Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (First sitting)

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

Q It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. Thank you, Mr Hall, for your comprehensive notes and the briefing that you provided to the Opposition in advance of the Bill. I have some specific questions following my colleagues’ earlier comments.

TPIMs are not widely in use. You have said that the system works okay—I think that was the phrase you used in this evidence session. Is there a concern that these proposals not only do not make the operation of TPIMs more effective, but actually make them less effective, not just in an operational sense but, given the speculative commentary about their being used as an alternative to prosecution or to deradicalisation strategies, in terms of public perception, which undermines their wider use?

Jonathan Hall: It is quite difficult. I am always cautious about talking about public perception, because I do not have a crystal ball. What one can say is that the best counter-terrorism response, the one that has the most common legitimacy, is criminal prosecution. One should continue to strain to prosecute terrorists. It is fairer, it means the public can see what is being done to protect them, and it results in stronger, tougher disposals.

To pick up on the point that you made, I think I mentioned in my notes that from my consideration of TPIMs, I was not entirely convinced that there was enough scrutiny by the Secretary of State and by officials of the evidential case against individuals. There certainly is consideration by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, but there is the risk that, once a TPIM has been made and someone has been identified as a risk, that takes priority—in other words, the TPIM is the best way of protecting the public—over trying to get criminal evidence to prosecute, which would be preferable from a public perception point of view.

[Conor McGinn]

Q Given that there has been no example of where a TPIM has been unable to proceed on the basis of the current standard of proof, would you, if the Bill passes, look very carefully to ensure that there is not an immediate spike in the use of TPIMs? In November 2019 there were five in use. Is that something that you would see as a measure of whether this is a practical measure introduced to aid law enforcement or counter-terrorism, or whether it is being used as an alternative to prosecution?

Jonathan Hall: I do not have a sense that there is an intention to spike suddenly, which is why I go back to the question: what exactly is the purpose served by changing the standard of proof?

[Conor McGinn]

Q I understand that. I have some sympathy with the Government on statutory renewal being on the basis of new evidence of terrorism, but I have some concerns about what is called, rather bizarrely, “indefinite renewal”—I think your term “enduring TPIMs” is more palatable and makes more sense. Is there a logical compromise on this so that, after a certain period, there must be evidence of continuing involvement in terrorism or a lack of repudiation of terrorism, rather than the onus being on finding new evidence? Might that assuage some of the safeguarding concerns about indefinite sentencing?

Jonathan Hall: If there is evidence of continuing terrorism, that would meet the current law and allow a new TPIM to be imposed. So far as repudiation is concerned, I expect that, if the law is changed in this way, that is how these matters will be framed. It will be said that there was evidence of somebody being involved in terrorist-related activity, that they have not repudiated their views, and that therefore they remain a risk. I would not venture to suggest that one could amend the law as to how risk should be proven. I think one should leave that reasonably open.

[Conor McGinn]

Q One could argue that that is exactly what the whole thrust of the Bill is doing in relation to the standard of proof.

When relocation orders were used before, one in six were overturned in court. Are you concerned that this is rather a dubious way to proceed, if you are going to undermine not just the legislation that you are creating but the wider counter-terrorism strategy? A not insignificant proportion of the people subject to relocation orders as part of control orders in the past were able to overturn them in court.

Jonathan Hall: Relocation is an important power. It is regrettable, in the sense that it is a very strong measure and causes a lot of disruption, but I am quite satisfied that in a small number of cases it is needed. You are right to pick up on that when one looks at the enduring TPIM. The combination of lowering the standard of proof, plus the ability for TPIMs to endure forever and the power of the measures, including relocation, means that someone could be forced to live away from their family for up to, say, a decade, on the basis that they only “may” be a terrorist. A possible safeguard is to say that if one is going to do that, one at least ought to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.

[Conor McGinn]

Q Is it your understanding, looking at the package of measures being introduced, that you could conceivably have someone who has been convicted of a terrorism offence being free from constraints before someone who has been placed on an enduring TPIM?

Jonathan Hall: Yes.

[The Chair]

We have three Members still to ask questions, so we need to be very brief.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you.

[Conor McGinn]

Q Thank you, Assistant Chief Constable Jacques—and not just for you and your colleagues’ work now. As a north-west MP, I am particularly proud of your distinguished service in Lancashire and our region over many years. I am very pleased to see you in your current position. In terms of policing’s priorities and asks from the Government, was this top of your list?

Tim Jacques: Was what top?

[Conor McGinn]

The measures contained in the Bill: the amendments to the current operation of TPIMs, and provisions on sentencing. Is that what counter-terrorism policing in the UK feels it needs as a priority from Government?

Tim Jacques: The Bill came out of the recent changes in sentencing. One of the potential effects of those—in the previous Bill that went through Parliament—was offenders coming out without licence conditions in place. We refer to that as a cliff edge; I think Jonathan referred to a different cliff edge. For us and our operational partners—the Probation Service, the security services and so on—licence conditions are incredibly important, allowing us to manage individuals. In some of those cases there is potential for TPIMs to be applied in order to manage the risk that people pose, whereas the licence conditions do not offer that. That was the driver behind the TPIM element of the Bill.

Some of the measures and the changes that the Bill includes are the result of the Bill being put forward and talking about TPIMs. They include some of the problems that we have encountered in recent cases and that we think could be improved through legislation. This was not right at the top of our priority list, but if the Government are looking to take the Bill through, we think aspects of it are worthy of consideration by Parliament because we have encountered them operationally as problems.

[Conor McGinn]

Q Do you think you will require additional resources in order to implement the measures that are proposed in the Bill?

Tim Jacques: As you have seen, the number of TPIMs is very low. We do not envisage there being swathes of TPIMs if the Bill is enacted in its current state. There will be changes—the use of polygraph and so forth—that will have an impact. In the grand schemes of things and in the numbers that we are talking about, it will have an impact. Where TPIMs endure longer than two years, they will obviously require monitoring and resources for that. If an individual poses a risk and a threat anyway, they will consume resources regardless of whether they are on a TPIM; there is just less control around them.

[Conor McGinn]

Q May I press you a little? You say that the measures in the Bill will make the police’s job easier and will make people safer. When the police or the security services say that, I absolutely trust them and believe that that is the case. You also said there is no case where the current standard of proof prevented a TPIM, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said. You went on to say that some of the things, such as individuals’ risk profile increasing on returning from abroad, mean that the measures are welcome. However, those risk factors exist today and have existed for a period of time. I am trying to work out the contradiction in saying that there has not been a case where the standard of proof has prevented a TPIM, but that lowering the standard of proof will make it easier.

Tim Jacques: In relation specifically to the standard of proof, I think the security services’ point is that that may have utility in the examples that I gave. My answer to the question was on the wider changes around notification of TPIMs, the sentencing regime and so forth. It may have utility in terms of lowering the burden of proof, and it will make our collective role easier and the public safer.

[Conor McGinn]

Q I understand. Thank you. Finally, the Bill also contains a measure to remove the statutory deadline for the reporting of the Prevent review. The review was announced last January, but it has been delayed and postponed. We are now at the stage where the Government intend to have it report next summer but have removed any deadline. Is it frustrating that you have continuing speculation and debate around Prevent, with an independent review proposed, mooted and having gone through several iterations, yet you are still none the wiser about where the review is at, so you cannot get on and do not have certainty about what it will look like after the review, 16 or 17 months after it was first proposed? Is that a frustration for the police? Does that uncertainty undermine the Government’s wider counter-terrorism strategy?

Tim Jacques: We welcome the Prevent review and are very happy to engage in the Prevent review. Prevent is a critically important part of our role; it is absolutely vital. It is controversial, and has been controversial, but we engage in it, we operate, and we protect the public through Prevent every day. The review will be helpful, I am sure, from many perspectives.

[Conor McGinn]

Q But you are keen for it to progress speedily and get it done and out of the way.

Tim Jacques: It would be helpful if the review came to an end. Whether that will finish the debate on Prevent, of course, is another matter. It may do that; it may not. We will continue regardless, but we are happy to engage in the review and see it concluded.

[Miss Dines]

Q Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, may I first thank you on behalf of the Committee for all the work you do to keep us safe? You have made it quite clear that your view is that the provisions in the Bill will make policing easier. Can you give us a working example of that, please?

Tim Jacques: Gosh—there are many examples. If you look at some of the relocation notification measures, because of the new variant, and because some of the terrorism prevention and investigation measures we now use are not relocation, there is potentially a flaw in the legislation as currently made out that subjects do not have to tell us where they are living. That is one small but fairly clear and obvious example. If we are not relocating them, which we are not all the time now, the law does not require them to tell us where they live, which seems an obvious gap. The Bill will enable us to manage the individual to use these measures in a different way, and potentially a less intrusive or restrictive way for the individual, enabling us to manage the risks that they pose to the public.