My Lords, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, this Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeThat the Grand Committee do consider the Human Medicines (Authorisation by Pharmacists and Supervision by Pharmacy Technicians) Order 2025.
Relevant document: 34th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
My Lords, the legislation before us today is part of a wider programme of common-sense reform to modernise pharmacy regulation and to cut red tape, which will enable pharmacies to thrive and will make pharmacy services quicker and easier for patients to access, as well as maintaining high levels of patient safety.
The Government recognise that the current legislation we have in place is outdated and restricts practice, putting restrictions on the quality of service to the public. So I am very pleased to bring forward today another measure that, if approved, will mean that pharmacists will be able to spend more time delivering clinical care and registered pharmacy technicians will be able to manage more dispensing processes autonomously.
I draw your Lordships’ attention to the fact that these measures are voluntary, and take-up will of course vary across the measures that I will describe.
I turn to the detail of the SI. It proposes to amend the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 and the Medicines Act 1968, using powers under the Health Act 1999. The legislation broadly extends across the UK, but I point out that some of it does not in practice apply to Northern Ireland—I will return to that.
I wish to set out three core proposals. The first covers who must supervise the dispensing of pharmacy and prescription-only medicines. Currently, the situation is that a pharmacist must carry out or supervise all stages of the preparation, assembly, dispensing, and sale and supply. Case law has led to restrictive practice and different interpretations of the law. Many of these activities can and should be delegated to registered pharmacy technicians, who are competent and ready for these changes.
The first proposal will allow a pharmacist to authorise a registered pharmacy technician to undertake or supervise others to undertake these activities without the pharmacist needing to supervise. In giving an authorisation, the pharmacist can set conditions. For example, they may wish to exclude certain categories of drugs and ensure that staff know when to consult the pharmacist.
The law demands that a pharmacist must have due regard to patient safety when giving an authorisation. This means in practice that a pharmacist will be authorising only staff who are trained, competent and confident to undertake a task. The pharmacist will still be expected to undertake a clinical check, which is critical to make sure that a medicine is safe and appropriate for each patient. A further reassurance is that professional standards and guidance will be updated to support the safe implementation of these changes in practice.
The second proposal aims to stop the only-too-familiar situation we will all know about, whereby patients who arrive at a pharmacy find they cannot be handed their medicine because the pharmacist is absent for some reason or another. For example, they may be with a patient or taking their well-earned lunch break. This will be resolved by allowing a pharmacist to authorise any member of the pharmacy team to hand out checked and bagged prescriptions in their absence. This change in the regulations allows the pharmacist to decide who it is professionally appropriate to authorise to hand out medicines in their absence. This is likely to be a pharmacy technician, or a dispensing or counter assistant. Again, the pharmacist is required to have due regard to patient safety and to have already done a clinical check—in other words, they must be content that the medicine is appropriate for that patient and no further consultation is required.
The third proposal relates to how hospital aseptic facilities are managed and run. These are highly specialised services delivering sterile medicines for cancer patients, premature babies and other vulnerable patients. At the moment, the law states that only a pharmacist can run this type of facility. But the reality is that pharmacists are not the only staff capable of running such facilities. There is a cohort of pharmacy technicians who have undergone additional education and training and who are competent and capable of managing these important facilities. So, this legislation will allow registered pharmacy technicians to lead these facilities. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society is updating its 2016 professional standards for the quality assurance of aseptic preparation services. This will define the required knowledge and training for both professions to support and ensure safe implementation.
I turn to the scope and timescales. It is important to note—I made reference to this earlier—that, while the statutory instrument extends across the UK, proposals one and three will not apply in Northern Ireland until pharmacy technicians become a registered profession in Northern Ireland. At this point, we will, of course, work with the Department of Health, Northern Ireland to bring in these measures as soon as possible.
With regard to timescales, we are proposing a phased implementation. The measures relating to the handing out of completed prescriptions in the absence of a pharmacist will enter into force 28 days after the regulations receive royal approval. This means that patients will benefit immediately, thereby taking pressure off already busy pharmacy teams. The aim is to bring the other measures into force following a one-year transition period. This will be enacted by a separate Order in Council. This will allow time for the development and publication of professional standards and guidance and will ensure that these measures are implemented into practice safely.
I hope that I have been able to set out the purpose, alongside a clear rationale on the need for change. I look forward to what will be, I am sure, an informed and constructive debate. I beg to move.
My Lords, some concerns about the order have been drawn to my attention, so I have a few questions for the noble Baroness. Pharmacy technicians, on entry to the register, have an NVQ 3 qualification, which is equivalent to two A-levels. By contrast, pharmacists have a level 7 qualification, a master’s degree, which is a different basic training, with pharmacists obviously having much greater scientific and clinical knowledge. There is a worry that large pharmacy corporations could create pressure or targets which result in pharmacy technician supervision replacing pharmacist supervision for financial gain, which could put patients at greater risk because of the knowledge gap between the pharmacist and the pharmacy technician.
With 16% of 237 million drug errors annually being due to dispensing errors, I ask the Minister, who will, after all, be legally responsible in the event of any patient harm, why supervision is not defined in legislation or in the draft SI. I could not find any evidence of definition. The noble Baroness said in her introduction that pharmacists would be required to make a clinical check, but I cannot see that in the order.
I understand that, in the government consultation, 58% of all respondents and 76% of pharmacist respondents opposed allowing pharmacists to authorise pharmacy technicians to supervise the preparation, assembly, dispensing, sale and supply of prescription-only medicines in pharmacies. Also, 51% of respondents and 65% of pharmacists disagreed with allowing pharmacy technicians to supervise the preparation, assembly and dispensing of medicines at hospital aseptic facilities in the way that pharmacists do under current law.
That generates a few questions. First, what is in place to prevent any one pharmacist—for example, one working centrally across a chain of stores—writing an authorisation for large groups of pharmacy technicians on the register to supervise medicines preparation, assembly, dispensing, sale and supply from, potentially, every pharmacy on the register, implying indirect supervision en masse? If this cannot be done in a single authorisation, could any one pharmacist write multiple authorisations to the same effect? Is it correct that an authorisation can be made without the explicit consent of the technician, and that, once made, it can be withdrawn or varied only by the pharmacist who gave it? If that is correct, individual pharmacists in pharmacies would be powerless to withdraw the authorisation if they were not the one who gave it, even if they were the pharmacist on the premises and had concerns. It seems that, even if the on-site pharmacist was not the one who issued the authorisation, they might be liable for something that occurred but which they were powerless to prevent. It just does not seem clear enough; that is the reason for my questions.
The government website states:
“Although the presence of a pharmacist in retail pharmacy is not explicitly stated in law, section 70(2) of the Medicines Act 1968 requires that a responsible pharmacist must be in charge of what happens at a retail pharmacy. This means, in law, the ‘physical presence’ of a pharmacist is inferred”.
Can the Minister confirm whether this inference is drawn from the responsible pharmacist regulations 2008, which have been revoked? The General Pharmaceutical Council’s rules are expected to allow for a pharmacist to be absent from a pharmacy, and for a pharmacist to be responsible for more than one pharmacy and, therefore, not physically present in all of them. How will authorisations be tracked so that a local pharmacist can know whether a given authorisation is current or has been withdrawn orally or in writing or varied? The authorisation could have been given by a different person, on a different date and on different premises.
It looks as if a pharmacy technician can hold two or more different authorisations—one of which could be oral, which may be useful in times of emergency or great pressure—but this order requires either verbatim recording or video recording at the time, stating either a date of expiry or that this overrides the previous authorisation. What happens if authorisations conflict? How will a conflict be resolved if, for example, one pharmacist allows the supply of certain drugs and another prohibits it?
This brings me briefly to the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, which, in its current form, provides sweepingly extensive powers for the Secretary of State to amend the entirety of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 and to make regulations regarding the preparation, assembly and supply of lethal substances —particularly in Section 37(4). This could allow pharmacy technicians to supervise, prepare, assemble and supply highly toxic lethal mixtures. Many medicines are incompatible when taken together, which is a concern.
I apologise for the complexity of the questions and the confusion that this order has provoked.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in this debate. First, I declare an interest as a member of your Lordships’ House’s Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Only last week, I met the Company Chemists’ Association, which very much endorses this order. This morning, I chaired a round table on vaccinations, which showed quite clearly that, if community pharmacies are able to execute vaccinations on a widespread basis, their other work in terms of dispatching and gathering together prescriptions can be done by fully regulated pharmacy technicians.
However, I take on board the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in respect of qualifications and the wide gap in those qualifications. There are also issues to do with terminally ill adults and medication and prescriptions, particularly around contraindications. If that happens, it could have severe consequences for the patient.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her very clear introduction of this SI. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Ritchie, and to say, perhaps counterintuitively, that I agree with both of them. It is very clear that there are arguments for steps forward because of the way in which circumstances and technology have changed: there is an argument for reform. But the questions put by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, are very important and we have to put those into context.
I note that a survey put out in August by the National Pharmacy Association and Community Pharmacy England said that 63% of pharmacies could close in the next year and only 6% of pharmacies were profitable. Only 25% of pharmacies are independent; the rest are either corporate or supermarket-owned pharmacies.
The concerns are obvious when we are talking about that last group. There is a risk of seeing one pharmacist having effective control and providing authorisation to a large number of pharmacy technicians where there might be corporate structures that put a large amount of pressure on financial returns rather than ensuring absolute safety and the controls that are needed. So we need to understand this SI in that context. Obviously, in some ways that is what is driving the SI, but we also need to think about the controls and where there is huge financial pressure on independence. A majority of prescriptions now come through giant corporate companies with very distant methods of control.
My second question is on timing. I note that on 1 October the General Pharmaceutical Council opened its consultation on overhauling the pharmacy technician training framework, including plans to move study from level 3 to level 4. It rather feels that we have just opened a consultation on changing the training, yet here we are bringing in regulations that almost seem to be assuming that that training has already been stepped up. Would it not be a better idea to step up and overhaul the training and then bring in the different regulations? The consultation suggests there is a very clear understanding that there is a need to improve the training of pharmacy technicians.
My final set of questions has to go back to physician and anaesthesia associates and the Leng review. I would like to understand how this SI fits within the broader framework of regulation of all the medical professions. I note, looking back over the history of this, that we go back to 2014 and the Law Commission recommendations about the regulation of a new single legal framework for health and care professionals. Under the previous Government we had consultations in 2017, 2019 and 2021, all of them in this space. So far as I have been able to discover, they did not seem to cover physician technicians: certainly not in much detail. This whole physician and anaesthesia associates débâcle, I have to say, was supposed to be part of a whole process of looking at all stages of medical regulation right across the board. How does this SI fit within that framework?
Finally, I have to note that, in the Chamber on 16 July, I was told that the Government would be delivering an implementation plan for the Leng review in the autumn. I have noticed that quite a lot of leaves seem to be changing their colour at the moment. I know that the government definition of “autumn” can be quite extended, but perhaps the noble Baroness could update us on when we can expect to see that implementation plan.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. In fact, it is a pleasure to follow all noble Baronesses who have spoken and to be the first Baron to speak in this debate. A bit like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I counterintuitively support quite a lot of what has been said, even though some of it is quite contradictory and does prompt questions, even though the generality is supported.
I also thank the Minister for outlining in a clear and understandable way the order before the Committee. In my role as vice-chair of the APPG on Pharmacy, I have been able to speak not only to a number of organisational groups but to individual pharmacists to understand some of the differences of opinion within the sector.
This is without doubt a pivotal moment, marking a significant shift in pharmacy regulation. I offer the Government our general support for the core principle of modernising an outdated legal framework to unlock clinical capacity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, pointed out, for far too long—in fact, since 1933—regulations have been rigid, forcing highly qualified pharmacists to oversee tasks that can be safely and competently managed by other registered professionals.
This order, by introducing the concept of authorisation and delegation to pharmacy technicians, corrects this historical anomaly. The benefits are clear; it empowers pharmacists to fully embrace clinical roles: prescribing, consulting and administering services, probably as part of the new neighbourhood health services that the 10-year plan suggests. It validates the expertise of pharmacy technicians, providing them with greater autonomy, particularly in complex environments like hospital aseptic facilities. It introduces, to use the Minister’s phrase, common sense measures of allowing trained staff members to hand out pre-checked, bagged medicines in the pharmacist’s temporary absence, ending needless patient delays.
However, the consultation process responses, which saw over 5,000 replies, revealed a sector divided. Although professional bodies and pharmacy technicians largely welcomed the proposals, we must not ignore the fact that many individual pharmacists expressed profound concern, as quite rightly highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. It is here in the detail and the perceived risk that we must focus our scrutiny. Indeed, while welcoming the statutory instrument, there could be some unintended consequences. The issues raised are not frivolous; they are structural and require ministerial assurance.
I wish to highlight three major areas of risk. The first one is patient safety, training and accountability. The core objection from many pharmacists relates to the level of initial education and training required by pharmacy technicians to take on these new autonomous roles. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, the consultation has just started. It ends on 24 December. It will not pick up pace until at least early 2026, and then there will be the training, the qualifications for the training and the accountability for the training. Are the Minister and the Government convinced that there is enough time to roll out not just the training but to assure its quality before technicians are allowed to do this?
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has really highlighted the problems that could come around with vague authorisation. If a pharmacist gives a general or oral authorisation without clearly defining the scope, conditions and limitations for the technician, it could lead to confusion and mistakes, particularly concerning high-risk medicines. I was going to ask similar questions to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, but I will leave those to one side.
There also is, potentially, an accountability gap. While the order notes that a pharmacist’s failure to have a
“due regard to patient safety”,
may lead to professional misconduct, establishing clear accountability when a technician makes an accuracy error under general supervision could be challenging for regulatory bodies. There is a contradiction there that needs to be understood.
Also, on dispensing queries, the new rule allowing a sale supply of ready dispensed products in the pharmacist’s absence creates a challenge. For example, will a shop assistant who has been there for one day and works in the pharmacy be allowed to do this? It does say “any member”, so I am pleased that the Minister is shaking her head. I seek reassurance on that particular point.
What if a patient has a question about the medicine? The person carrying out the transaction must know when they are qualified to answer and, crucially, when they must stop the transaction. How will this be addressed and understood by all concerned? The safety mitigation is reliant on the General Pharmaceutical Council-strengthened guidance and rules—work that is still pending, as we have heard. We must ensure that this guidance provides absolute clarity on the minimum competence standards required for authorisation and, crucially, that the professional indemnity cover for those roles is appropriate for the new scope of the responsibility.
Secondly, on the risk of undervaluing dispensing services, as the Minister said, the changes are enabling and not mandatory, yet the risk of financial exploitation is real. Pharmacies are already funded below cost for dispensing. My concern mirrored—
My Lords, as the noble Baroness said, the changes are enabling and not mandatory, yet the risk of financial exploitation of the regulations is real. Pharmacies are already funded below cost for dispensing, and my concern, mirrored by many in the sector, is that the department or NHS England may interpret this regulatory freedom as an automatic justification to reduce dispensing fees based on the assumption of a cheaper skill mix that may be automatically adopted. Any such reduction would threaten further the financial viability of community pharmacies, particularly small independent ones, risking closures and access issues.
The third issue is the ambiguity of supply “at or from” a pharmacy. Some in the sector feel that the proposed change to allow the supply of medicines at or from a pharmacy, while intended to cover home deliveries, introduces ambiguity. This phrase is viewed by some as a potential gateway to unsupervised remote supply models, such as unstaffed collection lockers in remote locations. The Government must emphatically stamp out any interpretation that undermines the fundamental principle that a pharmacist’s professional clinical input or availability is the bedrock of safe supply.
To ensure that we implement this modernisation safely and successfully, I ask the Minister for clear answers on these three points. On professional assurance, what guarantee can the Minister give to individual pharmacies that the new GPhC standards will explicitly address the concern over minimum competency and mandatory continual professional development, and that the accountability split is clear before the main authorisation provisions come into force?
On financial stability, can the Minister offer an unequivocal commitment that NHS England and the department will not use the new skill mix freedoms as a mechanism to unilaterally reduce the dispensing fees paid within the community pharmacy contractual framework?
On the safety of supply, given the sector-wide apprehension, will the Minister commit to publishing restrictive statutory guidance that clearly defines “supply at or from” a pharmacy to rule out any future implementation of unsupervised off-site collection points for pharmacy and prescription-only medicines?
This is a reform that will have good outcomes if implemented correctly. The move forward for progress must address the potential risks, ensuring support for the entire pharmacy team and financial stability for dispensing as well as, crucially, protecting patient safety and access to local dispensing community pharmacy.
My Lords, I also thank the Minister for the way she introduced this SI. I begin by also thanking the thousands of pharmacists and pharmacy technicians who deliver vital services to patients every day in both the community and hospital settings— I can see that your Lordships all agree with that.
From these Benches we support the principle behind this statutory instrument. As the Minister said, in many ways it is common sense. It reflects the evolution of community pharmacy practice, which has changed significantly since the original 1933 Act was introduced—a time when pharmacists still routinely compounded medicines by hand. Over the years, that role has evolved and medicines are now largely pre-packaged and supplied via global supply chains. Pharmacists increasingly play a critical role in delivering NHS services, from vaccinations to blood pressure checks, emergency medications and, of course, Pharmacy First consultations—which many noble Lords agree with. Given the Government’s priorities on moving from hospital to the community, they also play a vital role here.
This legislation rightly seeks to release capacity, allowing pharmacists to spend more time with patients, and it allows pharmacist technicians to take on more responsibility in line with training and regulation. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Bennett, said, there were concerns about the technicians and the differential in training level, and taking that on. In some ways, that takes us back to the physician and anaesthetist associates debate. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and I were on different sides in that debate, I think that we would all agree that it was not right that those who were not qualified were taking on the role of those who were more qualified and taking on roles above their qualifications. What can the Minister say about that, given the experience of anaesthetist and physician associates? We welcomed that. Some of them were being asked to do roles for which they were not qualified. How do we make sure that pharmacist technicians are not repeating that?
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to today’s debate. I noted the discussion between noble Lords about whether they could agree with several noble Lords at one time; the answer is yes because I can do so, too. I feel that the questions asked will shine a useful light.
I am grateful for the support that this order has received and for the understanding that it is about releasing capacity and meeting what people need these days, as compared to the situation in 1933—or, indeed, at any time since then. This is about our move from hospital to community; our reliance on and welcoming of the whole pharmacy sector; and what that sector can bring to us. This sector is a tremendously important part of our National Health Service and allows us to provide services when, where and how we need them; I add my thanks to pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and their professional bodies for their work in this area. I hope that, overall—I picked this point up—noble Lords will see that this order is about supporting pharmacy services, supporting patients and cutting the red tape that frustrates both the sector and those who use it.
I turn to the specific questions asked by noble Lords; I will of course be glad to write if I do not manage to address any of them. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, my noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised concerns about the order, particularly in respect of pharmacy technicians’ qualifications. Let me say at the outset—this is quite a good framing, really—that pharmacists are of course absolutely critical in delivering pharmaceutical services, but the fact is that they cannot deliver without a dedicated team. That is what we are building on.
Pharmacy technicians are ready for these changes. Their training and expertise enable them to take responsibility for many activities that would previously have been the sole responsibility of the pharmacist. I can certainly say that post-registration training and professional guidance will be supporting these changes into practice. I say this to noble Lords: the answer to a number of the questions that have been legitimately asked is the professional guidance, because, as I know noble Lords will understand, this cannot all be laid out in legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked about definitions in respect of clinical checks. Let me start by talking about the professional guidance, which will set out what the pharmacist’s role is to be—including when and how there will be a need for a clinical check. It is important to say that the sector wanted pharmacy technicians to be able to work autonomously; that falls outside what “supervision” traditionally means. Therefore, we are introducing a second form of delegation, which will allow pharmacists to authorise a pharmacy technician to undertake or supervise dispensing activities without the need for direct supervision by the pharmacist. We are aware that we need to give the sector the legal clarity that noble Lords have asked for with regard to what “supervision” means in this context; I can refer noble Lords to a detailed annexe that was published alongside the consultation, but the point is well made.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, my noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised various questions in respect of what I will refer to as indirect supervision en masse and the need for a responsible pharmacist. So let me give the reassurance that these proposals do not remove supervision or change the legal requirement that a responsible pharmacist must be signed in at a registered premises when dispensing activities are taking place and when open to the public. We have stressed at every stage of formulating this policy our commitment to maintaining the legal requirement that noble Lords are rightly concerned about, whereby every community pharmacy must have a pharmacist on the premises.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, asked why there is a reference to “any member of staff”. The reason is that pharmacists will be able to authorise any member of staff to hand out checked and bagged prescriptions but they must be authorising only staff who are trained, competent and confident to undertake a task. There will be updated professional standards and guidance to ensure that good governance supports the safe implementation of these changes in practice. Therefore, it could not be, for example—the noble Lord might have had this in mind—an assistant in a supermarket who happens to be working in the pharmacy. That would not meet what is required. Again, that is an important point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, asked how authorisations will be tracked and what happens if there is conflict. I go back to my opening comments that practice matters cannot be set out in law. They will be addressed in professional standards and guidance, as I have said. That will be set by the regulators and professional leadership bodies to support the implementation of these changes into practice, and we look forward to working with those bodies. That should include professional expectations for record-keeping requirements when an authorisation is given. Training is to make clear to all staff—I return to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven—that they need to follow standard operating procedures for when the authorisation is given, when they should consult the pharmacist and when a supply should not go ahead. That will all be part of that.
My noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked about matters relating to Northern Ireland. As I mentioned, when pharmacy technicians become a registered profession in Northern Ireland, which is expected by April 2027, we will work with the Northern Ireland Department of Health to enact the other changes as soon as possible.
I thank my noble friend Lady Merron for that helpful information. Initially, up-and-running pharmacy technicians were to be registered by 2025. Why the two-year delay in terms of Northern Ireland? Maybe she would be so good as to ask Minister Nesbitt.
I cannot give a specific answer, but I will be pleased to write to my noble friend and other noble Lords about the timetable rather than land Minister Nesbitt in it in any way, which I would never wish to do. But I can give the assurance to noble Lords that officials are in regular contact with their counterparts in Northern Ireland, and the measures we are talking about have been developed in collaboration with the devolved Governments and the four chief pharmaceutical officers across the UK. I hope that will be helpful.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, asked about a focus on improved training before the regulations. Pharmacy technicians undertake two years of focused training in clinical settings, and they can provide clinical and dispensing services that are appropriate to their level of training at the point of registration. However, additional post-registration training is widely available to support technicians to prepare for these new roles. Assurance is also provided by the annual revalidation for all pharmacy technicians across the country. If we combine this with robust standard operating procedures and professional guidance, it will provide a clear frame- work to ensure that pharmacists can be confident to authorise pharmacy technicians to carry out, or to supervise others carrying out, activities while ensuring patient safety, which is at the heart of this, as well as service.
Given the high number of drug errors due to dispensing errors currently, will there be some monitoring of the frequency of drug errors to see whether they increase or decrease as a result of the changes?
It is important to keep all matters under review—and I would want more than that—because we need to see how things are going. Certainly, the monitoring will continue. However, I would counsel a bit of caution: increases may not be directly related. As the noble Baroness well knows, it is always a complex situation, but certainly monitoring will continue. We will want to see how these reforms are working.
On training, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, that initial education training is assured by the regulator. Post-qualification training is a responsibility of NHS England. No pharmacy technician should be acting outside of their competency, and pharmacists have the responsibility that I outlined of ensuring that they are delegating tasks appropriately.
On accuracy errors, which the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised, pharmacists and pharmacy technicians remain professionally accountable for their actions. There is no change to that. On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, about a patient having a question about their medication, the pharmacy technician, or the other professional handing out the medication, will be trained to refer this back to the pharmacist. So, again, that assurance can be given.
I make reference to pharmacy funding because the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised it. We have been quite clear that funding community pharmacy is a priority. The new community pharmacy contractual framework, which has been secured by this Government, is the first step in rebuilding community pharmacy as part of our plan for change. There is a £3.1 billion deal; it is the largest uplift in the funding of any part of the National Health Service, which shows, I believe, our commitment to supporting community pharmacy and building a service that is fit for the future.
I know that the sector welcomes the commitment from the Government to the uplift—that is not in doubt—but that fact is that, even with the uplift, dispensing fees are still below cost. The question was quite specific, because it is causing a bit of worry in the sector: can the Minister assure the sector that, because this measure is enabling and not mandatory, the Government will not use a skill-mix change as a way of trying to reduce dispensing costs?
I will be pleased to write to the noble Lord in greater detail, if he will allow that, because his question raises a whole range of points, and I would like to be accurate in my response to him.
I move on to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, about the transition period. I hope that it is helpful for me to say that, following the approval of the Privy Council and royal approval, provisions on handing out checked and bagged prescriptions in the absence of a pharmacist will apply, as I mentioned earlier, some 28 days later. The other measures will be brought into force after a one-year transition period, which will be enacted by an Order in Council to be agreed with the Privy Council. This will allow time for the professional regulations and guidance that are absolutely crucial to making this work to be updated; we cannot do this without that time.
Noble Lords have made extremely helpful and important points today. I know that there is more work to be done to ensure that the sector is fit for the future so that we can deliver the change described in the 10-year health plan. I am grateful for noble Lords’ support for innovating and modernising the regulatory framework, because pharmacy services must be sustainable, deliver quality services and deliver the outstanding patient care that we all deserve. I thank noble Lords for their contributions and questions.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeThat the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Mutual Recognition Agreement) (Switzerland) Regulations 2025.
My Lords, these regulations are a vital step in implementing the UK’s commitments under the Bern Financial Services Agreement, signed with Switzerland in December 2023. This agreement is a landmark in our financial services relationship, reflecting the UK’s status as a leading global financial centre and our long-standing ties with Switzerland.
The purpose of these regulations is straightforward. They create a legal framework to allow Swiss investment service firms to supply certain cross-border services directly to UK clients, including sophisticated and high net worth individuals, without the need for UK authorisation.
This new market access is based on mutual recognition. This means that each party recognises the other party’s regulatory and supervisory regimes and deems that the other party’s regulatory and supervisory regime achieve equivalent outcomes to its own. These outcomes relate to market integrity, financial stability and the protection of consumer and investors.
Mutual recognition is underpinned by enhanced supervisory co-operation between the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, or FINMA, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Bank of England and the Prudential Regulation Authority. For UK insurers, the Swiss offer under the BFSA allows them to provide certain insurance services directly to Swiss clients, including sophisticated and high net worth individuals, without the need for Swiss authorisation, subject to the same principles of mutual recognition and supervisory co-operation.
To ensure this new access is safe and well-managed, the regulations also equip our financial regulators—the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Bank of England—with new powers and duties. These include the ability to request information from Swiss firms, intervene if risks to UK consumers or financial stability arise, and oversee an orderly wind-down of Swiss firms’ UK activities if the agreement is terminated. The FCA is also required to maintain a public register of Swiss firms operating under the agreement, ensuring transparency for UK clients.
The regulations also establish enhanced co-operation arrangements between UK and Swiss regulators, including a formal memorandum of understanding. This will support regular information sharing, joint supervisory work and effective dispute resolution. The FCA and PRA will work closely with their Swiss counterparts to address any risks or issues that may emerge.
Importantly, these regulations do not diminish the UK’s high standards of consumer protection, market integrity or financial stability. Safeguards are in place to allow UK regulators to act swiftly and decisively if a Swiss firm’s conduct threatens our financial system or clients. Swiss firms will remain subject to supervision by the Swiss regulator, but UK authorities retain the right to intervene where absolutely necessary and if co-operation with the Swiss regulator has failed. These are backstop powers and will therefore be used only as an absolute last resort.
Industry stakeholders, including TheCityUK, have welcomed the agreement and these regulations as a positive development for cross-border financial services. They provide greater certainty and flexibility for firms, while maintaining robust oversight and protection for UK consumers.
In summary, these regulations deliver on our international commitments, strengthen our financial services partnership with Switzerland, and ensure that new market access is accompanied by appropriate regulatory powers and safeguards. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument, which, as he said, implements the UK’s commitment to the agreement between the UK and the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in financial services.
I note that the explanation of the SI says that it will, as the Minister said, allow the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority to essentially oversee and ensure that nothing is going wrong and have oversight of Swiss operations here. That is perhaps not as reassuring as one might hope. I note a report in the Times yesterday that the Financial Conduct Authority had privately shared concerns about the 79th Group with the City of London Police eight months before the group collapsed, owing thousands of people more than £200 million. It is, to quote the Times,
“suspected of being one of the largest Ponzi schemes in British history”.
I note for the record that the company denies any wrongdoing. None the less, the Financial Conduct Authority appears to have had concerns but did not share those with consumers, who are clearly now very much paying the price.
It is worth reflecting that it is a little bit surprising that, as the Minister said, this reflects an agreement that was struck in December 2023 by the previous Government. They said that this was a
“ground-breaking pact on financial services cooperation”
and that it would enable
“frictionless, cross-border provision of financial services between the UK and Switzerland”.
It is interesting that a Government who have been elected on a promise of change now appear to be delivering exactly the agenda with the same kind of terminology as that of the previous Government who they replaced.
It is important to put on the record and focus on the reality of Swiss banking, which is deeply corrupt and non-transparent. If we take, for example, the Tax Justice Network’s financial secrecy index, Switzerland ranks second, and that is not a good result—it is second worst. The UK ranks at number 20, which is relatively good comparatively. Yet we now appear to be seamlessly linking up these two systems, linking our system into a more secret system, with considerable risks. Switzerland also ranks fifth on the Tax Justice Network’s corporate tax haven index, so it is complicit in multinational companies’ tax abuse in particular. The Tax Justice Network estimates the cost to other countries of the Swiss operations to be $21 billion a year.
Perhaps this is a specific question to the Minister. As regards the worldwide rise of automatic exchange of information notes in the past decade or so, in which Governments are supposed to exchange relevant financial information with their peers to help them enforce criminal and tax laws, Switzerland has carved out exceptions to these so-called AEOI notes. So, Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Article 127 of the direct federal tax Act, which still provide for secrecy, have not changed. That is going to be accessing our system and under Swiss law we will not be able to see what is happening. There has been talk of using trusts to replace some of the secrecy instead, but of course trusts are one of the issues that are a major problem.
I note in particular the work of Maria-Gabriella Sarmiento—I do not know whether the Minister has seen this, but I certainly encourage him to look at it—who completed a PhD at the University of Zaragoza about the estimated losses of between $20 and $40 billion for corruption practices, of which Switzerland is a significant destination for that money. Over 20 years,
“assets from at least 33 jurisdictions have been traced to Swiss banks … primarily proceeds of grand corruption, money laundering and other crimes”,
with their estimated values ranging between $112 billion and $514 billion.
The reality is, of course, that the UK and Switzerland are quite similar: they have expansive banking sectors, sophisticated wealth management services and market high-value assets. They are prime destinations for the corrupt to stash their money. To take one practical example from Transparency International, Carlos de São Vicente, a former CEO of a partially state-owned insurance company in Angola, embezzled more than $1.2 billion through Bermuda-registered companies; he then transferred substantial sums to Switzerland. That is one case where someone has been found out, but it is a sample of what a great many people we know are doing without being found out and without me being able to name the details.
I note also that, in 2023, Swiss regulators inspected their institutions and found that 50% had largely unsatisfactory anti-money laundering systems. I do not know whether the Minister can tell me whether there have been significant improvements in that area of money laundering since then.
It is very sad that this important statutory instrument is getting so little attention and focus and that it is happening in this Room, because it is crucial. We have to situate this in the context of the grave concerns—it is not just me who is expressing them—about the state of financial stability in our current system, for all kinds of reasons that I will not go into here. This is about linking up two systems that have great problems with corruption and a lack of transparency—two of the biggest systems in the world—and I cite a former Conservative Minister saying that 40% of the world’s dirty money goes through the City of London and the British Crown dependencies. I do not have a comparable figure for Switzerland, but I have no doubt that it is significant. We are linking up these two sets of money flows, which has to be a concern.
My Lords, this statutory instrument gives legal effect to the mutual recognition agreement between the UK and Switzerland known as the Bern financial services agreement. As the Minister has so clearly outlined, the agreement enables the UK and Swiss financial firms to provide services to each other’s markets, particularly in wholesale sectors, such as investment services, insurance and banking, without needing to establish a local presence or duplicate regulatory approvals.
The UK’s position as a global financial centre depends on maintaining strong transparent relationships with trusted international partners. We therefore welcome this agreement with Switzerland, developed on our watch. Mutual recognition, when accompanied by effective supervision and regulatory co-operation, can deliver meaningful benefits to both markets. Under this agreement, Swiss firms will be able to operate in the UK under the supervision of Swiss regulators, with the FCA and PRA granted powers to step in if issues arise—as the Minister explained. The same applies to UK firms offering services in Switzerland.
With that in mind, I would be grateful if the Minister could address the following points. First, I would like to probe the Swiss end. Has Switzerland yet put in place what is needed there to allow UK firms to benefit from mutual recognition? If not, when will this be done? What are the nature and scale of benefits to the UK financial institutions? That seems an important point.
Secondly, turning to our end, how confident are the Government that UK regulators have the necessary tools to monitor Swiss firms’ activities and act swiftly if concerns emerge? What protections are in place for UK clients—not only high net-worth individuals but small firms—should something go wrong?
Thirdly, on timing, why has it taken nearly two years from signing the agreement in December 2023 to putting this framework in place? Has there been a problem with the regulators not being ready or is the Treasury not working at pace?
I was grateful for the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, to my Question on 16 September, reporting that, by July this year, 51% of assimilated EU law—most of it in financial services—had been repealed, amended or replaced. This was a much lower figure than I had hoped for, given the importance of financial services to growth. I am not sure whether the Swiss regulations—the one set that we are debating and the negative set that is not being debated—will be included in the count in that definition, but the point about pace generally is important. The Official Opposition have been supportive of the transformation process, and there is no excuse for delay.
No doubt the Minister will respond on some of the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and perhaps explain how things have improved in Switzerland over time. But I note that there will be information sharing as part of the deal, which is important. However, how will Parliament be kept informed of the operation of this agreement, particularly in the event of regulatory diversion or dispute, or a bad case of the kind that was asked about?
In conclusion, we support efforts to deepen co-operation with trusted international partners in financial services, but it is vital that it is done without compromising consumer protection or financial stability, and that it delivers the trading benefits that we all hope to see. I look forward to the Minister’s response, ideally today but otherwise in writing.
I thank both noble Baronesses for their comments on this SI, which were gratefully received. This is an important SI because it is all about growth and building a relationship with a trusted trader in Switzerland that we can build on into the future.
On security and trust, the UK and Switzerland have a strong and established relationship in financial services, and last year we increased the number of transactions et cetera by 27%, and the amount by £4.9 billion. I cannot give a figure for how that is going to extrapolate into the future, but we are doing this to make it easier to have growth. Those figures will hopefully improve—they will improve, in my view—over the coming years.
In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, the agreement includes, for us, robust safeguards. Swiss firms must be authorised and supervised by FINMA, and the UK regulators retain powers to intervene if risks arise, including restricting activities and managing wind-downs, which both noble Baronesses raised. The FCA and the PRA act swiftly in urgent cases and collaborate closely with Swiss authorities. These measures ensure that, for UK consumers, market integrity and financial stability remain protected, while enabling the benefits of cross-border market access.
How they will be held to account was another issue raised by both noble Baronesses. Regulators will be held to account through clear statutory duties set out in regulations requiring transparency in their actions and co-operation with His Majesty’s Treasury. Their decisions, such as interventions against Swiss firms, are subject to oversight and include the right of affected firms to refer matters to an independent tribunal. The FCA public register will provide visibility of Swiss firms’ activity, supporting scrutiny by clients and stakeholders. Regular engagement with industry and reporting to the joint committee further ensures regulators’ accountability in implementing and managing the agreement. On the anti-money laundering aspect that was raised, Swiss firms will still need to comply with the UK anti-money laundering regime that we have in place.
On timing, it has taken two years—longer than that, actually, because the negotiations have been going on for a few years. Ultimately, we want to get this right. It is not just us but Switzerland that wants to get this right. There are two different kinds of regimes that have to agree this. After it was agreed by the Swiss Parliament, they had to allow 100 days for a potential referendum to be held. It was not held—it was not called for, so it did not take place—but that is 100 days of that two year period that the noble Baroness mentioned. International agreements often take time. We have to get it right.
I will ask a fairly technical question, so I will entirely understand if the noble Lord wishes to write to me about it. In his response, he said that this SI avoids duplicating regulatory burdens, but he also said that the Swiss companies would be covered by our anti-money laundering laws. As I referred to in my original contribution, my understanding is that transparency is avoided under Swiss law. I do not claim to be an expert on Swiss law; obviously I am taking advice here. Article 47 of the federal Act on banks and Article 127 of the direct federal tax Act effectively allow Swiss institutions to avoid scrutiny and reporting. But we are then saying that this will have to be covered by our anti-money laundering laws. As I said, I am not expecting the noble Lord to give me a response now, but could he commit to write to me about that issue of transparency and anti-money laundering, as well as how we can avoid duplication and ensure that we have our own anti-money laundering regulations?
Obviously, I will write with further detail but, as I said, the regulators will be held to account for what they do. This requires transparency—that is one of our stipulations—but I can write to the noble Baroness with further detail about that.
I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the scale of the opportunity to date and, therefore, our ambition for more; this is very good news. I am not sure that it has been quite quick enough for me—from May 2024 to today seems like quite a long time—but, of course, the Government are new and have been very busy with many things, so it is understandable.
Perhaps I could just come back to the point about parliamentary scrutiny. The Minister mentioned a Joint Committee; I am not sure which Joint Committee that was. Clearly, it is important that parliamentarians should be able to see the progress of important financial agreements such as this. I am not quite sure what the mechanism is. Is there an annual report from the FCA that covers this? That would be the FCA and the PRA. I am interested in how parliamentarians will be able to scrutinise this. What will be the best approach?
I will write to the noble Baroness with a fuller answer to her question.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeThat the Grand Committee do consider the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 (Extension of Operative Period) Regulations 2025.
Relevant document: 36th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
My Lords, the purpose of the instrument before your Lordships is to extend the powers to make regulations to implement private international law agreements for a further five years from 13 December 2025. This instrument may not have a very snappy title, but it is an important one because, if these powers are not extended, they will permanently lapse.
As your Lordships are doubtless aware, private international law rules are applied by courts and parties involved in legal disputes that raise cross-border issues. They generally apply in the context of civil and family law. In other words, private international law agreements help govern how we live, work and trade across borders. In the past, the domestic implementation of new private international law agreements generally required primary legislation, but most domestic provisions implementing private international law agreements concern technical matters and are limited in scope: therefore, implementation can appropriately be handled via secondary legislation. This is because policy issues are often settled when the private international law agreement is negotiated, so the implementation process focuses largely on the procedural changes needed to give effect to the policy decisions reached during negotiations.
The Committee will be interested to know that the Government have carried out a consultation with experts from across the UK. The vast majority of respondents considered that these powers have been used properly to date; that the safeguards are effective; and that the continued use of the powers is in the public interest because they provide a single, clear means of implementing private international law agreements and make proportionate use of parliamentary time.
The purpose of this instrument is to extend the powers to make regulations under Section 2 of and Schedule 6 to the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020. Section 2 allows the “appropriate national authority” to make regulations for the purpose of implementing international private international law agreements; to apply those regulations to the UK’s different jurisdictions; and to extend these regulation-making powers for a further five years. The Scottish and Northern Irish national authorities can grant permission to the Secretary of State to make regulations on their behalf, including regulations extending the five-year operative period in their jurisdictions, as they have done in this case.
I very much thank those noble Lords who sit on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for their review of this instrument and for their clear, concise summary in their 36th report, which I commend to the Committee.
I turn now to the reasons for extending the powers. We suggest that these powers provide a single, clear method for implementing private international law agreements. They protect the public interest by ensuring that parliamentary time is used effectively, and they retain the effective safeguards and limits on the powers provided by the Act. The powers are vital in ensuring the UK’s credibility with its international partners by reassuring them that private international law agreements can be implemented in a timely way.
By way of example, the powers were used to implement the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019. Without the powers granted by the Act, primary legislation would have been needed, thereby delaying implementation. Our ratification of Hague 2019 was warmly welcomed by the legal sector—and, indeed, by Members of your Lordships’ House—as an important step for international, civil and commercial co-operation.
The Government are now proposing that the powers would be used, for example, to implement the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which would allow cross-border commercial mediation settlements to be recognised and enforced more easily before the UK courts. Furthermore, in July 2023, the Government confirmed their intention to implement two model laws that had been adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law—UNCITRAL—of which the UK is a member state.
I will say a brief word about the consultation. The Act imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to consult such persons as he or she considers appropriate before using the powers. As your Lordships will be aware from the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government consulted targeted experts on whether to extend the powers for a further five years. These experts included academics, lawyers and professional bodies, some with very large memberships, from all parts of the UK; the vast majority agreed with the extension of the powers, for the reasons I outlined earlier.
On safeguards, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, doubtless remembers from his involvement in the passage of the Act, several noble and learned Lords raised concerns about the extent of the powers, which led to amendments introducing various safeguards. These include the prohibition on granting legislative powers, the banning of the creation of imprisonable offences and the establishment of a five-year extendable time limit, which is the subject of the instrument before your Lordships today.
In addition, most regulations made using the powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure or equivalent processes in the devolved legislatures. Therefore, Parliament and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures retain the ultimate say regarding the use of the powers. I would like to take this opportunity to reassure noble Lords that this instrument does not affect those safeguards. I should also add that several consultees noted the proportionate use of powers to date, as well as the effectiveness of the safeguards, and judged that the benefits outweighed the concerns raised during the passage of the Act.
I thank the noble and learned Lord in advance for his contribution, as I cannot see anybody else present who looks as though they want to say something; I very much look forward to working with him. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction of the regulations, which extend the powers conferred by the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 in order that Ministers may implement private international law provisions contained in international agreements in accordance with our dualist system of law.
Private international law is, of course, a vital extension of our domestic legal framework. It enables businesses, individuals and families to operate confidently and lawfully across borders. That is why the previous Conservative Government championed the 2020 Act. It expands the sphere in which reciprocal legal treatment can be upheld, with flexibility and indeed a degree of agility, as indicated by the Minister.
The Act is also one of several measures introduced to address the legal and legislative gaps following our departure from the European Union, filling the gaps in a way that minimised the burden on parliamentary time while continuing to promote the UK’s commitment to international legal co-operation. At the time, concerns were raised, as the Minister indicated, by the then Opposition about the potential for executive overreach. In practice, however, the power has been used very sparingly—only twice, I understand, since 2020—and the requirement for parliamentary renewal every five years provides an important check on its use. Far from becoming a tool of unchecked executive authority, it has functioned within very clear and indeed limited boundaries.
If the instrument is to continue serving our interests, we must be confident that it is both effective and proportionate. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government will consider undertaking a formal impact assessment to provide clarity on how they see the instrument being used in the coming years. Clearly, we must ensure that the instrument becomes neither a dormant provision nor a vehicle for unchecked executive action. I thank the Minister for her introduction.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his contribution to this debate. He is a lawyer of great distinction, and his comments were listened to carefully by me.
He made an important point about the necessity of ensuring that all legislation of this sort does not succumb to overreach or indeed become dormant but must remain both effective and proportionate. He asked whether we would consider an impact assessment. I may have to come back to him on that and write when there has been an opportunity to consider this. I will take it away and think about it carefully, because it seems that the points made are important.
As I set out, these powers are an important tool that will support a clear and effective implementation mechanism for private international law agreements. In turn, these agreements will provide greater clarity and confidence for UK businesses, families and citizens who work and live across international borders.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made towards their target of building 1.5 million new homes.
My Lords, our Government remain committed to delivering 1.5 million homes over this Parliament. Through major planning reform and investment, we are breaking through the barriers to development and will build the homes this country needs. Our bold planning reforms alone will drive housebuilding in the UK to its highest rate in 40 years. The spending review confirmed the biggest boost to social and affordable housing investment in a generation, alongside significant investment through the national housing bank, reforms to the building safety regulator, a new mortgage guarantee scheme, a support package for SME builders and work on a comprehensive construction skills package. We are laying the strong foundations for a generational rocket boost to housebuilding.
My Lords, 1.5 million is exactly what the country needs, but few outside government believe that this target is achievable. One in four of those homes would have to be built in London. London’s target for this year is 88,000 homes; by June, 4,000 had been completed. One reason that developers give for this slow progress is the target for affordable homes of up to 35%. Sites that were viable until recently are no longer. Can the Minister confirm that discussions are now taking place in Birmingham and London with a view to watering down the Government’s affordable homes programme in order to drive up completions? As one developer said, 35% of nothing is not a sensible policy.
I know the paper to which the noble Lord refers. With his ministerial experience, he will know that I cannot comment on leaked documents. However, let us make no mistake that London and the mayor are extremely ambitious about delivering the housing that London needs. The Government recognise its unique challenges, including higher build and labour costs, which have contributed to falls in starts and completions in the capital. We are working in partnership with the mayor and the GLA to accelerate housing delivery and are supporting the development of an ambitious next London Plan. We are already taking action to accelerate housebuilding through planning reform and unlocking large-scale developments such as at Euston. We are also supporting stalled sites in the capital via the new homes accelerator. London will be allocated up to 30% of the £39 billion social and affordable homes programme, granting approximately £11.7 billion to the GLA to support housing delivery in London.
Just after the war, a large number of prefab houses were built, with great success, and they lasted very well. Is there any good reason why one could not put up a lot of prefabricated houses, which would go a long way towards this number the Government want?
I remember those days and know how fond some of the inhabitants of those prefabricated homes were. Things are moving on; we are now looking at modern methods of construction homes, which could make an important contribution. They deliver high-quality, energy-efficient homes more quickly while creating new and diverse jobs in the sector. We have undertaken bold action to support housebuilders, including in the modern methods of construction sector, reforming the planning system, unblocking sites and increasing supply. We have developed a publicly available specification for MMC homes, which will bring greater clarity to the insurance and warranties market and support the delivery of the quality homes we all want.
My Lords, we clearly have grey-belt/green-belt confusion when planning inspectors are approving more than 70% of major residential grey-belt appeals. These appeals are expensive, time-consuming and quite obviously delay housing delivery. Given this clear disconnect between local interpretation and national policy success at appeal, will the Government please issue some clear, unambiguous guidance regarding grey-belt criteria, as in paragraph 155, to clarify the current confusion which clearly exists and helps no one?
I am very happy to take back whether we need some more communication on this. We have been very clear that we take a brownfield-first approach, but we know that brownfield alone will not be enough to deliver the country’s needs. That is why we have asked all local authorities that cannot meet their needs to review green belt and to identify opportunities. We expect them to prioritise the development of brownfield and the low-quality grey-belt land that the noble Baroness referred to. High-performing green-belt land and land safeguarded for environmental reasons will still be protected. The green-belt reforms support a more strategic and targeted approach to green belt. However, as I said, we are looking at brownfield first. Then, we expect local authorities to look at grey belt. I will take back to the department whether we need to communicate any further on that issue.
My Lords, before I ask the question, I wish all noble Lords a happy Diwali.
What role do local authorities play in achieving the 1.5 million homes target, and how are they supported?
I am grateful to my noble friend, particularly for his Diwali wishes. Unfortunately, I had to miss the Diwali celebration at home yesterday due to being here on the planning Bill, but it seems very appropriate that we have a festival of light at this time. I think we all need some light, so happy Diwali to all those celebrating.
Of course, local authorities are key partners in the delivery of 1.5 million homes—in the delivery of the social and affordable homes that we know we need, in tackling homelessness across our country and in developing some of the very important regeneration schemes which I have seen some fantastic examples of as I have gone round the country. Our job is to make sure that the planning system works effectively for them. Local authorities are uniquely able to look at local housing needs in their area and make provision for those. They are key partners in delivery, and we work with them constantly to see whether there is more we can do to help them do just that.
The Minister in her reply to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, mentioned energy efficiency. What requirements are His Majesty’s Government making that all new homes should have either photovoltaic or solar panels on them?
We have made it clear that we expect new homes to be built with PV panels wherever possible, although it is not possible in every instance. Later this year, we will bring out our future homes standard, which will set clear expectations around the energy efficiency of homes. It is important not only for all householders that their homes are efficient for the purposes of lower bills but for the planet that we are doing the best we can with the energy we have.
My Lords, to return to local authorities, have the Government assessed the impact on their 1.5 million homes target of local government reorganisation? I sat last year on the Devon Housing Commission chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Best, and it found that one of the biggest challenges for development in the county was local authority and planning departments. I know for a fact that, over the next two or three years, every planning department in Devon will be challenged by the considerable reorganisation due to take place.
That is an appropriate question for today because I met the leader of Plymouth City Council just this morning, and we talked about some of the issues facing Devon. We understand that the reorganisation of local government adds to the considerable pressures that local authorities already face. However, it is essential to ensure that local authorities are as efficient and sustainable as possible. We are working closely with our local authorities on that project. We have helped our local planning authorities with resourcing through an increase in planning fees for householders and other applications, as well as through measures in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill to enable local planning authorities to set their own planning fees to cover costs. We have also provided a £46 million package of support to help train and build capacity in local planning authorities.
My Lords, in an Oral Question in September, my noble friend Lord Jamieson raised a concern with the Minister about the proposed removal of the lower rate of landfill tax for inert construction waste, a change that could reportedly add up to £25,000 to the cost of building a single new home. At the time, the Minister did not directly respond to the question; she promised a written response that has not been received. Given the Government’s ambition for 1.5 million homes in this Parliament, can the Minister now clarify their position on this proposal and explain how such measures would support, rather than hinder, their wider housing delivery ambition?
The treatment of landfill is important for the environment, so it is key that we deal with that efficiently. I attended an SME round table as part of the APPG for SME House Builders last week; they raised the issue with me, and I will take it back to the department. I thought that I had replied to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, but I will go through and make sure that we did so. This is a particular issue for SME builders, so we are thinking that through and will issue a response shortly.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what work is under way to develop a rolling stock strategy for Great British Railways.
My Lords, my department is already working on a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, which will be the first for over 30 years, both to give certainty to the manufacturing and assembly market and to pursue modern standards of carbon-friendly traction and passenger comfort and accessibility.
My Lords, I welcome the work that is under way. Establishing the right industry partnerships is essential to developing a more efficient and cost-effective British railway model. Can the Minister update the House on the current status of discussions with EUROFIMA and indicate when British operators might be able to leverage its financial support in the procurement of public service rolling stock?
My Lords, EUROFIMA is a long-established, supranational financial institution, established as a joint stock company by an international treaty, the convention, signed by 25 European member states. It is dedicated to financing public passenger railway rolling stock and related infrastructure, as well as the modernisation and renewing of related equipment. As part of developing the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, my department is exploring a range of financing structures to support investment in partnership with private finance. This includes active engagement with EUROFIMA to assess how its financing mechanisms could support future investment in the UK rolling stock market. If, following due diligence, EUROFIMA is considered an appropriate avenue to go down, then we would aim to accede by the end of 2026.
My Lords, now that the Government own South Western Railway, they have inherited about 4,000 trains that were manufactured four years ago and have not carried any passengers at all. Can my noble friend the Minister tell the House when these trains are likely to enter service?
My noble friend is accurate: 90 trains were procured; some of them were delivered five years ago. At the time that the South Western Railway operation reverted to public ownership, six out of the 90 were in service; as of today, 23 are now in service. The new management is doing what the old one did not, which is to put the new trains in service and have the old ones taken out of service and scrapped. The rest of them will be introduced as fast as the drivers can be trained, which will take a little time because that had not been done either.
My Lords, before the election last year, we published a rolling stock pipeline so that the industry was aware of not just the trains that the Department for Transport wished to procure but the fact that it had Treasury funding, which I hope has been a useful foundation for the work that the Minister is doing on the rolling stock strategy. Given that foundation that was put in place, is he able to add to the Answer he gave the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and indicate to the House a timeframe of when he wishes to publish that rolling stock strategy for the competitive rolling stock industry that we established over the last decade or so?
The noble Lord’s recollection of what happened in his term of office might be quite good, but the fact is that the industry does not have much regard for what was published at the end of the term of the previous Government and is actively and interestedly waiting for something which relates to a real future, which is related to the age of the rolling stock and future usage. Currently, there are already three live procurements in the market for rolling stock, which will be referred to in the publication of the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, which I expect to take place next summer.
My Lords, in the north-east we rejoice at the success of the reinstated Northumberland line, linking Ashington to Newcastle, which has seen over 700,000 journeys since the line was reopened last December. However, the route struggles with a lack of carriages, and the company would like to put more trains on. Can I ask the Minister whether the strategy will seek to prioritise regions in our country which have traditionally been underinvested in, so as to fast-forward the economic growth the Government so desire?
If that is an answer, I will sit and listen to it.
The right reverend Prelate is correct that the new line to Ashington is a success. Northern is resolving to put additional rolling stock on those trains now. It is able to do that at certain times of the day. One of the procurements that I referred to is for 464 vehicles for Northern, which will replace a large and elderly fleet of existing diesel trains over the next several years. That will result in enough rolling stock to satisfactorily serve demand on the Ashington line and, indeed, on other routes.
Can my noble friend the Minister tell me how adversely the rolling stock strategy has been affected by the cancellation of the Crewe and Manchester legs of HS2?
The abrupt cancellation of phase 2a of HS2 necessitates thinking through again the rolling stock strategy for the whole of HS2. It is one of a number of really enormous issues that the new chief executive and new chair of the board of HS2 are grappling with, because it is about time that both the Government and the country knew how much had been done for the money that is currently being spent, how long the project will now take to deliver and how much it will cost, and we do not know any of those things currently.
My Lords, my apologies for intervening early—old habits die hard. Currently, as the Minister said, there are three rolling stock procurements under way for Southeastern, TransPennine Express and Northern, but how will the Government ensure that there are no further delays to procuring new train fleets? These are essential to replace thousands of old trains—some over 40 years old and, frankly, they are rapidly approaching the end of their operating life, which could lead to a major crisis.
The noble Baroness is right that there are a lot of old vehicles. The average age of vehicles on the national network is 17 years. There are 12,000 vehicles across 14 operators, and it is essential that we plan for the future, if only because several thousand jobs in the manufacturing plant in Derby and the assembly plants at Newton Aycliffe, Goole and Newport, Monmouthshire, all depend on this—as does, as she is right to say, passenger comfort and reliability for rolling stock that has reached the end of its normal life.
My Lords, when the Government nationalised the train operating companies, they said that one of the advantages was that they would no longer be paying fees to the private sector. Have the Government carried out, or do they intend to carry out, an assessment of the value for money to the taxpayer of continuing to finance rolling stock through the use of roscos in the private sector?
The Government’s policy is to continue to use the private sector to supply rolling stock to the British railway market. That has been quite clear since the manifesto before the election and nothing has changed. I think it is likely that the cost of rolling stock will be better than it has been, simply because the life of the rolling stock has been uncertain, but not sufficiently to diminish the risk taken by those companies, which is why they exist and why they should make a profit.
My Lords, did I hear, in the Minister’s opening statement a promise or guarantee that the rolling stock strategy will actually address the issues of decarbonisation and the reduction in fossil-fuel use?
The noble Baroness is right. The reason it is entitled the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy is that, with modern technology—including, mainly, batteries—for the first time we can look at bi and tri-mode vehicles. Of course, that is exactly what we need to do. In fact, very few manufacturers are now making diesel-only trains, because it is recognised that we need to be carbon-neutral in future. The strategy will indeed address the issues that she refers to.
My Lords, how does the rolling stock strategy interact with the strategy with regard to the personnel who will be driving those trains, and with regard to their pay and training, and making sure we have adequate people to be able to do it on weekends?
The noble Lord is right that you certainly need staff to drive the trains, and in many cases, but not all, you need conductors. I do not think the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy deals with that directly, but he is absolutely right that one of the critical things to establish reliability on the railways is sufficient staff to drive the trains—in particular, on Sundays, at least on some routes. One of the things that has been done since this Government got elected, one of the input measures that I seek for both this year and future years in the business plans of operating companies, is an increase in the number of drivers so that there are not cancellations and there are reliable Sunday services.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made in negotiations with the European Union for the UK to rejoin Erasmus+.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and declare interests as co-chair of the APPG on Modern Languages and president of the Chartered Institute of Linguists.
The UK has agreed to work towards association to the Erasmus+ programme, on financial terms to be mutually agreed, which should ensure a fair balance as regards the contributions of and benefits to the UK. Negotiations are under way, and noble Lords will understand that I cannot comment in detail on ongoing negotiations.
I thank the noble Baroness for that encouraging reply and appreciate that she cannot go into negotiating detail. Can she at least clarify that the overall objective is to achieve associate membership by the start of the next funding round, in 2027-28, and that the UK aims to include eligibility for schools, as well as for students in higher education? The international experience provided by Erasmus significantly enhances future employability as well as language skills.
My Lords, we are considering possible timelines for the UK’s association as part of ongoing discussions, including whether association for 2027-28 is feasible, although timelines are extremely tight. To use Civil Service language, we are moving at pace. We will bring forward the final agreement of any negotiations to your Lordships’ House in the usual way, and that will include details about schools and students.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a visiting professor at King’s and chairman of FutureLearn. I strongly welcome the Government’s efforts to associate with Erasmus. EU student numbers in the UK have roughly halved over recent years and now face further challenging policy headwinds under this Government. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact on EU students in the UK of the Government’s plans to impose a further 6% tax on international student tuition fees?
The noble Lord raises an interesting point which is slightly out of scope of the Question, so he will have to bear with me. I will write to him on the detail of any assessment, as I do not have the information in front of me. The opportunities afforded to us by the current Turing, Taith and CEEPUS schemes, and potentially with Erasmus, allow us to ensure that our relationship with the EU, as our largest trading partner, and the cultural ties that are afforded, can be continued. That is incredibly important.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, that the Government are working at pace to associate with Erasmus+. I semi-declare an interest, in that I have worked with several students on Erasmus Mundus programmes. Does the Minister understand the importance of getting in at the start of the multi-annual financial framework? Year-by-year arrangements do not necessarily work. To fully plug into the Erasmus programmes, it would be ideal to be there at the start of the next EU multi-annual financial framework.
The noble Baroness raises a very important point about our ongoing relationship with the European Union as part of these negotiations. Having committed to undertake negotiations to join Erasmus+ in 2027-28, we therefore hope to be part of the full MFF going forward.
My Lords, the Minister says that she cannot go into details, but will she be asking for UK citizens to be afforded the fullest breadth of opportunities—meaning opportunities not just for students but for teachers in terms of their professional development abroad? That was extremely valuable when we were previously a member of Erasmus+.
The noble Earl raises the most important point. Currently, 60% of our schools are struggling to recruit modern foreign language teachers. There is a genuine issue about how we ensure that not just students but their teachers and supporting staff have opportunities in this space. That is one of the benefits of us rejoining the Erasmus scheme, and as part of our negotiations, we will seek to ensure the fullest opportunities, including in respect of staffing.
My Lords, is not the Government’s attitude towards Erasmus and similar excellent schemes an example of the timidity shown by all Governments for many years in response to proposal that students be brought into the Europeanising process? All vice-chancellors across the land would say that Erasmus has brought in extraordinary intellectual and cultural stimulation. Furthermore, the economies of towns where Erasmus schemes are in operation have benefited. Will the Government throw off the shackles of timidity and show enthusiasm for a wonderful scheme that has enriched the world?
My Lords, very few people would ever call me timid. I think it fair to say that it is for exactly the reasons my noble friend has outlined that we are seeking to move at pace to ensure that we can participate in Erasmus in 2027–28. It has notable benefits, and we look forward to making sure that we deliver a fair deal financially with our participation, but also that the people who may benefit from the scheme can do so as quickly as possible.
My Lords, while discussions continue with the European Union “at pace” on the prospect of rejoining or aligning with Erasmus+—and while I appreciate that the Minister did refer to the Turing scheme—can she confirm that the Government will remain fully committed to the Turing scheme, which was established by the previous Administration, and to continuing the excellent work it does in widening access for students to study not just in the EU but in the rest of the world?
The Turing scheme, the Taith scheme and the CEEPUS schemes have provided wonderful opportunities for many young people. The noble Baroness will not be surprised to hear that I wanted to know how many people from the Potteries have participated: 200, in case noble Lords are interested. It is incredibly important that we make sure there is no gap and that we look at all these schemes in the round. Obviously, once negotiations—which are currently active—have been held, both on this and on the youth mobility scheme we will be discussing next week, there will be full disclosure to your Lordships’ House so we can discuss in the usual way what happens next.
My Lords, “at pace”, as we know, does not seem to have a timeline. We must note that many cohorts of young people have already missed out on these schemes. Do the Government not recognise that those in their mid-20s to late 20s do not have those opportunities to look forward to? What will this Government give to them?
The noble Baroness raises an interesting point. I know that she personally benefited from the Erasmus scheme. The scheme could be open to those who are still accessing education and those teaching in educational establishments. She suggests that it is closed to those in their mid-20s to late 20s, but they might be able to access the scheme in other ways. We will be discussing the youth mobility scheme proposals next week. My definition of “young” might have changed slightly, but I look forward to discussing the proposals with her, and how people in their 20s and 30s may be able to access schemes in this way.
Stretching the Minister’s patience further, under transitional arrangements, UK citizens who go to school and live in the EU continue to pay domestic fees at university. That ends in 2028. Will His Majesty’s Government continue ending that penalty against UK citizens? I declare my interest as master of Christ’s College, Cambridge.
The noble Lord will forgive me if I write to him.
My Lords, does this not demonstrate yet again how badly Brexit was negotiated by the last Government and how much we have been disadvantaged by the poor negotiations that took place?
I was doing so well before we got to Brexit. My noble friend raises a genuinely important issue. This Government have been committed, through our Brexit reset, to re-establishing our relationship with the European Union, recognising that it is our largest trading partner, with £813 billion of trade last year alone. It is extraordinary that it took until we came to office for there to be the first EU–UK summit, which happened in May and has genuinely delivered. The world is a very unsettled place right now, and we need to make sure we have the best possible relationships with our closest neighbours and allies. Erasmus is part of that deal, but so is the EU reset, which we will discuss again in your Lordships’ House.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the report by His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons A review of work and training provision in adult prisons, published on 13 October, regarding the impact of cuts to education in prisons.
We inherited a crisis in our justice system and I am passionate and focused on providing good education and work opportunities, which are vital to prisoner rehabilitation. The education budget has not been cut—in fact, it has increased by 3%—but many prisons will face reduced delivery due to rising costs, while others will see an increase. We are focused on maximising value from new education services and expanding work opportunities through employer partnerships.
I thank the Minister for his reply. I chair the Justice and Home Affairs Select Committee, and our recent report on prisoners made clear that we want to see a much wider range of education opportunities in our prisons, for more people, to help reduce reoffending and to make the public safer. As the Minister clearly said, he entirely agrees with that principle, but he has to accept, as the Chief Inspector of Prisons made very clear, that the current provision of education in our prisons is woefully inadequate. As the Minister pointed out, some provision of education in prisons is being reduced by as much as 50%. Can he at least assure us that, in addition to all the improvements in efficiency that he wants to make, he is lobbying hard for increased funding to pay for that much-needed education provision?
The noble Lord and I share the ambition for our prisons to be places where people turn their lives around, and education has a big part to play in that. We are making progress. In five prisons, we have the working week happening now—31 hours of purposeful activity. This year, 10% more prisoners participated in education compared to last year, which is really good. Our reading strategy is now in every prison, and the third sector is involved in that. I am a big believer that we need to strongly manage contracts. As I said last week, there are too many classrooms with teachers but not enough prisoners. We need to see more of them. I have also changed the word “education” in our prisons to “skills academy”, thinking that that would appeal more to our prisoners who did not have a good experience of education. I saw that last week in HMP Hindley, where I had positive feedback from the staff and prisoners.
My Lords, the Minister mentioned reading, but he knows that nearly 70% of people entering prison are assessed as having numeracy levels below that of a primary school child. This both hinders rehabilitation and increases recidivism. Is the Minister aware of Shannon Trust’s model of support? It uses peer mentoring to teach maths to prisoners who would not engage with traditional education. It is a model that can take place outside normal structures and reach parts of the prison that formal education cannot. What assessment have the Government made of this model of support and how might they provide further support to Shannon and other charities to roll it out more widely?
I am a big fan of the Shannon Trust. It does fantastic work in many prisons and I would like to see more of it. A number of other third-sector organisations play an equally important role: Storybook Dads is one that I have been interested in for a long time, and the National Literacy Trust does really good work as well. The role of peer mentoring is important. Often, fellow prisoners and volunteers are the people who turn someone’s life around. I have employed many people from prison who did not come out of prison with great reading and maths but who were inspired by somebody who helped them to turn their lives around. The role of the Shannon Trust and others is crucial.
My Lords, as has been said, prison education is in a dire state. That is very clear from the report. Why have the contracts just been re-awarded to the same failing providers that are responsible for the mess? Rather than shoring up their profits, surely we should look at the advice being given by prison educators and the trade union UCU, which is calling for these contracts to be brought back in- house, for a standardised curriculum and standardised employment practices.
My noble friend is aware that we are very reliant on fantastic teachers and educators in our prisons. For me, they are some of the finest public servants. They come in, day in, day out, in often very difficult circumstances. The government procurement situation is something that I am still trying to get my head around, coming from the commercial sector. It takes a little longer and is often more expensive than I would expect. We have more than 500 suppliers delivering education services in our prisons; I want to ensure that they deliver them to a high quality and that we hold them to account.
My Lords, when asked last week why the Government were abandoning their manifesto commitment to reduce reoffending through access to prison education, the Minister replied:
“We are rebalancing because some prisons had an oversupply of education”.—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 165.]
Given that His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons has just found that education provision is atrocious, will the Minister now tell us how many prisons he believes have an oversupply of education provision?
I met the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Charlie Taylor, yesterday, and we discussed exactly this situation. We discussed, for example, Manchester prison, which used to have over 1,000 prisoners and now has, I think, about 650 to 700. That is why we have reduced the amount of money being spent on education in prisons such as Manchester, because there are just fewer prisoners. The noble and learned Lord is correct that it is about reducing reoffending. We have to focus on that, and education has an important part to play. But it is not just about being in a classroom. When I go and visit prisons, what is more important to the men and women I meet there is them learning a skill so that, when they are out, they can get a job, which means they stay out of prison. Last week, I visited a workshop at Lowdham Grange, where they were making sofas—on which a number of Members of your Lordships’ House probably sit on a regular basis—and a fantastic bricklaying workshop. It is not just about education but about learning skills for jobs on release.
I am grateful to the noble Lord.
Does the Minister accept that the damage done in individual institutions by cuts in education and skills training is compounded by the effect of the churn going on in the prison population at the moment, meaning that many prisoners are in individual institutions for short periods of time before they are moved to another institution? That is very damaging to the effect, which the Minister was talking about, of having the encouragement to change.
I completely agree. Stability is really important. That is one of the things that I am trying to get into the system. The Sentencing Bill that will come to your Lordships’ House has a real focus on stability. The noble Baroness will know from her fantastic work in prisons that you want to be able to work with an individual for a long period of time to help them turn their life around. When I went to Eastwood Park, a women’s prison just north of Bristol, the average number of days a woman is there is 46. That is just not long enough to support them with their often significantly complex needs.
My Lords, I acknowledge the Minister’s personal commitment to purposeful training within prisons and the contribution that he has made to providing work to prisoners who have been released, but there are 10 serious concerns identified in this report. Could the Minister say to the House what concrete and specific measures the Government are proposing to take in, say, the next six months to address the more serious of these 10 concerns?
I was clear when I started in this role that it is going to take time to fix what is a complex and troublesome system. Therefore, I cannot say exactly what I can achieve in the next six months. However, I am very clear that we need stability, and staff who are trained to deliver a safe and secure environment. From a position of education, it is important that staff have enough prisoners in their classrooms to teach. All too often, due to regime issues, security issues and so on, we have too many examples—as I saw on my prison visit to Hindley on Thursday—where people are locked up 22 hours a day. That is part of our inheritance but something I am having to deal with. I am addressing it in exactly the same way I addressed how I ran my business: focus, delivery and making sure I get accountability from the teams that are passionately engaged in what we are trying to do.
My Lords, one of the omissions from the report from the group of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is that there is no mention of AI. AI provides us with an opportunity for low-cost training, education and rehabilitation. Could the Minister say that, within the next six months, action will be taken to advance AI in prisons? You can engage prisoners more with AI than with traditional means. Maybe we could try to get some of the tech companies that are not paying tax to come in, working on a joint basis, and do some work in prisons to achieve the kind of objectives the Minister is seeking.
I thank my noble friend for the question. In over 70% of the meetings I have, AI is mentioned. Often, it is mentioned as a way that will solve problems much further down the line, but it is about how we can embrace it now to get the advantage of it. Digital learning is important in prisons and something that we need to push further on. There is a product called Launchpad, which is in people’s cells. It is basically an iPad-type device that they can learn, read and educate themselves on. There is a business called Coracle Inside that supplies lots of iPads and laptops to prisons. I recently was part of a “Dragons’ Den”, where a number of tech companies came to present some really interesting ideas, and a number of them mentioned AI in their presentation.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the outage affecting Amazon Web Services.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice, and in so doing I refer to my interest in the register as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.
My Lords, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is leading the Government’s response to the Amazon Web Services outage that took place yesterday. DSIT continues to work across government and with businesses to understand the full impacts of the outage. All AWS services were restored yesterday evening, and DSIT is in contact with AWS to understand how such events can be mitigated in future.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that response. I notice that he did not say whether the outage was precipitated by hostile state activity. Given the impact on UK critical services, including those run by the Government, should we have more variety in cloud producers and more sovereign capability? What additional guidance are the Government intending to give to enable the public and private sectors, as well as individuals, to prepare for such disruptions in future?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for those questions. There is no evidence that this was caused by any malicious activity, and we have to be very careful that we do not speculate otherwise. AWS has publicly stated that the outage was initially caused by an issue with its configuration of the domain name system, or DNS, and some wider related complications. Departments independently determine which suppliers to use based on their use cases. Some cloud providers are strategic suppliers, but departments make decisions on adoption based on not only reliance but cost, capability and their staff’s expertise. We are working to diversify the UK’s cloud ecosystem and encourage greater participation by UK-based and European providers, as well as promoting innovation through our digital infrastructure and cybersecurity programmes. At the same time, the NCSC offers advice and guidance on how businesses and organisations can make themselves more cyber resilient, and this advice is also broadly applicable to digital resilience issues.
As I mentioned in Oral Questions last week, businesses should also take it upon themselves to ensure that they have sufficient cyber resilience systems in place by ensuring that their software and hardware are up to date and, if they can, seeking certification so that their systems are Cyber Essentials certified. Businesses should also be encouraged to have a business continuity plan so that, if anything happens, they have a plan in place.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on his Question; I submitted exactly the same Question yesterday. Is it possible that some of the sites affected in the UK, including the GOV.UK portal, were not aware that the data was held in America rather than in the UK and that, therefore, when a problem arises as it did in East-1, or whatever it is called, on the east coast of America, they were not aware that we would be in this vulnerable position?
I thank my noble friend for that interesting point. I think most businesses, and government, know that AWS is a provider with significant market share—something like 30% of cloud services. The other providers—Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud—also provide such services. I am not sure what he means by people not being aware of AWS’s services.
My Lords, I feel that I am a member of a large club, as I too submitted an identical PNQ. I note that the whole House will have been deeply concerned by this outage. Although, indeed, it does not appear to have been caused by a cyber or other malicious attack, as the Minister has said, we have to work on the assumption that it will happen again. Can officials please urgently produce a report setting out, first, the cost to the United Kingdom of this outage; secondly, the long-term policy implications for the Government as they seek to enhance our resilience; and, thirdly, the immediate mitigations that are, I trust, being devised or implemented as we speak?
My Lords, in respect of the noble Viscount’s point about cost, this happened just yesterday so, of course, we are still working it through; it will take us some time to evaluate how much it will cost the economy. I am sure that economists will be kept very busy for some time working out the costs and the impact on productivity.
We are already taking steps to strengthen the resilience of the UK’s digital infrastructure. Through the national cyber strategy and the national resilience framework, we are working with the National Cyber Security Centre to treat major cloud service providers as part of our critical national infrastructure. This includes measures to ensure that they have robust redundancy back-up and incident response capabilities in place. At the same time, we are consulting with industry on enhanced incident reporting and transparency requirements so that the Government can be alerted immediately to any service disruption that could have national impact.
My Lords, at the very least, this should be a wake-up call for the Government. It is clear that the Government have been overdependent on two US cloud service providers, which, as the Competition and Markets Authority says, have 70% to 90% of the market, and restrictive practices impede competition. Of course, there is now a sovereign AI unit within DSIT. Will government procurement policy now change to encourage UK cloud service providers, which would then help to deliver sovereign AI? Will the Government also encourage the CMA to act rapidly, given this lack of competition?
I thank the noble Lord for those points. The Government are aware and are taking cybersecurity seriously. That is why we have published a number of strategies and are working with the National Cyber Security Centre, as I mentioned earlier. The noble Lord also mentioned procurement and the service providers. The three providers I just mentioned—Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud—probably have something like 60% of the market share. Yes, we have other small, independent providers as well but, at the same time, procurement is dependent on government departments: on how they want to procure their services and from where. The basic point is that, going forward, we have to ensure that it is safe and resilient.
Did the outage affect His Majesty’s defence forces? If it did, what lessons will we take from that?
My Lords, the departments impacted were HMRC, the Home Office, the DVLA and the DWP. I am not aware that the Ministry of Defence was impacted, but I will write to the noble Lord if it was.
Unfortunately, as Health Minister I saw at first hand instances of lack of resilience in the health systems, not just in the NHS but among a lot of its suppliers. Many noble Lords will recall the cyberattacks on the blood testing services in summer 2024. I did not quite hear in the noble Lord’s response to the question from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that we will make sure we can really understand the costs and the lessons learned from all this. Given the nature of these sorts of incidents, is the Minister willing to do this?
I thank the noble Lord for reminding me. Yes, of course we have learned from what happened last year with CrowdStrike. As we know, in July 2024 the Government committed to a review of the lessons learned from the CrowdStrike incident, which was co-drafted between DSIT and the Cabinet Office. The Government have made a number of changes since that incident, including announcing a forthcoming cybersecurity and resilience Bill and bringing the Government Digital Service, including the newly formed government cyber unit, into DSIT as part of the digital centre of government.
My Lords, if such an act was proven to be carried out by another state, would that amount to an act of war?
My Lords, as I said earlier, we have to be very careful that we do not speculate. AWS reported that this was not a cybersecurity incident but very much a technical incident to do with DNS.
My Lords, the outage that occurred yesterday was obviously very serious, and let us hope that it was not a foreign actor intervening. However, the assumption that underpinned the way it was responded to was that it would be fixed, and fixed quickly. But we know that these kinds of attacks recently have not been fixed quickly and sometimes it has been necessary for organisations to use pretty basic skills, even going back to pen and paper. Can the noble Lord tell the House whether he feels that in general those very fundamental skills, which need to underpin people’s understanding of advanced technologies, are still there and can be reverted to if necessary in a crisis?
I thank my noble friend for that point. The Government are obviously aware that we need to give guidance to businesses as well as to people working within government. The NCSC has published a lot of guidance and toolkits, and I encourage my noble friend to look at its website and at all the various guidance and toolkits available to individuals, schools, businesses and other stakeholders.
I think the Minister can hear that everybody is rather concerned about this development and the related developments on things such as mobile. I wonder whether it is time for a debate in this House on this and on cyber in advance of the Bill, which is most welcome.
I thank the noble Baroness for that. As for a debate, I leave it to Members of the House to table it accordingly. I would welcome a debate to look at this in further detail. As far as the Bill is concerned, we have been working on it for some time, as most noble Lords know. The Bill itself will ensure that the UK economy and information systems relied on by most important digital services and suppliers are better protected. As a result, businesses and public services that rely on them will also benefit. The Bill will include powers for the Secretary of State to update the security requirements that companies in scope of the regime must have in place to protect their systems from any further disruption, whether because of a cyberattack or for other reasons, even simple things such as human error, system outage or physical damage.
My Lords, if it is not hostile activity, is that not possibly slightly more concerning in that we are putting our faith in these very large companies and the amount that they can invest because they are secure and less likely to fall over? The noble Lord has just talked about the cybersecurity and resilience Bill. Can he tell us when it will come forward? Will its provisions apply more generally—broader than the critical national infrastructure—to all the key suppliers, some of which will not be at the level of critical national infrastructure, and require that they invest more in their resilience and their cyber capacity?
I refer my noble friend to what I said in last week’s Oral Question. I hope the Bill will be published very soon, before the end of the year. At this stage I cannot go into too much detail as to what is in the Bill, but I hope to soon be able to share the Bill itself with noble Lords.
My Lords, I noticed yesterday that the Amazon share price did not move at all as a result of this incident. Is it the Government and us as consumers who are meeting the cost of this, and is that unacceptable?
The noble Earl poses an interesting point. At the end of the day, businesses have to take upon themselves their responsibilities towards future cyberattacks and whether, as I said, their infrastructure and digital framework are secured from any such attacks. I am a firm believer in that. Before I came to this House, when I was running various businesses, the first thing I did was ensure that we had a comprehensive risk assessment as to whether our system might be attacked. We also ensured that our website and software source codes were lodged with an escrow account to protect them further, so that if anything happened we could get access to those source codes. I urge businesses to ensure that their systems are compliant with the latest security patches and, if possible, to get Cyber Essentials certified so that they can have confidence that their systems are protected from any such attacks.
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Lords Chamber(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 16 July be approved.
Relevant document: 34th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 15 October
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. Unless, therefore, any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the order of commitment be discharged.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, in response to this Urgent Question in the other place, the Security Minister appeared to do little more than try to shift the blame to the previous Government. He did not answer the question from my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary, so I would like to put that question to the Minister here. I would be grateful if he could answer the question without his colleague’s obfuscation. The question quite simply is: when did the Home Secretary become aware of the impending collapse of the case? Also, given that the CPS has said it was given insufficient evidence, did the Home Secretary take steps to provide further evidence?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his question. As he knows, the Security Minister made it clear last week, on 15 October, in Parliament that Ministers were informed after the DPP had made his decision and shortly before reporting restrictions were lifted. He came to the House straightaway to make a statement; self-evidently, I hope that answers the noble Lord’s point.
My Lords, yesterday my noble friend Lady Tyler of Enfield asked about the personal safety of parliamentarians and campaigners, and their families, whose detailed information has been handed to China’s centre of power. In her answer, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent, acknowledged a duty of care and said:
“I know that direct conversations have happened”.—[Official Report, 20/10/25; col. 486.]
However, I know for a fact that for at least one very prominent human rights campaigner there have been no such conversations at all along these grounds. Given that he was left out, I worry about others. Can the Minister confirm that it is his department that is accountable for protecting people whose information has been leaked in this way? Whatever that answer is, can he undertake that the Government will absolutely ensure that these people are properly protected?
I certainly give the noble Lord the assurance that this department takes extremely seriously the security of individuals whose personal circumstances have been brought into the public domain in a way which puts them under potential threat from any hostile force at all. I will certainly also take his comments back, and if he wishes to supply privately to me the name of any individual who he believes to be under threat, we will examine their individual circumstances. I hope that gives a reassurance to the noble Lord.
My Lords, in the Commons yesterday the issue of the influence of China in general was raised. Can the noble Lord please explain this to us? We have heard the Prime Minister being taped saying that he would call in the embassy application, which he did. Then, according to a senior Chinese official, he said that he invited Britain to
“fulfil its obligations and honour its commitments”.
What are these commitments?
The noble Lord will clearly know that, self-evidently, certain threats are provided by the Chinese Government. Those threats are well known, well understood and well assessed by the Home Office and other government departments. But China also remains one of the largest economies in the world, and we import and export and deal with China on a number of issues.
I am giving the noble Lord the answer that I will give him to whatever he has asked. I say to him now that we recognise there are certain threats in China, and certain issues with the Chinese Government that we need to address, but we also recognise that China is a major trading partner that we need to work with.
The Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have submitted evidence from their perspective about the nature of the embassy. A planning application is being undertaken, which will be considered in due course, following a report by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. That is the right and proper way to undertake that instance. The Prime Minister is cognisant of the fact that there are opportunities with China, but there are also threats. That is why we have to keep all these matters under constant review. That answer may not satisfy the noble Lord but it is the answer I have given him.
My Lords, as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and on its behalf, I thank the agencies for their very detailed briefing last week on the intelligence behind this incident. We have now decided to have an investigation into the intelligence part of this incident. As a former member of the committee, the Minister knows that we have statutory powers to call that evidence, but could he assure the committee that the Government will fully co-operate with those investigations?
I welcome the fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee is undertaking its statutory duties to look at these issues. Of course the Government will co-operate fully with the Intelligence and Security Committee and give information on whatever issues are requested.
My Lords, the problem for the Government is not the collapse of the spy trial, embarrassing though that may be, but the fact that this story keeps dribbling on from day to day and the Government do not seem to be able to get off the hook.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. It dribbles on from day to day because Members continue to ask similar questions to those being covered, which they are entirely within their rights to do. He will know that the trial collapsed because the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service deemed that the evidence they had was not sufficient to secure a conviction. That was their decision, made independently of the Government. They made that decision, and that is why the trial has collapsed. Members of both Houses seek to press the Government still further on a range of issues around that, which is their absolute right, but the basic facts are that that is what happened.
My Lords, I am one of many Members of the House who is finding it difficult to understand the reasoning of the Director of Public Prosecutions as to why the evidence was insufficient to take this matter to a jury. The DPP is, of course, supervised by the Attorney-General. The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General is a Member of this House. It would be very helpful to know whether the Attorney-General agrees with the assessment made by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
I can say to the noble Lord that the Government are extremely disappointed in the outcome of the event not going to trial, but that is not a matter for the Government or the Attorney-General. The independence of the Crown Prosecution Service and the DPP is central. They have taken that decision. I and the Government find it very frustrating, but that is the decision that has been taken. If the noble Lord had expected me or any other Minister to interfere in that decision, we would certainly be quite rightly roasted in this House for interfering with judicial independence.
My Lords, the reason why the Minister may be a little frustrated that Members of the other place and this House keep asking questions is because he does not give straightforward answers. Let me try to ask again the question that my noble friend on the Front Bench asked: was the Home Secretary aware of the impending collapse of the case before it was made public, and did she or any official or special adviser acting on her behalf take any steps to inquire about whether the Government could strengthen the evidence that was with the Director of Public Prosecutions? It was asked five times yesterday and the Minister answering did not give a clear answer. Can this Minister do better?
I will always try to give this House a straight answer. Let me give the noble Lord a straight answer. On 14 August this year—the final date for the evidence to be submitted—the evidence was submitted to the CPS by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The current Home Secretary did not take office until after that date and the previous Home Secretary had not seen the evidence. No Minister or special adviser interfered in the decision that was taken by the CPS.
The noble Lord said that it is not the question he asked. I am giving him a response on behalf of the Government that the information supplied on 14 August was the case information. The current Home Secretary, her spads and us Ministers have not interfered with anything to do with that decision. When we learned about that decision we came to inform this House, as my honourable friend did in another place.
My Lords, I will ask a question to which I hope the Minister can give me a straight answer. Much has been said in this House, in the other place and in the media, and there has been much speculation. Will he take this opportunity to assert unequivocally that the two men who were charged, and against whom the proceedings were dropped, enjoy and continue to enjoy a presumption of innocence?
Yes. They have not been charged with or convicted of any offence; therefore, as far as the law is concerned, they are not guilty of any offence. That is the self-evident state of play at the moment. That does not hide the fact that the Government are extremely disappointed that the matter did not go to trial, but that was a matter and a decision for the CPS and the DPP.
My Lords, the Government keep saying, and the Minister has reiterated today, “What can we do? We’re as frustrated as everyone else”. From the point of view of the British public, we have allegations of spying on elected MPs and a Government who basically say, “What can we do about the fact that we can’t do anything?” Does the Minister understand that this feels like an impotent response, which is either a cover-up, if you are conspiratorial, or, at best, saying to the British public: “What can we do? Not our fault, guv”. It is frustrating and demoralising, and makes it seem as though the Government have no power or will to resolve this.
The Government are not saying that there is nothing we can do; we will robustly defend the rights of parliamentarians to be free of spying influence, and robustly defend and work with the intelligence services to ensure that we disrupt and destroy spying efforts on United Kingdom agencies, businesses and parliamentarians. But this case, which would have been brought had the evidence been brought by the CPS, is now gone, as it collapsed due to the decision not to take it forward. I find that decision frustrating, but it does not stop the Government doing their best to ensure that we protect our citizens against malign foreign influence.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. The amendments concern the crucial questions of ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the extensive investigatory and enforcement powers granted under the Bill. The Bill sets out to create a powerful investigatory body with wide authority, but the lines of accountability are unclear.
The first of my amendments roots the exercise of the powers provided for in this part of the Bill firmly within the framework of the Act itself. It makes it clear that investigatory and enforcement powers under Clauses 3, 7, 17 and 38—covering information notices, entry and seizure powers, direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders—may not be exercised except as expressly provided for in this clause. This is a vital safeguard. It ensures that these powers cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes beyond those envisaged by Parliament. In essence, it ties the use of such powers to the functions and objectives clearly defined elsewhere in the Bill, preventing mission creep, ensuring accountability and anchoring their use in clear statutory purpose.
The second amendment, which is closely related, builds on that principle of restraint by setting out a clear system of authorisation, accountability and record-keeping. It would require that the most serious powers—those involving access to personal financial information, entry and search of premises, or the recovery of large sums of money—can be exercised only with explicit ministerial approval. This is not just bureaucracy; it is responsibility. It makes Ministers answerable for the exercise of powers in their name.
Other powers of a lesser nature would require sign-off at senior Civil Service level or above, ensuring that every exercise of authority is subject to appropriate scrutiny and senior oversight. In addition, the PSFA would be required to maintain a register recording each use of these powers—the date and nature of the action, the official or Minister who authorised it, and the justification for doing so. That register would then be laid before Parliament annually.
If we are to give such considerable powers to civil servants acting on behalf of Ministers, we must be absolutely certain that there are clear lines of responsibility and clear records of decision-making. Without those, we risk creating a dangerous vacuum of accountability. Let us be clear: the significant new powers which the Bill grants to officials are not to be taken lightly. They go to the heart of personal privacy, financial autonomy and, potentially, due process.
Under this amendment, certain especially intrusive powers, such as requiring the disclosure of personal financial records, applying for search and seizure warrants or imposing deduction orders of over £10,000, would require explicit approval from a Minister of the Crown. This would ensure that decisions with the potential to impact individuals’ lives in a profound way are not taken in isolation by junior officials, because if something goes wrong or those powers are misused or abused, it will not be the officials who are hauled before Select Committees or public inquiries—it is the Minister for the Cabinet Office who will be called upon to account for actions taken in his or her name, of which they may have had absolutely no knowledge. It is therefore vital that the Minister is satisfied that the action is justified and is willing to stand behind that decision if challenged. This line of accountability is crucial for proper oversight; it also protects the Minister.
We have seen through painful and enduring examples such as the Horizon scandal what happens when the chain of accountability between operational decision-makers and Ministers is allowed to break down. Victims are left without recourse, officials retreat into anonymity and Ministers are left to apologise for decisions they did not make and could not have prevented. We should learn from that experience. We should ensure that the exercise of coercive state powers, particularly powers as sensitive as these, is traceable, reviewable and ultimately answerable to Parliament.
These amendments were well received and supported by noble Lords across the House in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name, and other noble Lords who supported these proposals. These amendments protect the Minister, the department and individuals who may be subject to these powers. They ensure that no power is used without proper authorisation, that every use is recorded, and that Parliament can see each year how these powers have been exercised and by whom. We support the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud and error in the public sector, but we must always remember that power without responsibility breeds mistrust. This is not an abstract constitutional point. It is a matter of basic fairness, good governance and trust in public administration.
For those reasons, this amendment is of vital importance. It provides the clear lines of authority and accountability that must underpin any responsible use of the significant powers in the Bill. The Government may say that safeguards already exist, but those safeguards are internal, opaque and unenforceable by Parliament. We are proposing a statutory framework for oversight that gives Ministers clarity, Parliament visibility and the public reassurance that power is being exercised carefully, lawfully and transparently. This amendment is not about obstructing the Government’s aims; it is about protecting them and protecting the integrity of the system we are building. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Bill creates a wide range of unprecedented and intrusive powers for both the Cabinet Office and the DWP. Throughout the course of the Bill—and in its previous incarnation under the last Government—my focus has been on trying to ensure that these powers are restricted to what is actually required for the purposes of dealing with fraud against the public sector and that there are appropriate and strong safeguards against overreach and overuse of these powers.
I recognise and acknowledge that the Government have introduced a lot of safeguards into the Bill compared to those we had when we were discussing similar measures under the aborted Data Protection and Digital Information Bill last year. This is a much better Bill, but it still introduces a wide range of new powers, and, while better, there are still areas where the safeguards should be improved. In particular, when creating powers of this nature, it is important that the safeguards should be in the Bill and not left to codes of practice or internal departmental rules, both of which can be changed without scrutiny. We will come back to that theme several times later today.
These two amendments cover the police powers that the Bill would give to the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. I have serious doubts as to whether it is genuinely necessary to give search, entry and seizure police powers to civil servants anyway, but if we are to do so, it is essential that there are very robust safeguards around their use.
My Lords, the amendments, as has been clearly stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, concern ministerial and parliamentary oversight—it is the oversight that is important—or the powers granted to authorised officers for reclaiming finances under this Act.
As has been stated by other noble Lords, these amendments would require that a Minister of the Crown authorise the use of such powers where the amount involved exceeded £10,000. This would also oblige the Public Sector Fraud Authority to maintain a register of instances in which the powers were exercised, with a relevant Minister required to lay a copy of that register before Parliament.
On these Benches, we have been critical throughout the passage of the Bill of the broad powers—and in some cases inadequately checked powers, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—granted to recover funds identified as perhaps fraudulent. We therefore support these amendments, as they would introduce additional senior authorisation for cases involving substantial sums and provide a necessary level of parliamentary oversight. If the noble Baroness pushes her amendment to a vote, we will support her.
My Lords, while I appreciate the intention behind these amendments, the reality of their drafting would give Ministers the ability to block politically inconvenient investigations. They would prevent counterfraud enforcement at any kind of scale, and they would expose the identities of civil servants investigating serious criminals. On that basis, we cannot accept them.
Although we cannot agree to the amendments, it might surprise the noble Baroness that I believe there is a lot that we agree on. We agree that the measures in the Bill are powerful and must be used with care; we agree that staff must be appropriately trained before they are able to use these powers; and we agree that robust oversight, both internal and external, is essential.
With regard to ministerial oversight, for as long as the powers sit in the Cabinet Office, they will be exercised in the name of the Minister for the Cabinet Office. However, the amendments go beyond accountability; they bring the Minister into specific operational decisions. It is not appropriate to mandate that the Minister for the Cabinet Office be brought into hundreds of operational decisions in the way that the amendments suggest.
First, Ministers must be free to delegate, or the work of government will grind to a halt. Your Lordships’ House would be rightly concerned if Cabinet Office Ministers, who need to make government more effective and efficient, were spending their days taking detailed counterfraud operational decisions.
Secondly, it would be inappropriate for Ministers—of whichever party happens to be in power—to take operational decisions on individual enforcement cases. That would make enforcement political. It would necessarily expose every case to charges of political interference; it would place honest Ministers in an invidious position; and it would give dishonest Ministers the power to block investigations that were politically inconvenient.
However, the noble Baroness is right that Ministers should know what is happening in their name. Ministers are accountable and must therefore choose how these powers should be delegated, not simply hand them over to civil servants and forget about them until a crisis occurs, which I know is a genuine concern. In response to the noble Baroness’s challenge, let me set out what Ministers will do before any of the powers are used.
Ministers will scrutinise the set-up of the PSFA, its plans to use the powers, the oversight arrangements in place, and the skills and experience of authorised officers and authorised investigators. They will also decide what thresholds they wish to set and what constraints they wish to place around the exercise of powers in their name. Ministers will decide what reports they want to receive and their frequency. They will also decide how they wish to appoint authorised officers and authorised investigators, and will take a strong interest in the training, experience and professionalism of those staff. Finally, Ministers will be accountable to your Lordships’ House and the other place to show that they have done that. I am happy to commit to Ministers bringing forward a statement before the powers are first used to demonstrate that these commitments have been fulfilled. Every time there is a change of Ministers, officials will ask for the new Minister’s view on these questions, and not silently continue out of sight, which I know is a genuine concern of the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to draw attention to how delegation works in government; it is for Ministers who are accountable to decide on the appropriate delegation.
I turn to the seniority of civil servants provided for in proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 28. By requiring senior civil servant sign-off for every use of the powers in Part 1, the noble Baroness seeks to set the bar for internal authorisation too high. Currently, the PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively small—I love using the word “relatively”; it is not large—so the number of information notices envisaged in a year, for example, could all be reviewed by a senior civil servant. However, we are making this legislation to last decades, and its operation cannot be contingent on keeping our capacity to pursue public sector fraudsters small. At any scale, requiring excessive civil servant grading in legislation is a strict operational limitation and unnecessarily expensive.
That is why those who use these powers successfully elsewhere in government, such as HMRC, do not have these requirements in either their legislation or their practice. It is not the grade that matters; it is skills, experience and professionalism. Authorised investigators and authorised officers in the PSFA will all be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. They will undergo bespoke training, on top of the previous knowledge, skills and experience they bring to the role. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit bring a wealth of experience with them. They include former police officers, customs officers and other civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of departments.
Noble Lords have been clear in this debate that they are particularly concerned about the use of PACE powers. Let me remind your Lordships’ House that it is the courts that will authorise any application that the PSFA makes under PACE. No civil servant—of any grade—nor any Minister can authorise a search warrant or a production order under PACE. Only the courts can authorise such actions, each and every time we seek to use them.
That means that the PSFA must be able to demonstrate, to the court’s satisfaction, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence of fraud has been committed against a public authority and, as set out in PACE, reasonable grounds to believe that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation—I repeat: it must be of substantial value. This means that the subject of an application has the protection of a court’s scrutiny before authorised investigators can execute a warrant or production order.
Moreover, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person, as specified under Clause 65. I have committed to ensure that the independent person will be passed all the concerns raised by parliamentarians, including those we have heard today. The PSFA will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be made publicly available and will be laid before Parliament.
Finally, I turn to the question of maintaining a register that has to be laid before Parliament. We will of course keep meticulous records of how and when powers are used; that would be a bare minimum for good investigatory practice. Those records will be made available to the independent reviewer, who will report on the use of the powers to Parliament, ensuring democratic oversight. However, laying this register before Parliament carries significant risks; it may compromise ongoing cases and expose the identities of investigators to dangerous individuals, jeopardising their safety and the integrity of the justice system. We must remember that we are talking about people who undertake criminal activity—online in some cases—so publishing the names of the investigating officers could make them vulnerable.
On the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the appalling Horizon scandal, I want to take this opportunity to reassure and remind noble Lords that the scandal was based on private prosecutions that the PSFA will not undertake.
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and have set out how Ministers will act in an effort to assuage them, but the amendment cannot stand. It would allow dishonest Ministers to block politically inconvenient investigations, it would make counter-fraud enforcement at any scale impossible, and it would expose the names of officials to the fraudsters they are investigating. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply, but I must be absolutely clear that we are not satisfied that the tests we have set out have been met, or with the responses received. The Government ask this House to confer upon the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers that are extraordinary in scope: powers to compel information, to enter premises, to seize property, and to reach directly into the private finances of individuals. Those are powers that, in any other context, would belong to the police. We have voiced, as has noble Lord, Lord Vaux, reservations about granting police powers to civil servants in this instance.
Our amendments seek to provide a clear statutory foundation for the exercise of those investigator enforcement powers, ensuring that they are explicitly bound by the structures and intentions set out by Parliament. They provide a clear chain of accountability: from the official who exercises the power, through to the Minister who authorises it, and to the Parliament that must ultimately answer for it.
I hear what the Minister says about dishonest Ministers choosing to block an investigation, but ultimately, if a Minister chooses to block an investigation, that is a decision for the Minister who is responsible for the public finances and who will be accountable in Parliament for his or her decision. It is not about putting Ministers in charge of operations. The clear purpose behind these amendments is to create a clear chain of accountability for great powers, because that clarity matters. That is how responsible government works, and that is how public confidence is earned and sustained. Instead, the Government’s proposal leaves the PSFA largely insulated from meaningful scrutiny. It gives immense authority to civil servants, while shielding their actions from the transparency and parliamentary visibility that such authority demands. That is not proportionate oversight.
The recent China espionage scandal has laid bare the dangers of confusion and obfuscation when questions of accountability and responsibility are left unresolved. These amendments would provide the structure and safeguards the Bill so plainly lacks. They do not remove powers, but they make those powers defensible. When we are dealing with an authority that will routinely exercise serious and far-reaching powers, there can be no room for ambiguity. We must have clarity about who is responsible, who is accountable and where the lines of authority lie. These amendments provide that certainty. They embody the minimum requirements for a just and serious law.
We have tried at every stage of the Bill to work constructively with the Government, and I appreciate the engagement we have been given, but the state must be equipped to confront fraud in a way that preserves trust. That trust is earned through transparency and accountability. These amendments offer a constructive and proportionate way to embed those principles into the Bill. We have a duty to ensure that power is never granted without accountability and that no one, however well-intentioned, operates beyond the reach of ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny. For that reason, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I now turn to Amendments 34, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. This group of amendments addresses some concern we have heard throughout the passage of this Bill—most recently from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, during Grand Committee—that the enforcement unit being part of the Cabinet Office means that there is limited oversight and accountability for the use of the powers in Part 1 of this Bill.
However, setting up the PSFA’s enforcement unit as a stand-alone statutory body would be disproportionate while it is still small. While I strongly believe that the PSFA has established a robust oversight provision and built a multitude of safeguards into this legislation, as well as into its processes and structures, I am aware of how complicated and contentious this space is, particularly in respect of protecting the public from the misuse or incorrect use of powers.
We have therefore tabled this group of amendments to enable the PSFA and the powers in this Bill to be merged with another statutory body, rather than necessarily being set up as a stand-alone statutory body, although the power to do that remains. This builds flexibility into the legislation to achieve the same aim, in terms of separation between investigators and Ministers in future, but avoids the need to set up an entirely new statutory body if it is not considered proportionate to do so.
Importantly, this would enable the PSFA’s enforcement unit to be moved at arm’s length from Ministers sooner, adopting the protections, governance and accountability set out in Schedule 2 to the Bill. As the Government have said during the passage of this Bill, it is not proportionate to set up a new stand-alone ALB for a small enforcement unit. These amendments allow for even a relatively small unit to be placed at arm’s length from Ministers, if desired, without incurring disproportionate overheads.
Ministers also have a responsibility to the taxpayer to ensure public money is spent judiciously and where it is most needed. It is counter to government policy to establish a new statutory body when its function could be undertaken by existing bodies. Building in this flexibility through these amendments enables us to achieve the same policy intent without necessarily adding to the proliferation of ALBs. When it is the right time to establish the PSFA’s enforcement unit at arm’s length from Ministers, that will happen only with engagement, debate and agreement with both Houses of Parliament.
Your Lordships’ House has spoken, and we have listened. I beg to move.
My Lords, we give this amendment a partial welcome. It speaks to a principle that we on these Benches have consistently raised in relation to the formation and constitution of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. The change proposed here—that the PSFA should be established through affirmative regulations rather than by simple commencement—is certainly a step in the right direction. It introduces an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny and prevents the authority from being created entirely at the discretion of the Minister. That is an improvement, and we are pleased to see it reflected in this amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and the Opposition Front Bench for their support—not for concessions but for the commitments that I made on Amendment 35. I am pleased that we came to a level of agreement.
I am grateful for the level of support that is available for these government amendments. It would be helpful to confirm that, regardless of the statutory body where the PSFA ultimately ends up, the PSFA as an entity will publish public annual reports on its operations, including on the use of new powers in the Bill and the findings of reviews on the use of these powers. Should the PSFA either transition to a stand-alone statutory body or be merged with an existing arm’s-length body, it will be required by the Bill to produce an annual report for the relevant Minister, who would then lay it before Parliament.
We have put significant safeguards in this legislation, and listened to the debates both in Committee and on Report, to make sure that as many safeguards as can be have been added. These amendments will provide important flexibility regarding the future of the PSFA, when it is put on a statutory footing. They address concerns we have heard through the passage of this Bill about the oversight and accountability of the enforcement unit while in the Cabinet Office and the disproportionality of setting up a new ALB while the unit remains small. I therefore hope that noble Lords will support these amendments.
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 41, I will speak also to government Amendments 42, 43, 64, 80, 90 and 111.
Under current devolution arrangements, DWP administers certain devolved benefits on behalf of the Scottish Government through agency agreements. These amendments will ensure that the expanded information gathering powers introduced in this Bill will be available to Scottish Ministers, should they require them in the future. This follows confirmation from the Scottish Government that they would like the updates to these powers to apply to them too.
These amendments will ensure necessary changes are made to the DWP debt recovery powers in the Bill. As drafted in Clause 91, the UK Government are seeking powers to apply new recovery methods to debts of certain devolved benefits delivered under agency agreements. However, the Scottish Government have confirmed that they do not wish these new recovery methods to be applied to devolved benefits administered by DWP through agency arrangements.
Taking the amendments in turn, government Amendment 41 simplifies Clause 73, reflecting how it was originally introduced, with new Section 109BZA now containing the expanded power to issue information notices to any information holder as part of a DWP criminal fraud investigation and ensuring that Scottish Ministers will have access to these equivalent expanded powers in the event that Scottish Ministers deliver any benefits covered by the 1992 Act.
Government Amendments 42 and 43, made to Clause 74, update the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, aligning it with the new powers and ensuring that the requirement to issue a code of practice and the ability to make payments for information also apply properly to Scottish Ministers.
Government Amendment 90 to Clause 91 reflects the position of the Scottish Government on the DWP debt recovery powers. It ensures that the Scottish Government retain control over how debts relating to their devolved benefits are recovered. Once these agency agreements come to an end, it will be for the Scottish Government to determine their own approach to debt recovery, including establishing new powers if necessary.
Finally, government Amendment 111 to Clause 101 confirms that Clauses 73 and 74 are treated as pre-commencement enactments for the purposes of the Scotland Act 1998, enabling Scottish Ministers to use these updated powers for fraud investigations in relation to devolved benefits. It confirms that the provisions in Clauses 96 and 97 relating to cost recovery and data protection apply to Scottish Ministers’ existing debt recovery powers. Amendments 80 and 64 update the clause references in Clause 85 and Schedule 3 as a consequence of these changes.
Having outlined the case for these amendments, I hope noble Lords will accept them so that we can fulfil our agreements with the Scottish Government. I beg to move.
My Lords, on these Benches, we welcome the agreement reached with the devolved Administrations—may this be a lesson to people around the world on how to deal with them, at least in this case.
The amendments in this group relate to how the powers in the Bill refer to Scotland specifically. Amendment 41, together with related amendments to Clause 74, and the replacement of Clause 101 and others, reverses—I stress that—the changes made in the House of Commons. I gather that this follows confirmation from Scottish Ministers that they wish the changes to the Secretary of State’s functions regarding information notices to apply to them as well. This seems to me a positive movement of Administrations working together—long may it continue.
My Lords, as it is my first appearance at the opposition Dispatch Box on Report, I echo remarks made by my noble friend Lady Finn on the first day of Report, because I also appreciate the constructive approach that the Government have taken following Committee.
It is perhaps appropriate that, as a Scot, my first brief contribution relates to matters north of the border. It is our understanding that this amendment has been brought forward by the Government in order to apply to Scotland those provisions of the Bill which we have already debated in earlier clauses, in particular those concerning the new powers to issue information notices under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and to clarify that the new methods of recovery introduced under the Bill will not apply to devolved benefits.
In that sense, these amendments are essentially technical in nature, as the Minister said, ensuring consistency across the United Kingdom and confirming that the devolved benefits system in Scotland remains outside the scope of the new recovery powers. We appreciate and support the clarification. However, while the amendments themselves are straightforward, they raise some wider questions about the relationship between the UK and the devolved Administrations in this area.
It is somewhat surprising that these changes have had to come forward as government amendments at this relatively late stage of the Bill, when one might have expected such matters to have been settled at the drafting stage through earlier consultation and agreement with Scottish Ministers. The Government have placed great store over the past year in stating that they seek to improve communications and trust between the UK Government and the devolved nations, so can the Minister give us an update on how they view progress on these changes and what has changed in the past year?
While we do not oppose these amendments—indeed, we welcome the fact that the necessary legislative consent has now been secured—they prompt reflection on the importance of ensuring that such engagement happens promptly and systematically in future. The relationship between the UK and the devolved Governments works best when issues of competence and application are identified and agreed well in advance, rather than being corrected through amendments on Report.
That said, I would be grateful if the Minister could take this opportunity to update the House on the Government’s current assessment of the risk of fraud in relation to devolved benefits and on what engagement has taken place with the devolved Administrations to address that risk. Can she tell us what steps she is aware of in those authorities to tackle fraud within their systems and how information sharing and co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Governments is being managed to ensure that fraud risks are tackled effectively across all jurisdictions?
We are content to support these amendments that bring Scotland into line with the rest of the UK where appropriate while respecting the devolution settlement and maintaining clarity over responsibilities in the fight against fraud.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his kind words. I, too, have enjoyed the engagement we have had across the House. It shows how the Lords can make a constructive contribution to the scrutiny of legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is quite right that we have a developed and developing devolution situation in the UK, and are showing that it is possible for different jurisdictions to make different judgments and to find ways of coexisting peacefully. We are very glad to be able to do that, and I thank him for flagging that up.
On the timing, I am advised that it is routine for these matters to be resolved at this point in the process. I reassure the House that our officials have engaged with their Scottish counterparts throughout the policy development stage and the passage of the Bill. It was during Lords Committee that we received formal confirmation from the Scottish Government that they wished the updates to the information gathering powers in the Bill to apply to them too, hence we have brought forward appropriate amendments.
In response to the questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, fundamentally—this stems from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer—tackling fraud and error in devolved benefits must be the responsibility of the relevant devolved Government. That is the nature of devolution. However, we have engaged extensively with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and these amendments reflect that engagement. I reassure him that we routinely work closely with the Scottish Government to share information and good practice to support each other’s efforts to tackle fraud and error. That includes data-sharing agreements so that we can share information where necessary, which I suspect is the kind of assurance that he was hoping for.
I am grateful for those questions, and I hope that with those assurances noble Lords can accept these amendments.
My Lords, since we are moving on to discuss the eligibility verification measure, about which we had extensive discussions in Committee, I want to say a few words about the need for it and the intent behind it. This enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice—EVN—that will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system.
This measure has been misunderstood and occasionally misrepresented throughout the Bill’s passage. It is simply a measure that enables the DWP to ask for limited data from financial institutions that will help the department to identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It requires financial institutions to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts which match the specific eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. This limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet the eligibility criteria for the benefit that they are receiving.
My Lords, I appreciate the reassurances given by the Minister—they are taken into account—but none the less I have two amendments that could go even further. I hope that the Minister can listen.
Amendment 50 seeks to ensure that affected parties are informed by their own bank when they are flagged following an eligibility verification notice. To note, the EVM will by design, as has been conceded, detect not only serious fraudsters but people who have been flagged because they have erroneously received an overpayment, possibly due to the DWP’s own mistakes—a possibility not acknowledged enough by measures in this Bill, in my opinion. Because of this, it is important that individuals identified by the power understand the basis on which they have been subjected to greater scrutiny and intrusion.
I stress that this amendment is not intended to compromise investigations or tip off fraudsters, as was implied in Committee. In fact, it would come into play only after an individual has been identified by the EVM. This matters because one principle of the rule of law, which I know this Government are very keen on, is that if you are accused of wrongdoing, you should be told the basis for that suspicion.
Being flagged by the EVM should not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion in and of itself, as dealt with in Amendment 52, which I will fully support when we get to it. There is even less reason for an individual who is not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing but who may be the victim of DWP administrative error to be subjected to further checks and requirements without even being told why. It is just not good enough for the DWP to warn people in the personal information charter that the bank account information for the recipients of benefits may be provided to the department. People need to be informed at the moment when the powers bite—that is, once they have been flagged. It is important to note that organisations such as the Public Law Project are keen on seeing this being made a reality.
To humanise why this amendment matters, last week several leading charities and advocacy groups, including Big Brother Watch, Age UK and Disability Rights UK, sent a joint letter to DWP Ministers, highlighting the potential human impact and real-life costs of this Bill’s powers. It included testimony from members of the public receiving pension credit, who told their stories to Silver Voices, the advocacy organisation for older people. I was particularly struck by the testimony of Sue from Manchester, who recounted her experience of having to clear her name due to a previous wrongful flag by the DWP, which accused her of having multiple undeclared bank accounts. Sue said,
“I had to get letters from each of those banks to clear my name as none of the banks answered the DWP. The mental anguish this has caused me is unbearable and nearly sent me under”.
I appreciate that the DWP has gone to great pains to emphasise that it does not consider the EVM to be a government surveillance power, but the idea that you could be flagged by an algorithm that has rifled through your private bank statements and reported you back to the department for further checks, all without you being informed, is—and I say this tentatively—Kafkaesque, so I would like Amendment 50 to correct that.
I have also tabled Amendment 62, which requires that the code of practice include scrutiny provisions about the algorithm used by banks—an issue I raised quite a lot in Committee, with some support from fellow Peers. The situation is that the bank accounts of millions of people will be scoured by third-party algorithms that neither the Government nor banks had any hand in creating. It is therefore essential that we be able to scrutinise exactly what these algorithms are doing. I know that the Minister understands the concerns; she has just explained and articulated that well. The Government have said that the code of practice is not the appropriate vehicle for such scrutiny, but we still have not been provided with any alternative. What is more, there has been ministerial opposition to amendments designed to provide greater transparency over the eligibility indicators, which I find worrying.
The Minister characterised the algorithm that will be deployed for the EVM as merely comprising two tests that must be met to determine whether an individual can be flagged: whether an account receives a relevant benefit, and whether the account meets the criteria set by the DWP and the EVM. The Minister also said in Committee, and again today, that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. But—and it is a big but—that review will only take place on the basis of information returned from the EVM, meaning that we have to be able to scrutinise exactly what is being picked up by the algorithm. They may be simple tests, but they will be applying unpublished eligibility indicators that can complicate issues, depending on what those eligibility indicators require banks to search for.
There may be little to scrutinise in algorithms which simply detect whether someone has more than £16,000 in their bank account, or whether, for example, 50% of their transactions have occurred abroad over a period of four weeks. However, should the algorithms have to assess conditions that are more complicated, the algorithms deployed by banks will necessarily be more involved. For example, for relevant benefits currently in scope, such as pension credit, employment and support allowance, and universal credit, could the DWP require banks to find people who they suspect are claiming ESA when not actually suffering from a disability or health condition that affects how much they can work? Or could the DWP require banks to identify recipients of pension credit who live with a partner but claim to live alone?
That might be misplaced suspicion, but exactly how the algorithm determines this sort of complex information, and what information it extracts to reach its conclusions, requires oversight. People will otherwise be worried and paranoid; we otherwise risk them being identified for further scrutiny and investigation, potentially on the basis of flawed algorithmic logic. As I emphasised during Committee, determining whether bank accounts meet the eligibility criteria for an EVN requires judgment. It might not be human judgment but algorithmic judgment, yet the question is: what are those criteria? What will the algorithm be asked to search for?
My Lords, as we have heard, this group relates to the measures in the Bill which would give the DWP the ability to require banks and other financial institutions to trawl all accounts that they hold to identify and provide information on accounts that have received certain benefits and which meet certain criteria as defined by DWP, all without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This is done by means of an eligibility verification notice, which can require periodic reporting—the noble Baroness did not mention this when she described it. For example, it could be daily, although there has been no clarity from the department or the Minister yet as to the periods that are intended. I should reiterate at this point: this is a much better Bill, and the safeguards are much greater than the last time we saw these clauses, but there is more to go.
I would like to make one other little correction to the noble Baroness on her example of universal credit. Her example was that the eligibility criterion that would be provided by DWP to the banks would be £16,000, because that is the limit. In fact, it could be a much lower number, because under the Bill:
“The eligibility indicators may be criteria to be met by a single account or by”
a number of “accounts combined”. For the universal credit example it might be £10,000 or £8,000, or something of that nature. In that situation, it is even more likely that eligibility indicators would be flagged for innocent people, but that is just a wrinkle within the Bill.
I think many of us are nervous about the introduction of what is effectively the suspicionless trawling of benefit recipients’ accounts, even with the safeguards that are there. However, I understand and have an awful lot of sympathy for the need to reduce fraud and error, and the need for the department to have the tools to do that. Amendment 45A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others, would—as I think we are about to hear—remove the provision altogether. My approach in this group and the next has been to seek to strengthen the safeguards that surround the use of the powers rather than to remove them altogether.
To that end, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 49, which the noble Baroness has already alluded to. I am grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support. It is very simple: it requires that the Secretary of State may issue an eligibility verification notice only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so for the purposes set out in the Bill. It was quite surprising that this basic safeguard was not already in the Bill, because the same wording already appears in relation to all the other powers it creates. I had assumed that this was a drafting error or oversight, as I cannot imagine any reason why it should not be there in relation to these powers.
I am very pleased to say that, since I tabled Amendment 49, the Minister has tabled Amendment 48, which she has mentioned. That amendment does much the same thing, although it does not restrict the necessity and proportionality to the purposes of the Bill. That is regrettable, but I can live with the Minister’s version and I am grateful to her for doing this following the constructive discussions we have had on a range of issues throughout the process, for which we are very grateful.
The Minister’s other amendments also introduce small but useful tweaks to the safeguards, although I am not sure I would go as far as she does on their effect. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement, I will not move Amendment 49, but I should be clear that I do not believe that Amendment 48 and the others she has tabled remove the need for the changes we will discuss in the next group. We will have those discussions then, and I will obviously reflect on what she has said in the meantime.
My Lords, I will be very brief. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has amendments in this and other groups, several of which I have signed, to try to ameliorate or provide safeguards for some of the most intrusive elements of the current draft of the Bill. I also have great sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, around the issue of transparency, which is very evidently absent from most of the Bill. I will support those individuals if they press their amendments.
My Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A, in contrast to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are not nuanced. They would simply remove Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3, in effect eliminating the requirement for banks to look into claimants’ bank accounts. They would destroy the principle that the Bill establishes: that a group of people, defined by the common characteristic that they are in receipt of benefits, should have a more limited right to privacy and data protection than the rest of the community.
I am also very concerned when banks become investigative agents of the state. I regard these as lines we simply should not cross. I know that the Minister does not share that view and is very content that those in receipt of benefits should be under a level of surveillance that is considered inappropriate for the rest of the community. To her credit, she has limited some of the most abusive features of the Bill that we received from the Commons, but she still asserts the underlying principle.
I also realise that this is very much a paving Bill for the intrusions that will follow the introduction of the digital ID. That scheme provides the tools that enable the state to carve out for surveillance any variety of groups of people whom it deems unworthy of sharing the general rights accorded under the law. I have tabled what are killer amendments, in effect, because the public need to know what exactly is at stake and what line has been crossed. I will not press my amendments, but I am also determined that the issues will not be quietly tidied away.
My Lords, I will say a few words about Amendment 60. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for her support.
My concern is about justice. People on the receiving end of DWP penalties and accusations of fraud will predominantly be old, sick, disabled and the poor. Most would not be able to afford legal advice or qualify for legal aid, which is scarce in any case. DWP actions and penalties could arise because people have made errors in completing very long and complex forms. For example, the pension credit form is 24 pages long and has 243 questions on it. Errors can be made in completing the forms and interpreting the questions on them, and in the DWP’s assessment of the answers given to those questions.
There is a high probability that some people may eventually be unjustly accused of committing fraud and face the removal of money from their bank accounts without their express approval. It will be the might of the state on one hand and a poor person who does not have any legal advice on the other. We know from the Post Office scandal that innocent individuals can be pressurised into admitting fraud that they did not commit and into handing over money that they did not steal or do not owe. There is enormous scope for injustice in the Bill.
The 2023 High Court case of R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions related to a single mother of two disabled adults who was receiving universal credit and was overpaid by £8,623, entirely due to the fault of the DWP. The DWP sought to recover the money. The High Court’s judgment said that, under certain circumstances, benefit claimants may be able to argue that recovering the debt would be an unlawful breach of their legitimate expectation and the debt need not actually be paid. Would many claimants who are accused of committing fraud or receiving overpayments be aware of these things?
Steve Webb, the former Pensions Minister, said:
“It can be difficult for people to understand whether the demands they are being sent for overpayments are a mistake, as benefits such as tax credits and pension credit are so complex”.
Without legal advice, these people become even more vulnerable.
Last year, a lot of press coverage was given to the plight of a 75 year-old pensioner who was chased by the DWP for pension credit fraud, adding up to £22,000. The Sun newspaper took up the case, and eventually the investigation showed that there was no fraud—it was all due to errors by the DWP. This case, obviously, is not unique; there are many others that do not get the publicity. I cannot help wondering how many people over the years have been pressurised into admitting guilt when they are not guilty. How many more will admit guilt when they are simply pressed into it?
Last year, data secured by Big Brother Watch showed that more than 200,000 people wrongly faced investigation for housing benefit fraud and error after the performance of the Government’s algorithm fell far short of expectations. Earlier this year, 30 charities wrote to the Government, pointing out the dangers of this legislation and previous legislation, and they identified 686,756 new official error overpayments on universal credit.
Eventually, at some point, people who are accused need some advice. Amendment 60 suggests that the Government ought to provide legal advice to people who may well qualify for it. On 9 October this year, the Government announced that all victims of the Post Office Horizon IT scandal who are claiming compensation will be entitled to free legal advice. Why wait until people suffer? Why not offer this advice up front to save anguish to millions of people? That is what a civilised society would do.
I am sure the Minister will not support this and will possibly refer to the cost associated with it, but the cost of injustice is even higher. I hope that the Minister will be able to offer some help with this.
My Lords, I take this opportunity to refer to the title of this Bill, which is not just “Fraud” but “Fraud, Error and Recovery”. What we are really dealing with is unintentional error. If you are at the bottom of the food chain, worrying how to pay for your food and all the other necessities of life, and you receive some money, you do not look too carefully at that in the real world; you are just grateful for all that you can receive. It then transpires that there has been an error, not really a fraud, and that is part of the title of this Bill. What the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Sikka, and my noble friend Lady Kramer have tried to explain is that these are errors, not frauds. These amendments reflect ongoing concerns that the Bill grants excessive powers that could intrude upon individuals’ financial privacy and be applied punitively to those receiving universal credit who are at the bottom of the food chain.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would align the safeguards that apply for the use of eligibility verification powers with those in other parts of the Bill, ensuring continuity in this legislation. My noble friend Lady Kramer’s amendments would remove the requirement for banks to examine the bank accounts of relevant claimants. I do not think we expect a Division on this, but I hope the Government will take account of the nervousness that many of us feel about excessive powers that could affect the people least able to defend themselves.
My Lords, there are a number of amendments in this group, each touching on different principles relating to the operation of and limits to the eligibility verification measure. I will address them all briefly. I appreciate the Minister’s full reminder of the intent of this and of some of the operational details behind the EVM, which was very helpful.
I am afraid that we cannot support Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as she may expect. As the noble Baroness herself iterated, these amendments would in practice remove one of the Bill’s core operational mechanisms: the framework that enables the detection and investigation of fraud and error in the welfare system. Taking out Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3 would not simply adjust how the powers are used; it would dismantle the machinery that allows the system to function. We on these Benches support the principles behind the Bill and, broadly speaking, how it seeks to counter fraud and deter wrongdoing. As the Minister reminded us, it was a Conservative Government, up until the general election last year, who initiated the approach for the DWP to ask banks and financial institutions for their help in tackling welfare fraud. I also acknowledge that some improvements have been made in the past year.
Removing these clauses would, in effect, as the noble Baroness has admitted, be a wrecking amendment, denying the Department for Work and Pensions the tools it needs to identify and evidence cases of fraud. The real debate, which this House has been having constructively throughout Committee and again on Report, is about how those powers are exercised—proportionately, cost-effectively and with due regard to rights, safeguards and well-being. That is the discussion we should be having, not one that seeks to strike out the core of the Bill.
We broadly welcome the government amendments, which make sensible, constructive improvements to the operation of EVNs. The first, set out in Amendment 48, is the insertion of the “necessary and proportionate” test, which is a welcome safeguard that raises the standard for how these powers are applied. The second clarification, that EVNs may be used only for assisting in identifying incorrect payments, provides welcome precision and helps prevent any risk of mission creep.
Talking of precision, I thank the Minister and her team for producing a series of flow charts. As she knows, I was pressing for these in Committee because there is considerable complexity, including work in progress—I am not quite sure whether we now call it “test and learn” instead of proof of concept—for all those involved in understanding the processes and operations between the banks and the DWP, with the checks, balances and timeframes set out. I hope the Minister acknowledges that this is a help for the department and that it will be continuously updated and improved as the system evolves.
We believe, however, that there remains scope for further clarification, which is why I was glad to add my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. This additional clarification through the language of his amendment is important. It would make it explicit that the exercise of this power is anchored to the purposes of the Bill rather than to any broader or more flexible administrative interpretation that might develop over time. In practical terms, it would ensure that the Secretary of State’s use of these powers cannot be varied or expanded except by returning to Parliament to amend the primary legislation; for example, were the Government at some future point to seek to extend these powers to cover other forms of welfare support.
We believe that this is an important safeguard. It ties the scope of the eligibility verification regime firmly to the text of the Bill, providing Parliament and the public with confidence that its use will remain confined to the limited, proportionate purposes that we have debated. For that reason, we consider this a sensible and necessary amendment and we are glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in bringing it forward.
We are sorry to say that we cannot support Amendment 50, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, although we entirely appreciate her engagement with us on this point and the spirit in which it was brought forward. The aim of improving transparency is understandable but requiring banks to inform account holders that they have been flagged following an eligibility verification notice risks undermining the integrity of ongoing investigations.
I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s speech, and despite her explanation and the safeguard that she outlined, we remain worried that notifying a potentially liable person too early could allow them to conceal or move funds, frustrating the process. While the intention is fair, it could cause or create a serious loophole. Therefore, I am afraid we cannot support it.
However, one of the points on which I agree with the Government is that some of those seeking to defraud the state—after all, it is taxpayers’ money we are talking about—will stop at nothing to get their way to make money for themselves. There is a line to be drawn to ensure that transparency does not provide an open goal for fraudsters.
It appears that the drafting of Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, may not achieve what is intended. As it stands, it would seem, having read it, to place a duty on banks or institutions, rather than individuals, to receive legal advice before complying with a notice. The DWP, in any case, has access to legal advice intradepartmental, so it would be up to the department’s discretion to use this on a case-by-case basis and should not be statutory.
If, however, the noble Lord’s intent, which became clearer in his remarks, is to ensure that individuals affected by DWP actions can access advice or support, that is a broader and legitimate issue. However, this amendment does not appear to address it; therefore, we do not and cannot support it. Individuals might choose to consult a lawyer, but this would be up to them. Can the Minister confirm that no taxpayers’ funds would be used to fund this, if this was indeed the intention?
We welcome the Government’s change in Amendment 61 to extend the review period from seven to 14 days. This responds directly to concerns raised by these Benches and by other noble Lords in Committee that the original timeframe was too short for financial institutions to act upon. It is a practical and welcome step that reflects the realities of compliance, and we are glad that the Government have listened.
Finally, we have some sympathy with Amendment 62, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I remember that the noble Baroness spoke to this in Committee. It is right that individuals should be able to understand, at least in part, the role of algorithms used in decisions that affect them, and being able to have sight of this as part of a review makes sense. However, transparency must not come at the cost of investigatory integrity. As I stated earlier, there is a delicate balance between fairness to individuals and protecting methods that could be exploited if disclosed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked many questions, which I will certainly not repeat. I simply ask the Minister to clarify how these concerns might be addressed in practice, perhaps through the review or the appeal mechanism, while maintaining that balance.
Finally, we welcome that the amendments in this group provide us with an opportunity to have a further discussion on this important part of the Bill, the essence of its prime aim. We are grateful to the Government for listening to the concerns that were raised in Committee, as well as to other noble Lords for identifying areas about which they are concerned and offering the Government the chance to comment. We shall be listening with interest to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions today and, indeed, throughout Committee. We have a better Bill as a result, and I am grateful for that. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for his support for the principle we are discussing here and for his gracious acknowledgement of the improvements to the Bill. I thank him for that; it was a kind and gracious comment, and I appreciate it.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I will not dwell on this matter, but I am grateful to him for accepting that, even if he came at the issue from a slightly different angle, he is happy with where we have ended up. I thank him again for pushing us, throughout the stages of the Bill, in various ways, and I am grateful that he has accepted where we have ended up with our amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is absolutely right that her amendment is not nuanced; it lands firmly in the court of whatever the opposite of nuance is. In a sense, it is straightforward: her party does not support these measures at all. I have no doubt that, were her party to form a Government, it would locate another place to find £1 billion to make up for this. However, our party is determined that, if we are to spend money on social security, it should go to the people who are entitled to it and the people who need it—it should not go to other people. We will take the necessary measures to make sure that that happens, and we are doing that in this Bill. We also want to make sure that it is done appropriately and with enough safeguards, and I hope that I have shown to the House my willingness to bend over backwards to provide those safeguards. The principle is that people should not get money to which they are not entitled; it should go to those who are entitled to it and who need it—and that is what we are doing here.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, is right that my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 60 applies to the section that covers penalties that may be issued to financial institutions that fail to comply with an EVN. Therefore, the effect of the amendment would be that the DWP would be required to ensure financial institutions had taken legal advice before issuing a penalty for failing to comply with an EVN. I think we would all agree that, if they need legal advice, they could probably afford it—and so we are okay on that front. However, I fully understand that it is very hard to table amendments outside government, so I take it that the intention of the amendment is as my noble friend made clear: that the DWP is required to ensure that claimants receive legal advice before the DWP can make any adjustments to a person’s claim. However, we do not regard that as either practical or necessary.
There are already existing protections for claimants whenever an overpayment is calculated, including the ability to request a mandatory reconsideration and/or appeal to tribunal. Where an individual is investigated on a suspicion of fraud, they may be interviewed under caution. In that situation, they will always be notified of their right to seek legal advice and provided information about applying for financial assistance with legal costs through legal aid. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, legal aid is funded from the public purse, so if somebody were to qualify for legal aid, it would be funded by the taxpayer in the appropriate way. I confess that that is about as much as I can offer on that front.
My noble friend Lord Sikka mentioned a range of difficult circumstances. A lot of the debate here tends to mix up fraud, error and all the other reasons for overpayments. There are different reasons why somebody may have been overpaid: it may have been a genuine error; they may have been careless; they may have forgotten or deliberately failed to tell us about some change to their circumstance that affects their entitlement; it may be fraud; or there may have been an error on the part of the state. Gathering data early minimises the extent of the build-up of any overpayment, whatever the reason. That has to be a good thing; it is what we found out elsewhere. I hope that my noble friend appreciates that that is at least part of our approach.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. As she said, Amendment 50 would require account holders to be informed. Even though I know that she does not intend the amendment to do this, the reality is that it could compromise the DWP’s ability to tackle fraud. In most cases where it is just an error that has been made, the DWP will contact claimants to give them the opportunity to explain potential incorrect payments, in which case the amendment would not be needed. However, in the cases where there is a suspicion of fraud, it would clearly undermine any criminal investigation to inform potential fraudsters that their information had been identified using an EVM or what the financial institution had identified. It might also cause unnecessary distress for those who are not guilty of fraud, such as account holders and claimants who, for example, may have a disregarded compensation payment and who otherwise would have been quite rightly left alone because they had not done anything wrong—there is no need to try to scare people into thinking that an issue will be coming down track. It would also impose further burdens on financial institutions, which would have to inform their customers about this.
Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seeks scrutiny of the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts. At the risk of boring the House, I note that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where criteria, set out in the Bill, have been met. Financial institutions operate in many ways, and it is for each individual financial institution to work out how it identifies relevant accounts, rather than for the Government to set out potentially cumbersome processes.
Just to pick up on a couple of things that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, I want to make this really clear: we will not be asking banks, for example, to work out whether somebody is entitled to a health benefit, such as ESA. We may ask them to identify an account into which ESA is being paid. Health data will be special data and will therefore be expressly prohibited from being returned. The intention is very simple: to ask them to identify the kind of things I described earlier. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I was giving an example. There are many examples, but that was the one I chose.
To sum up, I have set out a clear case for the EVM and how our government amendments today and other changes that have been made address many of the areas of concern. I recognise that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, but I hope other noble Lords can see the point of this measure, can see the difference it would make and can understand that with the safeguards around, it is the right thing to do. The EVM will save an estimated £940 million by 2029-30. It will be a vital tool to help the DWP spot and detect errors quickly, while also assisting us in identifying fraud. I urge noble Lords to support this measure.
My Lords, during the debate on the previous group, I mentioned that the two amendments in this group are designed to strengthen the safeguards around the use of the eligibility verification powers that are created by the Bill. I am once again grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support.
Amendment 52 deals with how the bank account data that is provided by the banks may be used. The Bill requires banks to carry out a trawl of all accounts they hold to identify any that are in receipt of specified benefits and then to test those against criteria that will be provided by the DWP. If they meet those criteria, this raises a flag called an “eligibility indicator”, details of which must be provided to the DWP, along with certain other limited information, in a format to be decided by the DWP. The trawl can be required on a periodic basis. It could be, for example, daily—we do not yet know. No suspicion is required; this is simply a trawling operation of all bank accounts.
This raises two important issues. First, the existence of an eligibility indicator will presumably trigger action by the DWP. At the moment, there is nothing in the Bill that decides what that action could be. Clause 73 creates a range of very intrusive investigatory powers to investigate if an authorised officer of the DWP has reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. Reasonable grounds for suspicion are not defined. Could the mere existence of an eligibility indicator constitute such grounds? There is nothing in the Bill to say that it cannot. I do not think that the amendments that were referred to in the last group by the Minister and which say the eligibility indicator can be used only to assist in identifying fraud or error solve this issue.
Secondly, and similarly, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent action being taken to suspend or alter a benefit payment in the event that an eligibility indicator is flagged. As we have heard, there are many innocent reasons why an eligibility indicator may exist. Indeed, as I have said, the eligibility indicator can be set at a level which would not indicate fraud at all—for example, £8,000 for a universal credit situation. The existence of an eligibility indicator does not indicate any guilt.
The Minister has told us the department will not treat an eligibility indicator as reasonable grounds for suspicion, but there is nothing in the Bill to define that. The draft code of practice that we have been provided with says that a benefit cannot be altered just because of the existence of an eligibility indicator, but that is only a code, which can be changed at will by this or any future Government without scrutiny. Furthermore, it is not known how much data will be sent to the DWP by the banks under the EVM process but, presumably, it is going to be substantial. It is clear that it will be processed electronically, and there is nothing in the Bill to prevent this process from becoming fully automated, including the decision-making. The DWP has made it publicly very clear that it is rolling out AI processes generally, which may be more efficient, but, in my view, any decisions need to be subject to human review.
In Committee, we heard about the Netherlands child benefits scandal, which was caused by automated decision-making—and interestingly, it eventually led to a Government falling. The Minister has been clear, and the draft code is also fairly clear, that the information will be reviewed by a person before any action, such as an amendment to or suspension of benefits, can be taken. But it is only in the code, and this could be changed without scrutiny.
I think that all of us in this Chamber trust the Minister completely, but she will not always be the Minister, however much we might wish that were the case. Indeed, it is even possible that this Government will not always be the Government. But this law will remain the law. A future Government may be less scrupulous about how benefit recipients are treated. The Bill, left unamended, would open the possibility that eligibility indicators, regardless of innocence, could lead to deeply intrusive actions or unfair financial impacts, potentially on a fully automated basis.
All Amendment 52 does is to make it clear that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and it would make it a requirement that a suitably experienced person must have reviewed the information before any action to use intrusive powers against a benefit recipient or to amend or suspend payments is taken. I believe that is what the Government intend, so I really do not understand why there is a problem with accepting the amendment. It does not add any onerous obligations; it simply clarifies the situation that we are being told is the case.
Amendment 67 considers the impact and potential unintended consequences of these powers. The Government have included an independent review process in the use of the eligibility verification powers, which is a very welcome and important safeguard and a genuinely excellent addition since we last saw the Bill. But as it stands, the scope of that review is very limited. It covers only that the exercise of the powers has been in accordance with the Bill and the code of practice, that the persons who have been issued with eligibility notices have complied, and that it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. The independent reviewer cannot look at any other impacts the policy might have.
In Committee, we spent a lot of time debating the costs that the Bill will impose on the banks, but no meaningful attempt has been made to quantify those yet. To quote from the impact assessment:
“At this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation because the operational solution for the measure is still being developed”.
We really need to make sure that the costs are proportional. All that Amendment 67 adds is a review of the costs of the policy to the scope of the independent review to ensure they are reasonable and proportional to the benefits.
We heard a lot about the fears of the impacts these new powers might have on disabled people and other vulnerable people, as well as the concern that imposing these onerous duties on the banks might reduce the willingness of the banks to provide banking services to those in receipt of benefits. As politically exposed persons, this is a subject that most of us here have personal experience of. We have seen how the banks behave when additional burdens are put on them in respect of a particular group of people. There is no reason to believe that that could not be the same in this situation. But the Bill includes nothing at all in relation to potential unintended consequences. Amendment 67 adds consideration of those potential unintended consequences to the scope of the independent review.
Finally, the amendment gives the independent reviewer the opportunity to confirm that they have received all the information that they require. This is now a bit of a formality, following the welcome government amendment that we debated last week, which changed “may provide information” to become “must”, but it was subject to a reasonably required caveat. There is still a possibility of disagreement between the reviewer and the department as to what information they might reasonably require. This just allows the reviewer to flag that they have not got what they think they need, which I think is a useful but not onerous safeguard.
These proposed eligibility verification powers are extremely intrusive, so they really must be subject to robust safeguards, which these two relatively simple amendments seek to strengthen. Unless I hear something unexpected from the Minister—and I shall listen to her very carefully—I am minded to seek the opinion of the House when the time comes. I beg to move.
My Lords, there are moments when you hear a speech on a subject of which you are in general support that brings home very clearly the key issues; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, produced that speech just now.
It is extremely dangerous for us to put ourselves in the hands of AI. It is particularly dangerous to put those who are vulnerable into the hands of AI. Indeed, I find it offensive when people who are able to appreciate things particularly well think it all right for others to be subject to automatic operations. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—the Government recognise this matter, which is why it is in the advice, though why is it not in the Bill?—is a very important issue for this House.
I do not think it acceptable to have circumstances increased where vulnerable people are subject to “the system”, which is why I want to say just a word about it. It seems to me that one reason why democracy is so much under threat is because so many people feel themselves to be under threat by the system. The system is an alien thing. Well, if you do not want it to be alien, you have to make sure that it is at least human and not merely a machine.
There is another reason; it is one that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, gave delicately and politely but effectively. There are some pretty nasty people in this country who are, at the moment, blaming most things on groups of people whom they dislike, whether it is because of their race, because of their position or, in a sense, because they think that they just do not matter. It is always possible that such people get into power. I do not want those people to have a chance to use legislation that we—we are decent people, I hope—have passed. That is why I have come to speak on this particular amendment: in these months and years, we have to stand up on every occasion and recognise the damage that is done in a system where people like that get power. You have only to look across the Atlantic to see what happens when those who build up antagonism against groups get power and use legislation that was meant to be different in order to ensure the ends that they have in mind.
I beg the Minister to recognise that all we want is the guidance in the law. If we have that, she need not worry. I say that as somebody who has a history, as a Minister of some 16 years, of always being very tough on fraud and always believing that people should not get what they do not deserve, do not need and should not have, because that is very damaging to those who do need it. That is why I do not like it: it puts them in so difficult a position. I beg her simply to make sure that, when we do not have Ministers of the standing and quality that she has shown, they cannot use the law for improper purposes.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, very much for that. The point I would like to make is that there are people who will perpetuate fraud but, if you try to close up every single channel, you will catch people who are innocent. I believe that all laws should allow for people to get away with fraud, perhaps, if it means that you are not accusing people unintentionally. These amendments are appropriate because, as has been said, who knows what Government will come along and what people will be in charge? If there is fraud, it has to be proved pretty conclusively, rather than, because we suspect fraud, us making it impossible for people who would otherwise be found innocent. We found that with the Horizon scandal: it looked all right but AI said that they were all guilty, though they were not guilty. When even speeches made in this House probably come from AI, we have to be increasingly careful about what we do. These amendments protect people; if they are pressed, we on these Benches will support them.
My Lords, I speak in support of these amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and I am pleased to have added my name to them, because both amendments make valuable and necessary clarifications to the operation and oversight of the eligibility verification mechanism—EVM—and they do so in a way that strengthens, rather than weakens, the Government’s objectives under this Bill.
Amendment 52 makes a particularly important clarification. As the Government have repeatedly described their approach to the EVM as a test and learn process, it is vital that we make clear in the Bill that the mere existence of an eligibility indicator does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion. That may sound like a technical point, but it has real-world implications. When a system is still developing, when its data sources are still being refined and when human understanding of how it operates is still evolving, there is a very real risk of false positives and unintended consequences.
The Government have said that there is some clarification within the process of an investigation that would help to clarify that persons subject to an EVM are not guilty, and that there are not, therefore, necessarily reasonable grounds for suspicion. However, putting this clarification in the Bill would be a really valuable step in making this absolutely clear, in black and white, to everyone involved. This amendment removes ambiguity and ensures that this point is not in question.
We have already discussed throughout this Bill the importance of safeguards and clarity when new investigative systems are created, particularly where multiple third parties are involved in data sharing and enforcement, which is paramount. This amendment provides exactly that and sets out this lack of reasonable suspicion in the Bill so that we avoid the potentially harmful ambiguity.
Moreover, this amendment ensures that, before any intrusive action is taken—in other words, before any benefit is amended, suspended or investigated—a person of appropriate seniority and experience must review the information and confirm that there are genuine reasonable grounds for suspicion. This aspect of the amendment places human oversight where it belongs: between the algorithm and the citizen. This matters all the more because, as many noble Lords will have seen, the Government themselves are moving rapidly to expand the use of AI in fraud detection and enforcement. Only a couple of weeks ago, civil servants across Whitehall received an internal update about the significant expansion of AI use within the Public Sector Fraud Authority in an article titled:
“Behind the Scenes: Building the AI Tool that is Revolutionising Fraud Prevention”.
I listened very carefully to the passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, added to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We believe that this makes these safeguards an urgent necessity. As we rightly modernise our defences against fraud, we must also modernise our protections against error, bias and overreach. Ensuring human involvement in that process in the way it has been set out in this Bill is fundamentally important, and this amendment provides that assurance.
Amendment 67 complements the first one by broadening the remit of the independent review of the EVM powers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, eloquently laid out his reasoning here. It makes sure that the reviewer looks at not just operational effectiveness but proportionality, costs, unintended consequences and how these powers affect vulnerable people and those interacting with the banking system. These are precisely the areas where well-intentioned powers can have unintended harm if they are not closely monitored.
We on these Benches raised these concerns in Committee and do so again on Report. There is the potential for disproportionate costs on financial institutions, the potential chilling effect on access to basic banking services for those already on the margins and, above all, the potential for harm to vulnerable people who find themselves caught up in complex enforcement processes. It is right that the independent reviewer should have these matters placed explicitly within their remit. I am therefore glad that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has framed his amendment to achieve exactly that. We need to recover public money which has been overpaid—we are in no doubt on that point—but doing so in a way that causes more harm than good benefits no one. The reviewer must have regard to this, not as a suggested area of review but as a statutory duty.
These are measured, practical amendments that I believe carry broad support across the House. They are not about blocking the Bill or frustrating its purpose: they are about ensuring that the new systems it creates are used wisely, fairly and proportionately. We therefore hope that the Government will listen and take these proposals seriously, recognise their constructive intent and accept them as a genuine improvement to the Bill. If the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, decides to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches will be supporting him.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. My response to these amendments builds on the arguments I made at greater length in the last group.
Amendment 52, from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, states that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for the suspicion of fraud under Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act. I have sought to assure noble Lords already today that a conclusion will never be drawn from EVM information. At the point the information is shared, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong and therefore, by definition, no action could be taken to correct the thing that could have been done wrong because no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. I could not be clearer on that.
I think it is worth reminding the House that there are two different things happening here. This measure allows DWP to ask banks to flag up accounts that may on the face of it have received a benefit to which someone is not entitled. That is a piece of information that comes into the department. Along with other pieces of information, it will be sifted and examined, and decisions will be made through the usual processes. DWP does this all the time, with all kinds of information. Those decisions are made. Pursuing fraud is something that is done day to day. Whenever DWP receives data in response to an EVM, the data will be matched with information that DWP holds, so it can identify the claimant and any inconsistencies between the information received from the financial institution and the information provided by the claimant over the life of their claim. It will also look at any possible disregards and any other relevant information, as I explained on the last group.
It is only then, as with our current practice, when a possible inconsistency is identified, that steps will be taken to determine how or even whether a claim needs to be reviewed. In some cases, it will be clear that no further action is required and the data from the EVM will be used no further. In cases of potential error, DWP may contact the customer to discuss the claim or ask for further information. In cases where potential fraud is then suspected, the case may be passed to an authorised officer, who will consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a passionate speech, and he is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect. If what he suspected was happening, his passion would be justified, but I want to persuade him that it is misplaced. The decision to judge that someone has been guilty of fraud and to take action is not an automatic process. It is also not a determination that can be made by just anyone. It can be made only by an authorised officer in the DWP. If there are no reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed, the case is passed back to the relevant benefit team or compliance team. At all times during that process, as is the case now, DWP will ensure that any next steps are reasonable and proportionate. There are no immediate suspensions of benefits during the process and, where appropriate, DWP will always endeavour to work with the customer to establish the facts around a benefit claim and identify any possible vulnerabilities. I hope that my position on that is clear and is made even clearer by the government amendments—
If that is so, what is wrong with making it statutory? The issue is that what the Minister says is what now happens. We are concerned about what could happen if it is not in the Bill.
My Lords, it is in the Bill. The requirement for reasonable suspicion for exercising powers under Clause 109BZB is set out in that clause. The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not necessarily mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences. It does not even necessarily mean that a benefit has been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3B on eligibility verification makes clear that eligibility indicators only indicate that a benefit
“may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid”.
The eligibility indicators in an eligibility verification notice must be criteria which indicate that the specified relevant benefit may have been or may be incorrectly paid.
The legislation therefore clearly reflects that EVM information will have to be considered alongside all other relevant information before further steps are taken. As I have said, DWP is required to consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. This is about not just this but about existing legislation and powers. I hope that my position on that is clear and that the government amendments in the previous group have helped to make it clearer.
Amendment 52 also requires that the information be reviewed by an appropriately senior person. We do not know exactly what the definition is of a senior person. However, it is an established legal principle that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that officials are suitably trained and experienced to take decisions on their behalf. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press it.
Amendment 67 would add three additional requirements to the role that the EVM independent reviewer will be required to undertake. Government Amendments 68 and 69, spoken to in an early group by my noble friend Lady Anderson, addressed paragraph (f) of that requirement by requiring the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent reviewer where it is “reasonably required”. In case there are any concerns about that, we foresee a close working relationship between DWP and the independent EVM reviewer, where DWP gives the reviewer the information that it needs.
However, the government amendment makes it even clearer that we are committed to providing necessary information. If necessary, DWP could ask the reviewer to demonstrate why a certain piece of information is necessary for the purposes of their review, by reference to the scope of the review and the matter that it has to cover, as set out in legislation. If the independent reviewer then demonstrates that the information is necessary for them to carry out their review, the legislation is clear that DWP must provide it.
On paragraph (d) of this amendment regarding costs incurred by business, this is a matter the Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping costs associated with this measure proportionate and to a minimum. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is well aware, over the passage of the Bill we have worked very closely with UK Finance to improve the Bill and our draft codes of practice. At a recent meeting with Ministers, UK Finance welcomed this extensive engagement, which it feels has significantly strengthened the Bill. It indicated that it was not calling for further legislative change.
Crucially, I do not regard this amendment as necessary because the independent reviewer must already assess the measure’s effectiveness. Financial institutions receiving an EVN have the right to appeal a notice that is unduly onerous. We have committed to provide a further impact assessment 12 months after Royal Assent.
Paragraph (e) of the amendment would require the independent reviewer to include within their annual report any adverse effect that the EVN may have on vulnerable persons’ or benefit claimants’ access to banking services. I assure the noble Lord and the House that protecting DWP customers, especially those who are vulnerable, is very much a priority for this Government. However, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.
First, there is no reason for individuals to lose access to banking services solely because of information shared under EVM. We have been clear that information does not imply any wrongdoing. The Bill makes provision to exempt financial institutions from returning suspicious activity reports in certain circumstances if the information that they have is only the result of an EVM match. We are working with the FCA to prevent any unintended consequences. Secondly, as I have indicated, this measure simply provides a source of data that feeds into the long-standing processes in DWP, where layers of support and specialist staff already exist to ensure that those who are vulnerable or have complex needs get the right support. Thirdly, this measure will help our customers, including those who are vulnerable. It will help us to spot genuine errors in claims early, help us to take steps to correct these and prevent large overpayments and debts building up that are recoverable.
I hope that the arguments which I have put out there have been enough to persuade the House on why we should move ahead. I beg the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his generous words, and the Minister for her fulsome response. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about allowing people to get away with fraud, I want to make it really clear that I do not want people to get away with fraud. I am as keen as anyone to make sure that fraud and error are reduced. Please do not take away from this that I am soft on fraud. I hope my track record on fraud is well known within this House.
My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness had to say on Amendment 67. All it would do is add scope to the independent reviewer to cover the costs of this policy, to make sure that they are reasonable and proportionate and that any unintended consequences are identified.
I will make just a couple of points. The noble Baroness mentioned UK Finance. I acknowledge that she and the department have had a lot of constructive discussions with UK Finance during this process, and that it is broadly happy with the Bill. However, it is not at all sure what the costs are, because we still do not know exactly what it is being asked to do. So UK Finance supports including a review of the costs in the Bill.
The debanking point is not to do with an eligibility indicator causing someone to be debanked; it is because the Bill creates onerous obligations that relate to benefit providers. As I have said before, as we know as PEPs ourselves, where banks have to follow onerous rules or suffer onerous provisions, there is a risk that they decide not to provide services to people related to those onerous activities. We have seen that with the PEP situation; I know myself that it has been very difficult. This point is slightly different from the one the noble Baroness described, but it is important that the costs be reviewed to make sure they are proportionate and reasonable and that any unintended consequences are identified by the independent reviewer. So I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I apologise: noble Lords are going to get fed up with hearing me, but this is the last of it. Amendments 75 to 77 relate to the new police powers that the Bill confers on DWP staff. Once again, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support on this. I am also very grateful to the organisation Justice for its help and briefings on this matter.
Chapter 2 of Part 2 creates powers of search, entry and seizure by authorised DWP staff, effectively giving civil servants the same powers as police officers. This is similar to the powers conferred on the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority that we have debated previously, but with one very important difference: unlike the PSFA powers, these DWP powers would allow DWP-authorised officers to use reasonable force against benefit claimants when exercising their new entry, search and seizure powers. This would make it lawful for a DWP officer—not a police officer, but a civil servant—to enter your home, seize your belongings and forcibly hold you down while doing so. Let us be clear: this power of force is being sought to be used against benefit recipients, a section of the population, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that is recognised to be more vulnerable and to live with disabilities at a higher rate than the population at large.
My Lords, I strongly support the case that has been made by the noble Lord for a number of reasons. I strongly agree with his opening proposition that the Government should take only powers that are absolutely necessary, and I will listen, as he will, to the Minister, when she sets that out.
I come at this from previous experience. When I became Immigration Minister, it was in the wake of a tragedy that had occurred when force had been used to deport somebody from the United Kingdom who sadly, in the process, lost their life. As a result, we set up an independent inquiry. We took these matters very seriously. That inquiry reported and set out very clear steps and processes that should take place when the state uses force, as is sometimes necessary, to carry out policy. One of the things that came through very clearly was about the high standards of training and oversight that are necessary before reasonable force is used. Otherwise, the result can be people losing their lives. As a result, that was something that we took very seriously. The Home Office now puts a lot of effort into training officers who carry out deportation work to make sure that that work is properly authorised, training takes place, and it is done in a safe and reasonable way.
That experience then came to the fore during the Covid pandemic, when the Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government attempted to give similar powers to use reasonable force to local government officials to enforce some of the Covid regulations. My party was in power at that time, and I had private conversations and some conversations in the other place about the unwiseness of giving those powers to officers of the state who were not properly trained to use them and where there was not the proper safeguard of oversight. I am happy to say that, in that particular case, I persuaded the Minister, who then brought forward a revised set of regulations that no longer gave local government officers the power to use reasonable force.
I made the case, as the noble Lord has, that if there are cases where reasonable force should be used, it should be used by a constable—somebody who is properly trained to use reasonable force, and where there is proper oversight from a command and control system that means that, first, it is used properly, and that if something goes wrong, there is a proper process to scrutinise and to learn from mistakes that are made.
From what the noble Lord said about what the Minister said in Committee, and from what the Explanatory Notes say, the intention is that the power will be limited to being used against things, not people. It seems to me that the legislation should reflect the policy intent and we should not just rely on Ministers telling us what the power is going to be used for.
I should say that I am a bit reluctant even to accept the compromise that the noble Lord has put forward. The danger is this: what if the officer of the DWP is using reasonable force to deal with things and the person concerned tries to intervene to stop the reasonable force being used? You do not have to think very far forward to see that you could end up with a very difficult situation, potentially with vulnerable people, where the result is that somebody is injured or tragically loses their life.
I say to the Minister—I felt this very keenly when I was Immigration Minister, even though this particular loss of life happened before I came into post—that if this legislation was passed and a DWP official used reasonable force and the consequence was that someone was injured or sadly lost their life, it is the Minister who would be held to account at that Dispatch Box. People would want to know why that power was given to that official and to understand in incredible detail, possibly in a public inquiry, what steps had taken place about that use of force being authorised and what training had taken place. I can tell her that it is a very uncomfortable experience when there have been failings and you have to set up an independent inquiry and say the result has been that somebody has lost their life.
In the case that we were talking about, it was somebody who should not have been in the United Kingdom and who had committed an offence but, even so, it should not have resulted in that person losing their life. That was a failing of the state, and it was something that we took very seriously.
I would say to the Minister, when she comes to the Dispatch Box to justify the legislation as it is drafted, that, unless I have missed something, it does not correctly set out the policy intent. Even if she thinks that the amendments that have been tabled are defective, I think it would be wise to accept them and then for the Government to come forward and tidy them up during ping-pong. Also, we should not just rely on the Minister saying how the powers are to be used. Even if that is the Minister’s intent, there are many thousands of officials in the department. With the best will in the world, if the powers are there and somebody attempts to use them, this will end very badly.
In Section 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which is referred to—and I have checked it—there is not a limitation on the power to be used just “against things”. The “reasonable force” power is available to a constable for the full breadth of the thing that they are trying to do. So far as I can see, the legislation as drafted does not deliver the policy intent that is set out in the Explanatory Notes. I may have got that wrong. If I have, I will be delighted for the Minister to point it out, but I would urge her, for her own sake and that of her successors: do not give power to use reasonable force to people who are not trained to use it and do not have proper oversight.
There is a perfectly reasonable compromise in Amendment 76, although, personally, I would be more comfortable if the power was just taken out completely, even if you have to beef up the ability of the DWP officials to work with the police. I am not saying that there are never errors or tragedies with the police’s use of powers, but the police are properly trained and they have a proper structure of oversight. There is also a proper, independent complaints process and mechanism to account for the use of that power—as the noble Lord said, it was set up recognising that the use of force against citizens is a power of last resort for the state.
As this debate progresses, I would urge the Minister to think carefully about whether, at the end of it, she should, in effect, force the noble Lord—without putting words into his mouth—to test the opinion of the House. On reflection, could the Minister perhaps accept one of these amendments or offer to come back herself with something that the House will be more comfortable with? As drafted, the Bill gives too much power to Ministers and goes far further than the Minister herself has said previously is the policy intent of the Government. If the noble Lord were to test the opinion of the House, I would be happy to support any or all of his amendments.
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 75. There is a lot of wisdom in what the noble Lord has said. What happens when this reasonable force is being exercised by members of the DWP? On the way there, everything looks okay, but you get into the house and, before you know where you are, fighting breaks out. In that house, there is a criminal gang, which is part of the fraud. What will happen? What number will they ring to ask for reinforcement?
Of course, it will be 999. The police get up there and they realise that the case has already been messed up. It is not very easy to clear things up when people think, “These could be robbers”. Whatever force and power you thought you had given to these DWP officials, you could end up with a very awkward, difficult situation.
In some places such as London, the police may get a very bad report, but generally, throughout England and Wales, people know that the police have authority. The uniform has given them something very definite. In most cases, apart from where organised crime is pretty furious, when they turn up they get good entry, they get people talking to them, because they are there to keep the King’s peace.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for tabling these amendments. I think they are genuinely key, and very important to resolve before we pass this Bill. I do not think they are minor or unimportant at all. Throughout the debates in Committee, and continuing here, concerns have been raised by some of us about the enormous state power created by the Bill. Largely, we have focused on things such as privacy rights and so on, and these are very important, but this actually gives draconian powers of force to a new body in a way that should make us gulp, in my opinion.
In earlier groups today, people have been very keen to say that the problem is not that this Government will misuse the powers but that we have to worry about future Governments. It is a kind of lurking spectre. Everybody knows who they are referring to. There is a notion that there will be future nasty Governments out there who might misuse the powers but that this Government are absolutely well intentioned. I think that is a little bit of a cop-out because it is this Government who are creating an enormous new set of state powers, and this Government have to answer to why they want these particular powers of force.
I think that is important, not because I have any suspicion about the intentions of the noble Baronesses who are our Ministers here—obviously not—but, none the less, what are the Government doing accruing this force?
I was squeamish about the PFSA having police powers to search, enter and seize, but it did not have the reasonable force clause. The thing I find most difficult to understand is the idea that the sort of major fraudsters that the first half of the Bill deals with are somehow subject to only half the force, but, suddenly, we get on to the people on benefits and physical force is justified. What does that say about our set of priorities? I am not being paranoid to go, “What? You actually think those people are the enemy, so you need to use physical force?” That is one thing.
The second thing on that, by the way, is the idea of physical force against the body versus physical force against property. Of course, there is a distinction, but I do not know if noble Lords have ever been there when somebody has come in and started booting your furniture round or kicking down the doors—I have; it was not the DWP or, indeed, the police. Anyone who has been on the receiving end of somebody destroying property around them will know that it is intimidating, frightening and scary, so I am worried not just about the bodily force but about having the right to do that to your property.
To return to our discussion on an earlier amendment, these are DWP officers. What? I do not want DWP civil servants, who might have been on a minor training course, to have that power. I think it is wrong. For them to have that power of physical force aimed at people on benefits seems wholly wrong and morally dubious.
I note that a number of times the Minister has emphasised the importance of this Bill being hard on fraud. I just want to reiterate a point that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made earlier, which is that worrying about some of the aspects of this Bill does not make you soft on fraud. As far as I am concerned, when public money is fraudulently obtained by criminals or malign forces, or just by people on benefits acquiring money they do not deserve, I consider that to be an attack on the public, and I think we should be hard on it. But the way that you demonstrate you are hard is not by playing the hard man. It is not about throwing your weight around; it is about having the appropriate form of state legislation to deal with it. I am afraid this part of the Bill really gives me pause about what is driving this, and I do not even think it will get us anywhere in resolving the problem of people malignly stealing public money.
I would just like to ask the Minister three direct questions. First, why are people in England and Wales so much nastier that they need this force, whereas the Scots do not? That is not, it seems to me, a very sensible distinction. It should be either all of us or none of us.
Secondly—because I think it should be none of us —can the Minister explain why it is suitable for DWP officers to do something against individuals who are thought to be fraudulent, while officers of a similar kind do not have the power to do it if it is organised crime? Can she explain why that is?
My third question is extremely simple. Everybody who has ever had a ministerial job that involves this kind of thing knows, as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said so clearly, that you absolutely need to be trained to do this. Can the Minister say who is trained, how much training they have and whether there is a budget for that training? If her answer is not satisfactory on any of those, I suggest she accepts the amendment which gets rid of this entirely.
Let us get to a sensible world in which the police have powers—for which, in most places, people trust them—and civil people do not have powers. We should remember the comment from the noble and right reverend Lord that was very simple: you know when a policeman is there, but how do you really know that this is a DWP individual? You have to look at some piece of paper, perhaps, but you do not know that. I think this is a very dangerous proposal.
My Lords, I support this amendment because any exercise of physical powers must surely rest with the police. Are we going to train a new breed of DWP officers who have to be tough and able to act as police? It is quite nonsensical.
The one thing that worries me about this amendment is that it is quite easy on violent filing cabinets. You can attack a filing cabinet, apparently, because that is all right. I think this division between property and individuals is a very strange line to draw. Do you hide in a filing cabinet because you think that would be safer? No, you must not hide in a filing cabinet because, under this legislation, even under the amendment, you can attack a filing cabinet because it might hit back. I think the whole thing, when you read it carefully, is quite nonsensical. We have to get back to the crux of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is that if there is going to be physical restraint, it has to be from the police and from no one else.
My Lords, I am very glad to have added my name to this series of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. They go to the heart of one of the most serious concerns that we have raised repeatedly with the Government, both inside this Chamber and beyond. I am very pleased that my noble friend Lord Harper spoke from his personal experiences where the state has found itself having to use force, and I will revert to that in a moment.
We are deeply concerned by the powers being granted to DWP investigators under this Bill, particularly the authorisation to use reasonable force against both property and people when exercising powers of entry, search or seizure under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—I believe that my noble friend Lord Harper referenced 2017, but I will need to check my facts on that. These are, in both name and substance, police powers. The idea that civil servants—officials who are not police officers—should be able, in law, to use physical force against members of the public is one that should give this House real pause. It raises profound questions about the limits of state power and the safeguards that ought to accompany it.
The Government have said that they cannot carve out these powers from PACE because it is separate Home Office legislation, but that simply does not stand up to scrutiny. We will hear later from the Minister, but they have already carved out the power of arrest for both the DWP and the Cabinet Office and they have explicitly carved out the use of reasonable force from the Cabinet Office’s own PACE powers under this Bill. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to do so; the Bill itself provides the precedent.
Given that, we struggle to understand why the Government are unwilling to make a simple, sensible and proportionate distinction that reasonable force may be used only against property and not against people. As it stands, the provision creates an unnecessary and troubling loophole, and one that we doubt will withstand the realities of operational use. On that basis, I had formed my own questions and, funnily enough, they chime with many of the points raised by my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, so there is support around the House.
Let us kick off. First, assuming that the DWP visits a property with a view to seizing property only and people there threaten violence or are violent but the police are not there, what are DWP officials expected to do there and then? Secondly, what training would DWP officials be given to deal with any potential violence? How far would this training go? This point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Is it clear what is expected of them? What are the limits? What might be given to these officials for defence against physical force? Thirdly, what equipment would DWP officials be provided with to assist with restraining individuals if this arose in a scenario where only assets were being seized? Fourthly, and perhaps the biggest question of all, what happens if matters get out of hand, the police are not there, or they have been called but they are not there yet, and an individual is injured? The individual could be a DWP official or an individual within whose house the property is being seized. The police can be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, but what redress or investigations are in place for DWP officials, given this scenario? I am referring to legal protections.
My Lords, a lot of questions have been asked and I will do my best to answer them all. I will start by making clear what we are seeking to do. These powers would give authorised and trained DWP officers the ability to use reasonable force. We want them to be able to use that against property, not against people. Making a distinction in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, does in one of his amendments is not straightforward, despite the wishes of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger.
A number of noble Lords have said that they would be horrified to see civil servants using powers meant for the police. I am sure that members of the previous Government will be aware that HMRC, Border Force and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority already have these powers. This is not unprecedented.
My Lords, I have not spoken on this Bill before, and I was genuinely trying to be helpful to the Minister. She has just said that you cannot make an easy distinction between the use of force against things and people. That is exactly the point. If you give powers to be used against things, you will get drawn into using them against people. I am well aware that Border Force has these powers, but if she talks to her noble friend sitting next to her she will find out that, as a result of the independent inquiry we had, there is extensive training for Border Force and for immigration enforcement officers before they are allowed use that force. That is my counsel; I urge her to be cautious.
My Lords, I will come on to answer all the noble Lord’s questions if he will give me a moment to do so. I have not got there. That was my opening paragraph. I will answer the points one by one, so I hope he will be patient with me.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, did not mean to do this, but the impression he and some other speakers gave is that the DWP will seek to use these powers against an average benefit claimant who has accidentally overclaimed by £20. I make it clear that this power cannot be used in those circumstances. It will be used where the DWP has a reasonable belief that someone has intentionally committed sophisticated, often high-value fraud against the DWP. These operations seek to find evidence of criminality that is not obtainable through the DWP’s other criminal investigation powers, such as its information-gathering powers, which would be the normal route for obtaining evidence in investigations. To use these powers, we have to seek a warrant from the court. The warrant application will go to the court, which will be the ultimate arbiter of whether a warrant is approved, based on a relevant justification. Those warrants have to be used for investigating serious organised criminality, and those offences tend to be high-value and complex. For that to happen, there would need to be reasonable suspicion related to indictable offences. We are not talking about individuals who have accidentally been overpaid a small amount of money.
I will go through the specifics that have been raised. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, wants to do with his amendments and his desire to limit the use of reasonable force to property and not people. However, the use of reasonable force is set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198, which, as he pointed out, does not distinguish between the use of force on items and persons. There is no precedent for breaking down the PACE power of reasonable force to restrict it to people or items. As I will go on to explain in a moment, to do so could result in unintended consequences.
The DWP has been clear from the outset that its intention is that reasonable force will be used only against things, not people. That will be made clear in guidance and training. The power will enable DWP-authorised investigators to use reasonable force to access locked cabinets and digital devices once they are lawfully on a premises. Without that ability to secure evidence, the DWP would have to continue to be reliant on the police, who would need to remain on the premises for the duration of the search activity. Imagine a situation where, for example, a significant universal credit fraud has taken place. There are potentially a lot of papers, either in filing cabinets in a premises or on devices. The police effect entry to a premises and secure them. The police stay there, and we ask them to carry on picking up every single file so that DWP officials can tell them if it is right or not. The police could be out on the streets tackling real crime and protecting people or they could spend that time in the premises while the DWP searches devices.
I understand the intention behind the amendments—
I know, but I am trying to ask some sensible questions. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will have to decide whether to press Amendment 76. I encourage him to press Amendment 75 and take this out completely. The Minister just talked about the police having to stay there to pick up files and devices. Why would they need to use force to do that? That is an administrative exercise. She is in danger of defending the indefensible in an unnecessarily complicated way. We are trying to be helpful.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help but I will try to manage for now. To open a filing cabinet or to open a device without the consent of the owner requires using reasonable force. I fully accept that he does not think that the DWP should have any of those powers. I hope he will bear with me and allow me to move through the arguments to make a case as to why I think it is necessary. If I cannot persuade him then I accept that, and he will go into the other Division Lobby, but I hope he will allow me to explain why I think this is necessary and proportionate.
One of the risks of the approach that has been taken to try to limit the use of reasonable force as set out by PACE is that it could have the unintended consequence of removing an authorised investigator’s common-law right to self-defence—for example, if they were physically threatened during a search and seizure activity. Clearly, the safety of our authorised investigators is paramount and they, like anyone else, must have the right to defend themselves if threatened. We will of course take a number of steps to ensure staff members’ safety. That includes conducting risk assessments on application for the warrant and during the search and seizure activity itself, and equipping staff with critical safety equipment and protective clothing.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about training. All DWP-authorised investigators will be required to complete training to the equivalent standard of the police before they can use these PACE powers. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that money will be made available to pay for that. We will not expect people to use these powers if they have not had appropriate training. That was a good question and I am pleased to answer it. In addition, DWP criminal investigators undertake investigative training as part of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. All staff must have training to industry standards before they can be considered even for authorised investigator status. That will ensure that staff are benchmarked to the same standard.
The DWP will not have the power of arrest. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that the previous Government’s fraud plan, including the version put out in 2024, when he was standing where I am, proposed not only the powers we have here but that DWP staff should have the powers of arrest. We decided that was not appropriate but, as I have said, we do think that the power to have reasonable force against property is reasonable. We have taken what I think is a proportionate view. In the situation described, where the DWP arrives at premises but the police are not there and its staff find their entry is obstructed, the policy will be that they should remove themselves from any potential danger and request police presence.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also mentioned oversight. We will be commissioning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to inspect the use and effectiveness of these powers in England and Wales and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland to do so there. These inspections can focus on any part of the end-to-end criminal investigation and their reports will be published by the Secretary of State. In addition, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will be responsible for reviewing any serious incidents or complaints in relation to these powers in England and Wales, with the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner responsible in Scotland.
While I am here, two other questions were asked on the IOPC. In one, I think the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the IOPC regs were a Henry VIII power. I am advised that they are not, because they do not seek to amend or repeal primary legislation. The proposed amendments to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act are contained in the Bill itself. On the question of funding, the DWP has secured the necessary agreements with the IOPC and will continue to work closely and in partnership with it to ensure that its needs are considered, including financial arrangements. The regulations will make provision as to payment for this service and permit the lawful disclosure of sensitive files and information relating to the exercise of the functions and powers. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.
On the other questions that have been mentioned, just to be clear, the drafting in Schedule 4 for Scotland is intended to clarify that force cannot be used to compel individuals to provide information when required to do so by a court protection order. This mirrors PACE as it applies in England and Wales. On the exercise of reasonable force when executing search warrants, the provisions in the Bill both in Scotland and in England and Wales are comparable. I hope that reassures noble Lords who think that we think that people in Scotland are less dangerous than people in England and Wales. I can assure them that is not the case.
Noble Lords asked about the difference between the PSFA and the DWP. Primarily, this is a matter of scale. A tailored approach has been adopted by the DWP and the PSFA. The PSFA is likely to do a smaller number of investigations; the scale at which the DWP operates would be a very different use of police resource than it would be in the case of the PSFA. Therefore, we think it is appropriate.
Finally, I think somebody—I am sorry, I have forgotten which noble Lord this was—asked whether we would use this provision against vulnerable people, benefit claimants being vulnerable. Again, another form of reassurance is that the law requires any warrant application to include information about any vulnerable individuals who may be present on the premises. As a result, the DWP has to conduct risk assessments before even applying to the court.
I understand the comments that have been made. I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that our proposals are proportionate. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for giving us the benefit of his real-life experience on this and the very powerful example of how this can go wrong.
I confess that I am not persuaded of the need for DWP officers to have the ability to use reasonable force and I am tempted to go down the route the noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggests of removing it altogether. However, I want to be constructive. I do not want to ruin the Bill, so I think I can live with a situation where the Bill tries to mirror what the Minister has said the powers will be used for and limit it to that. If she thinks there are unintended consequences from that, those can be fixed at a later stage, at Third Reading. I make the point now that it is outrageous that Third Reading is in less than two days’ time from now, on Thursday. That is not the way we do things in this House. It does not give us time to sit down and try to work things out. I put it on record that it is just wrong.
I was slightly confused by one thing the Minister said. She described a situation where the police are there throughout as a waste of police time, when they could be off dealing with real crime, but just the sentence before she told us that this will be used only in cases of sophisticated high-value fraud. Is that not real crime? I confess that I am a bit confused by that.
Anyway, nothing I have heard has changed my view about the ability to use reasonable force against people being appropriate for DWP officials, particularly if the police are likely to be there all along anyway. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75, but I will, when the time comes, test the opinion of the House on Amendment 76.
My Lords, Amendments 86, 87 and 88 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Finn concern the independence and effectiveness of the independent reviewer established under Clause 89. They are what we might call bite- size amendments, but they go to the heart of what independence and accountability mean in practice.
Amendment 86 would remove the power of the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes. Amendment 87 would change the wording of Clause 89 so that the Secretary of State “must”, rather than “may”, provide information to that independent person for the purposes of their review.
We bring these amendments forward in the spirit of consistency and fairness. We welcome the Government’s amendments to Clauses 66 and 76, both of which change the wording from “may” to “must” when referring to the Minister’s duty to provide information to independent reviewers. Those are important and positive changes.
The Government have rightly recognised that independent scrutiny cannot be meaningful unless reviewers have the information they need, and that Ministers must therefore be under an obligation and not merely a discretion to provide it. We entirely agree with that principle, one we championed consistently throughout Committee, and which garnered the support of many noble Lords present. However, we are concerned that, having been adopted in Clauses 66 and 76, it has not been applied consistently across the Bill.
Clause 89, which deals with the independent review of powers exercised under Sections 109A to 109H of the Social Security Administration Act 1992—including, among other things, the power to enter and inspect premises under Section 109C—still uses the weaker “may” formulation. This means that the Secretary of State is not required to share information with the independent reviewer and can determine which periods or activities the reviewer is permitted to examine. When we are talking about an independent review mechanism, we do not believe that this is good enough.
If the Government accept, as they now have, that independent reviewers examining the Cabinet Office’s functions under Clause 65 and the DWP eligibility verification mechanism set out in Clause 76 should have an enforceable right to the information they need, then surely the same must apply to those reviewing the DWP’s use of these further powers under the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no justification for having one standard of transparency for one and not the other.
The Government amendments on their own subject the PSFA and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to different standards to the DWP, which surely cannot be right. Based on the Government’s amendments, the Minister for the Cabinet Office must provide information to the independent reviewer for the purposes of an investigation into the exercise of the Minister’s functions under this part. However, it is different for the DWP, which must provide this information to the independent reviewer only when it comes to the EVM. For other independent reviews under this part, the Secretary of State still “may” only provide this information.
I rise very briefly to support these three amendments, particularly Amendment 87, which relates to whether the independent reviewer “may” or “must” be given information. I thought we had that debate some time ago. The Minister tabled amendments for other parts of the Bill which reflected that, saying that they “must” be given information they reasonably require. I was not terribly happy with “reasonably require”; none the less, it seems very odd that this one is different and remains a “may”. My first reaction was that this must be an oversight, but apparently it may not be. I would love to understand why this is different for this clause, but not for the rest of it.
Amendment 86 is also important because, while the Bill creates the independent review process, it does not include when and over what period—that is to be added later, which somewhat undermines the independent review. It is rather unusual; I do not think I have ever seen a Bill which does not establish, on the face of it, when a review must be, or at least the latest time it can be issued. I really think it ought to. With that, I support these amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for explaining his amendment. I will start by gently reminding him of something. He said that we should not avoid oversight because it is inconvenient. Does he remember that when his Government, led and represented by him, introduced equivalent powers to many of these in the DPDI Bill, there was literally no independent oversight at all anywhere in that Bill? So, I am very happy to respond on the way we are putting it in, but I hope the House will give us credit for having actually put in significant independent oversight, and I would encourage him to remember that.
Having said that, while I understand the rationale for Amendments 86 to 88, we do not believe that they are appropriate or necessary. DWP’s intention for Clause 89 is to appoint an independent, external inspectorate body to inspect DWP’s end-to-end criminal investigations. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has provided this function for public services for over 160 years. DWP has committed to commissioning HMICFRS as the body best placed to provide an independent inspection role in England and Wales and, similarly, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, for Scotland. I can assure the House that DWP are committed to ensuring the right level of scrutiny for these powers and will follow existing HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland’s processes and guidance, which requires transparency and accountability.
These inspectorate bodies bring huge experience of working in this area, providing robust inspections to other similar bodies. That is why DWP will work with them to agree mutually that each inspection takes place over a suitable period, so that they are assessing and reporting on a period which realistically reflects DWP’s use of search and seizure powers. DWP has worked closely with both HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland, and we understand that sharing information is an integral part of the inspection process. That is why the department is committed to providing all relevant information, so that meaningful inspections can be carried out.
It is important to highlight the unnecessary risk Amendments 86 and 87 create. These amendments could result in sharing information with the inspectorate that could then become disclosable material in a live investigation, potentially jeopardising the outcome. Because of the range of investigatory techniques used during DWP criminal investigations, it is important that the Secretary of State retains discretion not to provide information when the consequences of sharing that information outweigh the benefit to an inspection—for instance, to protect customers or prevent compromising future prosecutions. Depending on the circumstances, examples of such sensitive material not suitable for sharing might include material given in confidence, details about witnesses or other persons who may be in danger if their identities are revealed, material revealing the location of any premises or other place used for surveillance, and material relating to the private life of a witness. I hope that explains why I cannot accept these amendments.
Amendment 88 seeks to extend the remit and scope of an independent person appointed under Clause 89. We have already confirmed that this will be HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland. They will provide an additional safeguard to ensure that the DWP is using these powers proportionally and in line with their intended purpose. However, although the inspectorates are very impressive in their fields, it is clearly not within their remit to assess expenditure or amounts recovered and conduct cost-benefit assessments of the various measures in the Bill. But the Office for Budget Responsibility has certified the estimated £1.5 billion of benefits contained in this Bill and, separately, our impact assessment clearly outlines the estimated costs and how we will scale up our rollout to deliver the savings and commits to monitoring and evaluation of Part 2 of the Bill.
I also remind the House of the existing reporting mechanisms for the DWP’s fraud and error activities that make this amendment unnecessary. In the DWP’s annual report and accounts, the department reports on the savings made from our fraud and error activities, including savings made from activity across our counterfraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we also report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. The departmental annual report and accounts are reviewed and scrutinised by the National Audit Office, which publishes a report on the accounts and provides independent assurance to Parliament on the proper use of public funds.
Finally, a question was asked about what is different between the DWP and the PSFA. The type and nature of DWP and PSFA criminal investigations are likely to be very different. That means the risks and decisions involved in disclosing sensitive material are different for each organisation. Due to the function it plays, the DWP is likely to have significantly more individuals who may be vulnerable, and it considers that disclosing sensitive material relating to those persons is not an appropriate approach for it to adopt. For that reason, the DWP must be able to withhold material in such cases to ensure that there is no detriment or risk to vulnerable persons who may be placed at risk.
To conclude, the DWP is committed to transparency and to delivering this Bill and its savings, but I do not think it is helpful or necessary to ask the inspectorates to step outside their existing remit given the routes already in place. I therefore urge the noble Viscount not to press his amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, but I am afraid we are still not persuaded on the point we raised around the powers of the independent reviewer to be provided with information. I certainly do not want to repeat what I said in opening but, in response to her earlier remarks, I want her to be clear that we recognise that some progress has been made on the Bill after a year. Without further ado, I have listened very carefully and heard her responses to Amendments 86 to 88, and I will test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, there being an equality of votes, in accordance with Standing Order 55, which provides that no proposal to amend a Bill in the form in which it is before the House shall be agreed to unless there is a majority in favour of such amendment, I declare the amendment disagreed to.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.
The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.
Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:
“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]
to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.
The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.
We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.
If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.
With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.
We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.
My Lords, I was happy to add my name to the noble Lord’s. He explained the position very thoroughly.
It is worth me repeating that the number of children—which is perhaps increasing, as the noble Lord said—is necessarily limited, when discussing children born between the deprivation order and the outcome of an appeal or the expiry of an appeal period. Nevertheless, the risks to such children may be considerable. The fact that only a small number of children may be affected does not affect the importance of the amendment, although I appreciate that, to some people, it may suggest that the problem is less serious than the noble Lord and I regard it.
I do not need to repeat what the noble Lord said, but that is not to say that I do not look forward to hearing speeches and support from other noble Lords in the Chamber.
My Lords, I apologise that I was unable to speak at Second Reading, but I have read the debate and listened to the speeches in support of the amendment—of course. As a member of the noble order of terriers who have battled on behalf of children’s citizenship over the years, I have a moral duty to express my moral support for this amendment.
My Lords, this amendment shows that there are ways in which the rights of children could be protected. The debate so far has shown that we believe it to be extraordinarily important that the rights of children in these circumstances should be protected. I am therefore very glad that the amendment has been tabled, even though the chances of it being accepted are small.
My Lords, we on these Benches also approve of the amendment. This is a very narrow Bill, with an even narrower amendment. I do not intend to repeat everything I said about children at Second Reading, but we are absolutely clear that, without a measure of comfort, the Bill will have consequences for a very limited number of children and will reverse the protection that has been offered to them under the Supreme Court case of N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, we are discussing the limbo status of some children in this situation. A child whose parent’s citizenship deprivation was ruled unlawful by a court could have their citizenship status left in limbo until their parent’s final appeal is determined. We had a debate at Second Reading about how long that period would be. There were some views that the justice system was so quick that it might flash through in a number of weeks, but others suggested that it could take a number of months or even longer. During an extended period of uncertainty, the child could be exposed to serious harm or death, without the ability to enter the UK and reach safety or to obtain consular assistance.
As I explained at Second Reading, this is not a hypothetical matter. There are, and have been, cases where the situation has arisen. It may involve a small number of people—a small number of children—but we cannot be certain that those children will not face such risks in the future. This amendment would therefore provide a minimum safeguard to prevent the most serious consequences for the children who might be caught by the Bill, and who are obviously the most vulnerable British children. It would ensure that the best interests of the child are prioritised and that the effects of the Bill do not unjustly threaten the lives and rights of British children.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendment and for their contributions to today’s debate. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who has previously raised this issue with me in private meetings. I was pleased to meet the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who tabled the amendment to discuss their concerns privately; it is an important issue that I hope I can address today. I am also grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Lister; as the regular recipient of terrier activity on my legs, I appreciate her persistence in these matters.
I want to be clear—this is an important point that the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made in his introductory remarks—that where a child already holds British citizenship, the subsequent deprivation of a parent’s citizenship does not change that. I know that that was a concern held by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, but that is a given. As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said in his introductory remarks, we would need to make changes to sections of the British Nationality Act 1981 that relate to the acquisition of nationality in order for the amendment to have its desired effect. Whether or not we want to make those changes, they would be out of the Bill’s scope, so I am unable to agree to them today.
In any case, the amendment could not be limited to cases where the parent’s appeal is ultimately successful and their citizenship reinstated. The amendment would apply to cases where a higher court upholds the Home Secretary’s decision. In my view, that would undermine the integrity of the immigration and nationality system and could give rise to cases where a child is temporarily a British citizen, only to lose that status through no fault of their own. If their entitlement to another nationality were to be removed because another country had laws that prohibited dual citizenship, there is also a risk the child could be left stateless.
In accordance with the duty under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, consideration of a child’s best interests is a primary consideration in the immigration and nationality decisions that affect them. Considering the representations I have had from the noble Lord and the noble Baroness in our private discussions, I say to them that the Government will monitor the impact of the Bill, including the impact on children, during the course of its implementation downstream. If there are lessons to be drawn from that, obviously we will do so.
As I mentioned during the Bill’s Second Reading last week, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, under the UK Borders Act 2007, can assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the migration and borders system, which includes the deprivation power. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, I say that, if there were a challenge in expediting appeals or an issue with children being impacted, I have no doubt—without wishing to assess the independent inspector’s programme for him—that the inspector would examine those matters. The UK Borders Act 2007 empowers the inspector to define their own inspection programme, something that the departing inspector, David Bolt, refers to in his most recent annual report as
“the cornerstone of the role’s independence”.
I have no doubt that, in the event of challenges appearing—and with representations from noble Lords, Members of Parliament or voluntary organisations—that could well be an area where the inspector focuses their attention.
I thank the noble Lord and noble Baroness for prompting this worthwhile debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has not spoken today, but I believe that he broadly supports the position that I take on this matter. I trust that, for the reasons I have set out, the Members who tabled the amendment understand why the Government cannot support it. I therefore respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.
I am not seeking to challenge the Minister on this, but his statement that changing the 1981 Act would be outside the scope of this Bill is surprising. I am sure that he would not want to send people down into culs-de-sac chasing that claim. It might therefore be helpful if he could make it clear that the technical issue is not what underlies the Government’s opposition to our amendment, so that people understand that this is a policy matter, not a technical matter.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.
I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.
The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.
Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving that the Bill be read a third time, I just say on behalf of the whole House that the safety and security of those in the UK is the Government’s highest priority. Deprivation is an important and effective tool.
I want to thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debates on the Bill today, and I particularly thank the security and intelligence services, law enforcement and others who work day in, day out to protect this country. I thank my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis, my colleague in the Whips’ Office, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and indeed all those Members who have tabled and spoken to amendments. It is important to put on record that the policy, legal and bill teams in the Home Office have worked tirelessly to make the Bill possible, as have the team in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel. I thank them and the staff of this House, as ever, for their professionalism in helping us get the Bill through both Houses of Parliament. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to government Amendments 89, 91, 101 and 102; I start with Amendments 89 and 91. I tabled these amendments because it has been clear that, despite all my attempts to reassure noble Lords at earlier stages, concerns continue to be raised as though DWP’s new recovery powers could be applied to debtors who are in receipt of benefits. Indeed, I think that may be the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as the explanatory statement on her Amendment 92 in this group relates to the use of these powers on benefit claimants. To be clear, this is not the case.
The DWP’s new debt recovery measures can be applied only to debtors who are no longer receiving DWP benefits and where we cannot recover from PAYE. However, to further reassure noble Lords and everybody else, we are making it even clearer in the legislation, through new Section 80AA, that the new powers cannot be applied to those receiving benefits from my department. This provides further clarification that a direct deduction order or immediate disqualification from driving order must always be suspended or revoked if the debtor subsequently receives a benefit payment from the DWP while that order is ongoing. I hope that provides further assurance to the House.
Amendment 101 is a procedural amendment regarding the technical mechanisms for DWP to make applications to the court for disqualification orders. The Bill already allows DWP to make an application to the magistrates’ court for a suspended or immediate DWP disqualification order. The purpose of this amendment is to introduce a regulation-making power enabling DWP to set out at a later stage any practical steps necessary for those applications to be made and considered. This engages commonplace procedure rules, dealing with practical matters to ensure cases are progressed fairly and efficiently for all parties involved, such as the type of form used or how notices and orders are served on parties.
Amendment 102 is a technical amendment which ensures that the term “processing” is correctly understood in new Section 80D, which establishes the DWP debt code of practice. It is a small change to provide clarity by linking the term “processing” to the definition already set out in Section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018. This helps avoid any ambiguity in interpretation and ensures consistency with existing data protection legislation.
None of these government amendments changes the existing policy intent for how the powers will be used or the safeguards that are set out in the Bill. These will continue to be powers of last resort, to be used only after DWP has made all reasonable attempts to negotiate an affordable and sustainable repayment plan. These amendments support the policy intent and delivery of the Bill, and I urge noble Lords to accept them. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will be very brief. I laid Amendment 92 in the same spirit as the amendments that I laid in an earlier group. The part of paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 that I find most difficult is a subset of the requirement for banks to provide information. The overarching requirement instructs banks to hand over to the Government, on request, three months of account statements for them to examine. The schedule says that the information must be used only to help determine whether or not to make a deduction under the Bill. I was trying to find out from the Minister what assurances there are that the use will be that narrow. It may be that I have misread it, but I cannot see any form of transparency or accountability that would provide that kind of assurance. It all seems to be completely internal to the DWP. My first question to the Minister is therefore this: how will the scheme verify that the information is not used for other purposes, because detailed account statements undoubtedly have information that could interest all kinds of people? Most importantly, will that information be destroyed after an investigation is closed?
The part of paragraph 3 that exercised me the most, in the original language of the Bill that came from the Commons, is that which prohibited banks from ever notifying the account holder that their information has been handed over to the state and for what purpose. To the Minister’s credit, that now seems to have been amended to say that the account holder can be told after three months. I am unclear whether that is an automatic notification, notification at the bank’s choice, or notification that requires a request from the account holder. To me, this matters, because I suspect that transparency is the only way to ensure that the information in the account is not used for purposes other than those stated in the Bill.
I am generally exceedingly uncomfortable with the idea that the original version basically required a sort of covert process, in which the information held on an individual by the state was not disclosed to that individual. The Minister has often suggested that the monitoring of accounts is to start a dialogue to see if a person has made a mistake in overclaiming rather than committing fraud. If somebody is not told that their information has been taken, read through, examined and dealt with in detail, I cannot see how they can possibly enter into a constructive discussion to explain what is happening.
I want to draw the attention of the Minister to an underlying principle. Jonathan Fisher KC has published part 1 of an independent review of disclosure and fraud offences, which was commissioned by the Government. I want to quote his words on transparency, because it seems that transparency was not built into the original Bill and is still limited in the revised version. He said that:
“A modern disclosure regime must require the prosecution”—
he is talking about the courts—
“to be honest concerning the reasonable lines of inquiry that have been pursued and how investigative material has been gathered, handled, and interrogated”.
I would very much like to see those principles embedded in this part of the Bill. I think we need assurances from the Minister that if we cannot find the language then they will in practice be embedded in this part of the Bill, because transparency is fundamental.
My Lords, the amendments in this group tabled by the Government contain a mixture of substantive safeguards and some technical improvements designed to tidy up and clarify the Bill.
The main amendment, government Amendment 91, introduces further restrictions and procedural safeguards around the use of the new recovery methods created by Schedules 5 and 6. It requires that liable persons are properly notified and given an opportunity to settle their liability before enforcement action is taken, and that alternative routes of recovery, such as deductions from earnings or benefits, are considered before more intrusive powers are used. These are sensible and welcome provisions that strengthen procedural fairness and ensure that the new powers are exercised proportionately.
We do, however, note that these changes have come rather late in the passage of the Bill. They are substantive clarifications, going to the heart of how these powers will operate in practice. However, I listened to the explanations from the Minister on an earlier point I made about this and I now understand her position—while not necessarily agreeing with it, I understand it.
The group includes two largely technical amendments. The first, to Schedule 6, allows the Secretary of State to make regulations relating to applications to or appeals from magistrates’ courts in England and Wales, ensuring clarity and consistency in procedure. The second, to Clause 94, aligns the Bill with the Data Protection Act 2018 by confirming that “processing” has the same meaning as in the Act. This is a straight- forward but important clarification. It is my view that these amendments strengthen the fairness and clarity of the Bill, ensuring that it operates in a way that is proportionate, consistent and aligned with existing law. We therefore support them.
On Amendment 92, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, she may not be surprised that we do not support this amendment. It would remove a key part of the machinery that underpins the operation of this Bill—specifically, the ability of the Department for Work and Pensions to obtain limited, relevant bank information to determine whether a direct deduction order should be made. I realise that this chimes with the noble Baroness’s earlier Amendment 45A, so I will not repeat the comments I made then, save to say that this is a considerable change and would strike at the heart of the framework that enables the recovery of money lost to fraud and error.
The Government must have the legal capacity to verify whether an individual is eligible for the payments they are receiving and whether further action is required to prevent overpayment or recover funds that are owed to the state and, by extension, to the taxpayer. If a person receives money from the state, the state has both the right and the duty to ensure that this money is not being misused—and certainly is not ending up in the pockets of fraudsters or criminals. The Minister has already made clear that individuals in receipt of benefits will be informed that the Government may access certain account information for the purposes of investigating suspected fraud or error.
We are satisfied with the Government’s assurance that the information obtained under these provisions will be high level, proportionate and strictly limited to what is necessary for the purpose of recovering money lost to fraud and overpayment. Far from being excessive, the powers set out in this part of the schedule are a necessary and measured tool to protect public funds. For those reasons, we oppose Amendment 92.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his support on these matters. Amendment 92 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the DWP for the purposes of making a direct deduction order from benefit recipients. I am not sure whether that was her intention or whether she intended to remove it from all, but that is the effect. I therefore need to clarify for the record that these powers cannot be used for those in receipt of benefit, and Amendments 89 and 91 make that even clearer.
My Lords, throughout the passage of the Bill, we on these Benches have repeatedly raised concerns about the punitive measures applied to carers who receive carer’s allowance and subsequently earn small amounts through additional work, often losing their carer’s allowance entirely. Amendment 103 would prohibit the Secretary of State using recovery methods in cases of overpayment of carer’s allowance until an inquiry has concluded and recommendations from that inquiry have been implemented on carer’s allowance overpayment.
We have had discussions with the Minister’s department on this, and we are hopeful that the Government will commit from the Dispatch Box to a date for publication. In those conversations we were promised a departmental briefing to me and, if necessary, to an MP of my choice. I will give advance notice of what we would expect to learn in that briefing: when do the Government expect to publish their response to the report? It has been nearly three months since they received the report. We acknowledge that there has been a change of Secretary of State, but are the Government still treating this with the high level of priority that they have given it so far? At our meeting, can the Government also set out a timetable for the publication of the report and actions they will take to deal with the issues set out in that report?
What are the Minister’s reflections, if she has reflections, on the report and its findings? Will the Government meet with carers—and in particular Carers UK, with which I have been in constant touch—who have been affected? Finally—and this will probably be the nail in the coffin—are the Government considering writing off any overpayments to carers?
From discussions that we have had outside this Chamber, I hope we can have a meeting with the department to deal with these matters and get some progress on them. Maybe it would not solve them completely, but it would mean that we feel we do not need to test the feelings of the House.
My Lords, I am afraid that we must oppose Amendments 103 and 113 set out by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for the same reasons that we gave in Committee.
The independent review to which I believe the noble Lord refers has a clear and limited purpose. As set out in the Government’s own guidance, it is designed to establish three things: first, how overpayments of carer’s allowance linked to earnings have occurred; secondly, what can best be done to support those who have accrued them; and, thirdly, how to reduce the risk of such problems arising in the future.
Nowhere in that remit does it question whether the overpayments were made. That point is already settled. The individuals in question have received government funds—taxpayer funds—to which they were not entitled. To put this in context, since 2019 over £357 million has been overpaid to carers for various reasons, such as where claimants breached the earnings limit, where claimants ceased to provide care, and where the claimant was also in receipt of an overlapping benefit. Often, I have to say, there have been innocent reasons.
The review will rightly examine how the system can be improved and how claimants can be better supported, but it will not, and cannot, rewrite the fact that money was misallocated and must therefore be returned. We think it would make no sense to halt all recovery activity pending the outcome of a review that does not address the underlying question of entitlement. The amendment would effectively suspend the recovery of public money that we already know has been wrongly paid out. We believe this cannot be justified, whether fiscally or morally.
I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who is in her place, set out to us outside the Chamber her concerns about a cliff edge. I welcome that input—her doing that and saying that—and the Government may want to comment on that. But it is also worth remembering that, even according to charities in support of those who have caring responsibilities, overpayments have been made to people who have not correctly reported that their caring responsibilities have ceased, that the person they are caring for has died, or that they are in receipt of an overlapping benefit. The person in question has a duty to report these changes, and it is clearly wrong that the person has not fulfilled their obligation to the taxpayer to report when these events happen.
Moreover, this amendment goes even further by requiring the Government not only to await the completion of the review and the laying of its report before Parliament but to implement its recommendations in full—I must emphasise that—before recovery can resume. We believe that this is quite extraordinary. We have no idea what those recommendations will be, and it would be deeply irresponsible to commit the Government in advance to implementing them wholesale without the ability to assess, modify or reject them as appropriate.
Public funds must be safeguarded and the Government must retain the flexibility to act responsibly in response to the review’s findings. This amendment would tie their hands and delay indefinitely the recovery of money that should never have been paid in the first place. In his summing up, the noble Lord might suggest how long the wait would be; the noble Baroness might also hazard a guess. Will it be many months, if not possibly a year or two? We really do not know, but I am sure it will be many months. It will become increasingly difficult to recover the money when so much time has gone by. Individuals may have experienced substantial changes in their lives or gone abroad. At worst, the individuals may, very sadly, have died.
For whatever reason, and bearing in mind people’s circumstances or vulnerabilities, we believe in principle that overpayments—a reminder that this is taxpayers’ money—are just that. They have been made to individuals in error—please note that—and should be repaid as soon as possible. I have an iota of sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, on the principle behind the amendment—namely, ensuring fairness and learning lessons from what has gone wrong—but its practical effect would be short-sighted, costly and contrary to the basic duty of government to protect the public purse. For those reasons, we cannot and will not support it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for explaining his amendments. Before we discuss the detail, I pay tribute to the millions of unpaid carers across the country. The Government value carers highly and recognise the vital contribution they make every day. I assure the noble Lord that my new Secretary of State feels just as strongly about this as the rest of us.
However, the reality is that, when we came into government, we realised we faced a flawed system where too many hard-working carers were left with often large overpayments to be repaid, sometimes worth thousands of pounds. I say clearly that I recognise the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and others on the whole issue of carer’s allowance. It is precisely because this Government take the issue so seriously that we commissioned an independent review of earnings-related overpayments of carer’s allowance to understand exactly what had gone wrong and to make any necessary improvements.
We have received the report from the independent reviewer, and I thank Liz Sayce OBE who led the review for her work. We are currently finalising our response to the report, following careful and detailed consideration of its findings and recommendations. I am pleased to confirm that we will publish both the report produced by Liz Sayce and the Government’s response to it before the end of this year. My ministerial colleague has written to the chair of the Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee to notify her of this.
This Government set up the review because we are determined to deal with the problems the system has created for carers. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, will be reassured by today’s commitment. Once the report and government response are published, and he and his colleagues in the other place, if he wishes, have had the opportunity to consider both, the ministerial team and the DWP will be happy to meet them to discuss this important issue and the Government’s next steps in detail.
I also remind the noble Lord and the House that this review is not all the Government have done to put things right for carers. We have been reviewing our communications to make it as easy as possible for carers to tell the DWP when there has been a change in their circumstances that may affect their carer’s allowance payment. We have been improving guidance and processes for our staff on the treatment of earnings and putting in extra resources to process the earnings information we receive from HMRC.
I think the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, mentioned the cliff edge, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is interested in. We have begun scoping work on introducing an earnings taper in carer’s allowance in the long run. This was mentioned by the Chancellor in the Budget. It is not straightforward, but a taper might be a way to further incentivise unpaid carers to do some work and could reduce the risk of significant overpayments. However, introducing a taper in carer’s allowance is not without its challenges. It could complicate the benefit as it currently stands and mean a significant rebuild of the system. The DWP has begun some scoping work to see whether an earnings taper might be an option in the longer term, but any taper, if introduced, will be several years away. I do not want to underplay the significance of trying to make changes such as that.
We have also introduced the largest increase in the earnings limit since carer’s allowance was introduced in 1976. That limit is now 16 hours of work at national living wage levels and over 60,000 additional people will be able to receive carer’s allowance between 2025-26 and 2029-30. I hope the noble Lord recognises this progress. He asked whether we would meet Carers UK. I can reassure him that Ministers and officials regularly meet Carers UK and other organisations which represent unpaid carers, as well as unpaid carers themselves. There have been meetings specifically on earnings-related overpayments in the past, and we expect further meetings in the future.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for all that she has said. We are looking to have a departmental meeting to deal with the problems out of the public eye. I take some issue with what the noble Viscount said about carers. Many of them are receiving things they should not receive. I accept that. The trouble is, once you have received it and bought your loaf of bread or whatever it is, there is no money left. A lot of those people are in straitened circumstances and we have to understand that not everybody is good at managing their finances when they have very little. I ask for us to look at that in a caring way, punishing those who have blatantly taken money they should not take, but also by building up the comments I have made. If the Minister agrees to such a meeting with me and one of my Members of Parliament so that we are all singing from the same page, in those circumstances I am prepared to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this amendment follows on from a previous amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, in Committee. It also has support from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I am very grateful to both of them. Since Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and I have engaged with the Minister, who has been very helpful and constructive. I also thank the Public Law Project for its assistance, not least in navigating a complex area of law and public policy.
The amendment seeks to ensure that the recovery of overpayments by deductions from universal credit payments, which is the DWP’s preferred method for recovering overpayments from people still in receipt of universal credit, is fair and affordable. It seeks to achieve this objective by adding a new subsection to Section 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The new subsection would have two effects.
First, it would require DWP to consult claimants before deductions are applied and to ensure that the rate of recovery is affordable to that individual. The version of this amendment that we debated in Committee would essentially have written off official error overpayments. The version that we have brought on Report is wider in scope, in that it applies to all overpayments, not just those due to official error, but it is also less ambitious in that it does not require any write-off of overpayments.
The second effect of the amendment is that it would limit the powers of recovery to overpayments that are less than six years old, in line with the limitation period that applies to the recovery of debts through the courts. In Committee, the Minister stated that the department’s preference was,
“always to agree an affordable and sustainable repayment plan”.—[Official Report, 25/6/25; col. GC 16.]
This is not currently the approach applied to the recovery of overpayments from individuals still in receipt of benefits. Instead, in these circumstances, DWP has the power to deduct 15% of an individual’s monthly universal credit payments directly, with limited notice and without the individual’s consent. For a single adult aged 25 and over, this amounts to a sudden, unanticipated loss of £60 a month.
The current approach to the recovery of overpayments stands in stark contrast to the requirements that apply to commercial lenders, such as banks and utilities companies, which are required by regulation to engage with customers extensively if they owe them money. That approach also contrasts with the provision of new powers to recover deductions from the bank accounts of individuals no longer in receipt of benefits and who are not engaging with the system. In these cases, the legislation would provide for an opportunity to make representations on affordability and hardship, before the deductions begin.
By requiring the Secretary of State to give notice and invite affected persons to make representations on affordability, the amendment seeks to ensure that equivalent protections are put in place for the recovery mechanism that applies to those who continue to be in receipt of benefits. As far as the limitation period is concerned, the new subsection would require that a recovery must commence before the expiration of a six-year period from the date on which the recoverable amount was paid. Currently, no such restriction applies, which means that individuals can face recovery action for overpayments that are many years old—and of course, in those cases, people will often not be able to locate records.
I understand that the Government are sympathetic towards the objectives of our amendment but still have concerns. We have addressed at least one of those concerns in the version of the amendment that has been tabled; that concern related to the way in which we had formulated the subsection on limitation. But I understand that the Government have a wider concern: the Minister explained in particular that, in a complex system such as welfare, there is a risk of unintended consequences once any new statutory provision is put into operational effect. I know that she speaks from depths of experience and from a sincere commitment to make the system fair and efficient.
Given that we have agreement on first principles, if in her reply the Minister is not inclined to support this amendment in its current terms, I hope that she might consider a Third Reading amendment that reflects the Government’s concerns—although I echo the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about the very limited time we have before Third Reading. If the Government are not inclined to bring back a Third Reading amendment, can the Minister reassure us in two critical respects: first, that the Government agree with the objective of giving people in receipt of benefits a fair chance to discuss an affordable repayment plan rather than applying the automatic deduction of 15%? Secondly, can the Minister outline concrete alternatives to the statutory provision that we have proposed whereby this objective might be achieved? One solution might be the setting up of a task and finish group within the governance structure of the current review of universal credit to work through the technicalities.
Again, I am very thankful to the Minister for her exemplary engagement with us on this amendment. With that, I beg to move.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for tabling this amendment, which, as he said, follows up on the one I tabled in Committee, to which he spoke so eloquently. I too thank my noble friend the Minister and her officials for the very useful meeting we had recently and the Public Law Project for all its help.
Through the universal credit system, the Government determine the minimum amount that people and families need to live on. As has been evidenced by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, for many that amount is not sufficient to meet their essential needs. As acknowledged by the DWP’s own policies, any deduction that takes people below that amount will result in hardship.
A Public Law Project survey of 500 people who had deductions applied found that a third of respondents became destitute as a result. Some 97% of Citizens Advice advisers reported that overpayment or advance loan deductions negatively affect people’s ability to afford essentials, while analysis by Policy in Practice found that, in addition to lowering income, deductions increased income volatility,
“making it harder for low income households to budget and plan ahead”,
with
“far reaching consequences, particularly for housing affordability and the risk of homelessness”.
The need to address the impact of deductions on poverty and financial instability was recognised by the Government at last year’s Autumn Budget, when they introduced the fair repayment rate. This move, which reduced the maximum amount that can be taken from someone’s universal credit payment to repay debt from 25% to 15%, was very welcome, but it is not enough to address the issues associated with overpayment recovery. The 15% rate is the rate that already applied for recovery of overpayments where individuals do not have earned income. Further, while it is helpful to have a maximum cap, it is not a substitute for assessing what constitutes an affordable rate of repayment for individuals.
A recent report from the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, while welcoming the fair repayment rate, expressed concern that the 15% rate would continue to drive hardship. Its research found that the current system for overpayment recovery
“disproportionately affects people with severe mental health conditions … who are eight times more likely to have been overpaid benefits”.
The result, the charity says, is
“serious financial and psychological harm for many people already struggling with money and mental health problems”.
One research participant commented on the deduction, saying,
“some days I have been not eating because I can’t afford to, which is leaving my mental health in tatters”.
My Lords, I am pleased to have added my name to this amendment. As this is the first time that I have spoken at this stage, I want to thank the Ministers for their careful consideration of the concerns raised by noble Lords, as well as all those who have engaged with such diligence on this matter. For the record, this is an important Bill. Attempts to commit fraud will not stop as a result of this Bill—that will never be possible—but it will be far harder for those making these attempts, and that is absolutely right, as is the ability to recover overpayments.
The principles behind this amendment are fairness in the face of the various reasons for an overpayment being made, including error by the department, and affordability, ensuring that those already in poverty are not pushed further into it. Let us remember who will bear the brunt of these new powers: people who are reliant on benefits, which independent research suggests are already insufficient to meet people’s basic needs. With the requirement to pay off their debts via universal credit deductions of up to 15% of the standard allowance, there is a real risk that many will, I fear, be pushed even deeper into poverty.
It is not a trivial number of people who will be affected. According to a DWP Freedom of Information Act response in 2023-24, nearly 900,000 new overpayment debts were entered on DWP’s debt management system, nearly 80% of which were recorded as caused by official error. The amendment before us offers a constructive path to stop people being pushed into even more precarious circumstances. By introducing a clear limit on how far back overpayment recovery can go, it would bring predictability and restraint to the process. People should not live in fear that an administrative slip-up made a decade ago will suddenly resurface as a bill they cannot hope to pay. Other areas of law recognise the principle of limitation periods and so should we here. Equally, by requiring an affordability assessment, the amendment would ensure that any repayment plans are fair, sustainable and consistent with human dignity. This is for the good of the individuals but also of the Government. If the state appears heavy-handed then confidence in the integrity of our welfare system, which is the thrust of this whole Bill, is undermined.
The amendment would not weaken the fight against fraud. It does not seek to excuse dishonesty or to diminish accountability. It seeks to uphold the Government’s stated objective of ensuring that recovery of overpayments is done in a fair and affordable way. I urge the Minister to take these concerns into account, in particular the suggestions of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, on how these concerns can be addressed practically. I, like others, will not be pushing for a Division on this matter, but I seek real reassurance from the Government.
My Lords, I speak in strong support of this amendment, so ably tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, and to which I am pleased to have added my name.
The amendment speaks across so many of the principles that have underpinned our debates and the position that we on these Benches have adopted throughout Committee and Report—fairness, proportionality, transparency and responsibility. This amendment is about finding this balance and ensuring that the recovery of overpaid public funds is carried out in a way that is both effective and humane.
We have been clear from the outset that we support the core objectives of this Bill. Public money that has been wrongly paid out, whether through error or fraud, must be recovered. We owe that duty to the taxpayer and the integrity of our public finances. Equally, it is a duty of government to ensure that such recovery is done in a way that is fair, measured and responsible, does not impose unnecessary hardship, recognises the realities of individual circumstances and upholds confidence in the system.
This amendment embodies precisely that balance. It would establish clear and necessary safeguards before deductions are made from a person’s benefits. It would require that the liable person be notified of the rate and the basis of deduction, and, crucially, that they be given the opportunity to make representations about affordability. It would insist that deductions should proceed only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that recovery will not cause hardship in meeting essential living expenses and that the process is fair in all circumstances, including where the overpayment may have arisen through official delay or error. Sensibly, it seeks to sets a six-year limit for recovery, in line with the limitation period that applies through the courts. In other words, this amendment would ensure that the state exercises its right to recover the money in a way that is just, proportionate and accountable, and would align the recovery of overpayments through benefit deductions with the very same principles of fairness and restraint that we have already built into Schedule 5 in relation to deductions from bank accounts.
Throughout our scrutiny of this legislation, we have repeatedly emphasised that good governance is not simply about having the power to act but about exercising that power responsibly. This amendment reflects that philosophy perfectly. It strikes the right equilibrium between fiscal responsibility and social justice and between protecting the taxpayer and those who may already be in vulnerable situations. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for bringing forward this thoughtful and well-crafted proposal. It would strengthen the Bill, give legislative effect to the principles of transparency, fairness and proportionality, and ensure that, in pursuing the legitimate goal of recovering public funds, we do so in a manner that remains worthy of public trust. This is a measured, sensible and responsible amendment and we are very pleased to support it. I hope the Minister will give welcome assurances on it.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their early and constructive engagement on this topic. I understand that the intent of Amendment 109 is to replicate some of the safeguards introduced in Schedule 5 for direct deduction orders for the recovery of universal credit and new-style overpayments by deduction from benefit. Although I understand clearly what the proposers of this amendment want to do, I cannot accept it. However, I hope I can provide some assurances along the way.
The DWP is committed to improving payment accuracy to prevent overpayments occurring through continuous improvement activity. Where overpayments do arise, the Secretary of State has an obligation to protect public funds and ensure that, wherever possible, money owed to DWP is repaid. But within that objective, we are clear that our aim is to secure affordable and sustainable repayment plans and ensure that safeguards are in place to protect vulnerable debtors.
As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, Amendment 109 applies not just to official error but to all universal credit and new-style benefit overpayments recovered from benefits, including debts arising from fraud. The DWP already sets out that fraud overpayments are subject to stricter recovery rules due to their nature and seriousness. To treat all debts the same would not be right; it would be unfair on those who obtained a DWP benefit in good faith. This amendment also applies only to debts being recovered by deductions from benefits. A key driver for the new debt recovery measures is to bring greater fairness to debt recovery, giving DWP the tools to recover debts from those debtors who are not on benefits and have the means to repay but choose not to. This amendment could undermine that important objective.
Taking each part of Amendment 109 in turn, proposed new subsection 8(a)(i) would require DWP to give an individual notice on the basis of the deduction amounts. Individuals receive a notification about the overpayment; setting out the deduction rate and basis for this would present significant challenges. Benefit awards can fluctuate month to month, and deductions for repayment of debt are calculated accordingly. The deduction rate will also depend on other deductions being taken. Therefore, a legal requirement to issue a fixed notice setting out a single rate of recovery may risk being inaccurate, confusing or even misleading.
However, noble Lords are making an important point, and while I cannot accept the amendment, I commit to the House that in response I will explore how we might notify individuals more clearly about forthcoming deductions within the existing legal framework. I intend to do this as a part of the commitments I have made to review our communications to those with debts.
Proposed new subsection (8)(a)(ii) seeks to replicate the representation stage for direct deduction orders where recovery takes place by deduction from benefits. These processes are intentionally different because when deductions are made from benefits, DWP already holds accurate information about benefit payments, existing deductions and in some cases income from other sources. Crucially, there is also no ambiguity about ownership of the funds. Notifications already make it clear that at any time, the individual can contact DWP to discuss the affordability of the deduction.
By contrast, for the DDO process, DWP may know little or nothing about a person’s financial circumstances because they are not on benefits or in PAYE and they have refused to engage with us. This is why the Bill makes provision for DWP to obtain bank statements as an important safeguard. However, we recognise this may not give DWP as complete a picture as we have for benefit claimants. It is therefore right that individuals and any joint account holders can make representations about information that may not be apparent from statements alone before a deduction is taken from a bank account.
Nevertheless, in line with my previous commitment, I will commit to look at what more we can do to make our communications as clear as possible on how claimants can contact the department at any time to discuss repayment. I will also look at the timing of these communications.
Turning to proposed new subsection (8)(b), I agree that deductions from benefit should not cause unintended hardship and should be fair. This Government are committed to the principle of debt repayment being affordable; that is why processes exist to achieve this. Protections are in place to prevent excessive deductions. Regulations set out the maximum rates of recovery from benefits for fraud and non-fraud debts. For those in receipt of universal credit, as my noble friend Lady Lister mentioned, the fair repayment rate policy, which this Government introduced on 30 April, reduced the total amount that can be deducted from universal credit from 25% to 15% of the standard allowance in most cases, and I am grateful to her for acknowledging that. Crucially, there is also a priority order for deductions taken from universal credit to ensure that debts such as housing arrears are taken first to prevent people facing eviction and thus causing hardship. Recovery of overpayments is a long way down the list of priority order.
Moreover, there are robust processes in place to support the vulnerable and those struggling with debts, such as referrals to the Money Adviser Network for free and independent and impartial money and debt advice. I again stress that individuals can and should contact DWP at any time to discuss repayment terms. Where individuals make contact, DWP can reduce or temporarily suspend recovery depending on the circumstances. In exceptional cases, DWP can consider waiving recovery of the debt entirely.
I turn now to the question of fairness in this amendment. The extension of whether the act of recovery itself is fair differs from the provision in Schedule 5, which is limited to consideration of the deduction being fair in the circumstances as known to DWP. Every overpayment decision has existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights, and these are the right routes to challenge whether the overpayment should be recovered.
Although Amendment 109 is specific to recovery by deduction from benefits, it risks creating uncertainty as to whether it was fair to recover by other methods too, such as by deductions from earnings, or voluntary repayment plans.
Finally, proposed new subsection (8)(c) would limit the commencement of recovery of any overpayment of UC or new-style benefits from deductions from benefits to six years. The existing framework under Managing Public Money provides enough flexibility to forgo the recovery of historic debt where appropriate. Imposing a statutory time limit on commencing recovery would have consequences that may not be intended; for example, DWP could be prevented from recovering money obtained through benefit fraud where we could not reasonably identify the fraud until six years after the payment was made.
It is important to distinguish DWP recoveries from those by other creditors through court orders, for which a limitation period might otherwise apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, indicated. DWP recovers benefit overpayment debts one at a time, beginning with the oldest. Due to the protections that I outlined earlier, we recover by deductions from benefit at a much lower rate than other creditors typically would, and we rightly prioritise deductions for certain debts, such as housing or utilities arrears, over benefit overpayments to prevent hardship. That means that recovery of a UC or new-style benefit overpayment could rightly take place some time after the initial overpayment has been notified to the individual. A blanket limitation would risk undermining the integrity of the process, could create hardship for individuals and could significantly reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I will not press this to a vote, so the Whips do not need to worry. Instead, I would like to make a few points.
My first point is about the complexity of setting out to claimants the deduction rate. I hear what the Minister said, but it does not entirely reassure me. I believe that, as a matter of basic fairness, however complex certain calculations are, the Government should, just like commercial enterprises, be able to set them out in as simple a way as possible to the beneficiaries—the claimants.
My second point is that the way we crafted the amendment—the comprehensive provision on fairness in proposed new subsection (8)(b)(ii)—was precisely designed to distinguish fraud cases from other cases. However, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester said, the vast majority of these debts are actually due to official error; that is mainly what we are dealing with. Of course, it would have been possible to exclude the recovery of debts from overpayments due to fraud from the scope of the amendment.
Limitation periods are very important in any legal system because they are about both fairness and efficiency. Given the mountain of overpayments that various reports have pointed to, a system that does not have a cut-off time will continue to repeat those same mistakes. It is therefore about efficiency as much as fairness.
With that in mind, I am grateful to the Minister for the reassurances she has given. They go to two critical elements: clarity of communication with affected individuals, and timeliness. I hope that she will pursue those two objectives as much as she can within the policy, because it is absolutely necessary that people are told about these deductions before they actually begin. They have to be told clearly what the deductions will be, and as soon as possible—ideally, quite a bit before the deductions begin. With those assurances in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I realise that we are approaching the end of Report and the hour is late, but I do want to spend a little time speaking to my Amendment 110.
Those who were present in Grand Committee will recall the examples I cited of individuals producing and disseminating videos designed to help people cheat the checks put in place by the DWP to ensure that welfare support goes only to those with genuine entitlement. These were not isolated incidents. We are talking about content with titles such as:
“Unlock The Secret Steps For WINNING Your PIP Claims—Step By Step Guide”,
hosted on channels with names such as “Mike Bolton Benefits Training”. This is what has come to be known as the phenomenon of the “sickfluencer”, and it represents a serious and growing threat to the integrity of the welfare system—a threat which, I regret to say, the Government are, we believe, struggling to keep pace with.
For those to whom this term is unfamiliar, let me briefly explain. Sickfluencers are individuals who use Instagram, YouTube, TikTok and other social media platforms to publish detailed guides on how eligibility checks for welfare benefits can be manipulated or bypassed. They provide ready-made scripts to their viewers, instructing them on how to answer questions, what to disclose, how to pretend to have a disability or injury, and when to tell the truth and when they should lie. In short, they are professionals in coaching claimants to circumvent established eligibility safeguards. Indeed, the testimonies published on their websites and channels make it clear that many successful claimants attribute their outcomes directly to the advice of these sickfluencers. This is not simply a nuisance on the fringes of the system; it is an organised, deliberate effort to undermine the very principles of fairness and integrity on which the welfare system depends.
Since I last spoke on this issue, in Committee, thousands upon thousands more people have viewed this content. Hundreds more will have used it in their eligibility interviews, and possibly dozens will have been successful in their claim, precisely because of these videos and not because of a genuine entitlement.
I want to be clear that I understand that noble Lords on these Benches understand, and that the Conservative Party makes a point of understanding, that there are people in our country who should receive support from the state. There are people who cannot live without the support provided to them through the welfare system and it is absolutely right that we help those people. What can never be right is the abuse of this system of support by people who do not have a genuine eligibility, but who are coached to cheat the system and steal from the limited resources which should rightly be going to those who need them most.
If we have confidence in the system of testing as it currently stands, we should also be confident that it, and the assessors themselves, have the ability and the capacity to determine who is in need of support and those people who are not. This is the context in which we bring forward this amendment, which is designed to deal with this growing problem directly and proportionately. The amendment has been carefully drafted to ensure that we target those who are encouraging, facilitating and enabling fraud, an objective which I am sure noble Lords across the House will support.
Proposed new subsection (1) makes it absolutely clear that the offence applies only where a person intentionally publishes or communicates information that is reasonably likely to be used to mislead or deceive public authorities in order to secure welfare to which they are not entitled. This goes right to the heart of the problem I have described: the deliberate creation and dissemination of coaching materials designed to cheat the system.
Proposed new subsection (2) adds the essential safeguard that culpability arises only where the individual knows or ought reasonably to know that the content is intended to facilitate dishonest conduct under existing legislation, such as the Social Security Administration Act 1992 or the Welfare Reform Act 2012. This ensures that we are not targeting ordinary members of the public, but only those who are actively propagating content to enable fraud.
Proposed new subsection (3) then builds in crucial protections for legitimate activity. Journalists, academics and others who are acting in the public interest or who take reasonable steps to prevent their information being misused have a statutory defence. That means that this amendment does not criminalise responsible commentary or research; it criminalises those who deliberately and knowingly produce guides to cheating welfare assessments.
Proposed new subsection (4) sets out proportionate penalties: up to 12 months on summary conviction and up to five years on indictment. These sanctions are in line with other serious fraud-related offences, reflecting the harm done when organised online actors undermine the integrity of the welfare system.
Finally, proposed new subsection (5) makes clear that this applies across the spectrum of modern media: written, audio, video and digital content, including social media platforms. This allows the provision to keep pace with the reality of how this fraudulent material is produced and shared, and therefore safeguards its operational effectiveness into the future.
Therefore, we believe that this amendment is tightly drafted, carefully targeted and proportionately safeguarded, and would ensure that those who maliciously spread instructions on how to cheat the welfare system can be prosecuted. In short, it would criminalise not the sharing of information but the facilitation of fraud.
Fraud today is not static; it evolves, it adapts and it exploits new platforms with increasing sophistication. If this Bill is to succeed, it must be capable of not only addressing fraud as we see it today but of anticipating and countering the methods of tomorrow. This amendment would ensure that we do precisely that, tackling a wider breadth of fraudulent activity both in the temporal sense and in the online sphere. We believe it is an essential provision if we are to make this legislation truly effective and enduring.
There is a good reason for bringing this up again on Report. As the Minister knows, we seek a much greater effort in action from the Government to take down these abhorrent websites. We seek a series of proactive steps, with a timetable, to neutralise the individuals involved, who are no less than fraudsters. What are the government doing about sickfluencers? If the Minister replies that it is not for this Bill, then where and when?
I am concerned about the fact that the Government are not doing the proper groundwork required to tackle the threat, which is also to understand its scale. Is the Minister aware of work under way in the department to understand the relationship between sickfluencers and the rate of those claiming benefits such as PIP? What is the causal relationship that the department understands there to be between these two matters? In other words, how are the Government assessing the scale of the threat, with a view to crafting a response to match it? Academics at Oxford University and Bournemouth University, and journalists from an ever-increasing range of publications, are highlighting this, and have done so since I raised the issue in Committee. We are not alone in imploring the Government to take action on this front.
To conclude, I will be listening carefully and with interest to the response from the Minister. I am not expecting her to repeat that the current legislation is sufficient. I think she knows from discussions outside the Chamber that what I am really looking for is some real meat behind her remarks to show that the Government are taking this seriously as an abhorrent operation.
My Lords, I share the interest of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, in the important issue of fraudulent activity in the digital age, especially where it affects our social security system. I start by recognising that online activity in this space is wide-ranging. There are people who offer advice on social media or elsewhere online because they genuinely want to help others, often disabled people, to understand the benefits system better so that they can access the support they need. That is understandable and perfectly legal. However, there are others who deliberately use online platforms to encourage or facilitate benefit fraud by sharing information or organising fraud themselves. This kind of behaviour is calculated, harmful and must be taken seriously, but we do not need new legislation to deal with it.
Those individuals can and should face consequences under existing law. Section 7 of the Fraud Act 2006 and Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 already make it a criminal offence to assist or promote fraud. This amendment would not strengthen that existing legislation. In fact, as I pointed out in Committee, it would be softer than existing offences. It would reduce the maximum sentence for the proposed offence to just five years, compared to the 10 years already available under existing legislation. That is a weaker deterrent. Moreover, introducing a new offence risks duplicating the powers that the Government already have. This would create unnecessary overlap and a more confusing legal landscape, and could create a disparity in how cases are prosecuted and sentenced. There is no need to complicate the legal framework when legislation is already in place.
Where there is online activity which provides information on how to commit fraud, and where this activity can be reasonably countered, we think we have the right tools and networks in place beyond the legislation that I have already outlined. The department actively collaborates with a range of government partners, including Action Fraud, the City of London Police and the National Cyber Security Centre, to identify malicious sites that impersonate the department, enable fraudulent activity or target DWP customers.
For example, in partnership with Action Fraud, we have recently been raising awareness of winter fuel payment scams across Facebook and X—formerly known as Twitter. This has taken place alongside the DWP’s continued work with trusted partners and charities such as Independent Age to ensure that accurate and timely information is available. The DWP has also developed a recorded message for our telephone lines and issued a press release via GOV.UK to raise awareness of such scams.
Secondly, social media companies also have clear responsibilities under the Online Safety Act. They are required to remove harmful and illegal content, including anything that encourages or helps others to commit offences. The Act enables us to work with Ofcom through its new trusted flagger process. This builds on established relationships and escalation routes that we have with individual companies to report suspicious content on certain platforms quickly and effectively.
I thank the Minister for her remarks. As I said, one of my main aims in speaking to this again was to draw out the actions from the Government on what they are doing to address what I call the scourge of sickfluencers. She states that the existing legislation covers the offences, but the offences are still occurring and are growing. However, I think I have succeeded to some extent in that I have managed to elicit from the Minister more information than I did in Committee, which is now on the record, on what the Government are undertaking cross-governmentally here. Although I am not entirely satisfied, I think I have succeeded to some extent. In the meantime, I wish to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, government Amendment 114 ensures flexibility in the commencement of certain provisions of the Bill across the different nations of the United Kingdom. This approach is well established in legislation such as the Care Act 2014, the Digital Economy Act 2017 and the Public Order Act 2023. It ensures that implementation is both practical and responsive to the specific circumstances in each jurisdiction. For example, the courts in one part of the UK may be ready to hear certain applications while, in another, staff training and procedural updates may still be under way.
This amendment allows the flexibility to commence later in one area without unnecessarily delaying implementation in an area that is ready. Crucially, the amendment does not alter the substantive provisions contained in the Bill, and nor does it affect how or to whom they apply. It is simply a matter of good governance, ensuring that the legislation is brought into force in a way that is orderly, effective and sensitive to operational realities.
I hope that the House will support this amendment as a sensible and necessary step in delivering the Bill effectively across the UK. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will keep my remarks brief. Amendment 114 is, as the Minister has indicated, a technical amendment but one that raises a point of some practical importance in how this legislation will be implemented. The amendment would allow commencement regulations to provide for provisions of the Bill to come into force on different days in relation to different areas. We recognise that this is a standard enabling power and we do not object to it in principle.
However, while we appreciate that this is likely to be a technical and administrative provision, we would welcome a little more clarity from the Minister as to the intended purpose. In particular, can the Minister explain whether the Government currently anticipate that the legislation will, in practice, come into force in a staggered way across different parts of the UK? It would be helpful to know whether any particular regional or administrative reasons have led to this amendment being proposed—for example, to accommodate devolved competencies or pilot schemes, or differences in data infrastructure between public authorities—or whether this is simply a precautionary measure to preserve flexibility.
We would also be grateful if the Minister confirmed whether the Government expect any significant differences in timing or rollout between areas once the Bill is enacted. If such differences are anticipated, what criteria will determine the order of commencement and how will Parliament and the public be kept informed of that process? So while we are content to support this amendment as a sensible technical adjustment, we would appreciate some reassurance that it will not result in confusion or inconsistencies.
Finally, as we come to the end of Report, I want, on a lighter note, to take this opportunity to thank all noble Lords for their engagement throughout these proceedings, and all those who have voted on the amendments upon which we have divided. I look forward to seeing some noble Lords again at Third Reading on Thursday.
My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for his questions. First, we have no reason to believe that any area or jurisdiction will not be ready; this is simply a precautionary measure to provide flexibility in case unexpected issues arise down the line. It is a standard legislative approach that provides flexibility to adapt if needed, and avoids holding back implementation in areas that are ready, should there be another area that needs more time. No specific powers have been earmarked or delayed. The amendment is an enabling one, and where readiness exists, powers will be commenced without delay. On how people will know, Parliament and the public will see the commencement regulations, which will make that clear. This amendment is simply to ensure flexibility in the commencement provisions across the different nations of the UK, and I commend it to the House.