Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for mentioning those things. I am not quite sure what the questions are, but I can say quite clearly that I do not see a direct line between the public sector equality duty and Black Lives Matter. What I have seen with Black Lives Matter is black people being treated very poorly and some being killed because it was not working properly. The fact that it was not working properly was not because it existed; it was not working properly because the police were not avoiding and fighting discrimination.
On the point about the increase in HR, those of us who are perhaps behind on our fire safety assessments might be concerned about that. Each organisation must assess what it needs to do for all its members of staff. I keep saying to the Minister, “Please don’t just train specialist staff in things like violence against women and girls; it has to be throughout”. Why does it have to be throughout? Because of the equality issues and all the points that were raised by noble Lords who have spoken and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, earlier on, about women being much more likely to be victims of serious crime. That is why we need it: because it is absolutely underpinning everything the police do.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful for the opportunity to support the public sector equality duty in legislation and to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there are times when you know before anybody has even spoken that you are not going to agree with the premise of the argument. This is one of those occasions. I am not going to agree with the premise of the argument, but I will not repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said. I will only in part repeat part what she said by referring to what Section 149, the public sector equality duty, is.
It says:
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination”—
or should the police not be looking at making sure that they eliminate discrimination in their dealings? On harassment, should the police not be ensuring that they are not involved in harassment in their dealings? On victimisation, should the police not be involved in ensuring that they do not victimise in their dealings? It goes on to refer to
“any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.
It says in this Section, which the noble Lord wishes to remove from legislation, that the police or any public authority should
“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.
Section 149(5) says:
“Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to … tackle prejudice, and … promote understanding”.
Does the noble Lord think that the police should not have a role in tackling prejudice and promoting understanding? That is what he is saying by seeking to remove this piece of legislation. The section goes on to say:
“The relevant protected characteristics are—age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation”.
Does the noble Lord believe—he obviously does, since he has tabled the amendment—that those protected characteristics should not be ones that the police seek to take into account when dealing with these matters?
The noble Lord has put a perfectly fair argument, but it does not take my listening to it in detail to know, as I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that it is not on my core values list or my core approach to how we deal with policing, and it is not how the public sector equality duty is designed. It is designed to embed day-to-day work in all our public authorities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that leads to better outcomes for individuals and for communities. For policing, the duty is vital to maintain public trust and legitimacy. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterson and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the Peelite principles mean that the police police with the consent of the community. If they did not take into account the duty not to discriminate, victimise or harass then I am sorry, but that is not a police service that would secure the support of the community in its policing.
Compliance with this duty is not a bureaucratic exercise. It is a practical tool, but one with a moral under- pinning, for better decision-making and accountability. Removing the duty would risk undermining confidence in policing, particularly among those communities that are in the protected characteristic list in Section 149 of the Equality Act.
There are times when we can have a debate, have an argument and, potentially, listen to areas where we will have some movement from either the Opposition or the Government. This is not one of those times. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment now but, if he brings it back on Report, I will take great pleasure in asking every Member of this House to vote it down.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I will allow the Minister to dismount from his high horse on this. The fact of the matter, as he knows very well, is that between the election of the Labour Government in 1997 and 2010, when the Equality Act came in, there was still a concern, based on a moral underpinning by the then Labour Government, to improve equality in the workplace and elsewhere. My party brought forward, for instance, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which tackled discrimination. The Minister’s party, very rightly, brought forward the Race Relations Act 1976. It is not a moral imperative solely for the Labour Party and this particular Government. There is, however, an argument to be made about bureaucracy and whether the focus is too much on EDI, which prevents senior management and officers at the operational level concentrating on keeping people safe and tackling crime. That is the point that we are making, not that we on this side do not care about people being treated fairly and equally in the workplace and elsewhere.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
From my high position on my horse, I say to the noble Lord that we will take a different view on that. From the position of a very high horse, I think that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would be damaging to community relations, to community cohesion, and to the police’s ability to police effectively. It would give carte blanche to the type of events that have happened in certain police stations in London in the last few weeks. It would also, dare I say it, remove the floor from the policing principle that we do not tolerate those things.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, says that certain things have not happened; he mentioned, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that some standards have not been raised in the time of the Equality Act. I remind him that there will be somebody speeding today, and somebody stealing from a shop today. There might even be a murder today. It does not mean that people would not break the law because we did not have that legislation.
The key point is that, with the Equality Act, we are trying to set a public duty that public authorities act with fairness irrespective of the protected characteristics listed in that Act. I think the police would want to—never mind should—be held to that level of account. That is why I have come to the judgment that I cannot support the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. That is a fair political disagreement between us. I have not done that in a way that says anything bad about the noble Lord’s motives. It is simply that, for me, there is a difference. There is blue/red water between us on this. I am happy to say that I hope he withdraws the amendment today; however, if he does not, we are willing to make those arguments on Report. I hope that, with the support of the Liberal Democrats and others, my noble friends and I would stand up for what we think is right about the Equality Act 2010.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Would the noble Lord comment on the High Court judgment that said that police impartiality was, in fact, compromised in the example I gave relating to Northumbria Police? That situation directly speaks to this. Will he also reflect or comment on whether he feels that fairness and anti-discrimination has been guaranteed to all by the public sector equality duty when we consider the events and protests that happened around the Sarah Everard case and the, frankly, inexplicable one-sided policing, in many instances, at demonstrations around Palestine, at the expense of Jewish people and Jewish citizens of this country? The argument that the public sector equality duty is a bureaucratic exercise that box-ticks your way to suggesting that everything is fine in the world, whereas some of us are rather more concerned that the status quo is not adequate or good enough in the fight against racism, for women’s rights or, indeed, for equality.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If the noble Baroness looks at aspects of the Bill before us today and earlier in Committee, and at what we said in the policing White Paper yesterday, she will know that the Government do not accept that standards do not need to be raised. We want raised standards, better vetting of police officers, better performance and speedy dismissal if police officers have done wrong. We want to improve those standards. However, the Equality Act is about basic principles underpinning how public services interact with people in our community. In the policing sense, I argue, as I did a moment ago, that those Equality Act provisions underpin what the police want to do, which is to police with the consent of the community. I cannot agree with her; that is an honest disagreement between us. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; it has been short but stimulating. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for their support.
When considering this matter, there is a question that I would like all noble Lords to keep in mind: what do we want the police to prioritise? Surely the answer is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law. As I have said, and as the legal framework makes clear, policing is already tightly regulated. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, codes of practice, judicial review, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the courts all ensure that police powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately. None of those protections would be removed by this amendment. The entire purpose of the amendment is to remove a layer of bureaucratic obligation that is ill suited to operational policing and increasingly counterproductive. It would allow officers to make decisions based on intelligence, behaviour and risk, rather than the fear of breaching abstract equality issues—but perhaps I am guilty of looking at this from an operational perspective.
If we want the police to be active on our streets rather than passive observers and to intervene early rather than apologise later, and if we want public confidence rebuilt through effectiveness rather than process then we must give them the clarity and confidence to do their job. We must recognise that effective policing is itself a public good and that the most equal outcome of all is a society in which the law is enforced without fear or favour. With that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, for his amendments, which have generated some interesting discussion and points. I will try to respond to those in some detail.
It is accepted across the Committee that counterextremism is a deeply challenging and complex area, and that the Government have a duty to protect their citizens from the harm of extremism, violence and hatred. The approach we are trying to take to counterterrorism is something that the Home Secretary, the Security Minister and I take extremely seriously. It is not appropriate that any citizen should be made fearful for their safety or should be excluded from public or political life on the basis of hateful prejudice. There is already legislation on the statute book to deal with these matters. Our society also rightly rejects those who preach, promote or espouse hatred, and as such everyone has both a right and a responsibility to challenge extremist narratives. I hope there is agreement on what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. The Government will continue to uphold and promote those values across the board.
I will look at the amendments in detail, starting with Amendment 438E, which, in the noble Lord’s words, seeks to require every police force to publish a report on strategies to tackle non-violent extremism within three months of this Act passing. I understand the intention behind the amendment and the need to tackle non-violent extremism. However—I think this again echoes a point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—police forces already work within national frameworks and report through existing channels and imposing a statutory deadline would risk diverting resources from front-line activity and might lead to incomplete or inconsistent reporting. The measure potentially duplicates existing accountability mechanisms and could, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, add bureaucracy rather than improving security outcomes.
Amendment 438EA seeks to impose an annual reporting duty on the 43 forces to report meetings with religious leaders and faith communities. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to others who mentioned it—the noble Baroness, Lady Fox and Lady Foster, have talked around these issues—that the impact of what happened in Birmingham resulted in the chief constable of the West Midlands losing his post and it will result in an examination of the practices around that.
However, if we take the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, at face value, I am not convinced that such a requirement would improve policing outcomes or community safety. Publishing who met who, when and how, could potentially deter some of the candid dialogue that is sometimes needed behind the scenes to ensure that community cohesion is taken into account. I also do not wish to expose sensitive protective security or safeguarding interactions with places of worship. There may even be some faith communities that do not wish to be seen in their community to be engaging with the police. It is possible, but I want to still encourage the police and those faith community leaders to have meetings. If that engagement is catalogued and publicised, it could undermine some of the problem-solving partnerships that I know the noble Lord wishes to foster.
Amendment 438F proposes including non-violent extremism in scope of the youth diversion order, which we will come on to in due course in Clause 167. That clause reflects the intended scope of that order, which seeks to implement a recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. That was a very specific recommendation to introduce a new diversionary civil order to better manage terrorist risk from young people. Including non-violent extremism in the scope of that potential order would go beyond the original design and intent that was suggested to the Government.
During policy development, officials have engaged with operational partners and the independent reviewer themselves. In essence, the youth diversion order is not a counterextremism tool for young people who hold divisive, extremist or hateful views but do not pose a risk. That is the key. It would not be proportionate to impose a counterterrorism risk-management tool on a young person who was simply assessed as holding extremist views. There are ways in which we can deal with that. There is the Prevent mechanism generally. There is a range of educational mechanisms that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to for ensuring that we tackle these long-term issues in a much more productive way. I say to the noble Lord that the youth diversion order would not be the specific tool for the type of activity that he seeks to discuss today with his amendment.
In addition, I say to the Committee that there is no statutory definition of or consensus on what would include extremism. This would represent a level of interference with and intrusion on the rights of young people that is not yet even available in adult cases. In practice, the amendment would increase the scope of the order and would overlap with the remit of Prevent, which is designed to deal with individuals who are moving into extremist views but have not yet reached the terrorist threshold.
The Home Office is undertaking extensive counter- extremism work in collaboration with local government departments and the Commission for Countering Extremism. On the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, I know from my devolved responsibilities in the department that we are discussing those issues with the devolved Administrations.
Turing to Amendment 454A, I agree that transparency is important. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has pushed for this transparency and has supported the amendment. I say this in the hope of being helpful to the Committee but, if documents such as the rapid analytical sprint on counterextremism were put into public domain, it could, for example, undermine policy development. It might impact upon the integrity of how policy is developed, because we would know that such documents were going to be put into the public domain. It would prevent disclosures, which would undermine the policymaking process, and less robust, well-considered or effective policies may well result.
However, through a range of mechanisms—this is the important point for the noble Lord and his amendment —the Home Office is accountable to Parliament for its counterterrorism policies and the rapid analytical sprint. Members here can debate, as we are now; they can table Questions, as they do; they can table Written Questions, as they do; I can appear before Select Committees, as I did at the European Affairs Committee with the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, only last week; I can be answerable for Statements; and I can be answerable in debates. Home Office Ministers can appear in private before the Intelligence and Security Committee, where a private discussion between Members of this House, Members of the Commons and Government Ministers on the conclusions can be done in a way that does not compromise security information. It is absolutely right we are held to account for that. Equally, is it absolutely right that, on some occasions, it is done behind a shielded door, where privacy can help with better policy development. Further, we have just submitted written evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee’s ongoing inquiry into combatting new forms of extremism. My colleague Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, gave oral evidence to that committee only last week.
There are definitely ways in which we are held accountable to Parliament. However, even if we accepted Amendment 454A and published all those documents, what goes into those documents means that there is a further wall behind them, and so we would not be able to put in them the things that we wanted to.
Amendment 454B, also from the noble Lord, seeks to mandate that, within three months of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must appoint a dedicated counter- extremism commissioner. I was grateful to the noble Lord for his question the other week. That aspect of policy is not my direct responsibility in the Home Office; I answer for it here, but it is not my direct responsibility, so I was not aware at that time of the status of the Commissioner for Countering Extremism. I thought my letter had helped clarify the matter, but apparently it has not.
To clarify, the previous commissioner, Robin Simcox, left in July last year. As I said in my letter to the noble Lord on 9 January:
“We are currently reviewing the roles and remits of various bodies to ensure our resources are best placed to meet current challenges”.
That means that we are looking at a number of arm’s-length bodies, for which I have overall responsibility, to see whether we need them, whether we can rationalise them and whether we can make cost savings in them. The Commissioner for Countering Extremism is subject to that review. The Home Office has been asked by the Cabinet Office to do that as part of a Cabinet Office-led arm’s length bodies review. We are looking at the roles and remits of various bodies. I do not think that I have spent a single year of my now 30 years in either House without somebody asking why we are not reducing the number of quangos that are operational in departments. That is what the Cabinet Office is trying to do; we are looking at the arm’s-length bodies that we have. That is a general demand, and not to say that I know what the outcome of that review is going to be.
If Amendment 454B, from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, was passed, it would mean that we would have to appoint a dedicated counterextremism commissioner. We may well do that, or we may not, but these issues are under review. I welcome the work that Robin Simcox has done. I cannot accept this amendment, given that we are still working through the outcome of the review.
I have tried to answer each of the amendments in turn. I am sorry that, in answering them, I cannot accept any of them. However, I hope that I have given legitimate answers as to why we are where we are. I hope that the noble Lord can reflect on those and, in due course, withdraw his amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments and I thank her and many others in the Committee who have given cogent and compelling arguments for their inclusion in the Bill.
It does indeed feel like the dial is starting to shift with regard to the protection of our children from online harms. I am very pleased, for instance, that your Lordships’ House supported my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment last week in voting to ban under-16s from social media. The amendments before us today are in many ways an extension of that argument—that social media is not appropriate for children, it is causing irreparable harm and, in the most severe cases, as we have heard today, is leading to death. As the father of teenage children who, like so many other children, face a world of online temptation, pressure and influence, these issues are very personal. There is a lot to be said for creating further duties when there is the death of a child.
As has been said, the issue was in live consideration in the previous Government’s legislation, which included a clause that created a data preservation process. I am aware that the text of Amendment 474 is different, but the fundamental issue is the same: at their heart, these amendments contain the simple objective to ensure that coroners can access the social media data or the wider online activity of a deceased child where the death is suspected to be linked to that activity. In that scenario, it is plainly sensible to ensure that that data is not destroyed, so that coroners can access it for the purposes of investigations.
I have nothing further to add, given what has already been said. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will all agree that we have a great deal for which to be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and her work in relation to the online space and its regulation when it comes to our most vulnerable citizens. It is so obvious that all child deaths are harrowing and deeply distressing for bereaved families that to say so seems almost trite. However that may be, I start my remarks by acknowledging this to make the point that the Government have this both front and centre. Anything I say this afternoon should be seen in that context.
I pay tribute to every brave family who fought to understand the circumstances that led to the death of their own child. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for telling me that some of the families are in the Gallery; I have not had an opportunity to meet them yet, but I extend the invitation to do so now. I also understand that for most, if not all, of them, this is not just about the circumstances of their own child’s death but about trying to ensure that this does not happen to other families.
We know that the data preservation provisions in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act continue to be a focus, both for bereaved families and parliamentarians who do not think that the process is quick enough to stop services deleting relevant data as part of their normal business practices. We agree that it is a proper and urgent objective to make sure that Ofcom has the powers to require, retain and provide information.
Section 101 was originally introduced following the campaign and amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. In order to support both coroners and services, in September, both the Chief Coroner and Ofcom published guidance on this new provision. Ofcom consulted on the draft guidance in parallel and published its finalised guidance in December 2025. The Chief Coroner’s guidance encourages coroners to consider requesting a data preservation notice early in the investigation if the relevance of social media or another in-scope service cannot be ruled out. This should safeguard against automatic deletion of the data by service providers due to routine processes.
The Government brought forward the commencement of data preservation notices, which came into force on 30 September 2025. Since then, Ofcom has issued at least 12 data preservation notices. On 15 December 2025, the guidance for Ofcom was updated in relation to information-gathering powers, including new guidance on data preservation notices themselves. The Government are therefore working closely with Ofcom and the Office of the Chief Coroner to understand how effectively these are working in practice, but we have heard the concerns about the speed and efficiency of this process.
Against this background, I begin with Amendments 438ED and 438EE. The police themselves accept that there should be better guidance for the application of powers to preserve and access digital evidence in investigations of child deaths in order to ensure consistency across forces. Forgive me, I have a bad cough.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology are already working with the police and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to create guidance to raise awareness of and promote the consistent use of powers available to the police to preserve and access data following the suspicious death of a child. Officials in the Home Office have been supporting this work where appropriate. That said, we can see why the noble Baroness’s idea of updating statutory guidance is attractive.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I can start again; I am very grateful to my noble friend for taking over. I say now that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as she and I discussed when we met briefly the other day. The Government do have concerns that being too prescriptive in legislation may create more problems than it solves because the legislation would need to be amended every time there were changes in technology or in operational practices. Your Lordships will be well aware, given our many late nights spent scrutinising primary legislation, of which tonight may be another, how clunky, cumbersome and time-consuming it can be to keep amending primary legislation.
For this reason, it is the Government’s view that our shared objective can be achieved using non-statutory guidance. Police forces are well used to applying and following guidance in a range of areas, from missing people to information sharing. Having said that, I make the point that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see whether we can find a way through this by working together to do so.
I turn to Amendments 474 and 475. Again, this is an issue that the Government take very seriously. I reassure your Lordships that we are carefully considering the issues that these amendments raise and are grateful for the continued engagement of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the bereaved families. Taken together, these amendments would require coroners to notify Ofcom within five days of a child’s death, triggering a standard form to request data preservation.
Once again, we can see the appeal of such a requirement. The problem is that it would apply to all cases of deaths in the over-fives, regardless of whether social media may be relevant to their death. So, for example, where a child died as a result of a road traffic collision or of cancer, it is unlikely in most cases that social media retention would be of use to the police or the coroner. Therefore, while the Government are sympathetic to the aims of these amendments, it is our view that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
On that point, does the Minister have the number of children over five who die in other ways, just so the Committee can understand how much of a burden that might be?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I cannot give the noble Baroness the answer now, but I can write to her with that data.
Our view is that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences; the need not to place a disproportionate burden on those investigating; and how such a provision might be drafted so as not to capture deaths which are outwith the scope of the amendment.
To conclude, we are not saying no. What I am saying is that I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that the existing statutory provision for the preservation of a deceased child’s social media data should operate as effectively as possible and we will consider carefully what further steps could be taken. As I have just mentioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I spoke briefly and agreed to meet, and I am happy to extend that to include Ministers from both the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
I look forward to updating the House on Report on this important topic. I cannot update the Committee in relation to the issues with the United States now, but I will write to the noble Baroness in relation to that. In the meantime, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I start by accepting all the various offers to meet the Minister and thank her for her tone in her response and for expanding it to the other departments as necessary. Before I withdraw the amendment, however, I want to make a couple of things very clear.
First, this sits in the broader issue of failure to have the Online Safety Act implemented properly. It sits in the broader issue of why children are dying at all. Moreover—I think I have to say this both on my own behalf and on behalf of the bereaved parents—I am very grateful for everybody’s gratitude, but we do not want gratitude; we want action. I am sorry, but on the actual points—six months, the same letter about the guidance that never comes—I do not accept that there cannot be a way of exempting sick children, and I would like to know how many children died in car crashes because someone was on the phone.
I do not think it is an excuse, and I really feel at this point that officials and Ministers are way too comfortable with unintended consequences. How about the House starts with dealing with the intended consequences of its legislation that are not being properly implemented? With that, and the promise to come back on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(b) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence within paragraph (a),(c) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (England and Wales and Northern Ireland: encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to an offence within paragraph (a),(d) an offence under the law of Scotland of inciting the commission of an offence within paragraph (a), or(e) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence within paragraph (a).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is a drafting change (aligning the approach taken in relation to inchoate offences with that taken in paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 11).
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 439 and 446 in my name are technical in nature and provide changes to the provisions concerning the youth diversion orders.
Government Amendment 439 relates to the definition of ancillary offences in Clause 167(3). Clause 167(1) provides that a court may make a youth diversion order if satisfied, among other things, that the respondent has committed a terrorism offence. The definition of “terrorism offence” includes ancillary offences such as aiding or abetting the commission of an offence. This technical amendment ensures that the definition of an ancillary offence operates as it should—I know that the noble Lord will appreciate this—in the context of the Scottish legal system and also aligns the drafting of the legislation with that in Schedule 11 to the Bill for consistency.
Government Amendment 446 relates to Clause 182(2). This disapplies the six-month time limit for a complaint to a magistrates’ court in England and Wales so that an application for a youth diversion order may be made at a later date where necessary. The amendment similarly disapplies the six-month time limit in Northern Ireland. I know that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, also has two amendments in this group. I will respond to those after hearing his representations. I beg to move government Amendment 439.
Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 440 and 445. Amendment 440 would require the respondent to receive citizenship education in British values, and Amendment 445 sets out what those values are. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, has also added his name to these amendments. He very much regrets that he is unable to speak this evening due to a commitment chairing a police commission that he is not able to change.
I will make two preliminary points to avoid misunderstandings. First, these amendments are not about personal values or lifestyles. They are about the fundamental political values on which our whole society is founded. Secondly, these values are not a kind of innovation in our law; they already have to be taught in our schools.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the explanation given of the Government’s amendments.
We recognise the principle that underpins Amendments 440 and 445 tabled by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries. Youth diversion orders are intended not simply to punish but to steer young people away from future offending and towards constructive participation in society. The idea that citizen education might play a role in that process is an interesting one. However, we feel that a number of practical and conceptual questions arise from those amendments.
First is the issue of delivery. Citizenship education of the kind envisaged here would require properly trained providers, appropriate materials, sufficient time, et cetera, to have any meaningful impact, and we should be cautious about placing new statutory requirements on the Secretary of State without a clear sense of how they would work on the ground or whether they would be consistently available across different areas.
Secondly, the amendment sets out a detailed definition of British values—or, as the amendment would have it, “values of British citizenship”—built around five specified pillars further defined within the amendment. The noble and right reverend Lord mentioned the Prevent strategy of 2011, which set out four basic values, as a matter of government policy rather than in legislation. I think we all recognise the importance of democracy, the rule of law, freedom and equal respect, but it is fair to ask whether we should enshrine those in legislation and, further, whether this is the right place to attempt such a definition, particularly in the context of youth diversion. Plainly, there may be disagreements about what might be included, as we have heard, how these concepts should be framed and whether a fixed statutory list risks being either too narrow or too prescriptive.
More broadly, we should also consider whether youth diversion orders are the most appropriate vehicle for this kind of civic education or whether those objectives are better pursued through schools, families or community-based interventions that can engage young people in a more sustained and holistic way. But I thank the noble and right reverend Lord for the arguments he made, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reflections on the amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, with his Amendments 440 and 445 has commenced a wider debate on the provisions of youth diversion orders. Through the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, we have had a wider discussion about the purpose of these orders, a point also mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
The requirements that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, has tried to seek for the Committee to add would require, as part of the youth diversion order, the Secretary of State to design a package of citizenship education that can be imposed on a mandatory basis. I recognise that there is a positive intention in that, and I do not mean to argue against that positive intention, but I point the Committee to Clause 169(1)(a) and (b). There is no exhaustive list of requirements and restrictions that can be imposed through the youth diversion order. Clause 169(1)(b) says a youth diversion order may
“require the respondent to do anything described in the order”.
So the order can include a range of measures. Although later on there is a list of potential activities under Clause 169(3), it is also intended that the order is flexible so that the court can impose any requirement or restriction that is considered necessary for mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. There is no restriction on imposing any type of educational requirements on a respondent, provided that they are necessary and proportionate for mitigating the risk.
I come back to the purpose of the order, which is to look at individuals who are not yet at a significantly high threshold to look at how, with police and youth justice services, we can offer interventions on a voluntary basis rather than potentially also as a mandatory requirement. I understand the intention of the amendments, but, again, I take what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has mentioned: there is no definition of the element that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, is trying to bring into play.
I argue that a youth diversion order seeks to reduce terrorist risk and actively diverts respondents away from further contact with the criminal justice system but is not as specific or restrictive as the noble and right reverend Lord seeks in his amendment. Police and youth justice services may seek to provide supportive interventions on a voluntary basis, and that could include education. It may well include some wider education about the importance of Britishness or personal development programmes. However, as I have said, supportive interventions may also be imposed on a mandatory basis if the court agrees that is necessary for the purposes of protecting the public. That could be, for example, mandating to attend appointments such as those offered through Prevent, including ideological or practical mentoring. The point that I come back to with the noble and right reverend Lord’s amendments is that they would add a level of prescription that I would not wish to see in relation to the potential court’s activity.
A number of noble Lords asked whether the Government intend to pilot youth diversion orders. The answer is no, not at this moment. If the Bill receives Royal Assent, we will look at having it as an order that is available to the courts and would have the sole purpose, under Clause 169, of prohibiting the respondent from doing anything described in the order or requiring them to do anything described in the order. That could include the very points that the noble and right reverend Lord has brought forward, but I do not wish to restrict the process by being too prescriptive in Clause 169.
With those comments, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name. I ask the noble and right reverend Lord to reflect on the points that I have made and, I hope, not move his amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(da) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendments to this clause, provide that a youth diversion order may include conditions relating to the inspection of an online account accessed by means of an electronic communication device the use of which is restricted under the order.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(2) The following do not apply to a complaint under this Chapter—(a) section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc);(b) Article 78(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26)) (time limit for complaints).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment disapplies the time limit for applications to a magistrates’ court in Northern Ireland (as well as in England and Wales).
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a vigorous and wide-ranging debate, dealing with very difficult questions. I thank my noble friend Lord Hailsham for his amendments. Regretfully and unfortunately, I have to disappoint him by stating that I cannot support them because I believe they would significantly weaken the effectiveness of our counterterrorism legislative framework at a time when the threat we face is persistent and evolving. In the words of my noble friend Lord Goodman, there is a darkening context.
The amendments would insert an intent requirement, where Parliament has deliberately chosen not to do so. Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 created offences that were crafted to disrupt terrorism at an early stage to prevent radicalisation and normalisation, and to give practical assistance long before violence is carried out. That preventive purpose would be undermined if the prosecution were required, in every case, to prove a specific intent to encourage or to enable a terrorist act.
It is also important to be clear that the current law already contains safeguards, especially in the court process. Prosecutorial discretion, a public interest test and judicial oversight all ensure that these offences are not applied casually or indiscriminately. I entirely accept the point from the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, that these must be applied consistently. The suggestion that individuals are routinely prosecuted and tried without regard to context or fairness is not borne out.
On a different note, I support Amendment 450 from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. The glorification of terrorism, in all cases, is abhorrent. We have seen such glorification, from certain quarters, of the IRA and Hamas, which serves only to normalise such atrocities. I simply cannot add to the power of the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and indeed by other noble Lords who spoke in favour of her amendment, which I simply cannot add more to, except to say that I support it and I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, beginning with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Proscription is one of the most powerful counterterrorism tools that we have. The UK’s proscription regime was established through the Terrorism Act 2000, which noble Lords are aware of, and there is a statutory process for it. Under that Act, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned with terrorism. An organisation may be concerned with terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Decisions to proscribe an organisation are not taken on a whim; they are taken on advice from the security services and significant intervention from Home Office officials to examine the case. They are not taken lightly. They are ideologically neutral. They judge an organisation on its actions and the actions it is willing to deploy in pursuit of its cause.
I say neutrally that Palestine Action was deemed to be over the threshold of the 2000 Act and, on advice to the Home Secretary, to be an organisation concerned with terrorism. Once an organisation is proscribed—this House and the House of Commons overwhelmingly supported that proscription—it is an offence to be a member of it, to invite support for it, to make supportive statements, to encourage others to join or support it, to arrange or address meetings to support it in furthering its activities, and to display, carry or wear articles in a way that would arouse suspicion that one is a member or supporter of it.
Amendments 447 and 448 from the noble Viscount would apply to the offences concerning support and the display of articles under Sections 12 and 13. For the same reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has given, these amendments would ultimately limit these important offences in such a way that they would become largely unusable in practice. I do not believe that that is his intention, but that would be the practical outcome. In relation to the offence of inviting support, it is already established that the offence requires a knowing, deliberate invitation to support. The changes proposed in the amendment would mean an additional burden for the prosecution to overcome.
I have heard comments, including from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that belief in or support for Palestine Action should not cross that threshold. Amendment 447 would import a further mental element, requiring intention. That goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that it is at odds with the requirement to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a person intended to encourage, incite, facilitate or otherwise an act of terrorism. To provide a defence similar to the effect for the prosecution to disprove would again undermine the core element of the offence.
Section 13 is currently a strict liability offence, meaning that there is no requirement to evidence the intent behind the conduct, again as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, mentioned. It is important that we say to the Committee that free speech is important. The right to criticise the State of Israel and to support Palestine is important. It is also quite right that, if people wish to say that they do not wish to see Palestine Action proscribed, that is also within the legal framework. It is a matter for the police, who are operationally independent, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide whether a crime has been committed. In particular, the CPS will want to consider, in charging an individual as opposed to arresting them, whether the prosecution is in line with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which is a vital safeguard that prevents prosecutions from going ahead which are not in the public interest.
I have previously defended in this House the proscription of Palestine Action. The decision was not taken lightly. The police and the CPS have independent action, but I suggest that the noble Viscount’s amendment would, for the reasons mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, undermine the purpose of that. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that those actions have been taken for a purpose. The threshold has been crossed and I suspect that, for those concerned with Palestine Action, more information will come to light as potential future prosecutions continue, which I think will show why those decisions were taken. We have a court case ongoing at the moment. I put that to one side, but that is my defence in relation to the noble Viscount’s proposals.