Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments, as has been clearly stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, concern ministerial and parliamentary oversight—it is the oversight that is important—or the powers granted to authorised officers for reclaiming finances under this Act.

As has been stated by other noble Lords, these amendments would require that a Minister of the Crown authorise the use of such powers where the amount involved exceeded £10,000. This would also oblige the Public Sector Fraud Authority to maintain a register of instances in which the powers were exercised, with a relevant Minister required to lay a copy of that register before Parliament.

On these Benches, we have been critical throughout the passage of the Bill of the broad powers—and in some cases inadequately checked powers, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—granted to recover funds identified as perhaps fraudulent. We therefore support these amendments, as they would introduce additional senior authorisation for cases involving substantial sums and provide a necessary level of parliamentary oversight. If the noble Baroness pushes her amendment to a vote, we will support her.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, while I appreciate the intention behind these amendments, the reality of their drafting would give Ministers the ability to block politically inconvenient investigations. They would prevent counterfraud enforcement at any kind of scale, and they would expose the identities of civil servants investigating serious criminals. On that basis, we cannot accept them.

Although we cannot agree to the amendments, it might surprise the noble Baroness that I believe there is a lot that we agree on. We agree that the measures in the Bill are powerful and must be used with care; we agree that staff must be appropriately trained before they are able to use these powers; and we agree that robust oversight, both internal and external, is essential.

With regard to ministerial oversight, for as long as the powers sit in the Cabinet Office, they will be exercised in the name of the Minister for the Cabinet Office. However, the amendments go beyond accountability; they bring the Minister into specific operational decisions. It is not appropriate to mandate that the Minister for the Cabinet Office be brought into hundreds of operational decisions in the way that the amendments suggest.

First, Ministers must be free to delegate, or the work of government will grind to a halt. Your Lordships’ House would be rightly concerned if Cabinet Office Ministers, who need to make government more effective and efficient, were spending their days taking detailed counterfraud operational decisions.

Secondly, it would be inappropriate for Ministers—of whichever party happens to be in power—to take operational decisions on individual enforcement cases. That would make enforcement political. It would necessarily expose every case to charges of political interference; it would place honest Ministers in an invidious position; and it would give dishonest Ministers the power to block investigations that were politically inconvenient.

However, the noble Baroness is right that Ministers should know what is happening in their name. Ministers are accountable and must therefore choose how these powers should be delegated, not simply hand them over to civil servants and forget about them until a crisis occurs, which I know is a genuine concern. In response to the noble Baroness’s challenge, let me set out what Ministers will do before any of the powers are used.

Ministers will scrutinise the set-up of the PSFA, its plans to use the powers, the oversight arrangements in place, and the skills and experience of authorised officers and authorised investigators. They will also decide what thresholds they wish to set and what constraints they wish to place around the exercise of powers in their name. Ministers will decide what reports they want to receive and their frequency. They will also decide how they wish to appoint authorised officers and authorised investigators, and will take a strong interest in the training, experience and professionalism of those staff. Finally, Ministers will be accountable to your Lordships’ House and the other place to show that they have done that. I am happy to commit to Ministers bringing forward a statement before the powers are first used to demonstrate that these commitments have been fulfilled. Every time there is a change of Ministers, officials will ask for the new Minister’s view on these questions, and not silently continue out of sight, which I know is a genuine concern of the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to draw attention to how delegation works in government; it is for Ministers who are accountable to decide on the appropriate delegation.

I turn to the seniority of civil servants provided for in proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 28. By requiring senior civil servant sign-off for every use of the powers in Part 1, the noble Baroness seeks to set the bar for internal authorisation too high. Currently, the PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively small—I love using the word “relatively”; it is not large—so the number of information notices envisaged in a year, for example, could all be reviewed by a senior civil servant. However, we are making this legislation to last decades, and its operation cannot be contingent on keeping our capacity to pursue public sector fraudsters small. At any scale, requiring excessive civil servant grading in legislation is a strict operational limitation and unnecessarily expensive.

That is why those who use these powers successfully elsewhere in government, such as HMRC, do not have these requirements in either their legislation or their practice. It is not the grade that matters; it is skills, experience and professionalism. Authorised investigators and authorised officers in the PSFA will all be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. They will undergo bespoke training, on top of the previous knowledge, skills and experience they bring to the role. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit bring a wealth of experience with them. They include former police officers, customs officers and other civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of departments.

Noble Lords have been clear in this debate that they are particularly concerned about the use of PACE powers. Let me remind your Lordships’ House that it is the courts that will authorise any application that the PSFA makes under PACE. No civil servant—of any grade—nor any Minister can authorise a search warrant or a production order under PACE. Only the courts can authorise such actions, each and every time we seek to use them.

That means that the PSFA must be able to demonstrate, to the court’s satisfaction, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence of fraud has been committed against a public authority and, as set out in PACE, reasonable grounds to believe that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation—I repeat: it must be of substantial value. This means that the subject of an application has the protection of a court’s scrutiny before authorised investigators can execute a warrant or production order.

Moreover, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person, as specified under Clause 65. I have committed to ensure that the independent person will be passed all the concerns raised by parliamentarians, including those we have heard today. The PSFA will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be made publicly available and will be laid before Parliament.

Finally, I turn to the question of maintaining a register that has to be laid before Parliament. We will of course keep meticulous records of how and when powers are used; that would be a bare minimum for good investigatory practice. Those records will be made available to the independent reviewer, who will report on the use of the powers to Parliament, ensuring democratic oversight. However, laying this register before Parliament carries significant risks; it may compromise ongoing cases and expose the identities of investigators to dangerous individuals, jeopardising their safety and the integrity of the justice system. We must remember that we are talking about people who undertake criminal activity—online in some cases—so publishing the names of the investigating officers could make them vulnerable.

On the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the appalling Horizon scandal, I want to take this opportunity to reassure and remind noble Lords that the scandal was based on private prosecutions that the PSFA will not undertake.

I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and have set out how Ministers will act in an effort to assuage them, but the amendment cannot stand. It would allow dishonest Ministers to block politically inconvenient investigations, it would make counter-fraud enforcement at any scale impossible, and it would expose the names of officials to the fraudsters they are investigating. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply, but I must be absolutely clear that we are not satisfied that the tests we have set out have been met, or with the responses received. The Government ask this House to confer upon the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers that are extraordinary in scope: powers to compel information, to enter premises, to seize property, and to reach directly into the private finances of individuals. Those are powers that, in any other context, would belong to the police. We have voiced, as has noble Lord, Lord Vaux, reservations about granting police powers to civil servants in this instance.

Our amendments seek to provide a clear statutory foundation for the exercise of those investigator enforcement powers, ensuring that they are explicitly bound by the structures and intentions set out by Parliament. They provide a clear chain of accountability: from the official who exercises the power, through to the Minister who authorises it, and to the Parliament that must ultimately answer for it.

I hear what the Minister says about dishonest Ministers choosing to block an investigation, but ultimately, if a Minister chooses to block an investigation, that is a decision for the Minister who is responsible for the public finances and who will be accountable in Parliament for his or her decision. It is not about putting Ministers in charge of operations. The clear purpose behind these amendments is to create a clear chain of accountability for great powers, because that clarity matters. That is how responsible government works, and that is how public confidence is earned and sustained. Instead, the Government’s proposal leaves the PSFA largely insulated from meaningful scrutiny. It gives immense authority to civil servants, while shielding their actions from the transparency and parliamentary visibility that such authority demands. That is not proportionate oversight.

The recent China espionage scandal has laid bare the dangers of confusion and obfuscation when questions of accountability and responsibility are left unresolved. These amendments would provide the structure and safeguards the Bill so plainly lacks. They do not remove powers, but they make those powers defensible. When we are dealing with an authority that will routinely exercise serious and far-reaching powers, there can be no room for ambiguity. We must have clarity about who is responsible, who is accountable and where the lines of authority lie. These amendments provide that certainty. They embody the minimum requirements for a just and serious law.

We have tried at every stage of the Bill to work constructively with the Government, and I appreciate the engagement we have been given, but the state must be equipped to confront fraud in a way that preserves trust. That trust is earned through transparency and accountability. These amendments offer a constructive and proportionate way to embed those principles into the Bill. We have a duty to ensure that power is never granted without accountability and that no one, however well-intentioned, operates beyond the reach of ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny. For that reason, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

34: Clause 70, page 37, line 28, leave out from “provision” to end of line 31 and insert “about—
(a) the establishment of the Public Sector Fraud Authority (“the PSFA”), and(b) the transfer of functions conferred by or under this Part to the PSFA or to another public authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendments to Schedule 2, would give the Minister the power to establish the PSFA by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure (rather than using commencement regulations) and would permit the transfer of functions under Part 1 of the Bill to a public authority other than the PSFA, including on an interim basis if the PSFA is subsequently established.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I now turn to Amendments 34, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. This group of amendments addresses some concern we have heard throughout the passage of this Bill—most recently from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, during Grand Committee—that the enforcement unit being part of the Cabinet Office means that there is limited oversight and accountability for the use of the powers in Part 1 of this Bill.

However, setting up the PSFA’s enforcement unit as a stand-alone statutory body would be disproportionate while it is still small. While I strongly believe that the PSFA has established a robust oversight provision and built a multitude of safeguards into this legislation, as well as into its processes and structures, I am aware of how complicated and contentious this space is, particularly in respect of protecting the public from the misuse or incorrect use of powers.

We have therefore tabled this group of amendments to enable the PSFA and the powers in this Bill to be merged with another statutory body, rather than necessarily being set up as a stand-alone statutory body, although the power to do that remains. This builds flexibility into the legislation to achieve the same aim, in terms of separation between investigators and Ministers in future, but avoids the need to set up an entirely new statutory body if it is not considered proportionate to do so.

Importantly, this would enable the PSFA’s enforcement unit to be moved at arm’s length from Ministers sooner, adopting the protections, governance and accountability set out in Schedule 2 to the Bill. As the Government have said during the passage of this Bill, it is not proportionate to set up a new stand-alone ALB for a small enforcement unit. These amendments allow for even a relatively small unit to be placed at arm’s length from Ministers, if desired, without incurring disproportionate overheads.

Ministers also have a responsibility to the taxpayer to ensure public money is spent judiciously and where it is most needed. It is counter to government policy to establish a new statutory body when its function could be undertaken by existing bodies. Building in this flexibility through these amendments enables us to achieve the same policy intent without necessarily adding to the proliferation of ALBs. When it is the right time to establish the PSFA’s enforcement unit at arm’s length from Ministers, that will happen only with engagement, debate and agreement with both Houses of Parliament.

Your Lordships’ House has spoken, and we have listened. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we give this amendment a partial welcome. It speaks to a principle that we on these Benches have consistently raised in relation to the formation and constitution of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. The change proposed here—that the PSFA should be established through affirmative regulations rather than by simple commencement—is certainly a step in the right direction. It introduces an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny and prevents the authority from being created entirely at the discretion of the Minister. That is an improvement, and we are pleased to see it reflected in this amendment.

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On our previous day in Committee, I indicated that, alongside my noble friend Lord Younger, I would consider the assurances given to us by the Minister on the review of PACE powers, specifically within the Cabinet Office section. We discussed this on Amendment 35, which I believe will be called after discussion on this group. Having done so, on the back of what the Minister set out last week, I am assured that our concerns in this area have been met. I am therefore not intending to push this matter to a Division. I thank the noble Baroness for working with us on this point to ensure that the independent reviewer in Part 1 has the power to assess the use of PACE powers and whether it meets the metrics that we set out.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and the Opposition Front Bench for their support—not for concessions but for the commitments that I made on Amendment 35. I am pleased that we came to a level of agreement.

I am grateful for the level of support that is available for these government amendments. It would be helpful to confirm that, regardless of the statutory body where the PSFA ultimately ends up, the PSFA as an entity will publish public annual reports on its operations, including on the use of new powers in the Bill and the findings of reviews on the use of these powers. Should the PSFA either transition to a stand-alone statutory body or be merged with an existing arm’s-length body, it will be required by the Bill to produce an annual report for the relevant Minister, who would then lay it before Parliament.

We have put significant safeguards in this legislation, and listened to the debates both in Committee and on Report, to make sure that as many safeguards as can be have been added. These amendments will provide important flexibility regarding the future of the PSFA, when it is put on a statutory footing. They address concerns we have heard through the passage of this Bill about the oversight and accountability of the enforcement unit while in the Cabinet Office and the disproportionality of setting up a new ALB while the unit remains small. I therefore hope that noble Lords will support these amendments.

Amendment 34 agreed.