Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.

There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, accurately pointed out that a respect order may be made merely on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof. Will the Minister confirm my understanding that, if a criminal charge is to be brought for breaching a respect order, it will be brought under new Section I1, and the offence of breach of respect order? It is then for the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, on the criminal standard, that the person concerned has not merely breached the respect order but has done so without reasonable excuse. That may provide an answer to some of the more graphic and extreme examples that have been given in this debate of when a respect order may apply. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my understanding is correct.

In this debate we need to take account of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs in our society with alarming regularity and causes misery to law-abiding citizens. There needs to be some effective means of addressing it. Having said all that, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed as to the width of the powers that we are being invited to endorse. There are two particular concerns that I have.

The first is that in new Section A1(1)(b), it is sufficient for the court to consider it “just and convenient” to impose a respect order. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to that—and I have great sympathy with the argument that that really ought to be a test of “necessary and proportionate”. All the sorts of cases that one would want to see prohibited by law could be brought within a necessary and proportionate test.

The other concern that I have—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the one who mentioned this—is that in new Section A1(9), the test of anti-social behaviour is

“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.

That means any person, however vulnerable they may be, or weak-minded, which is a purely subjective test. I suggest in this context that there really needs to be some objectivity written into the definition, whether or not by referring to a reasonable person; other types of drafting mechanism could be adopted. I share some of the concerns, but I also see the need for an effective and functioning system in this context.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Since the Minister rightly accepts that there is a test of proportionality under the Human Rights Act, would it not be better to put it in the Bill, so that everybody understands—whether they are magistrates, judges, solicitors or counsel—that that is the test? That would provide a great deal of comfort and protection for those who may be subject to the orders.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.

Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.

Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.

The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.

Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.

I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.

Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my voice to what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The fundamental principle is set out in new Section 11ZB(2): if the defendant cannot have a fair trial, the hearing cannot proceed. The gravity of the allegations and the public interest demand that there be no hearing, notwithstanding the damage that this causes to the unfortunate alleged victim. I entirely agree that new Section 11ZB(3) confuses the position; it introduces uncertain concepts and will inevitably lead to unhelpful litigation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 289, I thank my noble friend Lady Royall, who is not in her place today because she is ill, and Mr Stephen Bernard, both of whom met me recently. We discussed both the impact of the limitation period on victims and survivors of child sexual abuse and their concern over the test of substantial prejudice within this clause. I was moved by what Mr Bernard told me and I thank him for his courage in telling me about what happened to him.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for moving Amendment 289. I hope both my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord will be reassured that I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, for welcoming the general spirit of the clause and for their constructive comments. I make it clear that we absolutely do not want to add additional or unnecessary barriers to stop victims of child sexual abuse from proceeding with their civil claims. So I have asked my officials to look closely at the issues this amendment raises for further consideration, and I aim to provide a further update to your Lordships on Report.

Turning to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 82 standing part of the Bill, I think he is well known for being very expert in this area and I pay tribute to that. But Clause 82 implements important recommendations made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The noble Lord raised concerns during Second Reading and again during this debate that the reform is unnecessary and would lead to greater uncertainty and litigation, but, with respect, I disagree. The inquiry looked at this in great detail. It found that the limitation period for civil claims itself acted as a deterrent to victims and survivors—just the very fact that it existed. The inquiry also found that it acted as a deterrent irrespective of the existence of the discretion in Section 33, and the inquiry therefore found that Section 33 did not provide sufficient protection for victims and survivors.

The inquiry found that the regime acted as a barrier to claimants at three stages: first, solicitors’ willingness to take on claims, because it can make it really hard for them to find a lawyer to represent them; secondly, the settlement and valuation of claims, because it can lead to victims accepting lower settlements because of uncertainty about the limitation issue; and, thirdly, the hearings themselves in relation to the limitation period, the effect of which on the claimants was described as “intrusive and traumatic”.

I think the noble Lord will find that it was not this Government who said they were not in favour of these recommendations; it was actually the previous Government. This Government accepted the recommendation in February of this year and are satisfied that Clause 82 is necessary and proportionate. The courts are perfectly capable, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, of deciding when a claim is inappropriate or unfair and should not succeed. This Government and my department put victims at the heart of everything we do. This is why we believe that this reform is necessary and important for victims and survivors. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment and I hope the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 82.

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[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, like everyone else, I am in favour of all the amendments in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, set out very powerfully and alarmingly the reality of what is happening online. I do not think that I need to go through all the amendments in detail—other noble Lords have done that very well—but I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said about asking ourselves if this is the normal that we want to live in.

Do we want to allow content that makes child abuse appear acceptable? Surely not. Do we want to see websites trivialise and, indeed, promote incest as some form of entertainment? Surely not. Should we allow tools that enable the nudification of images, which are overwhelmingly used to target women and girls, and which, as we have heard, are being used in schools? Surely not. Instead, do we want to ensure that age and consent are clearly verified, and that consent can be withdrawn at any time? Yes, we do. Do we want to see a parity between what is prohibited offline and what is prohibited online? Surely yes.

That is what this group sets out to do. I hope that the Minister will accept all the amendments in this group to ensure that we have a new normal that we all want to see.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support these amendments. I will make two points that are additional to the powerful factors that have been addressed so far. First, I am very concerned to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that the Government have not yet responded in full to her review. Can the Minister tell us why that is, given the importance of the subject, and when there will be a full response?

Secondly, although I support the objective of Amendment 314 to apply the same principles to material online as to material offline, I am very doubtful that the way the amendment seeks to achieve this is sensible. The amendment seeks to incorporate into the Bill the definition of “harmful material” found in Section 368E(3)(a) and Section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003. However, those provisions refer simply to the decisions and criteria of the British Board of Film Classification without specifying the criteria applied by that body. The criteria that that body applies, as set out in its guidelines, are helpful, but they are not categorical. For example, the guidelines say:

“Exceptions are most likely in the following areas”,


and the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, helpfully set out the factors that they have regard to.

This is perfectly appropriate in the context of the BBFC, from whose decisions appeals are possible, because the context is the licensing of an R18 video, which, of course, can only be sold in a licensed sex shop. However, we are concerned here with criminal law, which needs to be defined with precision so that people know exactly what cannot be published online. Therefore, we need a revised Amendment 314, which I hope the Government will accept in principle, to set out in specific terms what Parliament is prohibiting online, such as material that depicts conduct in breach of the criminal law and material that depicts or appears to suggest non-consensual sexual conduct. There may well be other categories; let us set them out so that everybody knows what is prohibited online.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will deal with my noble friend’s second point first. There are decisions of the domestic courts here that support the fact that you cannot bring prosecutions for what was the unlawful sexual intercourse offence under Section 6, nor can you even bring a prosecution for sexual assault based on the same facts, because that would transgress the prohibition in Article 7. As regards the time limit, Section 9 of the 2003 Act has no time limitations in it, which is the usual principle of criminal offences in this country, but for this tiny cohort of behaviour—it really is very small—you could not prosecute under Section 9 because of Article 7. Section 6 no longer exists, and you cannot get round it by using Section 9, but it really is a very small number of cases.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in addition, these offences are so serious that they would not be prosecuted in the magistrates’ court; they would be indictable offences, would they not?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite correct: this has nothing to do with magistrates’ court time limits. There was a statutory time limit contained within Section 6 of the 1956 Act that said that all prosecutions for offences under Section 6 must be brought within 12 months in any court. It is nothing to do with the time limits in the Magistrates’ Courts Act.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am of course more than happy to write to my noble friend, and it must be my fault I am not explaining this properly. There is no time limit for prosecutions brought under Section 9 generally, unless it refers to particular behaviour—so that would be an offence committed against a girl aged between 13 and 15—that took place before the repeal of the 1956 Act and the bringing into force of the 2003 Act. You could not prosecute that under Section 9 because the time limit has expired for bringing it under Section 6, in the same way that you cannot prosecute for sexual assault for the same behaviour because you cannot bring a prosecution under Section 6. I had better write, because I can see from the puzzled look on my noble friend’s face that I have not explained it very well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Perhaps the noble Baroness could also include in that letter reference to what is either a decision of the Appellate Committee or the Supreme Court—I think it is the former—which addresses this and explains precisely why those who are alleged to have committed offences before the relevant dates are protected by the 1956 Act and continue to be so.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick for commencing this discussion and debate. A number of views have been expressed in Committee today and some go wider than the amendments that are before us. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, raised a number of issues which go beyond what is before us. My noble friend Lady Ritchie also touched on the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie. It is clear that there are differing views in the Committee—from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on the Front Bench opposite—which tells me that this is a truly complex area where there are very different legislative options open and where the Government need to consider very carefully what needs to be done.

The Government are absolutely committed to tackling the harms associated with prostitution and sexual exploitation, including where it takes place online. This is an important part of our work on tackling violence against women and girls which, as colleagues in the Committee will know, is a top government priority, and about which we will be saying more shortly. But we need to look at the evidence. We have limited evidence as to what will most effectively reduce demand for prostitution and disrupt exploitation without—and this is the key point that came out of some of the contributions—unintentionally causing harm to victims and survivors and making life more difficult for those who choose that lifestyle. I say to my noble friend that the Government are not in a position to accept the amendments today, but I want to make it absolutely clear that we are in the business of taking steps to tackle sexual exploitation and to gather evidence to inform further interventions in the future.

Amendment 310 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie would make it an offence to assist, facilitate, or control the prostitution of another person, regardless of whether the individual secures any personal gain from this facilitation. The broad wording of this offence could—and again this echoes what the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, said—have an adverse consequence for people who choose to be engaged in prostitution, for example, by criminalising professionals such as healthcare support workers, charities which provide sexually transmitted infections testing or those providing contraception or safety planning. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made a compelling case around some of the issues that the Government have reflected on in relation to that amendment. My noble friend Lady Goudie’s amendment would also make it a criminal offence to operate a website hosting adverts for prostitution, and I will come back to that again in a moment, if I may.

My noble friend Lady Ritchie, in Amendments 316A and 316B, would introduce new criminal offences to tackle the sale of personalised sexual content online, including audiovisual and visual content. Amendment 316A would make it an offence to own, manage or facilitate one of these online platforms, while Amendment 316B would create an offence of causing or inciting an individual to sell personalised sexual content on these platforms. It would also introduce a duty on the online platform to remove personalised sexual content within 24 hours if an individual is convicted of the offence and if an individual who is incited to sell the content has requested its removal.

The Government recognise very strongly that we need to take action to tackle these websites. The so-called pimping websites need to be addressed and tackled. However, I would argue that criminalising those websites may have safety implications for people who sell sex and may result in displacement to on-street prostitution, which is more dangerous for individuals. It may also disrupt policing operations. The police can scan adult service websites for signs of vulnerability and exploitation and to gain data to support criminal investigations.

I accept that members of the Committee might want government Ministers to say that, but Changing Lives, an organisation supporting people who have been sexually exploited, also advocates against criminalising adult service websites. Instead, it is calling for stronger regulation, more referral mechanisms and more funding to support people affected by exploitation.

Amendment 311 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie would make it an offence for an individual to pay for or attempt to pay for sex either for themselves or on behalf of others. The Government have looked in detail at this approach in other countries which have taken it and have seen indications that the law can be misused to harass and victimise people engaged in prostitution. Again, that is a matter for debate and discussion, but that is the view the Government currently take.

Amendment 312, in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie, would repeal the offence in Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 which criminalises a person aged 18 or over who persistently loiters or solicits

“in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution”.

Amendment 313 would disregard prior convictions and cautions. There may be some common ground here, because I absolutely recognise the concern that this offence may criminalise vulnerable individuals and restrict their opportunities for employment. However, I am also mindful that on-street prostitution can have an impact on local communities, and it is important that we consider their views.

My noble friend Lady Goudie, were she able to be here, would say that the criminal law rightly evolved in 2015 to make it clear that children cannot be prostitutes and that any child who is paid in exchange for sex is clearly a victim of child sexual exploitation. Therefore, I would argue that it is long overdue that individuals issued cautions or convictions for the offence in Section 1 of the Street Offences Act before 2015 have their criminal records expunged.

The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, asked for details. I simply repeat: children cannot be prostitutes. Children who are paid in exchange for sex are clearly victims of sexual exploitation. The records currently in place provide significant barriers to the employment and psychological rehabilitation of those who are now adults. It is important that we look at the long-term consequences of those incidences and help support them in rebuilding their lives. That is why we have tabled government Amendment 308, which will disregard convictions and cautions for Section 1 offences issued to under 18s. Amendment 309 will provide pardons for such convictions and cautions.

In each case, what we have tried to do—I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will reflect on this—is to ensure that the disregard and pardon are automatic. We do not want to retraumatise victims and survivors of childhood abuse by requiring them to go through an application process. I asked today in our internal Home Office discussions how many individuals this could impact. We have looked at the figures for the last 30 years and assess that 350 to 352 individuals would fall under the auspices of that. Someone aged under 18 30 years ago is now approaching their 50s. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that for that person an offence committed as a child would still be on their record. Something they maybe did not have responsibility for at the time would therefore impact upon their employment and life chances. Therefore, I would welcome his support for that repeal.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely support what the Minister is putting forward. Is it the intention of the Home Office to track down these 350 or so individuals and notify them of the consequences of this legislation when it is enacted?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We will reflect on that, but, as I said, the disregard and pardon will be automatic, so it will happen if the Bill receives the support of both Houses and Royal Assent. I will reflect on what the noble Lord said, because there may be an opportunity to consider that. However, I do not want to commit to it today, because we do not necessarily know where someone who was that age in 1995 is now—the address, contact details and so on might all be different. The key point is that this is an automatic disregard for those individuals, so if publicity is given to this new clause and the Bill receives Royal Assent, it will potentially lift a burden for those who were under 18 at the time.

The Government cannot share in the support for repeal of the Section 1 offence for those over 18, and I can give reasons for that. We will consider in future, if the Section 1 offence is repealed in its entirety, whether the disregard and pardon should be extended to adults, because that is a separate issue. However, today I wanted to focus on those under 18.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 315 seeks to do something very simple but long overdue: automatically commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. The Act requires the Government to pass a statutory instrument to commence its provisions. We have been waiting two years now for this SI, so the Act is not in force. Of the four sections in the Act, the only one in force is Section 4, on the extent, commencement and Short Title of the Act.

As with other groups this evening, this amendment has a cross-party background. It is worth noting and giving credit to Greg Clark, the former MP for Tunbridge Wells, because this was his Private Member’s Bill, sponsored by him and given time by the then Conservative Government. Greg said he had heard some harrowing experiences of school students in his constituency. It is really shocking that one in three girls reports being sexually harassed while wearing a school uniform. In our society in 2025, that is unacceptable. The 2023 Act creates a new specific offence of harassment on account of an individual’s sex.

The amendment to this Bill was tabled in the Commons by my honourable friend Mike Martin MP, who is now the MP for Tunbridge Wells. Like Greg Clark, Mike Martin believes that the Government need to create the statutory instrument to bring it into effect, but there has been nothing other than warm words from Ministers—no action has happened. The Act criminalises harassing, following, shouting degrading words or making obscene gestures at women and girls in public places with the deliberate intention of causing them harm or distress. This offence will carry a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and under the Government’s new proposal would clearly still come under the magistrates’ courts, whereas in the past it would have not been able to, but would have had to go to a Crown Court. As Mike Martin MP said in the Commons debate, sexual harassment is a blot on our society.

The statistics are damning. Some 71% of women in the UK have experienced sexual harassment in public; this rises to 86% among women aged 18 to 24. The lack of action from this Government on ending the sexual harassment of women, especially young women, is not good. Mike Martin MP tabled a Written Question on this back in the spring, and the Government said then that they would publish their next steps. However, more recently, the Government said that it will be done in due course. To be honest, this sounds as though it is further away than the next-steps offer made earlier this year. The amendment says that now is the time.

Greg Clark’s Private Member’s Bill had cross-party support and this amendment also had cross-party support when the Bill was debated in the Commons. I worry that this Government cannot deliver on their manifesto commitment to halve violence against women and girls when they will not take this straightforward first step to challenge and prevent the appalling sex-based harassment that continues to be so evident everywhere in the UK. I look forward to the Minister’s reply but, above all, I urge that now is the time for action on this matter. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness’s amendment for the reasons she gives and for a further reason, which is that I deprecate the practice of Ministers of all Governments of not bringing into force legislation which has been enacted by Parliament. Parliament intends legislation to come into effect; otherwise, we are wasting our time debating and approving it. Parliament enacts legislation to address a mischief, as, in this case, the mischief that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has identified. Of course, I understand that sometimes time is needed to prepare for the effects of legislation, perhaps because implementing regulations are needed, but after two years, it is high time for this legislation to come into force.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment exposes the indefensible gap between Parliament’s clear intent and women’s lived reality. The new offence was deliberately framed to capture deliberate, targeted and deeply damaging conduct, with a suitably serious maximum penalty, but without commencement, there are no consequences for offenders and no visible progress for the public. The Government’s delay sits uneasily alongside their stated ambition to halve violence against women and girls, particularly given previous assurances that implementation would follow swiftly as part of their wider strategy.

From these Benches, the message is simple: Parliament has already done the hard work in legislating; what is now required is immediate commencement, not further consultation or prevarication, so that this cross-party achievement can finally begin to offer real protection on the streets and in public spaces.

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On my amendments to delete summary trials, as the Committee knows, I am always an advocate for much harsher penalties and feel that the vile abuse of animals should be a Crown Court matter. However, I will not persist with that either, and I trust the judgment of the noble Lords who have tabled the excellent proposed new clause. For all these reasons, I will not seek to press any of my amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, since the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, have said that this is not an easy subject, I remind the Committee of what happened when Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on sex with animals was debated in this House in Committee on 1 April 2003. I draw attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said on that occasion:

“I hope that this matter is not something that most noble Lords come across. As we rarely have the opportunity to talk about such subjects, it seems right to ensure that any possible imperfections in the wording are covered, however difficult it may be to talk about them”.—[Official Report, 1/4/03; col. 1186.]


That wise advice applies today.

The prohibition of sex with animals has a long history. It was proscribed in Leviticus, chapter 18, verse 23. Coke’s 17th-century Institutes of the Lawes of England, volume 3, page 59, refer to the criminal offence by a “great Lady” who

“committed Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has explained, the limits of Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act, like its predecessors, are that it covers only some sexual activity—penile penetration of the vagina or anus of the animal or of a human being by an animal—and does not apply to sexual activity with a dead animal. The exclusion of sex with a dead animal is particularly odd, as the next section of the 2003 Act, Section 70, does make it a criminal offence to engage in penetrative sex with a human corpse. The amendment would extend the scope of the offence to cover all “sexual activity” with an animal or using an animal for sexual gratification.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, has sought to define sexual activity in this context with a degree of precision in proposed new subsection (2), but has also left room for debate by stating that sexual activity “includes” what is specified. Of course, sexual activity is as broad as the human imagination. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be preferable for an amendment to the law not to attempt a legislative Kama Sutra of possibilities but rather to adopt the approach seen in other sections of the 2003 Act.

The 2003 Act already uses the concept of “sexual activity”, for example in Section 4, and Section 78 provides a general definition of sexual activity. Sexual activity, says Section 78, means what a reasonable person would regard as sexual in nature, irrespective of the defendant’s purpose in relation to it. There is a slightly different definition in Section 71 relating to sexual activity in a lavatory, and I confess that I have not fully understood why Parliament in 2003 used a slightly different definition in that context. However, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be better to have a portmanteau phrase, “sexual activity”, so defined, which is already the approach that the 2003 Act takes in Sections 4 and 78.

I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will not pursue his original wish to substitute the term “bestiality”. My understanding is that, as a matter of law, bestiality is confined to penile penetration of the vagina or anus, which is contrary to the admirable intention of the noble Lord, Lord Black, to broaden the scope of the legislation.

It may also be helpful to include a definition of an “animal” in the new clause by cross-reference to other statutory definitions. As the Committee will know, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 provides by Section 1 that it applies to vertebrates other than man, but there is a power by regulations to extend the protection to cover classes of invertebrates. The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 covers, in addition to non-human vertebrates, molluscs and crustaceans. I doubt—the noble Lord, Lord Black, may have broader knowledge than me —whether sexual activity with a mollusc or a crustacean is a mischief which the Bill needs to address.

I have one final point. As was mentioned, this amendment would increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the Section 69 offence from two years to five years. I am doubtful about that. I would expect that defendants who are found guilty of the sexual abuse of animals nowadays are, as they always were, sad, pathetic individuals who need help rather than a lengthy prison sentence of more than two years. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister whether in any of the cases under the current Section 69 in the last few years any defendant has received a sentence of two years, or whether any judge has complained that the current sentencing powers of a maximum of two years are inadequate.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 316 from the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just taken my entire speech away from me, so I will not quote Coke’s. I thank him for what he has said. He is a lawyer and he has tried to help with this.

On the point of this amendment—I declare an interest as a vice-chair of the APPG on Cats—the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, has our support on animal welfare, and indeed he has been driving this for a number of years via a number of APPGs. So the essence of what he is trying to do is right. The comments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made are helpful: perhaps when we get to another place, we will have a better-worded amendment that carries more support.

For me, the reason I am supporting this is because of the animal side, but there is evidence that the abuse of animals leads to abuse of children. That link is clear, and there is evidence from everywhere that that is where it starts, but it ends with children and young people.

That is why this amendment, difficult as it is to speak about, is vital. When the evidence is there of a cause leading to a different cause that is worse, the amendment should get the support of this House and the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is right; he is trying to right a wrong and he understands the points of law. His principle is right: this does need resolving, and it is an important issue to animal lovers. Lots of animal lovers in this country have no idea that this is going on around them. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may be right, in that some of the people in question are poor people who are not part of society; but there are also those who kill animals for videos and live feeds, to be watched for money. That is going on all around the world; it is not just an English problem.

There is a bigger picture. This is not just about an unfortunate person abusing an animal; like everything else in today’s debate, it is a wider society problem. I hope that people approach this with the gravitas it deserves. Animal abuse is one thing; but transferring that to children and young people is equally important. That is why I support the amendment.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not think anyone could disagree that this is a deeply troubling and uncomfortable issue. I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Black, for moving his amendment, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Cameron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their contributions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Black, for sharing a copy of his speech with me yesterday—it was helpful and informative.

The Government are committed to protecting animals and holding to account those who abuse animals. I listened with care to the concerns raised by the noble Lord. These are horrible offences. That said, we believe that the criminal law as a whole already provides sufficient powers to tackle the sexual abuse of animals as well as the robust offences to tackle child sexual abuse and domestic abuse.

I pause here to say that while this is not a laughing matter in any way at all, I shall long remember the striking description of the Kama Sutra of sexual offences against animals given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will have to write to him about the sentences imposed for animal abuse, although I am rather minded to agree with those noble Lords who spoke about the fact that there are pathetic individuals but there are also some really wicked ones out there as well.

As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has said, sexual abuse of animals causes them suffering. It is therefore possible to prosecute sexual acts involving animals under broader animal cruelty offences, which bring with them additional powers for the courts to impose orders on offenders.

As the noble Lord said, this is in addition to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The latter two offences are listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, meaning that if convicted, individuals are automatically subject to the notification requirements, which is colloquially known as being on the sex offenders register.

We acknowledge that the law in this area is set out across a number of different offences. However, we believe that, taken together, these offences ensure that there is sufficient coverage of the sexual abuse of animals in criminal law. We are not persuaded at present that these amendments would substantially increase protection for animals or for people who are victims of sexual abuse. There is plainly coexistence of the two groups of offences. We are less sure that there is evidence for a causative link between the two.

Having said that, I welcome the evidence that the noble Lord shared in his speech. To that end, I would welcome a discussion with him in the coming weeks to look at the issues he has raised; first, in relation to the need for specific further offences and, secondly, the evidence in relation to the possible causative links between the two groups of offending.

My notes say that I will now turn to Amendments 316ZA to 316ZE, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but I shall not turn to those, as the noble Lord does not intend to press them. I am grateful to him for his temperate and constructive comments on this issue.

I was going to say that I would be happy to meet with either or both of the noble Lords to discuss any evidence suggesting that there are gaps in the law. That offer still holds good. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Does she not agree, however, that it is arbitrary in the extreme that Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 addresses sex with animals, but that it covers only specific, very limited forms of sexual activity? If you are going to have a specific offence, surely it should cover a wider range of sexual activity with animals, not just the limited categories that we have discussed.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The Government are satisfied that, when looked at as a whole, all the possible offences here cover the conduct complained of. However, I am conscious that there are ways of committing sexual offences that have not necessarily occurred to the draftsmen of earlier legislation. The best that I can offer the noble Lord is that I will reflect on the matter. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry again to rather disagree with my noble friend, although I have some sympathy with the underlying problem. I declare an interest in that I have three electric bikes, all of them, I hope, with fully approved batteries. One is the Brompton, on which I go from King’s Cross to this place—very good it is too, and, I hope, wholly safe.

There is a problem with batteries—my noble friend has addressed it—and particularly with regard to fires. Personally, I try never to charge a battery in a house, even with my bikes, which were both expensive and, I hope, very good. There is a problem with them that needs to be addressed, but the real problem with the amendment is that, other than providing the occasion for inspecting the battery, there is no obvious relationship between the criminal offences specified in the proposed new clause and looking at the battery. There is no necessary or, indeed, probable connection between the battery and the offence, so I am very much against linking those criminal offences with the inspection of the battery. Moreover, as my noble friend has said, the enforcement problems are very great here, because most or many of these batteries are bought online, and trying to identify the contract of supply would be next to impossible.

However, my noble friend is right to draw attention to the danger of batteries which are inherently unsafe, and right too to draw attention to the fact that people are disconnecting the controls on their bicycles so that they can go very much faster than the law allows. Those are matters which should be addressed by the Government, but not, I think, via this particular amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, it is of course a criminal offence to ride your e-bike at more than a specified rate. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he rides any of his e-bikes, complies with those requirements at all times. But if it is already an offence to ride a bike at more than a specified speed, it must surely already be an offence to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling the rider to break the law. I do not understand why that is not already a criminal offence.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am afraid I disagree. On the roads, it is certainly an offence to use an e-bike beyond a certain speed—I think it is 15 miles an hour—but, of course, e-bikes are also used for off-road purposes, and at that point, the speed regulations are not in play.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Then the answer to the problem is to ensure that the speed limits apply whenever the e-bike is used. I fail to understand why it is a criminal offence to use your e-bike above a specified speed on the road, but not on the pavement. It seems ridiculous.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I use one of my e-bikes to go around my fields. In fact, I do not go at more than 15 mph because, first, I would fall off; secondly, it is not necessary; and thirdly, the bike cannot do so. However, I cannot see why, as a matter of principle, I should be restrained from going at more than 15 mph on my own land.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I do not want to prolong this, but the purpose of this amendment is not to regulate the speed of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on his field. The concern is e-bike riders on pavements, and I suggest that the answer is to ensure that people cannot ride more than a specified speed on the pavements, if at all. Of course, they are not allowed to ride on the pavement at all, so they should not be doing so. The point, surely, is that if there is a specified speed limit, it is already a criminal offence to conspire to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling e-bike riders to break the speed limit.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, we have heard some jolly clever speeches. It seems to me that the general point of this group of amendments, and indeed the previous one, is to bring this matter of great public concern to the attention of the Government during this debate. We are not now, this afternoon, looking for statutory perfection; we are looking for the Government to pay attention, and every one of us, be it my noble friend Lord Goschen walking here, or my noble friend Lord Hailsham riding at a reasonable speed from King’s Cross to this place, has our own experiences and anecdotal stories to inform the House and this debate.

I really do not think we need to get stuck in the weeds; we just need to get the Government to be a little braver. Yes, they should read out the departmental notes they have in front of them, but they should also realise that this is a matter of real and pressing public concern. The use of e-cycles by drug dealers and others, who wear the stolen uniforms of respectable companies to deliver drugs here, there and everywhere, with no lights on their bikes, wearing balaclavas and dark clothing, at night, placing themselves and other road users in danger, is a matter of deep concern. That is what we need to get across to the Government, and I hope they will take the general point on board, even if they disapprove of the niceties of the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Shinkwin and Lord Blencathra.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I think that noble Lords and Ministers are getting the message from nearly all sides of the Committee—apart from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that there is a real problem here that the Government are not addressing.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely accept that there is mischief here. My comments were addressed at the specifics of the amendment—but I accept that there is a problem that needs to be addressed.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government are keen to discourage racial abuse against individuals who are doing their job, and that is what Clauses 107 to 109 do. The clauses set out in legislation a broad thrust of definitions. Ultimately, in these cases, police and health workers usually have body-worn cameras on and the police will judge evidential material to determine whether they wish to refer it to the CPS. The CPS will review the incident that has led to the potential referral and determine whether it meets the evidential threshold and is worthy of prosecution. Then, if it comes before a court, it will be for that court to determine whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.

With all that, it is not a simple matter of us passing the legislation; it is also a matter of the judgment of police officers, CPS officials and ultimately a judge or jury in determining the outcome of those cases. As with most legislation, I want none of this to go to court. I want it to change the behaviour of people who are looking at a charge of using racially abusive language not on the street but in their home. I hope it sets a minimum standard, which is what this Parliament should be about, in saying that we will not tolerate this. That is why I support the inclusion of the clauses.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very strong case as to the principle behind these clauses, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. But will he address the specific concern of the Constitution Committee that the language used in these provisions—the concepts of “insulting” and “distress”—is too broad?

As he knows, the Constitution Committee concluded:

“These clauses should be drawn more narrowly and the Government should more clearly define the terminology within the Bill”.


Will the Government reflect on that before Report and come back with a more precise definition in these provisions?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As ever, we will reflect on what has been said. The judgment we have made is as in the clauses before this House, as introduced and supported by the House of Commons. There will be opportunity, if the noble Lord so wishes, to table amendments on Report to reflect any view that he has, but this is the judgment we have made.

The principle of today’s discussion is that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, believes we should strike out these clauses. That is not a principle I can accept—I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on that. Whatever reflection takes place on this, our principle is that we have included these clauses for a purpose, which I hope I have articulated, and I wish for the Committee to support that principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I have not taken part in this Bill before, but I do so now because I have been closely connected with someone who was treated by a so-called psychotherapist and removed from her family as a result. These people do something almost inconceivable. They get inside people’s minds and teach them totally false memories, so they begin to imagine that their parents have abused them and behaved in appalling ways which are entirely untrue. They believe it and as long as they go on with the so-called therapy, they are imprisoned by these wicked people.

This is done for two reasons: money and control. I very much agree with what has just been said, but I do not wish that to be yet another excuse for not accepting this amendment. There are far too many people in this country being destroyed for money and power by wicked people, and our law does not protect them. We have now discussed this so often, so long and so convincingly that frankly, I want to beg the Minister: please do not be another Minister who finds a reason for not doing this. Because if so, he allows yet more young people to have their lives destroyed by some of the most evil people I have ever come across.

I think my contribution was worth while, not just because I have personal and direct connection with someone who was in this condition, but because I want to assure the House that there is no need to worry on a religious ground. I think I am known to have very strong religious views, and I do not think this is going to cause problems for any legitimate religious organisation. There may be some problems from some pretty illegitimate religious organisations such as the Moonies and the Scientologists, but the truth is these people work on their own. They are individuals and they do this for money. I beg the Minister not to let this chance go to protect the most vulnerable young people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the other speakers have established that there is a very real mischief here. My concern is about the width of this amendment. If it is going to be brought back on Report, either by the Minister or by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it really needs to be more specific. It is very broad in the concepts it uses, such as the concept of “psychological harm” and whether

“the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable”.

It seems to me that the mischief here is people who provide psychotherapy or counselling services in bad faith or dishonestly, and we need to have an amendment which more specifically addresses that mischief. The French legislation to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred was much more specific and tailored than what we have here.

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have inspired me to speak. I support the amendment and would add another set of people who do exactly the same: spiritual faith healers. They do coercive and controlling behaviour and target the most vulnerable. They do all the things mentioned. In certain minority ethnic communities, they will target vulnerable women, for example, and take large amounts of cash from them. I do not expect noble Lords to amend this proposed new clause to add those sets of people, because they obviously want to maximise their chances of getting their clause through, but they have inspired me to think about replicating their amendment and perhaps proposing it for future legislation. So the Minister can expect a letter from me to discuss this further—which also amounts to spiritual abuse.

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[Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my support for these probing amendments and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her work on this issue. I strongly welcome the Government’s promise to launch the largest crackdown in history to reduce violence against women and girls. While of course the misery of experiencing violence and harassment is not exclusive to women, surveys from the TUC and others have shown that it is overwhelmingly women who suffer this abuse. I also welcome the Government’s recognition that we need a whole-system approach that places prevention and survivors at its heart. As we have heard already, every part of society has to step up if we are to achieve the goal of every woman feeling safe everywhere, and that must include action to make the workplace a place of safety for women, too.

I had hoped that we had moved on from the notion that violence against women is somehow a private or domestic matter, but let us take the practical example of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations. This is the UK’s health and safety law that requires employers to report specific serious work-related incidents, such as fatalities and major injuries, to the Health and Safety Executive. These reports help the HSE track risks and prevent future harm, making it a vital legal duty to maintain workplace safety and accountability. But, if you look at it today, you see that the HSE website explicitly states that, while acts of violence to a person at work that result in death or a major injury are reportable, a physical injury inflicted on one employee by another during a dispute about a so-called “personal matter”, or an employee at work

“being injured by a relative or a friend who visits them at work about a domestic matter”

is not reportable. So, the HSE has no responsibility to track violence against women that happens in the workplace which is deemed to be a personal or domestic matter. I find that pretty shocking. You have to question why women’s experience of violence at work is disregarded in this way.

As we have also heard, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has responsibility for the duty on employers to prevent sexual harassment, but it is open and public that it will investigate only what it describes as “strategic cases”, as it simply does not have adequate resources to deliver comprehensive enforcement. Surely, health and safety inspectors who have the powers and ability to go into workplaces have a role to play in enforcing prevention of sexual harassment.

The UK has fallen far behind the ILO’s recommended standard for the ratio of labour inspectors to the size of workforce. In effect, the safety and welfare of British workers has been deprioritised over the last decade and more compared with other countries. But it seems that the safety and welfare of women workers have been deprioritised even more. There is an opportunity for an update and a reset. The new fair work agency and boosting the number of labour inspectors will be vital, but we must get the health and safety framework right, too. For the sake of women workers, I hope the Minister will talk to other colleagues, for sure, but also give careful consideration to the amendments before us.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the objective of Amendment 348—who would not support the objective of preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace? I suspect that the main argument against Amendment 348 will be the burden that it would impose on employers, particularly small ones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made that point very eloquently.

I will briefly identify one reason why it is very much in the interests of the employer to have these duties. It is because if there is illegal violence and harassment in the workplace which causes, as it will, damage to the victim, she—and it normally will be she—will be looking for remedies, and the person against whom she is most likely to be advised to sue is not the rogue other employee but the employer. The employer is particularly vulnerable to such a civil claim if they have not, as required by Amendment 348—which no doubt can be improved in its drafting—conducted any sort of assessment to identify potential risks, have not implemented policies and procedures to eliminate those risks, and, in particular, have not provided at least basic training to all employees on the importance of these matters. So, yes, this will impose a burden on employers, particularly small ones, but it is very much in their interests to protect themselves against legal liability and to deter such action taking place.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments ask employers not only to react when something goes wrong but to look ahead, identify the risks and take sensible steps to prevent harm before it happens. That is especially important for women and those in insecure or public-facing roles, who we know are more likely to be targeted and less likely to feel safe reporting what has happened to them.

The statistics are damning. There were nearly 700,000 incidents last year alone, with attacks on lone workers surging by 132% over three years. We strongly support the aim of these amendments; however, as we did previously, we have questions around how a duty to eliminate risks, so far as reasonably practicable, would work in small businesses on tight margins. Layering new mandates on top of existing duties under the Equality Act and employment law risks confusion, which could dilute accountability. This is not an argument against doing more, but a practical issue which needs to be addressed.

There is also a wider cultural point. Legislation can set clear expectations, but workers will be safer only if staff feel confident to report incidents and these reports lead to action, not to victims being sidelined or blamed. Training, confidential reporting routes and proper follow-up, all mentioned in the amendments, are not extras; they are essential if any new duty is to change what has sadly become everyday reality for many people just trying to do their jobs.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the right to protest, like most of the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, requires a balance. A balance is required here between the rights of protesters and the rights of others.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, may not wish to recognise that, but there are other rights that need to be balanced against the rights of protesters. For her to dismiss as “nonsense” the noble Lord’s concerns will trouble many people here in this Committee, because the protester has to accept that there are other rights and interests that need to be taken into account. So, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on this issue.

I am also unpersuaded that we need Amendment 369, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has eloquently advanced today. I doubt it because, as he rightly says, it echoes almost word for word what is in Article 11, read with Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is already part of our law under the Human Rights Act. I am very doubtful that we need an express statutory provision that repeats what is already part of the law of this land.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I draw the Committee’s attention to my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. I will speak about Amendments 369 and 371 in the name of my colleague and noble friend Lord Marks.

Protest is the lifeblood of any vibrant democracy, and in the United Kingdom it is one of the most powerful ways for ordinary citizens to make their voices heard. Our democratic system depends not only on elections but on the active participation of the people between elections. Protest is essential because it allows us to challenge decisions, hold leaders accountable and demand change when systems seem slow or unresponsive.

Throughout our history, protest has driven meaningful progress. Universal male suffrage in Britain was pushed forward by mass movements such as the Chartists and later reform campaigns which used strikes, mass meetings and demonstrations to pressure Parliament into extending the franchise and paying MPs so that working-class men could serve. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I imagine those were quite inconvenient to a few people. Women’s suffrage in the UK was won by the suffragettes only after decades of marches, processions, civil disobedience and hunger strikes, culminating in the Representation of the People Act.

Peaceful protest educates the public, sparks debate and creates the pressure necessary for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society. However, our right to protest is, as has already been said, under relentless attack. Through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, the previous Government introduced multiple restrictions on our precious right to protest. Then last year, the current Government found a way to further suppress peaceful demonstrations by misusing terrorism legislation to stop protests. This led to 2,700 arrests of mostly elderly people who were protesting about what was happening in Gaza. We had the bizarre sight, week after week, of police arresting vicars and old ladies in Parliament Square when they posed no threat whatever to anyone.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I just point out to the noble Lord, if he will allow me to, that these people were not arrested for expressing a view about Gaza? They were arrested for supporting Palestine Action, which is a violent terrorist group.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.

The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.

There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.

It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.

On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.

On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.

In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:

“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.


In paragraph 64, he said:

“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.


Paragraph 65, says:

“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.


The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:

“The intolerable has become normalised”.


That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.

Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.

I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.

Clause 122(2) says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—


(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,


(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or


(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”


to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.

I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.

Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.

In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.

The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything

“that is more than minor”,

in particular to

“the making of a journey”

or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,

including access to

“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.

That is what the regulations say in redefining

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.

Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.

I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.

There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.

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I hope that the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may well assess further whether the powers existing in the 1986 Act are still fit for purpose. As I said, if there are any recommendations from the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the Government will consider them, and there will be further opportunities potentially if we agree to legislate at a later date, but not within the Bill. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in what has been an interesting, complex—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and their understandable concerns about the protests outside the Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill by saying that this is a matter for the police. Have the Government no position on whether it is acceptable for people who are dining in an Israeli-owned restaurant to be subject to abuse and intimidation of the sort that we have seen on London streets?

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I am concerned a little about cumulative impact. I see that we cannot necessarily have counter demonstrations too close to each other, but I am not sure that saying “This area has had enough demonstrations for a while, they need to move somewhere else” finds the mark. I would advise being a little bit more precise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, suggested, and in particular looking back at how we solved the issue around abortion clinics as a way of solving the issue of protests close to religious centres.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Polak, in thanking my noble friend Lord Walney for all his hard work and leadership in seeking to secure a fairer balance in this context. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I positively welcome government Amendment 372, because it will ensure that the police must take account of cumulative disruption when exercising their power to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies.

The amendment will be, and is, particularly welcomed by synagogues and their members, whose access to and from Saturday prayers has been regularly disrupted by hostile, abusive and intimidating crowds of protesters. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that we should look at intention here, but whether that is the intention of the protestors, it is the effect, and it is very damaging to the right—and it is a right—of worship.

With great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, should recognise that there are competing rights here. There is not just the right to protest but the right to go to a synagogue, to have access to a synagogue, to be able to leave a synagogue, and not to be deterred by hundreds of abusive protesters protesting in favour of a particular cause. The noble Lord made the point that cumulative protests may be very effective, and I am sure he is right about that in many contexts. However, the point of government Amendment 372 is not to stop protests or people expressing their view about matters of public policy. The question concerns where the protest takes place, and why it is necessary to go past the same synagogue with hundreds of people every Saturday, preventing those who wish to exercise their right of religious observance—and their right to get there and to leave—doing so peacefully and securely. Yes, protest, but you do not have to do it in the same place, along the same street, every week. The street has no significance for the protester, but it has a real significance for those who want to go to the synagogue.

The noble Lord, Lord Hain, says that the right to protest is not in conflict with the right to religious observance, and he is right. The problem arises, as here, where the protesters go along the same road each week. As I say, they do not have to go along that road; they can protest somewhere else, and that is what this amendment is concerned to achieve.

The amendment would reintroduce, with an improvement, the secondary legislation introduced by the previous Government which was held to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal in a case brought by Liberty. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, the secondary legislation was held unlawful by reason of matters other than cumulative disruption. The Court of Appeal did not say that the cumulative disruption provisions in the statutory instrument were unlawful. It said that other parts of the statutory instrument that sought to define the circumstances in which protest was unacceptable were unlawful, not those on cumulative disruption. Amendment 372 is an improvement on what the previous Government introduced because it imposes a duty on the police to have regard to cumulative disruption. The statutory instrument introduced by the previous Government merely conferred a discretion.

I turn to Amendments 373 to 378 from the Opposition Front Bench. I am grateful to the Opposition Front Bench for producing these amendments, which would vary the criteria in government Amendment 372 by focusing attention, for the purposes of cumulative disruption, not on the geographical area in which the public procession or assembly is repeatedly held but on whether the repeated procession or assembly concerns “the same subject matter”.

I recognise that these amendments are well motivated, but I do not support them. The vice of cumulative disruption is that it occurs repeatedly in the same geographical area—for example, in the same street near the synagogue—and causes disruption every Saturday. To focus on whether the repeated protests concern “the same subject matter” misses the point. I am also concerned that legislating with reference to the same subject matter will inevitably provoke disputes over how the police should apply such a criterion. Protesters would inevitably say that last week’s march was in support of Gaza, this week’s is against the Netanyahu Government and next week’s is against the policy of the Trump Administration. I am very doubtful that a specific reference to 50 metres, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would suffice. It all depends on the size of the protest and the nature of the premises, does it not? This is a context where police discretion is desirable.

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 380, tabled by my noble friend Lord Walney, which would apply the duty to take account of cumulative disruption to the power to prohibit public processions. The same reasoning that justifies the Government’s wish to require cumulative disruption to be considered in relation to the power to impose conditions also justifies a duty to take account of cumulative disruption in relation to the power to ban a public procession.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as one of the vice-chairs of the APPG on Counter Extremism, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in these amendments. He has already referenced the Time to Act publication, which was published late last year and deals with a number of statistics that are quite startling and deserve to go on the record today. It was found that one in five voters— 21%, actually—

“say that political violence in the UK is acceptable in some conditions, and 18% would consider participating in violent protests as the state of Britain declines”.

That is a very concerning thing to read. We know that there has been a nearly 600% rise in antisemitic incidents in the UK following 7 October 2023. We also know that anti-Muslim hate has doubled over this last decade. Those are statistics that cannot be ignored. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, outlined why she finds some difficulty with these amendments, but there is recognition in the report that extremism

“is one of the primary domestic security and societal threats facing the UK”.

When the noble Baroness was detailing some examples of extremism, the noble and right reverend Lord asked why people were not prosecuted. I would argue—and I know that the noble and right reverend Lord will recognise that I have an amendment later in the day—that the glorification of terrorism needs to be much more clearly defined in law. We will come to that later in the amendments. Defeating terrorism is not just about dealing with it from a military point of view but about dealing with the narrative around those terrorist organisations—“draining the swamp”, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would put it. We are allowing glorification to continue on the streets of our country and then not recognising that extremism will grow as a result. I hope that when we come to debate that issue, there will be a good airing of the issues around the glorification of terrorism.

The first thing we need to do in this area is to recognise that there is a problem, and then to define the problem and move on to understand it and deal with it. I very much welcome these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, but I am very doubtful that further legislation is required. There is, as previous speakers have said, a very worrying degree of antisemitic extremist speech, particularly, I am sorry to say, in the Muslim community and not just in speeches in mosques. Opposition to the policies of the Israeli Government—opposition shared by many Jews—cannot begin to justify such speech.

The sort of people who murdered Jews in Heaton Park synagogue come from a community. They have been to school in this country. They are members of mosques. The real question is how the whole community, not only the Muslim community, is going to address this problem. I know, and the Minister will no doubt confirm, that the Government do a great deal to ensure that civic values and the lessons to be learned from the Holocaust are taught in schools, but I fear that much more needs to be done and there really is a responsibility on the leaders of the Muslim community to take further steps to ensure that those lessons are understood.

It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, particularly poignant that this issue is raised on Holocaust Memorial Day, and sad that these matters need to be readdressed. It is a problem in our society; it needs to be dealt with, but, as I say, I am very doubtful that legislation is the answer.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, there is significant public support for Amendment 460. Polling reported in the Telegraph last June found that two-thirds of women supported a return to in-person consultation, while just 4%, a tiny minority, were in favour of continuing with the status quo. Pills by post has been an experiment that has gone wrong, and it is time that we reverse the scheme.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is an exceptionally difficult issue because of the conflicting interests, which cannot, in my view, be balanced.

The first is that under existing law, many women who have recently suffered miscarriages are subject to distressing and intrusive investigations when they have not acted unlawfully. However sensitive the investigation carried out by the police, it will inevitably be intrusive and distressing to the woman concerned. That is the first interest. On the other hand, we have to recognise that there will be women who terminate their pregnancies at a late stage for impermissible reasons, such as was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. We have to recognise that, if Clause 191 is enacted, there may well be more such cases. These are two conflicting interests, and I am very doubtful that either of the proposed compromises is a solution to this problem—that is, the identification by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, of further defences, or the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, of a requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General.

The reason why neither of these compromises works is that they will not prevent the investigations of women who have recently suffered the loss of their child. No view can be taken on whether the defences identified by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, apply or whether it is right and proper for the Attorney-General to give his consent to a prosecution, unless the facts and circumstances of the case are known; so the investigation has to take place, and it will inevitably be distressing to the woman concerned.

Therefore, it seems to me that we simply have to make a policy choice here, and it is a choice between two evils: the evil of the investigation of many, many women in very distressing and sensitive circumstances when they have acted perfectly lawfully, or the evil of allowing the women who have acted improperly not to be prosecuted. We will each have our own view on which is the greater evil.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

There is a further consideration that the noble Lord should perhaps address, and that is the value that Parliament should place on human life.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Of course Parliament should place a value on human life, but it should also, should it not, place a value on the interests of the unfortunate women who have, in the most distressing of circumstances, lost the child they are carrying. Therefore, to talk about the value of human life does not answer the profound dilemma which Parliament faces in addressing Clause 191. There are two evils here and the question is how we best address the problem.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggesting that where sensitive matters are investigated, we should change the law? Let me refer to the case of a coroner investigating a death at home. I can cite an example only last Saturday of a friend of mine who died at home of natural causes, but his wife and family had an investigation and understood it was par for the course. They were very upset at the death of their father and their husband; none the less, the law is required to investigate suspicious deaths even in the most sensitive circumstances.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I take the noble Baroness’s point, and I very much sympathise with those who have been bereaved and who face such an investigation. However, there is a profound difference in what we are considering here, which is an investigation of a woman who has just lost the child she is carrying and who is being investigated with a view to the real possibility of a criminal prosecution of her. We have to recognise that a woman in those circumstances is particularly vulnerable and sensitive. We have to weigh that interest against what I accept is the real concern that there will be women who have acted improperly and unlawfully who will get away with their criminality.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I wonder if what the noble Lord describes, with which I have a great deal of sympathy—I say this as a signatory to Amendment 456—would be ameliorated in terms of the distress of the investigation if the Attorney-General were to adopt guidance, and that guidance set out strict criteria that would at least remove or ameliorate the risk of the distress these investigations can cause. The Attorney-General can define very narrowly the circumstances in which the police would be entitled to do that, can he not?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

He can, but as I have already said, the difficulty is that, however sympathetic the guidance, the circumstances of the woman concerned have to be investigated in order to identify whether her case falls within those criteria. Therefore, the damage he has done to the woman who has recently lost the child is caused, however sensitive the investigation and whatever the criteria. That is the problem.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

The noble Lord says that there is a profound difference. However, there are circumstances—maybe others are aware—where parents lose a very young child in the home to sudden infant death syndrome. In certain of those circumstances, the police have to come through the door. There is no profound difference there: unfortunately, we need to investigate sensitive things, and that is not a reason to not change the law.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely understand and accept that the police will investigate many alleged possible offences in highly sensitive circumstances, but the issue that arises for Parliament, and your Lordships’ House in particular today, is whether we should adopt special criteria where the sensitivity and the distress relate to a woman who has recently lost the child that she is carrying. It is very difficult, in my view—I am obviously not an expert on this; women in the Committee will have a stronger view than I do—but I can understand the real, particular and damaging concern that arises where a woman who has carried her child for however many months loses that child and is then the subject of a criminal investigation. It is difficult to imagine anything that is more distressing to the woman concerned in those circumstances. The Committee therefore has to take a view on this. My current view—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very reasonable case, but is it not really an issue of proportionality and balance? He talks about the level of distress but did not really answer the points made by my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lady Berridge. The fact is that this has affected approximately 100 women in terms of criminal investigations, as against 1.5 million abortions since 2020. That is an important point to make in terms of informing the argument that he is making.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Committee will take its own view on whether I have answered the questions that have been put to me. I do not think that a reference to 1.5 million abortions really takes the argument any further forward.

I recognise the difficulties of this, and each Member of the Committee will have their own view, but my current view is that the nature of the investigations, the distress that they cause and the unlikelihood that they would lead to a prosecution is the paramount consideration. I therefore see great force in Clause 191.

[Baroness Hazarika (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 459C, to which my name is attached. I very much support Clause 191, which I believe would modernise our society, but Amendment 459C would halt ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed abortion offences, no matter when committed. This would tighten up Clause 191 on technical grounds. It would stop ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed offences, no matter when they were committed; currently, Clause 191 applies only to actions after the Bill becomes law.

We are aware of multiple women who have been reported to the police by medical professionals in the months since the House of Commons voted in support of Clause 191. There was a clear signal from that vote—it passed by 397 votes to 137 votes—that Members of Parliament wanted women to stop being targeted. Existing guidance obtained from FoI requests indicates that Parliament cannot rely on police and prosecutors to make the decision to discontinue ongoing cases without a clear legislative process. This amendment would provide clarity for everyone.

I also want to lend my support to Amendment 461J, which my noble friend spoke about. This is about pardoning women with criminal records for abortion offences, in line with the Turing pardon. It also chimes with the scandal of young women who were the victims of the Pakistani grooming gangs, many of whom ended up with criminal records, which I am sure we will all agree was unforgivable.

Many of us in this House have spoken up bravely and passionately about the grooming gang scandal and talked about the plight of those young women and girls, and how vulnerable and alone they were. Well, let me tell you: many of the women who seek an abortion outside the law are often the same girls, and young women who face very similar circumstances. They are desperate. They have often been groomed, abused, violently attacked and raped, and they find themselves in very isolated situations. They do not have a loving partner or a lovely, warm family, and they do not trust the state at this point.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Then I am not terribly attracted by the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am rather more attracted by that of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, although I have heard the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about that.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I assist the noble Baroness? Clause 191 is perfectly clear in that no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. It simply does not affect the criminal offences that are committed by any person, whether a doctor or otherwise, who assists a woman. There are precedents for that distinction in the Suicide Act 1961. The act of suicide is lawful, but it is unlawful to assist.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I do grasp that point, although I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for assisting me. In a broader sense, can it be relied on that Clause 191 would not have a wash effect over the Abortion Act 1967, which has been subjected to various attempts at amendment but has largely held the course since 1967? I understand all the very good reasons for it, but how we can be sure that this decriminalisation of the woman concerned would not ultimately lead to an amendment of the Abortion Act 1967.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Verdirame has explained, my noble friend Lady Wolf cannot be here today, so I will pick up some of her points in this intervention as she is not here to make them herself. If we want to change the law, many say that Clause 191 will improve the situation for women’s bodily autonomy. I am all for that, but only after a considered debate, which we had in the past when we amended the Abortion Act 1967 to bring it into conformity with changing medical science and social attitudes. It is not as though we are stuck in aspic. This Bill is not the place to do so, as the breadth of amendments that this clause has attracted demonstrates.

I will concentrate mainly on the Covid-era regulations which permitted the obtaining of pills by post at any point of gestation, whereas previously, later stages required face-to-face consultation between the pregnant woman and doctors under the Abortion Act. This may have been necessary during lockdown, and it is a failure on the part of the then Government not to have contemplated a review after lockdown ended. As things stand, Clause 191 will facilitate changes where decriminalisation of late-stage and full-term abortions may well create additional dangers to women’s health, as pointed out at Second Reading by numerous noble Lords. It will also open the door to coerce women to seek late-term abortions against their own wishes. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is not in her seat, but I think that is the point that she was trying to get to in her intervention.

If there is no sanction in law, what reason can one give a controlling partner who insists that it is perfectly permissible in law? Decriminalisation suggests that there is nothing to prevent the woman from aborting late-term through the convenience of pills by post, virtually no questions asked. So you have the perverse effect that, alongside the certainty of greater autonomy for women, we may well see the risk of coercive control and deception. I am sure that is not what the movers of this amendment in the other place sought.

My noble friend Lady Wolf made the point that while home-based abortions have become common, they normally use two drugs in the form of pills: mifepristone, which blocks progesterone, needed in pregnancy, but does not kill the foetus; and misoprostol, which basically causes cramping, bleeding and the emptying of the uterus. If taken early in pregnancy, the result is the same as an early miscarriage, in effect, and in England and Wales it is allowable for abortions up to 10 weeks of gestation.

The pills are advertised as simple to use and as creating early miscarriages with bleeding and perhaps some bits of tissue. So the descriptions are reassuring and encouraging. However, the reality may be very different and life-threatening to the woman, who, whatever her reasons for wishing to terminate the pregnancy, may not appreciate the complications. Pills by post do not require further safeguards than those put into place by the 1967 Act other than a phone or virtual call, which is the least satisfactory method of ascertaining stress, emotional distress or, indeed, coercive pressure.

I want to share with the Committee some examples of emotional pressure. Noble Lords may be aware of the case of Stuart Worby in December 2024. I am grateful to the prosecuting counsel, Edmund Vickers KC of Red Lion Chambers, for giving me some background information to this case. I should add, before I say anything further, that the victim is subject to lifelong anonymity.

In December 2024 the judge summed up the details of the case. A central aspect was that the victim married the defendant after the commencement of the pregnancy. He wished to terminate the pregnancy, but she wished to keep her baby, with or without him. He set about securing the termination without her knowledge and used a female friend to obtain abortive drugs from an online private clinic. The judge pointed out that he must have known that this was dangerous for his wife, as he knew she was many weeks past the time limit to use the drugs safely.

When Mr Worby received the drugs, he first added mifepristone to food and drink. The next day he told the victim that he wanted to try something sexually new in bed, which involved blindfolding her and tying her up. The real purpose was to insert the second type of medication, misoprostol, into her vagina. Shortly after he had done that, she became unwell, and the next day she suffered a miscarriage, losing the baby that she so badly yearned for. The judge’s remarks explained that the offence of administering poison to bring about a miscarriage was made more serious by Mr Worby’s prolonged research and planning over many weeks, by his involving others, by bringing about a miscarriage, and by the devastating effect it had on his then wife’s dream of having a child.

This sorry tale attempts to demonstrate that it is not only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the woman who may wish to terminate her pregnancy or the unborn child. There is a further factor here: the partner, the husband or other members of the family who may seek coercion.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. That is a shocking story, but nothing in Clause 191 would affect the criminal liability of the man who behaved in such a disgraceful manner.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I find that very interesting. I am sure it will be a welcome debate among lawyers. I will look into that and take it into consideration when I come back with a renewed amendment on Report.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sorry, but this is simply not a controversial issue. Clause 191 says that

“no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy”.

It simply does not affect the criminal liability of anyone else.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; I was not ready, but it is worth waiting for. This amendment would change the legal test for imposing a respect order, requiring the court to consider this step “necessary and proportionate”, and not merely “just and convenient”, in preventing a person engaging in anti-social behaviour. This small, targeted change would ensure that the test is more proportionately aligned with the potentially serious consequences of these quasi-criminal orders, since a breach can result in up to two years’ imprisonment. It would also better reflect the Government’s stated intention that these orders should be used to tackle the most persistent cases of anti-social behaviour.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noted in Committee, these cases would be adequately covered by a “necessary and proportionate” framework. The Minister says that judges must already take necessity and proportionality into account under the Human Rights Act. If that is so, I struggle to see why that very safeguard cannot be placed transparently in the Bill. This is a critical point, given the well-documented failures of previous anti-social behaviour powers. The evidence shows that, in practice, vague legal tests not only lead to inconsistent decisions: they sometimes deter the courts from using orders.

A more rigorous test would also address concerns about systemic bias. Existing anti-social behaviour powers continue to fall more heavily on minority-ethnic and other disadvantaged groups. Without stronger safeguards, this will almost inevitably be repeated by respect orders. Tightening the test is a modest way to reduce that risk, and will provide greater clarity for all concerned—judges, counsel and victims—as well as those made subject to these orders. It also better aligns the order with the risk assessment duty already outlined in new Section J1 inserted by Clause 1.

In Committee a number of Peers expressed concern about judicial overreach, particularly with tools so sweeping that they can order somebody to do anything described. But the current broad and vague test will do nothing to solve this. In fact, it will make matters worse. The quasi-criminal nature of these orders will invite legal challenge, causing delay in already backlogged courts, potentially clogging the system with marginal cases while doing little for victims of persistent and ongoing anti-social behaviour. A clear necessity and proportionality requirement would sharpen the law, focus efforts on the worst cases and help ensure that respect orders become the tool of choice for serious or repeat anti-social behaviour, rather than just another broad but inconsistently used power added to an already confusing landscape.

I have one final point. In Committee we welcomed the Home Office’s plan to pilot these orders, only to be told that the Government had decided that this was no longer necessary. On that occasion, the Minister informed me that things change. However, since then things appear to have changed again: the latest policy paper says that respect orders will now be piloted before being rolled out nationally. That is obviously very welcome, but I hope that today the Minister can reassure the House that—in this matter, at least—there will be no further changes. One change I strongly advocate is that outlined in Amendment 1. If it sharpens the law, improves enforcement and offers greater protection against injustice for the price of a modest drafting alteration, why resist it? I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. As I understand the Government’s position, they accept that it would not be appropriate to impose such an order unless it is necessary and proportionate, and indeed that is the test applied by the European Convention on Human Rights, so the only question is whether the language of the Bill, and the Act that it will become, should reflect the true test. It seems to me, as it seems to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highly appropriate that what is in the legislation should set out the true test. This has to be applied not just by judges but by police officers, local authorities, communities and everyone who is responsible for considering and enforcing this legislation. Let us put the true and proper test on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, there is a lot in this group. The Government are undoubtedly sincere in wanting to use the Bill to further tackle anti-social behaviour, and such moves to take on this blight on communities will certainly be popular. However, we have to pause a moment and say that there is already a plethora of tools on the statute book designed to tackle anti-social behaviour, and yet it does not seem to be improving. This is the group in which we need to ask why. Perhaps anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions in all their various guises, from community penalty notices to public spaces protection orders, are just not fit for purpose.

I fear that, instead of tackling this, the Government are taking an easy and performative route and affording the state even more of the same—with more draconian powers—under a different label, that of respect orders. They are doing all this with little clarity or evidence of efficacy. That is what the amendments in this group are designed to tackle. By and large, I support them all.

I tabled Amendment 6, which calls for an independent —I stress the word “independent”—review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which should be published prior to the commencement of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act. As legislators, we have an obligation to take responsibility for assessing the impact of, and the evidence about, laws that we made in the past before we duplicate their weaknesses. We need to understand the pros and cons.

This review would look at solving the evidence gap. It is extraordinary that there is significant variation in data captured across relative authorities. Because ASBIs are locally administered in a patchwork of varied use, there is a worrying variation in the types and quality of data collected, the location of that data and the ability of that data to be extrapolated and shared internally or with relevant agencies where appropriate. This is surely a slap across the face of evidence-based policy-making, because without data it is not possible to adequately assess the effectiveness of behaviour orders and to fully understand any trends arising out of their imposition, enforcement or breach, including disproportionate impacts.

That is why Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, which would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data, is so important, as well as Amendment 12 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which calls for an annual report. Both amendments positively try to tackle the limits of the availability of the evidence base, without which I do not know how we can make informed policy decisions.

At present, all the critiques of present behaviour orders are invaluably brought to us from sporadic academic research, FoI-based research led by the likes of Josie Appleton and her team at the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, and the excellent campaign group Justice. They want their work to be made redundant by the Government; they want the Government and officialdom to do their work instead. If the Home Office does not understand its own legislative tools because it does not have the data, the misery of anti-social behaviour will remain untouched while the statute book grows.

I hope the Minister will listen to the front-line workers who have to implement and use these orders and who, reasonably, bemoan the lack of proper consultation with those who understand the ASBI regime in real life. I note the government amendment on consultation, which is welcome.

The majority of practitioners who Justice consulted believe that the new respect orders are unnecessary and replicate flawed laws already available. Only 6% conclude that they will improve outcomes for victims; 82% of respondents to the practitioners survey have called for the review of the existing 2014 Act and of existing powers prior to respect orders being introduced. There was unanimous agreement that the Government should address problems inherent in existing injunctions and orders before creating more, and that failure to properly consult has meant that opportunities to resolve problems with the way orders operate in practice, not on paper, and to increase their effectiveness have been missed. Surely the Minister will want and feel the need to understand why research shows that a significant proportion of CPNs and PSPOs are, for example, being overused for trivial activities, such as feeding the birds, honking horns, gathering in groups or idling in your car, or imposed in inappropriate circumstances against, too often, the homeless and the mentally ill, where the behaviour complained of falls far below the threshold of antisocial behaviour that the public are concerned about and that the 2014 Act was envisaged to tackle.

All that we are asking in these amendments is for the Minister to look at what has gone wrong so that we can improve it. Surely the Government are worried about the vastly varied use of existing orders, which creates a postcode lottery for victims and means that British citizens do not know what is allowed from one town to another. Conduct that is totally lawful in Lincoln might be subject to state sanction in Leeds. Surely such a differential variation in the volume of orders imposed, the type of orders imposed, the conditions imposed, and so on, undermines the rule of law that I know this Government strongly support. It makes enforcement dependent on the victim’s location, rather than circumstances, or on the perpetrator’s location, rather than precisely how they are behaving badly. This makes a mockery of the notion of all of us being equal under the law. A review would look at these problems and recommend practical solutions.

Amendments 1 and 3, especially, are important in relation to ensuring that respect orders are used only when necessary and in a proportionate way. We have already heard about that. I think this is very helpful, particularly in creating a right to appeal. I am worried that the statutory test and the language used for imposing these new respect orders are so broad that, rather than capturing behaviour that is serious and persistent in nature, they will criminalise more trivial behaviour. That these orders can be imposed on individuals without their knowledge and, most egregiously, for an indefinite duration—for example, until further notice—is why we need this appeals process. How is it fair or proportionate that an individual who has never been found guilty of an offence is required to comply with serious restrictions on their liberty and personal life indefinitely, yet someone convicted of an offence by the criminal justice system is at liberty and free of prohibitions once they reach the end of their defined term of sentence, or even sometimes before that these days? This is reminiscent of that stain on our justice system, the abolished and abominable IPP indefinite sentence, which caused such a scandal. Why would the Government now create these new, oppressive orders that flout the important principle that if individual lives are subject to state interference, they need to know how long the interference will last and when it will end?

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 7, an excellent contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on fixed-term penalty notices, based on the work of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life. This, I hope, will ring true with any Labour Government, because ensuring that private companies dishing out on-the-spot fines for antisocial behaviour, and doing so to profit financially, is surely something that offends the Government’s values. There are concerns that antisocial behaviour orders have been corrupted for income generation and commercial purposes. With fines increasing so much under this Bill, surely that tendency will be turbocharged. I think it is something that the Government will want to tackle, because all the orders in Clause 4 being issued at such a low benchmark are likely to result in fines going up. I am worried that this will encourage councils to become trigger-happy with orders and so on.

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, will remember, as I do, the scandal of Kingdom Security in north Wales in, I think, 2019, when councils including Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Anglesey outsourced the collection of their on-the-spot fines to a private security group, Kingdom, which illustrated that the behaviour of the enforcers could well be seen as being far more anti-social than any of the behaviour of local residents for which they were supposed to be fining them. A grass-roots campaign attracted 8,000-plus members to its Facebook page and led to numerous protests all over north Wales, with the security group’s wardens accused of threatening, bullying and even stalking north Walians, following dog walkers and smokers at a distance just so they could catch them out and fine them. They expressly targeted the elderly and women and children; the tissue of one 95 year-old lady blew from her wheelchair to the ground, and she was fined.

--- Later in debate ---

There is a point to be made, and if the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, wish to make it, that is fine, but this is consistent with Acts of Parliament that are currently in place on similar orders. Courts will take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of the duties that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised under the Human Rights Act. Therefore, it is an unnecessary procedure to amend the legal test, particularly as the effect would be to increase the threshold for the use of these orders, making the job of the police, local authorities and others in protecting communities that much harder.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Would the Minister accept that it is very difficult ever to think of circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a court to impose a respect order, with all the implications that has for an individual, unless the court is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made his point. I am trying to give the defence from the Government’s perspective. That is our view. He has made a reasonable point, but that is our view and I hope he accepts our comments on those issues in good faith.

On Amendment 2, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, will understand when I say that I agree with the points that he made. Amendment 2, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is rather bureaucratic, in that the council must carry out a full public consultation prior to any application to the court for a respect order to be made.

I was leader of a council for some years. We had six or seven meetings per year. Does the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, really expect, in the event of this legislation becoming law, that the council would consider respect orders and agree them on a six or eight week basis, six times per year, before the police could go? I am with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one. Some areas undertake this as a matter of course as part of local practice, but there is no requirement for a public consultation prior to a public spaces protection order being implemented. It is certainly my and the Government’s view that such requirements would add an inappropriate and disproportionate barrier to respect order applications and delay important relief for ASB victims. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree with His Majesty’s Opposition and me. He may not, but I put that point to him for his consideration.

Amendment 3, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would add a provision for a respondent to appeal the making or variation of a respect order. I hope I can assure noble Lords that there are express provisions in the Bill that provide for an application to be made to vary or discharge a respect order. The ordinary rules of appeal will apply to decisions to grant a respect order or a refusal to vary or discharge an order. To be absolutely clear on this issue, decisions to grant or vary respect orders, as well as decisions not to grant or vary one, will be appealable through the usual avenues under Civil Procedure Rules. I hope that assists.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for his Amendment 5. I know that he wished to speak to that in Committee. He seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. I recognise the importance of relevant agencies having the tools to tackle anti-social behaviour, but we should exercise caution before extending these powers without more consideration. I say that in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the noble Lord. The Home Secretary has a power to amend the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. If it is considered appropriate to add a for-profit registered social housing provider to the list then we can do that via secondary legislation after the Bill has achieved Royal Assent, but I would like to give more consideration to this point. This is not a “no”; it could be added later with more consideration. I hope that will at least help him in the discussions that he has had today.

Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Home Secretary, within six months of the Bill becoming law, to commission an independent review of the existing powers under the 2014 Act prior to introducing respect orders, housing injunctions or youth injunctions as a whole. Again, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It is a manifesto commitment that we fought the election on to improve anti-social behaviour responses, and one such response that we specifically put in the manifesto at the general election was respect orders. So, the idea that we wish to—

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, we support the principle underlying this amendment. Serious and organised waste crime both is an environmental nuisance and has real consequences for communities and the taxpayer. As we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the Government’s own estimates say that around 20% of waste in England may be illegally managed at some stage in the supply chain, and that over a third of waste crime is linked to organised crime groups. These figures underline that waste crime is not simply limited to opportunistic fly-tipping; in many cases it is co-ordinated criminal activity driven by profit. It is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords wish to see it recognised as a national strategic priority.

However, we have some reservations about placing such a requirement in statute. Under Section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Secretary of State already determines the NCA’s strategic priorities following consultation. At present there is no fixed statutory list of priorities, and to single out one specific crime type in primary legislation would be unusual. The question, therefore, is not whether waste crime is serious but whether this is the right legislative mechanism. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that serious and organised waste crime receives a sustained and meaningful focus.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too have concerns about this amendment. Nobody could dispute that waste crime is a very serious problem that needs to be addressed. But as I understand it, the NCA’s strategic priorities at the moment—whether they are required by the Secretary of State or otherwise—focus on degrading the highest-harm organised crime groups, with a particular emphasis on tackling drugs, online fraud and organised immigration crime. There may be others. The NCA surely cannot treat all serious matters as a priority. The whole point of a priority is that it focuses on the most serious criminal offences that our society faces. I am not persuaded that identifying this very real problem as a strategic priority is going to assist.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment. As he explained, it would allow the Secretary of State to include serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority for the National Crime Agency. We have all agreed that waste crime blights local communities, that it damages the environment and that serious organised crime—which is on the rise—is a factor in that. The Environment Agency is now regularly alerted to new illegal waste sites.

As evidence for the noble Earl that the Government take this matter seriously, the Environment Agency’s additional waste crime enforcement budget for 2025-26 has been increased by more than 50% to £15.6 million, a £5.6 million increase on the previous year. That is because we recognise that there is a potential area of concern here. It has allowed the Environment Agency to increase its front-line criminal enforcement resource by 43 full-time staff in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime and area environmental crime teams, as well as bringing additional staff for enforcement duties under our major waste reforms.

The Environment Agency works closely, as the noble Earl mentioned, with the National Crime Agency and the Joint Unit on Waste Crime. There are multi-agency prevention and disruption tactics taking place, as well as investigatory activities to impact successfully on criminals. Between the organisations, they have developed enhanced intelligence-sharing and an enhanced approach to targeting organised criminal gangs. We are looking, with other law enforcement bodies, at recommending and introducing new technical capabilities to look at how we can, through an agreed strategy, target waste crime.

Therefore, there is a role for the National Crime Agency but, as the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Pannick, alluded to, the National Crime Agency is not the lead agency for tackling waste crime. That is the Environment Agency. Under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency need to reflect changing threat levels in respect of different crime types. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, here, who would have been lead Minister on the 2013 Act that established the National Crime Agency. I served as a shadow Minister at the time, when dealing with that Bill. Section 3 of that Act is deliberately silent on types of organised crime because it does not want to fetter the National Crime Agency—the very point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made in relation to the Home Secretary’s discretion to skew the National Crime Agency’s priorities. Therefore, to insert a crime type, however well-meaning or needed, would be to undermine the principles of Section 3 of the 2013 Act.

In short, the Government fully agree with the sentiment underpinning the amendment. We take waste crime extremely seriously; the increase in the budget is evidence of that, as is the co-operation between the NCA and the Environment Agency. I hope that with those comments, the noble Earl will agree that his approach of tying the National Crime Agency to specific targets would not be as helpful as he had hoped and that he can withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is a grim subject, like, I am afraid, many of those that we are going to discuss in our proceedings today. An overwhelming case has been made by those who have spoken, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I very much hope that the Front Benches—Government and Opposition—are listening to the views that have been expressed.

I shall offer one argument additional to those that the noble Baroness has set out. In addition to regulatory sanctions against the providers of these online services, and in addition to any possible criminal remedies that may arise, there is also the possibility of civil sanctions: claims for damages brought by groups of parents who have the misfortune to have had their children dealt with in this appalling way. Any such claim for damages would be immeasurably assisted were the providers of the online services to have a legal duty to risk-assess the likelihood of their services being used in this way.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I was also at the meeting, which has been referred to, that was held this lunchtime and dealt with the troubling question of what seems to be an epidemic of growth in the exploitation of children on the internet. I must say that it revealed figures that I was not aware of, and I regard myself as relatively well briefed on this matter.

Further information came out today—particularly from the work, which has already been alluded to, by Members who were present at that meeting—that much of the of the material that is seen online also moves across into the real world. The use of these elements on the internet to groom children, to set up meetings with them and then to participate with them in illegal acts has been growing to a point where it is quite clearly an epidemic that must be dealt with. We are at the start of something extraordinarily unpleasant that needs to be looked at in the round, in a way that we have not yet done or been able to do.

Having been heavily involved in the Online Safety Act, I am conscious of the fact that we are dealing with legislation which has been overtaken by technology. The developments that have happened since we the Bill became an Act have meant that the tools we thought were being given to Ofcom and being used by the Government are very often no longer appropriate. They are probably not as far-reaching and certainly do not deal with the speed with which this technology is moving forward.

I have not been able to attend any meetings which Ministers may have had with my own side on this, but I gather that there is a Whip on against this amendment. I wonder whether the Minister could think hard about how he wants to play this issue out. It seems that one of the problems we have in dealing with legislation in this area is that we are never dealing with the right legislation. We want to amend the Online Safety Act but obviously, by moving an amendment to this Bill, which is from another department, we are not maximising the chances of having an output which will work. In addition, the way Ofcom is interpreting the Act seems to make it very difficult for it to reach out on new technologies, such as those described by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in her excellent speech introducing the amendment.

In a moment of transition, when we are so keen to try to grasp things so that they do not get out of our control, there may be a case for further work to be done. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned that she was happy to try to look again at the wording of her amendment if it is not appropriate for the Government. I am conscious that the Government are also trying to move in other areas and that other departments are also issuing measures which may or may not bear directly on the issue. It seems that there is a very strong case—although I do not know how my noble friend will respond—for asking for this issue to be kept alive and brought back, perhaps at Third Reading, where a joint amendment might be brought between the noble Baroness and her supporters and the Government to try to make sure that we do what we can, even if it is not the complete picture, to take this another step down the road.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 277, which would create a specific criminal offence of secretly filming someone without their consent for sexual gratification or in order to humiliate or distress them. In addition, it would make profiting from such footage a serious aggravating factor for sentencing, bringing clarity to a legal grey area and aligning the law with the reality of abuse in the digital age.

This amendment follows a BBC investigation which exposed the widespread practice of men covertly filming women on nights out and then monetising the footage on online platforms. The BBC identified over 65 channels across YouTube, TikTok, Facebook and Instagram posting this content. The material is being filmed in major cities worldwide, including London, and Manchester is a hotspot, with creators travelling from abroad specifically to capture surreptitious low-angle shots of fully closed women in dresses and skirts as they walk along the street. These are then uploaded as so-called “walking tours” or “nightlife content”. These posts have racked up more than 3 billion views in the last three years, with a single video generating up to £5,000 in revenue from ads and sponsorship.

Women and girls deserve to move freely in public without fearing that their bodies will be splashed across the internet without their consent. The problem is that existing voyeurism offences turn on narrow definitions of nudity and privacy. We welcome the Bill’s focus on non-consensual intimate image abuse and support the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen and Lady Bertin. However, these are confined to images of subjects in an intimate state. Fully clothed people generally fall outside this definition, even when filmed for sexual kicks.

Amendment 277 instead focuses on the degrading and predatory intent, which is where much of the harm lies. It centres on the victim’s humiliation and objectification, rather than on narrow definitions of body parts, clothing or location. It follows Law Commission advice to expand voyeurism legislation to non-private settings, based on intent. This amendment is carefully targeted at those with malign motivations.

In 2024, Greater Manchester Police made an arrest for this practice. However, no further action could be taken due to what the force described as “limitations in current legislation”. Harassment and stalking laws fail because they require a proven course of conduct. Abusers know that this behaviour is not currently captured by law and are exploiting this loophole. Without action, predators will continue to see this as a risk-free way of making easy money.

My honourable friend Wera Hobhouse MP has tabled a Private Member’s Bill on this issue. I echo her calls to compel platforms to remove such content. The Angiolini Inquiry recently warned that sexually motivated crimes against women in public are still not sufficiently prioritised. That is why I urge the Minister to give my amendment the serious consideration that it deserves. We need concrete action, not more rhetoric.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this group covers a range of human conduct, from the objectionable to the disgusting. I thank the Minister for tabling a series of amendments which will benefit women and society at large. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for all the work that she has done, which has led us to this position, and for the amendments that she has tabled. I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to her.

I will speak specifically to Amendment 273, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to which I have added my name. I understand that the noble Baroness may, if the Minister does not accept the amendment, wish to test the opinion of the House. This amendment simply seeks to impose a duty on a court to make a deprivation and deletion order where a person is convicted of an offence involving sharing or threatening to share intimate images without the consent of the victim.

The argument in favour of this amendment is very simple. It is necessary to give comfort to the victim who knows that the perpetrator has created or distributed the intimate images without consent. Unless there is a duty to destroy this content, the victim is inevitably going to remain extremely concerned that the content will remain in circulation and in existence.

That is the first argument. The second argument is that I can think of no justification whatever why the culprit should retain such intimate images when they have been convicted of being a wrongdoer in this respect. Those two points make this amendment unanswerable, and I strongly support it.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group—the government amendments, those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and the other amendment that was tabled. It was such an excellent speech, with such detail, that I do not want to go over the specifics, except to say that the noble Baroness is our leader and we will follow her through the Lobby.

I want to make one point, regarding the fantastic list of what is in the gap between what Ofcom can do and what Parliament can do. We should hesitate on that thought. Having looked a little this afternoon at the Government’s consultation, I see that there is almost nothing about what Ofcom cannot do, almost nothing about enforcement and, as I explained earlier, almost nothing about risk assessment. What happens beforehand, to prevent all this? What happens after it has all happened and we start to get enforcement? We cannot keep playing around in the middle. We have to go upstream, to the beginning, and we have to come to the end and get these things categorically dealt with in a way that interferes with business and makes it unacceptable to do it. With that, I will be supporting the noble Baroness.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the people-pleaser in me would love to be able to say, “Oh, go on then— I will accept them all and make everybody happy”, but I am afraid there are some good reasons why I cannot accept some of these amendments. I am going to try to respond to them all as briefly as possible, in the hope of explaining why the Government do not consider these amendments necessary in some cases, and do not consider it desirable for them to be done through the unwieldy mechanism of primary legislation in others.

I start with Amendment 273 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on deletion orders. I say at the outset that the Government of course recognise the harm caused by those who retain copies of intimate images, and we want to ensure that the legal framework protects victims. We agree that it is a no-brainer about the principle, but, for reasons I will come to in a moment, it is not as simple to enact as it might seem.

The noble Baroness has correctly identified that there is a difference between depriving offenders of devices that have been used, and actually getting rid of—deleting—the images themselves. If there is an issue about insufficient judges making deprivation orders for devices, then we must tackle that. This amendment is not the solution to that. Indeed, if she is right that judges are proving to be reluctant, there is a risk that, even if this deletion order provision came into force, they might be reluctant to do that as well. That is not the way to tackle judges not making the orders.

We must make sure that what we do is workable. Verified deletion is highly complex in practice. There are a number of challenges concerning, for example, images stored in the cloud. The noble Baroness’s amendment is very short on the practical measures that would be needed to make it effective, such as how the verification is to be carried out, what the penalty would be for an offender who refuses to comply with an order to provide the password, or what happens during the appeal period. For example, in the Crown Court, defendants have 28 days following conviction to lodge grounds for appeal. These are all significant drafting issues that present problems with the amendment as tabled by the noble Baroness, so we need to give this further thought.

As I said to the noble Baroness in Committee and during our recent meetings, we are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seize intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself.

One of the issues which concerns us is that only a fraction of the victims of intimate images go through the criminal justice system. Many victims do not want to go anywhere near a criminal court, so we want to look at the available remedies in the civil courts in order to ensure that these, too, will offer meaningful redress for victims.

But anything we do needs to be comprehensive and in a package that works well together, ensuring removal of these images as quickly as possible. That is why I am pleased to announce today that we intend to review the available court order protection for victims of intimate image abuse across civil and criminal courts. The review is going to include routes for deletion to ensure that it is fit for purpose, that it identifies necessary improvements and that it has attached to it all the consequential provisions that are needed to make sure that it is actually effective.

This is not an attempt by the Government to kick the can down the road. We want to get it right, and we want it to have material value. We do not want to create something that does not work so judges do not use it. But we do not think a court order available in the criminal court addresses this problem as a whole, and that is why we need to take time to think more comprehensively about a tailored solution, working for victims and for criminal justice partners. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, Professor McGlynn and I have discussed this, and I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment today in the light of that announcement.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. The amendment, as she understands, imposes a duty on judges. Therefore, there is no question of a judge deciding not to use it. More substantially, I am very concerned about the delay that will result if the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, does not move her amendment. Surely, the proper way to deal with this is for the Government to accept the amendment, and, if they will not, for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to move it. If the Government wish, as they are perfectly entitled to, to add or to subtract, they can do so at Third Reading or, perhaps more realistically, in the other place. They will have plenty of time to do that; let us get on today and put this into law.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will say two things in response to the noble Lord. The first is that the criminal courts tend not to be very keen on provisions that they regard as complex when they come at the end of a sentencing hearing. They tend to react by saying, “We’re going to leave this to be dealt with through some other mechanism because it’s too complicated. We can’t work out how to verify it”—the sorts of objections that occasionally are made in relation to, for example, very complicated compensation orders or confiscation orders. The second point is that there is, as I have already said, a real risk in piecemeal legislation that you bring in provisions for one court that then do not work in the read-across from the civil courts. On the civil courts, we cannot do that today.

We need to do this quickly, and we absolutely recognise this. After all, there is no point in saying that we take this stuff seriously and then saying that we are not going to do anything about getting rid of the images. It is illogical, apart from anything else, as well as perhaps not being very moral either. I ask the noble Baroness to accept the sincerity of what we say. That is as far as I can go today.

I turn now to Amendment 274, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I understand and agree with what she is trying to achieve. The only issue between us is whether this is the right way to do it. Ofcom has already consulted on additional safety measures for its illegal content codes of practice. These proposed measures explicitly include the use of perceptual hash-matching technology to detect and remove non-consensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes.

To be deemed compliant with their Online Safety Act duties by following the codes, services would need to deploy this technology automatically to identify and remove such content, providing victims with reassurance that their images are being removed swiftly. Given the urgent need to strengthen protection in this area, Ofcom announced on 19 February that it is accelerating timelines and will publish its final decision on these proposals on the use of hash matching in May, with measures expected to come into effect by the summer.

We consider that the work of Ofcom meets the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The protection that she seeks will be delivered promptly and robustly through Ofcom’s forthcoming codes of practice. It is an area where unnecessarily imposing duties in statute, especially where work is already in progress, could have the adverse effect of restricting the flexibility of this work should it need to respond and change to the ever-changing online landscape in the future.

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[Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)]

My Lords, more than 40 years ago, Parliament ensured that pornographic material that was deemed too degrading, too explicit or too dangerous could not be distributed. Parliament never changed its mind, but technology overtook the law, which is why we now have the absurd situation where content is illegal when viewed on a DVD but legal and freely available on the internet. That is why we desperately need Amendment 298 to deliver online/offline parity. I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Bertin, her team and all the other noble Lords in this House who have, as we have heard, campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years.

Moving on to my noble friend’s other amendments, I support all of them, but I will speak briefly to three of them. I welcome the Government’s commitment to tackle incest pornography but, without including stepfamily relationships, this new amendment will have little to no impact on the actual content available. The videos will be the same; they will merely be retitled. My noble friend has already explained the popularity and violence of the “barely legal” teen pornography content. Other countries have already legislated to prevent this type of material proliferating. Amendment 300A would ensure that we did the same.

Finally, Amendment 300 is about preventing exploitation and abuse. The porn industry makes money from violence against girls and women. It is an industry that we know profits from human trafficking. This is not an industry that we can trust to do the right things. So I strongly support this amendment, and I very much hope that my noble friend will test the opinion of the House on this and all her other amendments if Ministers are not able to move further.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I associate myself with what my noble friend Lord Russell said about the remarkable contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I also thank the Minister for all her efforts today to explain the Government’s position, and for the amendments that she has brought forward on behalf of the Government.

Amendment 298 is very important because it seeks to regulate online harmful content, and I very much support the principle. However, I will raise an important quibble. Amendment 298 defines what is meant by “harmful material” by reference to a number of very specific matters that I think we would all agree should not be online, such as material that

“promotes or encourages sexual activity that would be an offence under the Sexual Offences Act”,

or any sexual act that is

“non-consensual, or … appears to be non-consensual”

or

“threatens a person’s life … or is likely to result … in serious injury to a person”,

et cetera.

I have no difficulty with that: I entirely agree with it. However, I am concerned that, in subsection (2)(b) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 298, “harmful material” also includes that which

“would be an offence under … the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or the Obscene Publications Act 1964”.

I am concerned that that would be a very unwise way for us to regulate online content. The reason is that that Act is notoriously vague and uncertain. It depends on jury assessments of what would “deprave and corrupt” a person. It does not seem appropriate or necessary to include that element of harmful conduct when the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, lists, in perfectly sensible and acceptable ways, the specific types of content that ought not to be online and that should be prohibited.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as with the last group, we on these Benches support the Government’s amendments, but we do not believe that they go far enough. Alongside the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Pannick, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her tireless work on the Independent Pornography Review and subsequently. We on these Benches fully support her amendments to ban step-incest pornography and content that mimics child sexual abuse, to implement age verification for those featured on porn sites and AI nudification apps and to establish vital parity between online and offline pornography regulation.

I will be extremely brief. Amendment 298 in particular would create parity between offline and online regulation. Offline content that would not be classified by the BBFC should not be legal online. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, rightly proposes a monitoring role for the BBFC to support Ofcom’s enforcement and I very much hope that the Government will concede on this. If the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are taken on board, the Government can easily alter that amendment at ping-pong.

I have also signed Amendment 281A. The Government’s nudification amendments are clearly too narrow. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has described, by limiting scope to UK products, they ignore the global nature of this harm. We must go further to capture possession and use of any software designed to produce these non-consensual images. I very much hope that we will be able to avoid votes on the four amendments that the noble Baroness has put forward, and that the Government will take them on board.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Quite simply, if seven years is appropriate for sex with a dead person, despicable though that is, two years is grossly inadequate for sex with a live animal, which may then have to be put down or killed by the abuser. Of course, I accept that government Amendment 301 is better than what we have currently, but the two-year penalty needs to be increased. I know that my noble friend has said that he may look at other things at Third Reading. All I ask from the Government at Third Reading is simply to increase the two years up to five: make it the same as animal cruelty. That is not too much to ask for; it is still less than the penalty relating to a corpse, and it is much better than the current draft.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is another X-rated group of amendments. I added my name to government Amendment 301, on sexual activity with an animal, and I spoke on this subject in Committee. The prohibition of sex with animals has a long history—it was proscribed in Leviticus, chapter 18, verse 23—and it is high time that the statute book comprehensively addressed this subject. The predecessor section in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 fails to do that. I am pleased that the Minister, whom I thank, listened very carefully to the debate. She has listened to all those who made representations, and the Government have brought forward an amendment that—while it is no doubt less than perfect, for the reasons that the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Black, indicated—is a very considerable step forward. I am grateful to the Government and support Amendment 301.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s amendment on sexual activity with an animal. The original amendment in Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Black, shone a fierce but necessary light on the grim intersection of animal abuse, child exploitation and online coercion, and it is because of that work that we are now debating a meaningful change to the law. What matters now is that the law recognises the overlap between animal sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and wider patterns of coercive control, and that we respond with tools that are fit for purpose in 2026.

The Government’s amendment to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act replaces the narrow offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a broader offence of

“sexual activity with an animal”,

defined by intentional or sexual touching, whether the animal is living or dead. It also ensures that such conduct engages the notification regime in Schedule 3, so that those convicted can be managed as sexual offenders. That is a significant and very welcome step. However, there remain gaps that need to be addressed. The terminology widely used in policing and safeguarding is “animal sexual abuse” because it captures a spectrum of exploitative acts, including material that is filmed, traded online or used to groom children. These are not marginal cases; they go to the heart of how abusers terrorise children and partners, including by targeting family pets.

Amendment 390 from the noble Lord, Lord Black, would introduce notification and offender management requirements for a defined list of serious animal cruelty offences, placing those convicted on a register. That would apply to those who cause unnecessary suffering, arrange animal fights, possess extreme pornographic images of animals, damage protected animals or intentionally engage in sexual activity with an animal, as well as those who cause, coerce or permit another person, including a child, to do so, or who use an animal for sexual gratification. These are not technical tweaks. Notification and active offender management recognise the strong links between serious animal cruelty and the risk of harm both to animals and to people, especially children, who may be targeted with these horrific images or forced to participate in their creation.

A similar system to the sex offenders register would allow the police and probation service to monitor such offenders and retain the information needed to manage the risk they pose over time. I freely acknowledge the progress already made, but without the robust notification and management framework envisaged in Amendment 390 we will still be asking front-line agencies to deal with extremely dangerous offenders with one hand tied behind their back. The cost of getting this wrong is borne not only by animals but by the children and adults who are terrorised, coerced or groomed through this abuse. While I welcome the Government’s amendment as an important milestone, I urge the Minister to go further and to match the full ambition of the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Black, on notification and offender management.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Clause 140 is an oppressive clause. It would provide the police with the powers to restrict the very protests that are most likely to be justified and effective. There is no way of curing it and we should have none of it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord has already accepted that the right to protest has to be balanced against the rights of others. Surely the virtue of the cumulative disruption provision, Clause 140, is that it is totally unacceptable that the rights of others who wish to pray in their synagogue, who wish to get to their synagogue, who wish to get away from their synagogue, should be repeatedly disrupted in the same place every week. The cumulative nature of the disruption pushes the balance in favour of asking the protesters not to cease protesting but to do it somewhere else.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before I speak to my amendments in this group, I would like to say that I learned to read a long time ago—more than 70 years ago, before I went to school. This alphabet soup of a Bill is quite confusing, partly because so many people disagree with it. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, should perhaps be aware that it is moderately unusual to have this many amendments; perhaps it would help if he accepted one or two. Obviously, all of my amendments are incredibly reasonable, so I urge him to pick them up. My first amendment in this group would solve the problem outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so I expect his strong support on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, moved Amendment 369 on the right to protest. In Committee, we were all reassured that this was not necessary, because the right to peaceful protest is already protected under the Human Rights Act. We were correctly reminded that Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the freedoms of expression and assembly, and that public authorities are already bound by those duties, but that reassurance is based on the assumption that those protections will remain intact. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, we cannot be sure of that; we cannot speak for future Governments, who might cause our right to protest to deteriorate.

Over recent years, under this Government and the previous one, we have seen a steady erosion of our right to protest and an expansion of police powers to restrict those protests. Each time, we are told, “The powers are modest—you will hardly notice them”. Of course, that is not true, because the effect is cumulative, damaging and leads to much greater constraint on people who are campaigning and protesting. The balance is shifting and Parliament continues to widen state power without at the same time reaffirming the underlying right.

I have also cosigned Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. There are many legitimate reasons why people might want to cover their faces at protests. Some noble Lords on this side of the Chamber might benefit from wearing masks sometimes, just to hide their look of derision at other noble Lords who are speaking coherently, cogently and sensibly. People might fear losing their job if their political views were known. They might fear backlash from family or their local community. They might be worried about racial profiling, particularly given the increased use of facial recognition technology. They might be protesting against a foreign regime and be genuinely concerned about repercussions for loved ones overseas. It is not unreasonable to wear masks.

I turn now to my Amendment 372ZA. Clause 139 is very problematic. It gives the police significant new powers to restrict protests near places of worship. I am an atheist, but I absolutely protect the right of people to worship freely, as they want to, and without fear. At a time of rising antisemitism, Islamophobia and racism, that duty is paramount for us here in Parliament. All our diverse communities must be supported and defended, and every faith group must have the ability to worship freely. As drafted, Clause 139 risks undermining that balance between rights. If the Government are not prepared to remove it, it must at the very least be clarified and narrowed. My amendments are offered as a compromise and an attempt to introduce clarity where the drafting is currently vague and overly broad.

My amendments, which address the phrases “in the vicinity”, “within 50 metres” and “the purpose of intimidating”, seek to establish clarity on these broad definitions in Clause 139. The clause seeks to restrict the right to protest by giving the police new powers to ban or restrict protest “in the vicinity” of places of religious worship, based on the false premise that these powers are required to protect freedom of religion. “In the vicinity” is a vague definition that could mean 10 metres or 10 miles. At the very least, the clause must be amended to make it more specific and contained, with an eye towards protecting Article 11—the right to freedom of assembly. “In the vicinity” needs to be clarified in terms of a specific distance. Many cities and towns have a large concentration of places of worship. The clause as it stands could make it virtually impossible to protest, as other noble Lords have said, including taking protests to Parliament or other such places on which protesters might wish to focus in order to make their point to people in positions of influence—for example, in government.

The Green Party feels that 50 metres is a sensible compromise that would provide clarity for police on the threshold for imposing conditions on protests while protecting the Article 11 right. Amendment 372ZA would help the police because it is so specific that they could take a tape measure to protests to make sure that protesters were at the designated distance. It would also help protesters, because they would know whether they were legally allowed to protest at that point or not. I urge the Minister to think about this and to clarify what “in the vicinity” means. It is far too vague to bring in in legislation. Surely the Government must see that.

The phrase “may intimidate” again is terribly vague, and I do not understand why anybody would put that in a Bill. This is bad writing—which is why we have so many amendments labelled ZA, ZZ and BZ and so on Report. All our diverse communities have to be supported and defended, but Clause 139, as it stands, will not do that because it is too vague. There are existing powers to address racial and religious hatred and violence. Under the Public Order Act 1986, the police can impose conditions on protests that may compel people not to worship, disrupt the activities of an organisation or intimidate or harass people in the vicinity. My amendment tries to make things clearer. As always, I am just trying to help the Government get things right.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before she sits down, I put to the noble Baroness that her amendments would not achieve the purpose that I understand the Government to have with Clause 139. If you confer the power in relation only to a protest that takes place within 50 metres then you are not going to achieve the purpose, which is to ensure that people are able to get to and away from their synagogue every Saturday. If there is a march of hundreds or thousands of people that impedes their access, 50 metres is not going to work. As I have already put to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, protest is a balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of other people. The noble Baroness is ignoring the rights of others.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, this is indeed Report and I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to. I also take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones: this is a large group, with a large number of amendments. But I will restrict my comments to Amendment 369A.

As the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Chakrabarti, said, it is much simpler to apply the test of “reasonable excuse”, rather than the complicated language used in Clause 133(2), where there is a test of whether the wearing of the clothes of concealment had

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others”.

That is just asking for a complicated interpretation, and the “reasonable excuse” test is, in my view, sounder.

I will make one comment relating to the entirety of Report on this Bill. I, and I am sure other Members of this House, have extreme concern that we are having to sit every night beyond 11 pm to midnight. I am glad to see a nod from the Liberal Democrat Benches. That places great strain, not only on Ministers—I hasten not to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, how many midnights he has been sitting up in this House for. He would find it difficult to count on his fingers: there are only 10 fingers to count on, so I am afraid he does not have enough fingers to count the number of times. So it imposes a strain on him, and it also imposes a great strain on all of us who need or want to participate in this Bill throughout every debate. There is another problem: with the House sitting so late, some important amendments are not considered. This happened to me on Monday last week. I had a very important amendment down, together with others, which was not reached. Indeed, it was not even spoken to. This goes for the whole of Report.

I am blaming nobody: I am certainly not blaming Ministers or the Government Chief Whip, all of whom I greatly respect. But there is a problem, and I cannot help recalling that, on Wednesday last week, when again the House sat to midnight, I was sitting in a committee room in Portcullis House and the annunciator said that the House of Commons rose at 7 pm. There is a disproportionate burden being placed on this House and I protest about it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in my experience, the later the sitting, the more persuasive the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, gets—but that is just a personal view.

I shall make one general comment and then make my observations on Amendments 369 and 369A. The modest changes—and they are modest—introduced in the Bill by the Government to public order legislation do not justify some of the alarmist comments that we have heard today about the death of the right to protest in this country. Protest is alive and well, as we see constantly, and will continue to be alive and well—and there is nothing in this Bill or in the Government’s proposals that will stop the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others protesting against matters they disapprove of—so let us keep this in perspective, please.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way, but perhaps I could give him a very small example of something that is completely relevant to what he says. On 5 March this year, the Metropolitan Police raided a Quaker meeting house and arrested a number of young, non-violent activists who were being trained in non-violent protest. How can that happen? They were not even protesting: they were just planning how to be non-violent at protests. The noble Lord must concede that that would have a chilling effect on people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes a forceful point, but my understanding is that that led to no charges. I certainly would not defend what the police did in those circumstances. Perhaps more relevantly, it has nothing whatever to do with the contents of the Bill or the proposals that the Government are putting forward in this proposed legislation.

Amendment 369 is an important amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, proposing that we should insert into the statute book a right to protest. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that it would be most inappropriate. It cannot be right to introduce a statutory right to protest when we are not introducing into the statute book, and rightly so, any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to freedom of speech or to religious freedom. The reason for that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that we already have the protection of the Human Rights Act, which is applied by our judges.

With respect, I do not accept the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he focused on the European concept, in the European Court of Human Rights, of the “margin of discretion”. But that is an international concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. There is something similar here—a discretionary area of judgment—but the European concept is an international concept that is not applied by the domestic courts. Then the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, “Well, we need to put a marker down in case future Parliaments interfere with the right to protest”. But nothing that we do today will prevent a future Parliament, should it wish to do so, legislating in a way we may think is inappropriate. That is a matter for the future Parliament, and a matter for debate at the time.

The third point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made was that the convention allowed for a restriction for the protection of morals. He said that was surely inappropriate. Well, yes, but I cannot think of any case where protest has been limited because of a moral view imposed by the police or any other authority. I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said—I wrote it down—that morals were a “dead letter” nowadays, which is perhaps a wider proposition than she intended to suggest. But Amendment 369 would be most unfortunate. It would cause confusion and achieve no sensible purpose, if I may respectfully say so.

I take a different view of Amendment 369A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I have signed it. It deals with Clause 133, which introduces this new offence of concealing your identity at a protest. No defence of reasonable excuse is included, despite the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its fifth report of the Session, proposed that there should be such a defence. The absence of such a defence is very puzzling, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, because in Clause 133(2) there are defences

“relating to the health of the person … religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

In Committee I gave an example of why a defence of reasonable excuse is required. The example—and it is a very topical example—was of a man or a woman who wishes to protest outside the Iranian embassy or at some other demonstration against the conduct of the Iranian regime. They may well have a very strong reason for concealing their identity, which is that they have relatives in Iran. Are we really to say that they are committing a criminal offence, despite the obvious need for them to conceal their identity in those circumstances?

With great respect to the Minister, I heard no convincing answer to that point in Committee. That is why I have joined the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in suggesting that a defence of reasonable excuse should be added to this new criminal offence. If the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House—and I hope he does, if the Minister cannot give any comfort on this—I will certainly support him.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise mainly to support the Government. It seems to me that they are broadly taking steps to stop intimidation of the public, not to stop intimidation of the Government, which is what those who support the right to protest seem to be suggesting. The amendments, on the whole, seem to try to restrict that right. For the reasons that many people have already said, I do not think it is necessary.

The job of the police is to ensure that peaceful protesters are able to protest and that they are not intimidated. It is not their job to maximise the impact of the protest, which is what the implications of facilitation seem to suggest. Other people’s rights have to be respected; in the heat of a protest it is very difficult for the police to get that right. It can be a little easier in preparation for the protest, if you are able to plan, but many of these decisions often have to be made during the protest. When there are thousands of people who are emotional and shouting, perhaps outside the Israeli embassy, it can have an intimidating effect on everybody. We have to think seriously about how the police are able to implement these amendments.

I accept that proportionality is a very important part of the ECHR—I would not argue against that—but it is quite hard for the cops to measure this on the ground. In Northern Ireland it became such an issue that we ended up with a Parades Commission, which took the issues away from the police. The way that legislation is going, I suspect it might be wiser to leave someone independent to make these decisions rather than the police. But while it is with the police, it has to be as simple as possible, not because the police are simple—I speak personally—but because it is not easy to get that balance right. This is an acute judgment, not one that is measured in a court.

I want to speak about two other issues. If Parliament decides that it wants face coverings, we have to think carefully about the reasonable excuse. I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I suspect that everybody will have a reasonable excuse. Imagine, as a police officer, confronting somebody about wearing a mask and trying to determine whether they have a reasonable excuse, together with four or five other people in a crowd. It would be almost impossible. Do they have a cold? That is one of the defences in the Act already. I think it would be almost unenforceable. I am not saying that it is wrong to have a reasonable excuse, but it is difficult to determine it during a protest.

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We heard discussion about the fear of reprisals when it comes to transnational repression. I say particularly to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that introducing a statutory defence relating to transnational repression would introduce operational complexities for the police, as it is of course the role of the courts, not law enforcement, to assess reasonable doubt and evaluate any defences raised by the defendant. In the context of transnational repression cases, which are often internationally complex, such a defence would place an unnecessary burden on police to disprove claims relating to potential threats to an individual’s safety from a particular state, for example. I stress as well that clear—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

So is the Minister saying to the protestor at the Iranian embassy that he or she has only two choices: not to protest, or to protest not wearing a face mask and thereby run the risk that their relatives in Iran may be killed or tortured?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

In that example, I revert to what I said about the locality being designated only if the police suspect that criminality is likely to occur or has occurred on previous occasions. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a largely peaceful protest outside an embassy and at an appropriate distance would not fall into that category of protest.

As I was going to say, clear operational guidance from the NPCC—

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I test the patience of the Minister? I am very grateful to him. The defence he is offering—that this applies only if there is criminality—does not explain why Clause 133 recognises the defences of health, religious observance or a person’s work. If the Government recognise those defences, even though they are in the context of criminality, surely the clause should also cover the type of example I have given.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.

Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring

“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”

of a place of worship.

As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.

Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.

The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.

Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.

Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.

There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for bringing forward Amendment 371A and all noble Lords who have added their name to it. I thank the Members of your Lordships’ House who, I hope, will be speaking to it. This amendment is eminently sensible. We have heard several examples already of groups which engage in criminal and intimidating behaviour to further their ideological ends, but which do not necessarily pass the terrorism threshold. There is no justification for their continued lawful existence, but to proscribe them as terrorists obfuscates the meaning of the category and incorporates inactive supporters within the definition. The pertinent example of this is Palestine Action. I will not speculate on whether the behaviour actually amounts to terrorism, but the actions of its supporters following its proscription highlight the necessity for action.

An organisation that damages defence infrastructure and attacks members of the public should cease to exist, but for the police to then have to spend precious time arresting hundreds of protesters with placards is clearly not ideal. It may seem morally dubious on behalf of those protesters, but I think we can all agree that they are a far cry from the archetypal terrorist supporters of, say, ISIS or the Taliban. Most importantly, it is a waste of police time to have to deal with sanctimonious protesters who otherwise peacefully support a general ideological cause. That is why we entirely support the noble Lord’s amendment. Our Amendment 371B introduces a minor change to the drafting that reflects our belief that the proscription of groups in this category should not be contingent on whether they fulfil the criteria of both subsections (1A) and (1B). Individually, the actions in both subsections should merit a protest group being proscribed and prohibited from taking further action.

If a listed crime is committed that creates a serious risk to the safety of the public, then the line is crossed from dissent to danger. I think noble Lords can agree that whether a group is for an ideological end or not, this should merit proscription. The very act of a group entering an arms factory with sledgehammers should preclude its existence, regardless of motive. That said, ideological motive is also a factor that should be considered in its own right: if a group shuns peaceful protest and becomes willing to commit criminal offences to further a political end, that should be grounds to ban it. Take, for example, BASH BACK, the activist group which has consistently engaged in criminal damage, vandalism and intimidation in the name of so-called transgender rights. To take one example—as I am sure my noble friend Lady Cash will highlight—it recently spray-painted the office building of the Equality and Human Rights Commission for simply declaring that biological sex is biological sex.

This vandalism is an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and should result in a group being proscribed. I am, however, wary that spray painting and other forms of vandalism may not be seen to create a risk of serious harm to public safety, and I am not confident that, with the right lawyers, the actions of these groups would result in them being proscribed, because of a technicality. Criminality alone introduces the possibility of restricting the practice of a protest group. Whether this is augmented by either a risk to public safety or by an intention to influence political decision-making should confirm that decision.

That being said, I reaffirm my support for the noble Lord’s original amendment. It is a pertinent time for this debate, and I believe that Amendment 371A finds the right balance between prohibiting criminal activity and permitting peaceful support. I hope all Members of your Lordships’ House can recognise the rationale for moving away from a rigid binary between terrorism and protest and acknowledge that it is a spectrum that will benefit from more nuance. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will support this amendment, and I look forward to hearing the closing remarks of the Minister and of the noble Lord, Lord Walney.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As the noble Lord mentioned, the House will be very familiar with the problems that have arisen from the use of the power that the Secretary of State has to proscribe a terrorist group. The virtue of Amendment 371A is that it avoids any such description. It focuses on the severe mischief that we know certain groups are causing in our society.

Who could object to the Secretary of State having a power, by regulation, to designate a group as an extreme criminal protest group if there is a reasonable belief that its purpose and practice is the deliberate commission of the serious offences set out in this amendment: riot, violent disorder, destroying or damaging property, and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure? Surely the Secretary of State should have power to take action, particularly when, as the amendment requires, those offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions, and they create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others.

We all support the right to protest, but there are limits, and these clearly are breached by deliberate conduct the purpose of which is to act in the way set out in the tightly drawn amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As he has pointed out, he has avoided in his drafting the real problem that has arisen in the Palestine Action case: that people are criminalised by reason of support for that body. That has caused problems. The Court of Appeal case is pending, but this amendment avoids those difficulties.

So I support this. I hope the Minister will not tell the House that this is not the time and that we should wait in particular for the report of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I too have the highest regard for him, but we should bear in mind that, with this Bill, the Government have not waited for his report in a number of provisions relating to public order, particularly and rightly on cumulative disruption. So I say to the House: let us deal with this. This is a legislative opportunity; it is a pressing problem, and we should deal with it now.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, I strongly support this amendment.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, because it addresses a difficult area—something that falls short of terrorism and which causes problems for legislators, policing and the courts. Terrorism is fairly well understood. It is the application or the threat of violence for a political purpose; it is easily stated. In this case, it seems to me that there are some indications that there might be a gap. It is not the first time we have been confronted by this problem. Before terrorism was defined—probably by the terrorism which started in Northern Ireland—in the 1930s, we saw that people were parading on the streets for political motives, so legislation had to be introduced on uniforms and various other things that indicated that people were trying to use violence or political aspirations to influence the Government.

It seems that the gap that has evolved is around Palestine Action. There are probably three indicators of a need for a solution to a gap that has developed. First, we have had a criminal case in which a police officer was hit by someone with a hammer, and the people who appeared to have been involved have been found not guilty. That case has been appealed, but that one issue has obviously caused some concern for everybody affected—the police, in part, but mainly the businesses being attacked by this group. The second case is a civil case, which is already—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just correct the noble Lord? In that case, what happened was that the jury could not agree and there is a retrial of those serious criminal allegations.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

That is quite right, and thank you for that correction, although, clearly, they were not found guilty.

Secondly, the civil case is about prohibition. The High Court has decided that it does not prefer the Government’s judgment that Palestine Action should be a proscribed group. I find that constitutionally quite odd. I understand that sometimes, the court will come to a different opinion on legislation, but it seems to me that the Government, faced with the best information possible, have concluded that it should be proscribed, and the court has decided that that is not proportionate. Whatever the outcome on appeal—which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has alluded to and we will hear eventually—this needs to be resolved quickly because it is hard to understand.

Both cases might indicate that there were some doubts about the proscription of this group. Most of the time, terrorist groups are obvious. Terrorism is mass and indiscriminate violence that murders tens of people. We see it and it is very obvious. In this case I did wonder, but sometimes governments have information that the rest of us do not. One of the other signs, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, was that, when support began to be expressed for a proscribed group, people then said, “This is quite odd; why are we arresting them?” They did not have the same qualms about Irish terrorism or about ISIS when they were beheading citizens of this country. It indicates that, perhaps, there is something different about this group. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has identified a reasonable solution to that gap. Conspiracy alone is not a sufficient answer. It is possible to charge someone with conspiracy to commit a violent act or conspiracy to riot, but you cannot prosecute people who might fund that conspiracy. This amendment would start to address the protest group and the way it is funded and supported.

My final point—quite narrowly defined in this sense—is that this is about the intent to cause serious harm to public safety or to affect public policy and democracy. Both are substantial bars to pass before somebody could be convicted of this offence. The Government ought seriously to consider filling the gap with this amendment, or, if they do not, with something very much like it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.

The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.

Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.

The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.

Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.

I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.

In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.

It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.

Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.

We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I accept that, to a certain degree.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.

I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.


That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.

It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I know a young man who has just got his driving licence. He is very excited and sees it as a rite of passage; he is now a grown-up. He has joined the club of drivers and he shows his driving licence with pride. I can assure noble Lords he has no idea that applying for a driving licence means that he is joining a vast biometric police database, a club of police surveillance, and his mugshot will be treated like one of those Most Wanted gallery of rogues images.

This is a corruption of public trust. The public apply for one thing, only for it to be subverted and used for something else. It seems to me to be duplicitous and behind the backs of the public. Currently, police forces can directly access and search DVLA data only in relation to road traffic offences and must phone the DVLA in relation to other offences. I note that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would not prevent police forces accessing DVLA data for law enforcement purposes, but it should not be the default position. It is important to create this safeguard to prevent such data being used to conduct, in effect, phishing exercises of facial recognition. Therefore, we need this amendment to be taken seriously and I will be interested in what the Minister has to say.

This is not some paranoid dystopian vision. In a recent submission to the Home Affairs Committee, the National Police Chiefs’ Council stated that police chiefs were indeed seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition. That would be a huge expansion of police surveillance powers, granting them access, as we have heard, to the biometric data of tens of millions of citizens. We cannot overestimate how important it is that we do not just nod this through but take seriously the risk to civil liberties. It is why the noble Baroness’s Amendment 380, which creates a safeguard, is so important: to protect the civil liberties and privacy of innocent driving licence holders.

I conclude with a quote from Big Brother Watch, which says that this represents

“a disproportionate expansion of police powers to track and identify citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs”.

In a way, it is an abuse of the police to ask them to use these underhand methods, and it is therefore vital that there are safeguards in law to prevent this happening, particularly because it is happening behind the backs of ordinary people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.

There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Baroness is very eloquently making her case on the basis of a lack of consent. I suggest to her that the police regularly use material that people have not given their consent for them to use—for example, their fingerprints and saliva.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I am an unworthy substitute for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but I am afraid it is one of those occasions when real life catches up with your Lordships’ House; it has stopped her being here today. She supports the amendment. When you start to think about it, it comes under the heading of a no-brainer: there should be a consistent approach. If you are taking on an economic activity to transport something across the country, you should have a rough idea about a consistent approach to transporting it. If you have not, there should be a very good reason. There does not seem to be one, other than it having been decided that they will be charged at this rate.

Heritage railways are a nice cause, but there are more widespread and universal economic impacts from this if you transport goods on our main transport system without incurring extra, sometimes prohibitive costs. It would be comparatively easy for the Government to at least bring them into line and give them some steer as to a realistic level of charge to be placed on them. At the very least, admin considerations around this can be cut down. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that it is all in hand and that the Government have a timetable for making sure anybody involved in this knows what is happening, so that everybody can say “thank you very much” and move on to the next issue.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment. I suggest that if, as I hope, the Minister agrees that regulations are needed, they should not just deal with consistency but impose a substantive limit on the fees to be charged. It seems that in this context, as in many others, the maximum that should be charged is the cost incurred to police forces.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, although the movement of abnormal loads may seem like a niche and marginal activity, my noble friend Lord Attlee, who recently retired from your Lordships’ House, laid out a compelling argument in Committee for why that is not the case. The heavy haulage industry is a vital component of our national infrastructure and construction sectors, yet the framework governing when police escorts are required and how much may be charged for them is inconsistent.

It is wonderful that my noble friend Lord Parkinson has now taken up the mantle on this matter. He began his contribution by outlining his concerns about the use of heavy haulage by the heritage railway industry, an issue also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester. The issues are wider than that. In Committee, Earl Attlee spoke with considerable authority on this matter and set out the difficulties that parts of the industry have experienced. In particular, he highlighted the sharp increase in charges in certain areas and the absence of any national framework governing those fees. In some cases, police forces have charged for a full shift of officers, even where the escort itself may take a very short period of time. Industry representatives have raised understandable concerns that such practices can result in costs that far exceed the cost of the haulage operation itself.

The overwhelming majority of police forces apply the relevant legislation in good faith and without difficulty. The problem appears to arise in only a minority of forces, where the absence of national guidance has led to practices that the industry considers disproportionate. The result is uncertainty for hauliers, increased costs for major infrastructure projects and, ultimately, inefficiency within a system that should be operating smoothly.

Therefore, the amendment seeks to ensure that there is a clear national framework. It sets out when police escorts are truly necessary, as opposed to private self-escorts, and would establish a transparent schedule of fees. It also sensibly seeks to allow police forces to apply to the Secretary of State for flexibility in genuinely exceptional circumstances. Put simply, the amendment balances the need for consistency with the operational realities that police forces face. For those reasons, I am grateful both for the tireless campaigning of Earl Attlee and to my noble friend Lord Parkinson for continuing to push the Government on this matter.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I join all the speakers in the debate on this small but important issue in praising the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who, after almost 34 years of service in this House, retired just a few days ago. It would be remiss of me not to join in paying tribute to him, his work and the tenacity with which he pursued this issue, including recruiting the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester to take up the cudgels on his behalf. He was a true champion of the heavy haulage industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, said, it is important that we focus on this not just because of the impact on the Heritage Railway Association—as dear as it is to many hearts in your Lordships’ House—but because of the importance it has to our economy, including all the construction and infrastructure that we wish to provide.

Earl Attlee took great pride in being the only Member of your Lordships’ House to hold an HGV licence. I hope that, in his absence, he is pleased to know that that knowledge gap has been bridged in some part by my newly introduced noble friend Lord Roe of West Wickham. By virtue of being a firefighter, he holds—or at least held—an HGV licence for the purpose of driving fire engines. I think that Earl Attlee would have appreciated that.

Moving to the matters before us in the amendments, as noble Lords have explained, the amendment relates to setting criteria specifying when a police escort is required and charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads and would require the Secretary of State to establish a framework to regulate such fees. While I recognise that the aim of the amendment is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe that a new statutory framework is necessary.

Changes have already been made to support greater consistency. In May last year, the National Police Chiefs’ Council published new guidance outlining when police escorts should be provided for abnormal loads. This was developed in collaboration with policing, industry and national highways. The NPCC Abnormal Load Guidance 2025 is the national framework used by all UK police forces to determine whether an escort is required and, if so, whether that escort must be provided by the police or can be undertaken as a self-escort. Furthermore, a national framework setting out charges for escorting these loads already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the cost of policing in specific circumstances. Fee levels are set out in the guidance on special police services by the NPCC, and this is updated annually.

Introducing a standardised regulatory framework—as I said in Committee, and I will repeat it here—undermines the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. We cannot escape this fact. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country and are influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic additions and the availability of police resources.

To be clear, the Government take this issue seriously. As we have heard, following a meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, my colleague, Policing Minister Jones, wrote to West Midlands Police to pass on her concerns. I am grateful for the commendation from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner, of that correspondence. As a result, I understand that West Midlands Police is undertaking an independent, expert evaluation to assess the force’s compliance systems and processes against the NPCC guidance.

It is important to allow time for the recent guidance to have effect before considering further action. Furthermore, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose, the NPCC has committed to formally review its abnormal loads guidance 12 months after publication; that is, in May of this year—a couple of months’ time.

I understand noble Lords’ concerns around the adherence of police forces to this guidance. Therefore, I can confirm that the Government will write to the NPCC following Royal Assent of the Bill to remind forces of the need to follow the guidance I have mentioned.

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and, in the same spirit, my noble friend Lord Faulkner asked what weight could be given to the guidance issued by the NPCC and what actions might be pursued by West Midlands Police as a consequence. As I have already said, West Midlands Police is undertaking a review. This is NPCC guidance, which it is itself reviewing to make sure that it remains current and responsive to issues that emerge over time.

There is always a balance between having inflexible statutory guidance, inflexible statutory regulation and guidance that is operated locally. We are currently on the side of the latter. Within that, this is national guidance. Police forces will pay great attention to that. They will pay even greater attention to the idea that, to quote my noble friend Lord Faulkner, the Policing Minister is “on the case” with this. With respect, I think that is an appropriate level of intervention. The Government are aware that it is an important issue. We will always keep our eyes on it and make sure that we can have a level of scrutiny to ensure that police forces behave respectfully toward hauliers while maintaining their local operational independence.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Will the letter that the Minister mentioned make the point that it is unacceptable in principle for police forces to seek to make a profit via the imposition of these fees?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I would need to go back and check on the correspondence for the noble Lord, but this is about making sure that this is covering costs, rather than anything else.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have real reservations about Amendment 385, which I am afraid I cannot support. I am glad that my noble friend is not thinking of testing the opinion of the House.

I speak as a cyclist and I fear, for the reason touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that what is proposed in Amendment 385 is likely to damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists. The truth is that, when bicycling, we all wear a variety of things that are capable of disguising our identity. I did this morning. One always wears a helmet, very frequently one wears goggles or spectacles, either as sunglasses or to keep the rain out, and when it is cold one wears a ski mask or scarf around the bottom of one’s mouth. All these things are capable of concealing one’s identity. I saw several people doing this today when I was bicycling in from King’s Cross. This will damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists.

I ask, rhetorically, what kind of person is the police officer likely to stop? Most probably, I suspect, it will be a person from an ethnic minority, who may be young too. Anybody who has been in Parliament as long as I have knows the trouble that you have from stop and search. That is proportionate, because the carrying of weapons is a serious risk. I acknowledge that it is perfectly correct that cyclists on occasion conceal themselves in order to seize bags and mobiles—that is true—but the remedy is disproportionate.

Furthermore, the amendment gives rise to an interesting question of principle. If it is right to impose this restriction in respect of cyclists, what about motorcyclists? They come into exactly the same category and are perfectly capable of snatching a bag or mobile, and most of them now have visors over their helmets. So, what are you going to do about that?

My own view is that, yes, there is a problem, but this is a disproportionate remedy. It will impact on innocent cyclists, as I venture to describe myself, and it will damage relationships between the police and the cycling community. I was very glad to hear that my noble friend indicated he will not test the opinion of the House because, had he done so, I would have voted against him.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hear the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about Amendment 385. It would confer a power on a constable to stop a cyclist without any basis, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that they are committing an offence or are about to commit an offence, when they may have, as the noble Viscount said, a perfectly good reason to be wearing a face mask. They may have influenza, which they do not wish to share with others, or they may be concerned to avoid diesel or petrol fumes on the road. Moreover, the amendment would confer an unrestricted power on the constable to require the person concerned to remove the face covering, with the sanction of a fine or imprisonment, without any requirement on the constable to consider whether that individual has a proper reason for wearing a face mask and without any defence of reasonable excuse. I too could not support such an amendment.

In Amendment 387A, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a powerful case about the mischief which afflicts local communities. My only concern is whether her proposed new clause would do much, if anything, to address this real mischief. The remedy would still depend on enforcement action by local authorities or the police, and would still depend on evidence which is difficult to obtain. I appreciate that police forces are independent, but the Government need to do all they can to encourage them to take action to deal with these problems. If that requires further resources then they should have further resources, but it should be a priority for effective policing.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Buscombe in the thrust of what she is seeking to achieve with her Amendment 387A. I do not think I heard my noble friend say that this would be a panacea or the answer to this complex situation, which clearly needs a multi-agency response. There seems to be a widespread agreement or understanding that there has recently been a substantial proliferation of essentially cash-only businesses on our high streets for nefarious purposes.

Many businesses may well be totally legitimate and carrying on as they have done for many years, but, as one example, in a town not very far away from where I live in the West Country, I recently counted 10 barbers or nail bars in a relatively short street. There are not enough nails or hair within that area, when, only a couple of years ago, approximately two would have sufficed. Either there has been a massive demand by the locals for these services or there are other motives. It seems clear that the police, trading standards and the Government know what is going on.

It is incumbent on the Minister, when he replies to the debate, to acknowledge the scale of what is happening and to give the House an indication of how a truly multi-agency and tough, robust approach will be taken to this issue to nip it in the bud. Where the public see acceptance of widespread law-breaking, there needs to be action for the law to continue to be respected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, can I add my two-penn’orth to this? I declare my interest as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee, but I am speaking more as a serving Bishop. I have to hear disciplinary complaints against clergy. Sometimes those clergy have committed something which is being investigated first by the police. To answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often the police tell us, “We don’t want you interfering until we have finished”. If the result of the criminal proceeding is that the person is convicted, I can then do quite a summary process in terms of applying a penalty or perhaps depriving that member of the clergy from serving in their parish, perhaps banning them from ministry for a time or for life. But all of that is very much on that balance of probabilities, on the civil standard. It is very different from the criminal standard.

There are many cases where the police investigation may not lead to a trial or may lead to a trial and acquittal but there are still major issues around the suitability of that person to be a minister of religion, such as their safeguarding ability. I need to be able to reassure my people in my diocese by following a proper disciplinary process on exactly the same facts as the criminal case was dealing with, but to that very different standard of proof.

Again, as chair of police ethics, I think the ability of the police to be respected by the public, for me, demands that there are occasions when somebody who has been acquitted at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt should still then face the disciplinary matter at that civil standard of the balance of probabilities, so I could not support this current amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

393B: Clause 168, page 219, line 13, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will give me as satisfactory a response in relation to this group as the other Minister just gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

Amendments 393B to 393F in this group are in my name. They address Clauses 168 to 171, which will create a presumption of anonymity for an authorised firearms officer who is charged with an offence in relation to the use of a weapon in the exercise of his or her functions. That presumption will apply unless and until that defendant is convicted of the criminal offence.

I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black of Brentwood, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for adding their names to these amendments. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, cannot be here tonight. They send their apologies. We will all miss their contributions, as they made powerful speeches on this subject in Committee. I also record my gratitude to Emma Snell of Justice and to Sebastian Cuttill of the News Media Association for their very helpful briefings.

Amendment 393B would replace this presumption of anonymity in the Bill with a power for the court to grant anonymity where it considers it necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the firearms officer or another person, such as a member of the officer’s family, or to prevent harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and to the principle of open justice. That, in essence, is the common-law position that applies now.

I recognise the need for courts to have this power to grant anonymity in appropriate cases, but it would be a mistake to legislate for a statutory presumption. That is because the criminal courts have long proceeded, and rightly so, on the basis that open justice is a core principle of our legal system. It is a core principle because it is essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Restrictions on reporting what goes on in our courts always need to be justified. In the context addressed by Clause 168, there are especially strong reasons for upholding open justice.

We are here typically concerned with the actions of a firearms officer acting on behalf of the state, whose use of a weapon has killed another human being. That event will have led the CPS to bring a criminal prosecution, which means that the CPS believes that two criteria are satisfied—first, that on the available evidence, the court is more likely than not to convict, and secondly, that it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. Of course, the prosecution must prove its case, but in this context the interests of open justice are very important in the public interest. The public, not just the family and friends of the deceased, surely have a strong interest in knowing what is alleged against whom.

Open justice, I suggest, is of particular importance at this time, when public confidence in our police force is low—perhaps lower than ever before. A presumption that the press cannot fully report a murder trial will, I fear, inevitably cause further damage to public confidence.

I accept that there will be cases where open justice should give way to the need to protect the defendant and his or her family. The court must have power to provide protection by requiring anonymity, but that must be because of information that provides a reasoned basis for concern that such protection is required in the particular circumstances of the case.

I also emphasise that Clause 168 would confer special protection on firearms officers. The Government do not suggest that other police officers or prison officers whose conduct may lead to the serious injury or death of another person should enjoy this presumption of anonymity, and rightly so. To confer this unique protection on firearms officers is unnecessary because a discretion for the court suffices, and it is wrong in principle because this is a context where the interests of open justice are at their strongest.

In Committee my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere—I am very pleased that he is in his place—suggested that firearms officers might be deterred from taking up such posts if there is no presumption of anonymity. That seems to me, with great respect, a weak argument when no other police officer enjoys such a presumption, when Clause 168 does not guarantee anonymity, when our amendments would allow anonymity in appropriate cases and when a firearms officer is far more likely to be concerned about the risk of prosecution than about the question of anonymity.

Also in Committee, my other noble friend—I do not have very many—Lord Hogan-Howe, whom I am also very pleased to see in his place tonight, emphasised the difficult and important job done by firearms officers. I recognise that, and I agree with my noble friend. That should be carefully borne in mind when decisions are taken in the public interest on whether to prosecute. Once a prosecution is brought, no defendant should enjoy a special presumption of anonymity. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe also drew attention to the fact that there are not many of these cases. That is no doubt true, but I suggest that adds nothing to the debate on how such cases should be treated when a prosecution is brought.

In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, emphasised that firearms officers can face serious death threats and intimidation—very regrettable but no doubt true. So can other police officers, and if there is information suggesting such circumstances or a risk of such circumstances, our amendments would allow the judge to protect anonymity. That is the right way to ensure both protection and open justice.

The other amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 393C and 393D, would ensure that the criteria for courts imposing restrictions are the same after conviction and pending an appeal, and Amendments 393E and 393F would ensure that courts have flexible powers to vary or revoke reporting restrictions or anonymity orders in the light of any changes. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an interesting and important debate on a vital question. I am also grateful to the Minister and her officials, who have devoted considerable time to meeting me and others concerned about this matter, for taking our concerns so seriously. My noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere made the point that there is much agreement on all sides, and there is. It is very important to emphasise that. We all agree that firearms officers do a vital job. They do it in the public interest, they do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and they have our thanks for their service.

Respectfully, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on Amendment 394, for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To say to the public that a particular category of defendant—firearms officers—should be prosecuted only if the circumstances are exceptional would send a terrible message to the public and damage public confidence in cases where someone has died by reason of the actions of an officer of state. Surely the standard principle should apply: the CPS asks itself whether a conviction is more likely than not and whether it is in the public interest for there to be a prosecution. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said, in assessing the public interest and whether a conviction is likely, the CPS of course takes into account all the circumstances; in particular, whether the officer is acting normally in the heat of the moment in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

I have a couple of points on my amendment in relation to anonymity. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the powerful point that firearms officers are unique in that they are licensed to shoot, and that, in almost all cases where they exercise that power, the likely outcome is death. I say to the House that this special and unique role makes it all the more important that open justice fully applies, unless there is information before the court suggesting that anonymity is needed.

The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made the powerful point that these officers deserve certainty, because otherwise, when they go out to work and are faced with an immediate threat, or what they perceive to be an immediate threat, they might hesitate before shooting as they are worried about the consequences for them. This would be very much against the public interest. I say to the noble Viscount that, under Clause 168, the firearms officer does not have certainty. All that the Government are providing is a presumption, and, as the Minister rightly emphasised, the court will decide, even with a presumption, whether anonymity should apply.

However, whatever noble Lords may think of my judgment on this, I can count, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 393B withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Taken together, these amendments would introduce basic, evidence-based safeguards. They are about ensuring that youth diversion orders, if they are to exist, are tailored, workable and fair to the child. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will press her amendment to a vote, because I strongly support it. I would like to force a vote on mine as well but, obviously, the House is going to be very tired by the end of this Bill, so I will not—she said bitterly.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am saddened by the attack from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Ministers, because they have sat through hours of debate on the Bill and listened most patiently. I have not always agreed with them, but they have responded with the utmost courtesy. They should be thanked, rather than criticised, for their efforts.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group. We accept the Minister’s amendments, which seem entirely reasonable.

I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, we believe that they are somewhat misguided. Youth diversion orders, whatever one may think of them, will be implemented as a means of dealing with some of the most serious offences committed by people of the age of criminal responsibility. We should not be making concessions to people who have committed or intend to commit terrorism offences. We believe that engaging in these acts forfeits any right to the conditions of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409H as a primary consideration.

Similarly, regarding Amendment 409J, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I entirely understand and acknowledge the issue she is trying to grapple with. Our position, however, is simple: court proceedings should be carried out in the language of the land. That said, the Government do offer translation services, and I ask the Minister to set out measures that are already in place to ensure that offenders understand orders that are made by the courts.

Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, youth diversion orders must be underpinned by the principle of proportionality. Amendment 417A would ensure that they are being used in this expected manner. We particularly support the intention behind Amendment 409G—that youth diversion orders will be a serious step to take, and that ensuring that multi-agency evidence backs up the decision to issue an order is therefore incredibly important. Similarly, the sharing of data on terrorists and terrorism networks is becoming an increasingly urgent need. Any step that improves the efficiency of the sourcing and sharing of information between authorities is welcome, so we also support this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

In some ways I can see the problem. I do not know that this amendment will tackle it. It could bring into scope a whole range of activities that are superficially offensive, and undoubtedly hurtful to anyone who has been a victim of terrorism, but mean that we do not do what we need to do, which is a much harder job—have these arguments out in public regularly and call it out, as it were. Arresting them and carting them away just turns them into a new kind of martyr, in my mind, and we do not want to give anything to their martyr status. I can see the aim, but I do not think this is the method.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that this amendment is not going to solve all problems in this area, but it is going to make a significant contribution. She is concerned about hard cases, and she identifies some of the possible hard cases. My answer to that is that the CPS will prosecute only in a case where it believes there is a more than 50% chance of a conviction and it is in the public interest. Many of the examples that she gives are most unlikely to satisfy those criteria.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, if noble Lords in this House do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is giving the answer to a problem that is a reality within our society, then I hope that the Minister, if he is not accepting this, will tell us what the answer is. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about going into the campuses and talking to these young people. You will never shame the likes of Gerry Adams, so just trying to talk them away is not going to solve the problem.

I am speaking for those in Northern Ireland who went through 30 years of terrorism. Every day you went out, your loved one went to the gate and watched you get into the car, believing it was the last time they would see you. Society cannot live under that. It should not be asked to live under that. Therefore, if the Minister says this is not the answer to the problem, I respectfully ask him to give us the answer and not close his eyes to reality. We have to deal with it, and we need to deal with it now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name. Like many noble Lords, I was surprised by the decision of the High Court that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, in view of her detailed description of its terrorist activities in her House of Commons Statement on 23 June 2025.

In reading the High Court judgment, I was struck by the inconsistency of the arguments of the learned judges. At the beginning of the judgment, they set out the details of Palestine Action’s Underground Manual, which is standard textbook terrorist stuff: guidance to form small autonomous secret cells and to recruit only trusted participants. Then there is operational terrorist tradecraft: instructions to use secure email and VPNs, to conduct reconnaissance, and to pick targets based on complicity with the Israeli arms industry. It then has a section on targeting and tactics, with lists of defence firms, universities, financial firms and government buildings, and practical advice aimed at serious property damage to disrupt those targets.

The court then concludes that proscribing the organisation was “disproportionate” and that the Home Secretary did not follow her own policy, even though it said that

“the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.

I submit that the Home Secretary must have the absolute right to proscribe an organisation based on the advice that she has received from our advisory bodies.

In coming to her decision, the Home Secretary sought copious advice on the terrorist nature of Palestine Action. As all noble Lords know, the Home Office and the FCDO do not proscribe organisations willy-nilly. We all complained about their failure to proscribe the IRGC. The Home Secretary had reports from a proscription review group, a cross-departmental group including counterterrorism policing, which encompasses specialist police officers from many police forces. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the CTP gave their reports.

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre produced its assessment. JTAC comprises counterterrorism experts from United Kingdom intelligence agencies, police forces and government departments. Its report is very significant and was summarised as having concluded:

“Although most of its activity could not be classified as terrorism within the definition in Section 1 of the 2000 Act … Palestine Action had ‘commit[ted] or participate[d] in acts of terrorism to the extent of the attacks at Thales, Glasgow … at Instro Precision (a subsidiary of Elbit) in Kent … and at Elbit in Bristol … JTAC noted that those participating in the Bristol attack had ‘entered the [Elbit] warehouse, using weapons including sledgehammers, axes and whips’ and ‘during the attack two responding police officers and a security guard were assaulted and suffered injuries. One police officer had been assaulted with a sledgehammer and sustained a serious back injury’.


JTAC noted that Palestine Action had cleverly issued videos of the damage to property but not its violence against the responders.

We now come to the crucial question of proportionality. From reading the evidence, I am certain that the Home Secretary’s proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate, and a necessary response to an escalating campaign that threatened critical national infrastructure. The statutory test, the court admits, was satisfied. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits proscription where an organisation

“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.

The Home Secretary concluded that Palestine Action met that test and laid an order, which was approved by both Houses of Parliament.

Operational intelligence supported that decision. The JTAC assessment concluded that the group had conducted incidents resulting in serious property damage and that the Underground Manual provides

“practical advice and advocates for serious property damage”.

That assessment links the manual and the recorded actions to the statutory definition of property damage designed to influence government. The High Court judgment itself accepted that three of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorist offences, which strengthens the factual basis for proscription.

The proscription was proportionate because of the severity and escalation of conduct. The pattern of over 300 direct actions with increasing frequency and severity, including attacks on defence suppliers and critical infrastructure, supports a conclusion that ordinary criminal law and targeted prosecutions were insufficient to address the systemic risk. It was proportionate because of the targeting of national security supply chains. Where actions against defence firms and related infrastructure create heightened national security risks, proscription is a legitimate, proportionate tool to protect those interests where the conduct is political and aimed at influence.

Proscription was also proportionate because policy and process safeguards were engaged. The Home Office relied on PRG and JTAC operational inputs and then laid the order before Parliament—steps that reflect the five policy safeguards that the Secretary of State must consider after concluding that it satisfies the terrorism test: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities, the threat to the UK, its presence in UK, and the threat to British nationals overseas.

Of course proscription interferes with Article 10 and 11 rights to peaceful free association and expression, but it is narrowly aimed at an organisation which has been shown to promote or prepare acts meeting the statutory terrorism definition. Where evidence shows a real risk to infrastructure, violence and public safety, the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights is justified and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the court said:

“We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate”.


Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Home Secretary was in breach of convention rights because there might be some supporters of Palestine Action who are not advocating destruction and violence but general support for the organisation. However, if these people want to protest about Israel or Gaza or anything else, then they can do so, but not under the umbrella of an organisation advocating violence and damage and terrorism.

The court went on to say:

“Real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action has organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism as defined at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. Those actions are small in number but they are still significant and it is also significant that these actions have happened in the United Kingdom … It is significant that Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration”.


Indeed, Palestine Action has lauded those who took part in the actions.

The court said:

“It is, further, significant that the contents of the Underground Manual provide good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.


Let me just repeat that last sentence. The court concluded that Palestine Action intends to continue with terrorist activities

“to promote the use of violence, regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.

But then the court makes an extraordinary statement:

“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”.


So that is all right, then. The court has decided that three terrorist actions were not enough to justify the Home Secretary’s decision. How many does it want? Five actions, 10 actions, 15 terrorist actions, or to wait until persons—innocent people—are killed?

The Home Secretary has a duty to protect the public, not the court, and she should not be second-guessed in this way on the facts when there is clear evidence of terrorist activity. Even if it is only three serious incidents, there was the danger of escalation. The court said:

“When striking the balance between issues such as these, the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.


I agree about the latitude and my Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that only the Secretary of State can make that judgment based on the advice of all the anti-terrorist organisations at her disposal, and at her own discretion. She is the one who answers to Parliament, to us, on the rightness and wrongness of her decision. My Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that supporters of any proscribed group who were arrested after that group was proscribed and before it was de-proscribed can be prosecuted for such an offence.

Of course, my amendments will be technically flawed, and my noble friend on the Front Bench will object on principle, with perhaps good reason, but I believe the concept is right. I hope that the Minister will bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to implement what I am advocating here. If he will not, will he tell the House what he proposes to do to reverse this perverse decision?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the House, that the judgment in Palestine Action to which he objects is under appeal and the Court of Appeal, in due course, will pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the High Court decision and the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision. These criticisms, with some of which I certainly agree, are premature. What matters is not what the noble Lord thinks or what I think, but what the Court of Appeal says and, if necessary, what the Supreme Court says on such an important matter.

In any event, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a noted constitutionalist, that it is in principle wrong to seek to remove the power of the courts to assess the legality of judgments of the Home Secretary. Surely, it is a very valuable protection of the rule of law in this country that the courts pronounce on legality and Parliament does not remove the power of the courts to do so.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I have no objection to the court pronouncing on a point of law. However, on this occasion, it was not pronouncing on a point of law but making a judgment on the facts of the case and disagreeing with the Home Secretary on the facts.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am not defending the Divisional Court’s judgment, but it would say that it was intervening on a point of law, because a point of law covers whether the Secretary of State was lawfully entitled to form the conclusion that she did in the circumstances. However, as I say, this is all highly premature.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Archbishop of Canterbury]

My Lords, many noble Lords will know that the Church of England’s view on abortion is one of principled opposition, recognising that there can be limited conditions under which abortion may be preferable to any available alternatives. This is based on the belief of the infinite worth and value of every human life, however old or young, and including life not yet born. The infinite value of human life is a fundamental Christian principle that underpins much of our legal system and has shaped existing laws on abortion. All life is precious. We therefore need to recognise that women confronted with the very complex and difficult decision to terminate a pregnancy deserve our utmost understanding, care and practical support as they face what is often a heart-wrenching decision.

However, I cannot support Clause 208. Though its intention may not be to change the 24-week abortion limit, it undoubtedly risks eroding the safeguards and enforcement of those legal limits and, inadvertently, undermining the value of human life.

I support Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, since it is not clear how the law can function in an enforceable way without in-person consultation before accessing early medical abortion. The risks of medical complications are, as we have heard, much greater if the pills for early abortion are taken beyond the 11-week limit. Although there are benefits to telemedicine—I do not dispute that—there are also flaws, and they are key to the debate on whether Clause 208 should pass.

As I have already said, this is not a debate on whether the legal abortion limit should change, but without the levers necessary to monitor and enforce the law, we are at risk of it becoming exactly that.

In the same vein, I support the amendment in the name of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester, as we have a particular duty of care to those under 18 to ensure that they are properly cared for and supported while making such difficult decisions.

I am reminded of the call of the prophet Micah both to do justice and to love mercy. Balancing justice and mercy is the challenge that we are debating today. I do not think that women who act in relation to their own pregnancies should be prosecuted, but I also do not wish to see any increase in late-term abortions.

Although Clause 208 is well intentioned, it risks making an already imperfect situation worse. Therefore, I support Amendment 424 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.

Decriminalisation of abortion is a question of such legal, moral and practical complexity that it cannot be properly addressed in an amendment hastily added to another Bill. Consideration of any alteration to the abortion laws needs public consultation and robust parliamentary processes to ensure that every aspect of this debate is carefully considered and scrutinised.

There are many outstanding questions, which deserve greater attention, about the tone of policing in this area, about how we can best ensure that women suffering miscarriages can access the right care when they need it, and about how those who provide abortions outside the law will continue to be held accountable for doing so.

As I have said before in this place, we need a framework that supports women, not one that puts them and their unborn children in the way of greater harm. On that basis, I will support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Monckton and Lady Stroud, and my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester should they push them to a vote.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It was suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that Clause 208 would undermine respect for the law. On the contrary, it will enhance respect for the law, because it will express in statutory form compassion for women who have the misfortune to suffer the loss of their baby at late term for whatever reason it occurs, and it will prevent intrusive, distressing police investigations at a most sensitive time in any woman’s life.

It has been suggested that there should be a balance in the law. Clause 208 already includes the necessary balance because it protects the woman but maintains the criminal liability of anyone who assists her to have a late-term abortion, whether it be the abusive partner, the rogue doctor or whoever it may be. That is right and proper, and that is the balance that should be accorded.

As a lawyer, I look for precedents. The precedent that occurs to me is the Suicide Act 1961, in which Parliament recognised that a person who had the misfortune to seek to take their own life should not be prosecuted. You cannot be prosecuted for attempting to end your own life. But the law says—I appreciate that we are currently debating the assisted dying Bill, but my speech has nothing to do with that—that if you assist a person to seek to take their own life, you can be prosecuted. That is the distinction there, and it is the distinction in Clause 208.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

There is another distinction that the House may wish to consider: under the Suicide Act, it is not a crime to take your own life, but we are talking about taking the life of an unborn baby.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Of course, the unborn baby, until it is born, has no legal identity. That is the law of the land. The unborn baby has no legal identity, and the mother is in the prime position in relation to that baby. We have to balance the interests of all concerned. My view is that Clause 208 does contain the balance that I have suggested to the House.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, if we have to balance the needs and rights of all concerned, does that mean that an unborn child that is viable beyond 24 weeks has no rights and should not be considered here? Does it mean that it is only the rights of the mother that matter?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am not commending late-term abortions. Nobody on either side of this debate is commending late-term abortions. The question addressed by Clause 208 is whether there should be a criminal liability: whether people should be investigated by the police and potentially sent to prison in those circumstances. That seems to me, with all due respect, to be the wrong balance. I say to the House that this is a very difficult issue, but I am afraid that those who oppose Clause 208 simply fail to recognise the arguments on the other side, which need to be balanced.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 426C and thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner, Lady Spielman and Lady Lawlor, for their support. I will also speak in support of Amendment 422E, to which I have added my name.

Before explaining why we have tabled Amendment 426C, I give a little context. Like, I am sure, all other noble Lords, I have received a great deal of correspondence on Clause 208. One thing repeatedly said by proponents is that, apart from decriminalising all instances of maternal abortion, nothing would change. The Fawcett Society, for example, says that apart from this one change, the Abortion Act 1967 would continue to operate as it always has. However, I think this is quite mistaken. We are not tidying up a small drafting error here; we are making a fundamental change to the law. When you make a fundamental change to the law, you change perceptions and behaviour, and it has knock-on effects.

We have heard, for example, that there has been a marked change in the number of investigations related to abortion. We have also learned—the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, alluded to this—that the changes are a bit more complicated than we might have thought. There has been an increase in the number of investigations related to procuring illegal abortion offences, but at the same time there has been a decrease in the number of investigations for intentional destruction of a viable unborn child. For example, there were seven investigations of intentional destruction of a viable unborn child in 2025, compared with 18 in 2023. Only one person, a male, was proceeded against in the most recent year. Clearly, something is going on but, equally clearly, it seems to be a little more complicated than we might think and the Government do not really know. To repeat the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, made, it is not possible to determine how many investigations there have been that relate to women, including women acting in relation to their pregnancy.

Alongside that we have had another major change, about which we have already heard a great deal this evening, in Committee and at Second Reading, and that is the arrival on the scene of abortifacient pills. They have completely changed the profile of abortion, including whether the foetus is dead before it is delivered. It is not just about telemedicine but about pills by post, which have become much more easily available, not simply within this country but increasingly across country boundaries.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and others have discussed consultations by pregnant women, and we have had some discussion of whether these should or should not all be in person. Our Amendment 426C has a rather different focus. It would create a new crime of obtaining abortifacients, which for the moment are pills, by false representation. To explain why this is desirable, I will say a bit more about the case of Stuart Worby, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, referred.

In 2025, Stuart Worby was found guilty of poisoning his pregnant wife by administering abortion medication without her knowledge or consent. She very much wanted the baby she was carrying and he did not. A female associate of Worby’s procured the drugs through an online consultation in which she claimed early pregnancy and was duly prescribed and sent the pills. Worby gave his wife the drugs without her knowledge. She suffered a devastating miscarriage and the government website summarising the case notes that she is left unable to bear children. The victim of Worby’s act was not investigated when she miscarried. The crime came to light only when she found messages on her husband’s phone and went to the police.

In another recent case in Scotland the abortion was procured by a paramedic who injected his partner without her knowledge. Again, she was not investigated; the crime only came to light indirectly. There may be many other cases like this, but it is possible and becoming easier to obtain these pills—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

No, I am going to continue. I agree with the Chief Whip on this; we should just keep going.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I took a number of interventions.

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

That was your choice. I am going to follow instructions.

It is becoming easier to obtain these pills not least because of the balkanisation of American states on abortion issues, which has also turbocharged the use of pills in the United States. If, as seems likely, obtaining and administering an abortifacient without consent is going to increase, then we think there is a good reason to make this a clearly defined offence. Our amendment is drafted in consultation with some experienced KCs based on existing fraud law.

I realise that there will be an obvious objection, which is that there is existing legislation, but as the Government Ministers themselves have made clear when introducing specific legislation to cover retail workers, the fact that there may be legislation is not necessarily a compelling argument against creating a new, clear offence. Sometimes the legislature may want to go further to inform, to highlight particular risks, and to clarify the law in new situations, which is what we are in in this case.

We have drafted this amendment on the assumption that Clause 208 stands, because you have to have to make an assumption, but the fact that it was so difficult to do this, that it is so unsatisfactory and that, if we went forward, we or the Government would have to redraft in the light of what does or does not happen to Clause 208 makes it clear that we are in an unsatisfactory situation. We are making law on the hoof when what is needed is a really good look at the situation we are in and the way that the changes that we might introduce would impact on other behaviour, so that we could take a coherent, holistic view of whether abortion law needs to be rethought.

In that context, I return to Amendment 422E. The first rule of good policy-making is to be clear about the problem. I do not think we are. Amendment 422E therefore proposes an alternative to the unscheduled and unexpected introduction of the sweeping changes in Clause 208. It would require the personal consent of the DPP for an investigation, with a tight time limit. It would address the distressing situations that we have heard about and it would leave us time to discuss properly what changes could usefully be made to current law. It would also ensure that any change that occurred fulfilled the objectives of those who proposed and support Clause 208. I am really concerned at this pulling something out.

I have two final, quick points. Many people will say that lots of other countries have decriminalised, but that does not mean they have a situation that would be exactly like ours if we passed Clause 208. Whether you have full decriminalisation exists in a whole set of different situations, and it certainly does not mean that those countries allow abortion at full term by mothers. The second point is that it is perfectly possible to have a review. The Scots have just done so. They have had a thorough review. One may or may not like what they have done, but that is what we should be doing. Given where we are, I commend my amendment to the House and strongly commend a compromise that would give us time. I hope that the Government are listening to the degree of concern over this and considering whether they might, in the near future, do something serious on this issue.