Tuesday 21st July 2020
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberCounter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 View all Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 July 2020 - large font accessible version - (21 Jul 2020)
17:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 189 / Noes: 335 - Question accordingly negatived.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. I am terribly sorry, but we have to move on now.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
Many hon. Members today have reminded the House that our first duty as Members of Parliament is public protection. The very moving contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), and the story of her friend, Louise, who was caught up in the terrible terrorist atrocity of 7 July 2005, very powerfully reminds us of that. On that awful day, 52 members of the public were murdered and 784 were injured.
We have heard powerful testimony from other Members who have had personal, first-hand experience of terrorism, including the hon. Members for North Down (Stephen Farry) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), whose family members suffered at the hands of terrorist murders. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) said that in her professional career prior to coming to this place, she had first-hand experience of the victims of terrorism. That testimony should remind us how important our duty is. By taking this Bill through Report stage, we are discharging that duty to our constituents.
It is worth pausing to say how constructive the discussion on this issue has been, on a cross-party basis, on the Floor of the House here today and previously at Second Reading and in Committee. It is an example of this House and our political system working at its best. Members from all sides of the House can be very proud of the way we have conducted the debate on this extremely important Bill.
Let me turn now to some of the comments raised by colleagues this afternoon, starting of course with my opposite number, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), who gave a characteristically detailed speech opening the proceedings. He started by commenting on new clause 1 on the probation service, which stands in his name and those of his hon. Friends.
Let me just take the opportunity to reassure him and other Members, once again, that probation service resources were significantly increased in the spending review last September. Moreover, earlier this year, counter-terrorism police resources were increased by £90 million and we are in the process of doubling counter-terrorist specialist probation officers, in addition to those very large numbers who have been given special training.
In addition, we are deepening multi-agency public protection arrangements. We are also establishing a counter-terrorism step-up programme, so I believe our work in the probation sphere is something all of us can take great confidence in.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is right to mention the additional funds and so on that have been forthcoming, and we very much welcome them, but we have a probation service in crisis. Would he like to comment specifically on the fact that there is a high sickness rate and a 10% vacancy rate? How on earth can they do their job properly if we do not have sufficient of them?
Chris Philp
Numbers in the prison and probation service have been increasing over the past few years. As I said, a great deal of extra money was provided in September last year, and that will most certainly have a further positive impact.
I move on to new clause 2, which the hon. Gentleman also commented on, and the question of deradicalisation. We heard evidence in the Public Bill Committee on 30 June, which some Members will recall, from Professor Andrew Silke, Professor of Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield University. He told us that, overall, he thinks that the UK’s approach to deradicalisation,
“is seen as one of the better available approaches…internationally”. ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2020; c. 84, Q175.]
That is, again, something we can take great confidence and pride in. Initiatives such as the healthy identity intervention programme, which Professor Silke expanded on at some length, are very effective. That is one of the reasons why reoffending rates for these terrible terrorist offences are only between 5% and 10%.
The shadow Minister asked about financial impact. I confirm, once again, that the cumulative impact on the total prison population will be less than 50 prison places, and the cumulative impact on the probation service will never be more than 50 places. To put that in context, there are about 80,000 people in prison and about a quarter of a million people on probation. On the financial impact, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned, the figure he had in mind may not have been quite accurate. The financial impact, according to the impact assessment, is a one-off cost of £4.2 million at the outset, followed by £900,000 a year thereafter, because these numbers, thankfully, are so small.
Jim Shannon
The Minister and everyone in the House will be aware that there have been three attacks in the last eight months carried out by those who were in prison and came out. Does the Minister feel that the investment that the Government are giving here will help to address that issue and will reduce those things happening, which is what we all want to see?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I believe that the measures that we are taking in the Bill, the additional resources given to counter-terrorism policing and the changes we made back in February in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 will provide exactly the protection he is asking for against ruthless terrorists of the kind he is describing.
On the question of reviews, which new clauses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 speak to, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker) pointed out, we already have quite a large number of reviews under way. There is the MAPPA review, being conducted by Jonathan Hall QC. There is, of course, Her Majesty’s inspectorates of prisons and probation, which produce frequent reports themselves. There is the Prevent review, which we will debate in the second group of amendments and, of course, there is the standard three-year review after legislation. With great respect, I think we have a lot of reviews going on. The numbers involved with this legislation are small, and I feel that it will be more than adequately reviewed by the mechanisms I just laid out.
Young people have been mentioned by many Members, in connection with new clause 6 and other clauses. The Bill recognises that those under the age of 18 are different, and no new minimum sentence is applied to them. It is up to the judge to decide in each case, and according to individual circumstances, what is the appropriate sentence for someone under the age of 18. There is a great deal of judicial discretion, for all the reasons laid out by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and others.
I understand the arguments that have been advanced about the ability to reform and rehabilitate those over the age of 18, and possibly extending that into the early 20s, but the cohort of offenders that we are addressing this afternoon is, thankfully, very small—a handful of offenders between the ages of 18 and 21 who have committed offences of extraordinary seriousness. These are terrorist offences where a life sentence can be imposed, where a judge has made a finding of dangerousness based on the facts and a pre-sentence report, and where a risk of causing multiple deaths was present. Given that small but serious number of offenders, I think a 14-year mandatory minimum sentence is appropriate. Rarely, there is the ability for judges to find exceptional circumstances, but when offences are that serious, it is right to take that action and protect the public. There may be other debates to have another time about how quickly people mature and how we should account for that, but for that small and dangerous cohort it is neither the time nor the place to advance that argument.
On legislative consent motions, I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West for her comments about Government amendments 9 to 16, and the changes made to orders for lifelong restriction. She properly raised that matter in Committee, and we fully acknowledged the points that she and her colleagues made, and are delighted to fix the issue this afternoon. On the application of polygraphs in Scotland, as she said, we are in discussion with the Scottish Government. We are edging ever closer to a point of blissful—I almost said “blissful union”—perhaps I should say “blissful unity” to avoid aggravating the question. We are edging towards a position of blissful agreement, and I hope we reach that in the near future.
Some Members questioned the use of polygraphs more generally. We took extremely compelling, and at times entertaining evidence from Professor Grubin, who is a worldwide expert in this area. Contrary to what one Member said, polygraphs are not untested, and 5,000 such tests have been used in connection with sex offenders in England and Wales. In between 60% and 70% of cases, the use of a polygraph elicits information that would not otherwise have come out. That is either because the offender volunteers it—they know a polygraph is going to be used and they volunteer information that they would not otherwise have provided—or because it prompts a negative reading and a follow-up investigation can occur.
I emphasise that nobody is recalled to prison as a result of a negative polygraph test, and nor are they deemed to have breached their licence conditions. It simply prompts further investigation, and while not always accurate, such tests have been found to be useful in prompting that disclosure or further investigation. In that context, I draw the House’s attention to one of the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall’s notes on this topic. On 4 June, paragraph 23, he stated:
“I therefore concluded that polygraph testing is likely to be a valuable additional means of gathering information relevant to terrorist risk for terrorist offenders on licence.”
Jonathan Hall thinks that polygraph tests are an effective and good idea.
On Northern Ireland, the hon. Members for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), for Strangford and for North Down raised the question of applying the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 provisions retrospectively to Northern Ireland. The UK Government believe that that is a lawful thing to do—that it does not infringe article 7 or any common law principles. We believe that terrorism measures are reserved and that we should treat the United Kingdom in those matters as one, but they do engage parts of the LCM mechanism, and we are therefore in detailed discussions with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister, Naomi Long. I had an hour-long conversation with her earlier this week and, again, we hope to make progress on that point in the coming week or so; I think she will come back to me in the very near future. I stress that these provisions affect terrorist prisoners on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland equally. They do not seek to penalise or victimise any one side or the other; they apply equally, and I ask Members to keep that important point in mind.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) on the Opposition Front Bench. I have a lot of sympathy with what he said, and I hope the Minister will address the points he made, because we want to be constructive. We all support the overall thrust of the Bill, but my concern, as Chair of the Justice Committee, is that we do not do anything—albeit inadvertently and for good reasons—that undermines the checks and balances that are a normal part of the criminal process.
That is why the change in the burden of proof in relation to TPIMs needs more justification put behind it. Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, is highly regarded in this field, and the Minister has quoted him with approbation on a number of occasions. In this instance, he does not regard the case as being made out. If the Minister takes a different view, with respect, we need something more substantial as to why that is the case. There may be good reasons, but it cannot be done on a purely speculative basis. It cannot be on the basis that it may be useful to have this wider test. It might engage some people outside the jurisdiction in ways that we cannot currently in terms of gathering evidence and intelligence, but that case has to be made. Having voted on two occasions to increase the burden of proof to where it currently is, I would like to have a pretty clear sense that there is a compelling reason for reversing those decisions—and there may be, but I think the Minister owes it to us to set that out, and we need Mr Hall to set out why he comes to a different view. We may be persuadable, but it is important that the case is made and that the House understands that.
I accept that there is an overall three-year time limit on the working of the Bill, but I am concerned that, without a time limit, the TPIM will become the default mechanism and more like a control order. We surely all ought to recognise that, wherever possible—wherever proper, admissible evidence can be obtained and proceedings can be safely and securely brought—if people have done the vile things that we are talking about, which pose a real criminal threat to the security of this country and its people, the normal and proper course ought to be to prosecute through the normal due process. An alternative means of dealing with this should only be undertaken in the most exceptional circumstances. I can see that there may sometimes be such circumstances, but again, that case needs to be spelt out.
The third issue that I wish quickly to deal with is polygraphs. The Law Society takes the view that the suggestion of the use of polygraphs in some of these circumstances is more to persuade people psychologically —that is the phrase it uses in its briefing—against breaching the orders. That may be valuable in itself, but we ought to be wary of the limits of polygraphs’ usefulness. There are mixed views in academic, scientific and legal circles about the reliability of polygraphs. I do not have a fixed view about them, but I think we should approach their use with caution and proportionality.
Sir Robert Neill
I am always happy to give way to my hon. Friend and near neighbour.
Chris Philp
My hon. Friend and south London neighbour is kind for giving way. Let me reassure him on his point about the limits of polygraphs. We understand and accept that they have limits, which is why a negative polygraph result on its own can never result in a recall to prison or licence conditions being deemed to have been broken. All a negative polygraph result could do is prompt further investigation by other means, which I hope provides him with the reassurance he seeks.
Sir Robert Neill
That is a very helpful reassurance for today’s purposes, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the Minister said that. It is an important point, and I am glad that he takes this on board. Sometimes, for the best of reasons, there can be a mission creep with these measures, which could lead to a broader spread of their use in the criminal justice system, and that would be a matter of concern. If he says that the use is very specific, I accept his word on that, but it is important that we continue to keep this under review and do not have unintended mission creep. As we all know, it is often easy to present perfectly benign and reasonable reasons for doing something that departs from the normal checks and balances, but it then becomes entrenched and permanent and spreads.
In that spirit, I take the Minister’s assurance, but he will understand why it is important that that issue is debated and that reassurances are given that the overall integrity of the justice system will not be affected by these changes. That has dealt quickly with the issues that I sought to raise. It was perhaps a record brevity, but I hope that brevity does not reduce the import of the issues raised.
Chris Philp
I thank the Members who have contributed to a very thought-provoking debate this afternoon. I would like to reply, if I may, to some of the points that have been raised. I will start with the first question raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), about a lone actor review—new clause 8. I know he has had what I hope was a lengthy and fruitful conversation with the Minister for Security earlier today. He will of course be aware that the Prevent review we have been talking about touches on this, but the MAPPA review will also significantly engage with this topic.
I have been endeavouring to obtain a firm date for publication during the last few minutes. I am afraid the best I can do from this Dispatch Box at the moment is to say that it will be soon—as soon as practical. I hope it will be within the timeframe the hon. Gentleman was asking for, but I am afraid I cannot give him a precise date. However, it is imminent, and we will do it as soon as we possibly can. I believe the MAPPA review will cover many of the issues that the shadow Minister has been raising in relation to the lone actor threat that he and his colleagues have been discussing.
Let me turn to the substantive questions about TPIMs that arose both this afternoon and in Committee. Let me start with what the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) termed the business case or the operational case: why are we proposing to lower the burden of proof? The hon. Members for St Helens North and for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the same question.
The best answer I can give the House to that question—what is the business case for changing the burden of proof?—is the evidence given to the Bill Committee by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, one of the national counter-terrorism policing leads, who had been briefed by the security services prior to giving his evidence. In his evidence, which is available in Hansard, he gave us three reasons why a lower burden of proof—a reasonable suspicion—would be better and would protect the public. The first reason he gave is that, where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing, there may not be time to establish the higher burden of proof before a threat or a risk materialises. Secondly, he said that where somebody is returning from abroad—for example, from Syria—it is very hard to establish an evidential base that, on the balance of probability, someone has been involved in terror-related activity because, by definition, getting evidence from somewhere like Syria it is very hard, if not impossible. The third reason he gave was where sensitive material needs to be relied on: disclosing that material to get to the balance of probability would potentially endanger sources—confidential sources—and it is clearly easier to get to the reasonable suspicion standard without disclosing the material. Those are the three reasons he gave. [Interruption.]
To pre-empt the intervention that I sense the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West is brewing, I accept that it is true historically—looking back—that there has not been an occasion on which the security services wanted to give a TPIM but could not do so because of the burden of proof. There is no such historical example, and I freely concede the point. I suspect that was the topic of the intervention. [Interruption.] Sort of. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) said in an intervention, we have to deal in this House not just with what has happened in the past but with what might happen in the future.
We have been clearly advised by Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, and through him by the security services, that this measure is necessary to protect the public. When the assistant chief constable gave evidence on 25 June, I asked him explicitly whether the lower standard of proof would make the public safer. He answered, categorically, that yes it would.
Joanna Cherry
The Minister anticipates my objection, so perhaps I can refer him to what the assistant chief constable said in response to me during the evidence session on 25 June. I asked:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
and he replied:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
Chris Philp
As I said, I accept that. There have not been any historical cases where the standard of proof has been a blocker, but we have been categorically advised by the security services, speaking through Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, that it might occur, and that these proposals will make the public safer. He said that categorically, and I do not think that the House could, or should, disregard such clear advice. In relation to Jonathan Hall’s comments, I suspect that he may not have heard the evidence that I read out. He gave evidence to the Committee immediately before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. His evidence was new to the House and to Parliament, and we did not have it on Second Reading. We do have it now, however, and we should have careful regard to it.
A number of Members raised questions about civil liberties, and not wishing to intrude on an individual’s freedom, and I will directly address those points. I will do so with reference to the original Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. By lowering the burden of proof, we are changing only one of five limbs. The other four limbs remain exactly as they are, and one of those, laid out in section 3 of that Act, states that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider whether the TPIM is “necessary”—I use that word carefully—for purposes connected with protecting members of the public. Subsection (4), condition D, states that the Secretary of State must consider whether a TPIM is
“necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity,”
That test of necessity goes far beyond the reasonable suspicion referred to in the first limb. The requirement for necessity is unchanged.
The hon. Member for St Albans said that this measure could be introduced on a Minister’s whim, and that a Minister could impose a TPIM with the sweep of a pen. I say to her gently, however, that that is not the case and there are judicial safeguards in the 2011 Act. For example, section 6 of that Act states that when a TPIM notice is given, the Secretary of State must go to the court and make an application, and the court has to verify or validate that the TPIM is reasonable, and certify that it is not “obviously flawed”. There is judicial certification.
Section 16 of the 2011 Act provides for a right to appeal. If the subject of a TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, or that the TPIM is unjustified, they can apply to the court in a process akin to a judicial review, and apply to have it overturned. There are judicial safeguards to protect individuals from unreasonable actions by the Government.
In the many years that TPIMs have been in operation since 2011, and in the six years when control orders were in place from 2005, the numbers used have been small. There were never more than about 15 to 20 control orders in force at any one time, and we heard evidence that as of today only six TPIMs are in force. That is a very small number, as they are used only in exceptional circumstances. When I asked Jonathan Hall whether he believed that any Government, including the previous Labour Government or the more recent Conservative Government, had ever abused the power provided by TPIMs or control orders, he answered that no, he was not aware of any such abuse. I would add that a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, has expressed support for the measures in this Bill.
Let me turn to the issue of time and how extendable TPIMs are. They currently expire after two years. We propose to make them extendable in one-year increments, as were the old control orders passed by the then Labour Government and indeed supported by some Members in this House this afternoon. We heard evidence from Jonathan Hall that there was risk where a TPIM ended after two years, as there could be a gap. He knew of two real cases where that occurred, with a gap of one year in one case and a gap of 16 months in the other before a new TPIM could be obtained. That is because we have to get fresh evidence; we cannot rely on the old evidence and we have to wait for somebody to do something wrong again to give us the grounds to renew the TPIM. Max Hill, when he was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in 2017, said that some terrorists were “biding time” waiting for the TPIM to simply time out.
In fairness to the last Labour Government, even though the previous control orders could be extended year by year, in practice most of them were not: 30 of them were for less than two years; eight were for between two and three years; four were for between three and four years; and only three extended for between four and five years. Again, the subject can apply for judicial review if they think the TPIM extension is unfair, so a judicial protection is in place.
I have two quick final points to make. In terms of prosecution, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst asked about, there is a duty under section 10 of the 2011 Act that requires the Secretary of State to seek prosecution where appropriate. On Prevent, let me say that the statutory obligation to carry out the Prevent review remains. There have been some delays, because the independent reviewer had to be replaced and then we had the coronavirus pandemic. Our commitment to do it remains in statute. Obviously, specifying a date caused a problem before, and we do not want to repeat that mistake. We hope and expect that this will be done by August of next year, but we feel that, given the experience of the recent past, putting that date in the Bill would simply be setting a bear trap. So I hope that I have laid out the case for resisting these amendments.
Conor McGinn
In the brief time available, I wish, first, to thank the Minister for addressing some of the concerns we have raised, not just today on Report, but through a thorough examination of the Bill in Committee. Although Labour Members wholeheartedly support robust action to keep our country and our citizens safe, and to tackle terrorism and its causes, it is the duty of any responsible Opposition to examine fully the Government’s proposals. I feel that we have done that, with the assistance of Scottish National party and Liberal Democrat Members, those from other parties in the House, and colleagues on the Back Benches.
The Minister and the Government should listen carefully to the very personal testimony given by my hon. Friends the Members for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana) and for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and indeed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott). Although I might not have agreed with her on every crossed t or dotted i, or even on whole words or sentences on occasion, she does speak with the voice of years of experience in this House and a commitment to these issues. She also, like Members who spoke from these Benches, speaks authoritatively and with great passion on behalf of the constituencies and communities she represents. The Government should listen to them, which was why I made the points I did about the importance of not only getting this Prevent review right but getting on with it, to give the clarity and confidence needed, and to address some of the challenges and controversies associated with it.
I was hoping that we might receive a commitment from the Government to publish their MAPPA— multi-agency public protection arrangements—review before we got to consideration in the House of Lords, because it is important, given the removal of the statutory deadline for Prevent and given that the Opposition have proposed a review on lone actors, to have some timeframe on that. I appreciate and understand that the Minister has made valiant efforts to do that, but I regret that it has not been forthcoming to date. I hope that in considering the request for a review on lone actors, the Government understand that we do so in a constructive spirit.
Chris Philp
The Lord Chancellor has appeared, as if by magic, behind the Speaker’s Chair and has indicated to me by eloquent gesticulation that the MAPPA review will indeed be published before the consideration of the Bill in the other place.
Conor McGinn
I thank the Lord Chancellor and the Minister for that commitment. The robust exchanges we have had have been in the context and spirit of working constructively on a Bill of huge importance, which is concerned with keeping our country and its citizens safe. Our proposals for that review are in keeping with that view. We await to see what the MAPPA review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation comes forward with. Colleagues in the other place will no doubt wish to scrutinise that. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4
Serious terrorism sentence for adults aged under 21: England and Wales
Amendment proposed: 30, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
“(7) The pre-sentence report must —
(a) take account of the offender’s age;
(b) consider whether options other than a serious terrorism sentence might be more effective at—
(i) reducing the risk of serious harm to members of the public, or
(ii) rehabilitating the offender.
(8) The court must take account of any points made by the pre-sentence report in relation to the matters in subsection (7) and consider whether they constitute exceptional circumstances under subsection (2).”.—(Alex Cunningham.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
May I take this opportunity to thank hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their careful scrutiny of the Bill thus far? I am very grateful to everyone who contributed to the debate on Second Reading, in Committee and today on Report. I would especially like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), whose impassioned speech regarding her friend Louise, who was caught up in the horrors of the 7/7 bombings 15 years ago this month, reminded us of the importance of the work we are doing here. I am particularly grateful for the co-operative and constructive spirit in which these debates have taken place, and for the broad support received for the Bill so far. That, I think, is testament to the fact that Members recognise overall the intent and purpose of the legislation, which are to protect the public and to keep our country safe. Those are the first and foremost duties of any Government.
There have been some differing opinions on certain measures in the Bill. They have enriched the debate and deepened our understanding of not just the intention behind the measures, but current practice. We have heard questions about the changes we are making to terrorism prevention and investigation measure notices—or TPIMs, as we know them. Let me say to the House that prosecution, or deportation in the case of foreign nationals, will always be our preference for dealing with terrorists, but there will continue to be a small number of cases where, despite the best efforts of the police and security services, that will not be possible. In those circumstances, TPIMs remain a vital risk management tool. A lower standard of proof will allow for TPIMs to be considered for use in a wider variety of cases and will better protect the covert sources and methods that are vital to the investigation of terrorist threat.
The Home Secretary considers very carefully the intelligence held by our security services, as well as consulting the police on the case for prosecution, before deciding whether a TPIM is necessary and proportionate. The Government have no desire to keep individuals on a TPIM any longer than is necessary and proportionate to protect the public. Removing the two-year time limit for a TPIM ensures that where subjects pose an enduring risk, we will be better placed to restrict and prevent their involvement in terrorism-related activity for as long as is necessary.
Further safeguards will remain in place. The courts will be able to consider permission hearings on whether the decision to impose a TPIM was obviously flawed and prevent the Home Secretary from doing so where that is the case. Subjects will continue to have a right to appeal any decision to extend the TPIM or vary any of its measures. The quarterly TPIM review group meetings will continue to provide regular oversight of every TPIM, including reviewing its ongoing necessity, whether prosecution is a possibility, and, indeed, the exit strategy for the subject of the measure.
Some concerns have been expressed about the removal of the statutory deadline for completing the independent review of Prevent. I must emphasise that the commitment to completing that important review continues and will remain in statute. We want the review into our strategy for safeguarding those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism to be completed as soon as possible, but we also wanted to run a full and open competition to appoint a new reviewer and to attract as broad a range of applicants as possible. Designing and running that process takes time, and I want to ensure that the new reviewer has an opportunity to decide how best to run the next phase of the review and has enough time to analyse the evidence, develop robust recommendations and, critically, can engage as openly, fully and widely as possible with communities, civil society and others. That will all take time if it is to be done properly, and we cannot fully predict whether events might have a further impact on the timings of that review, particularly in the context of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic, which, frankly, could present further practical challenges to how it could be conducted over the coming months. We should therefore avoid the risk of removing the reviewer’s ability to respond to and mitigate those events both foreseeable and unforeseeable.
For those reasons, while I fully understand the desire to put a new deadline in the Bill, there would, in my judgment, be a significant risk in doing so. It could have the unintended consequence of reducing the impact of this vital review, which I know Members across the House do not wish to do. We should not confuse our desire to give the reviewer the flexibility and time they will need with any question about a lack of commitment to it. I say again to the House that we want it to be completed along with a Government response as quickly as possible, and certainly no later than August of next year.
There has been much debate and discussion about the Bill’s provisions relating to polygraph testing, and I recall a lot of interest in the media when we announced the Bill and its details. I would like to be clear about what these measures seek to achieve and what they do not do. First, on their efficacy, the Committee heard compelling and detailed evidence from Professor Grubin, a leading expert in this field, who has attested to their reliability and their value. They are well established in this country already, having been used thousands of times on sex offenders, and they have been independently evaluated. Secondly, on their purpose, they are an additional risk management tool that can allow probation officers to test compliance with other licence conditions. They are not there to catch offenders out, and the results will most certainly not be used in criminal proceedings against the offender. We have already shown our intention to introduce polygraph testing elsewhere for use with domestic abusers, so we are not taking a novel approach for terrorist offenders. It is another way in which we can help to protect the public.
Finally on this issue, we recognise that they are currently used only in England and Wales, which is why the polygraph provisions relating to terrorist offenders on licence will not come into effect automatically. We will continue to work with Ministers in the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to provide advice and support to put the necessary infrastructure in place before polygraph testing can be conducted there. I am grateful for the continued co-operation of those devolved Administrations. I recognise the complexity and sensitivities of legislating across three jurisdictions’ sentencing frameworks. Right hon. and hon. Members have indeed reminded us of the need to tread carefully, and we do so. I would like to give reassurance that the Government are committed to ensuring that the measures in the Bill can work effectively throughout our United Kingdom, but I do not apologise for the determination, because we have to ensure our citizens are safe from terrorist offending whether committed in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland
I will pause at this moment to thank all those members of the Bill team who have worked so hard to bring the Bill to this stage. Most notably, I am profoundly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) for his stewardship both on Report and in Committee. Indeed I thank all the team both in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office—some of whom are in the Box today—for working collaboratively together. They have served Ministers and indeed the House diligently when it comes to the need to marshal all the clauses in a way that could withstand the most appropriate and thorough scrutiny. I am grateful to them, and I am happy to put it put that on the record here rather than via a point of order, which I think I did on a previous occasion when you were in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for that, too.
The United Kingdom has one of the strongest counter-terrorism systems in the world, but we continue to face a terrorist threat in this country that is complex, and that is diverse and rapidly changing. The House has rightly noted the growing threat that we face from right- wing extremists. Since 2017 we have foiled 25 terrorist plots, including eight plots planned by right-wing extremists, but we are not complacent. We have already established a joint extremism unit to strengthen the partnership of work across the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Of course, there is much more to do, and there will regrettably always be unfinished business.
We are on track to recruit an additional 20,000 police officers to boost frontline capability. That is why we have increased the budget for counter-terrorism policing by £90 million this year, compared with last, taking the overall CT police funding to over £900 million, and we are developing an ambitious programme to strengthen joint working between our police and our security services, which will leave terrorists with no place to hide.
As I have said on many occasions and will continue to say, public protection is our first duty. The comprehensive package of measures introduced in the Bill, on top of the investment that we are making and the programme we are putting in place, demonstrates, I firmly believe, our deep and enduring commitment to that duty.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I rise only briefly to state my strong support for the Bill. I should declare that prior to my election, I was the magistrate member of the Sentencing Council and a non-executive director of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. Accordingly, I was honoured to be a member of the Public Bill Committee for this legislation.
As we have heard several times during the debates on the Bill, the overarching responsibility of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and one of the five set out purposes of sentencing is to protect the public, and that is rightly the priority of the Bill. Terrorist attacks cause carnage, murdering indiscriminately and injuring wantonly. The Bill sends a very powerful message to those who seek to bring terror to the lives of innocent people. It demonstrates the contempt in which we hold those who seek to kill and maim to further their warped ideologies. A minimum sentence of 14 years to be spent entirely in custody is a clear signal that if someone commits a serious offence linked to terrorism, they can expect to spend a hefty proportion of their life locked up, and rightly so.
I, too, am a firm believer in rehabilitation, and the Prison Service has worked incredibly hard to devise and implement deradicalisation programmes, but I think most people would acknowledge that there is considerable scope for further improvement. Several times during the Committee’s evidence sessions, we were told that the reoffending rate of terrorists is low—perhaps just 3% —somehow implying that we therefore do not need such lengthy sentences as proposed in the Bill, but that surely misses the point. Even one terrorist reoffending is one too many, because even one terrorist attack can kill hundreds of people. In cases of terrorism, we cannot take risks.
The Bill also sends a strong message to the public that this Government are absolutely committed to protecting lives and minimising the chance of terrorist attacks taking place. The changes to TPIMs reflect the needs of the Security Service to have every tool to keep us safe. When Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques, the deputy senior national co-ordinator in the UK’s counter-terrorism policing, gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, he stated:
“Protecting the public is our No. 1 priority and sometimes that means we have to intervene regardless of evidence, because the risks to the public are so great.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 26, Q69.]
Our priority must be to support our Security Service and police in the heroic work they do day in, day out, often at considerable danger to themselves in their constant quest to thwart would-be terrorists from wreaking their havoc. We owe it to them to give them what they need to keep us safe.
Finally, it is vitally important that the courts take immediate note if and when the Bill is passed. I hope that sentencing guidelines can be introduced quickly to reflect the clear will of all sides of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison.
Robert Buckland
On that point, my hon. Friend will be assured to know that the Sentencing Council is putting work in train in any event to revise the terrorism guidelines and this Bill, should it become law, will no doubt form part of its work.
Rob Butler
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for reassuring me of that. I know from having served on the Sentencing Council that its members will diligently proceed with their efforts. That work will surely reflect, as I was saying, the clear will of Parliament to ensure that dangerous terrorist offenders spend more time in prison, to give greater opportunity for rehabilitation, to reflect the seriousness of their crime and, most importantly, to protect the British people.
Robert Buckland
I think it would be the right thing to do to allow our hon. Friend to compose himself for a moment as he remembers and shares with the House the horror of the effects of terrorism. We remain indebted to him and are always grateful to him for sharing his observations and we entirely understand how he must feel when he is reliving those moments.
Jim Shannon
I thank the Secretary of State very much for intervening. I do recall John Birch, Steven Smart, Michael Adams and Lance Corporal Bradley. I often think of the families of those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and of those who were injured. We owe so much to those families. Every MP in this House has a responsibility to keep their constituents safe, as others have said, which we all adhere to and I thank them for that. Today, our Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who, I have to say, I am very impressed by—I mean that honestly—and also the Secretary of State have come in here and ensured that the protection of all the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been cemented in legislation, and I thank them for that. We welcome the Government’s commitment and we thank all in the Committee for their work and the Clerks for their administration to deliver the Bill. Madam Deputy Speaker, thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.