Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

369: Before Clause 133, insert the following new Clause—
“The right to protestBefore section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions), insert—“10A The right to protest(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.(2) Public authorities have a duty to—(a) respect the right to protest,(b) protect the right to protest, and(c) facilitate the right to protest.(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to—(a) protect national security or public safety,(b) prevent disorder or crime, or(c) protect public health, or the rights and freedoms of others.(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (acts of public authorities).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities while recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in opening this group, I will speak principally to Amendment 369, which is in my name and the names of my noble friend Baroness Doocey, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I will also speak to Amendments 369A, 372A, 372B, 372C and 373.

Amendment 369 brings to Report our amendment calling for a strong statement in domestic law of the right to protest. Nothing has been said in Committee or so far on Report that has even started to persuade these Benches that this Bill does not need within it a strong statement of a statutory right to protest, which would both supplement and complement rights of the citizen under the ECHR. Our Amendment 369 is co-signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others, as I have said, and I accept entirely that the right to protest is, in part at least, enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 10 is on “Freedom of expression” and Article 11 is on “Freedom of assembly and association”. As I mentioned in Committee, the convention rights are circumscribed because they

“may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals”,

or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.

A significant feature of the rights under the convention is that the degree to which the European Court of Human Rights may interpret or enforce those rights is subject to what is known as the “margin of appreciation”, accorded to individual signatory countries to decide how they, as nation states, interpret and enforce those rights. It is only where countries stray beyond that margin of appreciation that the European Court of Human Rights will hold a signatory nation in breach.

What our amendment would do, that is new and not encompassed by the convention, is make it absolutely clear that in this jurisdiction, public authorities have a threefold duty in relation to protest: first, to respect, secondly, to protect, and, thirdly, to facilitate the right to protest. That duty is dynamic and positive. Our amendment is an important and clear statement of what every citizen would have a right to expect and insist upon from government, local and national. Government would have a duty to act, which is far stronger than a duty merely to refrain from interfering. Such a firm statement would be a more powerful protection than the convention rights, precisely because the margin of appreciation of which I spoke would be irrelevant.

I need remind the Government only that it is their own express view that how we determine and apply the limits of Article 8, on the right to respect for private and family life, is open to discussion, as is the proper area for domestic legislation which they propose to introduce, in order to limit the way that Article 8 might act within the margin of appreciation. That is their stated position in the context of immigration law. That is a position the Government are entitled to take under the European convention, in my view. But there is a risk that more extreme Governments might push the boundaries of what is acceptable in the context of other human rights, including the rights under Articles 10 and 11.

Members will no doubt remember that in Committee there was clear agreement around the House that, whether dealing with convention rights or rights under our amendment, we would have to strike a balance between the stated rights and the applications of the limitation—either under the convention, in the case of the ECHR rights, or under domestic legislation, if it were amended as we seek. But there is one specific area where that distinction may be important. The convention in both Articles 10 and 11 permits restrictions for the protection of morals, as was apparent from the passage I quoted. In a society as diverse as ours, with mixed secular and faith-based belief systems and philosophies, that is not an area in which we on these Benches would wish to see, let alone advocate for, a derogation from the convention rights or a restriction of our rights for the protection of morals. Our amendment would not permit a derogation or restriction on that ground alone.

We also discussed the possibility in Committee that future Governments might not be as enlightened as our present Government no doubt are. I fear we can see the possibility that a future Government, more extreme than this one, might wish to introduce restrictions on freedoms of speech or assembly. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, expressed optimism that this would not happen. He more or less said that if a Government were elected, they could do what they liked. I am not so sure. I say in answer to that point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson: let us make it more difficult to change the citizen’s rights for the worse, while we can.

There was also discussion in Committee as to whether there might not be differences between the convention rights and the rights under our amendment. The suggestion was made by some that this would give rise to satellite litigation. For my part, I do not believe that the convention rights would in any sense either clash with or limit the rights of people in this country under the clear rights that would be enshrined in domestic law pursuant to our amendment.

On a practical level, I acknowledged then, and acknowledge now, that policing protests can be an expensive exercise and that it is sometimes difficult for the police to draw a balance—which often has to be drawn in advance—between overpolicing and underpolicing protests. That makes it even more important to spell out in clear terms what the right to protest is, so that the police and local authorities may be accorded the necessary resources for them to carry out that duty to respect, protect and facilitate protest.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord has already accepted that the right to protest has to be balanced against the rights of others. Surely the virtue of the cumulative disruption provision, Clause 140, is that it is totally unacceptable that the rights of others who wish to pray in their synagogue, who wish to get to their synagogue, who wish to get away from their synagogue, should be repeatedly disrupted in the same place every week. The cumulative nature of the disruption pushes the balance in favour of asking the protesters not to cease protesting but to do it somewhere else.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 369A in my name, which we have just been discussing, and to Amendments 372A, 372B, 372C and 373, to all of which I have added my name. Regarding Amendment 369A, Clause 133 seeks to create a new offence of concealed identity at protests. If this clause were enacted as it stands, the police would be empowered to ban all face coverings at a protest with only some limited exceptions concerning the person’s health, religion or work. Many other categories of perfectly law-abiding citizens may have good reasons to conceal their identities at protests—for example, those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families, those who might be criticising their own religious or cultural communities, or survivors of sexual violence or domestic abuse who need to stay below the radar for their own safety. None of those is covered by the limited exemptions in Clause 133.

To solve this problem, Amendment 369A would provide a defence of reasonable excuse for the offence of concealing identity at protests, thereby putting the burden on police officers to justify why they believed that wearing a face covering at a protest made the suspect arrestable. This amendment strikes a careful balance between allowing the police to prevent public disorder and protecting the many law-abiding citizens who have legitimate reasons for wanting to exercise their freedom of expression anonymously.

I have signed Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks. Clause 139 seems to have been drafted to give reassurance to Jews, Muslims and other denominations that they can attend their place of worship without feeling intimidated by protests in the vicinity of their synagogue, mosque, church or whatever. That sounds to me like a laudable objective. What is not to like? The difficulty is a severe unintended consequence caused by the drafting. The sheer number of places of worship in a country as old, religiously diverse and densely populated as Britain that could inadvertently become no-protest zones is enormous. Here in Westminster, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square are both in the vicinity of one or more churches, and yet they frequently host major demonstrations. They could become off limits. Few if any large spaces in central London or any other city would escape the risk posed by Clause 139 of being ruled too close to a place of worship for a demonstration to be allowed. The Government may well say that this is not the intention of Clause 139, but that is exactly what the clause as drafted permits a senior officer to do.

My Lords, Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C would solve the problem by making a ban on protests near a place of worship possible only when the protest is directed at or connected with a place of worship or persons likely to worship there. Demonstrations that are unconnected with a nearby place of worship or that are in its vicinity purely by coincidence would be unaffected by Clause 139—problem solved.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I agree with much of the discussion about this important group, but I remember that this is Report. While I share particularly the concerns about cumulative disruption, because it is Report, not Committee, I will confine my remarks to one speech in this group, with no interventions, and focus on Amendments 369 and 369A as briefly and succinctly as I can.

I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about Amendment 369A. These arguments were rehearsed with great precision in Committee. The example was given of an Iranian dissident protesting and being concerned about reprisals—and you could substitute other countries and their embassies for Iran, that was just the one that came up that day.

In the clause, the Government acknowledge that there should be some defences to the offence of wearing a mask on a protest—I have concerns about the offence itself because it presupposes that protest is a slightly dodgy thing to begin with, and I do not agree with that—and included health, religious observance and work as justifications for concealing identity, but fear of reprisals was not included. The reasonable excuse defence proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and his colleagues is a proportionate one, given what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier about balancing rights. I urge my colleagues in government to think seriously about the noble Lord’s amendment because the defences currently to the offence of concealing your identity at a protest do not include the fear of reprisals, whether you are a battered woman, someone who disagrees with their employer or, crucially, a dissident outside the embassy of your homeland. I urge my noble friends in government to think again about that.

Just briefly on Amendment 369—I am still at just over two minutes—and enshrining the right to protest as a free-standing clause, even though it is acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that we have Articles 10 and 11 of the convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act, I say in friendship and gently to him that I think this kind of duplication may be a mistake we would come to regret. He is quite right, of course, as are the Government on other matters to do with Article 8, that you can, and should, be more precise in your domestic legislation when attempting to safeguard rights and freedoms, but this is not that much more precise. In effect, this proposed new clause pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11 of the convention but for the removal of morals. Frankly, I think that morals is a dead letter these days.

As a fellow human rights person—I have been working with the convention and with some Members of your Lordships’ House for over 30 years—I say that that kind of almost duplication is dangerous in legal terms. I urge the noble Lord not to press that one, just as I urge my colleagues in government to support him and others who have signed up to broaden the defence in Amendment 369A to the offence of wearing a face covering at a peaceful protest.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her gently to explain why she does not accept that the margin of appreciation permits the Government to do things outside what we would want to see? I know that she and I both are great advocates for the ECHR, and she knows that, but the problem is that the margin of appreciation can be taken advantage of to allow restrictions we would not want to see. The first and principal point I might make in relation to the duplication point is that having the right to protest enshrined in domestic statutory law does away with the possibility that the margin of appreciation should allow restrictions that this Parliament would not wish to see.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.

I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.

If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

On this having a chilling effect, the new offence will cover only people in the locality who are

“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity”.

As I said, the police will use this power only if they can say there is going to be criminality on a particular protest, such as a march. That is not a power they are going to be using lightly.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am sorry to keep pestering the Minister, but the difficulty is that there is absolutely no reason why the criminality has to be connected with the attitudes of those Iranians who are frightened. The criminality simply has to be connected with the protest as a whole. It may be entirely separate from the views, attitudes or desires of the Iranians who, in the example of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are likely to be deterred from attending a protest.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that and for all the work that she has done in organising those national protests, at least one or two of which I am sure that I have attended.

It is absolutely not a quota. It is simply to say that if you are regularly marching in areas side by side with other communities, that repeated activity should not impede their ability, for example, to come and go to a synagogue. It cannot be right, as I know is the case, that synagogues should have to alter their regular service times on a Saturday morning to allow for protests. There must be a way that police can accommodate the needs of the protesters and of those worshippers. I want to be clear: this is not about imposing a quota on protests. The provision does not allow police to ban a protest but places a duty on senior officers to consider cumulative disruption when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 is met.

Amendment 377C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to extend the notice period required for planned processions from six days to 28 days. As I explained in Committee, six days provides the police with adequate time to work with organisers who are planning protests to ensure that any conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. The noble Lord’s Amendment 377D seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 to enable a chief officer of police to consider

“serious damage to property, or … serious disruption to the life of the community”

and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions.

Section 13 of the 1986 Act rightly sets out a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. Widening the scope of this power, including to take account of police resources, would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest under Articles 10 and 11 and the legislation becoming incompatible with the ECHR. The noble compared this with the measure we discussed last week around aggravated offences. The latter was a clear manifesto commitment announced before the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven.

I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords who have spoken in this group. They have raised some very legitimate issues about whether existing public order legislation and the measures in Part 9 of the Bill strike the right balance between protecting the right to protest, protecting communities and preventing disorder. As I have said, there is an ongoing review examining just this issue, and I put it to the noble Lord that we should wait for the outcome of that review. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to press any of the amendments to a vote today. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief in explaining why I do not propose to withdraw my amendment. First, our amendment would introduce a dynamic right, with a duty on local authorities and public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. Secondly, of course the margin of appreciation is indeed an international concept, but this Government are planning to legislate on the application of Article 8, and they may be right to do so, but we need to have proper concern about future legislation within the context of the margin of appreciation.

Thirdly, I am not suggesting for a moment that we can entrench legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is absolutely right to say that Parliament cannot bind its successors. However, we can, by legislation, make it unattractive to reverse a public duty to support the right to protest. Finally, nothing I have said undermines the balancing of rights between the right to protest and the rights and freedoms of others; but the right to protest is at the heart of our democracy. If the Conservatives are not going to support us on this, so be it: that is very disappointing, but I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments seek to achieve a similar aim to an earlier amendment tabled in Committee, which the Government withdrew following concerns raised by the Benches opposite. In bringing back these amendments, I hope the revised drafting directly addresses the concerns raised by noble Lords who felt that the initial offence was drawn too widely.

Amendment 371 explicitly requires a protest to be taking place outside a public officeholder’s home for it to be an offence, rather than the broader activity reflected in the Committee amendment. Importantly, a person must be carrying out the protest because of, or in connection with, the public officeholder’s role. Amendment 376 further amends Sections 42 and 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, which confer powers to direct protests away from a person’s home, so as to remove the requirement that protest activity must be linked to a specific future action. As I said in Committee, this change ensures that harassing or intimidatory protests outside the homes of individuals are captured, regardless of whether they relate to past or future conduct.

I recognise the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, about whether additional legislation is truly necessary to protect the homes of public officeholders. The Government’s view is that there is an unequivocal need. We are not just talking about providing a feeling of safety to elected representatives; we are talking about the safety of their families too. This principle is foundational to the resilience of the public officeholder and thus to democracy itself. Under the Defending Democracy policing protocol, drafted and agreed by the former Minister for Security and the then Prime Minister, the previous Government set out a clear expectation that any protest outside the homes of elected representatives should be treated as harassment. That intent of the previous Government is what this amendment now achieves.

The role of elected representatives is the backbone of our democracy. Yet the Minister for Security has heard first-hand from colleagues who have tempered what they say or even how they vote because of intimidating behaviour targeted at their homes and their families. We know too that some, particularly women or those from minority backgrounds, are choosing not to stand for office because of the abuse they fear they will face. That is not democracy thriving; that is democracy shrinking. This legislation will give public officeholders and their families an additional layer of protection. It will help ensure that they can carry out their duties without fearing what awaits them at their front door and it will allow their partners, their children and their loved ones to feel safe where safety should be most assured: in their home.

Let me be absolutely clear: protest is a fundamental democratic right, and this Government defend it vigorously. There are proper, powerful places for protest: outside constituency offices, outside Parliament, at town halls, at political events, at rallies. But the home is different. It is where family life happens, where our children sleep, where our partners work, where people retreat from public life. It must not become an area for intimidation or a no-go zone. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, protests outside officeholders’ homes are in a special category. These amendments are plainly directed at harassing or intimidatory behaviour towards public officeholders, and they affect the families as well, so we are happy to accept these two amendments.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add how delighted I am that the Government have done that. It is rather overdue and will give some degree of satisfaction to at least some families of MPs in particular.

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[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union. I too share the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about the Government’s decision today to publish an official definition of anti-Muslim hostility and to appoint a tsar to ensure that it is observed. There are already adequate protections in the law for people of all faiths; I am thinking in particular of the proscription of the stirring up of religious hatred in the Public Order Act 1986 and the proscription of discrimination by employers on religious grounds of employees, applicants to jobs or service providers.

I am not persuaded that Muslims need particular protections over and above those that all faith groups are granted under the law. I am not convinced that in a city such as Leicester, for instance, publishing a definition of anti-Muslim hostility but not anti-Hindu hostility will allay rather than exacerbate community tensions. I hope there will be an opportunity for your Lordships’ House to opine on the entire action plan unveiled today when the House discusses the Statement in due course.

I do, however, support the amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. There are some extreme criminal protest groups who do not deserve the kind of free speech protections that other groups deserve, precisely because they use their free speech and right to protest to bully, intimidate and threaten those they seek to silence.

The Free Speech Union was itself the victim of an extreme criminal protest group that my noble friend referred to while speaking to this amendment and the supplementary amendment: Bash Back. It stole some data from the Free Speech Union’s website in a cyber attack, including the details of some small donors, some of whom had donated to some extremely sensitive crowdfunding campaigns in the expectation that they were doing so privately. That data, however, was stolen and published on Bash Back’s website. That was designed not only to silence those with whom it disagrees but to intimidate, bully and threaten an organisation that is simply defending the right to speak of those that Bash Back disagrees with.

Therefore, I think there are circumstances in which the Home Secretary should have the power to designate and proscribe certain extreme criminal protest groups. This more nuanced measure, particularly with the supplementary amendment, is a more attractive alternative to the present arrangement. In addition to defending a wide variety of people who have not broken the law, the Free Speech Union is currently engaged in defending a Palestine Action protester who was arrested and has been charged just for expressing support for Palestine Action by holding up a sign saying, “I support Palestine Action”. It is very difficult to defend the prosecution of people who merely express support for what I would think of as an extreme criminal protest group, not a terrorist group.

I therefore urge your Lordships to support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, as it creates a degree of nuance, and I believe that proscribing groups that deserve to be proscribed without also making it a criminal offence to express support for those groups is a welcome compromise.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, despite having some hesitation about it, we are broadly support of Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The concept of the new category of extreme criminal protest groups that are not proscribed has real merit and is plainly an attempt to plug an uncomfortable gap. We agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that unlawfulness is at the heart of this amendment. The amendment states that the group must have

“as its purpose and practice the deliberate commission of”

one of a series of serious offences, and that

“such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions”,

and that,

“the activities … create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others”.

Those provisions make it clear that extreme criminal protest groups are well named. The provisions as a whole would also make it clear, however, that it is not appropriate for proscription of those groups whereby any support for the groups is made a criminal offence under the Terrorism Act.

If the amendment would avoid the prosecution of peaceful protesters for peaceable support of groups that could be branded terrorist under the Terrorist Act, we could support it unconditionally because there would then be a hierarchy of offences. At the top of the tree would be offences under the Terrorism Act, and then the treatment of groups which qualified as extreme criminal protest groups under the Walney amendment. But the Government have not committed and would not commit—and I do not suppose they will at this stage commit—to end prosecutions for peaceable protesters under the Terrorism Act. That may change after the Macdonald review, or it may change if the Government’s appeal against the High Court’s decision in relation to Palestine Action is unsuccessful. However, our position is that it would be helpful to have a middle course, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out in very sensible terms. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, articulated the same point very well, but in a different way.

The problem we see with the amendment is that it does not affect the Terrorism Act, and there would remain the potential for prosecution of peaceful protesters under that Act as the law stands. So we have decided, with some hesitation, that it is probably sensible to await the Macdonald review. I accept that I am making that point in the face of the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should not be asking for any legislation along the lines of the Walney amendment to wait at all. Of course, there is the problem that not accepting this amendment would leave us with the limited choice of the Terrorism Act or nothing, and that is a very unfortunate position to be in.

We have some concerns about the drafting of the amendment, and they are not minimal. Under proposed subsection (3)(b),

“promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group’s materials”

would be an offence. Would subsection (3)(b) cover handing out leaflets or carrying posters or flags in a peaceable way? In proposed subsection (3)(e),

“providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG”

suggests that the level of knowledge required is very low. What is material support? What would count as equipment? Would posters, flags or banners count as equipment? It would be considerably worrying if the answer to those questions was positive.

In sum, we are broadly supportive and believe that there should be a middle category, but we are concerned about the amendment as it stands. The Government should be seriously considering their position between now and Third Reading; they should listen to the very strong feeling in the House that something is needed in the way of a middle course that would prevent these prosecutions for peaceable protest and support under the Terrorism Act. They should then come back to the House at Third Reading with an amendment that could answer the criticisms and gain widespread support.

Finally, we have considerable sympathy with Amendment 419 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which calls for the publication of a counterextremism strategy.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Noble Lords have spoken of the effects that these groups can have when they go unchecked, and I think that the whole House has benefited from listening to these anecdotes. We cannot stand for a society in which violent, insurrectionary behaviour is normalised. Groups such as Palestine Action or Bash Back should not be allowed to exist given their past actions, and this amendment provides for that. That said, their supporters are not advocates of general terrorist activities and, while they support morally dubious causes, requiring their arrest for standing outside with a placard is a monumental waste of police time.

For similar reasons, I also support Amendment 419, tabled by my noble friend Lord Goodman. His is a very simple amendment, which merely asks the Government to publish a counterextremism strategy, given the ever-increasing extent of political extremism and its encouragement in some quarters. Amendment 371A strikes a balance. It adds nuance to a category of offences that desperately needs it, and we wholly support its intent. I hope that the Minister will agree. I am happy to withdraw my Amendment 371B and, should the noble Lord, Lord Walney, wish to divide the House, we will support him.