Lord Katz
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we have started the fourth day on Report with a wide-ranging and interesting debate on the general landscape of public order law. The noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fox of Buckley, have argued that there are too many statutory limitations on protest in this country. I do not agree, and I suspect I will find myself in much agreement with the Minister on those amendments.
First, I will speak to my Amendments 377C and 377D. Amendment 377C would extend the notification period for public processions from six to 28 days. Currently, Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 requires any person organising a protest to notify the police of their proposal to hold it with six days’ notice. The purpose of this period is to ensure that the police can plan their resource requirements effectively. They need to examine the route, number of attendees and timing, gather intelligence on the groups and people involved and assess the likelihood of violence and disorder. If the procession is likely to be large or the cause highly contentious, or if those involved have a history of causing disorder, they may very well need to make contingencies and possibly bring in more officers.
The short period of six days causes significant problems for the police, the public and the organisers of the protest, and it may take the police a substantial amount of time to gather all the available evidence and set conditions so the organisers can often only be notified of those conditions the day before the protest is due to take place. This does not give them adequate time to ensure that they can comply with those conditions, nor does it allow the public and businesses adequate time to adapt.
Policy Exchange’s polling demonstrated that the medium level of notice that respondents believed protest organisers should have to give to the police is 28 days. In its survey, 51% said organisers should have to give at least three weeks’ notice while 45% said the period should be at least four weeks. The 28-day period is also incidentally the same notice period as exists in Northern Ireland, and while I appreciate the different historical and political context in Northern Ireland, it does not seem unreasonable to extend that to England and Wales—especially given the substantial time and effort that police must pour into planning for large-scale protests.
Amendment 377D concerns the criteria on which the police may prohibit a protest. Currently, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 permits the police to prohibit protests if there is a likelihood that the protest will result in serious public disorder. However, that is the only criterion included in that section, meaning there is no ability for the police to prohibit a protest if there is a risk of serious disruption to the life of the community, nor does it allow the police to take into account their own resources and ability to maintain public safety when making their assessment. My amendment would extend the criteria for the prohibition of protest to include where the chief officer of police has a reasonable belief that the protest could result in “serious public disorder”, “serious damage to property”,
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
or that it would
“place undue demands on the police”.
Given the Government's commitment to reform of public order law, I would think they should be able to accept these two amendments. Before the Minister says they need to wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, into public order and hate speech to report, I gently remind him that the Government were perfectly happy to pre-empt that review and legislate to extend the legislation aggravators based on characteristics last week. If they were happy to do so for that provision, I do not see why they cannot accept mine. However, if the Minister finds himself unable to do so, I am minded to press them to a Division when called.
I will also briefly comment on the other amendments in this group. Amendment 369, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others, would create a new statutory right to protest. While the attention behind this is understandable, it is difficult to see what legal gap it is intended to fill. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has already explained, the right to protest is already protected through the common law and currently through Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporated domestically through the Human Rights Act.
However, it is important to recognise that we do not derive our rights in Britain from international treaties or even from domestic statute. The right to protest was protected before Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1998 and before we joined the ECHR. It is a right derived from ancient English liberty and our common law inheritance, so placing it into the Crime and Policing Bill in 2026 will not change a thing. I dare say if we were to leave the ECHR and repeal the Human Rights Act, we would still have our ancient freedom to protest intact.
What is more, creating a new declaratory clause risks adding greater complexity without adding meaningful protection. Indeed, by restating rights that are already well established, we may inadvertently create new areas of legal uncertainty rather than clarity for the police, local authorities and the courts, and for those reasons I cannot support that amendment.
A similar concern arises with Amendment 369A, which would introduce a reasonable excuse defence relating to concealing identity at a protest. Clause 133(2) already contains these defences. They include when a person is wearing a face covering for health reasons, religious observance or a purpose relating to their work, and that is a perfectly reasonable and pragmatic list of exceptions.
Amendments 372A and 372AA seek to narrow the circumstances in which conditions may be imposed on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. In doing so, they replace the current test by which a protest may intimidate with a requirement to demonstrate a specific purpose to intimidate. That is a significantly higher threshold. The difficulty is obvious. In practice, intimidation often arises from the circumstances and impact of a protest rather than from an explicitly stated intention. Requiring the police to prove purpose before acting risks tying their hands precisely when communities may feel most vulnerable.
On Amendment 373, as I stated in Committee, we on these Benches are supportive of the introduction of police powers to take into consideration cumulative disruption when placing conditions on protests and assemblies. I do not therefore agree with removing Clause 140. After all, the previous Government tried to introduce this in 2023 and it was the Liberal Democrats and Labour who voted it down in this House at the time, so it is good to see the Labour Party finally has come round to the Conservatives’ way of thinking.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Marks, Lord Strasburger and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for affording us this further opportunity to debate the right to protest and public order measures in the Bill. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate.
The Government fully recognise the importance of peaceful protest in a democratic society. However, Amendment 369, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would place in statute a right that is already clearly protected in domestic law—and it is not only me saying that, as we have heard from the formidable legal troika of the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. As they said, public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act to uphold Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights which cover freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These rights are qualified and may only be limited when restrictions are lawful, necessary and proportionate. Common law also provides strong recognition of peaceful protest. Introducing an additional statutory provision risks creating overlap and uncertainty, particularly for operational policing, without offering any meaningful new protections.
In their contributions, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about the risks of, shall we say, a more extreme Government and this paving the way for further restrictions on the right to protest. I can only agree with comments made by a number of noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks: I hope the occasion never arises, but that is democracy, and any incoming Government that have that kind of mandate would not find it hard to overturn not only provisions that the Government are making in this Bill but the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes, should it make its way on to the statute book. I am therefore not sure that argument really washes.
The Government remain firmly committed to safeguarding the right to protest. That is one reason why we have asked the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to review the current legislative framework. One of the matters being explored as part of the review is—to quote its terms of reference—whether the current legislation
“strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe”.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is expected to report later in the spring. I assure noble Lords that we will consider very carefully all his recommendations, including any proposing a strengthening of the right to protest.
Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, would provide a reasonable excuse defence for concealing a person’s identity at a protest in a designated area and shift the burden of proof away from individuals within that designated area on to police. Instead of requiring a person to justify why they had a valid reason for wearing an item to conceal their identity, as set out in the specified defences, it would place the responsibility on the police to assess, during a live protest, whether the explanation provided was reasonable or not. As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that is not necessarily always an easy thing to do.
Clause 133 currently provides three statutory defences for concealing identity at a protest within a designated area: relating to the health of the person or others; religious observance; or for a purpose relating to that person’s work. The offence carries a reverse burden of proof, meaning it is for the individual to prove they concealed their identity for one of these reasons. I consider this a proportionate and carefully balanced offence.
It is important to highlight that any decision to designate an area and arrest a person concealing their identity must take into account Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, meaning that all decisions must be necessary and proportionate in relation to the right to peaceful protest. It is important to bear in mind that a locality will be designated only when it is thought that a protest activity is likely to involve or has involved criminality, so it is expedient to do so in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences.
Lord Pannick (CB)
So is the Minister saying to the protestor at the Iranian embassy that he or she has only two choices: not to protest, or to protest not wearing a face mask and thereby run the risk that their relatives in Iran may be killed or tortured?
Lord Katz (Lab)
In that example, I revert to what I said about the locality being designated only if the police suspect that criminality is likely to occur or has occurred on previous occasions. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a largely peaceful protest outside an embassy and at an appropriate distance would not fall into that category of protest.
As I was going to say, clear operational guidance from the NPCC—
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
It might well be that that protester is just on a general demonstration. If you are an Iranian or Chinese dissident, you might be on a civil rights demonstration, arguing for the right to protest. That would equally be the target of the ire of your authoritarian, anti-protest, anti-civil liberty regime. Can the Minister explain how this cannot possibly chill their right to go on a protest? It is not just the transnational example—other examples were given. Some people will not go on protests because they will be frightened of the consequences.
Lord Katz (Lab)
On this having a chilling effect, the new offence will cover only people in the locality who are
“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity”.
As I said, the police will use this power only if they can say there is going to be criminality on a particular protest, such as a march. That is not a power they are going to be using lightly.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am sorry to keep pestering the Minister, but the difficulty is that there is absolutely no reason why the criminality has to be connected with the attitudes of those Iranians who are frightened. The criminality simply has to be connected with the protest as a whole. It may be entirely separate from the views, attitudes or desires of the Iranians who, in the example of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are likely to be deterred from attending a protest.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.
Lord Pannick (CB)
May I test the patience of the Minister? I am very grateful to him. The defence he is offering—that this applies only if there is criminality—does not explain why Clause 133 recognises the defences of health, religious observance or a person’s work. If the Government recognise those defences, even though they are in the context of criminality, surely the clause should also cover the type of example I have given.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.
Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring
“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”
of a place of worship.
As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.
Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.
The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.
Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.
I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.
Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.
There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.
Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
I remind my noble friend that in Committee a number of us raised the statement that was issued by a whole range of civic society organisations, whose members often live in the communities in which they carry out protests. He will recall in particular that the TUC supported that civic society statement.
I speak as one of the perhaps few people in this House who has had responsibility for organising mass national demonstrations in central London. Can my noble friend reassure those organisations that this is not, as they fear, in effect, a quota on national demonstrations in London? Can he also give some guidance to the police on how they pick and choose between those different organisations if there is to be a quota?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for that and for all the work that she has done in organising those national protests, at least one or two of which I am sure that I have attended.
It is absolutely not a quota. It is simply to say that if you are regularly marching in areas side by side with other communities, that repeated activity should not impede their ability, for example, to come and go to a synagogue. It cannot be right, as I know is the case, that synagogues should have to alter their regular service times on a Saturday morning to allow for protests. There must be a way that police can accommodate the needs of the protesters and of those worshippers. I want to be clear: this is not about imposing a quota on protests. The provision does not allow police to ban a protest but places a duty on senior officers to consider cumulative disruption when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 is met.
Amendment 377C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to extend the notice period required for planned processions from six days to 28 days. As I explained in Committee, six days provides the police with adequate time to work with organisers who are planning protests to ensure that any conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. The noble Lord’s Amendment 377D seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 to enable a chief officer of police to consider
“serious damage to property, or … serious disruption to the life of the community”
and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions.
Section 13 of the 1986 Act rightly sets out a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. Widening the scope of this power, including to take account of police resources, would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest under Articles 10 and 11 and the legislation becoming incompatible with the ECHR. The noble compared this with the measure we discussed last week around aggravated offences. The latter was a clear manifesto commitment announced before the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven.
I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords who have spoken in this group. They have raised some very legitimate issues about whether existing public order legislation and the measures in Part 9 of the Bill strike the right balance between protecting the right to protest, protecting communities and preventing disorder. As I have said, there is an ongoing review examining just this issue, and I put it to the noble Lord that we should wait for the outcome of that review. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to press any of the amendments to a vote today. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief in explaining why I do not propose to withdraw my amendment. First, our amendment would introduce a dynamic right, with a duty on local authorities and public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. Secondly, of course the margin of appreciation is indeed an international concept, but this Government are planning to legislate on the application of Article 8, and they may be right to do so, but we need to have proper concern about future legislation within the context of the margin of appreciation.
Thirdly, I am not suggesting for a moment that we can entrench legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is absolutely right to say that Parliament cannot bind its successors. However, we can, by legislation, make it unattractive to reverse a public duty to support the right to protest. Finally, nothing I have said undermines the balancing of rights between the right to protest and the rights and freedoms of others; but the right to protest is at the heart of our democracy. If the Conservatives are not going to support us on this, so be it: that is very disappointing, but I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Parkinson for tabling these amendments that seek to ensure that our memorials of national and historic importance are afforded the respect and protection they deserve under the new offence created in Clause 137. As was noted in Committee, the offence of climbing on specified memorials was introduced to address gaps revealed by recent protests around war memorials, such as the Royal Artillery Memorial and, indeed, around the statue of our great wartime leader Sir Winston Churchill just outside this place. It was first introduced as part of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, and it is welcome that this Government have taken up the mantle.
Under the current drafting, however, only grade 1 listed memorials are specified, together with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill, but the list does not capture other memorials of equal national significance. As my noble friend has argued so eloquently, using grade 1 listed memorials does not serve a real practical purpose. It is much more about administrative ease. Why does Sledmere get two specified memorials but the Women of World War II Memorial gets no such protection? Amendment 370 would broaden the definition of “specified memorial” to include any war memorial that has been listed or scheduled, not just those that happen to be grade 1 listed.
That approach aligns with the fact that the significance of a memorial is not solely a function of its listing grade but of the history it commemorates and its role in national remembrance. Expanding the scope in this way provides a more objective and inclusive basis for protection and avoids arbitrary outcomes based on historic listing decisions.
Amendment 372 complements Amendment 370 by adding two memorials of particular national importance: the monument to the women of the Second World War in Whitehall, which honours the immense contributions of millions of women during that conflict, and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park, which stands as a poignant reminder of the horrors of genocide. Including those memorials recognises the breadth of sacrifice in the diverse stories that make up our collective history. I hope the Government will concede to this. If they do and my noble friend is content, so will I be.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who spoke in this short but important debate, particularly to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, who spoke very movingly about the power of memorials in every community and the hurt that communities feel when they are damaged or disrespected. Amendments 370, 372ZZA and 372ZZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, seek to expand the list of war and other memorials covered by the new offence of climbing on a memorial provided for in Clause 137. I am grateful to him for taking the time to meet with me and officials last week on this issue and for his thoughtful consideration of how best to achieve the Government’s aim, which I think is shared across the House.
As regards Amendment 370, I fully acknowledge that many of the listed and scheduled memorials covered in the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 commemorate events and individuals of great national importance. The Bill intentionally sets out a clear and fixed list of memorials which provides certainty for the public, policing and the courts. By contrast, Amendment 370 would link the offence to memorials listed or scheduled under two separate heritage Acts. Those Acts encompass a far wider range of structures than the focused list in this measure and can change over time. Therefore, this would introduce an uncertainty about which memorials were captured at any given point, undermining the clarity and consistency that the measure is intended to achieve. For this reason, I cannot support the amendment.
The noble Lord, and perhaps the House, will be pleased to hear that I am much more disposed towards his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB, which seek to add the monument to the women of World War II and the Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park to Schedule 14. Our aim is to ensure that memorials that have been deemed at threat in the course of a protest are covered by the offence. As the noble Lord has explained, these two memorials have been targeted in recent years. They are both culturally significant, and I agree with him that we need to protect them under this new offence. I am therefore happy to confirm that the Government support these two amendments.
The Holocaust memorial garden in Hyde Park is of course designed to be enjoyed as a garden and people are free to walk within it. I have given consideration to the practical issue of whether the police will be able to enforce this offence. The intention of the offence is to capture the action of climbing and I am confident it will not capture walking on an installation such as the Holocaust memorial garden. There are other memorials listed in Schedule 14 which have steps that may be sat on by members of the public, such as the Royal Artillery memorial in Hyde Park. I am content that, in enforcing this offence, police officers will use their discretion to consider whether an offence is committed.
As I have previously stated, the provision includes a power for the Home Secretary to add further memorials by secondary legislation. This might include the statue of Florence Nightingale in Waterloo Place, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This Government will be able to add to the list of protected memorials should a site be identified that requires inclusion. I remain of the view, however, that not every memorial or every war memorial can be included. To do so would make the measure unenforceable due to the number of memorials and many, by their nature—for example, commemorative plaques—cannot be climbed on. That said, I accept we need a clear process for deciding whether to add further memorials to Schedule 14.
We will commit to setting out the process through which the Government will add to the specified list of memorials through secondary legislation. We will ensure a methodical and structured approach to consider which memorials have a significant public interest in being included. We will set out the process shortly after the Bill receives Royal Assent. As the Home Secretary has already indicated, this will include the national Holocaust memorial when it has finally been built. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and that the combination of the addition of the two memorials specified in his Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB and the process I have outlined for considering the case for adding further memorials will persuade him to withdraw Amendment 370.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for that response and I thank him again for the time that he and his officials gave me last week to discuss this in detail. I am grateful too to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower for their support. As the right reverend Prelate said, these memorials stand very often on hallowed ground, but they are cherished and sacred to people of all faiths and none and inspire new generations to learn about the sacrifices of the past.
I continue to think that the solution in Amendment 370 is the more logical one, but I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said in support of my other two Amendments 372ZZA and 372ZZB, which gives an indication that the Home Secretary is willing to use the powers in Clause 137 where needed to make sure that these protections can be afforded to statues that are targeted by protesters and criminals. I will not press my Amendment 370. I look forward to seeing the two additions to the list and the vigilance of the Home Office and police in the years to come to see where others may need to be added, alas, if necessary. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Katz
“Protests outside public office-holder’s home(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P (alone or with other persons) carries on a protest outside, or in the vicinity of, premises that are used by a public office-holder as a dwelling,(b) P carries on the protest for the purpose of representing to, or persuading, the public office-holder that they—(i) should or should not do something, or(ii) should or should not have done something, and(c) P carries on the protest because of, or in connection with, the public officer-holder being a public officer-holder.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to premises that are an official residence.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they did not know the premises were used by the public office-holder as a dwelling.(4) A person is to be taken to have shown the matter referred to in subsection (3) if—(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale (or both).(6) In subsection (5) “the maximum term for summary offences” means—(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.(7) The following definitions apply for the purposes of this section.(8) “Public office-holder” means—(a) a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975);(b) any of the Welsh Ministers;(c) any of the Deputy Welsh Ministers (within the meaning of the Government of Wales Act 2006);(d) the Counsel General to the Welsh Government;(e) a member of the House of Lords;(f) a member of the House of Commons;(g) a member of Senedd Cymru;(h) a member of a local authority;(i) an elected mayor of a local authority within the meaning given by section 9H (elected mayors: England) or section 39(4) (elected mayors: Wales) of the Local Government Act 2000;(j) a mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009;(k) a mayor for the area of a combined county authority established under section 9(1) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023;(l) the Mayor of London or an elected member of the London Assembly;(m) a police and crime commissioner;(n) a candidate at an election for an office mentioned in any of paragraphs (f) to (m).(9) “Local authority” means—(a) in England—(i) a county council;(ii) a district council;(iii) a London borough council;(iv) a parish council;(v) the Common Council of the City of London;(vi) the Council of the Isles of Scilly;(b) in Wales—(i) a county council;(ii) a county borough council;(iii) a community council.(10) “Dwelling” has the meaning given by section 8 of the Public Order Act 1986.(11) “Official residence” means—(a) 10, 11 and 12 Downing Street, London;(b) Admiralty House, Whitehall, London;(c) 1 Carlton Gardens, London;(d) the Palace of Westminster, London;(e) Chequers, Missenden Road, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire;(f) Dorneywood, Dorneywood Road, Burnham, Buckinghamshire;(g) Chevening House, Chevening, Sevenoaks, Kent.”.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence relating to protests outside the homes of public office-holders.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments seek to achieve a similar aim to an earlier amendment tabled in Committee, which the Government withdrew following concerns raised by the Benches opposite. In bringing back these amendments, I hope the revised drafting directly addresses the concerns raised by noble Lords who felt that the initial offence was drawn too widely.
Amendment 371 explicitly requires a protest to be taking place outside a public officeholder’s home for it to be an offence, rather than the broader activity reflected in the Committee amendment. Importantly, a person must be carrying out the protest because of, or in connection with, the public officeholder’s role. Amendment 376 further amends Sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, which confer powers to direct protests away from a person’s home, so as to remove the requirement that protest activity must be linked to a specific future action. As I said in Committee, this change ensures that harassing or intimidatory protests outside the homes of individuals are captured, regardless of whether they relate to past or future conduct.
I recognise the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, about whether additional legislation is truly necessary to protect the homes of public officeholders. The Government’s view is that there is an unequivocal need. We are not just talking about providing a feeling of safety to elected representatives; we are talking about the safety of their families too. This principle is foundational to the resilience of the public officeholder and thus to democracy itself. Under the Defending Democracy policing protocol, drafted and agreed by the former Minister for Security and the then Prime Minister, the previous Government set out a clear expectation that any protest outside the homes of elected representatives should be treated as harassment. That intent of the previous Government is what this amendment now achieves.
The role of elected representatives is the backbone of our democracy. Yet the Minister for Security has heard first-hand from colleagues who have tempered what they say or even how they vote because of intimidating behaviour targeted at their homes and their families. We know too that some, particularly women or those from minority backgrounds, are choosing not to stand for office because of the abuse they fear they will face. That is not democracy thriving; that is democracy shrinking. This legislation will give public officeholders and their families an additional layer of protection. It will help ensure that they can carry out their duties without fearing what awaits them at their front door and it will allow their partners, their children and their loved ones to feel safe where safety should be most assured: in their home.
Let me be absolutely clear: protest is a fundamental democratic right, and this Government defend it vigorously. There are proper, powerful places for protest: outside constituency offices, outside Parliament, at town halls, at political events, at rallies. But the home is different. It is where family life happens, where our children sleep, where our partners work, where people retreat from public life. It must not become an area for intimidation or a no-go zone. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, protests outside officeholders’ homes are in a special category. These amendments are plainly directed at harassing or intimidatory behaviour towards public officeholders, and they affect the families as well, so we are happy to accept these two amendments.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in Committee I raised some strong objections to the amendment that the Government were proposing then. We were concerned that the proposals could inadvertently criminalise canvassing and leafleting an officeholder from a rival political party. We were also concerned about the proposed second aspect of the offence, which could criminalise making representations about a matter relating to the officeholder’s private capacity.
I still have reservations about the principle behind Amendment 371. I do not accept the Government’s argument that all protests outside a public officeholder’s dwelling constitute harassment. That is the stated view of the Government, but I think it is demonstrably false. If a protest outside a public officeholder’s home becomes actual harassment within the meaning of the law then that should be prosecuted as such, and if the protest breaches the peace or becomes highly disruptive then there are already laws to deal with that, but simply saying that any person who wishes to make representations to a politician about their actions or policies outside their house is harassment and therefore unlawful seems a disproportionate infringement of liberty.
Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for taking our comments on board. The amendment that the Government have tabled on Report is much improved and far more tightly drafted, and I welcome that. Could the Minister confirm that the definition of a protest in the amendment will not include canvassing and leafleting or asking someone to sign a petition? I think we would all benefit from that being on the record. Given that the Government have listened to our concerns, while we are not completely content, we will not oppose this amendment.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I particularly thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, because I feel that at this Dispatch Box I do not always meet the high bar that she sets for defending the Government’s position, so it is always good to win her praise.
To pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Government are committed to defending democracy. I therefore assure him that Amendment 371 does not restrict political campaigning. It is perfectly legitimate for campaigners during election time to door-knock and speak to their local public officeholders about different political opinion. Where this crosses the line is when these people choose to protest against the public officeholder at their home.
These government amendments are vital to protecting our democracy. As my honourable friend the Security Minister has made clear, harassment and intimidation must never be accepted as part of a public officeholder’s role. This cannot become the new normal, and the scale of the problem cannot be overstated. It is not simply MPs, either. The Local Government Association’s Debate Not Hate survey in 2025 found that seven in 10 councillors had experienced abuse or intimidation in the previous year. The Speaker’s Conference reported that an astonishing 96% of MPs who responded to their survey had suffered at least one form of abuse, intimidation or harassment. This demonstrates that it is a real problem. Harassment is not simply confined to online spaces; it is very active in the real world too. We must therefore put protections in place not only to keep public office holders safe but to ensure that they feel safe, and that their families are protected. With that, I beg to move.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this seems to be a convenient time to break for dinner break business. We will therefore not return to the Bill before 8.38 pm.