Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have not yet had a chance to read the report, which I believe was published only today, but I will of course read it in due course and respond accordingly.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the Minister seems to rely on the emergency transit mechanism on which Rwanda works with the UNHCR. Can he confirm that this mechanism—which has a maximum capacity of 700—is a temporary processing point for asylum seekers from Libya, and that none of the 1,453 evacuated to Rwanda has actually opted to stay in the country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not rely on that at all. As I tried to explain, a variety of aspects of the UNHCR’s work are included in our safety assessment—and that is just one of them.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, some extreme language was used throughout Second Reading and Committee and there was very strong emotion. I understand that, because the Bill evokes strong feelings, but I suspect that, beneath all that, there may be more agreement than has been visible in our debate today and in previous debates. The spokesman for the Opposition has not added his name to this amendment and they did not oppose Second Reading, I suspect because there is an understanding that this is a difficult problem that any Government have to deal with. Any Government of whatever stripe have to take protecting the country’s borders extremely seriously.

A great deal of agreement underlies all this. For example, we all agree that there should be better-organised legal routes for genuine asylum seekers than there are at the moment. The main difference between the two sides in this debate is over the role of deterrence. The Government argue that we will not succeed in handling this problem unless there is an element of deterrence.

To bring it up to date—I will respond to the Chief Whip’s desire to be quick—we now all have the impact assessment, which we did not have until the day before yesterday, which points out the Australian example. Australia brought in a law very similar to this, which gave its Government the power to detain people and turn them around, in their case to Nauru and the Solomon Islands—in our case it is to Rwanda—within 48 hours. I asked the Government, reasonably, why we are not doing this. They pointed out that the Australians do not have to pay any regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, whereas we do. In their view, to comply with that, we could not reasonably turn detainees around within 48 hours; we would have to take at least 28 days, as is in the Bill at the moment.

I do not know whether the Government have ticked every box and crossed every T in relation to the ECHR, but it is quite clear that they have made a big attempt to do so. They have clearly taken on board the spirit of what we have agreed, even if not the letter of the law. The Government are in discussions with the European court about the convention. I am interested to know what the Minister can say about the state of those discussions. It is not only the UK but other countries—Italy, Spain and France—that are in discussion, because this is a new problem which is not covered by the original convention. We have to take that into account and realise that there is a real problem here, which is not a lot to do with immigration but is about border control more than anything else, which any Government will have deal with.

In relation to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the Bill in its unamended form, as it is now, passed the Commons with a majority of 59. There is huge public support for what the Government are attempting to do. The latest YouGov poll showed 60% as saying that illegal migrants should not be allowed to claim asylum in this country; only 20% said the reverse, and 20% were undecided. We have to take that into account. As Matthew Parris, who is no one’s idea of a right-wing nutcase, said recently in an article:

“If you oppose the government’s plans to send away those who land, then whether or not you know it you are advocating an indefinite continuation of migrant deaths. And that is cruel”.


It is indeed cruel to allow that continue.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the refugee crisis in a global one and any sustainable solution needs to be international. If we do not comply with our international obligations, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, we are unlikely to achieve the international co-operation necessary to deal with the crisis. I am afraid I do not agree with the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that because other countries do not abide by their obligations, we should not abide by ours either.

The noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, talked about the cost. The Government’s own impact assessment says that implementing the measures in the Bill will cost the country more than the status quo. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, the impact assessment says there is an “academic consensus” that there is no evidence that the measures in the Bill will have a deterrent effect. Opinion polls may say that illegal migrants should not be allowed to settle in the UK but we are talking about genuine refugees; we are not talking about illegal migrants.

We support all the amendments in this group and Amendment 5 in particular, which we will support if the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, chooses to divide the House.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I have the misfortune to differ from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I know that he will not think that this is any personal discourtesy. Let me take a few minutes to explain to the House why I respectfully disagree.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He quoted a letter that the Minister very kindly sent to me two days ago about the reaction of the Committee on the Rights of the Child of the United Nations. That communication demonstrated that the committee found that if we did not amend the Bill—and the amendment we are looking at now is obviously required—we would be in breach of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. That convention was signed by the late Baroness Thatcher. I do not believe we should be in the business of ignoring the view that we will breach that international obligation we undertook in 1990.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, my noble friend Lord Scriven has signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. All of us on these Benches wholeheartedly support that amendment, in addition to Amendment 15 in the name of my noble friend Lord German.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in the spirit of reciprocity, we wholeheartedly support Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, as well as my noble friend Lord Dubs’s amendment.

My noble friend’s amendment points out that we should absolutely not rule out unaccompanied children from being admissible if they come via an illegal route. As we have heard from a number of noble Lords, this would not be in keeping with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German, is a practical amendment on granting re-entry into the asylum system for those the Government are not able to remove, and we are happy to support it. It would avoid potentially thousands of children, as well as other asylum seekers, being kept in limbo. As he very fairly pointed out, this is a backstop for the Government because, if they are true to their aspirations for the Bill, they will never have to use the noble Lord’s amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

My Lords, I notice that my noble friend Lady Hollins cannot be in her place today, but I urge the Minister to consider her wealth of medical, psychological and therapeutic experience, as she has her name to Amendment 154. That will strengthen the case for him taking back this group.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, wrote to the Home Secretary about this Bill on 7 September last year. I should declare an interest: I know Sara Thornton very well. We were police officers together and spent six months together on a residential course. She is extremely able and fiercely independent, and, in my opinion, the best commissioner the Metropolitan Police never had.

In relation to trafficking information notices, Sara said in her letter that trauma suffered by victims of modern slavery can result in delayed disclosure, difficulty recalling facts or symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. She went on to say that evidence from the Salvation Army pointed to the fact that many victims initially recall their experiences with contradictions and inconsistencies, and it can often take a considerable time before they feel comfortable to disclose fully what has happened to them, as many other noble Lords have said. Her conclusion was that to place a deadline on when they can submit evidence and to interpret late compliance as damaging to credibility fails to take account of the severe trauma suffered by victims. For those reasons alone, Clauses 57 and 58 should not stand part of the Bill.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I have listened to all of them with care. With respect to everyone else, I say that I always listen with care to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, in particular, as I think he will appreciate from our exchanges on other matters. I got the impression that voices in support of the Government were a little thin on the ground on this matter, but I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford is not doing these amendments not out of any personal reluctance; it was decided some weeks ago that my assistance on the Bill would include this group, and that is why I am doing it. It is fair to say that she has gone above and beyond on the Bill and others.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, just on that point, I was clearly not suggesting that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, did not deserve a break from her duties; she has been committed to this throughout. I said that I hoped that these parts of the Bill might be the reason, but I was obviously implying that they clearly were not.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think it might be best if we just moved on from that because, respectfully, I am not sure that it was a particularly good comment in the first place.

The measures in the Bill build on the landmark—it really was landmark—legislation brought in by the future Prime Minister, Theresa May, in 2015. On this occasion, I am very happy to acknowledge that it was brought in by the coalition Government; it was a joint effort. Notwithstanding that I am not a Home Office Minister, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, reminded me on a number of occasions, I can say that the Home Secretary is committed to bringing forward further legislation in the area of modern slavery as a priority, to ensure an efficient and resilient system in tackling modern slavery. That department, which is obviously not mine, will look to introduce those measures when parliamentary time allows.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not denying any stories. I set out statistics earlier on which were absolutely from the real world, and that is the issue that we are dealing with.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting, but the Minister has cited the statistics that he quoted earlier in answer to the question of why the Government were doing this. He talked about the number of referrals going from 3% to 16%. There could be three explanations for that increase: a rise in modern slavery; more cases being reported, even if modern slavery is not going up; or an increase in misuse. Bearing in mind that the majority of referrals to the national referral mechanism are made by the Home Office, and bearing in mind what he said about very few of the people who are referred being returned— I did not quite get the percentage—it sounds like the majority of those cases are not misuse. What we need are not the statistics that the Minister is relying on but the statistics on how many cases of misuse there are.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I have already said that I will write. I will copy everybody in, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with the relevant data. We can have an interesting discussion about potential explanations for it, but what it shows is that there is a significant increase. The question I was seeking to meet was: why do something now, why not wait until a future Bill? The short answer is that we have a manifesto commitment to deal with immigration and asylum issues. It is right that we address all issues at this stage, but, as I have underlined, this is not the Government’s last word on modern slavery. Now I really want to make some progress or we will be here until 3 am again.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Does the noble Lord not accept that 24% of modern slavery cases are UK nationals and have nothing to do with what the Conservative Party put in its manifesto?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

At this point, all I can do is pass that on, and I will.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

On Amendment 172A, I think the Minister said that victims of modern slavery already have access to legal advice, once the national referral mechanism has made an initial decision. If he looks at that amendment carefully, he will see it is entitled “pre-national referral mechanism advice”.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right, which is why I was making the point about it being a fundamental extension of the legal aid system, which is uncosted.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moreover, the coroner’s investigation, including the inquest, is an inquisitorial, fact-finding process. It is a narrow-scope inquiry—in a sense, a form of summary justice procedure which sets out to give answers to four statutory questions: who the deceased was, and how, when and where they died. This means that for the vast majority of inquests legal representation and legal aid are not necessary. That is why it is available only in exceptional cases.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have given evidence at numerous criminal trials, in the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court, but the most vicious, adversarial cross-examination was at the inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, an innocent Brazilian shot and killed by the police following the 7 July 2005 bombings. There is no way that process could have been described as inquisitorial. Indeed, part way through that proceeding, the coroner had to advise the barrister representing the police not to proceed in the way that he had up until that point. While in some cases it may be simply a neutral, inquisitorial search for the truth, that is not how a lot of inquests turn out.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving the Committee the benefit of his experience. Perhaps it is that experience which informed, or helped to inform, the remarks of the Chief Coroner, his honour Justice Thomas Teague, who has said publicly that one of his key objectives in his role is to ensure that the inquisitorial ethos of the inquest process is maintained. I hope that demonstrates a resolve within the system to address the failings or, at best, the over-eagerness, of counsel whose conduct the noble Lord described.

The amendment to increase the scope of legal aid at inquests would run counter to the approach of retaining their inquisitorial character. There is a risk that additional lawyers present at an inquest would not provide an overall improvement for the bereaved, that being something which ought to be a primary consideration, for the reasons expressed by my noble friend Lady Newlove. It is foreseeable—I think this is the point raised by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst—that the presence of additional lawyers could have the unintended consequence of turning an inquisitorial process into a complex exercise—

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I also rise to speak particularly about Amendment 292D. I support the noble Lord, Lord Bach, with all his experience of being an excellent police and crime commissioner.

There are many other examples. The noble Lord gave two. I shall just give one. A 59 year-old senior civil servant who worked for the Ministry of Justice in a responsible position connected with the criminal justice system, wished to retire and stand to be a police and crime commissioner. He was disqualified because, at the age of 13, he had been fined £5 for each of two minor juvenile offences. It is completely disproportionate and absurd that such people should be disqualified.

I seek to compare those disqualification rules with the rules applying to Members of another place. The last figures I saw produced by IPSA, the standards authority for Members of the other place, revealed that, in recent years, 43% of the Members of the other place had convictions of one kind or another. Maybe that tells you a lot about the other place. Nevertheless, this distinction makes its own point.

In passing on to the other issues, I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. Fundamental to this problem is the fact that we have 43 territorial police forces. This number ought to be at least quartered. If so, the structure—including police and crime commissioners—would be much more coherent. There would be far greater consistency and police forces which currently struggle to deal with very complex inquiries would be able to deal with them because they would have the critical mass of staff.

I turn next to police authorities. I hesitate to disagree with those noble Lords who tabled the first amendment in this group because I respect them all. Part of my experience as a Queen’s Counsel has been to advise police authorities when they have got into difficulties. I recall one case from the north of England in which the police authority concerned was institutionally corrupt and in the pockets of a small group of senior police officers. It had got itself into a hopeless mess and at least one criminal prosecution ensued. To describe it as an example of democratic effectiveness was an insult to both democracy and effectiveness.

I accept, of course, that some police commissioners are better than others. So are some Cabinet Ministers. So are some head teachers. So are some doctors. So are some Members of Parliament. This is inevitable. Some of the commissioners are very good, such as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and Dame Vera Baird, who was referred to earlier. Where police and crime commissioners are effective, they are very effective indeed.

Just think about it territorially. If one of these referendums took place and there was a police and crime commissioner in Cheshire but not in Lancashire, or one in north Wales but not in Dyfed-Powys, people in the areas that did not have a police and crime commissioner would be unlikely to say, “Oh, how wonderful; this is going to be run by our local council.” In the modern world, they will say, “Our democratic rights have been diluted.”

Other noble Lords remember, as I do, when the Welsh Assembly was created. In many parts of Wales, people said, “Nobody will know who their Assembly Members are. It’s all a waste of time. It will be completely ineffective.” It is true that, for a time, people tended not to know who their Welsh Assembly Members were. Today, however, if you look at the evolution of the Welsh Government during the last 20 years or so, it has become remarkably effective. It has brought people much closer to government.

I believe that police and crime commissioners are still evolving. They have a valuable role to play, particularly, as I said earlier, if the Government have the courage to reform the territorial policing services in this country.

As to the deposits, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The £5,000 deposit is not reasonable. I would not oppose a much lower deposit of the kind that has to be put down by somebody standing to be elected as a Member of Parliament. The election process is expensive. Some kind of gatekeeping requirement of this kind is helpful.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, when he started talking about amalgamating police forces again and the Welsh Assembly, I wondered whether this was turning into a filibuster. However, we move on.

The issue raised by Amendment 292D that we all agree on is that it is ridiculous that somebody convicted of a very minor offence at a very young age should be disqualified. The other side of the coin is that there is no process for the recall of a police and crime commissioner who commits an offence in office or is guilty of misconduct. Because they are democratically elected, the only way to get rid of them is by another election. Compare this to MPs, for whom there is now a process by which a by-election can be triggered. I agree with Amendment 292D, but there is another side to the same coin which also needs to be addressed.

We on these Benches have always been opposed to police and crime commissioners, notwithstanding, as everybody has said, that there are some outstanding ones, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, was. Not just because he used to be my boss—this is the House of Peers now—I agree with almost everything the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe has said.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

Would the noble Lord forgive me for a moment? I know his view has always been consistent on this, but the truth of the matter is that the Bill got through only because of the support of both parties in the coalition; one of those parties was the Liberal Democrats. It is very easy to say now that you are not in favour of it as a party, but you clearly were in favour of it because you passed it into legislation. I am sorry if it is a crude point, but it happens to be true.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Yes, and, as the noble Lord will very well know, in a coalition there have to be compromises on both sides. You cannot get through the things you think are absolutely important unless you give way on others. However, the policy of this party now is to oppose police and crime commissioners. I am very grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to clarify the position of the party on that.

It is very difficult for one person to represent both rural and urban areas in policing, or perhaps an area where there is a large African or Caribbean community and another where there is a large south Asian or Chinese community, or even an LGBT community. These could and do exist within the same police area—as in London, for example. Therefore, with one police and crime commissioner for that whole area, it is difficult for that one person to represent all those communities. It is important to be represented when it comes to accountability around policing, particularly for minority communities, where trust and confidence in the police are not as strong as they are with others.

As others have said, the majority of police and crime commissioners are party political. Therefore, there is a danger that a small “p” political difference between a police and crime commissioner and a chief constable, or even a commissioner—without pointing at any particular examples of that—could result in a good chief constable or commissioner having to resign over that small “p” political difference, or even a personality difference with the police and crime commissioner

As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has said, we are in a position where, because it is one person hiring and firing the chief constable, we are not getting a range of candidates applying for the chief constable post. The assumption is that the incumbent deputy will have a good relationship with that police and crime commissioner and have a natural advantage over any outside candidate, and therefore it is not worth applying. For all these reasons, we feel that having a range of people holding the police to account—particularly if they are democratically elected councillors —as opposed to one person, would be preferable. But I agree with other noble Lords that the suggested way to replace the system is probably not through a series of referenda that could result in different mechanisms in different parts of the country.

As far as the abolition of deposits in elections is concerned, that is perhaps slightly wider than this Bill should be considering. Of course, as Liberal Democrats, we would have to declare an interest as far as that is concerned. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, about potentially reducing the size of the deposit, rather than getting rid of it completely.

Were police authorities better? In some places, I think they were. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has said, the Metropolitan Police Authority was certainly very effective. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who experienced both, said there was not much to choose between the two on accountability.

For the reasons that I have explained, we agree that there should certainly be an examination of how effective police and crime commissioners are.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the comments of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and other noble Lords, that we have had mixed experiences of police and crime commissioners—some have been very good, and some not so good. I will not go further than that, though, in relation to Amendment 278.

I wish to talk in particular about the amendment in the names of my noble friends Lord Bach and Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. They have drawn attention to the consequences we have witnessed as result of potential candidates for police and crime commissioner being debarred if they have been convicted of any offence, however many years ago, for which they could have received a custodial sentence, irrespective of whether they did actually receive such a sentence. I do not wish to pursue any individual cases but rather the general point, as others have done, of whether there should be another look at the reasons, in respect of previous convictions, for which a potential candidate for the office of police and crime commissioner can be disqualified.

When the issue has been raised previously, the Government have argued that it should not be reviewed because there was cross-party support for this requirement to be included in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. If that argument was followed through to its logical conclusion, there could never be any change to any legislation that originally had cross-party support, which is a bit of a nonsense.

The other argument advanced was that people must have complete confidence in the probity and integrity of whoever it is they elect as a police and crime commissioner because of their responsibilities and powers in relation to their police force, including the chief constable. Clearly, that is true, but whether an offence committed decades ago that could have resulted in a custodial sentence but did not—because it was not considered of a sufficiently serious nature to justify such a sentence—should automatically still be regarded as calling into question the probity and integrity of a potential candidate for police and crime commissioner, and thus disqualify them from holding such an office, is questionable, to say the least. It is certainly questionable when one looks at other positions that have powers and responsibilities in relation to the police and the criminal justice system but have no such similar restrictions on being able to stand for office or be appointed to an office.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, in order to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences when they are imposed consecutively to other sentences, we introduced several amendments in Committee. Following these changes, we are now making a series of minor, technical amendments to provide further clarification and to ensure that the legislation will operate as intended.

The amendments have a variety of complementary effects but, taken together, they ensure that new Section 1B, which was introduced in Committee, operates effectively within the Scottish jurisdiction. Given the complexity of the amendments, we have continued to consider their effect with the Scottish Government, resulting in these final amendments, which have been agreed by all parties.

Many of the amendments simply insert the relevant terminology into the new clauses and deliver consequential changes to ensure the smooth operation of Section 1B. The overall effect is to ensure that terrorist offenders in Scotland serve the appropriate custodial period when they are serving multiple sentences, including for non-terrorism offences, and that offenders who receive multiple sentences for terrorist offences—and therefore multiple licences—will serve only one, aggregated licence period.

I draw your Lordships’ attention specifically to Amendment 31, which ensures that the sentence calculation provided for in Section 1B will apply retrospectively. This will provide clarity in calculating release dates where sentences for both terrorism and non-terrorism offences are imposed, ensuring the effective application of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 in all cases.

Should noble Lords wish to see an individual breakdown of these amendments and their effect, I would be happy to place in the Library a letter in terms similar to the one I issued following Committee to explain the purpose of each one. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.

Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.

I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?

I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.

We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.

I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the time he has given to speak about this Bill and for government amendment 14 on the burden of proof. I welcome the change of heart in that respect.

As to the other area on the potential length of TPIMs, I very much hope that the Minister will accept what is essentially the compromise in Amendment 16 between indefinite periods for TPIMs and the current period. It seems to me that the gap that divides us is not that great. TPIMs can be imposed not merely because criminal conduct is suspected, but also because of activities that may not be criminal. It is imposed by the Executive. Although, of course, there is a right of review to the court, a right of review is very different from the decision of a court or independent tribunal in deciding whether the grounds exist.

It is therefore important to appreciate that the very significant restrictions on liberty are imposed by the Executive, something generally alien to our tradition. It would be even more alien to our tradition to go to the extent of enabling the Executive to impose such a restriction for an indefinite period of time. Such restrictions should only be available on people’s liberty where people are convicted of serious criminal offences. Quite apart from the humanitarian and liberty and traditional aspects of that argument, there is the further argument which I raised, and will not repeat, on Second Reading: namely, indefinite orders can, as experience has shown, give people a loss of hope, and in effect make them more dangerous and less susceptible to being reformed.

The compromise that we have put forward in this amendment is further emphasised by the fact that of course if there is new evidence of activity during the period, the four years is not an absolute cut off.

Finally, there is a great deal of sense in having a cut-off period. It is very easy for any decision-maker, particularly one who is worried about the consequences of not extending the TPIM, to go on extending and extending it. It is very wasteful of resources, because enforcing a TPIM is very expensive. It is also fundamentally unfair that someone should be subject to a decision that can go on being rolled over indefinitely rather than someone—to put it in the vernacular—having to put up and charge with an offence or to shut up.

I very much hope that the Minister will think again about the compromise offered in this amendment and accept it.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this group deals with changes to TPIMs. The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, someone who has unique access to secret intelligence, operational partners and government officials, has previously stated that the changes proposed in the Bill to the TPIM regime were not necessary. We agree, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger so powerfully set out in his speech.

In relation to Clause 34, the current independent reviewer says that he is not aware of any case where operational partners had wanted to impose a TPIM but were unable to do so because the burden of proof was too high, as confirmed by the representative of operational partners in the Bill Committee in the other place.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

18: Clause 37, leave out Clause 37
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove Clause 37 (TPIMs: extension of residence measure) from the bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I beg to move.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, appears to be right that the legislation in its current form does not place express limits on the use of information obtained from a polygraph for the purpose of extending a TPIM, yet my enthusiasm for Amendment 20 is limited. The reality is that TPIMs can be made and extended on the basis of a wide range of intelligence fragments, some of which may be little more than straws in the wind. It may none the less be important to take such matters into account. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomb and the ambiguous and potentially unreliable intelligence that, as I reported at the time, might, if it had been interpreted in a different way, have resulted in some sort of pre-emptive action.

An intelligence picture is typically a complex mosaic of multiple indications and assessments, of which polygraph material, depending on the circumstances, will not necessarily be the least reliable component. While it seems to me both unlikely and undesirable that a TPIM would ever be extended predominantly on the basis of polygraph material, I am wary of Parliament seeking to dictate the relative weight that is to be given to different sources of intelligence. The Executive and the courts are the bodies with expertise in this area, and I suspect that we should leave it to them.

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about Amendment 19, which seems not without merit.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained Amendments 19 and 20 to the House, and it would serve little purpose to repeat that as we will not be dividing the House on them.

As my noble friend has said, compulsory polygraph tests for those convicted on licence from prison are one thing, but such tests for those not convicted of any offence, who have a right to silence when being questioned, is quite another. It is a long-established principle that a suspect in criminal proceedings should be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Clause 38 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement for an individual subject to a TPIM to participate in polygraph sessions and to comply with instructions given to the individual by the polygraph operator. Although any statement made by the individual while participating in the polygraph session cannot be used against them in any proceedings for an offence, a failure to answer questions could be taken as contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice—that is, to comply with the instructions of the polygraph operator, so, in this case, the instruction to answer questions. Remaining silent during a polygraph session could therefore be an offence under Section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, for which the individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

If the person is convicted of a terrorism offence and is on licence and subject to a TPIM—unlikely but possible—it would be possible for them to be subjected to polygraph tests under Clause 32 of this Bill, and a failure to answer questions in those circumstances would be a breach of the licence. While we have reservations about that, we do not object to it being part of the Bill. However, if the person is not convicted and is subject to a TPIM, they have the right to silence and to be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Potentially being imprisoned for five years for failing to answer questions during a polygraph session is an adverse consequence, and we therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on whether Clause 38 should be part of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the effect of the Bill at the moment is that a condition of a TPIM can be that the subject takes a polygraph test, and that a failure to do that could be a breach of the TPIM’s provisions. Amendment 21 raises the question of whether that should be part of a potential TPIM. In answering that question, it is important to try to find out what the Government have in mind regarding the use of that provision. First, to what extent do they regard polygraph answers as reliable? There is a general view that they cannot be taken on their own. What is the Government’s view on that?

Secondly, will the Government introduce a code of practice, as envisaged by Amendment 19? If so, could they give some indication of what that would contain? In particular, would it be based on the American Polygraph Association’s code of practice?

Thirdly, in December 2020 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service announced that it would be seeking a long-term commercial partner to deliver polygraph equipment, training and support services for the sum of £2 million. When this was announced by the Government, it was noted that any partners must provide training to the standard approved by the American Polygraph Association, which is a trade body. Can the Minister give an indication of how that is going?

Will the Minister confirm that the Government will not act solely on the basis of any physiological reaction of the individual while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination, and that the effect of a “significant reaction” in a polygraph examination will simply lead to further inquiries being made?

There has been, over quite a long time, a legitimate—in the sense of authorised by legislation—use by the Home Office of polygraph tests in relation to sexual offenders. According to Home Office figures, over the last five years 5,228 mandatory polygraph examinations have been carried out on 2,249 sexual offenders. Will the Minister describe to the House what benefit has been obtained from this and the basis of any assertions of that benefit?

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

21: Clause 38, leave out Clause 38
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove Clause 38 (TPIMs: polygraph measure) from the bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I beg to move Amendment 21, which has already been debated, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

23: Clause 44, page 35, line 26, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) In section 20(9) of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism) omit the words from “within the period” to the end and substitute “by 31 December 2021”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would reinstate the deadline for the independent review of the Prevent strategy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I move Amendment 23 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This House voted for there to be a deadline for the publication of an independent review of the Government’s Prevent strategy in what became Section 20 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. In this Bill, the Government seek to remove any deadline for the publication of this review. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government hoped that the report would be published in the autumn of this year and that he hoped to get confirmation of this from the newly appointed independent reviewer of Prevent. On the basis of the estimate given by the Government in Committee, our Amendment 23 seeks to reinstate the deadline but with a generous margin of publication by the end of the calendar year. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, there seems to be a recurring issue with the timeliness of independent reviews in the field of national security. The chief problem as I observe it relates not to the speed with which independent reviewers do their job but to the speed with which those reviews are commissioned on the one hand, and the speed with which reports are published and laid before Parliament on the other.

As to delays in commissioning, in addition to the remarkably long time that it has taken to replace my noble friend Lord Carlile as the independent reviewer of Prevent, I note that it was only on 25 February this year that the long-awaited review was announced of closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013. That review was required by Section 13 of that Act to be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after June 2018. Yet, despite regular inquiries by the indefatigable Angus McCullough QC and others, and at least one Written Question in my own name, it was commissioned only two and a half years after that point. That seems simply unacceptable.

On the second of those points, there is the pre-election saga of the Russia report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I made my views clear at the time, and an occasionally elastic interpretation of the Secretary of State’s statutory duty to lay reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation before Parliament “on receiving a report”.

In the Public Bill Committee on the original TPIM Bill in 2011, James Brokenshire, during his first stint as Security Minister, said on this subject:

“There is no desire to sit on reports. It would be foolish and inappropriate for Government to do so, particularly with a report from an independent reviewer … It is not our intention to sit on reports; that is not the practice. If it gives comfort to the Committee and to the public, reports received from the independent reviewer will be published on receipt or promptly—whatever the appropriate phrase is. That is what I expect to happen, and I would expect any successor of mine to take the same approach.”—[Official Report, Commons Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 30/6/11; col. 253.]


Will the Minister take this opportunity to endorse the principled approach set out by James Brokenshire almost 10 years ago and apply it not only to reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation but to the report of the independent reviewer of Prevent? If he can, he will go some way to setting my mind at rest not only on the subject matter of this amendment but more generally.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would add a new statutory deadline of 31 December this year for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I am happy to say once again that we share the noble Lord’s and noble Baroness’s commitment to a successful independent review and the opportunity that it provides to learn lessons from what is and is not working—as well as to listen to a wide range of voices about how best to safeguard those who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

The review restarted on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. As I undertook to do in Committee, I am pleased to say that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has had a conversation with Mr Shawcross about the timescale for his review. He certainly agrees with the need to complete it as swiftly as possible, while affording it the consideration that it requires. He hopes to complete his work well before the end of 2021, and of course there will then need to be time for a government response to be prepared and laid before Parliament. However, it is out intention to set out the date of his report and, indeed, the Government’s response in the revised terms of reference, when they are published shortly.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to the remarks of my right honourable friend James Brokenshire, made in his first stint as Security Minister, about government responses being swift and timely. I hope the greatest reassurance to the noble Lord is the fact that my right honourable friend is back in that important post, albeit currently recuperating from his operation, from which we all wish him a speedy recovery. I am sure his remarks then stand now, as they do for my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who is covering while he recuperates.

We all agree that it is necessary to have a thorough, evidence-based review that engages communities and sees Prevent delivery in action and that has practical recommendations for improvement at the end of it. We fear that, at a time when fleetness of foot is vital, a statutory deadline could limit this. We referred in Committee to the ongoing pandemic; alas, it continues now we are on Report, and I hope noble Lords will all be mindful of the need for flexibility in light of it.

Mr Shawcross is keen to proceed at pace, as I say, but reintroducing a statutory deadline for the completion of his independent review would mean that, if he encountered a challenge to his timeline because of the pandemic, we would have to revisit the legislation or he might be forced to compromise in how he meets his objectives. Of course, we hope that there will not be any difficulties, but there remains a risk of further or ongoing restrictions, with all the unpredictabilities of the pandemic and the implications that that could have for Mr Shawcross, his team and those who wish to provide their input into the review. As such, we think that that remains sensible.

We believe that it is achievable for Mr Shawcross to complete his work quickly, while undertaking a thorough and robust piece of work—but it is important for the legislation to retain the flexibility for the reviewer, should he need it, to ensure that the valuable work of his review is not undermined. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will agree and, therefore, withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for their support for this amendment. The frustration that I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, expressed about the Government’s tardiness in reporting to Parliament on these issues has been reinforced by what the Minister has just said.

Not only has the Minister now turned away from what he said in Committee—that the Government anticipated that the report would be complete by the autumn—but he is now saying, “Of course, but then the Government will need time to respond to it.” This is absolutely the reason why we wanted this amendment in the Bill, and the Minister is showing complete contempt for what the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Ponsonby, and I have been saying.

I am sorely tempted to divide the House on this, simply to make the point. However, bearing in mind the time, I will reluctantly beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief. In earlier consideration of the Bill, the House has been concerned with prior authorisation—I repeat, prior. I do not resile for a moment from the importance of prior authorisation and I hope that we will have the opportunity to consider it in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, who has considerable experience in these matters, raises a narrow point relating to post-authorisation for the protection of officers. I should be interested in the Minister’s reply. My understanding is that the noble Lord seeks to deal with threats to the physical safety of the persons named in the amendment in narrow and possibly important circumstances. Its thrust, while dealing with another aspect, is in the spirit of your Lordships’ consideration of authorisation—in this case post, as opposed to prior, authorisation. Hence, my understanding is that he seeks to plug a possible gap by urging upon noble Lords the need for a statutory requirement for speedy, post-hoc authorisation in certain circumstances.

I have two questions for the Minister. First, how likely is such a situation to arise? Secondly, can we properly be told whether such situations have arisen in the past? In the circumstances, while I pay tribute to the noble Lord for raising this matter, I should like to hear the Minister’s reply on the need for the amendment and its practicalities.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who has great experience of these issues, spoke about our having thus far overlooked the dangers faced by undercover operatives. Little has been said about operational safeguards. Indeed, perhaps I may take this opportunity to mention that I was contacted by a noble friend this morning who emphasised the bravery of undercover operatives, who place themselves at considerable risk in many such situations.

The amendment highlights the limitations of the whole idea of granting pre-event immunity from prosecution within what the Government variously describe as criminal conduct authorisations that are tightly bound, specific, tightly drawn and within strict parameters. What the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has described is all too possible: that a CHIS—whether a highly trained agent, an undercover police officer or a 16 year-old child informant—encounters a situation that, even if foreseen as a possibility, the handler and authorising officer felt unable to authorise and grant immunity for in advance.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

63: Clause 2, page 4, leave out lines 10 to 23
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would restrict the authorities that can grant criminal conduct authorisations to police forces, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 63, 65 and 80, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, in this group. They attempt to get to grips with the plethora of organisations that the Bill seeks to authorise to grant criminal conduct authorisations. I remind noble Lords that this is to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources, informants or agents, and authorise them to commit acts that, under any other circumstances, would be a crime, but because these public authorities have said so, they are no longer crimes.

Unlike existing legislation that limits legal immunity to agents of the state engaged in property interference, intrusive surveillance, equipment interference and interception—all exclusively targeted on the most serious criminals and only with prior approval given by an investigative powers commissioner and often a Secretary of State—this Bill seeks to give public authorities the power to grant immunity to anyone, often criminals, for almost any crime that can be imagined with no prior authorisation outside their own organisation. One would hope that the number of public authorities would therefore be extremely limited, and that evidence would be produced to justify their inclusion.

I am taken back to a recent statutory instrument—the Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020—which added to the list of public authorities that can access communications data; that is, who contacted whom, from where, and when, but not the content of the communication. In the overall scheme of things, it is fairly low-level data. The Home Office had agreed to include more public authorities on the basis of detailed business cases submitted by each authority.

When I asked to see the business cases, I was told that I could, although the Home Office arranged for me to see them only 45 minutes before the statutory instrument was due to be approved on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister allow Members of this House to see the business cases that form the basis of the Home Office deciding which public authorities should be allowed to grant criminal conduct authorities, preferably not 45 minutes before we consider this issue on Report?

Our Amendment 63 would limit those public authorities that can grant CCAs to the police, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services, as it appears to us to be self-evident why these organisations may need to grant authority to agents or informants to commit crime. The other public authorities require justification, hence my request that noble Lords be able to see the business case justifying each of the other public authorities, albeit redacted and viewed in private.

Our Amendment 65 specifically singles out the Home Office, although it might be seen as a typical example—an example of a type of public authority—for further scrutiny. On the face of it, it sounds that, in theory, if not in practice, the Home Secretary could authorise a criminal to commit a crime and give that criminal legal immunity, whether directly or by ordering one of her officials to do so on her behalf. Giving power to politicians to authorise criminals to commit crime and to be able to grant those criminals immunity from prosecution, with no prior independent oversight, raises some worrying spectres.

Our Amendment 80 is consequential. At this stage, I will listen carefully to the concerns of other noble Lords and to the response from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has spoken with great clarity and authority on the amendments in this group. I will speak to the human rights perspective of Amendment 63 as set out in the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on the legislative scrutiny of the Bill. Chapter 6 is concerned with public authorities granted power to authorise crime, as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

Paragraph 75 of the report states:

“We accept that the authorisation of criminal conduct by the security and intelligence services and the police may on occasion be necessary … However, the Bill proposes granting the power to make CCAs … to a substantially wider range of public authorities”.


That concerns us. It goes on:

“This provision of the Bill, coupled with the ability to authorise criminal conduct in the interests of preventing disorder and preserving economic well-being … extends the power to authorise criminal conduct well beyond the core area of national security and serious crime.”


There are two key questions here from a human rights perspective. As the report states,

“the first key question is whether the exceptional power to authorise crimes to be committed without redress is truly necessary for each and every one of these public authorities. The second key question is whether the benefit of granting that power would be proportionate to the human rights interferences that are likely to result.”

The Government have provided little justification for the authorisation of criminal conduct by such bodies as the Gambling Commission, the Food Standards Agency and others. The Home Office published brief guidance and a series of operational case studies, which provide examples of authorisation by CHIS in the cases of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and other hypothetical examples of where CAAs might be used by the Environment Agency and the Food Standards Agency.

The question must be asked as to why the police or other bodies focused on the prevention of crime should not take full responsibility for authorising criminal conduct that may fall within the purview of these organisations. We are all aware that the police, in carrying out their responsibilities, have vast networks of agencies whom they consult in the course of their duties. They know whom to consult for specific issue as and when such consultation is needed. It is inappropriate and irrelevant to name other specific agencies, whose role is not protecting national security and fighting serious crime.

One of the witnesses to the inquiry carried out by the Joint Committee on Human Rights said:

“If the government believes it is necessary for each of these bodies to have the power to grant authorisations, it should be explicit about whether those bodies already possess non-binding ‘powers’ to authorise the commission of crimes and provide more detail as to how, and how often, those powers are used. In the absence of such an account, there is no reason to accept that all of those bodies require the powers the Bill would give them.”


No such detail is supplied by the Government. It is therefore impossible to assess how agencies whose primary function is not serious crime or national security can, or indeed would want to, be involved formally in granting CCAs. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to conclude the debate on this group of amendments.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her words and I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate.

I do not think that the Minister addressed the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, from the human rights perspective. What justification is there for public authorities to grant CCAs where it is difficult to see such CCAs being proportionate to the crimes that they seek to address? Authorising an undercover operative to commit a crime is very serious and needs to be proportionate to the harm that it seeks to address. Obviously, it will help when we see the business cases; I am very pleased that the Minister has agreed that we can look at them.

Can public authorities be added by statutory instrument? The Minister said that it will be via the affirmative procedure. I have already given the example of where authorities were added to those that could access communications data and the House was not able to properly scrutinise that statutory instrument because we were not given access to the business cases until the last minute. If that repeats itself, we will not be able to scrutinise adequately the addition of public authorities by statutory instrument.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, talked about being very troubled and the Bill going too far, which leads us on to the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater; I look forward to the jousting between the noble Lord and myself on these sorts of issues. The noble Lord said that I gave the impression that there was something very new in what is being discussed here and that it was a well-established practice. If only he were right. The point is that the granting of legal immunity to people who are being authorised to commit crime is a completely new scenario that no public authority in the past has been able to do—except the Crown Prosecution Service, after the event. I accept that this is a very dangerous world, as the Minister started her remarks with, and that 27 terrorist attacks have been prevented as a result of actions—but not, I would humbly suggest, by the actions of the Gambling Commission or the Food Standards Agency.

The Minister talked about the horsemeat scandal and how it had the potential to undermine public confidence in the food supply. How can getting a CHIS to commit a crime be proportionate to addressing an undermining of confidence, in the human rights sense of proportionality? She talked about the Home Office and the power being specifically required for Immigration Enforcement—so why not, on the face of the Bill, authorise Immigration Enforcement within the Home Office, rather than the Home Office in its entirety? In the communications data statutory instrument, which authorises public authorities to access communications data, the Military Police, not the Armed Forces generally, is authorised. Why not authorise just Immigration Enforcement and not the Home Office?

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, asked: why not call in the police to deal with criminality that these other public authorities have responsibility for? The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, gave some very good reasons why that might be the case, such as that it might not be high on the list of police priorities. But that then comes back again to the question of necessity. He felt that they needed to demonstrate a need—we will look to see whether these agencies have demonstrated the need when we look at the business cases—and that training was essential; he was hoping that it would be alongside police colleagues, but the Minister did not seem to think that that would be the case. He raised this other interesting issue about the fact that, if these agencies do not use this power very much—that is, if they are not exercising it—they will need to be trained more frequently because they are not used to using it. This raises more concerns, in my mind, about these other agencies. The noble Lord also talked about safeguards, as we have discussed in other parts of the Bill.

Clearly we will return to this issue on Report. At the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for drawing attention to the points I made, and I am sorry if I sounded too aggressive on some of them. The point I did not make, which I shall make now, is on how much crime is committed. One would expect that, in most cases, it would not be the commission of crime so much as association with people while they committed crimes, with the person in question not necessarily being directly involved but having some complicity, which is one of the problems.

The requirements, as I understand them, if they are in that situation and a criminal conduct authorisation is issued, are that it has to be proportionate, it may not be issued if what is sought to be achieved can be done in another way, and it has to be part of an effort to prevent more serious criminality. Those three conditions are perhaps not mentioned very much but are important.

I have left out some issues that I might have discussed. We have just talked about possibly leaving the Department of Health and Social Care out of the Bill. Think of this moment when organised crime, throughout the world, is seeing how it can get into the vaccines business in one way or another. The challenge that that will pose will feature in our news broadcasts and papers in the days ahead. It will obviously be a big issue. One recalls that the NHS was practically brought to a grinding halt from its systems being hacked and disrupted.

There is this, as well, if it is not too dramatic. At the time of Brexit, when we may be moving towards no deal, there is an idea to take from HMRC its ability to keep every possible assistance. In trying to deal with some of the problems it will have, it will need all the help it can get.

My concern about these amendments, and referral to the police or judges to overview the operations of CCAs, is that a clear structure is set up. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is a very senior judge and the judicial commissioners are very senior. My concern all the way along is that nobody has challenged how vital covert intelligence sources can be, in a range of different fields. The question is whether we can still keep those covert sources coming. The more we expand the range of people who have access to that information, the bigger the danger of leaks, and then there will be fewer sources available in the future. That is why I think the structure set up of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his judicial commissioners, with a tribunal and an annual report to Parliament on its operations, has important safeguards. Going much further than that starts to undermine the security of the information and imperil the safety of some brave people, who are giving evidence to help keep our country safe, in a range of different fields.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, with whom I completely agree on maintaining the status quo on the involvement of covert human intelligence sources and the ability of the police and security services to authorise these people to engage in crime. I have no argument with him on those issues. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the issue for us is the police granting immunity from prosecution or from any legal action at all.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 79, but I will take the amendments in this group in order. Amendment 75A from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is intended to require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to identify unlawful or improper conduct through a CCA to the police for investigation. I have a great deal of sympathy for what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, but I am not sure that her amendment achieves what she sets out to.

The amendment talks about conduct that is not authorised by the criminal conduct authorisation, but we are also concerned with conduct that is unlawful or improper that is authorised by a CCA, by accident, inexperience or corrupt practice. This does not appear to be covered by the amendment. Of course, if it is the result of police malpractice, referring the matter to the police may not be enough to ensure that it is properly dealt with.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in her opening remarks, these amendments are about maintaining the status quo—the public interest defence. She described additional safeguards against a rogue prosecutor—potentially of self-defence, necessity and duress—but of course these mechanisms are already in place, and they are put into the amendment to provide clarity.

I am very glad to have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Richie of Downpatrick, with her valuable experience in Northern Ireland. As the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, said in her very powerful remarks, the co-signatories to the amendment are from very different backgrounds. I remind the Committee that I was a police officer for over 30 years and was at one time a controller of informants—covert human intelligence sources, as we now call them.

As I said, these amendments, to which I have added my name, are about keeping the status quo by ensuring that there is a legal power that allows public authorities to authorise CHIS to participate in crime but leaving the question of immunity from prosecution to prosecutors, looking at all the circumstances after the fact.

At Second Reading, the Government made two arguments against maintaining the status quo: first, that it is “undesirable” for the police, for example, to authorise people to commit crime, and, secondly, that it is “unfair and unreasonable” for CHIS to operate under the possibility that they might be prosecuted. In other words, the status quo is not desirable, not fair and not reasonable.

Let me deal, first, with the argument that it is “undesirable”. Can the Minister please explain to the Committee the difference between it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal and it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to make criminal activity legal? Or, to put it another way, what is more or less desirable—a public authority telling someone to commit crime or giving a public authority the power to say something that is a crime is not a crime?

Is it not fundamental to the rule of law that the law applies to everyone equally and that it is clear what is and is not a crime? The Government propose to make legal an act that would otherwise be a crime, and to make the criminal law apply to everyone, except CHIS, who are authorised under CCAs. For example, Section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 would in effect change to “a person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation, unless he is authorised to belong to it by a criminal conduct authority, in which case he does not commit an offence”. The law, in effect, becomes “it is an offence/it is not an offence, and it applies to some people but not all”.

The effect of accepting these amendments is to say that, of course, belonging to a terrorist group is an offence, but it is clearly not in the public interest to prosecute this person because he was asked to belong to, or to continue to belong to, a proscribed organisation by an agent of the state, and that was necessary and proportionate. Immunity from prosecution should be based on an independent prosecutor deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, not on an agent of the state saying that this crime is not a crime, as many noble Lords have said.

At Second Reading, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—said:

“It is also undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


Paying criminals to pass information to the police is undesirable, and paying terrorists to pass information to the security services is undesirable, as is paying those employed by hostile foreign powers to commit treason by passing information to the UK—it is all undesirable, or murky waters, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said on the last group—but, however undesirable those things are, they are necessary. Although it may be undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal, it is necessary, and it is not as undesirable as the alternative. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for whom I know the whole House, including the noble Baroness the Minister, has the highest regard:

“The Bill would give power to police superintendents to confer immunity on members of the public, and of their own organisations, for the commission of crimes. That proposition is startling, and the potential for abuse obvious.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1064.]


I shall now deal with the “unfair and unreasonable” argument. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness the Minister said that

“it seems unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and potentially dangerous work while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for the exact same conduct. That tension has existed for many years.”

It has, but we need a reality check here. What might seem unfair and unreasonable to the Government, and indeed to some noble Lords, is not the same as what might seem unfair and unreasonable to undercover operatives, who, whether they be criminals or undercover cops, have willingly volunteered to do this work not for years or for decades but, I am sure, for well over 100 years.

If a handler thought that it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not authorise a CHIS to participate in crime; if a CHIS thought it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not participate in crime. What the noble Baroness the Minister seems to want to address is a sense of unfairness and unreasonableness which the Government have but which is not shared by the overwhelming majority of those who are directly affected—the handlers and the undercover agents.

The second question that has to be asked is: what is the possibility of the state prosecuting them, and is the status quo a real deterrent? The noble Baroness the Minister—again, at Second Reading—talked about what would happen if a CHIS were to undertake criminal activity that fell outside the strict parameters of a CCA:

“The prosecuting authorities are in a position to consider whether to bring a prosecution. This has been done before and will be done again if required.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


So the answer is, “It has been done before and will be done again if necessary”, but it has not been done so often as to put off either undercover police officers or criminals from participating in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, who have willingly engaged on the understanding that, provided you stick to what you have been authorised to do, the CPS is unlikely to prosecute.

There have, no doubt, been rare occasions when a criminal has asked for a written guarantee of immunity and has backed away when it could not be given, but the system has clearly not been seen by the overwhelming majority of those involved—neither the handlers nor the undercover operatives—as unfair or unreasonable, no matter what we might think, otherwise they simply would not do it. In any event, any guarantee of immunity would be conditional only on the CHIS doing precisely what he is authorised to do, which in itself presents problems, as we will see in future groups.

I argue that the potential unintended consequences of what is proposed in the Bill on the question of immunity, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, pointed out, are too high a price to pay just to make us feel better, because we feel it is unfair and unreasonable not to give immunity up front. CHIS engage willingly in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, despite the possibility of prosecution. The proposed solution, to a problem that does not exist, is startling and the potential for abuse obvious, which is why I support the amendments.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who brings experience that none of the rest of us who have spoken in the debate have. It has been a powerful and significant debate. It arises because, under the Bill, a consequence of authorising criminal conduct is that it is rendered “lawful for all purposes”, which creates an immunity both from criminal prosecution and from civil liability for the person carrying out the authorised crime.

As this debate has identified, that gives rise, in effect, to two issues. First, it is a departure from the existing arrangement whereby the effect of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in the third direction case was that the relevant authorities had the power to authorise the criminal conduct, but the power to authorise it did not render it immune from prosecution. In consequence, it was a matter for the relevant prosecutor to determine whether or not the fact that the CHIS was acting in accordance with the authority given to him meant that the CHIS—I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack —should not be prosecuted.

From the point of view of the Government—and very much of this debate—reasons have to be given why that principle is being departed from. The arguments fluctuate between, “It’s a useful power to have, for the prosecutor to determine”, to, “Actually, it makes no difference”. Can the Minister give an authoritative answer to the question why it is immunity now, rather than depending on prosecutorial discretion? In particular, is it because it makes no difference? Has it made a difference in the past and, if so, why is the principle being departed from?

Noble Lords speaking in this debate have asked penetrating questions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, in effect, “Tell us why the policy is being changed.” We on this side of the House want to hear answers to those questions before we make up our minds on this issue. The second and separate issue—here, we believe there is definitely a defect in the Bill—is that the consequence of the “lawful for all purposes” approach is that there is plainly no remedy for the victims of the conduct authorised by the criminal conduct authorisation. That is fundamentally wrong.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have received one request, so far, to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. He is right that there is widespread support for placing the involvement of covert human intelligence sources in crime on a statutory footing. The issue is immunity, to which these amendments are directed. Will the Minister clarify? He says that the change that this Bill brings about around immunity is to provide greater certainty and protection. It is an assertion, but the noble and learned Lord has not produced any evidence about why greater certainty and protection are needed.

The Minister went on to say that noble Lords have accepted that leaving a CHIS under the threat of prosecution is unfair and unreasonable. I do not know whether he was temporarily distracted, or whether he did not understand what I said, at length: while we and the Government may think that it is unfair and unreasonable, clearly CHIS and their handlers, in the overwhelming majority of cases in the past, have not felt that it is unfair and unreasonable, because they have carried out this activity without a promise upfront of immunity from prosecution.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

6: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) In section 27(2) of that Act insert—“(c) is not criminal conduct authorised in accordance with the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2020.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will ensure that victims of crimes authorised under this Bill can seek civil redress.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 6, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.

Section 27(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 states:

“A person shall not be subject to any civil liability in respect of any conduct of his which … is incidental to any conduct”


that, for the purposes of this Bill, is authorised by a criminal conduct authority. Our Amendment 6 removes this immunity from civil liability. My support in the last group should make it absolutely clear to the Committee that I feel that that is the solution to this problem. It would be only in the very unfortunate circumstance that those amendments are not incorporated into the Bill that I would revert to this amendment.

This part of RIPA was intended to deal with the interception of communications. This might involve placing a listening device in a car or a room or intercepting phone calls, text messages or emails. This could be done only if it was authorised in advance by an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and by the relevant Secretary of State, and against only the most serious criminals, such as terrorists. While intercepting communications is a serious matter, the physical or financial harm to the—suspected—very bad person targeted is likely to be minimal.

The criminal conduct authorities—CCAs—under this Bill authorise undercover operatives to commit crimes in which innocent members of the public could be involved and seriously harmed. A frequent scenario in the past would have been recruiting a member of a gang of armed robbers, who was allowed to participate in an armed robbery during which, by either accident or design, the undercover operative working for the police may have harmed the security guard, potentially very seriously.

Noble Lords will also be familiar with—and other noble Lords have already mentioned—undercover police officers befriending and entering into sexual relationships with environmental activists. Despite the Government’s implied promise at Second Reading that such things would never happen again, in fact, what the Government have said is that an undercover operative would never be “authorised” to have sex with someone they were tasked to enter into a relationship with, not that it would never happen again.

There are two clear and distinct issues here, where someone may seek civil damages. One is where the handler authorises a CHIS to engage in a crime in a way that is not lawful, necessary or proportionate. The other is where the CHIS, whether an undercover officer or, potentially, a member of a terrorist group who passes information back to the police, goes beyond the authority of a CCA.  This could be something

“incidental to any criminal conduct”

they have been authorised to do.

An undercover police officer could argue that he had no choice but to become intimately involved with the activist he was tasked to befriend, and that even if the sexual activity was not specifically authorised, it was “incidental to” the conduct that he was authorised to engage in. To grant him, and potentially the police force concerned, immunity from being sued for damages in such circumstances is repugnant. This illustrates that RIPA was never intended for, and is ill suited to, granting immunity under criminal conduct authorities. 

The Government will say that, even if the CHIS evades civil action, the police force that tasked him, for example, will not. However, that seems to be cast into doubt by what the Minister said in the first group about the extent of the immunity granted, in that that immunity would extend also to the person tasking the CHIS. Again, there are two distinct issues with this.  The first is that if the conduct authorised under a CCA is “lawful for all purposes”, it seems to me that the police force, too, is immune from civil action. The second is that—I speak from personal experience in the police service, as others have—racist and sexist behaviour in police forces reduced only when police officers and their police chief found themselves personally liable for their behaviour. If they had not acted in the course of their duties as a constable, the chief constable could deny vicarious liability, and the officer would be personally liable for any damages. It is the threat of legal action, whether criminal or civil, that ensures that handlers and CHISs keep within the law. Removing civil liability from a CHIS would remove another important check on their behaviour.  

We cannot support Amendment 8, for a number of reasons. First, it says that criminal conduct under the authority of a CCA is lawful for the purpose of the criminal law. Clearly, we do not agree with that. As I have argued in the previous group, we do not believe that that should be the case. Secondly, it requires the authorising body to indemnify the CHIS against having civil action taken against him. For the reasons I have just explained, the personal liability of the CHIS in such circumstances is an important check on their behaviour. 

Amendment 71 would allow a complaint to be brought before an Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which may award compensation. But there is normally a time limit of one year after the taking place of the conduct to which the complaint relates, which seriously reduces the scope for compensation to be applied for, compared with the normal seven-year limit for other civil actions. I do, however, believe that the proposal has some merit, and perhaps with further adjustment it may be more acceptable. I beg to move.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with his eloquence and experience. I shall speak to Amendment 8.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This committee scrutinised the Bill, received expert opinion on it and made the report referred to earlier, most recently by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. This report raises many issues of human rights that will need to be teased out and possibly resolved as we go through this Bill.

Amendment 8 is there so that victims of criminal conduct carried out under criminal conduct authorisation can access compensation. This is from paragraphs 104 to 110 in chapter 8 of the report. The report notes that the Bill as introduced is potentially incompatible with human rights legislation. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires the UK to secure the rights of all those within its jurisdiction, including victims of crime. Where crime also amounts to a human rights violation, the victim has a right to an “effective remedy” under Article 13, mentioned earlier. A victim also has a right, under Article 6, to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.

Since the Bill would render all authorised criminal conduct “lawful for all purposes”, it would prevent a victim of authorised crime vindicating their rights by bringing a civil claim for compensation. It would seemingly also prevent a claim for compensation under the criminal injuries compensation scheme.

My amendment mirrors the regime in Australia, which, as the report states,

“provides indemnification for any participant who incurs civil liability in the course of an undercover operation.”

In other words, a civil claim can be brought against the perpetrator by the victim, and compensation secured, but the state will then step in to indemnify the perpetrator against his or her losses. The effect of this provision would be to ensure that the person authorised to carry out criminal conduct

“would not suffer the consequences of civil liability, but it would also ensure that the victim of the conduct would obtain civil redress while secrecy is maintained.”

This Bill has been described as promoting the concept of “one size fits all”, framed more eloquently by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. It is simply not acceptable or possible to do that. In relation to my Amendment 8, I have mentioned specific issues on human rights legislation, which is the core of the report I have quoted today. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am happy to confirm that.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In speaking to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I do not want to get into an argument over who has more respect for whom, but I have the utmost respect for him and his experience as a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. There is a fundamental disagreement he has surfaced with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and me over what was described in a previous group as the tension in the fact that a CHIS committing a crime is potentially subject to criminal prosecution and being sued for civil damages. I note that the noble Lord does not believe that is right, whereas the noble Baroness and I think it is.

Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2020

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister has set out, these statutory instruments are the result of a judicial review heard ultimately in the Supreme Court on 30 January 2019, where it was ruled that the existing rules for criminal record disclosure are incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Claiming victory in the face of defeat, the Government said:

“By making these adjustments we will ensure that vulnerable people are protected from dangerous offenders, while those who’ve turned their lives around or live with the stigma of convictions from their youth are not held back.”


In fact, as my noble friends Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Thomas of Gresford have said, the Government fought this case all the way to the Supreme Court. These changes, which the Government now herald as necessary, reinforce how important the Human Rights Act, judicial review and the independent judiciary are in upholding UK citizens’ rights—all three of which the Government have threatened to undermine.

Of even more concern is that it has taken a judicial review, fought at every stage, to implement changes similar to those first suggested by the Home Office in 2002 and again six years ago by the Independent Parliamentarians’ Inquiry into the Operation and Effectiveness of the Youth Court, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, of which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, was a member.

We all make mistakes, particularly when we are young. As the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, said, it is essential that minor criminal matters do not ruin young people’s chances to get on in life. We support these orders, but we will oppose any attempt to restrict judicial review or to tie the hands of the judiciary.

Lammy Review

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con) [V]]

My Lords, we responded to the Lammy review by publishing in December 2017 our undertakings at implementation. Where a recommendation could not be implemented in full or as set out in the review, alternative approaches have been sought to achieve the same aim. We were clear then as to how we intended to proceed with implementation and we have been consistent and open in reporting against the actions we committed to take in a report in 2018, and more recently in a report of February 2020. We keep under review the report’s aims and make progress on a wide range of areas—indeed, in some areas beyond the Lammy recommendations. But I accept that there is a great deal more to do.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister in the other place suggested that police stop and search has increased from 25% to 40% BME over five years because the police are taking action against knife crime. However, 60% of all stop and searches carried out by the police are for drugs and only 13% for weapons. The Lammy report requires agencies to explain or change. The explanation given for you being almost nine times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white does not hold water. When will the Government require the police to change?

[Lord Keen of Elie [V]]

Clearly, these issues are under continuous review, but we have a particular concern over knife crime and we are bringing forward legislation on serious violence that will oblige responsible bodies in local areas to create a comprehensive plan tailored to their area. Stop and search is just one approach and we expect plans to be drawn up on a wider crime reduction basis.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, on his maiden speech. I look forward to hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, shortly.

I will use the limited time I have to talk about immigration and policing. In the Prime Minister’s introduction to the Government’s background briefing on the Queen’s Speech, he talks about a “fast-track NHS visa” scheme for healthcare professionals. Can the Minister confirm that the NHS will have to pay the immigration skills charge of £1,000 a year for each foreign healthcare professional it employs and that each foreign healthcare professional will have pay £625 a year to use the NHS, neither of which currently applies to EU nationals? What assessment have the Government undertaken of the likely impact of these changes on NHS budgets and on the recruitment of foreign healthcare professionals?

The Prime Minister also talks about an

“Australian-style points-based immigration system”.

Can the Minister explain how such a system will work in relation to auxiliary staff who work in low-paid jobs in the National Health Service, care workers employed in the social care system and foreign nationals employed in the catering and hospitality sectors?

The Prime Minister talks about “making our streets safer” by recruiting 20,000 new police officers. If the number of police officers leaving the service continues at the current rate, the Government will have to recruit more than 40,000 new police officers over the next three years, recruiting at a rate never previously achieved in the history of the police service. Is the Minister aware of the spikes in the rates of police misconduct and police corruption as a result of mass recruitment in the mid-1970s and mid-2000s? What steps are the Government taking to ensure that this does not happen again?

Of course, as the Prime Minister’s predecessor said repeatedly, it is not just about police numbers. British policing is based on consent—on the active support and co-operation of the public acting as the police’s eyes and ears, calling them when they see suspicious activity, passing on information and being witnesses in court. We would need vastly greater numbers of police officers were such co-operation to cease.

Blanket use of Section 60—“suspicionless” stop and search—undermines policing by consent. Only a small proportion of young black men are involved in violent crime, yet Section 60, a power that can be lawfully deployed only in areas with high levels of violent crime, affects a large proportion of young black men, the majority of whom will not be involved in violent crime. Despite a Sunday Times article last weekend casting doubt on the effectiveness of Section 60 and research by the College of Policing showing that stop and search is not effective above relatively low levels, the Government want Section 60 to be used even more, lowering the authority levels required. Today, the BBC published research showing that killings in London have risen every year over the past three years despite massive increases in Section 60 stop and search and higher stop and search rates per head of population than anywhere else in the country. Outside London, where stop and search is used far less, homicides are down for the first time in five years. We cannot arrest our way out of the crisis in violent crime.

The proposed legislation to provide better protections for the survivors of domestic abuse and better support for victims is welcome, but my concern about the royal commission into the criminal justice system is that it provides cover for inaction over the lifetime of this Parliament.

When it comes to immigration and making our streets safer, this Queen’s Speech contains many provisions that do not appear to have been thought through, or where the evidence suggests that they will be ineffective or even counterproductive. They will certainly not compensate for the loss of safety as a result of losing such measures as the European arrest warrant, the reduction in EU workers as a result of abolishing free movement and the other benefits of European Union membership.

We will assiduously scrutinise the Government’s actions and legislation. With a sizeable majority in the other place, there will be no one but the Government to blame when, as the evidence suggests they will, these measures fail to produce their intended outcomes.