Prevent: Learning Review

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments. The loss of Sir David was felt keenly across the House, but particularly by those who shared his political party or were close to his region. He will be forever remembered for the Adjournment debate, now named the Sir David Amess Adjournment Debate, in the House of Commons. For those who do not know, Sir David was always first up in every Adjournment debate to raise about 46 issues to do with Southend. Of those, 42 or 43 ended up in some positive outcome for his constituents. I should mention that, before Southend, he was the Member of Parliament for Basildon.

The noble Lord raises extremely important points. There is a criminal threshold for individuals who promote Islamist or neo-Nazi terrorism, or terrorism related to any other form of hate, such as misogyny. It is extremely important, if evidence is brought forward and the threshold is crossed, that the police take action via the CPS. The Prevent strategy is particularly about younger people being radicalised by those who have criminal intent and have provided criminal material, or individuals who have crossed that threshold and are having their own grievances or immaturities exploited by individuals for the purpose of terrorist activity. The Prevent strategy is about helping people who are going down that route. I think the noble Lord is referring to the criminal threshold, which is for the police and the CPS to determine. They have my full support to prosecute anybody who encourages terrorist activity.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I fully support the Prevent strategy. It is vital, as one of the four legs of the Contest strategy. Along with Pursue, to arrest the people who did it, Prevent obviously tries to prevent the thing happening, and Prepare ensures we prepare for the consequences.

One thing that needs to be addressed, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised, is that there is a handful of TPIMs in place. For those who are unaware of what that means, it refers to people who are not charged but have appeared in court, and conditions are put on how they live in free society. One of the most effective measures is their relocation, but it is also expensive, as is the surveillance that surrounds them. Over time, the security services have suppressed the number of people under TPIMs because, having served them, they have to follow these people, as do the police.

This situation seriously needs looking at, because we now complain that the police and others did not look at these people to prevent them committing the awful crimes we have heard about today. That suppression, which happens partly through resourcing but partly through accountability, does us no good. I cannot comment on whether 200 or 50 people need to be on these orders, but it needs to be more than a handful, because we expect others to bear that risk. When it goes wrong, we say, “Why didn’t you do something?” It is because we have suppressed the number under TPIMs. The place to decide whether they should be on them is called a court. I am afraid that, in my view, it has not happened in sufficient cases.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord brings a lot of experience to this topic. He is right that a very small number of individuals are currently on TPIM orders. For the House’s information, I publish on a regular basis the number of those on TPIM orders. A Written Ministerial Statement on this was published in, maybe, the last two weeks. From memory, the latest figure is certainly low. I cannot remember the exact figure, but it is under 10.

There is an argument to be had but, in a sense, it is not for Ministers. The TPIM legislation is there. If the police and the courts have severe concerns about individuals who may have previous prosecutions, but in this case do not have a prosecution in the specific area, TPIMs are a tool that can be used. It comes with a cost and potential further risks, but it is a valuable tool. Throughout my time in this field, TPIMs have been a way in which individuals who have not committed a crime can be monitored because of the danger they pose, and action can be taken in the event of them moving towards potential terrorist activity.

The noble Lord makes a valuable point, but I cannot, at the moment, give him a plan on resources. However, his point is noted and I will take it back to officials.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Udny-Lister (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief in moving this amendment. As I said at Second Reading, there is a clear opportunity within this legislation to design out terrorism by ensuring that anti-terrorism design principles are incorporated into new building projects that fall within the definition and scope of the qualifying premises. It is important that we take every opportunity to do this as we proceed with various bits of legislation that do have an effect on security.

Legislation, where possible, should always be forward-looking and include provisions that seek to prevent, rather than just address. I am therefore hopeful that noble Lords will see the benefits of mandating the need for the Secretary of State to work with local authorities on integrating the counterterrorism measures into planning and design policies, so that we can promote safer premises from the outset of their design. It is a sad reality that the threat of terrorism will not go away in the short term. We therefore have a duty to ensure that the venues of tomorrow are designed in ways that protect the public and prevent terrorism. I am confident that this amendment will achieve that, while further alleviating the financial burden of altering premises at a later date to ensure compliance with the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, and although it is towards the end of the Bill and it is a small addition, I think that, without this change, the Bill becomes less effective, because the thing we know works best in preventing crime—or terrorism, in this case—is design. The problem we have at the moment with car theft is that the thieves know how to steal them and are pretty effective at it. Car stealing has gone through the roof over the last few years. For 20 years, it went down. So we can design things better to make the terrorists less likely to be effective, or so that, if they do get through, they do less damage.

Prevention is critical to the Bill. At Second Reading, the Minister said that they could not consider it in this Bill, and that it had to be considered elsewhere. As much as I love and respect him, I am not sure that I agree. The danger is that the Home Office forgets, and it gets buried somewhere else. This is the best place to do it. There is an equivalent: the Section 104 agreements on new buildings, which are about crime—keeping new buildings safe by being designed to prevent crime. Car parks are designed in order to make it less likely that cars are stolen.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who, on the first day of Committee, suggested that we ought to have subheadings for groups of amendments to tell us what they were generally about. This may or may not be an issue worth pursuing. If we had a subheading for this particular group of amendments, it would be “The quango-fication of Martyn’s law”, because we are talking about two not-quite-superfluous extra bodies that would be created as a result of these amendments.

Normally, the position of His Majesty’s Opposition would be to say that we had too many quangos and public bodies being set up, rather than to suggest some entirely gratuitous ones. For example, Amendment 33, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, talks about an advisory board which shall “guide” the implementation and enforcement of the Act. Now it is a strange advisory board that “guides”. This again raises questions about the organisational structure of the Security Industry Authority, its governance structure and its relationship with the Home Office. It seems an unnecessary requirement. If it wants to take advice or consult widely with different sections of communities or organisations affected, that is something it can do. The same applies to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, which talks about setting up a review panel to monitor the Security Industry Authority. What, then, is the purpose of the Home Office?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I agree. I am surprised that the Opposition suggested more bureaucracy. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was right about the advisory board: if it is a good idea, and it could be, it is for the SIA to decide. Otherwise, if it were a separate body, there would be even more cost.

I have agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Frost, on many things about Europe, but I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was entirely right: you cannot say that it is bureaucracy in that context but not in this, because it is. It would confuse rather than clarify. Surely the purpose of the SIA board is to do the very thing that he described under the supervision of the Home Office. If it gets it wrong, I presume there would be a change in the legislation. He made a stronger argument for more clarity in the law and that it was the wrong solution for a problem that may materialise.

Finally, this reminded me that, post 9/11, the Americans concluded they had too many intelligence agencies. I think they had 19 at the time, and the result was that they were not communicating. Their solution was to put things called fusion centres outside the major cities—big warehouse buildings in which all these bodies would work together. Instead of reducing the number of intelligence agencies or finding a better solution, they built a place where they could meet better. I did not see the sense in that, so I cannot agree with either of these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate. As I say, my Amendment 33 seeks merely to create an advisory board for the SIA, so that we can have some form of independence—

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, there is enormous advantage in the various regulatory frameworks being consistent. That is a very basic principle. If you are looking for a holistic approach to protective security—which is what this Bill is about—there is the element of personal responsibility involved in making sure that sensible precautions are taken at a local level, but there will also be responsibilities on licensing authorities. It is my view that the various licensing authorities should proactively put in proportionate requirements for the various organisations concerned. In many cases they do that already, but I am not sure that it is a consistent process because each licensing authority is technically separate. While I am not sure that it is in the scope of this Bill to try to regularise the position of different licensing authorities, a holistic approach to protective security would ensure that licensing authorities behave in a consistent fashion.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has hit on a good point, particularly when you consider that at least four bodies would have a view about evacuation—the Health and Safety Executive, licensing authorities, the SIA and the fire regulators. Each has its own inspection regime, which means that there could be four inspections in one year about the same event. They would all want to make sure that this does not cause more cost but does cause more effectiveness. Whether it is in the Bill or something to reassure the people operating these premises, I think it worth considering at this stage. Nobody is saying that it should not happen, but it is about how it works together. This would be one more body in a similar area if we considered evacuation only, but I suspect that there are other overlapping areas.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 32 in my name would require the Security Industry Authority to notify all local authorities when guidance under the Act has been published. This amendment is a sensible and practical addition that enhances the effectiveness of the guidance regime established by the Bill. Local authorities, as the key regulators of many of the premises affected by this legislation, must be fully informed and equipped to act on the guidance issued by the SIA. Without clear and timely notification, there is a real risk that local authorities may be unaware of updates or new requirements, leading to inconsistencies in enforcement and, ultimately, undermining the policy aims of the Bill.

The Security Industry Authority will no doubt invest considerable resources in developing detailed guidance, taking into account the needs of various sectors and types of premises. However, guidance can be effective only if those responsible for its implementation are fully aware of it. Local authorities play a pivotal role in licensing, regulation and compliance, particularly in environments where security is a key concern. Whether dealing with entertainment venues, public spaces or other licensed premises, their ability to respond quickly and efficiently to new guidance is essential for maintaining public safety.

Ensuring that local authorities are promptly notified will support the smooth implementation of the Act and strengthen co-operation between central guidance bodies and local enforcement agencies. It will reduce the risk of delays in adopting best practices and foster a stronger sense of collaboration between stakeholders at the national and local levels. Ultimately, this measure will help create a more coherent and streamlined regulatory environment, benefiting businesses and the public alike.

Furthermore, this amendment underscores the importance of clarity and communication in regulatory frameworks. Given the increasing complexity of the legislative landscape for public safety and licensing, clear channels of communication between central bodies and local authorities are more critical than ever. We must not assume that guidance, once published, will automatically reach all relevant parties without a formal notification requirement. By adopting this amendment, we would take a simple yet effective step to close that potential gap.

I respectfully suggest that the adoption of Amendment 32 would represent a constructive and pragmatic step toward strengthening communication between national and local regulatory bodies. It is a practical measure that will enhance the effectiveness of this legislation and support its successful implement- ation. I urge the Government to give it serious and favourable consideration.

Southport Attack

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Thursday 6th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, this case, terrible as it is, shows the fine line that can exist at times between mental illness and terrorist offences, particularly where a single person is involved.

Prevent has struggled at times when police officers are trying to make decisions, based on intelligence or factual evidence, when mental illness is involved. I wonder whether the Minister might look at the unit in the Metropolitan Police called the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, may consider it. It was created in 2006 and has about 20 people in it. It was designed to protect royalty against people who become fixated on them. It is led by psychologists and psychiatrists. It makes a medical assessment of the threat, rather than just a criminal assessment as a police officer might do. It has police officers and mental health nurses who are able to access data from the health service as well as from the police. That balanced approach can be quite helpful. Sometimes, the way forward might be treatment, sometimes it should be criminal investigation with the consequences that might follow. This process has been quite well established for about 20 years, but it has never extended beyond royalty-fixated threat assessment. I wonder whether we all might learn from it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe; he brings immeasurable expertise in his contribution to this debate. I will say two things in response. First, the Prevent programme still has to focus primarily on people who are being radicalised through a range of means and pose threats on both Islamist and extreme right-wing fronts—that is the main focus. But, secondly, this case shows that there are potential areas where we need to look at other issues, including misogyny, concerns around violence and its worship generally, and people just wishing to inflict hate on society for a range of reasons that are not politically or culturally motivated. I take what the noble Lord said, as there may be lessons that we could learn from it. I would be very grateful to discuss—with both the Metropolitan Police and the noble Lord, if he wishes—how we can widen the debate on looking at potential areas. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will look at how we can draw a wider circumference around the support mechanisms to help with cases that fall outside the broad areas of Prevent but which still lead to the types of actions that Prevent is designed to prevent.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has put his finger on it. It seems to me that, if it is a large tent and 500 people are gathered within it, then somebody ought to be making arrangements to ensure that people are protected. That is what the Bill is about. I have listened with great fascination to the discussion about where we draw the definition of “building”. I always tend, because I am prejudiced that way, that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gives us a view on definitions, we should take serious note of that, because in my experience he is usually right. I leave it to the Government to come forward with what they think is a satisfactory definition that embraces what we need.

Ultimately, what we are trying to say with this legislation is that people who organise public events, whether they are formal events, community events, concerts or whatever else, should be thinking in advance, “Is this going to be secure?” That also means thinking about what I will do if somebody over there commits a terrorist act that has an implication for the people who are gathered in my event. I hope that my noble friend, when he replies, will say that the Government will look again, will gather together all those with strong views on the definition of “building”, temporary or otherwise, tents or not, and work out what works best. I think that our objective here is quite clear: that people should have a responsibility for the protection of people when they have gathered them together for whatever purpose.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20. First, I say in passing, on the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about the scope of the Bill, that terrorism is very well legally defined. It is either violence or the threat of violence for a political purpose. How that is interpreted depends on the political purpose and the act. It is a broad definition, and some may wish to change it, but it is well understood within the criminal law.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support this legislation, which commemorates the lives of terrorist victims from the past and obviously intends to reduce the chances of more deaths and injury in the future. Therefore, for all the reasons that have been described, it has my full support. It is the latest manifestation of the UK counterterror strategy Contest, which is there to Prevent, ideally stopping people becoming terrorists; to Pursue, so that, if they do become terrorists, they are locked up and put before the courts; to Prepare, so that, in the event that terrorists get through, we make sure that we recover as quickly as possible; and to Protect—that is this strand—the targets that terrorists may find the most attractive.

For a long time, where people have gathered in large numbers, venues have tried to reduce either the likelihood of an attack getting through or, if one did get through, the damage caused. But I am afraid this has been inconsistent and has lacked an evidence base on which to operate. In my view, this is the ideal opportunity to make sure that does not happen.

I will make only five points. I will first briefly respond to some of the points raised. There is clearly a debate about where we should draw the line: it could be 200 or 100, and some people prefer 300. I would be careful about altering it from 200. In 2018, at the request of the royal commission in New Zealand, I visited to look at the terrorist attacks on the Christchurch mosques, when 51 Muslims were murdered and 84 other people were injured. They were two small mosques—small in the numbers of people who gathered but terrible in the outcome of what happened when one man with an automatic weapon swept through them. So I would be really careful. Of course, they were places of worship. Although there is an exclusion in this legislation for places of worship, the fact that they are places of worship can actually amplify the target. Thousands of people can gather at—and do visit every day—some of our national venues such as Westminster Abbey. We have to be really careful before, in trying to accommodate their difference, we leave people who visit more vulnerable.

Secondly, I raise something that is not directly relevant, although it is relevant to the issue of communication in emergencies. The Minister may want to reassure himself about the latest level of the Airwave project, which is now eight years late, running at £12.5 billion and has no procurement in place to deliver the new system. It is indirectly impacting on the ability of the emergency services to respond to these terrible events together. We all ought to take this seriously, and it is worth at least contemplating when considering this legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady May, raised a good point about who is in charge when emergency services attend. Is it the people who are already running the venue? There is some good experience there post the Hillsborough event, and the Green Guide makes some clear recommendations about how this happens at football grounds. Rather than reinvent this, it may well be worth at least considering the advice there.

On CTSAs, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, got it right: there are very few of these people across the country, and they will need enhancing. There are tens of them throughout England and Wales, and I suspect that, given the number of premises involved here, there will have to be a significant investment to make sure that can go forward in the future.

The first of my five points is to support the point from the noble Baroness, Lady May, on design. This is about the design of new buildings, of course, but also the retrofitting of existing buildings. Design can help to reduce the number of attackers, can help to reduce the impact of attacks and can allow people who can escape to do so—or keep them safe where they choose to be. But this needs some clear thinking. Our shopping malls are open plan—they are not compartmentalised—but it is possible to design them so that they could become compartmentalised in the event of an attack. But it is not straightforward, as this place found out when PC Palmer was murdered. Do you lock down or do you open up? If you open up, where do you go and how do you communicate with people? Of course, people are in a panic and are not always able to hear you clearly. What advice will you give them when you at the time are not sure exactly what is happening? These are very difficult problems, but design can play a major part in making sure that we give the people who are operating these places a good opportunity to respond as well as they can.

Secondly, on technology, many of the venues that we are talking about—not the smaller ones, perhaps, but even some of them—have CCTV. We often have debates in this place about the horrors of AI and the terrible things that facial recognition can do, but actually it can do some pretty remarkable good things as well. If CCTV is available at some of our bigger venues—think about ExCeL and some of our big shopping malls such as Westfield in London, of which there are two—it can play an important part in spotting unusual patterns of behaviour in individuals. AI can assist with that, but I argue that the Bill is silent about how it might help. I will come back to why I think it is particularly important that it says something about this.

Facial recognition is another great opportunity. I am not necessarily talking about randomly checking people’s faces and whether they should be there or are terrorists. I am talking about checking them against lists of people who we know are dangerous: terrorists on control orders, people who have been released on parole from a terrorist sentence, or people on bail who have not yet been charged. These are significant characters, and I guess that any operator of a significant venue would like to know whether they have bought a ticket to some of these events, are strolling around their car parks or are carrying out reconnaissance in the days preceding their attacks, as we saw in New Orleans, to make sure that they are as effective as they can be.

How do we enable our CCTV to be as effective as it can be? If we cannot get this right for counterterrorist legislation, we will struggle to get it right for volume crime and general surveillance of public areas. This is a live debate, and we should not go to one end of the spectrum and say that AI and facial recognition are always bad. They can be, but they can also be incredibly effective, and we should not dismiss technology just because we occasionally have some concerns about privacy.

The third thing that I urge the Bill to say something about is different regulatory bodies. As we have heard, the venues are covered by different regulatory bodies: the Health and Safety Executive, local authorities looking after football grounds and some of the venues for alcohol licensing, and fire brigades, which inspect these places too. So there is a chance that they approach the same problem inconsistently—not intentionally, of course. We need to make sure that all our regulatory bodies approach these issues consistently and do not end up giving inconsistent advice—not least given that we have many local authorities but intend to give this to one national body, the SIA.

Of course, the methods of security are regulated by other people, too. The SIA already regulates the security operatives who work at these places. The Biometric Commissioner has interests in how data is collected, and the Data Protection Commissioner has an interest in privacy, while the Surveillance Commissioner has an interest in how all those systems come together. I would argue that we need them to consider the terrorist threat in a wide, not a narrow, way and that, when we come to things such as facial recognition or AI application, we need them to give consideration in a generous, not a narrow, way.

At the very least, we need the venue operators to know that, when they are trying to get agreement on how they operate their systems, they will get an open hearing and they do not have to approach the same problem in 172,000 ways—because there are 172,000 venues out there that will have to resolve some of these problems. Of course, the smaller ones are larger in volume, but some of the bigger ones are pretty high in numbers, too. So we need to consider at this stage how the various regulators are going to work with this legislation and make sure that it works effectively.

My fourth point is about research. We have already heard concerns about whether the SIA will be well equipped by the time this Act comes into force, and I can understand why those concerns are there. It is a relatively small organisation and there have been mistakes in the past: security operatives have had convictions for manslaughter and we have seen various things that have not gone well. But that could be said of many public organisations—so it can learn and it can improve. But the Bill is silent on where it is going to get its advice. It will of course need good research and academic support to work out how to deal with a crowd that is panicking. There is a science in this. We have had to see it through football matches and learn how to deal with large crowds, and how crowds respond. So I should like to hear a little more about how it is anticipated that the SIA will get its advice and develop research over time, because it seems to me that it should be able to develop commissions of research so that it can respond to new problems—because new terrorist attacks will come up and it will be vital that the SIA is dynamic and responds to the new threats.

My final point is about powers of search. At the meeting earlier, I said that you might think, “Well, that’s just what policemen say, isn’t it? That they need a power of search”. But my point is that all these venues often have security operatives. Sadly, in the Manchester attack we saw that the terrorist who attacked entered at the end of the event into an area that was not protected and was not being excluded, and was carrying the device that murdered so many people. But of course, if some of the security operatives had tried to approach and deal with him, they had no power of search. It is expected that security operatives are able to search as a condition of entry to the premises—you either get searched or you do not come in. But of course some of these people are trespassers—not all are terrorists—and with some people you cannot be sure whether they have a right to enter. So I wonder whether it is worth thinking about whether security operatives should have some kind of right, because the alternative is that you have to call the police, which will be inefficient; it will be slow and might be too late. So we should give some consideration to security operatives’ powers, used properly and reasonably, in a way that enhances security.

Finally, I realise that, on some of my points, the Minister might say, “Well, actually, there’s going to be advice issued and there will be secondary legislation”, so I am quite content that some of those points might have to be covered there. But I would argue that some of the regulatory issues need to be considered in the Bill because, if the regulator is faced with controlling legislation that gives it very clear direction and is then faced by secondary legislation that gives advice, it may have to go with its first statutory, primary legislation. So it is worth saying something about this in the Bill to help the other regulators. Things such as stop and search would certainly need primary legislation: in my view, it should not be the subject of secondary legislation, if it is considered applicable.

My final point is that I wish this Bill speedy progress, as the Minister said, so that we can implement it quickly. Although I agree that two years is a good period in which to implement it, in that we want to build the credibility of the SIA and make sure that the businesses are ready, I would keep an open mind that, if the businesses and the SIA achieve that more quickly, we should implement more quickly, too. Two years is quite a long time and we are already saying that the terrorist threat is high. Those two years could be a time in which we have some awful attacks that could have been prevented had we all got our act together a little earlier. So I would keep an open mind about the implementation date, should the evidence show that in fact the systems are ready and we are able to implement more quickly.

Anti-social Behaviour and Shoplifting

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The 2014 Act that changed the threshold and put a £200 threshold on shop theft did not change the law, but it changed the approach that law enforcement officers took: thefts under £200 were seen as thefts that we did not need to respond to or go out to. I regard that as unacceptable, which is why we are changing the law to abolish that £200 threshold to allow police to focus on the issue. Neighbourhood policing will help that. The shop workers’ defence and the aggravated offence of attacks on a shop worker are there to protect shop workers who are upholding the law in shops as the first form of defence. I have been a member of the shop workers’ union for 44 years. This is an important issue to the union—it has campaigned on it for 20 years—and it is an important issue for both Houses to recognise. I look forward to taking legislation through this House in due course.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the original question was entirely right: the repeat victim/offender location theory applies to both these offences. A small percentage of offenders account for a very high majority of offences. Would the Minister agree with me that there are three things police can do to bear down on this? One, as already indicated, is to attend the scene of an event and see what has happened, whether it is shoplifting or anti-social behaviour, rather than make a phone call. The second is that a linking offence or a linking event is the supply of alcohol to underage people through pubs and off-licences. The third is the uncontrolled street-level dealing of drugs. These are susceptible to some simple tactics. It is not an issue of resources: it is about uniformity of application and method. Perhaps the Government have an opportunity to make sure the police apply all three of those.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord; he makes three valuable points which we will certainly take on board. My right honourable friend Diana Johnson, the Policing Minister in the House of Commons, has recently chaired a round table which I attended with the chief constable of north Wales, who is the lead on shop theft, to look at how we can co-ordinate police forces better across county lines, how we can follow up on the points the noble Lord mentioned in terms of onward use of criminal activity such as alcohol and/or drugs, and how we can, through Operation Pegasus, resource and examine those serious shop thefts that are involving not just shoplifters on an individual basis, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, and others, but those criminal gangs that are organising very strong shoplifting hits. Operation Pegasus has just received additional resources from this Government to support its work.

Police Officers: Recruitment

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, people might expect me to automatically assume that the Met is right in this argument; I do not. Having taken over in 2011, when we lost around £600 million, and when 20,000 police were reduced nationally, we had to maintain our 32,000 by making sensible savings. I am always a bit sceptical, as many of us are, when public services make that argument. But will the Government consider two things when making their announcement next week? First, a disproportionate amount of the Met’s budget is spent on national duties, for example, counter- terrorism, protection of the Government, diplomatic and royal protection, and other things on behalf of the country. Secondly, the amount of population growth we have seen in this country has disproportionately affected London. The population is now well over 9 million and around 2 million people visit this city each day. Where they need policing, of course, the Met has to provide it. Those two arguments need to be considered carefully when the Government are making their decisions on where to allocate resources.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has far more experience than even I could bring to this issue. His words carry a very strong resonance. I am pleased that he reminded the Opposition of the challenges they put into policing in 2011-12, with funding reductions and real challenge in that system. He is right that the population of London faces not just its own challenges but the challenges of tourism and major events, and it has national responsibilities. Those are matters that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is reflecting on as part of the £100 million settlement for next year, and the £500 million she has announced for wider policing issues next year. She is cognisant of that fact. I hope the noble Lord will understand that I cannot go further, because I would be pre-empting statements that will be made before Christmas on the settlement not just for London but the whole of the England and Wales policing family.

Guns Manufactured by 3D Printers

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can tell my noble friend that it is an offence to manufacture and distribute a prohibited weapon, such as a handgun or semi-automatic rifle, however it is manufactured. That carries a sentence of life imprisonment. The maximum penalty for possessing such a prohibited weapon, including any 3D-printed prohibited weapon, is 10 years’ imprisonment with a minimum penalty of five years. We will keep legislation under review and there will be opportunities during the course of this Session to review that legislation in relation to any issues that might need to be brought forward.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, raises a serious point. Although, as the Minister said, there have not been too many instances, there have been quite a few where guns have been produced. One big thing that has changed over the past few years is that, apart from producing plastic-based guns, people are now able to produce metallic guns, which means they have more than one use. Of course, we do our best to control that production. We have very strict gun controls in this country. You cannot own a prohibited weapon—a handgun or an automatic weapon—so we are left with rifles and shotguns. If we lose this control point, which 3D printers allow, we will be in a serious situation. Would it be wise to consider banning the software, and the importing of the software, for these 3D printers? Finally, should there be some follow-up investigations on the list of people who have had these 3D printers delivered to find out what they are using them for and whether any of these guns have been produced on those particular printers?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his helpful intervention. I say quite simply again that 3D-printed firearms are captured by existing firearms legislation. If a 3D-printed firearm is made, it is treated in exactly the same way as any other type of illegal firearm. So they are covered by the legislation, but the suggestions he made are worthy of consideration. We keep those matters under review. Again, there will be opportunities in this Session to look at those issues as a potential police and crime Bill goes through this House.