Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

151D: Clause 57, page 61, line 31, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may not serve a slavery or trafficking information notice on any person who— (a) is aged 17 or younger, or(b) was aged 17 or younger at the time they were a potential victim of slavery or human trafficking on the basis of which they have made a protection claim or human rights claim.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would exclude children from the provisions of Clause 57.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register as a research fellow at University of Nottingham, in the Rights Lab, and as a trustee of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I hope that can be noted as we go through this part of the Bill, rather than me saying it at the beginning of every group of amendments, if that is in order.

Part 5 of the Bill deals with modern slavery. There are a couple of things to say before I turn to my amendment and some of the other amendments in this large group. It is sad to see modern slavery in what is essentially an immigration, refugee and asylum Bill. That is to be regretted. Notwithstanding that, it is in this Bill, and we have a large number of amendments and important issues to discuss.

I regret much of what is in Part 5, given that one of the iconic achievements of any Government over the last few decades was that of the Conservative Government under David Cameron, with Theresa May as Home Secretary and then as Prime Minister: the Modern Slavery Act. As a Labour politician, I was pleased and proud to support it. It was a fantastic achievement, and a model for the rest of the world, and indeed the rest of the world has followed it. That should be set down as a marker in this place. I hope that the right honourable Member for Maidenhead, the former Prime Minister, hears loud and clear what I think the vast majority, if not all, of this House believe with respect to the Modern Slavery Act.

I find it therefore somewhat difficult to understand why the Government have come forward with a number of proposals which undermine some of the basic principles upon which that Modern Slavery Act was established. Clauses 57 and 58 put victims on a deadline to give information or evidence and penalise them for late disclosure. They take no account of the realities faced by victims of slavery and trafficking, and will make it harder for victims to access support.

Like much in this Bill, the starting point for the Minister must be why the Government are doing this. What evidence is there of a real problem here that needs urgently to be tackled? There is none—I cannot find it. I can see no explanation from the Government for why they are doing this, other than a belief that part of the modern slavery legislation—the national referral mechanism, or whatever you want to call it—is being abused and misused by those who seek asylum or get into this country using the devious route of claiming to be victims of slavery when they are not. Where is the evidence for that? Where are the statistical points that the Government can use to show us the scale of the problem, to say that this is what is happening, and that this is why we must deal with it?

This goes to the heart of the problem. I do not know what the politically correct term is, but the Government have set up this target to justify legislation and legislative change on the basis of attacking some mythical statistical problem—“We have to do this to deal with that”. The first thing to know is what has caused the Government to believe there is such a problem that they need this to deal with it. From memory, about one-third of referrals to the national referral mechanism are from British citizens, so you start to wonder.

Those are the parameters of the debate. I will return to many of those themes as we go through Part 5.

It is very unclear what problem the Government are trying to fix with these changes and what is gained by the clauses, because the cost of them is stark. We look forward to the Minister justifying that at the beginning of his remarks. What assessment have the Government done on the impact that these provisions, if passed unamended, will have on the national referral mechanism?

Clause 57(3) suggests that a slavery and trafficking notice will be used even before a reasonable grounds decision can be made, putting up barriers before a victim has taken even their first step into the national referral mechanism. Can the Minister explain if that is the case? Is that the purpose of Clause 57(3)?

At Second Reading, the former Prime Minister Theresa May said:

“It takes time for many victims of modern slavery to identify as a victim, let alone be able to put forward the evidence to establish that.”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/7/21; col. 728.]


This is not from some wild, middle-class liberal or a person who is blinded by the belief that refugees, asylum seekers and those fleeing modern slavery can do no wrong; the former Prime Minister of this country outlined one of the deficiencies that many in this Chamber believe is a real problem. Does the Minister agree or disagree with the former Prime Minister? If he agrees, why does he not do something about it? If he disagrees, I think we will come to our own conclusions. How is that reflected in measures that create artificial deadlines, which have not been needed until now, and that penalise victims for not meeting them?

Also on Clauses 57 and 58, it is not clear, and I ask the Minister to explain, whether slavery or trafficking information notices will be served on all asylum applicants or on only some. It would be discriminatory if they were served on some asylum seekers or certain categories of asylum seeker—for example, the people the Government expect to be captured by these clauses. That point was made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Clause 58 provides that decision-makers must take account of a missed deadline and that it must damage a victim’s credibility, unless they have “good reasons” for providing information late. Why is the national referral mechanism all of a sudden not trusted to make decisions and give weight to these matters?

Amendment 154, which I have tabled with the noble Baronesses, Lady Prashar and Lady Hollins, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, seeks to find out what the Government mean by “good reasons” in Clause 58(2)—

“unless there are good reasons”.

No doubt the Minister will say that this will be clarified in guidance, that we can look forward to regulations and that, when the clause talks about “good reasons”, we can trust them, and that of course “good reasons” means good reasons”, et cetera. We will get into the nightmare situation in which nobody has a real clue what it means. That is why I am grateful to other noble Lords in the Committee for supporting that amendment.

I particularly highlight paragraph (g) in Amendment 154, which deals with the

“fear of repercussions from people who exercise control over the person”.

Time and again, you meet victims who are terrified of the system, and therefore will not co-operate, or victims who are coerced into activity that all of us sat in here—in the glory of the wonderful House of Lords Chamber—would think wrong, but which completely misunderstands the coercion that victims or survivors in those circumstances face. It is not the real world to believe that they cannot be coerced into doing activity that we might sometimes think is not right. It is not the real world; it is not their life; it is not the reality of their situation. I say to every noble Lord here, if you were told that unless you co-operated fully with individuals you were entrapped by, your parents, grandparents or family in the country from which you originated would be attacked or worse, I wonder how many of us would say, “Don’t worry, I won’t do it”. It is just not the real world.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right, which is why I was making the point about it being a fundamental extension of the legal aid system, which is uncosted.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to this incredibly important debate. It lasted just over an hour, so I will be brief to allow us to move on; otherwise, we could have a huge debate again in me responding to the Minister. I am sure many of the same points will, quite rightly, come up in the other groups. I hope noble Lords understand and accept that.

I will reiterate the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. It is interesting to note that, when a Government are in trouble, they defend themselves against everybody. You know when a Government are in difficulty because they resort to exactly the sort of defence—quite rightly; I have done it myself—that the Minister resorted to: “If only you understood the statistics and appreciated the difficulties”. That officialdom then rains on everything. When everybody else thinks you are wrong, you usually are. I gently suggest to the Government that they have got this wrong.

I am pleased the Minister was honest about this and I thank him for his response. It is clear the Government think the system is being abused and that people are claiming to be victims of modern slavery, either straightaway or late in the day. The Government are determined to shut down this loophole in the system. That is what is going on and it is why the danger that all of us raised about including modern slavery in an immigration Bill or the Nationality and Borders Bill—whatever you want to call it—sets a context that is difficult for modern slavery, to put it mildly.

All that I would say to the Minister is that even if the Government are right in saying that there is a problem here, by trying to deal with the issue as an immigration offence, which is essentially what they are doing, they are driving a coach and horses through the principles of the Modern Slavery Act. That is why people are so upset about it, so disappointed about it, so angry about it and so frustrated about it. They accept that the Government have to deal with immigration and that there are difficulties but this country has been proud of the way in which we deal with victims of modern slavery. Treating them, as they will be, as potential immigration offenders will change the dynamic. There are victims who we do not know and have no idea who they are. Children, whether they are 17 and a half or 13 are going to be impacted. As a consequence of what the Government are doing, innocent victims are going to be penalised in the name of tackling the problem of immigration. That is why people are so disappointed.

In conclusion, I say to the Minister that it must come to something when large numbers of the governing party as well as all the other parties that make up this House, including organisations of all faiths, are arraigned against this measure, along with all the voluntary sector, including the Government’s own voluntary organisation, the Salvation Army. I should have thought that that would have given the Government pause for thinking that maybe they have not got this quite right. Let us hope that between now and Report that they do so, otherwise I can foresee real problems on Report with respect to the clause and the other clauses in Part 5. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 151D withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Indeed, it was excellent. That is why I raised it—because I wonder what has happened to it. As I say, I find the suggestion made in Amendment 173 intriguing, and I hope that it will be taken very seriously.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I rise briefly to say that we support the amendments in this group. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, and we have said right across the Chamber, the points that he made about the contribution that Theresa May made—within the coalition Government, as I was reminded—were fantastic.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I was not there for that, but it seemed to me that it was worth repeating, if I may put it clearly.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Well, it is the first time that I have heard repetition in this Chamber, so I thought that the noble Lord could not have been here. But it was a serious point, and it deserved to be made again, because we all agreed with it.

We support all the amendments in the group. I will speak specifically to Amendments 157 and 173. The other amendments have been spoken to very ably by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others, so I will not address those, in the interests of time. With respect to Amendment 157, it is intriguing that the statutory guidance says that

“a Conclusive Grounds decision will not be made until at least 45 days of the recovery period have passed”.

Why does the Bill reduce that to 30? That is my understanding, unless I have misread it. We talk about enhancing, but, as I say, 45 days is the period in the statutory guidance, while the Bill talks about 30 days.

Given that we are in Committee, it would be interesting to hear more on this. Am I wrong? Does the 30 days refer to something different? I cannot find references to 45 days in the Bill, but that is what is in the statutory guidance. Could the Minister respond to that? It would be helpful to the Committee to know what the 30-day period is vis-à-vis the 45 days set out in the statutory guidance, which is what the whole sector uses with respect to the recovery period and is, indeed, how I have understood it.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The justification is to ensure clarity across the legislation, and I appreciate the comment made by the right reverend Prelate, and rehearsed by my noble friend, about advantages flowing or not from the Brexit process, which so many of your Lordships will have discussed. However, our ability to act differently from our partners across the channel is a valuable one, but what we seek to obtain by this measure is legislative clarity and a consistency in decision-making which will, we hope, benefit victims and develop understanding among all the agencies in this important sector. My noble friend is resuming his mask, and he did say that he would not interrupt again, although I hope that he will not bar himself from further interventions later in the debate.

I turn to Amendment 157, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank him for his powerful and compelling opening contribution to this debate and to earlier debates on the topic, and for his work at Nottingham University. I offer the Committee reassurance that we are committed to providing victims with at least a 45-day recovery period, or until a conclusive grounds decision is made, whichever period is the longer. Our position is—I maintain that this does not need to be placed on the face of the Bill, and I return to the earlier discussions with my noble friend Lord Deben—that it would create a misalignment with our international obligations under ECAT.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for all of that, and the commitment to 45 days. Why does it say 30 days in the Bill? Have I got that wrong?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

No, I think the noble Lord is correct. It is 30 days for the alignment with ECAT, but the 45 days appears in the guidance, and we commit to providing support over that period: a 45-day recovery period as expressed in the guidance, or until a conclusive grounds decision is made.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

So there is an absolute commitment to 45 days for the gap between reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds, even though legislation which we are going to pass says 30 days?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The noble Lord shrugged his shoulders, but I repeat that the justification for this is to align with our international obligations with our partners in ECAT.

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Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

158: Clause 61, page 64, line 4, at end insert—
“(aa) the person was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the first RG decision;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to preclude those exploited as children from being denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, before I start my remarks on this group of amendments, I want to say in answer to the question asked earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that the problem the Minister has—and he has it all the way through this part of the Bill—is that what the Government do not like saying is that the reason they are doing this is not really to do with modern slavery. They are trying to sort out what they see as an immigration mess and the problem they have with everybody moaning about immigration, asylum and so on, and this has ended up in a Bill it should not be in. That is the problem. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, asked why we were doing this. The answer is, “because we think the modern slavery system is being abused and lots of people who shouldn’t be applying to it are applying to it, and they’re immigration offenders and not victims of modern slavery”.

What this Committee is saying is that it should not be in this Bill. Victims of modern slavery are being conflated with immigration offenders, and it will lead to the undermining of the Modern Slavery Act and the principles on which it is based, and to potential victims not receiving the support and help they need. That is the motivation for the Government in doing this. I do not think that it is the motivation for this Minister, which is why it is sometimes particularly difficult for him to answer the specific questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as a one-nation Conservative—I think that is a compliment to him. The noble Lord has been trying to say to him that it was that brand of conservatism which drove the Modern Slavery Act. Perhaps the current Government—I can say this not as a lifelong Conservative—could learn from that. But that is a matter for internal grief and beyond the scope of this Bill.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to the titles of these clauses. I will say something on Clause 61, “No entitlement to additional recovery period etc”, but there is a particular difficulty with Clause 62, “Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection”, which goes to the heart of the problem. Essentially, it is another way for the Government to say that potential victims of slavery are abusing the system to get round it because they are really immigration offenders. The Government are saying, “The system is being abused and we are going to stop it, and this is the way we’re going to do it”. The problem is that they are going to undermine the Modern Slavery Act and the modern slavery system that they have put in place, of which they should be proud, and indeed of which people—including all of us—are proud. It is that contradiction that goes to the heart of Part 5 in every single utterance, whether it is made from the Government Front Bench, the Opposition Front Bench or others in this Chamber.

I point out that Clause 62 does not even say “potential victims”; it talks about “identified potential victims”. No wonder there is such disquiet, upset and anger about this clause, which I will come on to in a minute. There are very real problems with Clause 61, but particularly with Clause 62, hence the amendments that I and other noble Lords have tabled, and the clause stand part notice.

Again, I come back to this question on Clause 61: what problem are the Government actually trying to fix that requires primary legislation? Again and again that has been asked by noble Lords across the Chamber without the Government really being able to answer—apart the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, intimating the explanation I gave in his remarks on an earlier group.

The Explanatory Notes state that Clause 61 is there:

“In order to prevent the recovery period being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK and to remove unnecessary support and barriers to removal”.


Again, that goes to the heart of it. The Government are seeking to change an immigration offence using a modern slavery context. It is a contradiction. It is not supposed to be like that. The whole point of the Modern Slavery Act was to take this out of the immigration context of the Home Office. That perennial battle between immigration and modern slavery is unresolved and requires parts of the Government to stand up and say, “You’re wrong and we’re not going to do that”.

What evidence is there of recovery periods being abused? That is of interest, I think, as evidence for the proposed change before us. What evidence is there of us providing “unnecessary support” to a person using the NRM? Re-trafficking has increasingly become part of the traffickers’ operating model, including where people return to their enslavers for fear of repercussions for their families, which we touched on earlier. How does Clause 61 respond to or break that model? Does not the refusal of a further recovery period simply strengthen the perpetrators? I think that is a real risk.

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has asked on a number of occasions, will children be subject to the restrictions under Clause 61? Every single part of this Bill makes no distinction at all between adults and children. The Minister has experience of the legislative system, which, as a basis, divides children and adults on the grounds of good justice. Why is that not the case here? This is what Amendment 158 seeks to probe. Does the Minister have any figures for the number of children who go missing and are re-trafficked? Does he agree—again, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, also asked this—that a missing child at risk of exploitation is a safeguarding issue, not an immigration or enforcement issue?

On Clause 62, the key question is what action, if any, the Secretary of State intends to take on the comments made by the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, who has written a scathing article in the Times today—note the word “independent” in the commissioner’s title. The headline says:

“Fears about bill that would take support away from some modern slavery victims”.

She has concerns about the way Clause 62 will operate and the wide way in which certain phrases in it could be drawn. Is it the Government’s intention to ignore the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, including where she says that Clause 62 will empower and embolden people traffickers and criminal gangs? Why is something that the anti-slavery commissioner says is harmful included in the Bill? Can the Minister also give further detail on how Clause 62 will operate in relation to children who are victims of criminal exploitation?

The lead signatory of Amendment 169 is the noble Lord, Lord Randall, but he cannot be with us today and has sent his apologies. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have also signed it. Amendment 169 suggests to the Government that, if they are going to have Clause 62, which many would say should not be part of the Bill, this is a way they could redraft it to try to address some concerns. I personally would not keep Clause 62 but, instead of just a vague reference to a “threat to public order”, whatever that means, the amendment’s proposed new subsection (2)(a) inserts the words

“is prevented from doing so as a result of an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order”,

rather than a wider definition.

Similarly, under

“Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection”,

we have put the words:

“in exceptional circumstances … following an assessment of all the circumstances of the case.”

Then there is the importance of international co-operation and the fact that we have also not included children. These specific points seek to address some of the concerns that have been raised by many groups and other noble Lords.

My Amendment 164A is to probe a specific question: where a person is covered by Clause 62, is it the Government’s intention that that person will still be entitled to and receive a conclusive grounds decision, as they do at present, or do the Government consider that the duty to investigate trafficking and exploitation no longer applies?

The criticism of Clause 61 and particularly Clause 62 is that, in the Government’s efforts to deal with what they perceive is an immigration problem, they are undermining the protection that the Modern Slavery Act gives victims. That view is held by many noble Lords in this Committee, many Members in the other place and the various NGOs that seek to inform our debates. I beg to move.

[The Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees (The Earl of Kinnoull) (CB)]

My Lords, I must inform the Committee that, if Amendment 160A is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendments 161 to 163, by reason of pre-emption.

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I hope, for the reasons outlined, that noble Lords will be content not to press their amendments at this stage.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his typically courteous and thoughtful reply, and the way in which he attempted to answer every question put to him by noble Lords across the Chamber. We are very grateful and that was well received by everyone. I believe, however, that there is a very real problem at the heart of the Bill, with respect to Clause 61 and particularly Clause 62, notwithstanding his reassuring words.

It remains on the face of the Bill that an identified potential victim can be disqualified from the section if they are a threat to public order, or they have given information in bad faith. As noble Lords have said, there is no real clarification, notwithstanding the Minister’s response, on what a threat to public order means. We can see from what has been said, by many of the organisations that made representations, including lawyers and the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, that a threat to public order can include very minor offences. The Minister says, “Don’t worry, the decision-makers understand that Clause 62 does not apply if they are minor offences”, but that really is not good enough. It should be on the face of the Bill; it should be clearer, in primary legislation, what a “threat to public order” means—and indeed “acting in bad faith”. What on earth does “acting in bad faith” mean? That is usually something people use when they cannot think of anything else—“That’ll do, that will be something we can say because it encompasses everything.” It is not good enough, in primary legislation, to legislate in that way.

The purpose of the amendments that have been tabled, and the debate that has been had in Committee, will cause the Government to have to think again and, at the very least, be clearer in what they actually mean with respect to where they are going to disqualify somebody from protection when they are an unidentified potential victim.

The last point I will very quickly make is that there is real issue with respect to children. Both this Minister and the Minister who responded to the earlier groups say again, “Don’t worry, there is nothing to worry about. We understand the particular needs of children”. I say again that in virtually every area of government a distinction is made between adults and children, for obvious reasons. It beggars belief that it is not done anywhere in this Bill. We will come back to this at Report, but I thank the Minister for his reply and, with the leave of the Committee, withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 158 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, we have been quicker than I anticipated but what my noble friend said is true; I must admit that I am starving.

I will speak to Amendments 171 and 172 from the JCHR, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. They aim to remove the worst of Clause 64. Leave to remain is important for victims who are vulnerable to destitution and further exploitation without welfare benefits and other entitlements but, according to the anti-slavery commissioner, the number of victims being granted discretionary leave is very low. In 2015, it was 123. In 2019, it was 70. In the first three months of 2020, it was only eight; we do not have statistics for the whole of 2020-21.

Being granted leave can improve mental health by offering stability and thus a chance of recovery, but the equivalent reference to assistance and support in the Modern Slavery Act reads “physical or psychological harm”; that includes social harm. This Bill would put the law out of line with that and raise real doubts about compatibility with Article 14 of ECAT, which uses the phrase

“necessary owing to their personal situation”.

That is wider than what is in Clause 64(2)(a), which is why I commend Amendment 171 to the Committee. I was pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, refer to the JCHR’s report; he also mentioned the importance of family relationships.

Amendment 172 aims to rectify the omission from Clause 64 of any consideration of the best interests of the child so as to make it compatible with ECAT and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I seem to have mixed up my notes; I am sorry about that because I will now go back to Amendment 171.

In a case last year, the High Court held that refusing to grant discretionary leave while a slavery victim’s asylum application was being processed violated Article 14 of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking. It appears that, before amendments were made in the other place, Clause 64(2)(a) included a reference to the victim’s social well-being as well as their physical and mental health. However, it was removed on Report. Can the Minister explain why? Would the Government like to rectify this omission in the Bill regarding personal, situational and social harm so as to make me, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the JCHR very happy?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in the interests of time, let me just say respectfully to the noble Lord, Lord McColl, whose amendments I have signed, that I very much support him and the arguments and points that he made so well. We look forward to the Minister’s response. I pay tribute to the doughty work the noble Lord has done over a number of years to try to move the Government in what many of us regard as a simple and sensible way forward. Let us hope.

I shall speak to my Amendment 171AA. Clause 64 provides for limited leave to remain

“if the Secretary of State considers it is necessary for the purpose of (a) assisting the person in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm … (b) enabling the person to seek compensation”—

unless this can be done outside the UK

“or (c) enabling the person to co-operate”

with law enforcement. The standard, however, does not meet the UK’s obligation to children under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking. Article 14.2 of ECAT specifies that in the case of children, residence permits

“shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child.”

Paragraph 186 of the Explanatory Report to ECAT explains that

“the child’s best interests take precedence”.

Amendment 171AA, which is a probing amendment, simply asks why the Government cannot include leave to remain where children are protected and where it is in the best interest of the child.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, in consideration of the flight of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, I start by addressing Amendment 171B. ECAT sets clear parameters around when a signatory state is obliged to grant a residence permit to confirmed victims, which is where it considers that the stay is necessary either due to the confirmed victim’s personal situation or for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in an investigation or criminal proceedings. The Government have gone further than this and provided for a grant of leave not only on both of these bases, but also where it is necessary to enable a confirmed victim to seek compensation in respect of their exploitation.

A temporary leave provision is deliberately designed to allow for leave to be provided for as long as needed, where appropriate. It will be considered on a case-by-case basis and does not set an arbitrary time period. To specify a length of leave does not follow our overall approach of having a truly needs-based approach to addressing victim support. If it is necessary for leave to be granted for longer than 12 months in order to pursue a thorough investigation, or where an individual’s personal circumstances require it, leave can and should be granted.

I turn next to Amendments 169A, 170 and 170A. In Clause 63 we have sought to define the support entitlement during the recovery period for potential victims following a positive reasonable-grounds decision. Amendment 169A, however, would remove clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision-makers and reduce the effectiveness of the clause in supporting victims. Our approach to the wording of Clause 63 has been chosen specifically to provide more detail on the circumstances in which support is provided, while being in line with our international obligations. Our approach is not to go into detail on the types of support provided for in legislation, as Amendment 170A suggests, but to do this in guidance, the purpose being to ensure flexibility in our approach in future, so this can be tailored to victims’ needs as our understanding of trauma develops. I refer your Lordships to remarks made earlier in the debate that understanding the impact and the effect of trauma on individuals is an ongoing and developing thing.

Further to this, and in response to a matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, where necessary, all those who receive a positive conclusive-grounds decision and are in need of tailored support will receive appropriate individualised support for a minimum of 12 months. We committed to this in the other place and will consider where and how this commitment is delivered to ensure that it delivers best for victims. More details will be provided in guidance or in future modern slavery legislation, should parliamentary time allow. My noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich has been given that assurance by the Home Office Minister. The Home Office and, in particular, my noble friend Lady Williams are keen to continue working with the noble Lord on the implementation of this policy.