Work for Serving Prisoners
Jake Richards Excerpts(3 days, 21 hours ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson) on securing this important debate, and on her fine speech. We have known each other for many years, and she is one of the best advocates I have come across, at the Bar and now in this place. She is a ferocious champion of justice and social justice, a credit to the people of Derby North, and an asset to our politics. It is particularly apt that she brings this vital issue to the fore, as it deserves far more attention, and while I am in this role, I am determined to ensure that it receives it.
Finding employment after release is one of the most effective ways to support rehabilitation and break the cycle of reoffending. The evidence is stark beyond argument that having a job reduces the likelihood of reoffending, and given that reoffending costs the taxpayer around £20 billion a year, getting prisoners and prison leavers working is the right thing to do, not only for individuals and communities, but for the public purse. As my hon. Friend has mentioned, we are debating the Sentencing Bill in Committee next week, and I hope that the whole House will support the Government’s agenda of tackling reoffending through that legislation.
Work in prisons is vital, because the argument for work in prisons wins both the heart and the head. It is about self-worth for the prisoner and worth for society as a whole. Let us be clear: that must never mean offenders bypassing punishment for the pain that they have caused victims, but they should not be left to wallow in prison. Indeed, many have untapped potential that our economy desperately needs, as my hon. Friend set out. That is why the Government are committed to improving offenders’ access to purposeful activity, and to strengthening the links between prisons and employers, so that more people leave prison with the skills, qualifications and opportunities that they need to succeed. I must at this point pay tribute to Lord Timpson for his work before he was made a Minister in the Justice Department. He continues to be a fine advocate for this cause.
Delivering skills and work experience to prisoners is not always straightforward. It is right that I draw the House’s attention to a recent report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and Ofsted, “Just Passing Time”. It sets out serious concerns about the quantity and quality of work, and attendance at work, in prison. It is something that I and the Government take seriously. The problem is difficult, especially in the context of the prisons capacity crisis that this Government inherited last summer, but that does not mean we should not strive to perform better. The report only motivates me and this Government to do more.
I want to look forward and set out positive measures that we are taking to drive improvement in the short and longer term. To understand the needs of prisoners properly, His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service is now making sure that every prisoner has an individual learning and work plan during their sentencing, focusing on their needs, which might include numeracy and literacy. The hon. Member for Colne Valley (Paul Davies) is a fine advocate on this issue; he is doing great work on it in a pilot project that applies across the country. We must ensure that qualifications to improve inmates’ job prospects, as well as work experience and vocational training, are built into sentencing. Simply put, these issues should be right at the heart of sentencing policy and sentencing at court.
Jess Brown-Fuller
It is wonderful to hear the Minister laying out everything that the Government are doing to address what is happening in our prisons. I wonder whether he will give consideration to my amendment to the Sentencing Bill, which applies matters that are considered after sentencing to prisoners who are on remand, so that they can have the same access to work and rehabilitation programmes, rather than being released when it is time to be sentenced because they have already served their time, and then going home without any support.
Jake Richards
We will absolutely consider that amendment. I should congratulate her on her appointment to her role in the Liberal Democrats. That point was made in an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth). Although the remand population is too big, we must ensure that inmates on remand receive the services that they need.
Youth justice is also a key priority for me, and this issue also affects the youth estate. On a recent visit to Wetherby young offenders institute, I observed brilliant work by teenage boys in what they call Q branch working on allotments, helping with the recycling, learning to make honey, and building a garden for the custody community. It is genuinely heartwarming and important work that these young offenders are undertaking as they reach maturity. My only disappointment came when I learned that only 5% of the children in the young offenders institute were able to access those facilities.
We must do more to make sure that every single offender who can do so safely has access to the skills and training that they need. Earlier today, I was in Birmingham to see the brilliant social enterprise Skill Mill. I met three 17-year-olds who are learning skills in construction, recycling and agriculture. Those skills mean that they will have options when they reach the age of 18 that they would not have otherwise had.
Good work is happening. A good example on the adult estate is Greene King’s academy at HMP Onley. What they call “the hideout” is a replica of a Greene King pub that gives prisoners real-world experience in hospitality, City & Guilds qualifications, and genuine job opportunities on release. Marston’s Brewery has a similar set-up in the academy at The Lock Inn at HMP Liverpool, which equips prisoners with professional catering and kitchen management skills. In fact, I must make sure that I visit The Lock Inn as a matter of urgency; I will tell my private office so. Graduates from both schemes have already gone directly into employment on release, so these initiatives really are successful. We have the data, but we need to improve it to ensure that the evidence base is there across the prison estate.
The future skills programme delivers vocational training based on employer and labour market needs and requirements. It offers a range of sector-specific skills training courses, with a guaranteed job interview on release. Building on that, and to address HMIP concerns about the intensity of the work experience, we are trialling a new Working Week project in five category C prisons, including HMP Ranby, which I am aware that my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North visited recently. It is just a few miles from my constituency. Indeed, I drive past it on my commute to this place, and I will be visiting it in the coming months.
Jim Shannon
I was just thinking to myself that there probably are stats that show that many prisoners, with great respect—this is not meant to be judgmental—may not be able to read or write. When it comes to helping them find jobs, we have to create confidence in them, and enable them to say, “I can do that. I can learn to read and write, and can then get a job.” That is a very basic thing, but it is important. Maybe the Minister could tell us what will be done on that. That is not just about working skills; it is about life skills, social skills and being able to connect with the person next to them.
Jake Richards
I completely agree, and it goes back to the central argument that my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North made about the innate value of work. Labour Members, and I am sure hon. Members from across the House, believe that work is a good thing in and of itself. It is not just about earning a salary to pay the bills, though that is very important; it is also about building life skills and having confidence, so that when someone leaves prison, they can enter the world and be a better citizen, whereas too many leave as better criminals. That must be at the heart of what this Government do, and it will be.
In addition, release on temporary licence is an important rehabilitative tool that allows suitably risk-assessed prisoners to engage in work with employers in the community. That provides people with the opportunity to build relationships with employers and boosts their job prospects ahead of release. A good example of that is the work of Prisoners Building Homes at HMP North Sea Camp, where prisoners are trained and employed to build modular, low-carbon, affordable homes in partnership with housing providers, public sector bodies and third sector organisations.
Linsey Farnsworth
As part of the Justice Committee’s inquiry on rehabilitation and resettlement, we received evidence showing that ROTL use has declined, particularly since covid; it has not really recovered from that. It is great to hear the good work the Minister is outlining on this, but I urge him to continue to push for greater use of ROTL, because it could be a key aspect of rehabilitation of offenders going forward.
Jake Richards
Absolutely. We will look at the evidence that the Select Committee received, and we are having those conversations all the time. It is important to stress—I know my hon. Friend is very aware of this—that in the first year of this Government, we have been dealing with one of the most acute crises across the public estate, and that has clearly taken up the bandwidth of the Government and the Ministry of Justice. Because of the difficult decisions that the last Lord Chancellor made, we are now in a position where I hope we can do more on this.
The Government have also launched regional employment councils, which for the first time bring together businesses, prisons, probation and the Department for Work and Pensions. We have extended apprenticeships across the prison estate, from the open to the closed estate. At HMP Highpoint, five cohorts of prisoners are beginning rail apprenticeships this year. This is a model we want to expand further, and early results are encouraging. To help build on this expansion, we have announced new foundation apprenticeships, which are available to prisoners. They are shorter courses than traditional apprenticeships, and can be accessed by prisoners up to the age of 25. It was a fine point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards) about the length of courses. Clearly, too often prisoners are in and out for short periods. We want to try to stop that fundamentally, or at least amend the framework in that regard, but we have to have training and services for those who are in prison for a short time.
To support prisoners in considering their longer-term goals, we are delivering better careers advice and guidance in prisons. From April this year, we are rolling out new national careers, information, advice and guidance contracts, so that, again, every prisoner has access to consistent, high-quality careers advice, tailored to their needs and, critically, linked to real job opportunities. Taken together, employment hubs, employer partnerships, vocational training, apprenticeships and the Working Week project represent initiatives that are moving in the right direction, but I want to be clear that we know that the situation is not good enough, and that there is a lot more work to be done.
I once again thank my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North for raising this important subject, which, as I said, does not get enough attention. I hope to do my bit to change that. This Government are committed to rehabilitation to help cut reoffending. I hope that she will agree that the Government have built solid foundations to stabilise the prison system after the inheritance we received last summer, and have launched important initiatives in our first year in office, but there is much more to do, and I welcome her support in driving forward this vital work in the months ahead.
Question put and agreed to.
Sentencing Bill
Jake Richards ExcerptsTuesday 16th September 2025
(1 month ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am delighted to deliver the closing speech on Second Reading of this important Bill, which will tackle the prisons crisis that we inherited from the Conservative Government and confront the scourge of reoffending in this country. I thank all Members on both sides of the House for their thoughtful contributions to the debate—some more thoughtful than others—because this should be an agenda that enjoys support throughout the Chamber.
Most of today’s debate has been measured and helpful, indicating a recognition that it is necessary to stabilise a broken criminal justice system after 14 years of Tory misrule and to prioritise victims and the prevention of crime. The Bill achieves that aim. It is necessary to fix our prisons crisis, and it is also desirable, as it will confront reoffending and keep our communities safer. As my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister said in his opening speech, it takes us back to the central purpose of sentencing: punishment that works.
Let me deal with the Conservative amendment and the arguments we heard from the shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and the shadow Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan). They say that the Bill puts the public at risk, but without it we face the threat of prisons running out of places entirely, with no space to lock up the most dangerous offenders, which was their legacy when they left office last July. They say it will undermine the confidence of victims, but nothing is worse for victims than prisons running out of places and crimes going without punishment, which was their legacy when they left office last July. They say that the Probation Service cannot cope, and it certainly could not cope under the Tories, with a botched part-privatisation that cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of pounds and a persistent shortage of staff.
We are beginning to rebuild the Probation Service. We will increase investment in probation by up to £700 million by 2028-29, which is a 45% increase. We are recruiting: we hired 1,000 trainee probation officers in our first year, and we are on track for 1,300 more this year. It is worth remembering that this legislation was carefully drafted as a result of an independent sentencing review led by the former Conservative Justice Secretary David Gauke. I take this opportunity to thank him for all his work, as well as the previous ministerial team at the Ministry of Justice, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Scunthorpe (Sir Nicholas Dakin).
It is a great shame that the Opposition have attempted to play politics on sentencing and law and order. The Conservatives could have adopted a more mature position, appreciating the difficult context in which this Government took office. They could have drawn on previous Conservative traditions on rehabilitation and prison reform to support an agenda that aims to cut reoffending and keep our communities safer. Instead, they are more interested in social media clicks than serious government. It is their mess that makes this legislation so urgent. It is their failure to deliver appropriate prison places and their failure to confront reoffending rates and invest in community sentencing that has led to the mess this Government are clearing up.
As for Reform, I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Runcorn and Helsby (Sarah Pochin), and I say with the greatest respect that it is quite clear she simply has not read the Bill. She was given ample opportunity during her speech to set out what Reform’s position is, and she simply refused. [Interruption.] I am happy to give way to her, but I notice that she is not going to intervene. She lent on her role as a magistrate, and there are an enormous number of magistrates across the country, but I note that the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office said of her time as a magistrate that her behaviour
“fell below the standards expected of a magistrate”,
and her speech fell below those of an MP.
I want to address a number of the points raised by hon. Members in this debate. The issue of probation was raised by the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), whose expertise in this area we will no doubt lean upon. It was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Andrew Pakes), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) and my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth).
We are very aware of the pressures the Probation Service faces, especially after the damage done by the last Conservative Government. That is why we are investing £8 million in new technology to lift the administrative burdens on probation officers and enable them to refocus their time on where it has the greatest impact. I joined the Justice Secretary on his first visit to speak to probation staff, and they told us how important that technological change could be to the work they do. However, that is not enough, and as I have said, we are increasing funding by £700 million—a 45% increase—and hiring more probation officers.
My hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) raised the issue of trade unions, and the challenges that this new sentencing regime will place on probation officers. I reassure him that I and the Justice Secretary will be having conversations with the trade unions throughout this process.
Electronic monitoring was raised by a number of Members, including the Chair of the Justice Committee and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe. There are significant challenges in how we ensure that tagging works, but we know that tagging does work. There is clear and reliable proof of an individual’s whereabouts and behaviour, and reoffending rates are reduced by 20% when tagging is used as part of a community sentence. That is why we are investing £100 million—a 30% increase—on the biggest expansion of tagging since 1999.
The Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde), spoke passionately, as he always does, about victims. In my submission, this Bill strengthens protections for victims in our system. The Government inherited a prison system that was in crisis, and—as I have said before, but it is worth repeating—if our prisons collapse, it is victims who will pay the price.
The Bill is not just about building prison capacity and stabilising the prison system. The legislation aims to go further in offering victims protection. The Bill updates the statutory purposes of sentencing to make it clear that judges must consider the protection of victims during sentencing. This is a really important reform and I am very pleased to hear that the Liberal Democrats support that aspect of the Bill.
On domestic abuse, I again praise the hon. Member for Eastbourne for his campaign on the domestic abuse flag. I listened to the arguments he made today and I will no doubt have further conversations with him in future. The domestic abuse flag is a massive improvement to ensure that protective services across Government—local government and Whitehall—have better powers to track domestic abusers and keep victims safe. I am pleased that that measure has received so much support.
I would push back on the argument we have heard today about short sentences. I want to be absolutely clear, on behalf of the Government: we are not abolishing short sentences. Judges will have the power to send offenders to prison when they want to: where a court order has been breached, where there is significant risk of harm, and in any exceptional circumstances. I want to put it on record that in many domestic abuse cases short sentences have a really important role to play. They will continue to play that role under this legislation.
Very briefly, Madam Deputy Speaker—I am aware of the time—we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Matt Bishop), who brought great expertise from his experience in the police. He spoke about the depressing reality of reoffending in our communities, whereby offenders are caught and put in jail for a few weeks, and then come out and reoffend again. That is why we are taking this action today. Alongside sentencing reform, we need better rehabilitation in our prisons. That is why my hon. Friends the Members for Colne Valley (Paul Davies) and for Stoke-on-Trent South (Dr Gardner) raised important issues relating to literacy and gambling. I have already had conversations with my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South and I will be having more with my hon. Friend the Member for Colne Valley.
Before I close, I will address two shorter issues if I may. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) and my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich Albion—[Laughter.] Forgive me, I got carried away there; it’s nearly recess. I mean my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich (Sarah Coombes). They raised important and very serious cases relating to driving offences. I reassure them that I have heard their speeches and will follow up in due course about the specific cases they raise, but also the general issues.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) raised a number of issues, but one very important one was youth sentencing. Youth sentencing is outside the scope of the Bill, but I reassure him that I will be looking into the consequences of this legislation for youth sentencing in due course.
There are few more acute crises than that which this Government inherited in our prisons. Last summer, the Government took the difficult but necessary decisions to keep the system afloat. Now, we need long-term and sustainable reform, and that is what the Bill delivers. Alongside our efforts to boost prison capacity, it is time for fundamental sentencing reform to stabilise the prison estate, confront our rates of reoffending and deliver punishment that works. We know it is possible because the evidence is clear, but we must have a laser focus on public protection and reducing reoffending. That must mean a system that incentivises offenders to become better citizens, not better criminals, and reacts swiftly when they breach the conditions of their release; that puts strong restrictions on offenders serving sentences outside prison, enforcing them where possible with the best technology available; that tackles the root causes of reoffending; and that puts victims first, with the right safeguards to protect them.
It is a great shame that, as I said, the Opposition have chosen to chase social media traction, rather than engage sensibly with this important agenda. The modern iteration of the Conservative party has stuck its head in the sand on progress, rather than facing up to the legacy it left. I am pleased the Bill does not shirk from the challenge we have been given, but faces up to it head-on and delivers the change that will keep our communities safer in the years and decades ahead. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Oral Answers to Questions
Jake Richards Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
This Government are committed to tackling the root causes of reoffending. That means investing in services that turn offenders away from a life of crime and instead back on the straight and narrow. That includes services in employment, accommodation and substance misuse treatment.
Steff Aquarone
I thank the Minister for his response and welcome him to his place. We have a prison population crisis, but rather than building or releasing our way out of it, we have to reduce reoffending. I recently visited HMP Bure in my constituency and saw the excellent work it has been doing internally to support prisoners in learning new skills and equipping them for life after release. Will the Minister assure me that the Government will support and provide funding for such programmes? Will he meet me to hear more about the fantastic work of the staff at HMP Bure?
Jake Richards
The Government are committed to tackling reoffending, and that includes investment in services exactly like those that the hon. Member visited. We are building more prison places, because we need to. In 14 years the Conservatives added just 500 additional prison places, and in 14 months we have added 2,500. Alongside that, we have to tackle reoffending, and I hope the hon. Member will support the Sentencing Bill later this afternoon, which will do that.
Dr Beccy Cooper (Worthing West) (Lab)
Rehabilitation is a vital part of prison health programmes, but when prisoners develop infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, they can be isolated from organised programmes such as rehab. Given the risk that interrupted TB treatment can fuel antimicrobial resistance, what steps is the Department taking to ensure that prisoners receive both uninterrupted medical care and continued access to rehabilitation?
Jake Richards
I will be talking with colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care on exactly that issue and on tackling reoffending, making sure that there is treatment in prisons so that prisoners are rehabilitated. The sole focus of this Government is on stopping reoffending and cutting crime, and that means working with prisoners. There is also the Sentencing Bill, and I hope that my hon. Friend will contribute to the debate on that today.
Kirith Entwistle (Bolton North East) (Lab)
Marsha De Cordova (Battersea) (Lab)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
Although there is a long-term downward trend in the rate of proven reoffending, this country remains an outlier in that regard. That is why the Government are taking action to reduce reoffending, especially among prolific offenders. That includes measures in the Sentencing Bill on short-term sentencing, community punishment, investment in regional employment councils to bring local partners together to help offenders into work, and the rolling out of intensive supervision courts, which have had incredibly encouraging results so far.
Marsha De Cordova
I, too, welcome my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice and his new ministerial team to their roles. The Clink Charity has delivered life-changing rehabilitation at HMP Brixton for over a decade, significantly reducing reoffending rates. Indeed, its graduates are 64% less likely to reoffend. However, the charity has recently been told that it must compete in a commercial procurement process alongside large corporations to continue operating at Brixton. That risks disadvantaging an award-winning charity with a proven track record that is having a positive impact. Does the Minister agree that this is unfair, and can he reassure me that he will review the situation to ensure that procurement processes consider the excellent work already being achieved by organisations such as the Clink?
Jake Richards
Yes, I am aware of the great work that the Clink does, as are the Justice Secretary and the Prisons Minister in the other place. We will be reviewing what has happened and is happening there in due course.
Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)
One of the keys ways to reduce reoffending is to ensure that ex-offenders leaving prison have secure places to live and are not tempted to go back to a life of crime. However, it can be a consequence of early release that that is not prepared in advance. What action will the Minister take so that prison governors and those involved in the prison service ensure that ex-offenders go into secure accommodation once they leave prison?
Jake Richards
The hon. Member raises an important point and challenge for the Probation Service as the Sentencing Bill comes to fruition. I was with the Justice Secretary just last week meeting probation staff. Housing is a big challenge. I will work with colleagues from across Government to ensure that we are up to that challenge. The hon. Member makes a good point, and I will update the House in due course.
Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)
Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her really important question. I worked with the amazing charity Children Heard and Seen prior to getting this role. I am determined to ensure that we do more to protect the children of prisoners. The Prisons Minister in the other place is already working with the Women’s Justice Board to look at better ways we can treat women prisoners to ensure that they are rehabilitated.
Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)
Laura Kyrke-Smith (Aylesbury) (Lab)
Jake Richards
My hon. Friend raises a really important point. The Sentencing Bill, which we will debate later today, has really important measures that will protect victims of domestic abuse and ensure that victims are at the heart of our criminal justice policy, as well as probation services.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
The new Minister stated earlier that the Government have created 2,405 new prison places, but 1,468 of those are at HMP Millsike, which is part of the new prisons programme that was announced by the previous Conservative Government. The 10,000 additional prison places estate expansion programme—including the houseblocks and refurbishments programme, and the category D programme—has been downgraded from amber to red in the delivery confidence assessment, due to the programme’s key supplier entering administration. What steps is the Justice Secretary taking to put prison construction back on track?
Jake Richards
The hon. Member seems to be the last person defending the last Conservative Government on prisons and law and order. The truth is that over 14 years, they built 500 prison places; in 14 months, this Labour Government have built 2,500 places. We are fixing the mess that they left behind.
Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)
Voices—a domestic abuse charity in Bath—has created a guide to family court proceedings to support survivors to navigate the family courts without legal representation. The pilot was rolled out in the south-west and in Yorkshire. Will the Government work with Voices to roll it out nationally?
Sentencing Council Guidelines
Jake Richards Excerpts(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Shabana Mahmood
On the immigration guideline, I will correct something that the shadow Justice Secretary said earlier. Nothing in that guideline prevents the deportation of any foreign national offenders, and this Government have been getting on with the job, having deported more than 24,000 foreign nationals. Our record on foreign national offenders is one of a 20% increase in removals this year compared with the same period last year. I wanted to ensure that the guideline did not come into effect, and that is why I published the targeted Bill. I have acknowledged that there is a debate to be had about the wider role and powers of the Sentencing Council, which I will return to in the weeks and months ahead.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
The Sentencing Council was created in April 2010; a month later, the Conservatives came to power. If, as so many on the Conservative Benches seem to think, the Sentencing Council is a shadowy, revolutionary group of activist judges dangerously undermining the British way of life, why on earth did they not do anything about it?
Jake Richards
I think they agree with that now—interesting. Does the Lord Chancellor agree that this episode shows that our constitution is working? Parliament is sovereign, and if Parliament seeks to change this guidance, under this Government it will.
Shabana Mahmood
My hon. Friend is exactly right. At no point has anybody on the Conservative Benches shown any humility or tried to answer the question of why they did nothing about it. As I say, the case of amnesia from which the shadow Justice Secretary is suffering seems to be as bad as ever.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)
Jake Richards ExcerptsWednesday 19th March 2025
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Danny Kruger
I am conflating the two because they are conflated in reality. A care home where somebody lives is a residence, but it is also a community, a facility and a place where professionals work to support that individual. A clear demarcation between their living arrangements and the support they receive from the institution they live in does not exist in reality. That is why they are living there—because that distinction does not apply in their particular case. They require the support and help of the workers in the place where they live.
I am afraid it is not enough simply to say, “This is their home, and they should have exactly the same rights and freedoms as they would have if they were living alone in their own flat or house.” We have to recognise the reality of the situation, which is that they are living in a community, and what happens in the community affects them all. That is the nature of communal living. This is not individualised healthcare in the way that the hon. Gentleman imagines it is, and that is fundamentally our point of difference. This is separate or adjacent to healthcare, and it is delivered, by definition, by somebody else. By virtue of the Bill, it would have a separate regulatory environment to other healthcare treatments. Of necessity, it should have an appropriate legal framework to protect other people who are impacted by assisted death in a communal setting. That is my crucial point: if someone is living in a communal setting, what they do affects their neighbours.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that, although this is different from the healthcare services we currently have, we have a legal framework that deals with many of these conflicting issues as and when they arise in lots of different circumstances that are not completely adjacent to these?
Danny Kruger
I do not know what those might be, but I would be interested to hear. That might well be the case. I am afraid that no hard-and-fast rules can be clearly applied here; or, rather, we have to apply hard-and-fast rules in the knowledge of the grey areas, the exceptions and the situations in which we might feel that the law is unjust in particular cases. We have heard examples of that, such as the evidence about the lady in Australia cited earlier by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I can well imagine the distress involved if someone suddenly finds themselves in an institution that does not permit an assisted death, but they want one and are in their last days.
The alternative, however, is a different blanket rule. If we were to have a blanket rule that we can do an assisted death anywhere—that is one situation—there would be significant knock-on effects. Serious moral injury would be suffered by other professionals and residents. I recognise that my amendment could lead to someone having to relocate if they want to have an assisted death—I am sorry for that—but I think that we have to draw the line in a way that makes most sense.
Jake Richards
I welcome the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. As I think she accepts, given that she tabled the amendments, there is an oddity with the Bill as drafted that has to be fixed, and I think the amendments would do that.
I appreciate that there is some force to the argument of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. I would be interested to hear what the Minister says, but it seems to me that there is a balancing act between ensuring that medical practitioners and clinicians are working in an environment in which they do not constantly feel the heat of a lawyer’s breath on their neck, and ensuring protections. There is some force to the argument for removing the clause altogether, but on balance I see more force in the argument that we should have more clarity.
I want to raise some more issues that need to be considered in the light of the provision for aspects of civil liability in this process. That is why last night I supported the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, which was not passed, relating to guidance for doctors in certain circumstances during this process. I raise those points about the standard of care and the duty that doctors and clinicians will be working to throughout the process for the record, and so that the Government and my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley can take them forward. I raise those questions not because they are unanswerable—I think they are answerable—but because we need to work out exactly what we are asking our doctors to work to, and what form that guidance comes in. Does it need to be legitimised by Parliament, or can it be undertaken by a Minister?
I do not think I need to expand greatly on the point, but we can all imagine circumstances in which clinicians are compromised in their view of the duty of care that they have to the patient. When this process begins in this jurisdiction, it needs to be clear what that is.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. Well done for arriving on time, by the way.
These amendments aim to ensure that, if passed, this legislation will be legally and operationally workable. I will offer a technical, factual explanation and rationale for them. Amendments 501, 502 and 503 replace clause 25(1) and instead provide that the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill will, of itself, not give rise to civil liabilities in certain circumstances. Those circumstances are where an individual provides assistance in accordance with the Bill, where an individual performs any other function under the Bill in accordance with the Bill, and where an individual assists a person seeking to end their life under the Bill, in connection with the doing of anything under the Bill. Proposed new subsection (1A) would create an exception to the exclusion of civil liabilities, providing that civil liabilities can arise in cases when an act is performed dishonestly or otherwise than in good faith, as well as in cases of negligence. Without this amendment, there is the possibility that clause 25(1) could provide blanket immunity to a person from all civil liabilities, even when they may have been negligent in their actions in providing assistance in accordance with the provisions in the Bill.
Kim Leadbeater
That would be my understanding as well, but I am not a lawyer. Fortunately, a lawyer just tried to intervene on me, so he might want to step in.
Jake Richards
My intervention is on something completely different. I have been reminded that in Australia, there is a specific clause that relates to the provision in this amendment almost word for word, so I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire may have been incorrect in his comments.
Kim Leadbeater
I thank my hon. Friend for that. Unless the Minister has anything to add on injunctions—
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting)
Jake Richards ExcerptsWednesday 12th March 2025
(7 months ago)
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Rebecca Paul
My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not think family always know best. There are situations where someone rightly will want to exclude their family from the process, and I totally respect that choice. I am saying that there will be other situations in which family do have something valid to input that could impact the panel’s decision making. My right hon. Friend also mentioned injunctions; I am keen to understand more about how that process works as a protection, so perhaps the Minister could respond on that, because that may well give me some reassurance. I will come to judicial review in a moment.
My right hon. Friend is right that this is not easy. I am not saying that family should be involved in all situations. I am saying there is a balance to be struck, and I do not think we are getting it right, because at the moment it is all about full autonomy. The working assumption is that input from family must always be ignored if the patient wants that. There must be a balance, and it is difficult to say where that should sit, which is why we have such an incredibly difficult job with the Bill.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
I have a genuine question: is the hon. Lady of the view that families’ views about whether the decision is right for the individual should be considered by the panel, tribunal or judge, or is it just their views about eligibility under clause 1?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that important point. My point is that the family should be listened to and should have a route to legally provide information to the panel. Right now, they have no right to do that. In reality, I think most panels would take that information. I would like to think that, 99 times out of 100, if a family member contacted the panel saying, “I have really important information,” it would listen to that. But I am legislating for the one case in 100 or 1,000 in which, for whatever reason, the panel refuses to engage with a family member who has a relevant bit of information, and not having the right information leads to someone’s death.
The amendment is about protecting panel members too. If I were a panel member, I would want this process in place, because it would protect me when I make a decision. I would take great comfort from knowing that a family member with relevant information has a legal right at least to communicate it to the panel.
Rebecca Paul
I thank my right hon. Friend for raising that point, because it gives me a wonderful opportunity to draw everyone’s attention to subsection (3) of my amendment, which states:
“The Commissioner may consider the application without a hearing if they consider it in the interests of justice to dispense with a hearing.”
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that time is of the essence and that there will be situations in which it is right that things move as quickly as possible. I hope that that goes some way towards reassuring him that I am trying to come up with amendments that are balanced. I am aware that we have two different examples here; I am genuinely trying to make sure that I do not make it harder for those genuine cases, because I totally understand how important it is and I understand that there is a lot of pain and suffering, for all the reasons that have been set out. I hope that I am getting the balance right, but I am always happy to have further discussions.
Sir James Munby was one of the first to criticise the High Court safeguard; the hon. Member for Spen Valley says that she has taken those criticisms on board. His criticisms of the panel seem similarly acute. I hope that the Committee will agree that my amendment answers a real need and recognises the important role of family in the death of a loved one in most situations, although I accept not in all. It has a profound and long-lasting impact on them too, and their needs should not be entirely disregarded in the name of autonomy. The hon. Member for Rother Valley gave a very powerful speech yesterday on the subject, setting out that the amendment is not required because any decision could be judicially reviewed. I am not qualified to opine on whether judicial review would be relevant with this panel, but I look forward to the Minister covering the matter in her closing remarks. We need to be clear on that front.
Judicial reviews are a challenge to the way in which a decision has been made, rather than to the rights and the wrongs of the conclusion reached. It is important that this is understood. A judicial review just checks that the process was followed, not whether the right decision was made. That is why our role in setting the process is so important. If the new clause remains unchanged and there is no requirement for a panel to accept relevant evidence from a family member, there will be no avenue for appeal under judicial review if such information is not taken into consideration when making the decision, because the process will have been followed.
Our role on this Committee is a heavy one. It is about getting it right and setting the process for judicial review to work as it should. We have an appeal process in the new clause for when a panel wrongfully turns down an application, but not for when it wrongfully approves one. Why not, if judicial review is available and suitable? I suspect that it is because, as the hon. Member for Rother Valley is aware, the judicial review is not the best way to do it. It is a long, onerous process involving application for permission and, in some situations, the securing of legal aid, which is fraught with difficulty. I say gently to the hon. Member that if judicial review is not suitable when the panel has wrongfully turned down an application, then why is it suitable when they have wrongfully approved someone for an assisted death?
I think it is clear that my amendment is needed as a safeguard to prevent wrongful deaths under the Bill. It is a helpful safeguard. No panel will ever want to see someone assisted to die who should not have been, just because it did not have all the information. I suggest that the safeguard will help to secure panel members, because they will feel reassured that a process is in place to avoid mistakes. If my amendment is not agreed to, and if wrongful approvals have to rely on judicial review for a remedy, I suggest that the impact assessment will need to take into account the likely impact on socioeconomic groups that rely on legal aid for funding. I suspect that, owing to a lack of funds, they will find themselves with no avenue at all to appeal. I do not think that any of us wants a two-tier system in which rich families can intervene and poor families cannot.
Jake Richards
I have been rightly and fairly challenged in the hon. Member’s speech, but the difference is that if a family member has a right to appeal in the internal process, that family member would have to be a party in the original hearing. The whole point of the panel is that a person comes to it with their application. The family have the right to put information before the panel, but they do not have the right to make their case to the panel, because their views on the application are not relevant. Information that they might have is relevant, but their views are not. That is why there is a disparity between the person’s ability to appeal internally against a refusal of their application, and third parties having to take other routes. I hope that that offers some clarity as to why I am comfortable with the difference between the two. I reassure the hon. Member that I have thought about it long and hard as well.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Member. I would just clarify that currently there is no legal right for a family to provide information to the panel, which is part of the issue.
I turn to my amendment (c) to new clause 21. New clause 21 includes provision that, among other things, the panel’s function is to determine whether it is satisfied that the person has capacity, that they have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their life, and that they have not been coerced or pressured. However, it is not entirely clear what “satisfied” means in the new clause. My amendment assumes that, as in a civil court, it means “on the balance of probabilities”.
As I understand it, the leading case on the meaning of “satisfied” is a 1964 House of Lords case, in which the court held that “satisfied” meant “on the balance of probabilities”, rather than the tougher test of “beyond reasonable doubt”. In a later amendment, I will propose that we adopt that tougher standard, but this amendment assumes that the current wording will stand.
My view, as we have already established in lengthy debate, is that the capacity bar is low, because the doctor need only be 51% sure. On the clear, settled and informed wish and coercion test, the standard is only “to the best of the doctor’s knowledge”, which is not a particularly high bar to meet. We are therefore applying a low bar to a low bar. That certainly leaves us with a highly accessible process, but I suggest that that is not a positive or safe thing.
My amendment would bring in a further safeguard. As I have said several times, I would have preferred to see such safeguards in clauses 1 to 3, but as they were not accepted there, I am forced to propose them here, because it is better to have them than not. The amendment would give the panel the ability, if there is a “real risk” that the criteria have not been met, to pause and make further enquiries. They would not be obliged to give a decision that day, but would be obliged to look into the matter further, ask for more testimony, request more documents and consult experts.
The real risk test is taken from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Doctors will already be familiar with it, as they are already required under the Human Rights Act to assess when there is a real risk of suicide. It is not a strange novelty. The objection has been raised that introducing a real risk test to the doctors’ assessments would complicate matters, but the panel stage is a distinct stage with a distinct set of rules. I hope that the amendment will be seen not as introducing a complication but as filling a gap, particularly as this stage is meant to be more akin to a judicial stage.
Difficult situations will not necessarily be as rare as we hope. On coercive control, those with decades of experience of working with the most vulnerable have warned us time and again what the Bill could mean. Jane Monckton-Smith, one of the leading academics in the area, has said:
“Unless we do take this incredibly seriously, this Bill is going to be the worst thing, potentially, that we have ever done to domestic abuse victims.”
The consultant clinical psychologist Sue Smith, who specialises in cancer and palliative care, has submitted written evidence from which I will quote at length, because it vividly brings out the scale of the risk of coercive or controlling behaviour:
“In my clinical experience working with people who have cancer, a cancer diagnosis and treatment effects can amplify CCB…A woman asking for her needs to be seen and met alongside her increased physical and psychological vulnerability creates a change within the couple, which can lead to violent acts or CCB. The seriousness of the cancer diagnosis may be systematically and actively denied or minimised, claims can be made by the male partner that she is attention seeking, or she is accused of making up the effects of treatment, and can be left isolated and alone when in physical need, e.g. managing treatment effects like nausea or pain that restrict the ability to wash, dress and where she is reliant on others for help. At the same time a male partner may also state, ‘You are better off dead anyway,’ ‘Your children don’t care, and no one else in your life cares about whether you die.’ They may also threaten to leave. This pattern is extremely confusing, harmful and threatening. It continues over time, and a woman learns to doubt her reality and experience, and is extremely isolated. This can lead to heightened anxiety, hopelessness and helplessness, and abject despair, which can lead to a person wishing they were dead. The confidence and ability to know what one needs and wants is severely compromised when her reality is continually minimised or denied and will impact informed decision making.”
We can hope that the existing safeguards will catch some of those cases, but they will not catch all cases, so my amendment would go a little way towards improving the safeguards.
Amendment (a) to new clause 21 tries to pin down a missing detail, namely the standard by which the panel makes its decision. In a criminal trial, a jury is sent away to consider its verdict. The members of the jury know that they must be certain, beyond reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. It is not enough to think it likely on balance, nor is it enough that they have an opinion that they can justify with good reasons. It must meet a high threshold. Why is there such a high standard? Because we have to be sure about the decision, given the grave consequences. We are now considering a similar question: what is the right standard for a decision that will make the difference between life and death?
I turn to subsections (2) and (6) of new clause 21. We are told that the panel must be satisfied that the eligibility criteria have been met. The word “satisfied” is doing a lot of heavy lifting in the Bill. If a question subsequently comes to court, as has happened in Belgium where there was a wrongful assisted suicide, we will be asking the court to rule on whether the panel should have been satisfied. That raises an obvious question, which my amendment is designed to answer: what does “satisfied” mean?
I turn to a real-life example. In a famous case in Oregon, an elderly woman called Kate Cheney sought assisted suicide. She had a terminal cancer diagnosis; she also had dementia, so she was referred to a psychiatrist to establish whether she had capacity. She was accompanied to the appointment with the psychiatrist by her daughter Erika, who seemed extremely assertive about the assisted death. Kate Cheney denied that she was being pressured. However, the psychiatrist noticed that the daughter was coaching her mother. Referring to Kate, the psychiatrist wrote in his report:
“She does not seem to be explicitly pushing for this.”
He concluded that she did not have capacity to make the decision. The daughter was, in her own word, “incensed” that the psychiatrist was casting such a judgment on her mother. Kate applied for a second opinion and was assessed by a clinical psychologist. He found that Kate did have capacity, but he added that her
“choices may be influenced by her family’s wishes, and her daughter, Erika, may be somewhat coercive”.
Nevertheless, he gave the green light to the application and Kate received the go-ahead.
I ask members of the Committee whether they would be satisfied that Kate Cheney was eligible for an assisted death. Are they confident that colleagues would share the same judgment about being satisfied? Can they be sure that every social worker, legal figure and psychiatrist would be satisfied in the same direction? After all, the psychiatrists in Oregon were divided on it.
In written evidence, the most experienced clinicians have urged us to recognise that abuse is difficult to pick up. Sarah Grove, a consultant in palliative medicine, says:
“Over my years in practice, I have witnessed families acting for financial gain and not in their loved one’s best interests but in this kind of situation, this has always been impossible to prove.”
Dr Kathryn Myers, a retired palliative medicine consultant, says:
“I have seen coercion in the contexts of decision-making around the best place of care for patients and of money and property. Perpetrators are usually family members…Occasionally it has been overt and easy to detect, for example, threatening or manipulative words or actions. Most frequently it has been very subtle, one might even say, gentle. It can take skilled clinical nurse specialists highly trained in communication skills and in detecting coercion, who know the person well and who have a relationship of trust with them, several conversations over several days if not weeks to uncover that coercion has occurred.”
In such a case, with limited time, a panel may not be certain whether to give the green light to an application. That uncertainty will be even greater if it does not know what evidential standard to employ.
My amendment would clarify that grey area. It would bring in a standard that has been tried and tested and is well understood. To be clear, “beyond reasonable doubt” merely means that the panel is sure. The courts have said that the two phrases are equivalent, as has the Judicial College in its guide to judges, “The Crown Court Compendium”:
“What is required is a clear instruction to the jury that they have to be satisfied so that they are sure…if an advocate has referred to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the jury should be told that this means the same thing as being sure.”
The Crown Prosecution Service says:
“the magistrates or district judge in a magistrates’ court or the jury in a Crown Court must be sure that the defendant is guilty. Sometimes you’ll hear this described as ‘sure beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘satisfied so you are sure’.
Importantly, the word “satisfied” by itself is not enough. Juries must be not just “satisfied”, but
“satisfied so you are sure”.
The wording in the amendment would be equally strong. It opts for “beyond reasonable doubt” because it is a better known phrase and more widely understood than
“satisfied so you are sure”.
I do not want to get too hung up on which of those phrases to use. The point is to adopt the tried and tested standard that has worked in the courts. We want the Bill to have the highest standards and to protect people. Amendment (a) to new clause 21 would help to achieve that.
Members will all be delighted to know that I am moving on to the last amendment.
Jake Richards
I know that the hon. Lady has been on her feet for some time, but I just want to explore the difference between what a jury is doing and what this panel is doing. Let us, for example, consider the issue of coercion and a case where there is no evidence that the person is being coerced in any way, but of course the panel has not asked everyone in that person’s life. It has not heard evidence from everyone. There is no factual matrix determining what has happened or what has not happened. Can the panel sit there and say, “We are sure,” or do you think it would have to investigate all the circumstances of that person’s life and interview everyone that is in and around their social circle to be sure that they have not been coerced? Can you see why, as I set out in my speech, the “beyond reasonable doubt” burden is not appropriate for the task of this panel?
The Chair
Order. Can I gently again remind Members that “you” means me? Please refer to the hon. Lady.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Member for sharing that. It is useful to have these debates and conversations, but I would suggest that the panel needs to be sure off the back of the information that it has been given and the witness testimony, which goes back to why it is so important to ensure that we have that coverage and the right things feeding into the panel so it can get to that high threshold. I would expect the threshold to be at court level, given the huge, significant ramifications of this decision for that person.
Courts and Tribunals: Sitting Days
Jake Richards Excerpts(7 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Shabana Mahmood
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are keeping the situation in relation to Nightingale courts under review. Where they are making a contribution that is assisting with caseflow through the system, there is a case for keeping them, but it is under review and the courts Minister, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Sarah Sackman), will be happy to write to her with further details.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
I have been in this House for only a few months, but I must admit that I am absolutely staggered by the chutzpah of Conservative Members—most have left, but when they were here—in their attitude to this issue. In a competitive field, the state of our criminal courts and our criminal justice system perhaps wins the award for the most acute crisis as a result of the legacy of the previous Government. I really welcome today’s statement, in particular the emphasis not just on capacity but on productivity. May I just press the Government on whether that approach will also be taken in our family courts? I welcome the investment in infrastructure and capital spend in family courts, but we also need to look at how we can improve productivity.
Shabana Mahmood
My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point on productivity. That is why the second phase of Sir Brian Leveson’s work is so crucial. He will know that we have expanded our pathfinder pilot, which is making a really important contribution to the flow of cases through the family court, and we are keeping it under review.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Jake Richards ExcerptsWednesday 26th February 2025
(7 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Danny Kruger
Exactly. A few more words of clarification should not be regarded as burdening the Bill or creating bureaucratic obstacles for doctors and patients; the amendment actually specifies more explicitly what is going on. It is almost akin to the debate we had on amendment 181 and those dangerous words “for the avoidance of doubt”; that is essentially what this amendment does, but it goes further, because it imposes clearer obligations on doctors to do their job properly.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
Much has been covered today, and the issue of capacity was debated at length when the Committee considered clause 1, but I do have some observations.
I am sympathetic to the assertion that there should be changes to presumption and burden. Those are things that I have considered and spoken about with the promoter of the Bill and, outside the Committee, with experts who gave evidence to the Committee. I have spoken about them publicly as well; I am very sympathetic.
At the heart of this, we have two options. We could change the burden and presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying, rewriting 20 years of case law and medical practice. There is certainly some value to that, but that would be a radical departure from current medical practice, and there are other concerns. The alternative is to put in place rigorous processes and training around the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that it is implemented properly. After some reflection, I err on the side of the latter option, for a number of reasons.
First, I accept that there is debate among psychiatrists about this issue. We heard evidence from some who deem the Act not to be suitable for this new realm—I accept that we are entering new grounds, and I will come back to that point—but many psychiatrists and lawyers working in this area would deem it uncomfortable and unnecessary to depart from the Act.
Secondly, there is an oddity in changing presumption. There is an oddity in someone having to prove that they have capacity to fulfil their own desire. That oddity is one of the reasons that the Act is drafted as it is. It is partly—there are two sides to this coin—to ensure that there is no discrimination, partly to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 and human rights more generally, and partly to ensure that we do not end up in a medical situation that is patrician, whereby medical doctors take an intrusive view of capacity rather than meeting the individual as they are.
Thirdly, the Bill, when amended—I will come on to the amendments that give me some comfort—will offer more safeguards than the Mental Capacity Act. Amendment 5 to clause 9(3) would ensure a further level of assessment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she will support that important amendment, as have all members of the Committee. If there is any doubt, there will be a further assessment by a psychiatrist. That goes some way to reassuring me that it is not necessary to rip up the burden or change the presumption in this area.
I want to make an observation about burden of proof, presumption and the nature of the assessment. Professor Whitty clarified his evidence. It is right that the burden and the presumption do not change, but of course the nature of the assessment rightly changes according to the circumstances. Every assessment of capacity is somewhat different, which is why amendment 50 is too prescriptive, in my view.
Of course, we can consider incredibly serious cases involving deprivation of liberty or the ability to conduct litigation. I have worked with parents whose children are being removed and looked at whether they have the capacity to make decisions about how they present their case. It is very dangerous to compare the severity and the profound nature of different circumstances, but let us not pretend that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to assess the most complex issues of capacity every day.
I am very sympathetic to amendment 50. I have met the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled it, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to discuss it, but I stress that such a prescriptive provision is not appropriate for primary legislation when we are entering new ground. I accept, as hon. Members with different views have said, that we are entering new territory and that this is difficult. I accept that psychiatrists and medical practitioners will have to think long and hard about the nature of the capacity assessments, especially under clause 9(3), when that is activated. That work will have to be done. It has been set out in primary legislation through some of the training clauses, which have already been referred to.
There is no doubt that there will be a lot of work and consideration, but I do not deem it appropriate to have a clause drafted by one psychiatrist, albeit an undoubtedly esteemed and experienced one: the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled the amendment. Rather, the work needs to be done as the Bill is implemented over a two-year period. It needs to be done as part of a full consultation with psychiatrists, once the Bill has been passed, and that should be set out in guidance. That is what would usually happen with deprivation of liberty. I do not think it appropriate for primary legislation to set out the factors for a capacity assessment.
Jake Richards
We need to be careful when we say that the Mental Capacity Act is misunderstood, full stop. Let us be clear—
Jake Richards
I am grateful, Mr Dowd.
The evidence that we have received is that this is a test. These are assessments that happen every day across the country. Now, there are more complex assessments, and there will without doubt be areas in which the assessment is not done as rigorously as it should be done, but that is why I am assured by the safeguards in the Bill that if there is any doubt—any doubt—as to capacity at first instance, there will be a full and thorough assessment by a psychiatrist.
Let us think that through for a minute. Any competent psychiatrist trained in this area will no doubt have a sense of what the Mental Capacity Act says and of the normal test for capacity. Someone who is seeking assistance to die from a doctor who has doubts as to their capacity will have been referred. To my mind, it is unfathomable that that assessment, at that stage, would not be rigorous and would not satisfy every Member that it had been done to the correct extent practicable.
Jake Richards
We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity.
This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.
Danny Kruger
I have a simple point to make; the hon. Gentleman can work out what he is going to say next while I make my brief intervention.
The point is that the referral to a psychiatrist will happen if the doctor has doubts in their mind. There is not an obligation on the doctor to refer; there is only an opportunity for them to do so, if they conclude that there is a reason. May I put a scenario to the hon. Gentleman? It is not clear whether this could happen under the Bill; well, it could happen, because it is not prohibited. A private practice might establish itself to provide assisted death, with the medical assessments and the support right through to the end—to the final act.
In those circumstances, if a patient goes to one of those clinics, does the hon. Gentleman not see that there might be a risk that the whole incentive of the business, even if it is a charity, will be to expedite the process, tick the boxes and pass people through? Does he not consider it dangerous that there is not an absolute obligation to refer to a psychiatrist and in fact, an obligation to pass a higher capacity test than the one that is currently in the MCA?
Jake Richards
That was an intervention that I was grateful to take. I accept the point that there are dangers of a system that somehow incentivises this. That is why the Bill has to have such strict safeguards and such strict regulation of medical practitioners to comply with the law. The point about mandatory referral is key; I would have real concerns about this area of the Bill without that amendment, and unless the sponsor of the Bill had not made it very clear that she would be supporting it. But I take the point.
Lewis Atkinson
Does my hon. Friend agree that clause 8(6), which requires the second doctor to be independent of the first—they must not be
“a partner or colleague in the same practice or clinical team”—
would protect against the situation on which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire speculates?
Jake Richards
Yes, there are safeguards and mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that and to protect from a culture that would incentivise this practice.
Jake Richards
No, I am not going to, actually. I am taking my rights.
My final point concerns section 1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act and the discarding of the principle about whether a decision is deemed to be unwise. This is an issue we have already debated, but it is really important. Introducing a best interests test is, to my mind, impossible without ending up with a law that discriminates against certain groups. Essentially, it is impossible to do fairly.
I remain to be convinced. If there were an amendment that could do what I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire wants, I would support it. If there were an amendment that could look into someone’s mind and make sure that they are doing this for reasons that society would deem fit, I would support it, but I think that that is impossible. What the Bill aims to do is assess a person’s capacity and ensure that they are making this decision voluntarily. It also aims to protect them from the influence of third parties and outside sources. That is the only way, if this principle is to be adhered to.
Finally, I will be voting against the amendments, but I will finish where I started. I have genuinely thought long and hard, in particular about the presumption. I have spoken to experts who disagree with me, but in my mind it comes down to whether we rip things up and start again or whether we add rigorous safeguards, practices and processes, which may be a bit more boring but will actually be more effective at protecting any patients who go down this road.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of the amendments. Having worked as a mental health nurse for 22 years, I completed mental capacity training many times in my career, and I carried out capacity assessments as part of my day-to-day job. I think that the capacity assessment proposed in the Bill is not safe enough. That was one of the main reasons I voted against the Bill on Second Reading. I have spoken to many people who oppose the Bill, and one of their concerns is about the capacity assessment.
We have talked about capacity assessments every day in this Committee. It is one of the key issues that we will need to resolve to strengthen the Bill if it goes through. One of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ concerns is that capacity decisions are
“opinions with a margin of error and are time specific. A person’s capacity can change”.
I will talk about my experience with those margins of error.
A person’s capacity can be influenced by various factors, including their life circumstances, the medication they are taking or severe pain. Suicidal thoughts due to their mental state or depression can also influence their capacity. I have worked in acute mental health units. Every day, we carried out capacity assessments, including before we let someone out of the ward, whether they were admitted under the Mental Health Act or were receiving treatment as a voluntary patient. If somebody wanted to leave the ward, before the member of staff opened the door, they had to assess that person’s capacity. Sometimes a person might have said, “I am going to kill myself,” and the nurse would have had to decide whether or not they had capacity before opening the door.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West has talked about unconscious bias. The initial capacity assessment when a person comes to a hospital is very important. If a doctor has assessed at the beginning that the person has capacity, the following assessment can be influenced by that initial assessment. I totally agree with my hon. Friend’s argument about unconscious bias in capacity assessments. As Members have mentioned, the Bill proposes many occasions in the process when capacity will be assessed, but I am still not confident that each capacity assessment will not be influenced by the initial assessment. The amendments would strengthen that area of concern.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)
Jake Richards ExcerptsWednesday 12th February 2025
(8 months ago)
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Naz Shah
I share my hon. Friend’s concerns about the Bill not being tightened and fit for purpose. We cannot afford for those people to slip through the net. One woman’s death is one too many. One older person’s death is one too many. That is the bar we have to set.
I come back to the words of Dr Jamilla: she said, “Yes, absolutely.” Every single Committee member, and anyone familiar with this debate, found it heartbreaking to listen to those who came in to give testimony about how members of their families died. Those stories will stay with us forever, and rightly so. That is why, in principle, I am supportive of where we need to get to with the Bill. However, as Dr Jamilla said, we cannot get there by ignoring this big lot of people with vulnerabilities and inequalities, who would absolutely need this legislation. We need to fix the inequalities first.
Let us be honest: as legislators, we know that we will not fix every ill in society, otherwise we would not need a police force. We would not need laws if everybody behaved as they should and supported each other. However, it is incumbent upon us, as legislators in this place, to try our best.
Nobody came to this Bill Committee thinking it was going to be a walk in the park. We certainly did not know that we were going to get evidence throughout it, and plenty of challenges are popping up. We came to this Committee—I came new to the subject—because it is of such importance. I sat in the Chamber for five hours on Second Reading, bobbing, but I did not get the chance to speak—and that happened to another 100 colleagues, who also did not get to speak. However, those who made contributions—whether they were for the Bill, concerned about the Bill or were clearly not going to support the Bill—did so because they feel very strongly about it. That is our responsibility.
I come back to amendment 23, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate: we should really consider adding it to the Bill, because that would strengthen it. The amendment does not dilute the Bill, and it does not add another hurdle given that the Court of Appeal has already said that there is a responsibility to look for undue influence. I do not understand the resistance to the amendment, which I will support.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
This debate has been very interesting and has reminded me of my life before being elected. When I was a barrister in court, I was often junior counsel and, by the time I stood up, all the best points had been taken. I feel a bit like that this morning.
I have some observations, the first of which is on what is in the Bill currently. My central submission is that the Bill does more than enough in this area, and that simplicity is what is required, especially when dealing with very complex and difficult subjects, which coercion is. There are two sides to the coin of coercion: one is about acts by third parties, such as family members or society at large, and the other is the individual making the decision.
Clause 1 is clear that, as part of the assessment made by the doctor, judge or panel, the person must have
“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”
voluntarily. That precisely echoes words from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on whether to prosecute that is currently in operation. That guidance has been in use for some time, and it seems perfectly rational and logical to continue that.
The focus of the assessment should be on the individual and whether they make the choice freely. Clause 1 makes that clear, and I presume purposefully echoes the language from the CPS guidance. It then says it must be established that the person has
“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.”
That must of course be read with clause 26, which introduces a new offence:
“A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, commits an offence.”
That carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.
Jake Richards
I am very happy to share my CV afterwards. I practised as a barrister mainly in family law and Court of Protection law, but back in the day I also practised criminal law as a very junior barrister in the magistrates courts up and down the land.
I do not want to delve into the criminal element too much, because we are on clause 1, but it appears to me that the criminal offence set out in clause 26 is far stronger than the Suicide Act 1961, which talks of an act of encouragement. That is not included in clause 26, which talks about inducement—a much more holistic and wider concept than that of an Act probably drafted back in the late 1950s. In my submission, that brings the law far more up to date with modern concepts of coercion and pressure.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Gentleman is making interesting points. This is probably more a question for the Minister. I have been focused on clause 24, in terms of encouragement, but clause 26 obviously makes coercion and pressure a criminal offence. The hon. Gentleman says he thinks coercion includes undue influence; does it include encouragement?
I seek clarification of whether undue influence and encouragement are captured in clause 26. When I tabled the amendments, I assumed not. If it is the case, how does that interact with the Suicide Act, which already makes the encouragement of suicide a criminal offence, and is probably not—I have not checked, so I would have to look—consistent with this? That needs to be looked at. It is easy to say that undue influence is included in coercion, but it has a knock-on impact on a lot of other things. We need to be really clear on that point.
Jake Richards
My answer to the hon. Lady’s first question is yes. In my view, clause 26 covers undue influence and encouragement—I could go on to state why.
My reading of the Bill is that clause 24(3) essentially removes from the Suicide Act persons who are by all the other criteria eligible for assistance in death under the Bill. The Act that will be created is, in my view, stronger in any event. That is why—I genuinely mean this respectfully, because the hon. Lady made good points in an impassioned speech—this argument about encouragement in the Suicide Act does not follow through. What we have here is a much safer and more modern piece of legislation, which is reflective of what we all think of when we think of coercion and pressure.
Rebecca Paul
Forgive me—I hope the hon. Gentleman will bear with me as I seek to understand this; he is obviously very learned in these matters. My understanding is that clause 24 takes out only the assistance piece, not the encouragement piece. I think the hon. Gentleman just said, if I am right, that encouragement now falls under clause 26, but encouragement is also captured in the Suicide Act 1961. That is my non-lawyer interpretation of reading the Bill. I am not saying that is absolutely right, but I would appreciate it if he could clarify that.
Jake Richards
My reading of the Bill—we are dealing with clause 1, but we will get to clause 24—is that clause 24(3) says:
“In the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert”,
followed by the provisions in new section 2AA.
Juliet Campbell (Broxtowe) (Lab)
I have a question for the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. We are having a lengthy conversation about coercion and pressure, and whether those two words are a catch-all for things that can be much more subtle and nuanced. That is the point of the amendment, and it is the point that I will make when I speak to the amendment I have tabled. Clause 26 suddenly introduces new language, with the word “dishonesty”, which brings in another type of coercion and pressure. Could we rethink the wording of clause 1(2)(b), which refers to a person who
“has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured”?
The words “coerced” and “pressured” are insufficient to cover the safeguards that we are asking for. They are not a catch-all. We are asking for something much more nuanced, and for other words to be added, just as the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26.
Jake Richards
I did not draft the legislation, but my understanding is that the reason why the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26—I do not know whether the Minister wants to comment on this—is that when there is a criminal offence, there needs to be a mens rea. The person who has committed the offence needs to have been intentional or reckless in doing so. As I say, I was a criminal barrister only very briefly; I am sure my law tutors are shaking their heads.
Naz Shah
The principle of statutory interpretation means that by mentioning one thing, we exclude others, so it is my understanding that having the terms coercion and pressure in the Bill excludes undue influence. Will my hon. Friend, who has clearly gone through this in detail, also comment on the fact that section 2A of the Suicide Act says that encouragement includes pressure?
Jake Richards
With respect, I think my hon. Friend is wrong: it is certainly not an exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. The courts—this is why we have a common law system—interpret the language used in legislation.
Naz Shah
To build on that, I referred to the Court of the Appeal earlier, but when it comes to someone giving their organs, I think from the age of 12 or 13—I will try to find the reference—the words “undue influence” are used in the legislation. It comes back to the crux of my argument; I would like to understand why my hon. Friend is so concerned, from a legal perspective, about putting in the words “undue influence”, when they already appear in legislation.
Jake Richards
The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.
Jake Richards
Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s.
Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice.
I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.
Dr Tidball
Does my hon. Friend agree, as Max Hill did in oral evidence, that it would be helpful to have definitions of the three concepts in clause 26? Although we are discussing an earlier clause, it is important to thread the needle with this statute and ensure that we are looking ahead, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out.
Jake Richards
That sounds very sensible—I think my hon. Friend is talking about her amendment.
Rebecca Paul
I am so glad that the hon. Member has spoken, because this is a really important conversation. I appreciate that we are getting a little ahead of ourselves, so I will be quick before the Chair tells me off. Section 2A of the Suicide Act includes pressure when it talks about encouragement. That is why it is so useful to have this conversation—because that could mean that encouragement is captured by clause 26. There is some work to be done. I stand by the amendments—it is really important that we have them on the face of the Bill—but, when we get to the relevant point in Committee, we need to think about the interactions of clauses 24 and 26 with the Suicide Act. I am sure that the Ministers will want to look at that, but we may need to be very clear what is included in what, which may require some things in the Bill so that there is no ambiguity. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?
Jake Richards
Yes. As I say, the amendments are perfectly reasonable; it is sensible to raise them and it is good that we are having this conversation. I have looked into this carefully and I take it seriously. I feel that the square is squared—or the circle goes all the way round, to mix my metaphors—but that does not mean that we should not look into this further when we get to the relevant clauses.
Danny Kruger
I am worried about the constant suggestion that we look at these issues later. The fact is that we do not know what the Bill will look like later. We do not know what amendments will be tabled or what will be agreed. It is always possible to revisit amendments that have been passed in the earlier stages if subsequent amendments make them otiose. The point is that we should not pass this opportunity to strengthen the Bill if we can.
On the point that the hon. Member for Rother Valley was discussing with my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate about the Suicide Act explicitly referring to pressure as a subset, as it were, of encouragement, that Act specifies that encouragement is the general, catch-all term and includes pressure. I think the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, and other hon. Members have suggested, that it is the other way round: that coercion or pressure somehow include encouragement. Surely encouragement is the broader term—it exists in the current law on suicide. What is the problem with using that term in addition to coercion and pressure, consistent with existing law? It is a broader and more sufficient term.
Jake Richards
On the first point, in fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate was talking about a clause that we are going to consider and the link between two different criminal offences in the 1961 Act and clause 26 of the Bill.
On the second point, the Bill—to coin a political phrase—needs to be fit for the future. The language used in legislation over the last decade when we are considering coercion—I use that word automatically because that is the language we use now—is much more appropriate than “encouragement”, which is slightly archaic, to be honest. Perhaps we need to look at the Suicide Act as well—although not in this parliamentary term; that is for the second term. [Laughter.] I have nothing further to add.
Juliet Campbell
I rise to speak to amendments 113 to 115 and 118 to 121, which would require steps to be taken to establish that a person seeking assistance has not been manipulated by another person.
The amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has been manipulated, and would account for additional ways that a person can be influenced by another person into choosing an assisted death. Pressure and coercion may leave an individual feeling that they have no choice but to take that path; however, manipulation can make the person think that they made the choice themselves. Coercion is an overt and clear means of controlling someone, whereas manipulation is a hidden, psychological and deceptive means of control.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)
Jake Richards ExcerptsTuesday 11th February 2025
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 View all Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 February 2025 - (11 Feb 2025)
Sarah Olney
I look forward to the hon. Lady’s further comments, but as I said, the psychiatrists were very clear that they did not believe that this was a sufficient safeguard, and we should acknowledge that.
I was unable to put my question to Alex Ruck Keene KC during the oral evidence session, but he kindly agreed to give further evidence in writing in response to a letter I sent to him later that day. That exchange of letters has been published as written evidence. It was his position that, in actual fact, Professor Sir Chris Whitty misinterpreted the Mental Capacity Act when he gave evidence. There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act that states that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. Mr Ruck Keene’s view is that that was the common law prior to the Mental Capacity Act coming into force, whereas in actual fact the Mental Capacity Act does not require that the more serious the decision, the more capacity someone needs to be judged to have.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
I am sympathetic to the problem the hon. Lady has identified of people who have a terminal illness as well as other mental health conditions. Instead of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act for this new context, would it not be better to secure safeguards through clause 9, through which further assessments are potentially going to be mandated, if the amendment from the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) is agreed to, for those cases where there is doubt as to capacity? That would add a further safeguard rather than rewriting the established Mental Capacity Act and case law.
Sarah Olney
I have no intention of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act. It should stand exactly as it is and be used for the purpose for which it is intended. That is not the intention behind my amendment, which merely proposes that we should assess people’s ability to make the decision and not just their capacity. Many of those who provided evidence demonstrated that merely testing somebody’s capacity to make a decision is insufficient in this case.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Member is absolutely right. That would be another weakness of the Mental Capacity Act being used in this context: if someone is judged to have capacity, they are free to make an unwise decision, yet there is nothing in the Bill to provide a safeguard against people who might have capacity and make an unwise decision because their thinking has been obscured by mental illness, depression or something else.
Jake Richards
I have a few questions for the hon. Member. Who does she propose will decide whether a decision by someone who has capacity is wise or unwise? Does she also propose changing the law around patients’ refusing life-saving treatment? Should that be handled under the Mental Capacity Act, as it is at the moment?
Sarah Olney
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, but I am not proposing to change any legislation other than the Bill before us. All the other legislation to which he refers should remain precisely as it is, and for the purpose for which it was intended. He asks who is to say whether someone is making a wise or unwise decision; that is the job of the people who are instructed to provide assessments under the Mental Capacity Act. As was clear from my response to the hon. Member for Reigate, if someone has been assessed as having capacity, there must not be any further interference in their decision-making process, even if there are distinct concerns that that person may be deciding to end their life not purely because of their terminal illness but because they are suffering from depression. There is no other mechanism in the Bill to enable that further safeguard.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend puts it with his usual candour. He asked a straight question, so I will give him a straight answer: I think there is a difference between somebody who is depressed and somebody who is depressed and suicidal. I have no personal moral objections if someone who has a terminal illness, who suffers from depression and who has capacity as set out through the two-stage test in the Mental Capacity Act, ultimately wishes to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis. If they are doing it because they are suicidal as a consequence of their depression, that is a different and distinct issue. We are talking about individuals who want to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis, not because of their mental disorder.
Jake Richards
I keep making the point that clause 9 adds a different element to this process. It says that, when undertaking the assessment, one of the two doctors
“may, if they have doubt as to…capacity…refer the person for assessment”
of their capacity by a psychiatrist. Does that reassure the hon. Member that there is a further layer of safeguards in this area?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
That is one of the additional safeguards in the Bill. This Bill has more in-built safeguards than any similar piece of legislation across the world. I think the hon. Gentleman makes a valid point: when a doctor has concerns about somebody’s mental state, they can escalate the case and seek further, specialist opinion.