Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

In 2014, the timelines to support the work of our police, together with the relevant government agencies, made sense. But not now—we are dealing with a different, artful and evil scenario.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 385, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and Amendment 386 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. On Amendment 385, masks on cyclists are a difficult area. We all know that cyclists wear masks for reasons of keeping their mouth warm when it is cold. Not everybody who covers their face is a criminal. However, it is clear that some groups of criminals are wearing masks to avoid detection, which the amendment intends to address.

The point I raised in Committee is that, obviously, an officer already has the power to stop any vehicle, so they can stop any cycle without the cyclist having to wear a mask, or for any other reason. My only point is that, if you intend to give this power, there is not much point in having the power if you do not have the power to ask them to remove their mask. So there are difficulties with it, but that is where my support is.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, makes a good point. For as long as I was a police officer, when you stopped vehicles, you always asked them to take the ignition key out to make sure that you did not get run over and they did not run off. But now, if they do not have the key in, the car still goes. Just as importantly, you are always wary of what they are sitting on—a gun, knife or whatever else it might be—so getting them out of the car can be helpful. But I have to say that have been times when they were so big I kept them in the car. There are times when you use discretion.

All that said, I think it is a good amendment when we consider the changes in vehicle design, and it is worth the Government thinking seriously about it.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out the case for very well. It is linked particularly to the Chris Kaba case.

I will try to address the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. He made a fair point. There are times when, even if someone has been acquitted of a criminal offence—in this case, a charge of murder—disciplinary issues might be discovered which are not directly related to the death but a professional body may want to address, such as ammunition not being signed out properly or something else that was important but not relevant to a criminal charge. The concern in this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained, is that it appears from the press release, which is all we have to go on, that the IOPC basically laid its charge based on the criminal case—the charge of murder. That might seem very difficult to understand.

The amount of time this takes—I am sure that this can happen in medical cases—is substantial. In the Chris Kaba case, from event to criminal case took about three years. The officer will probably wait another two years. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, addressed the double jeopardy point—it is probably nearer to triple or more jeopardy. There are two or three bites of the cherry as far as the officer is concerned, although we must look at it beyond the officer’s understanding.

There is first an assessment of whether there is a criminal charge. Should that be negative, there is then a misconduct charge. Should both be negative, if there is a death involved, which we are particularly concerned about with respect to police firearms officers, a coroner’s court will be convened, after waiting for the two previous decisions. At the end there can be a verdict of unlawful killing, at which point the whole thing starts again. All this accounts for the very long processes. Why can these decisions not be considered in parallel rather than sequentially? I have still not really heard a proper explanation for that.

If the IOPC considered in the police case that there was gross misconduct or a conduct issue, why did it not lay a charge at the beginning? Why did it wait for the outcome of the criminal case, unless, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has suggested, more evidence had been discovered in the criminal case that might have made a difference? No one has said that.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Lord was suggesting, I think, that it is wrong to hold a subsequent disciplinary proceeding on precisely the same facts that gave rise to the acquittal. But in the regulatory proceedings of which I have been speaking, that is precisely the case. Very often a practitioner or registrant who has been acquitted before a criminal court then comes before a regulatory panel facing misconduct proceedings on precisely the same facts. My point is that the amendment is seeking to put in place a regime wholly different from that which operates in every other profession, and deprives people of the option of finding an officer guilty of misconduct when, on the balance of probabilities, the officer is guilty of misconduct.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I address that simple point? To be clear, in these cases, the IOPC is the investigating body. It is in full possession of the information it has gained—interviews, evidence from the scene, et cetera—so it is in a good position to query criminal charge or, at that stage, query misconduct charge, but it waits until the end of the whole process to instigate the misconduct charge that it could have instigated at the beginning, indicating the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it may be an employment issue. I find it confusing that it waits until the outcome of a criminal case, where it will have had no reasoned explanation for the jury’s decision—it would in a civil case, but not in a jury case, because no reason is offered. That is my point. It can be different in other professions, I understand, because they did not have the benefit of the investigators deciding what to put forward to the CPS.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

As police ombudsman, I was faced with exactly this problem, and I knew that our criminal proceedings had to be dealt with first.

To continue, what we are talking about here is the standard to be applied in misconduct proceedings. These proceedings exist in large part not just to ensure accountability but to enable forces to reflect and learn. They also enable the police to demonstrate that they take seriously situations involving the use of force, even when that force has been held not to be criminal. Despite that, the use of force must be necessary and proportionate.

This has broader implications. A disciplinary system that cannot scrutinise unreasonable mistakes risks undermining public confidence in policing. Retaining the civil law test supports public confidence by ensuring that unreasonable errors of judgment are open to scrutiny. Removing that scrutiny would weaken the learning function of misconduct proceedings, pose risks to public safety and give the impression that unreasonable policing errors lie beyond the review of accountability. That would have an impact, inevitably, by diminishing trust in policing.

For these reasons, I would be very grateful if the Minister could indicate what steps the Government are willing to take to address the serious concerns raised about moving to the criminal standard for self-defence in misconduct proceedings, particularly in the absence of wider public consultation or engagement with the communities most affected by police use of force. I am grateful to Justice, Inquest, the National Black Police Association and StopWatch for their help and support in this amendment.