King’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I had the pleasure of welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, during the discussion on the prison Statement much earlier today, and I now add my congratulations to him on his powerful maiden speech. His extremely warm and enthusiastic welcome from the whole House is a tribute to his long history of achievement in rehabilitation and reform, and his appointment gives fresh heart and hope to those of us—and in this House there are many—who have argued this case for a very long time. My hope is that we can now look to government to direct our criminal justice system towards reducing reoffending and turning lives around. That is not achieved simply by banging up offenders for as long as possible to keep them away from the public, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, just succinctly made clear. Taking dangerous offenders out of society for an appropriate period is, of course, a proper function of punishment, but I only wish more of the popular press would climb off that bandwagon.

I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, on an interesting and thoughtful maiden speech, in which he drew inspiration from his grandfather’s history to express his commitment to intercommunity cohesion. We also look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, at the end of a very long debate.

I will concentrate on justice; my noble friends Lady Doocey, Lord Taylor and Lady Ludford, and others from these Benches, have spoken on home affairs. But before I turn to the substance, I wish to make a point about the Arbitration Bill and the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, thought I might, because I have a serious criticism of our processes, which we must, I suggest, change.

The Arbitration Bill follows detailed recommendations made by the Law Commission for improving and updating our highly regarded Arbitration Act 1996. Legal services, and arbitration in particular, make an important contribution to the UK economy. London has long been the pre-eminent seat for international arbitrations—tied for the first time this year with Singapore. It is vital that we maintain our position.

The Bill was introduced into this House in the last Parliament following the special Law Commission procedure. A special committee was established under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and we took lengthy evidence in writing and orally from a long and distinguished list of witnesses. Two Government Ministers and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, were also members of the committee. We agreed important amendments, all of which are now incorporated into the new draft. Huge amounts of time and money were expended. The Bill was non-controversial, and everyone was happy to agree it. Yet, when the July election was announced, the Whips in both Houses could not make the time to agree that it should be put before them in the wash-up. Why not? It was because of an absurd and outdated convention that, if a Bill has not gone through all stages in one House, it cannot be introduced in the other so as to go through the speeded-up wash-up procedure, however much the Bill is needed and however uncontroversial it is. We could have completed the passage of the Bill in a couple of hours of parliamentary time before the Dissolution, but no: we lost it, and months of time, and we have sustained significant damage to our economy and loss of prestige for our legal services as a result.

We lost the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill in the same way, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have said. The litigation funding companies are, on any view, really important for access to justice, supporting litigation such as that brought by the sub-postmasters arising out of the Horizon scandal, which otherwise would not have got off the ground. They may need regulation in future, about which we may argue, but no one doubts that they should be permitted to function. Yet they are now an industry in limbo. That is because of the Supreme Court’s decision, in a case called PACCAR, that their agreements are unenforceable. The Bill, supported by all parties, would uncontroversially have reversed that decision. We have to change this absurd and outdated approach to the wash-up at the end of a Parliament to avoid a waste of time and money.

Turning to the substance, we welcome the proposed crime and policing Bill. Liberal Democrats have long been committed to community policing. Fostering close relationships between police officers and their communities is a proven and important way to build and maintain trust in the police, and so to increase the flow of information to and public confidence in the police. That is crucial after the number of horrific incidents over the last few years.

The victims, courts and public protection Bill will build on the Victims and Prisoners Act, which was a good example of cross-party co-operation in this House, but there is unfinished business. Strengthening the power of the Victims’ Commissioner by statute will give victims a more powerful voice. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and welcome her speech today and her unflinching commitment to improving support for victims.

I have some reservations about forcing offenders to attend sentencing hearings. It is probably right in principle that they should, but I am not sure what courts would do when they refuse. Are we to drag such offenders to court by force? It might be better simply to make it clear that a refusal to attend could properly be treated as a sign of a lack of remorse.

Commitment to reducing delays in the court system is an important priority—the noble Lord, Lord Meston, stressed that—but it will not be achieved only by allowing associate prosecutors to work on appropriate cases, as is suggested in the briefing. It will need more resources, yes, but also new efficiencies and new thinking, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, suggested.

The emphasis on tackling violence against women and girls is particularly welcome. We need a far more understanding, sympathetic and determined approach to protecting women and girls from harm. Over the years we have failed in this, and the results have been underreporting of offences because of an unsympathetic approach to victims and, furthermore, very low conviction rates when offences are prosecuted. I hope that the Government listen carefully to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that far too often women and girl victims find their privacy and digital records invaded and violated, which acts as a deterrent to victims becoming involved in the criminal process.

We should not forget that underreporting inculcates an arrogant overconfidence among sexual predators that they will get away with abuse and violence in both public and domestic contexts. The noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, made the important point that tackling violence against women and girls depends on measures to change the attitudes of male perpetrators throughout diverse racial communities.

I add a word on psychotherapists, about whom I have spoken to the House before. I hope there will be an opportunity to secure in one of these Bills a requirement for the regulation of unqualified people holding themselves out as psychotherapists, and for the criminalisation of abusive coercive control by psychotherapists using their power and influence over vulnerable and usually young clients and patients to cut them off from their families.

Turning—or returning—to prisons and the penal system, many noble Lords have made a strong case for a complete change of approach to prison and punishment, starting, of course, with the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester eloquently made the point that reliance on imprisonment as a complete answer to criminality is not supported by the evidence, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, repeated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, mentioned the role of a number of voluntary organisations in Oxfordshire, some of which I know, but her speech raises a wider point, which is that local organisations have an important role in supporting the rehabilitation of prisoners and in fostering linkage between prisons, prisoners and the communities in which they work. The noble Lords, Lord Waldegrave and Lord Meston, made similar points. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, spoke of purposeful activity, training for employment and life within prisons. We have heard mention of farms, gardens and libraries, but there is also scope for sports, music and drama.

My noble friend Lord Beith made a number of points about sentencing and the importance of a sentencing review. We must reverse the trend to ever-longer sentences. My noble friends Lady Burt and Lord McNally, and other noble Lords, made the clear point that not enough has been done to end the stain on our justice system of the continued incarceration of IPP prisoners.

My noble friend Lord Dholakia stressed the role of probation services in delivering community sentences and emphasised the degree to which the Probation Service is stretched. We also need through-the-gate support from probation officers, with contact with clients both before and after release. Three things help prisoners most to avoid reoffending: a job, a home, and family and community ties. Release into prisoners’ communities is very important, but that needs the prison capacity crisis to be addressed so that we can get over the shuffling issue.

On a general point that I call “spend to save”, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, mentioned the unwelcome effect of the capital cost of new and better prisons—unwelcome for Governments, that is. Yet that and the annual cost of imprisonment, currently £47,000 for a prisoner, are only part of the picture. Reoffending has been estimated to cost the country £18 billion, and that is not including the knock-on cost to the public of social care, family housing and lost tax revenues. I hope the Treasury will learn to adopt a more holistic approach to spending on rehabilitation that is less bunkered and more cross-department. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on legal aid, on which more liberality would avoid significant unnecessary costs, not to mention widespread unhappiness.

I close, finally, by saying that on these Benches we are greatly encouraged by this Government’s clear commitment to the rule of law, including international law, as stressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and in particular to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act, which I for one regard as one of the finest triumphs of the Labour Party. We hope that in Government we will have some more.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

168: Leave out Clause 84

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, at the risk of being accused of buttering up the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, I should say at the outset that we are very grateful to him, his officials and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for their positive engagement with us on the Ministry of Justice aspects of the Bill. There has been significant movement by the Government on the MoJ provisions, and on this group in particular.

While that is the reality, there remain significant differences between us on these provisions. Our position on the damages reduction clauses in the Bill is that the power to reduce or extinguish damages in a case against the Crown on the basis that the claimant has been involved in some terrorist wrongdoing in the past should never have been in the Bill. After all, the clause does not require the conviction of a terrorist offence. Ground 1 in Clause 85(3)(a)(i) is the commission of such an offence, but the alternative ground in sub-paragraph (ii) is nebulously described as

“other involvement in terrorism-related activity”.

That could be serious or it could be limited. After all, even wearing clothing that might suggest support for a proscribed organisation is a terrorist offence. I therefore invite the Government to give the House an assurance that the provisions on reducing damages will not be invoked on unproven allegations emanating from a foreign state that a claimant has been involved in some terrorism-related activity under the alternative ground in Clause 85(3)(a)(ii).

We have serious concerns about Clauses 84 to 88 being part of the Bill. Those concerns are that they are restrictive of civil rights, effectively denying or restricting legitimate claimants’ access to the courts and their right to a remedy; that they could enable the Government to avoid liability for damages in the face of justified claims; and that they would reduce accountability and limit the publicity for genuine claims of government wrongdoing.

These clauses risk undermining two important democratic principles: first, that everyone is entitled to enforce their rights in court and, secondly, that, where a legal right is breached, there is a remedy. Our central question is, why should the Government be excused from paying damages in a case where their liability to a claimant is proved? I invite the noble and learned Lord to explain how the Government answer that central question. Why, also, have the Government not confined this power to cases within Clause 88, where there is a risk of damages being themselves used for the purposes of terrorism?

In Committee, I drew attention to the cases of Jagtar Singh Johal, Abdul Hakim Belhaj and Fatima Boudchar, arising from the British Government’s complicity in torture and, in the latter case, detention in Thailand and rendition to Libya. Their cases and other cases of government wrongdoing might risk being threatened by this new power. However, since Committee, and in response to one of the main criticisms I and others levelled at this clause, the Government have laid Amendment 169. My reading of that amendment, which agrees with the Ministers explanatory statement, is that the court may consider reducing damages

“only if there was a connection between the terrorist wrongdoing and the conduct of the Crown complained of in the proceedings.”

Because it is complex, I invited the noble and learned Lord to write. Today, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I have received a letter from the Minister containing that assurance. I hope he will forgive me if I read from it the relevant paragraph. He says, “On damages I am pleased to confirm your understanding of the intention and effect of the Government’s amendments to the scope of the Bill. The Government consider that they will mean that applications by the UK security services to reduce damages in national security cases will be possible only where there is a connection between the Crown’s conduct and the terrorist conduct of the claimant.”

That assurance, embodied in Amendment 169 and its consequential amendments, is a significant concession and answers an important criticism. Although the central criticisms of principle that I have outlined remain, we will not be pressing the stand part objections we have laid. Important among our concerns, as pointed out in Committee, is that the clause fails to set out criteria as to when and on what basis the court should exercise powers to reduce or extinguish damages. This was a matter extensively canvassed in Committee, but the Minister could really only say that the provisions were intended “to convey a message” that Britain should not be seen as a “soft touch” for terrorism. There was no guidance as to how and on what basis judges should exercise this new power. With the benefit of several weeks to consider the way in which the power is to be exercised, can the Minister please give us such guidance now?

I turn to Amendments 174 and 175 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Ludford. At present, Clause 85(4) requires the court to take into account whether

“there was a limitation on the ability of the Crown to prevent”

the wrongful conduct complained of, including on the basis that it occurred overseas or was carried out in conjunction with a third party. That formulation suggests that His Majesty’s Government are just too weak to control their own conduct, if wrongful, overseas, or in collaboration with a third party. That permitted excuse is inadequate. Our amendments would restrict permitting any such limitation on the Crown’s ability to prevent its own wrongful conduct to places where it was both carried out overseas and—not or—instigated by a third party.

In the noble Lord’s letter, to which I referred, he has indicated that the Government are not prepared to concede these amendments. I would nevertheless appreciate the Government’s further consideration of the present provisions as they stand, and of the effect of the amendments we propose. I look forward to his further consideration and his response, in the hope that we might get a little further if he comes back with something at Third Reading. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments. I hope the House will agree that the Government have been in listening mode throughout this Bill, and that we have in this particular instance moved quite considerably to deal with what the Government consider to be justified observations by your Lordships.

On the general point, the reforms are designed to protect the public, to deter those who seek to exploit our security services for compensation and to reduce the risk that court awards or damages may be used to fund terrorism—perhaps the most serious harm that can be perpetrated against society, going to its very fabric. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked me to restate the purpose of the clause and I think I have endeavoured to do so in those words.

On whether the Government can give any assurance that these provisions will not be invoked on the basis of

“unproven allegations … from a foreign state”,

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the fact that this is a power in the court; it is entirely in its discretion. No court is going to act on anything other than proper evidence, so in the Government’s view there is no risk of the danger to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred, because this is a court process with rules of evidence and proper and fair procedures.

With those two preliminary observations, I come to the central point that was at issue when we discussed this clause in Committee. We have listened to the concerns expressed by noble Lords that the legislation needed to ensure that no national security case fell into scope where there was no connection between the Crown’s conduct and the terrorist conduct of the claimant. I can repeat before this House the assurance in the letter I sent noble Lords today, to which we have already been referred, saying that there needs to be a causal connection between the conduct of the terrorist and the reduction in damages.

As to what criteria the courts should apply when considering these issues, I know that noble Members felt the courts would require further guidance. In the Government’s view, the courts do not require further guidance; they are well able to interpret and apply this legislation, especially in light of the amendments we have proposed. The Government have every confidence in the court being able to discharge its functions under these provisions.

Our courts are well versed in taking a wide range of relevant factors into account in determining liability and assessing the level of damages. There are a number of common-law considerations to which noble Lords referred in Committee which may indeed provide some guidance. We do not seek to exonerate the Crown in respect of its own culpability; we aim simply to ensure that the terrorist conduct is properly taken into account when calculating quantum.

I turn to what I think are the only live amendments on this part, Amendments 174 and 175. Those amendments would apply to the Bill’s provisions whereby a court would consider the context in which the Crown had acted to reduce a risk of terrorism, but their underlying intention seems to the Government to be to markedly restrict those provisions. As I understand it, the amendments seek to limit the consideration of the court to where the Crown’s actions had been commenced —the provisions use the word “instigated”—and the conduct was required to have taken place overseas at the instigation of a foreign state.

While the Government accept that there are difficulties in preventing terrorism when the action concerned needs to be taken overseas, there are so many different facts and circumstances flowing from the claimant’s own actions that the proposed amendments would significantly limit the effect of these clauses. In the Government’s view, the courts ought to have complete discretion to apply the clauses as they stand; a very tight restriction both as to instigation and to the requirement that the instigated conduct took place overseas would limit them inappropriately and improperly restrict the discretion courts should have under the provisions.

The Government further feel that there is scope in these amendments for some confusion. The two aspects, an overseas element and instigation, seem to be couched in language reminiscent of an exclusive list, quite apart from the difficulty of deciding exactly what one means by “instigation”. In practice, the Government feel that the courts should be left to exercise their discretion, as they surely will, without the limitation proposed by these amendments. That is the Government’s position on the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I hope that in the light of what I have said, he will consider not pressing them.

There is one amendment by the Government—Amendment 181—which is proposed to ensure family proceedings in Scotland and Northern Ireland are excluded from the freezing and forfeiture provisions that are also part of this part, as with those in England and Wales. That simply corrects an oversight in the original drafting.

Having set out the Government’s amendments and why we are unable to accept the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, I commend Government’s amendments and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have heard the Minister’s explanation. It is right that the amendments that were between us were Amendments 174 and 175. Having considered his point on the court’s discretion, I am not sure that the difference between us is so wide as to justify my testing the opinion of the House on this occasion. I shall not move those two amendments and beg leave to withdraw the stand part amendment.

Amendment 168 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

180: Leave out Clause 88

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we now move on to group four on legal aid. Again, I express our gratitude to the Minister, and to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his engagement with us on these provisions. Nevertheless, in spite of one welcome concession, to which I will turn, we oppose in principle the Bill’s proposals to exclude access to legal aid for those previously convicted of terrorist offences, however minor, subject only to the time and age conditions set out in the Bill. Legal aid, restricted as it might already be, is a right that we enjoy as citizens, and it is wrong simply to exclude that right for anyone convicted of a terrorist offence, however minor, whether or not the legal aid sought has any connection with the previous conviction. At least in relation to damages in the last group, the Government made the concession in Amendment 169, as we have heard, that, for the power to reduce damages to be exercised, there would have to be some connection between the past terrorist activity and the Crown’s wrongful conduct complained of in the proceedings. Here, no such connection is necessary before the exclusion of legal aid kicks in.

All we have from the Government in this group is an exception in Amendment 186 and its associated amendments for cases where an applicant for legal aid is the victim of domestic abuse. That is, of course, important, and it is welcome, but it is based on no discernible principle at all. If the victims of domestic violence should be entitled to legal aid, why not the victims of human trafficking, which, we observe, may well have led them into terrorist activity in the first place? Why not the victims of sexual offences? These two examples are the genesis of Amendments 186A and 186B in my name and the name of my noble friend Lady Ludford.

There are many examples of other cases where legal aid ought to be available, regardless of past convictions: family cases involving children, housing cases, Equality Act cases, and eligible cases of applications for judicial review. It is simply no answer for the Government to say that exceptional case funding remains available. The criteria for exceptional case funding are very restrictive. Broadly, they apply where convention rights are said to be infringed—principally in family, housing or benefits cases. There are very difficult hurdles to surmount before exceptional case funding is given, and there is no promise by the Ministry of Justice to make that funding more widely available.

In any case, the Government are trying to make legal aid more difficult to obtain for past terrorist offenders. It is a nonsense for them now to claim, and then rely on that claim, that it is not all that bad because exceptional case funding will make it easier for the very people they are trying to exclude from the availability of legal aid. So we put down Amendments 185 and 187 based on principle, and it is exactly the principle the Government conceded in the last group in relation to damages reduction: that legal aid would not be excluded in cases where there was no link—which we have called “no relevant factual connection”—between the past terrorist offence of which the applicant had been convicted and the current application for legal aid. I have invited the Minister and the Government to accept that principle. Were it accepted, we would not press these amendments to a vote because, although these clauses would still be unacceptable, much of the sting would be removed from them. In the letter from the noble Lord to which I alluded earlier, those amendments have not yet been accepted. I invite the noble Lord to reconsider that.

We also support Amendment 188 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lady Ludford, restricting the exclusion of legal aid to cases where an offender has been sentenced to more than seven years for the relevant terrorist offence. At least those are serious terrorist offences—that is not a limitation in the Bill as currently drafted.

I regret that we cannot see the benefit of Amendment 188A, put down yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the Labour Party, after what must have been weeks of thought. It seeks a review of the impact of Clause 89 on offenders sentenced to a non-custodial sentence. The review sought is very limited and does not address the flawed principle of the proposal or its application. We will stick to our principled amendments, and I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am again extremely grateful to noble Lords for their interventions and, in particular, for the support for the principle behind Clause 89 expressed by the Official Opposition, subject to the point about minor offences, which I will come to in a moment.

As a quick reminder, Clause 89 narrows the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specific terrorism offences can automatically receive civil legal aid services. This includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more as well as other offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection. It is important to note that this clause modifies but does not exclude legal aid, because there is still the route of exceptional case funding, particularly if convention rights are in issue. One of the fundamental convention rights— I think this at least partially answers the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—is the necessity for a fair trial, in Article 6. The exceptional case funding route is still available in that regard. Phrases such as “excludes”, “denies”, “debars” and “no legal aid support” are not an accurate summary of what this clause achieves.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but is it not the case that no one gets exceptional case funding simply because they otherwise would not get legal aid? The point made by the noble and learned Baroness was that it is unfair, so you will not get a fair trial. However, that does not ground exceptional case funding —unless the noble and learned Lord has a different view of exceptional case funding from the rest of us.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, there might well be found applications for exceptional case funding; approximately 75% of such applications are successful each year. In any event, exceptional case funding is still available.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is not entirely irrelevant that exceptional case funding is always available for access to justice. That fact changes some of the comments that have been made about the restrictive nature of the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, there is a sharp division of opinion on the general principles here. I share the disappointment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, at the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the Labour Front Bench, particularly in view of the way the Labour Front Bench spoke in favour of the principles we enunciated in Committee. I do not propose to press Amendment 180, but when the time comes, I will seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 185.

Amendment 180 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

185: Clause 89, page 60, line 17, leave out “F” and insert “G1”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Marks’ other amendment to this clause inserting a new Condition G1. Condition G1 will become Condition H if the amendment to be moved by Lord Sharpe of Epsom inserting a new Condition G is accepted.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 185.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak to the amendments in this group, I would like to talk about some of the reasons why we are introducing them. Some of our amendments have been brought forward to reassure noble Lords and others that the offence will not capture the genuine work of journalists. We have listened to the concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords in the House, and some of these amendments are a direct response to them.

The Government have heard from media stakeholders who believe that they could no longer hold the Government to account and that these clauses could inhibit the publication of articles critical of the UK’s defence or security response. I want to address those concerns directly. The Government are committed to defending our freedoms—values which define us and make us who we are. Few are more fundamental to that than freedom of the press. There is no intention to stifle or censor the media’s ability to expose or shine a light on issues. That is the proper role and function of the media and why the UK is such a strong advocate of media freedom globally.

Before we get into the details of individual provisions, I remind the House that these provisions replace the existing law in the Official Secrets Act 1911. We have been provided with a number of examples of journalistic reporting that have been cited as part of the case that more must be done to protect journalists in this Bill. Even were the Government to accept that any of these examples could hypothetically be caught by any of the offences, the same would be true of the existing laws. Accordingly, great comfort should be taken from the fact that no prosecutions of journalists have taken place under the espionage laws to date. I want to confirm again, on the record, that the focus of the Bill is on protecting the UK from threats from foreign states and those acting against UK interests, not interfering with the free press.

I begin with the amendments focusing on “ought reasonably to know”. The phrase was said to be unclear, with concerns raised that it could be interpreted as imputed knowledge, thereby catching those who engaged in specified conduct unwittingly—who did not know but are told that they should have known. I would like to strongly emphasise that this is not the Government’s intention and we do not consider that the current formulation would be interpreted by the courts in this way. However, we have considered the concerns raised on this issue, particularly the useful contributions in Committee from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. We agree that it would be helpful to clarify the meaning. These amendments therefore clarify that the prosecution must look at what matters were known to the individual at the time in determining whether that individual ought reasonably to have known something.

I now turn to amendments which all relate to the offence of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service. The amendments that the Government have put forward update the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). These amendments are similar to the ones put forward in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The effect of these amendments is that the wording

“it is reasonably possible may”

in both Clauses 3(2)(a) and (b) would be replaced with “is likely to”, which in this context we see as meaning a real possibility. In order to ensure consistency across the clause, Amendment 13 also updates the relevant wording in Clause 3(3).

The Government have tabled amendments in response to a point raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. These would add protections for lawyers, ensuring that any genuine legal activity will not be captured under the Clause 3 offence in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the helpful explanation of the many government amendments in this group. I thank him and the Government also for the considerable movement they have made in response to criticisms made by me and many others at Second Reading and in Committee of the breadth of the offences under Part 1. We are very grateful to the Government for the comprehensive way in which they have listened to our criticisms and moved towards positions that we have taken.

In particular, the troublesome phrase “ought reasonably to know” has been clarified by the qualification that what a defendant ought reasonably to have known falls to be judged having regard to other facts known to that defendant. Furthermore, in Clause 3, as the Minister explained,

“conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”

becomes conduct that “is likely to” materially assist a foreign intelligence service.

I welcome the new strengthened review provisions introduced by the new clause proposed in Amendment 85, in place of the old Clause 56. These and other concessions in the amendments moved by the Government allay many of our concerns.

However, there is one area left untouched that we say is still completely wrong: the failure to tighten up the definition of the

“interests of the United Kingdom”.

That is the subject of our Amendments 2 and 3, and the corresponding amendments wherever the phrase

“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

appears. I note the word “or”: the interests of the United Kingdom alone are enough to qualify. It is principally in support of those amendments that I speak now.

We are concerned about the interests of journalists, and that is the title of this group. I do not accept what the Minister said when he suggested that it was permissible to rely on the fact that journalists have not in the past been prosecuted under security legislation. That may as a matter of fact be true, but it is neither safe nor good legislative practice to rely on it without tightening up the legislation so as to prevent such prosecutions succeeding.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) Section (Public interest defence) applies to any offence under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in Lord Marks’ name, are connected to Lord Marks’ amendment after Clause 38 (Public interest defence) to apply a public interest defence to the offences under Clauses 1 to 5 of the Bill and to offences under Section 5(6) of the Official Secrets Act 1989.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group concerns the public interest defence which is contained in Amendment 79 in my name, and the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to whom I am very grateful for their help, counsel and support. I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made it here so far because he is in court, but I expect him shortly, although he may not speak.

Our amendment would introduce a public interest defence to offences under Clauses 1 to 5 of the Bill, together with the amended Official Secrets Act defence, amended by Schedule 17 at paragraph 5. The group also contains associated amendments, together with Amendments 18A and 79A, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Ponsonby.

Although, as discussed in the last group, the Government have made a number of welcome concessions since Committee in tightening up the offences set out in the Bill, there has been no concession on a public interest defence. That is despite the repeated strong calls in the press and elsewhere, from many quarters, for such a defence; and despite the fact that such a defence is available in our Five Eyes partners and that the Law Commission recommended one here in 2000, and so did the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Each expressed the view that the lack of such a defence risked our being in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

While the Government may not have moved, we have. Amendment 79 is significantly changed from the amendment I tabled in Committee, in large part to meet the reservations expressed on my amendment in that debate. First, the burden of proof has been changed. The amendment in Committee would have imposed the burden of proof on the prosecution to disprove the offence once it was raised, and to do so to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Some noble Lords thought that this imposed on the Crown a burden that would be too difficult to discharge in a security-sensitive context. While I am doubtful that that is the case, I accept the point, and I also accept the difficulties of proving a negative. So our amendment now imposes the burden on the defence to prove its case on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard that is usually applied in these cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response to these amendments, but it has disclosed a very sharp distinction between those of us who believe that a public interest defence can do no harm and a great deal of good, and those who do not. We regard as a complete mischaracterisation of the public interest offence the suggestion that it is likely to encourage or enable espionage or other disclosures that would be damaging to the national interest. By way of contrast, we see the presence in this Bill of a proposed series of absolute offences—as discussed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier—where there is no defence for journalists, no defence for campaigners acting innocently, no let-out for whistleblowers and no protection for members of the public. We are concerned by a system that relies on perverse acquittals rather than acquittals according to law. Therefore, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I completely support what has been said by my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire in moving our Amendment 75, in respect of the exclusion of NATO members from the definition of foreign power, for all the reasons he gave and that I gave in Committee.

Put shortly, we cannot see any valid reason for treating NATO members as foreign powers on the same basis as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. We are tied to our NATO allies by a treaty which imposes binding mutual obligations of defence and support. I have considerable understanding for the concern and disappointment expressed in public and in the press by representatives of some friendly nations of that unflattering equivalence of treatment. Those feelings mentioned by my noble friend Lord Wallace are not helpful to British foreign policy or diplomacy.

I also cannot see why the Government would not regard it as positively helpful to have the power to add friendly nations to a list of countries that will not be regarded as foreign powers for the purposes of this legislation. It may be that the Government will conclude in due course, even if not now, that the inclusion of all friendly countries as foreign powers may be profoundly unhelpful to our national position. To have the power, if that transpires, to exclude countries from the definition by regulation, may be regarded then as thoroughly convenient. Why will the Government not accept the flexibility that this part of the amendment offers?

As to the exclusion of governing political parties from the definition of foreign powers, this was an amendment we moved in Committee and which we supported then, and support now, for many of the reasons mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in support of Amendment 74. We see no basis for categorising all political parties that form any part of a foreign Government as foreign powers, as proposed in Clause 32(1)(e). It is unrealistic, it makes no sense and it is wrong in principle.

As the noble Baroness pointed out, this is the definition of foreign powers that governs the application of FIRS, as well as Part 1 and other parts of the Bill. It could cause all kinds of difficulties where there are coalition Governments, often without UK-style collective responsibility. It is also the case that political parties are themselves diffuse in their views and often divided. To equate all governing parties with the foreign powers in whose Government they take a part—often a small part—is, we say, profoundly misguided. Perhaps the Minister could explain how the Government justify treating even small coalition parties as the Governments of which they form a part?

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

My Lords, I think that this part of the Bill was drawn up by someone who had not travelled very widely. It really just does not make sense.

I speak particularly to Clause 32. I do not exactly spend all my time, but I do spend a good bit of it, talking to embassies in London, largely from European Union countries that I have known for some time. I also go to Brussels very regularly because I still have interests there. I meet many people from other parties and groups—for a time I was a member of the Belgian Christian Democrat party—and I wonder where this lands. Of course, in some countries—Belgium is one—you will always have a coalition; it moves around, but it is always there.

There are also many other groups—for instance, the Kangaroo Group in Strasbourg covers all of the European Union and exists to pull down barriers to trade. I am a member of that group still because it has a foreign membership category. What are we supposed to do? Incidentally, the Kangaroo Group was set up by Basil de Ferranti, a British Conservative—though it is now a long time since he has been with us. This is a bit of a mess.

I want to deal in particular with Germany, which has a long tradition of political foundations. It has the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, which I do lectures for from time to time; I will be doing one later this month. It has the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which is the socialist, or social democrat, one. It has the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, which is, if I remember rightly, the one from the liberal party, and it has the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung from the Greens. They all engage in trying to hold international conferences and gatherings to put across their policies, and they also invite people like me, who are reasonably well known in Germany, to go and give lectures and talks to members of their Stiftung. Part of the reason for that is to educate their own citizens in overseas political practice; it is not all one-way. I think we have missed something out here.

The Minister will say that it will not mean this and it will not mean that, but other people have looked at this Bill and at the explanations. In particular, the German foundations have concluded, reading this draft law on entities acting on behalf of a foreign power—under the law, Germany is a foreign power; that is the definition —that, if they are to get money from their Stiftung to do any work in Britain, the Stiftung will have to satisfy the German Government that it is legitimate to accept and apply for that money.

According to the German lawyers, Clause 31(2)(c), which says that any work carried out

“with financial or other assistance provided by a foreign power for that purpose, or … in collaboration with, or with the agreement of, a foreign power”,

means that the Stiftungen will fall under the scope of the registration scheme. In other words, if the Stiftungen are to be able to operate and satisfy their funders, they will have to satisfy them about this clause in our legislation. This means that a German Stiftung—a political foundation—that receives German taxpayers’ money, or for that matter a cultural institute, Chamber of Commerce or any London-based NGO or think tank that receives money from Germany, is an agent of a foreign power and has to register, according to the definition, every single interaction with UK politicians or high-ranking officials within 28 days. They have described this as making their lives “impossible”. I say to the Minister that it is not what we say the law means; it is what it means to a lawyer, and in this case what it means to a German lawyer.

I cannot agree that the concept of “foreign principle” has been removed. It has been removed and replaced with “foreign power”, but this does not cover what is needed. The fact of the matter is that, in the Minister’s letter, he very carefully said:

“Foreign opposition parties are not classed as foreign powers (for example the French Socialist party).”


That is not the German interpretation of our law. The Minister can shrug his shoulders, but the sensible way forward would be to accept an amendment such as the one put down by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, which makes it quite clear that these countries are not foreign powers for the purpose of this legislation. I invite the Minister to think carefully and come back at Third Reading with a much better definition. This general, catch-all “foreign powers” covers all of NATO but also, as has been mentioned, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Where are we going? Please could the Minister think it out a bit better and clarify it, possibly along the lines of the amendment, but certainly so that the people we deal with every day, who are cheerfully telling me about the attitude of the British Government to the reconstruction of Ukraine—which is not quite what the British Government are saying but is what the diplomats are picking up—can continue to brief us and keep us on top of things?

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 66A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. This really important amendment gives us a chance to look at the Bill’s potential impact on investigative reporting. At the heart of that is Clause 29. I declare my interest as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group, which is a member of the News Media Association, and note my other media interests.

I support this Bill, which rightly tackles the grave threats to the security of our country; I am sorry that I, too, was unable to speak to that effect at Second Reading. I support this probing amendment because it highlights a substantive issue arising from the Bill that relates to public interest and investigative journalism. Although more could be done—I will mention a couple of points in a moment—this is a limited, practical, technical amendment that does not in any way impact on the Bill’s vital central mission but deals with a serious threat to media freedom.

I do not for a minute believe that this Bill’s provisions will be used regularly to prosecute journalists but, crucially, I do believe that there are circumstances where it could be deployed to stop a major piece of investigative reporting—I will explain why—because of the subsequent chilling impact on investigative journalism, not least because of the rightly high, heavy sentences involved. I also think that there are major issues of press freedom globally on this point because the way in which we legislate in the UK, especially on issues of national security, tends to be copied in a much more dramatic fashion in far less democratic countries; this issue was powerfully raised in a letter from international press freedom organisations that was published today in the Times and which I co-signed as chairman of the Commonwealth Press Union.

I want to make one general comment before I come on to the specifics of this amendment. For more than 25 years, I have been involved in one way or another in major pieces of legislation that are not intended to have any impact on the media. However, unforeseen consequences often become apparent as they are scrutinised and the potential risk becomes clear. On almost every occasion, Governments of every persuasion have acted to amend a Bill to protect the legitimate interests of media freedom. I believe that this is one such occasion when the Government or this House should act when problems become evident. Where public interest journalism is concerned, we must always act with the utmost caution.

Let me explain the crux of the problem. Modern public interest journalism in a digitally connected world inevitably straddles national boundaries. It involves a combination of civil society and media organisations working together to report on leaked documents from the public and private sectors, the publication of which is genuinely in the public interest. It often relies on whistleblowers, who expose themselves to serious risk, and those who provide information that substantiates the truth of claims. The Panama papers and the Uber files are two such investigations, but this point also applies to straightforward reporting, such as that by the Daily Telegraph on Chinese influence in the UK and British citizens being placed on a Chinese watch-list; the reporting of the Daily Mail on the horrific experiences of female submariners on-board nuclear submarines; and the BBC’s story last year about a spy who used his status to terrorise his partner before moving abroad to continue intelligence work while under investigation. You can see how arguments might be made about any of these reports potentially being of use to a foreign intelligence service.

The problem arises because of the wide definitions used in Clauses 1 and 3 and particularly at the foreign power condition in Clause 29. Together, they could potentially criminalise one of the core functions of journalism: reporting on leaks of information about Governments, organisations and companies. They could cause problems for civil society organisations that work legitimately with journalists on investigations if those organisations are funded by foreign Governments, many of whom, like the United States, are of course sympathetic to the UK. They could cause serious problems for sources, who might reveal restricted information such as trade secrets when disclosing information clearly in the public interest to organisations that accept financial assistance from foreign states. They could cause serious problems for those collaborating with UK and international organisations which receive funding from foreign Governments. The admirable Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, to take one such case, receives donations from the US Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. As we have heard, there is no distinction in the Bill between hostile and friendly sources of funding which would provide protection for such collaboration.

These might all be theoretical issues, as I am sure that my noble friend will say. When it comes to media freedom, history shows us that we must take the utmost care with problems of theory. However, one issue is most certainly not theoretical: the chilling impact that results from the combination of all these pitfalls and from this clause. When the potential sanctions under the Bill are so grave, would whistleblowers really want to take the risk? Would those involved in an investigation who might be needed to corroborate information be willing to take the chance? Would journalists want to put themselves and their editors and publishers in jeopardy? Would civil society organisations affected be prepared to do so? I suspect that the answer to all those questions is no, which would have significant repercussions for investigative reporting, particularly on international matters, something that the Bill never intended to do. The key point is this: journalists and whistleblowers may fall within the scope simply because they ought to have known a story about how a Government might assist another country. That is an incredibly low bar and cannot possibly be right.

The Bill does not need major surgery to deal with these issues. Instead, it needs the tightening up of the foreign power condition and the wording in Clauses 1 and 3. Ideally, as well as looking at this amendment, the Government will think again about Amendments 65 and 66 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which have already been debated. Sadly, I was unable to contribute to that debate. Further technical amendments and tweaks to language will be needed in relation to the search powers in Schedule 2. Amendment 75 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support, would also be helpful.

There must be a holistic approach to the problems of journalism arising from this Bill. I would be grateful if my noble friend could look again at that issue in the light of this debate and consider two points, both of which arise from the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. First, “ought reasonably to know” in this clause is a low bar when the Bill is aimed at those who absolutely know what they are doing because they are involved in espionage. Let us raise the bar and not potentially criminalise whistleblowers—who already put themselves in serious danger—civil society organisations and journalists by taking that criterion out.

Similarly, we should ensure that the Bill’s provisions are aimed at those deliberately carrying out something which they know prejudices or is intended to prejudice the safety, security or defence of our country, not those who stumble into the purview of criminal sanctions while doing their job in the public interest. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling Amendment 66A, as it deals with a serious problem in a technical and proportionate way that in no way undermines the vital purpose of the Bill.

I very much hope that my noble friend is able to respond positively to this debate, either by bringing back an appropriate government amendment protecting media freedom on Report or, at the very least, giving a powerful signal from the Dispatch Box that the Bill is not aimed at journalism and those who work with journalists, or at hampering investigative reporting.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, have explained, this group concerns the definition of “foreign power”, both for the application of the foreign power condition and for the Clauses 3 and 15 offences concerned with assisting a foreign intelligence service and obtaining benefits from so doing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also raised a number of further and very interesting points in relation to political parties affected by the Clause 30 definition of “foreign power”, not only in relation to the offences but because, by Clause 81, the definition in Clause 30 of “foreign power” is incorporated into Part 3, on “Foreign activities and foreign influence registration scheme”. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s reply to the detailed questions that she posed. Interestingly, there is no reference to foreign powers in the definition of the prohibited places offences under Clauses 4 and 5. I invite the Minister also to explain why that is, so that we can consider his explanation before Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I again thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Amendment 66A seeks to exclude journalism and civil society activity from the foreign power condition unless the conduct is instigated by or is under the direction or control of a foreign power. I acknowledge the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to protect legitimate activity from being criminalised under the Bill with this amendment. However, the Government do not believe that the Bill criminalises legitimate activity and, as such, it is our view that this amendment is unnecessary.

The Committee will be aware that the foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link between a person’s activities and a foreign state can be drawn. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrong. It becomes relevant when the other elements of the offences to which it applies are met. As such, the Government do not believe there is a risk to those who engage in legitimate acts, such as journalism or forms of civil society activity.

Turning to the specifics of the amendment, we know that those with hostile intent seek to hide their activities under the appearance of legitimacy, and this amendment could therefore create a gap in our ability to prosecute such individuals. This amendment would mean that an activity carried out with the financial or other assistance of, in collaboration with, or with the agreement of a foreign power would not meet the requirements of the foreign power condition. As a consequence, where a state threat actor posing as a journalist has been engaged in harmful activity which is an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if we could show that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. This would produce an unwelcome effect whereby those seeking to cause harm to the UK could pose as journalists or members of civil society groups or operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted.

The Government understand that journalists and those conducting civil society activity can be acting wholly legitimately when receiving funding from a foreign power or working in collaboration with it. However, the other requirements for offences to be committed mean that those legitimate acts would not be captured. In answer to my noble friend Lord Black, I can be clear that this Bill targets wrongful activity from states, not whistleblowing —but we will be coming back to whistleblowing later in today’s session. I also hope that those comments reassure my noble friends Lord Black and Lady Stowell and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

I now turn to Amendments 67 to 71 on the meaning of foreign power, which were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley on Thames and Lord Purvis of Tweed. The noble Lords have tabled an amendment to remove from the definition a political party which is the governing political party of foreign Government. The inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities are being carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. We know all too well that states seeking to exert their influence or cause harm to the United Kingdom will do so through a number of different vectors, and we do not wish to create a gap in our legislation which state actors could exploit.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

How then, if you seek to attack political parties that are effectively Governments, do you correspondingly exclude political parties that are not in any sense responsible for the activities of the Government, even though they may form a small part of such a Government? The point we made about coalitions is in point and illustrates one of the points we are concerned with, which is that, in a desire to encompass everything that ought to be encompassed, you pull into the net all kinds of fish that ought never to have been caught.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I of course understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but the point is that this relates to the activities of these political parties and those who are working for them. Therefore, I am not entirely convinced that it would be appropriate to exclude the smaller parties in, say, a coalition.

I was going to go on to explain why certain governing political parties in the Republic of Ireland have been carved out, in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. A political party that is both the governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland is excluded from the definition of a foreign power, as noted. This exclusion is included in recognition of the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics.

A further amendment has been tabled seeking to add corporate or other entities.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

72: Clause 31, page 23, line 3, leave out paragraph (c)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is recommended by the JCHR and would narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity to remove giving support and assistance (including support and assistance unrelated to espionage activity) to a person known or believed to be involved in offences under the Bill (but would retain conduct which facilitates or is intended to facilitate such offending).

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lady Ludford, I am moving Amendment 72. It is a short amendment and I shall speak briefly. Clause 31 deals with foreign power threat activity, which is relevant to a constable’s powers of arrest without warrant and detention powers under Clause 35. Indeed, such activity acts as a threshold for the exercise of those powers. Foreign power threat activity also acts as a threshold for the powers of search, disclosure orders, customer information orders and account monitoring orders by virtue of Clauses 21(b), 22 to 24 and Schedules 2 to 5 incorporated in the Bill by those clauses.

Foreign power threat activity is defined in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 31(1). I am afraid I have to read them:

“In this Part references to foreign power threat activity and to involvement in foreign power threat activity are to one or more of the following … (a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats within subsection (3)”—


that is, the major offences under the first part of this Bill—

“(b) conduct which facilitates (or is intended to facilitate) conduct falling within paragraph (a)”,

which I have just read. Finally, our amendment is directed to paragraph (c), which we say should be removed from Bill and which refers to

“conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a).”

The reasons paragraph (c) should be removed are twofold. First, it makes no sense. Secondly, even if it did, the conduct described is far too vague and remote from the acts concerned in the offences described to make any sense at all or to make it worth retaining.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I base that confidence on the explicit reference to Clause 31(1)(a) in Clause 31(1)(c). With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I will withdraw it, but only on the basis that the Minister will consider this a little more carefully. As I have said, at the moment the clause seems to me unsatisfactory, and paragraph (c) ought to go. That would not damage the overall meaning of the clause at all, and I hope that the Minister will reconsider that before Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

74: Clause 36, page 26, line 5, leave out “in the interests of national security” and insert “for the administration of justice, having regard to the risk to national security”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is based on a recommendation from the JCHR. It ensures this Clause better complies with the right to a fair trial and the administration of justice.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I move Amendment 74 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Ludford. It is a very simple amendment which relates to Clause 36 and the power to exclude the public from proceedings. At the moment, the clause reads:

“If it is necessary in the interests of national security, a court may exclude the public from … any part of proceedings … under this Part, or … any part of proceedings relating to section 69A of the Sentencing Act 2020”,


which relates to the aggravating factors in sentencing so that we are concerned only with criminal proceedings under the Bill. The JCHR has recommended that the interests of justice take primacy over the interests of national security by substituting

“in the interests of national security”

with

“for the administration of justice, having regard to the risk to national security”.

The justification for that is that, when one is considering the exclusion of the public—which the JCHR has recognised as being of great importance—the interests of justice should take primacy. Of course, if the interests of national security are in conflict with what might normally be seen as the interests of justice, it is likely that the interests of justice will be served by giving way to the interests of national security. However, it is entirely wrong that the interests of national security should be the only interests mentioned in Clause 36, and this was the view taken by the JCHR—that the interests of justice should be mentioned first.

May I say a word or two about the Government’s approach to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? We sometimes feel on this side of the House—and I suspect in a great many quarters—that the recommendations of this objective, well-informed and impartial committee, which is appointed to consider the compliance of proposed legislation with human rights law and principles of human rights, is given far too little shrift by government. We would be very pleased to see a change in that approach, so that recommendations which are very carefully drawn up and researched, and usually in very modest terms, are properly respected. There is a fear that they are routinely disrespected on the basis that the Joint Committee is seen as an arm of the so-called human rights lobby, and treated with something like the Rice-Davies approach of, “Well, they would say that, wouldn’t they?”

That is frankly inappropriate. It is a criticism that is being felt more and more strongly and one that is surprising in light of the fact that many on the Government’s side of this House and the other place are broadly opposed to the continuation of our adherence to all the points of the European Convention on Human Rights. They justify that opposition by reference to the view that the common law and Parliament will always be there to defend human rights, but if the Joint Committee’s recommendations are given such short shrift, there can be little confidence in that assurance.

I accept that that is a digression, but it is an important digression, because my noble friend Lady Ludford’s amendments are directed to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and it is something I hope Ministers will bear in mind. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their remarks. Turning first to the subsidiary point in respect of the importance of the reports of the JCHR, I can certainly assure all in the House that the JCHR reports are taken very seriously by the Government and all the recommendations are appropriately considered. I can say that, as a human rights lawyer myself, I fully appreciate the importance of the human rights considerations and the very valuable work done by the committee. I hope my remarks go some way to assuage the concerns that were outlined.

I turn now to the substantive amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. This clause replaces Section 8(4) of the Official Secrets Act 1920 and in so doing makes it more explicit that the exclusion of the public from proceedings must be necessary in the interests of national security. The Government consider that the approach taken in the drafting is appropriate given the highly sensitive nature of the material that may be required to be considered during court proceedings in relation to offences under the Bill. It is important to note that the decision to exclude the public from proceedings is taken by the court on application by the Executive, who are well placed to set out the risk to the courts. We consider that the judiciary is already well placed to assess the impact of any such decision on the administration of justice.

The words that this amendment seeks to add are, with respect, unnecessary. In England and Wales, for example, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 would apply in such proceedings which already have as their overriding objective that criminal cases are dealt with justly. Therefore, those rules require a court to have regard to the importance of dealing with criminal cases in public and the overriding interests of the administration of justice when determining whether to exclude the public from any part of proceedings. It is clearly right that this clause notes and provides the court with a clear basis upon which to exclude the public on grounds of national security, and that is all that this clause does. For those reasons, the Government cannot therefore accept the proposed amendment and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I shall look carefully at the Minister’s response. For the time being I will certainly seek leave to withdraw the amendment. There may be room for further discussion—there may not. I accept that the overriding objective applies to criminal cases and to dealing with cases justly, but as regards whether it is not sensible that that should take primacy by a special mention in the Bill I am unconvinced at the moment. However, I will read what the noble Lord had to say. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 74 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

75: After Clause 36, insert the following new Clause—
“Public interest defence(1) A person subject to proceedings for any offence under sections 1 to 5 of this Act may raise as a defence that the person reasonably believed the conduct alleged to constitute the offence was carried out in the public interest.(2) Where a defence under subsection (1) is raised, it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct alleged was not in the public interest.(3) In determining whether such conduct was in the public interest the court must have regard to—(a) the nature of the alleged conduct;(b) the harm caused by the alleged conduct;(c) whether the manner in which the person engaged in the alleged conduct was in the public interest;(d) whether the person engaged in the alleged conduct in good faith;(e) whether the person engaged in the alleged conduct for personal gain;(f) the availability of any other effective authorised procedures for achieving the purpose of the alleged conduct and whether those procedures were exercised;(g) any other relevant feature of the alleged conduct.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a public interest defence to the offences under Clauses 1 to 5 of the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Committee for its indulgence in allowing a 10-minute break. The technical issue involved was entirely mine. I am tempted to say that there was a reasonable defence. It may not have been a public interest defence and I certainly cannot describe it as lawful justification, but nevertheless—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

A serious disruption?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Yes, it was possibly a serious disruption.

We have all received a very large number of briefings calling for a public interest defence, and none of them has suggested that such a defence is a bad idea or that it would imperil national security. I record our thanks to all the organisations which have sent us these briefings, including the BBC, the NUJ, Index on Censorship, openDemocracy, Guardian News & Media Limited and Mishcon de Reya, among many others. The briefings have concentrated largely on the threat to investigative journalism posed by the criminal provisions in the Bill. We dwelled on these at Second Reading, in the first two days in Committee and, to some extent, earlier today, so I will not go into detail. Suffice it to say that the threat to investigative journalism of criminalisation and the accompanying very long sentences is real and chilling—chilling in that the threat will have a deterrent effect on investigative journalism and in that it represents a real and frightening, and not merely theoretical, threat to open democracy.

It seems to be generally agreed that these provisions risk breaching Article 10 of the ECHR, on freedom of expression, a concern that was expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. The committee said, at paragraph 172:

“There seems to be a certain level of consensus that a whistleblowing or public interest defence is needed”.


It is also significant that a number of other countries, including our Five Eyes partners Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have some form of public interest defence to charges under similar legislation. However, it is not exclusively investigative journalism or even campaigning that is under threat. Those who expose wrongdoing by public servants or whistleblowing employees are equally at risk and may be equally deserving of an acquittal for an offence under this Bill after deploying a public interest defence.

It is for that reason that the public interest defence in our Amendment 75, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, goes further than protecting journalists alone. In so doing, it is close to the Law Commission’s recommendation in its 2000 paper, Protection of Official Data, which recommended that there should be a statutory public interest defence to unauthorised disclosure offences which should be available to anyone, civilians as well as journalists.

Therefore, our amendment would apply to all prosecutions for offences under Clauses 1 to 5 of the Bill, not just unauthorised disclosure offences, with which the Law Commission was concerned, but we regard that as right. Disclosure of restricted material is just as capable of being in the public interest as it is of assisting a friendly country’s intelligence service to apprehend or expose wrongdoing, as is entering a prohibited place to photograph or record corrupt transactions involving public servants. All can give rise to prosecution under the Act, and in each case there ought to be a public interest defence.

The defence we advocate is based on reasonable belief, so it relies on a test that is, in part, subjective—“Did the defendant believe their conduct was in the public interest?”—and, in part, objective: “Was that belief reasonable?” Juries are well used to applying that type of test and I suggest it is the appropriate one. By contrast, a wholly objective test of whether or not conduct was in fact in the public interest would impose a burden on juries to make what is essentially a political judgment, no doubt on the basis of conflicting evidence, expert and factual. That would not be the best test of the criminality of a defendant.

We have also maintained the principle that, once the defence is raised, it is for the prosecution to rebut it to the criminal standard of proof. That is the way our criminal law responds to a number of defences, reasonable self-defence being one such. We suggest it is the appropriate response. It would perhaps be different if we were concerned here with unauthorised disclosure by a member of the security or defence services who was bound by an agreed and binding confidentiality requirement. However, we are legislating here for criminal charges against private citizens, who, I suggest, are entitled to the benefits of the usual protections inherent in our criminal law.

In applying the test we advocate, juries would have to consider a number of factors set out in proposed new subsection (3) of the amendment. In formulating them, we have relied loosely, but not exclusively, on the factors mentioned in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which amended the Employment Rights Act 1996 for the protection of whistleblowers. These factors are designed to steer juries towards a balance between confidentiality and the public interest in disclosure. But we do not argue that these are in final form; at this stage, they are designed to give shape to what we would like to see in a public interest defence.

I repeat what I said the other day in Committee: there is no genuine democratic protection in the requirement that the Attorney-General’s consent should be obtained for a prosecution to be brought. That is a welcome safeguard, but its point is to avoid unnecessary and unmeritorious prosecutions. What is needed for the determination of guilt or innocence on a public interest defence is a trial before a jury, where the defendant has a fair chance to put their case that they reasonably believe that the conduct of which they are accused and which is said to be criminal was in the public interest.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his amendment but, unlike him though it may be, we say it goes nothing like far enough. We need a defence when the Bill becomes law, not merely an assessment of its possible merits. I note that, in the other place, the amendment of Kevan Jones MP, the Labour Member for Durham and a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, was nothing like as diffident as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I also note that Tom Tugendhat, for the Government, promised to engage further with the Opposition on this issue. I sincerely hope that the Minister gives a similar promise to consider the public interest defence, not just because of what we say here but because of the wide interest and concern about the importance of this expressed across the nation. The incorporation of the public interest defence in the Bill would address many of the concerns that these Benches and others have expressed about the dangers to personal liberty in this legislation. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will add very briefly to the comprehensive introduction of the amendments. I thank my noble friend for drafting the amendment and allowing us to debate it in Committee. My remarks relate to the concerns raised by the BBC—just one of the organisations that has been in touch—which I think are extremely significant. I have been very fortunate in my work as the foreign affairs and development spokesman for my party in being able to travel, including to conflict-afflicted areas. Our journalists and our BBC around the world are one of the jewels in our country’s crown. When they raise significant concerns, I think that there is a duty on us to listen to them very carefully.

With our free and fearless press in this country, I think that there is a dichotomy. I am sure that those in the intelligence community know that our free press and our openness make us more at risk; in fact, many journalists doing their job are at risk themselves in many areas. But we are a safer and more open and democratic country because of the press, and we have a higher standing in the world in the long term. So when the BBC raises concerns, as my noble friend indicated, highlighting the Law Commission’s comments about whether we are considerably less likely to not be complying with Article 10 of the ECHR, it is of concern for those recommendations to be ignored.

With the Bill, it seems as if we are now going to be in stark contrast with comparable legislation in other countries, including our closest intelligence partners in the Five Eyes countries. I would like for the Minister, in responding to this, to state why we go far beyond our Five Eyes allies in this regard.

There are a couple of other areas that the BBC raised: one is the criminalisation of the publication of material that is already in the public domain. With sentences of potentially life and 14 years, the chilling effect on journalists could be marked. I hope that that will be responded to very clearly by the Government. Those powers go beyond the Police and Criminal Evidence Act with regards to protections provided for journalistic material.

In Committee so far, we have raised the breadth of the Bill, combined with the extensive sentences that are open to it, and I believe that the chilling effect on our media will have a negative impact on our country overall. If they do not accept my noble friend’s amendment today—which I suspect the Minister will not—I hope that the Government will engage with him and with others who want to see the Bill work, but work by protecting the essence of our country, which is what my noble friend outlined.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is clear, in the view of the Government, that those issues relate to the provisions found in the 1989 Act, which are not addressed in the Bill. While I note that evidence, it is not relevant to this amendment. As I have already said, I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will be asking for leave to withdraw this amendment, not on the basis that it will go away but on the basis that, first, there is room for further discussion, even though only a chink has opened up in what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has had to say; and, secondly, on the basis that I accept that the amendment is not perfectly drafted and we would like to take further advice and further consider a number of matters in the drafting of the Bill. What I will say, very briefly if I can, about the amendment and the response of the Minister and the other speeches we have heard, is that this question has to be taken in the context of the introduction of the Bill.

There can be no doubt that the Bill will manifestly broaden the ambit of national security and protection legislation: first, because it is targeted not at individuals who have an obligation to the state but generally at citizens; and, secondly, in the way that the Bill is drafted. We talked about this a great deal last week, when we noted the inclusion of expressions such as, “know or reasonably ought to have known”, “conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service” and all those peripheral expressions. Indeed, we note the use of the phrase “prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom” when we know “the interests of the United Kingdom” are determined by what the Government of the day believe those interests to be. All those broaden the ambit of these criminal offences.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that this issue is not going to go away. All the briefings we have had from journalists and organisations tell us how important a public interest defence is. I completely take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and by the Minister, that Article 10 on freedom of expression is a qualified right. Of course, people of legal distinction can disagree, but it is entirely wrong to suggest that the Law Commission does not contain people of legal distinction.

If it were translated into a consideration of this Bill, because there is no material distinction on the disclosure points, I feel confident that the Law Commission would come out with the same recommendation as it did in 2020. We also have the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to a public interest defence. It is very difficult to argue that the fact that it is a qualified right under Article 10 does not mean that it would apply. Of course, we, the Law Commission and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have read the whole of Article 10 and understand the qualification, but the overwhelming point is the phrase

“necessary in a democratic society”.

Everything else is subject to that in the qualification.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Just so that I understand, is the noble Lord saying that the absence of a public interest defence, whether framed in the manner of this amendment or in a similar or a different way, means that the Bill would automatically be a violation of Article 10 of the European convention?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

As drafted, I fear that it would. Since we have had absolutely no indication that concessions will be made to all the amendments we discussed last week—I rather doubt that we will get them—it seems to me that investigative journalism will be seriously affected in a way that risks being a serious breach of Article 10. It might be saved by the qualification suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, but I do not accept that that case is made out.

I entirely accept the noble Baroness’s point that the damage of publication cannot be recalled, but a balance must be struck which takes into account the interest in disclosure against the interest in secrecy. We emphasise the importance not just of free investigative journalism in a democratic society but of the control of wrongdoing. For my part, I cannot see anything in what the Minister said which comprehensively puts paid to the idea that there could be a cover-up of wrongdoing not possible for citizens to redress by disclosure without being subject to criminal proceedings under this Bill.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)]

I reassure the noble Lord that I do not believe that any of my former colleagues would want wrongdoing to be concealed. In balancing secrecy and the public interest, you have to analyse what secrecy is there for. Of course, secrecy can be used wrongly and attached to things which are not secret. However, I am talking about things where revealing the information could compromise the lives of individuals at that level. Making that judgment is pretty tough on a court, without knowing the full context. To defend against that, prosecutors would have to compound the damage. Of course, wrongdoing should never be covered up, but secrecy is not there just for the sake of it. It is there to protect lives and methods.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I accept entirely that this is a very difficult issue and that the balance to be struck is very difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned the case of Clive Ponting, where there was undoubtedly government misinformation and wrongdoing. Clive Ponting was not a journalist; he was a former civil servant. In fact, he wrote books as well, including one on the truth about the “Belgrano”. Nevertheless, what he did was important. It is vital to our democracy that juries have the right—as one did in that case against the direction of the judge, because there was not a public interest defence—to say, “No, we will not convict because there has been wrongdoing.” A jury should not have to defy a judge and misapply the law because of the absence of such a defence to avoid covering up wrongdoing.

Of course I accept the point about drafting from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and that this amendment is not perfect. Indeed, it was he brought up the Ponting case at the very first instance in these proceedings. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we cannot run away from drafting a public interest defence, if that is necessary, because the drafting is difficult. It is a different topic, but in Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 we have a defence of reasonable comment on a matter of public interest. I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for that Act, and we considered very carefully how that would work. However, at that stage—although they are rarer now as a result of that Act—these were matters for determination by a jury, and a jury can determine such a public interest defence.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

First, with great respect, jury trial was effectively abolished by the Act that the noble Lord is talking about. Secondly, it put into statutory form a so-called Reynolds defence in a civil claim. Here we are talking about prosecutions of criminal offences of the most serious sort. The analogy is not appropriate.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I disagree—a fortiori, if such a defence is appropriate in a defence to a civil claim, it is appropriate in a defence to criminal proceedings that carry maxima of 14 years and life imprisonment. We may differ on that; nevertheless, of course I note that jury trial was abolished for defamation by that legislation. However, when we were considering the public interest defence, the abolition of jury trial was not then in mind; we had always had jury trials, and still can do in rare cases.

The only other point I wish to make is in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. Of course, in the case of whistleblowers, there are other avenues to pursue for those employed by the security services, but there are two answers to that point. The first is that we are not just concerned with those employed by the security services, or those employed by anybody in particular. We are concerned with offences designed to be used and prosecuted against ordinary citizens. Secondly, we have included in our amendment—it is one of the best drafted parts—that one of the factors to be taken into account would be

“the availability of any other effective authorised procedures for achieving the purpose of the alleged conduct and whether those procedures were exercised”.

That will always be an important point, because it answers the point that you could have gone to an authorised body for the protection of whistleblowers.

This issue is not going to go away. I suspect we shall come back to it on Report, and that there will be a vote on it. The amendment may be in a very different form, but nevertheless, with these very serious criminal offences, I cannot accept that a public interest defence is not in the interests of the public and the nation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 75 withdrawn.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

50: Clause 16, page 15, line 25, at end insert—
“(iia) section 3 (assisting a foreign intelligence service);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe the exclusion of offences under Clause 3 from the offence in Clause 16.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments simply raises two questions, which is why we put down two probing amendments. Clause 16 criminalises preparatory conduct for any offences under Clauses 1, 2, 4 or 12, but it does not cover preparatory conduct for offences under Clauses 3 or 5.

Clause 3, as noble Lords will know, is the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. It is not covered by the preparatory conduct offence, and we are simply at a loss to know why the Government deem it necessary to have an offence of preparatory conduct in relation to the protected information offence, the trade secret offence, the more serious of the two prohibited places offences and sabotage, but not in relation to assisting a foreign intelligence service. Can the Minister explain the Government’s thinking?

I do not believe that there is a need for a similar explanation for not criminalising preparatory conduct in relation to offences under Clauses 13 and 14, on foreign interference, or Clause 15, on obtaining benefits from a foreign intelligence service. That is because Clause 13 already covers preparatory conduct, because it refers to conduct or a course of conduct of which it, the conduct, forms part. Clauses 14 and 15 define the new offences in a way that states the criminal acts so tightly that they do not need a reference to preparatory conduct. Indeed, that would be inappropriate.

As for Clause 5, it may be that the reason for not making a separate offence of preparatory conduct for unauthorised entry to a prohibited place is that the Clause 5 offence is summary only and carries a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment. It may have been thought that preparatory conduct for such an offence was likely to be fairly nonspecific anyway. If the Government have other reasons for excluding Clause 5 from the ambit of the preparatory conduct clause, please may we know what they are? These are probing amendments, but I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 50 and 51 seek to expand the preparatory conduct offence by adding the assisting a foreign intelligence service or FIS offence, Clause 3, and the unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence, Clause 5, to the scope of the preparatory conduct offence.

The Committee will be aware that, under Clause 3, the first offence, in subsection (1), applies where a person engages in conduct that they intend will materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The second offence, under subsection (2), applies where a person engages in conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The person engaging in this conduct has to know, or ought reasonably to know, that the conduct is of this kind. The type of activity that could be considered to be preparatory acts relating to assisting an FIS are already sufficiently covered by the second offence under subsection (2) and also by the offence of obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service under Clause 15.

Clause 5 targets conduct in a prohibited place which is unauthorised. The offence targets lower-level activity, such as knowingly entering a prohibited place without authorisation. This offence does not therefore require a purpose prejudicial to the UK to be demonstrated. I remind noble Lords that the purpose of Clause 16 is to allow the most serious state threats activity to be disrupted at an early stage. It would be disproportionate to include the Clause 5 offence under the scope of the preparatory conduct offence, given that the offence does not require any proof of intent against the United Kingdom and accordingly carries a lower penalty. As such, we do not consider that the inclusion of these additional offences to the preparatory conduct offence is necessary or proportionate to achieve the aims of the offence.

I hope that that answers the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The Government therefore do not find the amendment to be necessary, so I invite him to withdraw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister’s response on Clause 5 was precisely in line with the possibility that I adumbrated, and he has confirmed that, so I shall withdraw that amendment without hesitation. Of course, I shall also not move the other amendment, because it needs further discussion. However, at the moment I do not understand how preparatory conduct is covered by Clause 3 at all. Perhaps we can discuss that behind the scenes between now and Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 50 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, government Amendments 52 to 59 are minor and technical, and bring consistency across the police powers in the Bill by aligning Schedule 2 with equivalent provisions in Schedules 3 to 5.

The amendments serve several purposes. First, they ensure that applications made under Schedule 2 for production orders and explanation orders may be made without notice to a judge in chambers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, or to a sheriff in chambers in Scotland. This means that, in cases where it could harm an investigation, an application may be made without notifying the defendant. For example, the police may require a production order to obtain evidence from a person suspected of preparing to conduct espionage. Notifying them of the application in advance may result in the destruction, concealment or alteration of that evidence.

Secondly, the amendments ensure that a production order made under paragraphs 3 or 4 of Schedule 2, or an explanation order made under paragraph 8, has effect as if it were an order of the court. This means that if a person fails to comply with the requirements of the order, they can be treated as being in contempt of court, which is a criminal offence punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine. Failing to comply with a production order or explanation order can impede a state threats investigation. To avoid damage to such an investigation, it is crucial that provision is made to hold to account those who choose to disregard these orders. This approach mirrors that of the account monitoring orders under Schedule 5 of the Bill and the equivalent production order power in terrorism legislation.

Finally, Amendments 56 and 57 simplify the way that the term “judge” is defined in Schedule 2, aligning it with the definition in Schedules 3 to 5. The amendments do not change the meaning or interpretation of “judge”; they just ensure the drafting is the same across the schedules.

I ask noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. As he has explained, these amendments make provision for applications for production and explanation orders to be made without notice to a judge in chambers. The amendments also make it clear that the orders should take effect as if they were court orders, so that disobedience would be treated as contempt of court.

We of course accept that such orders should be sought and obtained without notice, where necessary; we would expect that, generally speaking, it would be so necessary, because, as I think the Minister pointed out, a warning that application was going to be made for such an order would encourage the persons holding the material to hide it or other evidence concerned or to concoct explanations and provide false support for such explanations. If the orders are made without notice, the person is caught unawares and the orders are more likely to be productive. We also accept that disobedience should be punishable as contempt of court, simply in order to give the orders teeth, which they ought to have.

However, I add one general point. These production and explanation orders are quite draconian in nature and represent a significant intrusion on privacy and liberty. We accept that the conditions set out in the Bill for making these orders are tightly drawn and that, if those conditions are met, the orders are justified. However, it is important—I am sure the Government accept this—that those applying for these orders, and judges scrutinising these applications, will need to be astute to ensure that the conditions set out in the legislation for the orders to be made are fully met.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What was Clause 23 has now become Clause 28, because of various changes made by amendments to the Bill. So my noble friend’s remarks will be perfectly in order when we get to Clause 28, but we are not there yet.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

It might help the noble Lord to know that there are a number of amendments tabled to Clause 28, which is a controversial clause and will be debated on the first day of the new year, I suspect.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

I am very relieved to hear that, because I received this stunning brief which I thought, without necessarily understanding its contents, I should bring to noble Lords’ attention.

While I am on my feet, I shall just make one other observation which I think is important, relating to the size of the Bill and particularly the size of the schedules. The Bill is 65 pages long and the schedules stretch to 124 pages, which is very close to double the size of the Bill. I have spoken about this before on other Bills: there is a terrible disease now among those handling legislation, and we are included, which means that the legislation is of inordinate length. I draw the Committee’s attention to the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. That contains important provisions relating to landlords and the occupiers of their land. It stretches no more than 10 pages, and is readable in its entirety without having to take a magnifying glass.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out “, or ought reasonably to know,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to tighten the scope of the offence in Clause 1.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. Before speaking to them, I make a general observation which is applicable to nearly all the amendments we have put down for debate today.

Broadly, Part 1 of the Bill is aimed at updating and clarifying the law against espionage, sabotage and subversive behaviour which threatens the safety, security or defence of the United Kingdom. We and the whole House support that aim, which is clearly described in the Long Title: to

“Make provision about threats to national security from espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers.”


However, as I said at Second Reading, we on these Benches wish to ensure that the Bill sticks to that remit and is not so wide as to damage individual liberties which our security and defence services are there to protect.

The amendments in this group would ensure that guilt of the relevant offences could be established only on the basis of actual knowledge of essential facts, and not merely what is often called imputed knowledge. The Bill talks of what a person ought reasonably to know rather than what they might be deemed to know. However, we object to the addition of

“or ought reasonably to know”

after “know”.

I shall remind your Lordships briefly of the offences covered by these amendments and the sentences proposed for them. The offences in Clause 1, “Obtaining or disclosing protected information”, and Clause 12, “Sabotage”, both attract a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. All four offences in Clause 2, “Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets”, Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, Clause 4, “Entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, and Clause 15, “Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service”, attract a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. The offence in Clause 5, “Unauthorised entry etc to a prohibited place”, is in a different category because it is a summary offence, but, apart from that Clause 5 offence, all these offences are treated very seriously indeed.

Yet in order to be guilty of the offences, the defendant does not actually have to know essential facts. It is enough if they “ought” to know them. In Clause 1, the offence is committed if the person

“obtains, copies, records or retains protected information, or … discloses or provides access to protected information”.

Clause 1(b) provides that the person’s conduct has to be

“for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

In the next group, I will make the point that the interests of the United Kingdom concerned ought to be the “security or defence interests”, not just interests in general. But in this group, our point is that, in order to be guilty under this clause, the person should actually have to know that their conduct was for a purpose that was prejudicial to the UK. It should not be sufficient to constitute guilt that they merely “ought to have known” that, even if they did not. That is the point of our Amendment 1.

Another unsatisfactory feature of this and other clauses is that the clause presupposes an actual purpose—that purpose, presumably, being the reason for the defendant’s actions. It would be very odd if, the prosecution having established the purpose, the additional requirement of knowledge could be met not by showing that the defendant knew that that purpose, which was his or her own, was prejudicial to the national interest but merely that they “ought” to have known that.

Under Clause 2, which is the trade secrets offence, the defendant’s conduct, under the Bill, has to be “unauthorised”. However, as drafted, the defendant does not have to know that the conduct is unauthorised; it is enough if the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 7 would change that.

Under Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, it should be required, we say, that to convict a person of this offence, they actually knew—the Bill says that they ought to have known that it was “reasonably possible”—that

“their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

not merely that they should have realised that the possibility existed. Amendment 14 would address this. We also say that the word “likely” would be more effective than the words “reasonably possible”, but that is addressed in a later group.

In Clause 4, the offence of entering a prohibited place suffers from the same inherent problem as the Clause 1 offence. The purpose has to be proved, but the defendant does not actually have to know that the purpose was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom; it is enough that they “ought reasonably” to have known. The clause heading, “Entering etc a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, highlights the illogicality. How can you have that purpose if you do not actually know that the purpose is prejudicial at all? Yet the clause as drafted says that you can; that should go, and our Amendment 17 would remove it.

Clause 5 is the summary offence of unauthorised entry to a prohibited place. Under the Bill, proof of actual knowledge of the lack of authorisation is unnecessary; again, merely the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 22 addresses that.

Regarding Clause 12, the very serious sabotage offence, the same point applies to the purpose as in Clauses 1 and 4. Again, we say that guilt ought, crucially, to depend on actual knowledge that the purpose was prejudicial. Amendment 36 addresses that.

Amendments 46 and 48 make similar points about the defendant’s knowledge of the source of benefits provided by a foreign intelligence service. Amendment 65 would amend the application of the foreign power condition in Clause 29, which states that

“the person knows, or ought reasonably to know,”

that the conduct is carried out

“on behalf of a foreign power.”

The foreign power condition in the Bill is a very important condition for liability for a number of these offences. How can it possibly be just for the law to provide that the condition can be met if a person does not know that their conduct is carried out on behalf of a foreign power and naively does not catch on, just because it is later decided that even if they did not know at the time, they should have realised? Juries can, and frequently are asked to, come to a conclusion about what defendants know or knew or even what they believe or believed. Juries are good at determining actual states of mind, drawing conclusions from the evidence they hear and see.

To take a simple example, the Theft Act defines receiving stolen goods as:

“A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods”.


But here we are concerned with the proposal that juries should decide cases not on the basis of conclusions they reach about an actual state of knowledge or belief but on views they may take about what the defendant did not know but should have done. These are value judgments, not true decisions of fact.

We are not suggesting that imputed knowledge is never used in the criminal context, but where it is the context is very different. It is used, for example, for insider trading in Canada, where professional insiders receiving tips are able to be found guilty on conclusions that they ought to have drawn. It is used in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in respect of defendants who should have known their own conduct would amount to harassment. In the Official Secrets Act 1989 the reference is broadly to unlawful disclosures by Crown servants and contractors or others to whom confidential information was entrusted. They have a defence to unlawful disclosures if they show they did not know and had no reason to believe that the disclosures were unlawful. The burden of proof is reversed, I accept, but I suggest that is because of the positions the defendants hold or held. However, lack of knowledge or of the reason to believe in a state of fact amounts to a defence even then, so that liability is a long way from these cases because these provisions may catch anyone with no special relationship to the Government on an assessment that the defendant did not know the relevant facts but ought to have done so. Our position is that that is unjust. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I venture a few thoughts on this phraseology. The crucial question is: how much would the prosecutor have to prove about the state of knowledge of the defendant? In some contexts, when phraseology of this kind is used, it is necessary to show what the individual knew was the state of the law and what information that individual had at the relevant time from which a conclusion should be drawn.

The problem with the phraseology here is that it is so general that it is not clear whether the knowledge the individual had is to be the actual knowledge which that person had, which is one thing, or, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, imputed knowledge. If we are dealing with imputed knowledge, the situation becomes much more serious, particularly having regard to the fact that one is concerned with not just the safety of the United Kingdom but the interests of the United Kingdom, which itself is an unfortunately vague expression. I think it would help the Committee if the Minister would explain exactly what a prosecutor would be expected to have to prove in order to establish the offence.

Putting myself into my former position of prosecutor, I would find it quite troublesome to have to face up to proving not only what the individual knew about the law but what the individual knew about the facts. But it would be quite reasonable for me as a prosecutor to have to do that. To impute knowledge of facts to an individual with an offence as serious as this is to take the matter a long way from a reasonable punishment with the extreme penalties mentioned in this clause. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain exactly what would need to be proved in order to establish the offence so that the noble Lord and those supporting know exactly where they are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.

For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I shall certainly withdraw the amendment at this stage at the end of what I have to say, and will then consider it and my other amendments with the Minister and others between now and Report.

I am grateful for the incisive consideration of imputed knowledge by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, supported, as I understood it, by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who clearly articulated the difference between the basic knowledge that you must have and the conditions for imputing knowledge. That is what the Government’s drafting of all these clauses in the Bill simply does not address.

My noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed pointed out the very difficult coexistence of the Bill with the Official Secrets Act 1989, which I think the Minister accepted and said that we are going to come back to. It is difficult precisely because it is not simply a competition between offences that involve serving or former intelligence officers and those involving any person; it is also that there is a carefully defined defence under the Official Secrets Act that does not apply here, and the offences can be made out on the basis of imputed knowledge.

The point made by the Minister, that the requirement for actual knowledge might hinder prosecutions, would be a good one were it not for the fact that juries are very good at determining whether or not people who deny knowledge actually have it, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out. With the exception of the Clause 5 offence, these are all indictable-only offences, as you would expect, carrying very serious penalties. A defendant who denies knowledge will have that denial very carefully considered, and the underlying facts that he knew, or can be shown to have known, will be considered to enable a jury to decide whether he actually knew.

On that basis, I suspect that, at the end of the deliberations on the Bill, the House may well want to ensure that, for a conviction to stand, it is a question not of hindering prosecutions but of whether a conviction on reasonable evidence is a likely outcome. When that is considered, I believe that actual knowledge should be required, although I of course wish to consider this over the intervening stages of the Bill. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “or” insert “security or defence”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to clarify the definition of “interests of the UK”.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group would all tighten the definition of the

“interests of the United Kingdom”

that are to be protected under the provisions of the Bill. They would make it clear that the interests to be protected from damage or prejudice by this National Security Bill should be the “security or defence” interests of the United Kingdom.

In opening group 1, I made the point that the aim of Part 1 was set out in the Long Title: the Bill is about “threats to national security”, not general concerns about the interests of the United Kingdom. This reflects a point, made by me and others at Second Reading, that the interests of the UK in the Bill as drafted are not restricted to the defence or security interests of the UK at all but that any interests of the United Kingdom are to receive protection.

For example, under Clause 1, obtaining records or disclosing “protected information” is to be criminalised. “Protected information” includes any information that is “restricted in any way”, or may be reasonably expected to be so restricted, for the purpose of protecting any interests of the United Kingdom, not just security or defence interests. There is no requirement that a genuine threat to the UK be shown, and there is no restriction on which areas the interests of the UK might be held to cover.

As the Minister said in responding to the Second Reading debate, the phrase “interests of the United Kingdom” has been interpreted by the courts as meaning

“the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers”.

He also said:

“This is notably different from protecting the particular interests of those in office.”—[Official Report, 6/12/22; col. 152.]


In a personal sense, that may be so, but the interpretation that he recited, which I accept is correct in law, means effectively that the interests of the UK are synonymous with government policy at a particular time. So if the Government of the day are pursuing a particular policy on environmental protection, for example—I mentioned fracking at Second Reading but it could just as easily be immigration or any commercial interest covering transport, planning, housing, safety standards, employment rights or whatever—then investigation and disclosure would be at risk of being criminal.

Under Clause 4, photographing, recording or even looking at any prohibited place for a purpose contrary to any interests seen as those of the UK—these interests are effectively determined by the policy of the Government of the day—would all be criminal. Worse still, the photography or the recording could all be from outside the prohibited place.

Under Clause 8, the Secretary of State may designate anywhere in the United Kingdom—or for that matter any vehicle—as a prohibited place if they consider it necessary to protect the unlimited and undefined interests of the UK. That would hand an unscrupulous Government the power to choke off much of the investigative journalism and broadcasting that is fundamental to our democracy. Consequently, informed discussion of what the national interest requires would be similarly choked off. The dissemination of information about government policy on almost any topic that the Government could claim bore on the national interest could be stifled by the imposition of government restriction at will.

As drawn, many of these provisions have nothing whatever to do with national security. All of our amendments in this group are designed to restrict the interests to be protected by the Bill to “security or defence” interests. That is sufficiently wide, and it is the aim of the Bill, as demonstrated by the Long Title. We therefore hope that the Government will accept these amendments, because we find it hard to believe that they would wish to arrogate to themselves such wide-ranging protection of all possible interests that could be designated as interests of the United Kingdom in a Bill that is rightly concerned with the protection of national security. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will make some simple arguments, because there are other noble Lords who can make much more complex arguments. I say very clearly that the Bill we are debating is the National Security Bill and, therefore, it ought to be about national security. The offences should not be able to be translated to other areas. The offences are drawn so badly and broadly that they will criminalise a huge range of conduct which might only vaguely affect the interests of the UK. The wording should be changed to “security or defence”, as the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, have suggested in their amendment. It is a dangerous piece of legislation, because it is so broad that the police and security services will be able to turn it into something they can use against far too many people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.

I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.

I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.

As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, but, with respect, the fallacy that he falls into, and the fallacy into which the Government fall—the Minister has articulated it—is that, in the interests of being able to prosecute a wide range of activities, they threaten to lower the threshold for such prosecutions to a point where the responsibility for the decision on guilt lies not with a jury considering guilt or innocence but with those who decide to prosecute because they perceive a threat to the interests of the United Kingdom, and the interests of the United Kingdom are very wide.

I agreed with almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said; the one thing he did which I did not agree with was that he misquoted the Bill. The Bill is not about prejudice to the safety “and” interests of the United Kingdom. Everywhere that the phrase occurs, it says the safety “or” interests of the United Kingdom”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite right; I should have said that, and I meant to. I apologise to the Committee; that is what I meant to say. I thank the noble Lord for clarifying that.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am quite sure that no apology was needed for what was plainly a slip in a detailed speech made without reference to lots of notes. But the point is an important one, because the protection of the interests of the United Kingdom is free-standing, and the point that almost every noble Lord who has spoken has made is that, because they are defined, there is no clarity at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about opacity. It is not just opacity; it is that no one can know what is criminal. The prosecutors are there to decide what they will charge—certainly with the consent of the Attorney-General where that is required. However, where they make that decision, the jury is left with an impossible position. The judge is bound to direct the jury properly, under the terms of Chandler—that the interests of the United Kingdom are effectively what the Government of the day determine those interests to be—and the offense is left effectively without any clarity at all. That is our objection. I take it a little further, but it is an objection that illuminates the danger of going down that path. It is unjust not to have clarity about what behaviour is criminal, particularly where the sentences are so serious. It is also damaging to public confidence in the criminal law itself if prosecutors and defenders cannot know what is criminal and what is not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the debate on Amendment 4 flows fairly naturally from the previous debate. The amendment flows from the report by the JCHR, which I am a member of, and is designed to

“confine the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information to information that has been classified as secret or top secret (rather than to all information access to which is restricted in any way).”

As the offence relates to the sharing of information, freedom of information—which is of course protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights—is engaged, including the potential that it could catch journalism, political expression or whistleblowing activity. This could potentially capture a wide range of information, not least given the uncertainty we have just been discussing as to how the words

“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

might be applied in a given case.

The requirement that the information be “restricted in any way”, or even that it might be “reasonable to expect”—that also harks back to the preceding debate—that information be restricted in any way, lacks clarity and legal certainty. As your Lordships can see, common themes are emerging. It would of course catch information that was not protected but it was reasonable to expect that it would be. The Government’s Explanatory Notes set out that it would cover non-classified information accessible in a building with restricted access, such as a government building.

I recall the severity of the offence; with a potential punishment of life imprisonment, it might be reasonable in the light of that to expect that it would attach to a clear type of information such as that categorised as “Secret” or “Top Secret”. It seems unreasonable and disproportionate that the offence should attach to information simply categorised as “protected”, or indeed official information that is not restricted at all.

The offence as currently drafted in Clause 1 does not make it sufficiently clear what information is considered to be protected for the purpose of this offence. It creates an unacceptable level of legal uncertainty, raising concerns about compliance with rights to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, as protected by Articles 5, 6 and 10 of the ECHR.

As proposed by the JCHR report, in the interests of improving legal certainty and proportionality, this amendment proposes that the clause be amended to say that it applies only to information at a certain level of categorisation and therefore sensitivity, such as “secret” or “top secret”. The report suggests that the details of what could be included could be contained in a non-exhaustive indicative list or specified in a statutory instrument, but this amendment is designed to tighten up the offence so that it does not spread too far or impact too much on freedom of expression, journalism and other lawful activities. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, our Amendment 6 would omit Clause 1(2)(b). Your Lordships will know by now that Clause 1(2)(a) deals with protected information as being when

“access to the information, document or other article is restricted in any way”,

as my noble friend Lady Ludford has explained. However, Clause 1(2)(b) goes on to say that

“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information, document or other article would be restricted in any way”—

that way being entirely unspecified.

It is our position that the inclusion of Clause 1(2)(b) takes the clause far too wide. There is no answer to who would be doing the restricting, or what the determinant would be of when and how it would be reasonable to expect restriction. It might be completely reasonable to expect a mad authoritarian Government to restrict the most innocuous but possibly controversial informational document for the purpose of saving public or national embarrassment. Yet that would not make the entirely unjustified restriction on the information or document any less unreasonable; nor would it make the removal of the document from the public domain more justifiable.

This is a misplaced provision, and it should go. We agree with my noble friend Lady Ludford on the JCHR’s Amendment 4, that the restriction of prohibited information ought to be limited to “secret” and “top secret” categories as a matter of definition.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being present at Second Reading. I cannot even claim, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, that I was broadcasting the benefits of line-by-line scrutiny to a foreign power. I was performing a long-arranged judicial function in the Channel Islands.

I am well disposed in principle to Clause 1, and I entirely understand why the concept of protected information is not limited to “secret” or “top secret”, as the JCHR recommended. However, in the interests of obtaining a little more clarity, perhaps I might press the Minister on this point. Paragraph 63 of the Explanatory Notes states:

“Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material.”


Three examples are given. One is about information on the identity of police officers working with security and intelligence services. One is about information on intelligence officers operating in a foreign state. I suspect that they do not get much more classified than that. One is classified information on a defence system.

Bearing in mind that those examples appear to relate to classified information, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain, first, what circumstances he can envisage in which it should be an offence to obtain or disclose information that is not classified, or that could not reasonably be expected to be classified, applying Clause 1(2)(b). Secondly, how is one supposed to know that non-classified information is protected, given that the only controlling factor, other than the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—which, as the Committee has just heard, is very broadly framed—is that access should be restricted in some way? On one view, “restricted” could apply to anything, however innocent, that is not actually published. I assume that such a broad meaning is not intended, but could the Minister give us more of a clue as to where the line is drawn?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It would be the case only if those three tests that I have just described are met for the purposes of the offence in the Bill. So it would have to be that the information was protected, that the person ought reasonably to know that, and that its disclosure was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I imagine that will be the topic of some debate in the context of the hypothetical example that the noble Lord mentioned. It also has to be done with the intention to benefit a foreign power. I cannot see that, in the hypothetical situation the noble Lord mentioned, that issue realistically would arise because the combination of these tests means not only is the proposed offence proportionate but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution under this clause. The Government therefore consider that the definition of protected information is justified and cannot accept the proposed amendments. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Following up on my noble friend Lord Purvis’s question, would it not probably be in the interests of Canada in the example he gave to expose wrongdoing on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom? The Government of the United Kingdom might define the interests of the United Kingdom in accordance with government policy in a way which was inimical to the interests of Canada and the offence would still be committed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I find the hypothetical example that the noble Lord postulates hard to follow, because it seems difficult to envisage a situation where a prosecutor could conclude in those circumstances that there was a prejudice to the Government of the United Kingdom and a benefit to the Government of Canada, and that the other elements were present. It seems a most unlikely scenario.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I had two points to make, the first of which, about foreign power, has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, so I will not repeat it. The second is more of a question. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked, “Why not charge theft?” I have no doubt that I will be advised by the Minister, but is there not a requirement that you have to deprive somebody permanently of something to constitute the offence of theft? I can see some potential argument that somebody charged under that offence would say that they had no intention to deprive that person permanently of that information.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.

It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.

Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I have been listening very carefully to the noble Lord, whom I always listen to with great respect. Can I take it that he or his party will put down an amendment to the Long Title of the Bill in due course? Perhaps he has not read the Long Title in full, because, as far as I can see, it covers all these amendments in the exact way in which they are intended. We are in danger of over-sophisticating a non-existent definition of national security.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am bound to say that I discussed that before the noble Lord came in. Since, in my opening speech on the first group of amendments, I quoted specifically from the Long Title of the Bill dealing with Part 1 offences, I do not accept the criticism that I have not read it. Nor do I accept the criticism that it is apposite to threats that have nothing to do with national security, because the Long Title—which starts by dealing with Part 1, as far as the first semi-colon—is about making provision about threats to national security. My point is that, if you protect trade secrets in these very wide terms, it may include threats to national security, but it is not limited to threats to national security and it may go far wider.

It is not satisfactory for trade secrets to qualify for protection just because the information in those secrets might be reasonably expected to be subject to measures to prevent them becoming known generally. What would the measures be? Would they be imposed by a court, by government or by regulation? That is undefined. Perhaps the Minister, in replying, would explain what those measures might be. How does it help to protect trade secrets that are not subject to any protective measures, as the Bill specifically envisages? The clause raises far more questions than it answers.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will very briefly follow my noble friends to agree with that proposition. There has been reference to the foreign power condition, and I will refer to that too.

First, I take the opportunity to say that I am grateful to the Minister for what he said to me earlier by highlighting Clause 29(5). Yes, it does include that the foreign power condition can be met,

“if the person intends the conduct in question to benefit a foreign power”,

without necessarily identifying that foreign power. However, that is not an exclusive meeting of the test, as my noble friend Lord Marks has indicated. The test can be met, for example, if one of two business partners who has some intellectual property or something of commercial value is in negotiations with, say, a sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf and then there is a dispute between the two business partners. While one wants to sell that to the sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf, the other says, “You can’t do that, because that is now in breach of the National Security Bill, because I believe that this is a trade secret.” That is because a foreign power, under Clause 30(1)(c), is

“an agency or authority of a foreign government”,

so a sovereign wealth fund seeking investment could be within that definition. Therefore, I have sympathy for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but a counterpoint has been raised by asking whether the Bill is the most appropriate way for national security to cover those aspects—and, on balance, I do not think that it is.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful where the acquisition, use or disclosure constitutes a breach of confidence in respect of confidential information. As I understand it, that was the thrust of his argument. That is also the law: we have transposed the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 into UK law, so we have that intellectual property legislation—including a nine-page trade secrets regulation. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord said, and all of it, I think, is covered within existing legislation. The question then arises as to what the intent would be if one is either selling a trade secret or giving a trade secret to a foreign power to advance that foreign power.

That could absolutely be included in the Bill. The concern is that, given the way the Bill is drafted, so many other aspects could also be. That is the point we are trying to tease out: whether the Government intend that trade secrets are, as the noble Baroness indicated, some form of economic warfare, espionage or tactic. That is where the interest of the Bill should lie. It should not be the mechanism whereby trade disputes, commercial disputes or intellectual property disputes are resolved. Ultimately, that is where the Bill could be used. I do not think there are any in this Committee, but I am certain there are creative lawyers who might look for the most appropriate vehicle for the less appropriate cause. I am worried that the Bill would become one of those.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

12: Clause 3, page 3, line 23, at end insert—
“(c) intends that the conduct will prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a further intentional element to the offence in Clause 3.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group would add a mental element of intention to prejudice the safety and security or defence interests of the UK to a number of offences in the Bill—those in Clause 3, assisting a foreign intelligence service; in Clause 4, entering a prohibited place; Clause 5, unauthorised entry to a prohibited place; and Clause 16, preparatory conduct to any of the offences in Clauses 1, 2, 4 or 12. The amendments also add, importantly, a similar mental element of intention to prejudice to the foreign power condition that we discussed in the last group, in Clause 29.

The Clause 3 offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service would require intent to prejudice the safety, security or defence interests of the United Kingdom to be proved. That would answer my criticism at Second Reading that the Bill would criminalise a private citizen who helped Mossad to trace possessions looted by the Nazis from their victims, or criminalise the private citizen who helped the CIA to trace war criminals and bring them to justice from whatever theatre. Noble Lords may remember that the only answer that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, gave to my example of a citizen working for Mossad was that

“we would expect that the UK would have been made aware of such activity and it is possible that the UK would have made an arrangement with Israel. As such, the activity would have a defence in Clause 3(7)(c)(i)”.—[Official Report, 6/12/22; col. 156.]

On analysis, that is no answer at all. There is no legitimate reason why a British citizen should not assist the intelligence service of a friendly nation to achieve ends which are not remotely inconsistent with the interests of the United Kingdom. It is entirely wrong, not to mention high-handed and often either impractical or impossible, to suggest that the citizen should have to go through one of the hoops set out in Clause 7 of demonstrating a legal obligation, carrying out a UK public function, or being in accordance with an agreement with the UK or a proxy of the UK to make his or her conduct lawful.

The proper way out of this difficulty is to criminalise assistance to a foreign intelligence service only if it is intended to prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom—although, as I pointed out in an earlier group, I am not wedded to those words. But it must be clearly defined, and that is the point of the proposal in Amendments 12 and 15. That is consistent with the aim of the Bill, which the clause as drafted, with its breadth, is not.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has Amendment 16 from the JCHR in this group, which we support, but we stress the need for the interests of the United Kingdom to be defined by reference to national security; the disjunctive safety or interests of the United Kingdom generally is not enough.

Amendment 19 adds a similar requirement to the Clause 4 offence of entering a prohibited place. That clause is less offensive as it stands, because it already requires knowledge or imputed knowledge that the conduct in question is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. If our amendments in groups 1 and 2 were accepted, as they have not been as yet, all Amendment 19 would add is a positive intention requirement, which we say is justifiable and needed but which would not cause great problems by its omission if those amendments were accepted.

Amendment 20 to Clause 5, the summary offence, is more in need of change, even if our amendments in groups 1 and 2 were accepted. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has Amendment 21 in this group, with a similar change to Amendment 16 of requiring the intention to prejudice, which we support, subject to the same proviso regarding the definition of UK interests.

Amendment 47 adds an intentional prejudice element to the Clause 15 offence of obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. Again, as drafted, this is far too wide and ill defined. If a journalist is paid to investigate or write a story for the intelligence service of a friendly nation, entirely compatibly with the national interests of the United Kingdom, he should not be guilty of a criminal offence unless the benefit derived was, in the words of the Bill,

“reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services”,

and so was within the so-called excluded benefits in Clause 15(4).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I note the noble Lord’s remarks. I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic, but I will study Hansard carefully and take it back to the department.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has given no quarter. I suppose that is to be expected on the first day of a Committee on a Bill, with the Government defending their position as thoroughly as he has done. I hope that when he does read Hansard, as he has just promised to do, he will realise that there are a great many areas in which flaws in the Bill have been exposed—and exposed in particular by this group of amendments—where it is quite plain that conduct that ought not be criminal runs the risk of being criminalised. The question asked by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed just a moment ago exposed the danger for people working for a foreign intelligence service if they are British citizens; they are plainly caught. There are a number of areas where assisting a foreign intelligence service, for instance, gives rise to particular difficulties.

Before I go on to any detail, let me say that it is a dangerous path for a Government to say that they do not believe that there would be many unjustified prosecutions because the public interest test for a prosecution would not be met. Let us remind ourselves that the prosecution services have to consider two things: first, whether there is a reasonable chance of a conviction on the evidence, and, secondly, whether it would be—

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Realistic.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

“Realistic” is better than “reasonable”; the noble Lord knows far better than I what the test is.

The second point is whether it would be in the public interest to prosecute. That is a decision made by prosecuting authorities. What we are concerned about in this Committee is what conduct is criminal and merits a conviction in a criminal court. That carries with it the question of how a judge will be constrained to direct a jury as to what criminal conduct is. We have to get that right. Nowhere is that better shown than in this group of amendments.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was referred to jocularly in an earlier group by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, who said that she often does not agree with government policy and the interests of the United Kingdom as defined by government policy. Of course, he is right that she often does not agree with government policy, but she is right to point out the danger of ill-thought-out laws that go too wide, criminalising behaviour that is no more than the democratic expression of dissenting views. That is one of the evils at which this whole suite of amendments that we have tabled is directed.

An example of how the Bill goes too far was highlighted by the response of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, to my Mossad example. She said that, of course, Mossad operating in the United Kingdom would be—I forget the phrase she used—notifiable activity, or it would notify of the activity. That is not the concern I was expressing. The concern that I and others were expressing is that a private citizen helping a foreign intelligence agency in the interests of the United Kingdom or compatible with them, without a government sanction and without working for the Government, would be criminalised. I suggest that it is wrong for that private citizen to be dependent on the Government, prosecuting authorities or the Attorney-General taking the view that the public interest test was not met.

In connection with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, we simply heard no answer to his question about the tendering of legal advice. I know the Minister said that consideration would be given to that, but that calls into question the whole gamut of queries raised in this House, in this Committee and elsewhere about where the Bill goes too far. I suggest that where a Bill is too wide because it offends against human rights so that human rights are infringed and obviously infringed, the law can become positively dangerous—that is why the JCHR position taken on a number of these amendments is so important; I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on this. We do not just have to consider a benign and friendly Government steeped in the traditions of British democracy. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not here today, often says, you have to consider the possibility arising of a Government who are wholly against the traditional freedoms that are protected by our law on human rights. I suggest that that is the danger that we are concerned to defeat.

I therefore invite the Minister and his colleagues to go away and think very carefully about the breadth of these clauses and about the strength of the amendments that we have suggested to them, and to discuss with those people who have proposed amendments—we will all be willing to discuss these amendments and any refinements there should be; we are not wedded to the wording as it is the principles that are involved. Thus, by the time the Bill comes back on Report, they can be far more clearly defined, and the intent to prejudice national security—the subject of the Bill—should be clearly made out before anyone is subjected to serious criminal consequences as a result of misguided prosecutions and convictions that will inevitably flow from the misguided wording of the Bill. Having said that we will discuss it, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

13: Clause 3, page 3, line 25, leave out “it is reasonably possible may materially” and insert “is likely materially to”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a higher threshold to be met for the offence in Clause 3.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group contains only Amendment 13. That said, there ought to be two amendments, because a further amendment in exactly the same terms is required to Clause 3(2)(b).

Clause 3 deals with assisting a foreign intelligence service, and Clause 3(2)(a) provides that a person commits an offence if they engage in conduct

“that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”

For some reason that I cannot explain, we did not propose that Clause 3(2)(b), which provides that the person

“knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is reasonably possible their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities”

should be similarly amended. If this goes further, there will be such an amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.

It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I was going to ask the Minister something before he sat down, but he sat down so fast.

My concern with the Government’s approach, and the Minister’s approach in his response, is that it describes activities without reference to the legal definition of the activities concerned. Clause 3(1) involves the person committing the offence if the person

“engages in contact of any kind”.

Under Clause 3(4):

“‘UK-related activities’ means … activities taking place in the United Kingdom”.

It is not necessary to identify the service. As my noble friend pointed out, Clause 3(7) does not cover the private sector.

My amendments are very simple and very short, but even that raising of the threshold the Government resist. We are at a loss to understand why the Government are not prepared to bring a more forensic approach to the definitions in our criminal law. I quite appreciate and agree that the offence, in principle, of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the prejudice of the interests of the United Kingdom—which we say should be clearly defined—is a very important part of the Bill. But it is wrong to draft the law in such a way as to catch any conduct that attracts the displeasure of our intelligence services, our prosecuting authorities or government policy. It is important to define criminal conduct in such a way that it criminalises only conduct that ought properly to be a criminal offence when committed not only by United Kingdom citizens but by others who have absolutely no intention of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the detriment or prejudice of the United Kingdom. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

Public Order Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not been present for earlier proceedings on this Bill because of other commitments, for which I apologise. For that reason, I will say only a very few words. With everyone else who has spoken, I completely oppose Clauses 19 and 20 and support the amendments in this group restricting their ambit and the ambit of SDPOs, for all the reasons considered and voiced by my noble friend Lord Paddick in opening and all other noble Lords who have spoken.

The so-called serious disruption prevention orders amount to punishment that does indeed involve serious disruption: serious disruption of individual citizens’ liberties, imposed without a criminal conviction and on proof to the civil and not the criminal standard, and which can last indefinitely. These proposals are entirely inimical to principles deeply embedded in our law and to notions of crime and justice that we all hold so dear. They are an insidious attack on civil liberties. They threaten a gradual, incremental encroachment on civil liberties—the very type of encroachment that can ultimately lead to the destruction of those liberties themselves.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare a historical if not a current interest as a Home Office lawyer from January 1996 until the autumn of 2001. I was occasionally and habitually a happy and unhappy inhabitant of the Box.

I agree with—I think—every speech so far in this significant debate. I would go further than some in saying that I was always against this blurring of civil and criminal process from the beginning when, I am sorry to say, Labour did it. I was against ASBOs, CRASBOs, control orders, TPIMs, football banning orders and all the rest, because they were always about lessening criminal due process. That is always the intention when you blur civil and criminal process by way of these quasi-injunctive orders. Whether it is minor nuisance or suspicion of being associated with terrorists, whatever the gravity of the threat, you will catch behaviour without proper criminal due process and then prosecute people for the breach.

Although we do not always agree, I must commend the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in particular on a devastating critique of this use of copy and paste in my former department. Computers are wonderful things—until they are not. I will not labour the point, save to quote the right honourable Member for Haltemprice and Howden, who has done his best on this Bill in the other place along with Sir Charles Walker, from the Times this morning:

“Serious disruption prevention orders, or SDPOs”—


protest banning orders—

“can be given to anyone who has on two previous occasions ‘carried out activities related to a protest’ that ‘resulted in or were likely to result in serious disruption’”—

which is not defined—

“or even ‘caused or contributed to the carrying out by any other person’ of such activities. This is drafted so broadly so as to potentially include sharing a post on social media or handing out a leaflet encouraging people to go to a protest—even if you did not go on to attend that protest. Those issued with an SDPO can face harsh restrictions on their liberty, including … GPS tracking and being banned from going on demonstrations, associating with certain people”,

et cetera—and the orders are renewable indefinitely, as we have heard.

I am sorry if I have made noble friends feel uncomfortable. Do not think about these measures as they would be employed today. Think about how they could be used on the statute book by another Government, not of your friends and not of your choosing, in 20 years’ time. That is why, in a terrible Bill, Clauses 19 and 20 should not stand part.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in general we support the aims of this Bill. We agree that our national security law needs updating, and we agree that many of the threats posed by foreign actors to our national security are new and require fresh and targeted solutions. The Bill attempts to achieve all that and in many ways, which the Minister ably explained, it does so. I add our thanks to those of the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to the security services for all the brave, efficient and crucial work they do to protect our national security. However, we have a number of concerns. I shall concentrate largely on the criminal offences proposed in Part 1 of the Bill.

Our first concern is one of principle, because restrictions proposed in the Bill threaten important rights and liberties, but we are also concerned that the Government have missed serious adverse and almost certainly unintended and unforeseen consequences which follow from this proposed transformation of our national security law. These concerns overlap, where there are restrictions of our rights and liberties which were almost certainly unforeseen, and I shall deal with them together.

Our first objection in principle is that the breadth of many of the definitions in the Bill would substantially and unacceptably broaden the scope of the protections ostensibly afforded to national security. Let us consider protected information. The definition within Clause 1 is unduly wide. It covers any information where

“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information … would be restricted in any way”.

So the information does not need actually to be restricted to classify as protected information, disclosure of which is to be criminalised by the Bill.

Then there is the foreign power condition—the foundation of a major expansion of the reach of the national security provisions, and applicable to a number of the new proposed offences. I quite understand the need to replace the concept of a national enemy with the concept of a foreign power, in the attempt to update our legislation and rid it of old-fashioned distinctions between friend and foe and to make it “actor-agnostic”, as the Minister described it. But the attempt is not trouble-free.

In particular, the foreign power condition must be met for an offence under Clause 1 of obtaining or disclosing protected information to be made out. The condition is defined by Clause 29 and relates, broadly, to conduct that is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, which may be any friendly non-UK Government. Conduct qualifies as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is carried out with financial or other assistance provided by a foreign power, so a state-backed broadcasting organisation or state-run company funded by a friendly Government would have such financial assistance. It follows that anyone who obtains or discloses information which they “ought to know” is prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom, however defined—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that there is no definition available; it is a desperately controversial test—on behalf of a foreign nationally owned broadcaster is at risk of prosecution and conviction of this very serious national security offence.

The freedom of journalists working for foreign broadcasters might be substantially restricted if, for instance, they came by and used leaked information which the UK Government might prefer that they did not have and thereby found themselves at risk of being prosecuted for a Clause 1 offence. The relationship between the conduct and the foreign power may be indirect, so any such conduct meets the foreign power condition wherever it appears in the Bill. For example, it also appears in the definition of the new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets under Clause 2, which carries a maximum term of 14 years. Clause 2 again is very widely drawn; it covers unauthorised obtaining, recording or retention of a trade secret, for whatever purpose, on behalf of any body deriving financial assistance of any sort from a friendly overseas government body. This presents a significant threat to a wide range of investigative journalism on matters of importance and public interest, which ought to be aired in public even if the owners of such information might regard such airing as highly unwelcome.

In the unforeseen consequences category, the Clause 3 offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service presents a serious difficulty. Under this Bill, the foreign intelligence service can be that of any friendly foreign country; an offence under the clause, again carrying a 14-year term, penalises all conduct to assist any foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities—that is, any activities, of whatever nature, taking place in the UK. So, a UK citizen who assisted Mossad within the UK to recover goods looted by the Nazis, or who helped the CIA find and arrest war criminals, would be guilty of an offence, unless they could show that they were acting under a UK legal obligation or effectively on the direction of the British Government. If they could not show that, I can see no defence under the clause as drafted. How can that be right?

The unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence under Clause 4 is also far too wide, penalising even inspection of a photograph of a prohibited place, even for journalism, if the accused should have known that the purpose was prejudicial to the interests of the UK. And that is not just UK defence or security interests, but any interests at all. So, photographs of any environmentally damaging activity carried on by government as a matter of policy—fracking, for example, if it were ever again authorised—would count. That is not the defence of national security; that is the suppression of legitimate investigation and dissent.

The Home Secretary told the House of Commons in a Statement on national security and this Bill in particular on 1 November, a week after her reappointment:

“Now, as our markets integrate, we need to think about the future of our industry and innovation. Our economic security guarantees our economic sovereignty just as our democratic security guarantees our freedom … Britain has been on the frontline of the defence of liberty for generations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/22; col. 790.]


The Bill fails to ensure that the steps we take to defend our liberty are targeted and limited to what is necessary for that defence of liberty. So, the first task for this House at the later stages in the Bill will be to cut down the scope of conduct that is unnecessarily and wrongly caught by the Bill as drafted.

However, much of the discussion on the Bill has been as to whether there should be a public interest defence to the new offences. We regard such a defence as essential. It offers the prospect of avoiding convicting journalists, investigators, campaigners, whistleblowers and many others who should not be targeted by the criminal law at all. Such a defence must be broad enough to protect the free flow of information on which democratic political discourse depends, and it must protect from criminal sanction activities that may infringe private rights of physical or intellectual property where such infringement is justified in the public interest. As the NUJ briefing, which many of us will have received, put it succinctly:

“There should be no situation in which journalists risk being classed as spies or traitors … A free press is one of the conditions of a pluralistic democracy and the UK government should not close down scrutiny of its activities.”


I do not believe that the public interest defence should be available only in Clause 1 cases of obtaining or disclosing protected information. It should be no less applicable in cases under Clauses 2 to 5 and Clause 16, and possibly Clauses 13 and 15 as well.

The possible conditions of a public interest defence have been widely discussed, but I suggest they should include, in some form, each of the following. First, it should be for the defendants to raise the defence. I leave open the question of whether the burden of proof should be on the defence to prove the defence, or whether, once that defence is raised, it should be for the prosecution to rebut it. However, if the burden is to be imposed on the defendant to prove the defence, that should be on the balance of probabilities, and it should also be specifically incumbent on prosecuting authorities to consider the prospect of such a defence succeeding before a decision to prosecute is made. Unnecessary and unmeritorious prosecutions cause untold heartache and substantial loss. The prospect of being prosecuted has a serious chilling effect on conduct in the public interest, and the risk of such prosecutions should be carefully weighed before they are ever brought.

Secondly, the manner in which the defendant has acted should always be a factor to be considered. Thirdly, so too should the good faith of the defendant be considered, and whether or not the defendant reasonably believed that their conduct was in the public interest. Fourthly, proportionality should always be a factor, whether or not the conduct was no more than was necessary to protect the public interest asserted by the defendant. Fifthly, whether or not the conduct was for personal gain should be considered, but the fact that a defendant stood to gain from their conduct should not be enough to rebut the defence; after all, journalists stand to gain from scoops. Finally, a jury should always be left to consider the overall reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in the light of a balancing of possible harms risked against possible benefits to be derived by the public.

In an interconnected world, many of us work in a number of professional fields, collaborating with agencies of foreign Governments. Particularly sensitive is the work of journalists, academics, researchers in commercial fields, and many working directly for friendly foreign Governments and international organisations. My noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire will elaborate our concerns about the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS, and the degree to which academics will be snowed under by a bureaucratic avalanche in working out what they need to do to comply with this law’s requirements, and then in undertaking the necessary registrations to comply with an unnecessary and overcomplicated registration system which threatens to stifle and deter international academic co-operation. Journalists, broadcasters and researchers in the commercial world, as well as the media, are equally under threat.

On a happier note, it is a relief to note that the Government have excluded giving and taking legal advice from the scope of this part of the Bill; a completely justified protection of legal professional privilege and the right of all to secure legal advice in confidence. However, the Bill contains a pernicious attack on the right to equality before the law. Clauses 82 to 84 give a court power to reduce damages payable by the Crown to any claimant bringing national security proceedings against the Government. But national security proceedings include any case where any of the claimant’s evidence or submissions, of whatever nature, relate to the activities of any security service, here or overseas. So if a claimant sues the UK Government—any department—and adduces evidence of wrongdoing by, for instance, the Saudi or Rwandan intelligence services, the Crown is entitled to seek an order that the damages will be reduced, and to seek that order at any stage in advance of final judgment. Granted that one of the factors the court must take into account is whether the claimant has been guilty of terrorist wrongdoing, but the lack of that factor does not avoid a reduction in damages. That is inequality before the law. It hands the Government a tool to stifle legal claims against them. It is inimical to liberty.

So too is the proposed ban of up to 30 years on the grant of civil legal aid for anyone convicted of any terrorist offence or an offence having a terrorism connection. The ban is not just for the most heinous terrorist offences but minor accomplice offences, which may have been committed by a family member and which, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Law Society point out, may not be of a very serious nature. Further, the legal aid ban is not just for proceedings connected with terrorism but any civil legal aid to which they might be entitled for any purpose, thus largely putting them outside the protection of the law.

Although the general tenor of the Bill and its purpose are understood and accepted, at the later stages of this Bill we will be trying to make sure that it properly reflects the concerns that we have.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 12th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this was a depressing Queen’s Speech, and nothing in it more so than the Bill of Rights proposal. The Government’s briefing promises to

“end the abuse of the human rights framework and restore some common sense to our justice system”.

The assumptions that our human rights framework is being abused and that our justice system lacks common sense rely on banal, populist assertions, unsupported by any evidence.

The so-called “main elements of the Bill” include

“restricting the scope for judicial legislation”

and

“guaranteeing spurious cases do not undermine public confidence in human rights”.

These are vindictive and populist attacks on the Human Rights Act and on judicial review, unjustified, unfair to the judges and unworthy of serious politicians. As to what will be in the Bill, we are left to guess. Neither the briefing nor the Queen’s Speech even mention the Human Rights Act. The Minister enlightened us no further. The Government claim to be committed to the ECHR, yet they say they will

“establish the primacy of UK case law, clarifying that there is no requirement to follow Strasbourg case law”.

Can the Minister explain how that sits with Article 46 of the convention, which provides that:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties”?


If the UK is bound by decisions in cases to which it is party, how can our courts ignore Strasbourg decisions in other cases?

The truth is that the Human Rights Act has worked well for more than 21 years and still does, with great respect to eloquent points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. It is true that Governments may sometimes resent the Act, a point powerfully made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, but then it often suits Governments to override human rights. That is precisely what the Act and the convention are there to prevent.

The Act amply fulfilled its promise to “bring rights home”, enabling litigants here to enforce their convention rights in domestic courts. Can the Minister tell us the Government’s true intention? Is it to repeal the Human Rights Act and replace it with this new Bill of Rights? Will UK residents be entitled to enforce convention rights here or must they travel to Strasbourg once again?

Nor does the Act undermine parliamentary sovereignty. If a court finds a statute incompatible with the convention, it cannot strike it down. It makes a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. Parliament then usually legislates to remove the incompatibility. Certainly, by Section 3(1) courts must try to read legislation in a way that is compatible with the convention. So they should—we have an international obligation to respect convention rights. The section is sparingly and wisely applied; there is no evidence to the contrary.

We used to have a reputation for respecting our international obligations. This Government have cast that to the winds; witness their disrespect for the Northern Ireland protocol and the refugee convention. Such carelessness betrays a long Conservative history of honouring international obligations.

This Government established the Independent Human Rights Act Review in December 2020, with Sir Peter Gross as chair and a distinguished and varied panel. It was briefed to consider both the relationship between Strasbourg and our domestic courts and the Act’s impact on the constitutional balance between government and judiciary, which is not the one that needs rebalancing, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighhead. The review’s report made some detailed recommendations to make the Act work better—unsurprising after 21 years—but by and large the Act received a clean bill of health. The Government now threaten to ditch the review’s findings. In so doing, they appear to ascribe to the British public an ill-informed and frankly bigoted approach to human rights, which I believe seriously misreads the fair-mindedness of the people of this country.

For Liberal Democrats, belief in human rights is at our core. We will defend the Human Rights Act in full and the right of all in the UK to enforce convention rights here. We will do so for everyone, without discrimination or prejudice, because the Act has shown that human rights are for everyone, in matters of education, housing, health, social care and freedom of expression as well, not just undeserving foreigners trying to stay unlawfully in the UK, as the Government seem to imply. I have faith that we will be supported in that campaign, across the House and among the wider public.