Thursday 10th February 2022
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberNationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 82-V(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (9 Feb 2022)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I have listened to all of them with care. With respect to everyone else, I say that I always listen with care to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, in particular, as I think he will appreciate from our exchanges on other matters. I got the impression that voices in support of the Government were a little thin on the ground on this matter, but I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford is not doing these amendments not out of any personal reluctance; it was decided some weeks ago that my assistance on the Bill would include this group, and that is why I am doing it. It is fair to say that she has gone above and beyond on the Bill and others.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, just on that point, I was clearly not suggesting that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, did not deserve a break from her duties; she has been committed to this throughout. I said that I hoped that these parts of the Bill might be the reason, but I was obviously implying that they clearly were not.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I think it might be best if we just moved on from that because, respectfully, I am not sure that it was a particularly good comment in the first place.
The measures in the Bill build on the landmark—it really was landmark—legislation brought in by the future Prime Minister, Theresa May, in 2015. On this occasion, I am very happy to acknowledge that it was brought in by the coalition Government; it was a joint effort. Notwithstanding that I am not a Home Office Minister, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, reminded me on a number of occasions, I can say that the Home Secretary is committed to bringing forward further legislation in the area of modern slavery as a priority, to ensure an efficient and resilient system in tackling modern slavery. That department, which is obviously not mine, will look to introduce those measures when parliamentary time allows.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
In that case, why do we not wait for that legislation and do it comprehensively, rather than put into law things to which there is so much opposition? Does the Minister also accept that, in 2015, a number of really positive changes were made to that Act in your Lordships’ House because the Government chose to listen?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
There were two questions there. Why now? I was going to come to that, because that is a point that the noble Lord made earlier. As to listening to your Lordships’ House, the Government always listen to what goes on in this House. They always listen but they may not always agree.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, I think with some sympathy, referred to me as the “poor Minister” responsible for responding. I am poor in the sense that you do not take this job for the money, I can say that. I also cannot promise the meeting with the Home Secretary. What I can promise is that I will pass on what the noble Baroness said to the relevant people in the home department.
We have heard a number of arguments for removing Clauses 57 and 58 from the Bill. I will deal with those first, because I think that is really the head-on charge that has been put to me. I suggest that these clauses are important provisions to encourage disclosure of information at the earliest stage so we can identify victims and provide them with direct support as early as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, moving the amendment, asked why the provisions were necessary and quoted the former Prime Minister asking why artificial deadlines were required. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol suggested that the clauses would stop people coming forward. Far from deterring victims, these clauses are intended to encourage genuine victims to come forward and get protection and support on the earliest possible occasion.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but how does he see what he is saying as compatible with the statutory guidance issued only this month?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
Of course we have considered the statutory guidance, not least because it comes from the Home Department and was issued this month. With great respect, we do think they are compatible. We do not see any contradiction between the aims of the statutory guidance under the 2015 Act and what we are proposing here. As to who will be served with a notice, individuals who will be served with a slavery and trafficking information notice are those who have previously made a human rights or protection claim in respect of removal or refusal of entry. They are therefore potentially subject to removal action.
The noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, asked: why are we doing this? I think that was then refined to: why are we doing this now? That is pretty simple to state. As I have said, we want to identify genuine victims of modern slavery or trafficking within this group as quickly as possible so that they receive both protection from removal and access to the support given during the recovery period.
This may not be the best form of providing statistics, but the number of those detained in the UK following immigration offences in 2020 was obviously affected by the pandemic. However, even prior to this there was a clear rise in the number of referrals to the national referral mechanism, from 3%—501—in 2017 to 16%—1,767—in 2019. In 2019, only a small proportion, about 1%, of individuals detained in the UK following an immigration offence who made a national referral mechanism referral were returned. We published a report last year providing data on some of the concerns we are seeking to address through the Bill and outlining pressures in the system and where referrals of modern slavery are coming from. The reports are available on the government website but, to make it simpler, I will write to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, with a copy available, with the URL so they can find the relevant material.
I suggest it is right that we reduce the opportunities to misuse the system for immigration purposes and improve the efficiency of the processes, targeting resources where they are most needed to help victims recover from exploitation and rebuild their lives. We want to address concerns that some referrals are being made intentionally late in the process, to frustrate immigration action and divert resources away from legitimate claimants. It is not right that foreign criminals subject to deportation and those who have absolutely no right to remain in the UK can seek to delay their removal by waiting until the very last minute before raising new claims or putting in endless evidence or information relating to their status in the UK. So what Clauses 57 and 58 seek to do is on the one hand ensure that vulnerable victims receive appropriate and timely support, and on the other hand enable investigative and enforcement activities to take place with reasonable dispatch.
I should point out—this did not feature too much in the debate—that Clauses 57 and 58 are underpinned by access to legal advice, under Clauses 65 and 66, to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. As I have said before, a constant theme, particularly in modern slavery measures within the Bill, is that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, taking a needs-based approach. Therefore, turning to Amendments 151D, 152 and 155, it would be wrong in principle to create a carve-out for any one group of individuals, and to create a two-tiered system based either on age or the type of exploitation claimed. I am sure that this is not the intention of those moving the amendments, but, in the real world, which at some point we must think about, it could incentivise individuals to provide falsified information regarding their age or to put forward falsified referrals regarding timings or type of exploitation to delay removal action.
It was interesting, in the course of what was, with respect, a very forceful speech supporting his amendment, that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to 12 or 13 year-olds and not, for example, to a 17 and a half year-old. When it comes to children, if we define children as all under-18s, the approach that we want to take is to ensure that decision-makers have the flexibility to approach the claims of all children of different ages and maturities appropriately, and therefore I suggest that a blanket approach is inappropriate.
By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date—we are not talking about neat files here—we hope to identify those victims at the earliest opportunity. Clauses 57 and 58 have safeguards built in, and I assure in particular the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that, when considering the “reasonable grounds” decision, the decision-makers in the SCA are already well experienced in taking into account the specific vulnerabilities of children. I also point out to the Committee something that the noble and learned Baroness will know but other noble Lords may have forgotten: namely, that at the “reasonable grounds” stage the threshold is lower for children due to there being no requirement to show means of exploitation. That position will not change.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I have been biting my tongue, but the Minister talked about the real world, and I do not think that this Government have any concept of what exists in the real world. The Minister has heard examples from the real world, given by noble Lords who understand what is going on. It is not appropriate for the Minister to talk about the real world when he is denying the stories that he has heard today.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am not denying any stories. I set out statistics earlier on which were absolutely from the real world, and that is the issue that we are dealing with.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for interrupting, but the Minister has cited the statistics that he quoted earlier in answer to the question of why the Government were doing this. He talked about the number of referrals going from 3% to 16%. There could be three explanations for that increase: a rise in modern slavery; more cases being reported, even if modern slavery is not going up; or an increase in misuse. Bearing in mind that the majority of referrals to the national referral mechanism are made by the Home Office, and bearing in mind what he said about very few of the people who are referred being returned— I did not quite get the percentage—it sounds like the majority of those cases are not misuse. What we need are not the statistics that the Minister is relying on but the statistics on how many cases of misuse there are.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I have already said that I will write. I will copy everybody in, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with the relevant data. We can have an interesting discussion about potential explanations for it, but what it shows is that there is a significant increase. The question I was seeking to meet was: why do something now, why not wait until a future Bill? The short answer is that we have a manifesto commitment to deal with immigration and asylum issues. It is right that we address all issues at this stage, but, as I have underlined, this is not the Government’s last word on modern slavery. Now I really want to make some progress or we will be here until 3 am again.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Does the noble Lord not accept that 24% of modern slavery cases are UK nationals and have nothing to do with what the Conservative Party put in its manifesto?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am certainly willing to accept that a significant number of modern slavery victims are UK nationals. I do not know whether it is 24%, off the top of my head, but I am willing to have a look at that and come back to the noble Lord. I want to make some progress now, because I think we are going round the same points again and again.
Coming back to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, all child potential victims of modern slavery in England and Wales will be provided with an independent child trafficking guardian to support them in navigating the immigration and national referral mechanism systems. Decision-makers are obviously trained in making those decisions, and the particular needs of children are an important part of that. In fact, I hope what I have just said responds also to some of the points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol.
Moving to Amendment 153, as the noble Lords, Lord Cashman and Lord Paddick, also recognised, we understand that there will be cases where individuals are unable to comply with a deadline. There might be objective reasons, such as being under coercive control of an exploiter, or subjective ones, such as trauma, mental health issues or mental capacity, which can affect somebody’s ability to recall events. The clauses as drafted provide for this. As I have said on previous groups, we will set out in guidance the details of this approach, giving decision-makers the tools to recognise the effects of exploitation and trauma.
Where a person has raised evidence late, I suggest that it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness. Credibility is not necessarily determinative of the case, should other factors indicate that the individual is a victim or potential victim of modern slavery. Amendment 154 asks what will be defined as a “good reason” for late disclosure. That has deliberately not been defined in the Bill, as setting out a list reduces flexibility. Decision-makers will be able to consider all relevant factors, which may include everything set out in the list in this amendment.
Clause 58 is underpinned by the provision of legal aid, as I have said. Amendment 172A would provide non-means-tested legal advice on all immigration matters to individuals who might not be victims of modern slavery. This amendment is a wide expansion of the legal aid scheme which is entirely uncosted and ignores the Government’s responsibility to use taxpayer funding wisely, in a way that obtains value for money. Such a wholesale expansion of the legal aid scheme would allow anyone claiming that they are a victim of modern slavery, but who might not be, to receive immigration advice with no financial eligibility checks in place. Legal aid for immigration matters is already available for victims of modern slavery who have a positive decision from the national referral mechanism, and the Bill does not change this. This includes ongoing support from the mechanism if required by the victim. Of course, the exceptional case funding scheme is available on top of that.
The intention of Clauses 65 and 66 is to bring advice on the national referral mechanism into scope from the outset. This builds on what is already available by helping unidentified victims who are within the immigration system to enter the mechanism. Without Clause 66, we will miss the opportunity to identify potential victims when they are receiving legal aid on their removal case.
I have two further short points. I listened very carefully to my noble friend Lord Henley, a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Indeed, I appeared before that committee I think only last week. I have read the report carefully. It is on the Bench with me—it is a thumbed copy, not just a copy from the Royal Gallery. I hope I have set out the reasons for the Government’s approach, even if I apprehend that I may not have convinced him of their correctness.
Finally, I will ensure that the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is passed on. My understanding—and I am newer here than she is—is that a decision on whether and when to repeat an Urgent Question taken in the Commons is for the usual channels. Even if I were a Home Office Minister, and I am not, I could not help on that further.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am impressed by the Minister’s argument that the intention is benevolent, but how does he square that with the opening point of the powerful speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss: that the whole voluntary sector is convinced that this is damaging and unhelpful? As for his criticism that Amendment 154 would limit flexibility, could he reread the amendment and note that the opening line includes the phrase
“include, but are not limited to”
in respect of the list of reasons? In other words, it deliberately retains flexibility.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I reply to his points in reverse order. On the second, of course I appreciate that it is a non-exhaustive list. The point I was making is that even a non-exhaustive list is more prescriptive, when it comes to court, than absolute discretion. When you are arguing a case, even if the statute says A, B, C, D, E on a non-exhaustive basis, you are in greater trouble coming along with F, than if the discretion is free-standing. That is the point I was seeking to make.
Of course, my colleagues in the Home Office engage carefully with the commissioner and other entities in the voluntary sector. Ultimately, it is for the Government to decide what legislation to bring before the House.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I want to deal with Urgent Questions again, because the Minister answered a different question from mine. I asked why it was advertised so late. He may not know this, but the Greens are excluded from the usual channels, so we would have no way of knowing.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
At this point, all I can do is pass that on, and I will.
Lord Paddick (LD)
On Amendment 172A, I think the Minister said that victims of modern slavery already have access to legal advice, once the national referral mechanism has made an initial decision. If he looks at that amendment carefully, he will see it is entitled “pre-national referral mechanism advice”.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Lord is absolutely right, which is why I was making the point about it being a fundamental extension of the legal aid system, which is uncosted.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to this incredibly important debate. It lasted just over an hour, so I will be brief to allow us to move on; otherwise, we could have a huge debate again in me responding to the Minister. I am sure many of the same points will, quite rightly, come up in the other groups. I hope noble Lords understand and accept that.
I will reiterate the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. It is interesting to note that, when a Government are in trouble, they defend themselves against everybody. You know when a Government are in difficulty because they resort to exactly the sort of defence—quite rightly; I have done it myself—that the Minister resorted to: “If only you understood the statistics and appreciated the difficulties”. That officialdom then rains on everything. When everybody else thinks you are wrong, you usually are. I gently suggest to the Government that they have got this wrong.
I am pleased the Minister was honest about this and I thank him for his response. It is clear the Government think the system is being abused and that people are claiming to be victims of modern slavery, either straightaway or late in the day. The Government are determined to shut down this loophole in the system. That is what is going on and it is why the danger that all of us raised about including modern slavery in an immigration Bill or the Nationality and Borders Bill—whatever you want to call it—sets a context that is difficult for modern slavery, to put it mildly.
All that I would say to the Minister is that even if the Government are right in saying that there is a problem here, by trying to deal with the issue as an immigration offence, which is essentially what they are doing, they are driving a coach and horses through the principles of the Modern Slavery Act. That is why people are so upset about it, so disappointed about it, so angry about it and so frustrated about it. They accept that the Government have to deal with immigration and that there are difficulties but this country has been proud of the way in which we deal with victims of modern slavery. Treating them, as they will be, as potential immigration offenders will change the dynamic. There are victims who we do not know and have no idea who they are. Children, whether they are 17 and a half or 13 are going to be impacted. As a consequence of what the Government are doing, innocent victims are going to be penalised in the name of tackling the problem of immigration. That is why people are so disappointed.
In conclusion, I say to the Minister that it must come to something when large numbers of the governing party as well as all the other parties that make up this House, including organisations of all faiths, are arraigned against this measure, along with all the voluntary sector, including the Government’s own voluntary organisation, the Salvation Army. I should have thought that that would have given the Government pause for thinking that maybe they have not got this quite right. Let us hope that between now and Report that they do so, otherwise I can foresee real problems on Report with respect to the clause and the other clauses in Part 5. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. The amendments in large part concern provisions around the identification of modern slavery and trafficking victims.
First to speak was my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, who sought an explanation for Clause 59. The clause places the conclusive grounds threshold of a “balance of probabilities” into legislation. This is in line with the threshold that is currently applied and accepted by the courts and aligns with our current obligations under the treaty to which a number of speakers have referred: the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings —ECAT.
We submit that to remove this provision, as Amendment 156 would, would cause an inconsistent approach towards the two thresholds: the reasonable grounds threshold would be contained within legislation, whereas the conclusive grounds threshold would remain only in guidance. By legislating for both thresholds, decision-makers are able to rely on clear precedent and the process is both certain and ascertainable. This search for clarity will run through and inform the answers I will put before the Committee in this debate.
Amendments 156A and 156B from the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, would amend the test for a reasonable grounds decision in legislation. The matter of whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that an individual is a victim is the appropriate threshold —again, as it mirrors our obligations under ECAT. For those reasons, I cannot accept Amendments 156, 156A and 156B.
I shall expand on matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, touching first on the ability that exists in legislation for people to challenge a decision made. Multiagency assurance panels are required to review all negative conclusive grounds decisions made by the competent authority for all cases submitted to the relevant competent authority. Multiagency assurance panels do not review negative reasonable grounds decisions. The role of multiagency assurance panels and the processes they follow are set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales promulgated under Section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. There is equivalent non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland; it is not found in primary legislation. The guidance states:
“An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may request reconsideration”
of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority
“if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case, or there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with guidance.”
The final conclusive grounds decision remains the responsibility of the competent authority. Multiagency assurance panels do not have the ability to overturn negative conclusive grounds decisions made by the competent authority. The competent authority can be asked to review a case where there is concern that the decision has not been made in line with existing guidance; that, in the view of the multiagency assurance panel, that would add value and clarity but has not been sought; or that the evidence provided and used in the decision-making process was not weighed appropriately and considered. So an element of its ability to reconsider and discretion remains in place.
I think the whole Committee will be aware that understanding of the painful effects of trauma and suffering on individuals and their ability to recollect is developing and has developed considerably over recent years, as a better comprehension of these strains and pressures comes to be understood. That understanding filters into this field, as into others. In particular, I refer your Lordships to understanding in the criminal justice system as to why people may make declarations or give statements that are not in their best interests or that they subsequently seek to go back on.
This topic seems to inform the points raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and my noble friend Lord Deben. Victims may well not want or be able to relive their trauma to state officials. Moulded by forces that those of us who have been happy enough to lead comfortable and sheltered lives can barely comprehend, they may find state officials intimidating.
Will the policy inhibit such people and impact adversely their ability to come forward and speak up? We recognise that some victims of exploitation may be fearful of coming forward to talk to the authorities, including some of the organisations that operate as first responders. That is why a range of organisations operate as first responders, including charities—some of which the Committee has heard about—that work closely with victims and local authorities.
We are keen to ensure that potential victims of trafficking are identified as early as possible and are supporting this with an improved legal aid offer for victims of trafficking with no immigration status within the United Kingdom and subject to immigration removal. This is to ensure that individuals receive the correct support package at the earliest opportunity to address their needs, regardless of when cases are brought, to make sure that those who need protection are afforded it.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, the Minister is dealing with these issues with great sensitivity and I welcome the tone of his remarks. He has—I think deliberately—left a number of questions hanging, saying that a lot of work is being done on this and that people are considering these sensitive and detailed questions and looking at them more thoroughly. This all begs the question: who has demanded this change in this legislation at this time, in advance of us having detailed information laid before us?
It seems that we have it the wrong way around. Given that his noble friend said earlier that there will be a Bill specifically to improve the modern-day slavery legislation, why cannot we hold this over until we see more clearly where the information is wrong, where it is right and what the evidence is? Is it not the nature of good government to look and examine the evidence before bringing measures forward? I do not see any evidence that this has happened so far.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I do not wish to appear to give a cursory answer to the noble Lord in a debate of this sensitivity, but my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar committed to write on the data—I am grateful to the noble Lord for nodding his head in recognition. I imagine that the point he seeks to raise will be discussed in any such correspondence. Does that satisfy him at this stage?
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister, but it seems to be the wrong way around. Normally, there is pre-legislative scrutiny of complex and sensitive issues, and this is a classic example where there should have been pre-legislative scrutiny, as there was before the 2015 legislation, in some detail and at some length. Why was it thought that in a Bill dealing specifically, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, with nationality, borders and immigration, we should deal with an issue of this sensitivity? Would it not be better for the Government to withdraw this section of the Bill and come back with comprehensive legislation that we could all support?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I hear the points that the noble Lord makes. With respect, it seems that he moves forward into a question already put to my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar when he stood at the Dispatch Box in relation to the earlier matter. As he advised the Committee, the Government are concerned about misuse of the system. Rather than seeking to anticipate data that I confess not to having, with the noble Lord’s permission, I will move on from this point. I am again grateful to him for nodding his head.
I was expanding to the Committee on matters raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. We recognise that potential victims may not feel able at an early point to discuss information relevant to these matters bearing on their experience. That is why, in Clause 58, we have included the safeguard of “good reasons”. Each case will be considered carefully, including any reasons for not bringing information earlier, which will enable decision-makers to take trauma into account.
I am sure that I am merely rehearsing matters already within the knowledge of the Committee, but examples of what may constitute good reasons for late disclosure of information include where the victim was still under the coercive control of the trafficker, did not recognise themselves as a victim at that point, or for reasons relating to capacity—intellectual, emotional or age capacity—did not understand the requirement or the proceedings.
We will set out our approach in guidance, giving decision-makers the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall or share or recognise such events. We are concerned that by too prescriptively setting out the parameters of what can constitute good reasons in guidance, we will inhibit the flexibility of decision-makers to take a case-by-case approach, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar sought to emphasise in his submission to the Committee earlier, depending on a person’s specific situation and vulnerabilities.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am anxious not to delay matters but to seek clarification at this stage. A number of noble Lords have raised concerns about why the burden of proof has been changed and the fact that, through this higher standard, a number of victims may not enter the system at all. I cannot believe it is the Government’s wish to prevent genuine victims of modern slavery and trafficking to be excluded from the process. My noble and learned friend gave a simple, clear clarification that it was to make the bar the same for both, but the fallout, in the view of legal opinion from practitioners who will be using this on a daily basis, seems to be that we will inadvertently exclude justified victims from the whole process. I cannot believe that this is the Government’s intention, where they are genuine victims.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for her intervention, which permits me the opportunity of not only repeating what I said from the Dispatch Box earlier about the importance of decisions being taken on a case-by-case basis, but advising the House—perhaps I should have done so in answering the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—that in addition we are providing enhanced support and training to first responders.
The rationale underpinning the change proposed in relation to burdens of proof is certainly not to seek to exclude persons who ought to receive help and assistance from receiving it. The Government’s wish is that all who are victims should receive assistance and all who are criminal should receive their due punishment.
Lord Deben (Con)
If that is the rationale, I do not see why we need the change. I seriously do not understand what possible advantage changing this could be, whereas I perfectly clearly see what the disadvantage is. Although the Minister seeks in the most effective way to present the Government’s case, the word “rationale” is not one I would have used I these circumstances.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My noble friend sends me back to the dictionary. I shall include the use of that word in my reading later, among the other things which I expect I will be asked to reflect on. I think we are—or maybe I am—guilty of mixing up two things. The reason for the change to the test to introduce the balance of probabilities is to align ourselves with our international obligations under ECAT. It is in order to avert any baneful consequences thereof that I made reference to the enhanced support and training which first responders will receive, and to the other measures which I discussed.
Lord Deben (Con)
I am sorry; I will not interrupt again. I still do not understand the rationale of bringing ourselves into line with our international obligations. We do not break our international obligations by going further than the international obligations, so we are already in line with them; all we are doing is withdrawing to what are, in many of our minds, unsatisfactory international obligations. Without getting into the Brexit issue, I very much agree with the right reverend Prelate when he suggested that we thought this was precisely what the Government did not want to do. I happen to want to do it but that is a different thing. I feel rather hit by this in both ways.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
The justification is to ensure clarity across the legislation, and I appreciate the comment made by the right reverend Prelate, and rehearsed by my noble friend, about advantages flowing or not from the Brexit process, which so many of your Lordships will have discussed. However, our ability to act differently from our partners across the channel is a valuable one, but what we seek to obtain by this measure is legislative clarity and a consistency in decision-making which will, we hope, benefit victims and develop understanding among all the agencies in this important sector. My noble friend is resuming his mask, and he did say that he would not interrupt again, although I hope that he will not bar himself from further interventions later in the debate.
I turn to Amendment 157, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank him for his powerful and compelling opening contribution to this debate and to earlier debates on the topic, and for his work at Nottingham University. I offer the Committee reassurance that we are committed to providing victims with at least a 45-day recovery period, or until a conclusive grounds decision is made, whichever period is the longer. Our position is—I maintain that this does not need to be placed on the face of the Bill, and I return to the earlier discussions with my noble friend Lord Deben—that it would create a misalignment with our international obligations under ECAT.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I thank the Minister for all of that, and the commitment to 45 days. Why does it say 30 days in the Bill? Have I got that wrong?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
No, I think the noble Lord is correct. It is 30 days for the alignment with ECAT, but the 45 days appears in the guidance, and we commit to providing support over that period: a 45-day recovery period as expressed in the guidance, or until a conclusive grounds decision is made.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
So there is an absolute commitment to 45 days for the gap between reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds, even though legislation which we are going to pass says 30 days?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
The noble Lord shrugged his shoulders, but I repeat that the justification for this is to align with our international obligations with our partners in ECAT.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this did not stop us passing the Modern Slavery Act, which was ahead of the rest of the world.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Can I join the maskless crew? Surely international law, and certainly EU directives, are usually a minimum requirement, so if we wanted 45 days and a European instrument said 30, that is brilliant; it is better. It at least complies, so what is the problem?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I hear from all sides of the Chamber, including from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—
Noble Lords
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
Sorry, I do not mean once again from the Dispatch Box to rain brickbats upon the noble Baroness’s head.
Once again, I am not in a position to answer or explain myself on the basis of views taken by the Climate Change Committee, but in this context alignment with our ECAT partners was considered desirable.
I move on to Clause 60, which sets out the minimum time for the recovery period in line with our international obligations under ECAT. It provides us with the flexibility to set the operational practice as needed in guidance, which is important to reflect the changing needs of victims and the understanding of victims’ needs in a developing area of law.
In practice, in 2020 the average time for a conclusive grounds decision was 339 days. This long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project to ensure that victims get certainty more quickly, but it is notably longer than the proposed 45-day minimum.
In light of this explanation and the assurance of continuation of the current support set out in guidance, I hope that noble Lords in the Committee agree that Amendment 157 to Clause 60 is unnecessary. I urge noble Lords to take the view that promotes clarity and to consider that the objective of making sure that we are aligned with our international obligations is such to prompt the noble Lord not to press this amendment.
Amendment 173, again from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to introduce victim navigators for modern slavery and human trafficking victims in every police force in England and Wales. This matter was discussed in the Commons during the passage of the Bill. As was expressed on behalf of the Government, we are absolutely committed to ensuring that victims of modern slavery have the support they need when engaging with the police and through the criminal justice process.
As to the development that the noble Lord from the Front Bench advised the Committee of—that of victim navigators—we strongly support police forces using these NGO-led support models. Victim navigators are one model within that category. For that reason, we have commissioned independent research of three existing NGO victim support programmes, to help us better to understand what provision is in place and what effective support looks like for these victims. This will help inform advice to forces in the future about best practice and encourage national take-up of the most effective models of support. I also agree with the sentiment behind this proposed new clause that providing support to victims to help them navigate is something that can be studied and will inform advice to forces in future about best practice. We are already working to understand the most effective support measures, and we have made grant funding available to police forces and the GLAA to help identify and fill gaps in support.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his nods of assent and for agreeing that the work already under way should be completed and will help us to develop an understanding of how best we can support victims in engaging with the criminal justice system. It is right that we conduct that evaluation before putting a specific model of support into legislation. That is why I resist this amendment at this time and invite the noble Lord not to press it.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, it has been an excellent debate. I thank everyone for their contributions. I think there may be a question outstanding from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as regards children under the age of 18, but I take it as read that anyone aged under 18 would still be referred to the local authorities. I assume that my noble and learned friend will write to us if that is not the case.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for that, and I beg the pardon of the noble and learned Baroness for not addressing her question directly. If she is content, I will have that expressed in writing to her.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has endeavoured to be as full as possible in his response to all noble Lords. I express my disappointment that the guidelines are being changed in the way the Government envisage. I am slightly confused, because a lot of the situations for which this Bill makes provision would not have arisen if we had kept our international and European responsibilities under the Dublin convention, whereby we could have returned many asylum seekers to the first country in which they arrived.
It is a regrettable change. I do not think my noble and learned friend disagreed that a number of victims will be omitted from the system as a result. I will consider with others what to do at the next stage, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Dubs (Lab)
My Lords, again, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I shall speak very briefly. I should say how much I appreciate the contributions made by my noble friend Lord Coaker, by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who is on the Joint Committee with me, and by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in her very powerful remarks.
Many years ago—if I may tell a little anecdote—I heard of a certain conversation that took place in the Home Office when an official was told by her boss to justify a certain position. The official said, “But that is indefensible”. Her boss said, “Yes, of course—defending the defensible is easy. You’re paid to defend the indefensible”. I say that as a word of comfort to the Minister, who is defending the indefensible. He knows it, we know it and the officials know it—and I suppose he has to do it, unless he does what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, did and decides to distance himself from it.
I will say this very briefly. I find it hard to remember, and keep needing to remind myself, that we are talking about Part 5 of a Bill about modern slavery. Some of these issues are so remote from the rest of the Bill, as has already been said. The amendments to which I have put my name are concerned about a number of things. One is public safety and security. The amendments seek to get the right balance between public safety and security, which of course is important, and the rights of individuals who seek safety in this country. I contend that the Government, particularly in Clause 62, have got the balance quite wrong.
As the right reverend Prelate has already said, some of the people who are victims of traffickers or slavery are under threat; they are fearful, and the fact is that some of them at least will have been compelled to take up the position that they have taken up. We should respect that. These are frightened and anxious people, who are not secure and who do not know this country at all well. They may have been in this country for some time, or they may not have been, but they do not feel all that secure. We have to be sensitive to their situation, and I contend that what the Government are doing in this section, particularly in Clause 62, is to show insensitivity to some very vulnerable people—which is why I hope they will get rid of this provision, which does not make any sense at all.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, in opening from the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made a number of points in relation to the position of the Government in relation to the one-nation Conservative tradition, if I may put it like that. I will preface my remarks to the Committee by saying that, just as with our then coalition partners the Conservatives were in the forefront of dealing with the issue of modern slavery, so we were, hundreds of years ago, in dealing with the issue of slavery, as it then stood. Where slavery exists, Conservatives will always be found in the forefront of any attempts to confront it.
In relation to Clause 61, there is currently no policy on whether, or in what circumstances, individuals should or should not receive additional recovery periods under the national referral mechanism. Clause 61 addresses this gap by introducing a power to withhold additional recovery periods where an individual has already benefited from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism, unless appropriate circumstances are set forth. This is not an attempt to create two tiers, however it may be read; rather, it is an attempt to put into legislation appropriate controls against misuse, where that misuse takes place.
Amendment 158 seeks to remove this power if any of the incidents of exploitation occurred when the individual was under 18 years of age. I seek first to reassure the Committee that the provision may be applied only when the further positive reasonable grounds decision arises from things done wholly before the previous reasonable grounds decision was made. Therefore, this power does not apply in cases of re-trafficking.
From the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, like other noble Lords at an earlier stage, raised the question of why these provisions appear on the face of an immigration Bill. It is because there are overlaps between immigration and modern slavery, which the Bill recognises and seeks to address, but it also goes further in providing clarification on people’s entitlement.
As I said in relation to the previous grouping, and as I am sure we will all have occasion to say again, the complex nature of exploitation, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, identified in his opening speech and at other times in this debate, and the potential resulting safeguarding needs, particularly for children, are recognised by the Government. This clause is designed to allow for discretion in how decision-makers apply the disqualification, ensuring that the welfare of children will be taken into account. This discretion is an important part of our needs-based approach to the provision of support, and in the circumstances there is no need for the carve-out that the amendment proposes.
Moving on to Amendment 159, while we understand the intention behind this amendment, the existing discretionary element strikes the right balance between allowing decision-makers flexibility to grant additional recovery periods and preventing the misuse of the NRM protections to which I referred. Decision-makers will be able to consider the vulnerabilities and circumstances of the individual.
Turning to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to Clause 62, as noble Lords have outlined, ECAT envisages that recovery periods should be withheld on grounds of public order and improper claims. However, ECAT does not include a definition of “public order” and, to date, that omission has hindered our ability to disqualify suitable individuals in practice. The question was posed of whether the provision as it stands might impede operational decisions in relation to prosecution, but I submit that these decisions would be taken at all times in relation to that developing understanding of the pressures and difficulties. I fully appreciate that I am understating those things by using those expressions. Those pressures and difficulties are upon persons who are victims of modern slavery or human trafficking.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister. In Clause 62, the phrase “bad faith” seems extraordinarily ambiguous. Can he clarify that? What jurisprudence does this phrase come from and on what basis will it be interpreted in the courts?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. I was proposing to deal later with the expression “bad faith” and its source, but, to help him at this stage, it is not drawn from any comparable legislation, nor from the authority of the courts. We do not hark back to that. Rather, the nature of the problems that must be confronted in relation to this is sufficiently protean and diverse that a need was identified to arrive at a broad expression in the Bill, and “bad faith” was the language selected after consideration among Ministers and officials to represent that.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but I now realise that he has now moved on from Clause 61 and is talking about Clause 62. I was wondering whether he was going to answer my point about incompatibility with the ECHR memorandum. That says that
“where the person’s previous conclusive grounds decision was negative, the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2) of ECAT.”
However, you are not protecting them from removal in the meantime under Article 61, as far as I can see, so how is the Bill compatible with the ECHR memorandum?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
If the noble Baroness will bear with me, I will seek to get an answer to that question that I can deliver in the course of the debate—doubtless the Committee will remind me if I have not reverted to the noble Baroness by the time I sit down.
Amendments 160 and 162 do not define “exceptional circumstances” or “serious and ongoing” threat in relation to withholding protection from removal. As such, our view is that they would risk undermining the clarity which this clause seeks to provide and would make the power very difficult to use, meaning that potentially dangerous individuals would continue to receive the generous protections afforded by the NRM.
On Amendment 160A, Clause 62 specifies that disqualification applies when in the interests of national security, but it is right that the Government should also be able to withhold protections from individuals who pose a threat to public order more broadly, including where they have been convicted of serious criminal offences or have made a claim in bad faith, to use the expression that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred me to. I say that “bad faith” is appropriate in these circumstances because it is so broad and because it comprises so many aspects.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I want to intervene briefly on the “good faith” and “bad faith” point, in case it is of assistance to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others. Concepts such as “good faith” and bad faith” are commonly used in civil and commercial matters; we understand that. In contracting matters, it is incumbent on parties to act in good faith, subject to the deal they have done with each other. Why I think the Committee is so concerned about what the Minister called the protean nature of the phrase here is that this is human rights protection, and we cannot afford to be protean or vague in the same way that we can when we are talking about how we enter into a contract. This is life and death.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
The point I was seeking to make by that expression is, I think, the same one that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar made earlier, when he spoke about this—it is as familiar to the noble Baroness as a practising barrister as it is to me, and I think it was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If we have a list that sets out heads A to E, and then counsel attempts to rely on point F which is not otherwise comprehended, or not specifically enumerated but which may be comprehended within the expression “or any other circumstance”, that always—as my noble friend Lord Wolfson said—places counsel at a disadvantage.
On the threats, or potential threats, and the potential scope for abuse which lie within the power of a person seeking to exploit and make a false application under these circumstances, what we are seeking to do is to identify a phrase or term which is sufficiently wide to encompass all those potential points. Noble Lords in the Committee have identified, under reference to the traffickers and criminals whom it is the intention of the entire Committee to thwart, their cunning, resilience and resourcefulness in finding ways to slip between the cracks of aspects of legislation.
Amendment 169 does not provide a definition of “public order”. I reassure the Committee that we adhere to relevant provisions in our international obligations but it is unnecessary to specify that in legislation, and we are satisfied that the current definition of public order complies with ECAT.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering proposes that we replace the “bad faith” provision with one of “improper claims”. That proposal can be addressed in conjunction with Amendment 163, which seeks to remove the bad faith provision entirely. Another reason for the expression “bad faith”, and its breadth, is to avoid inadvertently excluding administrative mistakes made when submitting claims, which may be interpreted as falling under “improper claims”. We believe that “bad faith” is the appropriate language.
In answer to submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, under Amendments 169, 161 and 164, which seek to exclude children from this clause, ECAT does not specify an age limit. We deem it important that the United Kingdom maintains the full scope while ensuring that all decisions to withhold the protections of the NRM are balanced against our priority to safeguard children. The proposal set out in these amendments would create, in effect, a two-tiered system that could encourage those looking to misuse the NRM protections to provide falsified information regarding their age. We all sat late enough the other night in relation to the age amendment provisions elsewhere in the Bill for me not to wish to go into that area again, but we are concerned lest the proposals in the amendment provide an opportunity for persons to provide falsified information.
In relation to Amendment 168, the Government are aware that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may already have been convicted of serious offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity. I make it clear that neither the additional recovery period nor the public order disqualifications can be taken as being a blanket disqualification. Any decisions relating to disqualifications will be taken on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. This includes consideration as to the nature of any criminal exploitation that may have been made of them and the need to safeguard individuals. We think it is right that further details of how to apply this discretionary element should be set out in guidance for decision-makers rather than being placed in the Bill. That will give the Government the flexibility to meet the needs of victims and respond to changing patterns of criminal activity that may seek opportunities to misuse the NRM.
We do not consider that Clause 62 will present a barrier to people who have had convictions and prevent them coming forward, because of that discretionary approach and because there will not be a blanket disqualification on the basis of public order. All of us—the whole Committee, I am sure—want victims of modern slavery to continue to come forward for identification and support, irrespective of their personal circumstances or the circumstances in which they came to be exploited. However, we maintain that it is right that the Government can remove individuals who pose a threat to public order from the protections and support that the NRM affords.
Together with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, was concerned lest such victims did not come forward if they had criminal convictions. First responders should still always refer victims into the national referral mechanism, in line with modern slavery statutory guidance, even where the individual has had a previous recovery period or has a criminal conviction. Decision-makers trained in the field will then carefully consider each individual case and take into account specific vulnerabilities and the needs of each individual, again on a case-by-case basis.
The recovery period may be withheld following a reasonable grounds decision, and the rights that flow from a conclusive grounds decision may also be withheld at that stage if relevant disqualifications apply. I emphasise that we will carefully consider each individual case to ensure that people who genuinely need protection and support will receive it. I reiterate that it is right that we should be able to withhold rights from individuals where appropriate—for example, from those who pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom.
I return to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The protections of the NRM will be withheld in accordance with Clause 61 only when so to do would be compliant with our international obligations—
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I am glad to hear that the Government want to comply with our international obligations—some of us feel that that is not entirely evident from the Bill—but I was asking about compatibility with the European convention against trafficking. Clause 61 allows “a competent authority” to remove someone even when a conclusive grounds decision is pending. I am sorry to repeat myself, but the European Convention on Human Rights memorandum, produced presumably by the Home Office for the Bill, says at paragraph 76.d:
“the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2)”.
That is not what Clause 61 does; it allows the Government to remove the person. They are not “protected from removal” pending a new conclusive grounds decision, so the ECHR memorandum and the Bill are in direct contradiction. Can the Minister take further advice and answer that point? If he cannot do so today, I am sure that he will be able to write to me. I am pretty sure that this was identified by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is why we wanted to change “must” determine the person’s removal to “may”, so that there is wiggle room that might be in compliance with ECAT. On the face of it, I cannot see that this provision is compliant, notwithstanding the assertion in the memorandum that it is.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
The noble Baroness graciously affords me the possibility of replying perhaps in more detail and later. Unless I have further information to provide to her, I propose to take that course. I am obliged to her for her consideration.
In relation to how to assess whether a person is involved in terrorism-related activity or is otherwise a national security concern, the Government have extensive experience of assessing these things, together with our operational partners, and using these assessments to inform executive decision-making.
Whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is a crucial part of consideration for public order disqualification. Amendment 165 would weaken the United Kingdom’s ability to withhold protections from people of terrorism concern, and we therefore consider that it would increase the risk to the national security of the UK.
Regarding Amendment 166, NRM referrals for foreign national offenders and foreign nationals held on remand are rising, with an average of 85 per month for the first five months of 2021, compared to 19 per month in 2018. It is right that foreign nationals who have been convicted of the serious offences referred to in Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 should be included within scope for consideration of the public order disqualification. This ensures that we will have a clear definition provided for in legislation to support decisions.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, in the interests of time, let me just say respectfully to the noble Lord, Lord McColl, whose amendments I have signed, that I very much support him and the arguments and points that he made so well. We look forward to the Minister’s response. I pay tribute to the doughty work the noble Lord has done over a number of years to try to move the Government in what many of us regard as a simple and sensible way forward. Let us hope.
I shall speak to my Amendment 171AA. Clause 64 provides for limited leave to remain
“if the Secretary of State considers it is necessary for the purpose of (a) assisting the person in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm … (b) enabling the person to seek compensation”—
unless this can be done outside the UK
“or (c) enabling the person to co-operate”
with law enforcement. The standard, however, does not meet the UK’s obligation to children under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking. Article 14.2 of ECAT specifies that in the case of children, residence permits
“shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child.”
Paragraph 186 of the Explanatory Report to ECAT explains that
“the child’s best interests take precedence”.
Amendment 171AA, which is a probing amendment, simply asks why the Government cannot include leave to remain where children are protected and where it is in the best interest of the child.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, in consideration of the flight of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, I start by addressing Amendment 171B. ECAT sets clear parameters around when a signatory state is obliged to grant a residence permit to confirmed victims, which is where it considers that the stay is necessary either due to the confirmed victim’s personal situation or for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in an investigation or criminal proceedings. The Government have gone further than this and provided for a grant of leave not only on both of these bases, but also where it is necessary to enable a confirmed victim to seek compensation in respect of their exploitation.
A temporary leave provision is deliberately designed to allow for leave to be provided for as long as needed, where appropriate. It will be considered on a case-by-case basis and does not set an arbitrary time period. To specify a length of leave does not follow our overall approach of having a truly needs-based approach to addressing victim support. If it is necessary for leave to be granted for longer than 12 months in order to pursue a thorough investigation, or where an individual’s personal circumstances require it, leave can and should be granted.
I turn next to Amendments 169A, 170 and 170A. In Clause 63 we have sought to define the support entitlement during the recovery period for potential victims following a positive reasonable-grounds decision. Amendment 169A, however, would remove clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision-makers and reduce the effectiveness of the clause in supporting victims. Our approach to the wording of Clause 63 has been chosen specifically to provide more detail on the circumstances in which support is provided, while being in line with our international obligations. Our approach is not to go into detail on the types of support provided for in legislation, as Amendment 170A suggests, but to do this in guidance, the purpose being to ensure flexibility in our approach in future, so this can be tailored to victims’ needs as our understanding of trauma develops. I refer your Lordships to remarks made earlier in the debate that understanding the impact and the effect of trauma on individuals is an ongoing and developing thing.
Further to this, and in response to a matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, where necessary, all those who receive a positive conclusive-grounds decision and are in need of tailored support will receive appropriate individualised support for a minimum of 12 months. We committed to this in the other place and will consider where and how this commitment is delivered to ensure that it delivers best for victims. More details will be provided in guidance or in future modern slavery legislation, should parliamentary time allow. My noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich has been given that assurance by the Home Office Minister. The Home Office and, in particular, my noble friend Lady Williams are keen to continue working with the noble Lord on the implementation of this policy.