(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I speak to the amendments in this group, I would like to talk about some of the reasons why we are introducing them. Some of our amendments have been brought forward to reassure noble Lords and others that the offence will not capture the genuine work of journalists. We have listened to the concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords in the House, and some of these amendments are a direct response to them.
The Government have heard from media stakeholders who believe that they could no longer hold the Government to account and that these clauses could inhibit the publication of articles critical of the UK’s defence or security response. I want to address those concerns directly. The Government are committed to defending our freedoms—values which define us and make us who we are. Few are more fundamental to that than freedom of the press. There is no intention to stifle or censor the media’s ability to expose or shine a light on issues. That is the proper role and function of the media and why the UK is such a strong advocate of media freedom globally.
Before we get into the details of individual provisions, I remind the House that these provisions replace the existing law in the Official Secrets Act 1911. We have been provided with a number of examples of journalistic reporting that have been cited as part of the case that more must be done to protect journalists in this Bill. Even were the Government to accept that any of these examples could hypothetically be caught by any of the offences, the same would be true of the existing laws. Accordingly, great comfort should be taken from the fact that no prosecutions of journalists have taken place under the espionage laws to date. I want to confirm again, on the record, that the focus of the Bill is on protecting the UK from threats from foreign states and those acting against UK interests, not interfering with the free press.
I begin with the amendments focusing on “ought reasonably to know”. The phrase was said to be unclear, with concerns raised that it could be interpreted as imputed knowledge, thereby catching those who engaged in specified conduct unwittingly—who did not know but are told that they should have known. I would like to strongly emphasise that this is not the Government’s intention and we do not consider that the current formulation would be interpreted by the courts in this way. However, we have considered the concerns raised on this issue, particularly the useful contributions in Committee from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. We agree that it would be helpful to clarify the meaning. These amendments therefore clarify that the prosecution must look at what matters were known to the individual at the time in determining whether that individual ought reasonably to have known something.
I now turn to amendments which all relate to the offence of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service. The amendments that the Government have put forward update the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). These amendments are similar to the ones put forward in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The effect of these amendments is that the wording
“it is reasonably possible may”
in both Clauses 3(2)(a) and (b) would be replaced with “is likely to”, which in this context we see as meaning a real possibility. In order to ensure consistency across the clause, Amendment 13 also updates the relevant wording in Clause 3(3).
The Government have tabled amendments in response to a point raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. These would add protections for lawyers, ensuring that any genuine legal activity will not be captured under the Clause 3 offence in the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the helpful explanation of the many government amendments in this group. I thank him and the Government also for the considerable movement they have made in response to criticisms made by me and many others at Second Reading and in Committee of the breadth of the offences under Part 1. We are very grateful to the Government for the comprehensive way in which they have listened to our criticisms and moved towards positions that we have taken.
In particular, the troublesome phrase “ought reasonably to know” has been clarified by the qualification that what a defendant ought reasonably to have known falls to be judged having regard to other facts known to that defendant. Furthermore, in Clause 3, as the Minister explained,
“conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”
becomes conduct that “is likely to” materially assist a foreign intelligence service.
I welcome the new strengthened review provisions introduced by the new clause proposed in Amendment 85, in place of the old Clause 56. These and other concessions in the amendments moved by the Government allay many of our concerns.
However, there is one area left untouched that we say is still completely wrong: the failure to tighten up the definition of the
“interests of the United Kingdom”.
That is the subject of our Amendments 2 and 3, and the corresponding amendments wherever the phrase
“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
appears. I note the word “or”: the interests of the United Kingdom alone are enough to qualify. It is principally in support of those amendments that I speak now.
We are concerned about the interests of journalists, and that is the title of this group. I do not accept what the Minister said when he suggested that it was permissible to rely on the fact that journalists have not in the past been prosecuted under security legislation. That may as a matter of fact be true, but it is neither safe nor good legislative practice to rely on it without tightening up the legislation so as to prevent such prosecutions succeeding.
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I thank the Minister for his explanation of the Government’s amendments. We recognise that they have come a long way since Committee. The amendments in this group seek to address the unintended consequences of offences for journalists and NGOs. Concerns have been raised throughout the Bill that the legitimate activities of journalists, such as the possession of leaked information, could lead to their prosecution. The main focus of today’s debate is Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Black. It aims to give a specific offence, whereas our Amendment 79B calls for an assessment of the impact of this group.
Given the significant concessions made by the Government, I will not divide the House on Amendment 79B and we will abstain on Amendments 18 and 72 if they are moved to a vote. However, I understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, when she said that she would listen to the Minister, deliberate and see what will be done. I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will press Amendment 18 to a vote even if the noble Lord, Lord Black, chooses not to. Either way, the Labour Party will abstain on those votes.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for their very warm words. The strength of opinion highlights how important journalistic freedom is, and the Government take it extremely seriously. Whistleblowing will be dealt with in the next group, so if the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, allows, I will not deal with it in my response.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Black for his amendment and for his general comments in support of this Bill. As I have said, we have listened to concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords. The Government’s amendments are a direct response to them. I will endeavour to provide the clarity that my noble friend Lady Stowell asked for.
On my noble friend Lord Black’s amendment, the Government cannot accept a defence linked to the definition of a recognised news publisher. Rather than taking activity out of scope, the defence would act as a way for foreign powers, particularly those seeking to cause the UK harm, to avoid prosecution under this clause and engage in harmful espionage activity. If a journalist is deliberately colluding with a foreign intelligence service in relation to their UK-related activities, such as by revealing intelligence capabilities that could be exploited by that intelligence service, it is absolutely right that they should face criminal sanction.
I acknowledge that the amendment seeks to provide a targeted protection for journalists by referencing “a recognised news publisher”. The Government have serious concerns that any individuals working under the cover of journalism in foreign media organisations operating in the UK would be able to abuse this provision. Even if hostile state actors did not currently use journalistic cover to engage in espionage, having a defence such as this would almost certainly encourage them to do so. This defence would apply even if the conduct in question was probably against the public interest. This is simply not acceptable; it would give foreign states a back door to commit espionage. Accordingly, the Government cannot accept this amendment and I ask my noble friend not to move it.
However, I want to reassure the media sector that publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which might incidentally be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would not fall within the scope of this offence; nor would the handling of materials in the course of genuine journalistic activities, nor likely the other offences in this Bill. For an offence to be committed under Clause 3, an individual would need to engage in conduct intending
“to materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,
or know, or should have known given the information they had at the time, that it was likely that such conduct would do so.
The Government may profoundly disagree with the conclusions of some journalists, but we will not hide behind the criminal law to suppress genuine competing views and it is almost inconceivable that genuine journalism will be caught within the threshold for criminal activity. My noble friend raised some specific examples and there are many—for example, those relating Snatch Land Rovers a few years ago—but the Government do not consider that the publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which incidentally might be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would fall within the scope of this offence. I think it is worth repeating that.
Many of the examples that have been provided in various articles are stories which relate to terrorism. No journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under terrorism legislation. Even where examples are relevant to state threats activity, no journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. This Bill will be no different and the Government do not accept the view that it criminalises the activity described in the media.
The test of material assistance is key. To be “material”, the assistance to the foreign intelligence service must be important, considerable or in a significant way. As with all criminal offences, it is the specific circumstances of the case that will be important and will be a matter for the prosecuting authorities, but we would expect prosecutions to involve those with known links to foreign intelligence services, including evidence of a relationship, tasking or payment. Absent these links, the Government struggle to envisage even the most provocative piece of journalism meeting the threshold for the offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, noted the Statement made last week on Iran International, and many noble Lords will have read it; it highlighted the potentially lethal operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps taking place in the UK. Far from criminalising the important work of journalists, this offence is intended to protect Iran International, and others who live and work here, from such direct attacks on our people and values.
I turn to amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with regards to security or defence interests under Clauses 1, 3, 4, 8, 12 and 14. These amendments seek to narrow the definition of “interests of the UK” to ensure a focus on the protection of national security and defence interests, alongside economic security interests. Similar amendments were tabled in Committee, so I will reiterate the concerns the Government continue to have with these changes, as they remain relevant. Narrowing the interest element to cover only security or defence interests significantly moves away from the “safety or interests of the UK” test that already exists and is understood within current espionage legislation. I am afraid these amendments move away from the status quo by creating a test with an unduly narrow focus on national security. While the noble Lord importantly made specific reference to interests pertaining to the UK in its economic security, these amendments continue to not include other critical UK interests relating to public health or, for example, the preservation of our democracy.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the case of Chandler v DPP, as did his colleague the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. “Safety or interests of the UK” has been considered by the courts to mean the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown, on the advice of Ministers. We expect this interpretation to carry forward to the new legislation and there are safeguards in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that somebody is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact.
Each offence under this legislation includes a test that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit a Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is protected for a purpose
“that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
and the activity must be conducted for, on behalf of or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This limits the type of conduct capable of being caught under this offence, and in particular the foreign power condition ensures that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.
I now turn to Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The most concerning consequence of this amendment is that where a state threats actor, acting under a proxy, has been engaged in harmful activity, which was an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if it could be shown that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. The House will note the references to “state threats”, “foreign powers” and “national security”. Much as the amorous adventures of Matt Hancock may be of interest, clearly none of those falls in the scope of this offence.
It is no secret that those with hostile intent try to hide their activities through genuine means, and through this amendment there is a real risk that they could operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted. It is therefore clear to see that narrowing the scope of the foreign power condition will have a damaging impact across the Bill. The Government considers this amendment would create unnecessary loopholes for state actors to exploit.
I would like to remind the House that the Government amended Clause 31(2)(c) in the other place to put it beyond doubt that there needs to be a clear link between the conduct and any assistance or funding from a foreign power for the condition to be met. It is the Government’s view that this puts the focus on the foreign power, ensuring that financial or other assistance from the foreign power is caught only when it is provided to enable the person to carry out the conduct, not when it is just any financial or other assistance.
I would also like to make it clear that Clause 31(2)(d), which concerns activity carried out in collaboration with, or with the agreement of, a foreign power, requires the foreign power to be actively involved in that collaboration or agreement; it does not cover cases where a person’s activities align with state objectives. The Government therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press her amendment.
To conclude, as all speakers have noted, the Government have moved a very long way in ensuring that journalistic freedoms are not being unduly encroached in this Bill, so I hope noble Lords will accept our amendments and withdraw or not press theirs.
Before my noble friend sits down, I will offer one point of clarification. I will of course respond to the chair when called to do so after the next group, but I want to say that I am very grateful for the assurances he has given about the scope and intent of the Bill with regard to responsible reporting. My noble friend has made clear that Parliament’s intent in passing the Bill is not to interfere with the free press or investigative journalism and, on that basis, I will be withdrawing my amendment.
My Lords, this group of amendments covers the introduction of a public interest defence—a PID. This topic has been debated at length throughout the passage of the Bill. As the House will hear, the Government agree with the criticisms of Amendment 79, just elucidated so clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby.
I thank all noble Lords for their remarks during this debate, especially the degree of involvement we have had in the development of the Bill generally, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on the last group. However, it is right to say that the amendment does not address the issues that arise, and the Government therefore cannot accept it. As I set out during the debate in Committee, the offences in the Bill target harmful activity from foreign states, not whistleblowing or public interest journalism. Our view, therefore, is that a public interest defence is not only unnecessary but risks significantly undermining the utility of the provisions in the Bill.
The Government’s principal position is that a public interest defence in relation to espionage is not appropriate. While we note the changes made to the amendment, this does not change the Government’s view on the matter. Notably, the risk with a public interest defence is that, at the point that the defence comes into play, the harm will already have been done. Seeking to rebut any form of public interest defence in criminal proceedings risks only compounding the damage. This, of course, is a point already eloquently made by the noble Lord, Lord Evans.
Furthermore, the proposed public interest defence for onward disclosures of information obtained via the espionage offences in the Bill, as has been proposed here, is inherently damaging to the national interest. I also entirely agree in this regard with the noble Lord, Lord Evans. To permit onward disclosures of this information under any circumstances would significantly undermine the weight we are affording to these offences.
The questions posed about the Law Commission’s recommendations relate to the Official Secrets Act 1989 which is not, as we discussed in Committee, the topic of reform in this legislation. We have heard strong views and concerns raised about the 1989 Act in our public consultation, and we need to take time to give proper consideration to those concerns. Therefore, we are not reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989 in this Bill.
It is clear to us that reform is complex and engages a wide range of interests. It is only right that proper due consideration should be given to the concerns that stakeholders have raised in the consultation. Furthermore, we need to prioritise delivery of our wider package of measures to tackle state threats and ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence partners have the tools that they need to keep us safe from those seeking to do us harm. We do not want the complexity of Official Secrets Act 1989 reform to distract from this. To that end, I agree with what the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Evans, said.
I turn to the points raised in the previous group by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in relation to whistleblowers. We say that there are sufficient safeguards for whistle- blowers in the espionage offences. For the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information, that activity has to be for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. If an individual uses appropriate whistleblowing routes, their conduct would not meet this requirement—a point powerfully made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, when these amendments were being considered in Committee.
For the offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets, the activity has to be unauthorised. Using appropriate whistleblowing routes would not meet the requirement for unauthorised activity. Moreover, there is a damage element to the offence in Clause 2(2)(b). For the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service, the person has to know or reasonably ought to know that their conduct may assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK activities or intend their conduct to do so. This is very different from reporting something to an appropriate regulatory body as a whistleblower.
It is not the case that there is a reliance upon juries in the place of a whistleblowing defence, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, appeared to contend. The role of a jury, when advised by the judge, is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty based on the evidence presented during the trial. This takes up many of the points raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier in his speech a moment ago. This is an integral tenet of our justice system and applies in 1989 Act cases. This does not mean that the Official Secrets Act 1989 legislation is deficient. There is, of course, no statutory public interest defence in the 1989 Act, and therefore it is already clear in the law that juries should not acquit a defendant on the basis that they consider that the public interest in making a disclosure outweighs the damage caused by the disclosure. The Government are clear that we do not consider the introduction of a public interest defence in the Official Secrets Act 1989 to be appropriate. It is not the safest or most appropriate way for an individual to raise a concern of wrongdoing and have it rectified. It is already possible to make disclosures of information that are not damaging without breaching the 1989 Act.
However, the Government have heard and understand the concerns that the Bill could inadvertently capture genuine journalistic activity, as we discussed in the previous group. Even if the Government were to accept that these offences risk criminalising such genuine activity, a public interest defence would not be an appropriate way to address this. This sentiment was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, during the debate on the public interest defence in Committee, for which I am grateful. Indeed, a public interest defence would create loopholes that hostile actors would use to commit espionage against the United Kingdom.
As the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was quite correct in saying, the difficulty for whistleblowers is that they have an imperfect picture of the available information. It is not for the whistleblower to determine the extent of potential damage caused by the disclosure in the public interest.
The question of damage was raised in the debate. It was suggested that a damage requirement should be added to these offences. The Government’s position is that this would significantly undermine their utility. The type of activity described in the offences is inherently damaging. For example, in Clause 1, if an individual discloses protected information to a foreign power or otherwise on their behalf or for their benefit with a purpose
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”,
this is inherently damaging. Including a damage requirement would mean that we may need to prove the damage caused by disclosure in court. This, of course, would risk compounding that damage further. If we could not prove that damage in court, for example, because the risk of compounding the damage was too great, a person could freely provide protected information to a foreign power with the intention to prejudice the United Kingdom.
I already noted the potential risks and loopholes that could be created and exploited. This is not a defence in relation to Clause 3(2). The Government have extensively considered the arguments for and against a public interest defence but have concluded that the risk this could cause to the United Kingdom and the fact that this would undermine the purposes of the Bill mean that such a defence is not appropriate. Therefore, there is no need for an assessment and formal consultation on the inclusion of such a defence as tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, at Amendment 18A and the Government do not accept that amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, there have been significant changes to the oversight provisions in the Bill. It is correct that this amendment should be viewed in light of those changes in position by the Government.
Instead, we say that the focus should be on ensuring that the drafting of the requirements and offences in the Bill is sufficiently tightly drawn to ensure that genuine activity, including by journalists, is not in scope. This is why the Government have responded by tabling amendments to the provisions in Part 1, as stated a moment ago by my noble friend Lord Sharpe. This includes clarifying the phrase “ought reasonably to know” and the amendments to Clause 3. For these reasons, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.
I move now to Amendment 79A, which proposes the establishment of a new office for the national security whistleblower. I am grateful for the indication from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he will not be pushing the matter to a vote but let me outline the government position in relation to that. This proposal differs from that debated in Committee in this House. The Government’s view remains that such a role is not required in relation to these offences. As I set out in Committee,
“The Government are committed to ensuring that our whistle- blowing framework is robust, and I confirm that the business department intends to carry out the promised review of the existing framework, and that further details will be set out in due course in relation to that.”—[Official Report, 18/1/23; col. 1913.]
We have just debated how the Bill targets hostile activities for and on behalf of foreign powers. I have been explicit that this legislation is not targeting the genuine work of journalists. By extension, it is therefore clear that the Bill does not target genuine whistleblowing. Consequently, a whistleblowing office in relation to this Bill misunderstands the aims of the legislation. Again, I refer the House to the Committee stage, when I and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, set out the options available where an individual has a genuine need to raise a concern and I shall not repeat those here. The Government are committed to ensuring that these channels are safe, effective and accessible. For these reasons, we cannot accept the tabled amendments. I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions.
My Lords, my name is also on these amendments, and I have also spoken with the High Commission; my noble friend Lord Purvis has spoken to both the Minister on the Front Bench and to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in the Foreign Office. If I have an interest to declare, it is that 25 years ago I worked on the Cyprus conflict and discovered a fair amount about the complexities of Cypriot politics—and they are no less complex today than they were then.
I will make a number of domestic comparisons. This is in my experience very much a Home Office Bill; it does not appear to take into account diplomatic niceties or the sensitivities of other states. We have some bitter experience in this country of sensitivities about sovereignty and the attempts by other states to exert legislative authority over this country, in relation to the EU. We are still being told that the European Court of Justice has imperial ambitions, and that we had to regain our sovereignty because it was trying to legislate for us, about our country.
Beyond that, of course, we have US bases in this country. I am very familiar with RAF Menwith Hill, which is close to where I live in Yorkshire, and I know a fair amount about RAF Mildenhall. The Minister will remember that when it appeared that the wife of a US serviceman at RAF Mildenhall was trying to evade British law by claiming diplomatic immunity and then going to the United States, there was a campaign of outrage in the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and others over this incursion into British sovereignty.
I remind the Minister that the agreements between the UK and the United States over US bases in this country are extremely discreet: the details have not been published; they are renewed every 10 years without parliamentary debate; and the two countries negotiate quietly about the conditions under which they operate. They do not involve Congress legislating with reference to these extraterritorial bases in the United Kingdom. Indeed, if Congress were to legislate with reference to RAF Mildenhall, RAF Menwith Hill and other bases, I am sure that the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and others would be outraged on our behalf at this apparent imperial incursion into British sovereignty.
I am conscious that Cypriot domestic opinion has as many elements, from the right to the left, as we have in this country. Of course, it would be a populist, nationalistic, mischievous campaign to provoke a public outrage in Cyprus about this apparent incursion into Cypriot sovereignty, but we in Britain now have some hard-won and bitter experience of how easy it is for populist and mischievous politicians to cause nationalistic outrage.
These references are not necessary. Clause 97 is enough. I hope that the Minister will take advice and consider that the Government should withdraw the references to the sovereign base areas in these other clauses. I repeat: Clause 97 is enough. The good will of the Government of Cyprus, and of the public in Cyprus, is important to this country, and we should not offend them.
My Lords, this group covers a variety of related topics. The House has heard only about the amendments pertaining to the sovereign base areas, but I will address the other amendments advanced by the Government. The group covers amendments to the meaning of “government department” and changes to Schedule 2 to the Bill, and it deals with the amendments on the sovereign base areas, which I will come to in a second.
I start with a query raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in Committee. The question at the time was whether the reference to “government department” in the meaning of “Crown interest” in Clause 7 may include the departments of the devolved Administrations. It is the Government’s intention that any reference to “government department” within Part 1 of the Bill, including those falling under “Crown interest”, applies only to government departments of the United Kingdom. This means that we are not seeking to extend the meaning of “government department” to the devolved Administrations. I hope that this goes some way to settling the noble Lord’s concerns.
The Government have also made a number of changes to Schedule 2 to the Bill. In Committee, they made an amendment so that the Bill makes explicit provision that a Schedule 2 production order can be made to a judge without the subject being given notice of the application in advance. Currently, sub-paragraph (d) of condition 5 of the search and seizure powers at paragraphs 9 and 25 of Schedule 2 outlines that this condition may be met if the service of notice of an application for a production order may seriously prejudice an investigation. Without further change, this condition is no longer operationally effective because a warrant for search and seizure would not be granted in instances where the use of a production order more generally, which had been given without notice to a judge, would prejudice an investigation.
This group of amendments therefore closes the gap by bringing condition 5 closer to the equivalent provisions of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which sets out that the use of a production order would not be appropriate because an investigation may be seriously prejudiced unless a constable can secure immediate access to the material. It is important to stress that it has always been the Government’s position that the use of production orders should be considered in the first instance, resorting to a warrant where such an order is not appropriate to the investigation.
Finally, government Amendment 60 simply makes it clear that Acts of Adjournal made in relation to the production order powers in part 2 of Schedule 2 would be made by the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland. This is already the case within the current drafting, and we seek only to make this clear. Government Amendments 55 and 59 simply add the offences under Schedules 3 and 4—which were added to the Bill in Committee in the Commons—to the list of offences for which the powers of entry, search and seizure in Schedule 2 are not available.
I now turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wallace of Saltaire. These amendments seek to remove references to the sovereign base areas from the prohibited places provisions in Clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill. The sovereign base areas are critical for UK defence and include a unique governance structure among the overseas territories given that the administrator, who is also the commander of British Forces Cyprus, has all the executive and legislative authority of the Government of the UK overseas territory.
Is the Minister classifying the sovereign base areas as having the same relationship with Britain as overseas territories? I was not aware that the SBAs were formally overseas territories.
Clearly, the SBAs are a special structure, as set out in the 1960 treaty. As I say, they have a unique governance structure which I have already described. The unique context of the SBAs is precisely why we are including the option to extend the legislation to the SBAs in their entirety.
The thought behind these amendments is that the power in Clause 97 to extend the legislation to the SBAs is sufficient on its own. I understand the thinking behind this. However, these references are quite distinct and achieve different aims. References to the SBAs in Clauses 7 and 8 ensure that harmful activity taking place in respect of prohibited places will be prosecutable under UK law, in UK courts, only where it constitutes an offence under Clause 4. It is important to stress that the offence under Clause 5 cannot be committed in the SBAs, as this clause does not apply outside the United Kingdom. Similarly, the police powers under Clause 6 are conferred only on constables under UK law, and as such cannot be used in the SBAs. This inclusion of the SBAs maintains the status quo, given provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911, which already cover prohibited places in the SBAs as part of His Majesty’s dominions.
Clause 97, however, creates a power to extend any provision in Part 1 of the National Security Bill, with or without modification, to the SBAs. Should the power be used, the provisions will then form part of SBA law, and this would allow harmful activity to be prosecuted in SBA courts. Removing references in Clauses 7 and 8 to the SBAs would mean that those sites were no longer protected under UK law. That would reduce the protections currently afforded to them under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which will of course be repealed through this Bill. Furthermore, it is critical that these protections are afforded under UK law given that there is no guarantee that an Order in Council would be made so as to extend this part of the Bill to SBA law, leaving those sites potentially without any legislative protection. To reiterate the point I made in Committee—
The point, as the noble Lord will appreciate, is that the Bill should endeavour not to leave any potential vacancies which would potentially deprive the SBAs of applicability to this very important statutory provision. I reiterate the point I made in Committee that the Government consider that any references in the Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty, concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.
To address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, I can confirm that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the SBAs were consulted extensively throughout the Bill’s development and agree on its conclusion. I therefore disagree with the noble Lord that relying solely on Clause 97 would cause no harm.
I hope this explains the need to maintain the references in Clauses 7 and 8 and why the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.
The Minister has given us an explanation and I accept that the reference to a constable is to a United Kingdom constable, but Clause 6 gives the constable the power to clear people out of prohibited places. Why is it necessary for United Kingdom law to apply? Why is it not enough that this power should exist under the Order in Council applicable to the SBA? Since only the United Kingdom constable is covered in Clause 6, how can it possibly be necessary to define “prohibited place” for the purposes of Clause 6 as including places outside the United Kingdom? I just do not understand it.
The Government take the view that it is necessary to have the matter protected in UK law in addition to SBA law, and that, I am afraid, is the answer.
The Minister was careful when he said that the SBAs and the FCDO were consulted by the Home Office on bringing forward this decision. I would assume that one department would consult another in its own Government with regards to a Bill—I think we can take it as read that the Home Office should have consulted the FCDO. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made was that there was no consultation with the Government of Cyprus, which is embedded in the principles of the establishment treaty in 1960. That is why there is a problem with it.
With regards to the further point from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, if it is only a UK constable, and only within UK domestic law, who enforces it within the SBA area? Who enforces it within the adjacent area to the SBAs, given that the measures are much wider than simply activities here in the UK? Who enforces it there?
As I hope I have already made clear, it is only Clause 4 that applies. Clause 6 does not apply in this context.
My Lords, I am afraid I am very puzzled as a result of the Minister’s reply.
First, I think he was suggesting that the Government of Cyprus had been fully consulted. If he was suggesting that, all I can say is that that is the opposite of what I was told, and what the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Wallace and Lord Anderson, and everybody else who has been spoken to has been told. Secondly, why did the Government change Clause 97? Clause 97 provides for the powers earlier in the Bill to be operated within the SBA following an Order in Council. Are the Government saying that the justice provisions in the SBA are inadequate in some way? I can tell your Lordships that those of us who live around the legal profession know an awful lot of people who go and do cases and even sit as judges in those places, and that is not what they have found on the whole.
I would suggest that the Minister’s reply was insensitive—if I can be forgiven for using that word—and injudicious, and I invite the Government to consider it between now and the coming into law of this Bill. I am not going to press this to a Division tonight; I am not going to ask for the opinion of the House. But I feel a strong sense of dissatisfaction at the explanation, such as it is, that has been given. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 40, 41 and 50 relate to the offence of foreign interference.
Amendment 40 makes a procedural and technical tweak to address changes to the timetables of this Bill and the Online Safety Bill. The addition of foreign interference to the list of priority offences in Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill is government policy, which has been agreed at every stage of this Bill since its introduction. Designating foreign interference as a priority offence under the Online Safety Bill would disrupt state-backed disinformation targeted at the UK through the duties imposed on platforms by the relevant provisions in the Online Safety Bill.
However, now that the National Security Bill has overtaken the Online Safety Bill in its parliamentary passage, we must address the procedural challenges posed by this change to respective timetables. Government Amendment 40 will remove the reference to the Online Safety Bill from Clause 13(8) of the National Security Bill. The Government will then seek to add the offence of foreign interference to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill via an amendment to that Bill. The effect of this amendment will be exactly the same as the current approach; it is simply the change in timetabling that means this amendment is necessary.
Government Amendment 41 clarifies the scope of the foreign interference effect contained within Clause 14(1)(a) to ensure it is not misinterpreted. Foreign interference includes interference with rights and freedoms that are protected under domestic law, such as freedom of speech. We know that foreign states have sought to intimidate or threaten diaspora communities with punishment to prevent them engaging in lawful protest activities. We want such activity taking place in the UK to be covered by the offence of foreign interference. Government Amendment 41 simply changes the wording in the offence to “in the United Kingdom” as opposed to
“as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom”.
This will ensure that it is not misinterpreted to have a broader effect than we intend. It does not change our policy or affect the operational utility of the offence.
Amendment 50 is minor and does not introduce new policy. It simply reinforces the Government’s intention behind what is originally meant by “political decisions”.
Some concerns have been raised that references to proceedings in Parliament in both the offence of foreign interference and the foreign influence registration scheme risk creating unhelpful ambiguity about the prohibition on impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Government’s position is that such references did not and could not displace provisions in the Bill of Rights and were not intended to do so. However, we have amended the provisions to ensure there can be no suggestion of interference with privilege.
To address these concerns, government Amendment 48 removes references to proceedings of the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures from the definition of “political processes”. A key element of foreign interference is the infiltration of our democracy, including the institutions and processes which uphold our democracy. The other amendments we have tabled therefore seek to ensure that the offence still protects against such interference.
Amendment 49 adds to the definition of “political processes” a reference to
“the activities of an informal group consisting of or including members of”
the relevant legislatures of the United Kingdom. The policy intention remains the same—to capture foreign interference in Parliament targeted at the heart of our democracy—but we are achieving it in a slightly different way. I will briefly explain how we will do this.
The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials within Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions.
However, with this amendment we ensure that we also capture activity that is part of our democratic processes but which does not have official status within Parliament. We have therefore added reference to informal groups, which will include APPGs, to the definition of “political processes”. Foreign powers seeking to interfere in political processes through those who do not have public functions—for example, an external secretariat—will continue to be caught by the offence.
I turn briefly to government Amendments 42 and 44, which give effect to the new approach I have outlined, with Amendment 44 relating to the “legal processes” limb. They give effect to the new approach such that those interference effects apply otherwise than in the exercise of public functions. Government Amendments 43 and 47 are consequential amendments following from the change in definitions.
Taken as a whole, the amendments do not introduce new policy but simply reinforce the existing policy on the interference from foreign states that this offence is designed to protect against. I therefore ask noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments and beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 51, which stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Evans of Weardale.
This is about transparency. When the electors go to an election, obviously they consider the policies that are placed before them. They also consider the personalities that are placed before them, because they are voting for an individual to carry out the important and valuable role of their Member of Parliament. They also should be entitled to enough transparency to judge the ethical matrix in which each political party operates, as represented by the individuals who stand as candidates. This moderate and temperate Amendment 51 is an attempt to improve the knowledge that voters have about the ethical matrix of the political parties that stand behind the candidates they are able to vote for and have to choose from.
We know that there are problems about the ethical matrix of political parties. Sometimes it is not their fault, because outside forces, hostile actors from foreign countries, make interventions into elections—for example, via the internet—in an attempt to slant the vote in one direction or another. However, there is also a serious risk—I accuse no party of impropriety in this respect, at least for the purposes of this contribution to your Lordships’ debate—that foreign actors, foreign powers, may seek to influence an election, for example by making substantial donations to that party’s election fighting fund which enable it to fight the election at an advantage compared with other parties.
I will not go back to my days as a very happy Liberal and then Liberal Democrat MP and talk about the disadvantage we always started from because we had less money than the other parties. However, we were always worried, in those days at least—I am sure it is still the same today—by contributions that might have come from foreign powers and that would give an even greater advantage, concealed from the electorate, to those political parties.
So what this amendment seeks to do is protect us from the likes of Putin’s cronies, who might, one way or another, find their way to dinners, contribution events and even meeting people in this great building. We seek to establish a register. In effect, each political party would have to create a policy statement which meant that they were obliged to disclose at least the outline of contributions made by a foreign power—we are not talking about rich foreigners or wealthy businesspeople but about a foreign power which has a political reason for trying to influence the result of an election, either made directly or through an intermediary.
My Lords, I rise briefly to say that we very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; were he to push it to a vote, we would certainly support him in that Division.
I do not want to repeat much of what has been said by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Wallace, Lord Evans and Lord West. However, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was right to say that, although this is a modest amendment, its consequences are quite serious. There is no doubt that people are concerned about some of the issues that they have read about in the papers around foreign interference in elections and the funding of political parties. One of the things that we often debate in this House is confidence in our democracy and democratic system, including the threats to them and the erosion of that confidence. Sometimes, these may be small steps but they are important ones that can contribute in our trying to do all we can to protect our democracy. People are worried about foreign interference in elections and the integrity of our democratic system.
It is right to point out, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, did, that, through this Bill, we are requiring significant steps to be taken by businesses, organisations, industry, financial services and all sorts of other bodies to ensure that they conform to certain regulations that protect our national security. It would be right for them to ask, “Why is there one rule for us but another for political parties?” It is quite right that this amendment is supported; I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will seek to test the opinion of the House and that his amendment is supported by the majority of Members, because it is an important step in protecting the integrity of our democracy in the way that noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lady Hayter on the Labour Benches, pointed out.
Having said that, I want to ask one practical question with respect to many of the amendments that the Government have brought forward, which, by and large, we support. I want to deal with Amendment 49, the explanatory statement for which says:
“This amendment adds to the definition of ‘political processes’ the activities of groups such as all party parliamentary groups.”
I understand the bit about all-party groups but the implication there is in “such as”. Are the Government saying that the amendment is relevant to other groups? If so, can the Minister explain that to us?
With that, as I say, I very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, because it is very important.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group.
I will start, if I may, by addressing the question from the noble Lord, Lord West, by repeating something that I said in my opening speech; I think it goes some way to answering him. The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials in Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions. I hope that answers his question.
In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about Amendment 49, let me say that he is completely right. The reference to
“the activities of an informal group”
in this amendment is, as I think noble Lords know, designed to capture interference activities in APPGs by foreign powers. We are seeking to capture interference whether or however any person participates in the activities of these informal groups. We expect that to cover MPs and people external to Parliament and government who participate in the actions of such groups, but we also envisage informal groups to include things such as “friends of” groups. The use of the term “acting in that capacity” ensures that we do not capture things such as parliamentary book clubs but instead focus on those caught, such as the 1922 Committee, although they could also be covered by the public functions limb of the test. I hope that clears this up.
I know that Amendment 51 is a duplicate of a previous amendment, now tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The Government do not believe that this amendment is necessary, I am afraid. I was going to quote myself and say again that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls, but I am slightly more reluctant to do so after hearing the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. However, we believe that our regime ensures that only those with a genuine interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent.
I will go into more detail on this point, if I may, because I believe that the noble Lord’s ethical matrix is already in existence. It is already an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already report all donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; these are then published online for public scrutiny. Political parties are by law required to undertake reasonable steps to verify whether a donor is permissible and obtain their relevant details for the reporting requirements. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be reported and returned to the Electoral Commission, which also produces guidance outlining how the recipient of a donation can undertake these checks.
As I say, UK electoral law already sets out a regime of donation and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, so only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations; they include UK-registered electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities, as well as otherwise eligible donors such as Irish citizens who meet prescribed conditions and can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations that are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. The failure to return such a donation either to the donor or, as I just described, to the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence; any such donations must also be reported to the Electoral Commission. The Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.
The transparency of electoral funding is obviously a key cornerstone of the UK’s electoral system. All political parties recognise that third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report it to the Electoral Commission or their local returning officer; that information is publicly available. For transparency, all donations to political parties and campaigners must be recorded and certain donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission; as I said, these include donations from impermissible donors and donations from the same permissible source that amount to over £7,500 in one calendar year. To ensure transparency, donation reports are published online by the commission for public scrutiny.
To register as an overseas elector, a British citizen has to present ID. However, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that, if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election, you are also eligible to donate to that party. We believe that overseas electors are important participants in our democracy, but it is only right that they should be able to spend in UK elections in the same way as other UK citizens registered on the electoral roll.
I think that this is a reasonably comprehensive set of rules. There may be some debate as to whether it qualifies as a stringent regime but the fact is that donations to political parties from foreign powers, whether they are made directly or through an intermediary, are illegal. Political parties already have a legal duty to check that all donations they are offered are permissible.
In closing, I very much thank noble Lords for engaging so constructively in this debate. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, not to press his amendment in this group and ask noble Lords to support the Government’s amendments.
Before the Minister sits down, I just want to check one thing with him. He said that overseas electors will have to present ID. I was involved in the passage of the now Elections Act, which does indeed provide stronger, more limited ways in which correct ID has to be presented by people voting in person in British elections. However, I do not recall extra requirements around the presentation of ID for people who are resident overseas and wish to vote.
I think that I made it reasonably clear that to register as an elector overseas, you must present ID.
I could not agree more with the noble Lord, and that is why it is so incredible that no Prime Minister has discussed that with the committee since 2014. I say this in relation to my noble friend Lord West’s points about the failure of discussion and people’s failure to involve the committee at an early stage. Had that been done, we would have avoided much of the debate and controversy over Clause 30 or, now, government Amendment 66. My noble friend Lord West mentioned this on behalf of the committee, and I mentioned and highlighted yet again the failure of the Prime Minister to meet it since 2014, which is simply and utterly unacceptable. Something needs to be done about it, and the Prime Minister needs to hear this—I know that the Minister will take this forward.
This is a really serious matter. I could not believe it when I read it, and I do not believe that many noble Lords here would either, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us. According to the report, this was a regular occurrence:
“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work”.
But, despite repeated requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response. This is unacceptable, and it is why we get the sort of situation that we had with Clause 30.
Notwithstanding that, I thank the noble Lord the Minister and the Armed Forces Minister for their engagement in bringing forward Amendment 66, which is a considerable improvement on what went before. I note the change from automatic exemption to the reasonableness defence. No doubt the Minister can address the issues and questions that my noble friend Lord West raised on proportionality and other areas. It is important that the point of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is also addressed. With that, we welcome Amendment 66, but we also look forward to the reassurances that my noble friend Lord West seeks on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate on Clause 30, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. Before getting into the detail, I very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord West, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for their amendments tabled in advance of today’s proceedings. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who have consistently shared their time and expertise with me and my team, across a range of national security matters.
I also extend my gratitude to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which recently took the time to write to the Home Office on this measure and cast a keen and critical eye, with officials, over the Government’s amendment tabled for today. I carefully noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, as did my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who sat on the steps when he made them. I will obviously make sure that we reflect on that internally. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that my noble friend the Leader of the House heard his comments, and I am sure he will reflect them back to the Prime Minister, but I am not responsible for the Prime Minister’s diary, so I cannot go further than that at this point. However, we will return to this subject in group 12, when the ISC MoU will be debated.
The Government’s shift in approach on the SCA amendment reflects our maintained commitment to ensuring that individuals working for UKIC and the Armed Forces are protected when conducting their proper activities in service to this country. The Government’s amendment replaces Clause 30 with a new clause that provides a defence for acts that are offences under Part 2 of the SCA by virtue of the extraterritorial provisions in Schedule 4. This defence would apply to those carrying out the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces in supporting activities overseas; that is, it will be a defence for a person to show that their act was necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or the Armed Forces. I will shortly go into more detail on the Armed Forces, at the behest of my noble friend from the Ministry of Defence, so please bear with me.
As noble Lords will be aware, the current reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA would cover encouraging or assisting crimes domestically. We believe that it is right that this new defence is limited to where UKIC and the Armed Forces are supporting activity overseas. The territorial applicability of this measure is identical to that of the original clause. This is because the acute issue caused by the SCA offences, and therefore justification for this amendment as presented to the ISC, relates to support to key international partners’ activity overseas.
The defence provides UKIC and the Armed Forces with more reassurance than the current reasonableness defence, in that the defence is based around the proper exercise of the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces, rather than the more subjective requirement of proving “reasonableness”. We must remember that the tasks we ask these individuals to undertake, and the operational arrangements we have with our international partners, are ever more complex.
We still do not think it is appropriate that a potentially junior member of the agency or Armed Forces should be faced with the legal burden of proving that their activities were reasonable. Instead, the new defence imposes an evidential burden of proof on the individual to raise the defence. Once the defence has been raised, the legal burden would be on the prosecution to disprove it. It must be remembered that this amendment does not change the position for an individual who acts outside of those proper functions; they would remain liable for any wrongful acts. I believe that this strikes the right balance of providing appropriate protection while also having a clear route by which there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.
Noble Lords will now see an explicit responsibility on the heads of agencies and the Defence Council to ensure that their respective organisations have in place arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of their service that would otherwise be an offence under the SCA by virtue of Schedule 4 are necessary for the proper exercise of their functions. To be clear, that means that an act could not be considered within the “proper” exercise of a function of an intelligence service if it does not comply with the “arrangements” set by the relevant heads or the Defence Council.
In addition, the Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
On that point, there is a world of difference between the necessary task of a Minister satisfying himself that adequate arrangements exist within an agency—indeed, such arrangements have existed for years—and the Secretary of State being made aware of a potential action and required to approve of it, or prevent it from happening, once he has considered the major political implications it might have. If the system does not extend to that role in relation to individual actions, it will be severely deficient.
I will turn to ministerial responsibility if the noble Lord will bear with me. In fact, I am going to do it now. The Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. I have already said this, but there is more to say on the subject. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections and regular scrutiny by the ISC. I will return to this in a second.
I now turn directly to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, which, in short, seek to do two related things: to restrict the activities covered by the defence for the MoD to those which are related to intelligence activities, and—in the case of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beith—to restrict the defence to apply to the MoD only where it acts for UKIC.
I will now speak on behalf of the MoD and my noble friend Lady Goldie, who has sat through this debate. With reference to the Armed Forces, the amendment will enable more effective co-operation with our international partners. It will address operational challenges and remove the personal risk that trusted and dedicated individuals face for carrying out their proper official duties, whether as serving members of our Armed Forces or as intelligence officers within our UK intelligence community.
The amendment is principally concerned with addressing risks arising within an intelligence-sharing context, a primary activity of UKIC. What is perhaps less understood is the criticality of intelligence activity from an Armed Forces perspective, with intelligence sharing often forming a necessary part of wider co-operation with our allies. I assure noble Lords that the amendment is about clarifying the law and removing liabilities which sit onerously with individuals going about their lawful and legitimate duties.
The UK is committed to the rule of law and we would never collaborate or share information with a foreign partner with the intention of supporting unlawful activity overseas, but the SCA amendment does not change that. All aspects of the activities of our Armed Forces will continue to be bound by the relevant law of England and Wales and of international law. There will be no change to the UK’s international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
This defence will apply only where activity is necessary for the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces, and any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the Armed Forces will remain liable for those actions. Actions not in compliance with the MoD’s robust internal policies and processes, again such as the Fulford principles and the OSJA Guidance, which are designed to ensure that MoD officers do not knowingly support unlawful activity, would not be in the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. My noble friend Lady Goldie thanks him for the opportunity to discuss this with him. I understand that, because of a technical omission, he may not move his amendment tonight, but my noble friend Lady Goldie has—
As a point of correction, the omission has been remedied and the amendment is on the supplementary sheet.
My noble friend Lady Goldie has not been able to discuss that with our right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who is currently abroad, but she undertakes to do that and to engage with him on his return.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West. I am grateful for his contribution at Second Reading, where he confirmed that the ISC recognised that the government amendment identified a legitimate problem. This proposed amendment seeks to insert proportionality into the defence we are proposing in Clause 30. The objective of proposed new Section 50A is to provide clarity on how an individual working for UKIC or the Armed Forces can defend against a case in which they face personal criminal liability for the SCA offences.
For the reasons outlined previously, the Government consider that the existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA does not achieve this, given we would be asking a jury to consider what is reasonable in the complex operational circumstances in which our intelligence agencies and Armed Forces work with our international partners to protect the United Kingdom. The Government consider that inserting a proportionality requirement would have the same effect, in that it reduces the clarity of the defence, which not only does not achieve the objective of providing greater certainty to those who are carrying out vital work to protect us all but complicates a defence which is currently based on the functions of the organisations concerned. On that basis, we think that explicit reference is best left out of the defence, and we therefore cannot accept this amendment.
However, to be clear, considerations of proportionality are a crucial component of operational planning and delivery, and core to many of the legal frameworks with which UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to comply. Any joint working with a partner must be in accordance with domestic and international law, including relevant principles of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. Where the intelligence services or Armed Forces do not apply proportionality consistently with their legal or policy obligations, that would not be a proper exercise of their functions. To be completely clear, a person’s lack of compliance with their legal and policy obligations could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence —that includes proportionality.
Arrangements in place ensure that UKIC and the Armed Forces apply rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes for determining that activity is lawful and properly exercised. The arrangements include the following: operational decisions are recorded, taken at appropriate seniority and made with the benefit of advice from specialist legal advisers to ensure compliance with domestic and international law; all personnel receive mandatory training on their legal obligations; policy documents set out specific requirements for different activities, including what authorisations are required and how to decide whether activity is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. Compliance with these requirements ensure that acts are within the proper exercise of the functions of the organisation concerned.
Some of these policies have been published, such as the Fulford principles, where the passing and receipt of intelligence relates to detainees, the compliance of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, as I have already noted. Arrangements can also go beyond pure legal considerations, with ethics counsellors in post to discuss the difficult decisions we sometimes take when balancing risk.
To go back to Secretaries of State, they are accountable for the work of the intelligence services and the Armed Forces in Parliament. A central part of their obligations will remain authorising the required operational activity at the appropriate time.
The Minister knows that, in Committee, I quoted quite a lot from the OSJA human rights guidance, which I have before me. It also addresses the fundamental point of my noble friend Lord Beith. Both the security service guidelines—which are not published, but about which we know because of judicial processes—which categorise the means by which authorisations have to be secured, and the OSJA Guidance outline the risk assessments that officers must go through. They conclude that, if there is high risk, ministerial approval is necessary. The Government’s amendments do not state categorically that authorisations and ministerial approvals will be necessary for breaches of the SCA offences. Can the Minister confirm that it will be the case that, if there are breaches of the SCA which are forecast through risk assessments and during the processes, ministerial authorisations will have to be provided?
My Lords, I cannot confirm that from the Dispatch Box, but I will write to the noble Lord with the appropriate clarification. I do not actually have a copy of the OSJA Guidance in front of me, but I appreciate the points he is making.
I return to the third concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. I can confirm that, where a member of the intelligence services or the Armed Forces conducted activity that did not comply with the arrangements—namely, the rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes that I described earlier—this breach of the arrangements could be scrutinised by the proper oversight mechanisms; for example, an error would be reported to IPCO for a breach of the Fulford principles. It could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence. I also assure the noble Lord that the introduction of this new defence, in and of itself, will not lead to fewer ministerial authorisations sought by the intelligence services or to less daily oversight from Ministers and/or judicial commissioners over intelligence activity. I know that he asked me for an explicit reassurance on that point.
I conclude by saying that, for the reasons I have outlined, the Government cannot support the amendments tabled by noble Lords against Clause 30, and therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments. I also ask the House to support the new SCA defence amendment tabled by the Government.
The Minister has been helpful, but I hope he can be more specific. When does he think the encouragement or assistance of an overseas crime, conduct which is penalised by the Serious Crime Act 2007, might be necessary for the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces, other than in the intelligence context? For my part, I am quite prepared to accept that it may be necessary in the intelligence context; what I have not heard from the Minister is any suggestion of any other context in which it might be necessary, yet he asks me to withdraw my amendment, which would limit the application of the defence to the intelligence context. It may be that his answer will be in what I think he said about the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, needing further time to consult ministerial colleagues, but if I am to withdraw my amendment, and those discussions have not yet taken place, what assurance can he give as to possibly bringing back the issue at Third Reading?
My Lords, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord in previous debates on this subject: the activity is restricted to intelligence activity, and as such I believe that the amendment is eminently sensible. However, we cannot accept this current amendment, but the Government will take a very careful look at this apparent gap and will consider the best way to close it.
My Lords, that was a very interesting final remark from the Minister. I hope it will prove to have some substance, otherwise we are left with legislation that I do not think can be interpreted in the way the Minister describes it. I am quite puzzled, but he has shown willing, so I hope he pursues it. I express my gratitude, particularly to the Minister for the Armed Forces for the care she has applied to this matter—we had a very detailed discussion with her and her officials—and to the Minister who is answering this debate, particularly for the amendment that gets rid of the awful Clause 30 and gives us something that is certainly a significant improvement in its place.
I still have perhaps three areas of particular anxiety in addition to the definitional point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised about “in support of intelligence”. One is the very fact that we are changing the law about what happens on a battlefield and what happens in a counterinsurgency, apart from the context of the discussion about the use of our Armed Forces in the non-intelligence world. This does not seem to be a good way to legislate. There would have been people involved in and engaged with the legislation if that is what it had been generally about, if it had been applying to the Armed Forces, but that is a rather unsatisfactory feature and not one that we can change at this stage.
I found what the noble Lord, Lord West, said about what happened between the ISC and the Home Office profoundly worrying. It really was disgraceful. I trust the accuracy of what he said and I am sure it can all be correctly documented, but that really is no way to deal with intelligence. Accountability for intelligence in the democratic context has always been quite difficult. The ISC has been developed over decades to provide a good mechanism to deal with that. When it is treated in that manner, it really is very serious and I hope the Minister has recognised that and is determined to go back to the office and really make a noise about this. It is just not acceptable and should not be acceptable to either House of Parliament.
My final worry, which I think can be resolved without statutory means but certainly remains, is the ambiguity about whether Secretaries of State will authorise significant measures that could fall within the scope of the new clause. In my view, it is an essential part of the system that agencies have the backing of a senior Minister when they engage in particularly difficult tasks, and that senior Ministers know what they are doing and are aware of what is being undertaken. If there is a political or legal risk, then Ministers should be aware of it. It is one thing to have a very good internal system—and I believe the agencies have good internal systems now—but quite another to be sure that, at the highest political level, there is both knowledge and authorisation. Frankly, if I were the head of an agency, which I have never been, my instinct would be to try to set up such a system, because otherwise the agency will always get the blame, even when the Secretary of State should have taken responsibility and might even have come to a different conclusion. I think that, over time, we need to make sure that Secretaries of State are sufficiently closely associated, otherwise they drift apart and agencies live in a world of their own. That is not how it should operate. But that, as I say, could be resolved without further legislation if there is determination to resolve it. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this has been a more wide-ranging debate than I was anticipating. The definition of a foreign power is an important issue. It was covered by the Minister in Committee, and I look forward to him expanding on what he said and particularly to address the points made by my noble friend Lady Hayter in her Amendment 74. I think I will leave it there because we have other business to deal with, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I will do my best to clarify all the points and answer all the questions that have been raised. First, I turn to government Amendment 76, which addresses concerns raised in Committee and in the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the drafting of the third limb of the foreign power threat activity provision. This provision is a key part of the Bill which ensures that police have the powers they need in supporting investigations into state threats offences. The concerns raised were that support or assistance unrelated to the harmful conduct covered by foreign power threat activity under Clause 33(3) risked being caught under Clause 33(1)(c). That is not the Government’s intention, and this amendment puts it beyond doubt that the support or assistance must be in relation to the conduct covered by Clause 33(1)(a) rather than unrelated activity. I hope that addresses the concerns helpfully put forward by noble Lords in Committee and that this amendment is welcomed.
This group also includes Amendment 74 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and it relates to the meaning of a “foreign power”. The amendment seeks to remove
“a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government”
from the definition. I would very much like to thank the noble Baroness for the constructive engagement we have had on this issue. I know her principal concern is with the effect of this clause on the foreign influence registration scheme, which of course we will be debating next week.
The foreign power condition applies right across the Bill and is crucial in order that the new offences in it, such as espionage, theft of trade secrets and sabotage, work effectively. Removing it here would remove it from those other offences too. The Government’s position, as the noble Baroness is aware, is that the inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party, or parties, within a country, to such extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government.
My Lords, may I ask a question of clarification? I understand much more clearly what the noble Lord is saying: governing political parties are in effect acting as intermediaries for the state. However, certainly in the international relations which I have been engaged in over the last 40 years, many think tanks in other states also operate as intermediaries in that respect. In particular the Washington think tanks, which are very close to the Government, act as intermediaries, but foreign-funded ones in other democratic and non-democratic capitals often also do so. Should that not be included in the Bill for the same rationale that he has just given us on dominant political parties?
My Lords, ruling parties are the foreign power. As I have tried to be clear and have stressed twice now, registration will be required only where an individual or entity is directed by a foreign power—that is the condition. Therefore, if a think tank was being directed by a foreign power, the answer would be yes. If it was not, the answer would be no.
My Lords, does the Minister accept that an intermediary could be a conference-arranging organisation? If he is coming to that, I would be grateful.
I noted the noble Baroness’s questions about intermediaries, and I promise that I will address that.
I know that we have had some debate about what it means to be directed by a foreign power. I want to reassure all noble Lords that this is a high bar. The natural meaning of “direction” is an order or instruction to act. It is possible that such direction could be delivered in the language of a request but only where there is a power relationship between the person and the foreign power which adds an element of control or expectation to the request: for example, through a contract, payment, coercion or the promise of future compensation or favourable treatment. It is not enough for a foreign power to fund an activity, so generic requests, joint collaboration or simply an alignment of views, absent the power relationship, will not meet the test for direction.
I will quote directly from the letter I sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—I apologise for not sharing it more broadly with the House but I was cleared to send it only this morning:
“In terms of what activity would be registrable, we consider that where a parliamentarian is to be directed by a foreign governing party, for example, being paid or on the promise of favourable treatment, to influence Government Ministers or fellow parliamentarians, this would require disclosure under FIRS.”
I will come back to my quote in a second. I digress briefly into the subject raised by my noble friend Lord Balfe and his quick canter through the Stiftungen of Germany. We are in touch with the German Government on this issue and are grateful for their constructive engagement. We do not consider that, for example, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung would constitute a foreign power under Clause 32 of the Bill. A person acting under the direction of such an institution would not be in scope of the foreign influence registration scheme. We will have another opportunity to debate these issues next Tuesday. Konrad Adenauer should be reassured that it is not covered.
I want to be clear that there is no requirement for the activity to cease, only for it to be transparent. In these circumstances, there is a strong national interest in greater openness on the influence of British politics by foreign powers. It should be clear not only to the Government, but to parliamentarians and to the public, where this influence is being brought to bear. FIRS seeks to address the gap, providing us all with more information about the scale and nature of foreign political influence in the UK.
I will answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, directly. In the example she described, the intermediary would have to register, if directed by a foreign power. The noble Baroness herself, or a foreign power, would not.
This is at the heart of it. If the German SPD engaged somebody to set up a stall at our party conference, they would be directed, be paying and have a contract for it. This would then have to be registered. I have seen the draft regulations which the Minister kindly sent me. They would have to disclose which MPs they had invited to the event and all of that. As the Minister has just said, as soon as the intermediary—the conference arrangements organisation—is paid by an outside political party to organise this, according to the form that I have been sent, we would have to fill in our names. We may not be the ones registering, but it would be wholly disclosable. It has nothing to do with the Government nor with national security. It is a party-to-party issue. It is simply because they have used an intermediary—a conference arrangements organisation or interpretation.
I think it is clear and that we agree on this. I am not asking that we should be able to bring it back at Third Reading, but I am asking the Minister to leave a little chink of light. Having thought about it, in consultation with his colleagues, the Government might be willing to look at whether this is really what they want to achieve.
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. I am more than happy to continue engagement on this subject.
The final amendment in this group, concerning the definition of a foreign power, was initially tabled in Committee and has been retabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Wallace. It seeks to exclude members of NATO and other nations, via regulations, from the definition of a foreign power. I want to put it on record that we do not consider all foreign powers to be hostile. When this amendment was initially tabled, I put forth that the National Security Bill focuses on the harmful conduct undertaken by a person and not the foreign power they seek to benefit. I continue to believe that this is the right approach.
The Government do not seek to create gaps in the legislation which could allow states to act through proxies and thus undermine what the Bill seeks to do—to take necessary and appropriate action against harmful activity. Again, no doubt to groans, I will bring your Lordships’ attention to the case of Daniel Houghton. He is the dual British-Dutch national who attempted to sell sensitive information to the Dutch intelligence service in 2010. If this amendment were to be accepted, and NATO states excluded from the definition of a foreign power, cases such as Daniel Houghton’s would not be captured by the offences and measures in the Bill. This would not be an appropriate outcome which could undermine the Bill. I believe that the Dutch came to us on this particular occasion and I commend them for it. I ask again that these amendments tabled by noble Lords be withdrawn.
I do not want to detain the House. I asked whether the definition of a political party in Clause 32(1)(e) means all members of it or not.
I thought that I answered this when I talked about direction by a foreign power. If members of a political party are directed by a foreign power, they would be covered.
My Lords, before the Minister comes back, could either he or a representative of the Government talk to the German ambassador and clear up this difficulty because the Germans are quite convinced that they are caught by this? It would be good if he could come back here and say, “I’ve spoken to the German ambassador or the First Secretary and we have agreed this”. Otherwise, the confusion will carry on.
My Lords, in answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I cannot make any promises but I will certainly try. In answer to my noble friend Lord Balfe’s question, as I said in my initial answer to him, we have engaged extensively with the German Government.
My Lords, I am not convinced by the Minister’s argument. That he has to go back to the single case of Daniel Houghton shows the weakness of the ground on which he stands. We recall that case, which involved a Dutch-British dual national who was uncovered by our allies, the Dutch, with whom, of course, we have a close intelligence relationship as well as a number of other things; it was therefore resolved. No such things have happened with a hostile foreign power. If we have to go back to that case, it simply shows that there is not very much evidence on which the Government can make this argument.
Many of us who know that this is an important Bill and wish it well are concerned about the unnecessary offence given to friendly Governments. The Minister has not assured us that all our friendly Governments have been consulted and are happy with this Bill. I hope that, in informal conversations between now and Third Reading, he—or at least one of his Foreign Office Ministers who actually talks to other Foreign Ministers—will be able to assure us that we will not treat all foreign powers or contact with them on a similar basis.
On that basis, I will not divide the House but I remark that I am unsatisfied with the Minister’s response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, hits on a sore point for independent reviewers past and present. At the instigation of my noble friend Lord Carlile, the Australians copied the job of independent reviewer—I think they call him or her the independent national security legislation monitor, which is even more indigestible. In doing so, they provided in their statute that reports be laid before Parliament within, I think, 15 sitting days of receipt by the Minister, an excellent discipline which I rather wish this amendment had followed.
I do not wish to seem ungracious. The independent review of powers, whose exercise is attended by secrecy, is a token of good faith on the part of government. It has proved its worth since the 1970s in this country in the context of counterterrorism law. I never doubted the good faith of the Government where this Bill is concerned. This amendment will make that good faith evident to others. It will help to dampen down the conspiracy theories that are so prevalent in this area and allow us to keep pace with Australia—and shortly, I hope, Ireland—in providing for independent oversight of almost the full range of national security laws.
However, gratitude has its limits. On first inspection, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, looks even better, so if he divides the House, I shall vote for it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for those contributions. There has been plenty of discussion throughout the passage of this Bill about the need for oversight of the state threats provisions in the Bill. The Government have welcomed this debate and agree on the need for the Bill to go further in this regard. The new provisions proposed by the Government do just that. I am very grateful for the remarks made by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, on the Government’s movements in that regard.
I will not spend too long on this group but will set out briefly the provisions and how we expect the government provisions to work in practice. The amendments made by the Government create a single reviewer of state threats legislation to oversee the operation of the measures in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill. This means that the reviewer will oversee not just the STPIM regime but the criminal offences and the exercise of police powers to ensure that their use is appropriate and proportionate.
The Government are also bringing oversight of the provisions of the state threats port stops power—Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019—within the remit of the new reviewer, meaning that all dedicated state threats legislation will be considered as part of a single reviewer’s role.
The Government have heard the argument that this role should in practice be carried out by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and can see the potential benefits this could bring. However, the Government are also conscious that the role will be of public interest and will therefore run an open competition for it, rather than appointing someone directly. Given the synergy between the roles, the Government will align the appointment cycle of this post with that of the terrorism reviewer. This will allow the role-holders to work closely together, but also provide the option of having one individual fill both roles, should that be beneficial.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his proposed amendment on this topic, which would achieve the same effect but also add Parts 4 and 5 to the remit of the reviewer. As mentioned in previous debates on this topic, an explicit commitment to oversight of Part 4 in the Bill is unnecessary, given it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I therefore suggest that there is nothing lacking from the present proposal. The provisions in Part 5 are supplementary to the rest of the Bill. The reviewer will be able to look at how Parts 1 and 2 operate in terms of commencement, regulation-making powers and territorial extent without the need explicitly to mention Part 5 in the powers for the reviewer. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept Amendment 80 as tabled by Labour, and hope that colleagues across the House will welcome the government amendments.
Before the Minister sits down, I wonder if he might be able to address my point—which I remind him is the only point that I made?
I certainly addressed the point which he generously made praising the Government for our amendments. The point that he raised in relation to the Labour amendment, on the basis that there is no timeframe in the present amendments, is not valid in the Government’s submission, because the Labour amendment itself does not contain any binding requirement on the laying of reports. In our submission, that would remove a level of flexibility. In the area of national security, it is important not to hedge about these kinds of provisions with time requirements. For those reasons, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.
I know that this is Report and we do not have to and fro, but I was making the point that it was an omission in the Government’s amendment. It is utterly open-ended as to whether the Secretary of State will lay the report from the independent reviewer before Parliament. I was seeking clarification from the Minister that that would not be the case.