Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Scotland Office
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in order to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences when they are imposed consecutively to other sentences, we introduced several amendments in Committee. Following these changes, we are now making a series of minor, technical amendments to provide further clarification and to ensure that the legislation will operate as intended.
The amendments have a variety of complementary effects but, taken together, they ensure that new Section 1B, which was introduced in Committee, operates effectively within the Scottish jurisdiction. Given the complexity of the amendments, we have continued to consider their effect with the Scottish Government, resulting in these final amendments, which have been agreed by all parties.
Many of the amendments simply insert the relevant terminology into the new clauses and deliver consequential changes to ensure the smooth operation of Section 1B. The overall effect is to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period when they are serving multiple sentences, including for non-terrorism offences, and that offenders who receive multiple sentences for terrorist offences—and therefore multiple licences—will serve only one, aggregated licence period.
I draw your Lordships’ attention specifically to Amendment 31, which ensures that the sentence calculation provided for in Section 1B will apply retrospectively. This will provide clarity in calculating release dates where sentences for both terrorism and non-terrorism offences are imposed, ensuring the effective application of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in all cases.
Should noble Lords wish to see an individual breakdown of these amendments and their effect, I would be happy to place in the Library a letter in terms similar to the one I issued following Committee to explain the purpose of each one. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.
Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.
I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.
We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.
I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the time he has given to speak about this Bill and for government amendment 14 on the burden of proof. I welcome the change of heart in that respect.
As to the other area on the potential length of TPIMs, I very much hope that the Minister will accept what is essentially the compromise in Amendment 16 between indefinite periods for TPIMs and the current period. It seems to me that the gap that divides us is not that great. TPIMs can be imposed not merely because criminal conduct is suspected, but also because of activities that may not be criminal. It is imposed by the Executive. Although, of course, there is a right of review to the court, a right of review is very different from the decision of a court or independent tribunal in deciding whether the grounds exist.
It is therefore important to appreciate that the very significant restrictions on liberty are imposed by the Executive, something generally alien to our tradition. It would be even more alien to our tradition to go to the extent of enabling the Executive to impose such a restriction for an indefinite period of time. Such restrictions should only be available on people’s liberty where people are convicted of serious criminal offences. Quite apart from the humanitarian and liberty and traditional aspects of that argument, there is the further argument which I raised, and will not repeat, on Second Reading: namely, indefinite orders can, as experience has shown, give people a loss of hope, and in effect make them more dangerous and less susceptible to being reformed.
The compromise that we have put forward in this amendment is further emphasised by the fact that of course if there is new evidence of activity during the period, the four years is not an absolute cut off.
Finally, there is a great deal of sense in having a cut-off period. It is very easy for any decision-maker, particularly one who is worried about the consequences of not extending the TPIM, to go on extending and extending it. It is very wasteful of resources, because enforcing a TPIM is very expensive. It is also fundamentally unfair that someone should be subject to a decision that can go on being rolled over indefinitely rather than someone—to put it in the vernacular—having to put up and charge with an offence or to shut up.
I very much hope that the Minister will think again about the compromise offered in this amendment and accept it.
My Lords, this group deals with changes to TPIMs. The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, someone who has unique access to secret intelligence, operational partners and government officials, has previously stated that the changes proposed in the Bill to the TPIM regime were not necessary. We agree, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger so powerfully set out in his speech.
In relation to Clause 34, the current independent reviewer says that he is not aware of any case where operational partners had wanted to impose a TPIM but were unable to do so because the burden of proof was too high, as confirmed by the representative of operational partners in the Bill Committee in the other place.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, appears to be right that the legislation in its current form does not place express limits on the use of information obtained from a polygraph for the purpose of extending a TPIM, yet my enthusiasm for Amendment 20 is limited. The reality is that TPIMs can be made and extended on the basis of a wide range of intelligence fragments, some of which may be little more than straws in the wind. It may none the less be important to take such matters into account. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomb and the ambiguous and potentially unreliable intelligence that, as I reported at the time, might, if it had been interpreted in a different way, have resulted in some sort of pre-emptive action.
An intelligence picture is typically a complex mosaic of multiple indications and assessments, of which polygraph material, depending on the circumstances, will not necessarily be the least reliable component. While it seems to me both unlikely and undesirable that a TPIM would ever be extended predominantly on the basis of polygraph material, I am wary of Parliament seeking to dictate the relative weight that is to be given to different sources of intelligence. The Executive and the courts are the bodies with expertise in this area, and I suspect that we should leave it to them.
I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about Amendment 19, which seems not without merit.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained Amendments 19 and 20 to the House, and it would serve little purpose to repeat that as we will not be dividing the House on them.
As my noble friend has said, compulsory polygraph tests for those convicted on licence from prison are one thing, but such tests for those not convicted of any offence, who have a right to silence when being questioned, is quite another. It is a long-established principle that a suspect in criminal proceedings should be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Clause 38 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement for an individual subject to a TPIM to participate in polygraph sessions and to comply with instructions given to the individual by the polygraph operator. Although any statement made by the individual while participating in the polygraph session cannot be used against them in any proceedings for an offence, a failure to answer questions could be taken as contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice—that is, to comply with the instructions of the polygraph operator, so, in this case, the instruction to answer questions. Remaining silent during a polygraph session could therefore be an offence under Section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, for which the individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
If the person is convicted of a terrorism offence and is on licence and subject to a TPIM—unlikely but possible—it would be possible for them to be subjected to polygraph tests under Clause 32 of this Bill, and a failure to answer questions in those circumstances would be a breach of the licence. While we have reservations about that, we do not object to it being part of the Bill. However, if the person is not convicted and is subject to a TPIM, they have the right to silence and to be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Potentially being imprisoned for five years for failing to answer questions during a polygraph session is an adverse consequence, and we therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on whether Clause 38 should be part of the Bill.
My Lords, the effect of the Bill at the moment is that a condition of a TPIM can be that the subject takes a polygraph test, and that a failure to do that could be a breach of the TPIM’s provisions. Amendment 21 raises the question of whether that should be part of a potential TPIM. In answering that question, it is important to try to find out what the Government have in mind regarding the use of that provision. First, to what extent do they regard polygraph answers as reliable? There is a general view that they cannot be taken on their own. What is the Government’s view on that?
Secondly, will the Government introduce a code of practice, as envisaged by Amendment 19? If so, could they give some indication of what that would contain? In particular, would it be based on the American Polygraph Association’s code of practice?
Thirdly, in December 2020 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service announced that it would be seeking a long-term commercial partner to deliver polygraph equipment, training and support services for the sum of £2 million. When this was announced by the Government, it was noted that any partners must provide training to the standard approved by the American Polygraph Association, which is a trade body. Can the Minister give an indication of how that is going?
Will the Minister confirm that the Government will not act solely on the basis of any physiological reaction of the individual while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination, and that the effect of a “significant reaction” in a polygraph examination will simply lead to further inquiries being made?
There has been, over quite a long time, a legitimate—in the sense of authorised by legislation—use by the Home Office of polygraph tests in relation to sexual offenders. According to Home Office figures, over the last five years 5,228 mandatory polygraph examinations have been carried out on 2,249 sexual offenders. Will the Minister describe to the House what benefit has been obtained from this and the basis of any assertions of that benefit?
I beg to move Amendment 21, which has already been debated, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I move Amendment 23 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This House voted for there to be a deadline for the publication of an independent review of the Government’s Prevent strategy in what became Section 20 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. In this Bill, the Government seek to remove any deadline for the publication of this review. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government hoped that the report would be published in the autumn of this year and that he hoped to get confirmation of this from the newly appointed independent reviewer of Prevent. On the basis of the estimate given by the Government in Committee, our Amendment 23 seeks to reinstate the deadline but with a generous margin of publication by the end of the calendar year. I beg to move.
My Lords, there seems to be a recurring issue with the timeliness of independent reviews in the field of national security. The chief problem as I observe it relates not to the speed with which independent reviewers do their job but to the speed with which those reviews are commissioned on the one hand, and the speed with which reports are published and laid before Parliament on the other.
As to delays in commissioning, in addition to the remarkably long time that it has taken to replace my noble friend Lord Carlile as the independent reviewer of Prevent, I note that it was only on 25 February this year that the long-awaited review was announced of closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013. That review was required by Section 13 of that Act to be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after June 2018. Yet, despite regular inquiries by the indefatigable Angus McCullough QC and others, and at least one Written Question in my own name, it was commissioned only two and a half years after that point. That seems simply unacceptable.
On the second of those points, there is the pre-election saga of the Russia report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I made my views clear at the time, and an occasionally elastic interpretation of the Secretary of State’s statutory duty to lay reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation before Parliament “on receiving a report”.
In the Public Bill Committee on the original TPIM Bill in 2011, James Brokenshire, during his first stint as Security Minister, said on this subject:
“There is no desire to sit on reports. It would be foolish and inappropriate for Government to do so, particularly with a report from an independent reviewer … It is not our intention to sit on reports; that is not the practice. If it gives comfort to the Committee and to the public, reports received from the independent reviewer will be published on receipt or promptly—whatever the appropriate phrase is. That is what I expect to happen, and I would expect any successor of mine to take the same approach.”—[Official Report, Commons Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 30/6/11; col. 253.]
Will the Minister take this opportunity to endorse the principled approach set out by James Brokenshire almost 10 years ago and apply it not only to reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation but to the report of the independent reviewer of Prevent? If he can, he will go some way to setting my mind at rest not only on the subject matter of this amendment but more generally.
My Lords, this amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would add a new statutory deadline of 31 December this year for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I am happy to say once again that we share the noble Lord’s and noble Baroness’s commitment to a successful independent review and the opportunity that it provides to learn lessons from what is and is not working—as well as to listen to a wide range of voices about how best to safeguard those who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
The review restarted on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. As I undertook to do in Committee, I am pleased to say that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has had a conversation with Mr Shawcross about the timescale for his review. He certainly agrees with the need to complete it as swiftly as possible, while affording it the consideration that it requires. He hopes to complete his work well before the end of 2021, and of course there will then need to be time for a government response to be prepared and laid before Parliament. However, it is out intention to set out the date of his report and, indeed, the Government’s response in the revised terms of reference, when they are published shortly.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to the remarks of my right honourable friend James Brokenshire, made in his first stint as Security Minister, about government responses being swift and timely. I hope the greatest reassurance to the noble Lord is the fact that my right honourable friend is back in that important post, albeit currently recuperating from his operation, from which we all wish him a speedy recovery. I am sure his remarks then stand now, as they do for my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who is covering while he recuperates.
We all agree that it is necessary to have a thorough, evidence-based review that engages communities and sees Prevent delivery in action and that has practical recommendations for improvement at the end of it. We fear that, at a time when fleetness of foot is vital, a statutory deadline could limit this. We referred in Committee to the ongoing pandemic; alas, it continues now we are on Report, and I hope noble Lords will all be mindful of the need for flexibility in light of it.
Mr Shawcross is keen to proceed at pace, as I say, but reintroducing a statutory deadline for the completion of his independent review would mean that, if he encountered a challenge to his timeline because of the pandemic, we would have to revisit the legislation or he might be forced to compromise in how he meets his objectives. Of course, we hope that there will not be any difficulties, but there remains a risk of further or ongoing restrictions, with all the unpredictabilities of the pandemic and the implications that that could have for Mr Shawcross, his team and those who wish to provide their input into the review. As such, we think that that remains sensible.
We believe that it is achievable for Mr Shawcross to complete his work quickly, while undertaking a thorough and robust piece of work—but it is important for the legislation to retain the flexibility for the reviewer, should he need it, to ensure that the valuable work of his review is not undermined. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will agree and, therefore, withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for their support for this amendment. The frustration that I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, expressed about the Government’s tardiness in reporting to Parliament on these issues has been reinforced by what the Minister has just said.
Not only has the Minister now turned away from what he said in Committee—that the Government anticipated that the report would be complete by the autumn—but he is now saying, “Of course, but then the Government will need time to respond to it.” This is absolutely the reason why we wanted this amendment in the Bill, and the Minister is showing complete contempt for what the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Ponsonby, and I have been saying.
I am sorely tempted to divide the House on this, simply to make the point. However, bearing in mind the time, I will reluctantly beg leave to withdraw the amendment.