Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Monday 30th June 2025
(4 months ago)
Commons ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Of all the duties of Government, none matters more than keeping our country safe. It is an awesome task, and one to which we attach the utmost significance, as this House and the public would expect. For people to flourish, they must have confidence that they are safe as they go about their lives. For a society to excel, its values must be protected from harm and its laws upheld. For a nation to thrive, its leaders must be unrelenting in the pursuit of these critical aims. That is why the Prime Minister has made national security a foundation of the plan for change, and it is why we work around the clock with our partners in policing and the security services to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe.
In the face of a complex and evolving threat picture, it is essential that we keep the powers, tools and measures available to us under constant review. Where steps are needed to maintain the safety and security of our country, this Government will not hesitate to act. It is with that intention that we have brought forward this Bill, which, although narrow in its scope and intent, is vital to our ongoing efforts to protect the United Kingdom.
Before I come to the detail of the Bill, I will provide a little bit of background. The British Nationality Act 1981 provides for the removal of an individual’s British citizenship. This is also known as a deprivation of citizenship. Deprivation is an important and effective tool to maintain public safety and preserve national security. It is used in two different situations: where citizenship has been obtained by fraud, or where deprivation is conducive to the public good, which means that it is in the public interest to deprive a person of British citizenship because of their conduct and/or the threat that they pose to the United Kingdom.
Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I accept the Minister’s point that this is a very narrow Bill, but is he able to tell the House how many individuals who currently have an appeal that has not yet been heard, and to whom this Bill will ultimately apply, have been deprived of their citizenship?
Dan Jarvis
I am happy to do that. If my hon. Friend bears with me for just a couple of moments, I will provide him with the information that he has requested.
In the latter category especially—where deprivation is conducive to the public good—deprivation is used against some of the most dangerous individuals, including terrorists, extremists, and serious and organised criminals. Someone in the UK who has been deprived of their British citizenship no longer has any immigration status, steps may be taken to remove them from the UK, and they may be held in an immigration detention in the interim. If they are overseas, they cannot re-enter the UK using a British passport. In both circumstances, this is clearly an effective way to disrupt the threat posed by dangerous individuals.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
First, I commend the Minister and the Government for bringing forward this Bill. There is no doubt but that it is absolutely necessary. National security is paramount when considering revoking citizenship, as the Minister has outlined, and the Bill is necessary to close a particular loophole and ensure that no person can bypass it.
In Northern Ireland, many people claim both Irish and UK citizenship, as they are able to. I understand that the Bill will make sure their UK citizenship can be revoked, but they will still have the right as an Irish passport holder to travel to Northern Ireland. That is a very peculiar case. I am quite happy if the Minister wants to come back to me on this, but I just want to make sure that no one can get around these measures by using an alternative passport—an Irish passport or whatever it may be—and that Northern Ireland will be under the same laws as the rest of the UK.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, as I always am, and he is absolutely right that it is necessary to close this particular loophole, and that is the purpose of the Bill. He has raised a very interesting example, and I am grateful to him for saying he is happy for me to come back to him. If he lets me reflect on it further, I will respond to him when I make my concluding remarks at the end of the debate.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
The Minister keeps referring to a “loophole”. In fact, it has been an important principle of British justice that successful appeal equals vindication. This Bill is trying to remove that presumption. That is not a loophole; it is a basic judicial right on which we all rely.
Dan Jarvis
Again, if the right hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will come to his specific point in a moment, and if he is not satisfied that I have responded adequately then, I am happy to give way again. I will make some progress.
Deprivation decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and lawyers, and in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually. Decisions to deprive, where it is conducive to the public good, are personally taken by the Home Secretary. The power is used sparingly. It complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, and always comes with a right of appeal.
Turning to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell), let me give the House a sense of the frequency with which deprivation powers are used. From 2018 to 2023, on average 12 people a year were deprived of their citizenship where it was conducive to the public good. The available period for fraud-related deprivations is slightly different, but from 2018 to 2022 there were an average of 151 cases per year in that category.
Let me turn to the Bill, dealing first with why it is required; I hope this will go some way to responding to the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). In a recent case, the Supreme Court decided that, if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, the initial deprivation order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be a British citizen. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted by the Home Secretary.
Dan Jarvis
I am going to make a little bit of progress, if I may. I will give way in a moment, but I want to address the point that has been raised.
There are very good reasons why the Government may wish to stop citizenship being regained until all appeals are determined, withdrawn or abandoned. These include to prevent someone who is outside the UK and who poses a risk to our national security from returning when a further appeal may be upheld pending the Home Secretary’s decision, or to prevent a person from renouncing their other nationality and putting themselves in a position where, if further appeals are successful, a further deprivation order would not be possible as it would unlawfully render them stateless.
Gareth Snell
I thank the Minister for that explanation, but hypothetically there exists a circumstance in which the Home Secretary could deprive an individual of their citizenship, that individual could go for an appeal and have it reinstated, and this law would prevent them from retaining that citizenship and the Department could simply choose not to appeal further. How does the Department ensure that the individual is then allowed to access future appeals to try to regularise their citizenship status?
Dan Jarvis
For reasons that I do not understand, my hon. Friend is progressing a hypothetical scenario; I do not know whether it is based on a particular case that he has in mind. I have not personally dealt with such a set of circumstances, but I am happy to look at the matter he has raised.
Deirdre Costigan
Southall Community Alliance in my constituency has long been a defender of human rights. Would the Minister confirm to the alliance that this Bill means we will continue to use the power to deprive people of their citizenship very sparingly, and that there will be no changes to the existing right of appeal or any widening of the reasoning under which we would deprive somebody of their citizenship in this country?
Dan Jarvis
I can absolutely give my hon. Friend and the organisation in her constituency that assurance. This Bill is very narrowly drawn; it has two clauses.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
I am confused. If the individuals in question have done something so bad that they have to be deprived of their citizenship, why would we not simply jail them? Why would we need to deprive them of their citizenship?
Dan Jarvis
I hope my hon. Friend heard the point I made a moment ago about how the Government have brought forward this legislation in response to a recent Supreme Court decision. Essentially, an appeal against deprivation has resulted in a requirement for us to bring forward this clarification of the law. In response to her and my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Southall (Deirdre Costigan), this does not represent any widening of the existing arrangements. The right of appeal is completely unaffected by this legislation, which is incredibly narrowly drawn.
Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)
I am sure the Minister understands that due process is important and appreciates that the appeals process must be respected fully. He is intending making people temporarily stateless, so can he guarantee that the appeals process will be speeded up and people will have an opportunity to have their case heard in a timeous manner, so they can have their case resolved, not hanging over them for a long time?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member is absolutely right about the point of due process. I can say to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Southall that these powers are used very sparingly. Each and every individual case is decided on by the Home Secretary. I know that this Home Secretary has—and I am sure previous Home Secretaries have—taken these responsibilities incredibly seriously. Decisions are made carefully, on advice and in accordance with international law, and I am happy to give the hon. Member and others that assurance.
Dan Jarvis
Let me make a bit of progress, and then I will happily give way again.
The key point is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK, or whose conduct involves very high harm. We are talking about some of the most serious cases handled by any Government. Where a loophole is identified in the processes underpinning it, it is the job of any serious and sensible Government to close it, and that is precisely what this Government will do.
Let me turn to the substance of the Bill. The House will note its brevity and narrow scope; it contains just one substantive clause, focused solely on addressing the specific issues that have already been discussed. Its primary objective is to protect the United Kingdom from dangerous people, which includes those who pose a threat to our national security. The Bill will achieve that by preventing those who have been deprived of British citizenship from regaining that status automatically when their appeal is successful, until further appeals have been determined. That will replicate the approach taken on asylum and human rights appeals; in those cases, the effect of an appeal is suspended up to the Court of Appeal and extended to appeals to the Supreme Court.
To be clear, the Bill does not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons why a person could be deprived of their citizenship. Should an appeal mounted on behalf of the Government prove unsuccessful, then where there is no possibility of further appeal, British citizenship would be reinstated with immediate and retrospective effect.
Kit Malthouse
The Minister keeps referring to a loophole in justice. I do not understand why he cannot see that “innocent until proven guilty” should apply in these cases, as in any other. The idea that my winning an appeal would not automatically mean I was innocent, as it does in every other case, seems a breach of a fundamental tenet. He is also not correct to say that the power is used sparingly. Since 2010, dozens of people have been denied citizenship on the say-so of the Home Secretary, despite there being nothing proven in court. That is what is different about these cases. This is effectively something that is done in secret, behind closed doors, without the facts necessarily being proven in any way. I have a lot of respect for the hon. Gentleman, but this is a case in which we should be even more reliant on due process, rather than trying to legislate judges out of the room, as we are trying to today.
Dan Jarvis
I know that the right hon. Gentleman will understand and appreciate, from his time as a Home Office Minister, the huge responsibility that the Government invest in the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary of the day has to make some incredibly difficult, finely balanced judgments. I hope that he would agree that we have to ensure that the Home Secretary, whoever they are, and whatever political party they are from, has the necessary power to make decisions that safeguard the security of our nation. I am certain that he and I agree on that. The Bill essentially ensures that the Government can continue to do that, precisely as the Government whom he served could.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
I thank the Minister for giving way again. I am again completely confused. His specific example at the beginning aside, I still do not understand why, if the individuals concerned pose such a huge threat, other pieces of legislation will not deal with them and keep the public safe. He also pointed to the fact that somebody could win their appeal and he could still wish to deprive them of citizenship. I want to understand the circumstances in which, after someone’s appeal was upheld by a judge, the Minister would still wish to deprive them of their citizenship.
Dan Jarvis
Forgive me, but I do not think I said that; I think I said the opposite. I am very happy to discuss the matter further with my hon. Friend. I hope she understands, and I hope I have made it clear, that the Bill is incredibly narrow in its scope. It seeks to take us back to the legal position we were in a matter of months ago, prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court. It does not in any way undermine the right of appeal. If she has further concerns, I am very happy to speak to her, but I can give her an assurance. She is very welcome to look at the Bill. It will not take her very long to read it. It is two clauses, with a single substantive clause, specifically designed to take us back to the legal position we were in just a few months ago. I hope she will be reassured by that.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I have come to this debate without any prior knowledge of what is proposed, so I am making this point as a result of what I have heard so far. Am I right in thinking that what the Minister particularly has in mind is people with dual citizenship who might, for example, have gone abroad to fight for a terrorist organisation, such as ISIS. There would, in such a case, be nothing forbidding us from removing their British citizenship. If they came back, even if they could be convicted of anything at all, they would be imprisoned for only a relatively short time, if at all, and then the security services would probably have to spend many years monitoring them. Is that the sort of scenario the Minister has in mind?
Dan Jarvis
I am always grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. It is. Perhaps he did not hear me make that point earlier, but I specifically said that one of the reasons for the Bill was to prevent someone who is outside the UK, and who poses a risk to our national security, from returning when a further appeal may be upheld by the Home Secretary’s decision. He is right: that is a potential scenario that we have to guard against, and the Bill will enable us to do that, just as Governments could prior to the ruling of the Supreme Court. I hope he finds that reassuring.
As I set out, deprivation is one of the most powerful tools we have in our ongoing efforts to protect the United Kingdom and its citizens from harm. For it to remain an effective part of our armoury, we need to legislate. Before I finish, I pay tribute to our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In turbulent and uncertain times, their tireless work to maintain stability and security at home has never been more crucial. They must be supported at every turn, because the safety of our country stands apart from everything else we do. It is the cornerstone of our society, and ensuring that safety is the primary purpose of everyone involved in public service, including in this House. It is a responsibility borne not just by those of us on the Government Benches, but by parliamentarians of all parties. In that spirit, I urge Members to support the Bill, which is required to preserve our national security. I commend it wholeheartedly to the House.
Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)
Keeping our country safe is, and must be, the first duty of any Government. That comes with decisions and choices that Governments must take to keep their citizens, our country and our way of life safe. That is why we Conservative Members support the Bill. It is much needed to close a recently created loophole that must be addressed, as Members from across the House should agree.
The issue tackled by the Bill arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in N3 v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 2025. The Court held that if a person successfully appeals against a deprivation order, or if the order is withdrawn, they are considered never to have lost their British citizenship. That means that even where the Secretary of State intends to challenge such a decision through further appeals, the person’s citizenship is automatically restored in the interim. In practice, that could allow individuals to return to the UK or renounce another citizenship or nationality before the Home Office has exhausted the appeals process.
The Supreme Court judgment created two vulnerabilities: an unlocked door through which dangerous individuals could return; and an escape route, allowing terrorists to regain citizenship, fly back to Britain and then renounce other nationalities to become untouchable. The Government’s own assessment identifies specific risks: immediate re-entry attempts; terrorists becoming stateless to block future action; and foreign states interfering in our security measures.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation has created a situation that is unprecedented among our allies. The United States, Canada, Australia, France and the Netherlands all maintain revocation of citizenship throughout appeals. Until the February ruling, Britain’s framework operated effectively. Now, because of the judgment, we face a unique vulnerability that no other comparable democracy tolerates.
Removing citizenship is quite rightly considered to be a serious step—one that is not taken lightly or without thorough consideration. The seriousness of such decisions is reflected in the fact that it is the Secretary of State who personally decides whether, based on public good and safety, an individual should be deprived of their British citizenship.
The Conservative party absolutely agrees with the importance of having the power of deprivation of citizenship in order to preserve national security. It is a power that has been used sparingly but necessarily, with previous Home Secretaries rightly depriving more than 200 individuals of their citizenship for being non-conducive to the public good. These individuals risk undermining not only our security, but our society at large.
British citizenship is a privilege, not an unconditional right. Those who choose to shatter their bonds of loyalty through terrorism or heinous organised crime forfeit their right to carry a British passport. That is why successive Conservative Governments never shirked from using those powers against terrorists plotting to kill our citizens, or against members of the Rochdale grooming gangs for their sickening abuse of vulnerable children. That is why we are happy to support the Government in their attempts to close this loophole today.
Josh Simons (Makerfield) (Lab)
On this island, citizenship is an idea still in its infancy. When Great Britain was forged in the Acts of Union in 1707, British people were not citizens, but subjects, equals by virtue of their relationship to the monarch. Only with the British Nationality Act 1948 was the concept of citizenship introduced into our laws. I say that because, to my mind, we live in an age when political imagination is needed more than ever. The recent experiment with politics as bureaucratic management is over, and we are now returning to a politics with a longer history in this country, forging the future through imagination and creativity, and exercising the collective power to change the values and systems by which we are ruled.
At a moment like this, the relative infancy of citizenship in Britain should encourage us to pause to examine an idea we too often glide over; and I hope that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, will forgive me for doing just that. Citizenship, like the motivation behind this Bill, is connected to one of the great challenges of our time: controlling our borders and establishing systems of legal migration and asylum that are orderly, managed, humane and in our national interest.
Let me start with what my constituents in Makerfield tell me. They want to feel that they and their family belong in the community they live in, and they want their neighbours to feel that they belong there, too. That is why high streets full of vape shops, dog muck and smashed glass matter so much—they are a visible and constant reminder that others seem not to feel that they belong. When people treat their community with respect and love, they show that they feel that they belong.
Citizenship is belonging on a bigger scale—a larger us. It is the unchosen love we feel for our family, and even our town, projected on to the story of a country and its people—the monarch; the flag; the mountains, hills and seas; the industrial skyline of my home towns in northern England, and the cobbled streets of Cornwall. Citizenship is a feeling, and, like any feeling, it carries responsibilities. It is about not only what we are owed, but what we owe—responsibility, contribution, duty.
We live in uncertain times, with Europe at war, the middle east in crisis and the world order being remade at breakneck speed. In such times, I believe we should celebrate and nurture citizenship far more than we do. Now, we hide it away. We bury citizenship ceremonies in dingy, bureaucratic corners of town halls, making the test for those who obtain it their capacity to pay thousands of pounds for the privilege, not their commitment to our country and our values. For me, that is what citizenship should be about. I believe that citizens of this country should speak our language, know our history and share our commitment to fairness, tolerance, creativity and freedom. Those who wish to become citizens must, in the end, be willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with their fellow citizens to defend that freedom in a world where it really is threatened.
That brings me to the Bill. While I voted to remain, I did so after much thought. It was always true that the European Union changes the capacity of elected representatives to control borders, and places clear constitutional constraints on what Parliament can do. However, I am always suspicious of those who blame forces beyond Parliament for their failure to use its immense powers. My constituents understand a simple truth about this country’s constitution, which is that our politicians can enact almost any law they please, and Governments with strong majorities can do almost whatever they want. If they choose not to use those powers, rarely is it because of some external force, whether that be Strasbourg or an arm’s length body. Instead, it is because they are frightened to use their own power, or lack the imagination to use it well.
That is why I strongly support the measures in the Bill. It is not about making people stateless or subverting judges. Instead, it is about doing what this place is supposed to do, which is to assert the view of Parliament on what citizenship means and how it should be enacted. Valuing citizenship requires being clear about when and under what circumstances it should be taken away. Being an equal, full part of our society means sharing our values. British citizenship affirms a person’s part in our country, and there must be a way to remove those who threaten it, where they have dual citizenship.
If the Home Secretary has decided in narrow and prescribed circumstances that it is in the public interest to remove a person’s citizenship because they threaten our security, in my view, that is what should happen. Of course, we must have an appeals process—no one must ever be above the law in this land. However, an appeal should not mean that the will of elected officials is thwarted. This is part of a broader agenda of this Government that I strongly support: changing the process of judicial review to ensure that the few cannot hold up investment and infrastructure that benefits the many, and reforming the European convention on human rights to update human rights for the 21st century, strengthen national security and enhance control over our borders.
The British people are fed up with politicians passing the buck and blaming someone else for their own failure to act. If we do not create a modern citizenship regime, reform the ECHR and judicial review, establish digital ID or, for that matter, radically reform the British state, it is nobody’s fault but our own—us, the British political class. I, for one, am sick of politicians throwing up their hands and blaming others for their own failures. I will always support a Government who take responsibility for using Parliament to deliver the radical change that this country needs, and that is why I support this Bill tonight.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
The United Kingdom employs deprivation of citizenship orders more frequently than almost any other country in the world. While it is right, of course, that the Government should have the means to protect national security, both the current legislative framework and the Bill before us lack adequate provisions for transparency in and systematic oversight of when, why and how the Secretary of State exercises the power to deprive individuals of their citizenship.
The Bill is designed to ensure that if the Government take away someone’s British citizenship, that person stays deprived of that citizenship while any appeals against the decision are ongoing. In practical terms, if the Government deprive someone of their citizenship and that person appeals, the deprivation order remains in effect through the entire appeal period, meaning that even if that person wins an initial appeal, they will not get their citizenship back until all possible appeals from the Government—up to the highest courts—are finished, or the time limit for the Government to appeal has passed.
The Home Secretary has described the Bill as a necessary step to close a legal loophole—a description that has caused some debate already this evening. However, even if it is a loophole, that does not mean that these provisions deserve any less scrutiny. The power to deprive an individual of their citizenship is an exceptionally significant one, which in any democratic society should be exercised only in the most limited and extreme circumstances, and should be subject to rigorous oversight by Parliament.
We need to see proper reform of the whole citizenship deprivation process, not a piecemeal approach like we are seeing today. That principle has underpinned Lib Dem policy on the deprivation of citizenship since 2019, when it was most recently updated. At that time, our party leader, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Ed Davey), set out clear and just principles that should govern its use: deprivation of citizenship should occur only in the most extreme circumstances, its use must never be political, and the legislation conferring this power must be used with transparency and should be the subject of continuous and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.
The concerns about transparency have been echoed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, a cross-House and cross-party body. Earlier this year, it informed the Government that their current approach to the deprivation of citizenship falls short of the UK’s human rights obligations. The Committee called for significantly greater oversight of powers, including periodic independent reviews of their use and regular reports to Parliament.
The current regulations on the deprivation of citizenship already place far too much power in the hands of the Secretary of State. The requirement that the Home Secretary be
“satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good”
is too low a bar for the deprivation of citizenship. The Liberal Democrats would therefore confine the power to deprive naturalised citizens of citizenship only where their citizenship has been obtained through fraud, false representation or concealment of material fact, or where they have done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom and deprivation of citizenship is a proportionate response to such conduct and necessary for the national security of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, we are firmly of the view that no individual should be rendered stateless by the Government’s actions except in cases in which British citizenship was acquired by misrepresentation or fraud.
The powers conferred by the Bill will transfer even greater authority to the Secretary of State. It is therefore essential that those powers be subjected to ongoing rigorous scrutiny. I would welcome further details from the Minister about the plans to ensure such oversight. For example, will the Government consider reforming the deprivation of citizenship process to require the Secretary of State to apply to a court for permission to make a deprivation order, thereby obliging the Secretary of State to demonstrate that all the proper requirements have been met? Will they commit to publishing annual reports detailing the use of deprivation of citizenship powers, and to facilitating a review of the exercise of these powers by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation at least once every three years? Finally, will the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to ratify the 1997 European convention on nationality, thereby introducing an additional layer of international scrutiny of the UK’s use of these powers, particularly where there is a risk of rendering an individual stateless?
The power to deprive individuals of their citizenship engages fundamental rights and must be exercised with appropriate safeguards, transparency and oversight. Deprivation of citizenship must be the strict exception, never the norm. The Bill risks further concentrating excessive power in the hands of the Executive with too few safeguards to prevent error or abuse. The Liberal Democrats will continue to press for reforms that ensure transparency, judicial oversight and proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
I agree that the most important role of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, but I do not believe that citizenship is a privilege; I believe that it is a right. I also do not believe that the Minister answered my questions adequately earlier. I want to understand why, if somebody is such a huge threat to this country, we cannot deal with them under other legislation. If we cannot, are there not other pieces of legislation that require our attention? I really worry, because it feels as if the Bill could turn due process on its head. We would not accept that in any other branch of justice.
I hope the Minister will understand that, following the Windrush scandal and the case of Shamima Begum, there is a sense of nervousness among many communities when any legislation that touches on citizenship is brought before this House. That is for good reason: they worry that it disproportionately goes against people of colour or people who are British-born or long-settled whose heritage or ancestral links are outside Europe. The idea that their citizenship can be revoked because they could be eligible for another nationality is problematic. That is a fear that many people hold.
I always worry about legislation that seems to circumvent the judiciary. I ask the Minister to consider these concerns and, please, to answer my questions. I understand that he was talking about a very specific case, but he needs to be able to apply it to the many different examples that Members have put before the House. As he has heard many times, the deprivation of citizenship is an extremely serious thing. We want to make sure that it happens only in the most extreme cases.
Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)
I want to reflect for a moment on the title of the Bill. It could easily have been called something a bit more prosaic, such as the Revocation of Citizenship Bill or the Withdrawal of Citizenship Bill, but the notion of deprivation is far more evocative. When we talk about deprivation, it is often in the sense of going without something that is fundamental to our existence, such as food, shelter, water or liberty—the very things that we rely on for life itself.
I believe that “deprivation” in this context is flawed terminology, as it seems to equate citizenship with an essential right. I apologise if I am damaging his future career by saying so, but I very much agree with the hon. Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons). Citizenship is not a right; it is a privilege. To those who receive that privilege, through our immigration system or otherwise, we must be clear that it comes with duties and responsibilities.
We welcome those who come to the United Kingdom lawfully, ready to participate in the freedoms that we offer and equally ready to take on the obligations that go hand in hand with them. But when an individual who has had the privilege of citizenship bestowed on them uses it to threaten our national security, that privilege should rightly be revoked until the Secretary of State has exhausted all avenues of appeal in regard to his or her decision. Citizenship of our country is to be prized, not abused—and not reduced to some sort of transactional process or tick-box citizenship test. The “Life in the UK” test is well worth a look, for those who have not seen the poverty of knowledge and scrutiny that it requires.
We should not be defending the importance of citizenship only at the point at which a person has it removed. Everyone, whether they are a citizen through birth or through our immigration system, should receive an education in how precious the covenant between country and individual is to promote understanding and appreciation of our value system and the fundamental principles that underpin it: tolerance and respect, the right to equality before the law, the duty of loyalty to the United Kingdom—or, as an absolute minimum, a deep and abiding respect and commitment to the conventions and values that make up the British way of life—and, of course, the right to freedom of enterprise and aspiration. It is important not only to create wealth and opportunity, but to look at how our talents can be harnessed by making a contribution within our families and communities, whether that is through performing care obligations for young children and moulding them as the citizens of the future, caring for elderly or dependent family members, or leading local charities or community or faith groups.
Those values, and the rights and duties through which they are lived out, form part of our social contract—the ties that bind us as communities, societies and nations. They have supported our past flourishing and, if re-embraced, will also secure our renewal. Those who reject these values and seek to undermine and destroy them should not be citizens of our country. Although I agree with the measure contained in the Bill, my challenge to the Government is to ensure that respect for our national values and the rights and duties that underpin them is also at the heart of their forthcoming reform of our immigration system.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
As I hope the Minister knows, I have devoted much of my adult life to keeping individuals, neighbourhoods, towns, cities and indeed the entire country safe, but I have to confess that I have never been entirely comfortable with the deprivation of citizenship regime. Unfortunately, his Bill, which he is trying to pass off as an innocuous correction, has sparked that sense of unease.
The reason I am uneasy is that, although the objectives that the Minister proposes are laudable, I believe that the cost to our sense of self and the corrosiveness to our sense of citizenship and to the judicial process are perhaps too high. I will not detain the House for too long, but I want to raise three points. We have covered them to a certain extent, but they are worth reiterating.
First, the Minister’s sense is that the Supreme Court has created a loophole; my view is that it has corrected an anomaly. It has long been a tenet of the protections with which the judicial process provides me as an individual that an appeal equals vindication and that it is for my accuser to appeal, on the basis that I remain innocent, even prior to the first action that is taken against me. This regime will reverse that.
The second alarming point is that the legislation is retrospective. As the hon. Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) asked, there may be a number of cases going through the courts for which this law will have a highly prejudicial impact. The Government are effectively moving the goalposts mid-litigation to get what they want. That, again, is not something we would normally tolerate, and it is a further development of the power.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I always enjoy our debates. He says that the Government are moving the goalposts, but does he accept that we are ensuring that we have the same powers to deprive that he had when he was a Home Office Minister?
Kit Malthouse
The Minister is quite right—not that I ever exercised those powers. But as I said, in my view the Supreme Court has corrected an anomaly that the previous Government took advantage of. Yes, absolutely, hands up, they did—I am not saying that is correct. He is proposing that in the face of a Supreme Court decision that he does not like, he will change the law to say that the court was in effect wrong and that the fundamental right on which the Supreme Court has decided—we should not forget that the courts basically decide our rights within the legal framework—is somehow not to be tolerated.
Sir Julian Lewis
I have some sympathy with my right hon. Friend’s argument, but surely the effect of this change will kick in only if, in the end, the Government’s appeal succeeds. Therefore, it will be the case that the court previously was wrong; otherwise, the Government’s appeal against its decision will not succeed.
Kit Malthouse
My right hon. Friend is exactly right. However, it does mean that the state can render someone stateless by inaction, because it can take many years for cases to work their way through the courts. It is also, as I said, highly prejudicial, because it means that for the duration of the legal action that person will not be able to come to the UK and therefore will have to litigate from outside our borders.
Sir Julian Lewis
I grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way again. As I said in my first intervention, I am new to this whole debate, but I thought I heard from the Minister that the idea was for this measure to stand only until the Government appeal was resolved or the Government ran out of time to appeal. How long would that period be? I do not see how that would put things off for the inordinate amount of time that my right hon. Friend suggests.
Kit Malthouse
As I am sure my right hon. Friend knows, there are various layers of appeal that can be taken, right up to the Supreme Court. The Bill says that, throughout that period, as long as the Government continue to pursue appeals, the person remains deprived of their citizenship, rather than what the Supreme Court is saying, which is that if the person wins any one of those appeals, they immediately become in effect innocent, and their citizenship is restored as if it was never removed in the first place. That is in the same way as if, were I accused of a crime and found innocent and the prosecutor decided to appeal my conviction, I would remain innocent until that appeal was heard and decided against me. If it were appealed beyond that, I would remain innocent then still.
The Government are attempting to revert to the erroneous situation as determined by the Supreme Court. In my view, they are moving the goalposts on an individual who frankly seems to have won a case fair and square in our highest court in the land.
Finally, I want to raise a more fundamental issue about this entire process. Call me an old romantic, but my view is that once you are a citizen, you are a citizen. Once you are in, you are in. Unfortunately, the development of this power over the last however many years since the 1981 Act, which brought it in, has created two classes of citizens in this country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross), who spoke for the Opposition—she is no longer in her place—said, “citizenship is a privilege, not an unconditional right.” That is not true. It is an unconditional right for me as a freeborn Englishman of two English parents going back I do not know how many years. I have no claim on citizenship anywhere else. It is my absolute, undeniable, unequivocal right to have citizenship in this country, and it cannot be removed from me by any means whatsoever. That is not true of my children. I am married to a Canadian citizen, so they have a claim on Canadian citizenship. If the Home Secretary so decides, they could have their citizenship removed. That is also true of every Jewish citizen of the United Kingdom, who has a right to citizenship in Israel. There will be millions of British people of south Asian origin who feel that they have a second-class citizenship.
This law applies only to certain of our citizens. It does not apply to me. I do not know whether it applies to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Perhaps it is making other hon. Members think about whether it applies to them.
While the Minister has been clear that we should trust him and has given us lots of undertakings, we do not make the law on the basis of a Minister we like, trust and respect; we make it on the basis that the law might fall into the hands of somebody we are not that keen on and who may be more cavalier with the powers bestowed upon them. As the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), who spoke for the Liberal Democrats, said, we are a country that uses this power disproportionately more than any other western country. We have been free in our use of it, despite the fact that Minister after Minister has stood in the House and said, “We use it sparingly.” We do not. Dozens and dozens of people have been excluded, and we have to be honest about why. Sometimes it has been for safety, but sometimes, on balance, it has been to please the papers—because it looks good and plays well. We never ask ourselves about the cost of that to our sense of cohesion.
The hon. Member for Makerfield gave a lyrical and poetic view of citizenship, but if a large proportion of our fellow citizens believe that they have a second class of that citizenship—if some can say, “I am undeniably and unchallengeably a citizen, but you are not, so watch yourself”—what does that do to society?
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
Does the right hon. Member believe just by looking at me and my hon. Friend the Member for Brent East (Dawn Butler) next to me that the legislation could apply to people who look like us?
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Lady makes the point powerfully. I do not know, but she does. This legislation leaves people from minority backgrounds, second or third-generation immigrants, and those like my children who are of two parents of different nationalities, with a lingering sense of doubt about how secure they are in this nation.
Josh Simons
The right hon. Member is portraying the United Kingdom as an exception to a global rule in which citizenship is a straightforward binary and a right. I am of Jewish ancestry and have a right to claim citizenship in Israel, though I have not. My wife is American and our children are dual citizens, so this very much pertains to me. I gently point out that the United States has a similar regime. If a naturalised citizen in America breaks certain laws and is demonstrated to be a national security threat to the United States, they too can have their naturalised citizenship revoked. It is not accurate to paint the United Kingdom as a complete exception to a rule in which citizenship, whether by birth or by naturalisation, is treated differently by the state, by the court and by the legislature.
Kit Malthouse
I understand the hon. Member’s point, but I am afraid that I am not interested in comparisons with the United States. I would hold us to a higher bar. We are a more ancient country that should have, as he rightly pointed out, a better developed sense of how we build a cohesive society.
I would challenge whether the United States can be held up as a paragon of virtue on societal cohesion or whether actually it is a divided country, with part of that division coming from a sense that there are first, second and maybe even third-class citizens there. At the moment, it is going through a period of challenge as to what it means to be a United States citizen. We have seen litigation under—it has slipped from my mind. It starts, “We the people”. [Hon. Members: “The constitution.”] That is the word—forgive me; a senior moment. The United States is seeing legal challenge under its constitution on precisely those grounds of what it means to be a citizen.
I do not want to detain the House for much longer, but we need to think carefully about the impact that this regime has beyond the people whom it targets. We may say of cases like Shamima Begum that what she did was completely appalling and she deserves to be punished. Obviously, the decision was taken to revoke her citizenship. I am not sure whether that was the right thing to do. I do think she needs to be punished. In many ways, I would rather she had been brought to this country, and punished and jailed here. She is nobody else’s problem but ours. As I say, by promoting this regime I think we undermine the value of what it means to be a British citizen because, once acquired, citizenship should be a right. Civis Romanus sum. It should mean something. It is not the keys to the executive lavatory, to be removed when you lose the privilege and rights of your position; it is something that you acquire that is fundamentally in you once you are in the club, and we should be wary of the wider impact if we decide to remove it.
I have one final suggestion for the Minister. I realise that I am in a minority, and the House is not going to comply; he is going to get his legislation. However, I ask him to think carefully about the value of the judiciary in this process. Would it be possible to amend the process such that, when an appeal is won by an individual and the Government wish to continue to deprive that person of citizenship, the permission of the judge should be sought for that, pending a further appeal? The Government will have to seek permission to appeal in all circumstances; I ask the Minister to consider whether they should have to seek also permission to maintain the condition of a deprivation of citizenship, as part of that permission to appeal.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
I thank the Minister for his work and approach, today and every day. It is a pleasure to work across from him, against our enemies and in defence of our great country and its people.
Sometimes, fulfilling our duty to keep our country safe means taking action that we might otherwise wish to avoid, but it is completely right that depriving people of their citizenship under certain circumstances is a tool available to the Home Secretary. Those who hate our country and what it stands for, and work against our interests, should not be able to hide behind a British passport. Membership of a nation does not just imply rights; it also confers responsibilities. When British citizens engage in terrorism, support for terrorism or serious organised crime, they clearly disregard those responsibilities. It is clearly true that we cannot deprive such people of citizenship in all cases, particularly given that a worrying number of extremists are now homegrown, but where we can, we should.
If we accept that the deprivation of citizenship is an important tool in keeping our country safe, we should also accept that this power should be exercised pragmatically, with the safety of the British people coming first. Allowing potentially dangerous individuals to retain their citizenship while appeals are ongoing is absurd. This is not a power exercised lightly by any Government, and the idea that dangerous people might escape accountability by exploiting procedure is frightening. The current system also opens up the worrying possibility of dual citizens renouncing their non-UK citizenship during the appeal process, making it subsequently impossible to remove their British citizenship without rendering them stateless, so, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross) said earlier, we support the Bill, which will ensure that deprivation of citizenship orders will continue to have effect until the entire appeal process is complete.
The hon. Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) rightly placed the Bill in its wider context, both historically and politically, and I agree with him on the desperate need to restore our broken border and make British citizenship extremely precious. He spoke of the citizenship ceremony. My grandmother swore allegiance to the King when she became a citizen, and talked of it often. I know that it was one of the proudest moments of her life. The hon. Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) said that she considers citizenship a right rather than a privilege. On that, I am afraid that she and I disagree. As my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) rightly said immediately afterwards, citizenship is to be prized, not abused.
My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) was right to point out that there is a balance to be struck. Deprivation has a cost to those who are deprived. I say that the cost in the scenarios in which the Home Secretary may exercise deprivation powers is more than worth paying to protect this country and her people. Similarly, and more specifically to the Bill, the cost of maintaining a deprivation until the conclusion of the process is also a price well worth paying. I say that as a British citizen who, unlike my right hon. Friend, is entitled to several other citizenships.
Finally, the Bill is not just a good example of decisive action taken in the interest of national security; it is also a good example of Parliament’s role in our political system. In this country, the main job of the judiciary is to interpret and apply Parliament’s will. Unlike in other countries, judges are not the highest safeguards of our constitution. In Britain, that task is given to, and must remain with, the British people themselves. When the judiciary makes a decision that runs contrary to the will of Parliament, either as it was or as it is today, Parliament is perfectly entitled to overturn that decision; in fact, it must do so if our political system is to work as it should. In, say, the United States, the Supreme Court’s job involves working out the intention of long-dead statesmen. That is not the case here in the United Kingdom, where Parliament is a living, breathing institution, embodying the sovereignty of the British people. It can clarify its will or issue new guidance.
That kind of institutional dialogue is healthy; indeed, it is the lifeblood of our politics. We therefore welcome not only the specific measures before us today but the approach taken by the Government on this matter. We have seen Ministers and Government Members behave as if the law is an entity unto itself—an authority above all others, entirely separate from the political process. That could not be further from the truth. We must never forget that the supreme authority in this country is Parliament, and that the job of Parliament is to legislate in the interests of the British people. When the legal process produces a result that is not in the interests of the British people, not only is this House well within its rights to overturn it; it must do so.
Dan Jarvis
It is a pleasure to follow the shadow Minister. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken.
As I mentioned right at the beginning, the Bill is extremely narrow in its scope and intent, focusing solely on closing a loophole in the existing deprivation of citizenship process. As I outlined, the Supreme Court decided in a recent case that if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, or a deprivation of citizenship order is withdrawn, that initial order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be British. That means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
The Bill will therefore protect the UK from people who pose a threat to our national security by preventing those who have been deprived of British citizenship and are overseas from returning until all appeals have been determined. It will also prevent a person who has been deprived of citizenship on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good from seeking to undermine deprivation action while an appeal in their case remains ongoing by renouncing their other nationality and putting themselves in a position whereby a deprivation order would render them stateless. The Bill does not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship. It is crucial that our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the necessary powers to protect the public and secure our borders.
Let me reflect briefly on the contributions made during the debate. I am very grateful to the Opposition Front Benchers for their support and their speeches. It is always my intention that national security should never be a party political issue. That was the basis on which I approached it in opposition, and that is the basis on which I approach it in government. I am very grateful for the constructive and reasonable way in which they have presented their points today.
I am also grateful to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), for her contribution. She took the opportunity, as is absolutely her right, to call for wider reform, and she raised specific concerns about the process and about transparency. The Government believe that the measures in the Bill are necessary and proportionate, but I listened carefully to the points that she made about transparency. The Government believe that there is sufficient oversight and transparency of the use of the deprivation power. The Home Office publishes data in relation to the number of deprivation of citizenship orders, and the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration has the remit to review the power. The ICIBI has conducted independent reviews of the deprivation power, with reports published relatively recently, in 2018 and in 2024.
I also want to take the opportunity to further reassure the hon. Lady that deprivation decisions are made following careful consideration of advice, both from officials and from lawyers and, under this Government—I am sure it was the case under previous Governments as well—strictly in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually by the Home Secretary, and decisions to deprive, where it is conducive to the public good, are taken by the Home Secretary, and the Home Secretary alone. The power is used sparingly, it complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness and it always comes with the right to appeal.
My hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) made a thoughtful speech, including about what citizenship means, and I know that the House will be grateful for the contribution that he made this evening.
My hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised a number of specific concerns, and I want to do my best to respond to them. The deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves a very high harm. Deprivation on fraud grounds is for those who obtained their citizenship fraudulently, so were never entitled to it in the first place. Decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and—in respect of conducive deprivations—lawyers, and in accordance with international law, including the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness. The Government take these matters very seriously, and I hope that my hon. Friend will understand that we have to ensure that we have the powers necessary to keep the public safe.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
I hope the Minister understands the assurances I have been asking for. This will be the third time I have asked. I genuinely want to understand why someone who is such a danger to our public cannot be dealt with under other pieces of legislation. At the moment it seems that we cannot even stop them coming into the country because of the existing legislation. He also keeps saying that the Bill does not widen the situation under which people can be deprived of their citizenship, but it does; it does so on the basis that someone can win an appeal and then be told that they are not going to be given their citizenship back because the Government have further rights of appeal. The Bill does widen that situation. We genuinely need those assurances and an understanding as to why such dangerous people cannot be dealt with under other pieces of legislation.
Dan Jarvis
I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s second point. This Bill has been very carefully and narrowly drafted, and I do not think it does the things that she has said it does. As to why the Government would seek to use these powers, I hope she understands that we will do everything we possibly can—as I am sure the previous Government did—to keep the public safe and protect them from high-harm individuals such as extremists, terrorists, and serious and organised criminals, and that this Government, as was the case with the previous Government, consider that this is an appropriate, necessary and proportionate way in which to do that. I hope that the public and the House will understand why we are progressing in the way that we are.
The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) made a very thoughtful speech. He has clearly thought about this matter long and hard, and he has done the House a great service with his contribution.
I want to reflect briefly on the contribution made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I enjoy debating these matters with him, and I am genuinely grateful for his contribution. He suggested at one point that he might be an old romantic. I couldn’t possibly comment—but I could possibly say that he has advanced some interesting points. They are not points that the Government agree with, and I hope he does not mind me saying that they are not points that the majority of Members of this House agree with, but he has ensured that this debate has been richer than it would otherwise have been had he not made those contributions.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that the Government are acting in good faith in order to ensure that we are best placed to keep the country safe. I know that he is not satisfied with the measures that we have brought forward and does not agree with them. That is absolutely his right. I respect his right to make the case in the way that he has, but I would ask him briefly to consider an alternative scenario in which the Government of the day, regardless of their political party, did not put in place the necessary powers to keep the public safe. One can only imagine the criticism that any Government would face, were they not to do that.
Kit Malthouse
I can imagine that situation, but I have been an enthusiastic supporter of lots of powers to protect the public from people from whom the Minister cannot remove citizenship. For example, terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs—previously control orders—were specifically designed to put restrictions on individuals who presented a danger to the country but from whom the Government could not remove citizenship. If those measures are good enough for those people, why are they not good enough for the people on whom the Minister is conferring second-class citizenship? He must see that this legislation applies only to certain of our citizens, and that they are not the only ones who present a danger to this country.
Dan Jarvis
Again, I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. I do not doubt that if he and I and others sat in a room and sought to design a system, we probably would not end up with the one that we have, but I hope he understands that, given the constraints on parliamentary time and the bandwidth of Government, we are seeking to go back to the position that we had a number of months ago—I know that he did not agree with it then—to ensure that we have the powers that we need so that we are best placed to respond in the circumstances that I have described.
I want briefly to come back to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), because I gave him an assurance that I would do so. I can say to him that a dual British-Irish national could be deprived of British citizenship and excluded by the Home Secretary. An Irish national who had been excluded from the UK would then require leave to enter. I hope that responds to his point.
This Bill, although short in length, will have an important impact on the safety of those in our nation. It will ensure that those who pose a threat to the safety and security of our country do not have their citizenship restored until all appeals have been determined. The safety and security of those in our country is the foundation on which everything else is built and, as I have remarked in this House before, for this Government nothing will matter more. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill: Programme
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and on Third Reading
(2) Proceedings in Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion two hours after their commencement.
(3) Any proceedings on Consideration and proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee of the whole House.
(4) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to proceedings on Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(5) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Martin McCluskey.)
Question agreed to.
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Monday 14th July 2025
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 14 July 2025 - (14 Jul 2025)
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I remind Members that in Committee, Members should not address the Chair as “Deputy Speaker”. Please use our names when addressing the Chair. “Chair” and “Madam Chair” are also acceptable.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 9, at end insert—
“(2BA) But a judge may determine that an order does not continue to have effect for a person “P” during the appeal period if, on granting leave to appeal at any stage, they are satisfied that—
(a) “P” faces a real and substantial threat of serious harm as a result of the order,
(b) continuation of the order would significantly prejudice their ability to mount an effective defence at a subsequent appeal, or
(c) the duration of the appeal process has been excessive because of an act or omission by a public authority.”
The Chairman
With this it will be convenient to consider:
Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.
New clause 1—Independent review—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review of the effects of the changes made to section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 by section 1.
(2) The review must be completed within two years of the passing of this Act.
(3) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review, the person must—
(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and
(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (3)(b) within one month of receiving the report.”
Kit Malthouse
I am pleased to be opening this debate, although, given the turnout in the Chamber, it seems to be a minority interest among Members of Parliament, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation affects some of our most basic freedoms and rights. Before I address amendment 1, I hope you will forgive me, Madam Chair, if I briefly indulge in a preamble. There are a couple of issues that I want to impress on the Minister in the hope that he will respond favourably and, if not accept my amendment, agree to consider the principles it raises in the other place. Given the number of senior lawyers there, this legislation will be examined by some pretty stringent legal eyes.
First, Madam Chair, I hope you will agree that we established on Second Reading that this Bill is highly discriminatory. One of the truisms we always utter in this House is that we all stand equal before the law, but I am afraid that where this legislation is concerned, that is just not true. The Minister would be unable to wield against me the powers he is seeking to bring in under this Bill; it would not be countenanced because I have no right to citizenship elsewhere. However, there are Members of this House against whom the Minister could wield that power. Although he could not wield it against me, he could wield it against two of my children, although not against the other one—I have three. He could wield it against the children of the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak); against the children of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt); and against the children of the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden). I am trying to illustrate to the Minister that this legislation is highly discriminatory, and unusually so. He is tampering with some of the basic tenets of British justice through this Bill—a principle has been established in the Supreme Court that he is attempting to reverse—and I want him to have in mind that he is trying to embed that discrimination in law. I hope and believe that that is not his primary motivation, but he must comprehend that before he takes this step.
Secondly, I say to the Minister, who has a distinguished record of service in the defence of this country and now serves as Security Minister, that much of the Bill is, let us face it, focused on those accused of committing terrorism here or overseas. Terrorists win in two ways: first, by the physical injury that they inflict and the fear of that physical injury that they are likely to inflict by exploding bombs, killing people and all the horrors we have seen in our lifetimes over the past 30 or 40 years, if not longer; and secondly, by a long, slow undermining of our way of life and by sowing division within our society. Their long game is to force us to twist ourselves in knots around the freedoms that make us different, which they despise, and slowly to erode our standard of living and the atmosphere in which we live, and we have seen that before in this country.
The Minister is old enough to remember the evolution of the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland, where hearings were held without juries. We dispensed with the basic freedom of the right to a jury trial in Northern Ireland for a while, largely because of accusations of violence towards juries. It was proven later that this was part of a known strategy by the IRA to make the Six Counties ungovernable, other than by military colonial means, so the IRA saw that move as a triumph. What terrorists want in the long term is a twisting of our natural freedoms. They want us to make compromises in our legislation that undermine our sense of belonging in our nation and create a division not just between the governed and the Government, but within society. This legislation, I am afraid, starts to do exactly that.
On Second Reading I pointed out, as I have possibly already done today—I hate to be repetitive—that this legislation and this power create two classes of citizenship in the UK. There are those who can have the order removed and those who never can have it removed. As use of the power has accelerated over the past two decades, and we are using it now more than we ever did, it creates a feeling of unease among those whose citizenship is conditional.
I will explain to the Minister why I tabled amendment 1. As I said on Second Reading, my view is that he is undermining some of the basic tenets of British justice with what he is attempting to do with this legislation. With this amendment, I am attempting to swing the pendulum back a little in the cause of fairness before the law. As he will know, individuals subject to this power have the right to appeal on a number of bases, and courts will decide whether to allow their appeal. Broadly, there are three areas on which they can appeal: the first is whether the decision was proportional; the second is whether it was procedurally fair; and the third is whether the Minister or the Home Secretary has made a mistake over whether the person has a right to citizenship elsewhere and so may in fact be rendered stateless. As he knows, that is not allowed under the legislation.
If I have had my citizenship deprived essentially at the stroke of a pen by the Home Secretary, and I win an appeal, it seems unfair, given that I have won that appeal on the basis of fact, that the Government can continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal by them. Ordinarily, I would have got rid of this legislation, but the Minister seems insistent, and he won on principle at Second Reading, and that is fine. I am therefore appealing to his sense of good old British fair play to say, “This individual has won their first appeal on the basis of fact. Unless we have some profound reason to dispute that fact, we will not appeal, in which case they get their citizenship back.” On the basis of the fundamental British value of “innocent until proven guilty”, that person should get their citizenship back, particularly if a judge decides that the three conditions outlined in my amendment are satisfied.
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Kit Malthouse
By all means. I know he is a busy man, and I do not mean to be critical.
Dan Jarvis
I have huge respect for the right hon. Gentleman, but I think he is being a little unfair. He would have been entirely welcome to discuss his amendment with me. Had he chosen to do so, I would have happily sat down with him to discuss the detail of it.
Kit Malthouse
The Minister is a fair man and a fair-minded man. He is quite right, and I am willing to countenance his appeal and give him the benefit of the doubt, and that is exactly what I am asking for the individuals subject to this legislation. He will know that we have certain inalienable constitutional rights as British citizens, which this legislation contravenes. The first is that we have a right to a fair hearing and that any action the Government take must be exercised fairly. That right has been established in the common law again and again, and most recently in 1994, in the case of ex parte Doody, when the court decided that Ministers must exercise their powers fairly.
The second inalienable right, which has been decided in the Supreme Court, is that we all have a right to access to the courts, and that cannot be unfairly restricted. As that has been decided by the Supreme Court, the Government cannot put up artificial barriers to our access, such as raising fees or making sure that we cannot physically get to the court. Indeed, as the Minister will know, I have an absolute right to defend myself in person at every stage of legal action, whether that is at first hearing or at subsequent appeal. All those powers or rights that I have as a citizen are affected by the legislation he is attempting to put through.
My amendment essentially says three things. If the Government failed to win an appeal, but wished to continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal, they must, when seeking leave to appeal from the judge, also ask the judge for leave to continue the deprivation of citizenship. The judge basically could say no in three circumstances. First, the judge could say no if there is a real and substantial threat of serious harm to that individual if they were denied access to the United Kingdom. Some of these people will be living or operating from extremely dangerous places. If that person is likely to be killed pending further appeal on the denial of their citizenship, it would seem grossly unfair, their having already won an appeal, to deny them access to the country.
The second ground would be if their exclusion from the UK and the continuing of denial of citizenship would be deeply prejudicial to the conduct of their defence in an appeal that the Government subsequently decided to bring. In such a case, it would be impossible for me to defend myself at appeal in person, which should be my inalienable right as a British citizen. It would be impossible for me to do that remotely in some God-forsaken part of the world where I cannot Zoom in or I do not have the ability to communicate. It would be the same if I am unable to communicate with my legal team. I am sure the Minister can see that it would be unfair to interfere with someone’s ability to mount a proper defence—we should not forget that that person has already won an appeal—through the continuing denial of citizenship.
The third ground, which we covered on Second Reading, is the Government’s taking their time, achieving their objective merely by dragging their heels and playing for time, hoping that something, perhaps something untoward, will turn up. A judge should then make a judgment—the clue is in the name—on whether they are being efficient in their use of the legal system, rather than, as I am afraid happens from time to time, gaming it to their own advantage.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
As my right hon. Friend knows, I have a huge amount of respect and affection for him, and he is right to refer to the inalienable rights that a British citizen has in terms of access to justice and so forth, but surely he must accept that individuals facing deprivation of citizenship will have crossed a threshold of behaviour, or allegiance, so alien to our traditions, so alien to all the rights and responsibilities accrued over the decades of British citizenship, that in essence, in the court of public opinion, they will put themselves way beyond the pale when it comes to those issues. It would be an extreme hypocrisy for those who most seek to undermine our way of life to demand all the rights and privileges that they have sought to undermine, and possibly destroy, through their actions or foreign allegiances.
Kit Malthouse
I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I would have more faith, or confidence, in his view if it applied to me as well, which it does not. What we are saying is that we can have two British citizens who commit the same heinous acts but receive two different kinds of treatment. One can have his or her citizenship removed and be expelled from the country, but another—say I were to do that—cannot. My view is that this is highly discriminatory, and tramples over some of the inalienable rights that my hon. Friend has mentioned. We currently have plenty of British citizens in high-security prisons who have committed acts as heinous as those committed by people whom we have deprived of British citizenship, but we have decided to deprive them of British citizenship purely because of their heritage and background—purely because they may be second-generation immigrants.
As I pointed out on Second Reading, this legislation applies to every single Jewish member of the United Kingdom citizenry. They all have an inalienable right to Israeli citizenship, and as a result, in my view, they all have second-class citizenship. I do not think that that is right. I do not think that it is fair. I think that it drives a wedge into our society, and sows a seed of doubt at the back of everyone’s mind.
This is the point that I was trying to make at the start. Those who perpetrate such heinous acts overseas absolutely should be punished. As my hon. Friend will know, over the past 10 years I have been at the forefront of trying to ensure that as many criminals as possible end up behind bars, whatever the criminality might be, but the fact is that there is a principle in British law—we are all supposed to be equal—and the Bill breaches that principle very significantly. Moreover, what the Government are attempting to do not only reinforces that breach, but aims to twist and skew fundamental tenets of British justice that have been our right for centuries.
Simon Hoare
Surely the fact that a remedy is not available to all does not mean that it is not a remedy. If we wish to argue for the two-tier approach, we can think of instances in which mental capacity has come into play, particularly in respect of capital offences, when those existed here. In abstract theory, that was a two-tier approach to justice, determined on the grounds of mental capacity or lack thereof. Surely remedies do not have be applicable universally to be applied fairly and within the law.
Kit Malthouse
I am not sure that I accept the hon. Gentleman’s logic. The test of mental capacity in the judicial system applies to everyone equally. If I were being prosecuted for an offence, I would be assessed for mental capacity, just as my hon. Friend would. The court would accept that there might be mitigations for his actions, or a requirement for a different disposal if he lacks mental capacity, but that is an external influence on him. It may come about owing to mental illness or some other kind of disability—who knows?
The point is that this comes about through no reason other than birth. My citizenship, or my lack of citizenship, is conferred on me by reason of my birth—my parentage, or my heritage. I cannot do anything about it. I cannot be treated for it, as I can be for mental illness. This is purely because my parents may have come from another country, my skin may be of a different colour, or the country of the origin of my DNA may offer particular rights of citizenship. It is something arbitrary, about which I can do nothing. We might as well have a piece of legislation that says that people with red hair receive different treatment under the law, because there is nothing they can do about that.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this whole notion of heritage is not even an exact science? My first black ancestor to be born in this country was born in 1806, in Twyford; I have no idea where that is, but I know it is not that far from here. He was the son of a formerly enslaved person and a white domestic servant living in the house of his former master. I do not know what that particular ancestry is, but it goes quite far back. Just because someone called Thomas Birch-Freeman, who was living in the UK and would be deemed British by this legislation, travelled to Ghana as a missionary and settled there, and that is where my lineage comes from, I am now treated differently under the law, despite, perhaps, having heritage that may be similar to that of the right hon. Gentleman.
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Lady has made a very good point. My problem with this legislation is that it places a question mark over certain citizens. I am not suggesting that the legislation is on everyone’s lips every day, but when it is used with increasing frequency, it does place a question mark over people’s status as citizens of the United Kingdom, and that, I think, should be a matter of concern.
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman is making his points in a very considered way, but he is levelling quite serious charges against the Government. May I say to him, in absolute good faith, that our intentions here have nothing to do with someone’s place of birth and everything to do with their behaviour?
Kit Malthouse
I understand what the Minister is saying, and, as I said to him on Second Reading, I am not concerned about this power falling into his hands, but we do not know who will be in his position in the future, and we are never quite sure how the power might develop. As I have said, over the years we have seen an acceleration and an increase in what is a very draconian power that we should be taking extremely seriously. To deprive people of their citizenship is a profoundly serious thing to do, which may well—indeed, will—affect them for the rest of their lives. No doubt it will be done in the face of extremely serious offences on the Minister’s watch, but I am not sure that that will necessarily always be the case.
Given that under the power that is being created people can be expelled on the basis that their presence is not conducive to the public good, we could see its being used in combination with other powers that have been expanded recently. Just last week, in controversial terms, the Minister proscribed a particular organisation operating in this country. I am sure he will be able to explain, but in my experience—I think he referred to this at the time—proscription has been reserved for terrorist organisations. As the Minister has indicated, this power is reserved for those who are terrorists. Could it be used against individuals who are convicted of crimes under that proscription? That is the danger that I am trying to illustrate to him, and this is an area of law where I urge him to tread carefully and to think about the compromises that he is creating against our basic freedoms that we need to maintain, at the same time—I do not dispute his motivation—as protecting the United Kingdom in the best way he possibly can. I am just worried that he is taking a step too far.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
I rise to speak in favour of amendment 1, in the name of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who is definitely on the other side of the House but who I am very much allied with in seeing the clear flaws in this Bill. Like him, I remain uncomfortable about the Bill as a whole, which I am sure will come as no surprise to the Minister.
I was quite clear on Second Reading about my concerns, which unfortunately the Minister failed to adequately respond to. Under the Bill, someone who successfully appeals against an order taking their British citizenship away will not get it back until it is no longer possible for the Government to challenge that appeal. At present, the length of time is indefinite, making this a measure that is effectively designed to circumvent the judiciary, and I want to fully understand why.
On Second Reading, I repeatedly asked the Minister to specify what act a person must commit to fall into the particularly unique situation in which the Government would want to revoke their citizenship, and why there is no existing legislation that can be used to take criminal proceedings against, or imprison, them as someone who is extremely dangerous. I would really like him to give a clear example—beyond the one case that has sparked this knee-jerk response—of where this legislation would be required. He has to recognise that, once law, it can be used in more than one way and in more than one case, as the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire has clearly laid out. Surely the Minister can understand the apprehension that many people will have if this legislation is being brought forward to address only one specific example, yet potentially has implications for dual nationals and for those with eligibility for citizenship elsewhere.
I mentioned on Second Reading that certain communities are often wary of legislation that touches on citizenship, because it almost always—whether it is the stated intention or not—disproportionately impacts them. To be clear, I am talking about people from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, and those with parents or grandparents who may have been born elsewhere; they will be particularly alarmed by this legislation. Those of us who are entitled to citizenship of other countries for no other reason than where our parents or grandparents may have been born, or simply because of our ethnic origin, know that we are at a higher risk of having our British citizenship revoked. When such legislation is passed, it creates two tiers of citizenship. It creates second-class citizens, and we have known that since the Shamima Begum case.
As far as I am concerned, this Bill goes beyond keeping people safe and beyond a technical adjustment. It sends a message that certain people and certain communities are forever second-class citizens, and that no matter how long someone has contributed to this country, their citizenship is conditional, revocable and disposable. It seems that we have learned nothing at all from the Windrush scandal, because we continue to go through this cycle of creating pieces of legislation that may impact certain communities, noticing that they may impact those communities and passing them anyway.
As far as I am concerned, the power to remove someone’s citizenship has its roots in colonial logic, whereby belonging is granted or revoked at the whim of empire, but there is no more empire. That logic has no place in a modern democratic society. Citizenship should never be a privilege to be granted or withdrawn based on the political agenda of the day. Citizenship is and should be a right, and it is the foundation of equality before the law; and even though this may not be the intention, the Bill undermines that right for some people while safeguarding it for others.
I am against this Bill not just because of what it does, but because of what it says. Why has the Minister not seen it fit to conduct an equality impact assessment? I know the Bill has an incredibly narrow scope, but its potential implications are vast and the potential impact is limited to specific communities. Steps should have been taken to understand the impact that this legislation might have.
I hope the Government will consider amendment 1. We know that these cases are lengthy and can last several years; I point again to the Shamima Begum case as an example. Leaving somebody essentially stateless as the Government exhaust the appeals process risks their freedom and safety. Although the Government may wish to wash their hands of the individual whom they are seeking to deprive of citizenship—as evidenced by the very nature of appeal—that person and their safety is and absolutely ought to be, by law, the responsibility of their Government. If rendering them stateless throughout their appeal, regardless of whether it lasts a few months or a few years, risks harm to the individual, then it is only right that a judge can rule that the order does not continue to take effect until the appeals process is exhausted.
Ultimately, I believe that this legislation is reactionary and has been born out of frustration at the failures of the existing legislation. If someone is deemed to pose a severe threat to public safety and the existing legislation does not allow the Government to deal with the matter appropriately, we must amend the existing legislation.
As I said before, I am against this Bill not just because of what it does, but because of what it says about who we are and whose rights matter, and about whether justice in this country is truly blind or whether it sees skin colour and migration history before it sees the individual and the citizen. I genuinely do not believe that this knee-jerk approach is the answer. Creating second-class citizens is not the answer. There surely has to be another way.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 1, in my name. As I said on Second Reading, the Liberal Democrats believe there is a need for proper reform of the entire citizenship deprivation process. A transparent and accountable system for citizenship deprivation would ensure that this extraordinary power was used only in the most extreme circumstances, was never deployed for political reasons, and was consistently subjected to thorough parliamentary scrutiny. Sadly, the Bill before us falls short of that standard.
As I also said on Second Reading, the Home Secretary’s description of this Bill as merely closing a legal loophole does not mean that its provisions should escape robust scrutiny and review—quite the opposite; any expansion of powers to deprive individuals of citizenship demands the highest level of oversight. Earlier this year, even before this Bill was introduced, the cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the Government’s current approach to citizenship deprivation falls short of the UK’s human rights obligations. It called for significantly greater safeguards, including stronger oversight and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of these powers. The Liberal Democrats fully echo that call.
New clause 1 seeks to embed essential safeguards within the framework of these new powers in the same way. Specifically, the new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the effects of the changes made to section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 by clause 1 of this legislation. The review must begin within one year and be completed within two years of the passing of the Act. A report of the review must be produced and sent to the Secretary of State, who must then lay it before Parliament within one month.
New clause 1 recognises that although the Bill may appear narrow in scope, its consequences are substantial. The power to deprive someone of their citizenship is one of the most significant powers the state can wield, engaging fundamental rights and liberties. It is particularly serious given that under the current legislation, deprivation can—in some circumstances—leave an individual stateless. This is especially important in the UK, which uses citizenship deprivation orders more frequently than almost any other country. The Home Secretary already needs only to be
“satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good”
in order to strip someone of their citizenship—a threshold that is far too low. New clause 1 would simply ensure that any further power granted to the Secretary of State is at least balanced by proper oversight and transparency in its application.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
To be honest, I think many of us have sympathy for the hon. Lady’s new clause, but I am concerned about the security of this country, for which the Minister and the Government have responsibility. If someone contravenes that in any way or leads to any insecurity for the rest of the citizens, should they forfeit their right to citizenship?
Lisa Smart
The hon. Gentleman is right that one of the most serious jobs of any Government is to keep their citizens safe—I completely agree. There is, though, a need for robust scrutiny. The Government must have confidence that the legislation they are putting forward has the support of this House and of the country, including that that legislation does what they say they want it to do and does not accidentally do something else. I think the most confident legislators are those who are open, transparent and welcoming of scrutiny, so I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
The Liberal Democrats support amendment 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), which would empower the courts to prevent the Secretary of State from issuing a deprivation order in cases where doing so would place an individual at risk of harm or undermine their ability to mount an effective defence, or in cases where a public authority has caused unreasonable delays in the appeals process. This is a measured and sensible proposal that places essential limits on the excessive powers currently wielded by the Secretary of State in matters of citizenship deprivation, and we will support the amendment if the right hon. Gentleman pushes it to a vote.
Kit Malthouse
To refer back to the intervention by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), would the hon. Lady be interested to comment on this point? My understanding is that, under the terms of the Good Friday agreement, every UK citizen resident in Northern Ireland has a right to claim Irish citizenship. This Bill in effect means that every UK citizen resident in Northern Ireland can be deprived of their citizenship—have it removed by the Home Secretary—if that is conducive to the public good. That is another example of a whole group of people who would have a second class of citizenship.
Lisa Smart
I have listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s comments this evening and on Second Reading, and I have a great deal of respect for him and the way he lays out his arguments. I am very much looking forward to the Minister’s comments from the Dispatch Box shortly.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
Further to the intervention by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), is the hon. Member aware not only that Commonwealth countries allow people to claim citizenship from the birth of their parents or grandparents, but that some countries—notably Ghana and Kenya—specifically allow people to claim citizenship purely by being of African heritage, because they may not be able to trace their lineage due to enslavement?
Lisa Smart
I am very grateful to the hon. Member for those comments. We Liberal Democrats believe that the whole deprivation of citizenship regime needs fundamentally looking at and reviewing, and we would welcome any co-operation across the House with hon. and right hon. Members who want to work with us on that.
The Liberal Democrats are clear that deprivation of citizenship must remain an absolute exception, and never be a routine tool of Government policy. New clause 1 would provide the necessary guardrails to help ensure this remains the case, even as further powers are placed in the Secretary of State’s hands. Ultimately, the integrity of British citizenship and our commitment to fundamental rights must never be compromised by practicality. New clause 1 would uphold those principles and ensure that such a grave power was exercised only with full accountability and the closest scrutiny of this Parliament.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
I thank all Members for their contributions, Members who tabled amendments, and the Minister for his work and approach.
As has been set out, the Bill represents an important step towards tightening the existing rules on the deprivation of citizenship, as we discussed on Second Reading. This is a crucial tool that Home Secretaries must be able to exercise as part of their broader efforts to keep our country safe. Membership of a nation does not just imply rights; it also confers responsibilities. When British citizens engage in terrorism, support for terrorism or serious organised crime, they clearly disregard those responsibilities. We cannot deprive such people of citizenship in all cases, but where we can, we should.
Put simply, the intent of this Bill is to make sure that the Home Secretary’s use of deprivation powers is effective. More broadly, it also intends to make it clear that, when considering the use of the deprivation powers, politically accountable Ministers must ultimately be responsible for the final decision. The amendments must be viewed in that light.
Dan Jarvis
I have listened very carefully to this debate, and I thank all hon. and right hon. Members for the points they have made. As I have said in this Chamber many times, there is simply no greater priority than the safety of all those in the UK, and this Bill will help ensure the integrity of a vital tool in our ongoing efforts to protect the UK. As ever, I will endeavour to respond to the themes that have been raised.
I start with the Bill’s sole substantive clause. Clause 1 inserts into the British Nationality Act 1981 proposed new section 40A, which will prevent those who have been deprived of British citizenship from automatically regaining citizenship if their appeal is successful. This will be in effect until onward appeals have been determined, and that extends up to the Supreme Court. It replicates the approach taken on asylum and human rights appeals. If all appeals have been determined and the Government prove unsuccessful, British citizenship would be reinstated with immediate and retrospective effect.
This clause and the Bill in its entirety do not change any existing right of appeal or widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship. I also reassure the Committee that the Government have to demonstrate a genuine case for an appeal in order for courts to allow the appeal to proceed. The courts carefully assess whether any appellant has a reasonable prospect of success, or there exists some other compelling public interest, before granting permission. Rules of court exist to prevent superfluous or unfounded appeals being pursued.
Clause 2 is necessary to make the Bill operational. The provisions are retrospective and will come into effect on Royal Assent. This is necessary to mitigate effectively the risk of cases currently in the system. The Bill extends and applies to all of the UK, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, and I am sure that hon. Members will be glad to know that we have engaged closely with colleagues in the devolved Governments, Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
The Minister has made very clear exactly where the Bill will apply, but will he be clear about exactly who it will apply to? We have asked this question in different ways when talking about who we think will be disadvantaged, but can he be clear that those of British nationality who have no other claim to a nationality cannot be subject to such an order?
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is right about that specific point, but I will return to the points she has raised once I have responded to amendment 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I am genuinely grateful to him—he is looking a bit cynical as to the extent of my gratitude—for providing an opportunity to address the important issues, and they are important, he raised and for the considered, measured and thoughtful way in which he approached this debate and the Second Reading debate a couple of weeks ago.
The right hon. Gentleman made the case for his amendment in his own typically considered way. I listened very carefully to it, as I am sure did other hon. Members. He made the claim that the Bill will create a two-tier citizenship, and my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) reinforced that point. He claimed, I think somewhat unfairly, that the Government, through these measures, are seeking to undermine fairness. I say to him and to other hon. Members that we are not trying to do that. What we are trying to do, very simply, is ensure that the Government have the powers and the tools they need to keep the country safe. I know that he would acknowledge—I have made this point to him quite recently—that these are powers that existed under all 14 years of the previous Government. We are seeking to ensure that we have the same powers to be able to do what we need to do to keep the country safe.
I say to the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend that deprivation on conducive grounds is used very sparingly and against those who would pose a serious threat to the UK. It is essential that our legal framework protects our national security—I hope he would agree with that—but he made an interesting point about some of the fine balances and judgments that have to be made. I hope he would accept that, ultimately, deprivation of citizenship and matters relating to national security are matters for the Home Secretary.
The Supreme Court has been clear that the right to a fair hearing does not trump all other considerations, such as the safety of the public. I understand and respect the motivation behind the right hon. Member’s amendment, but it does not take into account the impact of the Court’s decision on national security. These are judgments and decisions that have to be taken by the Home Secretary. The fact that a court may have allowed an appeal against a deprivation decision does not mean that the person does not pose a threat to the UK, for example where the appeal is upheld on procedural issues. Furthermore, it is not controversial to delay the outcome of a lower court on a civil order while any further appeal is determined. It has nothing to do with being found guilty. As I mentioned earlier, the approach in the Bill is in line with the approach taken on asylum and human rights appeals.
Turning to the specific conditions set out in amendment 1, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations. It is also assessed whether deprivation would expose a person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights, were those articles to apply. Additionally, an appeal can already be paused until a person is in a position to effectively take part. The timings for appeals are agreed by both parties and the courts can order case management reviews to resolve disagreements between the parties. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask the right hon. Gentleman that the amendment be withdrawn.
Kit Malthouse
I am very grateful to the Minister. I have just a couple of points to make, if I may. He is quite right that timetables are agreed and there can be case management reviews, but there is nothing the court can do to restore someone’s citizenship even if the Government do drag their heels. If he could explain to us, perhaps in a little more detail, what recourse I would have were I somebody who had won an appeal, was awaiting a further appeal by the Government against me and mounting a defence but the Government were dragging their heels and basically ignoring the case management reviews. I do not think it is the case that the judge would just dismiss the appeal out of hand. The Government could effectively take their time.
I have a second question, if I may. Can the Minister tell the House whether, in his view, given that it is a subjective judgment by the Home Secretary, membership of a proscribed organisation would be prima facie grounds for the deprivation of citizenship?
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman undoubtedly makes some important points, but he makes them from a stance and a point of view that is slightly different from the position of those of us who have to serve in government. He spoke about the Government seeking to drag their heels. This Government and, I am entirely prepared to accept, the previous Government are not seeking to drag our heels; we are seeking to keep the country safe. That is what this is about. It is about ensuring that we have a legal framework that provides the tools we need to make difficult decisions, yes, but also to keep the country safe. He will forgive me if I do not seek to move into a slightly separate debate about proscription, not least because I think I would be in trouble with you, Ms Ghani, but I also want to come back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill.
My hon. Friend made the point that deprivation raises concern among certain communities. I am grateful to her for making that point and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond directly to it. Let me say to her and to other hon. Members that the power to deprive a person of British citizenship does not target ethnic minorities or people of particular faiths. It is used sparingly where a naturalised person has acquired citizenship fraudulently or where it is conducive to the public good. Deprivation on conducive grounds is used against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct involves high harm. It is solely a person’s behaviour that determines if they should be deprived of British citizenship, not their ethnicity or faith. Finally, my hon. Friend asked about an equalities impact assessment. I can say to her that the impact on equalities has been assessed at all stages of the legislation.
Turning now to new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), I appreciate the intention behind the amendment, specifically to ensure accountability in the use of deprivation powers. I recall that she is very consistent in raising her concerns about that. However, I must respectfully submit that the hon. Member’s amendment is not necessary, for two reasons. First, the role of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration already provides a well-established framework for independent oversight. She may recall that I mentioned that to her previously. The role was created under the UK Borders Act 2007, which sets out its statutory function. That includes the exercise of deprivation powers by the Home Secretary and by any person acting on their behalf. The independent chief inspector has the authority to conduct inspections, publish reports and make recommendations, ensuring that the powers are subject to rigorous external scrutiny.
Secondly, the Secretary of State already publishes annual statistics on the deprivation of citizenship. Those figures are publicly available and provide transparency on how often the powers are used and the grounds for deprivation. That data enables Parliament and the public to monitor trends and assess the proportionality and fairness of the system. Taken together, the statutory oversight by the independent chief inspector and the routine publication of deprivation statistics already provide a comprehensive framework for accountability. The amendment, therefore, duplicates existing oversight and reporting mechanisms. It would introduce unnecessary bureaucracy without adding meaningful value.
I would again like to thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions. I hope for their continued support in ensuring that these important changes can be made.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Mr Malthouse, do you wish to withdraw the amendment?
Kit Malthouse
In the hope that the Minister will do the right thing, yes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 1 and 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Bill reported, without amendment.
Third Reading
Dan Jarvis
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Third time.
I thank all Members across the House who have contributed to the debates on this Bill for their incisive and helpful contributions and their considered scrutiny. I know that hon. Members understand the importance and necessity of the Bill. Unfortunately, there are those who seek to do harm to our country and those within it. The deprivation of citizenship is an important tool to help us to maintain the safety and security of our country, and the Bill will ensure that it retains its effectiveness.
I thank the hon. Members for Weald of Kent (Katie Lam), for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross) and for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) for their work on the Opposition Front Benches and for the collegiate way in which they have worked with the Government on the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Selby (Keir Mather), who has done such an excellent job in whipping the Bill through this place.
I also take this opportunity to pass on my thanks to the officials who work very hard in the Home Office and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for their work in developing this legislation and supporting its passage through Parliament. I would particularly like to thank those who serve in our police, law enforcement and intelligence services, who work around the clock to keep us safe. Finally, I thank the fantastic House staff for their work in supporting the logistics of the Bill, in particular the Doorkeepers and the parliamentary Clerks’ team.
To conclude, this small but vital Bill has passed through the House swiftly and with cross-party support. As it moves to the other place, I trust that colleagues there will agree with us on the Bill’s importance and necessity and will work to ensure it continues its passage as smoothly as possible. I commend the Bill to the House.
Bell Ribeiro-Addy
I rise simply to ask the Minister if he might publish the assessment. He has said continuously that the Bill is fair, but I want to impress upon him that it cannot possibly be fair that should such orders be brought about, they would impact me and not him. I do not think that is fair at all.
I would also like the Minister to address his statement that the Bill is not discriminatory. He must understand that some communities may have these provisions applied against them more than others, even though they may be used sparingly, and that fact makes it discriminatory. He has to accept that.
I would also be grateful if the Minister thought specifically about the fact that no matter how sparingly the legislation is applied, it is being used more than in the past, and that is giving people much cause for concern. As the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) pointed out, the Minister and the Secretary of State may not always be in this place, and there may be others who wish to use the legislation in a way that is not intended. I would be very grateful if the Minister could address those points and see exactly where our concerns remain.
Katie Lam
I start by thanking the Minister for his work on the Bill. It is always a pleasure to work across from him in defence of our great country and its people.
Keeping our country safe sometimes requires taking difficult decisions, including the decision to deprive a person of their British citizenship. Working flagrantly against our country’s interests as, say, a terrorist does clearly demonstrates a disregard for the responsibilities of citizenship. Such people should not be able to hide behind a passport, and it is therefore right that the Home Secretary retains the power to deprive them of citizenship where it is possible to do so. It is also right that this power remains effective. We believe that the Bill is an important step towards ensuring that efficacy and clarifying Parliament’s intention on how those powers can be used.
Given that we are in agreement on the substance of the Bill itself, I would like to briefly make a broader point about what the legislation represents in terms of our constitution and Parliament’s role within it. As I mentioned on Second Reading, the main role of the judiciary in our system is to interpret and apply Parliament’s will; it is not the highest arbiter of our constitution. In most cases, with the exception of some prerogative powers, its only role in reviewing ministerial powers is to ensure that they are exercised according to the guidelines set out by Parliament. When the judiciary makes a decision that runs contrary to the will of Parliament, Parliament is therefore perfectly entitled to overturn that decision and to clarify its will. This is a living and breathing institution, which should be at the centre of our political system, because Parliament is ultimately answerable to the British people themselves.
The Bill before us represents one such clarification. At a time when it can seem that many on the Government Benches are happy to defer to the judiciary as a matter of course, it is heartening to see the Minister take a different approach—one that recognises the fact that Parliament is the cornerstone of our system—and I thank him for that. We must never forget that the supreme authority in this country is Parliament. When the legal process produces a result that is not in the interests of the British people, not only is this House well within its rights to overturn it, but it must do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Tuesday 15th July 2025
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 14 July 2025 - (14 Jul 2025)
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Tuesday 14th October 2025
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 14 July 2025 - (14 Jul 2025)
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
There is no more important task for any Government than to keep their citizens safe, and this Bill will form an important part of the Government’s ability to do just that. I remind noble Lords that the Bill is very narrow in its scope and intent: it contains just one substantive clause, which is focused solely on closing a specific loophole in the existing deprivation of citizenship process.
Noble Lords may recall its substantive provision, in Clause 1, which addresses a recent Supreme Court ruling: N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The effect of this ruling is that, if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, or if a deprivation of citizenship order is withdrawn, that initial order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be British. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before any further avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
The effect of this judgment creates two risks. The first is that someone who poses a significant threat to public safety could return to the UK before all onward appeals are determined. I am sure that is a situation that noble Lords would not wish to see. Secondly, it could allow a person who has been deprived of citizenship, on the ground that it is conducive to the public good, to undermine further deprivation action by renouncing their other nationality before all onward appeals are determined. This is because reinstatement of a deprivation order would then render them stateless. This Bill simply intends to maintain the status quo by closing these loopholes, which may arise in a very small number of deprivation appeals.
It is important to say at the outset that the scope of this Bill does not touch on any wider areas of the deprivation process. It is important to say that because this Bill does not amend the existing deprivation power, it does not extend its potential application to additional individuals, and it does not in any way widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship. It also does not change any existing right of appeal, and it does not place any new restrictions on individuals who are subject to a deprivation order.
It is self-evident that deprivation of citizenship is a significant power, and I know that many noble Lords have strong feelings on its use. However, Parliament has enacted the power and entrusted the Home Secretary with using it, including to protect the UK from those who mean us harm. The existence of this power is not, however, the matter before us today. Rather, in this Bill, it is the specific provision that relates only to the potential period between a successful appeal and a final determination on the case.
To explain why it is so important that this power remains effective, which is what the Bill seeks to achieve, I shall set out briefly the circumstances in which the power is used and therefore the types of threat that the Bill will help protect society from. Deprivation is an important part of the suite of tools available to the Government to maintain public safety and preserve national security. The use of deprivation where it is conducive to the public good is a decision to be taken personally by the Home Secretary. It is used against some of the most dangerous individuals who pose a threat to the United Kingdom, including terrorists, extremists and serious and organised criminals. Someone who has been deprived of their citizenship and is in the UK no longer has any immigration status. Steps may be taken to remove them from the UK; they may be held in immigration detention in the interim; if they are overseas when a deprivation decision is made, they would not be permitted to enter the UK. In these circumstances, this is clearly an effective way to disrupt the threat posed by dangerous individuals.
I know that noble Lords will be interested in the volumes of this power: it is a power used sparingly. From 2008 to 2023, the entire period of the last Government’s use of the power, 12 people a year on average were deprived of their citizenship when it was determined to be for the public good.
There will undoubtedly be interest in this debate in the safeguards within the system. As I have set out, the existing safeguards will not be affected by the Bill. Deprivation decisions are carefully considered and made in accordance with international law, following advice from officials and lawyers. Each deprivation case is assessed individually. Along with many other things we have been discussing this week, this regime complies with the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and always comes with a right of appeal.
On the specific provision in the Bill before the House today, I reassure noble Lords that there is indeed grit in the system to ensure that the Bill, once enacted, is not used for any spurious purpose. Rules of court set defined timescales within which any application by the Home Secretary to appeal must be made. In addition, the decision to grant permission for such an appeal lies solely with the courts and is contingent on the presence of a properly arguable point of law. This means that the Government cannot rely on the provisions of the Bill to maintain deprivation of a person’s citizenship following a successful appeal without proper legal grounds or justification.
Finally, noble Lords will be aware that the deprivation power can also be used where someone has obtained citizenship for which they were never entitled on a fraudulent basis—for example, by providing false documents. Indeed, the majority of the deprivation orders fall under this category, as from 2018 to 2022, there was an average of 151 cases in that category per year. However, I want to be clear up front that the Bill will not apply in such cases. This is because where citizenship has been obtained fraudulently, a deprivation order is made only once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. Such cases will therefore not be impacted by the narrow scope of the Bill.
As I hope I have stated and illustrated to noble Lords, the Bill is extremely narrow—in fact, in my nearly 30 years in both Houses of Parliament, it is probably the smallest Bill I have had the pleasure to introduce—but it seeks to ensure, in its smallness, that the deprivation power remains effective by retaining the status quo.
It is important, in finishing, to place on record a tribute by the Home Office team and me to our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They work tirelessly to keep us safe, and we owe them tremendous gratitude for that. This Bill is another tool in our toolbox to ensure that we can preserve our national security. I hope that noble Lords will examine it in detail. It is a small Bill; I hope they will support it, and I look forward to discussing it with Members of this House today, in Committee and on Report at a later date. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, as always, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister in opening the Second Reading of this short but highly important Bill. There is a lot that we disagree on in this House—indeed, in politics in general, it would be fair to say that the Minister and I have differing views on a number of issues—but we all have the same end goal: we want to see this country thrive and, to do that, it must be as safe and secure as possible. To that end, I fully support the Bill.
The Minister has given a detailed account of the events that led the Government to seek this change to Section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981. As he said, it arises out of a Supreme Court case earlier this year. In that ruling, the court held that were an appeal against a deprivation order successful, the order is considered to have had no effect. That means that while the Home Secretary’s further appeals are pending, the person would be able to enjoy their full rights of citizenship. The point here is that the power to deprive is used as a last resort. There was some talk in the other place that this power has not been used sparingly. That is not the case, because between 2010 and 2024, 222 orders were made on the grounds that deprivation was conducive to the public good—that is an average of 15.8 per year—and 858 orders were made for fraud. For context, there were 269,621 grants of British citizenship in 2024 alone, and since 2010, there have been at least 100,000 grants of citizenship every single year. We are therefore talking about a very small proportion of people who have their citizenship deprived when compared to the number of new citizenship grants that have been made. It is evident that the power is indeed used sparingly, in cases of the utmost seriousness.
Is it not wholly right, therefore, that in cases of such gravity the deprivation order should continue to have effect during the period of appeals? Of particular importance here is where a person whom the Home Secretary rightly deems to be a national security risk is currently abroad. The deprivation order would prevent that person returning to the United Kingdom. Under the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the law, if that person were to successfully appeal in absentia, their right to enter the country unhindered would be reinstated automatically, with no regard to the potential risk they presented to the British public. That is surely an untenable situation.
This new interpretation is also legally inconsistent with asylum and immigration decisions. With asylum claims, a refusal continues to have effect until all legal processes are completed. Asylum status is not simply automatically granted by a court upon the first successful appeal. The process requires one to exhaust the full spectrum of legal challenges first.
This Bill is not about attempting to subvert judges or to amend the appeals process, nor does it make it easier to deprive a person of their citizenship. Rather, it is about reasserting the simple fact that it is for Parliament to decide what British citizenship means and the expectations we place on those who are granted it. Citizenship is a privilege, one that demonstrates a bond of trust. Those who violate that trust and openly threaten our society, or who utilise fraudulent means to gain it, should have that privilege revoked. The Government are right to ensure that deprivation can continue during the appeals process and are right to bring forward this Bill.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this legislation, while described by the Government as “small” and highly focused, carries constitutional significance and poses risks to fundamental rights, which is why it needs the rigorous scrutiny which this House can provide. The Government’s stated purpose for the Bill is clear: to safeguard the UK from individuals who pose a threat to national security or public safety. The Bill seeks to amend Section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 to ensure that if the Government strip a person of their British citizenship, the deprivation order remains in effect throughout the entire appeal process. This measure is a direct response to the Supreme Court judgment in N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. That judgment established that when a person successfully appeals a deprivation order, their citizenship is automatically and retrospectively restored at that point.
The Government argue that this Bill is necessary to prevent high-harm individuals who are overseas from returning to the UK, and to stop persons seeking to undermine deprivation action by renouncing other nationalities in order to become stateless while an appeal remains ongoing. I understand the Government’s duty to keep the country safe, but we must question whether this measure is right, proportionate and the only tool available to achieve that goal. I will raise some of the contradictions that have been raised in the other place and look at some of the possible solutions to them. I will then pose questions to the Minister that I think will help to clarify the rightness and proportionality of the measure and whether it is indeed the only tool available to achieve that goal.
This Bill proposes to overturn the ordinary presumption that court orders take immediate effect. The legislation delays the restoration of citizenship until all governmental appeal rights are exhausted. That diminishes the only mechanism for scrutinising the Home Secretary’s decisions and thus could be viewed as an assault on the rule of law. The Bill grants the Government unwarranted power to ignore court rulings that find their actions unlawful. The Bill also applies retrospectively to appeals brought but not yet finally determined. This means that any individuals currently caught in the legal process will have the rules changed against them mid-appeal.
The principal concern relates to the severe consequences that this Bill poses, particularly for vulnerable individuals and potentially for British children. Under the current regime, the UK employs deprivation of citizenship orders more frequently than most other countries in Europe. The practice of citizenship-stripping disproportionately targets ethnic-minority communities. Some of those affected are stranded overseas and exposed to severe harms such as detention, cruel treatment and death, without consular protection or the ability to return home, even when courts rule in their favour.
The case of N3 (ZA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department is instructive. A child born in the UK to a British father whose citizenship was later ruled to have been unlawfully stripped was initially denied recognition as a British citizen. The Supreme Court ruled that the father should be treated as having retained his citizenship throughout the deprivation period. This Bill reverses that, meaning that future children in similar positions could be left without UK state protection until their parent’s final appeal is exhausted, which could be some years later.
We know that British children are already detained in inhumane conditions in places such as north-east Syria. Available information indicates that all British adults detained there have been stripped of their citizenship, leading to the creation of stateless, or effectively stateless, children. The Bill would expose those children to these extreme risks for a significantly longer period, even after a court has found that they have a valid claim to citizenship.
The Bill impairs an individual’s ability to participate meaningfully in legal proceedings. Individuals challenging deprivation from overseas face insurmountable barriers to accessing justice, making it difficult to instruct lawyers or access documents. The Bill prevents the individual, even after winning at the first instance, from returning to the UK to participate fully in the ongoing appeals process. UK courts have already acknowledged that appeals from those detained in north-east Syria would
“not be fair and effective”.
Forcing an individual to continue participating in this admittedly ineffective process compounds the unfairness.
I need to press the Minister on why the Government have chosen this blanket approach, rather than legislating for more targeted solutions, and why crucial safeguards have been either omitted or rejected. My questions to the Minister are as follows. First, the Government’s stated motivation is to maintain the ability to exclude individuals who pose a threat. Why was the alternative approach, suggested by Reprieve and others—of legislating to clarify the rules governing stays in the First-tier Tribunal and the SIAC, allowing the Government to apply for a stay of a successful order on a case-by-case basis where justified—rejected in favour of a blanket suspension?
Secondly, given that the duration of the appeals process could be considerable—potentially lasting years—and result in British children being stranded overseas, why have the Government resisted establishing an expedited appeals route to ensure unlawful deprivation orders do not continue to have effect for prolonged periods of time?
Thirdly, the Government have rejected judicial discretion to suspend the effect of a successful appeal, asserting that national security accountability rests with the democratically accountable Secretary of State. However, in the House of Commons, a proposed amendment—the so-called the Malthouse amendment—would have provided judicial discretion to prevent severe hardship, specifically if a person faced a real and substantial threat of serious harm, or if the continuation of the order would significantly prejudice their ability to mount an effective defence. Can the Minister confirm why the Government did not accept these basic judicial safeguards to protect against the most egregious cases of abuse and harm?
Fourthly, the current power to strip citizenship is already criticised for placing excessive power in the hands of a single Minister under the subjective test of being
“conducive to the public good”.
Will the Government commit to reforming the entire deprivation process—as called for by the Liberal Democrats—to require the Home Secretary to apply to a court for permission to make a deprivation order in the first instance, thereby ensuring judicial oversight before the power is exercised?
Finally, following concerns about transparency and oversight, will the Minister commit the Government to publishing annual reports detailing the use of deprivation of citizenship powers, and ensuring their regular review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation?
The Bill grants greater authority to the Government in a context already marked by high levels of citizenship-stripping and minimal checks. It threatens to legislate away the authority of British courts. Your Lordships’ House has a constitutional role as the final check on government overreach to ensure that, if this Bill is to proceed, we can preserve judicial oversight and prevent British people, particularly children, being left at risk of serious harm.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as the author of a report, required by statute and published almost 10 years ago, on citizenship removal resulting in statelessness. It was a short report, since that power introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, which was always intended to be highly exceptional, had never been used at the time—there was therefore nothing to report on.
However, my crash course in citizenship deprivation—a concept with which this country seems notably more at ease than most of our European and North American neighbours, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said—prompted three reflections of a general nature that may still be relevant. First, the
“conducive to the public good”
threshold for citizenship deprivation—which, in 2006, replaced the previous threshold of
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom”—
is remarkably low. There is some comfort in the self-imposed guidance that governs the interpretation by government of this elastic and subjective phrase. However, that comfort may not survive the arrival of another Government less keen on self-imposed guidance. For my part, I hope that we will return someday to this threshold issue.
Secondly, as was pointed out by speakers as different as Kit Malthouse and Bell Ribeiro-Addy in Commons Committee, citizenship deprivation discriminates by its very nature against individuals and groups who have, or are entitled to, another citizenship. Jews and those born in Northern Ireland were mentioned, but of course there are also many others. The power to strip people of their citizenship, however sparingly used in practice, reminds naturalised citizens in particular that the citizenship that they went through so much to achieve is precarious in a way that my citizenship is not.
A few years back, in the Nationality and Borders Bill, the proposal to allow the removal of citizenship without notice was greeted with an outcry, including a petition signed by more than 300,000 people. That is a consequence not only of Clause 9 of that Bill but of the sense it conveyed to some people with dual heritage that they were second-class citizens. Thanks to your Lordships’ House, that outcry was channelled into the much-improved Section 10 of the Act.
Thirdly, there is a gap where review of citizenship deprivation should be. The Minister in the Commons pointed correctly to reviews by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration that were published in 2018 and 2024. But the purpose of those inspections was procedural, as it was described in the 2018 report, to examine
“the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office’s processes”.
Even that procedural exercise had its limits. The 2024 inspection looked only at the status review unit, which deals with deprivations prompted by fraud or related to serious organised crime. What were described as
“‘conducive’ cases where sensitive intelligence is relied upon to make a decision”
are handled by the special cases unit and were acknowledged by the independent chief inspector to be “out of scope”. Published figures are welcome, but do not answer all the pertinent questions. What was the intelligence case for the sudden surge of conducive deprivations from 14 in 2016 to 104 in the following year? What were the circumstances of those subjected to it, and why was deprivation used in preference to the many other tools in the counterterrorism and state threats armoury?
The reality is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is a power used for national security purposes. Like other such powers, its exercise should be reviewable by the security-cleared Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, as successive holders of that office, including me, have recommended.
Having got that off my chest, I turn to the Bill. It is one of a growing number of Bills that seek to change the law as it has recently been declared by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the next one will come along on Thursday: the Crime and Policing Bill. There is nothing constitutionally improper about that. The courts try to make sense of what we decide, which, in this field, has chopped and changed several times since 2002, as the Supreme Court’s judgment made clear.
It is also relevant, it seems to me, that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, after consideration of all factors, including the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, declared the law to be as the Government now seek to clarify it by means of the Bill.
The Supreme Court took what it described as a “middle position”, under which the Secretary of State is bound by the result of a successful appeal for all purposes
“other than in respect of the validity of immigration enforcement action taken on the basis of the deprivation order up to the time the appeal against it is allowed”.
By doing so, the Supreme Court sought to banish the unwelcome spectre of damages claims in respect of past immigration enforcement action, while requiring the individual to be treated as having always been a British citizen for all other purposes, including in the hard case that was before it, by passing that citizenship to any child born during the currency of the deprivation order.
I am persuaded by the Minister, and I thank him for his time and that of the Bill team, that there are good reasons for preventing a person from regaining their British citizenship, even following a first-instance victory in SIAC until such time as the Home Office has exhausted its appeal rights. These are, in summary, the prospect of empowering a person who endangers national security to enter the United Kingdom, possibly forever; the risk that the tactical renunciation of other citizenships will render deprivation of British citizenship impossible; and the desirability of having immigration powers, such as detention and immigration bail, pending the resolution of appeal rights. Those are reasons enough for me to support the thrust of the Bill.
The Bill might be considered tough on infant children, such as ZA in the Supreme Court case. For that reason in particular, I see the case for a limited judicial discretion along the lines proposed by Kit Malthouse in the Commons and I will listen carefully to the debate if a similar or narrower amendment is tabled here. But I am not as struck by this as the noble Lord, Lord German. There is surely consolation in the fact that the appeal process is finite and can be expedited by the courts, and that the child’s citizenship will still be recognised if the Home Office is unsuccessful at the end of the day.
The Bill is retrospective in its operation, resembling in that respect court rulings, including the judgment of the Supreme Court that it seeks, in effect, to reverse. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, asked the Government why retrospectivity applied across the board and could not be limited to “conducive” cases. The Minister’s answer, that deprivation orders on other grounds are not made until the person has exhausted their rights to appeal, with the result that the Bill does not apply to them, sounds pretty conclusive to me.
Finally, I have in mind the fact that people may have their citizenship removed when inside as well as outside this country and that views on deportation, including in this country, appear to be hardening in some quarters quite alarmingly. I expressed to the Minister my concern that a Government less scrupulous than this one might take advantage of the Bill to remove a person’s citizenship on conducive grounds and then take advantage of their new status as a non-national to deport them, even after SIAC had declared the removal of citizenship to be unlawful. I was told that this fear was unfounded, in summary, as I understand it, because a deportation order does not come into force until in-country appeal rights, including on human rights grounds, have been exhausted, and because Section 78 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 prohibits such a person from being removed while any in-country appeal is pending.
On the face of it, that is reassuring, at least for as long as we have the Human Rights Act. But I would welcome the Minister putting his detailed explanation on the record, either from the Dispatch Box or in writing, so that it can be scrutinised by those more expert than me. This is not something that would have seemed worth worrying about 10 or even five years ago. But I am sure that your Lordships would not wish to pass a Bill that could facilitate the future use of unlawful citizenship deprivation as a means of effecting the arbitrary or large-scale deportation of British citizens who are objectionable or unwelcome to the Government of the day. Subject to that clarification, the Bill has my support.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.
This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.
There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.
The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.
As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.
Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.
Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.
I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?
I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.
It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow my noble friends who have just spoken, though I do not agree with them altogether. I had prepared a much longer speech, but I do not think it is necessary, so I will make just a few points.
First of all, my noble friends are much too pessimistic and are not actually exercising the role which we have today—I respectfully include an old friend of mine, the noble Lord, Lord German, in the same comment. My observation of the law relating to the deprivation of citizenship is that it is extremely valuable that the decision is made by the Home Secretary herself. She will be advised in a proper way and will ensure that the advice is properly given.
The decision we make is about the situation we are in today; it is not about some future in which a malign Home Secretary might come into existence. I do not think it is right for us as legislators to take that view of the future, unless there is hard evidence of imminence of such a person being appointed. We can rely on our courts and on the separation of powers to protect us from that kind of situation, and indeed on lawyers such as my noble friends to be part of that protection. The legal process by which these orders are tested through the court system is extremely rigorous. SIAC has the advantage of having special advocates who have access to all the relevant material upon which the case is decided. The appellate courts act likewise, and we can be confident that courts will provide protection.
On the essence of the Bill, it is extremely important that national security should protect us from those people who have been deprived of their citizenship. That is what the Bill is about in the here and now, and in broad terms at least I fully support that aim.
As to my noble friend Lord Anderson’s question about whether we should improve the test from “conducive to public good” to a more strict test, I would like to hear the Minister’s response to that. We might improve the law during the course of the Bill’s passage by such a change, if it can be drafted.
I agree that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation should be inserted into this process. There are two of us here who have been Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and I can see it being something that the independent reviewer could do easily.
My noble friend Lord Verdirame made some comments about the increase in the number of cases in which citizenship deprivation orders have been made. This is actually over the period when I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the period since. That is nothing to do with me—it is just a consequence of the change in terrorism and the change in the cases that we have had to face up to. It is no surprise to me that there is a need for a greater number of deprivation orders in 2025 than there was in 2007. I am afraid that that is an evolution of the very unpleasant effects of terrorism.
As for the situation with children, I would like the Minister, if he would not mind, to explain to us again the protection that children have during the period when appeals are pending. In principle, I am afraid I can see no reason why we should change an old existing situation in which there is no birthright to British citizenship applicable to children who happen to be born there. Some countries have that birthright; some countries—I can name one in the European Union—have that birthright if the father was a citizen of that country but not if the mother was a citizen of that country. There are all sorts of laws dealing with the nationality of children. I see no reason to change our law, particularly under the particularity of this Bill.
Broadly, I support the Bill. We should get it through this House as quickly as possible, so we can ensure that the measure intrinsic in it is able to protect our citizens as quickly as possible and as well as can be done.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, I enter view with some hesitation after speeches by such a phalanx of Cross-Bench lawyers. I understand the reasoning behind the Bill, as set out by the Minister in introducing it. I understand, too, that it will put us on more or less the same footing as like-minded countries. Finally, I appreciate that the Bill has cross-party support.
However, I have two concerns. The first, as I have explained to the Minister—to whom I am very grateful for his letter responding to my concern—is the implications of the Bill for children, especially children born between a successful appeal and the final determination of the case. Here, I share the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord German, and my noble friend Lord Verdirame.
Consider a child born to a successful applicant, whether in Britain or abroad. Under the present draft Bill, the child, unless born in Britain with one parent with British citizenship, will be deprived of citizenship even though his or her parent has successfully appealed against deprivation of citizenship. If the next stage of the appeal were quick, this might be acceptable, but the gap between the successful appeal and the hearing of the Government’s counter-appeal may be five, six or seven years. During that period, the child will be deprived of all the benefits of British citizenship, and if the parent and child are abroad, the child may be in a far worse situation, subject—as we are seeing in north- east Syria, for example—to illness, separation from his or her parents, or terrorist attacks.
My second point is that the obvious way forward is to speed up the appeals process. The Minister said in his letter to me:
“Provisions already exist to enable the courts to expedite such appeals … and it remains within the judiciary’s discretion to determine the suitability of such measures”.
Indeed, but five, six or seven years is too long. I understand and fully support the independence of the judiciary, but I ask the Minister at least to give an assurance that the Government’s views of the desirability of a speeded-up appeals process will be made known to the judiciary.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, this is a small but very important Bill. Most of the important issues it raises have already been spoken to by noble Lords, but some of them bear repetition.
To my mind, this is yet another Bill that, depressingly, seeks to make indents in our constitutional, judicial and democratic rights. The Bill, as we have heard, overturns the presumption that court orders take immediate effect. Clause 1 gives the Government of the day the power to overrule the court’s decisions by ignoring court rulings that have found the Government’s actions to be unlawful.
In brief, the Bill will deny citizenship to individual cases which the courts have already ruled eligible for further appeal. This denial persists until the last of all possible appeals have been exhausted, and as again we have heard, in some cases this may amount to years. Individuals awaiting appeal, and especially their children, are vulnerable, in that, in whatever conditions they find themselves, they are precluded from consular or any other protections.
In effect, this clause renders individuals stateless, and their children open to all kinds of other abuse, including forcible recruitment to armed militias from the age of 12, and/or to compulsory training camps, as happens in northern Syria. UK citizens in northern Syrian camps, for example, have already languished awaiting a court decision, and in some cases face life-threatening conditions. The Bill, given its retrospective mandate, will add years to their detention and render their children, some as yet unborn, vulnerable for years to come.
The purpose and the outcome of the Bill, to quote from a recent Reprieve briefing, is
“to prevent individuals from exercising their rights as British citizens even after the courts have ruled their deprivation unlawful, purely to maintain the Home Secretary’s unchecked ability to exclude them from the UK—however grave the abuses to which they risk being exposed”.
As we know, again, there was an attempt in the other place to introduce an amendment by Kit Malthouse, which proposed, among other elements, that a judge would be able to determine that an order had no effect during the appeal period if the individual faced a substantial threat of harm due to the order. This might be because such an order would adversely affect their ability, for example, to mount an effective defence, and/or the duration of the appeal period was excessive due, perhaps, to actions or omissions by public authorities.
Current levels of deprivation of citizenship in the UK are already very high and— again depressingly—disproportionately affect those from ethnic communities. The Home Secretary’s authority is considerable, in being able to issue an order to deprive a person of his or her citizenship on the basis simply that a person’s presence as a citizen is not conducive to the public good. There is no requirement, as far as I can tell, for judicial oversight, nor is the targeted individual necessarily informed of such a decision. Challenge at this stage is virtually impossible, as decisions are made under secret proceedings. Moreover, the current appeals system is lengthy, complicated and expensive, and certainly not easily accessed by those outside the UK.
This Bill is unnecessary. I hope very much that the relevant clauses will be challenged in Committee to ensure a more equitable, democratic and transparent procedure.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I hope that the House will forgive a Front-Bench speech from the second Bench: it is for practical reasons and not out of disrespect. I knew that a one-clause Bill would not defeat the House in its determination to make varied, well-informed forensic points. For me, the phrase “deprivation of citizenship” brings back memories of my noble friend Lord Avebury—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is grinning. Eric was so forceful and so clear about statelessness not being used as a punishment. I have often thought of him as a role model to whom I have not been able to live up.
As we saw a couple of years ago with Bangladesh, our Government’s views about a person’s citizenship do not always, as a matter of practice, align with those of the other state involved. Of course, many argued at the time of the Begum appeal judgment that two-tiered citizenship had been created, downgrading citizenship for naturalised citizens and the children of immigrants.
I have to say that I am one of those who is troubled by the phrase “conducive to the public good”. It is not for us today, as the Minister reminded us at the start of the debate, to try to open up the 1981 Act, but the term requires a value judgment. It is capable of varying and wide interpretations, and it sets a low bar, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described it. At one point during his speech he used the term “hard cases”. I was not sure whether we were being asked to think about bad law following on from that. Why not “threat to national security”? Indeed, Minister Jarvis in the Commons really seemed to use the terms interchangeably.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, suggested that we might be able to look at some change during the course of the Bill. The Long Title of the Bill is actually very short and very unhelpful in that sense, stating that the Bill is
“to make provision about the effect, during an appeal, of an order under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981”.
I look forward to the noble Lord’s ingenuity in seeking to build on that.
Whatever the ground, as has been said, it is not only the subject of the order who is affected, and the consequences for a child may be extreme, as we know from recent and current history. The APPG on Trafficked Britons in Syria, of which I am a member, has pointed out the risks of statelessness and the concomitant risks of exploitation and extreme ill-treatment, so let us not lose sight of the best interests of the child.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked a number of specific questions—I have seen the Minister’s reply—one of which was about the national security point that I have made. The letter also argues against SIAC having powers to suspend the effect of a successful appeal. Not quite all cases, I think, are security matters—or perhaps they are. It seems to me that “conducive to the public good” might extend that. One of my concerns is about it being a little unclear. There should be consistent mechanisms for managing all cases. The JCHR also asked about expediting appeals and the Government have told us that determinations are for the democratically accountable Secretary of State. I do not think the JCHR was actually challenging that.
I have seen a paper prepared by ILPA, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, regarding seeking a stay while an appeal is pending or still possible and pointing out a number of procedural matters that I would have thought could be overcome. I assume that the Home Office has seen the briefing. If not, I wonder whether I might send it to the Minister. It raises points that are pretty technical, I think, and perhaps not appropriate for the subject of this debate. But, if I send it to the Minister, perhaps he could consider responding to it, via me if that is appropriate. It is not aggressive; it is pointing out problems.
Like other noble Lords, I thought that the Malthouse amendment had much to recommend it in the Commons. Kit Malthouse said that he hoped that the Minister would do the right thing. Well, if they could not, let us do so.
The Government maintain the position, not just in this situation, that it is possible, practicable and not disadvantageous to exercise legal rights from outside the UK. When I was in practice as a solicitor, from time to time I found it difficult enough to get a coherent picture from some clients with whom I was face to face—never this sort of situation. It takes time, trust, patience, skill and, of course, access, particularly with a person who has undergone, perhaps over a long period, some extreme experiences. Like others, I feel that our system, which operates on the basis that if a relevant court makes a finding in favour of an individual, that stands, unless it is stayed, until it is overturned, is the way we should continue to do things.
I have been told that the Home Secretary’s powers are used almost exclusively against individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds who hold or are perceived to hold dual nationality. I can see how that could come about. The Minister might like to comment on that because, in the current highly charged political atmosphere, we should be as clear as possible about the facts.
Apart from one point that strikes me as a very good basis for a possible amendment in Committee—my noble friend does not know this yet, because I did not know he was going to make the point, but we will discuss it afterwards—I remain with the basic principles: that no one should be made stateless; that the state’s response to allegations of threats to national security should be tried in the UK unless there are very good reasons to do otherwise; and that the best interests of the child are a priority. I use the term “a priority” as that is what is in other legislation; I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, about that—and it would be a great shame if his barony were challenged. Finally, I remain with the basic principle that the exercise of the power of deprivation should always be proportionate.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for his clear exposition of the issue that is addressed in this Bill. I extend my thanks also to other noble Lords who have spoken this evening, albeit that some of the contributions would appear to me to go beyond the scope of the present Bill in seeking to address, for example, the amendment to Section 40 of the 1981 Act.
The Bill concerns one of the most significant powers available to the state: the ability to remove a person’s citizenship when it is deemed conducive to the public good. It is therefore appropriate that this Parliament should give the power the fullest scrutiny and that we should proceed with some caution and considerable care. However, this is not a new power. It is one that successive Administrations have exercised, albeit only in the most serious cases where individuals have posed a threat to our national security.
Some comment was made about the increasing number of instances in which deprivation has taken place but, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, observed, over the period since the provision came into force, we have seen an evolution of the terrorist threat that is faced by this country.
The right to determine the conditions of citizenship is a core attribute of sovereignty and clearly recognised under international law. Obviously, it must be exercised responsibly and in accordance with due process, but, following the recent Supreme Court judgment that has been referred to, this Bill seeks to restore the balance that was deemed to exist prior to that decision earlier this year.
The court’s ruling created a severe problem with respect to the effect of deprivation orders during an appeal process, with the result that there could be an undermining of public safety. Indeed, consequent upon the decision of the Supreme Court, where a tribunal overturned a deprivation order, that decision would take immediate effect even before the Government had exhausted their rights of appeal. I would indicate to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, that a right of appeal is not liable to take five to seven years. Albeit that we have considerable delays in the Crown Courts of this country, we have moved on from Jarndyce and Jarndyce.
Clearly, where the Supreme Court decision would have applied, it would have been open to an individual who was considered to be a serious security risk to this country to return to or enter this country during an appeal process. That would have been properly regarded as an unacceptable risk.
We agree with the Government that it is appropriate that this narrow and targeted measure should be taken. After all, the first duty of any Government is the security of the nation and the security of the people. We would champion, as do the Government, effective counterterrorism measures, including the reform proposed in this Bill.
I welcome the assurance from the Minister that the Bill does not alter the substantive grounds on which citizenship can be removed, nor diminish the right of appeal itself. It merely clarifies the issue following the Supreme Court decision. Of course, public confidence in this power depends not only on its necessity but on its consistent and judicious employment. The Government must continue to ensure that every deprivation decision is taken only after the most robust and rigorous assessment with appropriate safeguards in place. Those safeguards are in place through the application of Section 40 of the 1981 Act. I nevertheless ask the Minister to reassure us that the Home Office will continue to use deprivation powers carefully and only when there is the clearest justification in each individual case.
The Bill is not a sweeping reform but a measured correction to protect national security and uphold Parliament’s original intent with regard to these statutory provisions. It preserves our right to defend the nation state within the bounds of legality and due process. Therefore, we on these Benches support that aim. After all, the first duty of Government is to protect the nation state and the British people. There is always a balance to be achieved between liberty and security. It is never simple to achieve, but with this Bill we believe the Government have rightly struck the appropriate balance, and that is why we lend our support to it.
Finally, I merely observe that there is some constitutional significance to this Bill, inasmuch as it illustrates how our sovereign Parliament can move swiftly to reverse a decision of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court when the public interest is perceived by Parliament to trump legal niceties.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have raised points in this Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their support from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I also welcome the broad support from the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. I recognise that other noble Lords have made legitimate points, and I will try to respond to them.
I remind the House that the debate is about the very small amendment to the legislation. It is not about the principle or application of deprivation, or the numbers of people who have had their citizenship deprived. It is a response to the Supreme Court judgment and what that means in relation to individuals who could potentially return to or retain their status in the United Kingdom when the Government have, through the Home Secretary, determined, for whatever reason, that that individual needs to have their citizenship deprived. That is a very serious step for a Home Secretary to take. When the Supreme Court states, as it did in the recent case, that an individual can retain their citizenship during the appeal process, that means that the individual, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, just mentioned, will be free to remain a British citizen, with all the rights and privileges that brings, while the appeal is ongoing, unless this legislation is put in place.
The noble Lord, Lord German, in his introductory remarks, made a number of points about that. Essentially, I ask him whether he is willing to take the risk. That is the nub of the argument that we are putting to the House today—that the purpose of deprivation of citizenship being maintained during the course of the appeal procedure is so that the United Kingdom Government, the Home Secretary, accountable to the House of Commons, and me in this House, accountable for the Home Office, can take a decision and uphold it during the period of appeal. If the appeal is successful downstream then all bets are off and the individual’s citizenship is restored. For whatever reason it was originally removed, the Home Secretary’s decision has been overturned and the status quo for the individual remains. However, in the event of the individual remaining at the serious risk level that meant the Home Secretary brought forward the citizenship issue in the first place, that opens the United Kingdom to a risk until such time as the appeal is heard. This Bill deals solely with that issue. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said on this matter, but I put it to them and to the noble Lord, Lord German that the issue is about the management of risk by the UK Government in a limited circumstance, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for raising.
This has been a fair debate about what we call the “Kit Malthouse amendments”, as a number of noble Lords have raised in their contributions. It is not appropriate to confer this discretion on the courts, because it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to this House and to Parliament, through the House of Commons, for matters of national security. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, deprivation of citizenship and national security are matters for the Home Secretary. The Supreme Court itself emphasised that in its discussion and judgment. The Bill will align the approach to asylum and human rights appeals and extend it to appeals to the Supreme Court.
Decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations and with consideration as to whether to give deprivation will expose the person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary is the person responsible for that decision. I hear what noble Lords have said but that is the reason why my noble friend in the Commons, Minister Jarvis, rejected the Kit Malthouse approach, and the reason why I do so today.
Valid points have been raised. The noble Lords, Lord Jay, Lord German, Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame, mentioned citizenship and the impact on the child. I pay great tribute to the private discussions —which are now public discussions because we have talked about them—that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, because they raised an important issue. We have looked at that and reflected on it, and I hope I can give a satisfactory response to all noble Lords who have raised this question with me. It is simply this: the Bill does not alter the existing situation in relation to children born to deprived individuals, which is already established in law.
Where a child holds British citizenship, the deprivation of the parent’s citizenship has no effect on the child’s nationality status. Again, those points were mentioned across the House today. In cases where a child is born after the parent was deprived of British citizenship—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has mentioned privately and in the Chamber today—their entitlement to British citizenship will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the other parent. The consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in N3(ZA) is that if the child would have been British had their parent not been deprived then a successful appeal against deprivation by their parent means the child is automatically a British citizen. There are no changes in any of the principles that we have here, and I hope that reassures noble Lords on these points. Again, I am happy to reflect on that in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made valid points on the question of the appeals procedure and the fast-track process that takes place. In answer to what I think was his pointed question to me, the Government are committed to supporting the expediting of these cases on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, as quickly as possible. It is in no one’s interests to have long drawn-out appeals. What is the practical implication of that in relation to the courts determining the length of the appeal procedure where disagreements arise, now that courts have the power to order case management reviews to resolve issues? The current rules of court already permit the court to make directions to expedite cases if there are reasons for that to be done. The judiciary themselves are probably, dare I say it, better placed than the Home Secretary to determine and assess in each case how they can expedite those cases or not. All the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, is concerned about are things that would potentially mean that a judge could determine, with “defence counsel”, that this needs to be done quickly. That is reasonable, and we want to see it over and done with as quickly as possible. We can look at the practical implications for the Government, but I hope I can reassure him on the principle.
Questions were asked about whether a person could be deported from the UK while they are appealing against the deprivation decision. In theory, it is possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship and deported before the deprivation appeal is resolved, but in practice that is going to be difficult because there will be the opportunity for people to make a human rights claim in response to the stage 1 deportation letter, and that means they would have an in-country right of appeal against the refusal of that claim if certified and a right of redress against the certification decision. It is a matter for the courts how those appeals are managed.
A number of other points were raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the role of the terrorism reviewer having oversight of these matters. The current situation is that the oversight for this aspect of public policy lies with the inspector of borders. They can determine their own inspection regime, if they wish to look at that. The terrorism reviewer does not currently have that role and responsibility—that is an argument the noble Lord might want to put down for debate. Should the inspector of borders wish to have an investigation on the performance of any matter to do with this—including the rights of the child, the length of the appeal procedure or the Home Secretary’s powers—they could do that, should they so wish, independently of government. So there is a sort of oversight there, but maybe not to the standard or type that the noble Lord wishes.
Ultimately, for this House—and, again, I am grateful for the support of His Majesty’s Opposition, in particular on this—it boils down to whether we are willing to take the risk. If the Home Secretary has taken advice from officials at a senior level and signed that order and taken the decision to deprive an individual of their citizenship, they have done that because there is a threat to the United Kingdom, in one form or another. If this Bill is not enacted, that threat will potentially materialise in another form as the individual will be able to restore their rights as a citizen when they appeal the original decision. This is the purpose of this Bill.
I recognise the range of points made by noble Lords from across the House on a range of issues, from the principle of deprivation in the first place to the numbers and so on, but that is the focus of the Bill and I put the question: are noble Lords willing to take that risk? I suggest that the Government are not and I am grateful to those Members who will support that position in this House today.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I have a question for the Minister about the possibility that perhaps in the future the deprivation of citizenship would be used as a prelude to deportation, even in circumstances where the first-instance tribunal had decided that the deprivation of citizenship was unlawful. It would be very helpful if the noble Lord could write to me about that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thought I had answered that, but if I have not answered that to the extent that I thought, I will reflect on what we have said in Hansard and will ensure that, before the next stage of this Bill, which I think is scheduled for a week today, a piece of paper in electronic or physical form lands on the noble Lord’s desk. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Tuesday 21st October 2025
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 127-I Marshalled list for Committee - (17 Oct 2025)
Lord Verdirame
“(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the citizenship, during the appeal period, of a child of a person who makes an appeal under inserted section (2B).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the citizenship of the child of a person who has been deprived of citizenship, and who has made a successful appeal against the deprivation order, is not affected by the provisions of the Bill.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.
The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.
Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:
“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]
to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.
The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.
We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.
If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.
With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.
We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I was happy to add my name to the noble Lord’s. He explained the position very thoroughly.
It is worth me repeating that the number of children—which is perhaps increasing, as the noble Lord said—is necessarily limited, when discussing children born between the deprivation order and the outcome of an appeal or the expiry of an appeal period. Nevertheless, the risks to such children may be considerable. The fact that only a small number of children may be affected does not affect the importance of the amendment, although I appreciate that, to some people, it may suggest that the problem is less serious than the noble Lord and I regard it.
I do not need to repeat what the noble Lord said, but that is not to say that I do not look forward to hearing speeches and support from other noble Lords in the Chamber.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise that I was unable to speak at Second Reading, but I have read the debate and listened to the speeches in support of the amendment—of course. As a member of the noble order of terriers who have battled on behalf of children’s citizenship over the years, I have a moral duty to express my moral support for this amendment.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, this amendment shows that there are ways in which the rights of children could be protected. The debate so far has shown that we believe it to be extraordinarily important that the rights of children in these circumstances should be protected. I am therefore very glad that the amendment has been tabled, even though the chances of it being accepted are small.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, we on these Benches also approve of the amendment. This is a very narrow Bill, with an even narrower amendment. I do not intend to repeat everything I said about children at Second Reading, but we are absolutely clear that, without a measure of comfort, the Bill will have consequences for a very limited number of children and will reverse the protection that has been offered to them under the Supreme Court case of N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, we are discussing the limbo status of some children in this situation. A child whose parent’s citizenship deprivation was ruled unlawful by a court could have their citizenship status left in limbo until their parent’s final appeal is determined. We had a debate at Second Reading about how long that period would be. There were some views that the justice system was so quick that it might flash through in a number of weeks, but others suggested that it could take a number of months or even longer. During an extended period of uncertainty, the child could be exposed to serious harm or death, without the ability to enter the UK and reach safety or to obtain consular assistance.
As I explained at Second Reading, this is not a hypothetical matter. There are, and have been, cases where the situation has arisen. It may involve a small number of people—a small number of children—but we cannot be certain that those children will not face such risks in the future. This amendment would therefore provide a minimum safeguard to prevent the most serious consequences for the children who might be caught by the Bill, and who are obviously the most vulnerable British children. It would ensure that the best interests of the child are prioritised and that the effects of the Bill do not unjustly threaten the lives and rights of British children.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendment and for their contributions to today’s debate. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who has previously raised this issue with me in private meetings. I was pleased to meet the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who tabled the amendment to discuss their concerns privately; it is an important issue that I hope I can address today. I am also grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Lister; as the regular recipient of terrier activity on my legs, I appreciate her persistence in these matters.
I want to be clear—this is an important point that the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made in his introductory remarks—that where a child already holds British citizenship, the subsequent deprivation of a parent’s citizenship does not change that. I know that that was a concern held by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, but that is a given. As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said in his introductory remarks, we would need to make changes to sections of the British Nationality Act 1981 that relate to the acquisition of nationality in order for the amendment to have its desired effect. Whether or not we want to make those changes, they would be out of the Bill’s scope, so I am unable to agree to them today.
In any case, the amendment could not be limited to cases where the parent’s appeal is ultimately successful and their citizenship reinstated. The amendment would apply to cases where a higher court upholds the Home Secretary’s decision. In my view, that would undermine the integrity of the immigration and nationality system and could give rise to cases where a child is temporarily a British citizen, only to lose that status through no fault of their own. If their entitlement to another nationality were to be removed because another country had laws that prohibited dual citizenship, there is also a risk the child could be left stateless.
In accordance with the duty under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, consideration of a child’s best interests is a primary consideration in the immigration and nationality decisions that affect them. Considering the representations I have had from the noble Lord and the noble Baroness in our private discussions, I say to them that the Government will monitor the impact of the Bill, including the impact on children, during the course of its implementation downstream. If there are lessons to be drawn from that, obviously we will do so.
As I mentioned during the Bill’s Second Reading last week, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, under the UK Borders Act 2007, can assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the migration and borders system, which includes the deprivation power. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, I say that, if there were a challenge in expediting appeals or an issue with children being impacted, I have no doubt—without wishing to assess the independent inspector’s programme for him—that the inspector would examine those matters. The UK Borders Act 2007 empowers the inspector to define their own inspection programme, something that the departing inspector, David Bolt, refers to in his most recent annual report as
“the cornerstone of the role’s independence”.
I have no doubt that, in the event of challenges appearing—and with representations from noble Lords, Members of Parliament or voluntary organisations—that could well be an area where the inspector focuses their attention.
I thank the noble Lord and noble Baroness for prompting this worthwhile debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has not spoken today, but I believe that he broadly supports the position that I take on this matter. I trust that, for the reasons I have set out, the Members who tabled the amendment understand why the Government cannot support it. I therefore respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I am not seeking to challenge the Minister on this, but his statement that changing the 1981 Act would be outside the scope of this Bill is surprising. I am sure that he would not want to send people down into culs-de-sac chasing that claim. It might therefore be helpful if he could make it clear that the technical issue is not what underlies the Government’s opposition to our amendment, so that people understand that this is a policy matter, not a technical matter.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.
I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.
The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.
Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Tuesday 21st October 2025
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Act 2025 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 127-I Marshalled list for Committee - (17 Oct 2025)
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, in moving that the Bill be read a third time, I just say on behalf of the whole House that the safety and security of those in the UK is the Government’s highest priority. Deprivation is an important and effective tool.
I want to thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debates on the Bill today, and I particularly thank the security and intelligence services, law enforcement and others who work day in, day out to protect this country. I thank my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis, my colleague in the Whips’ Office, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and indeed all those Members who have tabled and spoken to amendments. It is important to put on record that the policy, legal and bill teams in the Home Office have worked tirelessly to make the Bill possible, as have the team in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel. I thank them and the staff of this House, as ever, for their professionalism in helping us get the Bill through both Houses of Parliament. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Royal Assent
Monday 27th October 2025
(6 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 132-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Amendments - (10 Oct 2025)