Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Scotland Office
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.
Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.
I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.
We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.
I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this very short debate. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the number of prisoners affected by this in relation to the International Criminal Court. I do not have that information to hand, but I undertake to supply it to the noble Lord.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, raised the lateness in the stage of proceedings at which this amendment has been tabled. I acknowledge the complexity of the statutes involved and the alertness of those in my office, the Advocate General’s office, and in the Scottish Government who are monitoring the position. There has been useful and effective collaboration between them. I will look into the matter raised by the noble and learned Lord and see whether I can provide any further detail as to why these points were identified only at this stage. If I can identify anything specific, beyond my general answer relating to the complexity of the relevant provisions, I will provide it to the noble and learned Lord in writing.
This is an incredibly important debate, because it goes very much to the heart of the views we take on what the Executive can do. It is anathema to our system that the Executive can impose restrictions on individual citizens on the basis of either the balance of probabilities or, worse, reasonable suspicion. Any restrictions placed must be justified, normally in a criminal court or, in the context of the current pandemic, by an exceptional event such as the pandemic.
All those who have engaged in this debate have accepted the need for some form of TPIM. On behalf of my party, I accept that too, but all our instincts should say that it should be on the most limited ground necessary at any point. I strongly opposed, as my party did, the idea that one can impose a TPIM on the grounds of suspicion alone and welcome Amendment 14, in which the Government reject that approach and go for a situation where the Minister “reasonably believes” that the person has been engaged in terrorist activity. The difference between “reasonably believes” and “balance of probabilities” seems in practice quite difficult to define; the Minister has to believe that the person has been engaged in terrorist activity and he or she must have reasonable grounds for believing so. What is the difference between having reasonable grounds on one hand and believing it on the balance of probabilities on the other, when the person who will test that is the courts? I think it is quite fine, but we will support government Amendment 14. I am grateful that they have listened; it is a very significant shift. The difference between honestly and reasonably believing something and suspicion is significant.
I am very disappointed that the Government persist in the idea that, once you have the basis for a TPIM, you can roll it over indefinitely. As various noble Lords have pointed out, the inclination of the Executive will be to roll these things over without further evidence. Therefore, we on this side of the House will also support Amendment 16.
Four years is a long time, longer than allowed at present and, what is more, the four years can be extended if new evidence emerges during that four-year period. We think there should be a limit on when a TPIM can be granted, where there is evidence for it. We would need new evidence to extend it beyond the four years. We think that four years is a long time, but we recognise that if the House backs this four years, that is the basis for a compromise we very much hope the Government will accept.
Amendment 22 would compel the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to conduct an annual review in relation to TPIMs. I think that is right. I agree with everybody who has said that the independent reviewer has to be properly resourced to do it. This is such an exceptional power that I think it is right that the independent reviewer should look at it every year.
On the proposition that there needs to be a limit on the period of restriction that is required in a particular home, because the power is going to be amended to remove the reference to “overnight”, the Government have given assurances that there will be such a limit, because of the courts’ imposition of limits to ensure that nobody is imprisoned in their house for 24 hours a day, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said the consequences of the section would be. That is not my understanding, legally, of the consequence of the removal of “overnight”, but I would like the Minister to repeat that assurance and also to say that if the court protection went, the Government would come back to ensure that it could not involve 24-hour imprisonment, in effect, in a particular house.
These are exceptional powers. Our role in this House is to ensure that they are subject to specific limits. I think the combination of government Amendment 14, Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and government Amendment 22, which would compel an annual review, is a workable compromise. I am very disappointed that the Government are not accepting it at the moment.
My Lords, before I turn to the amendments to which I have not yet spoken, I will address a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on government Amendment 22, about the requirement for the independent reviewer to produce an annual report every year for the next five years. She is right to say that the independence of the independent reviewer means that he could, if he so wished, provide such a review, but we want to ensure that he does so, because of the changes that are being made by the Bill. We, like a number of noble Lords who cited his work and that of his predecessors, find them useful and would find it useful to receive them over the next five years. We do not think that is unduly burdensome, as the noble Baroness suggested it might be. Indeed, that is evidenced by the support of the current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, for the amendment. I hope that that reassures her on that point.
I turn to the amendments. Amendment 15, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove Clause 34 in its entirety, and in doing so prevent the Government lowering the standard of proof for imposing a TPIM to “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism-related activity. As I set out earlier, the Government have listened to the concerns raised in Committee and brought forward a compromise, by lowering the standard of proof to a lesser extent than originally envisaged; namely, “reasonable belief” instead of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. We are confident that this approach represents an appropriate middle ground, one that ensures we are taking action to protect the public from an evolving and more diverse terrorist threat, while addressing the concerns that were expressed in Committee. Of course, “reasonable belief” is a standard which has been used in the past, having first been introduced in 2011 by the coalition Government, which included the Liberal Democrats as well as my own party.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained Amendments 19 and 20 to the House, and it would serve little purpose to repeat that as we will not be dividing the House on them.
As my noble friend has said, compulsory polygraph tests for those convicted on licence from prison are one thing, but such tests for those not convicted of any offence, who have a right to silence when being questioned, is quite another. It is a long-established principle that a suspect in criminal proceedings should be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Clause 38 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement for an individual subject to a TPIM to participate in polygraph sessions and to comply with instructions given to the individual by the polygraph operator. Although any statement made by the individual while participating in the polygraph session cannot be used against them in any proceedings for an offence, a failure to answer questions could be taken as contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice—that is, to comply with the instructions of the polygraph operator, so, in this case, the instruction to answer questions. Remaining silent during a polygraph session could therefore be an offence under Section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, for which the individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
If the person is convicted of a terrorism offence and is on licence and subject to a TPIM—unlikely but possible—it would be possible for them to be subjected to polygraph tests under Clause 32 of this Bill, and a failure to answer questions in those circumstances would be a breach of the licence. While we have reservations about that, we do not object to it being part of the Bill. However, if the person is not convicted and is subject to a TPIM, they have the right to silence and to be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Potentially being imprisoned for five years for failing to answer questions during a polygraph session is an adverse consequence, and we therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on whether Clause 38 should be part of the Bill.
My Lords, the effect of the Bill at the moment is that a condition of a TPIM can be that the subject takes a polygraph test, and that a failure to do that could be a breach of the TPIM’s provisions. Amendment 21 raises the question of whether that should be part of a potential TPIM. In answering that question, it is important to try to find out what the Government have in mind regarding the use of that provision. First, to what extent do they regard polygraph answers as reliable? There is a general view that they cannot be taken on their own. What is the Government’s view on that?
Secondly, will the Government introduce a code of practice, as envisaged by Amendment 19? If so, could they give some indication of what that would contain? In particular, would it be based on the American Polygraph Association’s code of practice?
Thirdly, in December 2020 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service announced that it would be seeking a long-term commercial partner to deliver polygraph equipment, training and support services for the sum of £2 million. When this was announced by the Government, it was noted that any partners must provide training to the standard approved by the American Polygraph Association, which is a trade body. Can the Minister give an indication of how that is going?
Will the Minister confirm that the Government will not act solely on the basis of any physiological reaction of the individual while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination, and that the effect of a “significant reaction” in a polygraph examination will simply lead to further inquiries being made?
There has been, over quite a long time, a legitimate—in the sense of authorised by legislation—use by the Home Office of polygraph tests in relation to sexual offenders. According to Home Office figures, over the last five years 5,228 mandatory polygraph examinations have been carried out on 2,249 sexual offenders. Will the Minister describe to the House what benefit has been obtained from this and the basis of any assertions of that benefit?
My Lords, the three amendments in this group stand in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 19 would oblige the Secretary of State to publish a code of practice on the conduct of, and use of results from, polygraph examinations, with a requirement to consult appropriate parties on the code before its publication.
We think that such an amendment is not necessary, since equivalent provision is already made by new paragraph 10ZA, which Clause 38 of the Bill will insert into Schedule 1 of the TPIM Act 2011. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, noted, Clause 38 includes a regulation-making provision for the conduct of TPIM polygraph examinations. The new polygraph measure will not be used within the TPIM regime unless and until such regulations have been made.
These regulations are expected to include detail on, for example, the qualifications and experience needed by polygraph operators; how records of the polygraph examinations should be kept; and how reports on the results of the examinations should be prepared. This will ensure transparency in how the polygraph measure in the TPIM regime will be applied in practice.
This approach follows the practice already established by the Ministry of Justice, which has set out its use of the polygraph in licence conditions of sex offenders in the Polygraph Rules 2009. Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise these future regulations and they will, of course, be subject to annulment by your Lordships’ House or the other place. As such, we believe that Amendment 19 is unnecessary, and I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw it, as she indicated she might.
Amendment 20 seeks to prohibit the extension of a TPIM notice on the basis of information derived from a polygraph test. Again, we do not think this is necessary. Clause 38 specifies the purposes for which the Home Secretary may impose a requirement on an individual subject to a TPIM notice to participate in polygraph examinations. These are, first,
“monitoring the individual’s compliance with other specified measures”
and secondly,
“assessing whether any variation of the specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity”.
The reference in new heading (ii) to
“variation of the specified measures”
means variation of the measures set out in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011, and the duration of the TPIM is not one of those measures. Extension of the TPIM for a further year can be done only by relying on the power in Section 5 of that Act, not by way of varying measures. Therefore, any attempt to use information derived from a polygraph examination to extend the duration of a TPIM notice would be unlawful. I hope that provides some assurance to the noble Lords and that they will therefore be willing not to press Amendment 20.
Finally, Amendment 21 would remove the addition of a polygraph measure to Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011 entirely. The Government cannot accept that. Adding a polygraph measure to Schedule 1, where the measure is assessed to be necessary and proportionate, will help our operational partners to assess an individual’s compliance with his or her TPIM notice. This might include being asked whether engagement with rehabilitation programmes is genuine or whether someone is, for instance, meeting prohibited associates. The insights gained from a polygraph examination will support decision-making on whether the TPIM notice should be varied, including the relaxation of measures or further restrictions.
The polygraph measure will not be mandatory for all TPIM subjects. It will be used sparingly and only where necessary and proportionate to restrict a subject’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Whether it is judged necessary will be determined by the Security Service on a case-by-case basis and a recommendation will be made to the Home Secretary.
My Lords, Clause 48 deals with the extent of the Bill. It provides that
“A provision of this Act which amends, repeals or revokes an enactment has the same extent within the United Kingdom as the enactment amended, repealed or revoked.”
Under subsection (2), provisions that do not amend, repeal or revoke an existing enactment extend to all four nations—England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland—save for two limited exceptions, in that Clauses 21(2) and 44(2) are of a limited nature, referring to retrospectivity.
It is not easy to extract the purpose of Amendment 26. Someone in the Ministry of Justice has concluded that there are problems under the Armed Forces Act 2006. Proposed new subsection (4A) suggests that, in the context of jurisdiction under the Armed Forces Act 2006, all the provisions of the Bill extend to all four countries. This is so even if an amendment repeals or revokes a provision of an existing Act that does not have that extent.
Under proposed new subsection (4B), the provisions of the Act extend outside the United Kingdom to the extent set out in Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act. That section applies to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and overseas territories excluding Gibraltar. British Overseas Territories do not include Cyprus, Belize or Gibraltar itself, which is specifically excluded. Those are all venues where I, as chairman of the Association of Military Court Advocates, know that courts martial take place.
Those are three places, and I am sure there are more, where courts martial take place—not to mention Germany, where the facilities have ceased. Courts martial can, of course, take place anywhere in the world, if properly constituted, and if charges for service offences are brought against anyone who is subject to the Armed Forces Act.
Terrorism exists outside the overseas territories. I would very much welcome clarification as to what happens if a court martial is held outside the United Kingdom, but not within those overseas territories to which the Armed Forces Act applies. I cannot help feeling that I am missing something, but the statement attached to the amendment is not at all clear—even though it states that the purpose of the amendment is to clarify the position. I look forward to the Minister doing so.
I endorse the question so clearly put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Despite the clear explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I am still struggling with this amendment. Can he tell us the sort of problem that proposed new subsection (4A), which Amendment 26 seeks to insert into the Bill, tries to deal with? What is the lack of clarity with which he was concerned? Can he also indicate whether there are any implied provisions put into the Armed Forces Act by this Bill?
Proposed new subsection (4C)(a) specifies:
“a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
Can he indicate what sort of provision that is aimed at? I would find it really helpful, in relation to proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B), to have an example of a problem that these two provisions would solve.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their contributions and questions. The position, so far as I can assist the House now, is that the amendment ensures that the provisions of the Bill which amend, modify or are applied by the Armed Forces Act 2006 have the same extent as that Act. That Act extends to the UK, Isle of Man, and British Overseas Territories, excluding Gibraltar, and can be extended to the Crown dependencies.
The Armed Forces Act 2006 is the main piece of primary legislation that establishes a service justice system. It uses a modified form of sentencing law of England and Wales for sentences imposed by the court martial, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, stated. The burden of the amendment is to ensure that the Armed Forces provisions in the Bill have the same extent as the Armed Forces Act 2006. This would ensure, therefore, that there is a correlation of the area over which the provisions apply.
On the specific question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on what would happen outside the territories covered by the Armed Forces Act, I am conscious that I would probably be straying into MoD territory rather than MoJ territory. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, will allow me to write to him on that so he gets an accurate and complete answer.
As to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on whether there is an implication in the Bill that is caught by proposed new subsection (4C), perhaps I can send him a letter on that, rather than risk getting the answer wrong, I am tempted to say that these are standard words used in Acts of Parliament about what is implied, but I understand the burden of his question and, if he will permit me, will send him a written response. I hope that I have responded to the points put to me and I commend this amendment to the House.