy. It is not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever. Something that was proposed by my predecessor, which would be an option for Parliament, is to say that if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.
Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject. Again, I do not think the authorities will be unwise in the way that they use that, but there is a risk that people will be on TPIMs for a very long time indeed. As you say, they have not been prosecuted, and it seems to be right in principle and fair that there should be some additional safeguards for those individuals.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Jonathan Hall: As things currently stand, yes.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
Q
Mr Hall, thank you for the very thorough online report. It is over 200 pages, and it is obviously a very thorough piece of work. I want to ask a general question from the perspective of one of my constituents. Looking at the overall measures that the Bill would bring in, you must agree that they will make the average citizen safer.
Jonathan Hall: I think some measures certainly will. For some measures, I am less clear in my mind that they will. It would be going too far to say that some of them would have a negative effect, although there is always a question about whether people being in prison for longer will make them safer when they come out.
Something that I was struck by, when I started doing this job, was that most terrorism sentences are quite short. The reason for that is that counter-terrorism police want to go in early and stop attack planning. They may go in when they have intelligence, but before the evidence is really there. They may have secret sources that they cannot use in court. That often results in finding things on phones or computers, which results in lots of convictions for having attack manuals, but not many convictions for attack planning. In practice, that means that most people convicted of terrorism offences will come out after a period of time.
The police and MI5 are always thinking, “How can we make the risk as low as possible when that person eventually comes out?” Obviously, one of the issues that one has to confront is that prisons do not always end up making people more safe. Extending their time in custody for a bit makes someone safer in the sense that they are off the streets for that period of time, but it does not necessarily mean that they are safer when they come out.
All I would say is, yes, there are some bits that are definitely to be welcomed. Anything that allows additional monitoring, that increases licences and that allows the police more monitoring powers is to be welcomed. Some of the things I am less sure about.
Miss Dines
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think it is the provision that allows a judge to say that any offence, if he or she finds that it is connected to terrorism, is a terrorism offence. That means that the police have a statutory ability to monitor that person for 10, 15 or up to 30 years. That is a really welcome change, which makes people safer.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
Q
TPIMs are not widely in use. You have said that the system works okay—I think that was the phrase you used in this evidence session. Is there a concern that these proposals not only do not make the operation of TPIMs more effective, but actually make them less effective, not just in an operational sense but, given the speculative commentary about their being used as an alternative to prosecution or to deradicalisation strategies, in terms of public perception, which undermines their wider use?
Jonathan Hall: It is quite difficult. I am always cautious about talking about public perception, because I do not have a crystal ball. What one can say is that the best counter-terrorism response, the one that has the most common legitimacy, is criminal prosecution. One should continue to strain to prosecute terrorists. It is fairer, it means the public can see what is being done to protect them, and it results in stronger, tougher disposals.
To pick up on the point that you made, I think I mentioned in my notes that from my consideration of TPIMs, I was not entirely convinced that there was enough scrutiny by the Secretary of State and by officials of the evidential case against individuals. There certainly is consideration by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, but there is the risk that, once a TPIM has been made and someone has been identified as a risk, that takes priority—in other words, the TPIM is the best way of protecting the public—over trying to get criminal evidence to prosecute, which would be preferable from a public perception point of view.
Conor McGinn
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not have a sense that there is an intention to spike suddenly, which is why I go back to the question: what exactly is the purpose served by changing the standard of proof?
Conor McGinn
Q
Jonathan Hall: If there is evidence of continuing terrorism, that would meet the current law and allow a new TPIM to be imposed. So far as repudiation is concerned, I expect that, if the law is changed in this way, that is how these matters will be framed. It will be said that there was evidence of somebody being involved in terrorist-related activity, that they have not repudiated their views, and that therefore they remain a risk. I would not venture to suggest that one could amend the law as to how risk should be proven. I think one should leave that reasonably open.
Conor McGinn
Q
When relocation orders were used before, one in six were overturned in court. Are you concerned that this is rather a dubious way to proceed, if you are going to undermine not just the legislation that you are creating but the wider counter-terrorism strategy? A not insignificant proportion of the people subject to relocation orders as part of control orders in the past were able to overturn them in court.
Jonathan Hall: Relocation is an important power. It is regrettable, in the sense that it is a very strong measure and causes a lot of disruption, but I am quite satisfied that in a small number of cases it is needed. You are right to pick up on that when one looks at the enduring TPIM. The combination of lowering the standard of proof, plus the ability for TPIMs to endure forever and the power of the measures, including relocation, means that someone could be forced to live away from their family for up to, say, a decade, on the basis that they only “may” be a terrorist. A possible safeguard is to say that if one is going to do that, one at least ought to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.
Conor McGinn
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
Laura Trott (Sevenoaks) (Con)
Q
Jonathan Hall: This is the covert world. I will slightly fudge my answer, because this is more of a technical thing—you might want to ask the next witness. Obviously, the police and MI5 have ways of monitoring and managing people, even if they are not subject to a TPIM. It is something that the authorities have to wrestle with. Some people who have been convicted are on licence, which gives you a way to manage their risk. Some people are on TPIMs. Unfortunately, there are quite a lot of people who are neither on a TPIM nor on licence, and who the authorities have to measure. They have real expertise in dealing with it. It is slightly sensitive to go into details. Your question is probably one for the next witness.
Laura Trott
Q
Jonathan Hall: It would be easier for the police.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Q
Mr Hall, can I address the young adult age group? It has also been referred to by the Opposition. If we accept that there are different questions of maturity, do you also accept that the 18 to 20 age group can be incredibly dangerous?
Jonathan Hall: Yes, and it is not only people who are over 18. It seems to be a phenomenon at the moment. If you think about what is available on the internet, and if you bring in issues such as mental health, young people can be very dangerous. As you know, there was the so-called Anzac Day plot involving a very young person.
Rob Butler
Q
Jonathan Hall: A sceptical Parole Board. Sometimes people look at the Parole Board and see early release. It is certainly correct that the Parole Board would have the power to grant early release, but it often does not release people.
Rob Butler
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, I think that would be a legitimate policy choice for Parliament. Can I just clarify one thing? You have the serious terrorism sentence, where the judge’s power is to pass one of these only for people who are 18 or over. In my notes, I have made some points about the 18 to 21 age group. You also have people who are not subject to those orders, but who are dangerous and have been convicted of offences that carry a maximum of life. For those people, including people below the age of 18, the Parole Board role disappears. One choice would be to say that if people are under 18, the Parole Board ought to retain a role.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Q
Thank you for all your evidence, Mr Hall. On sentencing, we have talked about rehabilitation and risk management quite a lot. The other purposes of sentencing are deterrence, protection of the public and punishment. Do you agree that those purposes are well served by the changes in sentencing that are contained in the Bill?
Jonathan Hall: Yes.
The Chair
We have come to the end of the session. Mr Hall, thank you very much indeed.
Examination of Witness
Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Should hon. Members wish to ask a question, it would be helpful if they could catch my eye early in the proceedings, so that I can try to restrict Front Benchers as necessary.
Thank you very much for joining us, Mr Jacques. Could you please briefly introduce yourself and your organisation?
Tim Jacques: I am Tim Jacques. I am an assistant chief constable and I work with counter-terrorism policing here in the UK. I am the deputy senior national co-ordinator.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: It will make our job easier, and yes, I believe it will make the public safer.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: That is a very long question. On the first point, policing itself is not the applicant for TPIMs; the Security Service is. Am I able to share its view in this forum?
Chris Philp
Please do.
Tim Jacques: First—Jonathan touched on this—there have not been occasions thus far when the current burden of proof has prevented the application of a TPIM. In terms of the numbers, there are six now in place in the UK. Neither we nor the Security Service envisage a large increase in those numbers as a result of the provisions in the Bill. The Security Service points to three instances where it thinks this would have utility from an operational perspective. The first is where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing—hypothetically, somebody who we know might be operating online, but our belief is that they are moving towards posing an actual threat on the street with an attack plan in place. If that is very rapid, which it can now be—we have seen instances of that—then being able to use a lower standard of proof is something that MI5 thinks would be of use.
Secondly—Jonathan touched on this too—there is the issue of somebody returning from abroad, who we believe has been involved in terrorist-related activity overseas, and the issues of evidence in that. The Home Secretary can currently impose temporary exclusion orders at the lower standard of proof. If somebody wants to come back and has a right to come back to the UK, they can be imposed on the lower standard of proof. If someone somehow makes it to the UK under the radar or without our knowledge, the higher burden of proof would have to be applied to impose a TPIM. That is the second case that MI5 would point to.
The third issue, which Jonathan also touched on, relates to sensitive material. TPIMs are challengeable and there is an automatic review and so on. The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder, but the lower standard would assist them in their national security role.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.
Chris Philp
Q
Tim Jacques: Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: I certainly have a view on that. From a policing perspective—I do not think it is any different for our operational partners—there are two trains in place here: one is punishment and incarceration, which was mentioned earlier; and the other is rehabilitation, desistance and disengagement. Ultimately, the best outcome is the latter: we change the individual’s mindset and view of the world, and mitigate the risk that they pose to the public in an enduring manner. Anything that promotes that prevent, disengagement and deradicalization position is to be welcomed.
Both those options are considered with TPIMs, and indeed with most of the work that we undertake. Both protect the public, if successful. We are conscious of that and drive both of them. Counter-terrorism policing operates across all the Ps of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, called Contest, and prevent and pursue are included in that.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: I cannot comment in detail on the Parole Board element of it. If we can encourage people via the use of TPIMs and the programmes that TPIMs include, that would be a good thing, but the intricacies of sentencing and release are beyond my expert knowledge.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: There are two elements, as I understand it, where polygraphs are introduced: one is in licence conditions and the other is the use of TPIMs. I can certainly talk about the latter, but maybe not the former.
It is safe to say that the science around polygraphs is not absolutely fool-proof. For that reason, we and the CPS agree that we would never seek to use them as evidence in a criminal prosecution in the UK. By introducing polygraph measures in these circumstances—in TPIMs—you may end up with that evidence through disclosure, not for criminal prosecutions.
The reality is that polygraphs are untested in the terrorist space, but we would welcome the ability to pilot them. We would not necessarily be seeking mandation on every single TPIM. It says “if required”, and again that should be an operational decision for us. They are untested, which is why they are not used in criminal proceedings. They have utility in the management of sex offenders, as Jonathan pointed out, and they may well have utility in the management of terrorist offenders. We would be happy to try that and see where it takes us.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: Our point has always been that polygraphs are something that may have utility. If the Bill enables that utility, we would be very happy to try that, but whether to use them is an operational decision. They are untested, but the Bill enables them to be tested.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Tim Jacques: I do not want to dodge the question, but these people will come out of prison at some point. My understanding of the measures in the Bill is that they will come out later, rather than sooner. We have to manage and mitigate the risk as and when they come out. We have to manage them when they come out, and they are going to come out at some point. That is the point for us.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Tim Jacques: I do see his point, yes. The new variant, as Jonathan describes it, is about using fewer measures and can include, of course, not relocating the subject, which was a matter of discussion earlier. Because each measure has to be justified as necessary and proportionate to the Home Secretary and then approved by the court, of course each one of the measures and the case for each one of the measures can be, and very often is, challenged on behalf of the subject. In simple terms, the fewer measures there are, the less opportunity there is for challenge and the less need for administrative work to deal with that. That is where that comes into play. It is MI5’s view that potentially there is further opportunity for them to get engaged in that if there is a lower standard of proof, and for disclosure of sensitive material potentially.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Tim Jacques: Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.
Joanna Cherry
That is quite an important statement: there is no case so far where the current standard of proof has prevented an application for a TPIM. Thank you.
Rob Butler
Q
Tim Jacques: Absolutely. Sadly, we have seen—you have mentioned the case that is within my background knowledge—very recent examples of very young people who pose an extreme risk to the public. It is sad, but it is real and it is true.
Rob Butler
Q
Tim Jacques: We would absolutely say that, yes.
Rob Butler
Q
Tim Jacques: We can see and we have seen not just the case that goes back a few years but, certainly within the recent past, a number of, and a worrying increase in, young people engaging in terrorism of different forms and posing a real threat to the public. It is shocking, in one sense, that you see people of such a young age and the maturity with which they carry out their activity, and the hate-filled ideologies that inspire them at such a young age, but it is real.
Rob Butler
Q
Tim Jacques: Yes, absolutely. As I said earlier, we are there to do both. We protect the public by both measures: prosecution and criminal justice means, if that is needed—which can lead to desistance and disengagement programmes—and measures before that. If we can dissuade and reduce and prevent people from getting to that stage, that is a good option for us as well—if it keeps the public safe.
Conor McGinn
Q
Tim Jacques: Was what top?
Conor McGinn
The measures contained in the Bill: the amendments to the current operation of TPIMs, and provisions on sentencing. Is that what counter-terrorism policing in the UK feels it needs as a priority from Government?
Tim Jacques: The Bill came out of the recent changes in sentencing. One of the potential effects of those—in the previous Bill that went through Parliament—was offenders coming out without licence conditions in place. We refer to that as a cliff edge; I think Jonathan referred to a different cliff edge. For us and our operational partners—the Probation Service, the security services and so on—licence conditions are incredibly important, allowing us to manage individuals. In some of those cases there is potential for TPIMs to be applied in order to manage the risk that people pose, whereas the licence conditions do not offer that. That was the driver behind the TPIM element of the Bill.
Some of the measures and the changes that the Bill includes are the result of the Bill being put forward and talking about TPIMs. They include some of the problems that we have encountered in recent cases and that we think could be improved through legislation. This was not right at the top of our priority list, but if the Government are looking to take the Bill through, we think aspects of it are worthy of consideration by Parliament because we have encountered them operationally as problems.
Conor McGinn
Q
Tim Jacques: As you have seen, the number of TPIMs is very low. We do not envisage there being swathes of TPIMs if the Bill is enacted in its current state. There will be changes—the use of polygraph and so forth—that will have an impact. In the grand schemes of things and in the numbers that we are talking about, it will have an impact. Where TPIMs endure longer than two years, they will obviously require monitoring and resources for that. If an individual poses a risk and a threat anyway, they will consume resources regardless of whether they are on a TPIM; there is just less control around them.
Conor McGinn
Q
Tim Jacques: In relation specifically to the standard of proof, I think the security services’ point is that that may have utility in the examples that I gave. My answer to the question was on the wider changes around notification of TPIMs, the sentencing regime and so forth. It may have utility in terms of lowering the burden of proof, and it will make our collective role easier and the public safer.
Conor McGinn
Q
Tim Jacques: We welcome the Prevent review and are very happy to engage in the Prevent review. Prevent is a critically important part of our role; it is absolutely vital. It is controversial, and has been controversial, but we engage in it, we operate, and we protect the public through Prevent every day. The review will be helpful, I am sure, from many perspectives.
Conor McGinn
Q
Tim Jacques: It would be helpful if the review came to an end. Whether that will finish the debate on Prevent, of course, is another matter. It may do that; it may not. We will continue regardless, but we are happy to engage in the review and see it concluded.
Miss Dines
Q
Tim Jacques: Gosh—there are many examples. If you look at some of the relocation notification measures, because of the new variant, and because some of the terrorism prevention and investigation measures we now use are not relocation, there is potentially a flaw in the legislation as currently made out that subjects do not have to tell us where they are living. That is one small but fairly clear and obvious example. If we are not relocating them, which we are not all the time now, the law does not require them to tell us where they live, which seems an obvious gap. The Bill will enable us to manage the individual to use these measures in a different way, and potentially a less intrusive or restrictive way for the individual, enabling us to manage the risks that they pose to the public.
Miss Dines
Q
Tim Jacques: I absolutely agree. Protecting the public is our No. 1 priority and sometimes that means we have to intervene regardless of evidence, because the risks to the public are so great.
Julie Marson
Q
Tim Jacques: The police are a target for terrorist offenders, as are many institutions of the state. The police are the public and the public are the police, so by some of these measures, you protect the police and you protect the public.
Joanna Cherry
I would like to add to what Julie Marson said. I do not think we can say often enough how much we and our constituents appreciate the risk that police officers put themselves in. You are there for us. I think all political parties would want to associate themselves with that. Thank you.
Tim Jacques: Thank you.
Alex Cunningham
On a point of order, Mr Robertson. Given that the Government have tabled 17 pages of amendments to the Bill, would it be in order for us to invite Mr Jonathan Hall to provide a further note on the Bill?
The Chair
Mr Hall is still here. Mr Cunningham is offering you extra work. If you would like to do that—[Interruption.]. I am terribly sorry; I am advised that I cannot invite you to speak again, but I think you have got the point.
Mr Jacques, I think the point Joanna Cherry made, supporting Julie Marson, was a good one that we would all echo. Thank you very much for joining us.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Second sitting)
Thursday 25th June 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 June 2020 - (25 Jun 2020)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Q
Peter Dawson: Thank you very much for the opportunity to give evidence. The answer, of course, is yes, and I will try to explain why I can say yes with such conviction. Three of my colleagues and a number of close personal friends were present at Fishmongers’ Hall. Had I left my office five minutes earlier that afternoon, I would have been present myself. I have seen the devastation that that crime unleashed on some very close friends, so, absolutely, personal protection is the first priority. Our concern with the Bill, which I am sure we will get the chance to explore, is that aspects of it may not be justified by public protection, and indeed some aspects may undermine it.
Chris Philp
Q
Peter Dawson: It is the only way to be certain for that length of time, but it is not always certain when that length of time comes to an end. This is the dilemma that faces the criminal justice system in every case. Of course, it is brought to the public’s attention by events of this sort, and such events excite particularly strong emotions. Terrorism is a very difficult thing to understand, but a lot of criminal motivations are difficult to understand and to predict, so we have systems that seek to balance the difficulty of that prediction with the rights of the person who has been accused and their right to a future life when they have served their punishment.
The problem with denying all hope of release on a conditional basis by a judgment about whether the person can be released safely or not is that it denies hope and affects the whole of the prison sentence. You will be aware that I spent a good part of my career as a prison governor, and the way in which people can be encouraged and assisted to engage in work that may change their behaviour in the future is if there is something in it for them. The parole process is not just about the judgment at the end of the custodial period; it is about the whole of the sentence from the very first day and doing work that may make a difference and may make the public safer when that person eventually leaves prison. It is a dilemma, but I do not think that the public are best served by saying that we will postpone the moment at which risk arrives without taking the opportunity to reduce that risk. The possibility of parole is essential to the process that reduces risk.
Chris Philp
Q
You mentioned trying to make people safer upon release. What sort of activity is most effective during the prison sentence, whether release comes early or not? What are the most effective interventions that lower risk when they prisoners are released, whenever that release occurs?
Peter Dawson: The most important thing about understanding rehabilitation is that it happens in a community. You must always have one eye on what life is going to be like when that person comes out and what it is about life after release to cause them not to commit crime. That is true for terrorist crimes as well as for all other sorts of crime. There is nothing secret about this: people need somewhere to live, a way to earn their living, and a reason to live in a law-abiding way. Very often, that reason comes from family and from exactly the same things that cause all the rest of us to live the way we do. That means having people who care about you and have an interest in your future, and having a feeling yourself that you have a stake in a future that is law abiding.
You cannot coerce people into rehabilitation. There has been lots of discussion about particular programmes and courses that may assist in that, and across the picture of offending behaviour there are some programmes that have some effect, but we clearly need to be realistic about the impact of those programmes, whether in relation to terrorism or anything else.
First, a successful programme must be built on a research base and a theory of change that makes sense, and that research base is relatively small. Secondly, the programme then has to be delivered according to its manual. The third thing is that the environment in which it is delivered and in which the person lives has to support the aims of the course, and programmes should be audited. That third aspect is really important in this. The aims of the course are to give a person a stake in their society to encourage lawful behaviour, so the authority must be legitimate. The people must go into an environment that treats them fairly and which they feel is fair.
The difficulty with providing no incentive or reward for engagement in that change is that that appears to be unfair. If you add to the difficulties, which are real and difficult for the Prison Service to deal with, a bias against people who have committed offences like this, the danger is that someone can go through a programme and appear to have made progress and then go back into a sentence lasting many years, during which they do not feel treated fairly. None of these programmes cure; some of them have some impact on some people.
The Chair
Order. I have to interrupt there, Mr Dawson, because I am conscious of the time.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
Peter Dawson: Yes. There is evidence that the Committee may want to look at on this. There has been a movement for about a decade called the Transition to Adulthood Alliance, which has looked very hard at evidence of maturation in young people—the physiological evidence.
There does now seem to be general acceptance that for most young people the process of maturing certainly does not conclude before the mid-20s. There is a consensus, really, that if you are interested in dealing with people according to their maturity, you should look at the age of at least 25. It is even more marked, of course, for children under the age of 18.
Tragically, many of the people who are committing offences of this nature are very young. That does not take away from the fact that they are young and very immature—very susceptible to being led astray and very likely to change dramatically from the moment they commit the offence to their mid-to-late 20s, when that maturation has happened. The risk—
Alex Cunningham
Q
Peter Dawson: The Bill should have a different sentencing framework for children and for young adults. At the moment, the law defines a young adult as someone aged between 18 and 20. It is not for this Bill to do, but at some point that should change to between 18 and 24. At least taking account of the detention in a young offender institution provisions would allow some recognition of the fact that young adults are different from more mature people.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Peter Dawson: I would simply leave the extended sentence provision as it is and have a discretionary release element in the sentence of particular concern. We know that parole works well. Of course there are cases where people go on to offend, but that is rare and the Parole Board has a very good record of success in relation to people who do not commit serious crime in future. We have an institution that works. Let us take advantage of it because of the impact it has on the management of the sentence and the likely future behaviour of the person.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Peter Dawson: There needs to be a discretionary release element in all extended sentences with no exclusion for terrorist offences and no exclusion for the new sentence. The new sentence needs to be designed in a way that includes a discretionary release element. It is for Parliament to decide where that falls; I would say that the obvious thing to do would be to have the discretionary release at the halfway point and a possible release on licence at the two-thirds point, although I understand that Parliament may want to reflect the perilous nature of the offences with a different division of the sentence.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
Q
Peter Dawson: There are two aspects in particular. One I have spoken about: the absence of a process for some of the people affected. There is probably nothing more to say on that.
The second is probably rather more controversial because it is about the length of sentences. The Government, in explaining the Bill and justifying a 14-year minimum, say that that gives time for work to be done with the offender during the sentence. That is much longer than is needed for that work to be done. The difficulty with very long sentences, across the board, is that they destroy what is known in the trade as protective factors—they destroy the things that are most likely to help someone out of crime in the future.
Relationships are an obvious example. For somebody who is convicted in their late teens or early 20s and who is not released until their mid to late 30s, the opportunity to build a life that is worth living, in which they can contribute to or play a part in society, has very often been destroyed. All of the things that the rest of us do during that period in our lives have not happened and may not happen once that person is released. It is a disgruntling process. Long sentences are justified for the most serious crime, but the longer we make them, the more harm we do and the more difficult it is for the person to live the rest of their life in the way that we all do.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Peter Dawson: It is essential. We know that there is no evidence of any deterrent effect with long sentences—they are not protecting in that way; they only have a protective impact by taking that particular person off the street for that length of time—but people are going to be released, and that is when the risk arises, so I would say rehabilitation is absolutely essential for public protection. You cannot trade off one against the other. If you remove incentive—if you destroy all the things that keep somebody interested in a life without crime—then you are just delaying risk for when the moment for release comes.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Peter Dawson: Well, I draw on it heavily. Once somebody is in prison, you have this enormous acreage of time to fill. People struggle to adjust to prison. People often have a tremendous sense of grievance in the early years of a long sentence, and very often a sense of grief as well, and very often remorse. There is a sort of teachable moment when someone may change their behaviour, but that [Inaudible] if there is nothing after that moment.
People are completely subject to the authority of the system. They are very sensitive to whether the system plays fair by them. If the system invests in their rehabilitation, but then does not follow through, and all they have ahead of them is time that serves no purpose, which is simply time to fill, then grievance grows. Once somebody has a legitimate grievance in prison, the chance of them engaging with anything more constructive reduces dramatically. In terms of managing difficult people in prison who can be very dangerous, this is a dangerous problem.
The other thing I would say, and I say this as someone who governed prisons and had responsibility for the safety of everybody in the prison—staff, prisoners and visitors—is that crime happens in prisons too. Prisoners without hope and prisoners with a sense of grievance are dangerous to the other prisoners and the staff around them as well. We have seen the homicide rate in prisons rise in recent years and at the same time the number of people serving very long sentences or sentences with no release has also risen.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Q
Mr Dawson, in evidence this morning, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said that many terrorist offenders often come from a stable family background. Does that not undermine the typical view that we have of rehabilitation—that having a job, a home and a family are necessary to prevent reoffending? In fact, are terrorism and terrorism offences not driven by ideology? The rules are different.
Peter Dawson: I think I would say the reverse, actually. As a parent, I think stable homes with good parents sometimes have very difficult teenagers and people grow up in a very chaotic way, often—
Rob Butler
Q
Peter Dawson: But I think it is the case. I do not think a stable home protects someone from the ideology, but for someone coming out of prison, particularly after a long sentence, a stable home and relationships with people who have kept faith with you and who have belief in your future are absolutely the things that help someone as a mature person. This goes back to the issue of maturity. For a 35-year-old, those relationships are completely different from the relationships that they would have experienced when they were 18. I just think that that continuity, and the willingness of people to continue to provide hope for a future, is absolutely crucial to rehabilitation. It is not a protection against ideology in a teenager, but it is a protective factor for rehabilitation.
Rob Butler
Q
Peter Dawson: Yes, there were. I worked in local prisons and in a female prison. Local prisons of course do hold terrorist offenders. They hold them in the early stages of their sentence, when they are often at their most—well, “disruptive” may not be the word, but when they are coming to terms with what has happened to them.
Rob Butler
Q
Peter Dawson: I am not sure that I would seek to draw any conclusions. People often behave differently as prisoners. I do not underestimate at all the difficulty of making a risk assessment based on the way someone has behaved in prison, compared with how they might behave in the community. It is not an easy thing and not a certain science. But what I would say is that if you want people to behave in a civilised, law-abiding way when they leave prison, the way you treat them in prison is absolutely critical. You must provide a model that people can follow and that they see as fair. If we do not do that, the chances of change are radically diminished.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
Q
“risks further alienating them and giving them grounds for grievance against the authorities”.
You are in effect saying that the Bill should include measures to ensure that effective deradicalisation programmes are provided. What would they look like?
Peter Dawson: The Prison Service runs two programmes at the moment. I said earlier that the evidence base for those was small, because it is innovative work, but they are clearly worth while. The most valuable work that is done in prisons in terms of changing people’s attitudes and behaviours is the day-to-day example that is set around them—the supporting of their growing up and giving them reasons that make life worth living that are nothing to do with their ideology. It is an incessant process, a slow process and an uncertain process, but it is about the impact of everybody in prison on that individual.
What people whose lives have changed dramatically would say is this—I can think of someone I know who committed two murders and who would tell this story. Very often, a particular individual, in the course of a sentence, makes a connection and is able to help that person to grow up and see a different future for themselves. The faith that that key person shows will often drive change in behaviour more than any particular programme.
I have said it before, but the one thing that I am absolutely clear about is that I have never seen anybody coerced into rehabilitation. The particular theory that academics talk mostly about now is called desistance theory. It is about what causes people to change their route in life. That rests very heavily on the idea that somebody has to be able to see a better life for themselves in the future. The academic work tends to support that but, I think, so does all our experience. So I would say that we should not look to prison for magic solutions; we should look for the extreme skill among staff of all sorts, and volunteers in prisons too, in establishing relationships that slowly change the way that somebody thinks about their future. When prisoners go out, however, those promises have to be met. That is why we are saying that rehabilitation is what happens after prison, as much as what happens during it.
Ruth Cadbury
Q
Peter Dawson: I do not think there is anything that I would like to see in the Bill. The question that I hope the Committee will ask is what we do not yet know about the circumstances of the cases that have prompted the Bill. Both the Fishmongers’ Hall attack and the attack in Streatham have been subject to serious case reviews. I certainly have not seen those reviews published.
In both cases, it seems to me that there are questions to ask about whether the existing framework of law would have been adequate had different decisions been taken. That is not to point a finger of blame but simply to say, if we have an existing structure that was not used to best effect, that we should think hard before changing the structure and changing it in a way that raises some of the problems that I have described.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
Q
Peter Dawson: On the first point, it protects the public for those two years or those four years. It does not protect the public on the day the person comes out. I accept the point you make, but if the risk is raised when the person comes out, that seems to be no consolation for the public; certainly it is no consolation for a member of the public who suffers at the end of those four years but has been protected during them.
On the second point, I just have to reverse it. There is no evidence for a deterrent impact. I have never met any prisoner who committed a serious crime who, at the moment of committing it, made a calculation about whether they would spend five, 10 or 14 years in prison. There is no evidence from anywhere in the world that I have ever seen that says that threatening people with longer sentences deters them from committing crime.
In cases of this sort, where an ideology that all of us struggle to understand is concerned, it seems to me that looking to deterrence as a tool for protecting the public is not rational; there is no evidence to support it. Of course, there is the risk that a punishment that appears—I hesitate to say “excessive”—out of kilter with the punishment for other offences creates a sense of grievance, creates martyrs and acts as a recruiting sergeant for people who might otherwise not think in that way.
Alex Cunningham
Q
“The expansion of SOPCs and the expansion of the number of offences able to be identified as having a ‘terrorist connection’ will need careful monitoring for their impact on prison security and on people from minority faith and ethnic communities”.
How can we improve the Bill to achieve that careful monitoring?
Peter Dawson: It may not be something that the Bill can achieve, but I think it is reasonable to ask the Government, after the Bill becomes law, to provide a report on what the impact has been. I entirely take the point that the nature of terrorism at the moment means that certain communities are likely to be more heavily represented, but the point is that all criminal justice agencies need to go beyond that to guard against the unconscious bias that will otherwise creep in.
This is not about Parliament’s intention and it is not about the equality assessment. It is about the behaviour of people on the ground who are not properly aware, when faced with someone from the Muslim faith, that, overwhelmingly, prisoners from the Muslim faith have not committed offences connected with terrorism and would not dream of doing so. Most prisoners see their religion as something that provides structure and help in their life, not something that motivates them to perform criminal acts. None of that is well understood generally, and I am not sure that it is always well understood in prisons. So that unconscious bias—that unwitting prejudice—risks disadvantaging people in all sorts of different ways, from the way complaints are handled to their privilege level in the prison—
The Chair
Order. Mr Dawson, I am afraid I will have to call you to a halt as we have run out of time. Thank you very much for your evidence to the Committee.
Examination of Witnesses
Les Allamby and Dr Hannah Russell gave evidence.
The Chair
We move to our next session, which is evidence from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with Les Allamby, the chief commissioner, and Dr Hannah Russell, the director of legal research and investigations and advice to government. Have we got you with us?
Dr Russell: I am here, and I can see that Les is here but is currently muted.
The Chair
We had better try to address that. This time we will switch sides and start with Conor Burns.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
Q
Dr Russell: If you do not mind me starting and, if we manage to get Les unmuted, I will let him take over. Apologies for the difficulties with the remote working of this. I think Les is now unmuted.
Les Allamby: I think I may be. Can you hear me?
Hon. Members
Yes.
Les Allamby: Apologies for my technological illiteracy. Yes, Conor, we have real concerns in relation to human rights in three areas among others. The first is the retrospective nature of many of the provisions in terms of both sentencing and release. As the Committee will know, some apply to individuals who have committed offences and not yet been sentenced, but some in particular apply to those who are already sentenced and are serving a term of imprisonment. Particularly for Northern Ireland, the change of the automatic release point of relevant terrorism sentences to two thirds and then referral to the Parole Board is being extended to Northern Ireland—it has already happened elsewhere—and the addition of polygraph testing conditions to the licence of a person who has committed a relevant terrorist offence are two of the retrospective measures for those who have been sentenced.
The second area is the extension of a number of provisions to those who are under 18, in terms of both sentencing and licensing arrangements. We have some experience, both historical and contemporary, in Northern Ireland of the impact that adults have on children and young people. It has been mentioned by the UN Committee against Torture and our own paramilitarism commission has looked at this. It is very clear that the evidence is, frankly, that 15, 16 and 17-year-olds are not leading grown men in paramilitary activity or the control of communities in Northern Ireland; it is the reverse that is true. Therefore—I will return to the rehabilitation aspects that Peter Dawson touched on—while these are serious offences that apply to under-18s and there is a very limited discretion in terms of mandatory approaches, we think that applying these provisions to children and young people raises human rights issues, particularly in terms of the UN convention on the rights of the child and a number of provisions in general comments made by the convention committee.
Our third concern is about polygraph testing. I am a great believer in evidence-based policy making. As far as I can see, there is a paucity of evidence about just how accurate polygraph testing is. Although I recognise that polygraph testing will be used only in very specific circumstances, and not for new offences and coming before the courts, and although it has been used in the case of sex offenders before, it still seems to me that, as the Independent Reviewer of Terror Legislation has suggested, there needs to be at least piloting and some evidence of its veracity.
Otherwise, it seems to me that there are two implications. Either someone who is innocent is presumed to be guilty of something without requiring any other salient evidence, which risks a miscarriage of justice and a sense of grievance, or the reverse: someone who is a danger passes the test and we fall into the risk of complacency setting in. Somebody’s licence can be revoked as a result of a polygraph test, and they could therefore be returned to prison. Also, as far as I can see—again, this was noted by Jonathan Hall—there is the possibility in the Bill of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure being applied as a result of a polygraph test. There are some significant outcomes to that. Again, applying that retrospectively also comes into play.
Finally, the purpose of the Bill is clearly laudable: to protect the public and to curtail terror. However, the Prison Reform Trust’s recent research noted the significant increase in the number of people serving very long sentences in prison, not just for offences related to terror. When you take into account the reduction in the opportunities for rehabilitation as a result of the provisions in the Bill—particularly the incentives for rehabilitation—it seems to me that that could lead to a greater risk both inside prison, in terms of overcrowding, mental health issues, suicide risks and radicalisation opportunities, as well as outside prison.
Keeping people in for longer with less prospect of rehabilitation really seems to me to be a blunt instrument to protect the public. We would do better to try offer and recognise rehabilitation pathways, alongside discerning those who are determined not to change their outlook on life and dealing with those individuals accordingly. Those are our concerns. We would be happy to put in a written submission on some of the wider issues around TPIMs, and so on.
Conor McGinn
Q
Already in Northern Ireland there is common parlance in use around internment for what might be seen as measures in place for existing terrorist and paramilitary prisoners. Is there a concern on your part, first, that what is proposed might interfere with the settlement in the Good Friday agreement, particularly around licensing, and, secondly, that rather perversely it may be used by those engaged in terrorism as a further opportunity, as you say, to groom young people and present themselves as the wronged party?
Les Allamby: Yes, Conor, I do think that there is a risk here. The number of offenders in Northern Ireland who are likely to be affected by moving to a two-thirds sentence is relatively small, but almost all of them, if not all of them—I do not have the figures in front of me, but it is certainly the vast majority—are people who will have been involved in what I might call Northern Irish-based terror activity.
Therefore, we have a small number of loyalists and dissident republicans in prison, some of whom have breached their licence conditions under the Good Friday agreement and have gone back into prison to serve the rest of their sentence, and others who have committed more contemporary crimes, often more around dissident republicanism or euphemistically “ordinary decent crime”, as it used to be called during the troubles, and people might be surprised to learn that we used to have ordinary decent criminals, and others.
In my view, what that means is that if you say to dissident republicans, possibly, and loyalists that they were going to spend x time in prison and it is now going to be y time, you will create the conditions for a sense of grievance and cause célèbres, of which we have seen plenty of examples. So, that is the downside of doing this, against—
The Chair
Order. I am sorry to interrupt you, but we really have to press on at this stage. Minister.
Chris Philp
Q
You will be aware that when Parliament passed the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in February, Northern Ireland was excluded because we were concerned about issues of retrospection, owing to the differences in sentencing structure in Northern Ireland compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. Having taken very detailed and extensive further legal advice, the Government now take the view that the measures in the TORER Act can safely be applied to Northern Ireland without engaging in issues of retrospectivity, and the Bill seeks to do that. Is that a conclusion with which you concur?
Les Allamby: Clearly, I have not seen your detailed legal advice, so I do not know, and I would have to reflect on whatever legal advice you received; we have not taken legal advice on the issue ourselves.
The one thing I would say is that, as you know, there will need to be a legislative consent motion on a number of the sentencing provisions and, off the top of my head, I suspect that this provision might be one of them. I know from discussions with the relevant Minister in Northern Ireland, who is publicly opposed to terror etc., that there are some very real practical concerns about extending this Act to Northern Ireland and some potentially unintended consequences.
So I think my answer to the question is this: listen very closely to your counterparts in the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and to the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, as to whether this change is advantageous to the circumstances of Northern Ireland. Frankly, I cannot speak for either the Minister or officials, but I would take very careful cognisance of what they have to say to your own civil service colleagues.
Chris Philp
Q
My final question relates to polygraphs. You mentioned the importance of evidence, and later this afternoon we are seeing a professor who is an expert in this area, as far as evidence is concerned. Would you agree that where polygraphs are used just to provide a bit more background information and perhaps prompt further investigation, rather than being used to have a biting and binding consequence, there can be some value in that, as part of a holistic assessment to work out where more work needs to be done? Nobody is suggesting that it would lead to a direct, binding consequence. Does that give you any assurance?
Les Allamby: It gives me, I have to say, a rather limited measure of reassurance. I say that because it seems to me that if that is the case, then frankly that ought to be written into the Bill. It ought to be clear that the outcome of a polygraph test on its own should not have any adverse impact.
If you are going to introduce polygraph tests, you really should pilot them. I will quickly give you an example. It may seem a slightly odd analogy, but I used to sit on the Social Security Advisory Committee, and I remember being told many years ago by the Department for Work and Pensions that it was looking at voice recognition, as a way of starting to tell whether somebody might be telling the truth or not. Great play was made about that approach as a possible way forward in fraud detection, etc. It unravelled as the evidence became clearer that there were significant flaws in using that technology for making assumptions about whether individuals were telling the truth.
I cannot draw any objective scientific comparison between voice recognition and polygraphs, but it is a cautionary tale of rushing into using technology without piloting it and really considering what other safeguards you should have before using it.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Les Allamby: Yes, certainly. One concern is the relative absence of safeguards around extending it beyond two years. I think there ought to be additional judicial safeguards. There ought to be a test, if you are going to extend beyond two years, as to whether there is a compelling basis for doing so.
I have concerns that the loosening of the test from the balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion. I note that we have slalomed, going back to control orders, as to what the required burden of proof is. I note the issues David Anderson raised. I also noted that the European convention on human rights memorandum issued by the Department suggested that things had changed between 2015 and 2020, but I am unsure whether that change is sufficiently compelling to reduce the test from balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion.
TPIMs are used in a very small number of cases. They are oppressive. None the less, they are utilised on a sparing basis. But you need additional safeguards, if you will extend them beyond two years. Two years is a significant period of time in someone’s life to restrict their freedom of movement and their liberty, to the extent that TPIMs currently do, bearing in mind some of the additional provisions that will now be contained in TPIMs.
Rob Butler
Q
“New subsection (5) establishes that statements or physiological reactions of the offender in polygraph sessions cannot be used as evidence in proceedings for an offence against the released person.”
Does that provide you with the comfort you were seeking?
Les Allamby: Yet again, it provides me with a very limited measure of reassurance. It is absolutely right that you should not be able to take someone back to court to suggest a new offence has been committed on the basis of the polygraph, so that provides a measure of reassurance.
But I am mindful that if, for example, you are released on licence and you fail a polygraph test, it can be used to revoke your licence and place you back in prison. That is a pretty severe consequence for technology that has not been piloted. The reassurance is welcome in those terms, but you have to understand where else the ramifications of—
Chris Philp
Q
Les Allamby: I think that is helpful—I would like to see any of those kinds of intentions in the Bill—but I come back to my fundamental point, which is that, as far as I understand it, the polygraph test is still untried in terms of its complete veracity, and we are using technology that has not been piloted in those circumstances. Frankly, if we are going to move to polygraph tests in those circumstances, I would much prefer them to be piloted, so we could then make a genuinely informed decision about their value before we start to take decisions that may have significant consequences.
Conor McGinn
Q
Les Allamby: Conor, I honestly do not know; I have not had discussions with either the PSNI or Garda Síochána on those arrangements. I certainly do not detect from PSNI a great deal of desire to see those kinds of arrangements in place, which I certainly do not think will be enhanced, but I cannot comment meaningfully on that.
One thing that I would say is that the much more significant issue for us in terms of cross-border co-operation—it is outwith your Committee—is reaching effective security and justice arrangements when we leave the European Union at the end of December. Northern Ireland’s land border with another member state creates a full range of issues that I think are slightly different for the rest of the UK. I have not detected in public discourse anything to suggest that, but “I don’t know” is a shorter and more succinct answer.
The Chair
Q
Dr Russell: Nothing in particular. To drive home the point about under-18s, I draw your attention to the UN convention on the rights of the child, in which a number of provisions, particularly in article 40, set out the need to treat children differently and to see the impacts that the criminal justice system can have on children who enter it as different to the impacts on adults. In the context of Northern Ireland, as it has already been raised, there are specific concerns around the recruitment of children by paramilitaries here. There are particular sensitivities around that, which need to be taken into account in the Bill.
The Chair
Thank you. Does anyone have any more questions? No. In that case, I thank both our witnesses very much. Mr McGinn, I think I called you Conor Burns at the start, thereby inexplicably confusing you with the distinguished former Trade Minister, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns). I think the best and safest thing I can do is apologise to you both.
Examination of witness
Michael P. Clancy OBE gave evidence.
The Chair
Michael Clancy is the director of law reform at the Law Society of Scotland. Good afternoon, Mr Clancy.
Michael Clancy: Good afternoon, Chair; good afternoon everyone.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: Thank you, Mr Philp. To answer about projecting what the effect of legislation will be on protecting the public and making people safer is quite difficult, because for me, as an individual, it would certainly be speculation to say that the Bill would protect people. Legislation has limited effect in terms of it being passed; it really has to be brought into effect and made to work through enforcement for the real impact to be felt. That is part of the issue about whether or not people would be protected by the Bill. It may be some time before we can turn around and do adequate research on the implementation of the measures in order to assume that people have, since its enactment, been better protected than they were before. It is difficult for me to comment on that.
That having been said, I know that sociologists and criminologists have been looking at this kind of things. In one article I picked up latterly, entitled “Does Terrorism Dominate Citizens’ Hearts or Minds? The Relationship between Fear of Terrorism and Trust in Government” by Ramon van der Does. He came to the conclusion that
“Despite its well-known effects on public health, safety, and finances, we still know little about how fear of terrorism can be mitigated.”
That might go some way to edging to an answer to the Minister’s question. Every Bill is good in parts, and has good parts, parts that can be improved by amendment during its passage and parts that, in some instances, should not be legislated at all. So, as you can tell from the Law Society of Scotland’s memorandum on the Bill, we take very much that kind of view.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: I certainly agree that, for those who are convicted of serious terrorist offences, keeping them in prison for a longer time means that they are not at liberty to commit other terrorist offences. Whether that actually means that they have no influence on others in the commission of terrorist offences—either those they meet in prison who are on their way towards release, or those with whom they can communicate outside prison while they are serving their sentence—is another matter.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Michael Clancy: I have great respect for the Law Society of England and Wales’s positions most of the time. As you will have seen from our memorandum of comments, we have reservations about the use of polygraphs. In particular, we think that there is an issue about the reliability of polygraphs. They have been used in England and Wales, but they have not been used in Scotland. One point that I would like to pick up on is that the adaptation of Scottish criminal procedure through the Bill to provide for polygraphs is something we would have liked to see further consultation on, with greater explanation of how this would work before it is fully imported into the legal system in Scotland. I know that considerable advances have been made in neuroscientific technologies, such as the use of polygraphs, but in many instances in the United States—I draw your attention to the Supreme Court case of US v. Scheffer in 1998—there were considerable concerns about the reliability of polygraphs. That concern has persisted since that time, to such an extent that we have to be quite careful about citing American jurisdictions, because some of them do not allow for any—
Alex Cunningham
Q
Michael Clancy: Of course, the Parole Board for Scotland is not referred to much in the Bill—only in a couple of instances. We would need to take a further look at exactly how the implications of the Bill work for the Parole Board for Scotland, which has its own particular arrangements. I will therefore pass on that question as to its effects on the Parole Board for England and Wales.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Michael Clancy: As you will have seen from other evidence that has been submitted, the aspect of children and young persons is quite significant for Scotland. I refer in particular to paragraphs 21 to 27 of the submission by Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, which clearly discuss the effects on children and young people in Scotland. He says:
“The proposed application of the serious terrorism sentence to offenders aged 18 to 21 in Scotland raises starkly the question of whether there is a bright line between offenders above and below…18. This is because the Scottish Sentencing Council is currently consulting on its third draft guideline, ‘Sentencing Young People’ and proposes that special sentencing principles should apply to offenders up to the age of 25.”
For all who are interested in the Bill, it would be helpful to know the extent to which the Government have been able to consult with the Scottish Sentencing Council about the provisions affecting children and young people in Scotland, particularly as they are carrying out the current review.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes, I believe so.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: I found Mr Hall’s analysis of the issue of orders for lifelong restriction very compelling. As he points out, this is a unique type of sentence, imposed
“for serious violent offences if certain risk criteria are met”—
for example,
“where the offender would otherwise seriously endanger the lives, or physical or psychological wellbeing, of members of the public at large.”
Therefore, I think we should view Mr Hall’s evidence carefully. He points out in his note:
“An Order for Lifelong Restriction is an indeterminate sentence comprising a stated period of detention or imprisonment (called a punishment part) during which the offender cannot be considered for release, followed by the continued incarceration of the offender unless and until the Parole Board for Scotland is satisfied that the offender no longer”
carries such a risk. That implies a paradox: the 14-year sentence plus the extended sentence might be a shorter period in prison than one under an order for lifelong restriction, so we have to be careful about weighing Jonathan Hall’s evidence against the provisions in the Bill. I hope that answers your question.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes. Well, I do not pretend to know the mind of Scottish Ministers as to why they have not introduced polygraphs in Scotland. I suspect that they think the jury is out on that question, because of the variable opinions about the value of polygraphs.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: That is true: they are not.
Joanna Cherry
Q
“responsibility, organisation, funding, monitoring and training”.
Can you elaborate on that?
Michael Clancy: It would be a significant step, because there has been no prior consultation to discuss the appropriateness of the use of polygraphs, how that would be implemented and whose responsibility it would be to arrange for polygraphs to be used in Scotland. Those are the kinds of issues that need to be explored quite carefully. It would also be important to know how they will be resourced. We are going to enter into a period of extraordinary public expenditure difficulty in the next few months and years, so introducing something that would be a significant expense in terms of their usage, the training of the operators and such, would be something one would want to look at very carefully.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Before I answer that, could I add a small coda to the provisions about polygraphs? Under clause 33, a new section is inserted into the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, which provides that
“Scottish Ministers may…specify a polygraph condition”.
The emphasis of that discretion in the Bill is an acknowledgement that this matter would be within the devolved competence of Scottish Ministers to be talking about and implementing legislation for. It would therefore be a question to ask Scottish Ministers, as to what their views are about the implementation of polygraphs in Scotland.
Going back to the standard of proof—
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes, that is correct.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Again, we set out some views in our memorandum. Moving from a position where it was on the balance of probabilities to a reasonable suspicion is a significant drop. It is even a drop from reasonable belief, which was a prior standard used in the old control orders that preceded TPIMs. We take that as being something that is problematic. It certainly indicates a lower standard, but that is about as far as I would put it at the moment. It is within the range of civil contemplation. We have got to be cautious about what we actually mean by reasonable suspicion. The balance of probabilities means satisfaction on the evidence that the occurrence is more likely than not. Reasonable suspicion is simply, “Have I got any basis for thinking that this is the case?”
Miss Dines
Q
“What is needed is to tackle the basic causes of these terrorist incidents”.
There are two parts to the first question: what do you say are the basic causes of crime, and why are the proposals that are being put forward not good enough? Secondly, what alternatives should be put forward? What are the causes, and what would you do, in rejecting these proposals?
Michael Clancy: These are very big questions. Explaining the causes of crime might just be a little bit beyond my competence in the time I am allowed to talk for. But, clearly, when we are dealing with a cohort that is inclined to terrorist offences, the issue is the achievement of some political or social aim through the use of violence, rather than through any democratic change, and that is roundly to be condemned by anyone who has any sense of democratic responsibility.
I do not for a moment underestimate the extent to which those who engage in such terrorist offences may have motivations that most other people would find difficult to understand. With any type of instance when terrorism has occurred, sometimes we can just think to ourselves, “How could someone do this to other people?” But I cannot reach into the psychology of terrorist offenders to be able to answer your question completely.
In our analysis of terrorist prevention and investigation measures, we have taken a view on the components of that—for example, the removal of the two-year limit on the length of time that a TPIM can be imposed, so it is now available under the terms of the Bill for indefinite renewal and no subsequent judicial review. We think that removing judicial review is a significant departure, and making the provision of the TPIM unlimited can be problematic. That probably engages certain provisions of the European convention on human rights. For example, in terms of the lack of a judicial review, there is no independent oversight of that. We would suggest that, given the small number of TPIMs there have been in the past, if that is going to be replicated, having some form of judicial review may allow for a contemplation about the extent to which article 8—the right to a private life—might be impacted by the provision of the TPIM as it is currently anticipated to be.
We would also refer to the variation of the relocation measures in the same kind of way, under clause 39. The extension of residence measures, so that any house or residence can be applied under clause 39, is something that we thought was potentially in conflict with article 8. We have already talked about the polygraph measures. I am less worried about the drug testing measures, because drug testing measures are in common currency in the tools that can be employed to make sure that people are not contravening the Misuse of Drugs Act, with the impact that that has on someone’s thinking and what they might want to do in a state where they are under the influence of drugs.
The Chair
Order. I think I am going to ask you to let me move on, Mr Clancy, because a few other people are indicating that time is moving on. Is there anyone else waiting to come in? No. In that case, I call Laura Trott.
Laura Trott (Sevenoaks) (Con)
Q
I was pleased to see in your evidence the point that an increased sentence offers an increased opportunity for greater rehabilitation while someone is in prison. Do you have any views on what form that rehabilitation should take?
Michael Clancy: I am not a penologist. Therefore, I would rather leave that to experts in rehabilitation theory than make up some layman’s version of it, if you do not mind.
Chris Philp
Q
Michael Clancy: Of course you can ask me, Minister. That is certainly something I will take back and think about, because I was not aware that that evidence had been given this morning. I should say that this is, of course, a civil law provision, not a criminal law provision, in terms of the standard of proof. Of course we have to take into account the views of the counter-terrorism police experts and weigh them very heavily, but it is a different environment, in one sense, from the environment that the police are used to operating in—namely, beyond reasonable doubt. But I take your point and will give that some further thought.
Chris Philp
Q
To give you further reassurance perhaps, the lower burden of proof, reasonable suspicion, is of course not a new burden of proof, because the old control orders, in force from 2005—they were introduced by the then Labour Government—and carrying on until 2012, had the same lower burden of proof, reasonable suspicion. This morning, I asked Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer, whether he was aware of any problems that occurred during that seven-year period, 2005 to 2012, when that lower burden of proof was in force, and he was unaware of any issues caused by it. Does that give you further reassurance?
Michael Clancy: It does. Of course, set against that is the fact that very few of these orders were in place at that time. I think that, in doing some reading in advance of this session, I saw numbers in the mid-40s—46 orders or something like that. If they are going to be used at that kind of level of exercise, it is clearly going to impact on a smaller group of people. Small does not mean insignificant, in this circumstance, but we will just have to wait and see what the evidence of their use produces.
Chris Philp
Q
I have one final point. You mentioned concerns about renewal. Of course, renewal, under these proposals, would take place annually. And you mentioned a few moments ago judicial oversight as a concern. Of course, the subject of the TPIM can at any time bring a legal challenge against the use of the TPIM if they feel that it has become unfair. Does the availability of that mechanism to bring a challenge give you reassurance that the subject of the TPIM does have recourse to the courts, and can be protected by a judge, if he or she feels that that is necessary?
Michael Clancy: Well, of course, yes, it gives me some reassurance. I am glad to hear you make such a clear statement of the interpretation of the Bill. Certainly, the TPIM is reduced for one year, but it is capable of being made indefinite. If one were to take action—as you have suggested someone who is subject to one of these orders might take action—it might be the case that the judge would only be able to quash the TPIM rather than make any variation. That might be a solution that we would mutually accept, but there may be implications from that I suppose.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: I have no evidence. As I have said, the important thing would be to see how this change to the legislation works and then, in a shortish period of time—between two to five years—think in terms of having some kind of post-legislative review, which would enable us to see whether this legislation had functioned properly and had met the objectives that the Committee has been discussing this afternoon of making people safer and protecting them. Then we can come to a view as to whether or not that change in the standard of proof was the right one.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Michael Clancy: As far as I know. I have not actually seen a statement by Jonathan Hall about the burden of proof, but I am sure that you are leading me to the conclusion that there is one.
Joanna Cherry
Yes. He has given us evidence this morning and provided a note to that effect, but, as always, you are being scrupulously fair.
The Chair
Absolutely. Are there any further questions? In that case, Mr Clancy, thank you very much for giving your evidence today.
Michael Clancy: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It has been a pleasure, a rather disembodied pleasure, but a pleasure none the less.
Examination of Witness
Professor Donald Grubin gave evidence.
The Chair
We now come to our final witness of the day, Professor Donald Grubin of Newcastle University, who has had the benefit of hearing some of the exchanges earlier. Let us begin.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I am a professor of forensic psychiatry, so I am a psychiatrist and not a polygraph examiner. I became interested in polygraph testing about 20 years ago in relation to work with offenders. What I found was that polygraph testing was being used very widely in the United States to monitor offenders. The people using it said, “This is fantastic. If they took it away, I would quit.” They would make comments like that, but the academics felt that there was no evidence for it and a lot of what we are hearing today is that it is not reliable. A lot of those issues were repeated. I became interested in that difference. We began to run some studies here in the UK. Gradually over time, a lot of evidence accumulated to show that it was a very effective means of monitoring and managing offenders in the community.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: The first thing to say is that there is a lot of misunderstanding about polygraph testing. We heard a lot of that earlier today, and I get very frustrated, because those same comments get repeated and repeated. There is also a lot of confusion about polygraph testing—what it is, what it does and how it is used.
In essence, all polygraph testing does is provide additional information—information gain—and it does that in two main ways. One is the test outcome, which people often get tied up in—is somebody lying or telling the truth?—but it is also about disclosures. The two are complementary. What every study ever carried out on polygraph testing has found is that when people are having a polygraph, they make disclosures. All the studies we have done here, and indeed the implementation of polygraph testing here with sex offenders, has found the same thing.
There was a comment that this has not been piloted, but we have now run about 5,000 tests in probation, with mandatory tests on sex offenders. We have tested over 2,000 individuals and the police, with voluntary testing, have tested about 1,000 individuals and run about 2,000 tests. We have a lot of information, and again we find that about 60% to 70% of tests result in new information that was not known before and is important to management.
The other aspect, of course, is test outcome. People always want to know how accurate it is, and we know —we have very good estimates. The best study was a comprehensive review carried out by the National Research Council in the United States about 20 years ago, when it was being raised for security vetting in Government agencies. It looked at all the available evidence and found it was between 80% and 90% accurate. That means it gets it wrong about one in five or one in 10 times, but that is a lot better than we can do.
The main question then is: is that accurate enough for the application you want to put it to? What we are talking about is post-release, post-conviction testing as part of monitoring offenders, and in that capacity it is being used alongside a number of other aspects of offender management. You are not relying on the polygraph either to clear someone or to send them back to prison or anything like that; it is not used in that way. It is just additional information that can be added. If you think about different sorts of results that you might get, if somebody, say, passes a polygraph test—I do not like to use the term pass, but I will for simplicity’s sake—and they do not make any disclosures and there are no other concerns about the individual, that provides reassurance that you are not missing anything; it is an agreement with everything else. If, on the other hand, you get some disclosures, that is something that can be investigated further. If somebody fails the polygraph, so they are thought to be lying, and there are already concerns, again, that reinforces that, but if there are not, the polygraph may be wrong—it may be one of the one in five or one in 10 times we have gotten it wrong—but it may also suggest that you need to look at it a bit closer and investigate further.
There were comments before about how if somebody fails a polygraph they are brought back to prison or brought before the courts. That is just not the policy, and we have heard that in the legislation that just does not happen. It is simply a warning sign that you had better take a closer look. Again, we have a lot of evidence from the testing we have done in this country—as I said, over 7,000 tests have been run—to show that that is in fact how things are working.
Can I say one last thing? We often present polygraph testing as if it is something that offenders do not like and is being imposed on them. That is true for some, but others actually find it useful. You have to remember that sometimes you catch people telling the truth, and where you have an individual who is being monitored, because a risk is a great cause of concern and there is a suspicion of them all the time, and they can demonstrate that they are actually not doing anything wrong and their risk is static or decreasing, that is very useful for them. We have anecdotal evidence of offenders saying they found that part of the testing helpful, and they like polygraph tests for that reason—because they can prove that they are following the rules.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: It is fair, except that I would say it is more than a prompt and that it actually uncovers information. You have to remember that a lot of this management relies on self-reports, so it is a way of saying, “We’re asking these questions anyway, only now we want you to tell the truth and we have a way of trying to determine whether you are telling the truth.” The other aspect, of course, which is often overlooked is its deterrence effect. If you know you are going to have a polygraph test, you are going to pay a lot closer attention to your activities, your actions and your behaviour. Again, we have a lot of anecdotal evidence—it is very difficult to prove—that people do modify their behaviour, because they know they are going to have a polygraph test.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: Nobody is recalled on the basis of a failed polygraph test. That is the important point which people often misunderstand.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: No. The sex offender work is, in effect, a pilot for this, because even though the risks are different the underlying principles are the same: there are individuals who are a cause for concern and you have time to intervene if you are picking up warning signs. If they are making disclosures that indicate that the risk is increasing, that would be grounds for recalling them to prison, but that is because of something they have told you. If they told you in another setting, if they said it in an interview with a probation officer, they would be recalled on that basis as well. If they simply fail a polygraph test but they do not make any disclosures, nothing happens to them. The questions on which they failed are explored further and to say, “Maybe this is wrong, maybe one in five times it is wrong, but maybe there is something there that we have missed and we have to have a closer look.” That is followed up by further interviewing with the offender. There may be other investigations that are put in place. We have a lot of examples, with the sex offender work, where that has happened. I would say, in a way, that the sex offender work is just a very large pilot for this application.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: I am not quite clear what you are asking. In terms of the disclosure, this is after they have been released so the tests are not being run in prison, they are being run in the community, so any issues with the Parole Board I do not think are directly relevant to the polygraph testing.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: There are two aspects: one is mental health and one is young people. I share your concerns regarding young people. It depends on what sort of age we are talking about. Certainly, I have had discussions about what an appropriate age might be. I am very clear that certainly any individual below the age of 16 should not be subject to a polygraph test.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: You say “subject”—that is probably not the right word. The reasons why you would not want to use it under 16 are, first, we are not sure that brain development means the polygraph will work in the same way as it does with adults. We know there is a big change in brain development around the time of puberty. Around the age of 16, I think things are adult-like enough to mean that polygraph testing will be valid.
Alex Cunningham
Sorry to interrupt you, but colleagues in Scotland are suggesting that you do not have full maturation until the age of 25.
Professor Grubin: It is actually a bit older than that—I have seen 29. It is not a question of full maturation; it is a question of whether the brain has matured enough so that the polygraph works in similar way to how it works with adults. Again, there is a lot of confusion about what a polygraph detects. It does not detect lies; we know that. It detects activity within the autonomic nervous system that reflects cognate processing in response to questions. By the time somebody has reached the age of around 16, that looks similar to an adult’s.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: That is an issue for training and oversight. There is an important thing for me with polygraph testing. A lot of the criticisms of it are not about polygraph but bad practice and the limitation of polygraph. It is very important that examiners understand issues around mental health and mental illness. If there are problems, they can either adapt their testing to take that into account or not do the test, depending on what the circumstances are.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: I am not sure that that is something you can legislate for, apart from saying that there needs to be proper training and proper supervision. My concern always is that, being Government, one day somebody will want to save a little bit of money and will say, “We don’t really need this supervision quality control. They can just get on with it.” That is where I think danger lies. Provided that there is proper supervision, I do not know how much further you can legislate.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Professor Grubin: I was a member of a risk management authority for a number of years, so I know how they work and what they look at. When you talk about piloting, are you looking to get disclosures that will have the same levels of accuracy? There is no reason why a Scottish offender should be any different from an English or American one. The polygraph should work in the same way. There is a lot of experience now on how to implement. From my point of view, this is one of the few things where we have been able to scale up from pilot studies to actual implementation and to continue to keep its integrity and keep it working. I do not see why any of that would be any different in Scotland. I appreciate there are resource and training issues, but that would not be a reason not to pilot it. That would be a reason to get the training and implementation issues in place.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Professor Grubin: Yes.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Professor Grubin: No wiggle room.
Joanna Cherry
Q
Professor Grubin: They are not under the conscious control of the subject. We know that. Also, you get those responses not just from being deceptive; there is a range of things that can cause that response. In a polygraph test, somebody does not just walk into the room, get hooked up to a polygraph and then get asked questions. It is a fairly lengthy process. It takes at least an hour: typically two or three hours for a polygraph test. Most of that is spent in a pre-test interview where you go through information with the examinee with the aim of making sure that, if he is responding, he is responding because he is being deceptive and not for some other reason. That is where are lot of the training comes from and that is what differentiates a good polygraph examiner from a bad one: the way they have approached the interview and the test means that those responses are seen because of deception. It doesn’t always happen, which is why we get the one in five, one in 10 error rate. What you are looking for is physiological responses associated with deception. They can be associated with other things as well, but the aim of the polygraph test is to try to make sure it is because somebody is being deceptive.
Miss Dines
Q
Professor Grubin: It is not valuable at all. You cannot use polygraph testing as a means of testing intentions. The polygraph is looking specifically at behaviours. Your colleague referred to concrete, very narrow questions of the type, “Have you done this?” They can be screening-type questions, or they can be very specific, such as, “Did you rob the bank?”, “Did you shoot the gun?” or whatever. It is not a tool for eliciting intentions or validating responses to those sorts of question.
Ruth Cadbury
Q
Professor Grubin: For people with an intellectual disability, you are absolutely right that the accuracy of the test decreases once IQ drops below a certain level. In the sex offender testing, we will typically test down to 60, but we are much more cautious with the test outcome. It is still valuable, because of the disclosure aspect; you still get information and information gain—the point about information gain is the main one I want to leave you with—from the test, even with someone with an intellectual disability.
Again, examiners need to be trained; they need to address their questions in a different way, one that is much more concrete. The test has to be modified. It has to be shorter because of fatigue and issues such as that. So, you are absolutely right that accuracy decreases, but you must remember that nothing hinges on a test outcome alone. If it is a deceptive response and you have no other concerns, you would still look further. You might say, “We have to be more cautious because of IQ.”
There is no evidence to suggest it works any differently with people with personality disorders from how it works with anybody else. Again, because of misunder- standings about how polygraph works, people think, “It does not work with psychopathic individuals because they don’t feel anxiety.” First, the test is not based on anxiety. Sometimes when we do talks, and we will have an examiner, we can do demonstrations of polygraph testing. We used to like to get a volunteer from the audience who we can hook up. I try to pick somebody who is also a psychopath, so we can kill two birds with one stone. I know that here we would not be able to do that, but in the audiences I speak to there are often one or two psychiatrists who would fit the bill for a psychopath. There has been some testing of personality disorders and there is no evidence that the test itself is any less valuable. Again, part of the training of the examiner is that they need to know how to interview these individuals, because of the challenges that they may present.
I believe the third group you were thinking about was those with neurodevelopmental disorder or autistic spectrum disorder. Again, the evidence is that the test works just as well with them as with anybody else, but you have to make allowances in the interview, because of the concrete nature of a lot of their thinking, language difficulties and so on. You need to take that into account in terms of the interviewing, but there is no evidence to suggest that the test itself works any differently with them from how it works with anybody else.
Ruth Cadbury
Q
Professor Grubin: We do test with interpreters, and they seem to work just as well. Again, it does take training for the examiner to know how to work with an interpreter, and the interpreter needs training as well. Certainly, security services in other countries use it with interpreters quite regularly.
Laura Trott
Q
Professor Grubin: There is a range of reasons that people can give either false positives or false negatives. Apologies for not looking at you while I am answering. Sometimes it is because the test hasn’t been set out properly, the examinee hasn’t been prepared properly in the pre-test interview or the questions haven’t been formulated well, and so on.
The examinee may have some other experience that is close enough to the way the question is being asked to cause that sort of response. For example, there was a very good study carried out in Israel. I won’t go through all the details of it, but they were able to debrief afterwards as we were with police officers who were applying for promotion. There were two false positives. The ground troops knew that these two people had been telling the truth, but they were said to be lying. One of them had said that he had previously made an insurance claim in Israel. At that time, the insurance companies in Israel would test people making insurance claims to see if they were honest or not. He said that he was being honest, but he was told that he was lying. He couldn’t get that out of his mind during the test. That causes the cognitive processing we were talking about, and it made him respond in that way.
The other person was more interesting. The experiment itself was about a test that the examinees could cheat on. You would know if they cheated or not. The second police officer said that he cheated when he took the test, but there was something wrong when he took it and the examiners had him do the test a second time. When he did it the second time, he said, “I don’t think I had better cheat again,” so he did it honestly. When he was asked if he had cheated on the test the second time, he said that he was thinking about having cheated the first time, which is why he reacted as he did.
There are other reasons as well, but it is hard to explain without going into the details about how polygraph testing works. Basically, you are comparing the relevant questions that you are interested in with so-called comparison questions. If those comparison questions are not evocative enough to elicit a response when a person is telling the truth to the relevant question, or vice versa, when they are too hot and the person is much more concerned about that question than about the relevant one, you can also get mistakes on the test.
The final reason is that sometimes we just don’t know; it just happens.
Laura Trott
Q
Professor Grubin: It is very similar. In sex offender testing, the majority of questions relate to their licence conditions and they are asked specifically about those conditions. You have to remember in a polygraph test and a screening test you get, at most, three relevant questions, so if they have 15 licence conditions you are only going to be able to test three of them. You can ask about all of them during the pre-test interview and, of course, the examinee won’t know which ones he will be asked on the test, which is why you get disclosures.
By and large, they are about licence conditions, and I would think that with this group that is what they would be. The things you would be interested in are undisclosed internet devices, have they been in contact with certain individuals, have they travelled to certain places and those sorts of question. The sex offenders are also asked about fantasies, but I am not sure that you would be particularly interested in that with this group.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Grubin: Either I have either misunderstood you or you have misunderstood me. Were you referring to intellectual disability?
Alex Cunningham
Yes.
Professor Grubin: I think what I said was when IQ gets down to around 60; I did not say that the accuracy was around 60. I said that it becomes less accurate as the IQ lowers and that we typically would not test somebody with an IQ below 60.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: There are a couple of aspects to the answer to that. First, there is no reason to think it would not work similarly with terrorist offenders. They are people and they respond to polygraph testing like anybody else. It is used with terrorist offenders in other countries, but the problem is that that sort of work is not published. My understanding of it is anecdotal and what people have told me. They certainly find that its use is successful, and they get the same types of response that you would expect from the sex offender work. There is no real difference there. But none of that is published, so it is anecdotal.
One other thing to say from the sex offender work is that we looked at whether, after polygraph tests, there was an increase in actions taken by the probation officers managing those people. You get an increase by a factor of 10, sometimes higher, in actions taken. That does not necessarily mean recall to prison or charging with a new offence, but actions that mean you have an opportunity to reduce risk, which is really what you are looking for here. With any sort of offence where you have time to intervene, polygraph testing provides a good means to get that information to allow you to intervene and reduce risk.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I will give you a couple of examples of that, but the first thing to say is that we do not know why it happens. There are various psychological attempts to explain it, but I know that I have been polygraph tested as part of our training and it was all I could do not to confess to the crime that I was meant to have committed. There is a real urge to disclose that I do not really understand, but there are various theories that I am happy to discuss later on.
To give you a couple of examples off the top of my head, one interesting case was a sex offender who was released from prison. Everything was thought to be going well with him. He disclosed that he had a new girlfriend, which was not known to the offender manager. That seems pretty mundane, but when they found this girlfriend it turned out that she was a single mother, that she was a vulnerable woman, and that this man was visiting her and helping her to paint her sitting room. He would do that in his underwear because he did not want to get his clothes painted. Her daughter was present at that time. A lot of that mirrored the way he had offended before, so that one disclosure about having a new girlfriend led to that man being recalled to prison —not based directly on the disclosure, but only indirectly, once the girlfriend was found and interviewed.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Grubin: I am not sure just what you would mean. I can tell you, because I checked these figures before I came, that in the probation testing about 65% of tests resulted in new disclosures in the pre-test. That is information that was important to management but was not known. That might be small bits of information or it might be big bits. After someone fails a test, they are asked to explain why that might be, and about 60% of those tests result in further disclosures to try to explain that. What I cannot say is how many of those were in tests where there were no pre-test disclosures, so it is likely that about two thirds or 70% of tests result in new information.
Chris Philp
Wow. Thank you.
Professor Grubin: That does not count something that I think is important but that is always overlooked: the truthful tests with no disclosures that provide reassurance, because decisions can be made on that. In the police world, they do voluntary testing of sex offenders on the register. Someone who is on the register for 15 years and wants to come off it may have been visited once a year for the past five years; there may be no intelligence on him, and an inspector is expected to sign off this person based on that information. If he passes a polygraph test and nothing of concern comes up, that gives them reassurance. Often, though, in those cases we find that bits of information do come up that they should have been aware of, and then they can move forward.
The Chair
Order. I am going to have to stop you there because we have run out of time. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence, Professor Grubin.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove).
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 30th June 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 June 2020 - (30 Jun 2020)
The Chair
Our first witness is Mark Fairhurst, national chairman of the Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers. Mr Fairhurst is participating via Zoom this morning, and I think it is just on audio, so it might be slightly tricky. Please bear with us. Do we have Mr Fairhurst?
Mark Fairhurst: Good morning.
The Chair
Good morning. Would you briefly just introduce yourself and your organisation, please?
Mark Fairhurst: I am national chair of the Prison Officers Association. We represent prison officers in every prison in the United Kingdom and secure psychiatric services as well.
The Chair
Thank you very much. We will start with questions. We have until 9.55 am, when we have to end the session bang on the dot. First, I will ask the Minister if he would like to ask some questions.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Thank you. That is most welcome, and it will be appreciated.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Sure. It is very much intelligence led and risk based. Throughout a TACT offender’s sentence, they will be allocated a key worker officer, who will get to know them and help them through their sentence plan. During that sentence plan, they will be offered the opportunity to address their offending behaviour, and they will be offered two deradicalisation programmes while they are in custody.
Staff will observe their behaviour on the wings, and who they mix with, and they will submit intelligence reports on a regular basis, specifically if they have concerns around radical behaviour while an offender is in custody. That will then lead to a multi-agency approach, and when the offender is coming up to their release point with the Parole Board, we put in place MAPPA arrangements. We will have reports from prison officers, psychologists, psychiatrists and healthcare, and we will liaise with security services, and a full picture will be presented prior to that person’s release.
As we have just witnessed with the Streatham attacker, he left prison as a high-risk, category A offender. The intelligence and the risks that we highlighted to the security services led to him being monitored 24 hours a day, because he was a significant risk to the public. When you look at it in that vein, what we did was appropriate and led to an atrocity being avoided because of the swift reaction. So I think we have got the risk part of the sentence planning really sufficient while in custody.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, that is correct, even—[Inaudible] —reached the halfway point, because legislation dictated that we had no option but to do that. The intelligence we had gathered on his antisocial behaviour and radical behaviour in prison led the Security Service to believe that they were right in following and monitoring him upon his release so extensively. That would be the case in this situation as well. I believe that, with this Bill, at the two-thirds point, people must go through a parole process.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: That is a really valid point, and these concerns have been expressed from the frontline. I can give you an example. At the moment, if we are going to extend the sentences, and we are going to insist that the most serious offenders spend the entire sentence in prison, that will increase headroom in the high-security estate. Also, it incentivises people not to behave correctly or to go on deradicalisation courses.
For example, at the moment, we have funding, and we should have open three separation centres, but we have only got one, with a small number of the most influential and serious terrorist offenders, in play. That leads to serious concerns from my members who are in that separation centre at HMP Frankland, because we are now in a situation where the prisoners who are housed there are not engaging with staff whatever. We have had a really violent assault on a prison officer, and there is nowhere to transfer those prisoners to if they show violence towards staff or if they become a security risk. That is why we need more separation centres open, especially with the implementation of this Bill. More concerningly, there is now no incentive for good behaviour.
Chris Philp
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I think the separation centres are the key. We need three open because, as you are all aware, the rise of the far right is a real concern for the security services. It would be unwise to put high-profile far-right extremist offenders in the same separation centre as Islamist extremist offenders, with staff stuck in the middle. That is the key point here.
To come to your point, what can we do to incentivise people to take part in deradicalisation courses if they know they are going to serve their full sentence? All we can do on the frontline is our best, and that is to try to engage with people, get to know them and encourage them to take part in deradicalisation. We involve imams and community groups to come in and speak to these people. We just keep chipping away, because it is down to the individual. Only the individual can change. We can encourage them to change. We can give them the ideas to change and the courses to help them change, but it is down to the individual. The biggest fear from the frontline is, “If I know, as a terrorist offender, that I am going to serve my full sentence, and I am not going to get any chance of early release, I might totally disengage, and that might reinforce my radical views, which leads me to a disruptive life inside.” That is the biggest fear.
Chris Philp
I understand, although, of course, if they step over the criminal threshold, they will be prosecuted. Equally, there is no value in people pretending to engage with deradicalisation programmes just to secure early release, so we need to be mindful of that risk as well. Thank you, Mr Fairhurst.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
You recently made a film called “The forgotten service”. In that film, you talk about the lack of support for prison officers, particularly around mental health, and there are other issues as well. Somebody responded to that film by saying—I hope the Chair will forgive the swear word in the middle—
“I left 3 months ago from the high security estate, after 18 years I had seen enough. Too much political bullshit, ridiculous workload, rubbish managers causing dramas, and good managers having to pick up all the pieces”.
Few would disagree that the main measures in the Bill are right, but what needs to happen in prisons to ensure that they can cope with the ramifications of it?
Mark Fairhurst: Mental health is a massive issue at the moment. We are getting more and more members suffering from PTSD. When you take the sentiments in that statement from that member of staff who left the service, I can echo every one of those.
What you have got to understand is that staff on the frontline are doing an absolutely fantastic job. They will monitor individuals’ behaviours and make a referral. The current system goes through a three-stage referral process, with the ultimate decision being made to remove someone from the main population to a separation centre at stage three. Very few of those referrals from staff get approved, because of the red tape and the legal challenges. It seems to staff on the frontline that the legal challenges are the major stopping point and buffer to removing people, who are a real danger in the normal population, to a separation centre.
You will eventually have complete apathy from staff, who keep referring people they think should be separated from the main population and keep getting knocked back. That has a knock-on effect, because, day after day, they have to deal with people who are threatening them, who are underhand, who are trying to radicalise people. Day after day, they know that if they make a referral, there is a good chance that that person will not be moved from the main population.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Mark Fairhurst: You need mental health support. You need some sort of counselling service on site five days a week during the working week. You need training to help staff cope, to spot the signs of radicalisation and danger. There is good training on offer if you work in a separation centre, but not for the main body of staff who work on the wings. You need to recognise that staff are under stress, so you need to rotate their jobs so that they are not in a high-stress situation year after year. We need more staff on site to assist us as well, to help prevent trouble breaking out.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Spaces in the high-security estate, where most TACT offenders are housed, are at a premium. We have very few spaces at all in a high-security estate. We do have spaces on courses for deradicalisation programmes, but they are not mandatory; the offender has the choice of whether they wish to attend one. That is another issue: do we want to make these courses mandatory, and where is the incentive to go on a course if you know you will not be released early?
If we are going to increase sentences, I suspect that we will need extra headroom. We will certainly need the other two separation centres open, because of the rise of the far right, and we will certainly have to think about a high-security prison—perhaps specifically to house terrorist offenders. Although there are only approximately 230 in play at the moment, it may be an idea to separate them totally.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I would like the Parole Board involved more, because it is an independent scrutiny body, but the measures we have in place at the moment are adequate. They work really well with the intelligence gathering from the shop floor, with the assessments and with multi-agency experts, including the security services. I do not think there is much more we can do, but I have no objections to the Parole Board being involved more as an independent scrutiny panel.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Mark Fairhurst: This is another issue. If you look at people under the age of 18 and at female offenders, do we have the capability to house them in a secure environment, or are we going to throw them into the adult estate? Throwing a young person into the adult estate due to the nature of their offence could have an adverse effect, so we need to come up with programmes for young offenders who commit terrorist crimes. I do not think we have that capability at the moment, but rehabilitation of a young person has more chance of success than rehabilitation of someone who is seasoned and radicalised. I feel that we have a big opportunity to make a difference in that field.
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP)
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I do think it is important to have an incentive for people to engage with rehabilitation and improve their behaviour. You must also consider that when terrorist offenders are released, they rarely reoffend. Only about 5% to 10% reoffend, compared with 50% to 60% of the general population. I understand that those who do reoffend are high profile and commit atrocities, but we are looking at a cohort that, on the whole, has a 90% success rate, because only 10%—max—reoffend. We need to take that into account when we are thinking about the future of the offender—not only when they are in prison and what we offer them there, but when they are released. I do not think anyone has mentioned that yet.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I like the sound of that, Kenny, I really do, because it gives people an incentive and gives them hope that they will be released before serving their full term, but they are also under no illusion that they will be monitored in the community, and if they commit an offence, they will end up back in prison. I like the idea of that. As you know, Scotland has a lot of good practices that we could adopt in England and Wales, and I ask people to seriously consider that element.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Mark Fairhurst: None whatsoever, Kenny. That would be down to some independent body responsible for performing polygraph tests. That is another skill that I would not mind staff getting trained in—it would be another string to our bow. How often is it going to get used? Is it going to be a regular occurrence? All these issues need to be ironed out, but I am not against the polygraph test and I am not against prison staff being trained in polygraph testing. However, I would guess that scrutiny panels would say that prison officers are not independent because they work with the offenders, so they would want a totally independent body to facilitate that.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Mark Fairhurst: This is the major concern from my colleagues at the only separation centre that is open, in Frankland. We have had one serious assault, and that member of staff had to be a moved away from the separation centre, because there is nowhere to transfer the prisoner. Once that prisoner goes to court, if he is convicted of that assault on the member of staff, where do we transfer him to? We do not. We keep him at Frankland.
We have got a Muslim member of staff at Frankland who is being moved from the separation centre because the terrorist offenders in that separation centre have threatened him. That is not right—staff are being penalised for doing their job because we do not have the capability to transfer violent and disruptive prisoners to another separation centre. We have funding for three, but we only have one open because of the red tape and the legalities of moving people into a separation centre, because apparently, if you have three or fewer prisoners in a separation centre, it is classed as segregation. Well, you know what? Staff on the frontline are not interested in how you term things; they are not interested in the legalities. They are interested in you keeping them safe and giving them the tools to do their job, so let us get these other two centres open and let us respect staff safety.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Q
Mark Fairhurst: I think we need a full review of those two courses, simply because of the last two atrocities, where both offenders had attended one of those courses. One was, in effect, a poster boy for one of the courses. I would like to see a full review, because what do we actually class as a success? Do we class success as offenders attending and passing those courses, or do we class as success the offender who attended those courses being released and not committing further atrocities? We need to look internationally at what is on offer for terrorist offenders, certainly around Europe, if not the world. We really need to review what we class as success, because I am not sure that those two courses offer what they should.
Rob Butler
Q
Mark Fairhurst: That depends on what you are going to offer in the community. Are you going to offer them support services with charitable groups, or groups that specifically deal with terrorist offenders, which meet them at the gate, take them to accommodation, maybe get them out of the area where there is peer pressure, engage with Muslim communities—there is a lot of shame involved with terrorist offenders, who want to reform when they go back into their communities—and get imams involved? Are we going to invest in that side of things and incentivise people while they are in prison to attend these deradicalisation programmes, in the knowledge that there will be massive support systems in play for them when they are released, or do we keep going along the same path, where offenders are released with not much support in place, and if they are a risk, they are monitored? There is still a lot of work and research to do. We have some really intelligent people getting interviewed this morning, with some really positive, radical ideas that need to be taken on board.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
Q
Thank you very much for your contribution, Mr Fairhurst. In response to the last question, you covered Muslim terrorist offenders. You have talked about deradicalisation, incentives to go straight and the success rate—the small percentage of terrorist offenders who reoffend. Do those figures and your general thoughts apply also to the growing number of far-right terrorists we are now seeing coming into the criminal justice system?
Mark Fairhurst: This is a completely new dynamic, but let me tell you this: if we have prolific far-right extremist offenders in the general population, they will be able to influence and recruit far more prisoners than Islamist extremists ever could. They will get more support. They will be a similar threat to what IRA prisoners were. They will have a lot of contacts in communities. They will be able to get staff details and addresses, and be more of a threat. That is why it is absolutely essential that we open the other two separation centres. What we do not want is, first, a situation where you have far-right extremists in the same centre as Islamist extremists or, secondly, a situation where a prolific right-wing extremist offender is recruiting in the general population and causing chaos. We really need to rethink this.
Ruth Cadbury
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, without a doubt. At the moment, we only have these two programmes: healthy identity and desist and disengage. We need to look at alternatives, because the far right is a completely different dynamic. It has not really raised its head above the parapet in our prisons at this moment in time, but I can assure you that it is on its way, because it is on the rise.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, I agree with that. It will be an essential tool, but it would also be essential if we had an incentive to release people early, and prior to their release they were given a polygraph and asked about their future intentions. That is something else to consider. I agree: it is very useful. I have no opposition to it.
Miss Dines
So you agree with clause 32? That provision would be useful?
Mark Fairhurst: Most definitely, yes. I would not like to see it removed.
The Chair
That is the end of that session. Mr Fairhurst, thank you very much for joining us.
Mark Fairhurst: You are very welcome. Thank you for your thoughts about frontline staff. We appreciate your support. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witness
Ian Acheson gave evidence
The Chair
We have until 10.25 am for this session. Professor Acheson, thank you very much for joining us. Would you like to introduce yourself and your organisation briefly, please?
Professor Acheson: My name is Ian Acheson. I used to be a frontline prison officer, so I would like to be associated with the comments that were made this morning. They are the unsung heroes of our criminal justice system, often overlooked and certainly undervalued. They do an amazing job.
I worked in the Prison Service as an officer and then as a governor. I left it and joined the Home Office via the Youth Justice Board, where I was the senior civil servant responsible for the Contest strategy, our counter-terrorism strategy, among other things in south-west England. After that, I joined the Equality and Human Rights Commission as the chief operating officer and I left public service then. I now work for a variety of organisations, including the Counter Extremism Project, which is an international non-profit organisation that looks at ways of countering violent extremism. I am also a visiting professor at Staffordshire University School of Law, Forensics and Policing.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Acheson: The Prison Service, as we are all aware, is under a great deal of pressure, certainly in England and Wales. The backdrop is what I would describe as a significant decline in all sorts of metrics of good order, discipline and control across most, but not all, prisons. That provides a backdrop of instability, which is germane to your question. We need to have stable, well-run prisons with suitable and sufficient numbers of staff present to set the tone, to be able to control the environment and certainly to be able to spot and intervene early when they see signs of extremist-related behaviour, whether from prisoners imprisoned under terrorism legislation or others who look like they are being drawn into violent extremism.
One of the problems that I have with the system is that we do not seem to have an assertive and challenging approach to managing terrorist prisoners, or ideologically motivated prisoners, from the start of their sentence to their last day in community supervision. The system is fraught with problems of handovers between the Prison Service, the Parole Board and the probation service. I do not believe that that system of managing a particular set of prisoners with some unique characteristics is the right way of proceeding.
I would like to see a dedicated unit, if you will—I recommended that in my 2016 report; unfortunately it was not one of the recommendations that was taken forward—that manages offenders end to end, from literally the first night in custody to the last night of community sentence, and that has a detailed biographical understanding of a prisoner. That involves specialists, psychiatrists, theologians and various people intervening but managing that prisoner all the way through into the community.
Mark Fairhurst mentioned the importance of reintegration after custody for terrorist offenders. In some respects, integration is the key challenge as well. At the moment, the state has a monopoly on the management of terrorist offenders after custody in terms of MAPPA, where the probation service, the police and the Security Service manage the security aspects. There are no other organisations, apart from some voluntary organisations that are involved in the desistance and disengagement programme. We do not have any community involvement in the resettlement of terrorist offenders and their reintegration in the community. That is a big issue that needs to be addressed.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Acheson: In relation to terrorist offenders, for example, the situation feels to me as though, as long as they are not creating any problems, they are largely left alone. When they start to create problems, there are alternatives, which could include segregation, administrative penalties or incentives and earned privileges penalties. In extremis, if they are subversive—this was one of my recommendations that was taken forward, as you might be aware—separation centres exist for them.
We need to make sure that we look at it from the sentencing point. To illustrate it like this: what is really important is that we have got some sort of baseline measurement for a judge, after a conviction, to inform sentencing. We do not have that at the moment. We do have pre-sentence reports, I understand that, but we do not have a sufficient level of granularity or expertise put into that plan, which is the baseline measurement of dangerousness, for any terrorist offenders.
As you are aware, they are a very heterogeneous group. They resist being compartmentalised. We have people who murder people who are losers and we have people who murder people who are university graduates. There is an enormous variety and it resists generic sheep dip-style approaches. I am afraid I would categorise healthy identity intervention as one of those processes that I do not think works. We need to go back to having this baseline measurement at the start, managed by one unit all the way through that is frequently looking at whether dangerousness has increased or decreased, and devising and managing interventions to meet that individual pathology, that individual terrorist profile.
I am aware that Lord King has said in Parliament that you are recruiting some prison imams to take part in ideological interventions. That is very good news—so, theological, psychological, family-related and substance misuse. It is important to look at these people as individuals if you want to reduce their dangerousness. It is important to look at that dangerousness as early as possible, with the right people managing it all the way through.
As I have said before—I do not want to repeat myself—I think the system is far too fractured at the moment. We are only talking about 220-odd offenders at the moment, with the Government making what I think is the fairly optimistic estimate of an extra 50 as a result of the new legislation. It will increase because of the police and security services’ ability to spot people further and further upstream from actual terrorist incidents. That number will increase, but it is still a manageable number and it is still worth while investing significantly.
I am not a great fan of the statistic that is bandied about that says that only 5% to 10% of terrorist offenders reoffend after custody. That is a proven reconviction for a terrorist offence. That is a very lazy proxy for damage. If you apply that to our number of offenders, that means there are another 11 Sudesh Ammans in the system. That is completely intolerable and unacceptable. I do not think we should be comforted by the fact that some research is showing us that recidivism is fairly low. There is research in Europe that says that the period immediately following release of a terrorist offender is the period of most risk. That does not fit the profile of the Westminster bridge attacker, who waited for 11 or 12 months before something mobilised him into murdering two young people. We have to apply a very individualised, very assertive and challenging approach.
You talked about incentives and so on earlier with Mark Fairhurst. I think that might be looking at it in slightly the wrong way. I have a bit of a problem with the philosophical and organisational fitness of the Prison Service, the probation service and the Parole Board to manage these particular offenders. They are ideologically inspired offenders. We must insist they adopt civilised values, not look at it as a thing that needs to be rewarded. That is very difficult. I am not suggesting it is simple.
Just to avoid any misunderstanding, in my specification for separation centres, I specifically designed a regime—and suggested this to the Prison Service—that was not punitive and which was, as I have described it, a humanised approach. We cannot talk to dead terrorists; we can talk to live ones. We can find out an enormous amount. We can influence them an enormous amount with the right skills and the right staffing to be able to have a good sense of how dangerous they are and influence them towards disengagement, or desistance if disengagement is not possible.
The Chair
I suspect that your evidence is extremely useful to the Committee, but I have to ask for slightly shorter answers, please.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Acheson: The amount of skill and training required to staff separation units—we know that only one out of three is running at the minute—is significant. If you are putting our frontline prisoner-facing staff, who will have the most influence and impact on individual terrorist offenders, in that sort of environment, it will take a huge amount of training, not only in the skill to deal with those prisoners, but in psychological resilience and so on. We know what seems to work in relation to violent extremism across Europe: it is the development of long-term, high-quality relationships, which are pro-social and expand far beyond the prison gates. That is very expensive, and it takes a lot of support to put that in place and to maintain it.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Acheson: This is not a very auspicious time to talk about the Parole Board, but it is very good at managing ordinary offenders, and statistics would bear that out. I have said this earlier, and I do not want to repeat myself, but I do not believe the Parole Board is philosophically or organisationally the best suited to managing that risk. It is very good at managing ordinary offenders, but we have a new cohort coming through of profoundly different, ideologically motivated offenders, either through Islamism or through extreme right-wing philosophies, and we probably need a different, multi-agency approach to managing that risk all the way through the system.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Acheson: I agree that the potential is greater, but I think sometimes we confuse vulnerability with dangerousness, and we use that in relation to young people and women. We have some very dangerous extremist offenders in either camp—very few of them, but we do have a small number—and we must not conflate the two.
In general terms, and I speak as somebody who worked for the Youth Justice Board, we need, where we can, to ensure that the disposals that are at the judge’s discretion, including detention and training orders and some non-custodial interventions, are still considered heavily before penalising people who, as you have said, may be just immature.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Acheson: The circle of trust and accountability is a system devised by Mennonites, I think, in Canada, where one of their community had been convicted of a high-profile sex offence and was returning to the community. That group of people said, “How can we welcome this person back into our community”—because that was the Christian ethos—“but also keep our kids safe?” They devised a system where there was community involvement in a circle around the individual, which managed to help him to reintegrate properly but protected the community as well.
I am very keen on that idea being replicated for terrorist offenders after release in the community, as a parallel to the state’s responsibility to keep people safe. In other words, there could be a community response like that one, where we are getting members of the community involved in protecting national security. We miss a trick in this country—research backs this up—in that we do not, particularly in relation to Muslim communities, enlist ordinary members of the community who have some standing and some credibility in supporting the reintegration of terrorist offenders.
Those offenders will suffer many of the same challenges that sex offenders do: shame, difficulty in finding somewhere to live and difficulty in finding something to do. All those things would point towards further offending and delay disengagement, so I am very keen on the concept being looked at in relation to released terrorist offenders here.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Acheson: I think we probably are. We are outriders in that respect in relation to the rest of Europe, which does heavily involve non-governmental organisations and community groups, for example, in reintegration. We have seen that in the Molenbeek suburb in Belgium, which is responsible for producing quite a number of jihadis, where the community has been involved and works in partnership with, although separate from, the statutory bodies whose first priority is safety and security. That is a necessary but insufficient way of dealing with the problem.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Professor Acheson: I am not sure which would work better. I am certainly on record as saying that I support the Government in much longer sentences for terrorist offenders, primarily because it is a unique opportunity to incapacitate an ideologically motivated offender and bring services around that individual. Those services need to be extended through the gate and into the community.
We need to focus on this as a national security issue that we need to deal with in a different way, so lifelong restriction may have its merits. The key thing is that we make sure that support and control exist around offenders who are being released and who may go back into extremist offending, so that in whatever way we apply restrictions on their liberty—including TPIMS, for example—we do it in a proportionate way. There is absolutely an argument that punitive measures increase alienation. I think that might be a trade-off, in some respects, for people with whom we may never be satisfied that they are safe to release. We have to embrace the idea that there will be a few offenders who must be kept in prison indefinitely, because they either cannot or will not recant a hateful ideology, and they have the means to mobilise that into violence in the community.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Professor Acheson: I must say I am not a great fan of the polygraph solution. Polygraphs are a very good way to demonstrate a physiological response to nervousness. Most people who take polygraphs are going to be nervous, so it is a very inexact science. I think it is probably slightly better than tossing a coin.
I am much more interested in using technology—wearable technology, in particular—with released terrorist offenders that will give us biodata and geographical data to allow us to spot when somebody is starting to re-engage in terrorist offending in all sorts of ways. It would create a geo-fence that restricts their movements and give real-time information on how that person is. I am not at all suggesting that technology is not useful here. I think we need to have much more investment in that.
The particular issue that I have seen—it has been talked about before—is the issue of disguised compliance, or lying, in layman’s terms. I am very happy to tell the Committee that Staffordshire University hopes to start a piece of research on disguised compliance led by me and Professor James Treadwell. It is mostly in the realm of social work in relation to domestic violence, but we want to see if there are ways to avoid a situation in which somebody like Usman Khan goes through an apparently successful deradicalization programme without apparently recanting any of his extremist principles, which are then put into murderous effect. I think this is a very under-explored area. It touches on polygraphs, but it is much broader than that. It is about how we skill up the people who are making the decisions on questions such as, “Can I trust you? Is your change authentic and credible, or are you trying to pull the wool over our eyes?”
We cannot have a perfect system. A perfect system would destroy our civil liberties, because we would keep terrorist prisoners in jail indefinitely and achieve the very effect that terrorists hope for in creating massive disruption in a liberal democracy. However, I think that we can do a lot more in relation to skilling up people to make decisions about whether and when somebody is safe to release, and under what conditions, and for how long they can be supervised.
Rob Butler
Q
Professor Acheson: Yes, for the reasons that I have just mentioned. I think that our position in January, where people who were so dangerous that they had to be man-marked by armed police officers had to be released from custody, was absolutely intolerable. We need to be focused on public protection. In relation to terrorist offenders, the Prison Service needs a bit of a change of mindset. There is too much of a reclamation and rehabilitation focus. I am not saying that that is not important, but I am saying that in relation to these prisoners, there has to be a primary public protection focus and a primary national security focus. That is not to say that the regimes in which terrorist prisoners are kept should not be as full and as varied as possible, so that people do not become alienated and further full of grievance.
Rob Butler
Q
Professor Acheson: This speaks to my earlier point about making sure that experts—forensic psychologists and psychiatrists—are specially chosen and trained to produce a baseline threat assessment, after conviction but before sentencing, to allow a judge to make a more informed decision on sentencing length, duration and so on, and to establish the basis against which that person’s progress can be managed and measured through custody.
Again, I think it is exceptionally important—the Government did not accept this, but I will reiterate it, and recent events have thrown it into the light—that we should have one dedicated multi-agency specialist unit that manages terrorist offenders from their conviction until they are deemed no to longer be suitable for supervision in the community. It is the most sensible way to manage this. We have far too many hand-offs in the system at the moment.
We have this morning’s report into Joseph McCann, a manipulative psychopath who managed to disguise his dangerousness because of failures in the probation system— because of under-trained staff who were over-stressed and insufficiently curious. All those things will apply to terrorist offenders as well. Having a dedicated unit that understands in great detail the individual’s biography, their background and the antecedents, and that could help to establish a programme of treatment or intervention that is individualised to that person, seems to me to make sense in managing the risk.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
Q
“the usual well-heeled, left-wheeled liberal rights activists”.
Neither the Chairman nor I could ever be accused of being one of those, and I do not oppose the Bill and the measures in it per se. However, as you have identified, it is important that the Bill receives scrutiny.
I was struck by something that you said about the Government’s approach to the Bill, which was that it was “populist”. Do you think that is at the expense of longer-term strategic thinking that could be contained in the Bill, particularly around things such as the Prevent strategy? The Bill removes the statutory deadline for reviewing that strategy. I suppose what am I asking is this: are the measures in the Bill serious and strategic and will they make a difference, or are they in keeping with a populist approach to these issues, as you have alluded to?
Professor Acheson: I was being quite flippant in that article, as you have to be if you write for The Spectator. The serious point is that there is no risk-free way to deal with this very dangerous, challenging topic; every way has risk. My small expert team and I sat and looked at separation units, and we argued for weeks about which was better: separation or dispersal of highly subversive, proselytising Islamist extremists. The focus was Islamism. In the end, we came to the view that separation centres would work as the least worst way of managing this phenomenon. The reason I mention this is that we are in a period of continuous evolution, and the law will need to be able to react to that.
They are not distinct, but we have an al-Qaeda generation of terrorists, from 2005 onwards, who are serving time—sometimes extremely long sentences—for organised plots, and we have an IS generation of much more oppositional terrorists, including lots of lone actors who have come along behind. Even looking at Islamist extremism as a group is very difficult. The answer to your question is that we have a good baseline for extending the amount of time that terrorists will serve in prison. We had an intolerable situation before, when it was quite clear that the system of supervision and the sentencing framework were broken; they let people such as Sudesh Amman out of custody. But we have to look at the quality as well as the quantity of what happens. The only way to do that is relentlessly to research what works.
Sometimes I am told by people, “There’s no evidence for what you’re saying.” I sometimes react to that by thinking, “That’s a kind of code for inertia, organisationally, or for timidity.” Sometimes we have to make the evidence. The point is that we have to take some risks. I am not sure whether separation centres will work or will continue to work. Mark Fairhurst eloquently made the point that there is a great deal of reluctance in the Prison Service to use them. There is some organisational resistance to the concept, and it is not simply about not being able to find the right people. A bureaucratic structure was built around selection for separation centres, which has made it all but impossible, frankly, for anybody to get in them.
Regarding separation centres and how the legislation needs to evolve, we need to make sure, as Mark has said, that there is sufficient capability for the extreme right-wing offenders who represent the biggest threat to be removed and completely incapacitated, breaking the psychological link between the “preacher” and his adherent. We will need to be continually alert and continually changing and challenging legislation in order to arrive at the best way of managing the evolving risk.
Conor McGinn
Q
Professor Acheson: I think there is a danger that we keep doing a Heath Robinson-type response. My critics will say, “Hold on, Ian, the Parole Board has specialist judges who sit on panels that consider terrorist offenders.” My response is: so what? Are they any better than the frontline prison officer who has been with an individual for four years, the psychiatrist who has been attached to that person’s journey, a forensic psychologist, the Security Service or the police? That is why I keep arguing that we need a completely separate way, philosophically and organisationally, of managing the risk. I am disappointed that that is not in the Bill, and that we are talking instead about skilling people up and giving them more training. I worry a little that that will continue to be exploited, given the number of hand-offs in the system.
Miss Dines
Q
Professor Acheson: You are quite right to call me out. I do not discount polygraphs entirely. I think they are perhaps a useful part of a more holistic approach to managing risk, but they are certainly no silver bullet. Again, we need highly skilled people who have been on a journey with these offenders, who understand them intimately, and who have been able to design interventions that speak to their plethora of needs, which I described earlier and are dealt with in a very individualised way. That is the way to crack this nut.
The Chair
I am really sorry. This is a very interesting session, but I have no choice but to cut it off at 10.25. Thank you very much for your evidence. Apologies to Members, but I have to do this.
Examination of Witness
Andrew Silke gave evidence.
The Chair
Good morning, Professor Silke. Will you introduce yourself and your organisation, please?
Professor Silke: I am Professor Andrew Silke, professor of terrorism, risk and resilience at Cranfield University.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: That is a crucial question. Probably one of the starting points—this has been touched on by some of the others who gave evidence—is how the UK sits in terms of the international approach to dealing with terrorism among violent extremist offenders. Overall, you would probably argue that the UK’s approach is seen as one of the better available approaches and enjoys what is seen internationally as a good success rate. I know that that is difficult to consider in the context of the attacks that took place in Streatham and London Bridge, but overall the UK’s system for dealing with terrorist prisoners is seen as one of the more effective ones available internationally.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: The approach has transformed a lot in the past 10 years. There has been a variety of ways in which it has changed. I am particularly looking at the approach in England and Wales here. First is the development of specialised risk assessment tools and frameworks for dealing with terrorist prisoners. There was recognition in the 2000s that the existing risk assessment tools did not work well with terrorist prisoners and that they needed something that was more specialised to more reliably assess risk with them. This led to the development of the extremism risk guidance 22+—the ERG—which is a bespoke risk assessment tool now used in England and Wales. In my view it has genuinely enhanced and transformed risk assessment for these prisoners, making it much more viable compared with what it had been prior to the introduction of this programme.
Tied into the development of the ERG has been the development of a number of interventions. The healthy identity intervention has already been mentioned, and desistance and disengagement has been flagged as well. The healthy identity intervention draws on the ERG, so the two of them are linked to some degree. HII has come in for criticism, but it is actually a much better intervention than perhaps it gets credit for. It tackles a lot of the issues that we are concerned about in terms of offender radicalisation. I have had the opportunity of being able to interview prisoners before and after they have gone on this programme, and certainly in many cases I have seen a transformational change in prisoners.
The other factor—this has also been raised in other testimony before the Committee—relates to post-release behaviour by prisoners. We have an extremely low reoffending rate for terrorist prisoners in the UK, which we should not dismiss out of hand. If we could get similarly low levels of reoffending for other types of offenders, we would be extremely happy.
Failures with interventions—such as a prisoner taking an intervention, being released and then reoffending—does not mean that the intervention itself is useless or ineffective in the majority of cases for people who use it. We should reflect that all the interventions used in the prison system, for a whole range of offences, have their failures. This does not mean that we should stop using them or abandon them or view them as unhelpful in the majority of cases.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Silke: It is a complicated question. In general, I agree with Mark Fairhurst’s point that the potential for early release is an important incentive for behaviour in custody. If we lose the potential for early release, we are losing a tool from the toolbox, and we need to question whether that is sensible, or whether there are advantages in keeping it in some shape or form.
Does false compliance happen? Yes, it certainly does, but if we look at reoffending stats, compliance seems to be genuine in most cases. Nobody has a 100% effective intervention for dealing with these types of prisoner or any other type of prisoner, so we should never expect an intervention to be 100% accurate. However, the stats suggest that what is happening in prison with most terrorist prisoners is currently effective, and so if we are making changes to the regime and to the interventions, we need to have a careful think about what the knock-on consequences might be.
Personally, I prefer still to have the potential for early release at some stage as a tool in the toolbox for these serious offenders. I think it can make a difference in some cases. From my perspective, the Parole Board usually brings a serious and considered assessment of the available evidence in a particular case, which is often very welcome. Again, by removing that from the equation, are we losing something that has value?
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Silke: The problems are relatively new. My view is that they work far better than most members of the general public want to think. Again, the proof is in the very low reconviction rates that we see after people have been released. If it is working in the vast majority of cases, that is an encouraging sign. If there are failures, we need to look into that. One thing that the Bill does not do in its current format is try to identify what is different about the failures compared with the rest of the prisoners who are being released—what went wrong in their cases compared to the others? I am not sure that we are getting at that at the moment.
The evidence base around both risk assessment and interventions for terrorist prisoners is in development. It is massively better today than 10 years ago, and I think it will continue to improve. I know that the Ministry of Justice is involved in a range of programmes to improve the evidence base around ERG and healthy identity intervention, which I strongly welcome. Many Governments are involved in similar efforts overseas.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Silke: That is a very good point. There are differences between very young offenders and the older, more established offenders, and I am not sure that that necessarily comes across strongly in the Bill. That is probably an area where our understanding is more limited than it should be. It needs more attention and research.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Silke: One of the things we will need to do is refine it, in terms both of risk assessment and intervention, to tailor it more for younger offenders. At the moment, there is a question mark over whether what is currently available has young offenders firmly enough in its sights.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Professor Silke: Honestly, I do not know enough about how it works to make an informed assessment of it. I am always cagey about anything indeterminate, which might imply indefinite detention. The advantage of having a fixed term, rather than something quite open-ended, is that at least you know exactly what you have to work with.
Kenny MacAskill
Q
Professor Silke: Polygraph testing is controversial—I think you have already had evidence on that—because it is not 100% accurate; there are errors in it. However, as I have already flagged, just because something is not 100% accurate, that does not mean that we should not use it.
Polygraph testing has a potential role to play in these cases. As an extra link in risk assessment and risk management, it could play a useful role. There has already been a commitment not to recall prisoners purely on the basis of a poor polygraph result. There would need to be additional information in order to justify that, and I think that is entirely sensible. There are potential benefits to using polygraphs within an enhanced framework, recognising that they do have their limits. I support the calls that are being made, if polygraphs are being introduced, for running a pilot programme first before implementing them across the estate.
Miss Dines
Q
Professor Silke: Yes, it is certainly more used in America than elsewhere. I am not intrinsically opposed to the use of the polygraph in these cases. I think there is a potential role that it can play. Obviously, it will need resourcing and appropriately trained and qualified people to run it. As I said, it can add an extra element to the risk assessment and risk management process, which can be useful.
Rob Butler
Q
Professor Silke: It stands even lower than 10%. For England and Wales, it is down to 3%. Really, when we talk about very low levels of reoffending for released terrorist prisoners, it is incredibly low. The vast majority of released terrorist prisoners will not re-engage in terrorism and will not be convicted for any future terrorist offences.
Rob Butler
Q
Professor Silke: The point there is that if we are going to be concerned about the potential risk of reoffending for any prisoner, we would then end up in a scenario where we release no prisoners. Risk for any prisoner being released for any type of offence is never zero.
Rob Butler
Q
Professor Silke: Sentences for terrorism can be long and, again, I am not opposed to that at all. One of the challenges we have is that we are imposing blanket long sentences across the board, when we know that the high-risk prisoners are a tiny minority of that group. One of the concerns I have with the Bill is that it does not distinguish; it is across the board. It would be nice if we could be more targeted and focused in terms of how we are identifying and managing the high-risk terrorist prisoners, as opposed to the entire group.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
Q
Professor Silke: Far-right and Islamist-inspired terrorism remain the two dominant threats in England and Wales, but many will be aware that the most active group in the UK continues to be dissident republican terrorists in Northern Ireland. Looking ahead, what are we likely to see? That will tie into a whole range of different factors. One of the concerns many people have is what are the implications of dealing with the pandemic for terrorism trends going forward. There are concerns about increased radicalisation in certain quarters, but also pressures on criminal justice and other agencies in terms of budgets going forward and what potential impact that might have over the next four to five years.
The Chair
We have time for maybe one or two more questions, if anybody would like to ask one.
Ruth Cadbury
Q
Professor Silke: I am not a fan of TPIM. The main saving grace of the approach has been that they have been used sparingly, and that has been consistently the case from control orders onwards. That probably is their main saving grace: they are only used in a handful of cases. The problem is that it is punishment without conviction, which is always problematic in a system of justice such as the one we have. The changes proposed are similar to some that have existed in the past. I would encourage the Government in general to look at alternatives to TPIM. If we are in a case where we are talking about five or six individuals who are under those measures, are there not alternative arrangements that could be used to monitor or otherwise manage the risk associated with those individuals, apart from a TPIM approach?
The Chair
If there are no more questions, Professor Silke, thank you very much for your evidence. It has been very useful.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. (Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 30th June 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 June 2020 - (30 Jun 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Members should feel free to take their jackets off if they are so inclined. We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available on the table. It is helpful to proceedings if hon. Members who want to push an amendment, other than the lead amendment in a group, to a vote could indicate that to me in advance. If they could supply your speaking notes to the Hansard reporters, I think they would be most grateful.
Clause 1
Offences aggravated by terrorist connection
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“(ab) In subsection (3), after ‘if’ insert ‘the court has found beyond reasonable doubt that’”.
This amendment determines that a court must decide beyond reasonable doubt that an offence has a terrorist connection.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship yet again, Mr McCabe. Hansard should have our notes, as we have already forwarded them.
We support the Bill but, as hon. Members can see, we have identified some ways in which we believe it could be made better. We will get into the details of that over the coming weeks. Terror attacks have shaken this country: people have lost their lives; people have lost their livelihoods; loved ones have been lost; people have suffered life-changing injuries. Nothing we do or say in this House can bring back those people who have died or heal those people who have been so badly injured, but we can try to ensure that justice has been achieved.
In his speech on Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) talked specifically about some of the terror incidents that we have seen in this country and the conclusions we can draw from them. Two possible conclusions were that prison sentences are not long enough and that deradicalisation programmes in prison are not working.
That is why Labour seek to work with the Government on this Bill, starting with amendment 35. We hope to make the case for why we believe there are some amendments that would improve the Bill. Ensuring that Government legislation does not discriminate unfairly against protected characteristics is a key part of what we will try to achieve throughout the process.
Terrorism is often conflated with Islamic extremism, yet the fastest-growing terrorist threat comes from the far right. We want to ensure that the legislation is fair and proportionate. It must go hand in hand with a coherent deradicalisation strategy alongside the Bill, working to minimise the risks of an offender committing further terrorism offences once they leave prison.
Many of the amendments that we will ask the Committee to consider are simply probing amendments to better understand the Government’s thinking, and to give the Minister more time to think about the different issues as we progress through this stage of the Bill. However, there are other amendments that we believe the Government should adopt, if the Bill is to achieve what it sets out to do and be seen to be fair. We will go further into the detail, but I hope we can have healthy and robust debate about how to move forward, and prove to the public out there that politicians from different parties can work together.
Amendment 35 determines that a court must decide “beyond reasonable doubt” that an offence has a terrorist connection. The purpose of this probing amendment is simply to clarify that the finding of a terrorist connection for the new offences that the Bill brings into scope will be subject to the same “criminal standard of proof” as is currently the case, and would effectively amend section 69(3) of the sentencing code, covering offences aggravated by terrorist connections.
We believe we should spell out in the Bill the need to ensure that there can be no reasonable doubt about the connection, because it can have serious ramifications for the offender and the legal system. The House of Commons Library briefing on the Bill states, under the provisions in clause 1:
“If the court determines that there was a terrorist connection, it must treat that as an aggravating factor when sentencing the offender. The presence of an aggravating factor may result in a higher sentence (within the statutory maximum) than would otherwise be the case.”
The Library briefing paper goes on to say:
“The finding of a terrorist connection can also trigger terrorist offender notification requirements and may result in the court ordering forfeiture in a wider range of cases.”
The briefing goes on:
“Such a finding also engages the restrictions on release contained”
in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which
“requires that all determinate terrorist or terrorism-related offenders must be referred to the Parole Board at the two thirds point of their sentence before they can be considered for release.”
The Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that
“Asian/British Asian and Muslim individuals within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) have been disproportionately affected by terrorism legislation relative to the percentage of Asian/British Asian and Muslim individuals in the total population.”
The equality statement goes on to the say that the provisions in the Bill are
“unlikely to result in indirect discrimination within the meaning of the Equality Act”.
However, the Lammy review highlighted evidence of disproportionate outcomes for BAME individuals at the sentencing stage and in decision making by judges and magistrates.
While the review found decision making by juries to be largely fair and proportionate, the same was not found when considering decision making by sentencers. That is relevant to the clause, given that the finding of a terrorist connection is at the discretion of the judge, taking account of any representations made by the prosecution or the defence. That is concerning, given the findings of the Lammy review, which are currently being discussed on the Floor of the House. We believe that BAME individuals may be at increased risk of discrimination, with their crime considered to have a terrorist connection.
Amendment 35 would amend section 69(3) of the sentencing code to require that the court must find “beyond reasonable doubt” that an offence has a terrorist connection. The House of Commons Library briefing paper, which colleagues will have read, says that clause 1 would
“greatly increase the number of non-terrorist offences that can be found to have a terrorist connection”,
whereas currently only specified offences can be found to have such a connection. The widening of what can be found to have a terrorist connection will, I fear, disproportionately affect ethnic minorities. That is why we must press the Minister on how he will guarantee decisions are made on the measure of “beyond reasonable doubt”.
There is also the question of what case law is used to guide sentencers as to what constitutes terrorism, as well as what constitutes a connection to it. Some of the commentators on the Bill are not entirely convinced about what the Government are trying to achieve. I can understand that, as there are already a lot of specific terrorism offences.
Unamended, the Bill seems to create the potential for sentencers to grow their own definitions, both of “terrorism” and “connection”. Can the Minister give examples of where the absence of the provision addressed in clause 1 has resulted in an injustice or an insufficient response? There are concerns that the provision could do more damage than anything else. A wrongfully determined terrorist connection could fuel or develop a grievance against the authorities that might not have existed before. We cannot ignore the impact a wrongful terrorism sentence would have on an individual’s life. We cannot take that sort of chance. We must be sure; we must be beyond reasonable doubt.
Taiwo Owatemi (Coventry North West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I share the concern expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North in relation to the burden of proof and the potential implications of the Bill in disproportionately convicting ethnic minorities by widening the scope of what a terrorist connection is under this legislation.
This is a sensitive subject. Terrorism and the actions of extremists have instilled fear, caution and a sense of doubt in many communities across our country. An act of terror and of any extremist is abhorrent. Those individuals should indeed be brought before a court of law and tried for their crimes, not least because of their direct action causing injury, committing murder or traumatising those who come anywhere near their path and because of the wider implications that will be felt across the country and the world in our age of quick-fire communications and social media.
In my generation, I have seen this in how the Oklahoma bombing instilled fear; in how 9/11 changed the world; and in how 7/7 changed my perspective and that it could happen here at home. The murder of Lee Rigby proved that even those who protect us are not always safe. The slain nine churchgoers at Emmanuel African Methodist Church and the Manchester concert bombings showed that no one, even those in the most innocent of settings, is off limits. The hateful act of violence that took Jo Cox proved that our own political discourse has taken an awful turn.
These acts by rampant extremists and the murderous death toll that they leave behind, the radical ideas that brought them to this path and the many plots that have been foiled that we will never know about show us that these crime, or crimes yet to be committed, are heinous. They also prove that we must determine, as this amendment seeks to do, that these crimes or plots are not small and should be taken with the utmost seriousness.
I have three concerns about widening the terrorist connection provision under this legislation and lowering the burden of proof. First, we are leaving it to sentencers to determine their own definition of what constitutes a terrorist connection. Secondly, it creates a form of suction like a vacuum that will imprison even more ethnic minorities and put them behind bars under terrorist legislation which will see them lose their freedom longer than they need to. Thirdly, and even worse, it potentially radicalises them while they are in prison.
There is a danger, as seen in clause 1, that by allowing any offence to be capable of having a terrorist connection, one’s judgement will inevitably come into play. This punishment carries a sentence of two or more years. It would not be amiss to say that everyone holds biases, including those who administer our laws and hand down sentences. By widening the scope and effectively leaving it open to interpretation, the Government want us to believe that we will capture individuals who may have slipped through the net thus far as ordinary criminals or should have been convicted of terrorism. Can the Minister point us to data that back this assumption? The likelihood is that we will just imprison people for the sake of being seen to be attacking the issues of terrorism and extremism.
We are already aware that ethnic minorities are disproportionately sent to prison under our legal system. We are also acutely aware that black and Asian men, particularly those of Islamic faith, are more likely to be seen as threats and harbouring extremist views. The Lammy review conducted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham highlighted some concerns about how our criminal justice system sees these individuals. The odds of receiving a prison system were around 240% higher for black, Asian and minority ethnic offenders compared with white offenders. Research commissioned by the review also found that at the magistrates court, black, Asian, mixed and Chinese women were all more likely to be convicted than white women.
The number of Muslim prisoners has more than doubled over the past 17 years. In 2002, 5,502 Muslims were in prison. By 2019, this had risen to 13,341. While in prison, Muslim prisoners described having their faith viewed by prison authorities through a lens of risk, according to the research, which also found that prisoners believed that this put them at greater threat of being radicalised. Given the biases in the system and the extraordinary likelihood of women from ethnic minorities receiving a prison sentence, what do the Government think this legislation will mean for ethnic minorities? Do they really think that lowering the burden of proof and expanding the scope of what constitutes a terrorism offence will do anything to keep these young men and women away from the hands of those who wish to radicalise them?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, in our line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I thank the shadow Minister for his opening remarks, in which he expressed general support for the objectives of the Bill. I hope that we can, as he said, provide an example of constructive cross-party working, although I am sure he will have many questions about the detail. As the shadow Minister has said, and as the hon. Member for Coventry North West said in her speech, the threat that terrorism poses is a serious one, and one of our heaviest responsibilities as Members of Parliament is to protect our fellow citizens from such attacks, but in a way that is lawful, fair and just.
Amendment 35 seeks to specify a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in making the terrorist connection, as clause 1 does. I am happy to confirm for the shadow Minister that existing criminal court procedure already requires the criminal standard of proof to be met in making a determination of a terrorist connection, or indeed any finding of fact in relation to sentencing. If, after conviction by a jury, there is a finding of fact to be made by the judge prior to sentencing in what is known as a “Newton” hearing, under existing procedures the criminal standard of proof is applied. On the request that the shadow Minister and his colleagues make, I am happy to confirm that it is already inherent in the operation of our criminal justice system, and rightly so, for all the reasons that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Coventry North West have outlined. I trust that on the basis of that assurance they will see fit not to press the amendment, given that the provision they call for is already enshrined in law.
One further point: both the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Coventry North West raised the question of what happens if the judge makes an error or exhibits some form of conscious or unconscious bias. That is extremely rare, but, if it did happen, there are of course appeal rights against both the sentence and any erroneous finding of fact associated with it. If a defendant or, by this point, an offender who has been convicted feels that the sentence is genuinely unfair or that an unfair determination has been made of a terrorist connection, they can appeal, so a safety mechanism by way of appeal also exists. I hope that on that basis the shadow Minister will not press the amendment to a vote.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. He believes that the matters are already covered in existing law, but perhaps he will accept that later in the Bill we will be discussing how we make sure that what has happened over a period of time has in fact demonstrated that the judges have got it right. In other words, we will revisit this matter with a view to seeking a form of review of how the legislation is working to ensure that we do not have the particular problems that might well be possible. I am also grateful to him for reminding us that in criminal proceedings we still have an appeal process in this country, and I am sure that that would operate appropriately. On the basis of what the Minister has said and on the basis that we will seek reassurance through a review process later in the Bill, I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 1, page 3, line 30, at end insert—
‘(8) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must commission an analysis of the impact of this section on people with protected characteristics, including but not limited to—
(a) the impact on people from minority faith groups, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served;
(b) the impact on people from BAME communities, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served; and
(c) the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics on efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences.
(9) A copy of the analysis must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to commission an analysis of the equality impact of extending the ability of the court to identify a terrorism connection.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 42, in clause 21, page 18, line 23, at end insert—
‘(3) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must conduct an analysis of the impact of this section on people with protected characteristics, including but not limited to—
(a) the impact on people from minority faith groups, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served;
(b) the impact on people from BAME communities, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served; and
(c) the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics on efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences.
(4) A copy of the analysis must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to commission an analysis of the impact of extending sentences for offenders of particular concern on people with protected characteristics.
Alex Cunningham
These amendments would require the Secretary of State to commission an analysis of the impact of this section of the Bill before it comes into force on people with protected characteristics, as well as the consequences of any disproportionate impact on efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences. With this amendment, we seek to address the issue that was highlighted by the probing amendment and to clarify whether the same criminal standard of proof would apply to determining a terrorist connection for all offences, as is currently the case for listed offences. In particular, we seek to determine whether the clause may have a disproportionate impact on people from minority faith and BAME communities, including on the numbers who are received into prison and the length of the sentence served.
There are significant risks involved in expanding the number of individuals who fall under the provisions of separate terrorism legislation, particularly if the imposition of additional sanctions is seen as neither fair nor proportionate and is found to have a disproportionate impact on minority faith and BAME communities in particular. As I said during my speech on amendment 35, the equality statement on the Bill acknowledges that
“Asian/British Asian and Muslim individuals within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) have been disproportionately affected by terrorism legislation relative to the total percentage”
of those individuals “in the total population.”
In 2016, a Ministry of Justice study of Crown court decision making found that, under similar criminal circumstances, the odds of imprisonment for offenders from self-reported black, Asian, Chinese or other minority ethnic backgrounds were higher than for offenders from self-reported white backgrounds. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North West spelled that out in some detail.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
I do not know whether my hon. Friend was in the Chamber to hear the urgent question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham about the Lammy review, but he pointed out that, when the review was done in 2017, the proportion of BAME people in prison was 41%; it is now 51%. Does my hon. Friend have any thoughts about that?
Alex Cunningham
Unfortunately, I was not in the Chamber for that statement, but I bow to the superior knowledge of my boss and my Whip on this matter. It is absolutely essential that we never lose sight of the facts that my hon. Friend has just outlined.
Unfortunately, when it comes to magistrates courts, systematic scrutiny of magistrates’ decisions is hindered by the absence of reliable data collected on a number of key issues. For example, magistrates courts keep no systematic information about whether defendants plead guilty or not guilty, although there are similar disparities at the Crown court level. Magistrates courts also do not keep proper records of defendants’ legal representation, which means that no one knows whether particular ethnic groups are more or less likely to appear in court facing criminal charges without a lawyer.
The cliché suggests we are all equal under the law, but it would be foolish to deny that our justice system has a certain bias. We must make sure that when we amend or introduce legislation, we do so with our eyes and ears open. Particular attention needs to be paid to the equality impact of the Bill, to ensure that the House is as informed as possible about its impact. We must also ensure that the provisions do not have a disproportionate effect on minority faith or racial groups.
During the oral evidence session, one of my questions was to Peter Dawson from the Prison Reform Trust. We talked about the expansion of sentences for offenders of particular concern and how they would work. Peter Dawson said in written evidence:
“The expansion of SOPCs and the expansion of the number of offences able to be identified as having a ‘terrorist connection’ will need careful monitoring for their impact on prison security and on people from minority faith and ethnic communities”.
I asked:
“How can we improve the Bill to achieve that careful monitoring?”
Mr Dawson replied:
“It may not be something that the Bill can achieve, but I think it is reasonable to ask the Government, after the Bill becomes law, to provide a report on what the impact has been. I entirely take the point that the nature of terrorism at the moment means that certain communities are likely to be more heavily represented, but the point is that all criminal justice agencies need to go beyond that to guard against the unconscious bias that will otherwise creep in.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 38, Q88.]
Other witnesses talked about similar things during the evidence sessions. It is important that we do not lose sight of that.
Along with the expansion of sentences for offenders of particular concern, the clause has the potential to increase significantly the number of individuals in prison who are subject to separate terrorist sentencing. Many of those individuals are vulnerable to radicalisation and they have experienced a steady accumulation of institutional discrimination.
The danger with these provisions is that they could create a significant population of individuals in prison and under supervision in the community who will receive longer sentences and be subject to more onerous and lengthy supervision requirements and forfeiture orders than others who may have received shorter sentences for equivalent offences because the terrorist connection to their offence has not been identified.
That could place those individuals at greater risk from people who would seek to exploit that sense of grievance, in order to radicalise them in support of an extremist ideology. It could also undermine the effective management and supervision of this group in prison, increasing the currently small number of people designated as terrorism offenders to a substantial proportion of the population. This morning, we heard from a representative of the Prison Officers Association, who talked in some detail about the difficulties that prison officers now face in trying to manage particular groups in the prison establishment.
It is right that we commission analysis of the impact of our legislation and if such an analysis proves that there is a disproportionate impact on certain groups, Ministers need to act to correct any discrimination and, if required, change the law. Amendment 42 would require the Secretary of State to commission analysis of the impact of extending sentences for offenders, which is a particular concern regarding people with protected characteristics, and for that analysis to be laid before Parliament before the section comes into force.
Clause 21 replaces schedule 13 of the sentencing code, with the schedule set out in schedule 6 to the Bill. That schedule lists offences that require the imposition of an SOPC where an extended sentence or life sentence is not imposed. This will bring a wider number of offences into the SOPC regime, removing the possibility of those committing such offences from being eligible for a standard determinate sentence. That would mean that only the most minor terrorism offences—those with a maximum sentence of two years or less—would not require an SOPC where an extended determinate sentence is not imposed.
The Bill will also create new sentences—the equivalent of an SOPC for adult offenders in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and for under-18s throughout the UK. Clause 21 addresses a problem created by the TORER Act, which made all terrorist offenders serving a custodial sentence eligible for release two thirds of the way through their sentence, subject to the discretion of the Parole Board. There remained an issue with offenders who were not granted a release until the end of their sentence, and who, as a result, would be released into the community without any form of supervision. The amendment would address this anomaly by requiring that terrorist offenders in the UK would have a minimum period of supervision on licence of 12 months following release, even if they serve the full custodial part of their sentence in custody.
The combined impact of the TORER Act and the provisions of this clause, along with the provisions of clause 1 that allow for the court to determine a terrorist connection for any offence, is to significantly increase the number of individuals subject to separate and more onerous terrorist-sentencing legislation. This includes a longer period in custody, release subject to the discretion of the Parole Board, and a minimum 12 months’ supervision in the community.
There are significant risks involved in increasing the number of individuals who fall under the provisions of a harsher sentencing regime, particularly if the imposition of additional sanctions is seen as being neither fair nor proportionate, and is found, as I have said, to have a disproportionate impact on minority, faith, and BAME communities in particular.
The amendment also seeks to determine the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics of efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate offenders convicted of terrorism offences. Many of those vulnerable to radicalisation have experienced a steady accumulation of institutional discrimination. The danger with the provisions is that they could create a significant population of individuals in prison and under supervision in the community who will receive longer sentences and who will be subject to those more onerous and lengthy supervision requirements than others who receive shorter sentences for equivalent offences. I have already covered that point. That could place them at greater risk from people who seek to exploit that sense of grievance to radicalise them in support of an extremist ideology. It could also undermine the effective management and supervision of this group in prison by increasing a currently small number of people designated as terrorism offenders to a substantial proportion of the prison population.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for his detailed exposition of some of the risks that we must seek to navigate and overcome. For justice to function, we must make sure that it is truly even-handed and fair in assessing anyone who comes before the court, regardless of their background, race or religion.
Taiwo Owatemi
Is the Minister not concerned that, without proper consideration of the impact of the Bill on many BAME communities, relationships between these communities and authorities may worsen?
Chris Philp
Let me come on to that point, which is the substance of the amendment. The amendment calls for an assessment prior to the clause coming into effect; it does not ask for an assessment afterwards but beforehand. I submit to the Committee that the impact assessment published with the Bill and the accompanying equality statement, which looks specifically at questions of racial and religious discrimination—or the potential for those things to happen—has already thoroughly analysed the Bill’s potential impact. That detailed analysis, which obviously included a review by Government lawyers and others, concluded that nothing in the Bill would unlawfully discriminate against people of a particular ethnic or religious background within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010.
Of course, the provisions in the Bill are simply based on a measure of criminality—has somebody committed a specified offence? Is there a terrorist connection? Nothing in any of those provisions is biased for or against anyone from any particular background, as is the case with all laws that Parliament passes.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister says that nothing in the Bill would lead to further discrimination. I should hope that that would be the case for any legislation we pass. However, the fact remains that there are certain groups within our society—BAME and other groups—who are disproportionately disadvantaged in the legal system. The amendment asks the Minister to recognise that there could be even more of that as a direct result of the provisions of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Where there are concerns of the nature of those raised in the Lammy review, which I think the shadow Minister or the hon. Member for Coventry North West mentioned earlier, the Government are committed to responding to those. Indeed, in a sense, we are in the wrong room in Parliament today to raise that, because there was an urgent question earlier on exactly that topic, to which the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) responded.
The Government are committed to acting in response to the Lammy review to make sure that no unconscious biases discriminate against any particular group. I have not had a chance to read the Hansard of the debate, and I suspect the shadow Minister has not either, but based on the conversations that I have heard taking place in the Ministry of Justice, I think that the Government generally and the Ministry of Justice in particular are committed to taking action where needed. I would have expected the response of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham to the urgent question an hour or two ago to have confirmed that.
Alex Cunningham
The fact remains that the Lammy review talked about a whole range of provisions that were supposed to be implemented, but very few of them have been. Some have been partially implemented and others have not. Can the Minister simply accept that we are failing as a Government and a Parliament to ensure that discrimination does not exist in our system? We are simply not taking the action to do that. Does he further accept that the more legislation we have where particular groups of people, BAME or otherwise, feel that they are being discriminated against, the greater the discord in society?
Chris Philp
Recent events obviously tell us how important it is to maintain social cohesion and confidence in the criminal justice system. The hon. Gentleman raises a point that goes far beyond the scope of the Bill, but it is a fair point none the less. If he listens to what my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, my fellow Justice Minister, said in the House of Commons Chamber earlier, he will see that the Government are resolved to act where necessary to address issues of that kind.
The substance of the Bill is obviously public protection. It makes no distinction between any kind of terrorism, whether rooted in a twisted religious ideology or a far-right ideology, or terrorist acts committed for any other reason. The Bill, as with all Bills, as the hon. Gentleman says, is even-handed between different kinds of offence and different kinds of offenders. Where we need to do more systemically, not just in relation to the Bill but across the whole range of the criminal justice system, to make sure that everybody gets a fair hearing and fair treatment, the Government will do that. I hope that the response of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham to the urgent question earlier will give assurance on that point. No doubt there will be many more opportunities to debate it.
Chris Philp
On the specific question of amendment 36 to clause 1 and amendment 42 to clause 21, which call for an impact assessment prior to the commencement of those clauses, I repeat what I said earlier. We have already done that. It has been published as the impact assessment together with the Bill and the equality statement that went with it. The obligation being requested by the amendments has already been discharged, but of course we must remain mindful, as the shadow Minister eloquently said, of potential unconscious biases. We must be vigilant and make sure that our justice system is not in any way besmirched by them. I am confident that the measures my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham laid out earlier will achieve that.
Alex Cunningham
I am sorry that the Minister would not give way, because I wanted to press him on that particular matter. We have several days of debate, so we have plenty of time to deal with these issues. It is a bit disappointing.
Chris Philp
I apologise; I did not realise that the hon. Gentleman was trying to intervene. Had I realised, I would, of course, have given way.
Alex Cunningham
Fair enough; I accept that.
The Minister was talking about how the Bill is important for public protection and I agree. It is essential to protect the interests of the public, but if the Bill results in a growing number of terrorists in prison, and if we are releasing into the community people who are still radicalised—or even new people who they managed to radicalise when they were in prison—perhaps public protection will not gain in the way that the Government hope.
I accept the Minister’s statement that he believes the law covers that, but I am disappointed that we cannot accept that a review, although it might cost a few pounds and take some time to commission, would at least give us some information to enable us to understand how well or how badly the legislation is working. I accept what he said, however, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We touched on many of the purposes of clause 1 in our debate on amendments 35 and 36. Very briefly, clause 1 seeks to give judges the power to make a factual finding after conviction that a particular offence has a terrorist connection, to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, as has been discussed, rather than simply referring to a fixed schedule of offences. If, for example, somebody commits an offence that is a serious offence but is not currently on the list of terrorist offences, the finding of terrorist connection can none the less be made. That has consequences in the rest of the Bill, and we will debate them in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 2
Meaning of “serious terrorism offence”: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The purpose of clause 2 is to create new categories of offences in relation to the new serious terrorism sentences. It defines the meaning of a “serious terrorism offence” in England and Wales, so that a sentencing court can establish whether an offender has committed a qualifying offence for the purpose of applying the serious terrorism sentence, which we will discuss more in due course.
The clause will amend section 306 of the sentencing code to include a new category of serious terrorism offence, with two subsets of offences: those in part 1 of schedule 17A, which specifies offences with a life penalty that are terrorist or terrorist-related; and those in part 2, which specifies offences with a life penalty that may be found to have a designated terrorist connection further to section 69 of the sentencing code, as amended.
Clause 2 inserts new schedule 17A into the sentencing code that is currently making its way through Parliament, so that those offences can be identified as serious terrorism offences by the sentencing court for the purposes of setting a serious terrorism sentence or, alternatively, an extended sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 3
Offences relevant for provisions of this Act relating to Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 3 has essentially the same purpose as clause 2. Clause 2 applied to England and Wales; clause 3 does essentially the same thing in relation to Northern Ireland, by amending article 12 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
There is a specific point on this and some other measures in this Bill pertaining to Northern Ireland: they will require a legislative consent motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly. To start as we mean to go on, and so that I do not have to ask the Minister this at every juncture, will he outline what representations he has received from the Northern Ireland Executive, specifically the Justice Minister? For the benefit of the Committee, will he also set out what it means to have to go through the legislative consent motion process?
Chris Philp
Under the Sewel convention, where a provision in UK legislation touches on a matter that is devolved to one of the nations of the United Kingdom, one applies for a legislative consent motion. Most of the Bill, relating as it does to terrorist offences, is reserved to the UK Government, but some relatively limited elements of it touch on matters that are ordinarily devolved. For them, we will of course seek a legislative consent motion under the Sewel convention. In that context, we have made contact with the Scottish Government in Holyrood and with the Northern Ireland Administration—in particular, with Justice Minister Naomi Long. We have entered into fairly extensive correspondence, which is ongoing, about the provisions in the Bill. The Justice Minister in Northern Ireland has raised various matters, which she has asked questions about, asked for clarification about and wanted to discuss further. Those discussions and that correspondence are ongoing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 4
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 4, page 5, line 32, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 45, in clause 6, page 9, line 20, leave out subsection (11) and insert—
“(11) In forming an opinion for the purposes of subsections (1)(d) and (6), the court must consider a report by a relevant officer of a local authority about the offender and the offender’s circumstances.
(11A) Where the offender is under 21 years of age, the report must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age; and
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender;
and the court must take these factors into account when forming its opinion under subsection (6).
(11B) In considering the report, the court must, if it thinks it necessary, hear the relevant officer.”
Amendment 46, in clause 7, page 10, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) Where the offender is under the age of 21, in forming an opinion for the purposes of paragraph (2), the court must consider and take into account a pre-sentence report within the meaning of Article 4 which must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age; and
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.”
Alex Cunningham
I am sure that these amendments come as no surprise to the Minister and other members of the Committee, given my interrogation of our witnesses during the oral evidence sessions over the past few days. This area needs particular attention from the Government, and I intend to press the amendment to a vote—unless, of course, the Minister comes up with an appropriate answer. On the basis of all this kindly co-operation and friendliness that we are sharing, and our intention to prove to the public that we can work across parties, perhaps he might surprise me a little.
Amendment 37 would require that when a court considers a serious terrorism sentence for a young adult under the age of 21, the pre-sentence report must take account of the offender’s age and consider options other than a serious terrorism sentence for rehabilitation and reducing harm. It means that the court must also take into account the issues raised in the pre-sentence report and whether it constitutes exceptional circumstances under proposed new section 268B(2).
We need a basic recognition in the Bill’s sentencing framework that, simply put, young adults and adults are inherently different, not only in terms of maturity, but in their potential for rehabilitation. Regarding the level of maturity, numerous organisations, such as the Howard League, have advocated for this proposal. It has been recognised in reviews such as the Lammy review, and by the Justice Committee. Why is it not recognised in the Bill?
As we have said from the outset, serious terrorist offences deserve a serious sentence, but it is still important to consider the age of the offender when other offences of a non-terrorist nature are committed. Although the amendment is specific to under 21s, in line with the Bill, evidence of maturation suggests that young adults up to the age of 25 ought to be considered as a separate group requiring a distinct response from criminal justice agencies.
The work in this area continues apace, and I have no doubt that Ministers may well have to address their approach to all manner of sentences for people up to the age of 25 when we can all be satisfied that the science proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that they ought to be treated differently. We had a considerable amount of evidence on that. I asked Peter Dawson from the Prison Reform Trust for his view on the different factors relating to young people. He said:
“The Bill should have a different sentencing framework for children and for young adults. At the moment, the law defines a young adult as someone aged between 18 and 20. It is not for this Bill to do, but at some point that should change to between 18 and 24.”
I think that is his opinion. He continued:
“At least taking account of the detention in a young offender institution provisions would allow some recognition of the fact that young adults are different from more mature people.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 34, Q75.]
We also discussed that issue with Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who said that the point he was making was that
“there is recognition that people who are young and immature are probably more susceptible to change than adults.” —[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q15.]
I asked him whether the bottom line was that with young people, there was perhaps a greater chance of change; he had said that there might be greater opportunity for reform than with those who are considerably older. Mr Hall responded:
“That is what judges are increasingly finding.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q16.]
I want to refer to a little more of Jonathan Hall’s evidence. He said that he believed that a younger person dimension needed to be considered in the Bill:
“One of the final points I make in my note about removing the Parole Board’s role is that, again, if it is right that children are more likely to change, and as a matter, perhaps, of fairness, one ought to give them the opportunity, then removing the opportunity to say, at the halfway or two-thirds point, ‘I have now genuinely changed; that was me then and this is me now,’ where it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Parole Board, does seem a little bit—I would not necessarily say ‘unfair’, but it fails to recognise the difference between adults and children.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 11, Q18.]
The current science and evidence tend to relate to people under 21, some of whom are a long way from full maturity. Analysis from the Royal College of Psychiatrists states that in terms of brain physiology, the development of traits such as maturity and susceptibility to peer pressure appear to continue until at least the mid-20s. That view was supported by the Justice Committee, which reported in 2016 that the growing body of evidence drawing on criminological, neurological and psychological research had led the Committee to conclude that young adults’ characteristics and needs made them distinct from older adults in terms of both their needs and their outcomes. There is no distinction in the Bill that recognises what the Justice Committee had to say.
The “Judging Maturity” report by the Howard League for Penal Reform also cited research that found the following:
“For the purposes of informing sentencing practice, the neurological and psychological evidence that development of the frontal lobes of the brain does not cease until around 25 years old is particularly compelling. It is this area of the brain which helps to regulate decision-making and the control of impulses that underpins criminal behaviour.”
As the Minister knows, I support trusting the experts where there is a significant trend. The trend of opinion from experts seems to be that we need to recognise the differences in maturity and development of young adults. In 2016, the Justice Committee reported:
“Dealing effectively with young adults while the brain is still developing is crucial for them in making successful transitions to a crime-free adulthood.”
Research into the success of interventions aimed at tackling radicalisation suggests that approaches that encourage young people to engage in education and training may be particularly beneficial, and that early interventions to encourage young people to undertake that education and training can be capable of successfully challenging radicalisation.
We talk a lot about rehabilitation, but we do not do enough of it. Labour Members do not want young offenders to be condemned to a life with no opportunity for rehabilitation when it has been reported to be successful in early adulthood. We can reform and rehabilitate, but doing so is a choice.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech on this point. On the point about young people’s brains still developing, there is potential for grooming and undue influence by adults. With the Justice Committee, I visited a young offenders institution in Kent, where a young woman who was being held for terrorism offences had been influenced by her mother. Will he comment on that?
Alex Cunningham
Indeed, that is very much the case. I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because he reminds me of some evidence we heard this morning about young people being more susceptible to being radicalised. Another important point raised this morning was that our prison system is not yet properly equipped to deal with young offenders in a suitable environment that prevents radicalisation. They are housed—wherever they are—with people who have committed similar offences, who will be aiming to build on their insecurities and their immaturity to encourage them into further wrongdoing. We must never lose sight of that important point. That is why I will talk about young people throughout our proceedings on the Bill, because young people have to be given a chance.
I will talk about this later, but if a 20-year-old is sentenced to14 years in prison, that will make them 34 on their release. Add another 25 years to that, and they are almost pensioners before they are clear of the shackles of the state. They have not been given the opportunity to reform, because they are constantly looking over their shoulder, perhaps with an attitude of, “Why on earth should I change when the authorities are always on my back?”
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
We talk about children as victims in this context, but the experts who gave evidence told us that these young people are also extremely dangerous. They said that rehabilitation is extremely important—of course that can take place in prisons—but that sentencing has other objectives, such as the protection of the public, including young people walking the streets who also deserve the protection of the law.
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Lady is entirely correct. We must, first and foremost, protect the public. We need to understand that we may never be able to rehabilitate some young people, and they may be a problem to society for the rest of their lives. However, there will also be young people in the system who have done some horrible, terrible and tragic things but who can be rehabilitated and recognise that they got it wrong. They should be given the opportunity to live their life to its full extent.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I rise in support of amendments 37, 45 and 46, standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North. I want to cover some general principles in what is my first opportunity to speak in this Bill Committee. Like the Government, we are committed to keeping the public safe and we share the desire to ensure that attacks such as those at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham never happen again—attacks where convicted but released terrorists were able to kill and maim innocent people.
We recognise the importance of adequate and appropriate punishment in sentencing, but punishment and sentencing must go alongside rehabilitation. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham said on Second Reading:
“We must not lose faith in the power of redemption—the ability of people to renounce the darkest chapters of their lives and move towards the light.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 213.].
For that, those offenders need an effective deradicalisation programme tailored to their motivation and circumstances, and they need hope—hope that before too long they can rejoin their family; that they can get meaningful work. They could even steer others away from the path they took before. I point out that programmes have operated in prisons in Northern Ireland with convicted paramilitaries on both sides of the troubles. In the later years of the troubles, those men became beacons of peace and reconciliation, educating young people towards positive paths.
Some contributions on Second Reading sometimes felt like support for a policy that almost veered on “Lock ’em up and throw away the key”. However, as many submissions and expert witnesses to this Committee have said, removing hope from these offenders and the opportunity to prove they are safe does not make the rest of us safer. I might add, even locking up people indefinitely, as the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford said earlier, does not protect us anyway. It does not prevent them from radicalising others. It spawns martyrs, not to mention the cost to the public purse of incarcerating prisoners for ever longer periods. As we heard this morning from the Prison Officers Association, there is also the danger to prison officers of attacks from angry men who have no hope of release in the foreseeable future.
I fear that some aspects of the Bill are born from a reaction to the terrorist atrocities in the last seven months and have been brought in without due research into what might work to further reduce the risk of attack from radicalised individuals, whether they are of a Daesh/ISIS persuasion, from the far right or, as a number of terrorists in the UK still are, rogue Irish paramilitaries.
The Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks were both committed by offenders who had been released automatically halfway through their sentence with no involvement of the Parole Board. Of course, with Labour support, the Government have now brought in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which ends the automatic early release of terrorist offenders and ensures that any release before the end of a sentence is dependent on a thorough risk assessment by the Parole Board. I am therefore not quite sure why the Government want to take the Parole Board out of sentencing now, without any adequate alternative provision being put in place.
Before I make some specific remarks, Dave, the father of Jack Merritt, who was killed in the Fishmongers’ Hall attack, wrote poignantly about how his son would have perceived the political reaction to his death, because of course Jack Merritt worked in the criminal justice system on the rehabilitation of offenders. Dave wrote:
“What Jack would want from this is for all of us to walk through the door he has booted down, in his black Doc Martens. That door opens up a world where we do not lock up and throw away the key. Where we do not give indeterminate sentences, or convict people on joint enterprise. Where we do not slash prison budgets, and where we focus on rehabilitation not revenge. Where we do not consistently undermine our public services, the lifeline of our nation. Jack believed in the inherent goodness of humanity, and felt a deep social responsibility to protect that.”
As I said, I support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton South—
Ruth Cadbury
My apologies.
Amendments 37, 45 and 46 relate to under-21s. I wish that they went a little older, possibly to 25, because they consider the issue of maturity. I declare a certain interest because for many years I was a trustee and, latterly, the chair of the Barrow Cadbury Trust, which initiated and funded the Transition to Adulthood Alliance about 15 years ago. Over a number of years, the alliance worked with a number of non-governmental organisations, the Ministry of Justice, Ministers, Opposition Members and so on to the point where maturity has now been introduced into sentencing practice and several other areas of the criminal justice system. I fear that we are going to lose that in this Bill.
When considering maturity, it is really important that we work on the basis of all the research that my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North mentioned and use that research to reduce the risk of serious harm to members of the public and to enhance the rehabilitation of the offender. The Committee has heard powerful evidence, particularly this morning, about the different motivations that people have for becoming terrorists or terrorist sympathisers, such as political, religious or psychiatric.
Sentences and rehabilitation must take account of the different motivations of different offenders. As we heard this morning, we probably also need to have tailored support, which needs to come into the pre-sentencing reports. One of the amendments says that the court must also take account of reports from local authority officers who have worked with the offender prior to the point of considering sentencing.
Alex Cunningham
I thank my hon. Friend for her comprehensive speech. She talks about resources and specialised facilities. The evidence we heard from some people in earlier sittings suggests that the system is not fit for purpose. Would she welcome from the Minister, as I would, a statement about how the Government will ensure proper provision for rehabilitation in our prison system?
Ruth Cadbury
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. As others have said, it would have been better if there had been proper risk assessments of a number of aspects of the Bill, because many clauses do not seem to be evidence-based. We know that we have funding problems within the prison system. We know that we have, as we heard this morning, disjoints between various elements of the course through the system for offenders. There is an awful lot of work to do, and there are a number of respects in which I do not feel that the Bill is fit for purpose. It would have been better if it had been based on proper evidence of what works to reduce the threat to the public and improve rehabilitation.
Children have long been treated differently in sentencing considerations, and the amendments would enable particular considerations for young adults, particularly of their maturity. Mr Hall, the independent reviewer, was concerned that, unless these considerations are taken into account, we risk locking people up for too long, building bitterness and a refusal to engage in the prison system, and actually, on eventual release, potentially a greater risk. He considered that longer and more punitive sentences do not in themselves ensure that people are less dangerous on release, and that while extending sentences for serious offenders may, of course, keep them out of our harm’s way for a temporary period, we do not want them to leave prison more dangerous than when they entered.
Early release provides prisoners with the incentive to behave and show that they are capable of reform. We heard powerful evidence that prison staff are at increased risk of harm where hope is lost. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North said, many studies show that young terrorist offenders are much more likely to reform than older offenders, yet the Bill treats a young adult who has just turned 18 the same as an older offender. Are the Secretary of State and the Minister concerned that the Bill effectively gives up on those offenders?
We need to look at the evidence, not the tabloids. We need a flexible response that is offender-based, and it must be tailored. If we really want to enable rehabilitation and reduce the harm to the public, I hope that the Minister will consider the amendment.
Chris Philp
I will speak to the amendments relating to younger offenders. There are a couple of things to be clear about first of all. For the sake of absolute clarity, offenders who are under the age of 18 are not subject to the 14-year minimum prison sentence. Only offenders over the age of 18 are subject to those provisions. The amendments relate to offenders aged between 18 and 21, so we are discussing a very specific cohort.
I agree and concur with many points that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth made about rehabilitation, and about the increased opportunity for rehabilitation for younger people. It is of course the case that younger people are more open to change—particularly as their brains mature—than older people, and it is right that we try to work with them to achieve that. I would not dispute that as a general principle, but clause 4 as drafted applies to an extremely small subsection of those offenders aged between 18 and 21. It by no means applies to the generality of offenders, including terrorist offenders, aged 18 to 21. It applies to that narrow subsection who have committed a serious terrorist offence, as we have discussed already, but it also requires a finding by the judge, following a pre-sentence report—something the shadow Minister referred to in his amendment and in his speech—of dangerousness. What a finding of dangerousness means in law is that there is a significant risk of the offender causing serious harm by committing further serious terrorism or other specified offences.
There are already two hurdles to jump: a serious terrorist offence, followed by a finding of dangerousness based on a pre-sentence report. However, there is also a third hurdle that must be jumped before a younger offender aged 18 to 21 would fall into the scope of this clause, which is that, at the time of committing the offence. they were aware, or should have been aware, that their offence was very likely to result in or contribute to multiple deaths. That is a well-established test dating back to section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. We are talking about an extremely small subsection of offenders aged 18 to 21 and a very small subsection even of terrorist offenders—those who meet all three of those criteria.
Alex Cunningham
I wonder whether it really is true that it is such a small cohort of offenders, because the Bill opens up the number of offences that can be considered severe enough for this sentence to be passed. There may currently be very few, but this new law extends the offences quite considerably—in fact, in some ways, it leaves it quite open for people to determine that a terrorist offence or a terrorist connection is involved. Surely there is more opportunity now for people to be serving this sort of sentence.
Chris Philp
The provisions open it up for judges to make a finding of a terrorist connection, but the impact assessment for the Bill refers to a potential increase in the prison population of 50 people. Of course, that is for all ages over 18; if we consider how many of those estimated additional 50 places might be occupied by people aged between 18 and 21, one might reasonably assume that the number at any one time will certainly be less than 10 and possibly even less than five. That is an estimate, but none the less, it appears in the impact assessment.
Alex Cunningham
It might be helpful, as the Bill progresses, if the Minister could publish some of the facts and the evidence for the claim he has just made about the 50 people and the relatively small number of younger people.
Chris Philp
I think the number 50 appears in the impact assessment, and I would be happy to look into the basis for that estimate. As for the number of younger people, that was something that I spontaneously generated, based on the fact that we are talking about a three-year range from 18 to 21, whereas the number of offenders will generally cover all ages, from 18 upwards.
The point I am making is that, while I accept the generality of what the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth say about the need to have hope and to have an opportunity to rehabilitate, we are talking about a very small number of very serious offenders, who have been assessed as dangerous following a pre-sentence report and who have engaged in activity likely to cause multiple deaths. In those very serious circumstances, I think it is appropriate, and I think the public would also think it is appropriate, that we protect the public for an extended period, as this Bill does.
If we are talking about other offenders, including terrorist offenders who do not meet that level of seriousness—there are many—all the comments made about rehabilitation and the chance to reform do legitimately apply. Indeed, we heard in evidence earlier today that the proven reoffending rate on release for that sort of offender is between 5% and 10%, which is an extraordinarily low figure compared with other cohorts. That suggests that the rehabilitation work done in prison is effective, as I think our last witness this morning suggested.
It is important, given the assessment of dangerousness that is made, that the pre-sentence report fully reflects the offender’s ability to change and the changes to the brain and so on that take place around the early 20s. That is a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, who is not with us this afternoon as he is attending the Justice Committee, has made to me. I will discuss with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer)—I would not like to get my north, south, east and west muddled up—who is the prisons and probation Minister, whether there is any more we can do to make sure that these pre-sentence reports fully reflect the points that the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth have made about people’s ability to change. Those points are relevant in the context of assessing dangerousness, because if someone is undergoing changes, they may be less dangerous than someone who is fixed in their ways. I will take up that point with my hon. and learned Friend.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister may well be considering whether he is prepared to take the risk with this small cohort of people. As my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth outlined earlier, these individuals, who could reach middle age before there is any prospect of the state being off their back, are susceptible to further radicalisation in prison and might radicalise others. Surely, therefore, there is an element of risk that needs to be considered so that we can try to balance things.
Chris Philp
The cohort that I have described are dangerous, have been found to be dangerous by a judge following a pre-sentence report and have tried to kill multiple people. With this very small number of very dangerous people, who are endangering the lives of our fellow citizens, it is appropriate to prevent them for an extended period of time—a minimum of 14 years—from attacking our fellow citizens in the future. It is a truly exceptional and small cohort.
Speaking of the word “exceptional”, if there are circumstances in relation to these people that a judge thinks are truly exceptional—some extraordinary extenuating circumstances—and that, despite the fact that they have done the terrible things I have described and despite the finding of dangerousness, merit different treatment, the judge has open to them the possibility to make a finding that there is an exceptional circumstance and can derogate from the 14-year minimum. We would expect that to be extremely unusual—indeed, truly exceptional, as the word implies.
Given how dangerous and damaging this very small number of people are, and given our obligation to protect the public, this measure is couched appropriately. There is the ability to not make a finding of dangerousness, having read the pre-sentence report. There is also the ability for the judge to find that an exceptional circumstance applies. That provides more than adequate protection, bearing in mind how dangerous these people are.
As for other offenders, however, I take the point about the need to rehabilitate; rehabilitation is often successful, as we have seen from the figures. As I said, I will talk to my hon. and learned Friend the prisons and probation Minister to make sure that all the relevant information is collected in probation reports, which will help a judge when making a determination on the question of dangerousness.
I would like to briefly respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth about indeterminate sentences and throwing away the key, as she put it. Of course, the coalition Government legislated—I think it was in 2012—to get rid of the former sentences of imprisonment for public protection, which had been introduced in the early 2000s, whereby people could be left in prison forever, despite not having been given a life sentence. Those sentences were replaced with extended determinate sentences, so the coalition Government, which of course was Conservative-led, legislated to remove, or significantly reduce, that problem of locking people up and throwing away the key, which the hon. Member referred to in her speech.
I hope that I have explained why this measure is appropriate, bearing in mind the small numbers and the extreme danger that these people represent, and I express my support for the Bill as it is currently drafted.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. However, I am not convinced that we are talking about only a handful of people. The fact that this piece of legislation grows the number of offences that could potentially fall into this cohort suggests that many more people could be caught up in it in the longer term—some of them perhaps not quite such serious offenders as some of those the Minister has described this afternoon.
The Minister says he agrees that we should have an eye to rehabilitation and that we should work hard to achieve rehabilitation. However, if I am right and he is wrong, and we do have dozens or perhaps even more young people falling into this category because of the way the Bill is drafted, there surely need to be some protections there and some opportunity for a pre-sentence report to explore specific issues around age and maturity before reporting to a judge who will make the ultimate decision.
On the basis that this measure could affect many more people than the Minister suggests, and that some of them might not be the most serious offenders, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
In my response to the amendment, I described the effect of the clause and the tests to be applied. If those tests are met, the minimum sentence of 14 years will be imposed, followed by a licence period of not less than seven years and not greater than 25. I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged 21 or over: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 5, page 7, line 35, after “25 years.”, insert—
“(5) Where—
(a) a prisoner is subject to a licence for an extension period under this section, and
(b) the qualifying period has expired,
the Secretary of State shall, if directed to do so by the National Probation Service, order that the licence is to cease to have effect.
(6) Where—
(a) the prisoner has been released on licence for an extension period under this section;
(b) the qualifying period has expired; and
(c) if the prisoner has made a previous application under this subsection, a period of at least twelve months has expired since the disposal of that application,
the prisoner may make an application to the National Probation Service under this subsection.
(7) Where an application is made under subsection (6) above, the National Probation Service—
(a) shall, if it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the licence should remain in force, direct the Secretary of State to make an order that the licence is to cease to have effect;
(b) shall otherwise dismiss the application.
(8) In this section, ‘the qualifying period’, in relation to a prisoner who has been released on licence, means the period of ten years beginning with the date of his release.”
The main area of concern that has led to the amendment relates to the maximum 25 years on licence specified by the Bill. We of course accept that we cannot have a cliff-edge situation whereby someone leaves prison without any further monitoring, particularly offenders in this cohort. There must be a licence period once the offender leaves prison. The issue is whether a licence period of up to 25 years is reasonable and whether it is a proportionate way of addressing the problem. There is also the concern over the lack of any review mechanism.
A licence for 25 years is equivalent to a licence for life. As well as severely curtailing the human rights of the offender after they have already completed their full custodial sentence, a licence for life also fundamentally constrains their ability to play an active part in society. For example, it would be a constant barrier to employment and—who knows?—perhaps new relationships. We would essentially be telling people that there is no point in them rehabilitating or contributing to society, because they will always be under suspicion—always under the careful watch and restriction of the state. A life on licence reduces individuals’ capability to reform and take positive action. It can have a detrimental impact on the joys of life that can keep an individual on the straight and narrow.
There is also the issue of the administrative burden on an already overworked National Probation Service, which has a financial cost, and which requires additional trained probation officers to deal with those released on licence. I would be interested to know where the idea for a term of 25 years on licence comes from. Is the Government’s intention simply that anyone convicted and sentenced to a determinate sentence of 14 years, with 25 years on licence, should have a life sentence, with the state constantly on their case and without any prospect of being released from it? If so, the Minister should say so. Can he confirm that there is logic in the period that he has decided on? Has he looked at the costs and at whether 20-year licenses, which would naturally be less expensive for the state, might be just as effective?
As I have said, the main area of concern that these amendments address is the maximum 25 years on licence specified by the Bill, which is effectively a licence for life under an indeterminate sentence for public protection. However, unlike the licence for life, the Bill does not allow for the licence to be terminated in certain circumstances. That creates an issue of unfairness, as well as a huge administrative burden, at a cost to the public purse.
I agree with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, who said:
“determining whether a 7-year, 15-year or 25-year licence is appropriate at the point of sentencing for dangerous individuals who have committed the most serious offences may be asking courts to engage in guesswork.”
I personally would not feel confident in making such a decision. Would the Minister?
As I said earlier, there is a concern about existing case law and guidance available for sentencers on identifying terrorism connections when sentencing. We cannot expect sentencers to feel truly comfortable and informed if the frame of what licence they can impose is so broad. It is worth reiterating that a 25-year licence period is not so different from a licence for life. However, whereas licences for life imposed on imprisonment for public protection prisoners could be terminated in appropriate cases, that does not apply to serious terrorism sentences. It feels like the principle of rehabilitation is again being somewhat missed.
I spoke earlier this afternoon about young people. Is it the Minister’s intention that they are effectively to remain on licence until within a few years of the state retirement age? A 14-year term for a 20-year-old means that they will be 59 before they are free of the licence. Will the Minister clarify the merits of 25-year licensing and address young people in particular?
I am a strong believer in people doing their time for violent offences, but with a strong focus on rehabilitation. Our amendment would give them some hope that their good behaviour has paid off after time. Perhaps we need to give people sight of a future where they would live their lives in a very different way—an honest and crime-free way. What, if anything, can the Minister offer those people—particularly younger ones?
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister posed a question: why a maximum of 25 years? Therein lies the answer.
Alex Cunningham
Maybe I misunderstood, but I thought the 25 years was mandatory.
Chris Philp
No, it is a maximum. The licence period is between seven and 25 years; within that, the judge has discretion to choose the most appropriate length of time. The point that I was about to make is that it is up to judicial discretion to decide the appropriate length of time. We ask the judge to make that determination, as we do when setting any licence condition. That is the way the licence system works at the moment. The judge sets the licence period at the point of sentence.
The shadow Minister, quoting the independent reviewer, asked, “How can the judge know in advance what a suitable length of time may be, looking potentially as far as 25 years into the future?” The answer to that question is that although the licence period cannot and in my view should not be varied by the Probation Service acting administratively—that is for the judge to decide—the Probation Service can, and frequently does, vary the terms of the licence conditions; as an offender behaves better over time and matures, or as their radical or criminal behaviour more generally changes as they get older, the licensing conditions can be and are relaxed. The Probation Service does that as a matter of routine, and I would expect and hope for that to happen as time passes.
Were we to give the Probation Service the ability to change the length of licence period, it would be overriding a judicial decision, which is wrong in principle and would possibly infringe article 6 of the European convention on human rights, which says that the Government should not be allowed to interfere with or alter a sentence handed down by the court.
The shadow Minister mentioned the arrangements for terminating licence conditions for indeterminate sentences—that is, the old imprisonment for public protection I referred to previously. As the name implies, those IPPs are indeterminate and indefinite. A judge has not imposed a time limit, so they could go on for the duration of somebody’s life. Some termination mechanism is needed.
Where a judge has made a decision—and it is up to the judge to choose, at their discretion, somewhere between seven and 25 years—it is right that licence condition is applied for that length of time. However, to reassure the Committee and the shadow Minister, I should say that the Probation Service can, as appropriate, relax and change those licence conditions as time passes. That is the right way of handling the issue.
Alex Cunningham
I accept the Minister’s explanation and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have covered many of the operative provisions. They are rather similar to the ones we debated in clause 4, in relation to people under the age of 21.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Serious terrorism sentence: Scotland
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 6, page 8, line 10, at end insert—
“(ea) the court does not impose an order for lifelong restriction under section 210F of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and”.
This amendment disapplies Clause 6 if an order for lifelong restriction, a sentence unique to Scotland, has been imposed.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. Before I move to the specifics of amendment 43, I will say by way of preface where my party and I are coming from. As the Minister is aware, we recognise that it is the duty of not just a Government to keep their citizens safe and secure; it is the obligation of all who serve in Parliament. At the outset, we have given the Government our assurance that any opposition will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism that we now see, sadly, all too regularly in our communities, is addressed and that we keep our people as safe as they can be.
Some issues concern us. The burden of proof has been mentioned in terms of TPIMs. The balance of the burden of proof has been an issue for over 40 years, since my involvement in the law—and, in a way, since the legal profession and legal systems came about. We recognise that there is good reason why there has to be some distinction when it comes to terrorism and that standards that might normally apply in a wider criminal trial cannot be expected, especially with regard to TPIMs. However, there still has to be an element of proportionality, and we have to ensure that we protect the rights of those who face considerable periods of loss of liberty. That is why we have concerns and are watching the situation.
Sadly, the issue disproportionately impacts BAME communities; we are conscious of that. It is clear that we are required not only to protect our people from terrorism—and, indeed, to punish those who perpetrate it—but to prevent it from happening in the first instance. If we have a system that is perceived, whether it in fact is or not, as prejudicial and impacting harshly, even sometimes deliberately, on one community, issues arise. Those of us old enough to remember the consequences of internment in Northern Ireland will realise that a community’s feeling of being discriminated against can be a recruiting sergeant rather than the method of preventing such recruitment.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian for his constructive comments at the beginning of his speech. As the shadow Minister said, in many respects the work on the Bill demonstrates Parliament and public life at its best, as we work together to protect our fellow citizens throughout the whole United Kingdom. Protecting our fellow citizens from violent attack is, thankfully, a principle on which we all agree, regardless of our differences on various other topics that often come before us. I am grateful for the constructive approach of the hon. Member for East Lothian, accepting, of course, that he wishes to discuss further points in due course, a few of which he mentioned.
There is clearly a question about how this legislation interacts with the order for lifelong restriction, which is applicable in Scotland. Indeed, the sentence that a Scottish court might hand down in the absence of this legislation could conceivably be longer—lifelong, as the name implies—than the period required by this legislation. The Government essentially accept the principle that there is an interaction that requires further work, and—let me be clear—further amendment.
On the detail of how the interaction will work best, discussions are ongoing between Ministry of Justice officials and officials in the Justice Directorate in Scotland about the technicalities. For example, although the clause as it is drafted would make it possible for an OLR to be imposed and, therefore, a lifelong restriction to be in place, we would lose the 14-year minimum sentence. What we would like to try to achieve technically is an amendment that preserves the concept of the 14-year minimum, but allows the lifelong restrictions to apply thereafter if a Scottish judge sees fit.
Those technical discussions are taking place. If the hon. Member for East Lothian or his colleague, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, wish to participate in those technical discussions, they are welcome to do so.
The fact that we would lose the 14-year minimum is problematic, but I accept the principle that an amendment is needed. If we can put such an amendment together quickly enough, we will be happy to bring it forward, in consultation with the hon. Gentleman, on Report. If we cannot get it ready fast enough for that, perhaps their lordships will be kind enough to consider making an appropriate amendment down at their end of the building.
I hope that my comments illustrate that I recognise the validity and the reasonableness of the point being raised. I hope that we can find a way to amend the Bill to preserve the 14-year minimum but not take away any ability that Scottish judges currently have to impose longer restrictions, should they see fit.
Kenny MacAskill
I am happy to accept that parliamentary drafting has its complexities; it is a skill way beyond my level of competence, but I appreciate the difficulties that go with it. I am happy to accept the undertaking given by the Minister, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 6 has the same operative effect as clause 5 has in relation to England and Wales.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 7
Serious terrorism sentence: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 7 and associated Government amendment 31 essentially do all the things we have just debated in relation to England, Wales and Scotland, but apply to Northern Ireland. The Government amendment is to ensure that we interact with Northern Irish sentencing law in a consistent way. It is rather the same issue that we debated a moment ago in relation to Scotland, where similar thinking clearly needs to be developed a little further. Government amendment 31 makes, I think, five technical changes to ensure that the measures that we have already debated apply consistently and coherently in Northern Ireland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for guilty pleas: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 8 relates to a reduction to the minimum custodial term for a serious terrorist sentence where the offender makes a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity. Ordinarily, when such a guilty plea is entered for most offences—not quite all, but most—a discount of up to 33% of the sentence is possible. However, reflecting the very serious nature of the offences we are debating, the clause limits the discount for an early guilty plea to 20% of the custodial term. By way of illustration, if a 14-year minimum were imposed—it could be more, of course—the reduction could be to 11 years and 73 days, but no less. Practically, that is implemented by inserting a new subsection into section 73 of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for guilty pleas: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 9 has the same effect as the one we have just discussed, but in relation to Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Reduction in appropriate custodial term for assistance to prosecution: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 10 provides for the court to apply a reduction to the custodial term for a serious terrorist sentence in England and Wales from the 14-year minimum in cases where the offender assists the prosecution. It does so by inserting a new subsection into section 74 of the sentencing code. The subsection notes that nothing in the STS sentencing provisions affects the court’s ability or power to take into account the extent and nature of any assistance given to the prosecution.
In keeping with the approach to all other sentences, including other minimum sentences and mandatory life sentences, there is no maximum reduction rate in relation to the flexibility that I have just described. While we are determined to ensure that serious terrorists receive the appropriate penalties for their offending, it is also important to ensure that an incentive remains for guilty offenders to assist the prosecution with other cases it may be pursuing.
This is a well-established process within the sentencing procedure across the whole United Kingdom. It can, and indeed often does, play a pivotal role in helping our prosecutors and the police to secure guilty verdicts in other, often more significant, related cases where the defendants may be a higher risk to the public than those in the case under direct consideration. We think it appropriate to continue that judicial discretion in cases where defendants assist the prosecution and where that assistance may help to convict other, even more dangerous people.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Fifth sitting)
Thursday 2nd July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 July 2020 - (2 Jul 2020)
The Chair
Members are free to remove their jackets, if they so wish, but must turn their electronic devices to silent. Mr Speaker does not allow tea or coffee to be consumed during sittings. Social distancing is still recommended here; we have been asked to suspend the sitting if there are any problems. Finally, will Members please give their speaking notes to the Hansard reporters? That would be very helpful. We will begin with clause 11.
Clause 11
Minimum term order for serious terrorism offenders: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 11, page 12, line 42, at end insert—
“(7) Before this section comes into force, the Government must publish an analysis of the impact of the introduction of minimum term orders for terrorism offenders on sentencing for other offences.
(8) A copy of the analysis must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment requires the Government to publish an analysis of the impact of the minimum terms on sentencing for related offences.
It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mr McCabe. The Labour party is not in principle against a minimum 14-year sentence for those convicted of serious terrorist offences. We are aware that it is a particularly small cohort who have been found guilty of some absolutely heinous crimes in order to find themselves in this category of offender. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice’s own impact assessment sets out that as few as 50 offenders could fall into this category, although, as I have said time and again, the Ministry of Justice can provide no evidence to back up that figure. None the less, as I have said throughout our discussions, the changes to legislation that this House makes must be underpinned by supporting evidence, and the amendment would do just that.
The amendment would require the Government to publish an analysis of the impact of the introduction of minimum term orders for terrorism offenders on sentencing for other offences, and to lay a copy of the analysis before Parliament prior to this section coming into force. The impact assessment estimates that the potential impact of measures increasing minimum terms for terrorist offenders given life sentences
“may result in fewer than 50 additional prisoners…annually”.
I am not entirely convinced by that assessment and ask that the Government conduct an analysis of the measures on wider sentencing practice.
In Tuesday’s sitting, the Minister was at pains to stress the figure of 50 additional prisoners caught up by his new proposals, with only a handful of them being under the age of 21, and said he would provide the rationale behind the numbers. Nothing arrived in my inbox yesterday, so I assume it is still a work in progress for the Minister. I would have thought it perfectly easy for him to support his numbers with evidence before now, but perhaps he will provide that full explanation in his response.
I have outlined in previous sittings my concern about the impact of the creation of new offences with a terrorist connection. We all need to be satisfied that the Government have got the numbers right, because if they have not the ramifications will be considerable.
As I have said throughout our discussions, the changes to legislation that this House makes must be underpinned by supporting evidence. We need to know whether minimum terms are working effectively. Have they made our country safer? Are they really a valuable tool in working with offenders? As I have spoken about at length, our justice system does not treat everyone fairly, even if it is our intention to do so. Given that it does not treat everyone fairly, we must consider the impact of our decisions on all groups, particularly those with protected characteristics. We as lawmakers need to obtain and understand evidence that increasing the length of time that individuals spend in custody leads to significant gains in public protection beyond delaying the possibility of an offence being committed.
In its written evidence, the Prison Reform Trust stated that increasing the length of the custodial period could undermine public protection by eroding protective factors. A key example is family contact associated with a reduced risk of reoffending on release. Perhaps the Minister can answer that challenge from the Prison Reform Trust. It is of course only right that the Minister talks about the number of offenders who will be caught up in his proposed new laws, because it is important to understand how many will be subject to additional impediments to their attempts to live anywhere near a normal life when they are released on a licence of up to 25 years.
The Government’s own impact assessment specifically sets out that the MOJ is aware that separating offenders, especially younger ones, from their families will negatively impact on their rehabilitation. We need answers from the Minister on that point. Yet we face a situation where the MOJ does not know the total number of offenders who will be caught up in this cohort. In addition, the MOJ does not know how many of those offenders will be young adults or under-18s, and it cannot provide any evidence-based reason for introducing the minimum sentence. The only thing that the MOJ seems sure of is that removing protective factors can impact on rehabilitation. It is important that the Minister gets those numbers right, because they have a major impact on how offenders are managed within the system and on whether or not the system will be properly equipped to deal with them.
I believe that the Government have said that the cost of these new measures will be around £60 million a year, but how has that figure been arrived at? The Minister holds tight to his figure of £50 million a year, but even if he is right, that is £50 million every single year and the number will build up to around 700 terrorist offenders in the prison system, all of them needing particular management in an already stretched service, which so many people tell us is under-resourced, lacks the expertise it needs and has rehabilitation programmes for terrorist offenders that, at best, need considerable improvement.
The need for analysis is probably even more important for us to understand the effects on young people and the potential impact of the determinate sentences. When he spoke on Tuesday against our amendment to have specific pre-sentencing reports that take age into consideration, the Minister made much of the fact that only a very small number of young people will be caught by his new measures. I do not want to repeat myself too often, but we still await an explanation as to where the Minister gets his estimates from, even if it is a very small number of people who will be affected.
For the sake of argument, let us say that the Minister is right, and for the sake of illustration, let us assume that it is eight young people a year who will be affected. Before a young person sentenced under the Minister’s new law is released, there are likely to be more than 100 people in the prison system who have been convicted of an offence with a terrorist connection. We really need to understand what that means for the offenders, for the Prison Service and for society.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we can be assured that the Bill will have a disproportionate impact on a certain sector of people—namely, those convicted of plotting or executing mass maiming and murder?
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Lady is right up to a point, but some of the people under discussion will not have been responsible for killing people. A lot of them are covered by the charge of plotting, and there is the new range of terrorist offences. The crimes to which she refers are already covered by legislation. People who commit such terrible crimes are already subject to a life sentence, so in this particular situation we are talking about a different category of people.
I was saying that we need to understand what these changes mean for offenders, the Prison Service and society. For example, does the necessary amount of specialist prison provision required to incarcerate these offenders actually exist? That is not just about the number of prison places; it is about having the expertise available to manage and engage these offenders. We heard a lot of evidence from Mark Fairhurst about the need for proper provision and the fact that, at the moment, we have only one centre to deal with these particular terrorists. We are supposed to have three such centres, but we do not yet know when the Government will come forward and tell us when the new centres will be up and running.
What are the Minister’s proposals for housing younger offenders? Again, we need the prison places, but we also need the support services. Do they already exist, or is he proposing to develop more of them? If he is going to develop more of them, when will they be available? Even in the next two or three years, based on the Minister’s numbers, perhaps 20 or 30 young people will need specialist accommodation. They need specialist support services. Where are those services coming from? They do not exist at the moment, as I hope that the Minister will acknowledge, so will he ensure that they will in future so that we can for and deal with these people appropriately? We must not have a situation in which younger offenders—albeit among the most serious ones, as described by the hon. Lady—end up in the adult prison system because there is nowhere else for them to go.
I would welcome a specific comment on the issue when the Minister responds. I know that he has some tidying-up amendments for later in the development of the Bill, but I want to understand specifically what will happen with younger offenders and whether it is possible that some of them will end up in the adult estate.
It should be clear to the Minister why he should not be shy about commissioning analysis better to understand the issues that we face. Everyone talks about the importance of data and making decisions based on evidence. The amendment provides the Minister with an opportunity to do just that, and the Opposition are pleased to offer the Minister our assistance.
Also, if the Minister had the analysis, it would be easy for him to demonstrate to the House that he had got his decisions right. When he faced challenges from the Opposition on the success or failure of his new measures, he would have the analysis at his fingertips. I know that, financially, the Justice Department is skint. It has suffered heavy cuts disproportionate to those for other Departments during the past 10 years or so, and we have seen the results of that. The latest figures show that the number of criminal cases yet to reach the courts has now exceeded half a million, with hundreds of thousands more tribunal cases also outstanding. Perhaps it is the lack of resources that has meant that the Lord Chancellor cannot crack on and plan Nightingale courts to go alongside the Nightingale hospitals—the money to do so simply is not available. He did write to me yesterday, telling me that some additional money will be available. But it is a very small amount of money compared with the challenge that the system faces. This Minister’s accepting the amendment might result in the use of some resources, but the right action in this respect could save considerable sums in the longer term, and as I have made clear, the Justice Department really needs the resources.
Our ask is simple. We believe that there are real benefits for the Government in carrying out the analysis described in the amendment. Let us have in Parliament the evidence suggesting that these measures are a necessity and actually keep the public safe. I hope that the Minister will take these points and accept that longer sentences do not necessarily reduce the risk of reoffending. Several of our witnesses made that clear and even suggested that minimum sentences may in fact be counterproductive. The Minister might be reluctant to adopt the amendment—I will be surprised if he is not—but I look to him to come up with answers to the real issues that it covers.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
Good morning. It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mr McCabe. Let me start by responding specifically to the amendment, and then I will try to pick up one or two of the more general points that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, raised in his speech.
Amendment 39 does not propose any very wide form of analysis, aspects of which the hon. Gentleman referred to. It in fact proposes a very specific form of analysis, which is an impact assessment on the effect of these minimum term orders on other offences. It asks us to do an analysis that says, “If we introduce a minimum 14-year term to be served by those with life sentences, what effect will it have on unrelated offences? What effect will the minimum terms have on unrelated offences in relation to non-terrorist crimes?” If I may respectfully say so, given that the Bill is about terrorist offences and nothing in the Bill has any impact at all on non-terrorist offences, I do not think that the analysis proposed by amendment 39 is particularly germane. The Bill will not make any difference at all to any other, non-terrorist offences, so I do not think that analysis would have any results or effect.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate the Minister giving way so early in his speech. The Bill creates a host of new offences, which will capture more people. It is important that he addresses the effect on other offences, which could all of a sudden become terrorism-related offences and therefore be subject to a very different sentencing decision by a judge in a court.
Chris Philp
My reading of the term “other offences” in line 3 the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is offences not caught by the scope of the Bill.
Let me turn to the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked and the numbers he raised. We have published an impact assessment and equalities assessment, as we discussed at some length in the previous sitting. He asked where I got the numbers of younger offenders from. I now have some information about the under-18 cohort, which he and other Members are concerned about. Currently, there are only three terrorist offenders in prison under the age of 18. I hope that illustrates the very small numbers involved.
On the question of whether we are unreasonably widening the scope of what constitutes a terrorist offence, my judgment is that most terrorist offences would be caught under the existing list of terrorist offences. It would be relatively unusual for a terrorist act to be committed outside the current list of offences, and for it to be necessary to make the terrorist connection. It could happen, and we are rightly legislating for that, but the existing list of terrorist offences is relatively comprehensive, so I do not think that the scope increase that the hon. Gentleman is referring to will have a dramatic impact on what are already small numbers. It is of course important that we give the judge the opportunity—the power—to make that connection where somebody commits an offence not on the current list; it is logically conceivable that that could happen.
Let me turn to the number—the 50. We can extrapolate how many of those 50 are aged between 18 and 21, as we discussed in the previous sitting. I do not think that number is the annual flow or the number of convictions per year. As I understand it, it is the impact on the total prison population. Given that these sentences are quite long, one would expect that the annual flow into the system affected by these serious terrorism sentence provisions would be somewhat lower than that.
Those numbers illustrate powerfully that we are talking about an extremely small number of people. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford said in her well-pitched intervention, we are talking about people who have committed a serious terrorist offence and have been found to be dangerous—in other words, the judge thinks that they pose an ongoing, serious risk to the public. Their actions either caused or were likely to cause multiple deaths, and, in the context of clause 11, the judge views the offence as so serious that a life sentence is appropriate. I hope that gives the Committee a clear sense that these numbers are extremely small and, thankfully, particularly small in relation to young people. We should take this opportunity to pay tribute to the tremendous work that our counter-terror police and the security services do to keep those numbers so very small.
Other remarks were made about funding. That is probably outside the scope of the clause, but I will address it very briefly, if I may have your indulgence for one minute, Mr McCabe. I am sure that if I stretch the bounds of your indulgence, you will call me to order. Counter-terrorism funding rightly increased substantially earlier this year in response to the enhanced level of threat. Spending on Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service of course includes work on rehabilitation, and that also received a significant funding increase in the spending review in September 2019. I am sure that everyone here would welcome that increase in expenditure.
The shadow Minister mentioned a number of outstanding cases in the legal system. I think the number he quoted relates to magistrates courts. Of course we are in the middle of—hopefully coming towards the end of—a serious pandemic, which inhibited the operation of the courts system. Prior to the coronavirus epidemic, waiting times in the magistrates court were about eight weeks. The outstanding case load in the Crown court was certainly a great deal lower than it was in 2010. Obviously, coronavirus has caused an increase in the outstanding case load. We are working hard to address that with the new Nightingale courts. There are, I believe, 10 sites working on extending sitting hours. By the end of July every court in the country will be back up and running, and we are rolling out the cloud video platform, so that hearings can take place by video. I commend to the Committee the court recovery plan that was published two or three days ago. I hope that that demonstrates the herculean national effort currently under way to reduce the outstanding case load that has built up during the coronavirus epidemic.
Alex Cunningham
I most certainly welcome the increased expenditure in the area in question. It is essential that the Government look to increasing it further, because there is no doubt, from the evidence the Committee received, that the system is not adequate to receive the people who will be caught up in the range of new laws. It was good to hear the Minister try to clarify some of the numbers. The figure of only three people aged under 18 is significant. However, according to the analysis, there would be up to 50 people a year, over a long period. Does the Minister want to correct me?
Chris Philp
I will double check that number, but my understanding, which I will check, is that as a consequence of the measures the total prison population will increase by 50, which is different from an extra 50 people extra flowing in each year. However, I will come back to the hon. Gentleman on that.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate that, but I thought I read it was 50 per year. I may of course be mistaken, but I look forward to the Minister clarifying that.
If the vast majority of criminal offences are committed under existing legislation, I wonder why we are here, other than to increase the determinate sentence to 14 years. Perhaps in a later speech the Minister will return to the matter. We may well return to it in future, but for the moment, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 11, as we have been discussing, amends section 323 of the sentencing code, which makes provision for the setting of a minimum term—a tariff—for discretionary life sentences. It will make sure that, where a life sentence is handed down to an adult offender who is convicted of a serious terrorist offence—which can be considered as a serious terrorism case—for the purpose of setting a minimum term, the provisions of this clause will apply.
The minimum term in a discretionary life sentence is the period that must be served in custody before an offender can be considered for release by the Parole Board. Offenders who are subject to a discretionary life sentence are subject to a life licence following the release. Clause 11 adjusts section 323 of the code so that, where the court considers an offender who requires a life sentence for their offending and has committed a serious terrorism offence, as found in schedule 17A to the sentencing code, an equivalent consideration is made to that for the serious terrorism sentence by requiring the court to consider it as a serious terrorism case.
A serious terrorism case is one where an adult offender has committed a serious terrorism offence and meets the criteria that we discussed previously for a serious terrorism sentence—that is, the court considers them dangerous; they present a serious future risk of harm, which in this context means the prospect of death or serious personal injury resulting; and in the opinion of the court they meet the risk of multiple death condition, which we discussed earlier in connection with serious terrorism sentences. The clause therefore requires the courts to set a minimum term of 14 years, unless exceptional circumstances apply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Minimum punishment part for serious terrorism offenders: Scotland
Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This clause has the same effect as the previous clause, which applied to England and Wales. This applies to Scotland, and will have effect by inserting a new section 205ZB into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Minimum tariff for serious terrorism offenders given life sentences: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 13 has the same effect as the previous two clauses, except in relation to Northern Ireland. It will amend the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Minimum custodial period for serious terrorism offenders given indeterminate custodial sentences: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 14 also relates to Northern Ireland. In this case, it applies to Northern Irish offenders who receive an indeterminate custodial sentence, ensuring that the 14-year minimum custodial period applies to them as well. The clause will have effect by amending article 13 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Additional offences attracting extended sentence: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This clause sets out a number of offences that, from the commencement date of this provision, will be included in the list of offences eligible for receiving an extended determinate sentence in England and Wales. Adding these offences will ensure that the sentencing regime in England and Wales is consistent in the type of offences it considers serious enough to be eligible for an extended determinate sentence. To make this change, the clause adds the offences specified within the provisions to part 1 of schedule 18 of the sentencing code. These offences all carry a maximum penalty of life, and include the making of explosives, developing biological weapons, endangering the safety of aircraft, using nuclear materials and hijacking or destroying ships. As such, they are of comparable seriousness to other offences already in scope for the extended sentence. Adding these offences to the list will correct the anomaly created by their omission and will ensure that these serious offences and others are eligible for an extended sentence as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Increase in extension period for serious terrorism offenders aged under 18: England and Wales
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 16, page 16, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) Section 255 of the Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
“(3) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 256(4)(b)(iii)—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(4) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (3).”
(6) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(7) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 41, in clause 17, page 17, line 4, at end insert—
“(4) Section 267 of the Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 268(4)(b)(iii)—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(2B) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (2A).”
(6) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(7) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”.
Alex Cunningham
Amendments 40 and 41 serve a similar purpose to amendments 37, 45 and 46, which we debated earlier. Hon. Members will recollect that, such was our strength of feeling on the need for the age of young people to be taken into consideration in the pre-sentencing report, and then by the judge in deciding what type of sentence to impose, we put clause 37 to a vote. The decision to do so was strengthened by the Minister’s failure to justify his estimates of the numbers that would be caught by the new offences and, therefore, sentences. We talked about that earlier. He dismissed our earlier amendments by claiming that there would be only a handful of young people caught by the measures. However, as hon. Members will have heard, I addressed our concerns about the lack of evidence of the numbers when I spoke to amendment 39—though I think there is more evidence to come from the Minister on that topic.
Chris Philp
I must say, the shadow Minister has painted for me a truly horrifying picture, namely membership of the Liberal Democrats followed by crushing defeat at a general election. Let that be a lesson to anyone who, like my former hon. Friend the Member for East Surrey, considers anything so foolish as a move to the Liberal Democrats. Looking around this Committee, that is something we can all agree on.
The first question raised by these amendments is whether there is an option for an extension period other than eight to 10 years. I am looking at amendment 40 to clause 16(3)(b). The way the legislation is currently drafted allows the judge the discretion to choose the extension period—the licence period—of anything between one and 10 years. All that these clauses do is increase the maximum from eight years—as it is now—to 10 years, but that is not mandatory; the judge can choose to have an extension period as low as one year. The choice for judicial discretion that the shadow Minister is calling for already exists without the amendment. Instead of the choice being between one and eight years, as it is now, the choice will become between one and 10 years, as we propose, but judicial discretion will still exist.
The pre-sentence report that the amendment calls for will exist already. There is always a pre-sentence report for offences of this nature. In deciding what length of extension period is appropriate, the judge will already have due regard to that pre-sentence report. They will also have due regard to that pre-sentence report in making their finding, or otherwise, of dangerousness.
On the question of a review of how things are going, I certainly do not fear any sort of review after the event. We have a standing procedure that legislation should be reviewed after—I think, typically—three years, to see how it is functioning. I would expect this legislation, as other legislation, to be subject to that same scrutiny process. I am sure that no one in the House would be shy to propose changes if, in due course, anything appeared to be amiss.
On that basis, in particular the first two points—
Alex Cunningham
I realised that the Minister was getting to the point at which he would sit down, but I asked specifically for him to address the issue of how young people who have committed this type of offence will be accommodated on the estate. Can the fears expressed by many individuals be properly addressed?
Chris Philp
Such young people will not move on to the adult prison estate until they turn 21, so that immediately provides some reassurance, I hope. The more general point that the shadow Minister makes, and has made before—and our witnesses made—is on the importance of rehabilitation. They are points well made. We should not simply lock people up and throw away the key; even with such serious offenders, who will rightly spend a great deal of time in prison, we should work on rehabilitation.
Part of the additional resources announced in the September 2019 spending review and this year’s March Budget will go to Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I have spoken to the Prisons and Probation Minister about young people, an issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury has also raised with me, and it is an area where effort, focus and attention are being paid, and will be further in future. That point about rehabilitation is well made, but it is being addressed. I am sure it is a topic that Members will return to. I have forgotten whether this is an intervention or a speech, but on that basis, I politely and respectfully ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendments.
Alex Cunningham
It is lovely to have a guarantee from the Minister that no young person will end up in the adult estate—
Alex Cunningham
The Minister qualifies that by saying “under the age of 21”. I appreciate that, and I assume that the word “guarantee” can be applied in this particular circumstance, despite the fact that some of our witnesses were concerned that we do not have sufficient facilities within the system to house 18 to 21-year-olds and some even younger than that.
In an earlier debate, I believe on Tuesday, the Minister appeared to accept that the pre-sentence report regime could be improved. In fact, he made a commitment to speak to his colleagues in the Home Office, to see whether they might find ways to ensure that the pre-sentence report covers some of the issues that I raised in Committee. We have not heard from the Minister about that, but perhaps in a later speech we will.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
On that point, does the hon. Gentleman accept that standard practice in all pre-sentence reports is for the judge to consider not only the physical, chronological age, but maturity, so some of those concerns should, as a matter of course, be addressed?
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Gentleman has greater experience of this area than I do, and I bow to his superior knowledge, but the important thing is that we look carefully at the reports, in particular in relation to that cohort of young people, to ensure that every single opportunity is presented to the judge so that the judge gets the right answer. With that, although we will return to the issue of young people at a later stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
As we have discussed, the clause extends the maximum possible licence period for serious terrorist offenders aged under 18 when given an extended sentence of detention. It gives the courts the option to increase the maximum—I say maximum—extended licence period from eight to 10 years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Increase in extension period for adult serious terrorism offenders aged under 21: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 17 has the same effect as the previous clause, but applies to offenders up to the age of 21. It does that by amending section 268(4) of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Increase in extension period for serious terrorism offenders aged 21 or over: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 18 has the same effect—raising the maximum licence period to 10 years. This time it applies to offenders aged over 21 in England and Wales, and it makes that change by amending section 281(4) of the sentencing code.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Additional terrorism offences attracting extended sentence: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The clause sets out a number of offences that will be included in the list of offences that are eligible for receiving an extended determinate sentence in Scotland, from the date of commencement. The offences to be included are terrorist offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years, which is specified in part 1 of schedule 5ZC, and non-terrorist offences carrying a maximum penalty of life, as specified in part 2 of that schedule, in cases where a terrorist connection has been found by the court under section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It also applies to under-18s convicted of terrorist and terrorism-related offences in Scotland. The clause makes that change by amending section 210A(10) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and inserts a schedule into that Act.
Alex Cunningham
We have talked a lot about numbers in this Committee. Will the Minister enlighten us on how many people will be caught up in these provisions?
Chris Philp
These provisions relate to Scotland. In order to avoid providing the Committee with erroneous information, it would be safest if I write to the hon. Gentleman with that information.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5
Terrorism offences attracting extended sentence: Scotland
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
The schedule is consequential to the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 5 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 20
Extended custodial sentences for serious terrorism offenders: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The clause does two things. First, it adds all serious terrorism offences to the scope of the extended sentencing regime. Secondly, it increases the maximum extended licence period for those who receive an extended sentence for serious terrorism offences. I should say that the clause applies to Northern Ireland, and the clause essentially does the same thing as the previous few clauses on extended sentence length and adding some additional offences. That will ensure that there is a consistent approach across the United Kingdom in terms of both offences that are tracked and extended sentences—in the case of Northern Ireland, extended custodial sentences—and that the courts may impose up to a 10-year licence period, should they find that appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Offences attracting special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 21 substitutes schedule 6 to the Bill for schedule 13 of the sentencing code. It is designed to ensure that, in all circumstances, specified terrorist offenders will spend at least 12 months on licence following their release, even when they are released at the very end of their custodial sentence. It does that by updating the offences that attract a custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern in England and Wales—the so-called SOPC sentence. The updated schedule includes all terrorist offences that carry a maximum penalty of over two years, and it replaces the specified non-terrorist offences that can attract a SOPC when committed in a terrorist capacity with a clause that includes any offence that is determined to have a terrorist connection under section 69 of the sentencing code in the SOPC regime. The changes made to the clause are applicable to those who are convicted of an offence on or after the day on which that provision comes into force, which is the day after the Bill gains Royal Assent.
Adding those offences to the SOPC regime will mean that the court will now be required to impose such a sentence where extended determinate sentences have been considered but not imposed. All such offenders will no longer be eligible for a standard determinate sentence. That is because the time spent on licence—the Bill introduces a minimum of one year—is very important for rehabilitating offenders, as the shadow Minister has said, as well as for protecting the public.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6
Offences attracting special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
It is consequential to the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 6 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22
Special custodial sentence for certain terrorist offenders aged under 18 at time
of offence: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
These are relatively technical amendments. The purpose of Government amendment 16 is to apply the same period of rehabilitation to the new sentence for terrorist offenders of particular concern as that currently applied to sentences in respect of grave crimes under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The rehabilitation period is specified in section 5 of that Act and varies depending on the length of sentence given. It begins on the day the sentence is completed, including any time spent on licence.
Government amendment 29 amends the statutory instruments referred to above in order to align the new special sentence of detention for terrorist offenders of particular concern for under-18s with sentences imposed under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Those are the central amendments.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
Can I just be clear? For certain offences, under-18s will be treated in exactly the same way as adults when being sentenced. If I have got that wrong, can the Minister please explain?
Chris Philp
No. The rehabilitation periods are different and lower for children—quite rightly, for the reasons we debated earlier. All we are doing is creating consistency between the rehabilitation period for adults who commit the various offences and the rehabilitation period for children who commit various offences. We are not making the rehabilitation period the same for children as it is for adults.
The purpose of clause 22 is to address a gap in sentencing options for those under 18 who commit a terrorism offence where custodial sentencing options are limited to a maximum two-year detention and training order, due to the offender not meeting the criteria required to impose long-term detention for offences punishable by less than 14 years in custody.
The new sentence ensures that those convicted of a terrorist offence—we are talking about the serious terrorist offences—spend a substantial period of time on licence to enable that very important rehabilitative work to be undertaken in the community, and to limit the risk that they may pose to the public. That will also ensure greater consistency between the approaches towards sentence and release for under-18s and adults, although under-18s will of course be typically serving shorter prison sentences.
Under the current framework, some terrorist offences can attract only a detention and training order of up to two years, with only half that being served in detention, or an extended determinate sentence where the child is considered dangerous and the sentence is at least four years. That is a consequence of the fixed-term sentences under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, and they are available only for specified offences. Terrorist offences are not a specified category.
As some terrorist offences carry a maximum sentence of less than 14 years, the only custodial sentencing option is therefore the detention and training order. Essentially, the clause fills the gap between those two sentences by creating the SOPC-type offence for under-18s. Of course, the length of sentence will be entirely a matter for the discretion of the judge, and the judge will have the pre-sentence report available in making that determination. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury said in his intervention, that pre-sentence report will include considerations regarding not just the offender’s chronological age but their mental maturity. Judges will of course continue to have discretion to ensure that they are balancing the offender’s maturity with the appropriate kind of sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 23 operates in Scotland, and essentially ensures that there is always a fixed licence period of at least one year when someone is released, so that people are not released without any licence supervision afterwards. We have talked about the reasons: both to facilitate rehabilitation and to protect the public. The clause is given effect by the insertion of new section 205ZC into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
The Chair
The question is that clause 23 stand part of the Bill. As many as are of that opinion, say aye.
The Chair
To the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it, the ayes have it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7
Offences attracting terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Scotland
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Very diplomatic, Mr McCabe. Schedule 7 is consequential to the previous clause. It sets out the terrorist offences within the scope of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, and will be inserted as schedule 5ZB to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
The Chair
The question is that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill. As many as are of that opinion, say aye.
The Chair
That’s certainly better. To the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it, the ayes have it.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 7 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 24
Terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I thank the Committee for its rousing endorsement of the previous schedule.
The purpose of clause 24 is to make amendments to provide for a new terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period. This is necessary to ensure an approach consistent with Northern Irish law. The Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 is amended to ensure that any offender may have the length of their terrorism sentence reduced by any relevant period spent in police detention or custody. There are further amendments, with broadly similar objectives, made to the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
More generally, clause 24 seeks to make amendments to terrorism sentences in Northern Ireland in a way that is consistent with the measures we have discussed already. The structure of sentences is a little different in Northern Ireland, hence the slight differences in this clause, but the offer is in effect that the minimal one-year licence period is the same as those discussed already for England, Wales and Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Corresponding provision under service law
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 25 introduces schedule 8, which makes the equivalent provisions under service law to certain sentencing provisions made by this part. It covers an equivalent of the serious terrorism sentence, including relevant term reductions for a guilty plea and for assistance to the prosecution, as we have discussed, as well as minimum term orders and provisions equivalent to those in clauses 8 and 9, and changes to the special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern, including the creation of an equivalent sentence for youth offenders.
The clause is necessary to ensure that the provisions in this Bill, which strengthen counter-terrorism sentencing, are applied to all jurisdictions in the UK, including the armed forces.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Corresponding provision about sentencing under service law
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Schedule 8 and the two Government amendments are technical changes that relate to the application of this law to the services, which I mentioned in the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 8 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 26
Increase in maximum sentences for certain terrorist offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 26 increases the maximum penalty for three terrorism offences, to ensure that the punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime involved. The three offences are: membership of a proscribed organisation, under section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000; supporting a proscribed organisation, under section 12 of that Act; and attending a place used for terrorist training, under section 8 of that Act. In all three cases the maximum penalty applicable will be increased from 10 to 14 years.
It will, of course, remain a matter for the sentencing judge to decide on the appropriate sentence, but given how serious the offences are we feel it appropriate to give the court the ability to issue a sentence of up to 14 years if, on the basis of the evidence and the pre-sentence report, the judge sees fit.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Sixth sitting)
Thursday 2nd July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 July 2020 - (2 Jul 2020)
The Chair
I will make a few preliminary points. As usual, please switch electronic devices to silent, and teas and coffees are not allowed in the room. I remind the Committee of social distancing rules. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members sent any copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 27
Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
It is a great pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. The clause is the first clause in part 2 of the Bill, and is one of the most important sections. It removes the prospect of early release for the most dangerous terrorist offenders in England and Wales. The provision is central to the core aims of the Bill—namely, ensuring that the most dangerous offenders serve their full sentence, to reflect the serious nature of their crimes and to protect the public from them. Some of the recent terrible terrorist atrocities have powerfully demonstrated the awful consequences that can follow the early release of a terrorist offender who goes on to reoffend, sometimes with tragic and fatal effect.
The clause amends section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, under which relevant terrorist offenders are currently referred to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of their custodial term, to be considered for discretionary early release. The clause would exclude a particular class of the most dangerous offenders from discretionary early release if they receive an extended determinate sentence; if that sentence is for a terrorist or terrorist-related offence; and if that offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Only if those three conditions apply is the prospect of discretionary early released removed, and those offenders instead serve their full custodial terms.
This is an important measure to protect the public. The only way to be certain that someone will not reoffend is if they are in prison. Of course, after release, offenders who have served their full custodial term under the provisions of the clause will then be subject to the extended licence period that we discussed this morning, which can now be as long as 10 years. During the extended licence period, work on rehabilitation can continue and public protection can be maintained. It is not as if offenders are simply let out and we forget about them; the licence conditions and monitoring will be extremely important. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
As the Minister said, the Bill brings a new facet to criminal justice by creating the serious terrorism sentence in an earlier clause but removing early release for those who prove to the Parole Board that they have been rehabilitated to the extent that they could be released from a custodial sentence.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and other hon. Friends said on Second Reading, we do not oppose the changes, because they apply to the most serious offenders who pose the greatest risk to the public. However, as we heard from a number witnesses, the changes carry risks of which we should be cognisant following the adoption and implementation of the Bill. We all have experience of judicial processes and policies that have changed because of various Bills, and there has been regret because the unintended consequences were not considered fully at the time. I also have concerns that the clause applies to under-18s. That raises further issues, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North has already covered, about the vulnerability of young offenders and also their ability to reform.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the note on the Bill that was published by Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. He also referred to this in his evidence to the Committee last week. His note stated:
“Firstly, to the extent that the possibility of early release acted as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders who are going to spend the longest time in custody, that has now gone…Secondly, the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings has also been removed.”
I am not clear what has replaced it, notwithstanding that early release has been removed. What is the full process to replace the Parole Board to understand current and future risk? Jonathan Hall was also concerned that
“child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults, have lost the opportunity for early release.”
Of course, they will be in their 30s by the time they are released from custody.
Peter Dawson of the Prison Reform Trust told us that the Parole Board could release early, and he pointed out that more often than not the Parole Board does not release people early. He confirmed that it is an important part of identifying terrorist risk.
Jonathan Hall also said:
“The role of the Parole Board is quite an important part of identifying terrorist risk, and if you don’t have that role then you lose that insight.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 12, Q20.]
We have also had evidence from witnesses saying that the opportunity for someone to prove that they have reformed—this is particularly true for young offenders—is removed by the changes made by the Bill.
I do not know how many Members have had a chance to look at their emails in the past couple of hours, but two and a half hours ago we received evidence from the Bar Council, which says that this clause needs to be scrutinised with particular care. It does not address many clauses, but it says that clause 27 “stands out”. It says:
“We would question how Clause 27 fits with the obligation placed on the court to have regard to the reform and rehabilitation of offenders when sentencing (s.57(2) of the Sentencing Code). This provision would not appear to be the subject of an exception to the s.57(2) obligation, in contrast with the express carve out from s.57(2) relating to the imposition of life sentences for specific terrorist offences (Clause 11).”
I return to Peter Dawson of the Prison Reform Trust, who said:
“The problem with denying all hope of release on a conditional basis by a judgment about whether the person can be released safely or not is that it denies hope and affects the whole of the prison sentence…The possibility of parole is essential to the process that reduces risk.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 32, Q72.]
In its evidence, the Prison Officers Association described graphically what the loss of hope means for prison management and for the risk of violence against prison officers.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady accept what Mr Fairhurst from the Prison Officers Association said in response to a question from me about the rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes for terrorist offenders? He said that there needs to be a full review of those programmes, and they are exactly what one would hope would turn people around if they were to be released early. The clear sign at the moment is that they are not good enough to enable early release, so prisoners need to serve the full term in custody.
Ruth Cadbury
What the hon. Gentleman says would be fine if we had that review of the Prevent programme and the programmes in prison. As several of my colleagues have said, the Bill does not provide for a review of those processes, so we have one side without the other, and that is a cause of concern for me and some of the witnesses.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Further to the matter that the hon. Member for Aylesbury just raised, do we have a commitment from the Government to undertake a full review of the methods that he described?
Ruth Cadbury
That is what I was going to say. I think there needs to be a review of this, as and when it is implemented.
Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)
The hon. Lady is quoting from the Bar Council. I want to make the Committee aware, in reference to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, that I am a member of the Bar and have practised at the Bar of England and Wales.
Ruth Cadbury
The Bar Council is a very authoritative body that needs to be listened to when we are introducing legislation that affects issues such as sentencing.
On the POA point, Peter Dawson pointed out clearly, in relation to violence against prison officers, that when hope is lost and the atmosphere and the management of prisoners gets much more difficult, we have nowhere to move terrorist prisoners who are already in specialist separation centres. He said that removing hope of early release increases that risk. I would like the Government to commit to a review if the proposal is implemented in this way. Obviously, we support the motivation behind it.
I have one more question for the Minister. Might the option for this sentence, with the loss of early release, lead to unintended consequences in charging and sentencing? Would sentencers avoid it and impose a lesser sentence? I am sure that the Government do not intend that.
Chris Philp
Let me briefly respond to one or two of the points that the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth made. She referred to the fact that if the sentence is served in full, there obviously will not be a Parole Board assessment prior to release. She asked about the risk assessment that would take place. I asked Mr Fairhurst from the Prison Officers Association about that in our evidence session on Tuesday morning. Even where there is no Parole Board involvement because release is automatic, there are a whole load of other review and evaluation mechanisms that can be used—for example, multi-agency public protection arrangements, careful monitoring by the prison staff and prison governor, and involvement by the National Probation Service in preparation for the release point. With the example of the Streatham offender, those kinds of risk-assessment measures led to a security services team monitoring him, which obviously had the result that it did. That is an example, as Mr Fairhurst said in evidence, of the risk assessment process working very effectively. That is what we would expect to happen in cases in which release is automatic.
The hon. Lady also asked: what happens when hope is lost? What if a prisoner is in prison and there is no prospect of early release? Does that not mean that it will be hard to get them to behave well? I want to make some points in response. First, the vast majority of prisoners, who have committed a range of offences, way beyond terrorist ones, are serving standard determinate sentences and are released automatically—typically at the halfway point—without any Parole Board intervention. The vast majority are subject to automatic release at a particular point. The second risk, particularly in relation to terrorist offenders, is that of false compliance, if they think that by pretending to comply with the deradicalisation programme, they might get released early. That is not necessarily an entirely healthy incentive and we should be mindful of that possibility.
Chris Philp
The operative provisions of clause 28 are very similar—in fact, they are identical—to those in clause 27, except that they apply to Scotland. Practically, that is given effect by amending section 1AB of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. The substantive effect of this provision is exactly the same as that for clause 27, which we have just debated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clause 29
Further provision about release of terrorist prisoners: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This is another consequential provision, which makes sure that the measure in clause 28 that we have just approved operates consistently in relation to the administration of licence periods for serious terrorism sentences and terrorism sentences for fixed licence periods in Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Restricted eligibility for early release of terrorist prisoners: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 30 and the amendments to it essentially apply to Northern Ireland. Some months ago in Parliament, we debated the provisions to end the automatic early release of terrorist prisoners. Committee members will recall that at the time we did not apply those provisions to Northern Ireland. But having carefully considered, in particular, the European convention on human rights and common law retrospectivity provisions, we are now comfortable that those principles are not infringed by applying the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions to Northern Ireland, and this clause does so.
Amendments 33 and 34 are consequential on those changes. Amendment 33 ensures that terrorist prisoners who will serve longer in custody as a result of the Bill are not released early for the purposes of deportation under the early removal scheme in Northern Ireland. That is a consequential point. Amendment 34 ensures, for offenders who will be newly eligible for parole commissioner-considered release through the provisions of this Bill in Northern Ireland, that that is done in accordance with the parole commissioners’ existing rules. That brings Northern Ireland fully into conformity with the rest of the United Kingdom.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. The main focus of my contribution to the Committee as the shadow Security Minister will be on part 3 of the Bill, but for reasons obvious even to the untrained ear, I have been asked to speak on some of the Northern Ireland aspects of the Bill.
May I crave your indulgence for a moment, Mr Robertson? While the Committee has been sitting, it has been announced that the largest ever law enforcement operation in the UK took place today. Operation Venetic has seen 746 arrests, with £54 million of criminal cash seized, along with 77 firearms and 2 tonnes of drugs. The whole Committee will want to pay tribute to Lynne Owens and the National Crime Agency and all the police forces involved in that fantastic operation. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]
I am always concerned when I hear Ministers talk about Northern Ireland being brought into “conformity” with the rest of the United Kingdom, because although it is an integral part of the Union, and that is indisputable under the terms of the various agreements that have been reached, it is not the same as other parts of the United Kingdom, particularly when it comes to measures relating to tackling terrorism, because there is a long history there that has evolved over how to address that, particularly when it comes to sentencing, rehabilitation and the particular licensing arrangements that there are.
I have had, as I know the Minister has had, extensive discussions with the Justice Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive on this clause in particular. We have tabled a new clause to ask for all the provisions to be reviewed, so I do not intend to speak on all the Northern Ireland measures contained herein until that is debated, but I did think it important to draw attention to this matter, particularly after discussions with Naomi Long on behalf of the Northern Ireland Executive.
There is real concern about the retrospective removal of the automatic right to release. The Justice Minister in the Department is very clear that that will require amendments to sentence-calculation processes and, critically, the power of the Department to refer cases to the parole commissioners and the powers of the commissioner to direct early release for offenders subject to determinate custodial sentences. The concerns can be condensed down to some key points.
The first is about—I was interested to hear what the Minister said about this—attracting legal challenge on ECHR-compatibility grounds. There is a belief in the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland that these measures will attract that. In addition, there is concern that the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland will be a respondent to any challenge that is made in the Northern Ireland High Court or subsequent proceedings in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, which could be a significant drain on its resources.
There is concern about the risk of destabilising the separated regime. The Committee might not be aware that paramilitary prisoners or those convicted of terrorist offences in Northern Ireland are separated. They are held in specific circumstances and subjected to specific programmes, on the basis of their perceived paramilitary affiliation.
Another worrying element is the potential increased risk to the safety of prison staff as a result of the reaction to these measures. In recent years we have seen David Black and Adrian Ismay, two prison officers in Northern Ireland, murdered by dissident republicans. That is something that we need to be very cognisant of: in making laws here, we have a direct impact on the people who we are asking to carry them out. They have to live in the community in Northern Ireland and face the threat that they, along with our brave police officers and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, do every day.
There is also a concern—shared by colleagues from the Democratic Unionist party as well as by the Justice Minister—that this has the potential to lead to currently serving terrorist offenders being released without licence supervision. It undermines the public protection arrangements currently in place and goes against the ethos and principles of the Northern Ireland sentencing framework. In taking these measures to avoid a cliff edge in England and Wales, we may inadvertently introduce a cliff edge to Northern Ireland that is mitigated by arrangements that are already in place there.
There was a more general concern about the erosion of the principle of judicial discretion to set appropriate custodial and licence periods. I thought it important that the Committee heard those concerns, because we, as the official Opposition, share some of them and want to work, as we always have done, in a bipartisan manner—not just on issues of national security, but on matters pertaining to Northern Ireland. It was important from that perspective and because we do not have Northern Ireland Members here to make those arguments. We do have, after years of painstaking effort by Governments of all hues, the restoration of the Executive, so it was important that the Minister of Justice for Northern Ireland—in addition to the influence she is bringing to bear in discussions with the Minister—had those concerns publicly recorded with the Committee.
Chris Philp
Let me briefly reply. I echo the hon. Member’s comments about the operations today. Our police and security services do fantastic work, and the huge operation today is an example of that work at its very best, so I join him in thanking them and congratulating them on the tremendous work they have done.
On Northern Ireland, the hon. Member is quite right: we are currently having detailed conversations with Naomi Long, the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland. As he says, it is very good news that the functioning Executive has been restored—it is good for Northern Ireland and good for us in Westminster to have a body that we can have dialogue with. Let me assure him that the dialogue is ongoing; it touches on many of the issues that he raised.
On the risk of legal challenge, the hon. Member will know that there has already been a legal challenge to the TORER Act that we passed back in February, and that is subject to a judgment that we await; I will therefore not comment on that any further. What I will say—in fact, I have said this to Naomi Long—is that we will certainly support the Northern Ireland Department of Justice in any litigation that it gets involved in. We have obviously done a great deal of work in preparing for that case; we would be happy to make that available and to support the Department in every way. We would not want it to be, as the hon. Member has suggested, burdened by having to defend cases. We will certainly stand with it and help practically with preparing for those cases, so that they do not unduly drain what I know are quite limited resources. I can give him a direct assurance on that. More generally, we are involved in detailed discussions, which are continuing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 31 simply makes the same provisions that we discussed in clause 27 for England and in clause 28 for Scotland, applicable also to Northern Ireland. I do not propose to go over those provisions again; they are in substance the same.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders:
England and Wales
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 32, page 28, line 22, at the end insert—
“(b) In subsection (1) at the end insert—
( ) The regulations under section 35(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020 must include provision that the following must not be used in evidence against the released person in any proceedings for an offence—
(a) any statement made by the released person while participating in a polygraph session, or
(b) any physiological reaction of the released person while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination.”
This amendment ensures that the results of any polygraph test must not be disclosed for use in a criminal prosecution.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 49, in clause 33, page 29, line 41, leave out “may” and insert “must”
This amendment ensures that the results of any polygraph test must not be disclosed for use in a criminal prosecution.
Amendment 50, in clause 34, page 31, line 13, leave out “may” and insert “must”
This amendment ensures that the results of any polygraph test must not be disclosed for use in a criminal prosecution.
Kenny MacAskill
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. Amendments 48, 49 and 50 were tabled in the name of Scottish National party Members but were put forward by the Law Society of Scotland, trying to achieve the best interests. That is obviously the position of the Government, but there is a distinctive legal jurisdiction. I know that yesterday the Prime Minister referred to the fact that there was no border between Scotland and England, but administratively and legally there most certainly is—the Minister has commented on that both today and yesterday.
Indeed, there is also the issue of polygraphs, which these amendments relate to. They are something that is currently unknown within the Scottish legal jurisdiction. They are something that, to be fair, the Scottish Government are sceptical about, but so are the legal profession and the judiciary. However, it is accepted that this is a reserved issue. It is a Government policy, and they are entitled to bring in that policy and it will have effect. Therefore, I think we are required to ensure that Scotland is able to deal with it adequately and appropriately.
These amendments are put forward on the basis of seeking to improve the legislation or seeking assurances from the Minister that the issues causing concern are being or will be dealt with. To be fair, the amendments are not simply tautological in any way; they are, in fact, a point of principle. We know that legislation is significant, and that the interpretation of words matters. It will produce a significant difference in the outcome, and it is not a matter that we can simply leave to a future court. In bringing the amendments forward, we seek clarification on the matters of concern. “Must”, as I say, is not tautological, in our view, but gives a clear indication that it is mandatory. “May”, while it may very well end up being the likely situation, certainly leaves it much more discretionary, even if it is not entirely absent.
As I say, the amendments were tabled on the basis of seeking clarification that Scotland will be able to act within the separate structures that we have, accepting the requirement and will of the Government, but that we take into account various issues and, in particular, the ability to protect the rights of the accused or, indeed, the released person in future issues that may come before them, to ensure that it is not counterproductive for them, and indeed that the system that we are operating is able to operate as efficiently as possible.
Alex Cunningham
We welcome this amendment in the name of the hon. Members of the Scottish National party, and we agree that the results of any polygraph must not be disclosed for use in a criminal matter. Put simply, they are far too unreliable to be used as evidence or an indicator of a person having committed a crime. We do not determine a verdict by the toss of a coin and Members will recollect the oral evidence given by Professor Acheson, who, in answer to a question about our operating regime for polygraph tests from the hon. Member for East Lothian, said:
“I must say I am not a great fan of the polygraph solution. Polygraphs are a very good way to demonstrate a physiological response to nervousness. Most people who take polygraphs are going to be nervous, so it is a very inexact science. I think it is probably slightly better than tossing a coin.”––[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 80.]
We should not be using a method as unreliable as a polygraph to determine whether a person has committed a crime. So I join the hon. Member for East Lothian in asking the Minister to give assurances here and now that the use of polygraph testing for offenders released on licence will not become a stepping-stone towards the introduction of polygraph testing across the justice system.
As colleagues may have noticed, I have submitted a new clause on the issue of polygraphs so I shall reserve most of my comments for the stand part debate later today, but we do need some clarification and assurance that we are not moving in the direction of an unreliable method of fact-finding like polygraphs.
What knowledge and evidence do the Government have on the reliability of polygraph tests, and why are they intent on their use in this context? As Professor Acheson said in his oral evidence,
“Polygraphs are a very good way to demonstrate a physiological response to nervousness”—
I am aware that I am repeating myself—and I, for one, would certainly be nervous undertaking a polygraph even if I knew I had not committed a crime, which makes me question whether polygraphs provide anywhere near the necessary level of assurance. We need a much more robust system if we are to start making decisions around a person’s future. We are not entirely dismissive of the place of polygraphs or the potential role that they can play, but we would not want to see the burden of proof rely heavily, or even moderately, on a polygraph result.
I plan to go into further detail in later examination of the Bill, once we reach the new clauses, on the impact of polygraph licence conditions on those with protected characteristics. In the meantime, it would help if the Minister were able to clarify the Government’s position on polygraph tests, including plans for future use.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
On a point of order, Mr Robertson. There was an unintentional mistake earlier, about Professor Acheson saying that the polygraph was only “slightly better” than the toss of a coin. Those who were here last week listening to the professor will remember—it is in the Hansard record at column 83—that I called him out on that. He said that I was “quite right” to do so and that it was a “useful” test. It is tricky, I know, when looking back on evidence on a hot afternoon. It was a mistake, I think.
Chris Philp
As we discussed in evidence last week, the Government—and the Committee—fully recognise that polygraph testing does not provide definitive information that meets a burden of proof that a court of law would expect to be met.
We did hear, however, compelling evidence from Professor Grubin that polygraphs provide a great deal of utility in two areas—first, in causing offenders being questioned while a polygraph is being applied to disclose more information than they otherwise would. He gave some compelling statistics, showing that a high proportion—from memory, something like two thirds—of offenders questioned with a polygraph being applied made a disclosure of information, which is a far higher figure than would ordinarily be the case. It is helpful to get people on licence to disclose information that is useful in working out whether their licence conditions are being adhered to.
Secondly, if a negative polygraph result follows in answer to particular questions, the principal consequence is further investigation by the probation service or, if appropriate, the police. Only if those further investigations yielded new evidence or new facts would further action follow. Polygraph evidence would never be admissible in a court of law, and there is no intention of that, because we heard clearly that although it is helpful, it is not definitive in a way that we would wish evidence submitted to a court of law to be definitive.
That approach is already enshrined in section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007, expressly disallowing the admissibility of polygraph evidence in court, but it is also covered in the equivalent provisions made for the devolved Administrations in this Bill, particularly clause 33 in relation to Scotland and clause 34 in relation to Northern Ireland. The Bill and the law in general are clear about how polygraph evidence should be used.
On amendments 49 and 50, and the use of “may not” as opposed to “must not”, I think that the phrases have the same meaning. “We may not do something” means the same as “we must not do something”—it is an express prohibition. I am sure it is helpful to put my view of that on the record, and I hope that the Committee concurs. It is categoric that something that may not be used cannot be used, and must not be used in any circumstances.
In support of clause 32 standing part, this is a useful additional tool in the hands of the probation service. It is used already with sex offenders in England and Wales. Professor Grubin provided very informative evidence—certainly the most entertaining evidence that we heard during our earlier proceedings. He made a powerful case for the way in which polygraphs, used properly, carefully, with the right training and with acknowledgment of their limitations, add something to the monitoring process. Therefore I think it is appropriate to include the measures.
Kenny MacAskill
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I am not going to debate “may” or “must”, which seems to be becoming a tautological argument. I am happy to accept the Minister’s assurance, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6—Reports on polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders—
“(1) Before section 32 comes into force the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report in accordance with subsection (4).
(2) Before section 33 comes into force the Scottish Ministers must lay before the Scottish Parliament a report in accordance with subsection (4).
(3) Before section 34 comes into force the Department of Justice must lay before the Northern Ireland Assembly a report in accordance with subsection (4).
(4) The form of the reports is an analysis of the expected impact of the appropriate section of this Act on people with protected characteristics, including but not limited to—
(a) the impact on people from minority faith groups, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served;
(b) the impact on people from BAME communities, including the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served;
(c) the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics on efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences; and
(d) the impact on people with physical and mental disabilities.
(5) No later than the anniversary of the appropriate section coming into force in each subsequent year, the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Department of Justice must each lay a further report updating the analysis under subsection (4).”
Alex Cunningham
I want to address new clause 6, and will be brief as I have covered much of what I wanted to say with reference to the SNP amendments. I will do the same on clause 35.
The new clause is simple enough. It would build in safeguards for people with protected characteristics, which includes people from minority faith groups and the BAME community, including on the numbers received into prison and the length of the sentence served, by ensuring that the Government commission reports on the impact of the relevant provisions on the distinct groups. The report would also cover the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics on prison authorities’ efforts to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences, as well as the impact on people with physical and mental disabilities.
We can all accept—and the evidence given to the Committee bears it out—that polygraph tests are far from being the holy grail in general, never mind when they are applied to the people covered by the amendment. It is worth noting that some of the evidence contained more detail. Professor Silke—I hope I will quote him correctly this time—was clear in his evidence. He said that there could be a role for polygraph tests, but discouraged Ministers from going headlong into a full roll-out:
“There are potential benefits to using polygraphs within an enhanced framework, recognising that they do have their limits. I support the calls that are being made, if polygraphs are being introduced, for running a pilot programme first before implementing them across the estate.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 86, Q182.]
Rather than going full steam ahead and introducing a regime of polygraph testing for everyone in the category in question, will the Minister launch the pilot that Professor Silke and other witnesses favour? That would help to address some of the issues that I have been concerned about, and that I raise in the new clause.
The Minister will be pleased to hear that I shall not rehearse again the injustices against certain groups that sadly remain very much part of the justice system, but I ask him to be mindful of the reality and to recognise that data is critical if we are to overcome those injustices.
Chris Philp
I would say two things about a pilot. First, as I said before, polygraph use has been running for a number of years now for sex offenders in England and Wales, and it has been found to be useful. It is used quite widely around the world, as Professor Grubin mentioned in his evidence.
In particular, the use of polygraphs for monitoring licence conditions is designed first to prompt the disclosure of information and secondly to provide information that might be followed up. Bearing that in mind, I do not think that the biting effect of the polygraph findings is of sufficient severity to require further pilot work, particularly as the technique is used already.
As to BAME communities, that is something we debated at some length a short time ago, as the hon. Gentleman said, but I would observe that the application of the technique applies to everyone equally, regardless of colour and creed.
In relation to the review, there is a standing convention that legislation is reviewed three years after coming into effect. I am sure that the effectiveness of the provision will form part of such a future review.
Alex Cunningham
That is very helpful. I will not press the new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders: Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 56, in clause 52, page 43, line 4, after “32” leave out “to” and insert “, 34 and”.
Amendment 57, in clause 52, page 43, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) Section 33 comes into force on such day as Scottish Ministers may by regulations appoint.”
This would have the effect that provision in the Bill that relate to polygraph testing would only become operational if the Scottish Government asked for those provisions to be implemented.
Kenny MacAskill
Amendment 56 is procedural, and may well have been superseded. Amendment 57 is to do with the situation in Scotland, where we do not have any current regime for polygraphs. It has been put forward to introduce a trigger, because the numbers in the cohort referred to by the Minister are clearly going to be limited. Even during my tenure in Scotland, we had only a handful, because most of our terrorists—all but a few—have been paramilitary and Northern Ireland-related. On that basis, it may be appropriate to have a trigger and that the provision should be implemented as and when necessary, as opposed to setting up a regime that is not going to be used perhaps ever, but certainly not for a short period of time. That would give Scottish Ministers, and indeed the Scottish legal system, an opportunity to prepare.
Chris Philp
We recognise that, as the hon. Gentleman has said, there is no operation of polygraph currently in Scotland. In considering the commencement provisions, it is the clear intention of the UK Government to work extremely closely with the Scottish Government to determine when they are operationally ready to introduce polygraph testing into the toolkit that probation services have. We would not want to trigger implementation too early.
Over the past week or so, we have heard evidence showing the benefits that polygraph testing can bring. However, we are aware that time is needed to prepare operationally for those benefits to come into effect. Although we recognise that some elements of the implementation of this are devolved—as I say, we are going to work extremely closely with the Scottish Government on those—ultimately, provision for dealing with terrorism matters remains a reserved power of the UK Government, so it is appropriate that the commencement provision remains one that is exercised by the UK Government. However, I repeat my assurance to the hon. Member for East Lothian that we will work extremely closely with his colleagues in the Scottish Government—in particular those in the Justice Directorate, his old Department—to make sure nothing is done prematurely, or without being ready for it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Polygraph licence conditions for terrorist offenders: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 34 essentially has the same operative effect as the clauses we have already discussed in relation to polygraphs, except in relation to Northern Ireland. For the benefit of anyone listening in Northern Ireland and that of the hon. Member for St Helens North, we will work very closely with Naomi Long and the Northern Ireland Government on this, in the same way that we will work very closely with the Scottish Government. We recognise that they are not doing this already, and before we commence the provisions, we will need to make sure that the Northern Ireland Government are operationally able and ready to use them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Polygraph licence conditions in terrorism cases: supplementary provision
Kenny MacAskill
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 35, page 33, line 8, after “State” insert
“after consulting with Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice”.
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult with the Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Department of Justice when making regulations under clause 35(1).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 52, in clause 35, page 33, line 12, after “State” insert
“after consulting with Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice”.
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult with the Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Department of Justice when making regulations under clause 35(2).
Amendment 53, in clause 35, page 33, line 17, after “qualifications” insert “training”.
This amendment adds “training” to the list of contents in regulations made under clause 35(2).
Amendment 54, in clause 35, page 33, line 19, after “keeping” insert “and confidentiality”.
This amendment ensures that regulations under clause 35(2) include provision for confidentiality of polygraph records.
Amendment 55, in clause 35, page 33, line 43, after “State” insert
“after consulting with Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice”.
This amendment ensures that approval by the Secretary of State of polygraph equipment under clause 35(7) should take place after consultation with the Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice.
Kenny MacAskill
The Minister commented on amendments 51 and 52 in his previous remarks, and we accept the grace with which his assurances have been given. The remaining amendments—53, 54 and 55—again seek some assurances. I will speak from my own experiences in Scotland, not regarding polygraphs because we have never had them, but about something that is akin in some ways: fingerprint testing and the fingerprint service.
Unlike some elements of forensic science such as DNA, it seems to me that polygraphs—as with fingerprints—are not a science, but an art. They are subject to interpretation, and mistakes can be made. During my tenure as Cabinet Secretary for Justice and my service in the Scottish Parliament before that, Scottish justice was turned on its head by a manifest injustice that came about because of an error in fingerprint identification. That error shamed Scottish justice and harmed a former serving police officer. It required us to review our fingerprint service from top to bottom, bringing in an eminent judge from Northern Ireland to address it.
Polygraph is not like a DNA test, which comes back with odds of 3 million to one. People are required to look at it and consider it. It is something relatively new, although it is operating in other jurisdictions. Who trains them? Who regulates them? Who ensures that they are kept up to speed? How do we ensure that those carrying it out are properly qualified, rather than someone seeking a fast buck? Some of this is in the drill-down detail. It may be something that has to be addressed. It is coming in.
I ask the Minister to take on board what I say, in an attempt to be helpful: some things are an art, not a science. Forensic science caused us huge difficulties in Scotland. To ensure that injustices do not arise and the service is as good as possible, we require some check against delivery, a method of regulation, an understanding of who can do it and a way of holding them to account.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian for his comments. I wholly concur with what he said about the importance of training and carefully managing who conducts these tests and how they conduct them. In evidence, we heard from Professor Grubin in some detail of the critical importance of training. Without the proper training, method and the right questions, the entire process is essentially worthless and could potentially lead to false results. I accept the spirit of the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
To reassure the hon. Gentleman, in clause 35(3)(a) there is a reference to “other matters”. I explicitly assure him that that includes things such as training. The Secretary of State will address those matters in detail in the regulations, as they are addressed in the current regulations made under the existing legislation that applies to sex offenders. Identical or similar measures relating to training will be included in those regulations.
In relation to the question of confidentiality, which I have previously touched on, disclosure of any information obtained by polygraph testing will be shared only with governmental partners, particularly law enforcement agencies. It will not be disseminated or disclosed any more widely. I hope that assures the hon. Gentleman about the detail that the regulations made under clause 35 will go into. They will most certainly address the issues that he is properly raising.
Kenny MacAskill
I am happy to accept the Minister’s reassurances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
Again, I will be brief. I am aware that an amendment that I have tabled cannot be selected for debate, so I am content to address clause 35 stand part instead.
We accept that polygraphs have their uses, albeit very limited. Most notably, we recognise that polygraph examinations have been used with some success in the management of sexual offenders since 2013 by the National Probation Service. The Minister spoke about that and convinced us that, for that reason, we do not need a pilot for the Bill.
However, as has been said over and again in the evidence sessions and in debate, they are far from 100% accurate. While they give an indication, when used in the right conditions, that can detect traits associated with lying, they are far from infallible. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph examinations on high-risk offenders who have been convicted of terrorist offences or offences related to terrorism. Specifically, it allows for mandatory polygraphs to be taken three months post release and every six months thereafter unless the test is failed, after which the offender would have to take them more regularly.
However, the Government seem shy of spelling out the detail of how their proposed regime will work, leaving it to secondary legislation in the shape of regulations, which are mentioned in subsection (9). I, for one, am always a little wary of the Government when they opt for that route.
The Minister needs to provide a robust explanation of why he does not want that detail in the Bill. Is it a case of having insufficient detail at this stage to work out exactly what he wants to achieve with polygraph testing, or does he share everyone else’s reservations about the application of the test? I hope that he will explain why there has to be a delay. I am sure that if the Minister looked at the legislation relating to the application of polygraph tests to sex offenders, he could cut and paste the wording, and tidy it up to suit this legislation, so there is no excuse for it not being in the Bill.
The Ministry of Justice has committed to a review of the value of polygraphing terrorist offenders and those convicted of offences related to terrorism after two years, which we very much welcome. However, as I said earlier, we would welcome that kind of commitment in the Bill, and a clear statement that people with protected characteristics will be covered specifically. It would help the Committee were the Minister to spell out how he expects such a review to be conducted, what he expects out of it, and whether he would adopt the need to achieve the specific things that I have spelled out.
I reiterate that Labour does not object to the use of polygraphs as set out in the Bill, but we should see the detail from the Government on exactly what they want to do. They ought to spell it out in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that, and perhaps accept that it would be an easy job to cut and paste from the other legislation and to table an amendment on Report that provides the clarification we seek.
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister asks why we do not specify in the Bill the full detail about how the polygraphs will be used, and why that will be done in secondary legislation. Of course, that is extremely common. It is usual for matters of great detail to be done via secondary rather than primary legislation, in order to avoid, in the first instance, filling the Bill with a great deal of operational matters.
There is also the possibility that operational best practice may change in due course. If scientific evidence develops, or as practice evolves, there may be things that we could do differently or better. Clearly, if it was set out in primary legislation, it would take a great deal of time to change the detail. We would have to wait for a Bill to come before Parliament with the matter in scope, which could take some years. There are quite a few things that the Government have been wanting to do for a while, and we have been waiting three or four years for the right Bill to come along, including some in the Ministry of Justice. Of course, such changes can be made more deftly and more quickly by secondary legislation.
If the shadow Minister wants to see the sort of detail that he can expect, the existing regulations made under the 2007 Act to implement polygraph testing for sex offenders will give him a great deal of information. Obviously, we will study those very carefully when making regulations under clause 35. If he wants further detail, he can certainly find it in the existing regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 36 covers the release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom. The clause refers to schedule 11, which, as we shall discuss in a moment, sets out arrangements for the release on licence of terrorist prisoners repatriated to the United Kingdom, so that their release provisions are consistent with those sentenced in the United Kingdom. In essence, it extends the provisions that we have debated already to ensure that people who are repatriated to the UK are affected by those provisions just as much as people who were here when convicted and when serving their sentence. I am sure that everybody would agree that that kind of consistency is extremely welcome and extremely important.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11
Release on licence of repatriated terrorist prisoners
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.
Chris Philp
Schedule 11 gives effect to the clause 36 in a number of technical ways, which I do not propose to go through in detail. It ensures that the clause has practical effect in law.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 11 accordingly agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 7th July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2020 - (7 Jul 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, I repeat the usual reminders about switching electronic devices to silent mode, tea and coffee not being allowed, and the importance of social distancing. Also, Hansard Reporters would be grateful if hon. Members sent any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 37
TPIMs: condition as to involvement in terrorism-related activity
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 69, in clause 37, page 34, line 25, leave out
“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.
and insert
“, on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds, believes”.
This amendment would raise the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM under the proposals in the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 58, in clause 37, page 34, line 26, leave out “suspecting” and insert “believing”.
This amendment would create a higher bar for the standard of proof under these proposals.
Conor McGinn
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I am more used to serving alongside you in the all-party parliamentary group on racing and bloodstock, which you chair. I am speaking for the first time as a shadow Minister in Committee, and it gives me great pleasure that you are in the Chair.
We have said throughout proceedings on the Bill that, for all of us, our first and most important responsibility is to keep the British public safe. The Opposition believe that very firmly and we have approached the Bill in that spirit. We have to be forceful and robust in the fight against terrorism and do everything possible to keep our country safe from those who seek to attack our way of life and values or to do us harm. We have said that we will be a constructive Opposition on these matters, not seeking to divide or oppose for the sake of it, but using parliamentary scrutiny to do what this place does best and performing our important duty to seek to strengthen and improve legislation where it is right to do so. That is the spirit in which the amendments in my name to this clause and others are tabled.
The events at Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham showed that there is a need for this legislation and for examination of measures such as terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which we will discuss this morning. That the perpetrators in each case had been automatically released halfway through their sentences, with no mechanism in place to protect the public, showed that there were major holes in the legislative framework that needed to be filled, first by emergency legislation earlier this year to prevent the imminent release of offenders without appropriate assessments—legislation that we supported—and now, rightly, by this wider Bill before us.
As we discuss the aspects of the Bill that fall under the remit of the Home Office, I want to say that we support the broad principles therein, but as we highlighted on Second Reading and as has been clear in some of the expert advice and evidence received by the Committee, there remain a number of issues of concern that we wish to probe and amend during the passage of the Bill, first to ensure that it does not fall short and secondly, in the spirit of co-operation, to work with the Government to improve it. It is in that spirit that I will discuss the amendments.
The Government are seeking to alter the standard of proof required to impose a TPIM such that the Secretary of State would need to believe it necessary based only on reasonable suspicion rather than the balance of probabilities. In probing further, we have tried to find a middle way, which is “reasonable and probable grounds”. We do not wish to harm the robust nature or operational utility of TPIMs. The Opposition support TPIMS and want them to be as effective as possible to keep people safe, so we welcome in principle any measures that demonstrably would help our police and security services to achieve that.
We acknowledge that the Bill puts Labour Members in a rather strange position when it comes to TPIMs, because of course it was a Labour Government who, on introducing control orders in 2005, imposed a standard of proof as proposed in this Bill, requiring only reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual was involved in terrorism-related activity. The standard of proof was raised by the coalition Government in 2011 with the creation of the new regime, and then again by the Conservative Government in 2015. I accept and acknowledge that, and I wanted to say it in Committee. However, having heard the evidence and the Minister’s explanations, we struggle to see the logic in lowering the standard of proof now, whether it is looked at from an operational, administrative or procedural perspective. We need to be clear that policy is made based on evidence and not on amending legislation for its own sake, particularly on such an important matter. We need to see the justification, which has been lacking to date.
In November 2019, just five TPIMs were in force. The police and Security Service have been clear that to date no TPIM request has been rejected on the grounds of insufficient evidence, so one could argue that the current threshold has not proved to be an impediment, even though the security landscape has evolved in recent years, with new risk profiles and challenges coming to the fore. At the same time the Government and law enforcement agencies say that they do not wish to see, nor do they foresee, a sudden spike in the number of TPIMs in operation. They are of course valuable mechanisms, but they are also very costly.
Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told the Committee:
“My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered.”
That risk ought to be addressed by the Government. We have not yet heard a compelling operational or administrative case made for lowering the standard of proof. I have not heard one from the Minister or his colleagues, or from any of the Committee’s witnesses, so why are the Government so intent on pressing ahead with this change? Again, in the words of Jonathan Hall,
“If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?” .”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 6, Q6.]
Taken in isolation, that is a serious enough question, but when paired with the proposed changes in clause 38 on the prospective length of TPIMs, it becomes significantly more urgent.
There are concerns about the fundamental contradiction at the heart of part 2. Liberty wrote that jettisoning the limited safeguards that currently exist while ramping up the severity of the measures that can be imposed would be “a retrograde step.” The Minister needs to respond to those concerns. The Opposition are not alone in being slightly confused by the Government’s approach, particularly to lowering the standard of proof. Amnesty International stated:
“That lack of reasoned argument as to the need for this change mirrors the lack of appropriate evidence or justification presented…at second reading.”
The Bar Council said it was not clear why the reduction in the standard of proof was said to be necessary, and the Law Society of Scotland said:
“Little evidence or justification has been provided for making the change.”
Perhaps the Minister will provide clarification for the Committee, as so far the arguments put forth by the Government have not quite assuaged those reasonable concerns, which are grounded in evidence.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, in the evidence session, the assistant chief constable highlighted three scenarios where the Security Service believed that lowering the standard of proof would be of use? One scenario was where an individual’s risk profile was rapidly increasing and they were moving towards posing an actual threat, with an attack plan in place, but there was not enough time to get to the stage of proof; the second was where somebody was returning from abroad, and the third related to sensitive material. The assistant chief constable said that all those scenarios created a need, as MI5 would see it, to lower the standard of proof. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that?
Conor McGinn
I accept what the hon. Gentleman says and the evidence given by the assistant chief constable. However, the assistant chief constable acknowledged that all of those circumstances currently exist, and that there has been no case where an application for a TPIM has not been granted. I think he was saying that shifting from the balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion would inevitably make it easier, but he had not experienced, nor did he envisage, any circumstances where that practically had happened or would happen.
As I said at the outset, we come to this wanting to assist and support the Government, but we need to hear a little more justification for this measure in terms of its effectiveness and the reason for it. We will not seek to divide the Committee on the amendment. I tabled it to raise our concerns and those of groups in society, to give the Minister the opportunity to address some of those concerns, and to explain why we not only in principle but now clearly in practice support much of what the Government are trying to do.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson, and to follow the hon. Member for St Helens North. Before I speak to the specifics of amendment 58, which I do not intend to press to a vote—it is very much a probing amendment—I will reiterate the position of the Scottish National party on the Bill.
We recognise that it is the duty of any Government to keep their citizens safe and secure, and all who serve in Parliament have an obligation to assist in that endeavour. We have already given the Government our assurance that we will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism is met and that we keep people in all communities across these islands as safe as is reasonably possible. However, we are also mindful of our duties as parliamentarians to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her constructive tone. Before she gets into the detail, will she tell us whether the Government in Holyrood will grant a legislative consent motion for the Bill?
Joanna Cherry
As the Minister knows, discussions about that are ongoing. He may take it that the constructive approach that I am indicating on behalf of the Scottish National party applies across the board, including the party in government in Scotland. He is aware from our discussions that there are certain concerns the impact of aspects of the Bill on devolved matters. They were addressed last week by my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian in respect of the order for life-long restriction and the question of polygraph testing. We wish to be constructive on those matters, and that will be the approach of my colleagues at Holyrood.
Today I am focusing on TPIMs, which are a reserved matter. It is fair to say that my colleagues in Holyrood and Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Minister, have expressed some of the concerns that I am about to elaborate on. Like the hon. Member for St Helens North, my essential concern is that we have not yet seen the case for change—the case for lowering the standard of proof. We do not believe the Government have made that case, and in so saying we are in good company.
Our amendment 58, like the official Opposition’s amendment 69, seeks to raise the standard of proof, albeit it using a slightly different formulation. It is a probing amendment, but in truth, we believe that the standard of proof should stay as it is, because we do not think a case has been made out to change it. We also believe that that is where the balance of the expert evidence that this Committee has heard lies.
It is important to remember that, as has been alluded to, the changes in the Bill align the TPIMs regime more closely with its predecessor, the control orders regime. It is also important to remember that the concerns about control orders were widely shared across the House by Members from all parties. Those concerns are legitimate, because TPIMs restrict some of our most fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom to have a private and family life. All these fundamental freedoms are restricted when somebody is sent to prison and convicted, but with a TPIM the person involved does not need to have been convicted of any crime for those freedoms to be restricted.
A TPIM is really just a step away from imprisonment, and depending on the package of restrictions, it can amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which for the time being at least is still a part of our domestic law. As none of the exceptions to the right to liberty in article 5 is applicable to the TPIMs regime, if the package of restrictions around a TPIMs regime amount to a deprivation of liberty, article 5 of the ECHR is breached. It is vital, therefore, that the TPIMs regime remains subject to the strictest of safeguards.
The current safeguard whereby a TPIM can only be imposed on the balance of probabilities is something that the Government are seeking to reduce considerably. We are concerned that the low threshold is disproportionate, and we do not think the Government have made out the case for lowering the threshold. It may well be that lowering the threshold would ease the administrative burden on the Government in terms of the evidence that is required for an application for a TPIM to be granted, but easing administrative burdens is not a sufficient reason to lower the standard of proof so drastically.
As I said, I will not push amendment 58 to a vote today, but if the Government continue to fail to deliver any compelling justification for their action, I anticipate that when the Bill returns to the Floor of the House, similar amendments will be tabled and there may even be a vote on whether this change should be made. The concerns that I am expressing are widely held. The hon. Member for St Helens North has told us that they are shared by the official Opposition and by the respected bodies that he listed. I know that some Conservative Back Benchers also share these concerns. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, is anxious, regarding this change as a lowering of the safeguards in relation to TPIMs. I am indebted to that Joint Committee for assisting me in my understanding of these issues.
Perhaps the most significant evidence this Committee has heard was from the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. He has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point in time.”
I would submit that, notwithstanding the intervention on the hon. Member for St Helens North, we have heard nothing in evidence that has convinced Mr Hall QC otherwise. I asked him whether the Government had given him a business case or a justification for lowering standards of proof. He replied:
“I have obviously had discussions, but I have not been able to identify a cogent business case.” ––[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15, Q31.]
That is what is missing here.
The lack of cogency or reasoned argument for the need for change mirrors the lack of appropriate evidence or justification that was presented to the House on Second Reading. If we look at the impact assessment, we see that certain questions are posed, such as:
“What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?”
However, the answers given to such questions relate solely to convicted offenders, with only a later reference to the policy objective to “better protect the public” and a link to the issue of
“individuals of terrorism concern outside of custody.”
Then, there is a vague explanation that the Bill will allow for more effective intervention when that is required. On the changes to TPIMs, the impact assessment says that they
“will enhance the ability of operational partners, such as counterterrorism policing, to manage the risk posed by individuals subject to TPIMs.”
It says that the change to the standard of proof will simply
“help ensure that operational partners are better able to impose TPIM notices on individuals where there is a requirement to protect national security.”
No further justification is given.
Rob Butler
The hon. and learned Lady seems to be arguing for not reducing the burden of proof at all, but the amendment in her name suggests changing “suspecting” to “believing”. “Believing” would still be a reduction from the current standard of proof, so does she accept that there is potentially a halfway house, or is she arguing for no reduction at all?
Joanna Cherry
My primary position is that there should be no reduction at all. That is why I have gone to some lengths to set out the lack of a cogent business case for any reduction. The purpose of the amendment is very much like that of the amendment from the hon. Member for St Helens North: to suggest a halfway house and to probe whether the Government can come up with the business case. I will not push the amendment to a vote.
I end by reiterating what the hon. Member for St Helens North said, which is that it does not seem to be the case that the current standard of proof has been an impediment to the security services. We have had no evidence that it has prevented the security services from seeking a TPIM where they considered it necessary and appropriate to do so. To use the words of Jonathan Hall, until we have that sort of cogent business case, I do not think the Government have made their case for reducing the standard of proof.
I will not press my amendment at this stage, but I expect to see similar amendments when the Bill returns to the Floor of the House. Without such amendments, I would suspect that clause 37 would face a challenge on the Floor of the House.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Robertson. I have listened very carefully to hon. Members. I appreciate the comments, concerns and the constructive way in which they have made their arguments. I support the Government, and I support the principle of TPIMs and of using every tool that we have in our armoury to protect the public, which I know is a concern for hon. Members.
I would like to try to put this into context, which is important, today of all days. Today is 7 July—7/7—and the 15th anniversary of one of the worst attacks that this country and this city have ever faced. It is an important reminder of why we are here doing this and why the Government want to bring in this legislation to protect the public.
With the indulgence of the Chair and the Committee, I would like to talk about my friend Louise—I will not get emotional. Fifteen years ago today, my friend Louise was on a train from Aldgate to Liverpool Street. The night before, she had had a great night out. She had been in Trafalgar Square, celebrating the fact that London had just won the bid to host the Olympics.
It was a very busy train. She was standing when the train was rocked by an explosion in the next carriage to her. Louise’s carriage filled with smoke. The lights went out and the train screeched to a juddering halt. She says her heart was beating so much she thought it was going to come out of her chest, but she fought to keep calm amid the screams and the panic around her.
Some people managed to control their panic and started helping each other. They were calling up and down the train for doctors and nurses—anyone who could come and help. Some people had fallen. Some had hit their heads. It was chaos. Some people tried to get out. They were trying to get out of the windows between the carriages. They tried to prise the doors apart. None of that would work. Someone cried out that there was a body on the track.
They waited in the dark. Some emergency lights were going on, but it was mainly dark, for over an hour, until Louise says she saw the top of a policeman’s helmet outside the tunnel. From that moment—seeing the policeman—she felt safe. All of a sudden, she felt that she was going to get out and that everything would be all right.
They could not open the doors, so those who were able to moved out of the way to make way for the injured to be carried or to walk past them. They were bloodied, black, bewildered. Many of them were bandaged with commuters’ possessions, like belts and scarves and ties. After what seemed like forever, Louise was able to get off the train, but she had to walk past the bombed carriage. She said it looked like it had just been ripped apart like a can of Coke.
She passed two bodies on the track, covered up by a fluorescent transport worker’s jacket. She saw a man who was badly injured being tended to by paramedics. He was barely clothed and was propped up against the tunnel wall—his entire body blackened by bomb blast.
She said it was very surreal to come from that black, hellish atmosphere into the light, where it was light, there were helicopters above, there were blue lights and sirens, and there was a triage unit on the pavement where people were being treated. Quite surreally, she was told to give her details to the police and she walked off into London, trying to find her husband and blackened by soot. She said she just wanted a cup of tea, very weirdly.
The “Sliding Doors” moments, and the fear, panic and shock, came later. The overriding feeling she was left with was why did she get into that carriage, why did she not get into the next carriage and why did she survive, when so many others did not. She was determined not to change her way of life, so she got straight back on the tube and went straight back to work. I think she personifies bravery, and what we always say, that in the face of terrorism we just get on with it and we will not let our way of life be changed.
Today, 15 years to the day afterwards, Louise will be leaving flowers at Aldgate, as she does every year. Many of her fellow passengers and other victims who were affected by the incident have never been back on a tube. Some are still suffering from anxiety and depression, some suffered life-changing injuries, some lost a loved one and some will never see the light of day again. Over the weekend, I asked Louise what she would say to the Committee. This is what she said:
“Terrorism is the biggest threat we face to our way of life. I have so much faith in our intelligence and security services. I feel they should be given whatever powers and resources they need to fight it. Whilst there will always be those who slip through thej net, especially the lone wolves, we need to feel safe and learn lessons, and let our police and courts have the authority to act and protect us.”
Today I wanted to talk about Louise and pay tribute to her, and all of those affected, not just in that incident but in others. My belief is that the best tribute we could all pay is to pass this Bill.
Taiwo Owatemi (Coventry North West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson.
The No. 1 priority for all of us here is to keep ourselves and our constituents safe. On this side of the House, we recognise the seriousness of this crime and we will do everything that we can to ensure we can effectively and robustly tackle the threat of extremism, and the terrorists who threaten our national security. As emphasised by my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North, we aim to be a constructive Opposition in identifying areas in which we can support the Government. In other areas, where we have questions and concerns about the legislation that comes before the House, we seek to strengthen and improve that legislation, where it is right to do so.
In support of amendment 69, I will briefly highlight some of my concerns about the imposition of TPIM notices, as outlined in the Bill. Terrorist offences are especially heinous and it is incumbent on us to ensure that we maintain a good, high standard in believing that an individual falls within this threat category. Having that standard for TPIMs, which we would support to keep our constituents safe, would protect the measures and not impede their robust or operational nature.
As my hon. Friend outlined, this standard of proof has been raised twice before, by the coalition Government in 2011 and by the Conservative Government in 2015. We have to wonder why the Government seek to implement the lowering of the standard of proof in clause 37. That would inevitably broaden the category of people who are suspected of being terrorists, but who may not pose a threat at all.
Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has serious concerns that this clause could work on the assumption that courts have and could interpret “reasonable grounds for suspecting” as
“a belief not that the person is a terrorist, only that they may be a terrorist.”
There is a strong possibility that some TPIM subjects would not be actual terrorists and, by virtue of that, be innocent.
Mr Hall, who has access to highly sensitive national security information, said that the current standard of proof “has not proven impractical” and has expressed doubt that there is an operational justification for making these changes to the regime at this time. The Opposition are firm believers in evidence-based policy making and in not amending legislation for its own sake, but these are no small matters. The threat and the serious nature of terrorist activities have implications we are all too familiar with. However, we do not see the merits of targeting individuals for the sake of it. That would see a disproportionate number of ethnic minorities and potentially innocent people subject to quite intrusive measures.
We also do not think it appropriate to add strain to the security services and to the public purse, particularly when resources are already stretched. It prompts the question of why, despite the evidence and the advice of independent reviewers, we are making this change. I urge the Minister to outline his case.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. Let me once again welcome the shadow Minister to his well-deserved place on the Opposition Front Bench.
The speech given a few moments ago my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford outlined with incredible power how important it is that we in this House and in government discharge our duty to protect the public. I thank her for sharing the experience that her friend Louise had 15 years ago today. I ask her to pass on the House’s thanks to Louise for the bravery and fortitude she showed on that day and subsequently, and for sharing her experience with the Committee. Hearing direct first-hand testimony of the kind we did a few moments ago brings to life how important this topic is and how seriously we must take our responsibility to protect our fellow citizens, so I ask my hon. Friend to pass on our thanks to Louise.
It is, of course, right that we take this moment to remember the 52 members of the public who lost their lives 15 years ago, and the 784 who were injured and who will often carry not just physical scars, but mental and psychological scars for many years to come. The shadow cast by terrorism is not just a physical shadow; it is a psychological and emotional shadow.
I turn to clause 37 and the proposed amendments. The first point I want to make, beyond reiterating that protecting the public is our primary duty, is that TPIMs are not something the Government, Ministers or the police reach for first. The first option is always to prosecute where we have evidence to do so, and that is what happens in the vast majority of cases—criminal prosecution before a judge and a jury, to the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, is the preferred and first option. We should always keep that in mind. We fall back on TPIMs only where we believe there is a real threat to the public and where they are in fact necessary. The word “necessary” appears in the original 2011 legislation, and that test of necessity is not being changed by this new Bill. It is a last resort.
The hon. Member for St Helens North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West both asked about the business case. Why are we introducing this change, and what is the need for this measure? I will begin by answering that question directly. As we have briefly heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, the answer is best found in the evidence that the Committee heard on the morning of Thursday 25 June from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques. I asked him something twice in general terms, and then he answered more specifically. I asked him twice whether this legislation will
“make the public less or more safe”.
He answered very clearly,
“yes, I believe it will make the public safer.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 20, Q48.]
To be absolutely sure, I asked him again whether it will make the public safer. He said:
“That is the view of the security services…that is their clear view.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q50.]
Conor McGinn
The witness did say that. The Minister might recall that I then pushed the witness on the specifics of it, and he said he was talking about the totality of the package contained within the Bill—more specifically around sentencing, rather than what was proposed around TPIMs.
Chris Philp
I will elaborate on the questions a little further. Question 50 was specifically about TPIMs and the burden of proof. To clear that up, I will read question 50 in full—it is not very long. “For those three reasons”, which I will go through in a moment,
“you are being categorically clear with this Committee and with Parliament that the proposed lower standard of proof”—
which we are now discussing—
“would be a benefit to the police and the security services, and that it would make the public safer.”
I was expressly referring not just to TPIMs but to the standard of proof. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques replied:
“That is the view of the security services…that is their clear view.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 22, Q50.]
He was answering specifically on TPIMs and on the burden of proof in question 50.
Joanna Cherry
If the evidence of the assistant chief constable and the three examples are so central to the Government’s business case, why were they not in the impact assessment and why were they not mentioned on Second Reading, when others and I were probing the Minister? For instance, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who is Chair of the Justice Committee, asked for the justification for the change. It seems to me the Government are seizing on this now as a justification. If it is the justification, flesh it out, put it in a business case but also, answer the question: why was it not there originally as a justification?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her intervention. First, some of the details I am about to take the Committee through were mentioned on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and I expressly mentioned the possibility of people returning from conflict zones such as Syria. In response to repeated interventions from the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), I gave the justification in general terms, which have been borne out subsequently by the detailed evidence.
Joanna Cherry
The problem of people returning from Syria, which I accept, is a significant one that has existed for a number of years. Is the Minister saying in terms that the current TPIM regime—the current standard of proof—has prevented the security services from dealing with the problem of people returning from Syria? If that is what he saying, he should say so in bald terms, rather than seizing on something after the fact to justify this significant change.
Chris Philp
I will finish dealing with the hon. and learned Lady’s previous intervention and then I will answer her second one. She was asking why the case was not made more fully on Second Reading. I said it was made in general terms and the example of Syria was given. I will come on to that in a moment. The reason we have witnesses appearing before Public Bill Committees is precisely to serve this purpose: to bring out the detail and let them give their testimony to the Committee and the House. The detailed testimony given by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques on the morning of 25 June is precisely why we have witnesses. It is serving the function it should have done, which was to give the Committee and the House the details they asked for on Second Reading and which hon. Members are asking for today.
I turn to the detail of Tim Jacques’s testimony and give the specific and precise reasons why he and the security services believe this is important, one of which is the Syrian example, which I will elaborate on in just a moment. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s first reason for why the lower standard of proof is necessary to protect the public is that we may find that there are individuals whose
“risk profile is rapidly increasing”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 20, Q49.]
If someone’s behaviour is quickly changing they may go from posing a potential threat to an actual threat to actually offending very quickly. He says that it is that rapid change of circumstances that necessitates a lower burden of proof. He then goes on to give a second reason, which was mentioned by the hon. and learned Lady a moment ago, which is the threat of somebody returning from overseas. He says that where someone has been overseas—for example, in Syria—it is extremely difficult, as one can readily imagine, to gather evidence that would meet the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, if someone has been operating in Syria, there will typically be no signals intelligence or eye-witness testimony, because it is very hard to get witnesses from Syria to come here, and there will be no results of other forms of surveillance: all the evidence that would normally be presented in a criminal prosecution enabling somebody’s guilt to be established beyond reasonable doubt. It is difficult—impossible, I would say—to achieve that when someone is returning. That is why, in those thankfully relatively rare circumstances, we might need to work to a lower standard of proof and reasonable suspicion in order to protect the public.
The hon. and learned Lady essentially said that people have been going to Syria for five years now, and indeed returning for four or five years. We heard in evidence from both Jonathan Hall and Tim Jacques that, historically, there have not been any examples where a TPIM was desired but not obtained owing to the burden of proof. In fact, that observation applies more generally and not only to the Syrian example. Let me directly answer the criticism immediately.
It is true, I accept, that there have been no occasions historically when a TPIM was desired but not granted owing to the burden of proof that currently exists. However, we are not seeking simply to cater for circumstances that occurred historically; we seek in this legislation, and as parliamentarians, to cater for risks that may arise in the future that may not have arisen in the past. The absence of such risks having happened in the last five or six years does not establish definitively that they will not happen in the future—such a risk might arise in the future. Indeed, the assistant chief constable effectively said that he thinks that is possible, which is why he is advocating for the lower burden of proof.
We must cater for risks, not historical certainties. That is why the evidence of the assistant chief constable is so important and why the Syrian example is a good one, even though historically we have not been inhibited. We might be in the future. A few moments ago, we heard a powerfully eloquent description of the devastating consequences that follow when the public are not protected.
Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out a third reason in his evidence concerning sensitive material—material that is gathered covertly, or the disclosure of which might prejudice investigations or the security services:
“The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q49.]
He says that, with a lower standard of proof, that disclosure would be required less frequently so there would not be such a requirement to disclose sensitive information.
In answer to a question posed by both Opposition Front-Bench shadow Ministers, Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out the business case powerfully in those three examples that I have just taken the Committee through.
Joanna Cherry
I have the greatest respect for the assistant chief constable and for the assistance he was able to give the Committee, but in a court of law we would call that hearsay evidence. He is not actually dealing with seeking TPIMs. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who is charged by the Government with the responsibility of overviewing all this, said that there is no cogent business case.
Can the Minister explain why the independent reviewer is not convinced by the assistant chief constable’s three examples? Mr Hall said that he has had discussions with the Government—presumably the Government have put those examples to him if they are so central to the business case. Can the Minister explain to us why the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is not convinced that there is a cogent case?
Chris Philp
I was not present at those meetings, so I cannot comment on what was discussed. However, the hon. and learned Lady has herself already observed that Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s critical testimony was ventilated in such details—publicly at least—for the first time in his evidence; of course, Jonathan Hall gave evidence just before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. As I say, I was not privy to the conversations that took place between Jonathan Hall and my colleagues in the Home Office, so I do not know what case was presented to him, but I do know that the case presented by Tim Jacques was, at least in my view, compelling.
Chris Philp
Before I move on to the second leg of my support for these measures, I will of course give way to the shadow Minister, who wants to intervene.
Conor McGinn
To echo what the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said, the evidence of the assistant chief constable was incredibly useful—he is hugely respected across law enforcement. But he was one witness. He made it clear, in response to the Minister’s questions about TPIMs, that it was the view of the security services that the lowering of the standard of proof might have “utility” when it came to the examples that he outlined—but he was also clear that the police are not the applicant.
Chris Philp
I have made this point already, in response to an earlier intervention, but at question 50 I asked the assistant chief constable expressly about TPIMs and the burden of proof. He expressly said that it would make the public safer—he was talking there not about the generality of the Bill, but about TPIMs specifically. Of course, I welcome the fact that in more general terms he feels that the Bill will help, but that question related specifically to TPIMs.
Chris Philp
The assistant chief constable said:
“That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q50.]
Although he was not applying for TPIMs, he is a senior police officer involved in counter-terrorism policing, he had been briefed by the security services before giving evidence, and he is responsible for monitoring and managing TPIMs subsequently. To dismiss his evidence as hearsay—the hon. Gentleman did not, but the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West did—is rather unfair, given that he had the briefing from the security services in front of him when he gave evidence and given the close role he and counter-terrorism police play in managing and monitoring TPIMs.
Joanna Cherry
There is no insult in saying that someone’s evidence is hearsay; it is simply that they are giving evidence about what someone else has told them. I am not undermining the witness in any way, but he is only giving evidence about what he has been told. Let us look at what he said at question 58, when I said:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
He responded:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
As I said to him, that is an important answer, albeit that it is hearsay. He is telling us that MI5 has said, in respect of two of the examples that the Minister is giving us as a justification for this significant change, that in no case so far has the current standard of proof been a blocker. Does that not perhaps explain why we have three distinguished Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation supporting the existing standard of proof, rather than this Government’s variation?
Chris Philp
I have already accepted, a few minutes ago, that there have not been any historical examples. That was clear from the evidence. I also said, in response to an earlier intervention on Syria, that just because there have not been any historically—we are talking about very small numbers—does not mean to say that there will not be such a situation in the future. We need to guard against potential future risk. That is what we seek to do.
Let me go on to the second plank of my rationale for why this proposed burden of proof is appropriate. It is because there are significant mitigants to any risks of abuse of process, miscarriages of justice or inappropriate behaviour. I rest my case for those mitigants on two legs or stands.
The first is that we do not need to hypothesise about how a Government—any Government—might behave with access to TPIMs, or control orders, with a lower standard of proof. As the hon. Member for St Helens North pointed out, we had control orders, passed by then Labour Government in 2005, which had the lower standard of proof—the reasonable suspicion. Those persisted for approximately six years, from 2005 to 2011. During that period, 52 control orders were issued. On the morning of 25 June, I also asked Jonathan Hall whether he was aware of any misuse in that six-year period—I said seven then, but it is six—when the lower burden of proof prevailed. He said:
“I am not aware of any misuse”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 7, Q9.]
I also asked him whether he was aware of the Government ever having misused the powers or used them without care and circumspection; I actually asked whether, as far as he could see, the Government had used the powers “with care and circumspection”. He said:
“I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 6, Q5.]
So the control orders, as they were then, operated with a lower standard of proof for six years with no abuse or misuse identified.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised a question about ECHR article 5 compliance and whether the lower burden of proof would potentially infringe that. I checked that during the debate. During the six years when 52 control orders were used, at no point, despite some challenges, were they found to be not compliant with the ECHR. The Committee can satisfy itself that when they operated previously, they did so without abuse and were not struck down as an instrument as a whole by the court.
The second set of mitigants is to be found in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, in which the Committee probably knows there are five conditions, labelled A to E, that have to be met for a TPIM to be granted. We are seeking to amend only one of those five conditions, condition A, which pertains to the burden of proof in so far as it touches on terrorism-related activity.
The four other conditions still have to be met and are not being changed by the Bill. For example, condition C requires the Secretary of State to reasonably consider “that it is necessary”—I labour that word “necessary”—
“for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism”.
The Secretary of State must be satisfied that there is necessity. It must not be done on a whim or because it might or may be required. It must be necessary. That is in section 3(3) of the 2011 Act, which is not being amended.
In section 3(4), condition D makes a similar point that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider
“that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity”.
Again, it uses the word “necessary”—not “possible”, “maybe” or “might”, but “necessary”. It is a very strong word.
Moreover, in section 3(5), condition E says that the Secretary of State must seek permission from the court, as described further in sections 6 and 9 of the Act. They must go to a court of law and make sure that it feels it is reasonable that a TPIM should be granted. At the outset, there is judicial oversight of the process. The Home Secretary cannot, just by a stroke of a pen, give out a TPIM and thereby restrict someone’s liberty. That is a serious matter, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West has already said. There is judicial oversight of the process. I say again that four of the five tests laid down in section 3 of the 2011 Act are not changing. They will stay the same.
Moreover, those subjected to a TPIM have a right of appeal against it. The 2011 Act, which, again, is not being amended, provides that they can go to a court if they feel that a TPIM has been unreasonably imposed, unreasonably varied or unreasonably extended. They can ask a court for relief and the court proceedings can carry on according to the principles used in judicial review. Beyond the simple question of burden of proof around terrorist-related activities, there are those further protections in the Bill and from the courts.
I will conclude, Mr Robertson—always welcome words during one of my speeches—by saying that the powers are used sparingly. There were 52 of the old control orders in total over six years, but at any one time no more than 15 were ever in force. As the shadow Minister has said, as of November last year there were five TPIMs in force, although I think that we heard in evidence that the number might subsequently have gone up to six.
We use such powers very sparingly, for the reason that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West mentioned: they touch on an individual’s liberty. However, they are occasionally, in the words of the Act, “necessary”—necessary to protect the public, necessary to protect people such as Louise who might otherwise be killed, injured or traumatised and necessary to protect our fellow citizens. It is for those reasons of necessity that I respectfully say that the clause as drafted is an integral and an important part of the Bill.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
TPIMs: extension of time limit
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) in subsection (3)(a), for “and D” substitute “, D and E”;”
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek permission from the High Court for any TPIM extension beyond the two-year mark, as when a TPIM notice is first issued.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment 64, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) in subsection (3)(a), after ‘met’ insert ‘and the court gives the Secretary of State permission’;
(zb) after subsection (3)(a), insert ‘(ab) In determining the extension, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.’”
Conor McGinn
Let me say at the outset that this amendment is intended to probe and provoke some of the debate that we had on the previous clause, although perhaps not in quite as lengthy a way. I will not be pushing any of the amendments in my name to a vote.
The amendments cover another critical aspect to the changes proposed by the Government, which we approach in a constructive manner in the hope of aiding the Government to make a case for them by understanding them and providing proper and effective scrutiny. I know the Minister accepts and welcomes that as the role of the official Opposition.
The proposed changes to TPIMs in clause 38, when taken together, have quite a profound impact on the regime as we currently understand it. If the standard of proof is to be lowered, while simultaneously making it possible to potentially indefinitely detain someone under a TPIM by removing the current two-year limit, scrutiny, oversight and safeguards take on a new-found and even more significant role.
We have therefore tabled a number of amendments to tighten the scrutiny, oversight and effectiveness of TPIMs where they are to be extended beyond the two-year period. We believe amendment 60 would help to ensure adequate scrutiny and oversight of notices that are in place for prolonged periods of time. As the independent reviewer made abundantly clear in his note of 5 June 2020, the current system and the proposed changes lack a sense of continuing judicial oversight, which is only exacerbated by the fact that many individuals subject to a TPIM opt out of the High Court review. The independent reviewer goes on to say:
“The prospect of individuals being subject to administrative measures for many years without robust scrutiny is unappealing”.
With this amendment, we seek to address that problem. As is the case where a TPIM notice is first issued, it would compel the Secretary of State, whether now or under a future Government, to seek permission from a High Court judge where a TPIM notice is to be extended beyond the critical two-year mark.
The Chair
Order. I am terribly sorry to interrupt you. We are only discussing amendment 60 to clause 38 and amendment 64, not amendment 61 at this stage.
Conor McGinn
Thank you, Mr Robertson, for your guidance. I look forward to discussing amendment 61 later.
The Minister will not be unaware of the concerns raised around the extent of the two-year period, given what a TPIM entails. We hope to provide some scrutiny around that, to underscore the effectiveness and credibility of the entire process by judicial oversight review, and maintain those safeguards, to reassure the public that they are protected by TPIMs—we believe they are a hugely important part of this legislation and keeping the public safe—and that this is being done properly, with due diligence and oversight.
Chris Philp
Allow me to explain why the current two-year maximum does not work from a security services perspective. As matters stand, if a TPIM comes to the end of two years and thereby automatically lapses, a brand-new application has to be made, requiring completely fresh evidence, without simply reusing the evidence used at the outset. New evidence must be obtained, which takes some time, particularly if during the two-year period of the TPIM, the subject has been careful to behave themselves, which is the purpose of the TPIM in the first place.
We have had examples of a gap caused by the renewal requirement. Jonathan Hall acknowledged that in answer to my question in his evidence on 25 June,. I asked him about gaps when TPIMs had expired and he said that he had found a couple of examples. He added:
“In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.”
In response, I said:
“It is fair to say that the risk would have existed in that 12 to 16-month period.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q2, c. 6.]
I was not asking about things that had actually happened; I was asking about risk—what might have happened. In response to that point, Jonathan Hall replied, “Yes.”
I went on similarly to ask Assistant Chief Constable Jacques whether a risk might exist in that gap. He said:
“Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q51, c. 21.]
We therefore have clear evidence, from both the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, and counter-terrorism expert Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, telling us that the gap that follows the two-year expiration of a TPIM poses a risk to the public. It is right that in the Bill we seek to close that risk by allowing for carefully considered annual extensions.
In terms of protecting the subject and ensuring that the extensions are not used unreasonably, let me make the following comments to reassure the Committee and, I hope, the whole House. First, the old control order regime did not have the two-year limit. In the period when the control orders introduced by the Labour Government in 2005 were enforced, 30 lasted for two years or less, eight lasted for between two and three years, four lasted for between three and four years, and only three lasted for between four and five years. The clear majority lasted for less than two years. Only a small number—15, according to the figures that I have—lasted for more than two years, and the bulk of those lasted for three or four years. Once again, when the powers are available, they are used circumspectly and sparingly.
Further protections are laid out in statutory provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which will continue. The first is found in section 11 of the Act, which requires the Secretary of State to keep TPIMs under review, in particular conditions C and D, which I mentioned earlier. That is given practical effect via a quarterly review process, once every three months, in which the security services and counter-terrorism police participate. Secondly, there is an ongoing right of appeal by the subject laid out in section 16 of the 2011 Act. Section 16(1), which will continue in force, says that if
“the Secretary of State extends or revives a TPIM”,
the right of appeal will apply, so every time a TPIM is extended, the subject, if they think the extension is unreasonable, has the right to go to court to seek protection.
Given that the current gap is posing a risk to the public, as Jonathan Hall and Assistant Chief Constable Jacques very clearly said, and given that there are good and strong safeguards in place, I believe that the provisions in clause 38, allowing considered, thoughtful annual extensions, serve the purpose of protecting the public.
Joanna Cherry
I am not going to speak to amendment 64, but I will speak in support of Labour’s amendment 61 when we get to it.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) for subsection (3)(a), substitute—
‘(a) may be extended under subsection (2) only if—
(i) the Secretary of State believes on the balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity;
(ii) conditions C and D are met.’”
This amendment requires the standard of proof for renewing a TPIM notice beyond two years to be “on the balance of probabilities”, where no new terrorism-related activity can be demonstrated.
Thank you, Mr Robertson, for your gentle guidance in navigating our way through the numerous amendments. Although they are linked, it is important that we examine them on their own merits. At its core, amendment 61, like the amendment we have just discussed, is about securing strong and robust safeguards, which, as I said, we should use the Bill as an opportunity to promote rather than jettison. We should show confidence in the process and procedures that we are introducing to keep the public safe.
The prospect of a TPIM notice enduring for a prolonged or even indefinite period deserves scrutiny. It is important to remember what a TPIM can involve: overnight residence requirements, relocation to another part of the country, police reporting, an electronic monitoring tag, exclusion from specific places, limits on association, limits on the use of financial services, limits on the use of telephones and computers, and a ban on holding travel documents. Even in the dying part of the Labour party that is the traditional old right, I balk a little at some of that. I accept that it is necessary to monitor very dangerous individuals and keep the public safe, but these are some pretty fundamental liberties that we are talking about denying people. There is a responsibility on all of us to acknowledge that, and to make sure that we give it proper scrutiny. These are, rightly, robust measures, and to reiterate: we do not believe there should be impediments in cases where a longer TPIM notice that would genuinely be in the interests of keeping the public safe and secure, which is of course our first priority, should be extended. It is also important to say that these sanctions, effectively, are imposed on people who have not been convicted of any crime, and that they are being taken in addition to the lowering of the standard of proof and the extension of the period without, it appears, due oversight needs to be properly looked at.
The other point is that TPIMs are resource-intensive instruments. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques clearly said that additional resources would need to be provided. It would be good to hear a commitment from the Minister that that would the case and that, whatever law enforcement would need, and notwithstanding that a spike in TPIMs is not envisaged, the extension thereof and any addition to the current number will be properly and fully resourced.
As the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said earlier, there is testimony not just from the current reviewer of terrorism legislation, but also from previous ones. Someone as respected as Lord Carlile, for example, said that a differentiated standard of proof, effectively, would be created for extending a TPIM beyond the two-year point. That would add another layer to the complexity of what proof is required at what point, and to what extent. Jonathan Hall also noted on 5 June that that would be the case.
As I said previously, not a single TPIM measure has been rejected to date based on insufficient evidence of the higher standard of proof, so the safeguard would not operationally hinder the TPIM regime, which we agree needs to be strong and flexible. We need to ensure that those TPIMs extended for prolonged periods are subject to an extra level of scrutiny and oversight and that they are applied in reasonable and proportionate terms, fundamentally in keeping with the thrust of what they are designed to do, which is to keep the public safe.
Joanna Cherry
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of amendment 61, and to remind hon. Members of what the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said in his evidence to us. I will look in particular at his response to my question 33, when he said that the combination of clause 37 and clause 38 is a “double whammy”,
“not just lowering the standard of proof but also allowing TPIMs to endure forever.”—[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q33, c.15.]
Indeed, he suggested the very safeguards set out in amendment 60 and 61. I support to amendment 61 for that reason. I take hon. Members back to what he said in response to my question 33. I said:
“What about looking at balancing out the changes made in this Bill to TPIMs by introducing some safeguards to ensure that TPIMs do not breach the human rights of a subject of a TPIM? Have you thought about that? We should always remember that the subject of a TPIM has not been convicted of any crime.”
He answered:
“As far as safeguards are concerned, you will probably have seen from my notes that here you have a double whammy. It is not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever. Something that was proposed by my predecessor”—
he meant Lord Anderson, as the hon. Member for St Helens North said—is that
“if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.”
He went on:
“Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject.”
Again, in fairness, he also said:
“I do not think the authorities will be unwise in the way that they use that, but there is a risk that people will be on TPIMs for a very long time indeed. As you say, they have not been prosecuted, and it seems to be right in principle and fair that there should be some additional safeguards for those individuals.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q33, cc. 15-16.]
Chris Philp
Amendment 61 seeks to introduce a higher standard of proof—the balance of probabilities—if a TPIM is to be extended beyond two years. We debated at some length the relative merits of reasonable suspicion and the balance of probabilities in relation to clause 37, so I do not propose to repeat those arguments at great length. However, I hope I established in my previous remarks the importance of the reasonable suspicion burden of proof, rather than the balance of probabilities.
On the issue of extension, I gave the reasons why it is important to avoid this two-year cliff edge a few minutes ago, during the debate on amendments 60 and 64. I also drew attention to the protections that exist, particularly the review process in section 11 of the TPIM Act, which is an internal process that goes on on a quarterly basis. I also drew attention to the right of appeal under section 16 of the same Act. Every time one of these orders gets extended by a year, the subject has a right to go back to the court if he or she feels they are being treated unreasonably and unfairly. For all those reasons, I think the annual renewal process, with a right of appeal should the subject feel the renewal is unreasonable, provides adequate protection.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for St Helens North, asked about counter-terrorism resources. As I am sure he is aware, counter-terrorism police expenditure was significantly increased earlier this year. The police have a great deal more resources than they had previously, and as Assistant Chief Constable Jacques said in evidence,
“Neither we nor the Security Service envisage a large increase in those numbers—
the numbers of people on TPIMs—
“as a result of the provisions in the Bill”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q49, c. 20.]
although as the shadow Minister said, some may endure longer. We are absolutely committed to making sure the resources required are available.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 38, page 34, line 33, at end insert—
“(ab) after subsection (3)(b) insert—
(3A) Where a TPIM notice has been extended under subsection (3), the Secretary of State must review, at 6 monthly intervals, whether it is appropriate to issue a revocation notice under section (13)(1).
(3B) A review under subsection 3A will include a memorandum to—
(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force;
(b) the Security Service,
(c) the Secret Intelligence Service, and
(d) the Government Communications Headquarters
outlining a tailored exit strategy.
(3C) A ‘tailored exit strategy’ under subsection (3B) shall include—
(a) an assessment of the individual’s current security threat, which must include an assessment of the current evidence and investigative steps as provided by the bodies listed in subsection (3B);
(b) a plan for agencies and public services to engage with the individual to promote rehabilitation for the duration of the TPIM; and
(c) a plan for how TPIM measures may be removed if no new evidence of terrorist related activity is provided.”
An amendment to require the Secretary of State to specify a provisional exit strategy for a TPIM notice, upon any renewal beyond the two-year mark.
It always struck me as a strange and inflexible design flaw of TPIMs that they had a set limit of two years. My right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, who chairs the Select Committee on Home Affairs, reminded the House on Second Reading that
“Control orders were set for a year but could be renewed”,
but
“TPIMs were fixed at two years.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 229.]
As far back as 2011, my right hon. Friend was raising concerns about what that would mean for the small number of people who might be extremely dangerous after two years, and what provisions would be in place to ensure the public were protected.
It would be good to introduce a measure of flexibility to TPIMs, but my concern is that by doing so that way, the Government leave a very open-ended approach, which could see cases effectively kicked into the long grass, often at great expense and with no realistic strategy for resolution of any kind. When imposing a TPIM, we must always have sight of what resolution is—whether prosecution or the removal of the notice—rather than the idea that we can indefinitely extend the TPIM and leave those who are subject to them in a sort of terrorism-suspect limbo.
The amendment seeks to address the open-ended nature of the Government’s changes by requiring the Secretary of State to specify what we have called a provisional exit strategy for a TPIM notice upon any renewal beyond the two-year mark. Under the provision in the amendment, the Secretary of State would be obliged to undertake a review every six months to set out whether it is appropriate to issue a revocation notice and to draw up, with police and security services, a tailored exit strategy. That strategy would involve an assessment of the individual’s current security threat, which should be the most fundamental and overarching aspect to the TPIM; a plan for agencies and public services to engage with the individual to promote rehabilitation for the duration of the TPIM if possible; and a plan for how TPIM measures can be removed if no new evidence of terrorist-related activity is provided.
It is not in anyone’s interest to allow individuals to remain indefinitely on TPIMs, not just for their own sake but for that of wider society because, crucially, they should be brought to justice and put through the judicial process. As Jonathan Hall said:
“There is the risk that, once a TPIM has been made and someone has been identified as a risk, that takes priority—in other words, the TPIM is the best way of protecting the public—over trying to get criminal evidence to prosecute”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 17, Q37.]
Having heard the wide-ranging evidence from witnesses, as well as what the security services and others have said, I am in no doubt that that is far from being the motivation of anyone involved in overseeing a TPIM, but those are important points to bear in mind none the less.
The idea of an indefinite TPIM means that someone convicted of a terrorist offence could conceivably be free of constraints before someone who is placed on an enduring TPIM. As we legislate in this place, we need to be cognisant of the potential for that to occur, which would be quite perverse and bizarre, albeit quite unlikely. The idea of leaving someone subject to a TPIM indefinitely is not cost-effective for the taxpayer and, notwithstanding all the amendments that we have tabled, does nothing to tackle the issues that have brought the individual to the point that they are subjected to the TPIM—namely, entering dangerous extremism and being suspected, as the lower standard of proof would say, of becoming engaged in criminal and terrorist activity.
I worry that the indefinite TPIM discourages a move towards seeking a conviction when that is appropriate, and increases the risk of individuals slipping under the radar over time if their cases are not regularly reviewed by those tasked with implementing the TPIM. An exit strategy would keep that small number of cases at the forefront of the Secretary of State’s mind and would ensure that, if there were enduring or extended TPIMs, we would not allow them to become indefinite beyond that which is reasonable.
Chris Philp
On the point about potential perpetuity TPIMs, once again I assure the Committee that history from the old control order regime teaches us that the number of TPIMs enduring beyond two or three years is exceptionally small, and the subject always has a right of appeal to the court. On the question about reviews and the exit strategy, which is the topic of the amendment, the Government essentially agree with the comments about their importance but, in fact, that is precisely what happens already. I have referred to the fact that section 11 of the TPIM Act requires the Secretary of State to keep under review whether conditions C and D are being met—that is, whether there is terrorist-related activity or whether the public need to be protected. That is given practical effect by a TPIM review group, a so-called TRG, that meets on a quarterly basis. The topics that it discusses are exactly those that the shadow Minister quite rightly and eloquently laid out a few minutes ago, including the exit strategy.
That was reviewed and commented on in the 2018 report of the then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Max Hill QC, who is now, of course, the Director of Public Prosecutions. In relation to the TPIM review group’s activity, he said that
“the TRG meets at three-monthly intervals”,
which is twice as often as the amendment calls for, and that
“very careful consideration is given to every aspect of the TPIM in force, including…the individual measures, each in turn…the exit strategy, in other words timely preparation for returning the TPIM subject to his”—
or her—
“home life at the end of the TPIM.”
I am delighted to be able to say to the Committee that exactly the review mechanisms, including the exit strategy, that the shadow Minister is calling for are already in place and were validated by the then independent reviewer, Max Hill, in 2018.
Conor McGinn
I do not have anything to add except to say that that was a rare example of a probing amendment that probed and received assurances, so I do not seek to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 38, page 34, line 35, at end insert—
‘(3A) After section 10 (Criminal investigations into terrorism-related activity) insert—
“Report on terrorism-related activity
10A (1) The chief officer of the appropriate police force must produce a report to—
(a) the Secretary of State; and
(b) the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, as set out in section (1) of the Justice and Security Act 2013.
(2) A report under subsection (1) must address the—
(a) current evidence, and
(b) investigative steps that—
(i) have been, and
(ii) may still be taken
in relation to the TPIM.
(3) A report under subsection (1) must be produced two years after the imposition or extension of a TPIM.
(4) Section (3) (Reports of the ISC) of the Justice and Security Act 2013 is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (3)(1) insert—
‘(1A) An annual report to Parliament must contain a statement as to whether it is satisfied with the content of a report produced under section (10A) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.’
(6) In this section—
(a) ‘appropriate police force’;
(b) ‘chief officer’; and
(c) ‘police force’
have the meaning as set out in section 10.”’
An amendment requiring the chief officer of the relevant police force to produce a report, at a TPIM’s two-year mark, to the Secretary of State and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on the current evidence and investigative steps that had been and may still be taken in relation to the TPIM.
This amendment, which I tabled on behalf of the official Opposition builds on previous amendments to ensure not only that there is judicial oversight of the extension, as well as an exit strategy, but that the latest evidence and investigative steps, as provided by the local police, can and are thoroughly explored by the Secretary of State.
We reference the Secretary of State directly because the Bill vests a lot of power in the individual who holds that office with regard to the decision about whether to impose a TPIM. I know that the Secretary of State is busy, certainly if she is doing even half the work of the shadow Secretary of State, but it applies only to a small number of individuals. It is right, given the authority that the Secretary of State has to impose TPIMs, that he or she is therefore responsible for their continuing oversight as well.
The Minister and Committee members will know that section 10 of the 2011 Act provides for a process of evidential review whereby the Secretary of State consults the relevant chief officer of the respective police force to determine whether a criminal prosecution at any given moment is viable, credible and practical, yet the independent reviewer writes in his note of 5 June that
“for the review process I found that neither the Home Secretary nor her officials saw anything other than a tick in the box to show that the relevant chief officer had performed this role.”
If the relevant chief officer says that they have fulfilled that duty, I have full and total confidence in that. It may have become an unfashionable view in some quarters, but I trust the police, their judgment and their assessment on such matters, because they are the experts. They are the people who are tasked with overseeing, implementing and doing that work on the ground. Procedurally and practically, however, it would be of real benefit, not just for Ministers and officials in the Home Office, but for the police and the security and intelligence services more widely, if they had access to comprehensive and detailed information from the local police at that critical stage.
The amendment would, in effect, remedy an existing gap. It would strengthen the rigour of the existing process by compelling the chief officer of the appropriate force to produce a detailed report, once again at that crucial two-year mark, to the Secretary of State, outlining the latest evidence and the investigative steps that have been or might still be taken in relation to the TPIM notice. It would allow for a better informed view on the current circumstances of an individual TPIM, but also give greater encouragement and clarity to law enforcement more widely on what the next steps, including the chance of criminal prosecution, might be, which brings us back to the exit strategy that we talked about.
Chris Philp
I will be brief, because we have discussed at some length the question of extensions and an exit strategy. I echo the comments about section 10 of the 2011 Act. As the shadow Minister said, section 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the relevant chief officer of police as to whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a terrorism-related offence before imposing a TPIM. The chief officer must then consult the relevant prosecuting authority. Once the TPIM has been imposed, section 10 says that the chief officer
“must ensure investigations of the TPIM subject’s conduct is kept under review throughout the duration of the TPIM with a view to prosecution for an offence related to terrorism if the evidential threshold can be met”.
Essentially, I think that what the hon. Gentleman reasonably asks for is enshrined in section 10 of the 2011 Act. I point again to the operation of the TPIM review group, to which I referred to in the previous debate, which meets regularly every three months and has input from police and the security services to do exactly what the shadow Minister asks.
On oversight and reporting, the hon. Gentleman mentioned the ISC. I believe it will be constituted soon, but that is not in my gift or purview. I think the most suitable person to oversee, monitor and scrutinise the activities of the Government in this area is the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whom we have all been quoting very frequently. He clearly does a very energetic and active job in this sphere.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
TPIMs: variation of measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 39 inserts an additional ground for variation into section 12 of the old TPIM Act that I have been quoting from. By virtue of that, it will be possible for the Secretary of State to vary the relocation measure in a TPIM notice, if considered strictly necessary,
“for reasons connected with the…effective use of resources in relation to the individual.”
The new ground for variation will apply only where the individual has already been relocated away from their home address and where the national security reason for requiring relocation still exists.
Conor McGinn
I want briefly to draw the Minister and the Committee’s attention to the fact that, when these relocation orders were previously challenged by those subject to them, one sixth of those cases were upheld. In introducing this measure, the Government need to ensure that their legal processes are very robust in that regard.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
TPIMs: extension of residence measure
Conor McGinn
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 40, page 36, line 31, at end insert—
“(c) after paragraph (1)(5) insert—
‘(5A) Where the Secretary of State has imposed on an individual a requirement to reside at a specified residence which is shared with another individual or individuals, the Secretary of State shall provide for an assessment to be made of the suitability of these individuals to reside together.’”
Requirement for a report on approved premises putting offenders in shared accommodation together.
This amendment puts forward a requirement for a report on approved premises putting offenders in shared accommodation together. That is an issue of real concern: the most effective sentencing policy or preventive intervention can be meaningless, frankly, when pitted against the pressure, manipulation or radicalisation that a vulnerable person might be exposed to from a friend, associate or, sadly, even a family member.
We heard throughout the witness sessions that custody can only have a protective impact by taking that particular person off the street, so to speak, for that specified period, and that it is on release that they are exposed. As Peter Dawson, from the Prison Reform Trust, said,
“people are going to be released, and that is when the risk arises”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 35, Q79.]
The importance of positive relationships cannot be undervalued. As Mr Dawson said,
“particularly after a long sentence, a stable home and relationships with people who have kept faith with you and who have belief in your future are absolutely the things that help someone as a mature person.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 36, Q82.]
All the evidence supports that view, so it is also the case that negative association and exposure to extremist pressure within shared accommodation carries real risks, particularly for young offenders.
We are therefore tabling this amendment to ensure that:
“Where the Secretary of State has imposed on an individual a requirement to reside at a specified residence which is shared with another individual or individuals, the Secretary of State shall provide for an assessment to be made of the suitability of these individuals to reside together.”
It would be pointless and perverse for the state to designate specific accommodation as part of a directive, only for that accommodation and those contained therein to be a major influence on increasing reoffending risks. Due diligence must be done on the appropriateness of the residence and those individuals.
The state cannot be responsible for ordering someone into a dangerous or radicalising environment; that would undermine all the other measures contained in the Bill. Therefore, I hope the Government will reflect on this amendment. I do not intend to push it to a vote, but I felt none the less it was important to move it.
Chris Philp
Relocation measures are on occasion a very important way of protecting the public. As Jonathan Hall said in his evidence to us on 25 June:
“Relocation is an important power. It is regrettable, in the sense that it is a very strong measure and causes a lot of disruption, but I am quite satisfied that in a small number of cases it is needed.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 18, Q40.]
The necessity of relocation on occasion is not in dispute.
In relation to the point that the shadow Minister makes about not putting people into multi-occupancy premises, let me say that the Government and the police never put people into multi-occupancy premises—that is to say, we do not impose a requirement on the subject to reside with other individuals. They would never be put into accommodation with other people, for all the reasons that he mentioned.
Of course, we do regular risk assessments of TPIM subjects, including via the auspices of the TPIM review group that I mentioned a little earlier, which meets quarterly. The group looks not only at the issues we have talked about previously to do with exit strategy and so on, but at various other matters, including the relocation measures and how those are working.
As I have said previously, a former Independent Reviewer Of Terrorism Legislation has commented positively, saying that these quarterly TPIM review groups entail robust discussion of every aspect of the TPIM, including residency, and consider every individual part of that TPIM in turn. I hope that gives the shadow Minister the assurance he requires that people are not compelled to live in multi-occupancy premises, with the potentially adverse consequences that may flow from that.
Conor McGinn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
TPIMs: polygraph measure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss new clause 12—Additional provision in relation to polygraphs when applicable to individuals under 25—
(1) Where, in accordance with section 28 of the Offender Management Act 2007, as it applies to terrorist offenders, or Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, a polygraph session is required of an individual aged between 18 and 25, that polygraph session must be attended by a counsellor.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a counsellor is a person who can assess the appropriateness of the application of the polygraph session and support the person to which the polygraph condition has been applied.
(3) Where the counsellor has concerns about the appropriateness of a polygraph session, these shall be reported to the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State shall lay in Parliament a report that includes—
(a) a summary of the concerns raised by counsellors on an annual basis; and
(b) a description of the actions proposed or taken to address the concerns raised.”
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
It will be a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson.
New clause 12 would require that a counsellor be present during the time that any individual aged between 18 and 25 is having a polygraph test. As subsection (2) of new clause 12 says:
“a counsellor is a person who can assess the appropriateness of the application of the polygraph session and”—
This is the most important part of all—
“support the person to which the polygraph condition has been applied.”
It is only right that we ensure that someone is present for the participant in a clearly stressful situation. The young person undergoing the polygraph test may not have the knowledge, the confidence or even the ability to speak out if they are not comfortable. Having a counsellor present would provide an extra layer of support and establish more confidence in the process. The counsellor would be required to report
“concerns about the appropriateness of a polygraph session…to the Secretary of State.”
That would mean that the Government would remain on top of any key or alarming issues that arise with polygraph tests, the equipment or even the testers, to ensure that their use is fair and proper in relation to young people.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay in Parliament an annual report containing a summary of the concerns raised by counsellors and setting out the actions proposed or taken to address them. As colleagues will be aware, from time to time we have discussed the use of polygraph tests and how the Government plan to use them in the future. It is a contentious issue and one that we must keep under regular scrutiny. The reason that we specify that there should be a counsellor present when the person undergoing the polygraph is under 25 is in response to the evidence that has already been presented to this Committee that there is a difference in maturity between those under 25 and those over 25. That is why we believe that this extra level of safeguarding—this is a safeguarding issue—is important. I would prefer that we were too cautious and that we focused on ensuring that people undergoing a polygraph test have the appropriate measures in place to provide a sense of trust in the process than that we were not cautious enough and did not put any protective measures in place.
This is a reasonable new clause, with the safeguarding of young people at its heart. I hope that the Minister will be able to recognise what a positive change it would make. Perhaps this time he will also recognise that younger people are different, and that he and we have a duty to protect them.
Chris Philp
It is worth reminding the Committee that the purpose of using polygraphs in this context, rather like the monitoring of licence conditions that we discussed earlier in our proceedings, is simply to seek to prompt new disclosures that might otherwise not happen, or to elicit an indication that might suggest that further investigation by the relevant authority should be undertaken. The purpose of using polygraphs is nothing more nor less than to achieve those very limited objectives.
The provisions of the new clause might be somewhat beyond the scope of the Bill, because it would apply not just to the people we are talking about here, but to sex offenders where polygraphs are used. When the Domestic Abuse Bill receives Royal Assent—it had its Third Reading last night—it would apply to domestic abuse offenders as well, so the scope is significantly beyond just terrorism.
The central point of the new clause is to ensure is that people under the age of 25 have some kind of counsellor present during a polygraph test. The main assurance I can give the Committee and the shadow Minister is the fact that, as we heard from Professor Grubin in his compelling evidence, the people who administer the polygraph tests are highly trained. The regulations that we already use in relation to sex offenders, and that are likely to form the basis of the regulations here, require high levels of training and quality assurance for those who administer the tests. They are expert people who are selected and trained very carefully, and they use their powers and authority in a carefully managed and circumspect manner. I hope the fact that the person who administers the test is well trained and carefully regulated gives the Committee and the shadow Minister confidence that the proposed additional measure of having a counsellor present is an extra level of protection that is essentially nugatory, bearing in mind the expertise of the person doing the test in the first place.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister, apart from the fact that he does not think the safeguarding is necessary, has just made a grand speech in support of my amendment. He has recognised very clearly that, although there may be experts, there are issues that need to be addressed. He actually talked about how the scope of the amendment would go far beyond the issues covered in the Bill. That is a good thing. Why should young sex offenders or young offenders covered by the Domestic Abuse Bill not also have the protection of having a counsellor present at their session? I will not push the new clause to a vote, but I believe that the Minister needs to start to focus very specifically on young people. We will return to the issue of young people on Report, because the Minister seems to dismiss the fact that a small number of young people are different. He does not recognise the difference. We will withdraw the new clause for now, but we will most certainly return to this issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
TPIMs: drug testing measure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 42 adds a new drug testing measure to schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011. A TPIM subject will be required to submit to drug testing by way of providing a relevant sample. Under the clause, testing is limited to testing for the presence of specified class A and class B drugs. These drugs are the same as the class A and class B drugs specified in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The definition of “permitted sample” sets out an exhaustive list of the non-intimate samples that may be taken, mirroring the definition of “non-intimate sample” in section 65 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Drug testing under the clause may be carried out only by a constable at a police station, but the clause contains a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing additional or alternative testers and places of testing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
TPIMs: provision of information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 43 amends an existing measure and inserts a new measure into schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011 to allow the Secretary of State to require the TPIM subject to provide additional information.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Additional offences attracting notification requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 44 amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 by adding a breach of TPIM notice and a breach of a temporary exclusion order to the list of terrorism offences that attract registered terrorist offender notification requirements. That ensures that individuals convicted of those offences on or after the day that the Bill comes into force will be subject to registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison. That will support the police to manage the ongoing risk posed by such individuals, and to take mitigating action as is necessary to protect the public.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in terrorism cases
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 45 introduces schedule 12, which amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to allow the police to make a direct application to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order in terrorist-related cases. That will streamline the application process and is intended to support an increased use of SCPOs in the circumstances I have just described.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 46
Serious crime prevention orders: review of operation of police powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 46 requires the Secretary of State to review the operation of the changes to the Serious Crime Act 2007 made by clause 45, and to publish a report on the outcome.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 7th July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2020 - (7 Jul 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good afternoon. I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, that we are not allowed tea or coffee in the Committee room, and that we are asked to respect the social distancing guidelines. Hansard would really appreciate it if Members could send electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. I think that is all the preliminaries.
I have been advised that the intention is to sit into the evening, possibly until around 7 pm. If we do that, I propose suspending the Committee at around 4.30 pm for about half an hour. Obviously, the progress we make and the speed at which we move is in the hands of Committee members.
Clause 47
Persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism: timing of independent review
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 47, page 40, line 17, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (support for persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) for the words from ‘within the period’ to the end substitute ‘by 1 July 2021’.”.
This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy, which will have to report by 1 July 2021.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I know that, over your distinguished years in this House, you have taken a keen interest in home affairs, so it is particularly appropriate for you to chair this session.
I said on Second Reading that, as well as what in the Bill, we are concerned about what it does not contain. The Government have missed a real opportunity to expound upon their wider strategy for tackling extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. This is most acutely felt in the proposal, in effect, to remove the statutory deadline for a review of the Prevent strategy that was announced some 19 months ago. We know that Prevent has been a crucial part of this country’s counter-terrorism strategy. In giving evidence to the Committee, Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques said:
“Prevent is a critically important part of our role; it is absolutely vital. It is controversial, and has been controversial, but we engage in it, we operate, and we protect the public through Prevent every day.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 25-26, Q66.]
I find myself in full agreement with all that, because it is a vital tool and also, as the ACC acknowledged, one that has an element of controversy, or certainly dispute, around it.
It is hugely disappointing—not, I must add, solely to Opposition Members, but to civic society and, crucially, to those dedicated individuals who deliver the policy on the frontline—to now see a real lack of purpose and clarity regarding the programme’s direction under this Government. The independent review was legally bound to report to the House by 12 August this year, but it is obvious that this deadline is going to be missed, resulting in a further lack of clarity and, sadly, I suspect, a further question mark around the credibility of the programme itself. To make matters worse, the Bill now actively seeks to remove any deadline at all.
The independent review was announced last January— 19 months ago—following a long-running campaign by Opposition Members and civic society, but it has since been delayed and postponed. We believed then, and we believe now, that a wide-ranging, robust review is the right approach. By now, that review should have been finished and reported to Ministers. In fact, that should have happened two months ago; if anything, the Minister should now be preparing to come before the House to give the Government’s response to it.
Frankly, it begs a question about competency at the Home Office that things have been allowed to get to the present stage. We would of course have been willing to accept mitigations that might have been needed because of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on tight deadlines. However, we have already had dithering and false starts over the period of the review. The fact that the Government are now seeking to remove the statutory deadline, and leaving little indication of when we are to expect completion, leaves the explanations that we have had to date from them with little or no validity.
The Government have said that they would like the report to be completed by next summer; in that case, why not accept my amendment and put that on the face of the Bill? I do not think that I am being unreasonable in saying that we are allowing the Government a year from now—19 months into the process already—by which time it should have reported. We are being constructive in granting another year, and I do not think that it is reasonable for the Government to respond, “Well, you’ll just have to take our word for it.” I am afraid that we have not been able to rely on the Government to meet previous deadlines. The amendment would reinstate the statutory deadline for an independent review of Prevent by 1 July.
As I stressed on Second Reading, the introduction of the Bill before the Prevent review under the 2019 Act has even reported makes it clear what a quantity of time has been wasted. Lord Carlile was initially appointed to lead the review, but he stood down. That is important. I have huge respect for him. I have spoken to him in preparing for the Bill Committee and he has an exceptionally valuable contribution to make to the debate. Lord Carlile’s having to stand down from the review was nothing to do with his integrity or ability; it was to do with the appointment process. It is important that the Opposition say that and make it clear. It was unfortunate and a pity; it was also avoidable. I hope that the Government have learned lessons from that about putting robust mechanisms in place for the appointment of independent reviewers of something that is as controversial and critical as Prevent. I felt that it was important to say that we thank Lord Carlile for the work that he did. We also thank Lord Anderson and the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, for the work that they do.
It is not beyond the bounds of reason, but the Minister cannot see that the amendment is constructive. It it would simply put into the Bill something that he says the Government would like to do, which is to report by next summer. We need some clarity about it. We need to end the continuing speculation about Prevent, which threatens to undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the programme. We need some coherence and surety about its centrality to the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy. The best way to get that is for the Government to commit to completing the review, not a month or even six months from now, but a year from now. That is eminently doable and reasonable.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I agree entirely with the points that the shadow Minister made about the importance of the Prevent review. It is a critical assessment, which the Government welcome, and we look forward to receiving it. As the hon. Member for St Helens North said, the original deadline, set out in previous legislation, was August this year. To state the obvious, that deadline will be missed. The two reasons for that are, first, the coronavirus epidemic, and, secondly, the resignation of Lord Carlile, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned.
Lord Carlile was appointed last summer, so he would have had a year to do his job, but unfortunately he stepped down in December owing to legal challenges about the manner of his appointment. I am able to confirm that a full and open competition is being run for a replacement. The closing date for applications was 22 June—a couple of weeks ago—and the applications will be assessed by an independent panel. I hope that gives the shadow Minister the assurance he sought on questions of process.
Given that the process of appointing Lord Carlile’s successor has not yet concluded because the application deadline was only a couple of weeks ago, completing the review will be challenging, but we want it to be done by the summer of next year, as the shadow Minister says. We would like to see it completed by August 2021, and that is the objective that the new chairman or chairwoman will be given. However, to put the deadline in primary legislation risks repeating the mistakes that we made previously: a deadline was set out in the statute, and for reasons that were not foreseeable at the time—first the resignation of Lord Carlile, and secondly, the coronavirus epidemic—it became impossible to meet that deadline. If unforeseeable circumstances arise again and something unexpected happens that causes another delay, we do not want to fall foul of a statutory deadline that requires primary legislation to correct.
The obligation to complete the review remains in statute. It is a statutory obligation that must be fulfilled, and that remains, but putting a deadline on it as we did before risks our falling into the same trap twice. I hope that the shadow Minister will accept the clear statement of intention to get this done by August next year. The applications were taken in an open process, and they will be assessed by an independent panel, so the process issues will not re-arise. Our commitment is absolute. On the obligation to put this in statute, the deadline could be problematic if something unforeseen happens again.
Conor McGinn
Unusually in our discussions, I cannot accept the Minister’s explanation. I do not think an explanation has been given for the delay between Lord Carlile’s standing down and the beginning of the recruitment process for a new independent chair, which could have predated the coronavirus pandemic. Given one would expect that some preparatory work was done in the period that Lord Carlile was in post, which would inform the new chair’s review, any suggestion that it might not be completed by next summer is hugely concerning.
The fundamental point is that we have been reasonable about it. We have accepted some of what the Government have said about wanting to do this properly, wanting to ensure it is fully independent, and wanting to respect the ongoing recruitment process, but as for giving it from now until 1 July next year to ensure it reports before Parliament goes into summer recess, to give surety and clarity to the wider public, to civic society who take an interest in such matters, and fundamentally to the people we charge with carrying out Prevent and implementing its strategies on the ground, I do not think they should have to wait any longer than is necessary. So I am afraid that, despite what the Minister says, I feel obliged to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
We now come to a series of relatively technical parts of the Bill and various technical Government amendments. I will go over these as quickly as I decently and reasonably can.
Clause 48 introduces schedule 13, which contains consequential and related amendments to bring the Bill’s provisions into effect. It will enable the Bill to function as intended across the legislative frameworks in the United Kingdom, as well as introducing several additional required measures related to the Terrorist Offenders (Restrictions of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions we have discussed already.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13
Consequential and related amendments
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 10, in schedule 13, page 102, line 22, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
6A In section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners to make the best use of the places available for detention, subject to certain exceptions)—
(a) in subsection (1)(a), after “protection” insert “, a serious terrorism sentence”;
(b) in subsection (1A), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(ca) references to a serious terrorism sentence are to a sentence under section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code;”.
Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)
6B In section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (power of courts to order hospital admission etc)—
(a) in subsection (1A), for “273, 274” substitute “268A, 273, 274, 282A”;
(b) in subsection (1B), after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) a sentence falls to be imposed under section 268A or 282A of that Code if it is required by section 268B(2) or 282B(2) of that Code and the court is not of the opinion there mentioned;”.”
This amendment excludes an offender serving a serious terrorism sentence from the possibility of early release under the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and provides that a requirement to impose a serious terrorism sentence does not prevent a court from ordering the offender’s detention in hospital in cases where the offender suffers from a mental disorder.
Chris Philp
Amendment 10 amends section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and it is to exclude the serious terrorism sentence in England and Wales from the power of the Secretary of State to make an order to release certain prisoners, as may be necessary in emergency circumstances. Amendment 11 amends section 264 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, so that a serious terrorism sentence for those aged between 18 and 20, which is a sentence to detention, shall be for the purpose of the section considered as a sentence of imprisonment. These are all consequential to clauses that we have debated previously.
Amendment 12 is in several parts, but essentially it amends section 15 of the sentencing code, which provides for committal of dangerous offenders to the Crown court so the serious terrorism sentence is included and the court has power to commit. The purpose of the second part of the amendment is to ensure that the principal guidelines duty, which requires the court to consider any relevant guidelines that apply under section 59 of the sentencing code, is amended to include a reference at subsection (2) to the serious terrorism sentence, clarifying that the duty is subject to the provisions of the serious terrorism sentence that we debated a few days ago. The purpose of the third part of the amendment is to amend section 120 of the sentencing code, which provides the Crown court with the power to fine an offender instead of, or in addition to, any other sentence in disposal.
Amendment 13 inserts a reference to the serious terrorism sentence into section 262(3) of the sentencing code, referring the court to section 399 of that code.
As you will have gathered, Mr McCabe, these are technical or consequential amendments to various measures we debated earlier in the Committee’s proceedings.
Amendment 10 agreed to.
Amendments made: 11, in schedule 13, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“(9) In section 264(7) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of provisions about consecutive sentences of imprisonment to sentences of detention), for “or 266” substitute “, 266 or 268A”.”
This amendment ensures that the provisions in section 264 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (dealing with treatment of consecutive sentences) will apply in relation to serious terrorism sentences including such sentences of detention in a young offender institution.
Amendment 12, in schedule 13, page 103, line 23, at end insert—
“(1A) In section 15 (committal for sentence of dangerous adult offenders)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—
(1A) This section also applies where—
(a) on the summary trial of an offence specified in Schedule 17A triable either way a person is convicted of the offence, and
(b) the court is of the opinion that the circumstances are such that a serious terrorism sentence (see section 268A or 282A) may be required to be imposed.”;
(b) in subsection (6), for “a specified offence” substitute “an offence”.
(1B) In section 59(2) (provisions to which duty to follow sentencing guidelines is subject), after paragraph (g) insert—
“(ga) sections 268B and 282B (requirement to impose serious terrorism sentence);”.
(1C) In section 61 (sentencing guidelines: extended sentences and life sentences)—
(a) in the heading, after “extended sentences” insert “, serious terrorism sentences”;
(b) after subsection (2) insert—
(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where a court is required to impose a serious terrorism sentence for an offence.
(2B) In determining the appropriate custodial term for the purposes of section 268C(2)(b) or 282C(2)(b) (serious terrorism sentences: appropriate custodial term exceeding 14-year minimum), section 60 applies to the court as it applies to a court in determining the sentence for an offence.”
(1D) In section 120(2)(a) (exceptions to the general power to fine offender convicted on indictment), after sub-paragraph (ii) (but before the final “or”) insert—
(iia) paragraph (ba) (serious terrorism sentences),”.”
This amendment makes amendments to certain provisions in the Sentencing Code, which are consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence.
Amendment 13, in schedule 13, page 104, line 10, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 262(3) (circumstances in which detention in young offender institution required), after “mentioned in” insert “—
(a) section 399(ba) (serious terrorism sentences);
(b) ”.”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes an amendment to section 262 of the Sentencing Code consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 13, page 104, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes an unnecessary consequential amendment.
Chris Philp
The purpose of the amendments is to remove unnecessary consequential amendments, which included a reference to a serious terrorism sentence in sections 273 and 274 of the sentencing code, which was advanced when the Bill was presented to Parliament. Paragraph (a) is removed to ensure legal clarity and the effect is to remove these amendments from the Bill.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Amendments made: 15, schedule 13, page 105, line 6, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes an unnecessary consequential amendment.
Amendment 16, schedule 13, page 106, line 11, at end insert—
“Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (c. 53)
10A In section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it forms part of the law of England and Wales (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—
(a) in subsection (1)(d), after ‘or section 250’ insert ‘or 252A’;
(b) in subsection (8)(f), before ‘of the Sentencing Code’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
This amendment and amendments 17, 18, 20 to 22, 24 and 27 to 29 add consequential amendments to ensure that young offenders given the new type of sentence introduced by clause 22(2) are treated in the same way, for various statutory purposes, as those serving an ordinary sentence of youth detention.
Amendment 17, schedule 13page 106, line 23, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33)
12A In section 25(5) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (restriction of bail for certain offenders: interpretation), in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘the relevant enactments’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 18, schedule 13, page 106, line 25, at beginning insert—
“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 38(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (youth justice services to be provided by local authorities), in paragraph (i), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
(3) In section 41(5)(i) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (accommodation that may be provided under agreement with the Youth Justice Board), in sub-paragraph (ii), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 19, schedule 13, page 106, line 25, leave out “of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 18.
Amendment 20, schedule 13, page 106, line 32, at end insert—
“Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c. 43)
13A (1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 62(5) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences in relation to which electronic monitoring conditions may be imposed on release), in paragraph (d), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(3) In section 62A(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from power to require imposition of electronic monitoring condition), in paragraph (b), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(4) In section 64(5) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences in relation to which drug testing requirement may be imposed on release), in paragraph (d), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(5) In section 64A(8) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (power to require attendance at drug testing appointment: interpretation), in paragraph (c) of the definition of ‘sentence of imprisonment’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 21, schedule 13, page 106, line 36, at end insert—
“Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
14A In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), in paragraph (h), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 22, schedule 13, page 107, line 21, at end insert—
“(6A) In section 263(4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences of detention to which provision about concurrent terms applies), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 23, schedule 13, page 107, line 22, leave out from “264” to “after” on line 23 and insert “(as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (consecutive sentences)—
(a) in subsection (6A)(a),”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 24.
Amendment 24, schedule 13, page 107, line 24, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (7), after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
(8) In section 327(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences attracting risk assessment measures for sexual or violent offenders), in paragraph (b)(v), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
15A In section 45(1) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (victims’ representations and information: interpretation), in the definition of ‘relevant sentence’, after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 25, schedule 13, page 107, line 26, at beginning insert—
“(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 27.
Amendment 26, schedule 13, page 107, line 26, leave out “of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 27.
Amendment 27, schedule 13, page 107, line 29, at end insert—
“(3) In section 213(3A) (as substituted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of section 253 of the Sentencing Code), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.
(4) In section 227(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (minimum sentence for certain firearms offences), after ‘250’ insert ‘or 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 28, schedule 13, page 107, line 36, at end insert—
“Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
17A In section 45(1)(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (sentences attracting notification requirements), after paragraph (via) (but before the final ‘or’) insert—
‘(vib) detention under section 252A of the Sentencing Code (special sentence for terrorist offenders of particular concern aged under 18),’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 29, schedule 13, page 110, line 36, at end insert—
“Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991/1505)
18A In regulation 5(1) of the Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (custodial sentences disapplying section 25 of the Children Act 1989), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Youth Justice Board for England and Wales Order 2000 (S.I. 2000/1160)
18B In article 4(2) of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales Order 2000 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (functions exercisable by the Youth Justice Board concurrently with the Secretary of State)—
(a) in paragraph (a), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’;
(b) in paragraph (m)(ii), before ‘or 259’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/223)
18C In regulation 1(3) of the Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (interpretation of Regulations), in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘penalty’, after ‘250,’ insert ‘252A,’.
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/794)
18D In regulation 160(5) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from disqualification for imprisonment: interpretation), in paragraph (c), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/379)
18E In regulation 96(6) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2013 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (exceptions from disqualification for imprisonment: interpretation), in paragraph (c), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.
Children (Secure Accommodation) (Wales) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 2015/1988 (W.298))
18F In regulation 14(a) of the Children (Secure Accommodation) (Wales) Regulations 2015 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (sentences of detention disapplying section 119 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014), after ‘250’ insert ‘, 252A’.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Amendment 47, schedule 13, page 110, line 36, at end insert—
“Part 4A
Amendments in relation to sentencing under service law
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (c. 53)
18G (1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5 as it forms part of the law of England and Wales (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—
(a) in subsection (1)(d), after ‘or section 209’ insert ‘or 224B’;
(b) in subsection (8), in paragraph (f) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
18H In section 32(1A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (sentences excluded from early release of prisoners to make the best use of the places available for detention), in paragraph (ca) (inserted by Part 2 of this Schedule), at the end insert ‘, including a sentence passed as a result of section 219ZA of the Armed Forces Act 2006’.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)
18I (1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 38(4) (youth justice services to be provided by local authorities), in paragraph (i), for ‘or 222’ substitute ‘, 222 or 224B’.
(3) In section 41(5)(i) (accommodation that may be provided under agreement with the Youth Justice Board), in sub-paragraph (ii), for ‘or 222’ substitute ‘, 222 or 224B’.
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c. 43)
18J (1) The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 62(5) (sentences in relation to which electronic monitoring conditions may be imposed on release), in paragraph (g), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
(3) In section 62A(4) (exceptions from power to require imposition of electronic monitoring condition), in paragraph (c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(4) In section 64(5) (sentences in relation to which drug testing requirement may be imposed on release), in paragraph (g), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
(5) In section 64A(8) (power to require attendance at drug testing appointment: interpretation), in paragraph (f) of the definition of ‘sentence of imprisonment’, after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
18K In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), in paragraph (h), for ‘or 218’ substitute ‘, 218 or 224B’.
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)
18L In section 237(1B) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (service sentences to be treated as equivalent sentences in England and Wales) —
(a) omit the ‘and’ before paragraph (e);
(b) at the end of that paragraph insert—
‘(f) references to a sentence of detention under section 252A of the Sentencing Code include a sentence of detention under section 224B of that Act;
(g) references to a sentence under section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code include such a sentence passed as a result of section 219ZA of that Act.’
Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)
18M (1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 188 (power to pass consecutive custodial sentences), in subsections (2)(b) and (4)(b), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(3) In section 209 (sentence of detention for offender aged under 18), after subsection (7) insert—
‘(8) This section does not apply if the Court Martial is required to impose a sentence of detention under section 224B.’
(4) In section 210 (place and conditions of youth detention), after ‘209’, in each place it occurs (including in the heading), insert ‘or 224B’.
(5) In section 211(4) (cases in which detention and training order not required), after ‘221A’ insert ‘, 224B’.
(6) In section 213(3A) (as substituted by the Sentencing Act 2020 and as amended by Part 4 of this Schedule) (application of section 253 of the Sentencing Code), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(7) In section 219A(1) (availability of extended sentence for certain violent, sexual or terrorism offences), after paragraph (d) (but before the final ‘and’) insert—
‘(da) the court is not required—
(i) by section 268B(2) of the Sentencing Code (as applied by section 219ZA(4) of this Act) to impose a serious terrorism sentence of detention in a young offender institution for the offence or for an offence associated with it;
(ii) by section 282B(2) of the Sentencing Code (as applied by section 219ZA(7) of this Act) to impose a serious terrorism sentence of imprisonment for the offence or for an offence associated with it;’.
(8) In section 223 (meaning of ‘the required opinion’)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) ‘The required opinion’ for the purposes of section 219ZA is the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of—
(a) further serious terrorism offences or other specified offences; or
(b) further acts or omissions that would be serious terrorism offences or other specified offences if committed in England or Wales.’;
(b) in subsection (4) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), after the definition of ‘serious harm’ insert—
‘“serious terrorism offence” has the meaning given by that section;’.
(9) In section 224A (special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern)—
(a) in subsection (1) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), in paragraph (d)—
(i) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after sub-paragraph (ii) insert ‘, or”;
(b) after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Where an offence is found to have been committed over a period of 2 or more days, or at some time during a period of 2 or more days, it must be taken for the purposes of subsection (1A) to have been committed on the last of those days.’
(10) In section 227(3) (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (minimum sentence for certain firearms offences), for the words from ‘, the reference’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the reference to a sentence of detention under section 250 of that Code is to be read as a reference to a sentence of detention under section 209 of this Act, and
(b) the reference to a sentence of detention under section 252A of that Code is to be read as a reference to a sentence of detention under section 224B of this Act.’
(11) In section 238(6) (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (offences aggravated by terrorist connection)—
(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (a);
(b) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) the reference in subsection (4)(c) to an offence not specified in Schedule A1 includes a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is not specified in Schedule A1, and’;
(c) in paragraph (b), for “(1)” substitute ‘(5)(b)’.
(12) In section 246 (crediting of time in custody), in subsection (6)(a), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(13) In section 256(1)(c) (cases where pre-sentence report to be considered), after ‘219(1),’ insert ‘219ZA(1)(d),’.
(14) In section 260 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (discretionary custodial sentences: general restrictions) —
(a) in subsection (1)—
(i) for ‘This section applies’ substitute ‘Subsection (2) applies;
(ii) after paragraph (c) insert—
(b) in subsection (4B), before paragraph (a) insert—
‘(za) section 268C(2) or 282C(2) of the Sentencing Code, as applied by section 219ZA of this Act (serious terrorism sentences for offenders aged 18 or over),’.
(15) In section 261 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020) (length of discretionary custodial sentences: general), in subsection (1), after paragraph (b) insert—
‘(ba) section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code as a result of section 219ZA (serious terrorism sentences),’.
(16) In section 262A (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020) (application of section 329 of the Sentencing Code)—
(a) after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) In subsection (4A)—
(a) paragraph (a) has effect as if, for “252A”, there were substituted “224B of the Armed Forces Act 2006”;
(b) paragraph (b) has effect as if, after “265”, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006”;
(c) the words after paragraph (b) have effect as if, after “278”, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.’;
(b) after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Subsection (5A) has effect as if, at the end, there were inserted “passed as a result of section 219ZA(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006.’;
(c) in subsection (4)—
(i) after the paragraph (a) treated as substituted in subsection (7) of section 329 of the Sentencing Code insert—
(ii) after the paragraph (d) treated as substituted in subsection (7) of section 329 of the Sentencing Code insert—
(17) In section 374 (interpretation of Act), in the definition of ‘custodial sentence’ (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020), in paragraph (b), for ‘or 221A’ substitute ‘, 221A or 224B’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
18N In paragraph 5(1)(a)(iv) of Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (service sentences of youth detention attracting notification requirements for terrorist offenders), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
Sentencing Act 2020
18O (1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 225 (restriction on consecutive sentences for released prisoners), in subsection (3)(c)(vi), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(3) In section 241 (period of detention and training under detention and training order), in subsections (6)(b)(ii) and (7)(c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(4) In section 248(4) (meaning of ‘relevant sentence of detention’), in paragraph (c), after ‘209’ insert ‘or 224B’.
(5) In Schedule 27 (transitional provision and savings), in paragraph 16(2), for the words from ‘, the reference’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the reference in section 224A(1)(d)(ii) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 to an extended sentence under section 266 or 279 of the Sentencing Code includes a reference to an extended sentence under section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
(b) the reference in section 224B(1)(c)(ii) to an extended sentence of detention under section 254 of the Sentencing Code includes a reference to an extended sentence of detention under section 226B of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.’”
This amendment makes amendments to enactments which are consequential on the provisions of Schedule 8 to the Bill (changes to the sentencing regime under service law corresponding to those made to the sentencing regimes in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland).
Amendment 31, schedule 13, page 116, line 7. at end insert—
“Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 29 (N.I.))
30A In section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (as amended by Part 8 of this Schedule) (length of custodial sentences to be reduced for periods already spent in custody), after ‘Article’ insert ‘13A(6),’.
Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27))
30B In Article 6 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (as amended by Part 8 of this Schedule) (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences), in paragraph (9)(b), after ‘Article’ insert ‘13A(6) or’.
Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1985/595 (N.I. 4))
30C In Article 44(1A) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (sentences requirement to impose which does not prevent making of hospital or guardianship order), in sub-paragraph (c), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24))
30D (1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In Article 2(2) (meaning of expressions), in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, after ‘13(4)(b)’ insert ‘, 13A(6)’.
(3) In Article 4(1) (power to grant absolute or condition discharge subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(4) In Article 10(1) (power to make probation order subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(5) In Article 13(1) (power to make community service order subject to sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
(6) In Article 15(1) (power to make combined probation and community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), after ‘13’ insert ‘, 13A’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
30E In section 45(3) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Northern Irish sentences attracting notification requirements), in paragraph (a), after sub-paragraph (iii) insert—
‘(iiia) a serious terrorism sentence under Article 13A(6) of that Order (offenders under 21 convicted of certain serious terrorist or terrorism-related offences),’.”
This amendment makes amendments to various enactments which are consequential on the introduction of the new serious terrorism sentence in Northern Ireland by clause 7.
Amendment 32, schedule 13, page 117, line 24, at end insert—
“Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 29 (N.I.))
31A In section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (length of custodial sentences to be reduced for periods already spent in custody), after ‘14(5)’ insert ‘or 15A(5)’.
Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27))
31B In Article 6 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences), in paragraph (9)(b), after ‘centre’ insert ‘, a sentence of detention under Article 15A(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008’.
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24))
31C (1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows.
(2) In Article 2(2) (meaning of expressions), in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘custodial sentence’, for ‘or 14(5)’ substitute ‘, 14(5) or 15A(5)’.
(3) In Article 4(1) (power to grant absolute or condition discharge subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(4) In Article 10(1) (power to make probation order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(5) In Article 13(1) (power to make community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
(6) In Article 15(1) (power to make combined probation and community service order subject to certain sentencing requirements), for ‘or 14’ substitute ‘, 14 or 15A’.
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
31D In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (application of notification requirements and orders to young offenders), after paragraph (l) of that section as it forms part of the law of England and Wales and Scotland, and after paragraph (m) of that section as it forms part of the law of Northern Ireland, insert—
‘(n) a sentence of detention under Article 15A(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008’.
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)
31E In section 45(3) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Northern Irish sentences attracting notification requirements), in paragraph (a), after sub-paragraph (iv) insert—
‘(iva) a sentence under Article 15A(5) of that Order (offenders under 21 convicted of certain terrorist or terrorism-related offences),’.”
This amendment adds consequential amendments to ensure that young offenders given the new type of sentence introduced in Northern Ireland by clause 24 are treated in the same way, for various statutory purposes, as those serving an ordinary sentence of youth detention.
Amendment 33, schedule 13, page 119, line 34, at end insert—
“Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 (c. 21 (N.I.))
35 (1) In section 55(2) of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 (prisoners who may be removed early from prison if liable to removal from the United Kingdom), for the words from ‘serving an’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) who is serving an extended custodial sentence under Article 14 of the 2008 Order, or
(b) to whom Article 20A of that Order applies.’
(2) In the case of a person—
(a) who has been removed from prison under section 55(2) of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 before the amendment made by sub-paragraph (1) comes into force, and
(b) to whom Article 20A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 applies,
subsection (3) of that section continues to apply to the person despite that amendment, but as if for the words ‘has served the requisite custodial period’ there were substituted ‘becomes entitled to be released in accordance with Article 20A of the 2008 Order’.”
This amendment excludes terrorist prisoners subject to the restricted regime for early release in Northern Ireland introduced by clause 30 from early removal from prison for the purpose of removal from the United Kingdom.
Amendment 34, schedule 13, page 119, line 34, at end insert—
“Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 (S.R. (N.I.) 2009 No. 82)
36 (1) The Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 are amended as follows.
(2) In rule 2(1) (application of the rules), after ‘Articles 18’ insert ‘, 20A’.
(3) In rule 7(2) (persons who may act as representatives of prisoner only with consent of Chief Commissioner), in paragraph (b), for the words from ‘sentenced to’ to the end substitute ‘who —
(i) is on licence having been released under Article 18 or 20A of the 2008 Order, or
(ii) is a person to whom Article 18 or 20A of that Order applies and who is on licence having been released under Article 20 of that Order;’.
(4) In rule 25 (application of rules to recalled life, indeterminate and extended custodial prisoners)—
(a) in the heading after ‘custodial’ insert ‘and terrorist’;
(b) in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘an indeterminate custodial or extended custodial prisoner’s case’ substitute ‘the case of a prisoner who was released on licence under Article 18 or 20A of the 2008 Order’.
(5) In rule 26 (short custodial terms)—
(a) for paragraph (1) substitute—
‘(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where—
(a) the Department of Justice refers to the Commissioners—
(i) the case of an extended custodial prisoner under Article 18 of the 2008 Order, or
(ii) the case of any prisoner under Article 20A of that Order, and
(b) the relevant part of the prisoner’s sentence is less than 26 weeks;
these rules shall apply subject to the modifications made by rule 25(a).’;
(b) after paragraph (2) insert—
‘(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the “relevant part of the sentence”—
(a) in the case of an extended custodial prisoner to whom Article 18 of the 2008 Order applies, means one half of the appropriate custodial term of the sentence as defined by Article 14(4) or 14(6) of that Order;
(b) in the case of a prisoner to whom Article 20A of that Order applies, has the meaning given by paragraph (9) of that Article;
and in determining the length of that part any reduction required by section 26(2) of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 is to be taken into account.’”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes amendments to Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009 which are consequential on the new arrangements for restricted early release of terrorist prisoners provided for in clause 30 of the Bill.
Schedule 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 49
Power to state effect in Sentencing Act 2020 of commencement of amendments made by this Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I will do my best to rouse more enthusiasm for clause 49 than its predecessor, schedule 13, managed to provoke in the Committee. I fear it may be an uphill task.
Clause 49 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the sentencing code to incorporate changes to provisions made by the Bill using the power contained in section 419(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020. It is needed so we can, if required, ensure a consistent approach is taken to the amendment of the code, and the Bill, once enacted.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Power to make further consequential provision
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 50, page 41, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) In the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000—
(a) in section 77 (supplementary and consequential provision), at the end insert—
‘(3) The provision which may be made under subsection (1) in relation to section 61 of this Act (abolition of sentence of detention in young offender institution etc) also includes provision amending or repealing—
(a) any provision of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020,
(b) any provision of an enactment that was inserted or amended by, or by regulations made under, the Counter- Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020’;
(b) in section 78(2) (meaning of ‘enactment’), after ‘in this Part’ insert ‘other than section 77(3)’.”
This enables the power in section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 to make amendments consequential on the abolition by that Act of sentences of detention in young offender institutions to be used to deal with references to such sentences inserted by the provisions of this Bill.
Government amendment 1 enables a power in section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. This power is to make any amendment that arises as a consequence of sentences of detention in a young offender institution being abolished by the Act. Should the DYOI be abolished, the power will be used to deal with references to DYOI sentences inserted by the provisions of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The amendment in the name of the Minister seeks to amend clause 50 to make reference to sections 77 and 61 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. Despite his introduction, it is unclear what the Minister’s intentions really are. As members of the Committee will be aware, sections 59 and 61 of the 2000 Act allow for the abolition of the special sentence for the detention of a young adult in a young offender institution. The explanatory note to the 2000 Act—passed under a Labour Government, mind you—sets out the policy reason behind that:
“it is now widely accepted that 18, and not 21, is the age of”
maturity, and
“there is no logic in having a separate sentence for those aged between 18 and 20 years old, and those aged 21 and over.”
That almost kills my arguments of the last few days—but it does not, because, despite the provisions being in place for two decades, the 2000 Act to which the amendment refers is yet to be implemented. I, for one, am quite happy about that, but it prompts the question of why the Government’s amendment draws on a 20-year-old piece of outdated legislation. What is the Minister’s intention?
In the 20 years since the 2000 Act was passed, a considerable amount of work has been done on the age of maturity, and it is now widely accepted, as I have said on numerous occasions, that 25 is considered by many to be a more suitable age of maturity. As such, it would be deeply concerning if the Government had any ambition at all to enact the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. The impact of doing so would be that offenders as young as 18 would be held in prison alongside adults potentially double their age or more. That could be hugely damaging, not only to the individuals but to the hope of rehabilitation too.
The Minister has provided the Committee with a guarantee that he has no intention of housing young offenders caught up in the provisions in the Bill alongside adult prisoners. Many may see this as a technical matter, but there are some very real dangers, as I have alluded to, and I am sure the Committee would welcome a further reassurance from the Minister that the Government have no intention whatsoever of using the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act to imprison young people alongside adults.s
Chris Philp
I understand this to be a technical amendment to ensure legislative consistency between the Bill and the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. I am not aware of any plans to change the current detention arrangements. I do not believe that the reference is designed to pave the way to do that. It is just a technical amendment to ensure legislative consistency.
Alex Cunningham
Will the Minister be specific? He says he does not think that there is any intention, but it could lead to young people being imprisoned alongside adults. Will he give that assurance to the Committee again? Not understanding or not being aware of something is not good enough.
Chris Philp
I am not the Prisons Minister, I am the Courts Minister, but I am not aware of any plans at all in the Ministry of Justice to change the current detention arrangements. None have been brought to my attention, either generally or in connection with the Bill. I can go and double-check with the Prisons Minister, and I will write to the hon. Gentleman, if he would like me to do that.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 50 gives the Secretary of State the power to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions by regulation, in relation to provisions in the Bill, by secondary instrument.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Extent
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 51 explains the territorial extent of the provisions in the Bill, which we debated quite extensively, because many of the clauses applied separately to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, owing to the different legal systems in the three jurisdictions. The Bill contains provisions that extend to all of those areas. Provisions that change existing legislation are applicable only to the territories to which the existing legislation extends. Certain provisions can also, in some circumstances, be extended to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, as per the powers specified in this measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Commencement
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 52, page 42, line 8, at end insert—
“, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zf)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 4 to 6.
Government amendment 8.
Chris Philp
These are more technical amendments. Amendment 2 allows the changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clause 21 and schedule 6 of the Bill to apply to the service courts, which we debated earlier. Amendment 8 also allows changes made by the Bill to the Sentencing Act, which come into force on Royal Assent or two months later, to apply to the service courts. Amendment 4 allows changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clause 1 and schedule 1 of the Bill, which apply to the service courts as well as civilian courts, to be brought into force separately if necessary for the service courts. Amendment 5 should be read in conjunction with amendment 6 to allow changes being made to the Sentencing Act by clauses 11 and 15 to 18 of the Bill, which apply to the service courts as well as civilian courts, to be brought into force separately for the service courts.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 52, page 42, line 23, leave out sub-paragraph (vii) and insert—
“(vii) Parts 8 and 9 of that Schedule.”
This amendment and amendment 7 correct a drafting error and provide that Part 8 of Schedule 13, which makes amendments consequential on clause 24 of the Bill, comes into force at the same time as clause 24.
Chris Philp
Amendment 3 is designed to correct drafting relating to the early commencement of the Bill’s provisions in clause 52, and amendment 7 is designed to correct a drafting error at clause 52 of the Bill, again concerned with commencement provisions.
Amendment 3 agreed to.
Amendments made: 4, in clause 52, page 42, line 26, at end insert
“, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(za)”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
5, in clause 52, page 42, line 30, leave out “18” and insert “10”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
6, in clause 52, page 42, line 30, at end insert—
“(ea) section 11, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zb);
(eb) sections 12 to 14;
(ec) section 15, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zc);
(ed) section 16, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(zd);
(ee) sections 17 and 18, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(ze);”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 8.
7, in clause 52, page 42, line 46, leave out sub-paragraph (iii) and insert—
“(iii) Part 7 of that Schedule.”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 3.
8, in clause 52, page 43, line 2, at end insert—
“(za) section 1 (and Schedule 1), as they have effect for the purposes of section 69 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zb) section 11, as it has effect for the purposes of section 323 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 261A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zc) section 15, as it has effect for the purposes of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code as applied by sections 219A and 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zd) section 16, as it has effect for the purposes of section 256 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(ze) sections 17 and 18, as they have effect for the purposes of sections 268 and 281 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 219A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);
(zf) section 21 (and Schedule 6), as they have effect for the purposes of Schedule 13 to the Sentencing Code as applied by section 224A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (as amended by the Sentencing Act 2020);”
This amendment provides for certain of the sentencing provisions of the Bill to be brought into force by regulations so far as they apply for the purposes of service law.
9, in clause 52, page 43, line 4, at end insert—
“(c) Part 4A of Schedule 13 (and section 48 to the extent that it relates to that Part).”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides for the new Part 4A of Schedule 13 (see amendment 47) to come into force by regulations made by the Secretary of State (reflecting the position for the provisions to which the
Clause 52, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 53 gives the shortened title for the Bill when it is cited, which will be the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2020.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Review of deradicalization programmes in prisons
“(1) Within one year of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a comprehensive review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on the effectiveness and availability of deradicalization programmes in prisons.
(2) The review must include an assessment of the following matters—
(a) the effectiveness of existing programmes at reducing radicalization and terrorist offending;
(b) how individuals are assessed for their suitability for a programme;
(c) the number of individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme;
(d) the number of individuals assessed as not requiring a place on a programme;
(e) the average length of time individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme have to wait to start a programme; and
(f) whether there is sufficient capacity and resource to meet demand for places on deradicalization programmes in prisons.
(3) The review must consider how the provisions of this Act have affected the matters listed in subsection (2).”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause requires a review of the impact of the Act on deradicalization programmes in prisons.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
We have talked in great detail about the many provisions in the Bill, but we have also talked about the many missing provisions, best evidenced by my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North, who discussed Prevent and the need for an end date for the report on its effectiveness to come into place.
One key area where we could do better in is the deradicalisation programmes in prison. While the minimum sentencing for terror offences has been increased, there is a suggestion that we could simply be delaying inevitable further offences unless we take action to use the offender’s time in prison to deradicalise them. We can only do that if there is an effective deradicalisation programme in place.
We have heard evidence that few people convicted of terrorism offences go on to commit further crimes, but some do. We have also heard evidence that these programmes are not entirely fit for purpose; perhaps, with these new longer minimum sentences, they really need a good overhaul. That is why the new clause has been tabled: to ask the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the impact of the provisions of the Bill on the effectiveness and availability of deradicalisation programmes in prison. Perhaps the Government could just tag it on to the Prevent inquiry and get two for the price of one.
The impact assessment for the Bill claims that longer incapacitation of terrorist offenders will enable
“more time in which to support their disengagement and rehabilitation through the range of tailored interventions available while they are in prison.”
However, the amount of time during which individuals have access to deradicalisation programmes in prison is not a key factor in determining their success or otherwise; rather, it is the effectiveness and the availability of the programmes in prison that has come under increasing scrutiny.
We need to know what is happening in prisons. What programmes are being delivered, who are they delivered to, who are they delivered by, when are offenders undertaking the programmes, how many deradicalisation programmes one offender in for a minimum sentence is expected to cover, and how is the success of programmes delivered? Those are just some of the questions that such a review would look into.
We need to understand the effectiveness of the programmes, where they work, where they do not and what can be improved. Currently, the main deradicalisation programme in prisons is called the Healthy Identity Intervention, which delivers one-to-one, individually tailored sessions. It is supplemented by the Desistance and Disengagement Programme, which can be offered to both prisoners and those released on licence.
Neither the Healthy Identity Intervention or the Desistance and Disengagement Programme courses have undergone any form of evaluation process to date, so perhaps the Minister will agree that a formal review is long overdue. It is a key part of our justice system, and rehabilitation should be at the centre of that, because people are released back into society. Putting someone back into society who has not been rehabilitated simply increases their chances of reoffending.
I remember the evidence from some of our witnesses—in particular from Mark Fairhurst who, at the start of his evidence, spoke of the role of key workers, the Parole Board and a range of professionals working with the offender. It was all very positive and very much to be welcomed. He went on, however, to say that an extended sentence, where an offender serves their whole sentence in prison,
“incentivises people not to behave correctly or to go on deradicalisation courses.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 69, Q145.]
All the more reason why Ministers should understand more about how the deradicalisation system works for the offender and for society.
I would particularly like to see data on the average length of time for which an individual has been assessed as needing to undergo a deradicalisation programme before they actually undertake it. I am concerned that in such cases time is of the essence. The offender is likely to feel incredibly hostile to a system that has just imprisoned them. There cannot be an indefinite wait for them to be put on to a programme if they are willing to do it. Not getting on with it just allows more time for further radicalisation and mistrust of the legal and justice system.
In addition to that evidence, Professor Andrew Silke, who has studied efforts to deradicalise those in prison for terrorism offences, has reported that some prisoners who said that they were willing to participate in a programme were never put on one before their release. That could easily be rectified. We cannot and must not take chances. We need to ensure that the programmes are readily available as and when they are needed, and that there are no delays due to capacity issues or availability.
Where insufficient resources or structures are found in prisons, the Secretary of State must take action to resolve that. They must provide the resources to ensure that it is not a lottery and that no risks or gambles are being taken on the rehabilitation of a terror offender. It is really surprising that the Bill has nothing to say on what measures will be taken to ensure that effective deradicalisation programmes are available to individuals in prisons who need them. Arguably, simply by increasing the length of time that people spend in custody the provisions of the Bill risk further alienating them and giving them grounds for grievance against the authorities, placing them at greater risk of radicalisation.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
I apologise for not being present to hear my hon. Friend’s earlier speech, which I gather was excellent, as I was in the House. Does he agree that deradicalisation programmes are even more important for young offenders? The data and evidence produced over the years and provided to this Committee shows that younger offenders—certainly under-25s—are more susceptible to influences, so deradicalisation, when done effectively, is even more effective in reducing reoffending when young offenders are eventually released.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. I have no doubt that she is correct. Young people are far more able to change their ways and benefit from the programmes. It is therefore essential that these programmes are in place. That is why I have spent most of my time in the past couple of weeks talking specifically about young people and how they differ from older people.
We all agree that rehabilitation is desirable and preferred, and a core cog in our justice system. Let us commit ourselves not only to talk about it, but to learn about it and ensure we deliver an effective system. The evidence so far to the Committee has suggested that it is not always effective. We need to deliver on that.
I am hopeful that the Minister will accept that a review is needed and that we need a greater understanding, just as we will have with the Prevent strategy. We need that greater understanding to ensure that the terror offenders have the support—and it is support—that they need in prison, so that when they are released into society, they can be the sort of citizens that we need them to be.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this extremely important issue. As we heard in evidence a couple of weeks ago, most people who come out of prison having served a terrorism sentence do not go on to reoffend, as the shadow Minister said. I recall that the figure we were given was that only 5% to 10% of those prisoners released go on to commit subsequent terrorism offences. Thankfully, that is a low rate of recidivism, although it is very serious when it happens.
The shadow Minister asked why there are not more deradicalisation measures in this legislation. That is because most of our deradicalisation work and programmes are done operationally inside the Prison and Probation Service; they are not specified in legislation. Let me say, however, that a great deal is being done in this area. The Healthy Identity Intervention programme is one area to which the shadow Minister has referred.
We have doubled the number of specialist probation officers. As per earlier legislation, we are creating a new counter-terrorism assessment and intervention centre, set up as part of the new counter-terrorism StepUp! programme; it represents a major shift in our capability to intervene with terrorist offenders, including young terrorist offenders in exactly the way the shadow Minister was discussing earlier.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister was in full flow and doing very well, but I am interested in the statement he made that the Government have already doubled the probation capability in this area. I invite him to explain what he meant by that statement and say what the timescale is for this new centre, which sounds as if it is on the money.
Chris Philp
The proposals that have been made will double the number of probation officers who specialise in counter-terrorism and deradicalisation work. The new counter-terrorism assessment intervention centre will do the work I was just describing, including identifying the risk people pose and getting the right specialists to work with them to reduce their risk while they are in prison. That has to be the right approach. That is a significant change and evolution in the way in which we deal with this particular cohort.
The shadow Minister mentioned the programme that is already in place—the Healthy Identity Intervention programme—which I think has merit as well.
It is a one-to-one programme that supports desistance and disengagement from extremism by targeting the social and psychological drivers of that behaviour. That intervention is delivered by highly trained psychologists and probation officers in prisons, but also—critically—with offenders on licence after they have left prison.
2.45 pm
The work being done already is valuable; the enhanced work via the new counter-terrorism assessment intervention centre that I described will go even further. I hope that illustrates the direction of travel. We want to do more in this area, for the reasons discussed, and ongoing evaluation of that will be part and parcel of the Government’s approach. There will be the normal three-year review of the legislation, of course—I suspect I may make that comment more than once as we discuss the coming 11 new clauses. That standard three-year review will be a useful and valuable checkpoint to see whether the measures that I have just described are having the desired effect.
Alex Cunningham
I would say that 5% to 10% of people reoffending in a terrorist way is 5% to 10% too many.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is nodding his head. He may have misinterpreted what I am trying to achieve with the new clause. He was saying that he does not want the detail of how we do deradicalisation in the Bill, but that is not what I am asking. I am asking for a review of how the process is working in prisons; I am not asking for details on how deradicalisation is done to be in the Bill.
The Minister originally said that the probation capability had already been doubled within the service, but in response to my intervention he said that that was a plan yet to be properly implemented. He also talked about the specialist centre, but did not answer the question of what the timescales were. There are an awful lot of unknowns here.
The Minister said that he hoped that what he had to say indicated or illustrated the direction of travel. It did, but we do not seem to be getting anywhere fast, and for that reason I wish to press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
When I became shadow Justice Minister for courts and sentencing, one of the things that I was most interested in was how our justice system treats women in particular. We know that women are less likely to commit violent offences and make up about 5% of the overall prison population in the UK—although, having said that, I should say that the figure has doubled in recent times. Is that because women are committing more violent offences than ever before? No, it is not. According to Women in Prison, 80% of women entering prison have committed a non-violent offence. In 2017, 30% of all prosecutions of women were for evading the television licence fee. Just 4% of prosecutions of men were for the same offence.
We can debate the failures and merits of imprisonment as an effective or even moral punishment for a non-violent offence, but we are here to talk about counter-terrorism and sentencing. We want to put the issue down of the differences in sentencing between men and women. We need to consider the impact of our policies on all people. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a review of the effects of the Bill on women, including the differential effects on sentencing, on the release of terrorist offenders, and on the prevention and investigation of terrorism. The review must also consider the impact of the Bill on the physical and mental health of women.
Many women lose their homes and possessions when going to prison and are consequently released homeless. We often focus much on sentencing and punishing people for their crimes, but we do not do nearly enough, or invest anywhere near enough, to ensure that people get on the right track when they leave prison. When they leave prison and are homeless, and perhaps imprisonment has damaged relationships with their family and friends, they may feel that returning to crime is their only option. If an individual returns to crime because they do not have the support to build a better life for themselves, it is we who have failed.
The issue is not just about accommodation and material possessions. Only 9% of children whose mothers are in prison are cared for by their fathers in their mother’s absence. Just 5% of children remain in their family home when a mother goes to prison. We cannot apply a one-rule-fits-all approach, because one rule does not fit all, and we must recognise the difference in circumstances, outcome and impact that sentencing women has compared with sentencing men.
The review would help us as lawmakers to establish where further policy developments are needed to address any unexpected or undesirable impacts of the new legislation. That could then have an impact on the length of sentence that a woman terrorist received. We would like to know the impact on children if a mother is sentenced to prison for a terror offence. What happens to children to ensure that they do not develop a distrust of the justice system, which can lead to radicalisation? How do we introduce measures that are sensible, proportionate and smart?
I hope that the Minister will be able to tell me what research the Government have done on how approaches to women’s sentencing and licensing differ from those of men in the context of the Bill, and how the Government are recognising and acting on that difference.
Chris Philp
To state the obvious, the measures in the Bill apply equally to men and women. No distinction is made between them. A full equalities assessment was undertaken as part of the preparation for the Bill and has been publicly published. Indeed, it suggests that men will far more affected by the Bill than women, because far more men, unfortunately, commit terrorist offences.
That assessment of gender impact in the context of the Bill has been undertaken already, but Ministers and other public servants operate under further statutory obligations that will ensure that the Bill is implemented in an even-handed manner. For example, section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 places a duty on Ministers and the Department to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other prohibited conduct. Moreover, article 14 of the European convention on human rights is engaged.
I understand that there are wider issues to do with sentencing and how female offenders are treated. Those are perfectly legitimate questions, but as far as the Bill, which is about terrorism, is concerned, men and women are treated equally. We have had the equalities impact assessment already and, for the purpose of terrorism legislation, that goes far enough. I am sure that we will debate on many occasions the wider questions of sentencing and prisons policy in relation to men and women, but as far as this Bill is concerned, that has been adequately addressed.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. If the Government recognise all their other statutory obligations in relation to women, that is a positive thing. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 3
Financial impact assessment report
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three years of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a report on the financial impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) That report must separately consider the financial impact of—
(a) extended sentences on the prison estate;
(b) extended licence periods;
(c) any increased staffing resources required for Her Majesty‘s Prison and Probation Service;
(d) the extended offenders of particular concern regime; and
(e) adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ licence conditions.
(3) The report may consider other financial matters.
(4) The report must compare the financial impact of the Act with the Impact Assessment for the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill published by the Ministry of Justice on 18 May 2020.”
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 3 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the financial impact of the provisions of the Bill. In that report, the financial impact must be considered, as set out in new clause 3, as consisting of:
“(a) extended sentences on the prison estate;
(b) extended licence periods;
(c) any increased staffing resources required for Her Majesty‘s Prison and Probation Service;
(d) the extended offenders of particular concern regime; and
(e) adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ licence conditions.”
As the Minister knows, Labour backs the Bill, but we are a little disappointed at the Minister’s considerable reluctance to examine the consequences of the Bill with the reviews and reports that we have called for—not to take up his time, but to inform him and his successors. Above all, however, we know that for the provisions in the Bill to be implemented and effective, there needs to be the resource behind it and the financial support to address the issues that we have raised in Committee, even if they are not addressed in the final Bill, such as deradicalisation programmes.
The Ministry of Justice has estimated that the Bill will only result in an extra 50 prisoners and reckons that the cost will be contained to around £16 million a year. During an earlier discussion last week, we talked about numbers—about which numbers were right and which might be difficult or misunderstood. The Minister replied:
“We can extrapolate how many of those 50 are aged between 18 and 21, as we discussed in the previous sitting. I do not think that number is the annual flow or the number of convictions per year. As I understand it, it is the impact on the total prison population. Given that these sentences are quite long, one would expect that the annual flow into the system affected by these serious terrorism sentence provisions would be somewhat lower than that.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 2 July 2020; c. 133.]
When I challenged him on that number, asking whether it was an annual number or in fact the total number over a long period of time, he said:
“I will double check that number, but my understanding, which I will check, is that as a consequence of the measures the total prison population will increase by 50, which is different from an extra 50 people extra flowing in each year.” ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 2 July 2020; c. 134.]
Alex Cunningham
I will give way when I am ready, but I am going to refer to the Minister’s letter, because he has written to me; I appreciate that he took the time to do so. He said in that letter:
“Our impact analysis has identified that, in steady state, the provisions may result in fewer than 50 additional prisoners per year, and fewer than 50 additional probation caseload. These are based on historical volumes of convictions and assumes that trends in sentencing remain stable. These impacts relate solely to the effect of longer periods in custody on the number of prison places required, and longer periods on licence with their associated effects on probation caseloads, not to an increased number of sentences.”
I believe that there is a recognition there from the Minister that there is a cumulative effect and that the number is not less than 50; in fact, there could be considerably more people in the system, particularly after a given number of years, and perhaps especially so after 10 years.
I now give way to the Minister.
Chris Philp
I think what I said in my original speech and intervention was correct. As a result of the changes in the Bill, we think that at any one time there will be 50 more people in prison than would otherwise be the case. I think I said that in my original speech, and it was correct.
Alex Cunningham
That leaves me rather confused. The Minister says that his original speech was correct, and I assume that he is also saying that his letter to me was also correct, but as far as I can see those two things conflict. In his letter, he said that
“Our impact analysis has identified that, in steady state, the provisions may result in fewer than 50 additional prisoners per year”.
I emphasise that: “per year”. He goes on in his letter to give a bit more detail; perhaps quoting this will be helpful. He says, in a paragraph towards the end of his letter that I will read in full:
“For further insight, the most recent Home Office statistical publication on the ‘Operation of police powers under terrorism legislation’ shows in the year to December 2019”
—that is, in one year—
“there were 65 individuals charged with a terrorism or related offence, of which 2 (3%) were under age 18 and 10 (15%) were aged 18-20. Twenty-two of those charged were convicted in 2019, of which 1 (5%) was under 18 and 4 (18%) were aged 18-20. We do not expect the Bill to have a notable impact on such small volumes.”
That was the number of charges per year, and 22 people were convicted in 2019. If 22 people are convicted in each of the next four or five years, that is 100 additional people alone. I cannot quite understand what the figures really are. Are they correct in the letter or in the Minister’s original statement to the House?
Chris Philp
I think they are correct in both. There is the stock, and there is the flow. The stock is the number of extra people in prison as a consequence of the measures, which could be 50. The flow is the number of people going into prison each year who might be affected by these provisions, which will be less than 50.
On the numbers that the hon. Member just quoted—the various convictions that occur—not all of those will necessarily be affected by the provisions in the Bill. I realise there are a lot of numbers floating around, but those figures are internally consistent. I would be very happy to sit down in a cold, dark room and go through them again. There is consistency.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for that intervention. I think it is I who needs a dark room somewhere to try to settle my head on this issue, but it would be a good idea if we could have specific clarification from the Minister at some time in the future.
I acknowledge the relatively small numbers—very small numbers—in this illustration of young people, but it does not matter whether it is one young person or a hundred. We need to treat them in a very different way from the way we treat people in the adult population, either by allowing them to have a counsellor present when they undergo a polygraph test or through the way that pre-sentencing reports are prepared for them prior to sentencing.
Bearing in mind that we do not know what numbers we are playing with now, can the Minister tell us whether the financial cost that has been identified for the new provisions will cover the additional cost of housing prisoners; the additional cost of creating spaces for new prisoners; the additional cost of having more than one specialist centre; the additional cost of having further specially trained prison officers; the cost for probation services of expanding the sentence for offenders of a particular concern regime; the impact of longer licensing on the National Probation Service; the new use of polygraphs; and the impact on youth offender teams? Such measures always have ripple effects, so we ask the Secretary of State to lay before the House within three years a report on the real financial impact of all these things.
There should never be an issue of resources when it comes to justice matters. We should ensure that prisons are properly staffed and that those staff are properly supported, be it for their personal security or to provide them with adequate services when they suffer mental illness as a result of their job—services that we heard are currently inadequate.
We should recognise the challenges that the justice system is facing. The Minister has tried to reassure us that the Government have a handle on the crisis in the courts, with hundreds of thousands of cases yet to reach them. Justice is being chronically underfunded. The Lord Chancellor simply does not have the resources he needs to do his job properly, so I struggle to have much faith that the measures in the Bill would be properly backed up financially.
I am sure the Minister will try to reassure me that all will be well and that there is plenty of cash to meet all the costs that the Bill will result in. Good! He could demonstrate his confidence in his statement by commissioning the report covered by this new clause.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to respond to the points that the shadow Minister has just made. I think I answered the points about numbers in my intervention on his speech, so let me speak to the financial cost. The financial cost of the measures proposed in the Bill has been comprehensively assessed in the impact assessment. Because the numbers are so small—an increase in the prison population of 50, or far fewer than 50, per year—the actual financial impact will be extremely small in the context of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s budget. Let us remind ourselves that around 80,000 people are in prison, so an additional 50 will not represent a substantial impact in that context
When discussing the previous new clause, I spoke a little about the wider deradicalisation work, the new team and the increased investment in specialist officers who work with radicalised prisoners. An extra £90 million for this year was announced for counter-terrorism policing—catching people in the first place and preventing terrorist atrocities from taking place—which is a substantial increase in spending on exactly the police who are active in this area, so the resourcing is being increased. The total budget for the prison and probation service is substantially higher this year than last year, which I think will be welcome.
On a review, the Bill will clearly have a very small financial impact on the prison and probation service’s total budget. Were we to review this along with the other 11 proposed reviews before us, we would do nothing but reviews all day. The financial review will probably be well caught up in the general financial reviews we conduct anyway and the debates we have on prison and probation funding. I do not think a further review would shed any additional light on that.
Alex Cunningham
I just wonder what probation officers and prison officers will have to say in a few years’ time when they are still telling us that there are insufficient prison and probation officers in the system. That is bound to have an impact in this area as well.
The Minister listed all these wonderful initiatives—the new centres, new initiatives, the different things that are going to happen. These things cost money; I think £16 million was the figure in the in the paperwork. I just wonder how far that will actually go.
I am also interested in whether the £90 million the Minister referred to is not in fact related directly to what will happen as a result of this Bill. However, there is no doubt that that additional money is needed. We need to be able to empower our authorities to secure more convictions. The Minister’s letter, in 2019, stated that one in three people charged with a terror offence were actually convicted according to the Government’s own statistics.
However, I accept that there are other reviews and things as far as financial things are concerned, so we will leave the matter there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 4
Role of the Parole Board
“(1) The Secretary of State must make an oral statement to the House of Commons on the effects of the provisions of this Act on the functions of the Parole Board.
(2) That statement must be made before the provisions relating to—
(a) life or indeterminate sentences for serious terrorism offences, and
(b) removal or restriction of early release for terrorist prisoners come into force.
(3) The statement must explain—
(a) the intended role for the Parole Board in the release of prisoners affected by the matters in subsection (2);
(b) what, if any, expert assessment of such prisoners will be undertaken before they are released;
(c) who will carry out any such expert assessments;
(d) whether any steps will be taken to compensate for any loss of intelligence gathering from a reduction in Parole Board interviews.”.—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause asks for an oral statement, not a review. The Minister is probably relieved that he would not have to carry out yet another review, but on the basis that he is not carrying out any, I do not know why it has proven a problem to him.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an oral statement to the House of Commons on the effects of the provisions of the Bill on the functions of the Parole Board. The statement must be made before the provisions come into force relating to the life or indeterminate sentences for serious terrorism offences and the removal or restriction of early release for terrorist prisoners. It must also explain the intended role for the Parole Board in the release of prisoners affected by the matters in subsection (2); what, if any, expert assessment of such prisoners will be undertaken before they are released; who will carry out any such expert assessments; and whether any steps will be taken to compensate for the loss of intelligence gathering from a reduction in Parole Board interviews.
The Minister may well say that there is no need for such a report or statement, most likely because he has sacked the board from its role in relation to offenders given indeterminate sentences. That would be sad, and I hope the Minister will take some time between now and Report in a couple of weeks’ time to reflect on how the Parole Board’s expertise could have a role in the assessment and rehabilitation of this particular group. The Parole Board has an unparalleled wealth of experience in managing offenders and assessing risk. We must ensure that experience is used, rather than abandoned.
As well as being asked to assess risk, the Parole Board plays a vital role in providing an incentive for prisoners to reform, and to respect each other as well as prison officers. It also provides intelligence vital to the work of the police and security agencies. I know that the prospect of early release is a key tool—probably the key tool—in the work of the Parole Board, but that is not a good enough single reason to turn our backs on it. The Bill intends to do away entirely with the Parole Board for those convicted of serious terrorist offences, yet we have been given no specifics as to what will replace its role. The Ministry of Justice assures us that no prisoner will be released back into the public realm without being risk-assessed, but we have heard no further detail as to how those assessments will take place, who will carry them out, or how frequently they will be conducted. Quite simply, the Bill removes a vital piece of the rehabilitation and monitoring of prisoners, and nothing has been offered to replace it.
Those who work for the Parole Board are experts in their field, and there is huge concern among Opposition Members that no assessor will be able to meet the standard of scrutiny currently offered by the Board. Ad hoc assessments conducted by unknown persons using unknown methods is just not good enough, and risks leaving us with prisoners released into communities under the supervision of services that will not have the benefit of the expertise that Parole Board members bring. That is an unacceptable risk, and we need assurances from the Government about what their plan is. Can the Minister explain what these assessments will look like, what qualifications the assessor will have, and how they will be appointed? Can he also explain the rationale for removing the Parole Board’s role, and why he thinks this new system that has yet to be clearly defined is better placed to carry out those assessments? Parliament deserves to understand the rationale behind these Government plans.
Chris Philp
The changes we made back in February, through the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, extend the remit of the Parole Board. Previously, terrorist offenders who were released early at the half-way point when serving standard determinate sentences would have been released with no prior consideration by the Parole Board. Now, the Parole Board will consider them prior to release at the two-thirds point, or subsequently if not referred at that point, so those changes dramatically expanded the Parole Board’s involvement with terrorist prisoners. Secondly, the Parole Board will of course still be involved with terrorist prisoners serving indeterminate sentences.
There is one remaining cohort: the very small minority of serious terrorist offenders who we have been debating during consideration of this Bill, those who will serve their full sentence in prison and will not be considered by the Parole Board prior to their release. The shadow Minister asked about the process that will take place in relation to that small minority of prisoners. As we touched on while taking evidence, a whole range of measures are taken to make sure those prisoners are properly managed and risk-assessed. The existing multi-agency public protection arrangements are at the core of that: they have been well-documented and well-reviewed, including by Jonathan Hall, so we know exactly what they are. Those measures also include the work done by the Prison and Probation Service, both in prison and afterwards on release, and work done in conjunction with CT policing.
Where the Parole Board will not be involved in a prisoner’s release decision, all those agencies will continue to be heavily involved in their risk assessment, working with the prisoners on deradicalisation where that is possible and managing them in prison and then in the community afterwards where it is not possible. I think we asked one of our witnesses, although I forget which one, whether they had confidence in those arrangements—MAPPA, the prison service, the probation service and the police—and the witness was very clear that they did. I have confidence in them as well.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for reminding us about those different cohorts and how they have been dealt with. Of course, the Opposition very much supported the provisions that were introduced earlier this year. As for this particular cohort, although I still think it is regrettable that there is no role for the Parole Board in working with some of our most dangerous offenders, I see no sense in pressing the clause to a vote. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
Review of effects on children and young offenders
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a review of the effects of the provisions of this Act on children and young offenders.
(2) That review must detail any differential effects on children and young offenders in—
(a) sentencing;
(b) release of terrorist offenders; and
(c) the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
(3) The review must consider the impact of imprisonment under this Act on the physical and mental health of children and young offenders.
(4) The review must consider the influences on children and young offenders who commit offences under this Act, including but not limited to—
(a) the internet;
(b) peer-pressure; and
(c) vulnerability.
(5) When conducting a review under this section, the Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers.
(6) The review may make recommendations for further changes to legislation, policy and guidance.
(7) For the purposes of this section, young offenders include adults aged under 25.”—(Joanna Cherry.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the effects of these measures on children and young offenders. It would also require the Secretary of State to consult with Scottish minister when conducting the review.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I apologise if I am interrupting the flow of the hon. Member for Stockton North as we go through the new clauses, but I suspect that he will sympathise with this one, which I move on behalf of the Scottish National party. I remind colleagues that sentencing is a devolved matter, and that there will have to be a legislative consent motion in relation to the Bill, but clearly the Bill has implications for sentencing across the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
New clause 5 would require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the effects of the provisions of the Bill on children and young offenders, to lay that review before the House within one year of the Bill being passed, and to consult with Scottish Ministers when conducting it. The clause reflects concerns already expressed by the hon. Member for Stockton North and by some of our witnesses about the impact of the legislation on children and young people. In support of it, I will refer to four aspects of the evidence that the Committee has received in writing or orally.
The first relates to evidence from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, which we heard on the first day of evidence, 25 June—in particular, his responses to questions 15 and 16, which were asked of him by the hon. Member for Stockton North in reference to one of several notes that Jonathan Hall has prepared on the Bill. The hon. Gentleman asked him about point 10 of the first of those notes, titled “Note on Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (1)”, in which Mr Hall says:
“The requirement of a minimum mandatory sentence for all adult offenders, however young, puts in doubt whether judges can properly reflect the fact that an adult of 18 years and one month may not be any more mature than a child of 17 years and 11 months”.
Of course, those sentences are not available for a child, but they are available for those defined as over 18. Mr Hall went on to say:
“Age may or may not result in ‘exceptional circumstances’ being found, which is the only basis on which the 14-year minimum can be avoided.”
The hon. Member for Stockton North put it to Mr Hall, in question 15, that that struck him as a cautionary note, and he invited him to elaborate upon it. Mr Hall said:
“I have identified what is really a policy choice for Parliament. As a matter of fact, I can say that an increasing number of quite young people are being caught up in terrorism, including new forms of terrorism—not just conventional Islamist, extremist or right-wing terrorism, but other new emerging forms, such as the incel movement or even things at the very boundaries of what you might consider terrorism that are very violent. It is not impossible that young people will be caught up in this.
The point I am making—I have referred to an authority from England and Wales and I think I have also referred to the approach in Scotland—is that there is recognition that people who are young and immature are probably more susceptible to change than adults. I suppose it is a choice for Parliament, but the age for a mandatory minimum sentence—meaning no prospect of early release, and effectively putting to one side the possibility of reform—might be raised to 21, rather than that being for those in the 18-to-21 bracket. I understand that in Scotland there is a debate over whether it should be as far as 25.
All I can do is identify the choice that has been made and point out that when it comes to sentencing, traditionally it is recognised that people are not necessarily that different when they are one month over 18 as opposed to one month under 18.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q15.]
The hon. Member for Stockton North said:
“But the bottom line is that with young people, perhaps, there is greater change. You have said that there may be greater opportunity for reform there than with those who are considerably older.”
Mr Hall replied:
“That is what judges are increasingly finding.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q16.]
The hon. Member for Stockton North has mentioned this afternoon that there might be a greater opportunity for young people to reform their ways and be deradicalized than there is for middle-aged and older people.
My second piece of evidence is Mr Hall’s third note on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, which deals specifically with the effect of the proposed changes in sentencing in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In particular, in paragraphs 21 to 26 Mr Hall talks about children and young people, and states:
“Striking features of the proposed legislation concern its application to children and young offenders.
The proposed application of the serious terrorism sentence to offenders aged 18 to 21 in Scotland raises starkly the question of whether there is a bright line between offenders above and below the age of 18. This is because the Scottish Sentencing Council is currently consulting on its third draft guideline, ‘Sentencing Young People’ and proposes that special sentencing principles should apply to offenders up to the age of 25.”
Paragraph 23 of the note states:
“Even if the Sentencing Council guideline does not ultimately go as far as 25, the application of the minimum mandatory sentences to those in the 18 to 21 bracket, and even more so the removal of the role of the Parole Board…for dangerous serious terrorism offenders for both adults and children, appears inconsistent with the distinct youth criminal justice regimes which have developed in each part of the United Kingdom.”
Mr Hall says:
“The current trend in Scotland is towards a welfarist approach to youth criminal justice, reflected in the Scottish government’s Youth Justice Strategy in June 2015. In Northern Ireland, following a recommendation by the Criminal Justice Review…the Youth Justice Agency was established to administer youth justice in Northern Ireland.”
He continues:
“There is a risk in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, that young offenders may be manipulated by terrorist groups or other unscrupulous individuals operating in the real world or online.”
He concludes at paragraph 26:
“As part of my role I receive regular briefings on counter-terrorism detention. I am aware of children, including quite young children, being arrested and detained for serious offences. Age does not necessarily inhibit capability (particularly technical capability) and intent. The internet, peer-pressure, and vulnerability are all significant factors in the types of offences committed and ideologies espoused. I question whether children who receive extended sentences for serious terrorist offences are so different from children who commit extended sentences for other serious offences, as to justify removing the Parole Board’s role.”
That is a fairly detailed exposition of the concern that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation has about the impact of the Bill on children and young offenders.
My third piece of evidence is the written evidence from the Law Society of Scotland. On page 6 it echoes the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and draws attention to the fact that the Scottish Sentencing Council is currently consulting on sentencing young people and considering changing the definition of a young person by raising the age to 25. That consultation opened on 28 February and will close on 21 August. Views are being sought on the sentencing of young people, with a recognition that that is complex and challenging and a suggestion that the sentencing of young people requires a more individual approach, with a need to take the unique circumstances of the young person into account.
The Law Society of Scotland states in its evidence that the
“introduction of mandatory minimum sentencing gives rise to concerns about the effect on young persons”,
because, as Jonathan Hall has said, they are more responsive to internet peer pressure and more vulnerable—those are significant factors in their offending.
Peter Dawson, the director of the Prison Reform Trust, has extensive experience of working in the system as a governor and deputy governor. In his oral evidence session, I asked him to elaborate on something that he had told the Minister at the beginning of the session:
“You said that some aspects of the Bill may undermine public protection. Can you summarise what you meant by that?”
Mr Dawson replied:
“There are two aspects in particular. One I have spoken about: the absence of a process for some of the people affected. There is probably nothing more to say on that.
The second is probably rather more controversial because it is about the length of sentences. The Government, in explaining the Bill and justifying a 14-year minimum, say that that gives time for work to be done with the offender during the sentence. That is much longer than is needed for that work to be done. The difficulty with very long sentences, across the board, is that they destroy what is known in the trade as protective factors—they destroy the things that are most likely to help someone out of crime in the future.
Relationships are an obvious example. For somebody who is convicted in their late teens or early 20s and who is not released until their mid to late 30s, the opportunity to build a life that is worth living, in which they can contribute to or play a part in society, has very often been destroyed. All of the things that the rest of us do during that period in our lives have not happened and may not happen once that person is released. It is a disgruntling process. Long sentences are justified for the most serious crime, but the longer we make them, the more harm we do and the more difficult it is for the person to live the rest of their life in the way that we all do.” ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 34, Q78.]
I then asked Mr Dawson:
“How important is rehabilitating terrorist offenders for the ongoing protection of our constituents and the public at large?”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 35, Q79.]
He said, “It is essential.” I read from that that Mr Dawson was drawing on his long experience to say that we are potentially creating real difficulty for ourselves by applying minimum mandatory sentences to children and young people. Those who are convicted in their late teens and early 20s will not get out until their mid to late 30s. During that time, most of us are maturing, learning how to participate in the labour market, forming significant relationships, and possibly having children or taking on responsibility for children in our wider family and friendship circles. Those convicted young people will be unable to do any of those things, which may prevent their deradicalisation.
Drawing on the evidence from Jonathan Hall, the Law Society of Scotland and Mr Dawson, I think that there is real and well-founded concern about the potential impact of minimum mandatory sentences on children and young people, which happens against the backdrop of divergent approaches to youth justice across these islands—I have explained what is happening and is being contemplated in Scotland, and what is happening in Northern Ireland. It is against the backdrop of those—in my submission—well-placed concerns that I seek to amend the Bill to mandate the Government to carry out, within one year, a review of the effect of the provisions on children and young offenders.
We would probably all accept that children and young people are different from middle-aged and older people and that we perhaps have a special responsibility towards them. In this context, with particular regard to the evidence given by Mr Dawson and Jonathan Hall, we have a responsibility to the public to try to rehabilitate children and young people who become involved in terrorism. There seems to be strong evidence that there is more chance of rehabilitating them than there is with older people.
There are two good reasons to have this review: our responsibilities to children and young people in general and, perhaps more importantly, our responsibility to the public, and British citizens at large, to do what we can to try and deradicalise convicted terrorists. We know we are much more likely to be able to do that with children and young people. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response to my new clause.
Taiwo Owatemi (Coventry North West) (Lab)
Once again, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.
I speak in support of new clause 5, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, which calls on the Secretary of State to review the effect of the measures in the Bill on children and young offenders. Much of the new clause relates to young offenders, and I agree that the impact of this Bill on them must be huge. We simply cannot treat young offenders in the same way as fully matured, grown adults, who fully understand their actions. The impact on their mental and physical wellbeing should be a fundamental consideration on how we carry out justice in this country.
The new clause also leaves room to consider the more general impact on children who are not accused of a crime. Children are often victims in the pursuit of justice, when they have done nothing to deserve the situation or warrant being the victims of a crime. All too often, children of offenders will pay the price for their parents’ crimes. This crime will also have serious effects on women. Only 9% of children whose mothers are in prison are cared for by their fathers, in the absence of their mothers. Only 5% of children remain in their family home when their mother goes to prison. A fifth of women prisoners are lone parents before imprisonment.
I am not aware of the background of Members in this Committee, but I cannot imagine how it must be for a child to see their parents taken away from them for a long period of time and having to live in a different way, with different people. Victims of crime never deserve to be so. It is imperative that this House recognise the true impact of our legislative decisions and how they affect the most vulnerable, in this case children. We support this new clause on that basis.
The young offenders of today do not have to be the reoffenders of tomorrow, but we need to make an effort and carry out the research to stop that happening. There will be children and young offenders caught up in terror crimes. It would be naive of us to think that there is any crime that children cannot be drawn into, but we have a choice about how we respond. We have the opportunity to ensure that they are not defined by the actions of their youth and that the actions of others will not disproportionately affect their lives.
I hope that the Minister will be able to support this new clause, as we do, and act to acknowledge that we must put the focus on how children and young offenders are treated and impacted.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West for moving the new clause, and for the eloquence and passion with which she described its various component parts.
The Bill already treats people under the age of 18 very differently from those aged over 18. It has different provisions, as we have already debated. Therefore, people who are children in the legal sense of the term—people who are under the age of 18—are already treated completely differently by the Bill, compared with those over the age of 18.
In relation to those aged between 18 and 20, 18 and 21, or 18 and 24, depending on where the line is drawn, there is clearly a wider debate to be had about the way that their brains mature and about the opportunity to reform those people, compared with people who are a little bit older. However, in the context of the Bill, I emphasise that we are talking about the most serious terrorist offenders. We are not talking about the average 20 or 21-year-old. We are talking about people who have committed the most serious terrorist offences.
It is worth reminding ourselves what level of severity has to be met before somebody gets the mandatory 14-year minimum term, all of which gets spent in prison. To qualify for that sentence, it has to be a serious terrorist offence. The offender has to be found to be dangerous—a finding that the judge makes on reading a pre-sentence report, so the judge can take that into account. It has to be an offence—one of the most serious offences—that ordinarily carries a life sentence. Most chillingly of all, it has to be an offence where there was a risk of causing multiple deaths, and the person carrying out the offence would have known or should have known about that. So we are talking about offences of the most exceptional gravity.
Ruth Cadbury
I entirely accept the important point that the Minister raises and how the issue is about severity. However, Labour Members keep raising the point about maturity. Whether it is stealing apples or being involved in planning a major terrorist incident where loss of life is potential or actual, maturity is an issue. As colleagues have said several times, and there is a raft of evidence, young people under 21—they get more mature as they get nearer 25—are at risk of coercion and radicalisation, and their very immaturity draws them into these crimes, however severe. All we ask in this new clause is that there should be a review and that maturity should be taken into account, in the same way that it is now taken into account in the context of sentencing those over 18.
Chris Philp
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention and the sentiments behind it, but I am not sure I entirely agree that this very small number of offences can be compared with the theft of apples. We are talking about a tiny handful of people who have committed the most serious offences where multiple people could have been killed and where the judge has found that the offenders are dangerous. Had they simply been misled, or coerced even, it might be open to interpretation as an exceptional circumstance, although we expect the exceptional circumstance derogation to be extremely rare—as the name implies, it is truly exceptional. Should truly exceptional circumstances exist, there is that opportunity open to the judge, but it would have to be truly exceptional.
To emphasise again how small the numbers are, the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, reading out my letter when we debated a previous clause, said that, last year, in 2019, of the 22 people convicted of terrorist offences, only four were aged between 18 and 20, and not all of those would meet the criteria for the serious terrorist sentence that we are talking about, so the numbers are microscopically small, thankfully, for those aged between 18 and 20. There is also the exceptional circumstance override, and we are talking about offences of the most serious kind, which have to pass three or four different hurdles before qualifying for the assessment that we have just described. In that context, where the offending is so serious and the risk so grave, the approach being taken is a reasonable one, but I accept the more general point about maturity in other, less serious contexts.
On the question of a review, given that the numbers are so very small, I am not wholly convinced that a bespoke review is the right thing to do, but, of course, there will be a regular review, as I might say frequently in the coming clauses, at the three-year mark, where it is right that the matter gets considered.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised some points that will require consideration. It might well be that nobody at all aged 18 to 20 ends up being affected by this measure, in which case it will be a pretty short consideration. Mandating it by statute is not necessary. There are other review mechanisms. As we saw when we debated the Prevent review earlier, if we have too many statutory reviews, we end up tripping over our own shoelaces by failing to meet all the deadlines that we have created.
The questions are serious. I understand and respect them. We will need to debate them in future, quite properly and rightly, but putting this measure in the Bill is a step that we do not need to take this afternoon.
Joanna Cherry
I thank the Minister for taking on board some of the points that I have made. In response to his points, first, I accept that this is only for the most serious terrorist offences. I completely accept that, and I accept that the numbers of children and young people who are so sentenced may be very small, but the important thing is that, if we have a young person or child convicted of a serious terrorist offence, and given the evidence we have heard about the opportunity to deradicalise and rehabilitate, there is all the more reason to try to make sure that that opportunity is taken.
All we are asking for is a review. If it turns out that the numbers are small, as is expected, it will not be a complex or time-consuming review. Although I am not going to push my new clause to a vote, I anticipate bringing it back to the Floor of the House. I would appreciate it if the Minister, in the spirit in which he responded, could take the evidential concerns away and consider what could be done specifically to measure the impact of this legislation on children and young offenders across these isles. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Review of legislation: Northern Ireland
“(1) On an annual basis from the day of this Act being passed, a report that reviews the application of the provisions of this Act in Northern Ireland must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament by the Secretary of State.
(2) Annual reports under subsection (1) must be produced in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive —(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that all measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland shall be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive, and a report shall be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.
I will not detain the Committee too long. I have much sympathy with what the Minister says about the number of reviews that have been called for, but I hope, similarly, that he might have some sympathy with those of us on the Opposition Benches. While he, in government, gets to do, all we can do at the minute is ask to review. I hope that position might change after the next election.
On Second Reading, a number of hon. Members from Northern Ireland raised the critically important point that this legislation is clearly of great significance to that region. I think we would all wish to acknowledge that so many people there have lived and continue to live with the devastating consequences of violence in their communities. It is only following concerted efforts for peace and reconciliation, which remain so vital that, we see some of those scars starting to heal.
The Minister rightly said that the Bill was designed to deal with terrorism in all its forms and was a UK-wide Bill. However, given the unique and long-standing circumstances in Northern Ireland and the hard work done to build the Good Friday and subsequent agreements and the Northern Ireland Executive, it is important that we do not risk any unintended consequences from measures in the Bill, which could have an effect in Northern Ireland and could have damaging consequences.
To that end, on behalf of the official Opposition, I am tabling new clause 7 to ensure that all measures in the Bill, as they pertain in Northern Ireland, will be renewed annually with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister and the Northern Ireland Executive and that a report is published and laid before both Houses of Parliament. The Minister will know that the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, with whom he and I have had extensive discussions, has herself expressed some concerns about the extension of provisions in the Bill to Northern Ireland, and has raised some potential inadvertent and unintended consequences that would be undesirable.
It is vital to the success of the legislation in performing and fulfilling a UK-wide function that we seek the benefit of her expertise—or that of whoever holds that post—and continue to monitor the legislation’s implications in Northern Ireland. The structure of sentences in Northern Ireland, for example, differs from that in the rest of the UK, and there are special and unique circumstances there that mean that we ought to ensure we legislate specifically and responsibly. For example, post-sentencing regimes work in prisons for paramilitary prisoners and those in prison for reasons related to terrorist offending, and in terms of an approach to deradicalisation and the points made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West about young people. Just as the polygraph section of the Bill has been crafted to be permissible but not mandatory in Northern Ireland, so it is right that all aspects of the Bill should be subject to review through the unique prism of Northern Ireland.
As we heard in the evidence sessions, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission set out a number of concerns about the legislation, including the retrospective nature of some provisions, both in terms of sentencing and release, the polygraph test, as has been mentioned, and the impact of provisions on those under the age of 18. I will not revise all those arguments here—they are known to members of the Committee—but it does seem obvious to me that it would be more advisable for the Government to work constructively with the Minister for Justice, rather than to risk legal or human rights challenges down the line. We spoke about that earlier in the Committee.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for introducing new clause 7, which would, along with other proposed new clauses, create a veritable snowstorm of statutory reviews. I appreciate the comments he made about the tools available to the Opposition, which I hope not to have to avail myself of in the near future—who knows what might happen?—but I would say that the Opposition have many tools at their disposal, which they frequently use, including debates, questions, parliamentary questions, Freedom of Information Act requests, and so on and so forth. There is no shortage of methods, quite rightly, by which any Government may be properly held to account by Parliament.
On Northern Ireland particularly, we fully recognise that it has a unique history and that terrorism is interwoven into some parts of that. We have taken very careful time—a great deal of time—to make sure that we have not in any way interfered with or unpicked the very important provisions in the Belfast agreement, because we do not want to do anything that interferes with or undermines that very important agreement. However, matters of national security and terrorism are reserved matters and, as far as possible, we would like to have a consistent position, which is broadly speaking what the Bill seeks to do.
I understand there are issues of sensitivity, which the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, Naomi Long, has raised with the Ministry of Justice here in London; it sounds as if she has also raised them with the shadow Minister. As I said in response to an intervention on our very first day of line-by-line consideration, we are in the process of having a very detailed, in-depth dialogue on those issues and are going through them one by one. Whether it is before or after the Bill is enacted, as I hope it will, I put on the record that we will always engage sensitively and deeply with the Northern Ireland Administration and, of course, the Government in Scotland in these areas, recognising how important they are to all parts of the United Kingdom. I assure the hon. Gentleman that that will be done with sensitivity and receptiveness.
On a statutory obligation to conduct a further review, I have mentioned my general position. Given Parliament’s ability to question and debate, to FOI and so on and so forth—there is no lack of scrutiny—I do not think that a further statutory review would add anything to the process. I accept the point, however, that we need to keep a close eye on these matters and be in continued and close dialogue with all our colleagues in the various Administrations, in Belfast and Holyrood in particular.
Conor McGinn
I thank the Minister for his comments. The only part I would challenge is the claim that there is no lack of scrutiny in Parliament, as we have a body that is tasked with overseeing scrutiny and overviewing all these matters that has not yet been reconstituted—the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is clear to me from discussions with colleagues in Northern Ireland, and given the dialogue that the Minister has had with the hon. Member for East Lothian and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that he is acting in good faith and is keen to resolve any outstanding matters with the devolved legislatures. It is important to put on record that that is very much the message that I have received. I encourage him to continue those discussions.
The Minister is right to assert that it is clearly a reserved matter, but there are elements that require a legislative consent motion, which will be difficult to get through the Northern Ireland Assembly. If the Justice Minister has reservations about it, one can only imagine what other parties in the Assembly and the Executive might have to say. I encourage him to continue those discussions. I am happy to assist him in finding a resolution and a way forward, because it is important that we get it right. On that basis, I will not press the clause to a vote and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Lone terrorists: Review of strategy
‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must be conducted by a person who meets the criteria for qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court, as set out in section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
(3) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) counter-terrorism policy;
(b) sentencing policy as it applies to terrorist offenders;
(c) the interaction and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), “public services” includes but is not limited to—
(a) probation;
(b) the prison system;
(c) mental health services;
(d) local authorities; and
(e) housing providers.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’—(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that the Government orders a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists including, but not exclusively, current counter-terrorism and sentencing policy.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Conor McGinn
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
As we have reiterated throughout the passage of the Bill, our overriding priority, which is shared on both sides of the Committee, is and always will be to keep the public safe, including from those individuals who seek to attack our values, destroy our way of life and divide us through abhorrent acts of violence and terror. The remarks made this morning by the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford were a testament to that and the response to it. We in Committee were privileged to hear the speech, which was worthy of a wider audience. I hope to hear her invoke some of what her friend Louise said again on the Floor of the House on Report, because it was very valuable.
Following the shocking and tragic incident in Reading a matter of weeks ago, we need to take stock of the new and emerging threats from terrorism. The agility that the Minister has asked for in amending TPIMs should be applied when it comes to looking at the threat from lone actors. That is why we have asked for a judge-led review into the Government’s strategy on tackling the dangerous and growing menace of lone attackers. Reading was the third time in less than a year that we have witnessed such devastation on UK streets, each with a lone attacker at its core, callously intent on mayhem and destruction in our communities.
Our proposal would make provision to address the systemic response needed to that phenomenon. The new clause asks the Government to order a judge-led review of the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists. It should address counter-terrorism sentencing policy, as the Bill does, as it applies to terrorist offenders and the interaction and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks.
Fundamentally, the review would seek to build firmly on previous research and expertise, such as the extensive work carried out by Lord Anderson that has provided a valuable insight into how we can improve and better connect the current systems. It would include an analysis of a wide range of key public services, including our probation and prison system, whose value and potential have been closely reflected on throughout these debates, but also mental health services, housing providers and local authorities, each of which can intervene at critical points. That is also why we need to get on with the Prevent review, which will play a critical part in addressing some of those issues.
There is absolutely no question about the high skill, dedication and bravery of our police and security and intelligence services. We need to do everything we can to support them as they set about their task of tackling extremism from root to branch, which is not easy. The fall in terrorism-related arrests to its lowest level in six years is concerning, particularly at a time when radicalisers and dangerous extremists increasingly operate through more and more sophisticated networks of hatred online, which are often understandably difficult for the authorities to monitor and intercept.
While the dangers of Islamist extremism persist, the menacing threat from far-right extremism is growing at a deeply disturbing rate. Far-right cases now make up almost a quarter of Prevent referrals and nearly half of all adopted Channel cases. All the while, the number of individuals in custody for terrorism-related offences and subscribing to those vile and hateful ideologies is up by one third on last year. That is on top of already record levels and steady rises over recent years.
We must urgently face up to this threat. We need to see that coherent and comprehensive strategy which, at this moment, I am afraid to say, appears to be lacking. The suspect in the Reading case was believed to be known to multiple public agencies and to have had a history of significant mental health issues; so too did the London Bridge and Streatham attackers. So many of our vital public services have interactions with individuals, which give them real concern, but they must have the necessary tools to intervene and work together in the most effective and efficient manner possible, ultimately to save lives and keep people safe.
The Lord Anderson review of 2017 outlines interesting pilot work on multi-agency centre pilots. They involve the identification of newly closed, high-risk subjects of interest; the sharing of data by MI5 and counter-terror policing with other agencies, such as local authorities and Government Departments; and the enrichment of that data from the databases of multi-agency partners. I wonder whether the Minister would write to me or enlighten the Committee on what is being done to address the existing barriers that were identified by the review to local partners’ involvement in managing subjects of interest, including the challenges of resourcing.
Lord Anderson said that
“some local authority representatives cautioned against unrealistic expectations of services such as mental health and community safety… against, what was described to me as, a background of widespread recent degradation of local services”.
Ruth Cadbury
I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting so clearly the risk of lone offenders, who are often not clearly linked to any particular organised network and are operating off not much more than hate, mental health problems and the internet. I think of David Copeland, who, in the space of two weeks, used nail bombs in violent attacks, causing death and injury to the black community in Brixton, gay people outside the Admiral Duncan in Soho and the Asian community in east London. Does he agree that there are potential new threats, as the independent reviewer pointed out in his evidence, such as the incel movement?
Conor McGinn
I do. My hon. Friend has eloquently outlined the development of the terrorist threat and its changed dynamics, as well as the fundamental point that hatred and terrorism does not discriminate. It is not homogeneous, because it is perpetrated by different people with different motives, nor does it discriminate, because fundamentally other people are hurt by it.
In asking for this, we are saying to the Government that those three attacks in different places, perpetrated by different people with no connections, over a relatively short space of time, provide evidence of a new and increasing threat. Coupled with the increase in right-wing extremism and the manifestation of that through referrals to Prevent and arrests, that needs to be looked at very carefully. Things have moved on since Lord Anderson’s very good report in 2017.
It is time that the Government looked at that again to identify the issues Lord Anderson raised and what they have done to break down some of the barriers that he identified in 2017 that were preventing us from apprehending these people at various junctures throughout their journey—from starting out with an extremist ideology to, on their own, as lone actors, committing the most heinous crimes, causing the types of suffering, hurt and heartache that were expressed so eloquently earlier today.
Chris Philp
The hon. Member for St Helens North has raised an important matter: the problem of lone wolf attackers acting outside recognised group structures. We have seen, in those incidents that he referred to, the terrible impact of the actions of those people who, while they are acting alone, none the less cause devastating consequences for the victims of their actions. We should take the threat they pose extremely seriously.
Since those first two events—at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham—we have moved to change the law in a number of areas. First, we introduced emergency legislation—the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020—which came into force on 26 February. As we know, that ended the automatic early release of terrorist prisoners and instead moved their release point to two thirds with Parole Board consent or later if not given, followed by the period on licence. We have legislated today to ensure that there is at least a year on licence, even where they serve their full term. That was one element of the response to those events to which the hon. Gentleman referred.
Of course, this legislation we are debating is part of that response, making sure that those most serious offenders are physically prevented from harming the public by incapacitation, which is a second important element of the Government’s response. The third element was a review of the MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements—which the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor commissioned in the aftermath of the Fishmongers’ Hall attack from Jonathan Hall QC, whom we met a couple of weeks ago, to see what more we can do to ensure that those agencies are working together where opportunities arise to identify somebody who might pose a threat to the public. That work was extremely important.
It is worth saying that in the three years since March 2017, 25 different attacks have been foiled so, while it is of course a tragedy that any attacks at all happen, the measures taken have disrupted, foiled and prevented 25 atrocities that might otherwise have taken place. Now would be a good time, in that context, to extend our thanks and gratitude to counter-terrorism police and the security services, who have done that work to keep us and our constituents safe these past few years.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about the need to be vigilant on this topic is well made. My colleague the Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and—
Chris Philp
The hon. Member for St Helens North is more familiar with parliamentary constituencies than I am. My hon. Friend the Security Minister is working on this and I am sure, in a spirit of cross-party co-working, he would be willing to sit down and have a chat, possibly a confidential chat, with the hon. Gentleman about the work that is going on in this area.
It is a good topic to debate and to think about. I have made my views on statutory reviews clear and I will not repeat them, but this is a topic that Parliament should be considering. We have been discussing it ourselves, because these threats do exist and we need to do everything we can on prevention, not only through policing, but through other forms of intervention. The spirit of the hon Gentleman’s comments is one I embrace and agree with, while very gently and politely resisting another statutory review.
Conor McGinn
I was going to put the new clause to a vote, but I thank the Minister for his very generous offer—
Conor McGinn
His colleague’s time, I note, but I think this is something we can work on together. My colleague, the shadow Home Secretary, has written to the Home Secretary on this matter, so while awaiting a response to that, which hopefully we will receive before Report, I will not push the new clause to a vote on this occasion.
We have approached all these amendments in the spirit of wanting to work together with the Government. As the Minister rightly says, while we are focusing here on how we can improve things, that should not for a minute be taken as an indication that we have anything other than incredible gratitude for the work that has been done to prevent what could have been many more catastrophic and devastating attacks. In that spirit, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Assessment of the mental health of individuals serving a sentence affected by this Act
“(1) Where an individual is serving a sentence affected by this Act, they must be subject to an annual assessment of their mental health for the duration of their sentence and their term on licence.
(2) Where an assessment under subsection (1) indicates—
(a) a mental health condition; or
(b) a deterioration in a mental health condition since the previous assessment
the Secretary of State must take measures to treat such a mental health condition.”
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 9 would require a mental health assessment of an individual who has committed a terror offence to be carried out annually for the duration of their sentence and their term on licence. It would also require that where a mental health condition is found, or where there has been a deterioration of a mental health condition since the previous assessment, the Secretary of State must take measures to treat the mental health condition.
I am not a mental health professional and I do not claim to understand the psychology behind why somebody commits or plans to commit an act of terrorism, but it strikes me as eminently sensible to carry out regular mental health assessments of those who have committed an offence under the Bill, not because there is any correlation between having a mental health condition and committing acts of terrorism, but because mental health conditions can turn people into who they are not. By treating mental health conditions, we can provide support and reduce the chance of further criminal acts being carried out when a prisoner is released.
This is not just about preventing terrorism; it is about how we treat each other as people. It is common for people to wander down the wrong path. Of course, some paths are much more dangerous than others and it is right that people are appropriately sentenced for their crimes, but I can only imagine what it is like to be in prison for years on end. A few hours in my local Holme House Prison in Stockton is certainly enough for me. I cannot fathom what impact being in prison for a long sentence has on an individual’s mental health year after year, and time spent in prison without receiving treatment can make an existing mental health condition much worse. The individual released into society after their prison sentence has been served is left to struggle with their mental health condition. It is a recipe for disaster, but we can take simple precautions to address the problem.
Prisons and the Government have a duty of care for the physical and mental wellbeing of people in our prisons, and they should stay on top of any identified mental health conditions in order to best support offenders in their rehabilitation, so that they can make the most of deradicalisation programmes and rejoin society without any mental health illnesses blocking their way. That way, we can ensure that we have covered all the bases, that we are providing what should be basic necessities, such as mental health treatment, and that we are helping people on their way to becoming citizens who can contribute positively to society.
I recognise that mental health services in this country need much more resources, and they are often inadequate for people in the general population. That is another task for the Government: to establish high-quality mental health services for all. The new clause could take the pressure off community health services in the longer term by ensuring that people convicted of terrorist charges are as healthy as they can be when they return to society. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Chris Philp
Let me again thank the shadow Minister for raising a very important point. We know mental health can often contribute to, or perhaps even cause, significant portions of offending, including some elements of terrorist offending—not all terrorist offending, but certainly some. It is certainly an important area that we need to be very conscious of.
It is already a fundamental aspect of the health and justice system that we have processes in place to identify, assess and then treat offenders with a wide range of mental health needs, both in custody and throughout the criminal justice process. The intervention that the shadow Minister calls for is already inherent in the way the system operates. The NHS long-term plan already stipulates that all prisoners, not just terrorist prisoners, receive an early reception screening and an assessment within the first 24 hours of entry into the prison system, followed by a second screening within seven days. Decisions about whether to provide mental health treatment are made on the basis of identified clinical need. The mental health teams that work in this area have clear clinical pathways describing such referrals. Prisoners in custody, but also those out on licence, are monitored for mental health issues. Where mental health problems are identified, they are referred and treated, including if there is a change in their condition—a deterioration, as the new clause describes it.
Regarding the capacity to provide treatment, I am sure that as constituency MPs we are all aware of the importance of building mental health treatment capacity. I was pleased that over the past year or two, recent announcements in relation to NHS funding have included a lot more funding for mental health treatment facilities in the NHS, which will treat prisoners as much as they will treat people who are not in custody. The spirit of the new clause is an entirely reasonable one, but it is already inherent in how the system operates that people are medically screened and monitored, with appropriate treatment following, as it should. I acknowledge the importance of identifying and treating mental health conditions in all offender cohorts, including terrorist offenders.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his helpful response, but if mental health services in prisons reflect mental health services in wider society, I am worried, because we know how inadequate mental health services across our country currently are. That is something to which the Government need to give extra attention. The Minister has talked about extra investment in mental health, which is welcome; however, even though I will withdraw the new clause, I suggest that at some time in the future he comes to the House and talks about some of the issues around mental health in prisons, so we can gain a greater understanding of what is and is not happening. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Review of legislation: National Probation Service
“(1) Within 18 months of enactment, the Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the impact of the provisions in the Act on the National Probation Service.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) the probation support provided to offenders convicted for terrorist offences;
(b) how probation support provided to offenders convicted for terrorist offences has varied since implementation of this Act;
(c) the—
(i) type; and
(ii) number
of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service to work with terrorist offenders;
(d) the—
(i) training;
(ii) assessed skill level; and
(iii) assessed experience
of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service to work with terrorist offenders;
(e) the turnover of probation staff;
(f) the average length of service of probation staff;
(g) the non-staff resources provided to manage offenders convicted for terrorist offences; and
(h) the adequacy of the operating budget of the National Probation Service.
(3) A report under subsection (1) may make recommendations to improve the probation support to terrorist offenders.
(4) Where a report has made recommendations under subsection (4), the Secretary of State shall respond within 2 months.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report under subsection (1) before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I would be doing a disservice to the many probation officers and others working in the service if I did not raise the issue of what has happened to our probation service in recent times. I am personally delighted that probation is no longer out there with a load of private organisations, but has been brought back in house. I hope that the necessary improvements will take place so we can deliver an effective probation service in future.
New clause 10 would require the Secretary of State to commission and publish a report on the impact of the Bill’s provisions on the National Probation Service, its support for terrorist offenders and various specialist staffing and resource matters, and to respond within two months to any recommendations made in the report.
The work of the probation service is to assess and monitor risk, but it is also to provide support while trying to change an individual’s mindset so that they have a second chance, are less likely to reoffend, and can take up a positive role in society. It is true that terror offences can pose problems in this area: many individuals convicted of such offences are motivated by strong political views and actively do not want to change. This is one of the reasons why it is appropriate to have specialism within the probation service. At the same time, it is important to not lose sight of the rehabilitative purposes of probation, even if those sometimes have to be secondary to the risk management purpose.
Let us remember that there are particular issues that affect the rehabilitation of terror licensees, even if they are strongly engaged with desistance. Those include rejection by family and community, a sense of hopelessness and that they will never be trusted again, and fear on the part of educational and volunteer organisations and employers. Community-led organisations that do not focus exclusively on terror licensees sometimes have the best chance of getting honest and sustained engagement from that challenging group. If no one is ever speaking to those people in such a way that their barriers come down, how are we actually going to know what is going on? How are we going to know what interventions are needed to stop reoffending?
Very long licence periods such as those proposed in the Bill are, in practice, very similar to life or other indeterminate sentences, and have the same consequences for probation staff and for the rehabilitation prospects of licensees. They increase workloads for highly specialist and rare probation staff and can make rehabilitation and risk assessment more difficult by reducing the incentives to engage and co-operate. Specialist probation officers are thinly spread and consequently hold very high case loads of terror-related cases—more than 120% the normal rate. That level is appallingly high and the Government recognise that it needs to come down.
Research shows that more time spent with offenders is essential for proper assessment and rehabilitation, but that is not possible with such high case loads. More time requires more money. I have already addressed the need for financial reports on the impact of the Bill in new clause 3. The very long licence cases, such as lifers and those with indeterminate sentences, are a special challenge for probation staff because they never really come off their case loads, even as more new cases are constantly added.
On Second Reading, the Secretary of State referenced doubling the size of the probation terrorism unit. However, as I said earlier today, it is not clear exactly what difference that will make to the service’s capacity, given that the provisions in the Bill will change demand in ways that are hard to predict. It is not even clear what he meant by doubling the unit. I hope the Minister will tell us a little more. I invite him yet again to tell us what that means, what the Government are going to do and when that is going to happen.
Longer licences will significantly increase demand on the probation service, while ending some early releases could help to spread the resource. The general issue with increasing the number of probation specialists is that they can only be recruited from experienced staff. In recent years, the service has been hollowed out and huge amounts of experience lost. Lots of generalist roles will need to be backfilled with newly qualified staff before the more experienced staff can move into specialist roles.
I have a host of questions for the Minister this afternoon. What modelling has the Department done of the expected net effect of the changes the Bill makes on the total probation case load in the years and decades to come? How many new staff will be required to join the terrorism unit to manage the increasing case loads? That will have to be factored into the current recruitment drive. Have the Government assessed the extent of overtime and emergency working that may be needed in the terrorism-related probation unit until sufficient numbers of trained staff are available? Have Ministers considered the consequences for standards of monitoring and for staff welfare and retention? Will the Government commit to reducing the case load of specialist probation officers, not just in line with other probation staff, but by significantly more in recognition of currently higher case loads and the difficulty of those cases? Will they set up a strategy and targets to achieve that?
As there is with other counter-terror work, there can be a lot of secrecy around the work of counter-terror probation staff. Our professional officers do their best in the most difficult of circumstances and often go beyond what can reasonably be expected of them, yet mainstream probation staff often have little knowledge or confidence in their ability, for example, to recognise the early signs of extremism. It may turn out that some recent incidents have occurred despite contact with non-specialist probation staff. Not every probation staffer can be a specialist, so there may be a need for some amount of counter-terror training for all, so that signs can be spotted even where no terrorist link or offence has been identified in the past. Will there be counter-terror training for all probation officers? The growth in far-right extremism may mean that we need more people to be able to spot that early on. Have the Government considered establishing counter-terror as a more formal and funded specialism in probation, like integrated offender management?
We have already talked about the impact of the Bill’s removal of early release and the fact that that might lead to lower engagement with rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes. That would make the task of probation staff even harder. The National Probation Service needs some serious attention from the Government, but I hope that, having brought the service back totally in-house now, we will see those improvements in future.
Without an effective and fully funded service, the intentions behind the Bill fall to pieces. That is why we have tabled the new clause requiring the Government to review the impact of the Bill on the National Probation Service. We cannot simply increase the responsibility and case load and consider the matter closed, because if there are more than the estimated 50 new prisoners, we will have other things to consider. There will be the longer sentences and longer licences as well, all creating more work, but without the resource to back it up. Let us be clear: effective probation working is essential to monitor the risks that offenders on licence pose; it is no less essential than counter-terror policing or intelligence work, yet the probation service is again under-resourced at a much lower level, and is paid far less attention than some other services.
I have asked the Minister a wide range of questions and I look forward to his detailed responses. Ultimately we need him to tell us exactly what action his Government will take to sort out the issues raised and ensure that the National Probation Service can get on with its day-to-day role, before we turn to the particular issues raised by the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clearly, the probation service is important and I pay tribute to the thousands of men and women who work in that service helping to rehabilitate offenders, and by so doing keep the public safe. Several questions have arisen, some of which would probably be better directed at the Prisons and Probation Minister, but I will attempt to answer some of them to give the shadow Minister a flavour of what is going on.
First, in terms of overall resourcing levels, the spending review last September laid out a significantly increased funding package for the Prison and Probation Service, which is, as we speak, flowing to the frontline. Another spending review is coming this autumn, and the hon. Gentleman will no doubt study that carefully to see what is in it for the Prison and Probation Service, and indeed the Courts and Tribunals Service, but the spending review last September was good news for the probation service in terms of financial support.
The shadow Minister also referred to community rehabilitation companies coming in house. The restoration of a comprehensive National Probation Service run directly by the Ministry of Justice is something that I suspect everybody involved in the criminal justice system will welcome, and it will provide an opportunity to do a lot more with the offender cohorts that the hon. Gentleman referred to in his speech.
Earlier this year—I think it was in January—a host of announcements were made in relation to counter-terrorism, one component of which was the extra £90 million for counter-terrorism police. It was also announced that we would double the number of specialist probation officers who focus on terrorist prisoners. We will also be creating the new counter-terrorism assessment and intervention centre that I talked about a little earlier. I am not sure whether all prison and probation staff will have counter-terrorism training. I will have to let the hon. Gentleman know, but given that only 200 or so prisoners out of a population of approximately 80,000 are in for terrorist offences, he can draw his own conclusions about the numbers. However, I will check with my colleague, the Prisons and Probation Minister, and come back to him on that specific point.
In relation to the new clause itself and the desire for a review of the probation service, once again there are already good mechanisms in place to review the probation service. I point in particular to Her Majesty’s inspectorate of probation, whose duty it is to conduct on an ongoing basis—not just after 18 months, but the whole time—precisely the kind of review that the new clause calls for. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is content to rely on the excellent work that Her Majesty’s inspectorate of probation does in conducting the analysis that he calls for in his new clause.
Alex Cunningham
I very much welcome the increased resources that the Minister says are flowing into the frontline, but everything that we have heard from him today suggests that that is a work in progress. We do not yet know how many new probation officers are being trained; we do not know when the new centre to which he alluded will open; and we do not know how we will end up with more than one facility to accommodate terrorist offenders in future.
I hope that the Minister will consider writing to members of the Committee to tell us exactly where we have got to with all the new investment and where the money is being spent; how many probation officers we had before the funding was made available and how many we have now; and what the timeline is to complete the doubling of the resource in the service. Similarly, I would like to understand when the new facilities will actually be available, because if we are going to accommodate people in prison for a longer time, we must ensure that there are appropriate centres.
I see no sense in pressing the new clause to a vote. As the Minister said, people out there are working extremely hard and we pay tribute to them, but we must always be mindful that, due to the lack of resource, the probation service is not operating in the way that professional officers would like. I hope that the Minister’s confidence in the new resource package will bear the fruit that we all want to see. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Review of legislation: Effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation
‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of agencies working to manage an individual who is serving a sentence affected by this Act.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) the effectiveness of the transition when an individual who is serving a sentence affected by this Act is transferred from the responsibility of one agency to another;
(b) the procedural safeguards that are put in place to ensure an effective transition; and
(c) the processing and transfer of information and intelligence from one agency to another.
(3) For the purposes of this section “agencies” includes but is not limited to—
(a) police;
(b) the prison system;
(c) intelligence services;
(d) probation services;
(e) mental health services;
(f) local authorities; and
(g) housing providers.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(5) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
Well, this is what happens when you follow someone else’s damned notes. It does not say his name here, but who I am to argue? I call Alex Cunningham.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
If the hon. Lady would like to deliver my speech, I would be quite happy to sit down and shut up. I think she suggested earlier that I was talking a bit too much.
Alex Cunningham
Oh, never? Well that is fine. Maybe it is because we share the same accent and she feels at home when she hears me speak, although I think there is a certain anglification in my accent these days.
Alex Cunningham
I am very relieved to hear that, and I am sure that, as a fellow Scot, you will also appreciate it, Mr McCabe.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of the agencies working to manage offenders who have committed offences under the provisions in the Bill. I know how fond the Minister is of my reviews, and this one would consider the effectiveness of the transition when an offender is transferred from the responsibility of one agency to that of another; the procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure an effective transition; and the processing and transfer of information and intelligence from one agency to another.
Tackling and responding to crime is not and cannot be the responsibility of a sole agency. The police do not arrest, convict, sentence, look after, monitor and assess people, and nor should they. Different agencies with different responsibilities working together are a key part of our checks and balances. By not giving anyone so much responsibility that they cannot fulfil their obligations, we ensure that they can perform their role in the system to a high standard. To ensure that there is a seamless transition from one agency to another, and that organisations are fully aware of their responsibilities, there needs to be effective communication.
The purpose of the new clause is to find out how agencies communicate with each other and how effective those methods are. We would like to know if there are communication issues between the agencies; we have already seen the horrific consequence of communication breakdown, when crucial information is not properly shared. We also need to find out what problems the Secretary of State can act on to rectify. We cannot afford to get this wrong. If there are failures in communication, it can fail the whole process—the justice system itself fails.
Chris Philp
I sense a certain appetite for brevity, so I will endeavour to achieve that in my response. I entirely agree with the points about the importance of inter-agency working. Many different agencies will encounter offenders or potential offenders at different times, and it is of course critical that they work together.
For that very reason, following the terrible attacks at the end of last year, the Government commissioned Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to carry out a review of the effectiveness of multi-agency public protection arrangements—exactly the kind of cross-agency working to which the shadow Minister refers. I believe that report is now with my colleagues, who are carefully considering its findings. We will publish the report, which is on exactly the topic that the shadow Minister wants us to review, at the earliest opportunity, so this may be an area where the shadow Minister not only gets a report but gets it perhaps earlier that he would otherwise have expected, which is a nice note to end on.
The shadow Minister is quite right that cross-agency working is important. We intend to make sure that it happens in the effective way that it should, and Jonathan Hall’s report will be an important part of that.
Alex Cunningham
Success at last. I can leave the Committee Room a happy man. I will not press the new clause to a vote, but it is important. Communications are central. Across all public services, we see a lack of communication leading to all manner of horrors in our society—children dying, terrorists recommitting offences; all manner of things happen because the communication is not right. It is clear that the Minister understands the importance of this. I look forward to Jonathan Hall’s report; I am sure that it will be good bedtime reading. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Chris Philp
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. Before you conclude the final sentence of this Committee proceeding, I shall quickly take this opportunity to thank all Committee members for their service over the last few weeks in considering this incredibly important Bill, which touches on the safety and security of our constituents. Nothing more powerfully illustrated that than the very moving speech given earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford on the experience of her friend Louise, which I think all of us will vividly remember. It reminds us how important the work we are doing here is.
I believe that, with this Bill, we are taking a significant step forward, largely in a spirit of cross-party co-operation from all corners of the House, as it should be for something as important as national security and the safety of our constituents. Of course, we have our differences elsewhere, but on this topic we seem to be mostly on the same page, which is extremely welcome.
I thank everyone who has supported this process. I thank the Whips on both sides for getting us through the Bill a little earlier than expected, which is welcome. I thank Mr McCabe and Mr Robertson for chairing the Committee proceedings with such aplomb, and for correcting the shadow Ministers and me when we occasionally erred from the path we were supposed to be following.
I thank the witnesses who took the time to give us evidence earlier in the proceedings. It was genuinely useful, and the fact that we spent a lot of time in our earlier debates dissecting that evidence shows just how illuminating it was. I do not think any of us will forget Professor Grubin, but I certainly will not be volunteering to hook myself up to any of his machines in a hurry.
Chris Philp
Do not tempt me.
Finally, I thank the phenomenal public servants who have supported the preparation of the Bill and the wider work that goes on, in particular members of my private office—I can see Andrew sitting over there—and all the people working in the policy, legal and financial teams at the Ministry of Justice. They are incredible civil servants who have been working so hard to put this Bill together, including working over the weekend to respond to the various amendments that arrived on Friday. A huge thank you to everyone in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office for the work they have done on this Bill.
It is appropriate to conclude by thanking those people on the frontline in the constant struggle to keep us and our fellow citizens safe—the police, the Prison Service, the probation service and the security service. Our thanks is due to them most of all. On a daily basis, they put themselves in harm’s way, to keep us safe. I put on record my gratitude to those outstanding public servants.
Alex Cunningham
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I would like to reflect what the Minister has said and, first and foremost, thank you and Mr Robertson for conducting our proceedings professionally and getting us through the business quickly.
I also specifically thank the Clerks to the Committee. They understand the things that I am trying to say and they can put them into the jargon that is required to appear on the amendment paper. I am very appreciative of that. I have come to the realisation that they understand more about what I am trying to get across than I do myself.
I thank Committee colleagues for some robust debate and a few corrections along the way. I thank the staff who had to work over the weekend. I pass on my thanks to them and I am sorry if I was the cause of all that additional work. At least we had reasonable responses from the Minister, and I welcome that. With that, I will simply sit down.
Joanna Cherry
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I will not detain people for long, other than to add my words of thanks to those that have been given already. I would particularly like to thank the Clerks to the Committee for their assistance in framing amendments. I thank the Whips for the assistance that they have given me and a third party in relation to this.
I acknowledge the powerful and moving speech we heard earlier. When I woke up this morning, the first thing I remembered was that that event was 15 years ago, but the way in which we were reminded of that as a Committee was particularly powerful and very personal. I thank the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford for that.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Tuesday 21st July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
17:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 189 / Noes: 335 - Question accordingly negatived.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Review of deradicalisation programmes in prisons—
“(1) Within three years of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a comprehensive review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on the effectiveness and availability of deradicalisation programmes in prisons.
(2) The review must include an assessment of—
(a) the effectiveness of existing programmes at reducing radicalisation and terrorist offending;
(b) how individuals are assessed for their suitability for a programme;
(c) the number of individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme;
(d) the number of individuals assessed as not requiring a place on a programme;
(e) the average length of time individuals assessed as requiring a place on a programme have to wait to start a programme; and
(f) whether there is sufficient capacity and resource to meet demand for places on deradicalisation programmes in prisons.”
This new clause requires a review of the impact of the Act on deradicalisation programmes in prisons.
New clause 3—Financial Impact Assessment Report—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three years of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a report on the financial impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) That report must separately consider the financial impact of—
(a) extended sentences on the prison estate;
(b) extended licence periods;
(c) any increased staffing resources required for Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service;
(d) the extended offenders of particular concern regime; and
(e) adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ licence conditions.
(3) The report may consider other financial matters.
(4) The report must compare the financial impact of the Act with the Impact Assessment for the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill published by the Ministry of Justice on 18 May 2020.
(5) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make an oral statement in the House of Commons on his plan to address the financial and non-financial issues identified in the report.”
This new clause requires a review of the financial impact of the Act.
New clause 4—Report on extended sentences for terrorist offenders: Scotland—
“(1) The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 210A(4) insert—
‘(4A) The report under section 210A(4), where it applies to a person convicted on indictment of a terrorism offence, must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extended sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(4B) The court must take account of any points made by the report in relation to the matters in subsection (4A).’
(3) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(4) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”
New clause 5—Report on extended custodial sentences for terrorist offenders: Northern Ireland—
“(1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1)) (extended custodial sentences) is amended as follows.
(2) In Article 9, after paragraph (2), insert—
‘(2A) The pre-sentence report under paragraph (2), where it applies to a person convicted on indictment of a terrorism offence, must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extended custodial sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(2B) The court must take account of any points made by the report in relation to the matters in paragraph (2A).’
(3) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(4) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”
New clause 6—Review of effects on children and young offenders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a review of the effects of the provisions of this Act on children and young offenders.
(2) That review must detail any differential effects on children and young offenders in—
(a) sentencing;
(b) release of terrorist offenders; and
(c) the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
(3) The review must consider the impact of imprisonment under this Act on the physical and mental health of children and young offenders.
(4) The review must consider the influences on children and young offenders who commit offences under this Act, including but not limited to—
(a) the internet;
(b) peer-pressure; and
(c) vulnerability.
(5) When conducting a review under this section, the Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers.
(6) The review may make recommendations for further changes to legislation, policy and guidance.
(7) For the purposes of this section, young offenders include adults aged under 25.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the effects of these measures on children and young offenders. It would also require the Secretary of State to consult with Scottish ministers when conducting the review.
New clause 7—Review of legislation: Northern Ireland—
“(1) On an annual basis from the day of this Act being passed, a report that reviews the application of the provisions of this Act in Northern Ireland must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament by the Secretary of State.
(2) Annual reports under subsection (1) must be produced in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive.”
This new clause ensures that all measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland shall be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive, and a report shall be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.
New clause 9—Review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders—
“(1) Before sections 32 to 35 come into force, the Secretary of State must, within 6 months of this Act being passed, conduct a pilot of the use of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders.
(2) The outcome of the pilot must be reported to Parliament within 12 months of this Act being passed.
(3) This report must include—
(a) data on the number of terrorist offenders who have been subject to polygraph testing during the pilot;
(b) an explanation of how the results of polygraph tests have been used during the pilot;
(c) an analysis of the effect polygraph testing has had on the licence conditions of terrorist offenders;
(d) data on the number of terrorist offenders who were recalled to prison on the basis of polygraph test results;
(e) a recommendation from the Secretary of State as to whether sections 32 to 35 should enter into force following the pilot; and
(f) evidence of independent research on the reliability and value of polygraph testing of terrorist offenders.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a pilot test of the use of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders and report the outcome to Parliament, in addition to setting out evidence for the reliability of polygraph tests based on independent research.
New clause 10—Review of sections 1 to 31—
“(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of this Act to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.
(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to the imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.
(3) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.
(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—
(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and
(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.
(6) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would require an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of the Act to be conducted after one year.
Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”
Government amendment 6.
Amendment 31, in clause 6, page 9, leave out lines 21 to 25, and insert—
“(11) In forming an opinion for the purposes of subsections (1)(d) and (6), the court must consider a report by a relevant officer of a local authority about the offender and the offender’s circumstances.
(11A) Where the offender is under 21 years of age, the report must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age; and
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender and the court must take these factors into account when forming its opinion under subsection (6).
(11B) In considering the report, the court must, if it thinks it necessary, hear the relevant officer.”
Amendment 32, in clause 7, page 10, line 15, at end insert—
“(2A) Where the offender is under the age of 21, in forming an opinion for the purposes of paragraph (2), the court must consider and take into account a pre-sentence report within the meaning of Article 4 which must—
(a) take account of the offender’s age; and
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.”
Government amendments 7 and 8.
Amendment 33, in clause 16, page 16, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) Section 255 of the Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(3) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 256(4)(b)(iii)—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(4) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (3).’
(6) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(7) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”
Amendment 34, in clause 17, page 17, line 4, at end insert—
“(4) Section 267 of the Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(5) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 268(4)(b)(iii)—
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(2B) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (2A).’
(6) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.
(7) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”
Government amendments 9 to 16.
Amendment 5, page 21, line 30, leave out clause 24.
Amendment 52, in clause 27, page 23, line 24, after “unless”, insert
“the terrorist prisoner was at least aged 18 at the time of the commission of the offence for which the prisoner is serving the sentence, and”.
This amendment provides that only certain adult terrorist prisoners are excluded from eligibility for early release in England and Wales.
Amendment 53, in clause 28, page 24, line 12, after “unless”, insert
“the terrorist prisoner was at least aged 18 at the time of the commission of the offence for which the prisoner is serving the sentence, and”.
This amendment provides that only certain adult terrorist prisoners are excluded from eligibility for early release in Scotland.
Amendment 1, in clause 30, page 26, line 16, leave out “whether before or”.
This amendment would remove the retrospective application of this provision.
Amendment 2, in clause 30, page 26, line 17, leave out from “(2)” to end of line 20.
This amendment would remove the retrospective application of this provision.
Amendment 54, in clause 30, page 27, line 14, after “terrorism sentence” insert
“and the terrorist prisoner was at least aged 18 at the time of the commission of the offence for which the prisoner is serving such a sentence”.
This amendment provides that only certain adult terrorist prisoners are excluded from eligibility for early release in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 55, page 28, line 17, leave out clause 32.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 32, which extends the current polygraph testing requirements to adult terrorist offenders released on licence in England and Wales.
Amendment 56, page 29, line 8, leave out clause 33.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 33, which extends the current polygraph testing requirements to adult terrorist offenders released on licence in Scotland.
Amendment 57, page 30, line 25, leave out clause 34.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 34, which extends the current polygraph testing requirements to adult terrorist offenders released on licence in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 58, page 33, line 7, leave out clause 35.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 35, which extends the current polygraph testing requirements to adult terrorist offenders released on licence.
Amendment 35, in clause 52, page 43, line 40, leave out “to” and insert “, 34 and”.
This amendment would remove section 33 from the list of provisions that are brought into force through regulations by the Secretary of State.
Amendment 3, in clause 52, page 43, line 40, leave out “to 35” and insert “, 33 and 35”.
This amendment would remove section 34 from the list of provisions that are brought into force through regulations by the Secretary of State.
Amendment 4, in clause 52, page 43, line 42, at end insert—
“(3A) Section 34 comes into force on such day as the Department for Justice of Northern Ireland may by regulations appoint.”
This amendment would mean section 34 could only be brought into force through regulations by the Northern Ireland Executive.
Amendment 36, in clause 52, page 43, line 42, at end insert—
“(3A) Section 33 comes into force on such day as Scottish Ministers may by regulations appoint.”
This would have the effect that provision in the Bill that relate to polygraph testing would only become operational if the Scottish Government asked for those provisions to be implemented.
Government amendments 20 to 29.
Alex Cunningham
In Committee, Members had a robust debate about many aspects of this Bill, which we support but believe can still be improved. I start with new clause 1 and the probation service.
We cannot begin to tackle terrorism without recognising the important role that the probation service plays in keeping people safe. New clause 1 requires the Secretary of State to commission a review and publish a report on the impact of the provisions in the Bill on the National Probation Service. It would have to consider the probation support provided to offenders convicted of terrorist offences, how probation support provided to offenders convicted for terrorist offences has varied since implementation of this Bill, the type and number of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service to work with terrorist offenders, the turnover of probation staff, the average length of service of probation staff, and the non-staff resources provided to manage offenders convicted of terrorist offences.
For the probation service to be fully functioning and effective, it must have the resources it needs. The Minister said that the spending review last September laid out a significantly increased funding package for the Prison Service and probation service, which is supposedly flowing to the frontline, but the National Probation Service is in a far from satisfactory state, and we know about the disaster that ensued when large parts of it were privatised. Thankfully privatisation is no more, but we still have to get the service right.
The NPS has a workforce including 6,500 probation officers and a budget of more than £500 million. Earlier this year, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of probation painted a picture of a service in crisis, with hundreds of vacancies, overstretched officers and managers, and crumbling, overcrowded buildings, including hostels for recently released offenders. Inspectors rated all of its divisions as requiring improvement on staffing. None of the areas are fully staffed. There were high rates of staff sickness—an average of 11 days per person, 50% of which related to mental health difficulties. There are 650 job vacancies nationwide in the probation service—a full 10% of the establishment.
Although the probation service is not in the Minister’s portfolio, I am sure he will agree that that is not satisfactory. We can only hope that things are improving. In Committee, the Minister talked about the welcome resources being invested in the service and about the spending review coming this autumn. Can he confirm that he is satisfied that there are sufficient resources to achieve what he wants, or are Ministers bidding for more from the spending review? Perhaps more importantly, will he confirm that the necessary support will be put in place to bring the National Probation Service up to full strength, to tackle the issues raised in inspection reports, and to provide staff with the support they need for their mental and physical ill health, to help them back to work and while they are there, and put an end to the high sickness rate? All those things put pressure on the service and the ability of staff to cope with offenders day to day—in this context, with some of the most dangerous ones.
In Committee, I also asked about whether all probation officers will have counter-terrorism training, and the Minister addressed that in a letter to me. He said:
“Governors and front-line staff are being given the training, skills, and authority needed to challenge inappropriate views and take action against them…Staff are also trained how to recognise aspects of an offender’s behaviour which might indicate terrorist sympathies. Over 29,000 prison staff have been trained.”
We all welcome that.
The increased workloads for highly specialised and rare probation staff are a cause for concern. Research shows that more time spent with offenders is essential for proper assessment and rehabilitation, but that is not possible with such high case loads. The very long license cases, such as lifers and those with indeterminate sentences, are a special challenge for probation staff because they never really come off their case loads, and more new cases are constantly added. Specialist probation officers are thinly spread and consequently hold very high case loads of terror-related cases—over 120% of normal. That level is appallingly high, and the Government recognise that it needs to come down. Their recruitment of more specialists to manage counter-terrorism offenders is also to be welcomed. That said, the general issue with increasing the number of specialists in probation is that they can only be recruited from experienced staff, and with high sickness levels and a 10% vacancy rate, how can Ministers be confident that they can provide a quality service, not just for those convicted of terrorism or related offences but offenders in general?
There is a danger that huge amounts of experience are being lost and that lots of generalist roles will need to be backfilled with newly qualified staff before the more experienced staff can move on to specialist roles—and that in a service where a full third of all employees have less than three years’ experience in probation. I asked this in Committee, but I do not believe an answer was forthcoming, so can the Minister now tell me what modelling the Department has done on the expected net effect on the total probation caseload over the years and decades to come as a result of the changes in this Bill? Ad hoc measures are not good enough; there need to be properly considered measures and funding given to the probation service to make it an effective mechanism to tackle terrorism and do one of our country’s most difficult jobs.
I turn to the related issue of de-radicalisation programmes in prison, and new clause 2. When someone has committed a terror offence and has gone to prison, there is an expectation that this person will be kept away from mainstream society for the purposes of keeping the public safe, and an expectation that their time in prison will be used effectively. This means that all efforts will be made to ensure that the individual does not return to the same destructive path that they were on prior to being arrested. In order to achieve this, there needs to be a properly structured and expert-driven de-radicalisation programme available for all those who are identified as being in need of enrolling on such a programme.
For the purpose of informing Members who were not members of the Committee, I will reiterate a number of points I made during that time. Although the minimum sentencing for terror offences has been increased, there is a suggestion that we could simply be delaying inevitable further offences unless we take action to use the offender’s time in prison to de-radicalise them, and we can only do that if there is an effective de-radicalisation programme in place. While we heard in evidence that many good things are happening in our prisons around de-radicalisation, there were also concerns expressed about the adequacy of the programmes and their availability.
That does not just concern Committee members and witnesses. At last Tuesday’s Justice questions, the hon. Member for Newbury (Laura Farris) pressed the Minister, the hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), on how programmes could be improved. Helpfully, the Minister replied:
“Twenty-two trained imams are doing de-radicalisation programmes in our prisons, but those are not the only measures that we are introducing. We have increased our training for prison and probation officers to deal with terrorism and we are bringing in new national standards for managing terrorists on licence. We want more counter-terrorism specialist staff and we want more places in approved premises as a transition from prison to the community.”
When I challenged her on the inadequacy and quality of the provision, she said:
“we continually evaluate the programmes that we operate within our prisons.”—[Official Report, 14 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 1361.]
If that is really the case, and if the Government are so confident that the programmes have been successful, what do they fear from commissioning a formal review of them and reporting to the House?
We really do need to know what is happening in prisons in relation to this. What programmes are being delivered? Who are they being delivered to? Who are they being delivered by? When are offenders undertaking the programme? How many de-radicalisation programmes is one offender in for a minimum sentence expected to cover? How is the success of these programmes measured? We need to understand the effectiveness of the programmes, where they work, where they do not, what can be improved, and what the Government are going to do to drive those improvements.
Neither the healthy identity intervention nor the desistance and disengagement programme courses, which form the main part of the programmes, have undergone any form of evaluation process to date. In Committee, the Minister said that most of the de-radicalisation work and programmes are done operationally inside the prison and probation service, and are not specified in legislation. He said that Ministers need the flexibility of being able to change guidance through statutory instruments, and I accept this. But we were never asking for the programme details to be placed in the Bill through this new clause—a new clause that would, I think, help to secure the public’s trust in our approach to tackling terrorism. This new clause is not about clearly outlining deradicalisation programmes in legislation; it is about reviewing how effective our deradicalisation programmes are, so it is only right that they are reviewed, with the results laid before Parliament.
That brings me on to the general financial impact of the Bill, new clause 3 and the resources it will need behind it for it to be successful and properly implemented. In Committee, the Minister told me that the impact assessment estimated an additional 50 people in prisons. Although I still believe that is an underestimation, bearing in mind the rise of far-right terrorism and other groups whose members will end up in the system, I will not rehearse those arguments yet again. I believe the cost of implementing this Bill is estimated to be about £16 million a year, but I do not think that honestly reflects the impact it will have on all service areas. Who knows, but providing the mental health support our prison and probation staff desperately need will be costly, and if we do not have that investment from elsewhere in the Department’s budget, we are not going to see the all-round service we all want delivered. So will the Minister confirm that he has covered the additional cost of creating space for new prisoners, the additional cost of having more than one specialist centre, the additional cost of having further specially trained prison officers and the cost for probation services of expanding the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime?
Matt Rodda (Reading East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a detailed and comprehensive speech, examining many of these difficult issues, which we all face. I have reflected on what he has been saying, and I believe that the way to approach these difficult issues is by having an open mind and asking a series of questions, rather than coming at any of these things with pre-conceived ideas. I am grateful for his thought and his incisive questioning of the Government, in a spirit of cross-party co-operation.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. He rightly says that this is about having an open mind. I was trying to persuade the Minister and the Conservative Members in Committee that they should have an open mind on a number of issues, because we are facing real challenges on deradicalisation programmes, the resources within the probation service and the fact that young people are going to be treated exactly the same as adult prisoners in the system—I will be coming on to that later.
We also want to understand whether the resources are available for the use of polygraphs and to deal with the impact on youth offender teams. I have already talked about the impact of longer licensing on the National Probation Service. Such measures as are in this Bill always have ripple effects, so we ask the Secretary of State to lay before the House, within three years, a report on the real financial impact of all these things. There should never be an issue of resources when it comes to justice matters, and a review would not only identify where there are issues, but arm the Secretary of State with the evidence he needs to resist further cuts to his Department’s budget and instead win some additional resources.
We should ensure that prisons are properly staffed and that those staff are properly supported, be it for their personal security or to provide them with adequate services when they suffer mental illness as a result of their job—services that we know are currently totally inadequate. I asked about these measures in Committee, but we still need reassurances. This is about not just funding for prison places, but the wider financial impact on society, especially when offenders get released from prison and need help rebuilding their lives. That is a particular concern for those who are young and may leave prison with no support system. These provisions do not come cheap, and I hope we are going to get some clearer answers on meeting the costs of the different services that I have laid out.
Throughout Committee, I stressed the importance of recognising that young offenders are different from older, adult offenders and that their age ought to be taken into consideration when they are being sentenced, even for the most terrible of crimes. That is why we tabled amendment 30, parallel amendments for Scotland and Northern Ireland and the remaining new clauses in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, myself and others.
Joy Morrissey (Beaconsfield) (Con)
May I ask why an actual age is not included in amendment 30? There is an allusion to an age, but not a specific age. Will he outline why that was not included in the amendment when it was drafted?
Alex Cunningham
Personally, I thought the amendment was clear. It lays down very specific issues in relation to young people. That is why we tried to detail in Committee that young people are different and need to be treated differently.
Joy Morrissey
If we are talking about the age at which a person is convicted of a crime and serves this type of sentence, it would have been clearer if an age was included in the amendment, whether that was 13, 15 or 18, just to further the case for why young offenders should be given a less severe sentence.
Alex Cunningham
The hon. Lady tempts me to start to rehearse all the arguments around the age of maturity. We know that children up to the age of 18 are treated differently under the law, much as the group between 18 and 20 are supposed to be treated differently. There is more and more evidence all the time. In particular, there have been some studies in Scotland—I am looking at the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) for the SNP—that are starting to talk in terms of, “Maybe we should be looking at 25 as the age of maturity.” That is all the more reason why we have to think carefully about how we treat young people in the justice system, because young people ought to be treated differently. They have a better chance of being rehabilitated, and it is important we give them that chance.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Melton) (Con)
I am slightly confused by the suggestion we should be extending to 25 years old when there are Members of Parliament who are under 25. Is he suggesting that somehow different rules should apply to them or that they are not yet at the age where they can appropriately represent their constituents?
Alex Cunningham
We are talking about issues of maturity here, not when somebody can be an elected a Member of Parliament. I think that Members can be elected at the age of 18 now. I do not see the point that the hon. Lady is making.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
Looking at the evidence that we heard during the Bill Committee, am I right in understanding that the greater possibility of rehabilitating young people is what is being looked at here? It is about where we define youth. Does it stop at 18, or 21, or—as we are now looking at in Scotland in our consultation—25, in terms of not maturity generally but the ability to rehabilitate?
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady, who has explained that far better than I could ever hope to; I very much appreciate that. Perhaps there are some MPs who need rehabilitating as well, Madam Deputy Speaker, but that is another matter.
Is it right for a person, even if they are young, who has committed a serious offence to be put in prison for a particular period of time to protect the public, without their age being considered? We have to balance this properly. How long is long enough for punishment for a young person, and how long is too long to prevent the individual being effectively rehabilitated? Those who commit serious offences will be released from prison at some point. Surely the Minister agrees that we can lessen the time that an individual spends in prison with the aim of it being core to their rehabilitation; it is indeed preferable to a longer sentence, where hostility and deep-seated mistrust of the state simply develops and grows.
We know that this legislation cuts out the role of the Parole Board from any involvement with offenders sentenced under it. I think that it is lamentable that this also applies to young offenders, who, if involved with a specialist group of experts, could benefit tremendously from that. It is not straightforward when dealing with young people, and we should not pretend it is. We need to be smart, cautious and measured. Sadly, there are always some people, young or otherwise, who will never respond to a second chance, and the judges in their cases will act accordingly, but I want the judges to be better equipped than they are at present so that when they see there is a chance that a long fixed sentence for a young person is not appropriate and does not offer the best chance of rehabilitation, they have the flexibility to do something else.
As I said in my opening remarks, there is a need for specific requirements for Northern Ireland, but I will content myself with a few short remarks on new clause 7. My hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) has been speaking in detail with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister, Naomi Long, and all the Northern Ireland parties about how we ensure that the measures in the Bill are compatible with the unique and well-established practices in terrorism-related sentencing and policing in Northern Ireland and, as we all know, are particularly sensitive to the political dynamics in Northern Ireland while ensuring that people in that part of the UK are kept safe and secure.
The mechanism proposed in new clause 7 would give some measure of assurance to the devolved institutions that their views are being heard by the Government. The Minister was reluctant to accept this amendment in Committee, but I hope that he will look at it much more closely.
Throughout the proceedings on this Bill, I have been very grateful to have formal and informal discussions with the Minister and to receive letters clarifying some of the issues raised in Committee. Last week, in response to my query about a technical amendment relating to section 61 of Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and sentences served in young offender institutions, the Minister confirmed to me and the Bill Committee that there were no plans to change the way young adults were accommodated in the prison estate. That I very much welcome, and I would be bold enough to ask him to reiterate his guarantee that section 61 will not be enacted.
As I said at the outset, I have, throughout the Bill’s progress, talked about young people being different and the need for them to be dealt with appropriately, so I was very surprised to have it confirmed to me by the Minister that some 18, 19 and 20-year-olds were not only in the same prison as older offenders but on the same wing and sharing the same social spaces. I am assuming that this mixing does not apply to terrorist offenders, but even if it does not, that practice is totally unacceptable. I would welcome news of a plan to deal with that very real issue, which today is putting younger prisoners at considerable risk.
In conclusion, I reiterate our support for the Bill and hope that the Government will act to address the very real issues that colleagues and I have raised.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Colleagues will be aware that there are a number of speakers who want to get in this afternoon. Sir Robert Neill has withdrawn, so I will go straight to Joanna Cherry, but after that, if colleagues speak for about five minutes, that will enable us to make some progress.
Joanna Cherry
I will start by apologising to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for being slightly tardy in taking up my seat for this debate. No offence was meant. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham). As well as sharing our country of birth, we share many of the same views about the Bill.
I wish to speak to new clause 6 and amendments 35 and 36, which are tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill). I will also speak to amendments 52 to 60, which have been tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman). She chairs the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments reflect some concerns held by that Committee, on which I also sit, about our duty to consider the human rights aspects of any legislation that passes through the House.
The SNP has made it clear from the outset that we recognise it is the duty of any Government to keep our citizens safe and secure, and all who serve in Parliament have an obligation to assist in that endeavour. I and my colleagues in Edinburgh have assured the UK Government that we will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism is met and that people across these islands are kept as safe is as reasonably possible. SNP Members are also mindful of our duty as parliamentarians to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections, and we have accordingly tabled a number of amendments to address the devolved aspects of the Bill, and raise some concerns about civil liberties.
Counter-terrorism is a reserved matter, but sentencing is not. The Scottish legal system, including policing, sentencing and parole, and the management of the Scottish prison service are devolved matters, and elements of the Bill that touch on those things will require a legislative consent motion. The Minister accepts that, and there are ongoing discussions with my colleague, Humza Yousaf, who is the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice. Until those discussions have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Scottish Government, SNP MPs cannot give the Bill their unqualified support, but we will continue to work constructively with the Government.
We are particularly pleased that the UK Government have addressed an issue that I and my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian raised in Committee—namely, the interplay between the new sentencing regime proposed in the Bill and the existing sentence of an order for lifelong restriction in Scotland. That unique sentence is imposed not so much for the crime committed but because the offender poses an ongoing risk. It was designed to deal with high-risk violent and sexual offenders rather than terrorists, and its purpose is to ensure that those people are not released until they are rehabilitated, and that even then they are subject to a risk management plan for the rest of their natural life.
I welcome Government amendments 9 to 16, which have been tabled to address the interplay between the new sentence and the order for lifelong restriction. As I understand it, they will ensure that an order for lifelong restriction will remain available to the Scottish courts when they are considering sentencing someone for a serious terrorist offence, provided that if an OLR is imposed instead of a serious terrorism sentence, the person sentenced must serve at least 14 years. I am pleased that the Government have taken our concerns on board, and we hope that the outstanding discussions on the legislative consent motion will have the same fruitful outcome.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and it was a pleasure to serve alongside her on the Bill Committee for this important piece of legislation. I guess it is something of a truism that the first duty of a Government is to protect their citizens, but that is precisely what this Bill seeks to do. As luck would have it, the seventh sitting of the Bill Committee took place on 7/7. I felt that morning, on that inauspicious, infamous date, that it was critical to put the debate we were having on the Bill in some kind of context, so I told the story of my friend Louise. I would like to tell her story again in this debate and in this Chamber.
On that day 15 years ago, Louise was on a train from Liverpool Street to Aldgate. The night before she had been in Trafalgar Square, celebrating the fact that London had just won its bid to host the 2012 Olympics. It was a very busy commuter train, so she was standing when the train was rocked by an explosion in the next carriage. Louise’s carriage filled with smoke and the lights went out. The train screeched to an appalling halt. She says she could feel her heart beating so hard that she could virtually hear it and thought it was going to jump out of her body, but she fought to keep calm amid the screams, panic and chaos around her.
Some people managed to control their panic and began trying to help each other. They called up and down the train for doctors, nurses and anyone who could help. Some people had fallen and some had hit their heads—it was just chaos. Some people were trying to get out of the windows between the carriages or trying to prise the doors apart, but none of that would work. Someone cried out that there was a body on the track. They waited in the dark. Some emergency lights were flickering on and off, but it was mainly dark for over an hour until Louise remembers seeing the very top of a policeman’s helmet outside the train in the tunnel. That was a very reassuring sight. She felt from that moment that everything was going to be all right and that she, at least, was going to get out.
Eventually, those who were able to move out of the way made way for the injured to be carried out or to walk past them. They were bloodied, black and bewildered. Many of them were bandaged with commuters’ possessions, such as belts, scarves and ties. After what seemed like forever, Louise was able to get off the train, but she had to walk past the bombed carriage. She said it looked like it had been ripped apart like a can of Coke. She passed two bodies on the track, covered up roughly by a fluorescent transport worker’s jacket. She saw a man who was badly injured being tended to by paramedics. He was barely clothed; the bomb had ripped the clothes from him. He was propped up against the tunnel wall and his entire body was blackened by the bomb blast.
Louise said it was very surreal to come from that black hellish atmosphere into the light and quite overwhelming. There were helicopters above. There were blue lights and sirens. There was a triage unit on the pavement where people were being treated. It is quite surreal, in a way, that she was just told to give her details to the police and then she just walked off on her own into London to try to find her husband and a cup of tea. She had no idea that she was covered, and her faced was absolutely covered, in soot. The fear, the panic and the shock came later. The overriding feeling she was left with was, why did she get into that particular carriage? Why did she not get into the next one? Why did she survive when so many did not? She was determined not to change her way of life, so she was soon back on the Tube and back at work. I think that that personifies an attitude that says, “This is not going to change our life. We will carry on the way we were before. Terrorism will not stop us.”
As we deliberated the Bill on that day 15 years afterwards, Louise was at Aldgate station placing flowers as she does every year. Many of her fellow passengers have never been back on a Tube. Some are still suffering from anxiety and depression. Some suffered life-changing injuries and some will never see the light of day again. This House and many Members have their own personal experiences of the savagery of terrorism, and I know we all want to do all we can to prevent future attacks. How can we do that? Today, in a very direct way, we can do a lot. We can do just what the Bill seeks to do: strengthen sentencing, limit early release, give the security services the best tools available to manage, and disrupt suspected and convicted perpetrators.
We are hearing, and I am sure we will hear a lot more, about the rights, youth, vulnerability and potential for rehabilitation of terrorist suspects and offenders. Those valid issues, and the issues addressed in many of the new clauses and amendments, are amply dealt with in the Bill. There is no doubt in my mind that the best way that we can honour the victims, like Louise and many others, is to pass the Bill, intact, today.
Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)
It is often customary to say that it is a pleasure to follow the previous speaker, but that would not seem appropriate given the contribution by the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson). It was incredibly poignant and powerful, though, and most appropriate given the Bill before us.
I was pleased to hear the contribution from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—I do not say that to cause her any discomfort—because we find common cause on the issue of polygraph testing. If I cast my mind back to my contribution on Second Reading, I recall that I spoke about the fact that there are distinct differences not only between our criminal justice systems throughout this United Kingdom but in the choices that we, as representatives, need to make about the appropriateness of embarking on an untested and unverifiable system that would ultimately be used to impose further restrictions on somebody’s liberty in a way that we cannot satisfy ourselves is at all appropriate.
I am pleased to find common cause among Members from different parties who have concerns about the creeping integration of the use of an unverified method of assessing offenders. We understand that it is restricted to licences and, now, to three or four discrete areas of offence, but just as the Scottish are being cautious, I believe that we in Northern Ireland will be cautious, too, about the introduction of such measures. To that end, I was pleased to hear chief commissioner Les Allamby from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission give evidence to the Bill Committee and highlight his concerns from a Northern Ireland perspective.
I recognise the thrust behind amendments 3 and 4, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry); however, I wonder whether they are necessary. If I reflect on clause 34, I see that it is for the Department of Justice Northern Ireland to decide whether the use of polygraphs is necessary. That provision should give us enough comfort about the operational introduction of polygraph testing in Northern Ireland. We should be slow to water down or remove the fact that counter-terrorism and national security measures are reserved to this Parliament. I say that believing not that the devolved institution in Northern Ireland should not have a role, but that we should be cautious in seeking to attain power on national security and counter-terrorism grounds, recognising the divergent views in our Northern Ireland Executive, some of the competing arguments that would be made and that ultimately we may get less protection should cross-community consensus be required for the introduction of those powers. I am therefore not minded to support amendments 3 and 4.
A recurring theme throughout the passage of the Bill has been its retrospective application. The Minister will recall that I was concerned that Northern Ireland was not included in the retrospective application of the extension of serious terrorist offences, and that I was pleased whenever Northern Ireland was included and that the implications, perceived or otherwise, of article 7 applications on the retrospective nature of the offences were overcome. I say that because when we take such decisions—when we decide as a Parliament that we are going to extend the custodial period of someone’s sentence—we need to do it with our eyes wide open. That is not to ignore the fact that an argument could be made that article 7 is engaged, but we have to reflect thoughtfully on what the policy imperative is for doing so and whether it can be robustly defended if there is a challenge.
Through the consideration on the Floor of the House, in Committee and elsewhere, strong and compelling legal arguments have been made that differentiate between a penalty and the enforcement of the penalty. It is appropriate that we, as parliamentarians, say clearly on the record that we are not changing the penalty for anyone who is currently in prison and subject to a terrorist offence sentence. Their sentence remains the same. How that sentence is operated and enforced is different. Uttley v. United Kingdom, Hogben v. United Kingdom, Kafkaris v. Cyprus and Grava v. Italy all indicate the distinction between the extension of a penalty and the enforcement of it.
While there are particular issues in Northern Ireland that we should be alive to, and we must approach these issues with our eyes wide open and recognise that some will seek to manipulate them for propaganda purposes, we must not fail to be prepared to stand up robustly for the rule of law within our country and say, “No. You may not like it—you may not like the rational choice that we as democrats make within our legal system, but we will not cow to the threat of violence, agitation or propaganda that seek to subvert the norms and principles of democracy that we all enjoy.” On that basis, I cannot support amendments that seek to remove the retrospective application of the Bill.
I will conclude, Mr Deputy Speaker, because there was a suggestion of a notional time limit, and you have been gracious enough to sit calmly as I move towards a conclusion. I think there is some sensible merit in new clause 7, which has been approached and drafted by Her Majesty’s Opposition rationally. It recognises that there are issues in Northern Ireland and that it is important over a period—be it one, two or three years—to carry out an impact assessment of how the Bill has operated in Northern Ireland and whether it has made a significant positive or detrimental impact, and then to lay a report before the House in conjunction with the Northern Ireland Executive. It is a sensible, well-drafted and appropriate new clause. Even if it is not pressed to a vote, I hope that, in taking decisions such as this with eyes wide open, recognising that there could be concerns about the operational impact and the opportunity for people to manipulate the democratic and legitimate choices we make, the Government will review this legislation and consider whether the consequences were warranted and these choices were appropriate.
Alicia Kearns
It is a pleasure to follow such considered comments from the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson). I want to start, unsurprisingly, by commending the Government for bringing forward this vital legislation. I also want to pay my respects to all those who have lost loved ones and the survivors of terrorism, for whom this legislation is a form of justice—particularly those who lost loved ones in the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham.
While the United Kingdom should be rightly proud of our record in combating radicalisation and terrorism, it is clear that more needs to be done, and that is what the Bill seeks to do. Many of us have rightly said that the first job of any Government is to keep their people safe. It is clear that that was at the top of Ministers’ minds when they drafted this. While I disagree with the Opposition on many points made today, I welcome the overall collaborative spirit that has emerged across the House. I note, for example, that many of the Opposition amendments—particularly the first five in the group—deal with questions about the effectiveness of the legislation. I am glad that the Opposition care so much that the Government’s priorities are implemented effectively.
I also welcome the Government’s considerations relating to lifelong restrictions for terrorist offences. Their work with Scottish MPs on that is a clear example of the Government working with Opposition parties to achieve the best results for all. For that reason, I welcome Government amendment 8. It is also right that the Government have tabled amendment 9, to ensure that a serious terrorism offence is convictable on an indictable offence. That is in line with ensuring that serious offences of any kind are included in the thrust of the Bill’s provisions. I also want to express relief that the Opposition have not sought to water down in any significant way the thrust of this legislation, because it is what the country wishes to see.
Prior to becoming an MP, my career was dedicated to our national security, specifically counter-terrorism, so I want to address some of the comments of witnesses. Jonathan Hall QC described the reforms as “pessimistic”. These reforms are not pessimistic; they are realistic. When people are radicalised, they are not half radicalised, or radicalised on a Monday, a Wednesday or a Friday; it is an enduring process that sticks in hearts and minds for a long time. Deradicalisation and rehabilitation are not quick, easy or straightforward. Indeed, I would challenge whether anyone can ever truly be deradicalised.
To be clear, that is the comment not of a politician who wishes solely to sound tough on crime, but of a politician who has sat in the same room as former terrorists who had been willing to blow up people in this room, and when I say that people cannot be rehabilitated, I am talking about the ones who claim to be. The psychological drivers that drew them to terrorism remain for life, so it is right that when we do this, we be very careful about the legislation we put in place.
Even with all the resources of government, which I have personally seen brought to bear, this process takes significant contact and monitoring—I would argue lifelong monitoring. The Government must have the time and the framework necessary to minimise the risk to our nation. This is not some scientific experiment conducted in an empty, tightly controlled space, but a highly individualised series of one-to-one interactions. When you engage with someone, you have to work with them on what makes them specifically vulnerable; there is no solution, there is no silver bullet, this is not straightforward. I do not accept the idea that any individual is ever truly deradicalised.
On that point, I take issue with the Opposition’s criticisms of the UK’s counter-radicalisation and rehabilitation work. I do not think they have the same understanding of exactly what the Government do to keep us safe. Whether in the middle east, in Europe, at home, or anywhere in the world—I have worked in many of those places—the UK is recognised as a global authority on anti-radicalisation work. We are a world leader on counter-terrorism, and the Bill will help to cement that further.
I want to talk specifically about young people and culpability, and the idea that under-18s or under-25s should be more stripped of their agency or personal responsibility for their actions. I would cite an example that has been in the media recently: that of Shamima Begum. I was working at the Foreign Office on counter-Daesh operations when she went to fight. She travelled after the beheadings of aid workers. She travelled knowing full well that a Jordanian pilot had been burnt to death. Many Members may not know that Daesh practised the burning of Jordanian soldiers seven times before they eventually put him in a box and burnt him to death.
This moves me because I had to watch that video. I spent years of my career watching brutalities carried out by people aged 16, 17, 18 and, undoubtedly, 20 to 25. I have held the hands of people who had been whipped by Daesh members who were 17 years old, and I have held the hands of British citizens whose loved ones were lost in Iraq and Syria and against whom known crimes had been committed by people aged 18 to 25, so I refuse to accept that those people cannot be held culpable. According to our law, criminal responsibility can be put back to 12. I made the rather blasé comment earlier about there being Members of Parliament who are under 25. Are people that age less culpable for the decisions they make?
Joanna Cherry
I hear what the hon. Member is saying, and clearly I respect her experience, but does she accept that we are not seeking to raise the age of criminal responsibility? We are simply suggesting that the age at which an extended determinate sentence can be imposed should be raised. There is no question of raising the age of criminal responsibility.
Alicia Kearns
I accept that point, but I fundamentally believe that public protection trumps rehabilitation, not least when evidence of rehabilitation is wishy-washy at best. Those individuals are just as culpable. I would never turn to a constituent whose son or daughter had been murdered by a 17-year-old somewhere in Rutland or Leicestershire and say that person was less guilty because they were 17. It is the same as with terrorism. It is the most heinous crime, and criminal responsibility changes for the most heinous of crimes.
I also cannot agree that 25-year extended licences are excessive or too costly. The Government must have the tools to be vigilant and aware of the threats from those who have been convicted of the worst offences. That is why I strongly recommend and welcome the provisions to allow extended sentences for offences with a terrorism connection, and it is entirely fitting that this be recognised in clauses 2 and 15, among others, which will enable a variety of offences, from kidnapping to weapons training, to be recognised as potentially having terrorist intent and offenders to receive either serious terrorism sentences or extended determinate sentences. Too often, in my experience, for those who go on a weapons training event—something delightful to talk about when they are playing some game like “Fortnite”—it is the start of a journey that leads to far worse.
I also want to touch on the role of the Parole Board, which I know was a matter of significant debate for the Committee. Terrorism radicalisation necessarily involves national security and long-term strategic debate. The Committee heard from witnesses that the Parole Board was not philosophically or organisationally best suited to dealing with terrorist offenders and that the Government should use a multi-agency approach when considering these risks. I fully agree, and I am glad that the Bill recognises that, too. We can do it and, as we are global leaders in this regard, our security staff are second to none.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I do want to give time for the second group of amendments that we are discussing on Report, so I am imposing a five-minute limit in order to get everyone in.
Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)
It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns). I recognise her deep experience around these issues.
I primarily want to talk to amendments 1 to 5 in my name and in the names of others. At the outset, let me stress my support for the Bill overall, and for the aims of tackling terrorism and of keeping our people and our communities safe from that threat. All of us from Northern Ireland have been deeply touched by terrorism in a very particular way over the past 50 years, but given the references that have been made to 7/7 and its anniversary that has just passed, I would like to read into the record thoughts about my cousin, Ciaran Cassidy, who was brutally murdered at Russell Square. His remains laid unidentified for six days, which brings home the enormity of the issues with which we are dealing. I accept the need for tougher sentencing and recognise that that brings very significant benefits, but it is important that we acknowledge that there is a much wider picture here, which involves trying to address terrorism at source and to prevent people falling into terrorism and being influenced by others. It is important that we bear that wider context in mind.
My main concerns lie in the application of the Bill to Northern Ireland. I certainly see attractions in the overall uniform approach across the UK in avoiding a two-tier system, and, indeed, Northern Ireland does want equal protection in that respect from the broad principles and framework of this Bill. None the less, we do need to recognise that, when it comes to implementation of those principles, a one-size-fits-all approach does not always work, and that flexibility needs to be considered in certain circumstances.
My main focus is around clause 30 and the retrospective application of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 to certain terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland, primarily a small number of dissident republicans. I am happy to see a tougher sentencing regime going forward, but I am concerned that the retrospective application will, in practice, bring relatively little benefit and could be counterproductive in a number of ways.
To date, the Government have only really addressed this issue in terms of the argument around interfering with judicial discretion and the potential implications for article 7 of the European convention on human rights. We can beg to differ on that particular issue, and we will see what happens down the line. In particular, I want to stress the concern around the potential propaganda opportunities that could be given to dissident republican terrorists and their fellow travellers.
Some people may seek to twist what the Government are doing into an argument that this somehow shifts the goalposts and creates a context for political imprisonment. We have had a sad history in Northern Ireland, from internment to the hunger strikes and beyond, of terrorists and their allies using the situation in prisons and framed grievances for wider agitation in the community and recruitment purposes.
The terrorist threat in Northern Ireland remains severe. The Police Service of Northern Ireland and the security service are doing an excellent job in tackling that terrorism, but it is, ever, a difficult challenge that they face. There are, sadly, still ongoing incidents and bomb incidents, and people losing their lives. We need to be mindful of that.
The Minister will be aware that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has raised concerns about clause 30. He will also know that my party colleague, the Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland, has raised those concerns and had a number of conversations with him. Indeed, there is a considerable question mark over whether the necessary legislative consent motion will get through the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly.
It is important that there is ongoing discussion and dialogue beyond the passing of the Bill through the Commons later today, whenever it hits the other place for consideration. Let us not finish that dialogue today. I will press not press my amendments to a vote, but I urge the Government to listen to the very genuine concerns I raise from the Northern Ireland perspective.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry), who spoke with great insight. I want to touch on the purpose of sentencing, which is primarily: to punish the offender; to reduce crime by preventing an offender from committing more crime; to act as a deterrent to others from committing similar offences; to reform and rehabilitate by changing an offender’s behaviour to prevent future crime and reoffending; and to protect the public from an offender and from the risk of more crimes being committed. When it comes to terrorism and terrorist offences, we must shout from the rooftops that, as a united country and as a people, we will not tolerate terrorist criminality even if it is from young adults. This behaviour is morally wrong, and there is no place for it in our society.
We are all incredibly lucky to live in such a free and tolerant country. We have freedoms not always found in other countries, which we too often take for granted. We must get tough, with zero tolerance as a country on people who wish to do us harm and try to disrupt our way of life. Some of these terrorists can have a long-term goal, and we need to be sure that, when they are released, they no longer seek to do us harm. We must face reality that, for some terrorist offenders, the risk to do harm endures, and we cannot be certain whether rehabilitation is simulated or real.
Terrorism comes in many forms to create fear and anxiety, and to stifle debate. Some people forget that terrorism has an impact on our human rights by affecting our enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical safety. It impacts on individuals, our communities and our society by undermining our peace and security. It threatens our social and economic development. An individual’s security is a basic human right, and protection of individuals is a fundamental duty of Government. I therefore welcome the Bill and its creation of a new serious terrorism sentence for dangerous offenders whose acts are very likely to have caused or contributed to multiple deaths. The 14-year minimum jail term, with up to 25 years spent on licence, will act as a real deterrent and send a strong message that this country will not tolerate and will not be cowed by the ill will of terrorists.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I have read and listened to past debates on this issue with great interest, and particularly those on parts of the Bill that bring Northern Ireland into line with the rest of the United Kingdom. I very much commend my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) on his contribution and the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) on his constructive comments.
I understand the concerns of the Department of Justice on possible legal action that could be taken with regard to early release. Such concerns are well founded: we need only look at the publicly funded judicial reviews in Northern Ireland through the legal aid system that will not help a father get access to his child but will allow a terrorist to sue the state—a debate for another day. There is no doubt that certain firms in Northern Ireland will be watching the votes and events of today with great anticipation, rubbing their hands together at securing another free ride from the taxpayer. Yes, there will be a case, but do we shy away from that? We are the lawmakers in this House—the legislators—and it is incumbent on us all to ensure that the laws we pass will withstand scrutiny. We do not and must not shy away from doing the right thing because lawyers may become involved. Well done to the Government for underlining to the Department of Justice and our Justice Minister that there will be governmental support in relation to any legal challenge. I very much look forward to reminding them of that at the appropriate time.
May I commend the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) for her personal account of her friend in relation to that? I do not think there is anybody in this House who does not understand what such an account means. Of course, as representatives from Northern Ireland, we have all lived through the troubles over a period of time. I was just thinking of some of them—La Mon, Abercorn, the Darkley gospel hall murders, Bloody Friday. Those are examples of how people have lived through the most violent times.
I support the Government in their call for minimum sentences. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East, I do not believe that this takes away the judge’s power and discretion. I believe that it shapes the policy to say that, no matter the extenuating circumstances, there are occasions that deserve minimum sentences, and terrorism is one of them.
It was one of the greatest surprises to me in Northern Ireland that the Good Friday agreement allowed mass early release, with no thought to rehabilitation. That was never right, and we are facing the consequences of that now, as we see the work of too many former offenders who are not reformed offenders. Indeed, some of them are still involved in such activities. I can never understand how our wee nation was tricked into accepting this as a payment for peace. The fact is that, even today, the threat of what these violent offenders will do is still having repercussions. That is the problem when we negotiate with unrepentant terrorists: we will continue to negotiate with them and the threat of violence for ever and ever.
I understand this well, yet I do not believe that this can prevent right being done in this place. It is right and proper that any terrorist with any cause in any part of this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland understands that terrorism is something that this House will stand against with its every ability. Whatever the mantra of the attacker and whatever rationale that person may have, we will not allow justice to be pared back just because of the threat of upset. The message is clear in this Bill and I support it.
I absolutely take on board the comments from the Prison Service. I believe it is essential that we have additional funding in place to give extra support to prison officers and to ensure that our prisons have appropriate staffing levels. I understand the need for new clause 2—I also refer to new clauses 5 and 7—on the deradicalisation programmes, because in my constituency paramilitary activity is probably at a height. Indeed, it is at a height, and that is probably the case in other constituencies as well. I think the hon. Member for North Down and I have very similar constituencies in relation to paramilitary activity.
In my office, we have seen at first hand the effects of paramilitaries at home getting young men hooked on drugs and with a massive debt that can be magically repaid if they carry out an action, They are told: “Sure, son, if you’re caught, you will hardly do any time for your first offence”. I know cases where that has happened, and I really do ache for those young people who are trapped, yet we cannot allow this exploitation to continue. I have great difficulty with this issue, and again I would highlight it to the Minister. I absolutely understand that zero tolerance means what it says—we will not tolerate this. There are hard decisions to make, and make them this House will.
Having lived with this heartache over the years and with the threat of terrorism for my entire life—some of my family members and friends have as well—I know that we must have firm but fair laws that send a message, and sentencing, with all its harshness and all its importance, is a very real and important way to reinforce that. That is why I wanted to talk about this today. I do hope, when the Minister replies, that he will reply with positivity. I know he will.
Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)
I am sure that all Members of this House agree that there are few Bills as important to the safety and security of the British people as this one, and I commend the Government for bringing forward this Bill. We have seen from recent tragic terror events in Streatham, London Bridge, Manchester and even here in Westminster and, over the last few decades, from the IRA terrorists, how vital this Bill really is. I commend the Government for taking strong and decisive action, as promised. Let me be clear: terrorism and supporters of terrorism in all its forms are wrong and morally reprehensible, and we must do everything in our power to stamp out terrorism, stamp out its supporters and make the country safer for all.
I shall focus on amendments that pertain to sentencing and the release of terrorist offenders. As my hon. Friends are aware, the probation reforms that come into force in 2021 will bring all offender management under the National Probation Service. That marks a shift from the present situation in which only higher-risk offenders are dealt with by the NPS.
New clause 1 would require a review of
“the impact of the provisions in the Act on the National Probation Service.”
However, the Bill already strengthens the ability of the Government and the police, prison and probation services of the UK to monitor and manage the risk posed by terrorist offenders, and individuals of terrorist concern outside custody. The Bill will allow more effective intervention when that is required, and will enhance the effectiveness of the measures available to authorities as a result of a combination of probation reforms. The Bill renders new clause 1—
Alex Cunningham
I am interested that the hon. Gentleman has addressed the issue of the probation service, because I talked about the crisis that exists in that service. Is he satisfied that it is operating in the way it needs to be to cope with the current business it has to deal with, let alone the increased activity arising from this Bill?
Alexander Stafford
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I am reassured that the Prison Service and the probation service are doing all they can to address this. Of course we want to put more into the probation service and to make sure that prisoners of all sorts are properly looked after, and I believe that this Government and this Bill have that at their very heart.
Furthermore, we must guard against a flurry of statutory reviews, which are costly, time-consuming and unnecessarily bureaucratic. As previously outlined by Ministers, there are already various routes of scrutiny of how the probation service and the Bill are functioning. Parliament has great power to question and to debate, and there is no lack of scrutiny in this regard. The Government have accepted that it is important to keep a close eye on these matters and to ensure a close, continued dialogue with all the Bill’s stakeholders.
New clause 2 would require a
“review of the impact of the…Act on…deradicalisation programmes in prisons.”
It is said that there is limited evidence of the impact of longer prison terms on reoffending, but in fact the evidence available to us indicates that prisoners in custody for longer periods do come to terms with their offending and are able later in their sentences to undertake constructive remedial activities. I believe that long sentences do work.
We also want to protect our young people and keep them safe from the evils of radicalisation. There is no dispute over that, but new clause 6 would mandate the Secretary of State to review
“the effects of the provisions of this Act on children and young offenders.”
It is worth remembering that the young people in question are very few in number. In 2019, only four of the 22 people convicted of terrorist offences were aged between 18 and 20, and not all of those four would even meet the criteria for the serious terrorist sentence. Therefore, we are talking about astonishingly small numbers for those aged between 18 and 20. Given those statistics, the Government position is that it may be the case that nobody of that age will be affected by the Act, and as such requiring a review by statute does not seem sensible or a good use of time.
These amendments address important concerns and certainly come from a good place. I thank those who have tabled the new clauses for throwing a spotlight on the National Probation Service, deradicalisation programmes and the radicalised children and young offenders. However, I believe the best mechanism to deal with these issues is the scrutiny provided by parliamentary debate. I agree that we must follow the aforementioned matters closely, and I firmly believe that we have all the tools needed to do that. In the context of this Bill, statutory reviews are not necessary or particularly effective. I greatly welcome this Bill, as laid down by the Government on behalf of the people of Rother Valley, and I greatly commend and approve of the Government’s dealing with terrorism and the robust way we are dealing with terrorists, both in this country and abroad. We must not let them come to our shores and if they are on our shores, we must stamp them out and stamp them out effectively. So I look forward to this Bill being passed.
Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford), and I pay tribute to some of the heartfelt contributions, such as the ones from the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) and my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson). This is an incredibly emotive topic. Since I was elected, I have made the case on a number of occasions that sentences must do what they say on the tin and be transparent to the public. The untenable status quo, where criminals are consistently let out part-way through their sentences cannot hold, and it damages public faith in our criminal justice system that sentences are not honest. When it comes to terrorist offences, the stakes could not be higher. Both the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist attack in November last year and the Streatham attacks in February were carried out by known terrorist offenders who had been released automatically at the halfway point of their sentences. This Bill will see dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in prison, and that is an important step in the right direction.
We must avoid any attempts by Her Majesty’s Opposition this afternoon to make the Bill any less robust when it comes to offenders between the ages of 18 and 21. The Opposition have made the case that young adults are inherently different in terms of their maturity and that they should be treated differently, but it cannot be forgotten that we are still referring to adults who have committed the most serious terrorist offences. These adults, to all intents and purposes, have the same rights and responsibilities as every other adult in the country. Labour Members are attempting to diminish the actions of young adult terrorist offenders, but I have frequently heard them extol the maturity of people even younger than 18 when it suits them, particularly with regard to extending the right to vote to 16 and 17-year-olds. Rather than gerrymander the different stages of adulthood when it suits us, we must be prepared to be clear that at 18, adults should be able to fundamentally tell the difference between right and wrong, and should know that any action they take that is likely to result in the deaths of multiple people is completely inexcusable.
We must be similarly robust in the case of Shamima Begum, the young terrorist who left our country to join the murderous ISIS terror organisation, which is responsible for the deaths of thousands, including British citizens. Her actions were a betrayal of this country and everything it stands for. When she was standing in a Syrian refugee camp afterwards, she said that she did not regret joining ISIS. I share the anger of many of my constituents at the Court of Appeal’s recent decision to allow her to return to the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, this represents another decision from our courts that is completely detached from the public interest and what the majority of the law-abiding public consider to be appropriate for someone many believe has committed treason.
Alexander Stafford
Does my hon. Friend agree with me and the Government that this decision by the courts is reprehensible and we should do everything we can to fight it?
Tom Hunt
I could not agree more. We need to be robust in fighting it. It is not just on this issue but on many others that there is this disconnect.
The Bill is an important step in our fight against the scourge of terrorism, which seeks to attack the foundations of our society and cause divisions between us. The mandatory 14-year prison sentences for the most serious terrorist offenders that the Bill includes will provide a strong deterrent against terrorism and send a clear message to those who want to spill blood on our streets out of hatred for our country that they will not be tolerated. I call on the Government to go even further over the coming months in looking at the out-of-touch decisions that are coming from our courts, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford) rightly said, and to deal with the Shamima Begum case.
This is a very sensitive issue. I appreciate that terrorist offences have touched the lives of many right hon. and hon. Members. We need to be robust in confronting it. We cannot make excuses and apologies for the people who take these actions. Yes, it is important—I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—that, for the public interest, people are able, under certain circumstances, to rehabilitate, but it is also important for the public interest for there to be a strong deterrent, and a message to deter future evil acts like some of those that we have discussed today.
Duncan Baker (North Norfolk) (Con)
It is an honour to follow the passionate speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt).
I spoke in the debate back in February when the Government passed emergency legislation to ensure that terrorist offenders would no longer be released early and automatically. I am glad that we are now doing all that we can on this. We must continue to root out terrorism from our streets. I am pleased that the earliest point at which terrorist offenders will even be considered for release is after they have served two thirds of their sentence. Indeed, no terrorist offender will be released before the end of their full custodial term unless the Parole Board agrees.
This Bill will ensure that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in custody, and it improves the ability to monitor and manage those of concern when they are released. It is only right that offenders still viewed as a threat to the public will be forced to spend the rest of their term in prison. Members of my party stood on a manifesto that promised to keep us safer, with investment in our police force and our Prison Service, and that included stronger measures to deal with terrorism.
It was thanks to the exemplary work of the Prison Service during the pandemic that I recently wrote to the governor at HMP Bure in my constituency, to voice my gratitude and appreciation for the fantastic work that the prison staff, healthcare staff and civilian staff there are doing, given the unprecedented challenges we face, during covid. We must do all we can to strengthen confidence in our criminal justice system and make society as safe as we can from cowardly acts of terrorism, which devastate lives and communities. That could be no better emphasised than by the heartfelt and moving speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson). The Bill, along with the doubling of the number of counter-terrorism specialists and probation staff, will absolutely do that.
We already have a MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements—review, a Prevent review an HM inspector’s report and three-year post legislation. It is unnecessary to have yet another layer of review. A serious terrorism sentence for the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders is a welcome move. We are going to get tough on terrorism and ensure that those that set out to hurt innocent people will spend at least 14 years in prison and up to 25 years on licence. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford) said, recent attacks show that the Bill is necessary; that sentencing needs toughening, but so does the investigation, the monitoring and the management of offenders.
Jim Shannon
Does the hon. Gentleman feel that those who have carried out acts of terrorism in the past, and perhaps have not been held accountable for them until this time, should be subject to these new laws that are coming in, because there would be no early release for them, as has been the past history? Those who murdered the four Ulster Defence Regiment men at Ballydugan some 25 or 26 years ago, those who murdered my cousin, Kenneth Smyth—does he agree that it is time that anyone who has never been made accountable, is made accountable as well?
Duncan Baker
I absolutely agree that we should make sure that those people who have committed absolutely heinous acts face the full prosecution of the criminal justice service.
I will finish by saying that giving the Secretary of State expanded powers to impose additional restrictions, such as imposing overnight curfews, and to gather more information on devices, such as electronic devices, would give us even more control measures and services to eliminate risk even further. This is about restricting, interrupting and stopping dreadful attacks, such as those that happened at Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham. As the Justice Secretary has said, the Government are pursuing every option to tackle terrorism. It is with that in mind that I welcome the Bill. The largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing and monitoring in decades, it delivers what we need to keep our communities safer and come down hard on those that set out to ruin lives.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the thoughtful intervention speech by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker).
It was a privilege to serve on the Public Bill Committee. As someone who lived in London in the 1980s and ’90s, I remember all too well the impact of terrorism on this nation’s capital. A massive lorry bomb was left outside the London overground station at the bottom of my then street in Bethnal Green and the local policeman, whom I knew, discovered it. We must not forget the emotional toll on frontline officers of dealing with such terrorist incidents; he has to live with that for the rest of his life. There are other parts of the Union that have to live with it more frequently. We all need to work together as one nation to deal with these issues. There are many human stories, with which we sympathise.
Serving on a Committee examining the proposed legislation seeking to counter terrorism was an interesting challenge, but a privilege. I thank the Minister for how he steered the Committee through the issues covered in the legislation. In Committee, I found the interventions of my hon. Friends the Members for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) and for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott) very useful in dealing with the issues. It was also very interesting to hear what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) and my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott) had to say in Committee meetings, and the contributions of all those other Members who sit in this Chamber today.
Having considered all the evidence, done my research and read back over the years, it is my clear view that the overwhelming weight of the evidence heard by the Bill Committee sessions was that the provisions of this Bill will make the public safer and will greater enable us to defeat terrorism and contain former terrorists.
This law is proportionate in what it seeks to do in relation to the rights of prisoners. Of course, we need to keep our people safe. The Opposition’s request for further reviews and delays is not proportionate with what we need to do today.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. I am terribly sorry, but we have to move on now.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
Many hon. Members today have reminded the House that our first duty as Members of Parliament is public protection. The very moving contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), and the story of her friend, Louise, who was caught up in the terrible terrorist atrocity of 7 July 2005, very powerfully reminds us of that. On that awful day, 52 members of the public were murdered and 784 were injured.
We have heard powerful testimony from other Members who have had personal, first-hand experience of terrorism, including the hon. Members for North Down (Stephen Farry) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), whose family members suffered at the hands of terrorist murders. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) said that in her professional career prior to coming to this place, she had first-hand experience of the victims of terrorism. That testimony should remind us how important our duty is. By taking this Bill through Report stage, we are discharging that duty to our constituents.
It is worth pausing to say how constructive the discussion on this issue has been, on a cross-party basis, on the Floor of the House here today and previously at Second Reading and in Committee. It is an example of this House and our political system working at its best. Members from all sides of the House can be very proud of the way we have conducted the debate on this extremely important Bill.
Let me turn now to some of the comments raised by colleagues this afternoon, starting of course with my opposite number, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), who gave a characteristically detailed speech opening the proceedings. He started by commenting on new clause 1 on the probation service, which stands in his name and those of his hon. Friends.
Let me just take the opportunity to reassure him and other Members, once again, that probation service resources were significantly increased in the spending review last September. Moreover, earlier this year, counter-terrorism police resources were increased by £90 million and we are in the process of doubling counter-terrorist specialist probation officers, in addition to those very large numbers who have been given special training.
In addition, we are deepening multi-agency public protection arrangements. We are also establishing a counter-terrorism step-up programme, so I believe our work in the probation sphere is something all of us can take great confidence in.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is right to mention the additional funds and so on that have been forthcoming, and we very much welcome them, but we have a probation service in crisis. Would he like to comment specifically on the fact that there is a high sickness rate and a 10% vacancy rate? How on earth can they do their job properly if we do not have sufficient of them?
Chris Philp
Numbers in the prison and probation service have been increasing over the past few years. As I said, a great deal of extra money was provided in September last year, and that will most certainly have a further positive impact.
I move on to new clause 2, which the hon. Gentleman also commented on, and the question of deradicalisation. We heard evidence in the Public Bill Committee on 30 June, which some Members will recall, from Professor Andrew Silke, Professor of Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield University. He told us that, overall, he thinks that the UK’s approach to deradicalisation,
“is seen as one of the better available approaches…internationally”. ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 84, Q175.]
That is, again, something we can take great confidence and pride in. Initiatives such as the healthy identity intervention programme, which Professor Silke expanded on at some length, are very effective. That is one of the reasons why reoffending rates for these terrible terrorist offences are only between 5% and 10%.
The shadow Minister asked about financial impact. I confirm, once again, that the cumulative impact on the total prison population will be less than 50 prison places, and the cumulative impact on the probation service will never be more than 50 places. To put that in context, there are about 80,000 people in prison and about a quarter of a million people on probation. On the financial impact, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned, the figure he had in mind may not have been quite accurate. The financial impact, according to the impact assessment, is a one-off cost of £4.2 million at the outset, followed by £900,000 a year thereafter, because these numbers, thankfully, are so small.
Jim Shannon
The Minister and everyone in the House will be aware that there have been three attacks in the last eight months carried out by those who were in prison and came out. Does the Minister feel that the investment that the Government are giving here will help to address that issue and will reduce those things happening, which is what we all want to see?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I believe that the measures that we are taking in the Bill, the additional resources given to counter-terrorism policing and the changes we made back in February in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 will provide exactly the protection he is asking for against ruthless terrorists of the kind he is describing.
On the question of reviews, which new clauses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 speak to, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker) pointed out, we already have quite a large number of reviews under way. There is the MAPPA review, being conducted by Jonathan Hall QC. There is, of course, Her Majesty’s inspectorates of prisons and probation, which produce frequent reports themselves. There is the Prevent review, which we will debate in the second group of amendments and, of course, there is the standard three-year review after legislation. With great respect, I think we have a lot of reviews going on. The numbers involved with this legislation are small, and I feel that it will be more than adequately reviewed by the mechanisms I just laid out.
Young people have been mentioned by many Members, in connection with new clause 6 and other clauses. The Bill recognises that those under the age of 18 are different, and no new minimum sentence is applied to them. It is up to the judge to decide in each case, and according to individual circumstances, what is the appropriate sentence for someone under the age of 18. There is a great deal of judicial discretion, for all the reasons laid out by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and others.
I understand the arguments that have been advanced about the ability to reform and rehabilitate those over the age of 18, and possibly extending that into the early 20s, but the cohort of offenders that we are addressing this afternoon is, thankfully, very small—a handful of offenders between the ages of 18 and 21 who have committed offences of extraordinary seriousness. These are terrorist offences where a life sentence can be imposed, where a judge has made a finding of dangerousness based on the facts and a pre-sentence report, and where a risk of causing multiple deaths was present. Given that small but serious number of offenders, I think a 14-year mandatory minimum sentence is appropriate. Rarely, there is the ability for judges to find exceptional circumstances, but when offences are that serious, it is right to take that action and protect the public. There may be other debates to have another time about how quickly people mature and how we should account for that, but for that small and dangerous cohort it is neither the time nor the place to advance that argument.
On legislative consent motions, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West for her comments about Government amendments 9 to 16, and the changes made to orders for lifelong restriction. She properly raised that matter in Committee, and we fully acknowledged the points that she and her colleagues made, and are delighted to fix the issue this afternoon. On the application of polygraphs in Scotland, as she said, we are in discussion with the Scottish Government. We are edging ever closer to a point of blissful—I almost said “blissful union”—perhaps I should say “blissful unity” to avoid aggravating the question. We are edging towards a position of blissful agreement, and I hope we reach that in the near future.
Some Members questioned the use of polygraphs more generally. We took extremely compelling, and at times entertaining evidence from Professor Grubin, who is a worldwide expert in this area. Contrary to what one Member said, polygraphs are not untested, and 5,000 such tests have been used in connection with sex offenders in England and Wales. In between 60% and 70% of cases, the use of a polygraph elicits information that would not otherwise have come out. That is either because the offender volunteers it—they know a polygraph is going to be used and they volunteer information that they would not otherwise have provided—or because it prompts a negative reading and a follow-up investigation can occur.
I emphasise that nobody is recalled to prison as a result of a negative polygraph test, and nor are they deemed to have breached their licence conditions. It simply prompts further investigation, and while not always accurate, such tests have been found to be useful in prompting that disclosure or further investigation. In that context, I draw the House’s attention to one of the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall’s notes on this topic. On 4 June, paragraph 23, he stated:
“I therefore concluded that polygraph testing is likely to be a valuable additional means of gathering information relevant to terrorist risk for terrorist offenders on licence.”
Jonathan Hall thinks that polygraph tests are an effective and good idea.
On Northern Ireland, the hon. Members for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), for Strangford and for North Down raised the question of applying the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions retrospectively to Northern Ireland. The UK Government believe that that is a lawful thing to do—that it does not infringe article 7 or any common law principles. We believe that terrorism measures are reserved and that we should treat the United Kingdom in those matters as one, but they do engage parts of the LCM mechanism, and we are therefore in detailed discussions with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister, Naomi Long. I had an hour-long conversation with her earlier this week and, again, we hope to make progress on that point in the coming week or so; I think she will come back to me in the very near future. I stress that these provisions affect terrorist prisoners on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland equally. They do not seek to penalise or victimise any one side or the other; they apply equally, and I ask Members to keep that important point in mind.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his introductory remarks, particularly about how we can best work together as a Parliament, and I join him in paying tribute to the hon. Members across the House who shared personal experiences and testimonies—particularly the hon. Members for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) and for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns). If we had had to be convinced to support the Bill, perhaps those experiences—in particular the experience of the friend of the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford—would have been sufficient to convince us.
The Minister’s ambition to have a sentencing regime in place for serious terrorism and terrorism-related offences has our support—no delay and no watering down—but he needs to ensure that the service is properly equipped and provides the services needed. I was therefore rather surprised—“stunned” is the word I wrote on my bit of paper—that the impact of introducing this new legislation will be less than £5 million for new prison places, an extended probation service and additional workers in the system. I cannot quite understand where that number comes from.
However, I am sure the Minister will be relieved to know that all I ask now is that he and his Home Office colleagues reflect on the challenges that we have made. I will withdraw new clause 1, but we will return to amendment 30 later. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Lone terrorists: Review of strategy
“(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must be conducted by a person who meets the criteria for qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court, as set out in section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
(3) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) counter-terrorism policy;
(b) sentencing policy as it applies to terrorist offenders;
(c) he interaction and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), “public services” includes but is not limited to—
(a) probation;
(b) the prison system;
(c) mental health services;
(d) local authorities; and
(e) housing providers.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”—(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that the Government orders a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists including, but not exclusively, current counterterrorism and sentencing policy.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 59, in clause 32, page 29, line 7, at end insert—
“(4) A Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure may not be imposed on an individual, or renewed, solely on the basis of—
(a) any statement made by the person while participating in a polygraph examination;
(b) any physiological reaction of the person while participating in a polygraph examination; or
(c) any refusal to comply with a requirement to participate in a polygraph examination.”
This amendment will prohibit the use of information obtained from a polygraph test as a basis for imposing a TPIM notice on an individual in England and Wales.
Amendment 60, in clause 33, page 30, line 24, at end insert—
“(8) A Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure may not be imposed on an individual, or renewed, solely on the basis of—
(a) any statement made by the person while participating in a polygraph examination;
(b) any physiological reaction of the person while participating in a polygraph examination; or
(c) any refusal to comply with a requirement to participate in a polygraph examination.”
This amendment will prohibit the use of information obtained from a polygraph test as a basis for imposing a TPIM notice on an individual in Scotland.
Amendment 61, in clause 34, page 33, line 6, at end insert—
“(4A) A Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure may not be imposed on an individual, or renewed, solely on the basis of—
(a) any statement made by the person while participating in a polygraph examination;
(b) any physiological reaction of the person while participating in a polygraph examination; or
(c) any refusal to comply with a requirement to participate in a polygraph examination.”
This amendment will prohibit the use of information obtained from a polygraph test as a basis for imposing a TPIM notice on an individual in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 40, page 34, line 22, leave out clause 37.
This amendment removes the provision that lowers the standard of proof to reasonable grounds.
Amendment 37, in clause 37, page 34, line 25, leave out
““has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.”
and insert
“, on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds, believes.”.
This amendment would raise the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM under the proposals in the Bill.
Amendment 39, in clause 37, page 34, line 26, leave out “suspecting” and insert “believing”.
This amendment would create a higher bar for the standard of proof under these proposals.
Amendment 42, page 34, line 27, leave out clause 38.
Amendment 41, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) in subsection (3)(a), after “met” insert “and the court gives the Secretary of State permission”;
(zb) after subsection (3)(a), insert “(ab) In determining the extension, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.””
Amendment 46, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) For subsection (3)(a), substitute “may be extended under subsection (2) only if—
(i) the Secretary of State believes on the balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity;
(ii) conditions C and D are met; and
(iii) the court gives the Secretary of State permission to extend the TPIM notice.”
This amendment will provide that any extension of a TPIM notice will require (i) a higher threshold to be met (“on the balance of probabilities”), (ii) the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual (Condition C), and that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual (Condition D), and (iii) judicial approval.
Amendment 47, page 35, line 21, leave out clause 39.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 39, which allows the Secretary of State to vary the relocation measure in a TPIM notice, if it is necessary to do so for resource reasons.
Amendment 48, page 36, line 27, leave out clause 40.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 40, which widens the scope for imposing a curfew beyond overnight.
Amendment 49, page 36, line 32, leave out clause 41.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 41, which inserts a new polygraph measure which can be imposed on TPIM subjects to test if they are complying with their TPIM measures, if the Secretary of State considers it necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.
Government amendment 17.
Amendment 50, page 38, line 3, leave out clause 42.
This amendment will remove from the Bill clause 42, which introduces a new drug testing measure which can be imposed on TPIM subjects, to test for Class A and B drugs.
Government amendments 18 and 19.
Amendment 38, in clause 47, page 40, line 17, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (support for persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) for the words from “within the period” to the end substitute “by 1 July 2021”.”
This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy, which will have to report by 1 July 2021.
Amendment 51, in clause 47, page 40, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert—
“(a) in subsection (8), replace the words “6 months” with the words “2 years”;
(b) in subsection (9), replace the words “18 months” with the words “3 years”.”
Clause 47 omits the current statutory deadline for (a) making arrangements for an independent review of Prevent and (b) laying before both Houses the report and any recommendations of the review of Prevent. Instead of removing the statutory deadlines, this amendment provides for new deadlines: in respect of (a), 2 years beginning with the day on which the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act was passed (12 February 2019) and in respect of (b), 3 years beginning with the day on which the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act was passed.
Conor McGinn
The overriding priority of this Labour Opposition is and always will be to keep the public and our communities safe. I want to concentrate on the three amendments that our Front Benchers have tabled on behalf of the official Opposition, conscious of the fact that we have little time and I wish to hear from colleagues on the Back Benches who did not have the opportunity to discuss these issues in Committee.
As we—including me, as shadow Security Minister—said on Second Reading and in Committee, the tragic events at Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham showed that there was a clear need for legislation, and subsequent events in Reading have only affirmed that. We on the Opposition Benches are committed to being forceful and robust in the fight against terrorism, so we welcome the Bill and in principle support its introduction. We have also sought to thoughtfully scrutinise the Bill, both to gain assurances on concerns and to attempt to improve it and ensure it is up to that most important task of keeping people safe.
To delve into new clause 8, following the shocking and tragic incident in Reading on Saturday 20 June, my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary called for a judge-led review of the Government’s strategy for tackling the dangerous and growing menace of lone attackers. Reading was the third time in seven months that such devastation had been witnessed on UK streets, with lone attackers responsible each time. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Reading East (Matt Rodda), who showed such leadership and thoughtfulness in the days after the appalling attack on his community.
We on the Opposition Benches have no doubts as to the immense skill, bravery and dedication of our police and security and intelligence services. New clause 8 is fundamentally about supporting them as they tackle extremism from root to branch, because they cannot fight the battle alone. We need to look at the range of services we all rely on, particularly when we want to identify, monitor and treat subjects who pose such a huge threat to wider society.
Our proposals would make provision to assess the systemic response needed for the emerging and disturbing phenomenon of lone terrorists. A judge-led review of the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with them could effectively do that. It would address counter-terrorism policy and sentencing policy as it applies to terrorist offenders and the interactions and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks. It would also undertake an analysis of a wide range of key public services, including our probation system, the prison system, mental health services, housing providers and local authorities, each of which can intervene at critical points.
The review would build on prior research and expertise, such as the extensive work carried out by Lord Anderson, the previous Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. That work has already provided insights into how we might better connect the current systems. His review’s proposal for multi-agency centre pilots would involve the identification of newly closed high-risk subjects of interest, the sharing of data by the Security Service and counter-terror policing with other agencies, such as local authorities and Departments, and the enrichment of that data using the databases of multi-agency partners. The review also highlighted barriers to local partners’ involvement in managing subjects of interest, including the challenges of resourcing.
Our public services must have the tools they need to intervene and work together in the most effective and efficient manner possible, particularly as many of the services have interactions with individuals who give them real concern. We need to undertake an assessment of the systemic response needed to confront the dangerous and growing threat of lone attackers, with all the necessary security safeguards in place, and I thank the Minister and the Security Minister for discussions on that.
Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, is looking at the issue in a review of the multi-agency public protection arrangements, which was commissioned by the Home Secretary. My understanding is that the review is currently with the Home Office. Can the Minister say a little bit more about that and perhaps commit to publishing it before the Bill reaches the other place, which I think would provide some assurance?
Turning to amendment 38 on TPIMs, we fully agree that the mechanisms must be robust and agile to help the police, the Security Service and their operational partners to do the job of keeping the public safe. As reflected by the amendments that the official Opposition has tabled, as well as those of the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), it is fair to say that we feel the Bill’s proposed changes to TPIMs will have a profound impact on the regime, especially when taken together.
We want TPIMs to be as effective and efficient as possible, and when those on the frontline in policing and counter-terrorism say that the changes will be useful, we fully trust and support their assessment and will do all we can to assist them. We will also, however, seek assurances that proper safeguards are in place. We would all want and expect to see such safeguards on measures of such importance in a democracy such as ours. If the standard of proof is to be lowered while simultaneously making possible a potentially indefinite TPIM by removing the current limit, then scrutiny, oversight and safeguards will take on a new-found importance.
We must remind ourselves that a TPIM notice can involve a wide range of measures: overnight residence requirements, relocation, police reporting, an electronic monitoring tag, exclusion from certain places, limits on association, limits on the use of financial services, and limits on the use of telephone and computers, as well as a ban on holding travel documents. Those are robust measures and, in my view, rightly so, but we must not forget that TPIMs are a restriction on rights for people who have not yet been convicted of any crime. It is not in the interests of anyone to allow such individuals to remain indefinitely on TPIMs, either for their own sake, for society’s, or, crucially, in terms of bringing them to justice.
Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend accept that the concern about TPIMs is not just the breadth of measures available but their indefinite nature against people who have not actually been tried and charged?
Conor McGinn
I do, and I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for the work she has done on this issue and her commitment to it. I am sure the Minister will have heard what she says. It is something I raised in Committee and I did receive some assurances from the Minister, but I think we would wish to hear—not just in the light of what my right hon. Friend says, but of what the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said when he made a similar point—what the Minister is doing to ensure those safeguards are in place.
Jim Shannon
It is very important that we look at TPIMs to make sure they are usable, but does the hon. Gentleman agree it is very important that the Secretary of State’s hands are not tied by legislation, but is able to respond to any emergent terrorism attacks or activities that take place in a way that is effective? Surely that has to be prominent precedent to follow?
Conor McGinn
The hon. Gentleman speaks with both great personal dignity and authority on these matters. I agree. We want the system to be agile and to be able to respond. The Bill places a very significant power on the Secretary of State. In seeking to ask the Government for assurances, we want to ensure the system itself is robust, because those protections allow authority and credibility in terms of being able to respond to the ongoing terrorist threat. The amendment we propose would ensure that there are reasonable and probable grounds for a TPIM to be issued. The higher bar would create safeguards without harming the robust nature or operational utility of TPIMs, which we want to be as impactful as they can possibly be to keep people safe.
We acknowledge that it was a Labour Government who, upon introducing control orders in 2005, imposed a standard of proof, as proposed in the Bill, to require only reasonable grounds for suspecting an individual had been involved in terrorism-related activity. That was then raised by the coalition Government in 2011 with the creation of the new TPIMs regime, and again by the Conservative Government in 2015. However, I cannot help but reflect on the words of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to the Bill Committee, when he said:
“If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 7, Q6.]
I think the Minister has to respond to that challenge. We need assurances from the Minister today, and an operational, administrative and procedural perspective for making those changes.
We would also like clarity on an exit strategy, given the indefinite nature of what has been proposed. Our concern with an open-ended or enduring TPIM regime is that it could see difficult cases languish, with no realistic plan for a resolution of any kind. Indeed, under the proposals, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation confirmed to the Committee, we could conceivably see someone who has been convicted of a terrorism offence being free from constraints before someone who has been placed on an enduring TPIM. That kind of situation is intolerable and I hope the Minister will again respond to those concerns, alongside the arguments of many colleagues in the House in relation to TPIMs and polygraph testing, which, while useful as an additional information source in certain contexts, we know is controversial and untested in the counterterrorism sphere. I do not think it would be unreasonable to run a pilot scheme, as per new clause 9, so that before making such costly national changes we could see proper independent evidence of the polygraph’s reliability and utility in the specific context of terrorist offenders. We all want an effective and efficient TPIM regime to help to save lives and protect our country’s citizens from harm, and we want to work with the Government to get it right.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) on the Opposition Front Bench. I have a lot of sympathy with what he said, and I hope the Minister will address the points he made, because we want to be constructive. We all support the overall thrust of the Bill, but my concern, as Chair of the Justice Committee, is that we do not do anything—albeit inadvertently and for good reasons—that undermines the checks and balances that are a normal part of the criminal process.
That is why the change in the burden of proof in relation to TPIMs needs more justification put behind it. Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, is highly regarded in this field, and the Minister has quoted him with approbation on a number of occasions. In this instance, he does not regard the case as being made out. If the Minister takes a different view, with respect, we need something more substantial as to why that is the case. There may be good reasons, but it cannot be done on a purely speculative basis. It cannot be on the basis that it may be useful to have this wider test. It might engage some people outside the jurisdiction in ways that we cannot currently in terms of gathering evidence and intelligence, but that case has to be made. Having voted on two occasions to increase the burden of proof to where it currently is, I would like to have a pretty clear sense that there is a compelling reason for reversing those decisions—and there may be, but I think the Minister owes it to us to set that out, and we need Mr Hall to set out why he comes to a different view. We may be persuadable, but it is important that the case is made and that the House understands that.
I accept that there is an overall three-year time limit on the working of the Bill, but I am concerned that, without a time limit, the TPIM will become the default mechanism and more like a control order. We surely all ought to recognise that, wherever possible—wherever proper, admissible evidence can be obtained and proceedings can be safely and securely brought—if people have done the vile things that we are talking about, which pose a real criminal threat to the security of this country and its people, the normal and proper course ought to be to prosecute through the normal due process. An alternative means of dealing with this should only be undertaken in the most exceptional circumstances. I can see that there may sometimes be such circumstances, but again, that case needs to be spelt out.
The third issue that I wish quickly to deal with is polygraphs. The Law Society takes the view that the suggestion of the use of polygraphs in some of these circumstances is more to persuade people psychologically —that is the phrase it uses in its briefing—against breaching the orders. That may be valuable in itself, but we ought to be wary of the limits of polygraphs’ usefulness. There are mixed views in academic, scientific and legal circles about the reliability of polygraphs. I do not have a fixed view about them, but I think we should approach their use with caution and proportionality.
Sir Robert Neill
I am always happy to give way to my hon. Friend and near neighbour.
Chris Philp
My hon. Friend and south London neighbour is kind for giving way. Let me reassure him on his point about the limits of polygraphs. We understand and accept that they have limits, which is why a negative polygraph result on its own can never result in a recall to prison or licence conditions being deemed to have been broken. All a negative polygraph result could do is prompt further investigation by other means, which I hope provides him with the reassurance he seeks.
Sir Robert Neill
That is a very helpful reassurance for today’s purposes, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the Minister said that. It is an important point, and I am glad that he takes this on board. Sometimes, for the best of reasons, there can be a mission creep with these measures, which could lead to a broader spread of their use in the criminal justice system, and that would be a matter of concern. If he says that the use is very specific, I accept his word on that, but it is important that we continue to keep this under review and do not have unintended mission creep. As we all know, it is often easy to present perfectly benign and reasonable reasons for doing something that departs from the normal checks and balances, but it then becomes entrenched and permanent and spreads.
In that spirit, I take the Minister’s assurance, but he will understand why it is important that that issue is debated and that reassurances are given that the overall integrity of the justice system will not be affected by these changes. That has dealt quickly with the issues that I sought to raise. It was perhaps a record brevity, but I hope that brevity does not reduce the import of the issues raised.
Joanna Cherry
It is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I endorse his concerns about the provisions in relation to TPIMs. My hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and I have tabled amendments 39 to 41 in relation to the proposed changes to the TPIMs regime. I am also speaking in support of amendments 46 to 51 and 59 to 61, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and signed by me. I will try to keep my comments brief, because I went into these issues in some detail on the Bill Committee and I want to allow others who were not on that Committee to speak.
First, I want to say something about the Prevent strategy review. I endorse what the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) said about that. It is important to remember that it was a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and a successful amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which imposed a requirement on the Government to initiate an independent review of Prevent. It has been delayed for reasons that we have heard a lot about, and I think the delay is most regrettable. Clause 47 of this Bill removes the time limit for conducting the review. We in the Joint Committee on Human Rights have concerns about that and we would like there to be a time limit, hence the amendments we have tabled. I am happy to associate myself with the date suggested by the official Opposition.
I note in passing that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved, and that although national security is a reserved matter, the Scottish Government’s delivery of the Prevent strategy reflects a rather different procedure. I will not take up too much time with that.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Streatham) (Lab)
Does the hon. and learned Lady agree that the delay of the review has caused quite a lot of concern in many communities who want better terrorist prevention legislation? Unfortunately, Prevent has demonised Muslim communities and put unfair duties on teachers and NHS workers. All those individuals want better terrorism prevention, but they will not get that if the review is delayed further.
Joanna Cherry
I endorse what the hon. Lady says. It is important to remember that black, Asian and minority ethnic communities—particularly the Muslim community —need the Prevent strategy as much as the rest of us, but they must not be demonised by it. That is why I referred to what has happened in Scotland. The Scottish Government, working closely with the Muslim community in Scotland, have managed to avoid that degree of resentment. This review is important for all communities in England and Wales, where unfortunately the same thing has not happened.
I turn to TPIMs. The Scottish National party and the Joint Committee on Human Rights are concerned that a case has not been made out for the changes that the Government wish to make. Others have referred to the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. In the detailed evidence that he gave to the Bill Committee, he described the combination of clauses 37 and 38 as
“a double whammy…not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever.”
I asked him about the possibility of safeguards, and he suggested the very safeguards that are set out in amendment 46, which is in my name and that of the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham. Jonathan Hall said that
“if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.”
He went on to say:
“Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15-16, Q33.]
I urge the Government to consider incorporating into the Bill safeguards similar to those suggested by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and set out in amendment 46.
As has been said, the problem with the change in the standard of proof is that no operational case has been made for it. I will not anticipate what the Minister will say later, and I may intervene on him if we have time. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall, who is appointed by the Government and charged with looking at these matters, has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point”.
I suggest that the Bill Committee heard nothing in evidence to challenge that. He said that he had had discussions with the Government but had not been able to identify a cogent business case. That is what is missing here. Although this affects only a small number of people at present—of course, it might affect more if the standard of proof is lowered—these are people who have not actually been convicted of any offence, so if the Government want to make such a significant change, it is really important that they bring forward a clear case for doing so.
Julie Marson
I am interested, as someone from a business background, to hear the hon. and learned Lady refer to business cases. We always have facts and figures that we can look back on historically. Is not the challenge for Government always to anticipate risk that has not happened? We are forever looking behind us, and the consequences are so great when those risks are missed, but this is actually the perfect opportunity for a Government to look forward and anticipate those risks. The risks might involve someone who has been active in Syria, for example, where we do not have that proof, where someone can perhaps take an opportunity for two years to bide their time, knowing that at the end of that period, they might be subject to a higher burden of proof, or just go off the radar.
Joanna Cherry
I hear what the hon. Lady says, but that is what the current TPIM regime is designed to do—to anticipate risk and to keep a close eye on people who have not committed an offence yet in a way that could mean that they are prosecuted, but who may be a risk to our safety. She gives, for example, the problem of people returning from Syria. That is clearly a significant problem, but it has existed for a number of years, and the Committee did not hear any evidence that the security services are unable to deal with the problem of people returning from Syria because of the current standard of proof. I use the words “business case” loosely; an “operational case” might be a better phrase. We need an operational case based on examples to justify why this change is needed.
All of us here care about having a TPIM regime in place that does the job. There is no suggestion that the current one is not doing the job and no clear operational case for it to be changed. We would be failing in our duty as Opposition parliamentarians if we did not test this in the way that we are, and I will leave it at that for now.
Mr Richard Holden (North West Durham) (Con)
I will speak briefly. As I did on Second Reading, I would like to associate a lot of my comments with those of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who again outlined with clarity some of the main issues in the Bill that I think will be challenged in another place. I hope they are to a degree and that the tyres are kicked a little harder.
We need a little more clarity from the Government on why we are moving to this much lower standard of proof. However, I am particularly pleased that the Minister has given clarification on the issue of the polygraph test. On time restrictions, I totally understand what my hon. Friend was saying about sleeper agents. Over the last few months, we have seen people going to ground for perhaps several months, or even years, and then re-emerging, but I think that there has to at least be some oversight of that and of the use of TPIMs.
Finally, I support Government amendment 18 and amendment 50. I do not see why it would be unreasonable for drug testing to be part of the TPIM regime. I generally welcome the legislation, and I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to some of these points at the Dispatch Box.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. We are going to have to introduce a time limit of five minutes to get in as many as we can. The Minister will come in just before 5.50 pm
Ms Abbott
I rise to speak in support of the amendments. The stakes in any debate about terrorism and how to combat terrorism successfully are extremely high, because these are issues that involve the lives and liberties of all of us. Children as well as adults have lost their lives in some of these terrible incidents, particularly in the horrific Manchester Arena bombing. Police officers have been murdered. We were all shocked by the murder of a fellow MP, Jo Cox, and I was a Member of this House in the ’80s and ’90s at the height of the IRA’s mainland bombing campaign, so, please, there is no one on the Opposition side who does not take the threat of terrorism seriously. However, it is extremely appropriate that Parliament should not be nodding through counter-terror legislation but should be subjecting it to proper scrutiny, because that is in the interests of us all. At the heart of that scrutiny has to be: will this legislation help minimise terror attacks?
Governments of all parties, including my own, have tended to want to argue that measures that undermine civil liberties are the answer to terrorism, but sometimes such measures run the risk of being a recruiting sergeant for terrorism. It is in that light that I address my remarks to the Prevent programme. The Government previously committed to a review of Prevent. I can only ask: where is the review? My hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), speaking from the Front Bench, described Prevent as controversial. It is not just controversial; it is a toxic brand, and I would argue it is increasingly counterproductive in the fight against terrorism that we all want to support. We should look at a replacement for the Prevent programme. It is not that good work has not been done in the name of Prevent—I visited some of those programmes in another role—but increasingly it is not doing the job it was established to do and, because its reputation is so toxic, it is not as effective as it could be in combating terrorism.
If we examine the terror incidents that have been inflicted on our communities in detail, we find that very few of the perpetrators have ever been in contact with a Prevent programme. At the same time, Prevent casts a hugely wide net over people, particularly in the Muslim community. In 2017-18, 7,300 people were referred to the Prevent programme, and the overwhelming majority of those were incorrect referrals. In fewer than one in five cases was there any discussion of these individuals at a Channel panel, and fewer than 400 people have received support from the Channel programme. No wonder, to many communities that find themselves targeted, it looks and feels like a trawling operation. I remember that in counter-terrorism debates with reference to the IRA’s mainland bombing campaign, it was former Army officers in this House—not people on my side of the Chamber—who argued against measures that could be a recruiting sergeant for terrorists.
As we know, when Ministers are challenged on Prevent, they respond as if any criticism of it is leading to an attempt to abolish our counter-terrorism efforts altogether. I want to nail that one. As Ministers know, Prevent is only one strand of the Contest strategy and we support the other three strands of pursue, protect and prepare. Serious consideration should be given to how all of those can be enhanced and made more effective. But, from all the evidence and all the people and communities I have spoken to, I conclude that Prevent is in danger of being counterproductive, alienating communities and ultimately making the fight against terrorism harder.
A more effective anti-radicalisation programme could and should be constituted. It would involve communities themselves. It would not be imposed on communities, but it would be working with communities, relying on people’s intelligence information, their sensitivities and their very real concerns, and the very real concerns of the overwhelming majority of people in this country who are opposed to terrorism in all its guises. Working with communities and relying on them, not demonising them and ostracising them, is the way forward.
In conclusion, all of us on both sides of the House have a great responsibility in fighting terrorism. The most important duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and we on the Opposition Benches feel that very strongly, but the safety and security of our people in the fight against terrorism cannot be upheld by knee-jerk reactions, simplistic formulations or programmes that prove to be counterproductive. An impartial review of the Prevent programme is long overdue. The fear is that now there is too much political capital invested in the Prevent programme for it to change course, but the fight against terrorism is too serious to be taken lightly. If something is not working, we need to fix it. That is why the time is right to review Prevent and to start again with an entirely new programme with the same aims, but a programme that works with communities rather than demonising them.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
We did add some time—[Interruption.] No, it is fine. We added a bit of time because we have just redone the maths and the time limit is now six minutes.
Daisy Cooper (St Albans) (LD)
I wish to start by endorsing some of the comments made by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) about the use of polygraphs. The Minister will know that I have been in touch with him a number of times on this particular issue, and I accept his assurances that they will be used simply for behavioural science purposes and not for legal purposes.
I wish to speak to amendments 40 and 42. As others have said, there have been a number of tragic terrorist attacks this year and there is an urgent need to protect people from further terrorist violence, but we need measures that will keep the public safe, not give the Government free rein to restrict the rights of innocent people on a never-ending basis based on little more than a hunch. We must ensure that our security services have the tools and resources that they need to do their jobs, but we must also ensure that any new powers and legislation will be necessary, effective and proportionate to the threats that we face. That is not the case when it comes to clauses 37 and 38, as they would massively expand the Home Secretary’s powers to impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which can include curfews and electronic tagging. These changes would essentially mean a return to control orders, as Members from all parts of the House have pointed out, and they were heavily criticised for getting the balance wrong between national security and civil liberties and were then replaced by TPIMs by the coalition Government in 2011.
There is minimal evidence that putting power in the hands of a single Minister to impose curfews and tagging will do anything to keep people safe, but it will put the rights and freedoms of innocent people at risk. These changes are opposed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Amnesty and Liberty, and the Liberal Democrats are also opposing these two clauses today. We had tabled amendments to remove them from the Bill and to keep the existing safeguards in place, and we were pleased to transfer our names to other amendments that seek to do the same.
The Liberal Democrats will continue to demand an effective, evidence-based approach to combating terrorism. Let me end by pointing out that this is the eighth counter-terrorism Bill in 10 years. If more legislation was the answer, we might have stopped these kinds of attacks by now.
Stuart Anderson (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)
As terrorism evolves, the modus operandi of terrorist groups starts to move. If more legislation has to be brought in at a later time, does the hon. Lady accept that we have to do that to evolve with the terrorist groups and how they operate, and it is about getting that fine balance right?
Daisy Cooper
Yes, of course I accept that there will be occasions when more legislation is needed, but, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) said, her Committee has taken evidence, and there is no compelling evidence as to why these two measures on the burden of evidence and the renewal of TPIM orders are needed.
There must be a much greater focus on effective measures that encourage de-radicalisation and rehabilitation, but instead we have in these two clauses the Government preparing for a power grab that could genuinely destroy innocent people’s lives, without presenting the public with a single shred of evidence that these measures will do anything to keep people safe or that the existing measures should be changed. That is why we will oppose them.
Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in this important debate.
It is our duty to reflect, calmly and seriously, on what we need to do to give people real security. This includes having the courage and strength to stand up as a matter of conscience and speak out when we see things around us that are wrong. That is why I must rise to say that the approach laid out in this Bill is fundamentally wrong. Terrorism suspects who have not been convicted of any offence now face expanded and potentially never-ending measures to control their lives. In the words of Rachel Logan, Amnesty International’s UK legal expert,
“It was never right to drastically curtail people’s liberty on the basis of secret, untested evidence using control orders or TPIMs—and we seem to be diving headlong into that territory where the standard of proof is extremely flimsy and people’s liberties can be curtailed on an indefinite basis.”
Indeed, there are real problems with the protection of human rights in the UK. In many areas, particularly in the spheres of immigration control, national security, counter-terrorism, freedom of association and speech, and the treatment of persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, UK law has been the frequent subject of criticism from experts in the UN Human Rights Committee and from the Council of Europe.
For some time, many have raised concerns that our approach to counter-terrorism is perceived by some to have been modelled on Islamophobic stereotypes, policies and political structures. That is why it is utterly extraordinary that the Bill removes the existing statutory deadline for the completion of the independent review of the Prevent programme. As people will know, Prevent is widely criticised for fostering discrimination against people of Muslim faith or background. It was developed without a firm evidence base and is rooted in a vague and expansive definition of extremism. It includes overt targeting of Muslim children in schools and has meant that our Muslim young people, in particular, are increasingly being viewed through the lens of security. Many, including some in this Chamber, have expressed how they have been moved and inspired by the Black Lives Matter protesters all around the world. It is an absolute insult that rather than listening and learning as people were calling out the state regarding racism, Islamophobia and discrimination, this Bill will further entrench discrimination against Muslims.
As someone who has first-hand experience of the rise in Islamophobia over the past decade, I know that every single day people of Muslim backgrounds like me face discrimination and prejudice. It is not just about enduring offensive remarks and presumptions, bad as those are, but about living with a real and serious constant threat to our faith group. At the same time, far too often, the foreign policy of successive Governments has fuelled, not reduced, the threat to us all. Yet recently we learned that the UK is to resume sales of arms to Saudi Arabia despite concerns that they could be used against civilians in Yemen in violation of international humanitarian law. That is why my constituents in Poplar and Limehouse know better than most that we must never again embark on illegal wars, imperialism and destruction but instead adopt a progressive, outward-looking global view driven by social justice, solidarity and human rights. The so-called war on terror has manifestly failed, despite the human cost being so devastating.
As has been pointed out by many, the covid-19 global pandemic has profoundly demonstrated that compassion becomes the tie that connects us to one another. Now, more than ever, we must come together and resist those that seek to divide us through violence, intolerance and hate. We cannot let this threat of terrorism take away our hard-fought-for rights and freedoms. We should not let our fundamental values be undermined. Our values are about caring for the whole of society and all our people, not walking by on the other side of the street when they need our help and support, and loving our communities enough to make this a place where nobody is homeless, hungry, held back or left behind. On the international stage, we must stand up for the values we share—justice, human rights and democracy—and work with others to keep people safe by ending conflict and tackling the climate emergency.
I am humbled and inspired by how people continue to organise to protect our communities, and I want to take this opportunity to recognise the enormous contribution that Muslims across Britain make to our country, our communities and our way of life, from which the values of respect and understanding derive. Those values resonate with everyone as we strive to build a better society for us all. In the end, it is only that hope that can lead us out of despair.
Zarah Sultana (Coventry South) (Lab)
I rise to speak about issues relating to amendments 37, 38, 40 and 46. I was seven years old on 11 September 2011, and that awful day passed a long shadow over my childhood. As a young Muslim, I saw the effects of the war on terror at home and abroad. At home, it meant rising Islamophobia, the steady erosion of civil rights, and the installation of cameras on streets near my childhood home. We were told that they were for traffic control, but we soon learned that that was not true. It was an area with a significant Muslim community, and we were being watched. As I got older, I became far too familiar with that. My community were seen not as citizens worthy of equality and respect, but as a threat viewed with hostility and suspicion.
At school and university, I encountered the effects of Prevent. It was said that it was targeting radicalisation, but when it resulted in Muslim university students being reported for reading terrorism-related textbooks as part of their degree, we knew that its effect was to target Muslims and erode the civil liberties of all. If we are worried about free speech on campuses, we need to look at the Prevent strategy.
In the past few years, terrorist atrocities have continued to rock communities across the world, from horrific antisemitic and white supremacist attacks, like that which hit the Pittsburgh synagogue in 2018 and the Christchurch mosque massacre in New Zealand last year, to the far-right extremist who assassinated a Member of this House in 2016 and the devastating attack that cruelly took 23 lives in Manchester in 2017. Everything must be done to combat such awful acts and keep our community safe. We must respect individual liberty and tackle the hate and fear that drives such horrific acts.
I have real concerns that the Bill falls short of those standards. First, it introduces control orders in all but name, which threaten all our civil liberties. Secondly, it removes the statutory deadline to review Prevent. Thirdly, it abandons any attempt to rehabilitate and reform, and instead keeps individuals trapped in a permanent web of surveillance and prisons.
On the first point, concerns and objections to changes to terrorism prevention and investigation measures have been raised by independent reviewers, including the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and civil rights groups such as Liberty and Amnesty International. Liberty says that the change
“reintroduces Control Orders in all but name”.
Control orders have allowed people to be placed under indefinite house arrest, without ever having been convicted of a crime or even having known the evidence against them. The coalition Government rightly abolished them, but this Bill effectively brings them back. Liberty says that the changes pose
“a threat to fundamental pillars of our justice system.”
That should be a concern to us all, so I encourage Government Members to support amendments 37, 40, 46 and 47.
On the second point, the Bill removes the statutory deadline for an independent review of the Prevent programme. To say that the programme needs an independent review is a serious understatement. Again, human rights organisations have consistently raised concerns about it. In 2018, Amnesty International said that it was developed
“without a firm evidence base and rooted in a vague and expansive definition of ‘extremism’”.
Countless examples can be found of the programme’s discriminatory impact on Muslims. In addition to the ones I have already mentioned, I want to include that of an eight-year-old boy who was questioned by Prevent officials after his teacher mistook the writing on his T-shirt, as well as the labelling of countless Muslim individuals, charities and mosques as extreme by the Government. The flaws of the programme have reached such heights that the likes of Greenpeace, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Extinction Rebellion were put on Prevent documents alongside proscribed neo-Nazi terror groups. The case for a statutory review of Prevent is clear, so I again urge Conservative Members to support amendments such as amendments 38 and 51.
On the final point, this Bill omits any effort to improve rehabilitation, which is an absolutely key measure to keeping our communities safe and preventing future attacks. Endlessly locking people up and interning them in underfunded, overcrowded, privately-run prisons is no way to protect the public. Instead, it is simply a recipe for creating more problems down the line.
I cannot support the approach of this Bill. We need to tackle terrorism, and we need to do that through prevention, but also by tackling the fear and hate upon which it thrives by bringing communities together and by never letting us be divided on the grounds of race and religion.
Chris Philp
I thank the Members who have contributed to a very thought-provoking debate this afternoon. I would like to reply, if I may, to some of the points that have been raised. I will start with the first question raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), about a lone actor review—new clause 8. I know he has had what I hope was a lengthy and fruitful conversation with the Minister for Security earlier today. He will of course be aware that the Prevent review we have been talking about touches on this, but the MAPPA review will also significantly engage with this topic.
I have been endeavouring to obtain a firm date for publication during the last few minutes. I am afraid the best I can do from this Dispatch Box at the moment is to say that it will be soon—as soon as practical. I hope it will be within the timeframe the hon. Gentleman was asking for, but I am afraid I cannot give him a precise date. However, it is imminent, and we will do it as soon as we possibly can. I believe the MAPPA review will cover many of the issues that the shadow Minister has been raising in relation to the lone actor threat that he and his colleagues have been discussing.
Let me turn to the substantive questions about TPIMs that arose both this afternoon and in Committee. Let me start with what the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) termed the business case or the operational case: why are we proposing to lower the burden of proof? The hon. Members for St Helens North and for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the same question.
The best answer I can give the House to that question—what is the business case for changing the burden of proof?—is the evidence given to the Bill Committee by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, one of the national counter-terrorism policing leads, who had been briefed by the security services prior to giving his evidence. In his evidence, which is available in Hansard, he gave us three reasons why a lower burden of proof—a reasonable suspicion—would be better and would protect the public. The first reason he gave is that, where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing, there may not be time to establish the higher burden of proof before a threat or a risk materialises. Secondly, he said that where somebody is returning from abroad—for example, from Syria—it is very hard to establish an evidential base that, on the balance of probability, someone has been involved in terror-related activity because, by definition, getting evidence from somewhere like Syria it is very hard, if not impossible. The third reason he gave was where sensitive material needs to be relied on: disclosing that material to get to the balance of probability would potentially endanger sources—confidential sources—and it is clearly easier to get to the reasonable suspicion standard without disclosing the material. Those are the three reasons he gave. [Interruption.]
To pre-empt the intervention that I sense the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West is brewing, I accept that it is true historically—looking back—that there has not been an occasion on which the security services wanted to give a TPIM but could not do so because of the burden of proof. There is no such historical example, and I freely concede the point. I suspect that was the topic of the intervention. [Interruption.] Sort of. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) said in an intervention, we have to deal in this House not just with what has happened in the past but with what might happen in the future.
We have been clearly advised by Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, and through him by the security services, that this measure is necessary to protect the public. When the assistant chief constable gave evidence on 25 June, I asked him explicitly whether the lower standard of proof would make the public safer. He answered, categorically, that yes it would.
Joanna Cherry
The Minister anticipates my objection, so perhaps I can refer him to what the assistant chief constable said in response to me during the evidence session on 25 June. I asked:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
and he replied:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
Chris Philp
As I said, I accept that. There have not been any historical cases where the standard of proof has been a blocker, but we have been categorically advised by the security services, speaking through Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, that it might occur, and that these proposals will make the public safer. He said that categorically, and I do not think that the House could, or should, disregard such clear advice. In relation to Jonathan Hall’s comments, I suspect that he may not have heard the evidence that I read out. He gave evidence to the Committee immediately before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. His evidence was new to the House and to Parliament, and we did not have it on Second Reading. We do have it now, however, and we should have careful regard to it.
A number of Members raised questions about civil liberties, and not wishing to intrude on an individual’s freedom, and I will directly address those points. I will do so with reference to the original Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. By lowering the burden of proof, we are changing only one of five limbs. The other four limbs remain exactly as they are, and one of those, laid out in section 3 of that Act, states that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider whether the TPIM is “necessary”—I use that word carefully—for purposes connected with protecting members of the public. Subsection (4), condition D, states that the Secretary of State must consider whether a TPIM is
“necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity,”
That test of necessity goes far beyond the reasonable suspicion referred to in the first limb. The requirement for necessity is unchanged.
The hon. Member for St Albans said that this measure could be introduced on a Minister’s whim, and that a Minister could impose a TPIM with the sweep of a pen. I say to her gently, however, that that is not the case and there are judicial safeguards in the 2011 Act. For example, section 6 of that Act states that when a TPIM notice is given, the Secretary of State must go to the court and make an application, and the court has to verify or validate that the TPIM is reasonable, and certify that it is not “obviously flawed”. There is judicial certification.
Section 16 of the 2011 Act provides for a right to appeal. If the subject of a TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, or that the TPIM is unjustified, they can apply to the court in a process akin to a judicial review, and apply to have it overturned. There are judicial safeguards to protect individuals from unreasonable actions by the Government.
In the many years that TPIMs have been in operation since 2011, and in the six years when control orders were in place from 2005, the numbers used have been small. There were never more than about 15 to 20 control orders in force at any one time, and we heard evidence that as of today only six TPIMs are in force. That is a very small number, as they are used only in exceptional circumstances. When I asked Jonathan Hall whether he believed that any Government, including the previous Labour Government or the more recent Conservative Government, had ever abused the power provided by TPIMs or control orders, he answered that no, he was not aware of any such abuse. I would add that a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, has expressed support for the measures in this Bill.
Let me turn to the issue of time and how extendable TPIMs are. They currently expire after two years. We propose to make them extendable in one-year increments, as were the old control orders passed by the then Labour Government and indeed supported by some Members in this House this afternoon. We heard evidence from Jonathan Hall that there was risk where a TPIM ended after two years, as there could be a gap. He knew of two real cases where that occurred, with a gap of one year in one case and a gap of 16 months in the other before a new TPIM could be obtained. That is because we have to get fresh evidence; we cannot rely on the old evidence and we have to wait for somebody to do something wrong again to give us the grounds to renew the TPIM. Max Hill, when he was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in 2017, said that some terrorists were “biding time” waiting for the TPIM to simply time out.
In fairness to the last Labour Government, even though the previous control orders could be extended year by year, in practice most of them were not: 30 of them were for less than two years; eight were for between two and three years; four were for between three and four years; and only three extended for between four and five years. Again, the subject can apply for judicial review if they think the TPIM extension is unfair, so a judicial protection is in place.
I have two quick final points to make. In terms of prosecution, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst asked about, there is a duty under section 10 of the 2011 Act that requires the Secretary of State to seek prosecution where appropriate. On Prevent, let me say that the statutory obligation to carry out the Prevent review remains. There have been some delays, because the independent reviewer had to be replaced and then we had the coronavirus pandemic. Our commitment to do it remains in statute. Obviously, specifying a date caused a problem before, and we do not want to repeat that mistake. We hope and expect that this will be done by August of next year, but we feel that, given the experience of the recent past, putting that date in the Bill would simply be setting a bear trap. So I hope that I have laid out the case for resisting these amendments.
Conor McGinn
In the brief time available, I wish, first, to thank the Minister for addressing some of the concerns we have raised, not just today on Report, but through a thorough examination of the Bill in Committee. Although Labour Members wholeheartedly support robust action to keep our country and our citizens safe, and to tackle terrorism and its causes, it is the duty of any responsible Opposition to examine fully the Government’s proposals. I feel that we have done that, with the assistance of Scottish National party and Liberal Democrat Members, those from other parties in the House, and colleagues on the Back Benches.
The Minister and the Government should listen carefully to the very personal testimony given by my hon. Friends the Members for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana) and for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and indeed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott). Although I might not have agreed with her on every crossed t or dotted i, or even on whole words or sentences on occasion, she does speak with the voice of years of experience in this House and a commitment to these issues. She also, like Members who spoke from these Benches, speaks authoritatively and with great passion on behalf of the constituencies and communities she represents. The Government should listen to them, which was why I made the points I did about the importance of not only getting this Prevent review right but getting on with it, to give the clarity and confidence needed, and to address some of the challenges and controversies associated with it.
I was hoping that we might receive a commitment from the Government to publish their MAPPA— multi-agency public protection arrangements—review before we got to consideration in the House of Lords, because it is important, given the removal of the statutory deadline for Prevent and given that the Opposition have proposed a review on lone actors, to have some timeframe on that. I appreciate and understand that the Minister has made valiant efforts to do that, but I regret that it has not been forthcoming to date. I hope that in considering the request for a review on lone actors, the Government understand that we do so in a constructive spirit.
Chris Philp
The Lord Chancellor has appeared, as if by magic, behind the Speaker’s Chair and has indicated to me by eloquent gesticulation that the MAPPA review will indeed be published before the consideration of the Bill in the other place.
Conor McGinn
I thank the Lord Chancellor and the Minister for that commitment. The robust exchanges we have had have been in the context and spirit of working constructively on a Bill of huge importance, which is concerned with keeping our country and its citizens safe. Our proposals for that review are in keeping with that view. We await to see what the MAPPA review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation comes forward with. Colleagues in the other place will no doubt wish to scrutinise that. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Amendment proposed: 30, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must —
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”.—(Alex Cunningham.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
May I take this opportunity to thank hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their careful scrutiny of the Bill thus far? I am very grateful to everyone who contributed to the debate on Second Reading, in Committee and today on Report. I would especially like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), whose impassioned speech regarding her friend Louise, who was caught up in the horrors of the 7/7 bombings 15 years ago this month, reminded us of the importance of the work we are doing here. I am particularly grateful for the co-operative and constructive spirit in which these debates have taken place, and for the broad support received for the Bill so far. That, I think, is testament to the fact that Members recognise overall the intent and purpose of the legislation, which are to protect the public and to keep our country safe. Those are the first and foremost duties of any Government.
There have been some differing opinions on certain measures in the Bill. They have enriched the debate and deepened our understanding of not just the intention behind the measures, but current practice. We have heard questions about the changes we are making to terrorism prevention and investigation measure notices—or TPIMs, as we know them. Let me say to the House that prosecution, or deportation in the case of foreign nationals, will always be our preference for dealing with terrorists, but there will continue to be a small number of cases where, despite the best efforts of the police and security services, that will not be possible. In those circumstances, TPIMs remain a vital risk management tool. A lower standard of proof will allow for TPIMs to be considered for use in a wider variety of cases and will better protect the covert sources and methods that are vital to the investigation of terrorist threat.
The Home Secretary considers very carefully the intelligence held by our security services, as well as consulting the police on the case for prosecution, before deciding whether a TPIM is necessary and proportionate. The Government have no desire to keep individuals on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. Removing the two-year time limit for a TPIM ensures that where subjects pose an enduring risk, we will be better placed to restrict and prevent their involvement in terrorism-related activity for as long as is necessary.
Further safeguards will remain in place. The courts will be able to consider permission hearings on whether the decision to impose a TPIM was obviously flawed and prevent the Home Secretary from doing so where that is the case. Subjects will continue to have a right to appeal any decision to extend the TPIM or vary any of its measures. The quarterly TPIM review group meetings will continue to provide regular oversight of every TPIM, including reviewing its ongoing necessity, whether prosecution is a possibility, and, indeed, the exit strategy for the subject of the measure.
Some concerns have been expressed about the removal of the statutory deadline for completing the independent review of Prevent. I must emphasise that the commitment to completing that important review continues and will remain in statute. We want the review into our strategy for safeguarding those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism to be completed as soon as possible, but we also wanted to run a full and open competition to appoint a new reviewer and to attract as broad a range of applicants as possible. Designing and running that process takes time, and I want to ensure that the new reviewer has an opportunity to decide how best to run the next phase of the review and has enough time to analyse the evidence, develop robust recommendations and, critically, can engage as openly, fully and widely as possible with communities, civil society and others. That will all take time if it is to be done properly, and we cannot fully predict whether events might have a further impact on the timings of that review, particularly in the context of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic, which, frankly, could present further practical challenges to how it could be conducted over the coming months. We should therefore avoid the risk of removing the reviewer’s ability to respond to and mitigate those events both foreseeable and unforeseeable.
For those reasons, while I fully understand the desire to put a new deadline in the Bill, there would, in my judgment, be a significant risk in doing so. It could have the unintended consequence of reducing the impact of this vital review, which I know Members across the House do not wish to do. We should not confuse our desire to give the reviewer the flexibility and time they will need with any question about a lack of commitment to it. I say again to the House that we want it to be completed along with a Government response as quickly as possible, and certainly no later than August of next year.
There has been much debate and discussion about the Bill’s provisions relating to polygraph testing, and I recall a lot of interest in the media when we announced the Bill and its details. I would like to be clear about what these measures seek to achieve and what they do not do. First, on their efficacy, the Committee heard compelling and detailed evidence from Professor Grubin, a leading expert in this field, who has attested to their reliability and their value. They are well established in this country already, having been used thousands of times on sex offenders, and they have been independently evaluated. Secondly, on their purpose, they are an additional risk management tool that can allow probation officers to test compliance with other licence conditions. They are not there to catch offenders out, and the results will most certainly not be used in criminal proceedings against the offender. We have already shown our intention to introduce polygraph testing elsewhere for use with domestic abusers, so we are not taking a novel approach for terrorist offenders. It is another way in which we can help to protect the public.
Finally on this issue, we recognise that they are currently used only in England and Wales, which is why the polygraph provisions relating to terrorist offenders on licence will not come into effect automatically. We will continue to work with Ministers in the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to provide advice and support to put the necessary infrastructure in place before polygraph testing can be conducted there. I am grateful for the continued co-operation of those devolved Administrations. I recognise the complexity and sensitivities of legislating across three jurisdictions’ sentencing frameworks. Right hon. and hon. Members have indeed reminded us of the need to tread carefully, and we do so. I would like to give reassurance that the Government are committed to ensuring that the measures in the Bill can work effectively throughout our United Kingdom, but I do not apologise for the determination, because we have to ensure our citizens are safe from terrorist offending whether committed in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland
I will pause at this moment to thank all those members of the Bill team who have worked so hard to bring the Bill to this stage. Most notably, I am profoundly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) for his stewardship both on Report and in Committee. Indeed I thank all the team both in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office—some of whom are in the Box today—for working collaboratively together. They have served Ministers and indeed the House diligently when it comes to the need to marshal all the clauses in a way that could withstand the most appropriate and thorough scrutiny. I am grateful to them, and I am happy to put it put that on the record here rather than via a point of order, which I think I did on a previous occasion when you were in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for that, too.
The United Kingdom has one of the strongest counter-terrorism systems in the world, but we continue to face a terrorist threat in this country that is complex, and that is diverse and rapidly changing. The House has rightly noted the growing threat that we face from right- wing extremists. Since 2017 we have foiled 25 terrorist plots, including eight plots planned by right-wing extremists, but we are not complacent. We have already established a joint extremism unit to strengthen the partnership of work across the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Of course, there is much more to do, and there will regrettably always be unfinished business.
We are on track to recruit an additional 20,000 police officers to boost frontline capability. That is why we have increased the budget for counter-terrorism policing by £90 million this year, compared with last, taking the overall CT police funding to over £900 million, and we are developing an ambitious programme to strengthen joint working between our police and our security services, which will leave terrorists with no place to hide.
As I have said on many occasions and will continue to say, public protection is our first duty. The comprehensive package of measures introduced in the Bill, on top of the investment that we are making and the programme we are putting in place, demonstrates, I firmly believe, our deep and enduring commitment to that duty.
Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)
This is an important Bill, which will have a significant impact on many aspects of the criminal justice system for many years to come. I wish to thank colleagues who contributed to the robust debates that we have had in Committee and on Report. In particular, I thank my colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), who has made characteristically thoughtful contributions throughout the Bill’s passage. I thank also my colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), for his characteristic robust approach, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who has been a pleasure to work with for the first time on the Front Bench. I also thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) for the joint working that we were able to do in opposition.
As I said on Second Reading, the Opposition fully accept that those who have committed serious terrorist offences should serve a sentence that fully represents the gravity of their actions. First and foremost, our approach has been an overarching commitment to keep the British public safe and to ensure that horrific terrorist attacks such as the ones at Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham cannot be repeated. The Opposition also accept that when those who have committed the most serious terrorist offences are released, it is only right that, even if they are really sorry, they are subject to stringent licensing conditions that would allow their close supervision in the community.
We accept that the broad thrust of the Bill is necessary and proportionate. It would be a mistake to say, though, that the Bill is flawless, or that its provisions on their own can protect the public from the ever-present threat of radicalisation and serious terrorist atrocities. One of the greatest concerns that we have had, as an Opposition, since the emergence of the Bill is that the balance between the importance of punishment and the necessity to rehabilitate offenders has not been quite struck. At this stage, it is important to make one point perfectly clear: even offenders convicted of the most serious terrorist offences, those who are subject to extended sentences under the Bill, will at some point be released back into society. That is the reality that, wherever we sit in this House, we must accept. Although, as I have already pointed out, it is only right that the most serious terrorists serve extended sentences of up to 14 years, the Opposition also believe that we have a moral duty to ensure that offenders leave prison less dangerous and less willing to harm the fabric of our society than when they went in.
Failing to believe and invest in deradicalisation strategies not only fails society but actively puts members of society at increased risk. Although it is sadly true that most serious terrorist offenders will prove to be either unwilling or unable to reform, it is our duty to believe in hope over despair. It is simply not good enough to lock terrorists away for longer, put them out of our minds and hope for the best. As we have seen from the devastating attacks at Streatham and Fishmongers’ Hall, this approach does not work.
The Government cannot simply give up on rehabilitation, nor the ability of former offenders to reform, which is why it is so disappointing that so little in the Bill will do anything to strip terrorists of their hateful ideologies or to encourage them to rejoin society as reformed individuals. It is abundantly clear that we need a serious and comprehensive strategy on deradicalisation in prison, and the Opposition will hold the Government to account on that in the months and years to come.
That brings me to another issue that the Opposition have sought to recognise during the passage of the Bill: the importance of probation. We cannot begin to tackle terrorism without first recognising the important role played by the probation services. It is worth remembering that the role of probation is not just to monitor risk but to provide support to those who have been released from prison so that they are less likely to reoffend and can play an active role in society.
The provisions of this important Bill will mean that more people will serve longer behind bars, followed by hugely increased licence periods in the community. With that in mind, it is more important than ever for our probation services to be fully functioning and effective, yet we know that our probation services are already hopelessly overstretched and overworked.
In particular, Labour is concerned that the provisions of the Bill will place a huge burden on specialised probation officers, who are already very thin on the ground and hold very high terror-related caseloads. Research shows us that more time spent with offenders is essential to the carrying out of proper risk assessments, but that simply will not be possible with vastly increased workloads. The Government cannot simply increase the responsibilities placed on probation officers, increase their workload and consider the matter closed. It is vital that probation officers are given the resources that they need to do their job; the safety of the public depends on it. The Opposition will hold the Government to account if they fail to meet their obligations to the probation services.
Another concern that was stressed throughout Committee and on Report is the importance of recognising the difference between young offenders and adult offenders. Young offenders and adult offenders are inherently different: they think differently and make decisions in different ways but, most importantly, young offenders are much more capable of reform than older adults. As Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, rightly pointed out during his analysis of the Bill:
“The requirement of a minimum mandatory sentence for all adult offenders, however young,”
raises the question of
“an adult of 18 years and one month”
being
“any more mature than a child of 17 years and 11 months”.
The Opposition recognise that there are significant differences between adults over 21, those who are between 19 and 21, and those who are under 18. Members of each of those groups are at very different stages of their lives, and reviews, including my own, have recognised the need for different criminal justice approaches to different age groups. In order properly to reflect the difference between young offenders and adult offenders, the Opposition tabled an amendment that would require a pre-sentence report to be carried out that would take into consideration the age of the offender and whether options other than a serious terrorist offence might be more effective. It is a shame that the Government did not accept that amendment, but I hope that the Secretary of State will consider the Opposition’s concerns in the months and years ahead.
Let me finish where I started on Second Reading, first in paying tribute to a dear friend, James Adams, who was killed in the 7/7 bombings, but also in paying tribute to Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, who lost their lives in the attack on Fishmongers’ Hall. Both Jack and Saskia believed passionately that there can be a glimmer of light in even the darkest and most hardened of hearts. We on the Labour Benches share that optimism. Although it is only right that those who have committed the most heinous of crimes are subjected to extended sentences, we cannot give up hope of rehabilitation. If even the smallest chance of redemption exists, we owe it to the victims of Fishmongers’ Hall to try.
Throughout the passage of this Bill, the Opposition have sought to work constructively with the Government to ensure that the courts have the powers they need to meet the continual threat of terrorism and keep terrorists off the streets, and I assure the Secretary of State that I will continue to work constructively with him over the months and years ahead. This Bill goes some way to doing that, and therefore we will support it on Third Reading.
Sir Robert Neill
This is a very important Bill. The Lord Chancellor and his ministerial team are to be congratulated on delivering it. It is the second major piece of legislation that the Lord Chancellor’s Department has delivered in very different fields, if we take into account the divorce reform Bill. It deals with the most profound matter. Many of my constituents commute daily to London—or they would, under normal circumstances—and the real threat and risk of terrorism there and in our great cities is a daily matter for them. Getting this right is vital for my constituents and for the country as a whole.
That requires a balance—a balance between security, and just and due process and the liberty of the individual. I do not doubt that it was the Lord Chancellor’s overriding intention to get that right. I believe he has succeeded. There are one or two areas, which I have referred to, where perhaps we will want to see how it works in practice, but we ought to give the Bill a fair wind.
I know that the Lord Chancellor will take on board the observations of the shadow Lord Chancellor and the Justice Committee about the importance of the work done by the probation service and the Prison Service in these areas and ensure that they are not only properly supported but resourced. In particular, we must ensure not only that offenders are, where necessary, properly contained in prison and then, where possible, rehabilitated afterwards, but that those who cannot be rehabilitated are not able to corrupt and suck into their web other, more vulnerable prisoners. Giving the Prison Service resource to do that is also an important part of protection. I support the Bill.
Joanna Cherry
I will not speak for long, because I have already spoken at length this afternoon about issues of concern to the Scottish National party and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I commend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), on his hard work to pilot the Bill through its stages so far, and on having an open-door policy to my concerns and those of my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) about matters pertaining to sentencing in Scotland.
I also thank the hon. Members for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) and for St Helens North (Conor McGinn); I enjoyed working with them on the Bill Committee, and it is always my pleasure to work with the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) and the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy). We have a good working relationship, and I would like that to continue on other Bills as this Parliament goes on.
As I said earlier, terrorism is clearly reserved. The position of the Scottish National party is clear: we want to work hard with the UK Government to make sure that all communities in these islands are protected from the horrendous consequences of terrorism, but sentencing is devolved, and it is important that that is respected. I am grateful to Ministers for taking on board the concerns that I and my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian raised about the order for lifelong restriction, and for bringing forward amendments to deal with those concerns. I am also grateful that there are ongoing discussions about the rather more difficult issue of polygraphs. In Scotland, we do not use them at present. My friend and colleague Humza Yousaf, the Justice Secretary, is in correspondence about that matter.
I add my own plea that we do not forget about the importance of rehabilitation and deradicalisation. There is not really anything about those things in the Bill. As I said earlier this afternoon, it is particularly important, when looking at children and younger offenders, that we devote thought and time to deradicalisation.
I have already made clear the Scottish National party’s concerns about the lack of a clear operational case for the changes being made in relation to TPIMs, and I suspect there will be more debate about that in the other place. That is not just the view of the SNP; the concern is shared by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I will leave it at that for now, but we will no doubt be revisiting matters if any amendments come back from the Lords.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I rise only briefly to state my strong support for the Bill. I should declare that prior to my election, I was the magistrate member of the Sentencing Council and a non-executive director of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. Accordingly, I was honoured to be a member of the Public Bill Committee for this legislation.
As we have heard several times during the debates on the Bill, the overarching responsibility of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and one of the five set out purposes of sentencing is to protect the public, and that is rightly the priority of the Bill. Terrorist attacks cause carnage, murdering indiscriminately and injuring wantonly. The Bill sends a very powerful message to those who seek to bring terror to the lives of innocent people. It demonstrates the contempt in which we hold those who seek to kill and maim to further their warped ideologies. A minimum sentence of 14 years to be spent entirely in custody is a clear signal that if someone commits a serious offence linked to terrorism, they can expect to spend a hefty proportion of their life locked up, and rightly so.
I, too, am a firm believer in rehabilitation, and the Prison Service has worked incredibly hard to devise and implement deradicalisation programmes, but I think most people would acknowledge that there is considerable scope for further improvement. Several times during the Committee’s evidence sessions, we were told that the reoffending rate of terrorists is low—perhaps just 3% —somehow implying that we therefore do not need such lengthy sentences as proposed in the Bill, but that surely misses the point. Even one terrorist reoffending is one too many, because even one terrorist attack can kill hundreds of people. In cases of terrorism, we cannot take risks.
The Bill also sends a strong message to the public that this Government are absolutely committed to protecting lives and minimising the chance of terrorist attacks taking place. The changes to TPIMs reflect the needs of the Security Service to have every tool to keep us safe. When Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, the deputy senior national co-ordinator in the UK’s counter-terrorism policing, gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, he stated:
“Protecting the public is our No. 1 priority and sometimes that means we have to intervene regardless of evidence, because the risks to the public are so great.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 26, Q69.]
Our priority must be to support our Security Service and police in the heroic work they do day in, day out, often at considerable danger to themselves in their constant quest to thwart would-be terrorists from wreaking their havoc. We owe it to them to give them what they need to keep us safe.
Finally, it is vitally important that the courts take immediate note if and when the Bill is passed. I hope that sentencing guidelines can be introduced quickly to reflect the clear will of all sides of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison.
Robert Buckland
On that point, my hon. Friend will be assured to know that the Sentencing Council is putting work in train in any event to revise the terrorism guidelines and this Bill, should it become law, will no doubt form part of its work.
Rob Butler
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for reassuring me of that. I know from having served on the Sentencing Council that its members will diligently proceed with their efforts. That work will surely reflect, as I was saying, the clear will of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison, to give greater opportunity for rehabilitation, to reflect the seriousness of their crime and, most importantly, to protect the British people.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
May I say briefly that there are many MPs in this House who have been affected by terrorism? When I was talking to the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) earlier, we were relating the stories of her friend and others. This Bill before us tonight cements and strengthens our position and offers us protection. We as MPs in Northern Ireland have felt the brunt of terrorism more than most. We know about it personally—I know about it. I often think of those whom I know who have given their lives. I think of my cousin Kenneth Smyth and his friend Daniel McCormick who were both murdered on 10 December 1971. I think of the four UDR men murdered at Ballydugan: young John Birch, Steven Smart—[Interruption.]
Robert Buckland
I think it would be the right thing to do to allow our hon. Friend to compose himself for a moment as he remembers and shares with the House the horror of the effects of terrorism. We remain indebted to him and are always grateful to him for sharing his observations and we entirely understand how he must feel when he is reliving those moments.
Jim Shannon
I thank the Secretary of State very much for intervening. I do recall John Birch, Steven Smart, Michael Adams and Lance Corporal Bradley. I often think of the families of those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and of those who were injured. We owe so much to those families. Every MP in this House has a responsibility to keep their constituents safe, as others have said, which we all adhere to and I thank them for that. Today, our Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who, I have to say, I am very impressed by—I mean that honestly—and also the Secretary of State have come in here and ensured that the protection of all the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been cemented in legislation, and I thank them for that. We welcome the Government’s commitment and we thank all in the Committee for their work and the Clerks for their administration to deliver the Bill. Madam Deputy Speaker, thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
We now come to Lords amendments to the Business and Planning Bill. I am going slowly here to allow a natural changeover of personnel at a 2 metre distance. I am grateful to hon. Members for their co-operation.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Wednesday 22nd July 2020
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Monday 21st September 2020
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time. No Government could be glad at putting a further counterterrorism Bill before your Lordships’ House, but sadly it is born of necessity.
The Bill was originally conceived in response to the appalling attack that took place in Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019. Sadly, during its development, in February 2020 a further terrorist attack was carried out in Streatham. Both attacks were perpetrated by offenders who had been automatically released half way through their sentence. There was no possibility of keeping them in prison beyond that point under the law at the time.
The Government took immediate action to redress that error by introducing emergency legislation, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020. We were grateful to noble Lords for the detailed and constructive debates on that Bill, which enabled us to halt the imminent automatic release of further terrorist offenders and ensure that they will be referred to the Parole Board before they can be considered for early release from their custodial sentence. Those debates and the swift passage of that Bill were a demonstration of the strength of our Parliament, in times of great need, to ensure that the right laws are in place to protect the public. Those shocking attacks underlined the need for the Government to do all that we can to offer greater protection to the public and justice for the victims of terrorism. Despite the ongoing and determined efforts of our security services, the threat of terrorism sadly remains; indeed, it is ever evolving.
This Bill will therefore strengthen not only the sentencing framework for terrorist offenders, but also the tools that enable our public services better to monitor and disrupt convicted terrorists and those who are of terrorism concern. Those who commit serious acts of terror must face sentences which match the severity of their crimes. Part 1 of the Bill sets out reforms which will introduce a new range of sentences—and improvements to existing sentences—which properly reflect the harm such crimes cause.
The first of these changes is the introduction of the serious terrorism sentence. This mandates a minimum custodial period of 14 years and a licence period of seven to 25 years for those who commit serious terrorist acts which put the lives of members of the public at risk. Where such offenders do not receive a life sentence, the serious terrorism sentence will provide for a minimum of 14 years in custody. The Bill will also make changes to the sentences of offenders assessed as dangerous by the court, and who could have received a life sentence for their offending, but instead received an extended determinate sentence. The Bill recognises these offences as sufficiently serious that there should be no prospect of early release from their custodial sentence. Further to this, for this cohort the courts will be empowered to apply licence periods of up to 10 years. I will say more on those licence conditions shortly.
We also propose to increase the maximum sentence given to those found to be members of, or providing support to, proscribed organisations, or those who attend a place used for terrorism training, from 10 to 14 years. These changes are made following the sentencing review announced by my right honourable and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in February.
This review also informed amendments to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which are also supported by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. These amendments will enable the courts to find any offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years to have a terrorist connection, which will lead to an aggravation of that sentence. It will also ensure that these offenders are subject to the registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison.
These measures clearly demonstrate the seriousness with which the Government view this type of offending. They also ensure that there is additional time for the authorities to support reform of such dangerous behaviour, improving our ability to rehabilitate offenders motivated by warped and abhorrent ideologies.
Noble Lords will appreciate how the recent terrorist attacks demonstrated the vital role played by those who monitor and manage the risk presented by terrorism in our communities, be they the police, the probation service or the security services. The Government know that time spent on licence is a crucial opportunity both to monitor and manage offenders in the community and to support their rehabilitation so that there can be long-lasting changes to their behaviour.
In recognition of the significance of this opportunity, we are adding all terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of over two years to the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime, with equivalent provision in Scotland and Northern Ireland. This will guarantee that any offender convicted of a terrorism offence covered by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act will no longer be eligible for a standard determinate sentence and, instead, will receive a sentence for offenders of particular concern, ensuring a mandatory period of at least one year on licence.
The Bill also introduces a range of measures that will support the effective and efficient risk management of terrorist offenders. It will make available the use of polygraph testing when terrorist offenders are released on licence—as a condition of their licence— where necessary and proportionate to managing their risk. This is an approach similar to the already successfully adopted practice used for the monitoring of sex offenders in the community in England and Wales.
Debate in another place aired concern over this provision, so I assure noble Lords that this measure has all the relevant safeguards within its design. A failed test—that is, physiological reactions which indicate dishonesty—will never be sufficient to recall an offender to custody, nor will information gained during a test be used in a criminal proceeding against the examined offender. The measure will, however, provide critical “information gain”, which will support offender managers in their essential role, allowing them to tailor and refine risk-management plans to the benefit of wider society.
The Bill also makes a number of changes to the disruption and risk-management tools available to our operational partners. We are lowering the standard of proof for imposing a terrorism prevention and investigation measure, or TPIM, notice from the “balance of probabilities” to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. Lowering the standard of proof increases the flexibility of TPIMs as a tool for public protection, supporting their use in a wider variety of circumstances.
The Bill also specifies new measures which can be applied to TPIM subjects and removes the current two-year limit for which a TPIM notice can last. Instead, a TPIM will last for one year at a time but will be capable of repeated renewal. A TPIM will be renewed only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Should that justification cease, the TPIM will not be renewed.
Although it is important that we make these changes to support our operational partners, it is also important to be clear that TPIMs will remain a tool of last resort to protect the public from dangerous individuals whom it is not possible to prosecute or deport, or individuals who remain a real threat after being released from prison.
A further preventive measure that we are taking is to amend legislation governing serious crime prevention orders by allowing the police to apply for one directly to the High Court in terrorism cases. This will streamline the application process and is intended to support an increased use of these orders in such instances.
We are also adding the offences of breaching a TPIM notice and breaching a temporary exclusion order to the list of relevant terrorism offences which can trigger the registered terrorist offender notification requirements. This will help to close current gaps in our ability to manage terrorist offenders following their release from prison and any risk they pose.
The combined impact of these changes will strengthen our ability to manage the risk posed by people of terrorism concern in the community, including those released from prison without a period on licence.
The Bill also makes some changes to the way we deal with young terrorist offenders under the age of 18. We recognise that there is a separate sentencing framework for that category of offender, with distinct purposes and aims, which, quite rightly, differ from those for adults. Although we accept that there are important considerations of age and maturity to take into account—and we remain firm in our ambition to ensure that custody is used only where necessary—some young people are susceptible to radicalisation or to adopting extremist views and, among them, a few will unfortunately pose a very serious threat to the public. After due care and consideration, we have decided to apply some of the measures in the Bill to those aged under 18 in cases where it is imperative that we address the risk to the public posed by serious terrorist offenders. In that regard, we believe that the extended determinate sentence provisions strike a balance between mitigating the threat posed by terrorist offenders assessed as dangerous by the courts and the need to consider the welfare of younger offenders.
The Bill will also ensure that the courts have the right range of options at their disposal to deal with those under the age of 18 who commit serious terrorist or terrorism-related offences by introducing a new sentence of detention for terrorist offenders of particular concern. This new sentence will ensure that those offenders are subject to a fixed, one-year period on licence once released, the aim of which is to support their reintegration into the community and to safeguard the public.
A major component of our strategy for dealing with terrorism is Prevent, which aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism through terrorist-related activities. The independent review of Prevent will deliver on the Government’s commitment set out in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and will critically examine and report on the Government’s strategy for safeguarding those susceptible to extreme ideology.
Following the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, stepping down, the process of appointing the next independent reviewer is under way by means of a full and open competition. To give the new reviewer the time necessary to carry out this important review, the Bill will remove the statutory deadline for the completion of the review. The aim is that it will have concluded, with a government response, by August 2021. However, given the ongoing uncertainty in light of the effect that Covid-19 is having on society, I hope that noble Lords will appreciate why a statutory deadline is no longer appropriate.
The threat posed by terrorism is one faced by every jurisdiction of this nation, and Her Majesty’s Government have a responsibility to protect all the people of the United Kingdom, wherever they may reside. To this end, we have set out to ensure that the provisions in the Bill will equally take effect in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. This includes the full application of the measures set out in the terrorist offenders Act to Northern Ireland.
We know that terrorism constantly morphs and adapts to circumvent measures put in place to counter it, so we must be equally flexible and refresh these critical laws to stay ahead of the threat it poses. The package of measures in the Bill aims to do just that by strengthening our hand at each stage of the process of dealing with terrorist offenders. From sentencing through to release and monitoring of these offenders, this legislation reaffirms our determination to ensure that the public are protected and, importantly, to give them confidence in that protection.
I am pleased that there can be rather more time to debate and scrutinise the Bill than was possible with the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act, and we look forward to the maiden speeches of my noble friend Lord Vaizey of Didcot and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester as part of that, but I hope that that can be accompanied by the same sense of resolve and common purpose as your Lordships’ House demonstrated during the passage of that earlier legislation. I beg to move.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for introducing with such care and clarity this important Bill. We understand he has been thrown in at the deep end after the sudden departure from the Government of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. He has acquitted himself impressively so far.
This is a significant Bill. The criminal justice response is key in the fight against terrorism but can never be the only response. While many of the recent terrorist atrocities have been associated with Islamist extremism, it is important to identify that there remain threats from others: as the UK’s top counterterrorism police officer, Neil Basu, recently confirmed, the fastest growing terrorist threat comes from far-right organisations. Of the 224 people in prison for terror-related offences, 173 are Islamist extremists and 38 are far-right ideologues; and of the 16 plots foiled by the end of 2018, four involved the far-right.
This Bill deals with four issues. The first is increasing sentences for terrorist-related offences. The second is changing the basis on which those convicted of terrorist offences can be released, and the terms thereafter on which they are on licence. The third is changing the TPIMs regime in three significant respects: reducing the burden of proof, making TPIMs last potentially indefinitely, and increasing the range of powers a TPIM can include. The fourth is removing the time limit for completion of the Prevent review, mandated by previous primary legislation.
On this side of the House, we will look carefully at the details of the increase in sentences and the proposed change to the way the system deals with early release of those convicted of terrorist offences. We will also look at when and how the Parole Board should be involved and how it should approach these issues.
While the detail matters a lot, we do not in principle oppose the first two parts of the Bill. There needs to be really tough sentencing for terrorists. Confidence in the system and justice for victims depends on it. The Deputy Mayor of Manchester, my noble friend Lady Hughes, described the gasp from the families of the victims of the Manchester Arena bombings when Mr Justice Jeremy Baker imposed a minimum term of 55 years on Hashem Abedi, who was convicted of plotting the Arena bombing with his brother. My noble friend described the gasp as a small amount of relief among their terrible anguish. It brings little comfort, but the pain of inadequate sentencing for the victims of terrorist bombings is real. The families of those who died in the bombing have themselves been sentenced to a lifetime of pain and loss. The very least they can expect is that the justice system pass sentences that reflect the gravity of what happened.
Coupled with that is the disregard with which the system is viewed when terrorists are released before their nominal sentence is concluded and commit offences again. The tragedies of Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November 2019, and Streatham High Street on 2 February 2020, are terrible examples. At Fishmongers’ Hall, the bravery of the Polish porter, Lukasz Koczocik, helped to overpower the terrorists. Two former offenders, James Ford and Marc Conway, also became heroes when they helped tackle the attacker to the ground. Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, who dedicated their lives to seeing the best in people, were working in offender rehabilitation, only to be killed at the rehabilitation conference at Fishmongers’ Hall. I pay a heartfelt tribute to them and extend my deepest sympathy to their families for their unimaginable loss. This terrorist attack, like the one on Streatham High Street on 2 February, was committed by an individual who was already convicted as a terrorist offender but had been released automatically halfway through their sentence. They were neither deradicalised nor deterred by their time in prison. In fact, their time at Her Majesty’s pleasure had made the position worse.
The most serious terror offences already attract what is known as extended determinate sentences, which require an offender to be referred to the Parole Board at the two-thirds stage of their custodial term, when they can be considered for release. At the end of the custodial term, the offender will be released on an extended licence. For terrorist offenders for whom the maximum penalty for their offence is life, this Bill removes the opportunity of Parole Board-directed release before the end of the custodial term, ensuring they serve a whole term in custody. This applies UK-wide and to both young and adult offenders. For this cohort of offenders, there will be no chance of parole before the end of the custodial term. This will give rise to prisoner management problems where there is no prospect of early release. However, that may well have to be faced. As the Bill goes through the House, we will need to consider whether that is appropriate for someone convicted under the age of 21. People seduced by appalling ideologies when teenagers should have some hope. There is agreement that, the younger the subject, the greater the hope for successful de-radicalising measures.
The Bill proposes that the maximum licence period for terrorists after release should be 25 years. We have concerns about the proportionality and cost of that reform, which have also been expressed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. There is no explanation as to how this burden will be paid for in the context of a decimated probation service. Much of what happens on licence will depend on the effectiveness of the probation service. It is truly hopeless of the Government to blithely increase these licence periods, thereby appearing tough to the public, knowing full well that without proper additional expenditure on the probation service, these commitments and legislation will have little effect in the real world. Could the Minister provide the House with estimates of how much extra expenditure will be incurred by giving effect to these additional licence periods? How will probation afford them?
These are some of the issues in the first part of the Bill that we will wish to explore. I make it clear that, in principle, we support increasing the length of terrorist sentences and the significant tightening of the circumstances, outlined in the second part of the Bill, in which a person convicted of a terrorist offence may be released before the end of his custodial term. We consider it crucial that the criminal justice system be effective in catching and convicting terrorists, passing appropriate sentences and ensuring—consistent with the terms of their sentence—that they are not released before it is safe to do so. That does not mean that every terrorist is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, but that the true length of the sentence passed and how it is implemented must have public confidence.
In connection with sentencing and early release, I have focused on what is in the Bill, but it is important also to focus on what is not in it. Inside and outside the criminal justice system, there must be a much more driven and focused effort on de-radicalisation measures. For many prisoners, such measures will have no impact whatsoever; moreover, many will manipulate the system to obtain early release by pretending they have had an effect. But that is not a reason to give up on those measures, both inside and outside prison. The Acheson review of 2016 dealt with de-radicalisation measures in prison. He made 69 recommendations, consolidated down to 11, eight of which were accepted. What happened to those recommendations remains a total mystery.
Mr Acheson himself said in a report published in 2019:
“Our unsafe prisons provide a fertile breeding ground in which predators, peddling extremist and violent ideologies, can prey upon the vulnerable, creating significant risks to national security and the public at large.”
He added:
“On the present trajectory, it is all too conceivable that a future terrorist will have been groomed and radicalised within our prison estate.”
Can the Minister provide details of which Acheson recommendations have been implemented, and give details of how they have been implemented?
The failure properly to address de-radicalisation measures in prison will haunt this country for generations, as we establish “academies of terrorism”. We must continue with these measures, as much for the prisoners—often young and vulnerable—imprisoned for non-terrorist offences, who end up radicalised and dangerous because of a total lack of push-back from the authorities against the vile, dominating hold of much stronger characters who are imprisoned for terrorist offences, certain of the rightness of their warped beliefs and able to seduce others into them.
In the world outside prison, it is equally important that the state ensures proper pushback against these warped ideologies. The Prevent strategy is designed to do that, but there are legitimate concerns about it and the extent to which its unintended consequences damage the fight against radicalisation. We are disappointed at the slow progress of the review; we are disappointed that there is no reviewer in place and that the Government are still in the process of selecting one. Can the Minister give the House details as to when they hope the review might report, and indicate what steps they are taking to ensure that it does so within a reasonable time? The removal of the time limit, which expired in August 2020, is plainly contrary to the wishes of Parliament when it introduced that amendment. Too often, this Government appear to make a concession in relation to legislation and then do all they can to undermine the effect of that concession. The Dubs amendment is a painful example.
The sentencing, early release and licence provisions in the first two parts of the Bill include a provision for polygraph tests, as mentioned by the Minister, which are to be used to inform licence conditions and their compliance and whether prisoners have broken those provisions. The unreliability of polygraph tests is well known. Can the Minister tell the House what view the Government take on their reliability, how—in light of that—they consider their use to be appropriate, and what studies they are relying on? Once they accept that it is not appropriate to rely on polygraph tests alone to determine whether conditions are satisfied, why rely on them at all?
Finally, the Bill makes it easier to get a TPIM, gives greater powers if a TPIM is granted, and allows it to last indefinitely without any change in circumstances. There will be cases where trial, conviction and sentence are not possible. It is right that the Government have the sort of power that a TPIM involves as part of their armoury against terrorism, but the changes are significant. Much anxiety has been expressed by non-aligned bodies about whether these powers are necessary. We will look very carefully at these powers. What is absolutely key is that the Government make a proper case for the need for these additional or changed aspects of TPIM. Can the Minister identify, in general terms, the difficulties experienced by those with the power to seek these orders, which currently arise from the balance of probabilities test? Can the Minister explain why it is thought necessary to extend them without a change in circumstances for longer than two years?
This is an important Bill. We will work constructively with the Government to deliver it, and will focus the whole time on equipping the authorities to be as effective as possible in combating terrorism. That means tougher sentencing and parole arrangements, but it also means effective measures to keep people from being radicalised or remaining radical.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I start on a personal note to say how pleased I am to be in the Chamber for the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey of Didcot; I am sure that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester will be equally magnificent.
The most important thing we should be seeking to achieve is ensuring that terrorists do not cause harm to others—on that, we are united. How best to achieve this outcome is what is likely to divide us. We on these Benches will decide on the evidence, not the rhetoric. We acknowledge that the terrorist threat level remains “substantial” and that the tragic and horrifying terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, less than a year ago, were committed by those who were known to the security services, and who had been released automatically at the half-way point of their sentence with no consideration by the Parole Board. As the Minister has said, we passed emergency legislation, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, to address that situation.
I believe there are six remaining questions of public safety arising out of these tragic incidents, which the Government should be addressing. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has said, some of these are addressed in the Bill but some are not. First, is the Prevent strategy effective in identifying those at risk of being radicalised, and in diverting them away from potential terrorist activity? The most important thing is preventing terrorism—to stop people being radicalised to the extent that they are a threat to the public. Yet, this Bill pushes the independent review of Prevent, which this House insisted on in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, into the long grass, with no timetable for completion. Can the Minister tell the House what progress, if any, has been made?
Secondly, does the Prison Service have the information, training, expertise and resources to be able to deradicalise those in its custody and to prevent inmates from being radicalised or further radicalised? If they are convicted and imprisoned, offenders need to be in an environment where they can turn their lives around. Longer and longer sentences, extending early release from half way to two-thirds to never being released at all, overcrowding and understaffing—all provide a fertile breeding-ground for radicalisation. What evidence do the Government have that longer sentences deter idealistic, radicalised individuals who are determined to do us harm?
Thirdly, is it more effective to deradicalise those in prison or those on licence—and what is the impact of longer sentences on the susceptibility to deradicalisation? The Government claim that longer sentences provide more time to deradicalise, but what evidence is there that this would be more effective? How do we know that longer sentences, which may be perceived to be unfairly harsh, do not create greater resentment and make someone less amenable to deradicalisation?
Fourthly, does the Parole Board have the information, training, expertise and resources to be able to assess the risk posed by such offenders? What are the Government doing to improve the Parole Board’s decision- making capability? There is nothing in the Bill on this issue.
Fifthly, does the probation service have the information, training, expertise and resources to be able to manage the risk posed by such offenders? The Government’s record in relation to the probation service generally is disastrous—and the experience and expertise required to manage the potential risk posed by such offenders is considerable. Perhaps lie-detector tests can help. As the Minister said, what evidence is there that they work? Does the probation service have the equipment, technicians and scientists to carry out and interpret the results of the proposed polygraph tests? If they are effective, why is there no plan to make these tests available to the Parole Board, for example, to help in its decision-making?
Sixthly, is the way that different agencies, including the police, probation service and security services, work together to investigate, monitor and manage terrorist offenders under the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements operating effectively? Where are we with the implementation of the recommendations of the independent review of MAPPA, particularly those considered urgent by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who carried out the review?
In 2011, control orders were replaced by terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs—moving from significant and indefinite restrictions on suspected terrorists’ liberties without trial to a limited power to manage the risk posed while evidence was gathered to secure a conviction. TPIMs can be imposed without the standard of proof usually required before the state can restrict an individual’s—that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. The civil case standard of
“the balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity”
is considered enough.
The Bill wants to take us back to the control order standard of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”—the same standard of proof that a police officer requires before making an arrest. Believe me, I know that that standard is very low. Jonathan Hall QC, the current independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, says:
“I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 6.]
In that case, why do the Government need to change the standard of proof? Jonathan Hall QC also argues against doing away with the two-year limit on TPIMs as the Bill proposes. At the least, he suggests, safeguards are needed, such as the Secretary of State seeking the court’s permission for any extension beyond two years in the same way that she does when a TPIM is first made. Although we are blessed with a number of former independent reviewers of terrorism legislation in this House, what is the point of having a current reviewer of terrorism legislation if he is not listened to?
We should not return to the days when the state could deprive someone of their liberties indefinitely without trial. We on these Benches have had enough of the Government’s “talk tough” rhetoric and their low-cost or no-cost options that have no evidence to support their effectiveness. We will support every measure in the Bill where the evidence shows they are necessary and effective in keeping us safe from terrorism but we will call out every measure where the evidence suggests they are unnecessary and ineffective.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con) [V]
My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests.
As noble Lords will know, the most important duty of legislators when considering measures such as the ones in the Bill is to protect the public from those who might harm them and to keep our hard-fought freedoms safe. I suggest that the Bill responds to that obligation in a suitable and proportionate way. I believe that, unlike some legislation, this has been thoroughly prepared and that the Government have responded to advice, as well as learning from the experience of law enforcers, law professionals and those who have been appointed to review terrorism legislation, including Jonathan Hall QC, the current holder of the role, and the previous reviewer, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who I am sure will give us the benefit of his wisdom and experience in the debate today. It has also benefited from careful and responsible scrutiny in the other place. Nevertheless, there are a few items in the proposals that I want to touch on today.
Terrorism is not some distant threat that can be ignored as a non-urgent matter in the consideration of security. In the last three years alone we have succeeded in preventing more than 25 potential attacks by extremists taking place in the UK, many with the direct assistance of our EU neighbours’ police and intelligence agencies. As noble Lords know, there are a large number of data-sharing arrangements in place with other EU countries that allow us to benefit in real time to stop attacks. These have included ECRIS, SIS II, Prüm and others. As rapporteur, I had the privilege shortly before I left the European Parliament to take the EU passenger name records measure through its various stages, with the strong support of the UK Government and the other European Governments. I sincerely hope that we will never allow such helpful provisions, which have proved so valuable, to be lost to the people of this country, since if we do it will inevitably put us in greater danger. I would be most grateful if my noble friend the Minister could give us some reassurances on that today.
On other points, I want to mention the changes to the terrorism prevention and investigation measure—TPIM. Of course we know that it is always better to be able to prosecute and, if necessary, deport terrorists than to resort to TPIMs. I know they are not used much and they are not preferred, but the lower standard of proof required for their deployment may well result in them becoming more common in wider circumstances and producing more questions. The removal of the present time limit, while sensible in some cases, raises further questions because, as I am sure we all agree, their use must always be proportionate.
The standard to be followed—that the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual of being involved in terrorist-related activity—has been available since the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, introduced then for making control orders, but it is a considerable watering-down of the current test. Can my noble friend tell us more about why this standard of proof is enough?
I want to refer briefly to the proposals for polygraph testing, both for adult terrorist offenders subject to the release provisions of Section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and as a TPIM requirement. I realise that their use is believed to be of help as a risk-management tool but I understand that they have only just entered pilot testing for domestic abuse offenders from March this year. My noble friend seems confident of their efficacy but I wonder whether he has plans to introduce a pilot programme similar to the one for domestic abuse and, if so, when that might start. Would that not be a good idea, especially before a comprehensive rollout?
My final remarks are to inquire about resources. I know we all greatly admire the work of our police and security services, especially the probation services, but does my noble friend believe that these new responsibilities can be adequately performed by the probation services and do not require more investment?
Any provision that helps us match the current and perceived future threat from terrorism is to be welcomed, and I am pleased to welcome that. Once the legislation is through, I just hope that the sentencing guidelines that must accompany it are not unduly delayed.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
In thanking the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his very clear and careful introduction of the Bill, I thank him, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice for making the changes that need to be made to sentencing legislation in the form of amendments to the code. This was a vital first act in that respect. Of course, it may not appear easy to follow as incorporated in the Bill before us, but it is plain from the way in which the code will be developed that judges will have before them all the provisions in the right place in one document. This is a huge step forward. The ministry and the Home Office deserve thanks for adhering to this Bill, unlike what happened in 2003.
I want to make three points of substance, two relating to the provisions in Part 1 of the Bill and one relating to Part 3. The first, in relation to Part 1, relates to the sentencing of youths and, in particular, Clause 4. It is clear that sentencing those under 21 is the most difficult task for a court. In relation to terrorist offences it is particularly difficult, partly because they are the people who are most suggestible or susceptible to persuasion to embark on terrorism and, in my experience, at least some of those who have committed offences have had learning or other difficulties. I think there can be little doubt that evidence exists to say that such persons are deterred by the prospect of long sentences. It seems to me that the clause ought to be examined in terms of whether the emphasis is in the right place on dealing with someone for the future and ensuring that that person does not in the longer term pursue a career of terrorism. It is an area where it is essential that the judge has full information and should be left to form a judgment.
The second point that I want to make on Part 1 is on the provisions for minimum terms, whether for life sentences, extended sentences or custodial sentences. The general principle should be that there should not be minimum terms unless there is a compelling justification. This is particularly so in relation to offences where there is a huge range of conduct that can be brought within the section, some less serious and some of the utmost severity. Section 5 of the 2006 Act is a very clear illustration of the range that can be encompassed and the difficulties to which it gives rise.
There are guidelines now and I have no doubt that the Sentencing Council will produce new guidelines to reflect the changes. The judges who try these cases are few and, by and large, the courts have been very tough. We need to be very careful in our scrutiny of the provisions for minimum sentences as applied by the Bill.
On TPIMs, perhaps I may make one or two brief observations. First, the use of control orders and TPIMs has a long history and it is clear that they have played an important role in dealing with terrorism. However, that long history makes two things clear. There needs first to be proper judicial scrutiny of all aspects of them. In looking at the amendment made by Clause 37 to the standard of proof, we need to be particularly careful about whether the test set out there is capable of good judicial scrutiny. The second concerns the need for a maximum period. There is quite strong evidence that one of the worst effects of imprisonment for public protection where there are no defined limits to the end point is that the lack of a defined limit can lead to people losing hope and becoming more dangerous. We ought to examine carefully whether we do not wish to impose a maximum, or at least subject that maximum to judicial approval.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, it is easy to talk about countering terrorism, so I want to start by expressing my thanks to all those in the different services who do the work. However, that does not lead me to the view that tougher legislative measures are the best form of prevention. The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—we have a bounty of reviewers with us today—wrote that the services’ propensity to argue for more tools in the toolkit was
“a homely phrase, which risks obscuring the question of justifying them.”
The most effective of tools used wisely are resources—resources addressed to the fear of being caught and of course prevention, so it is depressing that the focus of the Bill is punishment. What about radicalisation and rehabilitation, as other noble Lords have said and I am sure more will say? What will be the role of the reorganised, the re-reorganised, probation service? In the recently published review of MAPPA, to which my noble friend referred, Jonathan Hall recommends
“wider sharing with probation officers not only of specific intelligence but also of threat assessments and profiles”
and that they be given
“training in the principles of intelligence assessment.”
In parenthesis, but not I think irrelevant, I note that the Commons were told that the MAPPA review would be published by the time the Bill started in this House. It has been, and I might be flattered by an implicit recognition of our effectiveness, but as so often happens, something relevant not just to the debate but to everyone’s thinking is made available when the opportunities to amend the legislation are very limited.
That could lead me on to the delay in the review of Prevent, but I will save that for Committee as I want to concentrate on TPIMs. We are heading back towards control orders by another name, which I know will be approved of by some, but not by these Benches. I want to say a word about the impact of TPIMs on people—people for whom they are not intended as a punishment. The Bill deals with a limited number of measures, but they are part of the whole of what I have heard referred to as “social death”, such that the subject regards prison as preferable because it enables more social interaction and social freedom. TPIMs are outside the criminal justice system but mean being lifted from one’s community and placed somewhere utterly unfamiliar without the support of one’s normal contacts. To pre-empt the point that the contacts are the problem, I say that we should not ignore positive engagement with and monitoring by family, colleagues and co-religionists. Jonathan Hall writes of the emerging profile of a terrorist risk offender as
“lonely, vulnerable, self-radicalised individuals who are drawn to extreme views, usually encountered and reinforced online, many with poor mental health.”
TPIMs reinforce the sense of isolation of those who already have only a tenuous grip on reality. Whether loners or settled in a family, reporting, extensive curfews and controls on computers all make it difficult or impossible to find work. Visitors find security clearance and distance too great a hurdle while the children of the family grow up with depression, an enduring sense of injustice, and are bulled at school as “jihadi kids”. Familial cohesion breaks down. There are six current TPIMs, but that does not mean that only six people are affected, and now there will be no certain end in sight. Mr Hall also writes about the importance of stable accommodation in the right area in mitigating risks and says that the ability to find it and obtain support for mental health may depend on how effectively the police, prisons and probation are able to demonstrate its importance.
The Government take the view that lowering the standard of proof increases the flexibility of TPIMs, making it more practical
“to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism related activity.”
“Flexible” is a weasel word, as is the term “easier to demonstrate”. Of course, it will be easier to demonstrate: the Secretary of State will no longer have to be satisfied that an individual is or has been involved in the activity but just to have reasonable grounds for suspicion. The independent reviewer reports that
“even administrative convenience does not appear to provide a basis for reversing the safeguard of a higher standard of proof.”
which he says “has not proved impractical”.
In addition to his analysis of the lack of safeguards, including judicial safeguards to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, just referred, he observes that, “The criminal justice route of fair trial and sentence commands the widest public support.” I will add from these Benches that by lowering the standard of proof, we will be lowering our standards too.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) (Maiden Speech)
My Lords, I am grateful to follow the noble Baroness and for the opportunity to make my maiden speech in this important debate. Perhaps I may begin in the traditional way by thanking the Doorkeepers and staff for making me feel so welcome. I offer them heartfelt thanks because nothing has been too much trouble for them. I also thank my noble friends Lady Bloomfield and Lady Fall for supporting my introduction. Both are extremely busy people. My noble friend Lady Bloomfield has been taking the Agriculture Bill through the Lords and my noble friend Lady Fall has, like me, been preparing for the arrival of Lady Swire’s memoirs, which will be published this Thursday.
I do not want to make this too much like an Oscar acceptance speech, but I hope your Lordships will indulge me if I pay tribute to my late father, who came into this place 44 years ago. It was a place he loved and he served it assiduously. He made his maiden speech on the race relations Bill, expressing the hope that the Bill would one day be redundant. Obviously, given the events particularly of this year, that hope has sadly not been realised. He had a mischievous sense of humour. His final Written Question, published on the day of his death, was to take the Government to task for the misspelling of a sign by the Ministry of Works outside Richmond House. My father came into this place on the lavender list. I know that it would have appealed to his mischievous sense of humour to read the article I read just last week, which began with the immortal phrase, “This list of Peers is the worst list since the lavender list.” That provided me with a valuable connection to my father.
I was lucky enough to serve in the other place for 14 years as the Member of Parliament for the wonderful constituency of Wantage and Didcot. It is a remarkable place, as every MP says about their constituency, being a place of ancient history and modern science, ranging from the ancient white horse to the Diamond synchrotron, and now the manufacturing centre for vaccines. That is attracting politicians by the bucketload to visit it, including the Prime Minister, as it rises from the ground. It is a great privilege to be able to take the title of Lord Vaizey of Didcot, of Wantage in the county of Oxfordshire, to represent my constituency, although I slightly resent my brother-in-law christening me Lord Vaizey of Parkway.
In any event, I was lucky enough to serve for six years as the Minister for culture and technology in the other place, and those are the subjects on which I hope to bore your Lordships on regular occasions. I do not know how attentively you will listen to me, because I am not sure how good I was at my job. I was, for example, the Minister responsible for rural mobile broadband coverage. I remember—and maybe the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, will recall—the day I was sacked by the new Prime Minister Theresa May. I do not know if there are any sackees in the Chamber at the moment, but you get a call from Downing Street; I was in my car, and Downing Street said, “The Prime Minister will call you in 15 minutes”. As I drove off through the rural hinterland of Oxfordshire, I realised that I had lost my mobile phone signal. It took the Prime Minister half an hour to get through to me, and I was a Minister for 15 minutes longer thanks to the lamentable job I had done in the previous six years.
I turn briefly to the provisions in the Bill, and I say again what a privilege it has been to listen to the remarks made so far—this House is justly well known for the extraordinary expertise it contains within its ranks. It goes without saying that the Bill is essential, following the horrific attacks that have been referred to, and I pay tribute to the victims who sadly lost their lives in those attacks. It is also right to pay great tribute to our security services and our police force, who do such a remarkable job in preventing so many attacks, as has already been referred to.
I want to pick up on the theme, remarked on in some of the earlier speeches, of rehabilitation. It may seem odd to have a former culture Minister seek to speak at Second Reading of a Bill on counterterrorism, but my last meeting as culture Minister was in the Ministry of Justice, where I had assembled a series of charities—the National Criminal Justice Arts Alliance—all of which work in prisons and with offenders in an attempt to engage them, give them opportunities and hope, and turn them away from a life of crime. It sometimes sounds frivolous or even facetious, but I am a passionate and powerful believer in the power of culture, the arts and sport in engaging young people. Noble Lords have already referred to young, vulnerable and disengaged young men. We cannot necessarily forgive their crimes, but we can, if we engage them as early as possible, perhaps turn these young people away from them.
I know that the Prevent strategy has become somewhat controversial, but I think its aims are absolutely laudable. All I would do, given that the Bill covers the Prevent strategy, is urge the Government to continue to look at, and redouble their efforts in, engaging cultural charities and institutions to provide young people with hope and opportunity. I know from my own work with the National Youth Theatre how important that is, and what amazing opportunities are often given to young people.
The other issue I want to talk about briefly is the role of technology; and here is an area, I think, where we should hold people accountable. Those people are the ones who run huge global platforms such as Facebook and Google. As I am sure noble Lords know, these platforms are used by terrorist organisations. They use them to organise themselves online, to proselytise online, to convert the young and vulnerable people whom we have been talking about—and to monetise their activity. Extraordinarily, they are able to attract, through ad technology, legitimate adverts from legitimate businesses for their websites. Even more extraordinarily, some are even able to sell merchandise—T-shirts and memorabilia—on their websites, which funds their terrorist activities.
It is not within the scope of the Bill to address that issue. However, I know that the Online Harms White Paper—which will lead, I hope, to the online harms Bill—will provide an opportunity for this Government to put in place some really ground-breaking legislation, which I hope will change the debate and tip the balance. So I am grateful indeed for your Lordships’ indulgence, and the opportunity to make those remarks on the Bill.
Lord Risby (Con)
My Lords, we greatly look forward to the maiden speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, but I think it is fair to say that in terms of a maiden speech, we have had a massive treat today. It was an absolutely superb speech. I have known my noble friend for many years. After graduation, he actually became a barrister specialising in family law in practice, but he also at an early stage started writing speeches for some of our most distinguished parliamentarians and, indeed, subsequently followed in that vein by becoming the Member of Parliament for Wantage in 2005.
I would particularly like to highlight one aspect of the whole diversity of his actions as a Minister, and in his life in general. In 2010 he was appointed as Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries. I make no party-political point when I say that, pre Covid, there was a most extraordinary flowering of artistic and cultural endeavour in this country. Those involved in these industries knew one thing: they had a champion in the form of this Minister. He was absolutely committed to his role and to making structural reforms. For example, just one initiative was a new tax regime for the film industry, and we have seen this brilliant flowering of the British film industry in consequence.
When he left office, 150 of the most distinguished people in the arts and the creative industries wrote a letter to him just to say, “Thank you”. On reflection, this must be the very first time that this group has ever written such a letter to a Conservative arts Minister. I congratulate him warmly on an outstanding speech, and I look forward to many contributions with his brilliant sense of humour in the future.
Before entering your Lordships’ House, I represented a constituency in which there was a prison, and I would just like to mention this little story. The Roman Catholic chaplain asked to see me urgently, because of an atmosphere that was becoming very negative in this prison, and because a group of inmates was showing total hostility in an aggressive way towards him. I spoke to the prison governor, who knew about this but, quite frankly, did not know how to handle it. I discovered that a group of individuals was allegedly being sent, with official permission, to provide family and community contact with these particular individuals. In reality, they were radicalising them and spreading the poison of political extremism. I inquired further and found out that this particular group—who were going to other prisons as well—was actually being paid by the Government to fulfil this role. I simply say: thank goodness that all of this is now understood much better, and we move on to a more comprehensive understanding of the dangers that beset our society with the whole process of radicalisation in our prisons.
Of course, we must handle these matters with proportionality, not least to secure community support and to avoid community disconnection. However, it is plain today that, following some more recent atrocities, legislative action is required. Radicalisation and gang culture are now features of prison life, and let us never forget the immense strains this imposes on prison officers and their families.
I believe the Bill, being the largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing and monitoring for some time, is ready for moving on and being accepted into law. Of course, there are issues about young offenders, particularly those between the ages of 18 and 21, but let us remember that they are entitled to vote at the age of 18, and of course there are some who believe they should be entitled to vote at the age of 16. The atrocities in Manchester have given us a very clear signal about this. So I believe that this legislation balances the need to ensure that justice is served on those who commit the most serious crimes, but, as far as those who participate in lower-level activity, my noble friend the Minister may wish to comment further on this and on the issue of deradicalisation and reintegration into normal society, because it is all of real significance.
I happen to be the Prime Minister’s trade envoy to Algeria, and it may come as a great surprise to know that as, perhaps, an enduring result of the terrible war of independence, the Algerian Government, in addition to observing the rise of religious extremism, initiated at an early stage a really comprehensive and much-admired deradicalisation and reintegration policy. This has been most successful inasmuch as very few young Algerians went to support ISIS and, indeed, the mass demonstrations that have been taking place there have never been captured by religious extremists.
I conclude by saying that this legislation will see our most dangerous terrorists spending longer in custody while more effectively managing those who have been released. Therefore, I support the Bill.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester (Maiden Speech) [V]
My Lords, I begin by expressing my thanks to the parliamentary staff and fellow Members of this House, who have both welcomed me and helped me understand something of the workings of this place. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, on his excellent and entertaining maiden speech reminding us of the importance of rehabilitation—not only for sacked government Ministers. I declare my interest as chair of the Greater Manchester police’s Ethics Committee, which is recorded in the register.
I believe I may be unique among the Lords Spiritual in serving as Bishop of the diocese in which I was born, brought up and educated: I am a Bishop from Manchester as well as Bishop of Manchester. My education at the Manchester Grammar School taught me the proud history that Manchester and its surrounding towns have in women’s suffrage, the trade union movement and the extension of parliamentary democracy as well as this region’s place at the innovative heart of the industrial revolution.
In Manchester, I learned my love of numbers, going on to read and research mathematics at King’s College, Cambridge, before the blossoming of my Christian faith took me to Birmingham to study theology and, hence, into church ministry. I may be the only Member of your Lordships’ House able to tackle that medieval conundrum—“How many angels can dance on a pinhead?” —from two distinct academic disciplines.
The culture of Manchester is best represented by the city’s iconic image of the worker bee. However, bees are not only hard-working—they work together. Self-interest is subservient to the well-being of the hive. Manchester drew hard on that culture following the Manchester Arena terrorist attack of May 2017, to which noble Lords have already referred in this debate. It was my privilege to help lead my city in its response, and it is why I feel particularly called to speak in today’s debate. When the authors of terrorism sought to divide us, we came closer together, linking arms across the diversity of our city and region, which is among our principal strengths. I am fiercely proud of how Manchester held its head up high in the aftermath of an attack not only on innocent concert-goers but aimed at our very way of life.
I support the aspirations of this Bill and many of the measures included in it. Our first response to the threat of terrorism must be to improve the ways we prevent terrorist atrocities being planned and executed. Reducing the risk to the public from particular known individuals, especially those who already have convictions for offences linked to terrorism, has a vital role in preventing would-be terrorists from forming and carrying out their plans.
However, we will not defy terrorism through legislation that provides a recruiting sergeant for those who wish us harm. Long prison sentences, such as that properly handed out in the recent trial for the Manchester Arena attack, send a strong signal about our commitment to public protection. However, we must remember that they extend the isolation of prisoners from their families and the moderating influence of the wider community while keeping them for longer in close proximity with those who might seek to increase or reinforce radicalisation. This is particularly a concern for the youngest offenders.
Secondly, reducing the level of proof required for some sanctions, such as TPIMs, to well below the balance of probability may give rise to a sense of injustice, one that stretches far beyond the individual to whom the sanction applies, undermining the support from across the community, which is our strongest weapon in the fight against radicalisation. I urge Ministers to provide this House, during the various stages through which this Bill will pass, with clear evidence that the positive impacts of the proposals will outweigh the unintended negative ones.
In this House, we have a responsibility to ensure that the Bills we pass into law unite our society rather than divide it. If we apply a legal sanction that protects us from one individual—but at the price of radicalising three others—we will not control the threat. Terrorist ideology has its own replication number, every bit as deadly as coronavirus. Our challenge is to pass legislation that brings together the diverse voices of our land and carries confidence across the broad range of political, religious and other communities with whom we share a common life.
I hope that we will listen to those voices, both from within and beyond this Chamber as we debate this Bill, and will make improvements to it that will win the trust of those who we will need as allies in what is our common cause to protect the people of our nation and the values upon which Britain is built. I look forward to continuing to be a voice in this House for the diverse communities that make up Manchester and, especially, for those who are not so often heard.
Lord Ramsbotham (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure and privilege to follow the excellent maiden speech of the right reverend Prelate—the Bishop of, and from, Manchester—so soon after his introduction. Before being consecrated as Bishop of Manchester, he was suffragan Bishop of Dudley, being responsible for the interregnum between two Bishops of Worcester: Bishop Peter Selby—our most distinguished Bishop to Her Majesty’s Prisons—and the present incumbent, Bishop John Inge, who takes such a keen interest in justice issues. As the right reverend Prelate has given early evidence of his intention to play an active part in the proceedings of the House, I look forward to many more contributions from him, particularly on justice issues.
Any legislation forged in the white heat following a dramatic offence risks the likelihood of being flawed because there has not been enough time to think through all the implications. The Prison Reform Trust, in its written evidence to the other place on the Bill, pointed out:
“The government has not published the serious case reviews into the Fishmongers Hall and Streatham attacks despite these forming a substantive part of the policy and political justification for the measures in the bill”.
The Minister confirmed this in his introduction.
I will focus on three issues: the current availability of deradicalisation programmes in prisons, the assertion that longer prison sentences protect the public and the removal of Parole Board hearings prior to release. Earlier this year, the Government made a commitment to double the number of counterterrorism specialist probation staff and increase the numbers of specialist psychologists, specially trained imams and the resources dedicated to training front-line prison and probation staff.
Currently, there are only two deradicalisation programmes used in prisons, neither of which has been evaluated. One is called the Healthy Identity Intervention, and this is supplemented by the Desistance and Disengagement Programme, which is designed to be on offer to both prisoners and those released on licence. As programmes have very long waiting lists and delivery is limited by the significant cuts to both staff and resources over the last 10 years, their effectiveness is questionable, at best. In view of this, I ask the Minister whether the other government commitments that I mentioned have been implemented?
On longer sentences, my experience as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons leads me to believe that the Minister in the other place, Chris Philp MP, was wrong when he said that keeping the most serious offenders off the streets for the duration of their sentences is the only way to be certain that the public are protected. It is true that people cannot commit crimes against the public while they are in prison, but all will be released and what matters is their state of mind when that happens. Treat them like animals and you will get animals. So little is done with, and for, long-term prisoners that it is small wonder that so many reoffend.
Finally, I am horrified that, because of the removal of early release, the Parole Board should not be required to carry out reviews of serious terrorist sentences and extended determinate sentences before release. Over the years, the Parole Board has made remarkably few mistakes and reviews are very much built into the system for releasing long-term prisoners. Parole Board panels are used to addressing up-to-date risk to the public as they interrogate staff who are in daily contact with a prisoner. My noble friend Lady Prashar, a former chairman of the Parole Board, who will speak later, knows far more about this subject than me. I assure her that I will strongly support any amendment that she may table to reverse this decision.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I was fortunate in my time as a law officer that I did not have to advise on new terrorism legislation, so my advice on the detail of the Bill will be limited. Northern Ireland, for which I had a separate responsibility, enjoyed considerable calm in my time, although I had to adjudicate, in a diminishing number of terrorist-related offences, on whether to allow a Diplock court. In passing, I would favourably consider any temporary Diplock courts in England and Wales to help to reduce the backlog in crown court cases which have risen by 6,000 to 43,000. The option, at least, of a Diplock court should be closely considered. As a firm defender of jury trials over the whole of my professional career, I look forward to the Lord Chancellor’s proposals.
My first point on the Bill is to question the efficacy of the Prevent strategy. How confident are the Government that it is producing results? It is sad that the independent review of the strategy cannot take place in the time limit imposed by statute. I commend the work of the previous independent reviewers and have a high regard for the work of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Given the new leeway which the Government require, I trust that Parliament will be given the opportunity of considering the revised terms of reference.
My second point is that reservations have been raised in the Commons about the use of polygraph tests to monitor compliance with licence conditions. We should not shy away from new mechanisms. Many, many years ago, under my Minister, I helped to pilot breathalyser legislation through Parliament. It was not without controversy, but now it is accepted as effective and permanent. I note that the Scottish justice system chose not to use polygraph tests due to lack of evidence of their effectiveness. I hope the Minister can put forward the Government’s view of the differing approach of the law in Scotland and the law, as it will be, in England and Wales. Specifically, why are the proposals for England and Wales are preferred to those in Scotland? I am, of course, aware of their views in other fields.
Lastly, I am concerned, as a criminal lawyer, about the lowering of standards of proof for imposing TPIMs from balance of probabilities to reasonable grounds for suspecting, which is a very low standard. The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall QC, are concerned about the proposed lowering of standards. As a life-long criminal practitioner, I share that concern. I note the views of the national convenor on counterterrorism. I would not wish to contradict the operational evidence given by the assistant chief constable, but I would bear at the back of my mind the maxim: “Hard cases do not make good law.” I look forward to the Minister’s detailed justification on this aspect.
I support the Bill, having observed with horror the tragedy at Fishmongers’ Hall, involving caring members of one of my old universities, and other tragedies beyond belief, such as that in Manchester. The protection of the public must be a paramount consideration. Nevertheless, detailed questioning of the present proposals is more than fully justified.
Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will focus on two aspects of the Bill. The first is the serious terrorism sentence introduced by Clauses 4 to 7 and the second is the removal of restriction of early release for terrorist prisoners introduced by Clauses 27 to 31. The Bill’s objective is to ensure that victims and the wider public are protected for longer and to enable victims to feel safe for longer. I fully support that objective, but the principal consequence of these provisions is to remove the role of the Parole Board, a body I chaired between 1997 and 2000, in assessing risk to determine the safe release of the most serious terrorist offenders. Instead, offenders sentenced under these provisions will be released automatically at the end of their custodial term.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation, Mr Hall, has described this as “a profound change”. He notes three immediate consequences. First,
“the possibility of early release, which acted as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders with long sentences”,
will be removed. Secondly, he says that it removes
“the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings”.
Thirdly,
“child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults, have lost the opportunity for early release.”
As a former chair of the board, I entirely agree with Mr Hall’s concerns.
Parole is a vital stage in the risk management of those whose offending is serious enough to merit the imposition of an indeterminate or extended determinate sentence, including those convicted of the most serious offences. Parole is also a stage included in the special custodial sentence for offenders of concern and the Bill seeks to expand the remit of the sentence to include all terrorist offenders given a custodial sentence of over two years. Indeed, a paradox of the Bill is that on one hand it seeks to expand the role of the Parole Board in determining the risk of those convicted of less serious terrorist offences but, on the other, it seeks to remove the board from its role for offenders convicted of the most serious ones. How can this be logical?
No system for identifying future risk can ever be perfect and Mr Hall’s review included a number of recommendations on how to improve the court process involving terrorist offenders. It also highlighted the important role that the board plays as part of the process of assessing risk. Justifications provided by the Government for removal of parole are not convincing and I am not sure they are totally evidence-based. Denying parole hearings removes a key incentive for prisoners to engage with efforts by authorities to address their extremist beliefs. It also reduces incentives for prisoners to comply with the prison regime more generally, which could put staff at risk of violence. This has been highlighted by the Prison Officers’ Association as its biggest fear.
Then there are concerns about the fairness and proportionality of removing parole—authorised release for young adults convicted of terrorism offences where the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. The proposed changes would go against the recognition of age and maturity in other areas of sentencing by imposing the same conditions on children and young adults as on adults convicted of terrorist offences. It also runs counter to existing sentencing practice and evidence that this group is the most capable of change.
The need to reduce the risk posed by people convicted of terrorist offences is something we all agree on, but we must ensure that in the understandable desire to punish we do not undermine incentives to rehabilitate, or the arrangements in place to manage risk and protect the public. I am very grateful to other noble Lords: in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for highlighting the role of the Parole Board, and to the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, in his maiden speech, for highlighting the role of art and culture in rehabilitation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the two maiden speeches we have heard today, particularly that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey of Didcot, and his focus on the sufferings of victims of the crimes that led to this Bill, and their families. I also commend the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who reflected on the suffering of Manchester after the arena bombing. I was at a service the following day in Sheffield, which also lost citizens in the attack. There was great sympathy across the north, and far beyond, for Manchester.
I thank too the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for his introduction to the Bill. I know that he is particularly keen to hear from the Green Party, so I look forward to his response to my comments.
It is fortuitous that this debate follows on from the Oral Question on the probation service from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on which I would have liked to address several supplementary questions to the Minister, one of which is particularly relevant to the issue I wish to raise in connection with this Bill. It is now 14 years since a Member of your Lordships’ House, the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, delivered an excellent report on the way in which women offenders were being failed by the criminal justice system, and provided a map on the way forward. Very little action has been taken.
Women prisoners, as we know, are very badly catered for, being a very small percentage of the prisoner population and objectively different from male prisoners on multiple criteria. In the context of this debate, this is surely also true of women prisoners who need deradicalisation programmes. Do we have—are we planning to set up—programmes that are properly gender-informed? If the Minister cannot provide an answer now, could one be provided in future?
I make some general reflections on the Bill. Knee-jerk reactions in politics seldom age well: the scrutiny of history usually demonstrates them for what they are. “Lock them up and throw away the key” is a common reaction to awful events. What we need to do—what I urge the Government to do—is take a step back and look at what will make our society more stable and secure.
There is no doubt that we face threats from multiple ideologies: the racist neo-Nazi far right, QAnon, radical Islamism, Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the anti-female ideology known as incel—the list could go on. Anyone who commits a crime under any of those ideologies is of course entirely and solely responsible for their own actions and crimes and should be punished according to the law. We also need to think, however, about how we create a healthy society that does not feed and support the spread of these ideologies. That should be a primary focus of government attention: a public health approach similar to the one proposed—and delivered, in parts of these islands—on knife crime.
Last week, in talking about Covid-19 strategy, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said that a new and more thoughtful strategy from the Government was needed—and we also need that in relation to counter- terrorism.
The huge issues with Prevent will be addressed later by my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but I ask for a broader view, not necessarily from the Minister today—I understand the time pressure—but from the Government more generally.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, noted earlier the vulnerability of lonely, isolated, poverty-stricken individuals to people who will exploit them. The more we address these issues—the more we close off opportunities for dangerous individuals to use others—the safer we will be. That is also relevant to anyone in public life: we should ask them to think about how their words and their approach can feed hatred, misunderstanding and racism, and fuel crime and abusive behaviour.
We have also seen how other criminal behaviour and terrorism can be interrelated or closely related—the abuse of illegal drugs, mental ill-health and social exclusion. All these issues need to be addressed.
Finally, I cannot finish this speech without expressing my concern about the planned use of polygraphs in this Bill. I will always stand up for evidence-based policy-making, and the evidence is that polygraph results are not a solid basis on which to make any decision. That the Government plan to do so is seriously disturbing. I note the Law Society of Scotland’s reflection that
“there is a need for the responsibility, organisation, funding, monitoring and training involved to be addressed as part of the Bill if polygraphs are to be introduced.”
Those things need to be covered in the Bill. I also understand the Law Society of Scotland’s concerns about polygraphs being imposed on that nation and its observation that
“Retrospective legislation is not usually introduced because it does not comply with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
However, applying polygraph tests to previous offenders appears to do just that.
Lord Sheikh (Con) [V]
My Lords, to effectively tackle terrorism we must use a combination of radicalisation prevention, rehabilitation and punishment. This Bill is not balanced: it places too much reliance on punishment. We must effectively address the root causes and implement real solutions to deal with the problems of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.
To stop radicalisation and terrorism we must not merely apply stronger punishments. I am actively involved in the issues of radicalisation and terrorism, having prepared two reports on the subject and spoken about it in your Lordships’ House and elsewhere. I have also been very effective in dealing with the issues in the community. To deal with these problems we need input and participation in the form of new partnerships involving the Government, the police, local authorities, prisons and members of the community at all levels. We need a holistic approach—that is what may work. Unfortunately, a tiny minority of Muslims have been radicalised and committed terrorist acts. These Muslims go against the peaceful principles of Islam.
I recently asked a Question in the House about the lack of diversity in the justice system, and I have written to my noble friends Lady Williams and Lord Greenhalgh asking for their support for an in-depth study of Muslims in prison. I have not yet received a reply, so I ask my noble friend Lady Williams to comment on my request, and on the points I made about radicalisation, in her response.
I refer now to the important matter of the Prevent strategy. I repeat what I said in this House in November 2018:
“The Prevent strategy has caused concerns and raised objections. Some critics of the strategy have said that there is racial profiling, excessive spying and the removal of basic civil liberties from innocent individuals.”—[Official Report, 12/11/18; col. 1737.]
It is imperative that a suitable person is appointed to review the strategy and, importantly, that that person’s terms of reference must be reconsidered and be appropriate. The terms should, for example, include full consultations with communities.
Furthermore, it is important that a new date for the review, which must be adhered to, is fixed; otherwise, the matter may be kicked into the long grass. I ask the Minister to comment on this point and what I have said about the Prevent strategy.
I will now refer briefly to some of the Bill’s provisions. Due to constraints of time, I do not have a great deal to say. I am concerned about the Bill’s blanket approach to stopping release at the two-thirds point of the custodial sentence for certain offences and removing any early releases for the offences. Preventing the possibility of early release in this way will have unintended consequences, especially for those who were radicalised when vulnerable and have genuinely reformed in prison. Assuming that this is never the case is unfair and may undermine the chance for effective reform. Instead, I suggest we continue to implement the TORER Act 2020, as this considers individual circumstances. We cannot generalise when it comes to rights.
I am also concerned about how the Bill approaches the increasing severity of non-terrorist sentences considered to have a terrorist connection. In a climate of intolerance, it is possible that members of BAME communities would receive harsher sentences. Unfortunately, this is already happening, and I have said so previously in your Lordships’ House.
I want to express my worry about expanding the list of offences that can result in a sentence for offenders of particular concern. It begs the question of how an offender of particular concern will be determined. The sentence may be open to misinterpretation and bias, particularly if sentencing occurs in the wake of an unpleasant incident.
Finally, I express my disquiet about lowering the standard of proof for TPIMs and removing the two-year limits, which can cause problems. This, again, is open to greater interpretation, and the power to indefinitely impose conditions could undermine civil liberties by increasing surveillance. In conclusion, this is an important Bill, and we need to look carefully at its provisions.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, this is an important and well-prepared Bill, but not a perfect one. On Part 1, I respectfully adopt the points of sentencing so authoritatively made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. On Part 2, I associate myself with the remarks of my noble friends Lord Ramsbotham and Lady Prashar, and the concerns expressed by my successor-but-one as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, regarding the removal of Parole Board discretion. If the possibility of early release can encourage good behaviour and reform, we should think carefully indeed before discarding it.
I will focus on the changes to TPIMs, the successors to Labour’s control order regime of 2005 to 2011, proposed in Part 3 of the Bill. For six years, I closely monitored the operation of TPIMs. Like the Government, I believe they are unfortunate necessities for a small number of dangerous terrorists who cannot be detained for long periods under criminal investigation, as in some continental legal systems, and who cannot be placed on trial or convicted, because the intelligence that identified their plotting is insufficient to meet the criminal standard or cannot be publicly disclosed without endangering a human source or vital investigation technique.
TPIMs are severe measures and are designed to be so. They are imposed by the Home Secretary, who, in contrast to a criminal court, is not constrained as to the nature of the intelligence material she may take into account. Measures may include, among many, compulsory relocation to towns or cities far distant from the subject’s home. Relocation is harsh but effective. Removed by the coalition in 2011, it was reintroduced, on my recommendation, in 2015.
Any breach of any restriction, which would include, under Clauses 41 and 43, polygraph measures and drug-testing measures, can result in imprisonment for up to five years. Judicial review of TPIMs takes many months to come on, and since the intelligence relied on can often not be disclosed, it requires the subject to defend himself, without knowledge of the detailed case against him, through a special advocate who cannot take instructions from him.
That severity has, until now, been mitigated by two factors introduced by the coalition Government in 2011. First, TPIMs have a maximum duration of two years, save in exceptional cases—a limitation originally recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in a report of February 2008. Secondly, the Home Secretary is required to have not just a “reasonable suspicion” of involvement in terrorism but “reasonable belief”, on the balance of probability, as it is now expressed.
The two-year limit is a reminder that executive constraints of this kind can be no substitute for the criminal process and no long-term solution, even if, as I said in 2013, echoing the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, five years earlier, it is tempting to wish for longer in the most serious cases. Each of those mitigating factors, as has been said, would be reversed by this Bill.
Let me offer a comparator, which, while not exact, may be illuminating: the reasonable suspicion required of the Home Secretary by Clause 37, is the same standard that must be reached by a police officer to justify an arrest. Yet arrest without charge, even in a terrorist case, is tolerated in this country for only four days, extendable to a maximum of 14 days by repeated permission of the court. Noble Lords will remember unsuccessful attempts to increase that maximum to 90 and then 42 days. Yet under this Bill, the reasonable suspicions of the Home Secretary would be sufficient if she judged it necessary for the protection of the public—a judgment unlikely to be effectively reviewable in any court— to justify a form of house arrest that can persist for many years.
The Government now have huge experience with these orders, including their possible imposition on more than 400 people having returned from Syria to this country. So, it is significant that the Minister Chris Philp candidly accepted on Report in the other place, consistent with evidence given by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques in Committee, that
“there has not been an occasion on which the security services wanted to give a TPIM but could not do so because of the burden of proof.”—[Official Report, Commons, 21/7/20; col. 2093.]
We should investigate whether there is a better balance to be struck consistent with the enhanced public protection that the Bill aims to provide. Options, as the independent reviewer has suggested, include an upper limit in excess of two years and the retention of the current standard of proof, if not in all cases then at least beyond the initial period, which would take care of any valid concerns there may be about urgent cases.
I hope that the collective wisdom of the House will be brought to bear on the Bill in this respect.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, first, I remind the House that my wife is an adviser on the Prevent programme in the further education sector.
The horrific attacks we have seen at Manchester, Streatham and Fishmongers’ Hall have demonstrated the risk the UK faces from terrorism. I am broadly supportive of the longer sentences contained in the Bill for dangerous terrorism offenders. But we should be mindful of the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
But one concern I have, mentioned by other noble Lords, is the extent to which rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes will be put in place to accompany the longer sentences. We know in the case of Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham that the attacks were committed by individuals who had been convicted, had been in prison and, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer repeated, seemed to have been neither deradicalised nor deterred by their time in prison. Indeed, prison may have made them worse.
The impact assessment refers to research that shows a risk of offenders radicalising others during their stay in custody. This is well known, and I hope that when winding up, the Minister spells out the details of what is proposed for supporting and expanding the rehabilitation programme. Can she say how much progress has been made in implementing the report by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons? My noble friend drew attention to the fact that the Government accepted only a small number of its recommendations. I remind the Minister of a paper published last year for the Centre for Social Justice, in which Ian Acheson had some trenchant criticisms of the prison regime:
“Unfortunately, our current prison system seems to catalyse rather than remedy the very conditions which create offending. Squalor, indolence and brutality have become normalised within the walls of many of our jails… Ruinous cuts, inflicted on front line staff as the prison population increased, have made a mockery of a rehabilitation culture when staff routinely suffer serious assaults and cannot themselves feel safe at work, let alone be able to deal with record levels of prisoner self-harm.”
These are simply not the circumstances in which you can expect to conduct successful deradicalisation programmes. These must go alongside the longer sentences proposed in the Bill.
As someone who was on the Front Bench opposing the introduction of TPIMs and the removal of control orders in 2011, I find it tempting to go back to those debates, but the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has pointed to a number of issues that have arisen since the abolition of control orders. I am afraid that as this is the Home Office’s second go at strengthening TPIMs, it only goes to show that what we warned about in 2011 needed to happen.
One issue in relation to TPIMs was raised with me by the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner, David Jamieson. Obviously, TPIMs involve extreme resource-intensive measures which must be used proportionately and only when necessary. David Jamieson argues that some local oversight would enhance the ability of the Home Secretary to make an informed decision when considering a TPIM application, variation or extension. PCCs could submit additional information or make recommendations to the Home Secretary in respect of the community impact and the impact on local policing resources which, as I said, can be intensive as far as a TPIM is concerned.
In today’s debate on sentencing, one speaker raised the point that local authorities were not mentioned in the White Paper. I hope that the Minister gives some thought to this suggestion. Perhaps I will return with a probing amendment in Committee.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, this Bill contains some necessary and useful provisions, but it may take some time to be sure. We are still assessing the good effects of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the several terrorism statutes passed since 2000.
Of course, this Government are reacting understandably to the attacks in London and Manchester, and perhaps even to those in Salisbury, and I fully accept the context laid out by my noble friend Lord Parkinson in his very clear opening to this debate. The security services are aware of hundreds of potential or actual plots, many of which, thankfully, they disrupt before any harm is done. They and the police are stretched but perform with great bravery and resilience to protect us from homegrown and foreign attacks, and nothing that I say detracts from my admiration and gratitude for what they do.
I refer to my registered interests as a practising member of the Bar and as a trustee of the Prison Reform Trust. I also welcome the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and congratulate him on his maiden speech, a thoughtful and considered contribution to our proceedings, which I hope will be the first of many. His home city recently suffered a terrorist attack, by no means the first in his diocese in his or my adult life, so he speaks with knowledge and insight. Our constitution is eccentric in permitting not only unelected Lords temporal, but also unelected Lords spiritual to legislate, but as he has just demonstrated, it is an eccentricity that we should celebrate.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey of Didcot has also given us a taste of things to come. He and I were not only Members of Parliament at the same time, but also Ministers at the same time. However, whereas I was in office for just over two years—metaphorically, 15 minutes—he served as Culture Minister for over six years, longer than any previous holder of that post. The son of Marina Vaizey, the writer and art critic, and the late Professor John Vaizey—Lord Vaizey, the academic and economist—my noble friend is not a man given to political hyperbole. He is a wise and thoughtful man. We will hear from him, often I hope, on subjects he has a deep knowledge of and great affection for. We are fortunate that he has joined us.
Regarding the Bill, I agree with lengthy sentences for those guilty of serious terrorist crimes, and whole-life terms if appropriate, but in the time available, I highlight just one subject, covered in Clauses 27 to 31: the release of terrorist offenders. This part of the Bill, which covers all three United Kingdom jurisdictions, will in essence remove from the Parole Board—I use that term generically—the power to direct the early release of certain dangerous terrorist offenders—that is, those terrorist offenders found to be dangerous by the sentencing court at the time they were sentenced, and where the offence carries a maximum of life imprisonment. These provisions apply to the most serious terrorist offences such as attack planning, directing a terrorist organisation, or giving and receiving terrorist training. They will also apply to manslaughter, kidnap and possession of explosives, when the court finds these were connected to terrorism.
I can understand that at first blush, and without giving the matter a great deal of thought, this might seem entirely reasonable. Why should offenders in that category be released at all, let alone early? There will, I accept, be some such offenders whose early release would not be recommended by the Parole Board because they remain as dangerous to the public after years in prison as they were when they were first sentenced. As always, I will defer, and have deferred, to the knowledge and expertise of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson.
However, before we remove the Parole Board from the picture, should we not pay attention to those noble Lords’ successor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC? In his note on this Bill, dated 1 June 2020, he described the removal of the Parole Board’s role of considering the early release of the most dangerous individuals convicted of terrorist offences as a “profound change”; clearly it is. He points to three immediate consequences: first, to the extent that the possibility of early release acts as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders who are going to spend the longest time in custody— that will now go; secondly, the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings will be removed; thirdly, child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults, will have lost the opportunity for early release.
The Government may very well have cogent reasons that justify Clauses 27 to 31, and if they do, I will pay close attention to them, as I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, will too. However, given that the independent reviewer is there to provide his considered opinion on the matter, we should perhaps pay careful attention to what he has had to say as well.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP) [V]
My Lords, I am speaking on my telephone because of various IT failures; I apologise for that and hope it is clear. I welcome our two new Peers: the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. They both used humour in their speeches. I think they will find in future that other Peers listen harder if there is the potential for a laugh.
Many noble Lords with much more experience of counterterrorism have spoken today and I applaud those who were critical of the Government. However, for the average member of the public who might be listening, I will explain a little of what is happening in very simple language. The Prevent issue is a government omnishambles. For example, the legal deadline for the review, which was meant to be an independent review and for which many of us were waiting with bated breath, was missed. The deadline passed and no new deadline was set. This Bill now removes any deadline at all; it does not replace a deadline to produce the review. Given that the Government did not want an independent review in the first place, one can imagine that there is no sense of urgency.
Moreover, the independent reviewer they appointed was challenged. He stood down and a new reviewer has not been announced. In fact, the Home Office website has not been updated since April, so I am not sure what is going on there. It is all shambolic. These are self-inflicted delays, and a new statutory deadline should be in this Bill so that we all know when we can expect the independent review of Prevent.
The issue around TPIMs is rather nastier. Making it an indefinite procedure, with no change if there is a change in circumstances, is inhuman. Worse, the Bill changes the legal test for imposing a TPIM from “the balance of probabilities”, which is about 51%, to “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. This is an incredibly low threshold. Anyone would have great difficulty convincing a judge to stop issuing a TPIM if it is only at this level of value. It is very difficult for a judge to prove or see that something is obviously wrong; the balance of probabilities was a much fairer way of measuring the impact of somebody’s activities.
This Bill is a real shame, and I am delighted that there are so many noble Lords able to tear it into little pieces. I hope that the Government will listen to common sense.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, first, I thank the Minister for the clarity of his opening to this debate. I too pay tribute to the two memorable and entertaining maiden speeches which we heard. I look forward to hearing from both noble Lords frequently in future.
I think people have been trying to tempt me into saying something about Prevent. I will not, save this: I hope my successor as independent reviewer of Prevent will be given access to the very large body of evidence which I was able to collect, and will make his or her mind up quite independently, without any attempt at influence from me.
This Bill’s focus is the protection of the public, and we should not for one moment lose sight of that primacy. I support aspects of the Bill strongly, but at the outset I will refer to one briefly which I do not support: the relegation of the Parole Board. I agree completely with my noble friend Lord Anderson, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Falconer, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and others who have spoken about that.
However, I agree with the strengthening of sentences for terrorism-related offences, which are a very specific and unusual group of crimes. What is more important than the protection of the public from those who are released from prison at the end of terrorism offences, or from those who are radicalised in prison and released? In considering that, we should reflect on this: surely, if the release of a terrorist puts the public at risk, the crucial balance between rights and duties must justify properly regulated and proportionately extended detention.
I support the strengthening of TPIMs covered in Part 3. As a former independent reviewer, I had the scrutiny of the full period of control orders. They worked well; they were supported by the courts; the standard of proof was adequate; they were justiciable. For all the years since control orders were replaced with TPIMs by the coalition Government, I have called for their return. In effect, that has now been done, and I think it is correct. As I said, I believe the standard of proof is fair, tested and justiciable.
It is right that the evidential basis for release of terrorist prisoners should be as complete as possible, including psychiatric and neurological assessment. Polygraphs are not magic; they determine little on their own, but in various other areas they have been demonstrably useful as part of the toolkit used in the determination of truth. I see no strong argument against their use in that way in this context.
In the time left to me—in this speech—I want to be clear about the nature of the challenge we are dealing with, by reference to the Fishmongers’ Hall incident, which is very instructive. The perpetrator terrorist, Usman Khan, had been assessed as reformed and deradicalised by external experts, some of whom were present at Fishmongers’ Hall. However, evidence from the prison from which he was released—in my possession and provided to the Home Office some months ago—shows the following. First, almost none of the day-to-day custodial staff who knew him and dealt with him on a daily basis believed he was anything other than extremely dangerous at the time of his release—they were proved right. Also, unknown to the outside experts, in that prison radicalisation was not just in existence but rampant. For example, it included Friday prayers where there was a division into two groups, radical and non-radical, which a perfectly decent imam could not control; and within the prison, sharia courts meted out punishments that included floggings—inside the prison and known to the prison staff. Those are facts.
Before we can be comfortable with advice about release and release decisions, there must be far better management and verification of desistance and disengagement programmes, and of the prisoners who are part of those programmes. This is too important an issue for anything less.
Lord Mann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I join in the welcome to the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who I am certain will continue to make such excellent contributions to this House on a regular basis and will be a big asset. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, on his very convincing introduction; I had read what the Government were proposing in advance, but he eloquently outlined why and I see no objections to the way in which they are approaching this legislation. It seems that it should meet with widespread approval.
I declare an interest as a volunteer on the Government’s advisory board, along with a number of other noble Lords. I wish to raise the issue of voluntary organisations and how they may contribute to counterterror work, specifically the example we have in this country, which is without question the best such example anywhere in the world—the Community Security Trust, which provides security and co-ordinates with the security services—using the term in its widest sense—in this country, and has done so for some considerable years to great effect.
There was a time when a number in the Jewish community were rather blasé and complacent about the need for the organisation. Some would raise it discretely with me, 10 years ago perhaps. They have been shaken from that complacency by seeing what has happened in this country in terrorism generally and, more specifically, what has happened to the Jewish community in other parts of the world. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that there would be people who would be alive if some other countries had been able to have an organisation that mirrored the Community Security Trust in operation. I am talking about wealthy and advanced countries, in Europe and North America, where there have been terrorist outrages against the Jewish community. Often, when you have something working so successfully and brilliantly, one ignores it, because the sensational headline is not there, precisely because of the mundanity of everyday successful work.
The reason for raising this in this debate, other than to bring further attention to the success of Gerald Ronson and the Community Security Trust, is that the Home Office has, within its powers as a department, very responsibly part-funded the Community Security Trust over the years and backed up the money that Mr Ronson and others have raised—and they have been substantial amounts. The CST is potentially transferrable to other communities in this country. I know that in recent times there have been significant discussions between the CST and Government about the initial work that the CST has done to train and equip other communities in this country to similarly organise and defend themselves against the threat of terrorist attack, from wherever it may come. There are many different directions and ideologies that could lead to attacks on any one community.
It would be wise for the Government to invest in facilitating the speeding-up of the work being done by the Community Security Trust with other communities. That would be to the advantage of the nation. I strongly implore the Government to see whether that support to speed up and deepen the work already going on can go further and faster. To those listening from other countries, I think that more countries should be coming, looking, observing and learning the lessons of this great British success. The Home Office has played its part; I simply urge it to choose an even bigger and wiser part to play in the near future.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, we are all agreed that terrorism has the most dreadful consequences and we all feel a deep sense of compassion for the victims of terrorism and their families. It has a societal impact too, beyond the suffering of individuals and their families. One of the societal consequences is highlighted in the Bill, in the proposal that we should have legislation leading to a reduction of the freedom of individuals on the basis of suspicion alone. That is a grim consequence. It may have to be faced, but we should recognise it. And when we face up to it, we also have to address another simple fact. I suspect that all noble Lords know of cases—I certainly do—where individuals have been arrested with reasonable grounds for suspicion, who have turned out to be completely and utterly innocent. It is something worth bearing in mind.
Your Lordships have addressed all the issues, so I am not going to repeat them. I will merely say thank you very much and think of something new to say. It concerns the sentencing decision. Anybody who has had to pass a sentence will know that a sentencing decision is not as easy as it may look on paper. You are dealing with a human being who has upset, offended, injured, damaged or murdered another human being. Everybody is involved. A judge facing a sentencing decision—and this is no time for a lecture on it—has to balance a series of factors, some of which are totally contradictory.
Related to that, fixing different aspects of the sentencing formula is dangerous, but we have decided to do it by having a provision that enables the defendant who indicates an immediate intention to plead guilty to the crime with which he is charged to have a discount against his sentence of one-third. I can argue with you about the wisdom or unwisdom of that, but it is what we have. The Bill proposes, in exactly that situation, to reduce the discount to 20%—from one-third to one-fifth.
This matters. It is easy to say that it is just paper, but let us think of the value of an early guilty plea. The victim of the crime knows that that part of this awful process is over. He or she will not be challenged about his or her evidence. It will not be suggested to a woman who says she has been raped that she consented. It will save the victim a huge ordeal to know for certain that that is now over. It also saves the time and trouble of police officers who have to give evidence, forensic scientists and the whole process of the court. It also saves the court’s time, so that it can move on to deal with the huge backlog of cases that there currently is. It knows that that time will be available.
So when we talk about the sentence being reduced or a discount for a guilty plea, we should remember the value to the victim of closure: the fact that the problem can now be addressed and that the long uncertainty will not be hanging over him or her for 12 or 18 months; and the value to the public interest, which means that that is the end of it, apart from the sentence. In terrorist cases, that value is just as great as it is in any other. I know I will be told by the Minister that there is a precedent for this. It is a bad precedent. It is illogical and it should not be followed in this case. You cannot increase sentences for those convicted of terrorism offences, which I support, by devaluing the guilty plea of those who are willing to admit from the outset that they are guilty.
I have one other tiny observation. Can we be careful not to assume that the Newton hearing, which gets a mention in the Explanatory Note, is an answer to the potential danger of finding that somebody is being treated as though he has committed a criminal offence for which he has not been tried, let alone convicted?
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, crystallised the focus of the Bill as the protection of the public, and I think that is generally understood. Terrorism is a cancer in our society. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, is to be congratulated on the clear way in which he opened the debate; he said that it was ever-evolving. The question is whether it can be cured by more of the same. As the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out, all will be released in the end. Treat prisoners like animals and you will get animals. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred to the research that demonstrates that time in prison has exacerbated the situation of radicalisation.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, raised the question of minimum sentences. He pointed out that they are dubious where there is a large range of behaviour covered by a particular offence. He said that guidelines are available, judges are few and courts have been very tough. That view is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and very much by me.
I also support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who pointed out that a sentencer deals with people and called for the value of an early guilty plea to be maintained.
I very much regret that the independent review of the Prevent strategy has been delayed. Times have changed and there are as many referrals for right-wing extremism as for ISIS-inspired extremism, and this needs urgently to be addressed. In its inception, Prevent focused only on Islamist terrorism, but a feeling grew that Prevent encouraged Muslim communities to spy on each other. That led to some Muslim communities refusing Prevent funding and rejecting engagement from the start. The coalition Government reduced the budget for Prevent in the name of austerity and chose largely to end community-based Prevent work, with only a limited programme of local activities in Prevent priority areas controlled from London by the Home Office.
The revamped Prevent programme in 2011 was primarily about identifying and diverting individuals vulnerable to radicalisation—whether Islamic, right- wing or other forms of extremism, but excluding Northern Ireland. It operated through the Channel anti-radicalisation mentoring and counselling system. The problem is, as exhaustive academic analysis has demonstrated, that there is no definable set of indicators or social and economic circumstances, no identifiable conveyor-belt process, that can predict who will move towards terrorism, when and why.
The Prevent legal duty, introduced in 2015, was to place a duty on all state education, social welfare and health professionals and their institutions to implement the Prevent strategy. But questions remain. Should safeguarding be about protecting the needs and interests of vulnerable individuals or safeguarding wider society from those same risky individuals? What are professionals—doctors, teachers and social workers—being asked to spot and report? What warning signs of radicalisation should they be aware of and look for? Who trains the professionals and what is the quality, clarity and helpfulness of such training? Are teachers required, when they inculcate fundamental British values, to consider that they may be treated with suspicion?
As for TPIMs, I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was the only person apart from the Minister to speak in favour of a return to control orders. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed to the severe measures that are involved. The Home Secretary is not bound by the constraints of admissible evidence. The noble Lord pointed out that, when challenged by judicial review, the applicant does not know the case against him and is represented by a special advocate who cannot take his instructions. The removal of the two-year time limit originally recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with no limit on renewal, equals a loss of liberties and a loss of freedom without trial.
The standard of proof being reduced to reasonable grounds for suspicion was referred to by my noble friend Lord Paddick as the standard used by police officers, where the bar is very low, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, compared it to an arrest without charge, where detention can last only four days without anything further. The “reasonable suspicion” of the Home Secretary results in an indefinite form of house arrest. That reduction of the standard of proof, it was suggested, should last only for the first two years, if the Bill goes through.
However, the right reverent Prelate the Bishop of Manchester raised the essential question of whether the lowering of the standard of proof will undermine support in the community, which is our strongest defence against extremism. The Minister’s explanation that lowering the standard improves “flexibility” is completely incapable of being understood, and I agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who said that “flexible” is indeed a weasel word.
The noble Lord and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, asked whether the test of the Minister’s subjective suspicion was capable of legal scrutiny. There is strong evidence that TPIMs cause individuals to lose hope and become more dangerous. He is quite right that the exercise of this power should be subject to judicial approval and not left to challenge by judicial review in circumstances such as I have outlined. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, described the provisions as a watering down, a tool of last resort, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, with great experience behind him, said that hard cases do not make good law.
I come to release by the Parole Board. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out that the Parole Board makes remarkably few mistakes. It addresses up-to-date risk to the public by interrogating the offender and has a vital role to monitor police, probation and security services. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, prison management problems arise where there is no prospect of relief, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, who has great experience, said, “Do not undermine incentives to rehabilitate”. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, pointed out, the current independent reviewer takes that view as well.
I have spoken many times of the problems of Berwyn prison, near where I live, where there are unsafe prison conditions. In the year ending March 2020, the finds of weapons amounted to 18 finds per 100 prisoners. There were 29 incidents of prisoner-on-prisoner assaults per 100 prisoners in the same period. Such prisons are not safe and provide a breeding ground for radicalisation through the befriending of a vulnerable person. On the present trajectory, there will be young men who are groomed and radicalised within the prison estate by people who appear to be showing care for their welfare. The failure to address problems in prisons has been referred to by many academics as producing radicalised and dangerous youths.
There are many issues in this Bill which we need to address and consider in Committee, and I look forward to Committee stage.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the two maiden speakers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, spoke about the importance of arts and sport in prisons, and I know from my experience that that is indeed an important aspect of the rehabilitation process. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester spoke about the experience of Manchester through the bombing and his expectations of the Bill with a particularly perceptive analysis, and I look forward to his contributions through its later stages.
The measures in the Bill build on recent emergency legislation. They are based on the Government’s conclusion that there are some terrorism offences where the maximum sentence available is too low for the gravity of the offence committed. Since 2000, the Government have enacted 11 different pieces of legislation, with a ratcheting up of the sentences and controls available to the courts. The Bill provides changes in the sentencing, release and monitoring of terrorism offenders.
We on the Opposition Benches will not be opposing this legislation, but the elephant in the room, which has been discussed although it is not part of the Bill, is the effectiveness of the de-radicalisation programmes and the Prevent programme: they are not working sufficiently.
The point was made by a number of speakers on this Bill that just adding extra time for the offenders to spend in custody will not solve any problems unless there are better-tailored programmes. It was made by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who went on to make the important point that there needs to be full resourcing of deradicalisation programmes, as they are very resource heavy.
I have been contacted by two trade unions, the Prison Officers’ Association and the National Association of Probation Officers. Their members are on the front line and have to deal with the consequences of legislation. The POA makes a number of points—first, that this legislation will inevitably lead to an increase in the cohort of prisoners detained under the Terrorism Act; it is currently about 230 prisoners. Consideration will therefore need to be given to the headroom available in the long-term high-security estate, with the ability to separate Islamist and far-right terrorist offenders. What plans do the Government have to meet this expanded population?
The second question the POA has raised is the same point made by Peter Dawson, director of the Prison Reform Trust and a former prison governor, that denying prisoners hope will cause their good behaviour to deteriorate. This will potentially lead to an entrenchment of a sense of grievance, which can be dangerous for both prisoners and staff. This point has been made by many speakers in today’s debate. It also re-emphasises the point that it is mistaken to remove the Parole Board from considering certain types of terrorist offences. This too may enhance a sense of grievance with certain prisoners.
NAPO has raised points on how the proposed changes will affect its members, the probation officers. In particular it mentions MAPPA, the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, which are briefly mentioned in the Bill. The Bill does not mention the agencies to be included within MAPPA, but clearly it would include enforcement agencies such as the police and the Prison and Probation Service. I and NAPO believe it very important that other agencies—such as mental health agencies, social services and NHS England—are included in this as well. The point is that all these agencies should be named and have a statutory obligation to work collectively. This is a point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made and one we have seen in many other aspects of work in the Courts Service, not only in the context of this Bill.
The probation officers further referenced Clause 5 of the Bill, under which non-terrorist offences with a maximum sentence of more than two years can be found to have a terrorist connection and their perpetrators therefore sentenced under the Counter-Terrorism Act. The Bill does not define what a terrorist connection is—presumably this is for the court to decide—but I argue that, without some guidance or statutory definition, this could lead to a widening of the net and inconsistency in sentencing between cases.
On TPIMs, my right honourable friend David Lammy at Second Reading in the other place gave a succinct history lesson on the changes from control orders in 2005. We have had a similar history lesson today from a number of distinguished noble Lords. The central point made by my right honourable friend is that in a sense we are going full circle. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, supports the lowering of the standard of proof, and Jon Hall, the reviewer, has raised concerns about the removal of the two-year limit on TPIMs so that they could effectively be indefinite. This is something we wish to examine closely as the Bill progresses in this House.
A further point is that a balance needs to be struck. We are dealing with people who are not guilty of any offence but suspected of terrorist activity. The balance is between liberty and security, and the wider community—particularly the community from which the suspect comes—needs to see that what the Government are doing is proportionate and that people are not wrongly convicted.
I am not a lawyer, and maybe I do not give proper weight to the importance of particular definitions of proof, but for me the central point is that the safeguards need to be in place to protect innocent people while protecting the public from potential acts of terrorism. The public need to understand that this is the primary purpose of this legislation.
I am very aware that many speakers in today’s debate have been active in and following this type of terrorism legislation for many years, but in recent days I have spoken to many young people who are also following these debates. We need to remake the arguments for all the elements in this Bill. We need to convince young people that the legislation is proportionate and necessary and strikes the right balance between liberty and security.
In opening, my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said that the detail of this Bill matters a lot. I agree. It is the role of this House to look at the detail and steer this Bill to a suitable conclusion.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this Second Reading debate on what has been widely acknowledged as an incredibly important Bill. I join other noble Lords in welcoming, on “the worst list since the lavender list”, my noble friend Lord Vaizey and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It struck me that one person’s success is another’s disappointment, because I wanted the Diamond synchrotron to go in the north-west. It obviously ended up near Oxford, but it was very good listening to my noble friend.
The right reverend Prelate recounted the dreadful night of the arena bomb in Manchester. I reflected on his feelings about how Manchester came together after that; it really did. He talked about the bee; I carry the bee around on my lanyard at all times. It certainly defined a moment in Manchester’s history that will never be forgotten.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, talked about the rise of the far right, and of course we cannot forget about that; it really is on the rise in this country. Just as we talk about Islamist terrorism, we cannot forget about that. I also say to my noble friend Lord Sheikh that I will respond to his letter as soon as I possibly can; I apologise to him. I also apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, because at times, unless I am going deaf, I could not hear her very well. I shall look at Hansard and respond to her in due course if necessary.
Noble Lords including the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Thomas of Gresford, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, talked about the new serious terrorism sentence with a 14-year minimum. Of course, the sentence will be for the courts to impose on the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders who would otherwise receive a life sentence—those who have committed an offence involving a high likelihood of causing multiple deaths. It is right that we set a minimum that reflects the seriousness with which we take these offences. By having both a minimum custodial sentence of 14 years and a minimum licence period of seven years, and up to 25 years, we will keep the public safer by ensuring that dangerous terrorists serve longer in prison and are subject to longer periods of supervision and monitoring in the community.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, talked about the discount sentence. While the maximum reduction for a plea at the first reasonable opportunity is 33%, the position in sentencing law is different for offences that carry a mandatory minimum sentence. By applying a maximum reduction of 20% for an early guilty plea in the case of serious terrorism sentences, we are taking an approach consistent with the provision for other minimum sentences, such as those for firearms offences and third-strike burglary.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the evidence used to determine that longer sentences deter radicalisation. The rationale for this Bill is primarily about public protection, as noble Lords have said. Longer sentences and more onerous licenses are part of a package intended to ensure that offenders who commit serious terrorist acts are incapacitated for longer and better supervised on release. Longer sentences will provide both better protection for the public, by incapacitating terrorist offenders, and more time to support their disengagement and rehabilitation through the range of tailored interventions available while they are in prison.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, asked me for an update on the announcement of additional funding for CT probation prison programmes, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, alluded to this too. We are doubling CT specialist staff and dedicating resources to provide enhanced training to identify and challenge extremist behaviour. The National Probation Service has already developed specialist teams for the management of terrorist offenders, but the additional investment we are making will take this further and recruitment is already under way. These specialist, trained probation officers will be able to deliver enhanced levels of offender management for those high-risk, complex cases.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked for the estimate of additional probation expenditure. There are three effects on probation case loads that contribute to the additional costs expected. The first is the serious terrorists, and terrorism-related offenders, likely to receive an extended sentence. They would either face a 14-year minimum term, or be required to serve all of their sentence in custody, in steady state, and this may result in fewer than 50 additional probation case loads, at a cost of less than £100,000 annually. The second is expanding the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime to cover more offences. This would increase probation case loads by fewer than 50 offences at a cost of about £100,000 annually. The third, adding polygraph testing to certain offenders’ license conditions, would affect fewer than 150 offenders at a cost of about £400,000 annually in steady state. This totals an estimate of additional £600,000 annual cost for probation in steady state.
The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Ponsonby, have asked what HMG are doing to ensure that the Parole Board has the resources, training and so on to improve decision-making capability. The board has a cohort of specialist members, trained specifically to deal with terrorist and extremist cases, including retired high court judges, retired police officers and other experts in their field. We continue to work with the board, the police and security services to ensure that the parole system as a whole is fully equipped to deal effectively with these cases.
The noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlisle, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, lamented the removal of the Parole Board referral for serious terrorists. Dangerous terrorist offenders should serve a sentence that truly reflects the seriousness of their crimes. Removing the prospect of early release for these offenders sends a clear message that this Government will treat this kind of offence seriously. By ensuring that they will spend longer in custody, our Prison Service will have more time to manage and reduce the risk that these offenders present to the public when they are released from prison. Prison governors and HMPPS public protection casework officials have extensive experience in setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders on behalf of the Secretary of State, and will continue to be informed by the recommendations of probation officers and the multi-agency public protection panels in place to ensure their safe and effective risk management on release into the community.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester all talked about the vulnerability of children. Noble Lords will know that we have a separate youth justice system for children and the courts will always consider their specific needs when sentencing. However, we know that age is not a barrier to becoming involved in terrorist acts. That is why we have taken steps to ensure a degree of consistency between our approach to adult and youth offenders. The changes we are introducing to the EDS will remove the possibility of early release for the most dangerous offenders, allowing for the effective monitoring of risk factors over a longer period to limit the threat posed on release. The special sentence for offenders of particular concern will ensure that children who commit a relevant terrorist or terrorism-related offence cannot be released without a period of supervision in the community, maximising the time available to support their desistance from further offending.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and, to a certain extent, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester talked about the malign influence on children vulnerable to exploitation by adults—particularly, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said, online. That is why 47% of the projects that the Government funded in 2018-19 worked in partnership with communities to reduce the risk of radicalisation. They were delivered in schools to increase young people’s resilience to terrorists and extremist ideology in all its forms.
My noble friend Lord Vaizey talked about the online harms White Paper. Like him, I am looking forward to it becoming a Bill, and some of the problems that it will tackle, particularly online, for children and young people.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, talked about Northern Ireland and a possible separate sentencing approach. We think there should be a unified approach to the sentencing and release of terrorist offenders across the UK. We do not discriminate between types of terrorism. Any terrorist offender, regardless of their ideology or proclaimed motivation, and whether their offence was committed in England, Scotland or Northern Ireland, should be subject to the same sentencing and release regime.
There has been much discussion of the standard of proof. We are reducing the standard of proof from “on the balance of probabilities” to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” to support the use of TPIMs as necessary and proportionate to protect the public from terrorism-related activity. Only last year, Parliament took the step of updating the counterterrorism legislative frame- work through the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, because pathways into terrorism have changed and, in some cases, accelerated. Much radicalisation now takes place online, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said, and the operational pace for the Security Service and police is faster than ever seen before. Lowering the standard of proof will help to ensure that a TPIM can be considered as an option to manage the threat in a wider range of cases, where it is necessary to do so. For example, this change will assist in circumstances where an individual has been to Syria to fight for or assist a terrorist organisation but evidence of their activities there is hard to gather. Should they return, prosecution is the Government’s strongest preference. However, if there are evidential difficulties and the burden of proof required by a criminal court—beyond reasonable doubt—cannot be satisfied but there is a reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity, lowering the standard of proof will ensure that a TPIM can be considered as a risk-management tool to protect the public.
Noble Lords will, rightly, want to debate where the balance between civil liberties and public protection best lies. However, the Government are clear: we must ensure that the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing can make full use of the tools available to them to manage the risk posed by those involved in terrorism.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about the removal of the two-year time limit. The Government have no desire to keep individuals on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. This change will ensure that, when subjects pose an enduring risk, we will be better placed to restrict and prevent their involvement in terrorism-related activity for as long as necessary. This provision mitigates against the possibility of TPIM subjects “riding out” the current maximum of two years with no change to their extremist mindset, and it removes the prospect of a cliff edge being created whereby a TPIM is removed but the subject of the TPIM represents an enduring risk.
In cases of well-connected extremists, it will also multiply the benefits of the TPIM by reducing individuals’ capability of conducting terrorism-related activity, dismantling their networks so that they are ineffective at inspiring and influencing others to commit acts of terrorism, and reducing the wider long-term threat from others who might have been influenced by the subject were it not for the TPIM measures. This change will also assist with longer-term risk management, providing more time to meaningfully pursue deradicalisation and space for subjects to adopt different lifestyles and move away from their previous extremist contacts.
As is the case now, recommendations as to who should be subject to a TPIM will be provided by operational partners in the first instance and will therefore be underpinned by suitable operational experience and expertise. Where we cannot prosecute, deport or otherwise manage an individual of terrorism concern, a TPIM will be considered, if necessary, as a means to protect the public. I am confident that the changes that the Bill will make will strengthen the toolkit available to our operational partners, while continuing to ensure that robust safeguards remain in place to protect the civil liberties of those subject to the measure.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked me to cite examples, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asserted that there has not been an occasion where security services which wanted to use TPIMs could not do so. That was cited in the House of Commons and it is true, but the Bill provides, as it should do, for future situations that could well arise, as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier said. As I am sure noble Lords will know, the tests include not just the “reasonable suspicion” test but the following: that some or all activity is new terrorism-related activity; that the Home Secretary reasonably considers that a TPIM is necessary; and that the Home Secretary reasonably considers each TPIM measure to be necessary. In addition, the court must give the Home Secretary permission to impose a TPIM. Therefore, the decision is not based solely on that one test.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asked for the Government’s view on the amendment proposed by PCC David Jamieson that would give PCCs and local mayors an oversight role in the operation of TPIMs. The Home Office already works very closely with the police before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime. The process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with the relevant local police force and that community impact assessments are kept up to date. The Bill already contains a clause that will allow a TPIM subject’s relocation measure to be varied where necessary on operational resource grounds. Therefore, David Jamieson’s proposed amendment for an additional role for PCCs and local mayors in TPIM processes is, respectfully, not necessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who of course has great experience in this area, cited radicalisation in prisons and gave the example of Usman Khan, but he will know that I will not go into that individual’s case. My noble friends Lord Vaizey and Lord Risby, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—and, by turn, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—questioned the success of rehabilitation programmes in prisons. HMPPS delivers a formal programme—the Healthy Identity Intervention —in custody and in the community. In addition, the prison strand of the Desistance and Disengagement Programme was rolled out to prisons in 2018. The DDP provides a range of intensive, tailored interventions and practical support designed to help in rehabilitation.
Measuring changes in behaviour is obviously and notoriously hard, especially in such a small cohort relative to the size of the prison and probation population in England and Wales. Our intervention programmes have a robust research and evaluation mechanism built into them. Evaluation and research will be at the heart of the new CT assessment and rehabilitation centre announced by the Government earlier this year.
In terms of scrutinising the effectiveness of disengagement, we have consistently evaluated the effectiveness of our work and have taken action where appropriate. The department regularly reviews its approach to make sure that it is appropriate and proportionate to the risk presented by terrorist prisoners and people on licence. This will be a core mission for the new CT assessment and rehabilitation centre, which will lead the evaluation, development and delivery of our intervention approaches. In addition, the independent reviewer of Prevent—on which more later—will consider the work of the desistance and disengagement programme.
The noble Lord, Lord Mann, talked about the CST and other voluntary organisations that have been very successful in identifying people who wish to do harm to our communities. I absolutely pay tribute to the CST. I have seen its work in action and have seen how it has worked with other organisations, such as Tell MAMA. It is also involved in countering hate crime towards the LGBT community. I hope that its work goes on for many more years to come.
On terrorist offenders leaving prison, as noble Lords have alluded to, throughout a sentence we oversee multiagency end-to-end supervision, which includes regular risk assessments. All terrorist offenders released on probation are closely managed by the National Probation Service, and the highest-risk offenders, including terrorist offenders, are managed through the multiagency public protection arrangements—MAPPA.
I am aware of time; I hope that noble Lords will bear with me for a couple more minutes. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, asked about women’s de-radicalisation programmes. She will know that all convicted terrorist prisoners, including at the small number of women’s prisons, can access the rehabilitative interventions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked me about the Acheson recommendations. In our 2016 response to the Acheson report, the Government accepted eight out of the 11 principal recommendations. Following the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist attack, the MoJ Permanent Secretary commissioned an urgent review of progress against these recommendations. The review found that the department has delivered against all the recommendations that the Government accepted. This progress includes the establishment of separation centres to hold the most subversive extremist prisoners and to safeguard the vulnerable against their malicious ideology.
Over 29,000 prison staff, including all new recruits since January 2017, have received enhanced extremist awareness training. Arrangements are also in place to systematically remove extremist literature from prisons, and enhanced vetting arrangements for prison chaplains of all faiths are also now in place. Through the CT “step up” programme, the department will continue to build on this track record with increased resource and reform across these important areas.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked where we are up to with the MAPPA review. He will know that the terms of reference were published in January 2020 and that Jonathan Hall’s report was published on 2 September. He found that it
“is a well-established process and did not conclude that wholesale change is necessary.”
He made a number of recommendations; we will set out more about our response in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, challenged me about who Prevent is protecting. It is protecting the individual who needs to be safeguarded against being radicalised into terrorism. It is also protecting the people that might be harmed, both the individual and those around him or her. On the review, given both the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, having to stand down and how Covid has come to try us this year in respect of the work we can do, an incomplete or rushed review might well have been produced had we not removed the deadline through this Bill. The interviews are taking place later this month and will be followed by an announcement as soon as possible. The Government want the review to conclude by August 2021, but we do not want to constrain the reviewer’s ability to complete a comprehensive assessment, given the uncertainties associated with the current circumstances. Confirmation of the timescales will be agreed with the new reviewer and set out in the terms of reference.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, asked whether Parliament will consider revised Prevent terms of reference. The answer is no. There were also a couple of questions on polygraph testing; if noble Lords are amenable, I will respond to those in a letter as I have gone well over my allocated time. With that, I beg to move.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Tuesday 26th January 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 129-I Marshalled list for Committee - (21 Jan 2021)
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, in opening this debate, on the first day of Committee on this Bill, it might be sensible for me to outline our approach. This is particularly so, because I was not able to be present for the Second Reading debate on 21 September—for which I apologise but I was involved in a court hearing.
All on these Benches—and, I believe, all across the House—regard terrorist offences as particularly serious and deserving of the highest condemnation. This Bill was a response to two appalling terrorist attacks. The first was the attack in and outside Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, when Usman Khan, who had been released on licence after serving half of a 16-year sentence for terrorist offences the previous December, stabbed five people, killing two of them, after attending a prisoner rehabilitation programme, before being shot dead by police. The second was the attack on Streatham High Road in February last year, when Sudesh Amman, a terrorist who was under surveillance and had been released a month or so previously from a three year and four month prison sentence for disseminating terrorist material, stabbed and injured two people before being shot dead by police. As the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, rightly pointed out at Second Reading, both of those attacks were carried out by offenders who had been released half way through their sentences. The central feature of Part 1 of this responsive Bill is to make the sentencing regime tougher, both for offences that are considered by their nature to be terrorist offences and for offences deemed to have a terrorist connection.
Our concern, in considering this Bill at Committee stage, is to ensure that damage is not done, by the perceived requirement to respond severely to terrorist offences, to consistent and long-held principles of our criminal law. Clause 1, broadly, extends the range of offences that can be deemed to have a terrorist connection to include any offence, committed after the Act comes into force, that is punishable with imprisonment for more than two years. The terrorist connection need not be determined by the judge in the case of a number of specific terrorist offences listed in Schedule A1, effectively because it is presumed. Otherwise, it is for the judge to determine and state in open court that an offence has such a connection. A finding that an offence does have a terrorist connection, requires a sentencing judge to treat that terrorist connection as an aggravating factor when imposing sentence by reason of Section 69 of the Sentencing Code. For the purpose of that section, an offence has a terrorist connection if the offence
“is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism; or … is committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
I note in passing that the code does not require that the offender was a knowing party to the planning, objectives or implementation of the act of terrorism, actual or intended, that was in fact committed. Furthermore—and this is our central point on Clause 1 —the decision that the offence has a terrorist connection is to be taken by the court at the sentencing stage, even though such a decision inevitably fundamentally changes the nature of the offence for which the offender has been convicted. The decision that is then made involves a factual determination of great significance to the criminality of the defendant and of the offence, yet it is taken by the judge alone without the involvement of a jury. Because the category of offences that may give rise to such a finding is so wide—that is, any offence that carries a maximum prison sentence of more than two years—the offences include a very wide range, such as causing criminal damage over £5,000, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, theft and many others, some of which would often be quite minor if committed without a terrorist connection.
Terrorism as an aggravating factor in sentencing was introduced by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. By Section 30 of that Act, where a person was found guilty of an offence listed in Schedule 2 to that Act and the court found that the offence had a terrorist connection, the judge was bound to treat the terrorist connection as an aggravating factor. The mechanism was the same as is proposed under this legislation, but the Schedule 2 offences under the 2008 Act were of the utmost severity. They included murder, kidnapping, Section 18 wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, a number of serious explosives offences, hijacking, biological weapons offences, hostage taking and serious aviation offences.
A determination that an offence has terrorist connections has implications beyond sentencing, as it also triggers a number of forfeiture provisions and the terrorism notification requirements that apply. Under the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020—the emergency legislation we passed last year to prevent terrorist offenders being released after serving half their sentences—any offender whose offence came under the prescribed list of serious offences, and had been determined by a judge to have a terrorist connection, was subject to the rules in that legislation against release at the halfway point but, again, that Act involved a list of serious prescribed offences.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have a very different view from the opponent of the clause standing part. The UK Government, regardless of who is in power, obviously recognise at this point in time that the fundamental dimensions of this Bill are about the safety of the United Kingdom against terrorism. Our problem is that we are still a very open nation.
Whether it is in Afghanistan, the Middle East or Asia, in all those parts of the world we take an active role in promoting democracy. We see it occasionally with refugees who come to this country. Genuine refugees are welcome, but hidden within the alleged genuine refugees are, too often, terrorists or quasi-terrorists. It is against that background that my noble friend on the Front Bench is rightly introducing this Bill in Committee. If people think I am exaggerating, I have had personal death threats from the IRA. I happened to represent Northampton South, which had an IRA cell in the early 70s. Colleagues may know that I have been deeply involved in Sri Lanka for 50 years, and I am sorry to report that some number of illegal entrants to our country were active members of the LTTE Tamil Tigers. So the challenge is there, and we need to recognise it.
I praise those in our party who have decided the time has come to look again at the sentencing of terrorism. The problem is made worse by the misunderstanding—whether it be genuine or otherwise—of the difference between human rights and the original European Convention on Human Rights, which, of course, was the basis of our Human Rights Act. That is fine, but it should not cover elements where a war took place. Again, I cite Sri Lanka, because that was a ghastly war between a democratically elected Government and a terrorist movement, proscribed by the United Kingdom Government in in its last few months in 2001. The law that looks after the rights in that context is international humanitarian law.
It may surprise colleagues to know that under the generosity of previous Governments, we in the UK allowed the number two man running the Tamil Tigers to have an office in Camden. Okay, he was a British citizen, but he was in charge throughout the period when I was involved, and his wife—an Australian lady, now, obviously, with joint British citizenship—was involved in recruiting child soldiers. We had these people living in our midst. I say to my noble friend on the Front Bench: well done in bringing the Bill forward. Clause 1, to me, is absolutely fundamental to it, and I wish it a safe and swift passage.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is a privilege, as always, to follow the noble Lord. I respect his point of view and the experiences he has had. I am sure he will appreciate we are concerned with the rule of law and preserving the reputation this country has for justice done in the proper way.
Terrorist activity is an aggravating factor in sentencing. Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 enables courts to increase the sentence if it is established that the offence has a terrorist element. But the 2008 Act limited the use of this provision to the specific offences in Schedule 2, which were those most commonly connected with terrorist attacks or ancillary to them. The primary offences listed involved murder, manslaughter, violence to the person and explosives, nuclear, biological material and hijacking offences. The proposal in Clause 1 extends the offences that can be aggravated by a terrorist element to include any offence in the whole criminal calendar punishable with imprisonment for more than two years. This is an enormous widening of the provisions of the 2008 Act. The main feature of these provisions is that the issue of whether there is a terrorist element in an offence is not determined by a jury, notwithstanding the fact that these cases will inevitably be heard on indictment in the Crown Court.
The decision that there is a terrorist connection becomes part of the sentencing process, to be determined by the trial judge alone after conviction. Could the Minister explain the process the Government envisage? Would it be the equivalent of a Newton hearing, with a separate trial of the issue in which evidence is called and arguments heard on which the judge’s decision is based, or would the judge be entitled to come to a conclusion based on the evidence he has heard in the trial before the jury? It is an important decision. It is not just that his finding will add years of imprisonment to the individual defendant but, as my noble friend Lord Marks said a moment ago, it will trigger the terrorism notification requirements and the restrictions on early release contained in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020.
Surely, in the traditions of the criminal law of this country, a suspect believed to be involved in terrorist offences should be charged with those offences. It should be for the jury to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain such charges. It cannot be right to charge the suspect with lesser offences and allow the judge to add the icing to the cake. There is no way in which this clause can be satisfactorily amended; consequently, the only thing to do is throw it out.
Let me give a pertinent example which everybody will understand after the events of last year. Suppose a jury finds a Whitehall protestor guilty of occasioning actual bodily harm to a rival protestor outside the gates of Downing Street, by punching him on the nose and stealing his flag. Under this clause, the judge could find proved, after the jury’s verdict, that the use of force to influence the UK Government and intimidate the public was for the purpose of advancing an ideological cause and therefore well within the definition of terrorism in the pursuit of, shall we say, exiting the European Union. Does the Minister—whom I welcome to his seat in the House of Lords—agree?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I join noble Lords in welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his place in the House of Lords. I am sure he will make an enormous series of contributions to our debates on justice issues—not just criminal justice, but civil justice. He is very welcome.
This is a very important Bill. I think everyone in the House, certainly on this side, is very keen that the Government be given legitimate tools to fight terrorism as hard as possible. One legitimate tool must be the use of greater sentences, where appropriate, for people who commit terrorist offences. In principle, we on this side are not against the idea of expanding the circumstances in which an offence can be regarded as aggravated because of a terrorist connection, which is what Clause 1 does.
Also, in principle, I do not think it necessarily wrong for the judge to be given very substantial powers to make judgments on what the appropriate sentence may be. The most obvious example of this relates to murder, where the judge in effect has the power to determine whether the offender should be given a whole life sentence, which will obviously have huge ramifications for what happens to that defendant. Indeed, such a decision had to be made quite recently on the conspirator convicted in relation to the Manchester Arena bombings —he was given a whole-life sentence by Mr Justice Baker. That was a very significant occasion.
I am very keen to discover precisely what process the Government have in mind for how a decision will be made on what are more or less serious offences than the normal ones. What process is envisaged in which a judge can decide whether an offence is aggravated by terrorism in the sense envisaged by Clause 1? In principle, I think a fair process can be envisaged and it may not be wrong for the judge to decide that rather than the jury. However, I am very interested to hear what the Government have to say about it.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for reminding the Committee of the two terrorist offences at Fishmongers’ Hall and at Streatham, which formed the backdrop to this Bill. They were rightly mentioned at Second Reading; it is correct that we have them in our minds as we embark on Committee today.
Clause 1 addresses a limitation in the existing legislation to ensure that no terrorist-related offenders fall through the cracks. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out, at present the courts are expressly required to consider whether there is a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing only in relation to a defined list of non-terrorism offences set out in Schedule 1 to the Sentencing Code for England and Wales and Schedule 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 for Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Clause 1 removes this defined list of non-terrorism offences from Schedule 1 to the Sentencing Code and Schedule 2 to the 2008 Act. This is an important step, though not quite as radical as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggests. It will expressly require the courts, in cases where it appears that any non-terrorism offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years was committed in the course of an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism, actively to consider whether the offence was committed with a terrorist connection and should be aggravated as such. Closing this loophole provides a necessary flexibility in the legislation, reflecting the fact that terrorist offending takes a wide variety of forms.
On Second Reading we noted that, sadly, the terrorist threat is constantly evolving; offenders prove themselves rather inventive, alas, and it is right that the legislation keeps pace. I am glad for my noble friend Lord Naseby’s support, who sadly spoke with personal experience. I also welcome the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for this important step in expanding the list of offences.
This clause also ensures that the consequences of a terrorist connection are applied consistently to all offenders. The identification of a terrorist connection by the courts has a wide-ranging impact. First, it must be treated as an aggravating factor when sentencing. This will help ensure that terrorist offenders receive punishment befitting the severity of their offending and the risk they pose to public safety. Secondly, the change will also result in the offenders being subject to the registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison, meaning that they are required to notify specified information to the police. That information supports the police to manage an offender’s risk on release much more effectively. Thirdly, once the Bill receives Royal Assent—as we hope it will—offenders convicted with a terrorist connection will be subject to a minimum of 12 months on licence following their release and will be eligible to have certain licence conditions imposed on them to assist in the effective management of their risk, for instance polygraph testing.
It might help the Committee if I offer a hypothetical example to demonstrate how this change will work in practice, as noble Lords asked for. Today, someone convicted of possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life would not be guaranteed to have their sentence aggravated, even where the court has identified a terrorist connection. They would also not be subject to the restriction on early release provisions or the registered terrorist offender notification requirements upon release. That is because this offence is not listed in Schedule 1 to the Sentencing Code or Schedule 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Clause 1 will address this inconsistency in the current legislation by requiring the court to consider whether there is a terrorist connection and treat it as an aggravating factor if such a finding is made. It will also ensure that appropriate risk management tools, such as the notification requirements, apply following the offender’s release from prison.
I emphasise that, as is the case currently, courts will be required to apply the criminal standard of proof—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—when determining a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked about this. Judges routinely have to consider whether offences which they are sentencing have been committed with aggravating factors and, in doing so, they apply the criminal standard of proof and must be satisfied that they are made out beyond reasonable doubt. I hope that addresses the question that he and others raised about the process.
It is also important that the Committee notes what the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said in public about the Bill and these provisions, including during the oral evidence that he provided to the Public Bill Committee in another place. Asked by my honourable friend the Member for Derbyshire Dales which provision in the Bill, in his professional view, would have the biggest effect on making our citizens safer, he said that it was this one:
“That is a really welcome change, which makes people safer.”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 16.]
The Bill contains a comprehensive package of measures, of which this change is an important part. It will help to establish confidence in the sentencing framework by ensuring that those who commit terrorist-related crimes receive punishments commensurate with those crimes, spend longer in custody and are subject to appropriate risk management processes following their release.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I should have opened my earlier speech by welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his position and to the House. He has been extremely helpful to me in relation to the Domestic Abuse Bill and its provisions and I have seen him virtually on a number of occasions, so I have not completely appreciated that this is the first time that we have been together on a Bill. I also thank all noble Lords who have spoken and in particular the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his response.
I listened carefully to all that the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said. Of course we all, throughout the House, deplore terrorism and agree that it is crucial that we make our country safe from terrorism and treat terrorist offences with extreme severity. The point that I made, echoed by my noble friend Lord Thomas and, to a certain extent, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is that, in the effort to set up that severe framework, we must not abandon important principles of English criminal justice.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, has not answered the point made by me and by my noble friend Lord Thomas and, to a lesser extent, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the fact-finding process by which the aggravation of an offence carrying a sentence of more than two years’ imprisonment is to be proved has not been defined in the Bill, is taken out of the hands of the jury by the Bill and put into the hands of the judge, and does not satisfy the basic requirement of English law that the findings of fact about an offence are for the jury, and the sentencing is for the judge.
Of course I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the judge has discretion in many cases—including the offence of murder, which the noble and learned Lord mentioned—to increase or reduce a sentence in accordance with his view of the evidence. However, that does not answer the central point that what we have here is the creation of a raft of new aggravated offences, and the position that it is for the judge alone to decide whether he is dealing with an aggravated offence or a basic offence; and the basic offence can be quite a minor offence in general terms.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, has not answered the question from my noble friend Lord Thomas as to whether there would or would not be a Newton hearing. He has not answered the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, about how the judge makes a determination that the offence is to be treated as aggravated. I invite the noble Lord to go back and discuss with his colleagues in government how this point can be dealt with so as to ensure that the aggravated offence is either charged, tried and convicted in accordance with our principles of law by the jury, or how it is to be determined on proper evidence, if not by the jury then by the judge.
The clause as it stands is unacceptable. For that reason, I maintain the questions that I have about it.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 1. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister’s reply should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Schedule 2: Serious Terrorism Offences: England and Wales
Amendment 1
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes references to offences in the Space Industry Act 2018 from Schedule 17A to the Sentencing Code (serious terrorism offences). References to those offences will instead be inserted on their commencement by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (see the amendment at page 108, line 11) so that they are dealt with consistently by the Sentencing Act 2020.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I hope that the Committee will allow me to take a moment to thank the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their very warm words of welcome, which I appreciate.
Amendment 1 is a minor technical amendment that removes references to offences in the Space Industry Act 2018 from Schedule 17A to the Sentencing Code, which deals with serious terrorism offences. References to those offences will instead be inserted, on their commencement, by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 so that they are dealt with consistently by that Act. I beg to move.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I understand from the Minister that this is a minor amendment. I too welcome him to his position. He has been very helpful to me both on this Bill and on the Domestic Abuse Bill, with which we are dealing almost simultaneously. I have a couple of minor questions for him. First, what would happen if this amendment were not put in place? How would that have affected the position, and what could the consequences have been? Secondly, what level of consultation has he done externally to ensure consistency in Sentencing Codes and parliamentary Acts?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord. To answer his two questions, I say that this is essentially a tidying-up matter because of the different pace of legislation going through Parliament at the moment. The question of what would happen if this amendment were not made is an interesting one. At the very least we would be left with inelegant legislation, and I know from my previous incarnation that inelegant legislation is bad for Parliament but very good for lawyers, so let us try to make it as elegant as we can while we are at it. Much of the consultation on this matter preceded my involvement in this Bill and indeed my introduction to this House, but I am aware that there has been very significant consultation. Of course, if the noble Lord wishes to raise any particular points with me, my door is always open to him.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 2. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister’s reply should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Schedule 3: Offences for the purposes of this Act: Northern Ireland
Amendment 2
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments at page 53, line 44, page 95, line 4 and page 95, line 37 are consequential on the removal of Clause 34.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 3, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 73, 74 and 75. I will also signal my intention to propose the removal of Clauses 33, 34 and 35.
Clause 33 was intended to provide explicit provision so that Scottish Ministers might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Clause 34 was intended to provide explicit provision so that the Northern Ireland Department of Justice might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Scotland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but Scottish Ministers have broad powers to set licence conditions under Section 12(1) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. Northern Ireland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but the Department of Justice has broad powers to set licence conditions under Article 24 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 and Rule 3(2)(e) of the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence Conditions) (Northern Ireland) Rules 2009.
Through discussions on the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly on the provisions of the Bill, it became apparent that while this clause would enable a fully comparable UK-wide approach to polygraph testing on licence, pursuit of this provision in Scotland and Northern Ireland was not strictly necessary and could result in Scottish and Northern Irish Ministers withholding their consent for the Bill. The Government remain of the view that polygraph examinations are a useful additional tool in supporting the effective management of terrorist offenders, and we hope that the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly will see the demonstrable benefits of its introduction in England and Wales.
This Government will continue to legislate on reserved matters but, as an expression of our respect for the existing powers of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in relation to the setting of licence conditions, and as a demonstration of this Government’s reasonable approach to those discussions, we have now agreed to remove the provision on the clear understanding that, should this Scottish Parliament or Northern Ireland Assembly or a future one change its view on polygraph testing, it will be able to implement the measure without additional legislation being required.
Clause 35 was intended primarily to provide supplementary provisions to Clauses 33 and 34 that would restrict the circumstances in which the devolved Administrations could impose mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for certain terrorist offenders. As a result of the removal of Clauses 33 and 34 from the Bill, Clause 35 is no longer needed. The clause was intended to ensure that regulations could be made to ensure that polygraph conditions were confined only to those offenders’ licences where it was necessary and proportionate to do so, to ensure standards for the examinations and that appropriate records and reports kept in relation to testing were consistent across the UK. Polygraph examinations are already carried out on sexual offenders in England and Wales. The conduct of those polygraph examinations is governed by rules made under Section 29(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007. Amendments 2, 3, 17, 18, 21 to 26 and 75 are consequential on the removal of Clauses 33 to 35.
Amendment 73 is necessary to ensure that the measures that permit introduction of polygraph testing in a licence condition for terrorist offenders in England and Wales are commenced two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent. Previously, when explicit provision was sought and set out for Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as for England and Wales, we had agreed that the provision should be commenced via regulation to allow sufficient time to develop the relevant infrastructure in those jurisdictions. As explicit provision is no longer made for those jurisdictions through this Bill, and polygraph testing is already used by the probation service for sex offenders in England and Wales, the same delay is not now required. As such, the usual commencement of two months after Royal Assent is appropriate. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have many reservations about the value of polygraph tests. They rely on measuring several physiological processes—pulse rate, blood pressure, perspiration and so on, the changes that may take place in the course of questioning. However, the emotional and physiological responses recorded may arise from such factors as simple anxiety about being tested or fear of being judged deceptive, or a host of things—perhaps the state of one’s digestion after food. There is an inherent ambiguity in the physiological responses. The reluctance to use polygraph evidence is precisely because the response may mimic the response expected of a person seeking to deceive.
What is meant by “failing” the polygraph test? Failing the test means exhibiting a certain physiological response to a question. What is truth? The examiner cannot know whether that response means that the answer is a lie. However, there is no punishment for failing the test—whatever that means—or for exhibiting that response. That does not breach the terms of the offender’s licence. The individual will not be returned to prison. Alterations may, however, take place in the conditions of his licence, and those could be onerous.
The irony is that, in the course of questioning, the person being questioned may provide information truthfully that will have an adverse effect on him. He has not failed the test because his body does not react to his telling the truth, but he has provided information that may lead to his punishment. He has of course lost his right to silence, a right first developed in the late 17th century as a check to arbitrary rule. It has been regarded over centuries as fundamental to the fairness of the criminal law in this country and in the common-law countries all over the world.
Faced with the terrorist atrocities that we have seen in this country, the loss of the right to silence may seem a worthwhile price. Obviously that is not the immediate view in Scotland, nor in Northern Ireland. Let us face the dilemma: the proposals for England and Wales do not involve imprisonment for a lie but possible imprisonment for telling the truth or, since it is mandatory to answer the questions, even for remaining silent. Faced with legal and moral issues such as this, the drafters of the Domestic Abuse Bill, which is proceeding this week here also, as the Minister will know, decided that it was appropriate to proceed with a three-year pilot before finally rolling out the use of polygraphs generally in that field. Why is a different approach taken in this concurrent Bill?
It is interesting to note that the case studies in the MoJ memorandum on these proposals indicate that the information provided led to warrants being issued and physical evidence obtained in the offenders’ respective homes to contradict what they had said. However, there is no indication how often that has occurred or how many times such activity has proved nothing, and nothing has come of it. Will the Minister deal with that in his reply?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
Like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I too have considerable doubts about the reliability of polygraph material. This series of government amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, indicate some degree of shambles on the part of the Government. They are withdrawing the polygraph provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Had they consulted the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive prior to the initial publication of the Bill, they would have seen what the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive had to say about them.
In the light of what was said by those two Governments, why did the UK Government introduce these provisions? It is plain from what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, is saying that the Scottish and Northern Irish Administrations do not want them. There is a reference to the various provisions that might allow them to introduce them as licence conditions. However, neither of the Administrations have indicated that they want these powers, so why on earth were they introduced in the first place and when was it that the UK Government decided to respect those views? If they did not consult those two Administrations before, why not?
Separate to that, on the use of polygraphs, what advice have the Government sought from police forces in England and Wales? To what extent would those police forces be confident about using polygraph testing?
Moving on, the effect of Amendment 73 would be that Clause 32, which sets out the conditions for polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in England and Wales, would come into force two months after Royal Assent rather than by regulations. Why have the Government reduced the degree of scrutiny available to the introduction of polygraphs by removing the need for regulations? Separately, what provisions are available in the Bill to stop the use of polygraphs if they prove to be ineffective?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for setting out their various points. I turn first to those made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. On the effectiveness of polygraphs, as I said in my introductory remarks, they are used elsewhere in English law in relation to sex offenders. There is therefore a body of evidence as to their utility. On what “failing” means and the consequences of failure, it is important to remember, as I think the noble Lord appreciates, that offenders who are subject to testing cannot be recalled to custody for failing a polygraph test. They can be recalled for making disclosures during the test that reveal that they have breached other licence conditions, or that their risk has escalated to a level at which they can no longer be managed safely in the community.
On the right to silence and other Human Rights Act rights, I am sure that the noble Lord will recall that during the course of the sex offender pilot of the polygraph system, an offender challenged the imposition of testing on Article 8 grounds, but that was rejected by the courts. No further challenges have been made since then and we are therefore confident that this is compliant with the Human Rights Act and the rights contained therein.
On the remark that there is to be no pilot scheme, I will make two points. First, this is not the initial use of polygraphs in English law because they are already used in connection with sexual offences. Secondly, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient numbers of relevant offenders to carry out a pilot that would produce meaningful results.
I turn to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. It is rather odd to be accused of presiding over a shambles when we have actually listened to the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in our discussions with them. On whether police forces are able and ready to use polygraphs, they are of course already being used in circumstances related to sexual offenders. Therefore, this testing is not entirely new to them. The regulations that will govern polygraph testing have been set out and we do not think that it will be an ineffective tool.
I hope that I have responded to the various points raised. If noble Lords feel that I should provide further information on any of them, they know that we will of course continue to have discussions about these matters.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 53, line 41.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 4. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Clause 4: Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Amendment 4
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the balance between custody and licence for young offenders.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, Clause 4 and my Amendments 4 and 5 concern the imposition of serious terrorism sentences of detention in a young offender institution for offenders aged 18 or over when the offence was committed and under 21 when convicted. A serious terrorism offence is defined in Clause 2 and that definition is carried into the Sentencing Code through new Schedule 17A. Part 1 of the new schedule lists a number of very serious terrorism offences, while Part 2 lists other broadly serious offences where the judge determines that there is a terrorism connection. On Part 2, I repeat the points I made earlier on Clause 1, although here they are applied with less force because the offences are, by and large, much more serious so the aggravation of the sentence is likely to be less severe.
The structure of the sentence for a serious terrorism offence for young offenders is defined, as it is for adults aged over 21, as the aggregate of a custodial term and an extension period during which the offender is to be subject to a licence. A serious terrorism sentence is to be imposed where there is a significant risk to the public of serious harm caused by the offender in future terrorism offences where the court does not impose a life sentence and where the multiple deaths condition as defined in the Bill is met, so these are indeed very serious offences. The term of the sentence is defined as a minimum custodial period of 14 years and an extension period of between seven and 25 years. There is a very limited exception to the requirement to impose a serious terrorism sentence on detention where there are exceptional circumstances that relate to the offence or to the offender which justify not imposing the sentence.
I accept entirely that these are very serious offences so the sentences are very serious indeed, but for young offenders aged 18 they are what might be called “no hope” sentences. A period of 14 years in prison in a young offender institution would take the young offender to the age of 32.
There may be many cases where such a sentence is justified, but there are—or may be—others where it is simply too great. Our Amendment 4 would provide for a minimum term of 10 years instead of 14 years, without affecting the judge’s discretion in an appropriate case to impose a custodial term of longer than 10 years if that would be the appropriate sentence for the offence under the general provision of the Sentencing Code. Amendment 4 is balanced by Amendment 5, which adjusts the minimum term on licence upwards from seven years to 10 years.
The rationale behind these amendments is that there is a wealth of evidence for a number of propositions. For younger people in particular, the effect of very long custodial terms is particularly destructive, depriving them of their chances of education and building productive lives. For young people in particular, even those convicted of terrorist offences, there is hope of rehabilitation, deradicalisation and using educational opportunities to help turn their lives around and give them chances to make worthwhile lives for themselves even at the end of a long custodial sentence. Young people in particular benefit from the help and support to be offered by the probation service and others to offenders released on licence, and may benefit to a greater extent than older offenders from both deradicalisation programmes and education—vocational and general—which they might undertake on licence to help them come to terms with the real world on their release after what is anyway a very long sentence.
I therefore suggest that it would be of advantage to society, and to us all, to rebalance the division of a serious terrorism sentence, so as to have a greater period on licence to follow a minimum period in custody, which, while still very long, would be somewhat less draconian than presently proposed, and would not affect the right of the judge to impose a longer sentence in an appropriate case. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am always intrigued by the thought processes that must be brought into play in fixing a minimum sentence in a Bill. I would like the Minister to outline what consultation there has been concerning the minimum sentence of 14 years for a young offender between the ages of 18 and 21—a “no-hope sentence”, as my noble friend Lord Marks described it a moment ago, and I completely concur with everything that he said. I cannot imagine that it is a Minister who initially chooses the minimum number of years for imprisonment. Somebody in the Ministry of Justice must have drunk his cup of coffee and plumped for a figure to put in for the Minister to sign off on. I do not suppose he will ever have met a young offender—“Let’s just say 14 years sounds good.”
I want to contrast this with the role of a sentencing judge whose sentencing discretion is not bound by statute. The judge sitting in a serious case of terrorism would not be there if he had not had a lifetime of experience in the criminal courts, developing his instinct and his trained capacity to weigh the seriousness of one case against another. Other experienced practitioners and academics who have studied criminology have provided the judge with sentencing guidelines. They give him a guide to the accepted range and indicate what aggravating or mitigating factors he should have in mind. In addition, the judge will have the benefit of counsel’s submissions and a probation report from an experienced officer that will give him an insight into the background of the defendant. There may also be medical reports and, sometimes, witnesses prepared to speak up on the young man’s behalf.
This clause introduces an arbitrary minimum sentence as the guideline unless there are “exceptional circumstances”. There are no guidelines as to what those exceptional circumstances are: if the past is any guide, we will have to wait for the Court of Appeal to lay them down. The minimum sentence is chosen by a civil servant who, in all probability, has never been inside a court. So we get an arbitrary 14-year minimum sentence and an arbitrary seven years on licence. What is the evidence that this is the correct balance? Who said that? Why cannot a judge be left to do his job?
It seems to me that the only purpose of a minimum sentence is to make a single day’s headlines to the effect that the Government are being tough on crime, and specifically on terrorism. There is no question of looking at the individual who is before the court, and considering his future, his welfare, his rehabilitation or whatever. In putting forward this amendment, my noble friend is testing the rationale for the balance in the Bill, and I look forward to a full exposition from the Minister in due course.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, concluded his remarks by saying that the amendment was “testing the rationale” of these sentences, and that is indeed clearly the case. The first amendment reduces the minimum term in custody and the second increases the period on licence. Both the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Marks, referred to these as “no-hope sentences”. I understand the sentiment they expressed on these extremely long and very serious sentences being given to children—but they are not really no-hope sentences, are they? YOT and, more likely, probation and the Prison Service will have been working with these people for many years to give them hope that, when they get out of prison and are on licence and, eventually, off licence, they can go on to lead a constructive life.
Now this is a very tall hurdle. I understand that; we are dealing with the most serious sentences that one can imagine. Nevertheless, that is the role of probation and it is very important, I would say, for the young person to see that there is hope at the end of the period, because it is far more likely that, if they see that hope, they will engage constructively with people in prison and carry on that constructive intervention when they leave on licence. So I have some questions for the Minister. What assessment has been done of the likelihood of reform of offenders—is there any data on that? Also, what is the number of young offenders now in custody who are likely to be in custody as a result of this legislation? Are there any examples of where longer custodial sentences have helped young people to go on to lead lives in which they no longer offend?
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to stand and answer points made by the noble Lords who have spoken. I first acknowledge their great experience and wisdom in the field, and the evident compassion that underpinned their observations to the Committee. I know that at least two of them have had the experience that I have of acting for a very young person charged with a crime of the greatest magnitude and severity. I can tell from the way in which their questions were framed that they are aware of the extreme sadness at the loss of potential that the advocate finds when acting for a person in such a position. I hope that noble Lords appreciate that I am fully aware, from the perspective of legislation, of the awkwardness and difficulties attendant upon arriving at an appropriate sentence for these most serious of crimes.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
The noble and learned Lord very briefly answered the questions on consultation from my noble friend Lord Thomas. I hope he has in his brief the answer to the headline question of whether consultation was undertaken with probation and what its views were on the balance between custody and licence.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
Will the noble Baroness confirm that she is referring to the probation service?
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
I appreciate that there are levels and areas of probation. The question extends to all parts of those who provide probation services, but the central probation service, offender management, is probably more relevant to this than local probation services.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
If I may, I will respond to the noble Baroness’s question in writing.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, again I thank all who have spoken on these amendments, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. His response was sympathetic, in that he fully recognises the position of young offenders exposed to these extremely long sentences. In return, as he recognised, we accept the seriousness of the offences that are to be visited by these serious terrorist sentences. It is right that they merit an extremely serious response. But even for the most serious offences there ought to be room in a scheme of punishment for rehabilitation, particularly of young offenders who commit these offences in their youth but are serving sentences for many years to come.
My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford spoke of, and asked about, the arbitrariness of the choice of the 14-year term. Of course, he has had a lifetime of practising in the criminal courts. He has many years of experience of judges exercising their discretion, and those years have left him with a favourable view of judicial discretion—a view which I share.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, questioned the formulation that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I put that a sentence of 14 years of immediate custody offers no hope, because, he said, of the availability of help within a custodial setting. I regret that I do not agree with his optimism. Very long periods in custody allow offenders in custody no hope, or very little hope indeed. It is otherwise with time spent on licence, when a great deal of help in rebuilding their lives is available to offenders, from the probation service and other services and, we would hope, also from services to help deradicalise young offenders.
The question of rebalancing, which the Minister also accepted that these amendments were about, was explored and will be explored further between the Minister and my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I invite the Minister and the Government to consider whether more discretion could be left to the sentencing judge to permit that judge to impose a minimum term in custody of less than 14 years—we suggest 10—and to recognise that there is scope for a longer period on licence to enable young, or young middle-aged lives at that stage, to be rebuilt. In urging the Government to take that position, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give the courts more discretion when applying the minimum term.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, we spoke in the previous group about young offenders, but there is in Clause 4 a very limited exception to the requirement to impose a serious terrorism sentence of detention where there are exceptional circumstances which relate to the offence or the offender which justify not imposing the serious terrorism sentence. This amendment relates to a precisely similar provision in Clause 11 relating to the imposition of such an offence on adult offenders under Clause 11(5). I should have tabled a similar amendment in relation to Clause 4, and for that I apologise, but the omission can be made good, if necessary, on Report.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
[Inaudible]—is in relation to the necessity for the judge at trial to have full discretion in passing sentence. I do not wish to repeat that, but I will add a particular comment. When a judge is faced with a provision such as this, he has to define those circumstances which influence him. He has to set out in his sentencing remarks precisely what factors influence him. Things have moved very considerably over the decades away from the swift disposal of a defendant by a judge with very little comment. What he says is important not just for the defendant to understand why he is being sentenced in that way but of course, if there should be any appeal on sentence, for the Court of Appeal to understand precisely what it was at the time that the judge had in mind. “Exceptional” circumstances is too great an imposition on the judge’s discretion and I believe that my noble friend’s proposal that it should be “significant” is right.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Thomas, have explained their thinking behind the amendment to replace “exceptional” with “significant” to give more discretion to the judge. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, in any event a judge will explain the reason for finding exceptional or significant reasons for reducing a sentence.
My questions are for the Minister. What does he believe are exceptional circumstances, and what exceptional circumstances would justify a lesser sentence? In what circumstances would such lesser sentences be appropriate?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained, this amendment seeks to amend and change the circumstances in which a sentencing court could impose less than the 14-year minimum term for a discretionary life sentence imposed in a serious terrorism case by changing the circumstances from “exceptional” to “significant”. I respectfully agree with the noble Lord that the logic of his amendment would also apply to Clause 4. However, I respectfully disagree over whether such an amendment is appropriate.
The purpose of Clause 11 is to ensure a consistency of approach when sentencing those convicted of serious terrorism offences. It would not be appropriate for a court to be able to impose a life sentence with a lower minimum term for a serious terrorism offence other than where there are exceptional circumstances. If the circumstances of the offence and offending are such that the court imposes a life sentence, and unless there are exceptional circumstances, there should be no possibility of the offender being released earlier than someone given a serious terrorism sentence. That is what Clause 11 achieves.
By contrast, the amendment would remove that consistency, so that the court could consider a wider range of circumstances when setting the minimum term in a discretionary life sentence than when doing so for a serious terrorism sentence, although all other circumstances would be the same. While I accept that there is a distinction, in that the prisoner serving a life sentence may be considered for release only after the minimum term is served, it would be unprincipled for him or her to be released earlier than a counterpart serving a serious terrorism sentence.
A number of questions were asked about “exceptional circumstances”. That is a principle already established in sentencing legislation. It is used, for example, in connection with minimum terms that can apply to certain firearm offences. I must respectfully decline the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for a Minister to gloss from the Dispatch Box what “exceptional circumstances” might or might not be. It is a phrase used elsewhere in statute and known in law. Those are straightforward English words and it would not be appropriate or even helpful for me to gloss them on my feet at the Dispatch Box.
By contrast, I respectfully point out to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that as far as my research has indicated—I am happy to be corrected if I am wrong—there is no existing “significant circumstances” principle in sentencing legislation. Therefore, if accepted, the amendment would create an entirely new test, which in our view is unwarranted and likely to lead to litigation, which cannot be in our interests as parliamentarians in passing this Bill.
As far as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is concerned on judicial discretion, we are really talking about the extent of the judicial discretion and whether the test should be “exceptional” or “significant” circumstances. The question is not to the existence but to the extent of judicial discretion. As part of the Government’s recent White Paper, A Smarter Approach to Sentencing, we have committed to changing the criteria for other minimum terms for repeat offences to reduce the occasions on which the court may depart from the minimum custodial length.
For those reasons, I do not consider the amendment to be necessary or appropriate, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken, and to the Minister for his response. However, I am bound to say that I found it disappointing. He is absolutely right to state that “exceptional” has a clear meaning in law and is used elsewhere. It was to that meaning that I alluded when I said that the use of “exceptional” puts the judge in a straitjacket. It is for that reason that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is right to seek a little more latitude, because the sentence is so long and the circumstances may be very varied.
The Minister did not deal with the point that the circumstances can relate not only to the offence but to the offender. They may cover a very wide range. Therefore, it is our position that more discretion is called for. He is right that it is the ambit of the discretion with which this amendment is concerned. I invite him to reconsider it. While he does, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 7. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 16: Increase in extension period for serious terrorism offenders aged under 18: England and Wales
Amendment 7
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“( ) Section 255 of the Sentencing Code (extended sentence of detention: availability) is amended as follows.( ) After subsection (2) insert—“(3) The pre-sentence report must in the case of a serious terrorism offence under section 256(4)(b)(iii)—(a) take account of the offender’s age;(b) consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to ten years might be more effective at—(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or (ii) rehabilitating the offender.(4) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (3).”( ) The Secretary of State must at least once a year conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of the provisions of this section and their impact upon offenders.( ) The report of the first review must be laid before Parliament within one year of this Act being passed.”
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
Through this amendment, before the court considered whether to apply an extended sentenced of eight to 10 years to somebody aged under 18 at the time of conviction it would have to consider a pre-sentence report. That report should specifically address the age of the defendant and whether there are alternatives to the extended sentence of eight to 10 years. If the pre-sentence report considers that there are alternatives, the court is then obliged to consider that. It can reject it, but it has at least to consider it.
The amendment reflects our belief that for young adults, or people who might not even be adults, there may be, on the particular facts of a particular case, other ways better to protect a community than an extended detention period of eight to 10 years. The amendment would not require a court to accept that, but it would ensure that there is proper focus on whether there are better ways of protecting the community. I beg to move.
Lord Woolf (CB) [V]
My Lords, I adopt what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said and will add a few words. Although it was not accepted, I suggest that, from a practical point of view, the other provisions of the Bill would fall within what the Secretary of State might want to consider in reviewing the effectiveness of the section once a year has passed. That makes such a review highly desirable.
It is always possible for something to be thought of as exceptional, which, in fact, cannot be shown to fall within that limitation. It is a very healthy safeguard if the matter has to come before the Secretary of State as indicated in the proposed amendment, because that will give an opportunity to reconsider based on the experience of actually seeing the provisions of the Bill being implemented in the Act of Parliament, which in due course will be passed.
Lord Robathan (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar on what I think is his first outing with the Bill. I know where Tredegar is, but I am not sure I have ever been there. I do know, rather too well, the Brecon Beacons, just to the north, which are very beautiful but also extremely wet and cold, as I recall.
I enter this debate with some trepidation because we have a lot of clever lawyers taking part. On this occasion, I do not mean that in any derogatory sense; this is legislation, and we need it to be examined by clever lawyers who are lawmakers, but I speak only as a layman. We know what the issues are, and in this, as in so much, there is a need for balance. I heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, but we need to not be starry-eyed when thinking that a young person might not be perfectly capable of being radicalised early and remaining radicalised. We need to look at how the judiciary and the legal process can keep tabs on people who have been radicalised. That is why, in this particular case, I am certainly on the side of community safety rather than the rights of offenders.
Religious fanaticism is not, of course, confined to Islam. People inspired by ideology do not always respond well, whatever their ages. In December, Jonathan Hall said that deradicalisation using monitoring and theological programmes does not work. Therefore, we need, in exceptional cases—and there will be very few —to give courts the right, and indeed the duty, to ensure that society is protected, over and above the rights of some very unfortunate young people—young men, almost exclusively—who have transgressed in these terrorist actions.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I call the next speaker, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. I think we are having some problems with him, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have a slightly embarrassing confession to make. When I first decided to get involved with this Bill, I thought it was a completely different Bill. Having realised what is was about, I then realised that it is one of those bits of legislation that is a bit rushed. It reminds me of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which was rushed through Parliament because of public concern about, I think, 11 very dangerous and nasty incidents of people being savaged by dogs. It proved to be, first, a not very effective piece of legislation, and then, a not very popular one. I also had not realised there would be so many eminent lawyers involved in this debate, and I feel slightly uneasy, because I am coming into this as a member of society who has a very practical reaction to this sort of legislation. I do not believe that locking people up and throwing away the key is the best way of treating them, for all sorts of reasons. I do not mean for them, necessarily, but for society and the whole prison system.
This amendment goes to the heart of what we are trying to achieve when we sentence terrorist offenders. Are we locking up monsters and not letting them out again in the hope that prison is going to crush or contain them, or whatever? Or are we locking people away to protect society for as long as it takes to teach them the error of their ways and, perhaps, confront them with the consequences of their actions and return them to society as re-engaged citizens?
Statistics suggest that only a tiny percentage of people who have been locked up for terrorist offences come out and reoffend. We need to look at that and be practical about what we are trying to achieve. It is easy for the Government to appear to be tough on crime, throw red meat to the tabloids and satisfy the people who think that anything less than the death penalty for almost every crime is being soft on crime. I think there might be people on the Government Benches who think like that. But it is much harder for the Government to do the tough work of reintegration into society, which is a much more effective use not only of money but of resources. Locking people up in an extremely expensive prison service just teaches people to be better at crime while they are there.
As we have seen in the United States, extremist ideologies have spread among our own western societies. The so-called QAnon conspiracies, fuelled by Donald Trump, and promulgated across the internet, TV, and among the Republican Party, led people to hope for mass arrests and the execution of their political opponents. This is a domestic terrorism movement, which is growing and exists here in Britain. We are going to be encountering a completely different sort of terrorist: a white terrorist, just for starters. The Government have to step up. The problem is growing, and the solution is not just to lock more people up but to learn how to deal with this at source and also once people have offended. The Government need to rethink this a little bit, and be a bit more practical, and less reactive to perhaps transitory public opinion.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, about the benefits of pre-sentence reports. They are, and always have been, when available, important in the context of sentencing generally. They are a sophisticated tool, bringing before a court matters that may not be known to the sentencing judge in the absence of a detailed report on the background and motivation of an offender, and their potential to be rehabilitated in future. In not requiring such a report, which covers all the matters mentioned in this amendment, Parliament would be taking a retrograde step and excluding elements that may be important in determining the length of any sentence or extension period.
The amendment complements Amendment 6 that I introduced earlier, by giving the judge not only increased discretion in passing sentence, but also the material on which he can correctly and sensibly exercise that discretion. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who described such a report as a very healthy safeguard. I urge the Government to accept the amendment for that reason. It is a question of giving the sentencing court the material upon which to make an informed and sensible decision from everybody’s point of view.
Finally, I commend the words in the amendment that provide for a review of the workings of the clause, including the amendment. I fear that we are legislating in some haste in relation to the Bill, and a review of how it is working, particularly this clause, would be extremely helpful.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for introducing this amendment, although I hope to persuade him that it is in fact misconceived.
The amendment deals with Clause 16, which relates to an increase in the extension period for terrorism offenders aged under 18. As my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton said a few moments ago, I am sure it is common ground across the Committee that when dealing with such young adults one has to have the greatest care and consideration. Having said that, as my noble friend Lord Robathan reminded us, this is a matter of public safety. I respectfully endorse nearly all the comments that he made; I say “nearly all” because, in a debate where so many lawyers are speaking, I understand the temptation for someone who is not a lawyer to say that they are “only a layman”, but my noble friend is not “only” anything. With that slight quibble, I respectfully take on board everything that he said.
The amendment would require the pre-sentence report to take account of the offender’s age and consider whether options other than an extension period of eight to 10 years might be more suitable than an extended sentence of detention. The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament each year on the effectiveness of increasing the maximum extension period of the extended sentence of detention from eight to 10 years.
The nature of an extended sentence is that it comprises a custodial term and an extension period for the purposes of public protection, as defined in Section 256 of the Sentencing Code. The effect of the amendment would be fundamentally to alter the nature of the sentence by proposing an alternative to that extension period.
The amendment is also not necessary and, I say with respect, perhaps misunderstands the provision. I assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the clause simply provides for a new maximum licence period of 10 years in serious terrorism cases rather than the current eight. This is not mandatory; it is available for use at the court’s discretion, and it will remain possible to apply a licence period of any length between 12 months and 10 years.
For a youth offender to receive an extended sentence for a serious terrorism offence, the court will be required to consider a pre-sentence report. I therefore agree to that extent with the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the utility of such reports. In preparing the pre-sentence report, the youth offending team officer will always consider the offender’s age and circumstances in order to recommend an appropriate sentence. The Bill does not change the way in which pre-sentence reports are done.
However, time spent on licence is crucial for both monitoring and managing offenders in the community as well as giving them the opportunity to change their behaviour. Therefore, providing the courts with the option of imposing a longer period of supervision on licence for the most serious terrorist offenders is an important element and component of the Government’s efforts to protect the public from the risks that terrorist offenders pose while enabling a longer period to support rehabilitation.
In that context, I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of throwing red meat to anyone or anything, be it dangerous dogs or the tabloids. This, however, is a proper and proportionate response to the very significant danger that some offenders present. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, so I call him.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his comments. Yesterday, in debating the Domestic Abuse Bill, the Government declined to include child offenders in the definition of “domestic abuse” because, as the Minister said, the Government did not want to criminalise children. In this Bill, however, they seem to be taking a hard line when it comes to child offenders. What is the difference in approach? Is it because the Government think that domestic abuse is not a serious offence where the public need to be protected but terrorism is?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, there is a strong connection between the Domestic Abuse Bill and this Bill to the extent that both lie on my desk and I have the honour and privilege of dealing with both in your Lordships’ House. However, they present very different issues. I do not want to talk too much now about the Domestic Abuse Bill, but the structure of that Bill, which encompasses both civil and criminal consequences, is very different—indeed, I might say vastly different—from the subject matter of this Bill, which is extremely serious terrorism offences. If the noble Lord has any particular comments on the interrelationship between the two Bills, I am dealing with them both, as I say, and I am very happy to speak to him further about that. However, that is my response on the particular point that he has raised. My respectful suggestion to your Lordships’ Committee is that the analogy, while tempting, is false.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has participated in this short debate. I am very grateful to those who have supported my position, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Although he did not intend to, I think the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, also supported my position but was very keen to establish how clear-eyed he was. I do not think that people like myself—who are saying that, before a court sentences someone who is under 18, it should have the benefit of a pre-sentence report that asks the question, “Having regard to the person’s age, are there better ways to provide public protection?”—are necessarily that starry-eyed.
I was very hopeful that the Minister would persuade me that I was wrong, but I am not sure that he fully grasped the nature of the amendment. Section 255(1) of the Sentencing Code says that an extended sentence of detention for someone under 18 is available, while Section 255(2) says that the pre-sentence report requirements apply as they normally would in relation to sentencing someone under 18. My proposal is not to change the basis of the sentence; it is to say that, in that pre-sentence report, the pre-sentence reporter should have regard to the question of whether there are alternatives that could provide better public safety. If there are, the pre-sentence reporter should refer to them and the judge should take them into account.
I also agree strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, that in an area like this it is useful for the Secretary of State to consider how well or badly a particular sentence is going so that they consider what should happen to it in future.
I very much hope that the Minister will consider what I have said about what the actual import of my amendment is, because he appeared to be dealing with an amendment that had a different import. I very much hope that he will reconsider his position. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 8. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister’s reply should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 23: Terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Scotland
Amendment 8
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that new section 205ZC of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 does not apply where an offender aged under 18 is sentenced to detention without limit of time for a terrorism offence.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 9 in this group. Both are minor technical amendments to Clause 23. Amendment 8 would make a minor amendment to Clause 23, which introduces the terrorism sentence with fixed licence period in Scotland. The amendment would add the sentence of detention without time limit to the “waterfall” list of sentences of imprisonment and detention that a court can impose in relation to an offence. This would ensure that the new terrorism sentence was available only where a court did not impose a sentence in this list, which includes the indeterminate sentence of detention under Section 208, making the order of sentencing options clear.
Amendment 9 would simply remove a now redundant reference to new Section 205ZC(6) in subsection (4) relating to the new terrorism sentence introduced in Clause 23 due to an amendment to that provision on Report in the Commons. Subsection (4) defines the meaning of the aggregate term in relation to a sentence of detention in respect of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, as it applies to offenders of at least 16 years of age but under 21. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Minister’s words brought to mind many waterfalls that I know and love in Scotland, but I will forgo the opportunity to comment on Scottish criminal law. I am sure that both these minor and technical amendments are perfectly justified and I have no more to say about them.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for the clarity with which he introduced these two technical amendments. Perhaps I may ask two questions. First, on Amendment 8, what would the implications have been had this amendment not been made? I was not clear from what he said whether it would change any position. Secondly, in relation to Amendment 9, how many further convictions would have been included without the decision to limit the availability of the new sentence to cases of conviction on indictment?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, the purpose of the amendment was to reflect the approach adopted across England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. The “waterfall” approach means that courts can impose the new sentence only where they do not impose, for example, a life sentence or an extended sentence. Within the Scottish sentencing framework, this waterfall includes the sentence of detention without time limit, which was unintentionally omitted during initial drafting of the clause. As I said earlier, subsection (6) in the previous version of the Bill was amended during the Commons debate. The amendment would simply remove a reference to a provision that no longer exists.
Just as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is aware of attractive waterfalls in Scotland, I am aware of attractive waterfalls in Wales. I hope that some day soon we will be permitted to discuss them in a friendly fashion together.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a consequential amendment required as a result of the amendments already made to the Bill to limit the availability of the new terrorism sentence introduced by Clause 23 to cases of conviction on indictment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 10. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 10
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
“Rehabilitation and de-radicalisation programme
Within six months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must—(a) publish a strategy setting out how a programme of rehabilitation and de-radicalisation is to be applied to those sentenced under Part 1 of this Act; and(b) lay a copy of the programme before Parliament.”
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]
My Lords, first, I declare an interest, as my wife is an adviser on the Prevent programme in the further education sector. The importance of this amendment was driven home yesterday by comments from Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, when he said that terrorist prisoners are not being prosecuted for radicalising fellow inmates and that extremism is being encouraged behind closed doors in our prisons. Although I broadly support the major provisions of the Bill that are intended to ensure that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in custody, they surely have to go hand in hand with a rigorous programme of rehabilitation and deradicalisation.
The Government’s claim that longer sentences will allow more time in which to support disengagement and rehabilitation is, frankly, fanciful in the light of experience over the last few years. Even the impact assessment published alongside the Bill acknowledged that there is limited evidence of the impact of longer prison terms on reoffending and that there is a risk of offenders radicalising others during their stay in custody. So far, the Government have been less than convincing on how they are to tackle the evident problems in our prisons with terrorist offenders, so my amendment seeks to ensure that Ministers have to publish a strategy setting out how a programme of rehabilitation and deradicalisation is to be applied to those sentenced under Part 1 of the Bill.
The importance of gripping this was certainly underlined by Jonathan Hall yesterday, when he announced that he has decided to review terrorism in the prison estate in England and Wales. As he said, how terrorism is detected, policed, disrupted and prosecuted when it occurs within the prison estate is relevant to the overall effectiveness of terrorism legislation. Mr Hall said that he is particularly focused on acts within the prison estate that amount to criminal offences, such as encouraging terrorism or disseminating terrorist publications, the status and influence of convicted terrorist prisoners within the prison estate, and whether there is any connection to prison gangs. His review is of course highly relevant to my amendment, and particularly to its timing, but it does not detract in any way from the need for a concerted government strategy.
It is not as though Ministers did not know that they had real problems here. In 2016, the review by former prison governor Ian Acheson warned of a growing problem within prisons. Anti-terrorism legislation passed in the aftermath of 7/7 had led to a significant increase in conviction rates for terrorist offences. He identified that, progressively, more of those offenders were held outside the high security estate and that some were proceeding through the offender management system towards release into the community. Such prisoners extended the threat of radicalisation beyond those arrested for terrorist offences. Other prisoners, both Muslim and non-Muslim, serving sentences for crimes unrelated to terrorism were then vulnerable to radicalisation by Islamist extremists. Acheson argued, four years ago, that
“a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy is required to monitor and counter it”
and
“focus on greater coordination with the police.”
The Government responded in time by creating a new Security, Order and Counter Terrorism directorate. Specialist units were promised to allow greater separation and specialised management of the highest-risk individuals, with improved capacity for responding swiftly to serious violent incidents. Improved staff training, tightened vetting and removal of extremist literature were also promised, alongside greater focus on the safe management of corporate worship. For all those fine words, little progress has been made. Indeed, last week it emerged that only a handful of nearly 200 people in prison for terror-related offences were in the separation places recommended by Mr Acheson.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I give my strong support to both amendments in the group: that moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of King’s Heath, and the one that will be spoken to later by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.
I want to start by thanking the joint strike force on the Government Front Bench—the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart—who have brought a refreshingly clear and responsive attitude towards debates on quite complicated legal issues. I can say of both of them that their engagement with Members has been exemplary; the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has specialised in short, 20-minute conversations that cover everything in a relatively short time. I just hope that the noble Lords will not get over the open consultation they are giving to other Members of your Lordships’ House. It is very welcome.
I too want to reflect on what was said by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, yesterday. Obviously, he is very concerned about the efficacy, if such efficacy exists, of deradicalisation programmes in prisons. I am given to understand that the successor to my short-lived appointment as Independent Reviewer of Prevent will soon be appointed. I wonder whether this afternoon, as a piece of instant gratification to us all, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in replying to this debate may be able to tell us who that is going to be and announce the appointment. I am given to understand that it may literally be imminent.
During my time in that role, just as I came to the end of it as a result of an unwelcome judicial review, I was about to start the sort of examination that has been announced by Jonathan Hall. There is a background to it. A whistleblower came to see me from the prison where Usman Khan, the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist, was held. On my advice, that person immediately spoke to officials at the Home Office and the Home Office was made aware of the problems. It is clear that deradicalisation programmes in prisons are not working at all well. Maybe some are working but nobody knows which ones are working and on whom.
I draw your Lordships’ particular attention to proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 35 from my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, which sets out six criteria that need to be examined to see how these programmes are working. When I was the Independent Reviewer of Prevent, I had a review carried out of all the academic literature on Prevent, including these programmes. It exposed that no real measurement is being made of such programmes—no surprise given that the Fish- mongers’ Hall terrorist was thought to have been totally reformed. Before the programmes are put in place, they need to be carefully analysed and verified by proper, academic and, where possible, neurological research in which polygraphs are not an answer in themselves but a legitimate neurological tool as part of the armoury of an assessor.
I hope that the Government will recognise that these two amendments raise some serious issues that require the closest of examination.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has experienced computer problems, so we must move on to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, my name is to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It would have been added to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, but I was caught out by the speed at which we suddenly arrived at these proceedings. I appreciate that there are differences between the amendments, including the time period for review, and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is not confined to prisoners sentenced under Part 1. In particular, there is the criteria for assessment to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred.
Like others, I have been struck by Ian Acheson’s work. One of the many things that he has said that has been quoted widely is that:
“We cannot speak to dead terrorists. We can speak for dead victims. They demand that policymakers take risks to ensure that the people who wish to harm us through a corrupt ideology are engaged, not shunned. This should happen not because states are weak, but because they are confident the strength of their values will ultimately prevail.”
He has, of course, described prisons as incubators of radical behaviour. They are incubators of crime of all sorts: Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, drug crime and other organised crime. Are there hothouses within the incubators? Given that resources are not infinite, what is the best balance between work in prison and work in the community? To pick up a point made earlier this afternoon, I do not regard the rights of offenders versus the public as being the issue; both are about effective means of achieving the safety of the public.
Programmes must be assessed and, no doubt, evaluation and adaptation is not a one-off but a continuing process. All this has a context: the conditions in our prisons. That is hardly a novel point. How suitable are those places for rehabilitation? How well trained are staff? Do they have the capacity to spot the signs of how prisoners are affected by other prisoners and by their experience of imprisonment?
I have not seen mention, though I am sure it has been addressed, of the recruitment of staff from Muslim communities, who may be alert to what non-Muslims would not see. In the interests of balance, I should refer—although I am not sure how—to those who might be thought of, in a prejudiced, caricatured way, as having right-wing sympathies. I am not sure how you would do that, but I want to make it clear that this is not a single issue.
If terrorists are segregated from the rest of the prison population, does that reinforce their beliefs and attitudes? Is there a cumulative experience? What if the terrorism is rooted in different, opposing ideologies? What are the vulnerabilities of prisoners to becoming radicalised? How different is that process from being drawn further into, say, drugs crime or other violent crime? Indeed, may it not require more sophistication and knowledge to draw someone into Islamist extremism, which, as I understand it—others will know much more about it—involves much teaching and studying of the Koran?
None of this can be separated from what goes on outside prison, including when a prisoner is on licence. The skills required by the probation service are considerable, especially in the face of what I understand to be increasing sophistication on the part of prisoners on licence regarding how to game the system—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, may have referred obliquely to that. I cannot begin to answer my questions, and there are not nearly enough of them, but this is the moment to ask them.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming my noble friend Lord Wolfson to his position. I can say from experience that it is a challenging but rewarding post.
It is well understood that deradicalisation programmes are particularly challenging to evaluate. There is nothing new about this. I remember attending meetings in Brussels to discuss with my fellow Justice Ministers the problem of radicalisation in prison and the best response to it. There was no real agreement on that but my clear impression was that in 2015, we were already adopting a much more sophisticated approach to the problem than were other countries within the European Union. This is not some tedious pro-Brexit point: the whole purpose of our meeting was to try to share intelligence and work out the best response. However, even the most enthusiastic supporter of the various deradicalisation initiatives would acknowledge the difficulty of assessing their success or otherwise.
As I understand it, there are already a number of programmes deployed in prisons that are targeted at terrorist offenders, and I expect the Minister to tell us a great deal more about them. I have read what Jonathan Hall said about what are, effectively, offences that are committed in prison by the radicalisation of prisoners by other prisoners. This may well have happened in the case of the murder of three men in Forbury Gardens in Reading, which many noble Lords will remember all too clearly.
In 2016, Ian Acheson made a number of recommendations. A number of noble Lords have said that little progress has been made. I await the Minister’s comments on that, but I understood that quite a few initiatives had been taken, including training officers to spot signs of extremism and increasing the number of staff with specific counter-terrorism experience or knowledge.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, is not on the call, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP) [V]
My Lords, I would like to say everything I said on Amendment 7: we need effective rehabilitation, deradicalisation and reintegration of terrorist offenders. Right-wing extremism is growing. Research by HOPE not hate found that one in four people in Britain believe at least some element of QAnon conspiracy theories. These conspiracies allege that the world is run by satanic paedophiles who eat babies and want to kill 90% of the world’s population. The only logical solution for anyone who believes that is to fight and kill the people in charge, to stop it happening. The attack on the Capitol was only the beginning of such madness.
We are likely to see violence here in the UK too as a natural consequence of growing belief in these conspiracy theories. However, whatever the motivation of terrorists, the common theme is that they have been brought into such a deeply flawed belief system that they are prepared to inflict severe harm on other people. The only option is to repair those belief systems so that the perceived wrongs are no longer so severe as to justify harming innocent people.
I hope the Government can see that this problem will happen and will expand. We need better legislation to cope with it, and better practices inside and outside prisons.
Lord Robathan (Con)
My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and agreed with a great deal of what he said—and I understood it all. I realised that that was because he is not a lawyer either. Nevertheless, even as just a layman, I think we all appreciate how hugely difficult this issue is. I also listened to the very sensible comments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; he has huge experience of this matter. It is terribly complicated, and wishful thinking will not make it go away.
The strategy we are talking about is very important, but this has been going on for at least two decades and I do not have total confidence in deradicalisation or rehabilitation. Neither does Jonathan Hall, who is currently carrying out his review. We talk about rehabilitation but Usman Khan—who the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentioned—killed his mentor, Jack Merritt, who believed in his redemption and had faith in his deradicalisation, because Khan managed to lie successfully. Do polygraphs and lie detectors find this out? I do not know.
I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and others. This hugely complicated issue needs further thought and deep consideration of how, if at all, we can solve these problems. With religious fanaticism or a fanatic ideology, is it possible to deradicalise people? I do not know. Are we talking about what was mentioned earlier, those no-hope sentences? I hope not. Should we throw away the key as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, suggested some of us want to do? I hope not, because I think people have to have some hope. However, I do think we need to have greater depth of thinking in this. I say to the Minister that we need to be looking at this in such depth that it may be we are still discussing it in a year’s time.
Lord Woolf (CB) [V]
My Lords, in view of the speeches we have had from a number of noble Lords, there is nothing which I would want to detain noble Lords with regarding this amendment. I agree that it serves a useful purpose and particularly associate myself with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with regard to the openness of the Front Bench on behalf of the Government. Like him, I hope that will be something that will happily continue.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his first Bill. In my limited contact with him, I think that he is more than a match for the challenge the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, alluded to. I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, in his assessment of the current dangers of longer prison sentences in the absence of an effective programme of deradicalisation and rehabilitation. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also mentioned the comments of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. His concerns seem to chime with the concerns of all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I do not share the faith that noble Lords have in polygraph testing, for the reasons explained earlier by Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee rightly expressed concerns that prisons continue to be incubators, hothouses, or academies of crime—use which term you will—for crime generally, as well as places where vulnerable inmates are radicalised, whether by right wing extremists or by others. If ever there was evidence of the need for these amendments, it is what the Government describe as the
“range of tailored interventions available”—[Official Report, 21/9/20; col. 1650]
to the perpetrators of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham atrocities, that were designed to deradicalise and rehabilitate them while they were in prison. Unless and until the deradicalisation and rehabilitation of offenders is effectively applied to those sentenced under Part 1 of the Bill, and its impact is assessed, there is a real danger that the longer these terrorist offenders spend in prison, the greater the threat they pose to the safety of the public—whether by radicalising others in prison or directly upon their release. I intend to expand on these statements and the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which I agree with, when we come to the group beginning with Amendment 16.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, my Amendment 35 is in this group. I agreed with everything my noble friend Lord Hunt said when he introduced his amendment. My amendment is different in detail, but the overall approach is the same—that is, to have a realistic and timed review of the various approaches to the Prevent programme which the Government is embarking upon.
I got an interesting briefing on this debate from the probation officers’ trade union, Napo. It made a couple of points, which I will repeat. It said that in the offender management and custody model, it indicates that a high-risk offender should get one hour of individual contact per month with a probation officer. A probation office’s staff have a minimum of 70 clients, so it is impossible for them to meet that requirement. The central point that Napo made in the briefing was that, when one reviews approaches and puts down procedures, the reviews need to result in practical change on the ground, otherwise they are destined to be repeated without effective change.
I was very interested to hear the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who was a very effective Minister. He talked about his experience in that role. He also, interestingly, talked about the status of prisoners when they are in prison. I occasionally visit prisons, and I have visited Belmarsh on a couple of occasions. Belmarsh is a prison within a prison and there is undoubtedly status for the people on the inside prison; you can tell it from the tone of voice of the prison officers when they talk about the facility they are involved in managing. There is status to be gained through the way you are treated while in prison. I unfortunately know that to be true through friends of friends whose children have ended up in prison. There is a status to be gained within prison, which sometimes young men cannot have when they are outside prison.
I welcome the review of terrorism legislation by Mr Hall. I also note that it is Mr William Shawcross who has been appointed to review the Prevent programme, and I know he has extensive experience on this matter. The purpose of both these amendments is to tease out the progress and practical changes which the Government hope to make through reviewing the Prevent programme.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their amendments, which bring us to a very important set of issues. I discern that the Committee is united in believing that data is necessary in order that we might, as much as possible, develop and devise schemes by which deradicalisation can be accomplished. The Government do not think that a new strategy for rehabilitation and disengagement nor a review of the current delivery is beneficial at this time. However, to reassure noble Lords, I want to briefly set out the important work being done in prisons and probation to turn terrorist offenders away from extremism so that they can be released safely. The Government have a clear strategy for rehabilitation programmes for terrorist offenders. The important work in prison and probation here delivers against the Contest strategy, which was recently refreshed and published. Since then, significant work has been done to strengthen our approach to rehabilitation and disengagement of terrorism offenders. This strategy applies to all terrorism offenders, not only those who will receive the new serious terrorism sentence or be subject to the changes made by Part 1 of the Bill.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in what has been an important and fascinating debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, backed up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, paid tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for their approach from the Front Bench. We have seen from the full reply of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, that that is endorsed by me and other Members of your Lordships’ House.
I do not pretend that this is easy. As both the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Faulks, said, deradicalisation programmes are difficult to evaluate, and we should not underestimate the challenge that any Government would face. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, there are some pertinent questions to be asked about the deliverability of the current programmes in relation to deradicalisation and the skills required by staff in prison.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned the importance of considering right-wing extremism as terrorism too, and I endorse that. I also endorse the implication from the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, that we as lay people have something to say in these matters. Indeed we do, and I always believe it right that in some of these technical debates we hear from lay people and not just people within the legal and policing professions.
My visits to prisons in my two years as Minister in the Ministry of Justice some years ago taught me about the power of good rehabilitation programmes, which is why I am so keen that the Government have a proper cohesive strategy for taking this forward. I also believe that, as a lay person, I bring a strong sense, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, that it is not right for the House to agree to these longer sentences without having some guarantees of the cohesive programme of rehabilitation and deradicalisation that needs to go with it.
I welcome Amendment 35, tabled by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. It is different in detail but, as he said, overall our approach is the same. He was right to point out some of the practical issues involved, such as the fact that probation officers’ workload is so heavy, and the real issue in prisons: the cuts to front-line staff, which have caused such a problem to the whole estate and undermined the rehabilitation culture.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in his long, generous wind-up, emphasised the importance of data. He also set out some of the initiatives that the Government have taken since Ian Acheson’s report. I was grateful to him. He also referred to a number of achievements. The question is whether those are sufficient. From my point of view, I doubt that they are. Clearly Mr Hall’s review is a potential game-changer, and it is sensible to see its outcome. None the less, the Bill is an opportunity to ensure that, whatever that outcome, there is a requirement on the Government to come forward with a cohesive strategy. I think we ought to return to this on Report. Having said that, I thank all noble Lords and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 11. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 27: Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: England and Wales
Amendment 11
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“and the prisoner was aged 21 or above at the time of their conviction”
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
These are three simple amendments dealing with the sentencing framework for England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Bill as drafted removes the chance of parole for anybody, irrespective of their age, if they have committed a dangerous terrorist offence. As I have made clear, we on this side of the House are keen that there be strong penalties, because the aim is to prevent terrorism. However, we do not think it right that the possibility of parole be removed altogether for those people convicted when they are under the age of 21.
There are three reasons for that. First, the possibility of change must be higher when you are under 21. We are not starry-eyed about this, but that possibility should be there. Secondly, it will make prisoner management easier, as all prison governors attest. Thirdly, you avoid the possibility of the detention of someone over a very long period of time, and the sense that that person has served his sentence will create a recruiting sergeant in certain communities.
Each case has to be looked at on its merits; release would occur only when the Parole Board was satisfied. Occasions when mistakes have been made are all too well known and, indeed, have inspired this Bill. But if the aim is to provide as much security as possible for the community as a whole, then removing the chance of parole for anybody under 21—and it is only a chance of parole—is a mistake. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
The law has always distinguished between the adult and the young offender in many ways. Policy has always been to make every effort to rehabilitate the young before they become hardened criminals. It is even more important not to turn them into hardened terrorists.
“What works?” asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton—the Scottish wing of the strike force. A large incentive when persuading offenders to amend their ways is the fact that they have their chance, before the Parole Board, to have release if it is appropriate and safe.
The outcome of prison is the person who walks out of the gate at the end of the sentence. What has happened to him inside? Has he been radicalised or rehabilitated? Some go in with no particular ideology and are radicalised. Others go in radicalised and must be given the opportunity to change their lives. They should be managed with the personnel and tools described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart.
Young people can rehabilitate if they are given the courses and programmes that exist to enable them to gain skills to support themselves outside the prison environment. The longer the sentence, the more difficult that is. Prisoners convicted of terrorist offences provide a further problem. Have they retained the beliefs that got them into trouble in the first place? Or are they still radicalised? I was pleased to hear of the theological and ideological interventions that are promised to deal with problems such as those.
I support these amendments, because I believe we should continue that long-held view that young people should be treated differently and given a chance to turn their lives in a different direction.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, explained, Amendments 11, 13 and 14 are intended to retain the current release provisions for under-21s sentenced to an extended determinate sentence for a serious terrorism offence. As has been mentioned, the Fishmonger’s Hall and Streatham attacks revealed the devastating consequences of releasing terrorist prisoners too early. In the Bill, we are changing the release arrangements for all offenders convicted of serious terrorism offences to ensure that the most dangerous and serious terrorist offenders serve their full custodial term, essentially for two reasons—first, to reflect the severity of their crimes but, secondly and perhaps more importantly, the intention to preserve lives.
The amendment seeks to draw a distinction in release policy between those aged over 21 and those younger. However, the Bill will introduce changes to release for both adult and youth offenders sentenced for serious terrorism offences. The extended determinate sentence already operates in the same way for adults and youths in every other aspect, and because the nature of the offending and the threat posed is so severe, these changes should align with that pre-existing approach.
For those aged under 18, instances of terrorist acts occur, although, thankfully, they are rare. I shall come back to that point later. Among those under-18s are some who are capable of extremely serious offending and present a real threat to the public. They are the dangerous few youth offenders that these provisions aim to capture. This measure, therefore, is about offenders who have been deemed dangerous by the court. That also means that, when sentencing the offender to an extended determinate sentence, the judge would have already taken into account age and other relevant factors.
In that context, I turn to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. As to the possibility of change, one has to remember that this measure is about public protection and applies only to the most serious young offenders who have committed terrorist offences that carry a maximum sentence of life and have been deemed dangerous by the court.
We are alert to the point on prisoner management and have carefully considered it. There are a number of programmes within prison to make sure that the sentences proposed here do not adversely affect prison management within the institution. Although, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, correctly said, the prisoner is likely to end his sentence as an adult, the fact is that even when sentenced at the time, the nature of the offences mandate the sort of sentence we now propose.
As to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on radicalisation in the prison system, there are, as my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart pointed out, a number of interventions in the prison system designed to prevent radicalisation. They are extensive. I will not go over the points that he made earlier but I repeat and endorse them. As I said—I said that I would come back to this point—the number of young offenders in this regard who have been radicalised in prison is extremely small. We are alive to the noble Lord’s point, but do not believe that that is a reason not to proceed in the way in which the Bill is currently drafted.
Finally, and only because I wish to reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that I read all his amendments with extreme care, these seem to be technically defective, given that the wording is to be added after the close of quotation marks and, on the face of it, would appear to apply only to new Section (2A)(iv), and affect only the provisions related to service personnel. However, I hope that I have approached his amendments on their merits. For those substantive reasons that I have set out, I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw or not move his amendments.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for the careful way in which he dealt with my amendments. I fully accept and am guilty of the technical error he identified. He was kind to deal with the merits of the three amendments. I very much hope that the Government will reflect on what I and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said because it is a considerable mistake to treat the under-21s the same as those who are 21 or over, particularly with regard to public safety. We will return to this matter at a later stage. With the leave of the Committee, I will withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 12. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 12
Baroness Prashar
“Release on licence for prisoners serving a serious terrorism sentence: England and Wales
(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 244(1) (duty to release prisoners on licence) after “247A” insert “, 247B”.(3) After section 247A insert—“247B Release on licence of prisoners serving a serious terrorism sentence(1) This section applies to a prisoner (“P”) who is serving a serious terrorism sentence under section 268A or 282A of the Sentencing Code.(2) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to release P on licence in accordance with subsections (3) to (6).(3) The Secretary of State must refer P’s case to the Board—(a) as soon as P has served the requisite custodial period, and(b) where there has been a previous reference of P’s case to the Board under this subsection and the Board did not direct P’s release, not later than the second anniversary of the disposal of that reference.(4) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to release P on licence under this section as soon as—(a) P has served the requisite custodial period, and(b) the Board has directed P’s release under this section. (5) The Board must not give a direction under subsection (4) unless—(a) the Secretary of State has referred P’s case to the Board, and(b) the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that P should be confined.(6) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to release P on licence under this section as soon as P has served the appropriate custodial term, unless P has previously been released on licence under this section and recalled under section 254 (provision for the release of such persons being made by section 255C).(7) For the purposes of this section—“appropriate custodial term” has the meaning given in section 268C of the Sentencing Code in relation to a sentence under section 268A of the Code, and in section 282C of the Sentencing Code in relation to a sentence under section 282A of the Code;“the requisite custodial period” means—(a) in relation to a person serving one sentence, two-thirds of the appropriate custodial term, and(b) in relation to a person serving two or more concurrent or consecutive sentences, the period determined under sections 263(2) and 264(2).””
Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]
My Lords, the principle aim of the amendment is to ensure that the Parole Board retains its vital role in assessing risk to determine the safe release of terrorist offenders given a serious terrorism sentence or an extended sentence. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Ramsbotham, for supporting the amendment.
The amendment would remove Clause 27 and replace it with a new clause, which would provide for parole-authorised release for terrorist offenders given a serious terrorism sentence in England and Wales. The amendment is modelled on equivalent provisions on the extended sentences contained in Section 125 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. In line with these provisions, an offender sentenced to a serious terrorism sentence would become eligible for parole-authorised release at the two-thirds point in their sentence. The release test applied is the same as those for other sentences for dangerous offenders, whereby the board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. If that test is not met, the amendment provides for the offender to be retained in prison until the end of the custodial term. During that period, the offender is entitled to a parole hearing to reconsider their case every two years.
It should be noted that the changes to serious terrorism sentences introduced by the amendment would apply only in England and Wales. Equivalent provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland would need to be drafted for the changes to be fully workable. The amendment would also remove the changes to the release arrangements for terrorist offenders given an extended sentence in England and Wales introduced by Clause 27. Following the deletion of Clauses 28 and 31, other amendments would be needed to make equivalent changes to extended sentences in Scotland and Northern Ireland. This would mean that convicted terrorist offenders sentenced to an extended sentence for which the maximum penalty is life would continue to be eligible for parole-authorised release at the two-thirds point.
This amendment addresses the concerns raised by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, as well as by me and a number of other Peers on Second Reading. They relate principally to how the new serious terrorism sentence and the changes to the extended sentence will result in a loss of the benefits of both a risk assessment and an incentive to reform which the parole process provides.
The parole process contributes to public protection in a number of important ways. First, it helps to ensure that dangerous people are not released when they would represent an unacceptable risk to the public. The Parole Board deals with some of the most serious and complex cases in the justice system. It rightly takes a cautious approach when assessing whether the statutory release test by Parliament is met. However, it also decides that around 10,000 prisoners need to stay in prison for the protection of the public. This means that fewer than one in four prisoners meets the Parole Board’s stringent release tests.
Secondly, parole hearings provide an opportunity to give careful consideration to the risk presented by an individual and to put in place arrangements to mitigate the risk, if they are authorised for release. While no system for assessing future risk can ever be perfect, the Parole Board has an excellent track record when it comes to limiting the dangers posed by offenders on release. As Jonathan Hall has stated, with the new serious terrorism sentence and changes to the release arrangements for terrorist offenders serving extended sentences,
“the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings has been removed.”
Thirdly, the parole process provides hope and incentive for good behaviour and rehabilitation, particularly for offenders serving lengthy sentences. It can act as an encouragement for prisoners in the often difficult work of rehabilitation and reform. Poor behaviour and lack of engagement inevitably lessen the chance of release at parole hearings. Removing parole-authorised release removes a clear incentive for prisoners or authorities to engage in efforts to address their offending behaviour. It also reduces incentives for prisoners to comply with the prison regime more generally, which could put staff at risk of violence.
The changes introduced in the Bill also give rise to some significant anomalies in the sentencing framework for terrorist offenders. Under the provisions of the Bill, a life sentence will continue to be the most severe penalty available to courts. Unless an offender is given a whole-life sentence—there are currently just 62 prisoners with this sentence—these prisoners will be ineligible for consideration by the Parole Board once their punishment period is served. However, under the new serious terrorism sentence, an offender receives a 14-year minimum sentence, which must be served in full. Once that term is served, the prisoner is released automatically on an extended licence, without a risk assessment. Similarly, a terrorist offender given an extended determinate sentence, convicted of an offence for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment, would have to serve the entire custodial term. However, once that term is served, they are released automatically on an extended licence—again without a risk assessment.
These provisions are also more confusing given the welcome changes that the Government have made elsewhere to strengthen the role of the Parole Board in its risk assessment of less serious terrorist offenders. In February 2020, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act ended the automatic release of terrorist offenders at the halfway point of their sentence. Under this Act, these prisoners will be released only at the two-thirds point of their sentence if they can satisfy the Parole Board that their risk can be safely managed in the community.
It is surely worth considering parole participation in these new sentences to ensure that the benefits of both risk assessment and incentives to reform afforded by the parole process are not lost. As chairman of the Parole Board from 1997 to 2000, I have seen the incentives that parole provides at first hand. I too welcome the two new Ministers to the Front Bench and the open way in which they have engaged in Committee. I look forward to the Minister’s response, and I hope that he spells out for me the rationale for removing parole from this set of offenders.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, it was an honour to put my name to this amendment, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, with her experience as a former executive chair of the Parole Board for England and Wales. As she said, Clause 27, which this amendment would replace, aims to remove the role of the Parole Board in the case of certain dangerous terrorist offenders who have been given a determinate sentence. Clause 27 would do this by amending Section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, itself dating from only last year, which currently requires the Secretary of State to refer terrorist offenders serving any determinate sentence to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of the custodial term.
There are instinctive attractions—including, no doubt, electoral attractions—in providing for all dangerous terrorist offenders to serve their entire sentences in prison. But the notion that such offenders are uniquely incorrigible is not supported by the facts. I remind the Minister of a Written Answer that I received from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, last February, revealing that, of the 196 terrorist offenders released from prison in England and Wales in the seven years from January 2013, only six—barely 3%—had committed another terrorist offence by the end of that period. This illustrates a pattern of surprisingly low terrorist recidivism rates around the world, expertly analysed by Andrew Silke and John Morrison in an ICCT policy brief of September 2020 aptly entitled Re-offending by Released Terrorist Prisoners: Separating Hype from Reality.
This is not an argument for complacency. It most certainly does not mean that all is well in our prisons, but it is something to consider before we dispense with the Parole Board in the circumstances that Clause 27 would effect.
My successor but one as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, has been referred to today with wholly justified approval by at least two Ministers and numerous other noble Lords, so we should listen to the three reservations that he has voiced on Clause 27. First, it would remove the possibility of early release
“as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders who are going to spend the longest time in custody”.
At the same time, it would deprive the prison authorities of an important tool for prisoner management. Secondly, it would remove the opportunity to explore current and future risk at Parole Board hearings. Thirdly, it would remove the opportunity for early release of
“child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults”.
I endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said about that and the public safety implications in the last group.
Those reservations are addressed by this amendment and by the following group. I look forward to hearing what the Minister, whom I welcome warmly to his place, has to say about them.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We have been unable to reach the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, so we now move to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, the Bill has been broadly welcomed, in light of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks, by noble Lords across the House. One could add to that sad litany of attacks the murder of three men in Forbury Gardens, Reading. Noble Lords accepted the need for legislation such as this with something of a heavy heart. There have been anxieties expressed in Committee today and at Second Reading about some aspects of the Bill. I particularly noted the comments at Second Reading of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who described himself as “horrified” by the reduced role of the Parole Board.
I share, I am sure, with all noble Lords very considerable respect for what the Parole Board does. Decisions about serious offenders are particularly challenging. The boards, which have enormous experience, are given a great deal of material to make their decision, which they do with scrupulous care. I do not see that the purpose of the Bill in any way excludes or marginalises the board. The purpose, surely, is to ensure that serious terrorist offenders spend longer in prison and longer on licence, and it is that fact that removes the Parole Board from the picture, not any lack of respect for what it does.
I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said about the statistics on reoffending by terrorist offenders who are released, and I am sure that he is absolutely right to make that point. I would add just one gentle caveat, in the sense that a terrorist who commits another offence, maybe of the most extraordinary gravity, is not comparable to, say, a burglar who breaks into a house repeatedly, serious though that can be.
The offenders who will no longer be susceptible to review by the Parole Board will have their licence condition, when they are released, set by prison governors on behalf of the Secretary of State. As I understand their position, prison governors will be informed by the probation service, the multi-agency public protection panels, and presumably by information gathered about the prisoners in the prison or prisons where they have served their sentence, which will be something of an incentive for them to behave well. Prison governors have much experience of this process.
The Bill is certainly concerned with the protection of the public. Keeping the most serious offenders in prison for longer and removing their opportunity for early release is what causes the reduced role of the Parole Board. The removal of its involvement for what I understand is likely to be a very small cohort of 50 or so—perhaps the Minister can help—seems to be justified in the public interest.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that we are dealing with the determination of licence conditions in the context of terrorist prisoners having been sentenced to longer sentences. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, who has very considerable and relevant experience, and with my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich that the Parole Board has an important potential role to play in these cases.
It is said that the determination of licence conditions can adequately be dealt with by prison governors. That may be true in some cases, but prison governors do not have the range of expertise, the judicial discipline and the clear legal accountability of the Parole Board. It is therefore my view that this task should be undertaken by the Parole Board, which has all the relevant qualifications to do it. If the Parole Board was placed in that position it would command the confidence of the public. Indeed, those who believe that too much control is being taken of prisoners by government would be able to see that there was a thoroughly independent, accountable, quasi-judicial organisation dealing with these cases empirically and on their merits.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, this amendment incorporates significant changes to Clause 27. In particular, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, with all her experience of the Parole Board, and by other speakers, the suggested replacement for Clause 27 would preserve the Parole Board’s role. I regard the amendment as entirely helpful on the basis that, with some exceptions, the Parole Board has had an extremely good record of balancing the safety of the public with the need to rehabilitate offenders in society.
I will largely cover what I have to say on the principles involved in this amendment in my part in the next group. However, it seems to me that the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, made the very important point that Clause 27, as drafted, involves automatic release on licence without any assessment of the safety of that release by the Parole Board. I accept that prison governors would be involved, but that, in my view, is no substitute.
In summary, it is my view that this amendment would be an entirely acceptable way to address the problems with Clause 27 as drafted, the most important of which are its removal of the involvement of the Parole Board from the release process altogether and the concomitant results that offenders under Clause 27 would be automatically released, less likely to be rehabilitated and also more difficult to manage while in prison.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This is a significant debate. There are two circumstances that one has to consider. First, when one is dealing with a terrorist prisoner who is over 21, should the Parole Board, in the circumstances set out in Clause 27, have the power to direct early release? As I understand it, the effect of the Bill is that in certain specified circumstances early release is not possible for over-21s. Although it is hard, we are dealing with very dangerous situations. I am not sure that we would object to that, but I would like it to be clear: are we dealing in this amendment with the possibility of early release? If we are, then apart from those who are under 21 at the date of conviction, we would not wish to change the provisions of the Bill.
The second situation is where what the Parole Board is being asked to do is to either determine or advise on what the release conditions should be for somebody who is going to be released in any event. In those circumstances it would seem sensible for the expert risk assessors to determine not whether they should be released but what the conditions should be. I would be interested in the Minister’s views on both situations I have posited: one where we are dealing with early release, the other where we are dealing with conditions only.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, in this amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, whose experience in this area is profound, proposes replacing Clause 27 with an amended set of provisions. Certainly as I read them, their effect—and to deal immediately with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—is to provide that all prisoners subject to an extended determinate sentence or a serious terrorism sentence would be eligible for relief by the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of their custodial term. In concept, therefore, this is similar to the intention tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, which he referred to— we will come to it shortly—as he opposes Clause 27 standing part of the Bill. With this amendment, the noble Baroness goes further: to replace Clause 27 with a new provision. If I may say respectfully, the noble Baroness is correct to identify that without Clause 27 there must be some replacement provision included to provide the legislative authority to release those sentenced to the new serious terrorism sentence.
Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for a very open response and all other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I support and agree with my noble friends Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, because the points they made reinforce the points I was making. I respectfully disagree with my noble friend Lord Faulks about governors setting the licence conditions. Although the Minister explained carefully how that will be done, I do not see why that should replace an assessment made by the Parole Board, which has a great deal of experience in assessing risk.
Having said that, I think the principles of why parole is an essential part of our criminal justice system have been rehearsed. It is about public protection and the better management of prisoners. I do not think that it is fair to say that early release could lead to false compliance, because those who assess risk are very familiar and can assess whether the prisoner is serious or it is a false claim. I very much hope that the Government will consider the points made in the course of this debate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
Noble Lords should be aware that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have withdrawn from this debate, so the speaker after the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will be the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, as was said on the previous group, Clause 27 as it stands would mean that offenders serving serious terrorism offences sentences and those serving extended determinate sentences for an offence carrying a possible sentence of life imprisonment would be excluded from the operation of subsections (3) to (5) of Section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those subsections presently govern the involvement of the Parole Board in the release of offenders at the two-thirds point of their custodial term.
In answer to some who spoke about early release in the debate we have just had, the description of release at the two-thirds point, which is what is largely envisaged, is not, on our traditional understanding, early release. We have long recognised that there is a benefit in a remission system whereby release generally takes place at the two-thirds point of a custodial term before the offender’s sentence has been concluded.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out, subsections (3) to (5)—the present arrangements—were themselves the result of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act, the so-called TORER Act, which we passed last year, ending release on licence after the halfway point in an offender’s sentence. However, in the section concerned, we preserved the role of the Parole Board in cases where generally an offender had served two-thirds of his custodial term. That was emergency legislation. I invite the Minister to explain what has changed to justify removing the Parole Board’s involvement since that emergency legislation, which retained it. I venture to suggest that no further justification has arisen since we passed that Act.
Subsections (3) to (5) presently require referral by the Secretary of State to the board for consideration after the completion of two-thirds of the required custodial period, then consideration by the board as to whether it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner be detained. Only if it is so satisfied does the board direct release on licence. The effect of Clause 27 on the offences to which it applies is that release before the conclusion of the custodial term is excluded altogether and the Parole Board is not to be involved in relevant offenders’ release. Clause 28 and Schedule 10 apply similar provisions to Scotland, and Clause 31 to Northern Ireland.
One effect of removing the prospect of early release is that the Bill removes an incentive to behave acceptably in prison, which makes offender management in prisons far more difficult. It also makes it less likely that prisoners will engage with deradicalisation programmes within prisons—partly because there will be less incentive for them to do so, but also because deradicalisation, like rehabilitation more generally, is advanced by hope and inhibited by hopelessness. It would increase, in those subject to these sentences, the sense of hopelessness, powerlessness and hostility in prison from all around; I urge those who argue that hope and some sense of power in a prisoner’s own destiny are important to the welfare of society at large to accept the weakness of that position.
One reason why I make these points is that all those subject to these sentences will be released one day, unless their sentences outlast their lives; for that reason, their rehabilitation is important. Nor should we forget that the reoffending rates for terrorist offences are in fact low, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out when he referred to the response to the Question he raised last February, in which the Ministry of Justice calculated a recidivism rate of 3.06% for terrorist offences, as opposed to a rate of 28% for other offences. Of course I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that any reoffending by a terrorist offender is or may be disastrous, but I venture to suggest that excluding any involvement of the Parole Board, with its wealth of experience in weighing up risks to public safety, would be an unhelpful way of improving public safety; indeed, it would not improve public safety at all.
The central question that the Parole Board is directed to consider is whether continued detention is required by a continuing risk to the safety of the public. The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, repeatedly described this as risk assessment; that was the correct description. She rightly highlighted the importance in this process of the Parole Board and its hearings. Of course I accept in all this the point made in response to her amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that a replacement for Clause 27 would be required if that clause were to go. Whether or not that would have been the replacement proposed in Amendment 12 by the noble Baroness and others matters not. What does matter is that the present proposal does not help public safety, and has very serious adverse ramifications.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. No? We will come back to her. Let us try the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, I have once again signed up to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I do not want to repeat what I said on the last grouping, so I will raise just two additional points. The first is the risk of inconsistency that Clause 27 and its companions could bring into the law. They of course apply only to determinate sentences, so does this not raise what the independent reviewer has described in a recent series of tweets as the
“uncomfortable possibility that offenders may be ‘better off’ if sentenced to life imprisonment than extended sentences”?
He illustrated that observation with the case of the Anzac Day plotter—recently released on the recommendation of the Parole Board, having been convicted at the age of 15—and the decision last week of the Court of Appeal in the case of the St Paul’s suicide bomb plotter. The Minister and others might want to reflect on those cases, and on the observations of the independent reviewer before Report, when I suspect that we may need to come back to this.
Secondly, since the Minister accepts that the prisoners who would be affected by Clause 27 are not always incorrigibly violent, and since he does not take issue with what I said about the very low terrorist recidivism rates, is he not tempted to accept that there might be cases—perhaps rare—in which the Parole Board would feel able to recommend their release?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We still cannot reach the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, the Bill makes a welcome change to the sentencing, release and monitoring of terrorism offenders by toughening up the law. This is a time of higher risk—something that has not been referred to by our noble friends the lawyers. I am no lawyer, but I study the Middle East and south Asia in some depth, and I have lived abroad for a number of years. I have very good contacts in those parts of the world and, in my judgment, the risk of terrorism at this time is higher than we have ever experienced.
I might say as a side issue that I get concerned when organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and others call vociferously for the deletion of Clauses 37, 38 and 40. I am, frankly, not impressed by their objectivity. I wish I could be, but they and others I could mention, such as Freedom from Torture, do not in my experience bring objectivity to these types of cases. I contrast that with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC—although it is not involved in these cases on the whole—and Médecins Sans Frontières, both of which are involved in issues relating to torture, and they are very objective in their assessments.
It is objectivity that one wants. The British public has to understand and be convinced that any change that is made will help to deal with terrorism. I think, on having looked at the Bill, that Clause 27 is right. It is all very well for noble Lords to say that the numbers who abscond or the cases where people are released early are small, but the number of people who were killed in Manchester was not small. In most places where there is terrorist activity, the numbers are not small. I see my role in the upper House as being one where I look after the British public. It is not a risk assessment. The only risk is that someone will reoffend. When facing the challenge of that situation, I do not think that we can suggest to the British public that some of these men and women who have carried out heinous crimes should be released early on an objective risk assessment.
I make one other point. As it happens, I am doing a bit of work on national service, something which older Members of your Lordships’ House may well have done in the Army, the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. In my case, I was a pilot in the air force. I think of myself at the age of 21. We were all 18 years old when we did our national service. We were young men who were risking our lives and we were ready to fight; many lost their lives. I wonder whether 21 is too high an age; I personally would drop it to 18, which was the age at which you had to do your national service. However, that goes rather wider than what we are considering here.
As far as I am concerned, the Government are taking absolutely the right road. We have to toughen up on sentencing and we have to toughen up on early release and the monitoring of offenders because the risks at this point in time are very real.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) (V)
My Lords, by coincidence I am once again following the noble Lord, Lord Naseby. I would remind him that there have been high-risk periods before. His words reminded me of the Brighton bomb case, in which I took a part. The person I represented had been involved in a bombing campaign that covered some 28 seaside resorts, and the Brighton bomb case was the final one. When I look at Clause 31, I reflect on that case, because that clause, like the other clauses we are dealing with, is the one which says that there should be no parole for terrorism offences committed in Northern Ireland. In the Brighton bomb case, those who were convicted and sent to prison within weeks of the Belfast agreement were returned to Northern Ireland to serve out their sentences there—and within a very short time they were released. We have faced problems like this before.
The benefits of a two-thirds release system have been outlined by previous speakers: they encourage people to behave while in prison and to engage in deradicalisation and rehabilitation courses. That is done to persuade the Parole Board that the individual is safe to be released—to advance by hope and decrease hopelessness, as my noble friend Lord Marks put it. The Parole Board ought to have a role in this, and I was impressed by the views expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that perhaps the Parole Board should at least have a role in advising on the conditions of release as opposed to the governor taking on the role, as is being proposed.
There are dangers in automatic release at the end of a sentence. No doubt the full sentence has been completed, but the automatic release at the end of that time without any Parole Board involvement is a danger, as my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, have argued. I do not think that the solutions that have been developed and put into the Bill are necessarily the right ones, so I support my noble friend in his attempt to have these clauses removed.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) (V)
My Lords, we have had interesting debates on both this and the previous group. In closing the previous group, the Minister said that the proposed lack of involvement of the probation service in this particular group of prisoners was a consequence of the sentencing structure and was not a reflection on the Parole Board itself. I understand the point he has made, but what has been said repeatedly on both groups is that there is expertise in the Parole Board. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked whether there were two elements here. One is the possibility of early release, while the second is a point raised again just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the conditions of release for a prisoner who has served their whole term. I do not understand why that level of expertise should not be accessed when considering these types of prisoners.
I shall make a couple of other brief points which are different from those which have been made by other noble Lords. They arise from briefings that I have had from the trade unions. The Prison Officers’ Association believes that removing hope from prisoners puts its staff at risk. It is a point that the association makes repeatedly and is an important one to feed into this debate. The second point has been made by the National Association of Probation Officers—that is that the workload of probation staff working on the ground in prisons is so high that they are not managing to deliver to their required standards. They are being allocated around 70 prisoners each. I understand that the Minister has talked about these various programmes, and I know that we are talking about a very extreme group of prisoners. Nevertheless there is the practical working position of prison officers, probation staff and others in prisons to consider in trying to make these institutions work and to reduce recidivism when prisoners are released.
Even so, both the group of amendments we are speaking to now and the previous group illustrate the potential for changing the Bill to bring the Parole Board back in. That would reduce the potential risk to the public.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, the Committee will appreciate that there is a significant overlap between this and the previous group. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and indeed no other participant in this debate, will regard it as discourteous if on some occasions I take as read, as it were, points that I made in the previous debate. If the Committee finds it helpful, I propose to say a few words about each of the clauses and schedules to which objection has been taken and then come back to address some of the particular points raised by participants in the debate.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, we have had two serious and thoughtful debates on the last two groups, and I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and to the Minister, who, on his first outing on a Bill, has undoubtedly impressed us all with the care and the courtesy with which he has approached the amendments discussed today. We have one further group today, but nevertheless I express the hope that further consideration between now and Report will persuade him and some of his colleagues in government to compromise when they see the faults of some of these amendments.
All of us—and I say to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, not only those who see Clause 27 as an unmitigated, good toughening-up of terrorist sentencing—approach these issues from the perspective of what is best for public safety. That involves consideration of how to improve behaviour, and with behaviour the atmosphere, in prison.
I take the important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about the safety of prison staff. It involves consideration of how to avoid reoffending, how to rehabilitate and deradicalise even terrorist prisoners, and how to ensure fundamentally that when prisoners are released, that release is safe.
The Minister responded to my question on what has changed since the TORER Act to justify the removal of consideration by the Parole Board of the release of offenders, or removal of release at the two-thirds point, but for the moment I am not sure that I accept the distinction that he made, though I will read what he said with care.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 15. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 15
“Parole Board
(1) The Secretary of State must, within three years of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a report on whether the removal of the Parole Board from considering certain types of terrorist offences leads to bad behaviour in prisons.(2) A Minister of the Crown must make an oral statement in the House of Commons on his or her plan to address any issues identified in the report no later than three months after it has been laid before Parliament.”
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will be very brief on this amendment. The two previous groups have been groups of substance, and serious questions have been asked about the way forward. The amendment in my name would create provisions for a review of whether the removal of the Parole Board from considering certain types of terrorist offences leads to bad behaviour. That is a central point in many ways in the last two groups, but it has also been mentioned as an issue in many of the amendments that we have discussed today. I beg to move.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to our House. It is brave of him to start his parliamentary career in your Lordships’ House by going up against so many noble and learned Lords. It is going to be absolutely fascinating watching that.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for bringing this amendment. I wish I had signed it, because it is very good. It is about whether we want to rehabilitate prisoners and bring them back into society or just want them to rot away and hope they disappear.
I am sure noble Lords will know that the new independent reviewer of Prevent has been announced. It is William Shawcross, whom I do not know at all. As somebody who is a critic of Prevent—I have seen the good and the bad in it—I would say that the optics are not good. Having a white man from Eton and Oxford is possibly not the message that this Government should be sending out when you have critics of a programme that could have been fantastic.
I saw one case of a Prevent programme—in Birmingham, I think—where a young man had been recovered, or rehabilitated, from a radical programme. He had been a right-wing activist, but he responded to being found a job and a house. I am not saying it is always this easy, but rehabilitation was based on taking him out of poverty and deprivation. That is something that we do not see enough of.
However, to return to the amendment, it would require the Government to review the situation and report to Parliament, and I support it very strongly.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, the town of Tredegar is noted for its town clock, which was erected, or at least its plinth was, as a result of funds collected at a bazaar. I believe that information to be correct—and from my position in my home I think I can see the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, nodding in agreement with those facts. The Tredegar clock is always regarded as a symbol of the stability of the town—a town that has been through thick and thin, having been a place where coal was mined and steel manufactured.
The Parole Board has become one of the pillars of our prison system, and the board is seen as being as reliable as that town clock as it has developed over the years. I therefore join the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, in being really rather determined to persuade Ministers that they should take another look at the role of the Parole Board in the sentencing and licence provisions provided for by this important Bill, which I support in principle, as someone who believes that the sentences for terrorism should be long but subject to a proper, just and reasonable form of review that gives reasons if it finds against a prisoner.
I am happy to support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, not for its content but for the principle that it raises, and I invite the Minister to reflect accordingly.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I apologise for any inconvenience caused by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and me not speaking in the last group, where our names were included in the speakers’ list in error.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, addresses the serious question of the impact on prisoners who have no prospect of being released early or of being released at all, something that the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, spoke about in an earlier group, as did my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
Some indication of the potential impact comes from a report in the Times, dated 20 January 2021, on inmates at the only remaining isolation unit for extremist prisoners in Her Majesty’s Prison Frankland. These isolation units were designed to keep the most dangerous ideological prisoners away from the general prison population so that they could not radicalise vulnerable inmates, as other noble Lords have mentioned in today’s debate. One of those units was mothballed before it was opened, another is empty, and the one at Frankland houses five prisoners out of a capacity of eight. There are currently about 200 terrorist prisoners in the UK.
According to the Times, a report by the independent monitoring board at the prison says that inmates in the unit have become more entrenched in their views, that they are refusing to co-operate or to engage in activities and programmes—except for the gym—and that they are distinguished from other prisoners by a lack of progression. They display antagonism and hostility to staff, with one of the prisoners responsible for a serious assault on a prison officer in the centre.
Locking people up with no incentive to behave or co-operate is likely to be counterproductive, and the Times report supports that assertion. We support the amendment.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would require the Government to report on whether the removal of Parole Board consideration of certain prisoners’ release impacts their behaviour in prison. We return once again to the quite proper desire of the Committee for objective data to allow proper evaluation of the usefulness of measures. The point is an important one, but the Government do not think that a review and a report such as the amendment proposes would be practical or beneficial at this time. I will set out why in brief terms.
To carry out such an exercise would require there to be clearly defined factors influencing prisoner behaviour in custody, against which one could evaluate the distinct impact of the prospect of Parole Board consideration in a sentence. Such an evaluation method is simply not feasible. It would be impossible to measure the behavioural effect of a prisoner sentenced under provisions in this Bill expecting a future Parole Board hearing, compared to a counterfactual in which the Parole Board would consider the case. The amendment goes further, implying that the removal of Parole Board referral for some cases could impact on prisoner behaviour more widely. This would be even more impracticable to assess.
The policy intent across these measures is clear; the sentences available to the courts for terrorism offences should be proportionate to the gravity of these crimes and provide confidence for victims and the public. In some cases, this will mean that terrorist offenders spend longer in custody before release. To provide some reassurance further to what we have given from the Dispatch Box this afternoon about what will be done in that additional time in custody, I will make two remarks.
First, there is the hard work of prison staff with prisoners in their care, whatever their sentence or release arrangements. As your Lordships will have gathered, we deploy specialist counterterrorism staff to work with terrorist offenders, and we are recruiting more of these officers than ever before through the counterterrorism step up programme.
Secondly, the new counterterrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre, which your Lordships have heard about from the Dispatch Box, will drive the development, innovation and evidence-based delivery of our rehabilitative interventions. The centre will transform our capability to intervene effectively with terrorist offenders, including those sentenced under this Bill and those who will be released automatically. The Bill will be scrutinised in the usual way, including a statutory review after three years.
I now turn to contributions from Members in this short, but hopefully valuable, debate. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb; she succeeded in doing from her Benches what I was unable to do from the Dispatch Box earlier in answer to a direct request, by identifying Mr Shawcross in his new post. I hope the noble Baroness will accept my further assurances as to the seriousness with which the Government take the points she raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, in an elegant allusion to the values of the town clock at Tredegar, drew our attention to the important work of the Parole Board. We on this side share the noble Lord’s high estimation of the Parole Board. I promise, on behalf of myself and my noble friend and colleague, that we will reflect carefully on the observations made by the noble Lord and by others in the course of debate.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. First, turning to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as a fellow layman I thought she gave a good summary of rehabilitation. I see rehabilitation as three things: to have something to do with your time, so either a job or education; to have a roof over your head; and to have stable relationships. Stable relationships are very important in all our lives. The problem we may be dealing with regarding this particular category of prisoners is stable relationships which are not conducive to people not reoffending. Nevertheless, I appreciated the noble Baroness’s contribution.
Both the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Paddick, spoke about the principles of some sort of review. The Times article that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to reminded me of two or three visits I have made to prison gyms over the years. Absolutely invariably, I have been told by the officers who manage the prison gyms that there is never any trouble in a prison gym. That is because the prisoners know that that would be the first privilege they would lose, which they do not want to lose. So prison gyms, from what I have been told, are trouble-free areas.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, gave quite a lengthy answer to my amendment. He described it as potentially counterfactual and impractical. I will have to read properly what he said. However, he slightly mitigated his view on the amendment by saying that he was happy to consider any further submissions I might make. I therefore know there is a potential open door for a later-stage amendment, and with that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Tuesday 9th February 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 129-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (4 Feb 2021)
“Review of sections 1 to 31
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of this Act to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review. (3) The review under subsection (1) must consider but is not limited to considering any evidence as to any effects of this Act—(a) by the imposition of longer prison sentences upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders on whom they are imposed;(b) upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison and a correspondingly smaller proportion on licence;(c) upon the radicalisation of prisoners other than those upon whom longer prison sentences are imposed or who are required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison;(d) on the degree to which those prisoners upon whom a serious terrorist sentence is imposed are segregated from other prisoners.(4) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.(5) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.(6) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report under subsection (5)(b) within one month of receiving the report.(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause would require an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of the Act after one year, with particular attention to radicalisation in prisons and the effects of longer periods of imprisonment on reform and rehabilitation and radicalisation in prisons and of segregating serious terrorist offenders.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, by the amendments in this group noble Lords from around the House seek reviews of the impact of this legislation on the operation of our criminal justice system. Such reviews would consider: how we are dealing with terrorist offences, including the effects on the Prison and Probation Service and, in particular, the effects on prison capacity; the financial impact of the legislation; and the effect of the legislation on Northern Ireland.
The very fact that so many noble Lords seek such reviews, each with different emphases, demonstrates that however much the Bill’s provisions may chime with the prevailing public mood, for many of us they nevertheless cause uncertainty and misgivings. While we all recognise that terrorism must be dealt with extremely severely, on any view the Bill provides for radically harsher sentencing than we have had before. I suspect that the Minister and the Government recognise that this approach is not risk-free.
I shall concentrate on the review called for in the amendment in my name and the names of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Paddick. Our amendment is concerned with Part 1 of the Bill. To remind ourselves briefly of the ground we covered on day one in Committee, Part 1 deals first with sentences for what I might call ordinary criminal offences, punishable by two or more years’ imprisonment but aggravated by a terrorist connection; then, with serious terrorism offences and minimum custodial terms for offenders; with increased extended sentences for specified violent offences; and with other special custodial sentences for offenders of particular concern. The common threads running through all these provisions are, first, that judges’ discretion to impose more lenient sentences than prescribed in the legislation is considerably limited and, secondly, that terrorist offenders will generally spend much longer in prison than has been the case to date.
The review called for by our amendment is to be concerned, first, with the effect of the imposition of longer prison sentences on the reform and rehabilitation of those who serve them; secondly, with the likely outcome that longer sentences will mean offenders spending a greater proportion of them in custody and a lower proportion on licence; thirdly, with the radicalisation of other prisoners by those who will now spend far longer in custody and may have the dangerous potential to radicalise others who come into contact with them while in prison; and finally, on the segregation of serious terrorist prisoners serving these very long sentences. I make no apology for the fact that Liberal Democrats start from the position that while punishment plays an extremely important part in sentencing and that the more serious the offence the greater the punishment element in any sentence, nevertheless reform and rehabilitation, even in very long sentences, is a central purpose of sentencing.
Hope of reform and rehabilitation should motivate all who work within the system, as well as society at large. That belief is in our DNA. We do not believe that we should give up on serious offenders, even terrorist offenders. Nor do we accept that the lives of at least some among those whom we punish cannot ultimately be turned around.
Importantly, the review we seek calls for a person with professional experience of imprisonment for terrorist offences to be appointed by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. It was therefore heartening to note that on 25 January Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer, issued a statement saying that he had decided to review the subject of terrorism in the prison estate in England and Wales as part of his annual review of the terrorism Acts. His statement said that he was particularly interested in criminal behaviour which effectively encourages terrorism within prisons, in the status and influence of terrorist prisoners within them, in any connection to prison gangs, and in how to secure evidence of terrorist offences or terrorism-related activity in prisons. He is clear that his focus will be on terrorism because there is, he says, considerable literature already on radicalisation and extremism in prisons. Nevertheless, I would be surprised if he did not feel driven to consider, as part and parcel of considering terrorist activity within prisons, the question of radicalisation and extremism, and its effect on the prison population as a whole. Inevitably, he will also consider how to achieve reform and rehabilitation for as many terrorist offenders as possible.
One of any reviewer’s main starting points will be the work and findings of the 2016 Acheson review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, the recommendations of which many noble Lords mentioned earlier in the passage of the Bill. In setting out the context of his review, Ian Acheson wrote:
“Islamist ideology can present itself in prisons as a struggle for power and dominance in which perceived weaknesses are exploited by a gang culture which threatens or undermines legitimate authority and security”
and that Islamic extremism
“should therefore be a greater and more visible priority for NOMS, led by people with the time and resource to act swiftly and with authority.”
I make no apology for concentrating on Islamic extremism in the context of the type of terrorism that this country, and many others, have faced in recent years.
Perhaps the most significant of that report’s recommendations was that those few extremists who presented what Acheson called
“a particular and enduring risk to national security through subversive behaviour, beliefs and activities”
should be segregated in specialist units, where they would be given “effective deradicalization” programmes. It has been very disappointing that although the Government accepted this recommendation, as they did nearly all the Acheson recommendations, there has been so little action. When I have asked Ministers about this failure of promised implementation, I am afraid that the responses have been defensive or, worse, complacent.
In the wake of the London Bridge attack by Usman Khan on 1 December 2019, Professor Acheson wrote in the Times:
“I have evidence that the separation centres that I recommended be established to incapacitate those posing most risk are not filling up because of institutional timidity to deal with a terrorist threat that is more acute than senior officials want to admit.”
He then said that
“I remain deeply unconvinced that this service has the corporate leadership, competence or will to deal with terrorist offenders. I’m not sure any tangible progress has been made since my review concluded three years ago.”
My concern is that since the disastrous attacks in 2019, the Government have been so focused on tougher sentencing that other aims, just as important or even more so, have been sidelined.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I make a short intervention to support the amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks; it is carefully put and more than adequate. I support it because it is important that a close look is had into the workings of these important sections. One year should be sufficient, with the emphasis on consultation, which is vital to get an independent reviewer to take the temperature of how the Act is working.
In my many visits to prisons in my professional career, I was deeply aware of how prisoners live cheek by jowl. Particularly in the absence of other subjects of conversation, I would have thought, as a lay man, that prisons were fertile ground for radicalisation. It goes without saying that expert advice is needed. We are considering longer sentences, reform and rehabilitation, radicalisation and segregation—all vital subjects—and we should look at how the Act is working. With those few words, it is a pleasure to commend the amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has outlined, our Amendment 16 in this group calls for a review of the impacts of Part 1of the Bill. Why is such a review needed? The Explanatory Notes to the Bill describe its purpose as being to better protect the public from terrorism, effectively by two main means: ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in custody, and supporting their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation.
I am pleased to note there is no longer any pretence that longer sentences act as a deterrent to terrorist offenders. There was no such claim from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, either, when he introduced the Bill to this House on Second Reading. That will save some time.
The two premises on which the Bill is based appear to be these: that the public are better protected from terrorists if terrorist offenders are in prison longer; and that a range of tailored interventions while they are in prison will lead to their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation. In short, the longer they are in prison, the less likely they are to pose a threat to the public and the more time is available to deradicalise and rehabilitate them.
The first and most obvious problem with the first premise is that you cannot detain every suspected terrorist for the rest of their lives, despite the Government’s attempts in this Bill to achieve exactly that for some terrorist offenders. With an increasing number of exceptions were this Bill to be passed unamended, you cannot normally lock up suspected terrorists indefinitely or so curtail their freedoms as to effectively deprive them of their liberty indefinitely. We will come to the indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial when we come to the changes to the terrorism prevention and investigation measures.
The Government’s current Prevent strategy, at paragraph 3.5, says that
“radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.”
Such propagandists exist in our prisons. The Government’s argument that the longer someone is in prison, the more time there is to support their disengagement and rehabilitation can also work against their deradicalisation and rehabilitation.
First, it provides more time for them to be radicalised, or further radicalised, by propagandists in prison. There is clear evidence that this is happening. On 25 January, the Times reports the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, as saying that there was an increasing “drumbeat” of links between prison and terror attacks, with offenders not being properly punished for owning radical material, preaching extremism and inciting violence. The Times notes that the man given a whole life sentence last month for murdering three men in a park in Reading in a terror attack last year was befriended by a radical preacher while serving an earlier prison sentence. Secondly, if these vulnerable people believe that the sanctions imposed on them are disproportionate, or that the system that led to their imprisonment was unfair, the ideology promulgated by these propagandists is made to appear even more attractive and compelling.
No one would argue against a proportionate sentence of imprisonment for someone convicted in a court of law of a terrorist offence, as my noble friend Lord Marks has just said, or that, for a limited time, a suspected terrorist who is believed to present a real and immediate threat should not have their liberty to carry out a terrorist attack prevented while evidence is gathered upon which to base a trial in a court of law. However, paragraph 3.6 of the same Prevent strategy says:
“There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.”
Disproportionately long sentences of imprisonment and indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial would reinforce this rejection of our cohesive, integrated, multifaith society and parliamentary democracy. They would undermine any sense of belonging to this country and any support for our core values. Indeed, they begin to call into question some of our core values.
What evidence is there that it is easier to develop a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values while someone is in prison, compared with when they are on licence in the community? The Times article I quoted previously reports the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation as saying that encouraging and inciting terrorism were being
“successfully combated in the community”,
unlike the failure to address these issues in prison. Although he is to conduct a review of what is happening in prisons, it appears to be limited to examining how terrorism is detected, disrupted and prosecuted behind bars and whether improvements can be made, rather than the comprehensive review called for in our amendment.
For all these reasons, there is serious doubt whether Part 1 of the Bill will achieve what the Government intend by it; therefore, our Amendment 16 is necessary. Other amendments in this group call for a review of the financial impact of the Bill and the impact on the prison population, both of which could hamper the effectiveness of any deradicalisation or rehabilitation strategy and any attempt to prevent radicalisation or further radicalisation in prison. Reviews are called for on the specific impact of the Bill in Northern Ireland and on the National Probation Service, and we support these amendments as well.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we have had a wide-ranging introduction to this group from both the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Paddick. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said in his introduction, the amendments in this group call for a series of reviews of different aspects of the system. He expressed his misgivings and uncertainty that the system as it currently operates is succeeding and concluded his remarks by saying that a more sophisticated approach is needed.
Amendment 16 is the first amendment regarding the independent review of provisions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has spoken. The second in the group, Amendment 34 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, is concerned with the financial impact of the changes. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a financial impact assessment of the Act within three years of it coming into force, and this would include the financial impact of extended sentences, extended licence periods, and any additional staffing resources needed as a result of the Act.
Amendment 36 in my name calls for a capacity impact assessment. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an assessment of the capacity of the system as a whole. In their 2016 White Paper, Prison Safety and Reform, the then Government committed to £1.3 billion to create 10,000 new prison places by 2020 and to renovate the existing estate. The 2020 target was later changed to 2022; so far, only 206 new prison places have been built, with 3,360 under construction. The main reasons for those failures and delays were the delays in agreeing and receiving funding to build new prisons. This meant that the construction work began later than planned. In addition, HMPPS was not able to close all prisons and replace them with new ones, due to high demand, which meant it received less money from the sales of old prisons.
Amendment 38, also in my name, proposes a review of the legislation as it affects Northern Ireland. All measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland would be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive; a report would also have to be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament. This would ensure that the Government worked constructively with the Ministry of Justice and Northern Ireland Executive, and that all the Bill’s implications were subject to regular review through the prism of Northern Ireland.
Amendment 39 proposes a review of the National Probation Service. This would require the Government to commission and publish a review of the impact of the Bill on the National Probation Service within 18 months of it coming into force. The review would have to consider, among other things, the level of probation support offered to offenders, as well as the number of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service, and their skills.
I have received some briefing material from Napo—formerly the National Association of Probation Officers —which makes the point that the probation service is in crisis and that many of the offender management teams are struggling to maintain a balance between experienced staff and newly qualified staff. It is not uncommon to find teams in the community where the most experienced officer has only two to three years of post-qualification experience. As recruitment increases, as it is projected to increase, the pressure on the frontline staff will grow, with more probation officers being moved into management and training roles to support the trainees. The point made by Napo is that a properly remunerated and supported expansion of the probation service is needed to face the challenges ahead.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 16 would introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to arrange for an independent review of the impact of Clauses 1 to 31 in the first year of the Act coming into force. I must respectfully disagree that this amendment is necessary. As the House has heard in Committee, the Government already have an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, and his remit covers the Bill. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to, he has announced his intention to conduct a review in prisons, which we welcome. He has already shown his expertise and engagement with the Bill in its entirety by providing detailed comments on its provisions—contributions that I know this House and those in the other place valued highly. We have every confidence that he will continue to provide valuable and important scrutiny following its enactment and through the prisons review which he will be undertaking. I therefore disagree that there is any need to appoint another reviewer to focus on just some of the Bill’s provisions.
That said, I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others indicated particular concerns by specifying the areas which such a review ought to consider. I shall take these points in turn, which I hope will assuage noble Lords’ concerns. First, there is the question of the impact of longer sentences—or a longer proportion of the sentence spent in custody—on prisoners’ rehabilitation as a result of the Bill. I start by reflecting that within a year of the Bill’s commencement, the impact of longer sentences will not yet be available for us to analyse. Importantly, however, the rationale behind longer custodial sentences for the most serious and dangerous terrorist offenders is one of public protection, which is this Government’s primary concern. Ensuring that these offenders are incapacitated for longer meets this ambition. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke of the crucial importance of the hope of reform and rehabilitation, and we on this side share that hope. It is not that we consider that rehabilitation is unimportant; it will remain central to the work that is undertaken with terrorist offenders in custody.
Second is the question of the Government’s ability to protect other prisoners from radicalisation within the prison estate and the use of separation centres to this end. These issues are raised in reference to the Acheson review recommendations. I assure the noble Lord that most extremist prisoners are and should be managed in the mainstream prison population, with appropriate conditions and controls.
Across the entire prison estate, we have, and seek to maintain, robust case-management processes to manage the risks posed by extremists and to prevent them radicalising others, including co-located offenders. The Government, however, have designed separation centres to hold the most subversive extremist prisoners, preventing them spreading their malicious ideology to other prisoners. These centres were never intended for use with significant numbers of terrorist offenders, as this would undermine their main purpose: to separate the most dangerous from those most vulnerable to radicalisation. The Government use these centres only when it is necessary and, for reasons of national security, the Government do not confirm the numbers of prisoners in individual separation centres.
Finally, I note that the Bill will be subject to the usual practice of post-legislative scrutiny three years after the Bill receives Royal Assent, as is the case for all legislation. In light of this, and the existing position of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who already has authority to review this legislation, I do not believe this amendment to be necessary.
Amendment 34, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to lay a report within three years on the financial impact of the provisions of the Bill, specifically detailing the effects of extended sentences and extended licence periods; the expansion of the sentence for offenders of particular concern regime; the use of polygraph testing as a licence condition; and, as a result of these measures, any increased staffing resources required in Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I appreciate from the terms of the amendment that there is a concern to examine the cost of these measures when set against the impact assessment already published by the Government.
I make the point that numbers of terrorism offences are so low, comparatively speaking, that the impact of the measures the Bill puts in place is minimal. The impact of licence periods will depend on judicial discretion in setting them and, if the impact assessment carried out and published by the Government was inaccurate, that would be shown up by the process of post-legislative scrutiny. I cite to the Committee a number of figures to inform what I have just said. On 31 December 2020, there were 78,180 in the prison population. The impact assessment estimates the impact of the measures will be around 50 additional cases at any one time. On 30 September 2020, there were 222,657 cases on the probation caseload. The Bill’s impact assessment estimates that the impact of the measures will be around 50 additional case at any one time. The additional polygraph testing as a licence condition is estimated to affect fewer than 150 offenders at any one time, at a cost of about £400,000 annually in steady state.
Therefore, our impact assessment and the figures that support it estimate that the measures in the Bill will have a minimal impact on the prison population and the probation caseload of fewer than 50 additional cases at any one time. This impact, though small, will build up gradually over time and so will not be felt immediately. We are therefore confident that these changes will not have a substantial financial impact on Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that the Government are already providing funding to support our legislative changes: an increase of £90 million in funding for counterterrorism policing this year; an increase in the resources dedicated to training front-line prison and probation staff through the counterterrorism step-up programme; and an immediate £500,000 package for the Victims of Terrorism Unit. The Government will continue to publish data on prison population and probation caseloads, and we will carry out an internal review on polygraph testing. I do not believe that a legislative commitment is required or necessary to review the financial impact of these measures.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, spoke also to Amendment 36, which would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to lay a report on the potential impact of the Bill’s provisions on prison capacity. Again, I respectfully draw his attention to the impact assessment the Government published alongside the Bill, which has already made that assessment. The estimates I have already spoken of are based on recent trends in overall numbers of terrorist offenders being convicted. As the cohort of offenders affected by the Bill is small, these changes will have only a minor impact on prison capacity. We will always provide places, of course, for those sentenced to custody.
In addition to the impact assessment, as I have said, the Government routinely publish data on prison population statistics. I do not believe that a legislative commitment will provide any greater opportunity for scrutiny in this respect. It is worth underlining that the Government’s ambitious programme of improvement in this area—the counterterrorism step-up programme—will put more specialist staff in prisons, working directly with prisoners on rehabilitation, as well as providing intelligence and monitoring of such prisoners. This will make our prisons, and ultimately our streets, safer, an ambition that I am sure noble Lords will support. I know that that is a matter of agreement across the Committee. This programme will be important to ensure that prisons can manage any increased demand from terrorists serving longer in prisons in the near future. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to legislate for a further assessment of the potential impact of these measures.
The noble Lord spoke also to Amendment 38, which would insert a new clause placing a statutory requirement on the Government to review all measures in the Bill that relate to Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive. This review would be required annually and to be published as a report and laid before Parliament. First, I assure him that in developing the Bill, despite the fact that terrorism is a reserved matter, we have carefully considered Northern Ireland’s unique history with terrorism and taken great care not to tamper with provisions enshrined in the Belfast agreement and, particularly, the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. Furthermore, when we have found concessions viable, we have made them, as we demonstrated through our removal of clauses providing for polygraph testing in licensed conditions, following assurances from the Northern Ireland Executive that they are satisfied that the legislative power to use such measures exists already. That said, I remain of the view that we need to take a robust approach to terrorist offending wherever it occurs in the United Kingdom and whatever ideology it aligns itself to. We must avoid a two-tier approach to the sentencing and release of terrorists across the United Kingdom.
The most recent data shows that in 2019-20, there were just 14 convictions for terrorism-related offending in Northern Ireland, and just six in the previous year. With numbers at that level, I submit that there will be too little information on which to base an annual review. The same amendment was raised in the other place, and I respectfully remind the noble Lord that the opportunity already exists for the House to review the Bill’s impact in the relevant committee three years after it receives Royal Assent, through the post-legislative scrutiny process. A review clause of this nature is therefore not required. Reviewing the impact of a Bill after three years will provide a more meaningful opportunity for review. For these reasons, I am not persuaded of the benefit of an annual review of the Bill’s measures in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 39 would insert a new clause placing a statutory requirement on the Government to report on the impact of the provisions in the Act on the National Probation Service 18 months after its enactment. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that we have considered fully the impact on the National Probation Service of the measures in this Bill, which we consider to be low. We set out the impact in full in the published impact assessment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and to the Minister for his detailed reply.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, with all his experience, had no difficulty in recognising the need for the review for which we have called, and clearly set out why a review after a year was appropriate. My noble friend Lord Paddick emphasised the need for deradicalisation and made the point, which ought to be obvious but was not addressed by the Minister, that everyone will be released at some stage so working to help them to be safe on release is therefore crucial. He also highlighted the clear danger that keeping offenders in prison for disproportionately long sentences may make them more likely to offend rather than less by further radicalising them, depriving them of hope and undermining their prospects of reform.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in speaking to the amendments in his name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out the risk of implementing increased sentences without a clear approach to making safe, new prison places available and to ensuring that the special implications for Northern Ireland are properly considered. Particularly important from my perspective, he stressed the role of the probation service.
In response, the Minister urged the Committee to accept that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is the appropriate reviewer of this legislation. I do not accept that. While his role is of course extremely important, it is not the same as someone tasked with a full review directed at the whole, overall impact of this legislation and focused on it. There is a well-established place for formal review after legislation is passed. Nor do I accept that it is necessary for reviewing the impact of this Bill that we should see, as the Minister appeared to suggest at one stage, what has happened on release at the end of offenders’ periods in custody or even after three years. What is necessary is to see, and see reasonably quickly, how these sentences are working and how they are affecting prisons and the prison population—including in particular how the presence of more, very long-term terrorists affects those already in prisons. We need to assess the financial and other impacts at an early stage and see how far the system is changed by the new long sentences.
The Minister questioned the impact of those long sentences because the number of prisoners is low—indeed, he went so far as to describe it as “minimal”—but that leaves out of account the impact of the number of prisoner years to be served by those on very long sentences and the importance of those prisoners within the system, including the danger of their glorification by other prisoners with an inclination towards terrorism.
For all the Minister asserting that enough review work and impact assessments have been done already, so that the reviews we seek are unnecessary, I disagree. However, in the hope that we will be able to discuss a programme for future review with the Government, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment at this stage.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendment at page 29, line 14 are consequential on the removal of Clause 35.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement to the amendment at page 28, line 30.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 19. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 19
Baroness Hamwee
“(4) In section 30 (use in criminal proceedings of evidence from polygraph sessions), in subsection (1), leave out “a released” and insert “any”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the use of information obtained through polygraphs against third persons.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, I appreciate that the Committee dealt with some clauses regarding polygraphs on the previous day in Committee, to the extent of filleting the Bill so that certain provisions do not extend beyond England and Wales. I apologise to the Committee that I did not retrieve Amendments 19A and 19B, which were tabled at that time. I shall save my more general remarks about polygraphs for the next grouping, as this is a narrow point.
Section 30 of the Offender Management Act excludes the use of two matters as evidence in any proceedings against a released person. Those matters are physiological reactions and a statement made during participation in a polygraph session. The amendment would make it clear that those matters could not be used as evidence in proceedings against a third party, its purpose being to ask whether that is now the case. When dealing with terrorism offences, there must be a lot of interest in the contacts of individuals—and, perhaps, a lot of interest in finding evidence that can be used against those other people.
I was very grateful for the teach-in arranged by the MoJ on how these sessions are currently run for sex offenders. During that briefing, it was explained to us that the sessions are not fishing or trawling for information; they are not wide-ranging discussions to see what an offender might let slip. They use closed questions, to which the answer will primarily be yes or no. It seems to me that some questions can lend themselves to inquiries about situations which may be relevant to other persons: for instance, “Since our last session, have you had any contact with, direct or indirect, or any news of X?” or “Has your wife had any news of X’s family?” My amendment is to probe whether the answers can be used in evidence against X. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I regard this group and the next as essentially probing the Government on the use of polygraphs in relation to those convicted of serious terrorism offences. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I attended the briefing last week, during which the potential use of polygraphs was explained; I also found it useful. As I understand it, polygraphs will be a tool—not instead of anything else—to assist in monitoring by the National Probation Service of offenders who have been convicted of serious terrorist offences and are considered at high risk of causing further serious harm.
I need a little convincing that their use in monitoring sexual offenders is really a terribly useful precedent for the challenge presented by serious terrorist offenders, who often have particular ideological convictions which may make detecting lies or inconsistences rather a different challenge from serious sexual offenders, although I understand that polygraphs have been used by the National Probation Service since about 2013.
I suspect piloting may not be particularly easy, given the numbers involved. We all know from the terrible events following, for example, what happened at Fishmongers’ Hall how challenging it is to assess whether someone has been successfully rehabilitated or not. During the last group, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, stressed how important it was for there to be “effective deradicalisation”. I am sure all noble Lords agree that is a desirable aim, but it is something of a holy grail. As we discussed in Committee last week, effective deradicalisation has been a significant challenge for those responsible for managing offenders, not just in this country but in many others where Islamic terrorists and other extremists have presented problems.
I understand the primary purpose of this Bill to be protecting the public from the very serious consequences of offences committed by these offenders. That does not preclude the possibility of rehabilitation, but I think the balance in the public’s view is very much in favour of protecting them.
I understand that there will be an internal review of this polygraph testing—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, said so in response to a previous group—and that it is considered that it may involve something like 150 offenders, a relatively small cohort. He also said the responsibility for these offenders might, as I understand it, eventually be transferred to a specialist branch of the National Probation Service—the NSD. Experience of handling terrorist offenders in particular would certainly be desirable.
Although I look forward to the Minister’s response, this process of assessing how best to assist in monitoring serious offenders seems very challenging. Those with that responsibility need all the help they can get, given the difficulties they will encounter. At the moment, I see considerable advantage in using these polygraphs.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, may I say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his warning against equating too closely the use of polygraphs in monitoring sexual offenders with their use on terrorist offenders, who obviously pose a very different problem? The Minister should consider that.
Sixty years ago, in 1961, I was proudly driving my red and black little Austin A40—new car, brand new wife—along the twisting road from Mold to Denbigh in north Wales. It was a snowy day, just like today—that is what reminded me of the incident. We were not in a hurry. I approached a bend well on my own side of the road at a reasonable speed. There was a car parked on the bend; a large lorry coming from the opposite direction at speed saw it late, swerved out to overtake it on my side of the road and, as he pulled back, his rear end hit my car.
I gave evidence in the Denbigh Magistrates’ Court and found it very stressful. A police sketch of the accident was produced which purported to show where my car had ended up, with a 30-foot, perfectly straight skid mark. I told the chairman of the Bench I thought my car had finished some 20 yards short of where it was shown on the plan. He said, “Don’t you appreciate this is a carefully prepared police plan of your accident?” I said, “Well, it is entitled ‘rough sketch plan’.” Everybody laughed—except the chairman. The defendant was acquitted of careless driving, with the chairman commenting that the wrong person had been prosecuted —it should have been me. However, the lorry driver’s insurers paid me and my wife damages for personal injury without any questions.
The point of this lengthy reminiscence is that witnesses are giving evidence up and down the country in Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts every day, but nobody has ever thought to put a polygraph test on them as they are questioned. Your pulse may be racing, your blood pressure through the roof; you may be sweating, wishing you were anywhere other than perched in a witness box above the well of the court with myriad sceptical eyes looking you up and down—not because you are lying, but you may be afraid that someone, like the chairman of the Denbigh Bench, may not believe you. There are also those pesky lawyers paid to make you out to be a liar with their ridiculous version of the event. That is why the present Domestic Abuse Bill calls for special measures for victims and their witnesses and the present overseas operations Bill has a presumption against prosecution altogether, to save old soldiers the stress of recalling bad times.
The purpose of polygraph testing, as I said at our last meeting on 26 January, is to measure the physiological response of a person to questioning. It depends on the proposition that a person who lies will demonstrate it by changes in his blood pressure, perspiration, heartbeat and so on. I pointed out last time that these conditions are explicable by the stress of being questioned, by being thought to be lying, even by the state of your stomach-turning digestion, or by fear.
Because these physiological changes do not demonstrate that a person is lying, at least to the degree of certainty required for a conviction, evidence of the result of a polygraph test is excluded in court. It is therefore very good policy that, so far, the courts of this country have refused to accept polygraph results as admissible evidence.
We have already discussed whether such evidence should be used where terrorists are released from prison to monitor their continuing behaviour in the community. The purpose of this amendment is to probe whether the Government harbour any desire to go any further: whether this restraint will be maintained if the results of such a test appear to be relevant to a future terrorist trial in a court. That is when principle is put to the test—when there appears to be an indiscriminate danger to the public.
I support this amendment and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on the proposal.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and others have explained, Clause 32 puts the imposition of polygraph conditions on serious terrorist offenders released on licence on the same footing as applies in the case of serious sexual offences. I say at the outset that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Thomas that different considerations apply with terrorist offenders and sexual offenders.
Yesterday, in Committee on the Domestic Abuse Bill, we discussed the use of polygraph testing for domestic abuse offenders released on licence—and again, different considerations apply. Nevertheless, I said then that my outright opposition to the use of polygraph testing anywhere in our criminal justice system had become more nuanced when the proposed use was for the limited purpose of monitoring compliance with licence conditions on release from custody. My outright opposition hitherto stemmed from the lack of proven reliability of polygraph testing and from the perception at least that it is directed to providing binary answers, true or false, to complex evidential questions—hence the use of statements such as “He failed a polygraph test”. Lawyers naturally prefer a system which depends on the careful and balanced evaluation of evidence, often conflicting or inconsistent, rather than certainty.
In part, as I said yesterday, I have become more sympathetic to the use of polygraph testing with the help of the comprehensive and very helpful learning session organised by the MoJ last Thursday, which was attended by a number of Peers, including the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee, as they have said. In addition, I accept that there are legitimate reasons for the use of polygraph testing to provide information to the police and others investigating serious offences and, in the case of terrorism, often potential offences that threaten multiple lives. However, accepting polygraph testing for those limited purposes does not mean that we can accept polygraph testing in criminal cases, and that will remain our position unless and until the reliability of polygraph testing is far more conclusively established than it is now. I agreed completely with the observations of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford on how stress can affect evidence given in a court and on how falsely polygraph testing may skew such evidence.
Our Amendment 19 would amend Section 30 of the Offender Management Act to ensure that evidence of any statement made by a released defender in a polygraph session, and any of his physiological reactions while being so examined, could not be used in a criminal prosecution of any person, not just the released offender. It is right that this amendment is billed as a probing amendment, but that is plainly right. However, at the moment, Section 30 does not say that. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wolfson, said yesterday in answer to me on the domestic abuse provisions:
“Section 30 of that Act provides unequivocally that any statement or any physiological reaction made by an offender during the polygraph session may not be used in criminal proceedings in which that person is a defendant.”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 41.]
Therefore, the Government accept the principle that evidence obtained as a result of polygraph testing, or flowing from physiological reactions under such testing, cannot be used as evidence in a prosecution brought against the person being tested. It must be right that it should not be possible to use such evidence in the prosecution of anybody else, and the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Thomas apply equally to that situation.
It therefore seems that, while this is a probing amendment, it is an amendment that the Government can and should plainly accept without compromising their position or anything that the Bill is trying to achieve, and that it is simply consistent with the position taken by the Government that polygraph-testing evidence cannot be used to secure a criminal conviction.
I stress, in the context of the danger posed by terrorism, that I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that deradicalisation is difficult to achieve. He described it as a holy grail. I emphasise that nothing we say would prevent those administering polygraph testing to released offenders from passing on to the police for the purpose of preventing terrorism information revealed to them. Nor should the police be inhibited from using such information passed on to them in investigating and avoiding terrorist offences.
Amendments 19A and 19B would have the effect of insisting on the affirmative resolution procedure for regulations making provision relating to the conduct of polygraph sessions further to a terrorism-related offence. I suggest that the need for the affirmative resolution procedure is obvious. I would be grateful, however, if the Minister could confirm a number of other points about the regulations proposed, not just for the conduct of polygraph sessions but for using information obtained in the course of such sessions in relation to recall from licence.
My understanding is that, as with sexual offences, and as we were assured yesterday with domestic abuse offences, no decisions on recall from licence can be taken as a result of a test indicating deception. If the result of a test implies that an offender is lying about breach of a licence condition or about further offences, for example, I understand that investigators may ask the police to investigate further before taking any positive action. There is therefore to be no recall on the basis of a failed test, which will lead to recall only if the police find other evidence establishing that a breach has occurred. I hope that will be confirmed in a terrorist context as well.
I also have some concerns about cases where an offender makes a disclosure in a polygraph test, confessing to behaviour that is a breach, and who might therefore be recalled. I asked yesterday about this and was told by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wolfson, that recall in domestic abuse cases may follow if
“disclosures made voluntarily by the offender during the polygraph examination … reveal that they can no longer be safely managed in the community. Those circumstances would also lead to a return to custody. The important point to bear in mind in that regard is that that is no different from a situation in which an offender makes such disclosures without the polygraph licence condition.”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 41.]
I take that point, but I regard it as important that, before a disclosure in a polygraph test can lead to recall, there should be a hearing where the disclosure is either admitted by the offender to be true or can be tested so as to ensure that it is voluntary, genuine and true before a recall based on it is affected.
Yesterday I posed a number of questions to the Minister in relation to domestic abuse polygraph conditions. They are reported in Hansard, but the same questions are pertinent today in connection with this Bill. They concerned in particular: first, a guarantee that the results of polygraph testing carried out under the clause could not be used to secure convictions of a criminal offence; secondly, that recall from licence on the basis of a disclosure in a polygraph test of a breach of a licence condition will not be possible without a further hearing—the point I just mentioned; and, finally, whether evidence of a breach of a polygraph licensing condition could ever be itself based on evidence from a failed polygraph test. It would be helpful to have those answers in the context of this Bill relating to terrorist offences as well.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. He has covered much of the area with which I am concerned in these sensible probing amendments. The next amendment, Amendment 20, which talks about piloting polygraph tests in this area, deals in effect with the same concerns.
My understanding of the position that the Government are advancing is that we are now concerned only with England and Wales because they deleted the Scotland and Northern Ireland provision that was there before. In effect, they are applying the principles in the Offender Management Act 2007 on polygraph tests. Therefore, the first question is: should one put a polygraph condition into the licence conditions of a terrorist offender? As I understand it, a polygraph condition is that the offender has to agree, if asked, to a polygraph. Will it be automatic that such a condition will be imposed for terrorist offenders? What will be the basis on which such conditions will be imposed?
We on this side are very keen that the authorities should have every reasonable tool that they can to try to prevent terrorist offenders, including those who are released on licence. I am keen to probe whether this particular provision contributes to that. As I understand it from the Government’s proposal, the purpose of the polygraph sessions that will be included in the licence condition will be only to monitor the offender’s compliance with the other conditions of his licence or improve the way in which he is managed during his release on licence.
In relation to the first of those two—monitoring compliance with the other conditions of his licence—does that mean that it will be used to see whether he is in fact complying? If he fails a polygraph test, could that be a basis for recalling him to prison on the basis that he has failed to comply with the other conditions of his licence? If it is the Government’s intention not just to rely on the failure of a polygraph test before recalling an offender to prison, where is that reflected in the statute or in the Bill?
In addition to those questions, to what extent is the Minister worried that, if somebody passed a polygraph test, it would lead the authorities not to make further investigations about an offender’s possible breaches of compliance of the conditions of his licence? Additionally, in relation to the second purpose of polygraph testing—namely, to improve the way in which he is managed during his release on licence—can the Minister give us some examples of what that would mean in practice?
Can I deal with the legal use of the answers to polygraph tests? Section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007—this has already been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—says that evidence of
“any statement made by the released person while participating in a polygraph session; and any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination”
cannot be used against that released person for any offence. In answer to my question, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, can the Minister confirm whether that means that those two things can be used in relation to proceedings against somebody else? It would appear from Section 30 of the Offender Management Act 2007 that they could be. Can they be used on their own for recall proceedings, or are recall proceedings simply an administrative act—in which case, the question of whether they can be relied on alone to justify a recall arises?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, in responding to the amendment and the various points put to me, I will bear in mind and seek to avoid falling into the trap of being one of those “pesky lawyers” that, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded us, still exist.
In that regard, let me turn to the substance of the amendments, particularly Amendment 19 put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This amendment seeks to amend Section 30 of the Offender Management Act, which relates to the use of polygraph evidence in criminal proceedings. I understand that the noble Baroness and others may have concerns that evidence gathered from the conduct of polygraph examinations could be used against a third party in a criminal trial. I know that we covered this yesterday in the Domestic Abuse Bill, but I want to take a moment to record my thanks to those in my department who arranged the learning session for a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I understand that they found it helpful and informative, which perhaps indicates that those sessions could be used more often. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Committee that it is neither the intention nor the effect of the polygraph testing provisions of the Bill that they will be used in criminal proceedings against third parties.
In response to the specific point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, we do not harbour any desire to go further than the provisions in the Bill.
Polygraph examinations are now well established as a risk management tool in England and Wales. They have been used successfully, as the Committee has heard, with sex offenders since 2013. In the context of terrorist offenders, which I acknowledge represents a different cohort, they are—if I can put it this way—an additional tool in the toolbox. They will be used, to respond to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so as part of the assessment of the risk offenders pose in the community while on licence and how that risk can best be managed.
As I made clear to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, yesterday in the Committee sitting on the Domestic Abuse Bill, Section 30 of the Offender Management Act makes clear that
“any statement made by the released person while participating in a polygraph session; and any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination”
may not be used in criminal proceedings in which that person is a defendant. While that section does not expressly provide for such information to be precluded from use against others in criminal proceedings, which is what this amendment seeks to achieve, I do not believe the amendment to be necessary.
This is because, although there may be circumstances where information obtained through the polygraph test relating to a third party can be passed from probation to the police to make further investigations, the polygraph material would not be suitable for use as evidence in its own right against a third party. Any allegation against a third party would ultimately need to be tested in court. The court would have to consider, among other things, whether the polygraph evidence was admissible in such other criminal proceedings and the effect of the hearsay rule. While that would ultimately be a matter for the judge in the particular case, noble Lords will appreciate the great difficulties that would be presented by the hearsay rule.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that sex cases are different from terrorism cases. He is of course right, but he was also right to say that what is presented by terrorism cases is a difficult and challenging task. That is why, to use my earlier metaphor, this is another tool in the toolbox which we would like the services to have available to them. In that regard, I can assure Members of the Committee that polygraph testing will not replace any other risk assessment tools or measures, it is an additional source of information that would otherwise not be available. On that basis, I would invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw the amendment as it is unnecessary.
I turn now to Amendments 19A and 19B, which are tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The amendment to Clause 35 would require regulations relating to the conduct of polygraph examinations to be subject to the affirmative procedure. Perhaps I may remind the Committee that we have already tabled our intention to remove Clause 35 from the Bill, alongside Clauses 33 and 34 dealing with the introduction of polygraph testing as a licence condition in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as part of our efforts to secure legislative consent from each Administration. We covered this in the first sitting of the Committee. It does not reflect a change in policy for England and Wales. As I have said, we firmly believe that polygraph testing is an additional and useful tool.
In that regard, polygraph examinations will be used to monitor compliance with licence conditions based on what has happened and will not ask about future behaviour. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who put to the Committee an example of the type of questions that might be asked. She was right to frame those questions in the past tense. A polygraph examiner might ask, for example, “Did you enter those premises?”, if that was something which had been prohibited by the licence conditions. The question would not be, “Are you going to enter the premises next week?” The questions look at what has happened and past behaviour rather than future intent. They are not used as a way of trying to catch offenders out, but as a measure to identify the extent to which the person on licence is complying with the conditions of the licence.
Although I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded the Committee, that giving evidence in court can be a stressful experience, it was interesting to note that he pointed out that we have provided special measures for vulnerable witnesses in the Domestic Abuse Bill. As I understood it, he used that as an example of a case where we recognise that giving evidence can be stressful. Of course, we have also provided for the polygraph examination of the perpetrators of domestic abuse in that Bill. Just as it is in the Domestic Abuse Bill, it is also here; it is an additional tool in our toolbox.
I come to a question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I think was repeated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton: if a person who is subject to a polygraph examination “fails” a question, can they be recalled immediately? There are two parts to the answer and let me give both. First, what do we mean by “failing”? We use the term as a form of shorthand, and the Government factsheets use it because they are written in what we hope is plain English so that members of the public can understand them, but it is not the correct professional term. The correct terminology that is used by examiners in reports is whether there is a significant response or no significant response. That more nuanced term makes it clear that we are not dealing with a question of passing or failing here; rather it is about whether the examination results indicate that the response has been truthful or not.
That is why, coming to the second part of the question, we do not recall offenders to custody on a significant response in itself. In answer to the question put to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that is not in the Bill, but it is firm policy. Therefore, “failure”, a term that the Committee will now appreciate is a form of shorthand, does not by itself or by default trigger a recall. Where it is safe to do so—for example, with the addition of new licence conditions—the offender can continue to be managed in the community. However, if a disclosure is made which indicates that the risk has escalated beyond the point where the offender can be managed safely in the community, they can be recalled to custody.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, I have received a request from the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, to speak after the Minister.
Lord Robathan (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for not adding my name, which I put down to speak but not on a particular group. Yet again, I find myself as the only person taking part in the debate who is not a lawyer. I shall come back to that later.
In layman’s terms, I joined the Zoom call on polygraph testing last week, to which other noble Lords referred, and it was extremely useful. I thank Heather Sutton from the probation service, Professor Don Grubin and others for laying it on because it explained to me what polygraph testing is. They explained straightaway that a polygraph is not a lie detector but an additional tool to enhance the safe and effective risk management of offenders and could not be used as evidence.
I did, in fact, ask why sex offending was used as the only precedent for using polygraphs on terrorists. I think that I sort of understood the response, which was that it was a question of denial. That is what they sought to find out. It was a very useful teach-in session.
That is why I am slightly puzzled that we are discussing these amendments. As I said, I am not a lawyer. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, reminded us that law can be a gift that keeps on giving. We were reminded of that only at the weekend. We heard from three Liberal Democrats. I think they all said—the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, certainly did—that you cannot use a polygraph test as evidence. If you cannot use it as evidence against the specific person against whom you have done the test, surely by implication it cannot be used as evidence against somebody else. My noble friend the Minister specifically pointed to hearsay. It seems that we are slightly arguing about angels on the head of a needle: it will not be used, so why on earth are we arguing about it? This was presented as a probing amendment, but it seems to be probing something that we do not really need to probe
The point of polygraph testing is that, as an additional tool, we would get away from the case of Usman Khan at Fishmongers’ Hall, who had convinced his mentor, Jack Merritt, that he was de-radicalised. Jack Merritt believed in him and his redemption, and Usman Khan killed him. Surely we should use these additional tools if they have any substance or credibility. From what we heard in the teach-in last week, polygraph testing has some credibility.
Let us please back the use of an additional tool until proved otherwise, because frankly we are dealing with something that I guess probably none of us in this Chamber or on this call understand. We do not understand why somebody would get into an aeroplane, train for months in the United States and then fly that aeroplane into the twin towers. We do not understand suicide bombers. We do not understand the radicalisation that takes place in these people, so surely we should give the Government every tool they can possibly have. I certainly back them on this.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the question put to me by my noble friend. As I said, that is precisely what the Government seek to do: to provide an additional tool for the management of these offenders. The point he made regarding deradicalisation is, if I may say so, very perceptive. It is a difficult part of the overall structure we are putting in place in the Bill, as we have in other legislation.
I am delighted to hear that my noble friend found the teach-in session helpful. I am particularly grateful to him for putting on record the names of the people who presented it. I know that they put a lot of work into putting it together.
The only point I would respectfully disagree with my noble friend on is one that I had cause to point out to another Member of your Lordships’ House—I think last week. One must really stop apologising for not being a lawyer. I think my noble friend did it twice. I pointed out last week that what is regarded as a cause for apology in this House is generally regarded as a badge of honour everywhere else. The question put to me by my noble friend exemplifies how this is a matter for lawyers and non-lawyers.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, at the briefing by the MoJ, I was one of those who volunteered—at some point when we are able to travel again—to undergo a test, because I would like to experience what it is like. I sound a note of caution about the use of private—sometimes confidential but certainly private—sessions. They are terrific and helpful, but only so far; I do not believe that they can take the place of public debate. I could respond at some length to the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, but it would be outside the scope of the amendment. The purpose of scrutiny and its place in the development of legislation mean that it must be undertaken in public. I do not mean to sound too pompous in saying that, but it is something that I believe very profoundly.
The Minister apologised for being a pesky lawyer, but I think that being a pesky lawyer or an activist lawyer is a badge of honour. I disagreed with the comment of my noble friend Lord Thomas that people would not want to apply polygraphs in criminal proceedings. I can imagine that there are a lot of situations when people in court think that they would very much like to apply a polygraph to some witnesses—but that is by the by. I have told myself that I would not take up too much time with this response, because we have a lot of amendments to get through.
Inevitably, perhaps, this turned into a more general debate. On the specific amendment, we are told that it is unnecessary, and that what one might take—I cannot think of the right term— from a polygraph would be unsuitable for use in court, because it would be hearsay. I shall have a look at that after today, but I think that there is a little bit of circularity in all that. Certainly, in the real world, the questions that might be asked would, I am sure, provide material for the police, if not the prosecution—but that is a common-sense response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 20. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press the amendment to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“Review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders
(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act being passed and before sections 32 to 35 come into force, conduct a pilot of the use of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders.(2) The outcome of the pilot must be reported to Parliament within 12 months of this Act being passed.(3) The report must include—(a) data on the number of terrorist offenders who have been subject to polygraph testing during the pilot;(b) an explanation of how the results of polygraph tests have been used during the pilot;(c) an analysis of the effect polygraph testing has had on the licence conditions of terrorist offenders;(d) data on the number of terrorist offenders who were recalled to prison on the basis of polygraph test results;(e) a recommendation from the Secretary of State as to whether sections 32 to 35 should enter into force following the pilot; and(f) evidence from independent research on the reliability and value of polygraph testing of terrorist offenders.” Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a pilot test of the use of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders and report the outcome to Parliament, in addition to setting out evidence for the reliability of polygraph tests based on independent research.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This amendment proposes that the Secretary of State, within six months of the Bill being passed, should set up a pilot to see how the polygraph condition works in relation to terrorist offenders. It is a probing amendment. It may well be that a different or longer period would be required for the pilot, but the purpose of a pilot is to test a number of aspects of polygraph testing. We have gone through this on the previous group, and I do not want to spend too much time on it because we have already discussed it a lot, but I have three particular concerns that would be tested by a pilot.
First, how does polygraph testing operate in practice? I would be grateful if the Minister, who was very helpful on the previous amendment, would give us some indications about how it works in practice. By that, I mean the following. If one asks a question of an offender in a polygraph test, “Did you, in breach of your conditions, visit a certain place?”, and he gives an answer to which there is—to use the language of the Minister and the briefing—a significant response, does that mean that further investigations take place? If there is no significant response, would that mean, for example, that there would not be any further investigation? Does that give rise to risks that too much reliance will be placed on the answers in polygraphs to, for example, not undertake further investigations?
My second area of concern is the one raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on Amendment 19. It would appear from the very helpful answer given by the Minister on the previous group that answers given would be admissible in proceedings against another offender, albeit that their admission would be subject to the discretion of the trial judge for the other offence. In certain circumstances I can see very clearly that they might be of real evidential value—for example, because they constituted an admission or because they constituted evidence of a conspiracy, depending on the content of what is being said. Can I take it that the Government are saying that they might in certain circumstances be admissible and that they are content for that to be the position? It is important that the Committee knows what the position is.
Thirdly, am I right in saying that decisions about recall are made not by a court but by a probation officer, and are there any reasons why he or she should not rely on a significant response—to use lay man’s language, a failure—of a polygraph test? I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, the questions that have been asked are important. We cannot assume that the rules that currently apply for use with sex offenders are going to apply in terrorism cases. Indeed, Clause 35(2) tells us that there may be particular rules for terrorism cases, and even if that was not in the Bill, we know that rules can be changed at any time, relatively easily.
Polygraphs do not have a great reputation with the public, and “The Jeremy Kyle Show” did not enhance it, which is another reason for wanting to explore details today. I made the point only yesterday on the Domestic Abuse Bill that operators have to follow courses accredited by the American Polygraph Association, and I was interested—I will try to use a neutral term—that we in this country are following American practice.
Under the rules, there are requirements about reports and records. I had a look at the 2009 rules, under which the operator is required to explain the requirements of the session: that anything disclosed might be communicated to the probation officer, and that there must be consent—or, rather, written confirmation—from the offender that these explanations have been given. I stopped myself calling it “consent” because, in that situation, I wonder whether the anxiety to which my noble friend Lord Thomas referred would preclude a complete understanding by the offender of what is happening. In that situation, knowing that refusal to take a test would amount to a breach of licence conditions, would you not sign anything?
The current reviewer of terrorism legislation has called for a pilot, and, if not a pilot, then post-legislative scrutiny. Not many Bills come along for post-legislative scrutiny by Parliament. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, painted a picture that I did not quite recognise. It sounded rather more like a departmental review—an internal review—than scrutiny by Parliament to see how an Act is getting on.
At last week’s briefing, I asked about the reliability of polygraphs used on subjects who have undergone some extreme experiences, such as having been in a war zone. I understand that that cohort is particularly in the Government’s mind at the moment. The professor of psychiatry—Professor Grubin, I think—who, I understand, advises the Home Office, realised that I was referring to trauma. I had not wanted to assume that they were subjects who had been traumatised, but he was right. I remain concerned not only about what might be perceived from offenders’ reactions but that the test itself might be retraumitising, so I think that the questions being posed are very helpful.
Lord Woolf (CB) [V]
My Lords, it has been a privilege to listen to the speeches this afternoon. I have benefited very much from what has been said by all noble Lords and I make these submissions bearing that in mind.
At the moment, I see Clause 35(1) as the most important provision dealing with polygraph licence conditions. What we have heard this afternoon indicates just how clearly we are engaged on a learning curve at present. As I read it, subsection (1) provides that the power to use polygraph licence conditions will be limited by the regulations made in that subsection. Therefore, it seems that the whole of this debate should be conditioned by that provision, and that is why I thought it right to intervene in this almost private party that is dealing with these issues.
It seems to me that we are on a learning curve not only with regard to the provisions of this Bill but generally on the use of polygraphs in this country. It is obviously very useful to have as much material as we can so that, before we give the Government such powers as we consider appropriate, we know what the limitations will be.
I of course recognise that the Ministers we have heard address the House today would have given the assurances they did only if they were confident that they would in fact be applicable. But the provisions will be in their final form only after the regulations have already been drafted and the limitations expressed. That is why I think the whole concept in the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, should be treated as being very appropriate, because this is the mechanism by which those limitations are going to be defined.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I was very happy with the Minister’s reply when he said that a significant response—not a failure—does not lead to a recall and to the loss of liberty of the person who is being examined by polygraph. That seemed to be a very clear statement. But the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has raised some interesting questions and I would like to pursue them a little further.
He asked how it works in practice; I ask how it works in principle. For example, on 26 January I raised the point of the right to silence. The person who is obeying the conditions of his licence by taking part in a polygraph test is asked a series of questions. Nobody has suggested that he is warned that he need not say anything unless he wishes to do so. He does not have a caution, and he does not apparently have a right to silence, because if he refuses to obey the condition of his licence—regardless of anything he may or not say about his position—he is presumably open to be recalled to prison and to lose his liberty. That is a very important point that we should consider and address.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, also introduced an interesting concept in relation to the third person—namely, can the transcript of a polygraph test be used as evidence of a conspiracy? We would like a straightforward response to that from the Minister.
Finally, my noble friend Lady Hamwee revealed something that I had not appreciated: the recall to prison—the loss of liberty—is determined not by the court but by a probation officer. A probation officer takes the decision. “Well, he’s refusing to answer the polygraph test, he’s breached his conditions and I’m going to send him back to prison.” That, to my mind, introduces an important point of principle.
I wholly support the proposal in the amendment that there should be a pilot to investigate these practical and principled questions that have been raised.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I support this amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, who has asked some very important questions. I say immediately that I valued very much the teach-in that I attended on Microsoft Teams on the working of the polygraph, and I thank the Minister for arranging it.
We are in a new field in this context, and an issue of this kind, when it is embedded on the face of the Bill, demands very close attention. I raised the issue briefly in my speech at Second Reading, and I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, when he states that we are on a learning curve. Having assisted my Minister, Barbara Castle, many years ago, in piloting through the House of Commons the breathalyser legislation to tackle drink driving, which was a very controversial issue at the time, I would be the last to oppose innovation per se, and I do not oppose this proposal. All I am anxious to know, in the fullness of time, is how it is working.
I learned at the teach-in that the polygraph is a useful tool in the management of offenders. It only gives an indication of past conduct, but it could be used to pick up warning signs on what might be done in the future, and is a significant tool for the management of offenders. The important point above all else was that an offender could not be recalled for failing a polygraph test. I believe that the Minister confirmed this in his reply to an earlier amendment. It is not a magic bullet and it is not 100% accurate. The examples given of its use, in the course of the teach-in, involved such questions as, “Have you had contact with other terrorist offenders?” or “Have you used the internet for any purposes contrary to your licence conditions?”. The polygraph cannot predict future conduct, only past conduct.
At the teach-in, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether the polygraph was used in other jurisdictions such as Canada, Israel and the USA. The reply was that it tended to be used for vetting purposes. It was not clear to me whether it could be used for other purposes. If I am wrong in my understanding of the observations that we have heard on this very helpful tool from a panel of experts, the Minister will correct me. However, the limited use of the polygraph is made clear in subsections (1) and (2) of the proposed new clause. It is important to put on the face of a Bill, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton has put in the amendment, the need for a pilot to be in use within six months, with a report to Parliament, in the terms of the amendment, within 12 months,
I will not take up the House’s valuable time in repeating the details that are set out in the amendment itself. All I will say is that, given the kind of problem that we face in the management of offenders, we should not shut our eyes to the possibilities of the actions now proposed. How important it will turn out to be will be a question of degree. Therefore, I support this amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I wish either that this group had been grouped with the previous group or that I had spoken in the previous group, as we seem to be going over the same ground. Can I also push my luck, at the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, as an out and proud non-lawyer and wonder out loud whether lawyers feel somewhat threatened that there might be a machine more able to tease out whether someone is telling the truth or not, or even to tease out a disclosure, than a lawyer? I do not believe lawyers need to worry. I feel this group and the previous one turned into an extension of the teach-in. But I shall press on.
Amendment 20, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to which my noble friend has added her name, calls for a review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders based on a pilot scheme. I take a slightly different view to my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Marks, probably because they are pure Liberal Democrats, unlike me, who am contaminated by 30 years’ experience as a police officer.
Yesterday, in discussion on the use of polygraph testing in the Domestic Abuse Bill, the Minister talked about how polygraph tests were used. I join other noble Lords in saying how helpful the teach-in on polygraph testing provided by the Ministry of Justice was, and I thank the ministry for it. In that presentation, if I recall correctly, we were told that the tests are 80% to 90% accurate, on the basis of tests carried out on sex offenders. The tests measure physiological changes that occur if someone is trying to think of a wrong answer about an experience they have had in the past. People usually instinctively think of the truthful answer before they offer a dishonest alternative, and this produces physiological changes that the tests pick up. The evidence suggests a dishonest response cannot be used in court, and it is not used to recall someone to prison, but it might prompt further investigation by the police. Failing the test is not a replacement for any other form of risk assessment.
From the notes I made at the time, which take me back to giving evidence in court as a police officer, polygraph tests also prompt disclosures that might not otherwise occur. If such a disclosure indicates the subject has breached their licence conditions or is a threat to the public, this can result in prison recall. In short, disclosures can result in immediate sanction, but failing the test can only lead to further investigation.
Although polygraph tests have been used on a large number of sex offenders and have, therefore, been thoroughly evaluated, it will be more difficult, even with a pilot, to evaluate use with terrorists, as there are far fewer of them. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford mentioned the right to silence, recalling what we were told in the teach-in. The difference here is that these are convicted offenders on licence, who have no right to silence. However, the science is the same whether we are dealing with sex offenders or terrorists, and polygraph tests are useful where there is a pattern of behaviour rather than a single act. It is, therefore, anticipated that their use in terrorism cases will be similarly effective. There has already been considerable experience of using polygraph tests and evaluating the results, somewhat at odds with the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. But in agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, I think that it is true to say there has been very limited, if any, experience of using polygraph tests in connection with terrorism offences.
I feel sure that the Government will use polygraph testing with terrorists and, as we will hear in a later group, those subject to TPIMs, on a trial basis, as they intend to do in relation to domestic abuse. But the opportunities to evaluate their effectiveness with terrorists will be more limited, because, as I said, the numbers are considerably smaller. I am sure the Minister will say whether I got that right.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, on the face of it the purpose of this amendment, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is to provide for a pilot of polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in the UK and for a report to be prepared and laid with a recommendation on commencement before the provisions are commenced. I appreciate, however, that the debate has gone a little broader than that, and I will try to respond in my remarks to all the points put to me. I should say at the outset that I am impressed by the note-taking ability of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has obviously not diminished with time. I hope that the notes which he took are consistent with not only what he was told at the meeting, as I am sure they are, but with what I said on the previous group and what I am going to say on this group as well.
Polygraph examinations have been used successfully in the management of sexual offenders by the National Probation Service since 2013, following an initial pilot. Offenders involved in the pilot stated that, although they did not like being tested, for many it helped them modify their behaviour and comply with other licence conditions. While I therefore respectfully agree with the comments of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, that we are on a learning curve, we are in fact someway up the curve, if I may put it in those terms. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was right to remind us of Clause 35(1), which provides for regulations in this context. The breathalyser is a good example, as put before the Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, of how we must always in the criminal justice field avoid being shy of using technology where it is available. The question is how it is to be used; it is in that context that I come to the questions put to me by the Members of the Committee.
Having put that provision in place for sexual offenders, the independent evaluation of mandatory testing on sexual offenders carried out by the University of Kent produced extremely positive results. As the Committee is aware, we have since rolled out polygraph testing in that context. We must therefore be wary of two things. First, we must be wary of the trap of saying that because something might or might not be used in “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, it should form no part of the criminal justice system. “The Jeremy Kyle Show”, which I think has now stopped, can look out for itself. My concern is to ensure that we have proper provisions for polygraph testing in the criminal justice system.
The second thing we must be careful of, if I may respectfully say so, is not to fall into the trap of thinking that anything which comes from the United States of America is inherently suspect in the criminal justice field. I would gently point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the American Polygraph Association’s standards are those of an international professional association for polygraph examiners. That association carries out research and provides accredited training for examiners. It also provides mandatory professional development training, which all examiners must complete every two years to maintain their accreditation. Its standards are used by examiners across the world, and the Government want to ensure that those standards are maintained for examinations conducted on terrorist offenders.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Noble Lords may be pleased to know that we have had no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to everybody who has participated in the debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon—all of whom, with the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, supported the idea of some sort of pilot. I am also very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his response.
I take from this debate that there are very considerable issues and uncertainty around the use of polygraphs because they are quite new in this country. Like everybody else, I am concerned that, if they are a genuinely useful tool, they should be available to the authorities.
I am struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said about not having enough terrorist offenders on which to base a pilot, and I take note of that. I understood him to say that the Government will themselves carry out a review within two years. In light of what he said, I am minded to think that the right thing to do is to come back on Report with an amendment suggesting a pilot which can embrace all the terrorist offenders, because there will not be that many. That will not restrict the Government from using them now, but it will require them within two years—not the 12 months I have referred to—to come back with the information referred to in proposed new subsection (3) of the amendment. That would be good from the point of view of informing the public about polygraphs and, more importantly, informing the Government on how they do it, because they have to make a report on it.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for his response, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendments at page 94, line 15, page 94, line 29 and page 94, line 41 are consequential on the removal of Clause 33.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 93, line 28.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 93, line 28.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 93, line 28.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 53, line 41.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment at page 53, line 41.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 27. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make this clear in the debate.
Clause 37: TPIMs: condition as to involvement in terrorism-related activity
Amendment 27
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
“(a) for the first year of the TPIM, has reasonable grounds for suspecting; and(b) for any further years of the TPIM, is satisfied on the balance of probabilities,””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would leave in place the existing standard of proof for the second and subsequent years of any TPIM notice.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, TPIMs, or terrorism prevention and investigation measures, are the successors to, and relatives of, control orders. They may be imposed at the discretion of the Secretary of State, unless a court, on a preliminary look, considers them “obviously flawed”, if specified criteria are satisfied. They are summarised like this in the March 2020 annual report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation:
“There are up to 14 measures that can be imposed including overnight residence requirements; relocation to another part of the United Kingdom; police reporting; an electronic monitoring tag; exclusion from specific places; limits on association; limits on the use of financial services and use of telephones and computers; and a ban on holding travel documents. Breach of any measure is a criminal offence.”
It is common for all or substantially all of those measures to be imposed, severely limiting the basic freedoms of the subjects and impinging heavily on their families. Relocation—removed by the coalition in 2012—was reinstated in 2015. Additional measures are, of course, contained in the Bill.
The issue raised by Clause 37 and by these amendments, including Amendment 27 in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, is: how strongly must the Secretary of State suspect a person of involvement in terrorism before choosing to impose a TPIM on them? Since TPIMs succeeded control orders in 2012, the Secretary of State has been required to have a reasonable belief that the intended subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity—a belief, in other words, that the person has been involved in some capacity in the wide range of activity spelled out in Section 4 of the TPIM Act 2011. That range is not limited to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; it extends also to those who encourage, support and assist such behaviour. Nor need any specific act of terrorism be in prospect.
The “reasonable belief” formulation was amended in 2015 to one of satisfaction on the balance of probabilities, but the meaning is to all intents and purposes the same. The bottom line is that, before imposing this most extreme of all executive measures, the Home Secretary needs to have formed the view only that someone is, or was, probably involved in terrorism. That is already an easy standard to satisfy in the case of anyone who is likely to be a candidate for a TPIM—resource-intensive measures, as they are, that are not lightly applied for.
It is not a court that has to apply the balance of probabilities, on the basis only of admissible evidence. The judgment is entrusted to the Secretary of State, and she makes it, crucially, on the basis not just of admissible evidence but of the intelligence assessments with which she is provided by the Security Service and others. Such intelligence far exceeds what could be placed before a civil or criminal court. It is likely to include intercept material, or material supplied by foreign liaison partners who are unwilling to see it deployed in a public setting, or reports from a covert human intelligence source, whose existence could never be publicly disclosed. The Secretary of State sees all that in the form of documents, which, when I reviewed these things, I repeatedly described as thorough and conscientious. Everything is available to her, and she is required to conclude only that it probably demonstrates some involvement, past or present, in terrorism-related activity.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, given the experience of those who have put their names to the amendments in this group, I wonder whether I should say nothing so as not to damage the arguments—but I will join in.
It will be clear enough to the Committee that we on these Benches have considerable concerns about this part of the Bill. I hope that the Committee will understand that this does not mean that we do not take very seriously indeed the threat and actuality of terrorism and the work undertaken by our agencies. I say that because our amendments to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Bill, which we completed earlier, seemed to be heard by some noble Lords as opposition to covert sources period when we were directing ourselves to authorisations to commit crime by the mechanism of making the action not a crime. I do not want too much to be read into what I am saying. This is not opposition, as I say, to the work of those who keep us as safe as they possibly can.
We are not hugely keen on TPIMs, especially on their acquiring extensions that take them back closer to control orders. We consider it appropriate to test these administrative measures in terms of how they measure up to the presumption of innocence, fair trial, liberty and all the matters that we as a society hold to be important, knowing the damage that might be done by letting them slip. We are of course aware of the Government’s argument that it is not the TPIMs themselves that we should be looking to, but the application of particular measures. If you look at that from a slightly different perspective, it is a good argument for legislative safeguards.
At the time of the last three-monthly report to Parliament on 30 November, only three TPIM notices were in force, there having been six the previous May. That begs the question as to the need for these clauses. The Home Office fact sheet on lowering the standard of proof tells us that this would
“increase flexibility by making it more practical for operational partners to demonstrate an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.”
That requirement should indeed be more than merely suspected.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred to the statement in the Commons by the Minister. The current standard of proof does not seem to have prevented the imposition of TPIMs. The current independent reviewer has made the same point, so this is not even a matter of administrative convenience. These measures may be civil but they can, quite understandably, be perceived as a parallel system of punishment without trial, but currently on the basis of the civil standard.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, seek to meet the Government part way. We take the view that the alterations are not justified. I have referred to the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. To quote from his note on this part of the Bill,
“it is inevitable from the nature of intelligence that mistakes may be made. The significance of an individual’s actions may potentially be misinterpreted; their adherence to a cause overstated; their intentions misunderstood, if only partially. A safeguard that requires the Secretary of State to consider the intelligence presented to her by officials, and decide whether the individual has actually been involved in the terrorist-related activity that is alleged against them, and which allows a court to review that decision in the light of all information presented to it, is not an impediment to safeguarding national security.”
We oppose this clause standing part of the Bill.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke with such eloquence in making all the points that I can confine myself to making four short points.
First, as he rightly stressed, this is an important part of the conditions for TPIMs because it enables a judge and the Home Secretary, when making the decision, to concentrate on the factual evidence in relation to terrorist activity. The other conditions are more difficult to establish, or it might be more a question of judgment, but this at least concentrates on the facts.
Secondly, the amendment seeks what some may feel is an overgenerous compromise. I do not think so; I think that it is right to say that, for the first and initial period, a lower standard can be acceptable.
However, thirdly, that cannot be acceptable when one is looking at longer periods where a person’s liberty is to be constrained—particularly with the amendment that we will come to next, which concerns the indefinite detention period.
Fourthly, and finally, it seems to me that there can be no justification for making such a change unless there is evidence. Indeed, what was said about the position in the other place has been clearly set out.
I ask the Minister to set out fully what he believes is the evidence for this change. If he cannot do so in public on this occasion, there must be a means of informing those who are interested in this matter of the evidence so that it can be carefully reviewed before we impose on people accused of obviously very serious issues a standard of proof that really is completely unacceptable in any civilised society.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given your Lordships a very clear and succinct history of control orders and TPIMs—as one would expect, given his experience. He pointed out very fairly that control orders had the very same test that it is now proposed in the Bill should be used to decide whether a TPIM is appropriate. It is also worth pointing out that control orders were highly controversial and subject to a considerable number of challenges in the courts to see whether they survived a proper challenge based on the European Court of Human Rights and the convention. They survived that, which will reassure your Lordships.
I accept that the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which is supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is relatively modest, and I understand the reasoning for it, whereas the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, goes rather further and seems to involve a degree of subjectivity—although I will listen with interest to what he says—and that subjectivity might be difficult to satisfy.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester [V]
My Lords, I draw the Committee’s attention to my interest in criminal justice matters, specifically as chair of the Greater Manchester Police independent ethics committee, as set out in the register.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for tabling Amendment 28. I also note with interest Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. His arguments are powerful, not least in distinguishing clearly between belief and a mere suspicion, a distinction which for me as a bishop lies at the heart of my day job.
As I indicated to your Lordships’ House in my maiden speech at Second Reading, this is a Bill that I welcome and support. My city of Manchester has all too recently suffered a terrorist attack that killed 22 innocent people and maimed and traumatised hundreds more. We remain deeply grateful for the support we received from members of this House, government Ministers and many others at that time and since.
What I seek from the Bill are provisions that will most effectively reduce terrorism across our nation. My concern, particularly with regard to this clause, is that sanctions that are deemed by particular sections of the British public as either too severe or to be based on insufficient evidence will prove counterproductive. Measures that are overly harsh or that can plausibly be presented as such breed a sense of injustice and resentment, and if those sanctions appear to be directed against particular sections of the community, that may deepen into alienation, and alienation remains one of the most effective recruiting sergeants for incipient terrorists.
We rightly demand a high level of proof for a criminal conviction and a lesser but still significant standard on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. What we are presented with in Clause 37 as it stands is far weaker. All we are offered as an evidential base for a TPIM is “reasonable grounds for suspecting” an individual. That turn of phrase, suspicion, has a somewhat troubled history. Large sections of our community have, I would argue “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that policing interventions justified by reference to that phrase have been used disproportionately against people of their colour, religion or lifestyle. To apply this suspect standard to something as significant as a TPIM, which may be extended for some years, will increase the very risks to our society that it is intended to address.
In his Amendment 28, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, offers us a modest strengthening of the wording to include a test of probability alongside that of reasonableness. I hope that the Minister will be able indicate to this House that some form of strengthening the clause, either through Amendment 28 or otherwise, will be supported by Her Majesty’s Government as we continue to debate the Bill.
Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate, particularly because he and I are cuckoos in this nest of lawyers. I speak in opposition to the Question that Clause 37 stand part of the Bill.
The TPIM system is seriously problematic because it bypasses the criminal justice system to avoid the usual safeguards that protect liberty and fairness. The system allows a Government to rely on secret, undisclosed evidence while bypassing fair-trial rights and impose measures that severely interfere with the right to liberty, privacy, association and movement, and makes a breach of those measures a criminal offence. I do not expect to win the argument today about TPIMs per se but must object in the strongest terms to Clauses 37, 38 and 40. Between them, they make this troubling TPIM system far more constrictive while removing the main current safeguards.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, called the combined effect of Clauses 37 and 40 a “double whammy”. Taken together, they significantly lower the burden of proof at the same time as allowing TPIMs to endure forever for a person who has not been formally charged or prosecuted. The independent reviewer made it clear that he supports not changing the burden of proof and advises that it be left as it is. To my knowledge, the Government have yet to come forward with any convincing evidence for hardening the TPIM regime in any of the three ways that these clauses, Clauses 37, 38 and 40, would bring about. Indeed, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said in his note on the proposed reforms that it is,
“not clear why there is any need to change the law in the manner proposed.”
Even a third-ranking police officer, an assistant chief constable, who was wheeled out to support the Bill in oral evidence to the Bill Committee, conceded that,
“there have not been occasions thus far when the current burden of proof has prevented the application of a TPIM”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 20.]
Therefore, my two questions to the Minister are: why have the Government ignored the independent reviewer’s advice and where is the evidence to justify that decision? I look forward to his answers. I hope that he can do better than the “another tool in the box” mantra.
Clause 37 will reduce the burden of proof to such a low level as to make it almost no barrier at all. “Reasonable grounds for suspecting” covers a host of situations where an innocent person could unjustly lose their liberty and other rights, perhaps on the basis of a single, flimsy and uncorroborated piece of evidence. The courts have interpreted the standard of suspicion as a belief not that the person is a terrorist, only that they may be a terrorist. If a Minister merely believes that a person may be a terrorist, that is sufficient justification under this clause to impose a TPIM on them. With the best will in the world, this is such a low burden of proof that it makes the ministerial decision to impose a TPIM into a rubber-stamping exercise, more or less, with no constraints on the action whatever. The implications of such a severe and unfettered executive power should worry every Member of this House.
Combined with Clause 38, Clause 37 would mean that a Minister would have the authority to severely constrain the liberty of a possibly innocent person for ever, on the flimsiest justification, possibly cooked up by a rogue policeman, intelligence agent or government official, or it might just be that someone in the chain of command made an innocent mistake. We cannot allow this proposed new power to deprive someone of their liberty and other rights indefinitely—possibly longer than if they were convicted of a terrorist offence in a criminal court—when the process that put them there is so wide open to errors and abuse. There must be a meaningful burden of proof, but Clause 37 removes that. It therefore must not stand part of this Bill.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. Like him, I have some difficulty with Clauses 37, 38 and 40. I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates, so I have no direct experience of these issues, but in preparing for today I have been grateful for the excellent briefing that the Law Society of England shared with me. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for setting out so clearly the thinking behind his Amendment 27. We will hear in a moment the thinking behind Amendment 28 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
It says something when the past Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the present one both have enormous difficulties with Clauses 37, 38 and 40 as they stand. Like my noble friend Lord Faulks, I would like to understand the thinking behind why, in the context of this Bill on counterterrorism and sentencing, the Government feel moved to introduce these provisions against the weight of opinion of the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and, so it would appear, legal practitioners on the front line as solicitors dealing with these issues.
I am entirely in agreement with noble Lords who have explained the reasons behind their concerns about Clause 37 as it stands. It will deprive people of their liberty, as it contains measures that would relax the evidential threshold on imposing a TPIM, allowing the Home Secretary to impose one on the basis of having “reasonable grounds for suspecting” rather than being
“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity”.
I understand that TPIMs are not currently widely used and that only five were in force as of November 2019, so I struggle to understand why we are seeking to change the law in this way. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester said in his excellent contribution, we want to have confidence in the legislation. He expressed that his aim is to reduce terrorism and not give any cause to query the legislation before us.
I end my short contribution with a question directly to the Minister. Considering the issues that we have heard about in a number of contributions in this little debate, would he agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and share the misgivings of legal practitioners that this clause is not required? What guarantees can my noble friend give me today that the measures in Clauses 37 and 38 will not lead to an increased use of TPIMs in situations where they are not appropriate? With those few remarks, I look forward to the reply from my noble friend.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, we wish to see the current arrangements for terrorism prevention and investigation measures remain as they are, despite having concerns about them existing at all. As the name implies, these measures were designed to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has explained, intelligence is often received in relation to suspected terrorists that cannot be used in a criminal trial, either because it is not legally admissible or because it would reveal the source and potentially put the source’s life in danger. That needs to be balanced against Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined in British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. It requires that, in the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or for any criminal charge against an individual, everyone is entitled to a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law—this despite what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said about control orders withstanding such challenges in the past.
The answer to these potentially conflicting obligations is TPIMs, which are supposed to be a means of protecting the public while an investigation secures the evidence necessary to convict a person of a criminal offence. They were not intended to be indefinite house arrest without trial. As we will see in the groups that follow, the Government seek to overturn this principle of a time-limited safeguarding tool during an investigation into effectively indefinite deprivation of human rights without trial.
The conditions imposed by a TPIM can be draconian, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said. The subject can be told where to live and have to tell the authorities about anyone else who lives with them. They may need to get permission to stay somewhere else, they may not be allowed to travel outside a specified area without permission, they may have to surrender their passports and they may be prohibited from going to a particular place or area without permission or without being accompanied by a police officer. The authorities can have complete control over the subject’s bank and credit card accounts and they can be told that they cannot possess cash over a certain amount. The authorities can have complete control over the sale or transfer of any property that the subject has and complete control over transferring money to anyone, as well as complete control over use of phones, computers and any other electronic communication device owned or used by the subject or by anyone else who lives with the subject—these measures affect not only the subject but their innocent loved ones as well.
Authorities can have complete control over who the subject meets or communicates with and over where the subject works or studies. The subject may be required to report to a specified police station at specified times and to have their photograph taken at whatever time and location the Secretary of State requires and they can be electronically tagged. On the one hand, noble Lords will understand why the authorities might want to impose such conditions if the person is believed to be a terrorist threat, but they will also understand that TPIMs amount to interference with some of the most fundamental human rights of the subject.
These restrictions on someone’s freedoms and human rights have echoes of the sort of restrictions imposed by ISIS when it declared territory it once held a caliphate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in a Guardian article written when this House was considering the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 13 October 2008,
“we should fight to protect the liberties the terrorists would take from us, not destroy them ourselves.”
The first element the Government want to change through the Bill, which is covered by this group of amendments, is the standard of proof required before someone can be subjected to a TPIM. Originally, as we have heard, in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 the Secretary of State had to “reasonably believe” that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. This was changed by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to the Secretary of State having to be satisfied
“on the balance of probabilities”
—the standard required for a court to be satisfied in a civil case. The Government want to change this standard of proof to
“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.
A police constable may arrest someone when he has reasonable cause to suspect, and I can tell the Committee from my own personal and professional experience that this is a very low bar indeed. Of course, we are not talking about a police officer detaining someone for a few minutes or a few hours but about restricting someone’s human rights for up to two years, or indefinitely, if the Bill passes unamended. That is a shocking and frightening prospect.
If noble Lords’ common sense and sense of justice are not engaged by my arguments, perhaps they will be convinced by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, whom other noble Lords have mentioned. He has said:
“I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower … If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; cols. 6-7.]
That is actually seven words, but I think we understand what he meant. To which, no doubt, the Government will deploy the same argument successive Labour Governments used in trying unsuccessfully to extend the period that a terror suspect could be detained by the police without charge, initially under Tony Blair’s premiership to 90 days, and subsequently under Gordon Brown to 42 days. Operational partners argued that, although limits on the period a subject could be detained without charge had not been a problem up until then, they could envisage a situation where it might be an issue in the future. I suspect that is similar to the arguments the Government will deploy here. Both times, Parliament resoundingly defeated the proposals.
It is important that we consider the reputation of this country throughout the world for the effective protection of human rights. We should not allow such draconian limits on people’s civil liberties to be imposed on the basis of such a low standard of proof—lower than any court employs, even in civil cases.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his Amendment 27, offers a compromise, which he is developing a reputation for, trying to steer between what is arguably necessary and reasonable and what he, not without precedent, thinks the Government might accept. He suggests in his amendment that, for the first year, while intelligence-gathering is in its infancy, a TPIM might be imposed on the Government’s standard of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. After a year, the authorities should have been able to gather sufficient evidence for the Secretary of State to be convinced on the existing balance of probabilities. I see where the noble Lord is coming from but, with the greatest of respect to him, I am with the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on this one rather than with the former.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was not only a member of the Labour Governments to which I have just referred but, from memory, was fairly central to the attempts to extend detention without trial. His Amendment 28 would substitute the standard of proof required with
“on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds”.
I look forward to hearing his explanation of how this differs from the existing and government-proposed standards of proof, as, I must confess and with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, when I wrote this speech on Sunday morning I had neither the energy nor the required determination to work it out for myself. Having finished at midnight last night, I have even less energy this evening.
The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation thinks that we should leave the standard of proof where it is. We agree, which is why we believe that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, as ever. I am sorry that he did not have the energy to get to my amendment, but I completely understand why that would be. The difference between my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that mine seeks to unpack what the standard of proof would be; it requires an objective standard of “probable grounds”: in effect, balance of probabilities, but more spelled out. The difference between the amendments is that, in effect, the noble Lord’s amendment would give a year when the lower standard—namely, reasonable suspicion—could apply and thereafter insist on the balance of probabilities. The real difference is that first year of grace which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would give to the Government or the Secretary of State to have a lower standard of proof.
Our position on this side of the House is that the TPIM powers have utility to the Government for fighting terrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated clearly the intrusive effect of TPIMs on those subject to them; for example, having to move to a different location, not being entitled to go to particular places, or not being able to associate or communicate with particular people. These are powers of utility for the Government. They are, however, intrusive and infringe against what would otherwise be people’s rights. Before those rights are taken away, it is for this House to decide what the right balance should be between those individuals’ rights and the protection of the public.
All those who have looked at it in any detail, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his successor as the terrorism reviewer, take the view that the higher standard of proof from that which the Government currently propose—namely, the balance of probabilities—has not caused them any difficulty in imposing TPIMs where they want to. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it, there is no need to lower the standard to keep the public safe.
In addition to the point that no change is required, a significant change is being made to the ability to roll over TPIMs indefinitely, so the consequence of the proposed amendments to the existing law being suggested by the Government in this Bill is to lower the standard of proof for no purpose and to do so on the basis of indefinite restrictions on individuals’ liberty.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester was, in my view, correct to say that the right approach is to ensure that the Government have the right powers but also to ensure that people are confident that they are being properly imposed. If people do not have that confidence, it will cause difficulties down the line.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have tabled and introduced their amendments and all the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.
Following the dreadful attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, the Government reviewed the range of disruption and risk management tools at the disposal of those agencies whose job it is to keep us safe and identified areas that could be strengthened to improve public protection. We are committed to ensuring that the police and Security Service have the necessary tools to support them in their vital work.
TPIMs are an important part of those tools available to our operational partners. They were, as noble Lords have said, introduced in 2011, replacing control orders as a tool to prevent or restrict an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. TPIMs are a last resort to protect the public from dangerous individuals whom it is not possible to prosecute or deport and offenders who remain a real threat after being released from prison. Clause 37 will increase the flexibility of TPIMs by amending the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, lowering the standard of proof from “balance of probabilities” to “reasonable grounds for suspecting”.
Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, would, as he outlined, require the Home Secretary to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that an individual has been involved in terrorism-related activity when extending a TPIM notice beyond a second year. The standard of proof for initially imposing a TPIM under his amendment would be “reasonable suspicion”, the same as proposed by the Bill. I thank the noble Lord not only for the way he introduced his amendment but for his helpful outline of the background to TPIMs, control orders and the landscape against which we must examine these questions. Like everyone in your Lordships'’ House, I have immense respect for the noble Lord, who began his time as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation before I started working as an adviser at the Home Office and was still in post long after I had left. With respect, however, we do not agree with the need for his amendment.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, anticipated, I will point out that the 2011 Act requires that five conditions be met before a TPIM can be imposed. These are:
“Condition A is that the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.”
Clause 37 amends that condition so the standard of proof will be “reasonable suspicion”. The Act continues:
“Condition B is that some or all of the relevant activity is new terrorism-related activity … Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual … Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual … Condition E is that … the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 6”
to impose the TPIM. This happens in advance of the TPIM being imposed, or shortly after in an urgent case.
The Government are amending only one of these conditions—condition A, regarding the standard of proof. Lowering the standard of proof does not mean that the Government will be able to extend TPIMs whenever there is a suspicion of terrorism-related activity. To address the question raised by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, this is not about the frequency of TPIMs but about their flexibility as a tool for our operational partners. All the other conditions will remain unchanged, and with robust safeguards. These require the Home Secretary to be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate, to protect the public from a risk of terrorism, to impose a TPIM notice and the measures specified in it on an individual. The Government contend that proving past terrorism-related activity and demonstrating necessity are separate and distinct limbs of the TPIM test. It is also the Government’s contention that demonstrating necessity and proportionality is the key factor when considering whether a TPIM notice should be renewed beyond its first year, rather than the standard of proof applied to terrorism-related activity.
The Section 16 appeals process is particularly important in the context of longer TPIMs. I am certain that the court will take great care, when considering Section 16 appeals, that conditions C and D, which I outlined a moment ago, continue to be met. It may help if I offer a hypothetical case to demonstrate how an enduring TPIM might work in practice. Let us imagine a scenario in which a charismatic radicaliser has been relocated, has had an overnight residence measure imposed, is prohibited from accessing internet-enabled devices and is banned from associating with several individuals. Over time, it would be reasonable to expect the TPIM notice to contain ever fewer measures, so that, for example, only one prohibited associate remained. In that sense the TPIM might function similarly to licence conditions.
There is clear precedent from the control order regime which operated under a previous Government and which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, will remember, allowed for control orders to be renewed without placing a limit on the number of renewals or increasing the standard of proof the longer they endured for the orders not to last indefinitely. Within the lifetime of control orders, 30 individuals were subject to an order for up to two years, eight for between two and three years, four for between three and four years, and only three for between four and five years. There were many cases in which the then Government either revoked or decided not to renew the control order on the grounds that the necessity test was no longer satisfied. A similar approach would be taken with TPIMs following the enactment of this clause. The Government have no desire to keep people on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. Removing the time limit is intended to address the risk of TPIM subjects riding out the current maximum of two years with no change to their mindset, and to address the risk of a cliff edge being created by forcing a TPIM to be removed when a risk to public safety remains. I am conscious that we will look at this issue in more detail in the next group, but I make those points because the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said he would be keeping his ears open for a response.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, the Public Bill Committee in another place, heard from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, Deputy Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, who spoke not just for the police but on behalf of the security services, and outlined some hypothetical cases where a lower standard of proof could make a substantive difference. I think it would be helpful to highlight the practical examples he gave. The first scenario is where significant concern about an individual’s behaviour or activities as a radicaliser has led to their arrest. There may be, however, insufficient material to reach the prosecution threshold and the individual would have to be released. As ACC Jacques says, the lower burden of proof may help to manage the risk posed by the individual while further investigative and risk-mitigation measures are pursued.
The second scenario ACC Jacques gave is where an individual’s risk profile accelerates rapidly in the form of their moving quickly from consuming terrorist material online to presenting a future risk of attack. We have sadly seen this in the case of many lone-actor terrorists. There will not always be sufficient evidence to prosecute in a scenario such as this, particularly where an individual does not have a long history of terrorism-related activity. While a variety of tools and controls to manage this risk will be considered by our operational partners, and a TPIM may not be the measure that is ultimately deemed most appropriate, lowering the standard of proof will help to ensure that a TPIM can be used where it is deemed the best tool for mitigating the risk.
The third scenario that ACC Jacques gave was where an individual has been to, say, Syria to fight for a terrorist organisation, but evidence of their activities while they are overseas is hard to gather. This addresses the point raised by my noble friend Lord Faulks. There will be a range of tools which the Government and their operational partners will consider using on a case-by-case basis to prevent or to manage that individual’s return to the UK and, if they return, prosecution will remain our strong preference. However, if there are evidential difficulties, as understandably there are when we talk about activity in theatre in places such as Syria, and we cannot meet the burden of proof required by a criminal court—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—but we do have a reasonable suspicion that a person has been involved in terrorism-related activity, then the lower standard of proof will ensure that a TPIM can be considered as a risk management tool to protect the public here in the UK.
I think it was worth setting those out in detail because these are credible and not unlikely scenarios for which we must be prepared. That is why we contend that setting the standard of proof at reasonable grounds for suspecting at the extension stage is just as important as at the imposition of a TPIM to maintain a TPIM for as long as necessary.
I now turn to Amendment 28 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. His amendment would require the Home Secretary to believe
“on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds”
rather than have “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity before imposing a TPIM. Again, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, we do not agree with the necessity of this amendment.
The noble and learned Lord’s amendment proposes a mixture of recognised standards of proof within the TPIM regime. Specifically, it appears to blend the standards of “reasonable belief” and “balance of probabilities”. As the noble and learned Lord said, he has suggested this formulation with the intention of creating a new middle ground between those two standard—that is, a balance between the standard which applied when the 2011 Act was first introduced, and the current standard of proof following changes made by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Although I am not a lawyer and, mindful of the entreaties of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I do not apologise for that—I speak as a non-lawyer—but I must suggest that the mixing of established standards of proof which are recognised by the courts and by decision-makers would not be helpful or appropriate. We are not aware of evidence that the recognised standards are, in and of themselves, inoperable as thresholds. Given the potential for confusion in the application of this amendment—that is, blending legal tests of belief and probability—we urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment on this ground alone.
Additionally, the amendment would require a higher standard of proof than is proposed under the Bill. That goes against the policy intent of the Bill, which is to ensure that our operational partners can make use of TPIMs more flexibly in their efforts to protect the public. The pace at which the Security Service and the police must operate to thwart attacks and manage risk to the public is faster than ever before. The question of whether a person has carried out terrorism-related activity will often depend on an incomplete jigsaw puzzle of intelligence rather than hard evidence, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, outlined in opening this debate. In such cases, it is right that we give our operational partners the option of a TPIM as a risk management tool.
I have already referred to the evidence given by ACC Tim Jacques, which outlined the Security Service’s assessment of the benefits of lowering the standard of proof. The three scenarios he outlined—the activities of a known radicaliser, a rapidly escalating risk from someone who has consumed terrorist-related content online and a foreign fighter returning from Syria—all apply in relation to this amendment as well and form part of the Government’s justification for respectfully disagreeing with it.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister and I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation but I am somewhat confused. He cites the evidence given by assistant chief constable Tim Jacques and the three examples that he gave. I will carefully read his evidence in Hansard and what the Minister has said the assistant chief constable said.
From what the Minister was saying, the assistant chief constable was saying why TPIMs were necessary. It was because—I think I am quoting the Minister accurately—there was not sufficient evidence to reach the criminal standard of proof, but the criminal standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt”. From the examples that the assistant chief constable gave—as I say, I shall go back and read them carefully—I thought there was definitely evidence that the person may be involved in terrorism on the balance of probabilities. There would therefore be no reason in the three scenarios that the assistant chief constable gave for issuing a TPIM against those three people, on the current evidence.
The Minister has apparently ignored the history of this Parliament and its views on so-called future proofing, when it comes to the deprivation of people’s liberties and the severe imposition of restrictions on people’s human rights, as evidenced by the former Labour Government’s attempts to extend the period that terrorist suspects could be detained by the police without charge. Parliament does not take kindly to, “Well, okay, we accept that there is no evidence that a change in the standard of proof is necessary in this case, but it might be in the future, so we’re doing it just in case”. We cannot deprive people of their liberty to the extent that TPIMs do on the basis of “Well, it might be required in future”.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, there were a number of questions in the noble Lord’s intervention there. I certainly encourage him to reread the evidence given by ACC Jacques on 25 June 2020. Asked specifically about the proposal to change the burden of proof, he said:
“The Security Service points to three instances where it thinks this would have utility from an operational perspective.”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Public Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 20]
He then outlined the three scenarios that I have just repeated—but it is certainly worth looking at his evidence in full.
We are not ignoring the views of Parliament; that is why we are here in Committee, rightly scrutinising this Bill. But I repeat that we are talking about a burden of proof that has previously existed and been enacted by your Lordships’ House and the other place; it was repeatedly tested in the courts and found to be compatible with the ECHR, so I am not sure that I agree with the characterisation that the noble Lord gives.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
I am grateful to the Minister for his courteous response. I do not think I ever had the pleasure of meeting him in Marsham Street, although I had a good deal of respect for his boss. I am also grateful to noble Lords from all three main parties, the Cross Benches and the Bench of Bishops, who made such interesting and supportive contributions to this debate.
Those speeches will repay careful study and, after my long opening speech, noble Lords would not thank me for revisiting their many highlights. I will say simply that it was striking to hear the observation of a former Lord Chief Justice that the change now proposed, described by the Minister as “marginal”, is “completely unacceptable in a civilised society”. I defer to the right reverend Prelate on the theological distinction between belief and suspicion, while making a mental note to ask him some time where faith fits into the spectrum.
The central question, to which, with respect to the Minister, I received no satisfactory answer, is this: if, as Chris Philp said in the Commons, the current standard of proof has, in almost 10 years, not stopped a desired TPIM from being granted, why do we need to change it? The Minister spoke of “hypothetical” cases of, for example, a returning Syrian fighter. Well, we have had 15 years-worth of real cases under control orders and TPIMS, including several hundred returned Syrian fighters who were screened and considered for these measures, and it remains the case that this issue has not posed any problem in practice.
The Minister spoke of “flexibility”. Well, most of us are flexible enough to countenance some compromise, even of basic freedoms, if there is a pressing reason for it, whether that be public health or public safety. However, until I have seen that pressing reason—or at least fully understood what it is supposed to be—I cannot support Clause 37.
The point was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the hypothetical cases put forward in support of 90-day police detention were without foundation. We have managed perfectly well in practice for 10 years with the 14-day limit introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.
No doubt we will come back to these issues at a later stage. Before that, I shall reflect on the fair challenge from both the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that, in formulating Amendment 27, I may, in the absence of evidence for its position from the Government, have been too ready to compromise in respect of the first year. As to that first year, the Minister said nothing very specific—unless I missed it. However, for now, as is usual at this stage of the proceedings, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 29. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Clause 38: TPIMs: extension of time limit
Amendment 29
Baroness Hamwee
“(za) in subsection (3)(a), after “met” insert “and the court gives the Secretary of State permission”;(zb) after subsection (3), insert—“(3A) In determining the extension, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.”
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, we have Amendment 29 in this group, and we oppose Clause 38 standing part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has Amendment 30. The clause allows for repeated renewals a year at a time, instead of the two-year time limit. I should perhaps acknowledge that the rubric or clause heading is “extension of time limit”. However, I noted that the Minister, in responding to the last group, referred to an “enduring TPIM”.
It is difficult to disaggregate the changes and their impact, because they will be cumulative, but this group of amendments is about the time limit. So, when he focuses on that, I hope that the Minister can share with the Committee real cases where the expiry of a TPIM has caused a problem. In other words, this is a parallel question to the questions asked and the points put in the debate on the last group regarding the standard.
TPIMs were originally intended as targeted temporary measures under emergency legislation that Parliament had to reapprove each year. As I have said, our concerns about the standard are compounded by the removal of the time limit with no additional safeguards. Even if the notice has been revoked and revived, or expired, it seems that it can be continued. Can the Minister help me by confirming whether, once subject to a TPIM—at any rate, one imposed after this Bill has been enacted—one is always subject to it being reimposed? I am intrigued that the extension cannot apply to a current TPIM but, presumably, there is nothing to stop there being a new TPIM. What is the difference between the current three measures in force, which I referred to in the previous group, and those which are expected to come within the scope of this clause?
The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is critical in his notes on this, as on the previous point. He says:
“If there is an operational need … despite the fact that fresh terrorism-related activity cannot be shown … it should be possible for the Home Secretary”
to be satisfied that there is an “exceptional or compelling case” to go beyond two years. He comments on processes, described as a “tick in the box”, the absence of judicial oversight, and the lack of an upper limit to ensure that different cases are not parked—or, as he says,
“at the very least, a requirement to specify an exit strategy including how the severest measures … can be tapered off.”
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, referred to a reduction in conditions—for instance, being able to associate with more people as years go by. Combined with the comment about an exit strategy, that seems to be extremely important, but this is the first time I have heard about the reduction in conditions. It would be very reassuring to know that this is as much a part of the Government’s programme as the other points we are considering. References to flexibility and tools really do not meet the point; one would expect those who are operational to want as many tools as possible. I look forward to other comments on the time limits and to hearing more of the Government’s thinking on why they have included this provision in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will speak in this group to Amendment 30, which I have signed, together with my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. Clause 38, to which all these amendments relate, seeks to return in another respect to the days of control orders by removing the maximum time limit on TPIMs. Though I oppose Clause 38, as I did Clause 37 in the previous group, I would accept that the issues in this group are less clear-cut and the right solution less obvious.
In a report on the control order regime published in March 2012, shortly after that regime came to an end, I described control orders as an effective means of protecting the public from a small number of suspected terrorists who presented a substantial risk to national security but whom it was not feasible to prosecute. I observed a conscientious administrative procedure, coupled with close judicial scrutiny, which ensured a substantial degree of fairness to the subject. However, I added that those individuals were placed under extraordinary and intrusive restrictions; that this could go on indefinitely; that legal review was far from immediate; and that when the hearing did come around, controlled persons spent crucial parts of it excluded from the court, oblivious both of the detailed accusations made against them and of the submissions made by special advocates, who were able neither to communicate fully with them nor to call evidence on their behalf. I concluded that only in the face of strong necessity could it ever be justifiable for the individual to be placed in such a position by the state.
As will be the case if Clause 38 is enacted, there was no limit on the number of times a 12-month control order could be extended, so long as the statutory test continued to be met. During the currency of the control order regime, from 2005 to 2011, 15 persons were subject to control orders for more than two years—three of them for periods exceeding four years. Each of the four who had been subject to control orders for more than two years at the end of 2011 were transferred to TPIMs, where, as I recall, they served an additional two years, which was the maximum under that regime unless fresh evidence came to light—it rarely does.
Experience shows, therefore, that where the law has permitted it, Home Secretaries have considered it appropriate to keep British citizens who have never been convicted of a terrorist offence under these kinds of extreme constraints for periods in excess of five years. Indeed, had it not been for the introduction of the two-year limit, as originally recommended for all save exceptional cases by my noble friend Lord Carlile —my predecessor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—it is fair to assume that some subjects could have been detained in this way for far longer periods. That has been the experience with other, less all-encompassing executive orders, such as terrorist asset freezes. After all, who wants to be the civil servant or the special adviser to recommend the discharge of a control order, and who wants to be the Secretary of State to agree to it?
At the monthly TPIM review group meetings, at which all subjects were discussed, it became evident to me that the new two-year maximum limit was bringing some benefits. Since it was no longer possible for a TPIM to be used to warehouse a subject indefinitely, more serious and connected thought started to be given to an exit strategy: a suitable job, a suitable course of study, and the forging of new relationships away from the subject’s previous associates. However, as will be equally obvious, there could still be subjects who use their two years to lie low and who might still be adjudged to pose a threat when their TPIM comes to an end. That was the reasoning of those who had requested, agreed to and endorsed control orders for much longer periods than two years. I reported myself in 2013, echoing my noble friend Lord Carlile, that it was tempting to wish for longer than two years in the most serious cases.
If the goal is to minimise the potential threat regardless of the cost to civil liberties, the Government are justified in imposing indefinite executive detention. Yet that goal could also be used to justify warrantless searches of the home and general, suspicionless stop and search. All of us, surely, would instinctively recoil at such measures. I also note that, although they are notionally available in Northern Ireland, no control order or TPIM has, for whatever reason, ever been imposed there. I accept that TPIMs, although so far imposed predominantly, if not exclusively, on Muslims, have so far been only a minor rallying point for grievance: the numbers of TPIMs have been small, and the vast majority of British Muslims are only too glad to see dangerous extremists firmly dealt with. But the echo of internment can still be heard in Northern Ireland, nearly half a century on—a reminder that excess of zeal in this sensitive area can quickly become counterproductive.
There is wisdom in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, who wrote, when Justice Secretary, in 2011:
“The primary role of any government is to keep its citizens safe and free. That means both protecting them from harm and protecting their hard-won liberties.”
Where is the correct balance to be struck? We no longer live in times when a Conservative Government could come into power promising in relation to counterterrorism law, as they did in 2010,
“a correction in favour of liberty”.
So my amendment does not seek a perpetuation of the status quo. Indeed, it would double the current maximum limit, in the absence of additional evidence, to four years, allowing plenty of time to work on TPIM subjects, while still requiring the authorities to focus on an exit strategy. Coupled with the amendment that I have already moved on standard of proof, or one of the other amendments in the previous group, it would represent a toughening of the present regime, while still at least attempting to combine the two imperatives that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, identified.
Terrorism in this country has cost us almost 100 lives since 9/11, and the threat level, although reduced only yesterday, is still “substantial”. However, as this pandemic reminds us, the existence of a threat cannot by itself dictate where the balance should be struck. The balance is for Parliament, and I suggest that a maximum of four years for these unpalatable measures—tough as it undoubtedly is—gets it about right.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the next speaker on the list, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
I want to add only one point to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has just said, because I agree with the entirety of it. That one point is derived from my own experience of dealing with people who were imprisoned indefinitely under the IPP regime. During the hearing of several appeals, it became apparent that indefinite detention often makes someone more dangerous because you take away hope. I very much anticipate that we would never get to the stage where we made TPIMs that lasted for a person’s entire lifetime. The TPIM would have to come to an end at some stage, and, to my mind, giving someone a clear expectation of when the period of restriction is to end helps in dealing with the individual and prevents making him more dangerous by depriving him of any hope.
Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]
My Lords, I wish to argue that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill. In my contribution on Clause 37, I mentioned my general worries about the TPIM regime and how it circumvents all the safeguards in the criminal justice system. Those safeguards are there for a very good reason: to ensure that our trials are fair and that we do not punish people without a high degree of certainty that they deserve it. However, for the purposes of this debate, I will focus on the process that the imposition of TPIMs follows in place of a proper criminal trial and how unsatisfactory that process is by comparison with the real thing.
For TPIMs, a criminal trial is replaced by civil proceedings before a High Court judge. The Government present evidence to support their case for the target person to have their liberty and their other rights curtailed. I have called them “the target person” rather than “the defendant” because they have not been charged with anything and they are completely unable to defend themselves. That is because the evidence against them is presented in private to the judge without the target person’s knowledge. They are unable to see, challenge or contradict the so-called evidence because neither they nor their lawyer is aware of it. This process, known as closed material proceedings, is a very poor substitute for a proper trial, where evidence is presented in open court and the defendant’s lawyer can challenge it, present other evidence that contradicts it and cross-examine the person who provided it.
I mention all this because Clause 38, if enacted, would mean that a person made the subject of a TPIM in such an unfair and unsafe manner and confined to their home and subjected to other losses of their rights could find themselves in this position indefinitely, for ever, even for the rest of their lives. That is extremely harsh treatment for someone who may be innocent and has not been convicted of any crime. This treatment is far harsher than if they had been convicted in a criminal court and been sentenced to a few years in prison. In the worlds of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation:
“TPIMs … are as stringent as anything available in a western democracy.”
He considered the case for lifting the two-year cap, as Clause 38 would do, in his report on TPIMs in 2012. He concluded that the two-year limit was an acceptable compromise because two years was a serious length of time in the life of an individual and TPIMs should not be allowed to become a shadow alternative to criminal prosecution. Indeed, the Government themselves endorsed the two-year limit and in 2015 cited the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that there was no need to “put the clock back”. The Government went further and said:
“The two-year limit is a reminder that executive constraints of this kind are no substitute for the criminal process, and no long-term solution”.
What has changed the Government’s mind such that they wish to turn it into a long-term process? I am hoping the Minister will enlighten the House when he responds, and I hope that this time he can come up with something better than a meaningless reference to flexibility or that there is no need for it now but who knows what we might need in the future. To abolish the two-year time limit and replace it with an indefinite period of successive extensions, without even troubling the court, there would need to be a compelling operational case, would there not? However, no such compelling case has been made. In fact, no case at all has been offered by the Government, so far as I am aware. Given that fact, and given, as I mentioned earlier, the flimsy and unsatisfactory nature of the TPIM process as an alternative to our proper and fair criminal justice system, we cannot countenance allowing TPIMs to be made indefinite by means of Clause 38. It must go.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as I said on the previous group, we wish the current arrangements for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to remain as they are. I also said on the previous group that TPIMs were designed to be a temporary measure to protect the public from terrorism while an investigation gathered evidence to put before a criminal court. Currently TPIMs are in force for one year and can be extended by another year only once, although the Home Secretary can impose a new TPIM if necessary. Clause 28 allows a TPIM to be extended indefinitely. We do not believe that Clause 28 should stand part of the Bill, and Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation agrees.
As I described in the previous group, the restrictions that can be imposed under a TPIM can in some respects be similar to imprisonment, and in other ways more draconian than imprisonment. The Government do not normally seek to restrict those who can visit you in prison, or take control of your bank account. In important respects, it can be akin to detention without charge.
On the subject of detention without charge, my friend, the late Lord Lester of Herne Hill, also a former member of the Labour Party, said in a debate on a previous Counter-Terrorism Bill on 13 October 2008:
“To those noble Lords who say that the threat of terrorism is so appalling that we must do anything to counter it, logically their position is—or should be—in favour of internment”—
something that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has just mentioned—
“without any time limits, until the evidence has been forthcoming. That is what, at the height of the Second World War, Winston Churchill described as,
‘in the highest degree odious’,
and I think he was right … That is why this Committee has a peculiar responsibility today to strike a fair balance, as has been said, between the need to protect the lives of our people against a serious threat of terrorism and the need to uphold our tradition as a country which respects the rule of law”.—[Official Report, 13/10/08; col. 519.]
I think that they were both right. Were all the possible conditions available under TPIMs to be imposed, they would amount to internment. If they were imposed without time limit, it would amount to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has said:
“The Bill is conspicuous for its lack of safeguards. Safeguards are appropriate however carefully the Home Secretary and her officials consider TPIMs, and however much resource constraints inevitably limit the appetite for more and longer TPIMs.”
He suggests that the Home Secretary should be required to seek the court’s permission for any extension beyond two years, in the same way as she currently does when a TPIM is first made. Our Amendment 29 seeks to impose such a requirement on the Secretary of State.
The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation goes on to suggest that, at the very least, an upper limit be placed on a TPIM. The master of compromise, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, suggests in his Amendment 30 that there should be a four-year limit, double the current limit but short of indefinite, as the Government seek. I have to say that the noble Lord’s speech this evening was authoritative and convincing.
We believe that this is not a question for compromise but a question of principle. TPIMs are and should remain a temporary means of safeguarding the public during an investigation, and not a form of indefinite detention without trial.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
I am relatively new to these debates, but I remember making the point at Second Reading about the importance of rehearsing these arguments each time we make these types of orders. These orders are some of the most intrusive that we have in our country. Young people listening to these debates need to be convinced regularly of how important these orders are and that they are proportionate and protect our liberties.
In her introduction, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, drew a parallel with the group; there are obvious parallels between the legal tests in the previous group and the length of the TPIMs that we have been discussing in this group. Interestingly, in responding to the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, talked about a reduction in the measures within TPIMs as they progress in time. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to expand on that when he winds up the debate.
As I am now used to, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given a balanced view. He has put forward another compromise, although I sense that the Liberal Democrats and perhaps my own party, the Labour Party, are less convinced by this type of compromise, but nevertheless he has set one out in his amendments. I thought that he put an interesting challenge to the Minister, who is a former special adviser in the Home Office. I do not think that it was a rhetorical challenge, but I would be interested to know the noble Lord’s response. Would he have felt comfortable about recommending a discharge to an indefinite TPIM when he was in that role? It would be a difficult thing for a Minister or a special adviser to do. If the orders had a natural time limit, that would not put people in such a difficult and invidious position.
The other point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was that excessive zeal can be counterproductive. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also made the point when he drew an interesting parallel with the IPP regime and the importance of not taking away hope from people who are subject to orders, whether they be for imprisonment or a form of effectively indefinite house arrest. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summed up these arrangements very well. He quoted the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who I remember well in the House, when he drew parallels with internment. In fact, I may have been here when he made that speech. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also quoted Jonathan Hall extensively when he said that there should at the very least be an upper limit to the time that a TPIM can be in place without a further court order.
For all these reasons, the amendments as put forward by the other speakers in this group are worthy of our support.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate on this group. Amendment 29, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the Home Secretary to secure the permission of the court before signing a TPIM extension notice. We do not think that that is a necessary amendment to the Bill. To demonstrate why, it might be helpful to the Committee if I explain first the process by which the Home Secretary considers whether a TPIM notice should be extended, a process that will remain in place after the removal of the time limit as proposed by the Bill. I hope that that provides some reassurance to the Committee both about the thorough consideration which goes into whether the continuation of a TPIM is necessary and about the robust judicial oversight that is already built into the process.
At this stage, I should say in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I was certainly hoping to treat as rhetorical but which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, rightly picked on, these are rightly not matters in which special advisers are involved. They are questions for the Secretary of State and Ministers.
When extending a TPIM, the Home Secretary will consider the Security Service’s assessment as to whether it remains necessary. It is true that significant weight is placed on the professionalism and expertise of the Security Service, but the process is not simply a tick box exercise. The Home Office routinely challenges the Security Service’s assessments to ensure that they are robust. The scrutiny is demonstrated by the public comments which have been made by successive former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, who, for instance, have noted that through the quarterly TPIM review group meetings all TPIM notices in force are reassessed, including whether the measures imposed or the TPIM notice itself are necessary and proportionate, and what the exit strategy is for the notice.
If the Home Secretary considers that the extension of a TPIM notice is necessary, she will then consider whether the current measures remain necessary and proportionate to restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, or whether any of them need varying. To address the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, this can be in the form of a removal, a relaxation, or further restrictions.
This might be a good point to talk a little more about rehabilitation. To answer the question that the noble Baroness asked about whether somebody who has been subject to a TPIM could theoretically be subject to another, yes, they could, although that would have to rely on a separate national security case or evidence of terrorism-related activity. TPIMs are not designed as a tool of punishment; they are a tool of prevention and rehabilitation. Part of them involves encouraging subjects to attend what are known as desistence and disengagement programmes to assist with their rehabilitation and to turn them away from behaviour that leads them to be subjects of concern.
Decisions to extend a TPIM notice are not taken lightly but are based on detailed assessments by the Security Service and counterterrorism policing’s experience of managing the subject. The assessment that the Security Service provides will not only be based on the original national security case put forward for the imposition of the TPIM; it will also include the intelligence, both covert and overt, gathered over the course of the preceding 12 months. This could include evidence of further terrorism-related activity or non-compliance that does not reach the criminal threshold or which cannot be exhibited in open court. When extending a TPIM notice, the TPIM subject is invited to make representations before a decision is made. These are put before the Home Secretary.
As I outlined in our debate on the previous group, the 2011 Act established robust judicial oversight of the TPIM process. I will set out what that means. I hope to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on some of the existing safeguards. The court will consider at a permission hearing whether the Home Secretary’s initial decision to impose a TPIM was “obviously flawed” and will overturn a notice or its measures where that is the case. This is known as a Section 9 hearing. If I understand the amendment, this is a process that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord would like to see replicated when a notice is extended beyond a second year.
Section 16 of the TPIM Act provides an appeal route for TPIM subjects to challenge any refusal to vary their notice or to extend it, in addition to the Section 9 hearing. The in-built appeal route available through Section 16 makes it difficult to see in practice what the amendment would achieve in establishing an additional safeguard beyond that.
In addition to the Section 9 hearing and the Section 16 appeal process, the TPIM Act also requires the Home Secretary to keep under regular review the ongoing necessity of a TPIM notice under Section 11. This responsibility is also taken seriously. It is why the Home Office runs the quarterly TPIM review groups, where all TPIM subjects are discussed, including the notices to which they are subject and whether these remain proportionate and necessary.
I turn to Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I thank him for outlining it. His amendment would amend the 2011 Act so that a TPIM notice can be extended on “one or more” occasions if the conditions in Section 3 of that Act continue to be met. Currently, a TPIM notice can be extended only once and therefore has a maximum duration of two years. However, we respectfully disagree with the noble Lord on the need for his amendment. It would prevent a TPIM notice being renewed for as long as it is necessary for the purposes of public protection. Instead, it would set a new upper limit of four years. While we disagree with the noble Lord’s amendment, I should say at the outset that we support its principle in so far as it recognises that there are circumstances where it may be necessary to impose a TPIM beyond the current two-year limit, which the Government contend is too short.
There are several policy and operational justifications for Clause 38. First, experience has shown that there are TPIM subjects who pose an enduring risk beyond the two-year limit. This has meant that a new TPIM has had to be imposed after reaching the current limit and, as a consequence, a dangerous cliff edge has been created while the individual is at large in the community without the appropriate risk management tools in place before a new TPIM can be imposed. That has happened on more than one occasion. ACC Tim Jacques spoke to this risk when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
My Lords, I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have two questions. First, he spoke about Section 9 hearings and the appeal route under Section 16 making our amendment unnecessary. Can he tell the Committee how many times TPIMs have been revoked or restrictions eased as a result of each of these types of hearing?
Secondly, terrorism prevention and investigation measures are, as their title describes, temporary means of preventing terrorism taking place while an investigation tries to establish evidence to convict the person in a criminal court. Control orders, on the other hand, have been used in the past for public protection. If the Government are changing the nature of TPIMs and abandoning them as a temporary measure to enable an investigation to take place in safety, why do they continue to call them TPIMs? Why not now call them control orders, which are in fact what the Government are trying to use here?
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I will take the questions in reverse order. Prosecution is always the preferred method of disrupting those involved in terrorism-related activity. That will continue to be the case even under this Bill. Under the TPIM Act 2011, the Home Secretary is required to keep prosecution under review. That will not change with the amendments we propose to the Bill. If it becomes clear that there is an avenue for prosecution, the Home Office will support the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in bringing that prosecution against the individual and seek to remove the TPIM notice if it is no longer necessary and proportionate.
On the noble Lord’s first question about the number of times that appeals have been raised, if he is happy it would be better if I write and provide that information to him and the rest of the Committee so that I can be certain that it is up to date and accurate.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if, in the interests of time, I do not comment on every contribution. I must say, I have edited my notes as we have gone along, and it is more or less the same cast of characters throughout the clauses and amendments on this part of the Bill.
I noted in particular two comments that I think are well worth keeping in mind: my noble friend Lord Strasburger saying that two years is a serious length of time, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—who, as ever, put pithily and succinctly an issue that is at the heart of the case, as it were—saying that the effect of indefinite detention or what is perceived as indefinite detention, by the taking away of hope, is to create greater danger.
In response to the question about how many new TPIMs there have been because of the cliff-edge issue, we were told it was “more than one occasion”. If the noble Lord is able to expand on that, I would be grateful. I observe with regard to reviews—I use that term quite broadly—that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the subject to make effective representations because he does not know what points put to the Secretary of State he is responding to. It is worth saying one final sentence on the carrot—yes, that is what it is—of investing. One cannot even say that it is investing in rehabilitation, because no offence has been proved, but investing in managing the risk has to be worth it, even if you look at it coldly in terms of pounds and pence, because of the cost of enforcing and supervising TPIMs. I am looking at my screen to see whether the Minister will be able to respond to the question that I just put. As he has not leapt up—oh, he has.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
Only to disappoint the noble Baroness, but also to reassure her that I will add that to the information I provide in writing following the debate.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
I am grateful for that. We are in Committee, so it is appropriate that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 30A. I notify noble Lords that at the end of this group we shall have a short break. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate and anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 39: TPIMs: variation of measures
Amendment 30A
Baroness Hamwee
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent relocation for resource reasons.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, this takes us to the issue of location and relocation. It was probably very naive of me to be taken aback at seeing the provision for variation expressed in resource terms, though perhaps I should acknowledge the Government’s transparency in doing so in the Bill. The Secretary of State already has wide powers of location and relocation so I would be interested in understanding the balancing factors to be taken into consideration. I ask this because the impact of being lifted from one’s community can be considerable. I realise that community connections may be the problem, but the support of the community can also be very positive.
I appreciate the powers are intended to have a considerable impact, but so might being placed somewhere utterly unfamiliar, where visits from friends and extended family are much more difficult because of distance as well as the deterrence of security clearance. There are more likely to be problems seeking work—if reporting and other conditions permit work—and from being cut off from one’s belief systems when one may have only a tenuous grip on reality. It could be that for that lone wolf—the lone actor, as he was referred to earlier—not being well established in the community is a significant part of the problem, which will be exacerbated.
If there is a family, what about the impact on the spouse and children? I have heard the words “depression”, “anxiety”, “enduring sense of injustice” and “stigma”, applied to how this might be experienced by children. Family cohesion breaking down is unlikely to be beneficial to the management of the subject. I have also heard relocation described as creating toxic social effects. The longer the restrictions go on, the more likely a breach is, because of the loss of hope, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred. The best course is positive engagement, and we have just been talking about that, but TPIMs seem to be the opposite, and relocation must often mean compounding a disaffection with society. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, requiring a TPIM subject to relocate can have significant consequences, particularly, for example, if he or she has school-age children. It is a well-established fact in the rehabilitation of offenders that social ties are powerful in preventing reoffending. Relocating to another part of the country, presumably, would have the opposite effect.
Clearly, if there is a national security issue that requires the TPIM subject to be relocated somewhere they are not easily in contact with people they should not be in contact with, relocation should be considered. But to allow relocation simply to save police resources seems neither necessary nor proportionate.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This amendment does not address head-on the power under a TPIM to require somebody to relocate. This amendment is only touching on whether the Secretary of State should by notice have power to vary a relocation measure, in part, because
“the variation is necessary for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources.”
While I recognise the intrusive effect that relocation can have, I accept that there may be cases where national security demands it. I am interested to hear from the Minister what test is to be applied where a variation of a relocation order occurs when it
“is necessary for reasons connected with efficient and effective use of resources.”
I do not know, but I suspect that this concerns the perception that someone should relocate for national security reasons. Where they relocate to might be affected by the circumstances in which such an order might be enforced; the amount of resources that would be required if it was to be enforced where they normally live becoming disproportionate; or the amount of resources that would be required where they had been located becoming disproportionate. If that is right, I would have expected the measure in new subsection (1A) in Clause 39(2) to reflect something about proportionality. But there is nothing in it, and I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I hope he will indicate that resource relocations will occur only when it is effectively necessary to provide for national security.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have explained, this amendment is intended to prevent the possibility, as proposed by Clause 39, of varying a TPIM subject’s relocation measure for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to that individual. I hear what they say about wanting to understand and explore that through this amendment.
We do not believe that the amendment as drafted would have that effect in practice, and we think that it could inadvertently broaden out the application of the clause to enable relocation of the TPIM subject for the second time for any reason. However, as I say, I understand the questions which lie behind their tabling it.
The Government are committed to future-proofing the TPIM regime to ensure that our operational partners are fully supported to manage TPIMs efficiently and effectively. Clause 39 has an important role in doing that. It will allow the Home Secretary to move an already relocated TPIM subject to an alternative location, if necessary, for resource-related reasons, provided that the national security reason for requiring relocation still exists—that is key to note.
We want to ensure that operational partners, and in particular counterterrorism policing, are supported in their function of managing this small but significant cohort of high-risk individuals within the community. This clause seeks to ensure that there is a greater degree of flexibility in the system, so that there can continue to be effective management of a TPIM subject when operational circumstances evolve.
To provide a real-world example of where a police force finds that resources are affected, I draw the Committee’s attention to the Novichok poisonings in Amesbury, in Wiltshire, in June 2018, which suddenly and significantly diverted police resource in a small force for a considerable period of time to that important and high-profile investigation. In such a scenario, if a TPIM subject was residing within the force area, it might no longer be possible for counterterrorism policing to provide the same dedicated resources to ensure that the TPIM was being managed effectively and in a way that reduced the threat to the wider public.
The new ground to vary the relocation measure could also potentially be used to cover the following: first, a temporary move of the TPIM subject because all relevant counterterrorism officers with the necessary skills become unavailable at the same time due to illness or another temporary reason, such as during the current pandemic, for example, which I am sure will be on noble Lords’ minds; or, secondly, in circumstances where the presence of the TPIM subject becomes known locally and, as a result, there is increased pressure on counterterrorism resources to keep the subject both monitored and safe.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about the test for the Home Secretary. When first deciding where to relocate a TPIM subject, provided there is a national security reason to do so, the Home Secretary takes into account various factors to arrive at a proportionate decision. These include but are not limited to: the personal circumstances of the individual; the availability of services and amenities, including access to employment, education, places of worship and medical facilities; the proximity to prohibited associates; and the demographics of the community. It is reasonable to apply a similar approach when deciding whether the police force area in which the TPIM subject currently resides continues to be the most appropriate area for them to be placed.
We do not anticipate this ground to vary the relocation measure being used except in exceptional circumstances. We fully recognise that the relocation of a TPIM subject —or the re-relocation of the subject, as would be the case if relying on this new ground—is a significant action to take given the potential impact on the individual and could be used only when necessary and proportionate to do so, taking into account their Article 8 rights. The Government understand that stability in a subject’s life is a crucial factor behind their rehabilitation and supporting them to move away from an extremist mindset, which, of course, we want them to do.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rightly said that this amendment does not address head-on the question of relocation. However, as he raised it and noble Lords are interested, it is worth reiterating that the Home Secretary can relocate a TPIM subject only if it is necessary and proportionate to prevent and restrict involvement in terrorism-related activity, that consideration is always given to the subject’s Article 8 rights, and that, furthermore, a TPIM notice does not prevent an individual seeking or maintaining employment or study—in the past, TPIM subjects have pursued both of those. It is also worth reminding the Committee that TPIMs are different from the control order regime. Under control orders, somebody could be relocated anywhere in the country, whereas under TPIMs, relocation is up to 200 miles away from their home address.
We assess that, in most cases where a TPIM subject has been relocated but there is then a requirement to move them to a new place of residence, that is provided for within existing legislation. However, as with several of the changes we are seeking to introduce through this Bill, we deem it important expressly to create this flexibility for our operational partners within the TPIM Act 2011 as part of our mission to future-proof the system and to ensure that TPIMs can be managed efficiently and effectively.
Decisions to vary the relocation measure for resource reasons will be capable of appeal. As with other unilateral variations to the TPIM notice, the function of the appeal court will be to review whether the variation was necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Additionally, however, for variations to the relocation measure on resource grounds, the appeal court will also review whether the variation was necessary for the efficient and effective use of resources.
Given the crucial tasks that we expect of our operational partners, we want to ensure that we support them as best we can in their effective management of TPIM subjects, as well as in their ability to respond to other high-priority work such as the examples I have given.
Amendment 30B is consequential on Amendment 30A, and the same arguments apply. I therefore invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, I shall of course withdraw Amendment 30A and I shall not move Amendment 30B. The questions asked about proportionality and national security should be at the heart of this. The flexibility to which the Minister referred seems to suggest that subjects might be moved closer together for ease of management, which is the exact opposite of what I thought was one of the objectives of this regime.
I am still puzzled that
“purposes connected with preventing or restricting … involvement in terrorism-related activity”
in new Section 12(1A)(b) does not cover the Salisbury example that the Minister used, but, as one always does, I will look at the explanation, because I may well have missed it.
I did not miss the fact that my drafting was inadequate, but I do not take exception to that comment—that could be corrected later if necessary. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
We now come to the group beginning with the Question that Clause 40 stand part of the Bill. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 40: TPIMs: extension of residence measure
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, Clause 40 stand part is grouped with Amendment 31 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Bach, which is very different. I shall confine my remarks to the clause. A curfew can be more than overnight. All the points about amendments we have debated this evening are relevant to the time—the hours of the day and night—during which a subject may be required to remain wherever he is living—plus, of course, in particular, engaging Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the deprivation of liberty.
The ECHR memorandum published with the Bill is explicit that this provision is so that an individual can be required to observe longer curfew hours. That is not a justification, however. We have some case law, as I am sure other noble Lords may mention. In JJ, Lord Bingham said that account should be taken of
“a range of factors such as the nature, duration, effects and manner of execution or implementation”
of a measure—very much as noble Lords said on a previous group. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, took the view that the absolute limit was 16 hours, and I understand that no curfew has been for a period longer than 16 hours since.
The ECHR memorandum makes the point that the principle of curfew does not breach Article 5, and I take that point, but the particular issue I want to raise in this connection is that the clause—that is, the change—makes it that much easier for the limits to be pushed longer and longer and throws on the individual the need to challenge them, rather than having clear limits set on the Secretary of State through legislation.
I am sure that noble Lords will understand, when it comes to the appetite, and indeed the ability, of an individual to challenge each measure, or extended measure, it is not an easy task. The balance—I think it is called “equality of arms”—moves completely out of balance through this clause. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]
My Lords, rather like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I am not sure that our two amendments have any connection whatever. None the less, it is a pleasure to be able to make this short intervention on the Bill and to probe just a little more than I did at Second Reading the role of police and crime commissioners.
I do support the strengthening of the TPIM provisions. That the Government would have to do so was entirely foreseeable in 2011, when the coalition Government insisted on the abolition of control orders, despite the warnings that I and other noble Lords gave at the time.
My amendment was drafted after discussions with the West Midlands police and crime commissioner, David Jamieson. Clearly, the provisions are potentially extremely resource-intensive and need to be used proportionately and only when absolutely necessary. I would like to make two specific comments.
As the thresholds for a TPIM are lowered and the range of measures extended, it is important that greater scrutiny and oversight are implemented to give reassurance to individuals and communities that the legislation is being used fairly. These are of course issues of grave national security concern. The oversight offered by a police and crime commissioner could help to give the Home Secretary reassurance that full consideration had been given ahead of any decision regarding a TPIM. Local oversight could also enhance the ability of the Home Secretary to make an informed decision when considering a TPIM application, variation or extension. It would enable PCCs to submit any additional information or make recommendations to the Home Secretary in respect of the community impact and the impact on local police force resources—which, as has already been discussed, can be intensive for a TPIM.
It is not entirely clear how police and crime commissioners are currently made aware of TPIMs within their local area. Certainly, the chief constable should advise the police and crime commissioner when a TPIM is being considered, but there are no clear guidelines on how this should take place. My amendment would formalise this process. We know that the number of TPIMs in place nationally is small, and therefore it should not be envisaged that this additional step in the process would present a burden for police and crime commissioners or forces. As part of this process, the information would of course have to be shared within the most appropriate, secure environment.
At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, responded to that point by saying that the Home Office already works very closely with the police before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime. She went on to say:
“The process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with the relevant local police force and that community impact assessments are kept up to date.”
She then said:
“The Bill already contains a clause that will allow a TPIM subject’s relocation measure to be varied where necessary on operational resource grounds.”
On those grounds, she considered that my
“proposed amendment for an additional role for PCCs … in TPIM processes is … not necessary.”—[Official Report, 21/9/20; col. 1653.]
That was disappointing. The key issue here is that TPIMs are an intervention that places significant restrictions on a person’s life, based on the balance of probabilities. Given that, PCCs could add value in the process by seeking reassurance that due process had been followed. I remind the Minister that they do this for other policing powers that might be regarded as controversial, including stop and search and the use of covert services, and it would be appropriate if it were extended to TPIMs. I commend the amendment and hope that the Minister will be sympathetic.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, I have just a little to add to what has already been said about Clause 40.
The current requirement that a residence condition be “overnight” has acted as a limitation on the maximum length of the nightly period of house arrest that may be imposed under a TPIM; the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to some of the case law on this subject. Confinement to the home during substantial parts of the day may sound almost familiar in times of Covid but it would represent a major reversal of past practice. I see that my own 2012 report, to which the Minister was kind enough to refer, confirms that even control orders featured curfews of only up to 16 hours.
In that context, I have three questions. First, if Clause 40 is passed into law, for how many hours a day will it be permissible to confine TPIM subjects to their designated residences if that is considered, in the Minister’s words, “necessary and proportionate”? Is there any reason why it should not be for 23 or, indeed, 24 hours?
Secondly, what are the specific circumstances that make it necessary for public safety to extend these already formidable powers in this way? If they are to be credible after 15 years of real-world experience, please may we have actual examples, even if they must be anonymised, rather than hypothetical ones?
Thirdly, and more generally, my sense from the last few debates is that the Government will have to work quite hard if they are to persuade noble Lords of the operational case for some of these changes—particularly as they appear not to have persuaded their own independent reviewer, with all his privileged access to classified material. What proposals does the Minister have in that regard?
Lord Bach (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as the elected and serving police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I have been in that post for nearly five years now but in three months’ time, if the 6 May elections take place as the Government propose, I will no longer have this interest to declare. I look forward to once again playing a greater role in your Lordships’ House.
However, when, as in this Bill, issues of delicate constitutional importance arise—issues that affect the relationship between the state, in the guise of the Home Secretary and the police, and the individual, in the guise here of the reasonably suspected person—surely it is important to examine with great care, as this House always does and clearly has done today, the implications for the rule of law and individual liberty. That is why I put my name to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath’s Amendment 31, which, strangely, is in this group.
Amendment 31 suggests a practical and sensible way forward—one that balances the interests of all involved, I would argue. It suggests a role for police and crime commissioners that seems entirely appropriate and consistent with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. When the coalition Government proposed the setting up of what I will call PCCs, they deliberately gave them considerable responsibilities and powers. Not only were they described as the “local policing body”; the Policing Protocol Order 2011 insisted that police and crime commissioners had a role in the “totality of policing”. Sometimes, it seems as though the then Government’s intentions, as contained in the Act passed by Parliament, have not always been fulfilled by succeeding Governments, who, although keen to support the legislation, seem to draw back from some of its consequences. I very much hope that the way in which the Minister deals with this amendment will show that I am wrong.
Of course, we all agree that strong powers are needed to protect society from those who would use, aid or support terrorism to get their own way. In this Bill, there is an obvious intention to strengthen the power of the state against the individual, pointed out repeatedly by noble Lords from all sides. This involves the removal of basic safeguards, as we have heard today: first, the need for there merely to be reasonable suspicion, rather than proof of a balance of probabilities, and, secondly, the open-ended nature of a TPIM. The dangers of that last approach were referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, in the context of recent public prevention legislation. Immense executive power attaches to the Home Secretary and the police, who are tasked with TPIM powers.
Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]
My Lords, as we have heard, Clause 40 will allow the Secretary of State to extend the overnight curfew on a person subject to a TPIM to the maximum: every hour of every day. If the clause passes into law, it will mean that a person who has not been convicted of any offence can be condemned to full-time house arrest indefinitely, possibly until their death.
It so happens that we are all experiencing a very mild form of this regime right now during the Covid pandemic lockdown. I say a mild form because we are allowed to go to work. We can get out for exercise, to buy food, to seek medical advice or for a host of other exceptions. We know that this confinement, with all its exceptions, will last for only a few weeks, or at most months. Even so, cabin fever is rife and the increase in mental illness in the community is very real and alarming.
Imagine, if you will, how it would be if this serious constraint on our way of life and infringement of our liberties was permanent and without any of the opportunities to get out of the house that we have under lockdown. It would be unbearable. In some ways, it would be worse than a long prison sentence. In a maximum security prison, you still get some exercise outside your cell every day. But this is what the Government intend to be able to do to people who may well be innocent, whose incarceration has occurred without the Government even having to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities.
Under Clause 37, a Minister would merely need to suspect that they may be a terrorist—a truly flimsy threshold of proof, which is so insignificant as to be pointless and non-existent. Nevertheless, on this flimsy basis, Clause 40 allows a Minister to condemn a quite possibly innocent person to indefinite full-time detention in their home. Can the Minister please give a meaningful explanation or operational case for this change? In doing so, if he is going to deploy the flexibility argument again, could he explain who needs the flexibility, to do what and why? It is seriously unconvincing to me.
This change to the TPIM regime is cruel, inhumane and unfair. It must be seriously damaging to the subject’s mental health and that of those around him or her. This House must expunge this clause from the Bill.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, we believe that the existing TPIMs are sufficient and are at the limits of what a country that has a reputation for upholding human rights should tolerate. The extension proposed in Clause 40 would extend the requirement to remain at or within a specified residence from “overnight” to what could amount to total house arrest. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, that is a requirement to remain at or within the specified residence between any hours. “As are specified” is yet another step too far, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger said.
On Amendment 31, I commend the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bach, for their relentless attempts to get police and crime commissioners more involved in operational policing decisions, including operations that may have national security implications. I accept that stop and search may be considered controversial, but it does not involve issues of national security of this nature, and I am not convinced that their amendment is necessary or desirable in this case.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we have had two different debates in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved that Clause 40 should not stand part of the Bill, and I can do no better than the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his three questions, which I thought were very apposite and to the point. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s answers to those three questions.
My noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Bach then spoke to their Amendment 31. As we have heard, the gist of the amendment is to formalise a relationship between the Secretary of State, PCCs and local chief constables to give more direct input by PCCs. In the words of my noble friend Lord Bach, PCCs are responsible for the “totality of policing” in their area. As we have heard, they are already involved in controversial matters such as stop and search and covert activities. Of course, I support my noble friends in trying to give the PCCs more formal involvement in TPIMs in their own areas.
I look forward to my noble friend Lord Bach playing a greater part in the proceedings of our House. He has for many years brought great insight into his many roles on the Front Bench, and occasionally on the Back Benches, but he will improve that even further when he comes back as a PCC. He may, of course, have to do extra time; we wait to see. I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, and I will support my noble friends.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As some have remarked, Amendment 31 might have as easily sat in the previous group as this one. I turn first to that amendment, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of King’s Heath and Lord Bach. It aims to increase the oversight that local policing bodies, including police and crime commissioners, have of TPIM notices in their area. It would require the Home Secretary to notify the relevant local policing body when a TPIM notice is imposed in their area, and when a TPIM is withdrawn, ends or is relocated, so that it no longer falls within their area. It would also require the local policing body to provide six-monthly reports to the Home Secretary, which could include recommendations regarding variations to the TPIM and its continued necessity.
Because of the operational nature of the amendment and the impact that it would have on existing processes, officials at the Home Office have consulted colleagues in Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters on it, and they support our view that it is not needed in the Bill. Engagement with police forces is already an integral part of the TPIM regime. The Home Office works very closely with CT policing, both nationally via CTPHQ and with regional CT units, before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime, including regular engagement at quarterly TPIM review group meetings chaired by the Home Office. This well-established process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with, and ultimately the consent of, the relevant local police force. This existing practice also means that local community impact assessments are kept up to date, which supports the effective and efficient management of the TPIM subject by the Home Office and operational partners.
Given the current close working relationship that we have with operational partners in the ongoing management of a TPIM subject, there is no need for the local policing body to produce six-monthly reports; review meetings are already in any event held at more regular intervals than the amendment would require reports to be written, and those meetings already consider the types of issue that the amendment is seeking to ensure are included in any report. The amendment would also distort existing roles and responsibilities; it would be inappropriate for the relevant local policing body or police and crime commissioner to put recommendations for varying a TPIM or its continued necessity directly to the Home Secretary. Those judgments are, quite rightly, led by the Home Office in conjunction with the Security Service, which makes fully informed recommendations based on its expert assessment of national security risk. Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I think the examples that noble Lords gave of stop and search and other decisions are in a different category from the imposition of a TPIM.
It is vital that TPIM oversight and management processes protect the highly classified information that flows through a TPIM regime, including the details of the TPIM subject and the underlying national security case against them. The Government, CTPHQ and the Security Service are concerned about how the amendment could work in practice with regard to sharing and disclosure of such highly sensitive information. The close working relationships already in place and well-tested processes on information-sharing between the Home Office, CT policing and the Security Service make it unnecessary.
I turn to Clause 40, which amends the existing overnight residence measure in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act to strengthen the ability of the Home Secretary to specify certain hours when a TPIM subject must remain at a specified residence. Taken literally, the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, would remove Clause 40 from the Bill altogether and prevent several operational benefits from being realised. That is why the Government cannot support it.
Having a residence measure at our disposal is vital in managing an individual of national security concern and the risk that they pose to the public. That has long been the case, but our engagement with operational partners has established that the existing overnight measure could and should be improved to allow for greater flexibility in the way in which it can be imposed—specifically, by introducing a requirement for a TPIM subject to remain within his or her residence at specific times during the day, as well as overnight, when this is assessed as necessary and proportionate to manage the risk that they pose. The updated residence measure that Clause 40 introduces will allow the Home Secretary to specify a period that could be longer than overnight or spilt into varying segments throughout a 24-hour period, if considered necessary.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, unfortunately, the imperfection of the current system of remote participation means that one has to put in one’s request to speak “after the Minister” before the Minister has finished speaking. If the Minister in his last few sentences answers the question that you were going to ask, your question becomes obsolete, as is the case here.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to respond to the debate.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
I am in much the same position as I was with an earlier amendment: I do not see what is not already provided for in current legislation. I would be interested to know whether the examples used by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson—the radicalising threats to children and the case of someone who is suspected of being a not-yet-fulfilled attack planner—are examples of where the police have had a real problem.
I am not reassured that a measure is “likely” not to be over 16 hours. In response to various questions, we seem to be getting the answer, “It’s necessary because it’s necessary”. We will, of course, think about this particular aspect after today; tonight, I will not seek to oppose this clause standing part of the Bill.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 30C. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment, or anything else in this group, to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 41: TPIMs: polygraph measure
Amendment 30C
Baroness Hamwee
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure section 12 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 is not overridden.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, we have Amendments 30C and 30D in this group, as well as the clause stand part debate. These take us to polygraph measures, where we were not so many hours ago in connection with terrorist offenders—those were, of course, “offenders”, while the individuals subject to TPIMs are not.
If a polygraph measure is imposed as a requirement of a TPIM and the subject refuses to comply, then one asks: so what? That becomes an offence, as I understand it, and the subject would be liable to imprisonment for up to five years and/or an unlimited fine. In an attempt to think about the “so what?” question, Amendment 30C refers to Section 12 of the 2011 Act. That section deals with the variation of measures, with some safeguards. I will not hold it against the noble Lord if he says that the drafting leaves a lot to be desired; I dare say it does. The point is to seek to be sure that what is learned from a polygraph, and so points the examiner and therefore the police in a particular direction, cannot override the safeguards in legislation.
On Amendment 30D, we know that polygraphs cannot be used as evidence in proceedings. Can they be used to point to where there may be evidence? I assume that they can, so will the Minister therefore confirm whether this can be used as evidence of a breach of a TPIM, or to extend or impose a further TPIM? I think the Law Society has made the point—I hope I am not misquoting it—that polygraphs should not be used as a route to impose a TPIM. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I do not have anything to add on the substance of the amendments which my noble friend Lady Hamwee has outlined. However, I would like to go back to something that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford raised in relation to the use of polygraph tests on convicted terrorists who were subject to licence: the right to silence. Quite rightly, the noble and learned Lord who was the Minister at the time said that, because these people would be convicted offenders under licence, they had no right to silence. But TPIM subjects are not convicted offenders on licence; they are unconvicted. That is the whole idea of a TPIM, and so they do have a right to silence. The question for the Minister is: would it be a breach of TPIM conditions, which is a criminal offence for which the person could be sent to prison, if they refuse to participate in a polygraph test or if, in a polygraph test, they refuse to say anything?
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I have nothing of substance to add to the comments of the previous two speakers, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I, too, was going to raise the point made by the noble Lord about the right to silence of someone who is subject to a TPIM, as they are not convicted of an offence. The noble Baroness adequately covered the other points, so I have nothing more to add.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and brevity in this group so that we can make as much progress as possible. All these amendments are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Clause 41 provides for the addition of a polygraph measure into Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. Doing that will, in circumstances where it is assessed to be necessary and proportionate, help our operational partners to assess an individual’s compliance with his or her TPIM notice and support the decision-making on whether variations to the notice are required. That could include relaxations as well as restrictions.
As with all TPIM measures, polygraphs will not be mandatory for all TPIM subjects. I should like to reassure the Committee that we anticipate this measure being used sparingly, in a targeted and proportionate manner. Operational partners will consider its utility in relation to each TPIM subject on a case-by-case basis and make a recommendation to the Home Office for its imposition where appropriate.
By way of example, the results of a polygraph test may indicate that a TPIM subject is meeting someone whom he or she is prohibited from seeing for national security reasons at a particular location. While any findings from the polygraph test will be considered in the round by operational partners—that is, without an overreliance on the test findings and considered against other available information—the findings could inform a recommendation for the TPIM measures to be varied to restrict the subject from frequenting that specific location. The results could also be used to inform an assessment of whether a subject’s engagement with rehabilitation programmes under the TPIM notice is genuine.
We recognise that the prospect of polygraph testing understandably creates questions about the way in which information gleaned from tests may be used. That is precisely why we have taken steps to ensure that the wording of the clause is clear on that issue. The polygraph testing should only be carried out with a view to monitoring the individual’s compliance with other specified TPIM measures and assessing whether any variation of their measures is necessary. We have also specified that such information cannot be used in evidence against the individual in any criminal proceedings.
To further reassure the Committee of the steps that we are taking to ensure that this addition is both proportionate and considered, the clause sets out that the new measure will not be used unless and until the Home Office introduces regulations to make provision for the conduct of the polygraph sessions. Those regulations are likely to include detail, for example, on the qualifications and experience needed by polygraph operators and how records of the polygraph sessions should be kept, thereby ensuring transparency on how this measure will be applied in practice. The regulations would be laid before Parliament for scrutiny in the usual manner.
As with all other measures contained in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, this measure will not be imposed unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers it necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. It is important that we harness available technology and provide our operational partners with the tools necessary to protect the public, and that is what the clause will do.
Turning our attention to Amendment 30C, as I have set out, Clause 41 adds the new polygraph measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act. Following Royal Assent, if the polygraph measures are imposed, a TPIM subject will be required to undertake a polygraph test. Failure to do so would, to answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, be a breach of the TPIM measure. We appreciate the spirit in which the amendment has been tabled, but we respectfully disagree about the necessity of it. Condition D in Section 3(4) of the TPIM Act 2011 requires,
“that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual”
under a TPIM notice. In addition, Section 12(1)(c) of the TPIM Act requires,
“the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.”
Therefore, all the measures imposed under a TPIM notice and any subsequent variation must be considered to be necessary for those purposes.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, I may have missed it, but I am not sure that the noble Lord answered the point about the right to silence. It is difficult to read body language from eight miles away.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I apologise. I did not do so, but if the noble Baroness is happy, I will write to her and follow it up, along with any other questions that I might have missed.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
Equally, of course, we will go through the Official Report to see whether all our concerns have been addressed. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 30E. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 42: TPIMs: drug testing measure
Amendment 30E
Baroness Hamwee
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require reasonable suspicion before a requirement may be imposed under this section.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, I think that, on the last grouping, the question which lay behind this amendment was answered—but let me just check. Clause 42 covers the drug testing measure. My first thought was whether a subject could be caught up in being tested and fail the test because someone else in the house was using drugs which were detected, perhaps under his fingernail. The amendment raises the issue of reasonable suspicion, but I think the noble Lord has confirmed condition D—that the Secretary of State reasonably considers, in this case, drug testing necessary for the purposes we have talked about. It is the “reasonableness” of that consideration; I think he has confirmed that that will apply. So that he can confirm it again, I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, our Amendment 30E relates to subjecting the subject of a TPIM to drug testing for class A and class B drugs only, at a police station by a constable only. I have rather different questions from those of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. The question I cannot find an answer to—and I cannot think of one myself—is, “Why?” One might cynically argue that a suspected terrorist high on cannabis might be too chilled out to conduct a terrorist attack; conversely, if the Government fear a suspected terrorist might do something stupid, for example being emboldened under the influence of a class A or class B drug, why not test for alcohol?
Bearing in mind the restrictions on the subject’s movements and communications and on who they can associate with, where do the Government think the subject of a TPIM will get his supply of class A or class B drugs? Indeed, if the subject is taking class A or class B drugs, under the noses of the police or security services, does this not raise questions about what else he might be getting his hands on, such as explosives? In short, what is the point, other than placing further restrictions, being even more intrusive and making the subject’s life even more difficult?
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points made by the previous two speakers.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, through Clause 42 we are adding a new measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. If it is imposed, a TPIM subject would be required to submit to a drug test and provide a relevant sample.
Operational experience has shown that, in certain circumstances, drug use can exacerbate the risk of a subject engaging in terrorism-related activity. This new measure will support operational partners to mitigate this risk by confirming suspected drug use through a mandatory drug test and, where necessary, mandating attendance at rehabilitation programmes. They will want to follow up the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about where those drugs were obtained.
We consider this amendment unnecessary because the TPIM Act already contains robust safeguards regarding the imposition of all measures on TPIM subjects. Section 3 of the TPIM Act requires that at the point that a TPIM is first imposed the Home Secretary must reasonably consider that the TPIM notice and the measures specified within it are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Section 12 of the TPIM Act also requires that variations of measures specified in an existing TPIM notice, which would include the imposition of a drug testing measure, cannot be made unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.
Given that existing requirement, the amendment proposed does not go further than the safeguards already in place. Furthermore, the existing requirements of the TPIM Act, to which I have just referred, apply to all measures rather than being confined solely to the drug testing measure as this amendment has it. For those reasons, we invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, one might expect the Home Secretary asked to approve the measure to respond by asking those requesting it what the hell—sorry—the police were doing if they had not spotted that the subject was getting hold of drugs. As I anticipated, my question had already been answered. I hope that the hours that will be imposed—to pick up my noble friend’s comparison, which is not a comparison: alcohol is a drug too—will make it impossible to get hold of alcohol as well as drugs. However, my underlying question has been answered. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 30F. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 43: TPIMs: provision of information
Amendment 30F
Baroness Hamwee
Member’s explanatory statement
This purpose of this amendment is to question the disclosure of information about an electronic device used by any other person.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, Clause 43 is about the provision of information, including information about electronic communication devices—not just devices used by the individual, but those used by any other person in the individual’s residence. I have already referred to the impact of a TPIM on other members of the family. My recollection, which may not be absolutely accurate, is that a child’s lack of access to a computer was one of the things highlighted when control orders were abolished. The burden on children is, as I said, considerable, with bullying, confusion, being called a jihadi kid and all those things. This is presumably also one of the occasions when the condition about it being reasonably necessary will apply. Can the Minister confirm that this will not be invariable? In other words, will this disclosure requirement always be applied or will an assessment be made of its necessity? I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, the only thing that I will add to what my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said about this amendment is an assumption that, even if the subject of the TPIM provides the authorities with all the details of his or her communications equipment—computers, mobile phone and so forth—it would be possible that they could end up borrowing a device from somebody else in his or her household. That is what the authorities are seeking disclosure of, to ensure that they keep track of all the communications the subject of the TPIM is engaged in. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the provisions contained within Section 43(2)(a) reinforce the fact that TPIMs can impact to a highly intrusive extent on innocent people living with the subject of the TPIM.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This amendment is probing the additional power given by Clause 43 of the Bill to allow the Secretary of State to seek disclosure of
“such details as may be specified of any electronic communication device possessed or used by the individual or any other person in the individual’s residence.”
Its purpose is readily understandable: namely, if the purpose of TPIMs is in part to prevent the subject of the TPIM communicating with anybody or receiving communications from anybody, the authorities should have the ability to look at all the electronic devices to which he or she has access.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have both pointed out, that means, for example, that the wife, husband or children of a subject become subject themselves to an intrusive order. I would be very interested to know whether the authorities are going to take a different approach to the question of the subject of a TPIM’s own electronic devices, as opposed to those of his family or those belonging to those with whom he lives. What is the standard going to be? Necessary and proportionate? Strong case? I would be very interested to hear what it is. Just before I depart, I will pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Although I have not agreed with every one of their amendments, they have shown indefatigable probing of this Bill and incredible good nature throughout.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the final comments of the noble and learned Lord; that is exactly what Committee stage is for. It has been thorough but good natured, and long may that continue.
Clause 43 amends the existing electronic communication device measure in order that a TPIM subject will be required, upon request, to provide details of electronic communication devices—also known as ECDs—which they possess or use, or any such devices belonging to other individuals in their residence. It almost goes without saying that in the digital age in which we now live there is vast scope for ECDs to play a key role in the conduct or facilitation of terrorism-related activity, including attack planning and the radicalisation of others in a bid to inspire them to carry out a terrorist attack.
Amendment 30F would prevent the Home Secretary from being able to require TPIM subjects to provide details of electronic communication devices belonging to other people in their residence. This would significantly undermine the utility of the changes we are seeking to make and would ultimately be to the detriment of national security. We have seen in the past that TPIM subjects will access or try to access devices belonging to others in their household, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, rightly noted.
Clearly, there is an important balance to be struck between security and civil liberties, particularly of family members such as children. But we are clear, particularly given how sparingly we envisage this measure being imposed, that any impact on those residing with the TPIM subject—such as their family members—will be proportionate.
Preventing the Home Secretary from being able to require the provision of certain ECD-related information, as this amendment would have it, would leave a gap in a potentially useful information source which can assist with the effective management of the TPIM subject. I am happy to reassure noble Lords that, as with all measures contained in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, this measure will not be applied unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers it necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.
The Committee has already heard during the course of today’s debate that the TPIM regime has inbuilt and robust judicial oversight. This includes all TPIM subjects having an automatic right to have a court review of the imposition of their TPIM notice and each of the measures imposed, as well as a right of appeal should a TPIM subject wish to challenge a variation to one or more measures contained within the TPIM notice. This oversight will of course apply to the updated ECD measure proposed in this clause.
I hope that that provides noble Lords with the reassurances that they were hoping to receive and I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, yes, I will seek to leave to withdraw my amendment.
I find it a bit difficult to understand in this connection how one applies proportionality. The question I asked of the Minister was whether this condition would be imposed in the case of every measure. Obviously, if there is nobody else living at the residence, it would be irrelevant. However—this is a bit rhetorical—how can one apply proportionality in this connection? Either you are concerned about communications through any electronic devices or you are not. I should probably leave that hanging, because it is really a rhetorical question.
I should not finish without thanking both noble Lords who have commented on our indefatigability and good humour. I am not sure whether the good humour showed throughout; I am glad that it appeared to. I acknowledge that picking up so many separate points must seem quite tedious, but quite a lot has come out, certainly that will help us to assess how to address these clauses at the next stage of the Bill, and reading every line and every word is what we are here for.
I apologise to noble Lords who had expected to be able to take part in the Statement on Myanmar, which is a very important and urgent issue. I am very sorry: it has nothing to do with any of us who are speaking and it is a great shame that that Statement was displaced from this evening.
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 32. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 47: Persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism: timing of independent review
Amendment 32
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) omit the words from “within the period” to the end and substitute “by 1 July 2021”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy, which would have to report by 1 July 2021.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, my Amendment 32 would put into legislation a deadline for the Prevent review to be published. The Government commissioned the independent review in January 2019; it has been repeatedly delayed and postponed. The initial statutory deadline of 12 August 2020 will now be missed. The Government say that they intend to have the report by the summer of this year, but they will not commit to putting a date in the Bill. We have long campaigned for a wide-ranging and robust review, which we believe is the right approach. This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent Prevent review.
Amendment 33 takes a slightly different approach, which is to put in place a timetable. It would ensure that the Prevent review and any recommendations were laid within 12 months rather than 18 months, as the Bill currently states. This issue has been mentioned a number of times in Committee, and I think I can guess what the Minister is going to say in response to these amendments. Nevertheless, we need to be as confident as we can be that we can get this deadline and have a reasonable timetable, because it is important that we get these things right and that people can consider the effectiveness of the Prevent programme. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I pay personal tribute to the stamina and persistence of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Paddick. I pay tribute also to the Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, came off the bench half way through the second half, and my noble friend Lord Paddick put up a high one, which unfortunately he dropped: the clash between the presumption of innocence and the requirement to answer a question in a polygraph, which I raised earlier. I was not satisfied with the answer that I got—that it is appropriate to question somebody after conviction, when they face a further term of imprisonment, without any form of caution. I do not think that our law is that they have to answer.
The Prevent strategy, with its statutory duty for schools, NHS trusts, prisons and local authorities to report concerns, has received much criticism. It is clear that it has not been thought fit for purpose in the Muslim community, which regards it, rightly or wrongly, as discriminatory. A lack of trust leads to a lack of co-operation. Consequently, the Government should accept the burden of completing at the earliest opportunity the review that they have announced. Deadlines have already been passed. I have no wish to go into the appointments that have been made save to wonder to what extent those who are immediately affected by the strategy have been involved.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I completely agree with my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford’s comments on the suspicions that many communities have about the Prevent programme, which is why, in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, this House required the Government to undertake an independent review and report on the Government’s strategy for supporting people who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. A timetable was set in the 2019 Act for the Government to make arrangements within six months of that Act being passed and to report within 18 months. As my noble friend said, Clause 47 attempts to remove any timetable for starting, let alone completing, the independent review of Prevent.
As my noble friend said, and as I said at Second Reading, the most important and effective way to keep people safe from terrorist attacks is to prevent those at risk of becoming involved in terrorism-related activity doing so in the first place. It is vital that we know how effective Prevent is at identifying those at risk of being radicalised and diverting them away from potential terrorist activity, and that this is done as quickly as is reasonably practicable. Unless problems are identified and addressed, lives could be put at risk.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, suggests what might be described as a challenging and optimistic target of completing the review by 1 July 2021 in his Amendment 32. With the difficulties the Government have experienced over who should lead the review and the potential challenges ahead, there is a danger that a review within this timetable might not be thorough enough.
On 26 January, less than two weeks ago, the Government appointed a replacement independent reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross. Mr Shawcross’s previous comments on Islam and the Iraq war have raised concerns in some quarters but, assuming he remains in post, the alternative timetable in our Amendment 33 should be achievable. This would give the Secretary of State six months to make arrangements for the review and for Mr Shawcross to lay before Parliament the report and any recommendations within a period of 18 months, beginning with the day this Bill is passed. I might be biased, but we prefer our Amendment 33.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, both amendments in this group would add a new statutory deadline for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I certainly share the Committee’s firm commitment to the success of that independent review. It was clear in this short but important debate that our common objective is for a thorough and effective review to take place—one that will help us to learn how best to safeguard those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
However, we must allow the new reviewer sufficient time to conduct such a thorough and effective review. These amendments would limit his options for reasonable flexibility, shorten the timeframe that he is given and put at risk his ability to do his job properly.
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, the review restarted two weeks ago, on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. Our aim has been for the review to be completed by no later than August this year, but we will agree the precise timetable with Mr Shawcross shortly. We want to enable him to complete the review as swiftly as possible while affording him the consideration that his important task requires.
Of course, the uncertainties posed by the ongoing pandemic, such as the prospect of further ongoing restrictions on travel and face-to-face meetings, could, self-evidently, have implications for the reviewer, as well as for his team and all those who wish to provide input into the review. I am afraid that we therefore have to consider the potential impact of that on his ability to take evidence, including the vital work of engaging with different parts of the community. As the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick, highlighted, that work is vital, as is, for example, the reviewer witnessing for himself Prevent delivery in action so that he can deliver the thorough and evidence-based review, with practical recommendations for improvement, that we would like.
The Government believe that August this year is achievable, but this is of course dependent on the views of the new reviewer. He is independent, so I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We therefore recommend that the legislation affords the reviewer flexibility, should he feel that he needs it, to ensure that the valuable work of this review is not undermined. But we certainly hear what all noble Lords have said about the urgency, and I hope that they can hear that we share that. For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for the rhetorical flourish at the end of his speech, when he said that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, had been asking, “Why?”, on many of the previous groups. In his speech today, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas asked, “When will we get the Prevent review deadline?”
The Minister gave his reasons for putting Mr Shawcross in place. He has been in place for only two weeks and I understand that the Government have had problems in getting this review off the ground. I will not take a partisan view. I do not think that the amendment in my name is better than the one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but it is important to try to get a realisable date or timetable in the Bill so that the Government are held to that.
I will withdraw my amendment, but we might come back with a similar one at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 37. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate, and that anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 37
“Lone terrorists: review of strategy
(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists.(2) A review under subsection (1) must be conducted by a person who meets the criteria for qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court, as set out in section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (qualification for appointment).(3) A review under subsection (1) must consider—(a) counter-terrorism policy;(b) sentencing policy as it applies to terrorist offenders;(c) the interaction and effectiveness of public services with respect to incidents of lone terrorist attacks.(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), “public services” includes, but is not limited to—(a) probation;(b) the prison system;(c) mental health services;(d) local authorities; and(e) housing providers.(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.(6) A Minister of the Crown must table a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report no later than three months after the report has been laid before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause ensures that the Government orders a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists including, but not exclusively, current counter-terrorism and sentencing policy.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, Amendments 37 and 40 concern “lone terrorists” and the review of the strategy concerning them. Amendment 37 ensures that the Government will order a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists, including, but not limited to, current “counter-terrorism policy” and “sentencing policy”. My right honourable friend Nick Thomas-Symonds has called for such a review, following the shocking and tragic incident in Reading on Saturday 20 June 2020, which was the third time in seven months that such devastation caused by a lone attacker has been seen on UK streets.
The review would undertake an assessment of the systemic response needed to address this threat, building on prior research and expertise. It would include an analysis of various public services: probation services, prisons, mental health services, housing providers and local authorities. Professor Ian Acheson, who completed a report for a Conservative Government, said last year:
“Our unsafe prisons provide a fertile breeding ground in which predators, peddling extremist and violent ideologies, can prey upon the vulnerable, creating significant risks to national security and the public at large.”
What steps are the Government taking to put forward a deradicalisation strategy in the prisons?
Amendment 40 looks at MAPPA—multiagency public protection arrangements—and its purpose is to encourage the Government to define which agencies are included within them. I have received a short briefing on this from Napo, and the point that the probation officers make is that the input into the MAPPA arrangements varies according to the individuals one is dealing with: it may be local faith-based groups, housing providers, social services, education providers or substance misuse agencies—a multitude of organisations could be called on to work within the MAPPA system. In this example—and, I have to say, in all examples that I have come across—the system is all about integrated working, and it would be helpful if the Government could offer some perspective on the agencies that they think should be working within the MAPPA system. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the lone terrorist poses a particular danger. “We do not understand them,” said the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, earlier this afternoon. By definition, the lone terrorist is not engaged in communications of any nature that could lead to his apprehension through ordinary surveillance methods and techniques. His motivation may be obscure and entirely personal to himself.
Nevertheless, he can cause huge and unexpected damage, as we saw in the London Bridge episode in Fishmongers’ Hall. In that case, the attacker had been released in the belief that he was no longer a danger to the public—yet, without any obvious motivation, he launched himself against those who were trying to help him.
I support Amendment 37, on the basis that public safety demands that we burrow down into the causes and motivations of the lone actor. The threat to public safety is such that the appointment of a judge, with all the powers that a Supreme Court judge has, is very appropriate.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, the imperfections of remote working have again unfortunately intervened. I did ask to speak after the Minister on the last group, and I hope the Committee will indulge me if I ask one question of the Minister about the former group. The Government are saying that they hope the new independent reviewer of Prevent will produce his report by August this year. In our amendment, by my calculation, we are setting a deadline of August next year. Perhaps when the Minister responds to this group, he could also answer the question of why a 12-month deadline beyond what the Government are proposing themselves is not considered a reasonable time for that review to be undertaken.
Turning to this group of amendments, Amendment 37 requires a review and report on the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists. Amendment 40 calls for a report on which agencies are included within Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—or MAPPA—for the purpose of managing terrorist offenders. Both amendments are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.
In December 2017, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, published his independent assessment of police and MI5 reviews into the Manchester Arena attack and three other incidents in London—all of which involved lone terrorists—which killed a total of 36 people. The report made 126 recommendations, later consolidated into 104 things that could have been done better by counterterrorism officials.
In 2019, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, published a stocktake of progress on the recommendations in his 2017 report, including multiagency centres for managing the risk posed by those suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity, which presumably includes lone terrorists. I am not sure to what extent the review and reports the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is calling for overlap with the work of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Perhaps the Minister can advise the Committee.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
I apologise to the noble Lord. The delay in getting messages to the iPad on the Woolsack meant that I did not get the message that he wished to speak on the last group. But I now call the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, continues to prove himself doughty in the face of technological challenges, and I am happy to address the question he would have asked in the previous group. He makes a valid point about the much longer timeframe proposed in his amendment, which we debated in that group. As I said, however, because Mr Shawcross is an independent reviewer, I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We must speak to him and see what he feels is the timeframe he needs. If we are able to have that conversation and he feels able to give a view before Report stage, we will of course come back and report it, but it is for the independent reviewer to make his assessment of how long he needs to do the thorough job required, as I hope the noble Lord will understand.
Turning now to this group, Amendment 37 would require the Home Secretary to commission a new, judge-led review of the effectiveness of the Government’s strategy to deal with lone-actor terrorists. While I welcome the constructive spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, tabled this amendment, I must respectfully disagree over the need to add it to the Bill.
I reassure the noble Lord that a great deal of work is already under way to combat the terrorist threat, including that posed by lone actors. My right honourable friend the Security Minister talked in some detail about this in a speech he gave at RUSI in November last year—particularly the term “lone actor” itself. If the noble Lord has not seen it, it is well worth reading. I would be very happy to provide noble Lords with a copy of that speech if they would like it.
The Government have been clear that we will not hesitate to act where necessary. Following the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, we brought forward legislation to address flaws in the way terrorist offenders were managed. The legislation we are now debating marks the largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing in decades. It follows on from the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which came into force in February last year. That Act was, as noble Lords will remember, emergency legislation. One of its effects was to prevent around 50 terrorist prisoners being automatically released after serving only half their sentence, by amending their release point to at least two-thirds of their sentence and ensuring they are released only after an assessment by the Parole Board.
Following the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall QC to carry out an independent review of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, or MAPPA, when it comes to the management of terrorism, terrorist connections and offenders of terrorism concern in the community. MAPPA is the process through which the police, the Prison Service and the probation service work together and with other agencies—including children’s services, adult social services, health trusts and authorities, and youth offending teams—to protect the public by managing the risks posed by violent and sexual offenders living in the community.
That review found that MAPPA is a well-established process, and Mr Hall did not conclude that wholesale change is necessary. He made a number of recommendations on how the management of terrorists can be improved. In response to the review, the Government will shortly be bringing forward policing and crime legislation implementing a number of his recommendations, including new powers of premises and personal search, and an urgent power of arrest for counterterrorism policing.
This ongoing work builds on the response to the 2017 attacks. Three of the attacks in 2017 were carried out by lone actors, as was the attack in Reading, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, reminds us, which we sadly saw more recently. In 2018, the Government published a strengthened counterterrorism strategy, known as Contest, following operational improvement reviews overseen by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. As part of that strategy we have piloted new multiagency approaches at the local level—in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester—to enable MI5 and counterterrorism policing to share more information with a broader range of partners, including government departments, the devolved Administrations and local authorities. This has enabled us to identify, mitigate and disrupt threats earlier. Our superb police, and security and intelligence agencies work around the clock to keep us safe: they have disrupted 27 terrorist plots since 2017.
There are now more than 20 government departments and agencies involved in the delivery of Contest, and we have worked to build strong relationships with the private sector, the third sector and the wider public. We will continue to invest in these relationships and drive greater integration, recognising that to reduce the risk of terrorism we need not only a whole-of-Government but a whole-of-society approach. In the context of the wide-ranging work already under way and recently completed, the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendment is needed.
I turn now to Amendment 40. This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay a report within 12 months of the Bill being passed, defining which agencies are included within MAPPA for the purposes of managing terrorist offenders. The agencies included in MAPPA are already listed in Section 325 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As has been mentioned already, these include criminal justice agencies such as the police and the probation service, as well as other agencies, including mental health services, social services and NHS England. These agencies are placed under a statutory obligation to work together to assess and manage the risk presented by serious offenders.
Moreover, agencies with a legal duty to co-operate with MAPPA must have regard to statutory guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice. This guidance, which also sets out which agencies must co-operate, is publicly available. Agencies that do not have a statutory duty to co-operate with MAPPA are not obliged to engage. There are, however, no barriers in place to prevent this engagement for the purposes of assessing and managing the risks presented by serious offenders. It is our belief that the right agencies already have a duty to co-operate in place, and, as such, they are listed publicly in the Criminal Justice Act.
I have already mentioned Jonathan Hall’s recent review of MAPPA. On the question of the identity of the agencies involved in MAPPA, he raised no issues. He did, however, raise questions about the way in which MAPPA agencies share information with each other, and the Government have confirmed in our response to his review that we will clarify the position in upcoming legislation to put the matter beyond doubt. We believe, therefore, that since this knowledge is already publicly available and enshrined in legislation, there is no need for this amendment. I hope the noble Lord agrees and that he will be willing to withdraw it.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this short group of amendments. The Minister offered to send the RUSI speech of his friend, which I would indeed be happy to read. The gist of his comments on Amendment 37 was that a judge-led review is not needed because there are other government reviews currently under way. I hear what he says, but I will reflect on the view he expresses.
On Amendment 40, he listed the statutory bodies that are required to co-operate with MAPPA, but I thought it was interesting that the list he read out was a much shorter list than the one I got from the probation officers, who said it was very important to go wider than the short list he mentioned and include, for example, local faith-based groups, education providers and third sector substance misuse agencies. Those sorts of agencies may well be very useful and informative for the MAPPA system. I hear what the noble Lord says about Jonathan Hall and the plan to help the different MAPPA agencies co-operate with each other, which must be the right way to proceed. I will reflect on what he said, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 41, which is all government amendments. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate.
Schedule 13: Consequential and related amendments
Amendment 41
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(b) in paragraph (a), for “that Act” substitute “the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a further consequential amendment to section 23A of the Terrorism Act 2000 needed as a result of Clause 1 of the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 42 to 65 inclusive and to Amendments 69, 71, 72, 74 and 76. I make four very short points. First, the hour is late and getting later. Secondly, these are all technical and consequential amendments. Thirdly, we have placed an explanatory note for each of them, which I am sure Members of the Committee will have looked at. Fourthly, I propose to set out in a letter, which I shall place in the Library, a more detailed analysis of the admittedly somewhat arcane and, in many cases, technical and consequential nature of these amendments. I hope that in those circumstances, I can draw my remarks to a close there. Obviously, if noble Lords have specific questions, I will attempt to answer them now, but otherwise, I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, since requests to speak after the Minister are delivered to the Deputy Chairman of Committees by forked stick, perhaps I might comment on the earlier group concerning the review. Mr William Shawcross’s report on compensation for Libyan-backed terrorist atrocities in Northern Ireland was discussed on Monday. It was received by the Government last May but not published, as we have discussed. I hope that any review or report in the field that we have been discussing will not similarly be kept clutched to the Government’s bosom.
I have considered the government amendments to this schedule, and I am satisfied that they are consequential to amendments to legislation made necessary by this Bill and do not contain in themselves any questions of principle. I would not be surprised, given the complexity of the Bill, if other amendments emerged in the course of time.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford for doing the heavy lifting in looking at these amendments and reassuring me that there is nothing ugly lurking in the pile. I am grateful for the undertaking from the Minister to write to us with further details.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
The only amendment I would like to mention is Amendment 60, which amends Section 250 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 so that, according to the explanatory statement,
“the Parole Board will set the licence conditions for all prisoners to whom section 247A of that Act applies (restricted eligibility for early release) whose release is directed by the Board.”
Is this dealing with licence conditions where there is no right to early release or with licence conditions where there is a right to early release? If so, what is the effect of the amendment? It is the only amendment in this group that looked as if it might be doing something substantive. If the Minister would like to write to me, I will quite understand.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick. In response to the specific point put to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in one sentence, the change is needed to ensure that there was clarity over the authority for setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders, whether serving standard, determinate, extended or other sentences. I shall include an explanation of the amendment in my letter. I hope that satisfies him; if he wants any further information, I would of course be happy to provide it.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
2A_ In section 44(2)(e) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (provisions subject to review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation), for “Schedule 1” substitute “Schedules A1 and 1”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amends the list of terrorism legislation which is subject to review by the independent reviewer to include the new Schedule A1 inserted into the Sentencing Code by Schedule 1 to the Bill.
Member’s explanatory statement
This removes a repeal to Schedule 2 to the Sentencing (Pre-Consolidation Amendments) Act 2020 that has already been made by the Sentencing Act 2020.
“(3A) In Schedule 22, paragraph 4 (prospective addition of offences to Schedule 1 to the Code), and the heading above it, are repealed to the extent that paragraph 4 is not yet in force when section 1 of this Act comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This repeals a prospective amendment to the Sentencing Code made by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020. The repealed amendment will be unnecessary if not yet in force when Clause 1 of the Bill comes into force.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 121, line 17.
“(6A) In section 255C (extended sentence prisoners and those not suitable for automatic release)— (a) for the heading, substitute “Prisoners not suitable for automatic release”;(b) in subsection (1)(a), after “prisoner” insert “or a serious terrorism prisoner (see section 255A(7) and (7A))”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes a consequential amendment to section 255C of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reflecting the fact that those serving serious terrorism sentences will not be eligible for automatic further release after recall to prison.
Member’s explanatory statement
This removes an unnecessary amendment to the Sentencing Code.
Member’s explanatory statement
This removes an unnecessary amendment to the Sentencing Code.
“(21) In section 417(3) (commencement of provisions of Schedule 22 which relate to prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution)—(a) in paragraph (a), for “38” substitute “38B”;(b) in paragraph (d), for “268” substitute “268C”;(c) in paragraph (f), after “paragraphs” insert “68A,”.(22) In Schedule 22 (amendments of the Sentencing Code, including in relation to the prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution)—(a) for paragraph 36 substitute—“36_ In section 15 (committal for sentence of dangerous adult offenders)—(a) in subsection (1)(b), omit—(i) “of detention in a young offender institution or”;(ii) “266 or”;(b) in subsection (1A), omit “268A or”.”;(b) in paragraph 37 (amendments of section 59 of the Code)—(i) for “59(2)(h)” substitute “59(2)”;(ii) after “court)” insert “—(a) in paragraph (ga), for “sections 268B and” substitute “section”;(b) in paragraph (h),”;(c) in paragraph 38 (amendments of section 61 of the Code), after sub-paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) in subsection (2B), omit “268C(2)(b) or”;”;(d) after paragraph 38 insert—“38A_ In section 73(2A) (reduction in serious terrorism sentence for guilty plea), omit “268C(2) or, as the case may be,”.38B_ In section 74(4A) (reduction in serious terrorism sentence for assistance to prosecution), omit “268C(2) or”.”;(e) in paragraph 40 (amendments of section 166 of the Code), for “paragraphs 3 and 4” substitute “entries 3, 4 and 4A”;(f) in paragraph 46 (amendments of section 231 of the Code), at the end insert—“(d) in subsection (6A), for “sections 268C(2)(b) and” substitute “section”.”; (g) after paragraph 57 insert—“57A_ In section 282A (serious terrorism sentence of imprisonment: persons 21 or over), in the heading omit “: persons 21 or over”.57B_ In section 282B (serious terrorism sentence of imprisonment: circumstances in which required), omit subsection (1)(c).”; (h) in paragraph 62 (amendments of section 308(1) of the Code), after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) in paragraph (aa), omit “268B or”;”;(i) after paragraph 68 insert—“68A_ In section 323 (minimum term order: other life sentences)—(a) in subsection (4), omit “268B(2) or” in both places;(b) in subsection (6)(b), omit “268B(2) or”.”;(j) in paragraph 70 (amendments of section 329 of the Code)—(i) after the opening words insert—“(za) in subsection (3), for “(4) to (5A)” substitute “(4), (4A) and (5)”;(ii) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) omit subsection (5A);”;(iii) in paragraph (b), after “(e)” insert “, (ea)”;(k) in paragraph 72 (amendments of section 397(1) of the Code)—(i) the words from “in the definition” to the end become sub- paragraph (a);(ii) at the end insert—“(b) in the definition of “serious terrorism sentence”, omit paragraph (a)(including the word “or” immediately after that paragraph).”;(l) for paragraph 73 (amendments of section 399 of the Code) substitute—“73_ In section 399 (mandatory sentences)—(a) in paragraph (b)—(i) in the opening words, omit “, custody for life”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (i), omit “, 274”;(iii) in sub-paragraph (ii), omit “273 or”;(b) in paragraph (ba), omit “268B or”.”;(m) before paragraph 80 (amendment of Schedule 18 to the Code) insert—“79A_ In Schedule 17A (serious terrorism offences), after paragraph 24 insert—“Space Industry Act 201824A_ An offence under any of the following provisions of Schedule 4 to the Space Industry Act 2018—(a) paragraph 1 (hijacking of spacecraft);(b) paragraph 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering the safety of spacecraft);(c) paragraph 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of spacecraft);(d) paragraph 4 (endangering safety at spaceports).””;(n) in paragraph 101 (amendment of section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983)—(i) in sub-paragraph (1), omit “, as amended by paragraph 73 of Schedule 24”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (2), for “273” substitute “268A, 273”;(iii) in sub-paragraph (3), after “(1B)” insert “—(a) in paragraph (aa), omit “section 268A or” and “282B(2) or”;(b) ”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes further amendments to Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 (prospective amendments to the Sentencing Code in connection with the abolition of detention in a young offender institution) in consequence of the introduction by clauses 4 and 5 of serious terrorism sentences in England and Wales.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 108, line 18.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 108, line 18.
“(2A) The amendment made by sub-paragraph (2) does not apply where a person is convicted of an offence before the day on which this paragraph comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This ensures that the transitional provision set out in Clause 21(2) in relation to the introduction of the new Schedule 13 to the Sentencing Code by that Clause also applies to the related consequential amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This leaves out an amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 which is consequential on Schedule 8 to the Bill rather than Clause 21 (see also amendment at page 119, line 41).
“(a) in subsection (6A)(a), for “265” substitute “252A, 265”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This adjusts a consequential amendment to section 264 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to reflect an amendment made to that provision by the Sentencing Act 2020.
“(25A) In section 417(3) (commencement of provisions of Schedule 22 which relate to prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution), in paragraph (c), after “51” insert “, 51A”.(25B) In Schedule 22 (amendments of the Sentencing Code, including in relation to prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution)—(a) after paragraph 51 insert—“51A_ In section 252A (special sentence of detention for terrorist offenders of particular concern aged under 18), in subsection (4), for “21” substitute “18”.”;(b) in paragraph 70 (amendment of section 329 of the Sentencing Code in relation to the prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution), before paragraph (a) insert—“(zb) in subsection (4A), omit paragraph (b) (and the word “or” immediately before it);”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes further amendments to the Sentencing Act 2020 which are consequential on the introduction of the new sentence for offenders of particular concern aged under 18 at the time of the offence by Clause 22.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 115, line 24
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 115, line 24
“33A(1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it forms part of the law of Scotland is amended as follows. (2) In section 5 (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—(a) in subsection (1)(d), after “or section 209” insert “or 224B”;(b) in subsection (2F)(a)(ii), after “209” insert “or 224B”.(3) In section 5B (Table B - disclosure periods: service disciplinary cases), in the sixth entry of Table B, after “209” insert “or 224B”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes amendments to section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it extends to Scotland, to ensure that section deals with the service equivalent of the new sentence for offenders of particular concern aged under 18 at the time of the offence, introduced by Part 3 of Schedule 8 to the Bill.
“(4A) In section 418 (commencement of provisions of Schedule 26 in relation to prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Paragraphs 13A, 20A and 24A (and paragraph 1 so far as it relates to them) also come into force at that time.”(4B) In Schedule 25 (amendments of Armed Forces Act 2006), omit paragraph 45(5).(4C) In Schedule 26 (further amendments of the Armed Forces Act 2006 in relation to prospective abolition of sentences of detention in a young offender institution)—(a) after paragraph 13 insert—“13A_ In section 219ZA (serious terrorism sentence for offenders aged 18 or over)—(a) in subsection (1)(e), omit “a sentence of custody for life or (as the case may be)”;(b) omit subsections (4) to (6);(c) in subsection (7), omit “Where the offender is aged 21 or over when convicted of the serious terrorism offence,”.”;(b) in paragraph 14 (amendments of section 219A of the 2006 Act), for sub-paragraph (a) substitute—“(a) in subsection (1)—(i) in paragraph (d), omit sub-paragraphs (i) and (iii);(ii) in paragraph (da), omit sub-paragraph (i);”;(c) in paragraph 15(a) (amendments of section 224A of the 2006 Act), after paragraph (ii) insert—“(iii) in sub-paragraph (iii), for “detention or imprisonment under section 268A or 282A” substitute “imprisonment under section 282A”;”;(d) in paragraph 18 (amendment of section 239 of the 2006 Act), after “pleas)” insert “—(a) in subsection (3A), omit—(i) “(4) or”;(ii) “268A or”;(b) in subsection (3B), omit “268C(2) or, as the case may be,”;(c) ”;(e) in paragraph 19 (amendments of section 260 of the 2006 Act)—(i) in sub-paragraph (a), after paragraph (ii) insert—“(iia) in paragraph (ca), omit “268A or”;”; (ii) for sub-paragraph (b) substitute—“(b) in subsection (4B)—(i) in paragraph (za), omit “268C(2) or”;(ii) in paragraph (a), omit “268(2) or”.”;(f) in paragraph 20 (amendments of section 261 of the 2006 Act), at the end insert— “(c) in paragraph (ba), omit “268A or”.”;(g) after paragraph 20 insert—“20A_ In section 261A(3) (life sentences: further provision)—(a) in paragraph (b), omit “268B(2) or”;(b) in paragraph (c)(i), omit “268B(2) or”.”;(h) in paragraph 21 (amendments of section 262A of the 2006 Act), for the words from “, in subsection (4)” to the end substitute—“(a) in subsection (2A), omit paragraph (b);(b) omit subsection (3A);(c) in subsection (4), omit paragraphs (d), (da), (e) and (f) treated as substituted in subsection (7) of section 329 of the Sentencing Code.”;(i) after paragraph 24 insert—“24A_ In section 304C (to be inserted by the Armed Forces Act 2016: reduction in sentence), in subsection (5A)—(a) omit “268C(2) or”;(b) for “section 219ZA(5) to (8)” substitute “section 219ZA(8)”.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes further amendments, to the provisions of the Sentencing Act 2020 dealing with the abolition of detention in a young offender institution, which are consequential on the provisions of the Bill dealing with sentencing under service law.
“(2A) In section 250 (licence conditions)—(a) in subsection (5A), in each of paragraphs (a) and (b), after “a prisoner” insert “, other than a terrorist prisoner,”;(b) after subsection (5A) insert—“(5AA) Subsection (5B) also applies to a licence granted, either on initial release or after recall to prison, to a terrorist prisoner in a case where the licence is granted following a direction of the Board for the prisoner’s release.”;(c) omit subsection (5BA);(d) after subsection (8) insert—“(9) In this section “terrorist prisoner” means a prisoner to whom section 247A applies, or would apply but for the prisoner’s having been released on licence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amends section 250 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 so that the Parole Board will set the licence conditions for all prisoners to whom section 247A of that Act applies (restricted eligibility for early release) whose release is directed by the Board.
“Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (c. 49)
45A_ In section 6A(1)(d) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (inquiries into detention of children under certain enactments), after “44” insert “, 205ZC(5)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment enables an inquiry to be held under section 6A of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 into the detention of a child under the new terrorism sentence introduced by Clause 23.
“Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (c. 53)
45B_ In section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it forms part of the law of England and Wales (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences), in subsection (1)(d)—(a) for “Act 1975” substitute “Act 1995”;(b) for the words from “section 206” to the end substitute “section 205ZC(5) or 208 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995;”. 45C_ In section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as it forms part of the law of Scotland (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences)—(a) in subsection (1)(da), after “section” insert “205ZA(6)(serious terrorism sentence for young offenders), 205ZC(4) or (5)(terrorism sentence for young offenders or children),”;(b) in subsection (12), in paragraph (b) of the definition of “custodial sentence”, after “44,” insert “205ZA(6), 205ZC(4) or (5),”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes amendments to section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 so that it will deal with the new sentences introduced by Clauses 6 and 23.
“(1) The Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 is amended as follows.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 122, line 18.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 122, line 18.
“(3) In section 40(3)(a)(arrest of absent prisoners: application of section to persons sentenced or ordered to be detained under certain provisions of the 1995 Act), after “205” insert “, 205ZC(5)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 40(3)(a) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 so as to make section 40 applicable in relation to children sentenced to detention under the new terrorism sentence introduced by Clause 23.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 66. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister’s reply should email the clerk during the debate.
Amendment 66
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(1A) In section 1(3A) (release of short-term, long-term and life prisoners serving concurrent sentences), for “section 1A” substitute “sections 1A and 1B”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of new section 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 made by the amendment at page 123, line 6.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
In moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I shall speak also to Amendments 67 and 70, also in his name. These amendments are intended to modify Scottish provisions on sentencing with the intention of providing that, throughout the United Kingdom, terrorist offenders serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences. They are made necessary by an aspect of Scottish sentencing practice that does not appear elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
The three amendments, taken together, make provision for technical sentence calculation adjustment. They clarify how terrorism sentences will operate when served consecutively with non-terrorism sentences. The amendments come at the end of a positive engagement with the devolved Government; as a result of that engagement, the Scottish Government have now tabled a legislative consent Motion in respect of this Bill.
As I said in the course of these brief remarks, the amendments are technical in nature and I shall be happy to place detail of them and their implications in a letter in the Library of this House. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for moving these amendments and for pronouncing “Tredegar” correctly. I am sure that the noble Lord who hails from, or has a connection with, Tredegar, will be happy with his pronunciation as well. I have looked at these Scottish provisions. I agree that they are technical, and I really have nothing to add.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am minded to say, “Like the last lot”—but I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for his offer to write with details. I would just say that I think it is rather cruel and inhumane to expect three government Ministers to be forced to remain to the end of the evening; perhaps they can come to some better arrangement on a future occasion.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I too am grateful to the four Ministers for the care and good humour with which they have dealt with it all. Of the three amendments, Amendment 66 looks entirely technical. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, says, Amendment 67 deals with a situation where you have a non-terrorist sentence and then, consecutively, before or after, a terrorist sentence. I cannot work out how you deal with that situation for the purposes of licences as a result of this amendment. Hopefully, that will be explained to us—for reasons that may be entirely my fault, it is not entirely clear to me from the wording of the amendment. As I understand it, Amendment 70 again deals with the position of consecutive sentences; and again, the effect of that is not entirely clear to me. It might be significant, because what we are dealing with are very long sentences. So I hope that the noble and learned Lord will explain this when he comes to write his letter to us. I am very much obliged.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I will undertake to provide that explanation on what are, as all the speakers who have kindly commented on the provisions have remarked, matters of a technical nature.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(3) In the heading of section 1A, after “to” insert “certain”.(3A) After section 1A insert— “1B Prisoners serving consecutive sentences including at least one terrorism sentence(1) This section applies where—(a) a prisoner has been sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment which are to be served consecutively on each other,(b) one or more of the sentences (the “terrorism sentence”) was imposed in respect of an offence within section 1AB(2), and(c) the sentences were imposed on the same occasion or, where they were imposed on different occasions, the prisoner has not been released under this Part at any time during the period beginning with the first and ending with the last of those occasions.(2) If the prisoner is serving a terrorism sentence and a sentence imposed in respect of an offence that is not within section 1AB(2) (a “non-terrorism sentence”), the terrorism sentence is to be served (or, where subsection (7) applies, treated as being served) after the non-terrorism sentence irrespective of when the sentences were imposed.(3) Where subsection (2) applies, the prisoner is to be taken to begin serving the custodial part of the terrorism sentence (or first such sentence) as soon as the prisoner has served the custodial part of the non-terrorism sentence.(4) If (but for this section) the prisoner would have been released on licence under this Part in respect of a non-terrorism sentence, the period during which the prisoner would have been on licence under this Part is to be served concurrently with the custodial part of the terrorism sentence.(5) The prisoner may not be released under this Part in respect of the terrorism sentence unless and until the prisoner has served the aggregate of—(a) if the prisoner is serving a non-terrorism sentence, the custodial part of the sentence, and(b) the custodial part of each terrorism sentence that the prisoner is serving.(6) Subsection (7) applies where—(a) a non-terrorism sentence is imposed on the prisoner (the “new sentence”), and(b) the prisoner has already served part of the custodial part of a terrorism sentence (the “served part”).(7) The prisoner is to be treated as having served—(a) where the served part is less than the custodial part of the new sentence, such part of the custodial part of the new sentence as is equal to the served part,(b) where the served part is equal to the custodial part of the new sentence, the custodial part of the new sentence,(c) where the served part exceeds the custodial part of the new sentence—(i) the custodial part of the new sentence, and(ii) so much of the custodial part of the terrorism sentence as is equal to the amount by which the served part exceeds the custodial part of the new sentence.(8) Nothing in this Part requires—(a) the Scottish Ministers to release the prisoner in respect of any of the terms of imprisonment unless and until they are required to release the prisoner in respect of each of the other terms of imprisonment,(b) the Scottish Ministers or the Parole Board to consider the prisoner’s release in respect of any of the terms of imprisonment unless and until the Ministers are or the Board is required to consider the prisoner’s release, or the Ministers are required to release the prisoner, in respect of each of the other terms. (9) If the prisoner is released on licence under this Part the prisoner is to be on licence, on and after the release, until the prisoner would, but for the release, have served a term equal in length to the aggregate length of the term of imprisonment of any non-terrorism sentence and the term or, as the case may be, terms of imprisonment for the terrorism sentence or sentences less the period mentioned in subsection (10).(10) The period is—(a) any period served concurrently in accordance with subsection (4), and(b) if (but for this section) the prisoner would have been released unconditionally under section 1(1) in respect of a non-terrorism sentence, the period equal to one-half of the term of that sentence.(11) Where a prisoner to which this section applies is released on licence under this Part (other than a licence under section 3AA), the release is to be on a single licence which is to be subject to such conditions as may be specified or required by this Part in relation to all the sentences in respect of which the prisoner has been so released.(12) In this section “custodial part”, in relation to a term of imprisonment means a period equal to the part of the term that (but for this section) the prisoner would be required to serve before—(a) the Scottish Ministers are required to release the prisoner under this Part, or(b) the Parole Board is first entitled under this Part to make a recommendation that the prisoner be released on licence under this Part.(13) In this section—(a) references to a non-terrorism sentence include references to two or more such sentences that are treated as a single term by virtue of section 27(5) (whether imposed before, after or both before and after a terrorism sentence), and(b) where subsection (7) applies, the references in that subsection to the “custodial part of the new sentence” include references to the custodial part of the single term.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts new section 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. New section 1B makes provision where a prisoner is serving consecutive sentences including at least one terrorism sentence to which section 1AB of the 1993 Act applies, including provision consequential on the amendment of section 27 of the 1993 Act made by the amendment at page 125, line 15.
“(5A) In section 3A (re-release of prisoners serving extended sentences)—(a) in the heading, after “serving” insert “certain terrorism sentences and”;(b) in subsection (1), for the words from “an” to “sentences)” substitute “a sentence mentioned in subsection (1ZA)”;(c) after subsection (1) insert—“(1ZA) The sentences are—(a) a sentence imposed under section 205ZA of the 1995 Act (serious terrorism sentence);(b) a sentence imposed under section 205ZC of that Act (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period);(c) an extended sentence under section 210A of that Act.”;(d) in subsection (3), after “term with” insert “the sentence under section 205ZA or, as the case may be, section 205ZC or”;(e) in subsection (4), for the words from “if” to the end substitute— “(a) where—(i) the prisoner is serving a sentence imposed under section 205ZA or 205ZC of the 1995 Act or an extended sentence under section 210A of that Act in respect of a terrorism offence, and(ii) the Board is satisfied that the condition in subsection (4A) is met (but not otherwise),direct that the prisoner should be released;(b) where—(i) the prisoner is serving an extended sentence under section 210A of that Act in respect of a sexual or violent offence, and(ii) the Board is satisfied that the condition in subsection (4B) is met (but not otherwise),direct that the prisoner should be released.”;(f) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) The condition is that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.(4B) The condition is that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm that the prisoner should be confined.”(5B) In section 3B (review of decisions as to determinate sentences)—(a) in subsection (1)(a), after “from” insert “a sentence imposed under section 205ZC of the 1995 Act or”;(b) in subsection (1)(b)—(i) after “serving” insert “a sentence imposed under section 205ZC of the 1995 Act or”;(ii) after “sentence”, in the second place it occurs, insert “or extended sentence”;(c) in subsection (4)(b), after “relates to” insert “a sentence imposed under section 205ZC of the 1995 Act or”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends sections 3A and 3B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in consequence of the new terrorism sentences introduced by Clauses 6 and 23.
“(aa) in subsection (5), after paragraph (a) (but before the final “and”) insert—“(aa) sections 3A and 3B of this Act apply to children on whom detention has been imposed under section 205ZC(5) of the 1995 Act as they apply to long- term prisoners;”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 7(5) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 so as to ensure that sections 3A and 3B of that Act apply in relation to children who are sentenced to detention under the new terrorism sentence introduced by Clause 23.
(a) in respect of an offence within section 1AB(2), and(b) on or after the coming into force of paragraph 48(3A) of Schedule 13 to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision so that terrorism sentences to which section 1AB of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 apply will not be treated as a single term for the purposes of Part 1 of the Act.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(i) Part 3 of that Schedule, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(hb);(ia) Part 4 of that Schedule;”Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 44, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments at page 122, line 2.
“(q) sections 31 and 32;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will ensure that Clause 32 of the Bill (polygraph conditions for terrorist offenders: England and Wales) comes into force 2 months after Royal Assent (rather than by regulations).
“(i) Part 1 of that Schedule, except as mentioned in subsection (3)(ha);(ia) Part 2 of that Schedule;”Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the insertion made by the amendment at page 44, line 11.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the removal of Clauses 33 to 35 of the Bill and on the amendment at page 43, line 27.
“(ha) paragraph 6(3)(a) and (3A) of Schedule 13 as they have effect for the purposes mentioned in paragraph (a) above (and section 48 to the extent that it relates to those provisions for those purposes);(hb) Part 3 of Schedule 13 as it has effect for the purposes mentioned in paragraph (f) above (and section 48 to the extent that it relates to that Part for those purposes);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that consequential amendments made by Schedule 13, so far as they relate to provisions in the Bill which will be brought into force by regulations, will also be brought into force by regulations.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, with thanks to all noble Lords who have enabled us to complete the Committee’s scrutiny of the Bill this evening, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Wednesday 3rd March 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 169-I Marshalled list for Report - (26 Feb 2021)
14:00 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 1 - Ayes: 126 / Noes: 281 - Amendment 1 disagreed.
16:58 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 16 - Ayes: 316 / Noes: 267 - Amendment 16 agreed.
17:13 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 18 - Ayes: 103 / Noes: 300 - Amendment 18 disagreed.
17:51 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 21 - Ayes: 106 / Noes: 292 - Amendment 21 disagreed.
“(aa) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) The court may not assume that an offence has a terrorist connection for the purpose of this section unless—(a) the defendant has admitted in person and in open court that the offence has such a terrorist connection, or(b) where the defendant does not make such an admission, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt upon a trial of the issue that the offence has a terrorist connection.(1B) A trial held pursuant to subsection (1A)(b) above must be determined by a jury unless the court determines that the interests of justice would be better served by a trial by a judge alone upon evidence admissible in a criminal court.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require a trial of the issue as to whether or not there is a terrorist connection in relation to an aggravated offence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I argued in Committee that Clause 1 should not stand part of the Bill because it would create a whole raft of new aggravated offences, for which offenders would be sentenced on the basis that the offences had a terrorist connection without the question of whether they had such a connection ever having been tried by a jury or a judge or even tried on the basis of admissible evidence.
For the purpose of Section 69 of the Sentencing Act, which is to be amended by this clause, an offence has a terrorist connection if it is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism or is committed for the purposes of terrorism. The principal point I made in Committee was that the decision that the offence had a terrorist connection was not made by the jury before the offender was convicted but was reserved to the judge at the sentencing stage. A defendant might be convicted by a jury of the basic offence, for which the appropriate penalty might be a short term of imprisonment, but sentenced on the basis of a decision taken by a judge alone, without hearing any evidence, that the offence had a terrorist connection and merited a sentence of a long term of imprisonment. I said then and repeat now that that feature would cut across the principle of our criminal law that no one should be convicted of an offence except upon admissible evidence, open to challenge in a trial and, if in the Crown Court, heard by a jury.
Prior to this Bill, offences with a terrorist connection that would act as an aggravating factor in sentencing comprised a relatively limited range of very serious offences which might often be expected to have a terrorist connection, such as murder, a number of explosives offences, hijacking, hostage-taking and serious aviation offences. They were listed in Schedule 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and would all normally merit long terms of imprisonment.
For that reason, the effect of aggravating the sentence was less objectionable than it is to be as a result of Clause 1 of this Bill. That is because this Bill broadens the range of offences that may be treated as aggravated by a terrorist connection to include any offence that carries a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years. An offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for example, carries a maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, even though the violence involved can be relatively minor and the harm caused can be restricted to bruising or pulled muscles. The basic offence might merit a fine or a short term of imprisonment, but the offence committed with a terrorist connection might attract the maximum sentence. While the offender’s guilt of the basic offence would be determined by a jury, the terrorist connection would be a matter for the judge alone at the sentencing stage.
The finding that an offence has a terrorist connection does not simply increase the likely sentence; it also has the effect of activating the notification requirements for terrorist offences, thus classing the offender as a terrorist, with lifelong consequences, and the further effect of activating a number of forfeiture provisions. In addition, the increased sentence is subject to the restriction on early release under the so-called TORA Act, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 that we passed as emergency legislation last year. Not only would the sentence be longer, but the proportion served in custody would be greater. In short, the consequences of a finding of a terrorist connection are devastating for the offender.
It was the fact that those consequences could be imposed without a trial of the fact of the terrorist connection that led us in Committee to oppose Clause 1 standing part of the Bill, despite our complete acceptance of the central proposition of this Bill that terrorist offences call to be treated with the greatest severity, for the protection of the public as well as the punishment of the offenders.
Amendment 1 is far more targeted than the opposition to the clause standing part. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for discussing this amendment with me at a meeting yesterday. Importantly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, reminded us that in Scotland the different charging arrangements and arrangements for jury verdicts would enable verdicts to be given making it clear whether a terrorist connection was proved or not.
Not being a Scottish or Northern Irish lawyer, I had not attempted to formulate amendments that would apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. At the suggestion of the Public Bill Office, I have confined my amendment to England and Wales in the hope that, if it is agreed, the Government will draft and bring back suitable amendments for Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, it is to be noted that Section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which applies to Scotland and is also to be amended by this Bill—although not materially for this purpose—requires that, before an offender in Scotland can be sentenced for the aggravated offence,
“(a) it is libelled in an indictment, and
(b) proved”.
Only then does the court take into account the aggravation of the offence. This was, no doubt, what the noble and learned Lord had in mind, proving once again to this Englishman how often Scotland is more enlightened than England and Wales on justice issues.
In the short debate in Committee on 26 January, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford raised the possibility of a Newton hearing—a hearing to determine a question of fact relevant to sentence—as a way of determining whether an offence had the necessary terrorist connection to justify treating it as aggravated. That point was also hinted at by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
The applicable legislation does not provide for such a hearing. Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 provides only that the court must determine whether the offence has or may have a terrorist connection. Under subsection (3):
“For that purpose the court may hear evidence, and must take account of any representations made by the prosecution and the defence, as in the case of any other matter relevant for the purposes of sentence.”
That provision is entirely unsatisfactory for the wide range of aggravated offences now proposed, many of them not of the greatest seriousness in the absence of the aggravating factor.
Our amendment would require that before an offence is taken to have a terrorist connection, either the defendant must admit
“in person and in open court that the offence has such a … connection”
—in much the same way as a plea of guilty would entitle the court to pass sentence—or there must be a trial of the issue. That trial would be by a jury
“unless the court determines that the interests of justice would be better served by a trial by a judge alone”.
At the trial of the issue, evidence admissible in a criminal court would be adduced and the court could proceed on the basis that the offence had a terrorist connection only if satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.
I suggest that this amendment strikes a proper and important balance between the public interest in securing severe punishment for offences with a proved terrorist connection and the public interest—also of great significance—in ensuring that sentences are imposed for offences that are properly proved before the court upon admissible evidence. That is the way our criminal law has generally proceeded, and that is the way it should proceed. I will wish to test the opinion of the House if the Government do not accept the amendment. I also wish to record the fact that I would like my voice to be heard when the voices are counted. I beg to move.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP) [V]
My Lords, I strongly support the Bill, and welcome its extension to Northern Ireland. It is absolutely right that we have a unified approach to the sentencing and release of offenders across our United Kingdom. Although I share the desire expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to uphold the principles of our criminal justice system and defend everyone’s right to a fair trial, I believe that the concerns underlying Amendment 1 have been overstated.
At present the courts are expressly required to consider whether there is a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing, for a defined list of non-terrorism offences. Clause 1 would extend that requirement to all non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years. Importantly, for the aggravating factor to be applied, the offence would have to be committed in the course of an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism. I see no compelling argument that consideration of those issues at the point of sentencing represents a disproportionate burden on a defendant or restricts their rights. Judges already have discretion in many cases, including for the offence of murder, to increase or reduce a sentence in accordance with their view of the evidence.
The key factor in this case, therefore, is the need for effective guidance relating to the threshold for an aggravated offence, and its fair application. Only if there is enough evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof that there is a terrorism connection should the judge apply an aggravation. We have to remember, especially in an ever more digital and connected world, that terrorist offending can take many forms, so it is appropriate that the range of routine offences that can come under the scope of counterterrorism legislation is being extended. Ultimately, this process will help identify offenders who might otherwise have fallen through the cracks, and will ensure that they are registered, monitored and subject to notification requirements.
I make these points not because I am not committed to due process, or to respecting the fundamental rights of defendants, but because I believe that we must take a strong but balanced approach to enhanced sentencing and release provisions in such hearings.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his amendments clearly, and concentrated on the fact that the decision about a terrorist connection is made by a judge at the sentencing stage, not by the jury when they are assessing guilt or otherwise.
The noble Lord said that prior to the Bill, a limited number of offences were included. Those were serious offences, so his argument was that it did not make that much difference if there was a terrorist connection. He gave the example of ABH, for which the maximum sentence is seven years’ custody, although the penalty for low-level ABH may be some type of community order. His argument was that putting a terrorist connection on a wider range of lower-level offences would have a much larger effect on the likely sentence.
The noble Lord also spoke about activating notification requirements, and early release provisions. He prayed in aid the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who previously raised the possibility of Newton hearings. I am much more sympathetic to that possibility than that laid out in the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which would mean that either somebody admitted in open court that there was a terrorist connection or there would be a trial of the issue.
Surely that determination should be made by the judge. A judge could make a determination that a Newton hearing was the right way forward. Perhaps the Bill should be amended to enable the judge to make a determination for a Newton hearing, or to take it on himself or herself to make a determination of whether there is a terrorist connection. For that reason, we will abstain on these amendments—but if, at a later stage, amendments along the line that I have just suggested, giving the judge discretion to order a Newton hearing, are tabled, we may well be in favour of those.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. The amendment would require a trial of the issue as to whether there is a terrorist connection to an aggravated offence. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the way in which he set out his amendment, but I am afraid we feel that it would represent a fundamental departure from existing processes—a significant divergence from practice within the wider criminal justice system—and it is therefore not an amendment that the Government consider necessary or appropriate.
It may be helpful if I first briefly recapitulate why the Government are making the changes that we propose in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, gave a good summary. Clause 1 will expressly require the courts, in cases where it appears that any non-terrorism offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years was committed in the course of an act of terrorism, or for the purposes of terrorism, actively to consider whether the offence was committed with a terrorist connection and should be aggravated as such. At present only specified offences can be so considered. Closing this loophole will make for more effective and flexible legislation, reflecting the fact that terrorist offending takes a wide variety of forms.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, gave some examples of offences that are and are not covered. It might be helpful to include further examples. Various offences under the Firearms Act 1968 are not currently covered, including possessing a firearm with an intent to endanger life; as are offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, including destroying or damaging property with an intent to endanger life, and arson. There are many more, but I hope that provides an illustration of some of the offences that we think ought to be considered, if needed.
These changes will also ensure that the consequences of a terrorist connection are applied consistently to all offenders. The identification of a terrorist connection by the courts has a wide-ranging impact, as the noble Lord noted. It must be treated as an aggravating factor when sentencing, helping to ensure that terrorist offenders receive punishment befitting the severity of their offending and the risk that they pose to public safety. It will also result in offenders being subject to the registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison, which supports the police to manage their risk more effectively.
Finally, under the Bill, these offenders will be subject to a minimum of 12 months on licence following their release and will be eligible to have certain licence conditions imposed on them to assist in the effective management of their risk. I emphasise that both the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, and the Crown Prosecution Service expressed their strong support for this change. In fact, Mr Hall stated in his oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place that this change, out of all the measures in the Bill, would make the most substantial difference to public safety.
Having set out the background, I will address the substance of the noble Lord’s amendment, which proposes a significant change to the process by which the courts in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, determine a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing. This process is well-established, having been in successful operation for more than a decade since the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 came into force. It is also consistent with the wider criminal justice system.
Under the existing process, courts are required to apply the criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—when determining whether an offence has a terrorist connection. The court will make this determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing—that is, the trial evidence or evidence heard at a Newton hearing, if necessary, following a guilty plea—and take into account any representations by the prosecution or defence, as well as any evidence heard.
Furthermore, in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, it is the standard approach for the judge, rather than the jury, to determine the presence of aggravating factors as part of the sentencing function. To provide one example, Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires the court to aggravate a sentence for an offence if it was motivated by hostility based on certain protected characteristics, such as race or sexual orientation. The judge will determine such a finding as part of the sentencing. The terrorist connection provision works in exactly the same way. This very issue was debated by your Lordships’ House in 2008, when the terrorist connection provisions were first enacted. It was concluded then that the existing process is appropriate and the reasons that I will now outline still stand.
During the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, the then Government set out that, as part of their consultation on that Bill, they considered whether the determination of a terrorist connection should be made by the jury, rather than the judge at sentencing. That included discussing the option with experienced prosecutors in this area. It was concluded, however, that there were significant practical issues in taking that approach. For example, having to prove the terrorist connection as part of the trial would lead to lengthy diversions, were the defence to argue that the action of the suspect did not fall within the definition of terrorism. Such an approach would divert the prosecution from its primary aim to secure swift justice for the substantive offence—that is to say, securing a conviction or freeing the individual on trial—and would unnecessarily create significantly longer terrorism trials.
Alternatively, if the jury were to be responsible for determining whether there was a terrorist connection as part of a sentencing exercise after the trial, it would have to be summoned to make such a determination following a guilty plea. This would be entirely novel and run counter to well-established sentencing procedure. We therefore strongly believe that it would not be right to put it in the Bill. It was concluded then, as we maintain now, that sentencing is properly a function for the judge.
That is why the Government cannot accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks: it would impose unusual requirements on the finding of a terrorist connection, deviate significantly from well-established practice and, in doing so, put that process out of kilter with the courts’ considerations of other similar aggravating factors. The current system provides adequate safeguards against the erroneous finding of a terrorist connection. A judge who has determined that the offence was committed with a terrorist connection is required to state in open court that that is the case. That determination is capable of being appealed to the Court of Appeal. For the reasons outlined, despite the noble Lord being minded to do otherwise, I hope that he will see fit to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I heard what the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, said, and he seemed to accept that the aggravating factor should be proved to a court, on admissible evidence, to the criminal standard of proof. He did not answer the point that there ought to be a trial of the issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, had sympathy for the principles behind our amendment. He preferred the idea of a Newton hearing before a judge to the possibility of jury trial to determine a terrorist connection. That is a compromise position that is allowed for in my amendment, where the interests of justice require that there should not be a jury trial. The important thing is that this issue should be tried on evidence, not simply permission for there to be evidence, if the judge deciding the issue decides to have evidence; or, otherwise, that the court must listen to representations—that is submissions, which are necessarily partial.
The reason our amendment is framed in the way it is is that we believe in trial by jury. Since the aggravation of having a terrorist connection changes the whole nature of the offence, to have that issue tried by jury is, we say, consonant with our way of doing criminal justice and consonant with the way we have always conducted criminal trials.
The Minister suggested that this amendment represented a significant divergence from the criminal justice system. Most of his speech was, with respect, devoted to establishing that point. However, the Bill and much of the counterterrorist legislation of the last few years have involved such divergence. What is unique about the Bill is that the aggravating factor can raise a pretty commonplace offence into an offence of terrorism, with very severe consequences. I have heard nothing to answer the point that establishing that terrorist connection in a trial, on admissible evidence, before a jury or, in suitable cases, a judge, should be the way to proceed.
Nothing that I have heard from the Minister or the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, allowed for the possibility that an offender guilty of only the basic offence, but not guilty of committing an offence with a terrorist connection, would nevertheless be sentenced following a judge who heard only representations on the basis of the aggravated offence, with all the consequences that that would have. That is what runs counter to our criminal justice system.
Our point is limited and principled. The Government have made no concession to our principle at all. We say that there has to be a trial of the issue, not at the same time as the trial of the basic offence, but afterwards. To establish that principle, I wish to test the opinion of the House and have my voice heard when the voices are counted.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 2. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make this clear in the debate.
Clause 27: Removal of early release for dangerous terrorist prisoners: England and Wales
Amendment 2
Lord Carlile of Berriew
“Continued imprisonment of terrorist prisoners during the extension period of an extended sentence of imprisonment
(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 247A(7) (restricted eligibility for release on licence of terrorist prisoners), at the beginning insert “Subject to section 247B,”.(3) After section 247A insert—247B Continued imprisonment of terrorist prisoners during extension period of an extended sentence of imprisonment(1) This section applies to a terrorist prisoner within the meaning of section 247A, where— (a) an extended sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the prisoner under section 226A or 226B, or under section 254, 266, 268A, 279 or 282A of the Sentencing Code, and(b) the prisoner is in custody, in accordance with section 247A, immediately before the expiry of the appropriate custodial term.(2) The prisoner must only be released under section 247A(7) in accordance with the provisions of this section.(3) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to refer the case of the prisoner to the Board—(a) as soon as the prisoner has served the appropriate custodial term, and(b) if the prisoner is still in custody, every year, before the anniversary of the conclusion of the appropriate custodial term.(4) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to release the prisoner on licence as soon as the Board has directed the release of the prisoner under this section.(5) The Board must not give a direction under subsection (4) unless—(a) the Secretary of State has referred the prisoner’s case to the Board, and(b) the Board is satisfied that—(i) the prisoner does not represent a grave risk to the public, and(ii) it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.(6) Where the Secretary of State has not released the prisoner in accordance with subsection (4) by the conclusion of the extension period, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to release the prisoner immediately upon the conclusion of the extension period.(7) For the purposes of this section—“appropriate custodial term” has the same meaning as in section 247A,“extension period”, in relation to a sentence imposed under section 226A or 226B, or under section 254, 266, 268A, 279 or 282A of the Sentencing Code, means the period determined as such by the court under that provision.(8) Nothing in this section affects the duty of the Secretary of State to release a person whose release has been directed by the Board before this section comes into force.””
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I should like at the outset to acknowledge the assistance that I have received from the Bingham Centre in preparing the amendment and the courtesy of Ministers in this House and their staff in discussing it. I will briefly give my reasons for the amendment.
First, I am clear in my belief, which is shared by many others, that some men and women imprisoned for terrorist offences—I repeat, some—represent a threat to public safety and national security beyond the length of their sentences, and that the consequences of that risk may be the death of innocent citizens. Some examples of such people can easily be identified and are well known, but it is clear that others who present such a risk are much more difficult to identify.
It is to be noted that the recidivism rate for terrorist offences is extremely low compared with that for most other offences—under 3%, on the most recent figure that I have seen—and that a fraction of the recidivism rate therefore applies to terrorist offences. Their recidivism rate is a fraction of that for other offences, including serious offences such as armed robbery. So far, at least, projects in prisons to achieve deradicalisation or even recognition of the wrongness of the acts taken as radicals have been difficult to assess. It is extremely difficult to know whether prisoners are deradicalised and such efforts to assess prisoners have suffered significant failures. The room for erroneous judgments is high. I shall give only one of several examples, that of Usman Khan, the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist.
As part of the effort to identify whether prisoners remain a serious risk to the public, I support the use of polygraphs but only as one instrument of assessment—one component only in such determinations. It has been proved in other areas—for example, in relation to sexual offences and in the context of some immigration matters—that polygraphs can provide useful corroboration, though one should be careful not to use them as primary evidence.
A great deal of work has been done to enable terrorist prisoners to be assessed because it is known that, to date, the evidential analysis of such prisoners has proved fragile. It has been extremely difficult to assess the threat that they may present on release. Where has most of the work been done in relation to making judgments about such prisoners? I emphasise that we are talking about judgments. It has been done by the Parole Board and it is about its potential role that I am mainly speaking.
The Parole Board in its ordinary duties deals at present with people who have been sentenced for terrorist offences and, indeed, with prisoners who have become radicalised in prison, though not sentenced for terrorist offences. To deal with that, the Parole Board embarked on an extensive and detailed training programme so that its members—chairs and lay members—could fulfil empirically their existing role with that cohort of prisoners. The board is recognised as offering a fair procedure that is legal and justiciable in a way that is familiar to prisoners and their legal advisers, and is understandable to commentators and us parliamentarians.
I have met the argument that it would be a mistake to extend the role of the Parole Board beyond its present functions. However, given what I have said about the training that it has given to its members in relation to terrorism offences, and looking at what the board does in a more rounded way, I suggest that it is entirely fitted to have its range of responsibilities broadened to deal with wider issues. They could properly include a possible extension of sentences within appropriate statutory limits. Those decisions may not be made by the Parole Board if the Government or others do not find that acceptable, although, in my view, the board is well suited to making such decisions about the possible extension of sentences. For example, it could refer certain cases to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division or the Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales, so that if a sentence was to be extended beyond its temporal determination, that could be done by a senior judge or judges.
Given the very serious risk posed by a small percentage of terrorist prisoners, there is a danger that the majority who have been reformed may become the victims of the 3% or so who are unreformed. That should be avoided if at all possible, for I am sure that we would agree that what may seem like a failure to recognise that a prisoner truly is reformed and remorseful may create the very opposite effect and leave them to become reradicalised.
The aim of my amendment is to attempt to persuade Her Majesty’s Government to change the architecture of the process of extended sentences in relation to terrorism offences. I accept that the amendment does not complete the task, which is why I will not press it to a Division. However, I hope that it will be possible to discuss this matter further with Ministers before we reach the end of the procedures of the Bill.
I suggest that the changed architecture, as I have called it, should allow, first, the sentencing judge to inform and warn a defendant at the time of sentence—no ifs, no buts—that at the time when otherwise they may or should be released, they will be subject to assessment by the Parole Board and that that assessment will be based on whether they represent a serious and continuing risk to the public. It should be clearly said by the judge at the time of sentencing in accordance with the discretion of judges, who as has been said earlier, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, are used to dealing with sentencing scenarios.
Further, I suggest that the changed architecture should allow the following: if a prisoner presents a serious and continuing risk to the public, the ensuing procedure, founded on comprehensive evidence from both sides, as happens at Parole Board hearings, could result in the sentence being extended further, and possibly on more than one occasion. In my view, such an architecture would provide for a fair process that is clearly understood by a prisoner at the time he or she is sentenced. I suggest, therefore, that such a procedure would be fairer and certainly more capable of review before the courts, and safer for the small cohort of very dangerous prisoners envisaged by this Bill.
I also invite the Minister to confirm in his reply that the Parole Board has been consulted about any additional roles it might take, either along the lines that I have described or in the general context of this Bill. I would, as I have said, welcome further discussions with Ministers.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, particularly given his deep and long experience in counterterrorism and the legislation in this area, along with his wide experience of the workings of the Parole Board.
Clause 27 was the subject of considerable controversy in Committee because as it stands, it would remove the role of the Parole Board from the determination of whether, and at what stage, a terrorist offender should be released from custody. Without wishing to repeat the arguments that were canvassed in the debate on the clause at that stage, many of us felt then and continue to feel strongly that the Parole Board has had, and should continue to have, an important part to play in determining whether and at what stage even dangerous terrorist offenders should be released on licence.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, refers to prisoners who are serving extended sentences and applies after they have completed their custodial term, thus changing the architecture of extended sentences, as he has put it. Such prisoners’ release would be contemplated only after the custodial term, at which stage their cases would be referred to the Parole Board for consideration, as they then would on every further anniversary of the completion of that custodial term.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has explained, before the board could direct release, it would have to be satisfied that two important conditions had been met: first, the prisoner did not represent a grave risk to the public, and secondly, it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. We would have preferred that the amendment went further and applied more widely for the reasons that we expressed in Committee, but we regard the work of the Parole Board, whose members are specialists in the field, as extremely valuable. We are firmly of the view that a full hearing before the Parole Board is the best way to determine whether a prisoner should be released after a suitable minimum custodial term, having regard to the elimination of the threat that the prisoner posed to public safety and to such progress as might have been made in the prisoner’s deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reform.
I should emphasise that throughout our approach to this Bill, we have maintained the position that hope of rehabilitation should always be part of the process of punishment, even in severe terrorist cases, and that sentences which offer no hope are counterproductive. We recognise that all prisoners are likely to be released one day and that rehabilitation is more achievable in the context of a release on licence than it is in the context of continued incarceration. That is a position that was rightly taken and recognised by the experts who briefed a number of Peers at the Joint Extremism Unit drop-in session that was arranged for us by the Ministry of Justice. Those who attended found it to be interesting and informative, and we are all very grateful. For my part, however, I confess to remaining perplexed that the Government have decided to cut the role of the Parole Board in the way set out in Clause 27. This amendment would reduce the impact of that particular cutting axe, and I therefore support it.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, sets out an alternative possible architecture for assessing terrorists and the possibility of extending sentences. In speaking to the amendment, the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, expressed their faith in the Parole Board and the view that it should play a much fuller role in assessing terrorist prisoners who are coming towards the end of their sentences. I too joined in the very useful expert panel held last week with presentations from Home Office experts as well as senior psychologists who have an overview of this work.
The probation service itself employs around 350 psychologists, some of whom are specialists in this work. The message I got from that meeting last week is that it is very complicated work and there is no guarantee of success. However, that does not mean that there should not be efforts—indeed, very strenuous efforts—made to try to rehabilitate these offenders.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I understand that the intent of this amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to do two things: first, to introduce a role for the Parole Board where, otherwise, the changes in the Bill would make its role superfluous; and, secondly and at the same time, not to reintroduce eligibility for early discretionary release for this cohort.
I will begin by outlining briefly the effect of the amendment in a little more detail. It would replace Clause 27, which restricts early release for offenders convicted of a serious terrorism offence—that is, those listed in Schedule 2 to the Bill—who receive an extended determinate sentence, or EDS, or a new serious terrorism sentence so that they instead serve the full custodial term of their sentence. In its place, the amendment would insert a provision that would change the release provision for all terrorist offenders sentenced to an EDS. Further, and while I understand that this may not be the noble Lord’s intent, this amendment would also apply to those currently serving an EDS for a terrorist offence.
The replacement release provision in the noble Lord’s amendment would continue to restrict early release, but there is an important difference. At the end of the custodial term, the scheme set out in the amendment would instead refer the offender to the Parole Board. The Parole Board would then determine whether the offender represents a grave risk to the public and whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender continues to be imprisoned. Under the scheme in the amendment, this consideration would continue annually until release was granted, or to the end of the extended licence period, when the offender would then be released, unconditionally, into the community. The effect would therefore be that, if release were not granted until the end of the extended licence period, there would be a cliff edge and the offender would at that point be released unconditionally into the community. There would be no period of supervision and reintegration. For the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that is a matter of concern.
I have carefully considered the proposed changes, especially as they arise from an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope I may be permitted to say that contributions from him on this subject always merit the most careful consideration, and I can assure both him and the House that I have done so in this case. None the less, having undertaken that careful consideration, I must set out the Government’s view that the changes to the release provisions for the EDS, as set out in the amendment, would be contrary to safeguards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law governing sentencing and release. That case law is usefully summarised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this country in Brown v Parole Board for Scotland—we seem to be referring to Scottish cases everywhere today. It is reported at [2017] UKSC 69, in particular the discussions between paragraphs 49 and 55. While every decision of the Supreme Court is obviously a decision of a strong court, that court, for which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, spoke, contained three former and current Presidents of the Supreme Court.
The reason the proposal would be contrary to the case law is that the EDS comprises two distinct parts. The first is a punitive component—namely, the custodial term—imposed for the length a judge considers commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. The second is a separate preventive element—namely, the extended licence—imposed to protect the public from the danger posed by other, future, yet to be determined serious offending. To that extent, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who was right to draw attention to the question of serious risk to the public. That is what the second part of the EDS does.
If the Government were to detain EDS prisoners into their extended licence period for reasons related to their initial offending, that detention would be contrary to the nature and intended purpose of the community supervision component of the sentence, and contrary to the court’s order imposing the EDS. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, for the Supreme Court, put it in the Brown case,
“the purpose of detention during the extension period is materially different from that of a determinate sentence.”
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that this amendment would require further development, either in the form of a new sentence or by further alteration to the existing EDS regime. I am grateful for that acceptance. However, I must state that the Government would not support such a proposal, because there is no need for such a new sentence. The EDS and the new serious terrorism sentence are deliberately structured to do two things: to provide punishment and, separately, to aid public protection and reintegration through the licence period. We have no desire to change this overall approach or, to use the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to change the architecture.
For those who are not dangerous, the sentence for offenders of particular concern sufficiently caters for release with a role for the Parole Board and yet without the risk of an unsupervised cliff edge, which the amendment would introduce. I understand, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, that the amendment is born of a desire to introduce a role for the Parole Board. But there is no role for the Parole Board here because it is not necessary. There is no early release and no parole so, accordingly, there is no role for the Parole Board. That is, therefore, my answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who asked why there is no role for the Parole Board. It is for the reasons I have just given. While I suspect that my answer may not leave him persuaded, I hope it means that he is no longer perplexed.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we are saying that the alternative can do a better job than the Parole Board. I accept that, as the premise behind that question would admit, some Peers consider the Parole Board the only qualified body to deal with the specialised nature of setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders. But in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I must respectfully reject that approach. The reason the Parole Board is responsible for setting licence conditions when it directs the prisoner’s release is that that is part and parcel of the Parole Board’s decision that the offender can be safely released and managed in the community. The Parole Board decides that the offender can be released and, as part of that, decides the licence conditions that will govern such release.
However, with an EDS for a serious terrorism offence and the serious terrorism sentence, there is no provision for early release before the end of the custodial period. The corollary of that proposition is that release at the end of the custodial period is automatic. Where release is automatic, there is no reason why the Parole Board specifically should consider licence conditions.
Furthermore, offenders will be subject to management under MAPPA—Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—through which the police and the probation and prison services work with other agencies to manage the risks posed by offenders living in the community in order to protect the public. In cases under the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—and TACT-connected cases, that involves the probation service, the releasing prison, counterterrorism police, security services, the Joint Extremism Unit of HMPPS, and social services.
With the creation of the national security division of the National Probation Service, we will see even greater specialism in making such recommendations. That ensures that professionals with a detailed knowledge of the offender are involved in identifying the licence conditions which are necessary and appropriate. The key point is that that happens regardless of whether the final decision-maker on setting the licence is the Parole Board or HMPPS—the governor. While ultimately the board or the governor makes the decision, that decision is always directly informed by those with intelligence of and expertise in managing the offender. I therefore assure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the process is no less rigorous and the outcomes are no different.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked a specific question about our discussions with the Parole Board. We have shared the Bill with the Parole Board and discussed its implications with it, but there has not been a formal consultation, if that is what the noble Lord was driving at in his question.
For those reasons, which I hope I have explained clearly and fairly, I remain of the view that there is no role for the Parole Board where there is no consideration of early release. That point, combined with the issues I have explained around the legality of this amendment from an ECHR standpoint, leads me to consider this amendment unnecessary. I therefore respectfully urge the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw it. Of course, I am happy to continue our conversations with him about this matter, as I am sure we will continue to benefit from an exchange of views about other matters in the Bill also.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have spoken in this debate, to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their broad support for what I have suggested, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his detailed response.
When I was at school, I had a teacher who taught us about different forms of argument, one of which is entitled “argumentum ad maiorem”—argument using a greater authority. In those days, I suppose it was something like “Because Sir Winston Churchill said something, it must be right.” The Minister’s argumentum ad maiorem was about the case of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland, which, it will not surprise your Lordships to know, I have read.
I do not propose to embark on and bore your Lordships with a legal moot about that case. I say simply that I respectfully do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, despite his eminence as a lawyer, about the effect of that case on my proposal. I believe that my proposal, because of the change of the architecture that I suggested, including the fact that the sentencing judge would clearly refer to the potential extension provisions at the time of sentence, would come within the judgment of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Clause 29: Further provision about release of terrorist prisoners: Scotland
Amendment 3
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
“(a) a sentence of imprisonment imposed under section 205ZA of the 1995 Act (serious terrorism sentence),(b) a sentence of imprisonment imposed under section 205ZC of that Act (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period), or(c) an extended sentence imposed under section 210A of that Act in respect of a terrorism offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the scope of new section 26ZA of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 by making it applicable also in relation to a person who is serving an extended sentence under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in respect of a terrorism offence.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, in order to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences when they are imposed consecutively to other sentences, we introduced several amendments in Committee. Following these changes, we are now making a series of minor, technical amendments to provide further clarification and to ensure that the legislation will operate as intended.
The amendments have a variety of complementary effects but, taken together, they ensure that new Section 1B, which was introduced in Committee, operates effectively within the Scottish jurisdiction. Given the complexity of the amendments, we have continued to consider their effect with the Scottish Government, resulting in these final amendments, which have been agreed by all parties.
Many of the amendments simply insert the relevant terminology into the new clauses and deliver consequential changes to ensure the smooth operation of Section 1B. The overall effect is to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period when they are serving multiple sentences, including for non-terrorism offences, and that offenders who receive multiple sentences for terrorist offences—and therefore multiple licences—will serve only one, aggregated licence period.
I draw your Lordships’ attention specifically to Amendment 31, which ensures that the sentence calculation provided for in Section 1B will apply retrospectively. This will provide clarity in calculating release dates where sentences for both terrorism and non-terrorism offences are imposed, ensuring the effective application of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in all cases.
Should noble Lords wish to see an individual breakdown of these amendments and their effect, I would be happy to place in the Library a letter in terms similar to the one I issued following Committee to explain the purpose of each one. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.
Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.
I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.
We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.
I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this very short debate. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the number of prisoners affected by this in relation to the International Criminal Court. I do not have that information to hand, but I undertake to supply it to the noble Lord.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, raised the lateness in the stage of proceedings at which this amendment has been tabled. I acknowledge the complexity of the statutes involved and the alertness of those in my office, the Advocate General’s office, and in the Scottish Government who are monitoring the position. There has been useful and effective collaboration between them. I will look into the matter raised by the noble and learned Lord and see whether I can provide any further detail as to why these points were identified only at this stage. If I can identify anything specific, beyond my general answer relating to the complexity of the relevant provisions, I will provide it to the noble and learned Lord in writing.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment excludes sections 1AB, 1A and 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 from the scope of new section 26ZA(3) of that Act.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes new section 26ZA(7) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 subject to section 1B(11) of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 26, line 11.
(a) ”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 26, line 11.
(b) the term determined as the custodial term by the court that imposes the extended sentence on the prisoner under section 210A of that Act;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the purposes of new section 26ZA of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 a definition of “appropriate custodial term” in relation to an extended sentence under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 imposed in respect of a terrorism offence.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to section 205ZA is a reference to section 205ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (defined as “the 1995 Act” for the purposes of Part 1 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to section 205ZC is a reference to section 205ZC of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (defined as “the 1995 Act” for the purposes of Part 1 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993).
“(c) in relation to an extended sentence imposed on a terrorist prisoner under section 210A of that Act in respect of a terrorism offence, the period specified as such under that section by the court that imposes the sentence on the prisoner.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the purposes of new section 26ZA of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 a definition of “extension period” in relation to an extended sentence under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 imposed in respect of a terrorism offence.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 12. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 12
“Review of sections 1 to 31
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of this Act to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.(3) The review under subsection (1) must consider but is not limited to considering any evidence as to any effects of this Act—(a) by the imposition of longer prison sentences upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders on whom they are imposed;(b) upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison and a correspondingly smaller proportion on licence; (c) upon the radicalisation of prisoners other than those upon whom longer prison sentences are imposed or who are required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison;(d) on the degree to which those prisoners upon whom a serious terrorist sentence is imposed are segregated from other prisoners.(4) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.(5) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.(6) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report under subsection (5)(b) within one month of receiving the report.(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause would require an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of the Act after one year, with particular attention to radicalisation in prisons and the effects of longer periods of imprisonment on reform and rehabilitation and radicalisation in prisons and of segregating serious terrorist offenders.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 12 echoes the amendment calling for a review which we proposed in Committee. The purpose of the amendment is to enable the noble and learned Lord—or another Minister—to update the House on the Government’s proposals for reviewing the impact of the first 31 sections of this Act, as it will then be. During my speech in Committee, I spent some time setting out in detail why we contend that the review called for by our amendment is necessary. I will not trespass for long on the House’s time this afternoon.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee will speak to Amendment 13, in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick, about polygraphs. We broadly support Amendment 24 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
We are concerned, first, to ensure that the Government keep under review and report on the impact on prisoners of longer terms of imprisonment and consequently proportionately shorter periods on licence. To answer a point made in Committee on behalf of the Government, in our view it is not premature to ask for such a review at an early stage. It is not necessary to await the release of such prisoners in many years to come before reviewing the working of this part of the Bill. The impact of very long sentences on, for example, prisoners’ behaviour in prison—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—their prospects of rehabilitation and their continued contact with their families and friends outside prison can be assessed from an early stage.
Lord Bhatia (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I fully agree that the different treatment is justified because of the consequences of the early release of the offender. The offender must remain for the maximum sentence of 25 years as stated in the Bill.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to the whole group but I have co-signed Amendments 24 and 25 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, respectively. I signed those agreements because they seemed so sensible. It is all very well making up rules and imposing limitations on people’s liberty but, if you do not have the facts and you do not actually know what the statistics are, it all seems a bit academic. Post-legislative scrutiny is incredibly important, especially for Bills such as this which implement contentious and possibly damaging and complex arrangements. They can either work very well or be disastrous.
The Government are taking a very worrying approach to counterterrorism with this sort of “tough on crime” mentality where we just lock people up and throw away the key. We need an evidence-based, multidisciplinary approach to deradicalisation. We need to rescue people from these deeply destructive ideologies, recognising that they are pretty much groomed and brainwashed until their thinking becomes so warped that violence seems like a legitimate tool.
I agreed with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said earlier about prisons. I have visited prisons and have spoken to a lot of people who have been in them and, quite honestly, there is a huge risk that issues and behaviours like this can spread in prison and in fact the prisons become a recruiting ground. That is pretty much how ISIS started, in the prison camps in Iraq, so we have a precedent for some quite damaging events coming out of locking people up. We have to be very careful that the Government’s attempts to imprison people indefinitely do not just make the problem much worse. Could we please have independent reviews and get the evidence base, and compare the Government’s approach with the other options, which could be much better?
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendments 24 and 25 struck me as setting out a number of concerns that we would like to have seen in the Bill now. I agree very much with what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, had to say, except that I do not think that they amount to post-legislative scrutiny. Both highlight concerns that we expressed at an earlier stage, although not all those concerns. My noble friend’s Amendment 12 is rather different in that after a year’s experience of the Bill—an Act, as it will then have been—it would assess its impact. Like him, I have had a similar impression: a kind of inconsistency between the words that we see on paper in the Bill—the impression that is given about responding with even tougher sentences, which is supported by some of the debate that we have had—while privately we have had much more nuanced conversations which have encouraged me, even though I am somewhat depressed by this legislation.
I want to say a word—well, several words—about Amendment 13, which would provide for a review of the use of polygraphs. The amendment came out of amendments in Committee, not our own but those proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, when he called for a pilot and a report to Parliament, including on specified matters. I understand that, with a relatively small number of terrorist offenders to whom the polygraph condition will apply, it is quite hard to undertake a useful pilot, but that does not negate the importance of an assessment of the polygraph condition which is published in the public domain.
Crucially, the review that we propose in Amendment 13 would be an independent review. Its report would include data, as set out in the amendment’s subsection (3), on the number of terrorist offenders subject to the polygraph condition and on the number of terrorist offenders recalled to custody following a test. I should mark those sentences as copyright of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—I think I lifted them wholesale. It would also cover regulations, rules and codes of practice, and make recommendations regarding those, and the report would be made to Parliament. We have included the caveat that any material that the Secretary of State considered might prejudice public safety should be omitted.
The review would be within three years of the Section 32 polygraph condition coming into force. I understand, though I could not quite pin it down, that the Government are intending a review after a couple of years, which would essentially be the same; after two years is more or less the same as within three years.
I take this opportunity not only to argue for a review but to ask the Minister to confirm what is planned by the Government. not only as to the timing but as to the four elements that I have listed.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I have one amendment in this group, Amendment 25, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton put his name to Amendment 24. I was very pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said that she had read our amendments and that they seemed sensible; I think that is a good start. The general point made on this whole group is that there is an appetite for reviewing different aspects of this legislation, and the amendments referred to go into particular aspects of that.
I want to make a slightly more general point. It is important that the general case for this sort of legislation is made regularly. I have had the opportunity in recent days of talking to young people who are becoming more politically active and engaged. They are very interested in terrorism legislation as a whole, particularly in how Parliament seeks to review it, change it and make it more effective. Particularly in our House, we have a duty to make sure that those arguments are remade and heard by the general public.
The specific amendment that I have put my name to concerns looking at particular impacts on prison capacity, the National Probation Service and offenders convicted of terrorist offences, as well as levels of bad behaviour in prisons—a point that I made on an earlier group. Also within my amendment are financial matters, because there is a very significant financial impact of the review of extended sentences and licence periods.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group would all require the Secretary of State to commission independent reviews into various aspects of the operation of the Bill and to lay the resulting reports before both Houses of Parliament. I welcome the considerable appetite for scrutiny of these measures and for the accumulation of data—the facts and statistics that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, sought. I acknowledge the appetite for review, to which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, referred. However, while I welcome these things, I must respectfully disagree that the amendments are necessary.
First, as acknowledged within the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the Government already have an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, whose remit covers this Bill. Indeed, he has announced his intention to conduct a review of matters within prisons, which we welcome. The benefit of an independent reviewer is that he will not be constrained by the specifications of government and can decide what is most appropriate for his consideration. We have every confidence that he will continue to provide valuable and independent scrutiny following the Bill’s enactment and through the prisons review that he will be undertaking. I remain of the view that there is no need to appoint another reviewer to focus on just some of the provisions of the Bill.
The amendments indicate some areas of particular concern, which I shall seek to address with greater specification. On Amendment 12, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has noted a particular interest in the rehabilitation of terrorist offenders while in custody. As he told your Lordships’ House in relation to an earlier group of amendments, he and others, including the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Carlile, attended the briefing held by officials in the Joint Extremism Unit. I have heard that at least some noble Lords found that a helpful exercise, and I hope others did as well. I understand from engagement, and from the contributions made from the Floor today, albeit electronically, that there was a healthy discussion and a recognition that there is no simple cure or metric for this matter; indeed, that was acknowledged in a contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, on an earlier group of amendments.
It is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of intervention programmes in changing behaviour for any offenders but especially within such a small cohort. Efforts in our prison system to deradicalise and rehabilitate offenders in custody are ongoing, and techniques are developing constantly. However, while rehabilitation will remain central to the work undertaken with terrorist offenders in custody, that goes hand in hand with risk management.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has again raised the question of the Government’s ability to protect other prisoners from radicalisation within the prison estate, and the use of separation centres to this end. The risk was identified that such persons might otherwise become kingpins, looked up to by other persons in the prison estate. We have a set of specialist operational controls for managing counterterrorism risk in custody, as well as a number of population-management controls available for use across the entire prison estate.
I assure the noble Lord and the House that most extremist prisoners can, and should, be managed in the mainstream prison population with appropriate conditions and controls. That having been said, we take the risk of radicalisation within the prison estate seriously and, where deemed necessary, we have used, and will use, the separation centres available to us to prevent persons spreading malicious ideology to other prisoners.
In bringing to a close my submissions on this amendment, I acknowledge on behalf of the Government the anxious and thoughtful concern expressed by the noble Lord and others, following a very constructive series of engagements.
Amendment 13 would require the Government to commission an independent review and publish a report into the use and operation of polygraph testing in the licence conditions of terrorist offenders. Today and, more importantly, in Committee, we discussed in some detail the matter of polygraph testing. As I am sure noble Lords now understand, it is not intended to be used as a stand-alone measure but as part of a package to provide a further source of information to test offenders’ compliance with their conditions of licence. It is not to be used as something to catch an offender out in breach.
That said, I recognise that the use of polygraph testing as a licence condition is a novel matter for the House, which is why the Government have committed to conducting and publishing a review of polygraph testing on terrorist offenders after a two-year period, which will provide more meaningful results and report on most of the criteria outlined by the terms of the amendment. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who dwelt specifically on this material in the course of her submission.
I will make one further point on this amendment. The terms have specified that the review may make recommendations on
“regulations, rules and codes of practice”.
Clear rules governing the use of polygraph examinations in a licence condition will be laid by statutory instrument. We currently anticipate that these will be those already in place for the use of polygraph testing in licence conditions for sex offenders, as set out in the Polygraph Rules 2009, which specify the qualifications expected for polygraph examiners, how a polygraph examination should be recorded and how those examinations will be reviewed.
Our review will of course inform whether these require amendment or tailoring in light of factors presented by the specific cohort, so I assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who moved the amendment, and those noble Lords who spoke on it that our plans for the introduction of polygraph testing already account for this concern.
Amendment 24, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to
“commission a review and publish a report”
into a number of measures, most of which are not directly addressed by provisions in the Bill, in the first year of it coming into force. While I recognise the desire to test for unintended consequences of the Bill, I politely disagree that a review on these terms and within this timeframe would be either necessary or add to what is already under way.
I want to set out briefly why, taking each part in turn. Proposed subsection (1)(a) would require a review into
“the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists”.
There is a great deal of work under way to target the terrorist threat, including that of lone terrorists. I point the noble and learned Lord to the Security Minister’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute in November 2020.
The Government’s response to the recent terrorist attacks has been comprehensive and informed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s analysis. The Government will shortly bring forward policing and crime legislation to implement a number of recommendations from Jonathan Hall QC’s independent review of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—MAPPA—when it comes to the management of terrorism, matters connected with terrorism and offenders of terrorism concern within the community.
The Government recognise that independent analysis can be useful in terms of challenging existing practices and processes. That is why the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, QC, was asked to oversee the operational improvement reviews following the attacks in 2017. I submit that now is not the time for another review.
As part of the constant, ongoing review and improvement of our counterterrorism systems and processes, the CONTEST unit, based in the Home Office, undertook an internal review of lone-actor terrorism last summer, working with operational partners and departments from across government. The review’s findings are sensitive and will not be published, but they have been shared with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee.
Proposed subsection (1)(b) refers to
“the effectiveness and availability of deradicalisation programmes in prisons”.
As I have said, it is difficult to measure their effectiveness, but the primary intervention, the Healthy Identity Intervention—HII—has been accredited by a panel of experts and is informed by the best available evidence. We have also conducted an evaluation of the HII pilot study to assess implementation and delivery. This is publicly available on GOV.UK, and a short-term outcome evaluation of the HII is under way. Although this has been delayed due to the impact of Covid-19, we are committed to publishing it once it has concluded.
We remain committed to keeping our interventions under review and developing the evidence base, which is what so many of your Lordships who have spoken on this matter have sought. As I have said, we will establish a new counterterrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre, which will not only help us to develop knowledge and evidence but will bolster our capacity to deliver interventions by recruiting more specialist psychologists and trained chaplains.
The Government plan to make an oral Statement that will explain more fully the important work to rehabilitate terrorist offenders in prison, including an overview of the new centre’s strategy and programme of work. I hope that noble Lords will agree that these demonstrate this Government’s commitment to transparency and sharing as much as we can.
On proposed new subsection (1)(c) in the amendment, in relation to the polygraph, as I mentioned earlier in this group, we will be conducting an evaluation of its use after two years. This will add to our evidence of its effectiveness and value, which has already been established through independent evaluation, and I submit that a further review is not needed.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
I have received a request from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to ask a short question of the Minister.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, on that last point, I take it that the post-legislative scrutiny referred to is separate from the review of polygraph testing after three years, to which the Minister referred. On that, while I take his point about parliamentary scrutiny of regulations, codes of practice may not be statutory and therefore not subject to that sort of scrutiny. Might the Minister take back the suggestion that, following the very helpful sessions that the MoJ arranged during the course of the Bill on a number of matters, for which we were very grateful, Ministers might consider communicating with—and possibly even consulting—noble Lords in framing the review in three or so years’ time? I do not expect him to make a commitment now, but I would like to put that idea in his and his colleagues’ heads.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that that suggestion has lodged in my skull and will have been noted by others, and we will come back to it in due course. On her specific question on whether the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill is distinct from the review of polygraph testing, I am happy to confirm that that is the case.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, this has been a helpful debate as it has moved forward the process of keeping these new provisions under parliamentary scrutiny. I am very grateful, as I expect all noble Lords are, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for the comprehensive and careful way in which he set out the work of evaluation and research into the evidence concerning the treatment and punishment of terrorist offenders, and the arrangements for them within the prison estate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed the need for constant review. She warned us of the possible dangers of long-term imprisonment and the risk of radicalisation. As well as making a number of points and raising questions about polygraphs, my noble friend Lady Hamwee stressed the distinction between the “talk tough” language of the Government and the more considered, balanced and careful language of officials and Ministers that we hear in private. My noble friend called it “nuanced”. I add that the careful and cautious language she spoke of is also the language of nearly all the professionals in the system to whom we speak, be they in the Prison Service, probation service, inspectorates or elsewhere.
The important point is that longer sentences, while they may be necessary, are neither the only answer nor a complete answer. The “talk tougher” approach, leapt upon with enthusiasm by the press, has struck many of us as having had too little consideration. In his response, the Minister demonstrated that he certainly is determined to take an evidence-based and cautious approach to the issues raised by the Bill, including polygraph testing.
I accept the Minister’s point that the inclusion of these amendments in the Bill is not essential to provide that the work, which he described to us in some detail, is consistently explained to parliamentarians in both Houses. The important point about reviews, which I invite him and others to bear in mind—though not to lodge in their skulls—is that reviews which report to Parliament enable noble Lords here and MPs in the other place to consider and weigh up the evidence as it becomes available.
The Minister was completely right that there is no simple cure, but it is an important part of the role of Parliament to consider the evidence as it develops. The Bill puts before us a set of new and radical measures of particular severity. They need to be kept under constant attention. On the basis that they will get that attention because of work done by the Government and promulgated to Parliament, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in the group to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 34: TPIMs: condition as to involvement in terrorism-related activity
Amendment 14
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would change the proposed new test for the imposition of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure from one of reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity to one of reasonable belief of such involvement.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 14, I will speak also to Amendment 22; both stand in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. I will respond to the other amendments in this group at the end if the noble Lords in whose names they stand speak to them.
The Government have listened to the mood of your Lordships’ House as expressed in Committee, specifically the concerns of a number of noble Lords about lowering the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” involvement in terrorism-related activity. The Government have reflected on those concerns and tabled these amendments. On behalf of my noble friends and myself, I thank all noble Lords who engaged with us since Committee as we did so.
Amendment 14 will lower the existing standard of proof for imposing a TPIM of “balance of probabilities” to “reasonable belief”. However, this is a higher standard of proof than originally proposed by the Bill, and a higher standard than was applied under the previous control order regime.
As a result of this amendment, the Home Secretary will need to “reasonably believe”, rather than hold “reasonable grounds for suspecting”, that an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity before she can impose a TPIM. In practice, and as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in Committee, “reasonable belief” is closer to the current “balance of probabilities” standard than it is to “reasonable suspicion”. It is the standard that applied when TPIMs were first introduced in 2011 and the standard that is in place for other key tools used to counter terrorism, including proscription and asset-freezing orders.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, Part 3 of the Bill raises for these Benches some considerable points of principle regarding terrorism prevention and investigation measures. I know some noble Lords may hear that as not appreciating threats posed by some and the devastation caused by actions that are more than threats. They may hear that we do not appreciate what is achieved by the agencies protecting us from harm—harm that we, the public, did not even understand we were in the way of.
None of that should be read into what we say on these amendments. What should be understood is our concern for principles regarding detention without trial and the presumption of innocence. These are principles of which our country is proud. There are principles and interests to be balanced here.
We asked to group together all the amendments regarding TPIMs, other than those regarding polygraphs, because we thought that that would be more convenient for the House and because Part 3 appears to be a package. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, has spoken to government Amendments 14 and 22. I will start with Amendment 22, which proposes an additional clause. We are certainly not opposing it. I wanted to understand what this proposed new clause will provide for that cannot be done now by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. On the last group the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, stressed the importance of the independent reviewer being able to set priorities, so imposing the obligation on him is interesting. Yesterday I had the opportunity, for which I thank him, to ask the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, about this. He confirmed that the reviewer can carry out an annual review and that this addition is due to the Government wanting to be certain about how all this is going; I hope I have that right. I welcome that the Government want to be clear, but I would not have thought that they needed the amendment.
We have had a series of energetic, diligent and what in current jargon is often called “curious” reviewers, all of whom have juggled the work of the reviewer with other professional commitments. Their time, resources and capacity are necessarily limited, so we do not regard this government amendment as some sort of concession. I should express the concern that this specific, quite narrow, statutory commitment could well limit the ability of the independent reviewer to undertake work on the very many other aspects of terrorism legislation.
As regards government Amendment 14 and our amendments to leave out certain clauses, our starting point is that there is no need to extend TPIMs, such that, taken together as they are intended to be, they amount to the possibility of house arrest for individuals who have not been found guilty of anything. The House heard in Committee, as did the House of Commons, that neither the current independent reviewer nor the police see the need for this change. No one could argue that the measures currently permitted—those imposed on individuals—are not stringent, and no one should argue that the measures should be more stringent so that they are more of a sanction or punishment, because investigation and prevention measures are not intended to be punishment. They were introduced as temporary measures. This is not a tool in the toolbox for which we see a justification for extending.
Amendment 14 changes suspicion to belief—a judgment which still must be made by the Secretary of State. Belief is a higher threshold than suspicion, and to that extent it is welcome. But it is not as high as satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. I appreciate that there are other safeguards but, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it at the last stage, it would be a brave court that would second-guess evaluation by an elected Minister who has full access to intelligence.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, may say, as he said in Committee, that the Government are given flexibility by this reduction in the threshold. I think that saying flexibility is a soft way of saying wider powers. That is why we are registering our opposition to the change in the requirement under Section 3 of the 2011 Act by our amendment to leave it out.
I cannot detach Clause 34 from Clause 35, which would effectively make a TPIM and its various measures, including “residence”—or detention—indefinite. The point was made pithily by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in Committee. My noble friend Lord Strasburger talked about the double whammy, reminding us of the extension of the requirement as to where an individual is to live. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, referred to “an enduring TPIM.” Enduring? Indefinite? That is what Clause 35 would allow. Having no hope is a terrible thing. My noble friend Lord Marks referred to “no-hope sentences” in the context of explaining to your Lordships' House the panel’s views on rehabilitation that we had heard. No hope can have an outcome completely opposite to what is intended. It can lead to an attitude of “What have I got to lose?” It could lead to not having anything to lose and managing to get involved in terrorism, with catastrophic effect.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said yesterday, in a discussion, that the current limit gives the subject an endpoint at which he can aim, so he can spend his experience of the measures planning what to do when he is released from them. We are not persuaded by that view.
If the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, presses the amendment of up to three extensions—six years, that is—we will support it, as that is clearly an improvement on indefinite detention. If the House agrees it, we will recognise that that is what the House wishes and not divide to leave out the clause. But if it is not agreed nor put to a Division, we will seek the opinion of the House on the clause, and this is my giving notice of that.
Clause 37, on the residence measure, changes Schedule 1 to the Act to allow for the imposition of a requirement to remain at a specified residence, which is
“applicable overnight between such hours as are specified.”
Taking away the word “overnight,” as is proposed, will mean that the requirement will be “applicable … between such hours” with no specified limit. In Committee, we heard two examples of what the Government want to address with this. The first is that if a subject is thought to be a radicalising threat to children, he should be confined during hours at which young people arrive at and leave school. Frankly, I would have thought that an individual with that in mind would be rather more subtle, but that is not the point. The second example is that if an individual is a suspected attack planner, he should be curfewed for weekends during local football games—as well as, presumably, any other big local gatherings, but football games were the example. Again, in parenthesis, given that very few major matches seem to still kick off at 3 pm on a Saturday, I wonder about this. But I acknowledge that the Minister referred to the weekend, and anyway, again, that is not really the point.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, nostalgia is the theme of the Government’s amendments in this group, because each of them takes us back to the wording of the original TPIM Act 2011. I am nostalgic enough for those days to have put my name to both amendments.
Amendment 14 on the standard of proof, in the name of the Minister, is a tribute to those noble Lords from all parts of the House who spoke so compellingly to the similar amendment that I had the privilege of moving in Committee. They include the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, each of whom advised—rightly as it turned out—that my amendment did more than was necessary to accommodate the Government’s legitimate concerns. Gift horses should not be looked in the mouth, still less kicked in the teeth. Ministers have listened and have acted decisively. I thank them for that and welcome the retention of a standard of proof, whether expressed as reasonable belief or as balance of probabilities—between which I see no real distinction in practice—that has by the Government’s own account caused no unnecessary difficulties and exposed us to no avoidable danger over the past 10 years.
With a little more hesitation, I put my name also to the Government’s Amendment 22. This reinstates the original requirement in Section 20 of the TPIM Act 2011 for an annual review of the operation of the Act by the independent reviewer, which in turn succeeded a similar requirement in relation to control orders. Section 20 was amended in 2015 to allow the independent reviewer an increased degree of discretion as to the timing of those reviews. That was not unwelcome to the independent reviewer at the time—I declare an interest—who had, as I recall, been given a number of commissions additional to his normal annual duties. However, I understand that the current independent reviewer is content, and on that basis I support Amendment 22 on two conditions. The first is that the independent reviewer should have the necessary resources to perform his various important tasks with the frequency that will now be required and with the promptness that is so desirable. The second condition is an acceptance that, useful as these reports are to those of us concerned with policy in this area, they can be no possible substitute for the scrutiny of individual cases on the evidence that is properly the function of the TPIM review group, to which the Minister alluded, and of the courts.
However, this group is concerned with more than nostalgia. TPIMs have moved on since 2011. These notably harsh measures are harsher than they were then and will soon become harsher still. The toughest measure of all, relocation, with or without one’s family, to a distant town or city—colourfully described by Liberty as “internal exile” and removed by the 2011 Act —was restored on my recommendation in 2015. A range of other new obligations has been added to the list of available measures. Assuming that Clause 37 goes through, notwithstanding Amendment 18, TPIM subjects will for the first time be able to be confined to their houses for substantial parts of the day, while no doubt being tagged, limited in their social contacts and obliged to report to the police station during the periods that they are allowed out. That is rather a different proposition from observing a night-time curfew only in one’s home borough, which is how things were in 2011.
The cumulative effect of numerous measures under a TPIM, even under the existing law, was explained in this way by LF—a TPIM subject, anonymised like the others into a pair of initials—in recent evidence to the High Court. That evidence was summarised by Mrs Justice Farbey in the judgment handed down on 10 February this year:
“He says that he felt as if he was being asked to do something which is not humanly possible: to fulfil multiple and often changing obligations over possibly a two-year period without making one single mistake. He felt as if he was in a trap: if he were to breach any of the TPIM, he would be convicted and imprisoned. The TPIM would then be re-imposed, perhaps with even more requirements, and he would once again be at risk of breaching them.”
For, of course, while the basis for a TPIM can include conduct falling short of the criminal threshold—support, assistance and encouragement more broadly understood than in the criminal law—even the most trivial breach of a curfew or reporting requirement is a criminal offence for which the maximum penalty is five years in prison.
That is the context in which we have to consider the remaining amendments, Amendments 16 and 17. Your Lordships have three options, and I emphasise that none of them is a liberalising option. The Liberal Democrats, with their Amendment 17, offer a continuation of the status quo: a two-year maximum limit in the absence of new intelligence, as initially proposed by my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, save in exceptional cases, and as supported by the current independent reviewer.
The Government, with Clause 35, offer an unlimited extension, which would allow radicalisers in particular—whom the Government told the independent reviewer are
“the likely targets of enduring TPIMs”—
quite simply to endure forever, even if the intensive monitoring of the subject turns up not a single scrap of evidence or intelligence suggestive of re-engagement.
My Amendment 16 takes the middle path. It recognises that, as I reported in 2013, it is tempting to wish for longer than two years in the most serious cases. However, it recognises also that TPIMs must not be allowed to become a more attractive option than prosecution, that the authorities must be incentivised to work on an exit strategy—and not simply to warehouse TPIM subjects—and that in a free country, our fellow citizens, however odious we might consider them, cannot be indefinitely confined by the state in the absence of any attempt to put them on trial.
It is said that TPIMs of indefinite duration will in reality be no such thing because Ministers will volunteer their discontinuance and because the courts can be counted on to intervene if they do not. Yet, with respect, the evidence casts doubt on both propositions. I understand from the independent reviewer, who on his own initiative asked officials about this, that every TPIM imposed since 2015, unless revoked for extraneous reasons, such as imprisonment or a court order, has been extended by the Secretary of State on the one and only occasion that this is normally permitted under the existing law. That is hardly surprising. If a released TPIM subject were subsequently to reoffend, who in active politics would want to be the Home Secretary who had chosen voluntarily to release him from constraint?
As to court proceedings, it is not just that closed material proceedings make them slow and cumbersome, that they do not allow the subject to instruct his special advocate or to call evidence on the full national security case against him, or that the Home Secretary asks for and is generally accorded—as her predecessor was by the Supreme Court last week in the Shamima Begum case—a high degree of judicial deference for her decisions relating to national security. There is also, most regrettably, a funding and hence an access to justice issue. I am again grateful to the independent reviewer for the information that of the handful of current TPIM subjects, no fewer than three—JD, HB and HC—sought funding from the Legal Aid Agency to enable them to be represented in review hearings but were turned down, after which they requested the court to discontinue those review hearings.
It is said that indefinite TPIMs will keep us safer. On that, I first invite noble Lords to reflect on the severity of my own amendment. It would mean that the Secretary of State’s initial belief that a subject has probably been involved in terrorism is enough to justify four years on a TPIM, with every move tagged and every conversation potentially monitored. If further intelligence emerges of involvement in terrorism, at any stage during those four years, under my amendment a fresh TPIM could still be imposed, again extendable up to a further four-year limit—and so on, ad infinitum. That, surely, is draconian enough.
Would we be kept safer by the indefinite warehousing of TPIM subjects beyond the four-year mark, without the need for intelligence derived from what is, after all, not just a terrorism prevention measure but a terrorism investigation measure? Such people could readily become martyrs to a certain audience as, in a small way, one or two control order subjects did. As my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd said in Committee, by reference to the IPP regime, of which he has great experience,
“indefinite detention often makes someone more dangerous because you take away hope.”—[Official Report, 9/2/21; col. 273.]
This country has a long tradition of combining high levels of national security with a vigorous defence of individual liberty. We never imposed indefinite house arrest, relocation and other similar restrictions on those who preached communist revolution, and we have never imposed TPIMs, although we have the power to do it, on radicalisers of the extreme right wing or the Irish republican persuasion. Nor are we where we were in 2005, when it was widely feared that al-Qaeda-directed plots would take tens of thousands of innocent British lives. Existing measures have helped ensure that the total death toll from terrorism this century, in Great Britain, stands at less than 100. To introduce indefinite executive detention in response to this miserable bunch of ideologues would, I suggest, be a signal not of strength but of what the terrorists most want to see from us: fear and overreaction.
National security law must be more than a series of proportionality assessments performed by the Executive and observed by respectful courts. Something more is needed—checks and not just balances—or how else can Parliament offer guidance on where the limits should be? Your Lordships’ House has already this year greatly improved the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, whose original version suggested that this important truth may have been forgotten. This Bill, on a similar theme, was described by the independent reviewer as
“conspicuous for its lack of safeguards.”
Amendment 16 extends the reach of these always controversial TPIM measures, but it at least retains a tangible check on the executive power to constrain—a power of which the TPIM is the strongest example known to our law. I hope that the good sense of this amendment will commend it to your Lordships. With that in mind, my intention is to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I feel much more educated than I did half an hour ago. Today, I found myself not only supporting but signing a government amendment, which is a first for me—what a pleasure. I was in the prestigious company of two QCs and a privy counsellor. I will support any and all amendments that are moved. I find the four-year limit a little tougher to accept than that of two years, but anything that is not indefinite is an improvement.
In normal times, this issue would get much more coverage, but Brexit, Covid and everything else are taking the public’s attention away from these issues. Anything that would implement unending government surveillance and intrusion on someone’s life is, frankly, terrifying.
The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to remove various clauses, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would significantly improve this Bill. I hope that noble Lords who have been involved in this Bill will continue to work with us. They have shown that they are prepared to improve the Bill and I think that further improvements are possible. I hope that they are listening and will accept these amendments.
Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]
I speak in support of Amendments 15, 17 and 18, which would remove Clauses 34, 35 and 37 from the Bill. Each of those clauses would, if retained, significantly increase the severity of the TPIM regime or reduce the safeguards against the misuse of TPIMs and miscarriages of justice. Their combined effect would result in a dramatic increase in the powers of the Secretary of State, all to the detriment of fairness, justice and the freedom of those subjected to TPIMs.
The existing TPIM regime gives the Home Secretary the power to confine an individual to a property, perhaps located a long distance from their home, with a plethora of restrictions on how they live their lives and communicate. These clauses would give the Secretary of State new powers to impose a total 24/7 curfew, which is effectively house arrest, and to make this non-stop detention unending, permanent or until the person dies.
The subjects of TPIMs, who may never have been convicted of anything, could be condemned to a far longer period of incarceration than violent criminals and terrorists who have been convicted and sentenced by a court. That could happen without them knowing the allegations against them and without them having had any chance to see the evidence on which those assertions are based, let alone to challenge and refute them. Clause 34, even after being amended by the Government, makes it even easier for the Secretary of State to decide, at the stroke of a pen, to put an individual under this tough house arrest regime.
As the law now stands, she needs to believe, on the balance of probabilities, that the person is or has been involved in terrorism. I am no lawyer, but I can still do arithmetic and I take “on the balance of probabilities” to mean that there is a greater than 50% chance that she is right and the person is a terrorist. The clause changes the threshold from “on the balance of probabilities” to “reasonable belief”. Since the Government accept that this change lowers the burden of proof, I calculate that that means that the probability of them being a terrorist could be less than 50%, but they could still be locked away indefinitely. That means that the probability of them not being a terrorist threat could be greater than the probability that they are.
How could that come about? It could just be an honest mistake, based on flimsy evidence. We had a very strong hint that this does happen, when the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who has access to classified material, gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee. He said:
“There is a risk that mistakes can be made about assessing intelligence. I have reason to believe that. My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered. It is a fairness issue based on the authorities having all the cards.”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 6.]
Answering another question, he said that he knew of instances where the intelligence had been misunderstood. There you have it: a highly reputable and well-informed person is warning us that innocent people are being punished under the current standard of proof, let alone the lower standard to which the Government would have us agree, under Clause 34, as amended.
What sort of country are we becoming if we are prepared to lock somebody away, all day and all night, indefinitely, even if the chance of them not being a threat is greater than the chance that they are, and having given them no chance to defend themselves? Why, you might ask, are the Government seeking to tilt the scales, not once but three times, towards even more draconian powers, with less justice and fewer safeguards against mistakes or abuse? You would think that there must be strong and compelling reasons for this triple assault on the fairness of our justice system, but the sad truth is that the explanations that have been offered during the passage of the Bill are utterly threadbare and unconvincing. They have the appearance of having been retrofitted, long after these clauses were added to the Bill, in a forlorn attempt to justify the unjustifiable.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, with all his inside knowledge, searched for a good reason to lower the burden of proof and failed to find one. He said that
“it is not clear why there is any need to change the law in the manner proposed …where harsher measures are to be imposed, safeguards should be encouraged, not jettisoned.”
He also said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this … time.”
That is as forthright a condemnation of these three clauses as we are ever likely to hear from someone in his position.
What reasons have the Government come up with to justify lowering the burden of proof and therefore diminishing the safeguards against mistakes and misuse? We have been told that it will be easier to impose a TPIM, which frankly is a transparently circular argument. We have been told how hard it is to gather evidence to satisfy the current burden of proof. We have been told about pro-ISIS fighters returning from Syria being difficult to investigate. We have been told that it would simplify administration, although that is hardly a good reason for increasing the probability that innocent people are incarcerated by mistake.
All of these supposed justifications and all the others that have turned up and disappeared along the way were comprehensively holed below the water line by the Government’s star witness giving evidence to the Bill Committee. Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques gave evidence of behalf of the police and the intelligence services on 25 June last year. In answer to a question from Joanna Cherry MP, he made it clear that the current standard of proof is not an impediment to authorities getting a TPIM when they want it. His exact words were:
“MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”
We have been told by the police and the agencies that there is currently no problem to be solved. The Government’s last resort in devising an excuse for these clauses is to tell us that we do not know what problems are coming down the track, and that it would be nice to have another tool in the toolbox. Well, on that basis we can justify just about anything—we could use the prospect of impending but unknown doom to excuse all manner of assaults on our liberty and our lives. This “just in case” style of legislation is fraught with dangers. Powers that we were told would never be used can quickly become heavily used and set the new standard. We cannot, in all conscience, allow the Government to get away with such slapdash explanations for making their powers even more draconian while reducing the safeguards against injustice.
Clauses 34, 35 and 37 are not needed. The Government have not come close to finding a cogent and convincing justification for them. They have no place in the Bill and must go. As Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer put it so eloquently in his evidence to the Bill Committee:
“If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 7.]
I invite noble Lords to support Amendments 15, 17 and 18 should the House divide on them.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the time he has given to speak about this Bill and for government amendment 14 on the burden of proof. I welcome the change of heart in that respect.
As to the other area on the potential length of TPIMs, I very much hope that the Minister will accept what is essentially the compromise in Amendment 16 between indefinite periods for TPIMs and the current period. It seems to me that the gap that divides us is not that great. TPIMs can be imposed not merely because criminal conduct is suspected, but also because of activities that may not be criminal. It is imposed by the Executive. Although, of course, there is a right of review to the court, a right of review is very different from the decision of a court or independent tribunal in deciding whether the grounds exist.
It is therefore important to appreciate that the very significant restrictions on liberty are imposed by the Executive, something generally alien to our tradition. It would be even more alien to our tradition to go to the extent of enabling the Executive to impose such a restriction for an indefinite period of time. Such restrictions should only be available on people’s liberty where people are convicted of serious criminal offences. Quite apart from the humanitarian and liberty and traditional aspects of that argument, there is the further argument which I raised, and will not repeat, on Second Reading: namely, indefinite orders can, as experience has shown, give people a loss of hope, and in effect make them more dangerous and less susceptible to being reformed.
The compromise that we have put forward in this amendment is further emphasised by the fact that of course if there is new evidence of activity during the period, the four years is not an absolute cut off.
Finally, there is a great deal of sense in having a cut-off period. It is very easy for any decision-maker, particularly one who is worried about the consequences of not extending the TPIM, to go on extending and extending it. It is very wasteful of resources, because enforcing a TPIM is very expensive. It is also fundamentally unfair that someone should be subject to a decision that can go on being rolled over indefinitely rather than someone—to put it in the vernacular—having to put up and charge with an offence or to shut up.
I very much hope that the Minister will think again about the compromise offered in this amendment and accept it.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, this group deals with changes to TPIMs. The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, someone who has unique access to secret intelligence, operational partners and government officials, has previously stated that the changes proposed in the Bill to the TPIM regime were not necessary. We agree, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger so powerfully set out in his speech.
In relation to Clause 34, the current independent reviewer says that he is not aware of any case where operational partners had wanted to impose a TPIM but were unable to do so because the burden of proof was too high, as confirmed by the representative of operational partners in the Bill Committee in the other place.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This is an incredibly important debate, because it goes very much to the heart of the views we take on what the Executive can do. It is anathema to our system that the Executive can impose restrictions on individual citizens on the basis of either the balance of probabilities or, worse, reasonable suspicion. Any restrictions placed must be justified, normally in a criminal court or, in the context of the current pandemic, by an exceptional event such as the pandemic.
All those who have engaged in this debate have accepted the need for some form of TPIM. On behalf of my party, I accept that too, but all our instincts should say that it should be on the most limited ground necessary at any point. I strongly opposed, as my party did, the idea that one can impose a TPIM on the grounds of suspicion alone and welcome Amendment 14, in which the Government reject that approach and go for a situation where the Minister “reasonably believes” that the person has been engaged in terrorist activity. The difference between “reasonably believes” and “balance of probabilities” seems in practice quite difficult to define; the Minister has to believe that the person has been engaged in terrorist activity and he or she must have reasonable grounds for believing so. What is the difference between having reasonable grounds on one hand and believing it on the balance of probabilities on the other, when the person who will test that is the courts? I think it is quite fine, but we will support government Amendment 14. I am grateful that they have listened; it is a very significant shift. The difference between honestly and reasonably believing something and suspicion is significant.
I am very disappointed that the Government persist in the idea that, once you have the basis for a TPIM, you can roll it over indefinitely. As various noble Lords have pointed out, the inclination of the Executive will be to roll these things over without further evidence. Therefore, we on this side of the House will also support Amendment 16.
Four years is a long time, longer than allowed at present and, what is more, the four years can be extended if new evidence emerges during that four-year period. We think there should be a limit on when a TPIM can be granted, where there is evidence for it. We would need new evidence to extend it beyond the four years. We think that four years is a long time, but we recognise that if the House backs this four years, that is the basis for a compromise we very much hope the Government will accept.
Amendment 22 would compel the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to conduct an annual review in relation to TPIMs. I think that is right. I agree with everybody who has said that the independent reviewer has to be properly resourced to do it. This is such an exceptional power that I think it is right that the independent reviewer should look at it every year.
On the proposition that there needs to be a limit on the period of restriction that is required in a particular home, because the power is going to be amended to remove the reference to “overnight”, the Government have given assurances that there will be such a limit, because of the courts’ imposition of limits to ensure that nobody is imprisoned in their house for 24 hours a day, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said the consequences of the section would be. That is not my understanding, legally, of the consequence of the removal of “overnight”, but I would like the Minister to repeat that assurance and also to say that if the court protection went, the Government would come back to ensure that it could not involve 24-hour imprisonment, in effect, in a particular house.
These are exceptional powers. Our role in this House is to ensure that they are subject to specific limits. I think the combination of government Amendment 14, Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and government Amendment 22, which would compel an annual review, is a workable compromise. I am very disappointed that the Government are not accepting it at the moment.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, before I turn to the amendments to which I have not yet spoken, I will address a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on government Amendment 22, about the requirement for the independent reviewer to produce an annual report every year for the next five years. She is right to say that the independence of the independent reviewer means that he could, if he so wished, provide such a review, but we want to ensure that he does so, because of the changes that are being made by the Bill. We, like a number of noble Lords who cited his work and that of his predecessors, find them useful and would find it useful to receive them over the next five years. We do not think that is unduly burdensome, as the noble Baroness suggested it might be. Indeed, that is evidenced by the support of the current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, for the amendment. I hope that that reassures her on that point.
I turn to the amendments. Amendment 15, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove Clause 34 in its entirety, and in doing so prevent the Government lowering the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM to “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism-related activity. As I set out earlier, the Government have listened to the concerns raised in Committee and brought forward a compromise, by lowering the standard of proof to a lesser extent than originally envisaged; namely, “reasonable belief” instead of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. We are confident that this approach represents an appropriate middle ground, one that ensures we are taking action to protect the public from an evolving and more diverse terrorist threat, while addressing the concerns that were expressed in Committee. Of course, “reasonable belief” is a standard which has been used in the past, having first been introduced in 2011 by the coalition Government, which included the Liberal Democrats as well as my own party.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
I have received a request from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to ask a short question.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
The Minister just referred to the number of hours in the day for which the restriction may apply. Why have the Government decided, assuming that the decision is positive, not to include in the Bill a total limit per day? He referred to Article 5 but would it have been more convenient for the Government, let alone TPIM subjects—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had a good deal to say about the problems of pursuing applications to the court—not to allow the prospect of getting caught up in proceedings challenging the total number of hours?
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, the simple answer for not including that in the Bill is that we do not think that it is necessary to do so. The case law exists and has established that in practice the residence measure placed on a TPIM subject could not likely exceed 16 hours a day without constituting an unlawful deprivation of their liberty. However, measures are imposed and tested in the courts on a case-by-case basis, and that is the appropriate way to proceed.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would impose a four-year limit for TPIM notices.
Lord Paddick
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove Clause 37 (TPIMs: extension of residence measure) from the bill.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we come now to the group beginning with Amendment 19. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 38: TPIMs: polygraph measure
Amendment 19
Baroness Hamwee
“(2A) The Secretary of State must publish a code of practice relating to—(a) the conduct of, and(b) the use of reports on the results of,polygraph sessions.(2B) Before publication of the code of practice under section (2A), the Secretary of State must consult appropriate persons.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a code of practice relating to the conduct and use of polygraph sessions.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 19, I will speak also to Amendments 20 and 21. Clause 38 raises a rather different issue from the other clauses in Part 3, which deals with TPIMs. The clause introduces the use of polygraphs—so we are not affected here by nostalgia for 2011.
Amendment 19 requires the Secretary of State, after consultation, to publish a code of practice about polygraph sessions, both how they are conducted and how reports on them are used. New Section 10ZA, introduced by Clause 38, provides for regulations on limited matters, as set out in that clause. The requirement imposed is
“to participate … with a view to … monitoring … compliance with other … measures”
and
“assessing whether any variation of … measures is necessary”.
TPIM subjects are a different cohort from terrorism offenders, not having been convicted. Not everything, I would think, can be a direct read-across from the processes applied to terrorism offenders. In the case of an offender on licence, the tests are to assess compliance; in the event of a breach, the offender can be returned to custody. For a TPIM subject—of course there is no Parole Board here—it is not just about monitoring compliance but assessing necessity. This is a much less tight objective; in fact, if one were to use “objective” as an adjective, I am not sure that it would really meet that test. What if the subject’s reaction is ambiguous?
From the helpful briefings that we have had, as polygraph sessions are used currently and will be used in the case of terrorist offenders, the questions that are asked are closed questions: “Did you do such-and-such?”, or “Have you contacted so-and-so?” I had some difficulty thinking of the questions that might be asked, because so much of potential interest is likely to have been prohibited. I suppose that if there is a measure saying that a person will not visit whatever the nearest urban centre is, that is capable of a yes or no answer.
I wondered whether it is thought that polygraphs are an alternative to electronic monitoring, or a supplement. If there are to be polygraphs applied to TPIM subjects, it seems necessary that there should be a relevant code of practice—tailor-made, if you like—including a reminder that the subject is not an offender.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, appears to be right that the legislation in its current form does not place express limits on the use of information obtained from a polygraph for the purpose of extending a TPIM, yet my enthusiasm for Amendment 20 is limited. The reality is that TPIMs can be made and extended on the basis of a wide range of intelligence fragments, some of which may be little more than straws in the wind. It may none the less be important to take such matters into account. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomb and the ambiguous and potentially unreliable intelligence that, as I reported at the time, might, if it had been interpreted in a different way, have resulted in some sort of pre-emptive action.
An intelligence picture is typically a complex mosaic of multiple indications and assessments, of which polygraph material, depending on the circumstances, will not necessarily be the least reliable component. While it seems to me both unlikely and undesirable that a TPIM would ever be extended predominantly on the basis of polygraph material, I am wary of Parliament seeking to dictate the relative weight that is to be given to different sources of intelligence. The Executive and the courts are the bodies with expertise in this area, and I suspect that we should leave it to them.
I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about Amendment 19, which seems not without merit.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained Amendments 19 and 20 to the House, and it would serve little purpose to repeat that as we will not be dividing the House on them.
As my noble friend has said, compulsory polygraph tests for those convicted on licence from prison are one thing, but such tests for those not convicted of any offence, who have a right to silence when being questioned, is quite another. It is a long-established principle that a suspect in criminal proceedings should be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Clause 38 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement for an individual subject to a TPIM to participate in polygraph sessions and to comply with instructions given to the individual by the polygraph operator. Although any statement made by the individual while participating in the polygraph session cannot be used against them in any proceedings for an offence, a failure to answer questions could be taken as contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice—that is, to comply with the instructions of the polygraph operator, so, in this case, the instruction to answer questions. Remaining silent during a polygraph session could therefore be an offence under Section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, for which the individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
If the person is convicted of a terrorism offence and is on licence and subject to a TPIM—unlikely but possible—it would be possible for them to be subjected to polygraph tests under Clause 32 of this Bill, and a failure to answer questions in those circumstances would be a breach of the licence. While we have reservations about that, we do not object to it being part of the Bill. However, if the person is not convicted and is subject to a TPIM, they have the right to silence and to be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Potentially being imprisoned for five years for failing to answer questions during a polygraph session is an adverse consequence, and we therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on whether Clause 38 should be part of the Bill.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the effect of the Bill at the moment is that a condition of a TPIM can be that the subject takes a polygraph test, and that a failure to do that could be a breach of the TPIM’s provisions. Amendment 21 raises the question of whether that should be part of a potential TPIM. In answering that question, it is important to try to find out what the Government have in mind regarding the use of that provision. First, to what extent do they regard polygraph answers as reliable? There is a general view that they cannot be taken on their own. What is the Government’s view on that?
Secondly, will the Government introduce a code of practice, as envisaged by Amendment 19? If so, could they give some indication of what that would contain? In particular, would it be based on the American Polygraph Association’s code of practice?
Thirdly, in December 2020 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service announced that it would be seeking a long-term commercial partner to deliver polygraph equipment, training and support services for the sum of £2 million. When this was announced by the Government, it was noted that any partners must provide training to the standard approved by the American Polygraph Association, which is a trade body. Can the Minister give an indication of how that is going?
Will the Minister confirm that the Government will not act solely on the basis of any physiological reaction of the individual while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination, and that the effect of a “significant reaction” in a polygraph examination will simply lead to further inquiries being made?
There has been, over quite a long time, a legitimate—in the sense of authorised by legislation—use by the Home Office of polygraph tests in relation to sexual offenders. According to Home Office figures, over the last five years 5,228 mandatory polygraph examinations have been carried out on 2,249 sexual offenders. Will the Minister describe to the House what benefit has been obtained from this and the basis of any assertions of that benefit?
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, the three amendments in this group stand in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 19 would oblige the Secretary of State to publish a code of practice on the conduct of, and use of results from, polygraph examinations, with a requirement to consult appropriate parties on the code before its publication.
We think that such an amendment is not necessary, since equivalent provision is already made by new paragraph 10ZA, which Clause 38 of the Bill will insert into Schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, noted, Clause 38 includes a regulation-making provision for the conduct of TPIM polygraph examinations. The new polygraph measure will not be used within the TPIM regime unless and until such regulations have been made.
These regulations are expected to include detail on, for example, the qualifications and experience needed by polygraph operators; how records of the polygraph examinations should be kept; and how reports on the results of the examinations should be prepared. This will ensure transparency in how the polygraph measure in the TPIM regime will be applied in practice.
This approach follows the practice already established by the Ministry of Justice, which has set out its use of the polygraph in licence conditions of sex offenders in the Polygraph Rules 2009. Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise these future regulations and they will, of course, be subject to annulment by your Lordships’ House or the other place. As such, we believe that Amendment 19 is unnecessary, and I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw it, as she indicated she might.
Amendment 20 seeks to prohibit the extension of a TPIM notice on the basis of information derived from a polygraph test. Again, we do not think this is necessary. Clause 38 specifies the purposes for which the Home Secretary may impose a requirement on an individual subject to a TPIM notice to participate in polygraph examinations. These are, first,
“monitoring the individual’s compliance with other specified measures”
and secondly,
“assessing whether any variation of the specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity”.
The reference in new heading (ii) to
“variation of the specified measures”
means variation of the measures set out in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011, and the duration of the TPIM is not one of those measures. Extension of the TPIM for a further year can be done only by relying on the power in Section 5 of that Act, not by way of varying measures. Therefore, any attempt to use information derived from a polygraph examination to extend the duration of a TPIM notice would be unlawful. I hope that provides some assurance to the noble Lords and that they will therefore be willing not to press Amendment 20.
Finally, Amendment 21 would remove the addition of a polygraph measure to Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011 entirely. The Government cannot accept that. Adding a polygraph measure to Schedule 1, where the measure is assessed to be necessary and proportionate, will help our operational partners to assess an individual’s compliance with his or her TPIM notice. This might include being asked whether engagement with rehabilitation programmes is genuine or whether someone is, for instance, meeting prohibited associates. The insights gained from a polygraph examination will support decision-making on whether the TPIM notice should be varied, including the relaxation of measures or further restrictions.
The polygraph measure will not be mandatory for all TPIM subjects. It will be used sparingly and only where necessary and proportionate to restrict a subject’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Whether it is judged necessary will be determined by the Security Service on a case-by-case basis and a recommendation will be made to the Home Secretary.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is not available, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
Our views are very close, but we have not actually changed personalities yet. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked some extremely pertinent questions as the basis for an assessment of whether it was appropriate for the clause to remain in the Bill. It is a great shame that we have not had the answers to that list of questions; I do not think any could have come as a surprise.
May I pursue one point? Because there is a regulation-making power in new paragraph 10ZA, it is not necessary to have a reference to a code of practice. I have sat through many debates when we have been told that codes of practice are so useful because they are flexible; they can be tweaked without having to go through the legislative process. I have to say that I am quite surprised by that answer. I do not know whether we are being told that the rules that apply under the Offender Management Act in other situations when polygraph sessions are used are the rules that will apply. It is my fault; I got slightly lost during that part of the debate. It may be my perception only but, as I heard the answers, there seemed to be a lot of repetition of what is in the Bill, not answers to concerns which underlie the amendments.
When we get to it, depending on who the broadcasters go to, one of us will move Amendment 21. For now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 19.
Lord Paddick
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove Clause 38 (TPIMs: polygraph measure) from the bill.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
I beg to move Amendment 21, which has already been debated, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“TPIMs: annual review
(1) In section 20 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (reviews of the operation of that Act)—(a) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) The independent reviewer must carry out a review under this section in respect of each calendar year starting with 2022 and ending with 2026.Each review must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the year to which it relates.”;(b) in subsection (2), after “calendar year” insert “after 2026”;(c) in subsection (4), for “subsection (2)” substitute “this section”;(d) after subsection (6) insert—“(7) Subsection (1A) does not require a review to be carried out in respect of any calendar year during the whole of which the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers (within the meaning given by section 21(8)) do not exist because of their expiry or repeal under section 21.”(2) Subsection (1) does not affect any duty to carry out a review further to a notification given under section 20(2) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 before the coming into force of this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would reinstate the requirement for an annual review of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 by an independent reviewer for a period of five years beginning with 2022 (with reviews at the discretion of the reviewer after that period).
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We come to the group consisting of Amendment 23. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Clause 44: Persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism: timing of independent review
Amendment 23
Lord Paddick
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) omit the words from “within the period” to the end and substitute “by 31 December 2021”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would reinstate the deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I move Amendment 23 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This House voted for there to be a deadline for the publication of an independent review of the Government’s Prevent strategy in what became Section 20 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. In this Bill, the Government seek to remove any deadline for the publication of this review. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government hoped that the report would be published in the autumn of this year and that he hoped to get confirmation of this from the newly appointed independent reviewer of Prevent. On the basis of the estimate given by the Government in Committee, our Amendment 23 seeks to reinstate the deadline but with a generous margin of publication by the end of the calendar year. I beg to move.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, there seems to be a recurring issue with the timeliness of independent reviews in the field of national security. The chief problem as I observe it relates not to the speed with which independent reviewers do their job but to the speed with which those reviews are commissioned on the one hand, and the speed with which reports are published and laid before Parliament on the other.
As to delays in commissioning, in addition to the remarkably long time that it has taken to replace my noble friend Lord Carlile as the independent reviewer of Prevent, I note that it was only on 25 February this year that the long-awaited review was announced of closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013. That review was required by Section 13 of that Act to be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after June 2018. Yet, despite regular inquiries by the indefatigable Angus McCullough QC and others, and at least one Written Question in my own name, it was commissioned only two and a half years after that point. That seems simply unacceptable.
On the second of those points, there is the pre-election saga of the Russia report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I made my views clear at the time, and an occasionally elastic interpretation of the Secretary of State’s statutory duty to lay reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation before Parliament “on receiving a report”.
In the Public Bill Committee on the original TPIM Bill in 2011, James Brokenshire, during his first stint as Security Minister, said on this subject:
“There is no desire to sit on reports. It would be foolish and inappropriate for Government to do so, particularly with a report from an independent reviewer … It is not our intention to sit on reports; that is not the practice. If it gives comfort to the Committee and to the public, reports received from the independent reviewer will be published on receipt or promptly—whatever the appropriate phrase is. That is what I expect to happen, and I would expect any successor of mine to take the same approach.”—[Official Report, Commons Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 30/6/11; col. 253.]
Will the Minister take this opportunity to endorse the principled approach set out by James Brokenshire almost 10 years ago and apply it not only to reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation but to the report of the independent reviewer of Prevent? If he can, he will go some way to setting my mind at rest not only on the subject matter of this amendment but more generally.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this has been an extremely brief debate and quite a blunt one. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was very clear: during the passage of a previous Counter-Terrorism Act this House voted for a deadline and this current legislation is seeking to remove it. The Government commissioned an independent review back in January 2019, which has been repeatedly delayed and postponed, and the initial statutory deadline of 12 August 2020 will now be missed. The Government have said that they intend to have a report ready by summer 2021. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, he has been very generous by putting in his amendments a deadline of the end of this current calendar year.
In the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to this short debate I noted a tone of exasperation, and I do not blame him or the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for using such a tone. I really do not see why the Government cannot reaffirm their commitment to a deadline and I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response to both noble Lords.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, this amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would add a new statutory deadline of 31 December this year for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I am happy to say once again that we share the noble Lord’s and noble Baroness’s commitment to a successful independent review and the opportunity that it provides to learn lessons from what is and is not working—as well as to listen to a wide range of voices about how best to safeguard those who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
The review restarted on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. As I undertook to do in Committee, I am pleased to say that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has had a conversation with Mr Shawcross about the timescale for his review. He certainly agrees with the need to complete it as swiftly as possible, while affording it the consideration that it requires. He hopes to complete his work well before the end of 2021, and of course there will then need to be time for a government response to be prepared and laid before Parliament. However, it is out intention to set out the date of his report and, indeed, the Government’s response in the revised terms of reference, when they are published shortly.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to the remarks of my right honourable friend James Brokenshire, made in his first stint as Security Minister, about government responses being swift and timely. I hope the greatest reassurance to the noble Lord is the fact that my right honourable friend is back in that important post, albeit currently recuperating from his operation, from which we all wish him a speedy recovery. I am sure his remarks then stand now, as they do for my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who is covering while he recuperates.
We all agree that it is necessary to have a thorough, evidence-based review that engages communities and sees Prevent delivery in action and that has practical recommendations for improvement at the end of it. We fear that, at a time when fleetness of foot is vital, a statutory deadline could limit this. We referred in Committee to the ongoing pandemic; alas, it continues now we are on Report, and I hope noble Lords will all be mindful of the need for flexibility in light of it.
Mr Shawcross is keen to proceed at pace, as I say, but reintroducing a statutory deadline for the completion of his independent review would mean that, if he encountered a challenge to his timeline because of the pandemic, we would have to revisit the legislation or he might be forced to compromise in how he meets his objectives. Of course, we hope that there will not be any difficulties, but there remains a risk of further or ongoing restrictions, with all the unpredictabilities of the pandemic and the implications that that could have for Mr Shawcross, his team and those who wish to provide their input into the review. As such, we think that that remains sensible.
We believe that it is achievable for Mr Shawcross to complete his work quickly, while undertaking a thorough and robust piece of work—but it is important for the legislation to retain the flexibility for the reviewer, should he need it, to ensure that the valuable work of his review is not undermined. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will agree and, therefore, withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for their support for this amendment. The frustration that I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, expressed about the Government’s tardiness in reporting to Parliament on these issues has been reinforced by what the Minister has just said.
Not only has the Minister now turned away from what he said in Committee—that the Government anticipated that the report would be complete by the autumn—but he is now saying, “Of course, but then the Government will need time to respond to it.” This is absolutely the reason why we wanted this amendment in the Bill, and the Minister is showing complete contempt for what the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Ponsonby, and I have been saying.
I am sorely tempted to divide the House on this, simply to make the point. However, bearing in mind the time, I will reluctantly beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
We now come to Amendment 26. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 48: Extent
Amendment 26
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
“(4A) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) limits the extent within the United Kingdom of any provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006. (4B) Subsections (1) and (2) of section 384 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (extent outside the United Kingdom) apply to the armed forces provisions as those subsections apply to the provisions of that Act.(4C) The following are “armed forces provisions”—(a) a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006;(b) an amendment, modification or repeal made by or under this Act of—(i) a provision of or made under the Armed Forces Act 2006,(ii) a provision that amends, modifies or repeals a provision of, or made under, that Act, or(iii) any other provision, so far as the provision is applied (by whatever words) by or under that Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that provisions of the Bill which have a limited extent within the United Kingdom (such as amendments of the Sentencing Code) have UK-wide extent so far as they are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006. It also provides for the provisions of the Bill that relate to the armed forces to extend, or be extended, outside the United Kingdom in the same way as the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
My Lords, I apologise for the short break in proceedings while I came back to my place. I am afraid that the convention of not moving while the Chair is standing, and social distancing, do not go too well together.
This rather technical amendment to Clause 48 clarifies that the provisions of the Bill have UK-wide extent in so far as they are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006. That is the burden of proposed new subsection (4A). The amendment also rectifies an oversight in the original drafting of the Bill, to make Section 384 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 apply to provisions in the Bill if they amend or modify the Act, and when they are applied by that Act. This means that they will extend to the Isle of Man and the British Overseas Territories, except Gibraltar, and can be extended to the Crown dependencies. That is the burden of proposed new subsection (4B). That ensures that the same version of the Armed Forces Act 2006 will be in force in all the jurisdictions to which that Act extends.
I apologise for the fact that this amendment has not been brought forward until now. That was an oversight, but I hope that noble Lords will accept that it was an understandable one, given the number of issues that the Bill deals with, and their frequent complexity. The interrelationship between sentencing provisions and armed services issues adds a further element of complexity. The amendment itself, as I have said, does those two things, in proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B). I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, Clause 48 deals with the extent of the Bill. It provides that
“A provision of this Act which amends, repeals or revokes an enactment has the same extent within the United Kingdom as the enactment amended, repealed or revoked.”
Under subsection (2), provisions that do not amend, repeal or revoke an existing enactment extend to all four nations—England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland—save for two limited exceptions, in that Clauses 21(2) and 44(2) are of a limited nature, referring to retrospectivity.
It is not easy to extract the purpose of Amendment 26. Someone in the Ministry of Justice has concluded that there are problems under the Armed Forces Act 2006. Proposed new subsection (4A) suggests that, in the context of jurisdiction under the Armed Forces Act 2006, all the provisions of the Bill extend to all four countries. This is so even if an amendment repeals or revokes a provision of an existing Act that does not have that extent.
Under proposed new subsection (4B), the provisions of the Act extend outside the United Kingdom to the extent set out in Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act. That section applies to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and overseas territories excluding Gibraltar. British Overseas Territories do not include Cyprus, Belize or Gibraltar itself, which is specifically excluded. Those are all venues where I, as chairman of the Association of Military Court Advocates, know that courts martial take place.
Those are three places, and I am sure there are more, where courts martial take place—not to mention Germany, where the facilities have ceased. Courts martial can, of course, take place anywhere in the world, if properly constituted, and if charges for service offences are brought against anyone who is subject to the Armed Forces Act.
Terrorism exists outside the overseas territories. I would very much welcome clarification as to what happens if a court martial is held outside the United Kingdom, but not within those overseas territories to which the Armed Forces Act applies. I cannot help feeling that I am missing something, but the statement attached to the amendment is not at all clear—even though it states that the purpose of the amendment is to clarify the position. I look forward to the Minister doing so.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I endorse the question so clearly put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Despite the clear explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I am still struggling with this amendment. Can he tell us the sort of problem that proposed new subsection (4A), which Amendment 26 seeks to insert into the Bill, tries to deal with? What is the lack of clarity with which he was concerned? Can he also indicate whether there are any implied provisions put into the Armed Forces Act by this Bill?
Proposed new subsection (4C)(a) specifies:
“a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
Can he indicate what sort of provision that is aimed at? I would find it really helpful, in relation to proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B), to have an example of a problem that these two provisions would solve.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their contributions and questions. The position, so far as I can assist the House now, is that the amendment ensures that the provisions of the Bill which amend, modify or are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006 have the same extent as that Act. That Act extends to the UK, Isle of Man, and British Overseas Territories, excluding Gibraltar, and can be extended to the Crown dependencies.
The Armed Forces Act 2006 is the main piece of primary legislation that establishes a service justice system. It uses a modified form of sentencing law of England and Wales for sentences imposed by the court martial, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, stated. The burden of the amendment is to ensure that the Armed Forces provisions in the Bill have the same extent as the Armed Forces Act 2006. This would ensure, therefore, that there is a correlation of the area over which the provisions apply.
On the specific question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on what would happen outside the territories covered by the Armed Forces Act, I am conscious that I would probably be straying into MoD territory rather than MoJ territory. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, will allow me to write to him on that so he gets an accurate and complete answer.
As to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on whether there is an implication in the Bill that is caught by proposed new subsection (4C), perhaps I can send him a letter on that, rather than risk getting the answer wrong, I am tempted to say that these are standard words used in Acts of Parliament about what is implied, but I understand the burden of his question and, if he will permit me, will send him a written response. I hope that I have responded to the points put to me and I commend this amendment to the House.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
(a) in subsection (3A),”Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the amendment at page 121, line 5.
“(b) in subsection (9), after “applies” insert “to the extent that the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of an offence within section 1AB(2)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 1(9) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in light of new section 1B of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
“(2A) In section 1AA (release of certain sexual offenders), for subsection (9) substitute—“(9) This section is subject to section 1B.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 1AA(9) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in light of new section 1B of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
“(5B) Subsection (4) is subject to sections 1A and 1B.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 1AB of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 so as to make subsection (4) of that section subject to sections 1A and 1B of that Act (section 1B being inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
“(14) This section applies to a prisoner on whom sentence was imposed before the day on which paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 came into force as it applies to a prisoner on whom sentence was imposed on or after that day.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 1B of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 so that it will apply in relation to sentences imposed before the date on which the provision of the Bill inserting section 1B into that Act comes into force.
“(a) in the case of a prisoner to whom section 1AB(3) applies,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment at page 124, line 4.
(b) in the case of a prisoner to whom section 1AB(3) does not apply by virtue of section 1AB(2A), before the day on which the Scottish Ministers are required to release the prisoner under section 26ZA(5).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment prevents a life prisoner who is also serving a terrorism sentence to which section 1AB(2A) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 applies from making a requirement under section 2(6) of that Act before the day on which the prisoner would otherwise be eligible for release on licence under section 26ZA(5) of that Act.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 5 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in light of new section 1B of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
“(c) in subsection (4), after “1A” insert “, 1B”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 5 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in light of new section 1B of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
“(za) in subsection (3)—(i) after “(2) above” insert “or, as the case may be, section 1AB(4) or 26ZA(5)(a)”;(ii) after “sentence)” insert “or, as the case may be, before the date on which the sentence under section 205ZC(5) as originally imposed by the court expires”;(iii) after “so elapses” insert “or, as the case may be, the sentence under section 205ZC(5) expires;””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes consequential amendments of section 7 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.
“(ba) in subsection (5)(b), after “(1A)” insert “, 1B”;” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 7 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 in light of new section 1B of that Act (inserted by paragraph 52(4) of Schedule 13 to the Bill).
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes consequential amendments of section 7 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.
(e) after subsection (8) insert—“(9) This section is subject to section 1B.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes consequential amendments of section 7 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.
“(12A) In section 26A (extended sentences: application of section)—(a) in subsection (1), after “sentences)” insert “other than an extended sentence imposed in respect of a terrorism offence.”;(b) in subsection (2), for “section 1A” substitute “sections 1A and 1B”;(c) in subsection (6), for “section 1A(c)” substitute “sections 1A(1)(c) and 1B(11)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment excludes a prisoner subject to an extended sentence under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in respect of a terrorism offence from the scope of section 26A of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. It also amends that section 26A in consequence of new section 1B of that Act.
“(5B) In determining, for the purposes of subsection (5), whether a sentence passed on a person in respect of an offence (other than an offence within section 1AB(2)) is to be treated as part of a single term, any sentence passed on the person in respect of an offence within section 1AB(2) is to be ignored.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts new subsection (5B) into section 27 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 clarifying that, in determining whether non-terrorism sentences are to be treated as a single term, sentences imposed in respect of terrorism offences within section 1AB of that Act are to be ignored.
“(b) in each of paragraphs 10(2)(a) and (5)(a) and 11(2)(a) and (4)(a)—(i) after “1A,” insert “1B,”;(ii) after “21,” insert “26ZA,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes minor amendments of paragraphs 10 and 11 of Schedule 1 to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 in consequence of the insertion of sections 1B and 26ZA into the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.
“(b) after “1A,” insert “1B,”;(c) after “10” insert “, 26ZA”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes minor amendments of section 24(c) of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 in consequence of the insertion of sections 1B and 26ZA into the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Thursday 11th March 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 169-I Marshalled list for Report - (26 Feb 2021)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, as the UK Government have made clear throughout all stages of the Bill, we are committed to working closely with the devolved Administrations on this legislation to ensure that the important changes made by the Bill will make the UK as safe as possible from the threats posed by terrorism.
While terrorism and national security are reserved matters, some of the provisions of this legislation engage the Sewel convention, both in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. I am pleased to confirm to the House that the Scottish Parliament, on the advice of the Scottish Government, has passed a legislative consent Motion in support of the Bill. However, despite lengthy and continued engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, it has decided not to proceed with recommending that legislative consent be given for the Bill by the Northern Ireland Assembly.
I am grateful for the collaborative engagement from officials in both the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive’s Department of Justice, which has provided essential support in the development of this legislation. While on this occasion legislative consent has not been secured from the Northern Ireland Assembly, I reassure noble Lords that the UK Government will continue, as they always have done, to engage with the Northern Ireland Executive and seek legislative consent support for all future Bills which engage the LCM process in the Northern Ireland Assembly. On behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I would like to take a brief opportunity to thank noble Lords. We have limited time, but I want to give some thanks for their interest and contributions thus far to the progress of the Bill. I am grateful to noble Lords across the House who have contributed eloquently to the debates on Second Reading, in Committee and on Report.
Some strong and differing opinions have been expressed on certain provisions in this legislation. I am grateful for the scrutiny that that has brought, and especially for the co-operative and constructive spirit in which the debates have taken place. I am equally grateful for the broad support that most of the measures in the Bill have received so far.
I particularly thank, at this point, noble Lords from the Labour and Liberal Democrat Front Benches, who contributed a number of important interventions to debates on measures in the Bill, particularly on polygraph examinations and the work to deradicalise and rehabilitate terrorist offenders in the prison estate. I am especially pleased that so many noble Lords found the discussion in the House, and the complementary briefing sessions on these subjects, both thought-provoking and helpful. I hope that the House is now confident of the intention behind these measures and is reassured that the Government keep this important work under continuous review.
Noble Lords have contributed to a rich discussion on the changes being made to terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs, as we usually call them. The Government remain clear on the importance of strengthening this vital risk management tool, and we are grateful to all Peers who have spoken on the issue, especially those on the Liberal Democrat and Labour Front Benches, and also the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for their thoughtful contributions to debate.
The amendments made in this House to the TPIMs provisions, tabled by the Government and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will now be considered by the other place, and I look forward to returning to this matter when the Bill comes back to this House. Members of this House have recognised its importance, and we have discussed openly the complexity and challenges that dealing with terrorism poses.
The Government are confident that the Bill will strengthen the approach taken to the sentencing and release of terrorist offenders, by ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders will spend longer in custody, properly reflecting the seriousness of the offences they have committed. Crucially, it will improve the Government’s ability to manage and monitor terrorist offenders when they are released. This will ultimately provide better protection for the public and keep our country safe. For all these reasons, I hope that the Bill will progress quickly through the other place, and I look forward to discussing it further on its return to this House.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
First, I thank the Government Front Bench, whose approach to this very serious Bill has been measured and appropriate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, have been incredibly open with the House, and we are very grateful for that. I cannot remember whether this is their first Bill, but they have conducted it incredibly well. May I particularly mention the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, who ended up having to take this Bill when, I think, the person originally nominated left in somewhat of a hurry? He did an incredibly good job.
We have had very open and co-operative help from the Front Bench. It is clear that we on this side of the House strongly support many of the measures. We did not reach agreement on TPIMs or polygraphs, but we have made changes, particularly in relation to TPIMs. Some were agreed by the Government, but they did not agree to all of them. I very much hope that those in the other place will consider very seriously the changes that we have made, which have focused mostly on TPIMs, and will perhaps think that we have provided appropriate protection, but in a more nuanced and better way.
Lord Paddick (LD) [V]
My Lords, we on these Benches want to do everything we can to make the UK safer. What we sought to do in the Bill was to protect civil liberties and the rule of law. We have questioned the presumption that longer sentences, and people spending more time in prison, will make UK citizens safer. Instead, we have been trying to create a system in which prisoners stand the best chance of being deradicalised and rehabilitated.
As the noble Lord has said, terrorism prevention and investigation measures are supposed to do exactly what it says on the tin—to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. The changes the Government sought to bring about would have made it possible to extend TPIMs indefinitely, including what could amount to house arrest, by removing the overnight restrictions on curfews. Unless the compromise amendment forced on the Government by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, survives ping-pong, indefinite detention without trial beckons.
The Bill extends compulsory lie detector—polygraph —tests not only to convicted terrorists on licence from prison, but to subjects of TPIMs orders who are not convicted, and should have the right to silence. Instead, those unconvicted suspects face a term of imprisonment for not answering questions. The long-established right to silence has been eroded.
It is not all bad. As a result of the briefings arranged by the Government, as the Minister said, I am now convinced of the benefits of the limited use of polygraph tests for those released on licence from prison and I am reassured by the efforts being made to manage the risks presented by terrorist offenders on release from prison, although I still believe that they could be enhanced by extending the remit of the Parole Board, as sensibly proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. On a personal level, I am very grateful for the open and engaging way in which both Ministers have interacted with us, for the engagement with like-minded noble Lords across the House and to our own and Labour’s staff members, Sarah and Grace, for the considerable help and assistance they have provided.
Finally, I would be lost without the help and support of my noble friends, in particular my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and my noble friend Lady Hamwee, whose contributions in the Chamber are just the tip of an iceberg of dedication, superhuman effort and selfless support for others.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]
My Lords, I echo the verbal applause given so eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for the contribution and consultation given by Ministers. I have one regret about the Bill, which is that the potential role of the Parole Board is not recognised properly in it. However, with some confidence I express the hope that, outside the time pressures to complete the Bill in this Session of Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government will talk to the Parole Board at the most senior levels to ensure that best use is made of the board’s skills and of its long and successful rollout of relevant training on terrorism matters to its members. The Government should not forget that the Parole Board holds a high degree of accountability in public confidence.
I support the proportionate use of polygraphs, and I am heartened to hear that the Liberal Democrats have become converted to that use. I support it as one, but only one, of a larger set of psychological and neurological tools in assessing the risks presented by terrorist prisoners if they are released. I support the extension of TPIMs to the standard formerly available through control orders. When I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, I repeatedly opposed the dilution of those orders in 2010-11 by the coalition Government, and I only regret the passage of 10 years to reach today’s position. I recognise with acclaim the work of my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich on raising the length and standard of proof of TPIMs to a sound and realistic level. What I believe is the now achieved compromise, the limit of five years, is acceptable, but as long as prosecution always remains the preferred option.
I could but will not say much more, other than recognising that your Lordships’ House has left a better Bill than we started with. Of course, in the years to come, we shall scrutinise the operability of the Act and not hesitate to suggest further changes.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the words expressed by all the speakers. First, I in particular thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. He is right that I am something of a neophyte when it comes to the work of this House, so thanks from him, with his extensive experience, is especially well received. He was also correct to draw attention and pay tribute to the other two members of the ministerial team and the officials who worked on the Bill. My noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay did a lot of the heavy lifting, and my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton was, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew put it once in Committee, the other half of the Government’s twin strike force. I am very grateful to both my colleagues for everything they have done.
As I mentioned the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, I benefited personally—I know we all did—from his experience, both in this Chamber and in our discussions outside, and I am confident that they will continue on other legislative matters.
Finally, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his comments. Of course, we had some differences on certain issues in the Bill, but they were differences of principle; both sides were, I hope, well and fairly argued; and I am sure that those discussions and debates also led to a better Bill in the end. The noble Lord was part of a triple strike force, and he was right to mention his colleagues, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who also did a lot of work in this regard. I see the time, and therefore conclude my remarks there.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Monday 22nd March 2021
(3 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 22 March 2021 - (22 Mar 2021)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Lords amendments 2 to 17.
Lords amendment 18, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (e) in lieu.
Lords amendments 19 to 77.
Chris Philp
We had a very constructive debate on the Bill when it passed through the House last year, and I am delighted to speak to it again this evening.
Lords amendment 18, in the name of Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes a new upper time limit of four years for the duration of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure. The Bill as originally drafted sought to remove the current two-year limit and instead enable a TPIM to be renewed annually for as long as necessary. Having carefully considered the amendment tabled by Lord Anderson and consulted with him, the Government, in disagreeing with the amendment, have tabled amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, which set a five-year limit instead of a four-year limit.
I am given to understand that the noble Lord Anderson is content with that, and we believe that it represents a reasonable compromise between a desire to set a reasonable limit on the maximum duration of TPIMs and protecting our fellow citizens. We heard evidence from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques during the passage of the Bill that occasions have arisen when there has been a cliff edge and people have posed a risk to the public after the expiry of a TPIM. The Government believe that a five-year hard time limit is, ultimately, a reasonable compromise.
Of course, TPIMs are reviewable on an ongoing basis. They are reviewed and renewed, and if somebody ceases to be a threat, the TPIM will be discontinued. Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, there is not only an ability to have regular review hearings under section 9 but a right to appeal to the courts under section 16 for people wishing to challenge a decision for their TPIM notice to be extended. Given Lord Anderson’s agreement that five years rather than four is reasonable, I hope that the House will consent to our proposed amendments (a) to (e) in lieu.
Lords amendment 17 was a concession made in the Lords, and the Government will therefore support it. It elevates the burden of proof required before imposing a TPIM from reasonable suspicion, as originally proposed in the Bill, up to reasonable belief, which is a slightly higher standard of proof. Again, I hope the House will agree that this represents a reasonable compromise between this House and the upper House. The Government believe that with that slightly higher standard of proof, we can still keep our fellow citizens safe, and we feel that Lords amendment 17 strikes the right balance. We will therefore be supporting it, and it is backed up by Lords amendment 19, which creates an ongoing annual review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation of the use of TPIMs, commencing for the first time next year.
I do not want to detain the House long with the other amendments, because there are a total of 77 and I do not wish to go through all of them one by one. [Hon. Members: “Go on!”] I can hear that there is enthusiasm for that, but I am going to disappoint the audience by not going through each one individually. I will just say that a number of them relate to the devolved Administrations. In particular, we have removed the polygraph clauses from Scotland and Northern Ireland, because the legislative power already exists there, should those Administrations wish to use it. We have also made some technical changes concerned with single terming in Scottish law, and some technical amendments that are consequent on the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill.
In summary and conclusion—always a popular phrase—I think we have now arrived at a good set of measures, which will protect the public while also respecting and protecting fundamental rights. I therefore commend these amendments to the House.
Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the Minister, and I will not detain the House long or speak to each of the 77 amendments. However, there are some issues that I want to raise. I will start by thanking the Minister; I know we had a robust exchange today across the Dispatch Box, and I am sure we will have many more, but his conduct in speaking to and informing me over the course of not just this weekend, but the passage of the Bill, has been exemplary. I want to acknowledge that.
Clearly, we also want to thank those across counter-terrorism, policing and the security services and all their partners who selflessly put themselves in harm’s way to advance the effort to keep people safe. Following the horrific events of Fishmongers’ Hall, Streatham, Reading, and the Manchester Arena attack and others like it, I think that everyone across this Chamber acknowledged that there was a clear need for a change, both in legislation and approach. These Lords amendments, and particularly those that the Government have accepted, speak to the heart of that, and it is why we welcomed and supported this Bill in principle all along. It has returned to us from the other place in better shape, and I am pleased to see that some of the proposals that we made in Committee have influenced it.
However, even as amended, it is arguable whether any of what the Government have brought forward in the Bill would have had a significant role in preventing any of those attacks. I do not think there are many new tools here, if any, that the Government did not already have at their disposal. Since the passage of the Bill began, we learned that the perpetrator of the Fishmongers’ Hall attack was deemed a high-risk, category A prisoner before his release, and that there was intelligence suggesting he might be planning an attack. We know that the perpetrator of the Reading attack had been released from prison only two weeks previously, following a 17-month sentence for affray and assault, raising concerns about the influence and consequences of radicalisation in prisons, and that the ongoing inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack has already identified some serious questions about how terrorist suspects are monitored, as well as aspects of security around major events. We know that the number of offenders on licence for terrorism-related convictions recalled to prisons is steadily rising for 2020; up to just June of that year, it had doubled from what it was a decade before. That is why it was surprising for me to find out that the Government do not have any idea how many terrorist suspects are rearrested following their release after previously being arrested or charged.
On the specifics of the amendments, particularly Lords amendment 17, Lords amendment 18 and amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, the Government initially rejected our call for a review of so-called lone wolf terrorists last summer. We have since learned that they have, in fact, conducted one, but they are not willing to share the results or make clear the impact or actions that have come out of it. I have asked for a briefing on it and have not heard back. I do not think that is in keeping with my experience of my relationship with the Minister and his colleagues, and I hope that we can find a way to resolve that. [Interruption.] The Minister says from a sedentary position that it is a different Minister. He is right, but it is the same Department, and I trust that now and again they cross each other’s paths and liaise on matters relating to the Home Department.
We note the announcement in last week’s integrated review that the Government intend to set up a new counter-terrorism operations centre, but there is nothing in this Bill about that, and we have little detail about how it fits into current structures, where it will be based, who it will be accountable to and what it will do. Of course we then have the ongoing review of Prevent. Things move quickly in the sphere of counter-terrorism, and it is important that the police, the security services, their operational colleagues, this House and, above all, the British public have confidence that the Government are adapting to emerging threats and, indeed, pre-empting them. Tough talk is fine, but we need to see it matched with tough action.
In Committee, we tabled amendments that would, for example, have led to additional judicial oversight and an even higher burden of proof, and compelled the publication of an exit strategy for TPIMs. I think I argued rightly that it is not in the interests of anyone to allow individuals to remain on TPIMs indefinitely, not least in terms of bringing them to justice.
On the issue of the burden of proof, we want TPIMs to be robust but flexible. That is why we struggle to see the logic in lowering the standard of proof, whether from a procedural, administrative or operational perspective, because no prior TPIM request had been rejected at that threshold, proving that it was no impediment. That is why we tabled an amendment that would have raised the standard of proof, like the Government are proposing now some nine months later, to try to find a middle way on “reasonable and probable grounds”. The provisions before us now effectively retain that higher standard, and of course we welcome that.
We acknowledge the work of colleagues in the other place on Lords amendment 18 and the amendments in lieu in the Minister’s name. We welcome the fact that the Government have responded to our concerns and those raised by hon. Members across this House and, indeed, those in the other place, accepting the general principle of Lord Anderson’s amendment but making the limit of a TPIM notice five years rather than four. We accept that; it is a good concession. As I said before, however, we will endeavour to monitor its workings and impact as we move forward.
Again, we acknowledge the Government’s response to issues raised about the use of the polygraph. That is welcome too, and I appreciate the Minister’s engagement on that with the official Opposition and colleagues from other parts of the UK.
Finally, we welcome Lords amendment 19. We believe that the framework around TPIMs will undoubtedly be improved and enhanced by the input of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
We will always be uncompromising in tackling terrorism and, in that spirit, willing to compromise and work constructively with the Government. That has been our approach throughout the Bill’s passage, and it is good to see that, in large part, the Government have listened to our concerns. However, I raise those questions, particularly because, as the Minister will be aware, this is a fast-changing environment and we need to be responsive. Getting that right is of the gravest importance for us all. Alongside scrutinising and, as appropriate and without apology, criticising the Government, I will always commit to working together where we can in this endeavour.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I have been encouraged by those here physically who tell me that they will make short contributions to try to do this without imposing a time limit. May I encourage those participating remotely, if they have prepared short speeches, to stick with the speeches they have prepared?
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I shall be as short as comes naturally to me, Mr Deputy Speaker.
This is a very important Bill, because the topics are of profound significance to every citizen of this country. It is a difficult and sometimes very fine balance that has to be achieved between the key obligation of any Government to protect the citizen, and our commitment to the rule of law, due process and sensible and rational sentencing in dealing with people who are suspected of being, or have been, involved in the gravest of offences. The endeavour to get it right was very important. I think the Bill has been improved by the scrutiny. I, too, thank the Minister for his approach—it is a pleasure to follow him and the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) —and I think that we have got to a sensible place. I was grateful for the Minister’s briefing to me about the Government’s thinking on the Bill. As he knows, I have raised the two issues that we are discussing tonight on earlier occasions. I am grateful to the Government for listening and for the tribute to the noble Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has vast experience in this field. I am pleased that the Government have taken on board the genuinely felt views and experience of many practitioners in the field, and I think that we have ended up in a sensible place of compromise.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP) [V]
I want to make just three short points, including on the standard of proof required for TPIMs and on the number of extensions that can be granted. First, however, it would be appropriate for me to start by acknowledging that many of the Lords amendments that we are considering tonight, though perhaps not speaking about, respond to concerns about how the Bill would apply to Scotland. That includes, as the Minister said, concerns about polygraph testing and the calculation of release dates. These concerns were raised previously by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and by the Scottish Government through our Justice Secretary, Humza Yousaf. I welcome the fact that UK Ministers and officials have engaged with those concerns and that a set of amendments has been agreed during the House of Lords proceedings that is acceptable to both Governments. I thank everyone involved for their work on that. That meant, of course, that legislative consent was granted by the Scottish Parliament.
Secondly, turning to TPIMs and the number of times that they can be extended, both Lords amendment 18 and the amendment in lieu are clearly better than the Government’s original position of having no effective upper limit on extensions. However, it is still worth taking a step back and reflecting on the fact that, either way, we will now be doubling, or more than doubling, the length of time that a person can be made to live under really serious TPIM restrictions, while at the same time lowering the standard of proof for imposing them. That still is concerning.
As Lord Anderson said in the House of Lords, there is a danger of TPIMs becoming a more attractive option to the authorities in prosecution. Meanwhile, the warehousing of TPIMs subjects risks becoming the norm in place of genuine attempts to develop and implement exit strategies. To my mind, the four years provided for in the Lords amendment is way more than a sufficient concession to the Government already. For the Government to push for still longer shows a bit of a tin ear to the real and genuine concerns about the nature of these orders. However, with the Opposition having decided to compromise and with Lord Anderson reportedly content, there is no need to divide the House.
Finally, and similarly, the Government and the official Opposition have also previously agreed amendment 17, setting the standard of proof for a TPIM measure as reasonable belief. Again, as we have heard, that is another compromise. It is not as low as reasonable suspicion but not as robust as the balance of probabilities. I believe that the very real concerns about the appropriateness of these standards of proof, raised previously by the Scottish National party, have still not been properly addressed. Those accepting the compromise amendments in the Lords suggested that the difference between reasonable belief and balance of probabilities would be a fine one. I acknowledge that there are very significant legal minds who are content with that compromise, yet, as the Government’s explanatory notes make clear, and as the Minister made clear in his speech, reasonable belief is clearly a lower standard.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West said at an earlier stage of the Bill, the case for lowering the standard of proof required
“has not been made out”.—[Official Report, 21 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 2085.]
Indeed, Jonathan Hall, QC, the independent reviewer, remarked in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee:
“If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is…if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 7, Q6.]
My colleagues and I agree with the independent reviewer and regret that the Government and the official Opposition do not at this stage. Instead of dividing the House, we will have to monitor the use of TPIMs ever more closely than before.
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD) [V]
I, too, will speak briefly about TPIMs and the five-year limit. I listened very carefully to the Minister’s speech and the one thing that he did not offer in respect of the extension from four years to five was any actual evidence or justification. It says a lot about the way the Government do business that they seek always to expand the scope of any provision just because they can, rather than because they have any good reason for it.
My noble Friends in the House of Lords tabled an amendment for a two-year limitation on TPIMs, so the move to four years was already a significant compromise. The Minister has not brought forward any reason or evidence to justify the extension to five years, other than the fact that they can.
Like the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) has just said, however, it is not my intention to divide the House this evening, but it is worth putting down a marker. I do not think the Minister was in the House when the issue of control orders was in play, which led eventually, after some judicial intervention, to the creation of TPIMs. It seems to me that by constantly wishing to extend the boundaries of TPIMs, to lower the standard of proof and to extend the period for which they can be introduced, the Government run the very real risk of returning to the courts at some stage. We will eventually be forced back here again because the Government have insisted on acting without proper evidence or justification.
That said, the Government will clearly proceed as they choose tonight, but I fear that this is not the last we will hear on the subject.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I call Jim Shannon via video link. [Interruption.] No, so let us go to Ben Everitt in the Chamber. We will go back to Jim Shannon if we can establish a proper audio link.
Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. Can you hear me okay? [Laughter.]
This is a genuinely important Bill, because those who commit serious acts of terror must be met with the full weight of the justice system. Those who take lives in callous attacks on our streets should face sentences that match the severity of the crimes they commit.
I am pleased to say, as a member of the Bill Committee, that the Bill ensures that where offenders do not receive a life sentence, they will spend a minimum of 14 years behind bars. More importantly, it recognises that dangerous offenders who commit the most serious offences should not have the prospect of early release.
I am pleased that we have found a compromise on TPIMs, because the new measures in the Bill on TPIMs notices are a tool of last resort, but they will ensure that the safety of the public is paramount.
Terrorism is a malign force that is ever changing and ever harder to fight with the tools of the past. This legislation will strengthen our hand against new threats, with stronger sentencing, improved monitoring and more agile tools. I imagine we all wish that the Bill were not necessary, but as long as these threats exist, we need the wherewithal to tackle them and this Bill provides it.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I am afraid we have not been able to establish the link with Jim Shannon, so we will go straight to the Minister.
Chris Philp
I think I can say with some confidence that we will hear from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) on another occasion, which I look forward to very much.
May I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks, and I think the thanks of the whole House, to the security services and the police, who do so much to keep us safe in what are often very difficult and dangerous circumstances? I also thank the shadow Minister, the Front Bench spokesmen for the Scottish National party and the other parties, and the Chair of the Justice Committee for the very constructive way in which they have engaged in the passage of the Bill. I will respond briefly to one or two points that were raised.
The shadow Minister was looking for briefing on, I think, lone actors. The Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) would be the Minister to give that briefing. Obviously, he has had some health problems recently, but I hope that, through his private office, we can get that arranged as soon as he is back to his regular duties.
One or two questions were asked by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) about the five-year time period. I would emphasise that there are very few TPIMs in use. At the time we took evidence last year there were only six in use. Moreover, the subject has a right of appeal, as I said, under section 16 of the TPIM Act, so there are protections in place.
The hon. Gentleman also posed a question about evidence on the need for five years, rather than four years. As the shadow Minister will recall, we took evidence from assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, who said that there is a risk if the TPIM is terminated too early and somebody slips out. It takes time then to re-gather evidence to reimpose a new TPIM. He mentioned two examples: one where it took 12 months and another where it took 16 months. We are very keen to avoid that sort of situation, so I think there is good evidence.
Let me conclude by saying that the Bill is a very important measure. It constitutes decisive action to keep our fellow citizens safe from the scourge of terrorism. We saw in Streatham, at Fishmongers’ Hall and elsewhere how much of a threat former terrorist prisoners can pose on release. The Bill is designed to protect the public from those risks. I commend it to the House.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to.
Lords amendments 2 to 17 agreed to.
Lords amendment 18 disagreed to.
Government amendments (a) to (e) made in lieu of Lords amendment 18.
Lords amendments 19 to 77 agreed to.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Thursday 25th March 2021
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 186-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons disagreement and amendments in lieu - (23 Mar 2021)
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 18 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D and 18E in lieu.
“(b) in the heading, for “Two” substitute “Five”.”
(i) the words “without being extended under section 5(2)” become sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) at the end of that sub-paragraph insert “, or
(ii) having been extended under section 5(2) on fewer than four occasions,”;
(b) in subsection (7)(b), at the end insert “(and regardless of how many times it has been so extended)”;
(c) in subsection (9)—
(i) omit the “and” at the end of paragraph (a);
(ii) after paragraph (b) insert “; and
“(c) is treated as having been extended under section 5(2) on the same number of occasions (if any) as on which the revived notice had been so extended.””
“(3) The replacement TPIM notice is to be treated as having been extended under section 5(2) on the same number of occasions (if any) as on which the overturned notice had been so extended (including any extension that was quashed).””
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move Motion A. Commons Amendments 18A to 18E, tabled by Her Majesty’s Government in lieu of your Lordships’ Amendment 18, would set a new upper limit of five years on the duration of a TPIM, in contrast to the four years proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
As I said on Report, the Government are pleased that your Lordships’ House has acknowledged the inadequacies of the current two-year time limit. On more than one occasion, it has resulted in a cliff edge, leaving dangerous individuals in the community without suitable risk management measures in place while a new TPIM was prepared.
We do not share the concerns that were raised in respect of the Bill’s original proposal to enable TPIMs to be renewed for as long as is necessary for public protection, which included lessening the incentive to prosecute subjects or the risk of individuals being warehoused. None the less, we recognise the clear strength of feeling expressed by your Lordships’ House that TPIMs should have a finite limit.
The Government believe that a five-year limit would be more effective than a four-year limit in supporting our operational partners’ efforts to manage the enduring risk that some subjects pose. This reflects our experience of operating the TPIM regime, as well as historical experience from control orders. As I have set out previously, during the lifespan of the control order regime, there were three individuals who were sufficiently dangerous to be subject to an order for between four and five years.
As well as further reducing the prospect of a cliff edge when the measure comes to an end, a five-year limit will also ensure that the other benefits of a TPIM can be maximised, including providing more time to rehabilitate the individual and, if necessary, identify alternative risk-management and disruption options. In cases of charismatic radicalisers, it will also provide additional time to degrade their networks and reduce the wider threat from others who may have been influenced by the subject, were it not for the TPIM measures.
I emphasise that it will not become routine practice for TPIMs to last five years. The Home Secretary will not hesitate to revoke a TPIM notice, to remove measures specified within the notice or to choose not to renew the notice when it is no longer necessary or proportionate. As we have discussed in detail, TPIMs will continue to be subject to regular scrutiny, including through quarterly and annual review meetings, and the judicial oversight that your Lordships have heard about will continue to be in place, providing for another layer of independent scrutiny.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Baroness Hamwee
Leave out from first “do” to the end and insert “insist on its Amendment 18 and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D and 18E in lieu.”
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
From these Benches, at previous stages of the Bill, we have explained to the House our opposition to the extension of TPIMs through the package of changes to the 2011 Act contained in Part 3 of the Bill. We acknowledge that the Bill is not quite as it arrived originally with us, in that “reasonable grounds for suspicion” has become “reasonable grounds for belief”—that is still a long way from the current balance of probabilities—and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation will have a duty to carry out annual reviews for five years. As the Minister confirmed at the last stage, that is what could be done in any event, without that amendment.
We indicated our views by a number of Divisions, as well as in debate, but it was only the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, with the authoritative support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that was agreed by your Lordships, reining back indefinite TPIMs to four years. That is the issue with us today.
As I said, Part 3 as it relates to TPIMs is a package. Its main components are the length of the TPIM, residence measures—in other words, detention—where that detention or residence is to be, and the curfew. Without limits on the period referred to at a previous stage by the Government as “enduring detention”, that would have amounted to indefinite house arrest, without trial let alone conviction, and on the basis of the Home Secretary having reasonable grounds for belief that there is or has been terrorism-related activity.
We saw, and still see, no need to extend TPIMs, a view taken by the current independent reviewer, and we have heard from the police that they had been unable to apply TPIMs as they needed. Of course, five years must be better in our view than detention without statutory limit. The Minister called it “more effective”. Obviously, it is a longer period, by definition, and so closer to the Government’s original indefinite proposal. I am a little taken aback by the suggestion that it is better because it allows more time for rehabilitation—this may not be the moment to go into what rehabilitation is made available and was proposed to be made available on an indefinite basis, or whatever basis. In any event, it is five years compared with four years or the original two years, which we debated, and compared with the period that noble Lords asked the Commons to consider.
The Minister said that it would not be routine and, happily, it cannot be routine, because there are some other safeguarding provisions in the original legislation. The Minister—I refer to the Minister in the Commons—said that this
“represents a reasonable compromise between a desire to set a reasonable limit on the maximum duration of TPIMs and protecting our fellow citizens”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/21; col. 714.]
There are a lot of points to debate within that sentence, but I shall not try your Lordships’ patience by rehearsing them or the arguments that I and other noble Lords, particularly my noble friends, have made during the course of this Bill. Five years sounds less like a compromise than acknowledging that to stick to no limit would cause the Government trouble at a point in the parliamentary Session when they really do not have time for it, coupled with a concern not to lose face, which I suppose is simply human, but there does not seem to have been a lot of intellectual rigour applied to the proposal that we now have.
The views of our Benches are clear: we have not changed our views, but we recognise the parliamentary realities. We do not support what the Government are doing, but we will not seek to divide the House today.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, behind today’s limited and so far rather civilised debate lies perhaps the most divisive and hard-fought civil liberties dispute of this century. In the frenzied weeks after 9/11, we saw the British answer to Guantanamo—a scheme of indefinite detention in Belmarsh prison at the behest of the Executive for foreign nationals who could be neither deported nor put on trial. When that scheme was declared by our highest court to discriminate unlawfully on grounds of nationality, the control order regime of 2005, applicable to British citizens also, was put in its place.
Control orders were replaced by the more liberal TPIMs regime in 2011, after intense debate within the coalition Government. Then the pendulum began to swing back: relocation of subjects was restored in 2015, and this Bill, as it was first presented to your Lordships, would have allowed these uniquely draconian measures, now including the possibility of daytime curfews, to be imposed indefinitely and on the basis of nothing more than a reasonable suspicion of involvement in activity only indirectly related to terrorism.
It is not fashionable to claim that the institutions of our liberal democracy are in good health but, on this occasion, I suggest that they have succeeded in their function of resolving strongly felt differences in public opinion decisively, firmly and in a rights-compliant manner. Let there be no mistake: the measures about to be passed into law are severe and indeed draconian, as public opinion no doubt demands. But it is at least something that a 20-year struggle to reconcile the requirements of security and civil liberties, a struggle in which Belmarsh, control orders and TPIMs have been on the very front line, has been reduced to a dry-sounding choice between Motion A and Motion A1 on the Marshalled List.
In supporting the Government on the compromise that is Motion A, I first acknowledge the consistency and moral force of the Liberal Democrat position. The addition of the fifth year to the maximum duration of a TPIM may have been the straw that broke their back, and, as I indicated to the Minister, it came close to breaking mine. However, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is consoled by the fact that during the passage of this Bill her party has helped to restore two of its earlier vital achievements in government: the time-limiting of TPIMs and the requirement of at least a reasonable belief that a TPIM subject should have been involved in terrorism-related activity.
I further thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for co-signing the relevant amendments, and the Labour Front Bench for their support and votes—not perhaps a foregone conclusion, given that it was Labour which devised the original control orders back in 2005. I thank the Government for the equal flexibility which they displayed when confronted with the mood of this House, for the important assurances given just now by the Minister, in particular for the assurance that five years will not become the new normal, and for the accessibility and courtesy of all Ministers towards me. On one call with the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Wolfson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, I was impressed to see that no less a figure than the noble Earl, Lord Howe, had also been fielded, presumably as a kind of sweeper in the event that any of his freshly capped young ministerial colleagues might be tempted to give away the ball. What drills are performed on the ministerial training ground I cannot know, but I mean it as a compliment to all concerned when I say that no intervention by the noble Earl came close to being needed.
I finish with a reference to the latest report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, published on Tuesday and not, I think, previously brought to the attention of your Lordships’ House. Of Jonathan Hall QC’s 13 recommendations across the whole field of counter-terrorism law, numbers 9, 10 and 11 relate specifically to TPIMs. He recommended that the possibility of prosecuting TPIM subjects, not for breach of their TPIMs but for terrorism-related activity, be kept under closer review than is currently the case. He recommended that the cumulative period for which TPIM restrictions had already applied be expressly recognised as a factor going to their proportionality. He also recommended that legal funding be swiftly made available to all TPIM subjects for the purpose of participating in Section 9 review hearings, as appears, most unfortunately, not to be the case currently. That is the bare minimum, as he rightly recognised, for ensuring the access to court that can alone render these highly intrusive measures consistent with the rule of law.
Each of the independent reviewer’s concerns, as expressed in those three recommendations, can only be deepened by the extension to the maximum length of TPIMs that will be effected by this Bill. The Minister will, I am sure, tell us that the recommendations of the independent reviewer will receive careful consideration. But the Home Office has already had them for more than four months, and I notified the Minister this morning of my intention to mention them. I invite the Minister to go further this afternoon, by assuring the House that the Government accept these recommendations and will implement them.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
My Lords, in view of the eloquent and comprehensive speech of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I can confine my remarks to three points. First, it seems to me that the position taken by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, must be right as a matter of principle. Both the areas which the House has examined in detail—namely the burden of proof required and the length of time—are essential for ensuring that this is a regime that does not disproportionately affect the fundamental right of liberty.
Secondly, the considerable importance of the current amendment is that we have moved away from the prospect of orders of an indefinite renewal period. Not only would those have been discouraging and demoralising to the individual and made it more difficult to ensure that he could, on removal of the TPIM, return as an ordinary member of society, but, as importantly, they would have been perceived as unfair by the community. The perception of fairness by the community safeguards us to a much more considerable extent than any other matters.
Thirdly, I profoundly welcome the pragmatic approach of the Minister, supported as he has been in this by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. It is wonderful that a proper compromise has been reached here and I thank them for their considerable part in bringing this about. It may not be perfect, but it gets rid of those areas that would have been most damaging to our civil liberties.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]
My Lords, at Second Reading, I made the point that it is very important that we restate the arguments for these draconian measures. I took the opportunity of talking to my son and others of his generation of young people in their early 20s about these measures which we take in our country. We had an interesting discussion about the proportionality of this and the right of a state to protect itself from potential terrorism. It is right that these arguments are revisited, as they are every year. It is a tribute to this House that many of the Peers who have taken part in these debates have a long-standing involvement in these issues—unlike me. It is, nevertheless, important that these arguments are remade, as they have been.
I too thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for their engagement; it was an interesting process. They also made it possible for me and other noble Lords to meet some of the experts in the Home Office who are dealing with these issues on a day-to-day basis. It was certainly instructive to meet the psychiatrists and psychologists who are involved in the various programmes that take place in prison and look at how TPIMs are managed outside prisons.
I also acknowledge that the Minister has made a concession in time-limiting TPIMs to five years. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put the point well—as she always does—about the principle of having a time limit rather than the issue running on indefinitely. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who was responsible for the introduction of the original control orders in 2005, has changed his view on this, in light of the change in circumstances and the growing learning of how to handle people who are potentially very dangerous. Although the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed four years, we of course accept the Minister’s counterproposal of a five-year limit.
I conclude by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. He has led us on this, in some ways, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who also has tremendous experience in this area. If I were to direct my son to read a speech, it would be the final one from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which is a very good summary of the situation we have arrived at and the considerations we have made in reaching this compromise.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate today and, indeed, throughout the Bill’s passage through your Lordships’ House. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, we have had some very civilised debates about some very important issues of civil liberties, and we are grateful for the tone in which they have been conducted, as well as for the points that they have covered. Noble Lords asked a few questions which I shall cover briefly.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, while this may not be the time to open the debate about rehabilitation, asked about rehabilitative measures. We have seen, under the current two-year time limit, the problem of TPIM subjects riding out their maximum two years without changing their extremist mindset and with an unwillingness to engage with rehabilitative measures. This is an issue that has been reported on by a former independent reviewer. This change will, we think, create a genuine incentive for the subject to demonstrate that they have rehabilitated themselves and that extending the TPIM notice is not necessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, raised the latest annual report by the current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, and some of the points he has recommended. He is right that the response will be considered and published in full in the usual way, but let me address the points he raised. On reviewing the case for prosecution, we welcome Mr Hall’s recommendation that the case for prosecution should be kept under review. The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill that prosecution is our preferred option and the best way to manage risk. As has been noted through our debates on the Bill, TPIMs are resource-intensive tools and often an option of last resort. Before a TPIM is imposed, Section 10 of the TPIM Act first requires that confirmation be provided by a senior police officer that there is insufficient evidence for a prosecution and, under Section 11, the Government “must keep under review” the necessity and proportionality of all TPIM notices. A key consideration at all TPIM review group meetings is whether there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution for terrorism-related activity or the breach of a TPIM measure.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, on the Minister’s last point, I am not sure it can be called consensus, but we recognise the realities. He compared the opportunity for rehabilitation under a potentially five-year regime with one of two years. I was comparing it with one of four, but that whole issue is one for another day, and I have no doubt we will come back to this before too long. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. We have recognised that the thinking among our Labour colleagues has developed somewhat. I am sorry that we have not been able to meet face-to-face to discuss all this.
The House benefits enormously from the experience and wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I so much agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about the importance of the attitude of the community that is affected—not in the same way, but nevertheless substantially affected—when a member of the community is made subject to a TPIM. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as ever, put the situation far better than I can, even though we arrive at different, very slightly different, conclusions. I thank the Minister, all his colleagues and the officials in the Home Office. This is not over as a matter that we will be keeping our eyes on, because the country has to. I beg leave to withdraw Motion A1.
Royal Assent
Thursday 29th April 2021
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 12 March 2021 - (12 Mar 2021)