(1 day, 23 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.
The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.
Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:
“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]
to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.
The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.
We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.
If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.
With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.
We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.
My Lords, I was happy to add my name to the noble Lord’s. He explained the position very thoroughly.
It is worth me repeating that the number of children—which is perhaps increasing, as the noble Lord said—is necessarily limited, when discussing children born between the deprivation order and the outcome of an appeal or the expiry of an appeal period. Nevertheless, the risks to such children may be considerable. The fact that only a small number of children may be affected does not affect the importance of the amendment, although I appreciate that, to some people, it may suggest that the problem is less serious than the noble Lord and I regard it.
I do not need to repeat what the noble Lord said, but that is not to say that I do not look forward to hearing speeches and support from other noble Lords in the Chamber.
My Lords, I apologise that I was unable to speak at Second Reading, but I have read the debate and listened to the speeches in support of the amendment—of course. As a member of the noble order of terriers who have battled on behalf of children’s citizenship over the years, I have a moral duty to express my moral support for this amendment.
My Lords, this amendment shows that there are ways in which the rights of children could be protected. The debate so far has shown that we believe it to be extraordinarily important that the rights of children in these circumstances should be protected. I am therefore very glad that the amendment has been tabled, even though the chances of it being accepted are small.
My Lords, we on these Benches also approve of the amendment. This is a very narrow Bill, with an even narrower amendment. I do not intend to repeat everything I said about children at Second Reading, but we are absolutely clear that, without a measure of comfort, the Bill will have consequences for a very limited number of children and will reverse the protection that has been offered to them under the Supreme Court case of N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, we are discussing the limbo status of some children in this situation. A child whose parent’s citizenship deprivation was ruled unlawful by a court could have their citizenship status left in limbo until their parent’s final appeal is determined. We had a debate at Second Reading about how long that period would be. There were some views that the justice system was so quick that it might flash through in a number of weeks, but others suggested that it could take a number of months or even longer. During an extended period of uncertainty, the child could be exposed to serious harm or death, without the ability to enter the UK and reach safety or to obtain consular assistance.
As I explained at Second Reading, this is not a hypothetical matter. There are, and have been, cases where the situation has arisen. It may involve a small number of people—a small number of children—but we cannot be certain that those children will not face such risks in the future. This amendment would therefore provide a minimum safeguard to prevent the most serious consequences for the children who might be caught by the Bill, and who are obviously the most vulnerable British children. It would ensure that the best interests of the child are prioritised and that the effects of the Bill do not unjustly threaten the lives and rights of British children.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendment and for their contributions to today’s debate. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who has previously raised this issue with me in private meetings. I was pleased to meet the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who tabled the amendment to discuss their concerns privately; it is an important issue that I hope I can address today. I am also grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Lister; as the regular recipient of terrier activity on my legs, I appreciate her persistence in these matters.
I want to be clear—this is an important point that the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made in his introductory remarks—that where a child already holds British citizenship, the subsequent deprivation of a parent’s citizenship does not change that. I know that that was a concern held by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, but that is a given. As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said in his introductory remarks, we would need to make changes to sections of the British Nationality Act 1981 that relate to the acquisition of nationality in order for the amendment to have its desired effect. Whether or not we want to make those changes, they would be out of the Bill’s scope, so I am unable to agree to them today.
In any case, the amendment could not be limited to cases where the parent’s appeal is ultimately successful and their citizenship reinstated. The amendment would apply to cases where a higher court upholds the Home Secretary’s decision. In my view, that would undermine the integrity of the immigration and nationality system and could give rise to cases where a child is temporarily a British citizen, only to lose that status through no fault of their own. If their entitlement to another nationality were to be removed because another country had laws that prohibited dual citizenship, there is also a risk the child could be left stateless.
In accordance with the duty under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, consideration of a child’s best interests is a primary consideration in the immigration and nationality decisions that affect them. Considering the representations I have had from the noble Lord and the noble Baroness in our private discussions, I say to them that the Government will monitor the impact of the Bill, including the impact on children, during the course of its implementation downstream. If there are lessons to be drawn from that, obviously we will do so.
As I mentioned during the Bill’s Second Reading last week, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, under the UK Borders Act 2007, can assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the migration and borders system, which includes the deprivation power. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, I say that, if there were a challenge in expediting appeals or an issue with children being impacted, I have no doubt—without wishing to assess the independent inspector’s programme for him—that the inspector would examine those matters. The UK Borders Act 2007 empowers the inspector to define their own inspection programme, something that the departing inspector, David Bolt, refers to in his most recent annual report as
“the cornerstone of the role’s independence”.
I have no doubt that, in the event of challenges appearing—and with representations from noble Lords, Members of Parliament or voluntary organisations—that could well be an area where the inspector focuses their attention.
I thank the noble Lord and noble Baroness for prompting this worthwhile debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has not spoken today, but I believe that he broadly supports the position that I take on this matter. I trust that, for the reasons I have set out, the Members who tabled the amendment understand why the Government cannot support it. I therefore respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.
I am not seeking to challenge the Minister on this, but his statement that changing the 1981 Act would be outside the scope of this Bill is surprising. I am sure that he would not want to send people down into culs-de-sac chasing that claim. It might therefore be helpful if he could make it clear that the technical issue is not what underlies the Government’s opposition to our amendment, so that people understand that this is a policy matter, not a technical matter.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.
I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.
The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.
Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.