Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to just two amendments, Amendments 393B and 394. Amendment 393B is the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has introduced about anonymity. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with him. However, I shared with him a few days ago that I have some sympathy with the general position. Police officers should be accountable and one of the main ways in which to be accountable is to be identifiable, which is why they wear numbers and now wear their names. That is important. I therefore hesitate before I argue for anonymity. I am not saying that it is a black-and-white question. However, on balance, I agree with the Government’s proposal, which is to provide anonymity for firearms officers. The assumption is changed from the present: it is that there will be anonymity unless the judge decides there will not be. That is the complete reverse of the situation today. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, prefers it as it is today, but would put it in statute rather than common law.

I am going to say more on Amendment 394 and the group of special people we rely on. It is important because, in the case we have heard about of Sergeant Blake and Chris Kaba, the man that he shot, there was clear information before the court that Mr Kaba was a member of an organised crime group. In fact, he was wanted for two firearms offences, so there was reasonable suspicion that he and others who were linked to him had firearms access. That will not always be the case. Despite that, the judge in the case decided to lift the anonymity that had been possible. I met Sergeant Blake a few months ago. The effect on his life and his family was significant. When someone has been named, it cannot be retracted, which is why it is so important to get it right at the beginning. That is why I prefer the Government’s position. It could be argued out but, once argued in, everybody is named and consequences flow from that. Sergeant Blake was incredibly understanding of what had happened. He was not overly critical of anyone at all. We as Parliament have to consider him as one example, but there have been others. So, I prefer the Government’s position and I think it is defensible.

Finally, I made a mistake when I was speaking about this in Committee. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, corrected me. He was quite right. I said that it was a small case. It was not about being a small issue but about a small number of people. That is the point I misapplied. I realise it is an important issue. It is also important that these officers get supported. This protection, which can be argued out, is more important than the general principle on this occasion. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that other officers have come under threat who do not carry firearms. They can also apply for anonymity. However, if you are shooting someone dead, it raises the threat and the risk level and I prefer the Government’s calculation. So, I support the Government and not the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Amendment 394 is about trying to get a higher bar before officers are prosecuted. Not too many officers have been prosecuted over the years, and everyone who has been charged has been found not guilty. Some lawyers have said, “Therefore, the system works, why do you worry?” The trouble is that it sometimes takes three to five years for that outcome to arrive, during which time the officers and their families are under incredible pressure. So it matters who gets charged and we have to consider this special group of people. Out of the 145,000 police officers, probably about 3,500 can carry a firearm. They deploy to around 17,000 incidents a year. That was in 2025 in England and Wales. They actually discharged their weapon in between five and 10 operations. They hit fewer people and not everyone who was hit died. My broad point is that they are not a trigger-happy group. There is no evidence that they regularly go out and shoot people. When it happens, it is a serious issue, and of course there should be some accountability. But we rely on them as volunteers. They do not get paid more, and if they ever change their mind—which I think was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carter—we have no way to force them to do it. You cannot order an officer to carry a firearm in our present regime. We are not America, where it is a condition of service. So we rely on them an awful lot and we prey on their good will quite a lot, too.

I do not want to address the legal issue in terms of these officers, but I want to bring our attention to the policy involved. We all have to bear in mind that there are probably three broad groups of firearms operations. Something happens in front of an officer or they get deployed quickly; it is a planned operation, they are going to arrest somebody in their home; or it is a crime in progress. It all comes down to the same thing. In that second in which you have to make a decision, you remain a human being. You have to decide whether you are going to shoot or not. On the whole, the evidence shows that they get it right. Should they kill someone or hurt them seriously, the whole system, the whole panoply of the state, descends on them. “Why did you do that?” That is not the problem for me.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, raised the issue of other professions. I do not know how many surgeons there are in the Chamber, but when a surgeon makes a mistake and slashes an artery, the whole world does not descend and say, “Why did you do that?” But it does when a firearms officer shoots. I realise there is some distinction, but the outcome is the same. The firearms officer is going to come under severe scrutiny during that period. We have to consider that they remain a human being who did their best that day. They did not go to work to try to kill someone. They went to work to try to do the job that we had asked them to do on our behalf. In an unarmed society with an unarmed police force, I believe that they are a special group.

As I come towards the end of my speech, I should say that I have met most of the officers who, over the past few years, have been charged. One is called Anthony Long. He was under inquiry for 11 years before he was cleared by a Crown Court jury. Each officer I have met who has been in this position has shown great humility. They are the sort of people you would want to give a gun to. It is not about just whether they can shoot straight; it is about the judgment they apply at that time. You want sensible, mature people.

Despite the fact that all these people had been under inquiry for so long, they were incredibly understanding of why they were in that position. They understood that there had to be an inquiry, and they were very understanding of all the different processes. I think that this group of people deserves our honour as well as their own. At the moment, I am afraid, the system—not individuals—is treating them badly. Somebody has to speak up for them, which is why, for me, these amendments have so much power. I realise that there are big legal issues that must be considered—no one is immune to that—but my passion has been to try to support these people in what is, I think, a very difficult job. There is evidence that they are doing it properly; over the past 40 years, there has been no evidence of them doing it badly. There have been no convictions of an officer.

My final point is that it seems as though, on the route to getting into a court, everybody makes the judgment that this is a criminal charge. There is the investigation, which the police sometimes did; now, it is the IOPC. The CPS makes a decision, then it is put before a jury. To me, that is where some common sense gets applied. The benefit of a jury is that we have the judgment of our peers. When they apply their judgment, they conclude that this group of officers is generally doing things right. I wonder why the system cannot do more for firearms officers to encourage them to carry on doing this and taking these very difficult decisions on our behalf without having, in that second, to worry about the consequences over the next few years. We cannot sustain that, and I do not think that they should. That is my reason for arguing for these two amendments.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 403 in this group is in my name.

The group that we are talking about raises the issue whether authorised firearms officers deserve any special protection if they are, or may be, prosecuted for their conduct or if they are convicted. Some would say that they are not so deserving, because it would not be giving equal treatment to all. Others, me included, believe that they most certainly need some additional protection, whether that is a presumption of anonymity, a higher threshold before a prosecution can be brought, a lesser penalty if they are convicted, or a combination of all three.

These are among the bravest people in society. They volunteer for the job so as to protect the public, even though it means exposing themselves to a high risk of death or injury. They are motivated by the highest ideals and deserve special consideration because of it. They are emphatically not in the same position as ordinary members of the public who injure or kill others with a firearm, so I support the statutory presumption of anonymity, which the Government commendably proposed. I also oppose Amendment 393B, which would impose conditions before there can be anonymity.

In fact, I do not think that there is a huge difference between the Government’s Clause 168 and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—whatever number it is. In essence, we are talking about what the default position should be and whether that can be rebutted in the interests of justice, one or either way. The Government have come down in favour of a presumption of anonymity, which is where I come down as well, but I do not think that there is a huge gap.

For me, it goes without saying that the safety of firearms officers and their families is at real risk because of the extensive publicity that such cases attract. Parliament should, therefore, presume that to be the case. However, even anonymity does not avoid the intense stress that such officers, who have put their lives on the line for the rest of us, must endure while waiting for trial, which can, of course, take years, so I agree with the principle behind Amendment 394: that a higher threshold should be set before such a prosecution can take place. Whether this should be as high a threshold as requiring the case to be exceptional before there can be a prosecution is a matter for debate, but I agree that the factors set out in proposed new subsection (5), which would be inserted by Amendment 394—

“the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—

should always be given particular weight.

Where a prosecution is brought, especially if there is no higher threshold for prosecution, my Amendment 403 is designed to mitigate the penalty imposed if certain conditions are met. I tabled this amendment in Committee. but the debate took place with just 10 Peers in the Chamber at 11.15 at night, so I have brought it back on Report. It is about whether police firearms officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment in the honest but mistaken belief that the degree of force is reasonable, and who would otherwise be entitled to rely on self-defence, should be found guilty of murder or manslaughter.

Thirty years ago, in the Lee Clegg case, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords recommended that, in these circumstances, law enforcement officers should not be treated the same as terrorists and other murderers if they use excessive force; and that they should be convicted of manslaughter, not murder. I find that a statement of the obvious. Quoting the Court of Appeal, Lord Lloyd of Berwick said:

“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorist or domestic murders, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.


However, Lord Lloyd ruled that it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law and that it was for Parliament to do so. Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity.

In rejecting my amendment in Committee, the noble Baroness the Minister said that it would

“create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population”.

But is treating police firearms officers differently from other murderers a two-tier justice system? Surely not. We are not treating like with like. Police firearms officers who go on duty, risking their lives to protect us all and, in the words of the Minister, are

“having to make life and death decisions in an instant”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 266.]

are emphatically in a different category from those who kill with an evil motive. The law should therefore treat them differently.

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[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.

I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.

I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.

I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.

The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—

“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—


are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.

I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.

That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.

I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.

Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.

The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.

If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just consider one thing? He made some very strong points. One thing that concerns the officers—although the noble Lord is quite right to identify that there have been relatively few criminal charges over the period—and the reason they are not persuaded by the CPS, or whoever is making the decision, taking into account only sufficiency of evidence and public interest, is that on every occasion the CPS has brought a criminal charge, the jury has disagreed with it. It leads you to wonder what led to that decision-making process, because all the points the noble Lord made about all that is considered do not survive the test of a jury when it arrives.

That is why there is this concern. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Is this the perfect solution? I am not a lawyer and not in a position to judge whether it is the best solution, but it is why this question is raised so frequently—not because of the frequency of the cases but of how often they have been cleared in a very short time after all the careful consideration by very good lawyers who come to a completely different judgment from that offered by a jury.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments illustrates exactly how sensitive and difficult these cases are, does it not? In some of the amendments, noble Lords are saying that firearms officers should be held to a different standard than the rest of the population, but, in the others, it is being argued that even a small additional protection for them and their families is too great a differential in treatment.

Against that background, I start with Amendments 393B to 393F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I met the noble Lord, together with the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black, and the News Media Association, and I thank them all for the interesting and constructive conversation that we had. The Government have considered the noble Lord’s amendments with great care. We understand, and entirely support, the principle of open justice and freedom of the press, but what is in issue here is trying to find the appropriate balance.

I am really sorry to have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I admire greatly, but the Government firmly believe that firearms officers face very real and specific risks from organised crime groups and violent offenders, and that this requires there should be a presumption that only their personal details should be withheld up until such time as they are convicted—and if they are acquitted, that their identity will remain protected.

In doing so, we recognise that firearms officers who are being prosecuted for discharging their firearm face a unique situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The threats they face before and after the trial are real and, unlike most defendants, if acquitted, they are simply unable to return to their old lives as innocent people. Firearms officers and their families have targets on their back, even if they are cleared of any wrongdoing.

This special set of circumstances requires a tailored response, and we believe that the Government’s proposals achieve the correct balance. Those who are opposed to establishing a presumption of anonymity until conviction have twin concerns: first, that there is insufficient evidence that this is necessary; and, secondly, that it represents the thin end of the wedge. I want to deal briefly with each argument in turn.

First, on the evidence that this is needed, there is no doubt that the threat faced by firearms officers is not theoretical. There are very real risks. As I set out in Committee, and will not repeat in detail, firearms officers can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation, which also extend to their families. As evidence for the need, there is real concern that the revelation of the identity of police officers who are being prosecuted is having a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of these essential officers. I am not sure that these are exactly the same statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has, but certainly those from the document on armed policing attrition and retention record that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers, or an 8.8% reduction. This is a very real concern.

What is important is that this measure does not force the courts to issue an anonymity order. It will not cause secret trials. Judges must still consider the interests of justice and they have an active duty to uphold open justice. Even if no party challenges the anonymity, they still must, in considering the interests of justice, assess whether a reporting direction is necessary and proportionate. Even when anonymity is granted, the proceedings will remain public and the evidence will be tested in open court.

I am afraid the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is under a misapprehension about what this involves. The only restriction is removing the identity, so they will be referred to throughout all proceedings as Officer A. Everything else will be reported, and, in the event that they are convicted, anonymity will be rescinded and their identity will become known.

A further concern has been the ability of the media to challenge the making of such an order. The Government absolutely understand the point, and we offer the following reassurances. First, by virtue of Criminal Procedure Rule 6.2, courts must actively invite media representations whenever anonymity or reporting restrictions are under consideration, and the judge must create the opportunity for scrutiny.

Secondly, HMCTS has delivered a package of reforms to strengthen media access and support open justice in criminal courts. As part of this reform, every criminal court now has a new circulation list called the reporting restriction application notice list. This list includes contacts from the media distribution list who have specifically agreed to have their details shared with applicants for advance notice. They will be added as mandatory contacts to all reporting restriction application notice lists held by criminal courts to ensure service on their members. In addition, HMCTS has established a media engagement group to improve processes to better serve media professionals in criminal courts.

Thirdly, the law grants the media the right to appeal any decision to make a reporting direction or an anonymity order to the Court of Appeal. But here is one of the most important points: if a judge refuses to make an anonymity order, the prosecution and the defendant have no right of appeal. That is one of the reasons that the Government have decided that the starting point should be a presumption that anonymity is granted.

Would this be the thin end of the wedge? These are unique circumstances. The number of trials is tiny. In the past 10 years there have been two criminal trials for murder or manslaughter as a result of a fatal police shooting. By way of comparison, there have been 13 fatal police shootings since 2019-20. Clauses 168 to 171 have been carefully drafted to strike a lawful and proportionate balance between fundamental rights and the need to protect our firearms officers and their families.

I turn to Amendment 394, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and spoken to powerfully also by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. It is one of two amendments that take the opposite view to that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

While we acknowledge, once again, the importance of firearms officers and the debt that we owe them, the Government are unable to support this amendment, for these reasons. It would fundamentally alter the basis upon which prosecutorial decisions are taken by introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution for a particular group of citizens, who in this case happen to be police officers. Without doubt, this would create a two-tier approach to prosecutions in the criminal justice system. All public prosecutorial decisions, as we have heard frequently this evening, are made in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which has statutory force. Its two-stage test has stood the test of time.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggests that the CPS is getting the decisions wrong because of the number of acquittals. With respect to the noble Lord, that rather misses the point. The CPS test is not to decide whether it prosecutes somebody who is guilty. If we knew they were guilty, we would not need the jury. The test is whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. That is an exercise of judgment as to whether it is more likely than not that there will be a conviction. If so, and if the public interest stage is satisfied, the case is put before a jury, who decide whether or not they are actually guilty.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I understand and accept the distinction that she makes. Over the past 20 or 30 years, the concern for the police officers involved is that, on every occasion that the decision has been made, it has been wrong so far as the jury is concerned. It has left the officers believing, sometimes, that the way that the CPS has discharged its problem—with a public outcry about the shooting—has been to test it in a court, rather than making its own decision for which it should be accountable. I understand the distinction that the Minister makes, therefore, but it is spooky that on every occasion the CPS has got it wrong so far as juries are concerned.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, again, that is a fundamental misunderstanding. If the CPS had got it wrong, the judge would have withdrawn it at half-time. It would never have got as far as a jury. The two things —one of them being the fact that the jury has acquitted—simply do not correlate.

The noble Lord’s amendment gives no indication as to how this proposed test would fit with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, save that we would then have a two-tier system, with one rule for the police and another for the citizens they police. It is hard to see how such a situation could command public confidence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the unique position of firearms officers will be taken into consideration at both stages of the full code test. In cases involving fatal police shootings, the Crown Prosecution Service already considers whether the officer’s actions were necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, as the officer honestly believed them to be, recognising how difficult it can be to make fine decisions in the heat of the moment. It is the same law that applies to every citizen. Prosecutions in these cases are very rare, reflecting the high threshold already applied; an additional statutory presumption is neither necessary nor appropriate.

Lastly, I turn to Amendment 403 from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, which was, as ever, attractively advanced by him. The Government’s position remains as it was in Committee: there cannot be a separate criminal law for police officers in homicide cases. The current legal framework already offers robust protection for those who act under a genuine and honest belief, even if that belief later proves to be mistaken. In any event, the Law Commission is considering the offence of homicide, and the Government will consider its report carefully in due course.

I am grateful for the debate that we have had today. It is clear that there are strongly held views on both sides, but the Government believe that they have struck the right balance to protect our highly valued armed police officers while not standing in the way of the principles of open justice and a single-tier justice system. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

In 2014, the timelines to support the work of our police, together with the relevant government agencies, made sense. But not now—we are dealing with a different, artful and evil scenario.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 385, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and Amendment 386 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. On Amendment 385, masks on cyclists are a difficult area. We all know that cyclists wear masks for reasons of keeping their mouth warm when it is cold. Not everybody who covers their face is a criminal. However, it is clear that some groups of criminals are wearing masks to avoid detection, which the amendment intends to address.

The point I raised in Committee is that, obviously, an officer already has the power to stop any vehicle, so they can stop any cycle without the cyclist having to wear a mask, or for any other reason. My only point is that, if you intend to give this power, there is not much point in having the power if you do not have the power to ask them to remove their mask. So there are difficulties with it, but that is where my support is.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, makes a good point. For as long as I was a police officer, when you stopped vehicles, you always asked them to take the ignition key out to make sure that you did not get run over and they did not run off. But now, if they do not have the key in, the car still goes. Just as importantly, you are always wary of what they are sitting on—a gun, knife or whatever else it might be—so getting them out of the car can be helpful. But I have to say that have been times when they were so big I kept them in the car. There are times when you use discretion.

All that said, I think it is a good amendment when we consider the changes in vehicle design, and it is worth the Government thinking seriously about it.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out the case for very well. It is linked particularly to the Chris Kaba case.

I will try to address the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. He made a fair point. There are times when, even if someone has been acquitted of a criminal offence—in this case, a charge of murder—disciplinary issues might be discovered which are not directly related to the death but a professional body may want to address, such as ammunition not being signed out properly or something else that was important but not relevant to a criminal charge. The concern in this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained, is that it appears from the press release, which is all we have to go on, that the IOPC basically laid its charge based on the criminal case—the charge of murder. That might seem very difficult to understand.

The amount of time this takes—I am sure that this can happen in medical cases—is substantial. In the Chris Kaba case, from event to criminal case took about three years. The officer will probably wait another two years. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, addressed the double jeopardy point—it is probably nearer to triple or more jeopardy. There are two or three bites of the cherry as far as the officer is concerned, although we must look at it beyond the officer’s understanding.

There is first an assessment of whether there is a criminal charge. Should that be negative, there is then a misconduct charge. Should both be negative, if there is a death involved, which we are particularly concerned about with respect to police firearms officers, a coroner’s court will be convened, after waiting for the two previous decisions. At the end there can be a verdict of unlawful killing, at which point the whole thing starts again. All this accounts for the very long processes. Why can these decisions not be considered in parallel rather than sequentially? I have still not really heard a proper explanation for that.

If the IOPC considered in the police case that there was gross misconduct or a conduct issue, why did it not lay a charge at the beginning? Why did it wait for the outcome of the criminal case, unless, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has suggested, more evidence had been discovered in the criminal case that might have made a difference? No one has said that.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Lord was suggesting, I think, that it is wrong to hold a subsequent disciplinary proceeding on precisely the same facts that gave rise to the acquittal. But in the regulatory proceedings of which I have been speaking, that is precisely the case. Very often a practitioner or registrant who has been acquitted before a criminal court then comes before a regulatory panel facing misconduct proceedings on precisely the same facts. My point is that the amendment is seeking to put in place a regime wholly different from that which operates in every other profession, and deprives people of the option of finding an officer guilty of misconduct when, on the balance of probabilities, the officer is guilty of misconduct.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I address that simple point? To be clear, in these cases, the IOPC is the investigating body. It is in full possession of the information it has gained—interviews, evidence from the scene, et cetera—so it is in a good position to query criminal charge or, at that stage, query misconduct charge, but it waits until the end of the whole process to instigate the misconduct charge that it could have instigated at the beginning, indicating the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it may be an employment issue. I find it confusing that it waits until the outcome of a criminal case, where it will have had no reasoned explanation for the jury’s decision—it would in a civil case, but not in a jury case, because no reason is offered. That is my point. It can be different in other professions, I understand, because they did not have the benefit of the investigators deciding what to put forward to the CPS.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

As police ombudsman, I was faced with exactly this problem, and I knew that our criminal proceedings had to be dealt with first.

To continue, what we are talking about here is the standard to be applied in misconduct proceedings. These proceedings exist in large part not just to ensure accountability but to enable forces to reflect and learn. They also enable the police to demonstrate that they take seriously situations involving the use of force, even when that force has been held not to be criminal. Despite that, the use of force must be necessary and proportionate.

This has broader implications. A disciplinary system that cannot scrutinise unreasonable mistakes risks undermining public confidence in policing. Retaining the civil law test supports public confidence by ensuring that unreasonable errors of judgment are open to scrutiny. Removing that scrutiny would weaken the learning function of misconduct proceedings, pose risks to public safety and give the impression that unreasonable policing errors lie beyond the review of accountability. That would have an impact, inevitably, by diminishing trust in policing.

For these reasons, I would be very grateful if the Minister could indicate what steps the Government are willing to take to address the serious concerns raised about moving to the criminal standard for self-defence in misconduct proceedings, particularly in the absence of wider public consultation or engagement with the communities most affected by police use of force. I am grateful to Justice, Inquest, the National Black Police Association and StopWatch for their help and support in this amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this group of amendments was due to be heard last Wednesday. We were sent away just before midnight but reassured that they would be heard first thing on Monday. Well, it is 9.30 pm; I suppose that is first thing.

Amendment 377 is an important amendment, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies. It is about lawful or reasonable excuse for public order offences. It is not particularly easy for a legislature to say what could constitute a reasonable excuse. However, the law is currently in a mess. The culprit is the Ziegler case, in which the Supreme Court, by a majority, said that whatever Parliament might say, it was necessary for a court to decide for itself, using the vexed issue of proportionality as a separate assessment, it would seem. Paragraph 59 of the leading judgment describes the process of proportionality as a

“fact-specific inquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.

There has been widespread criticism of the Ziegler case. The courts have been backing away from it—for example, the Colston statue case in the Court of Appeal and last week in two cases, R v ABJ and R v BDN. Policy Exchange, the think tank, has mounted a long-standing campaign against the incoherence that the Ziegler decision has generated. There is absolutely no reason, from Strasbourg’s point of view, why national Governments should not decide on the sensible and appropriate limits on the law in relation to protest. Many noble Lords will remember the 2023 legislation and the provisions concerning tunnelling, major obstruction to transport networks and interfering with key national infrastructure. I was always concerned that superimposing on all these very specific offences the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse without giving any definition was, in effect, simply asking courts, “Do you think that there was a reasonable excuse?” but not saying how they were to approach that issue. I tabled amendments, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, without success, to clarify the issue so that courts could know what questions they should ask of themselves other than whether they liked the protest.

During the debate on this provision in Committee, no noble Lord from any party seemed to agree with the Ziegler decision or seek to defend it. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, seemed to dislike the amendment on one particular ground—that it purported to oust the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. I understand his loyalty towards the European Court of Human Rights, but the amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to confirm that, in our view—I think that it is pretty uncontroversial—this amendment complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. It respects a balance of the various rights, and the House will know only too well that Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights. It is clearly important that the law in relation to protests should take into account not only the rights of protesters but those of all those parties whose lives could be completely upset by the exercise of those rights and, of course, the police, who have to interpret the law and administrate the law, so coherence is most important.

I then looked again at what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, had to say in response to this group. I want to be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has been indefatigable in the course of this Bill, dealing with any number of amendments, and often with large groups. I do not blame him altogether for not seizing on the Ziegler point with any great detail, but I fear that his answer was simply not good enough. He merely said

“the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance”,—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/26; col. 1634.]

et cetera. It was a perfectly fair statement of what the aims of any Government are but not an answer to the inadequacy of the Ziegler case. Therefore, I ask the Minister directly—sorry, it is not going to be the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, replying, as he is getting a well-earned rest, but the noble Lord, Lord Katz—whether he says, on behalf of the Government, that the Ziegler decision was correct, or does he accept, like almost any other legal commentator, that the decision was unfortunately wrong, as other judges seem now to accept? If that is the case, the law is incoherent, and it must be changed.

I fear I must join my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is not currently in his place, in saying that it is simply not good enough to say that we must wait until the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, speaks on the subject—if he were to speak on the subject, because, of course, that may be some time in the future. Then there is the vexed question of legislative time.

We need to sort out the law in relation to protest. This amendment, whose drafting has not been criticised in any way, states what could or should constitute a reasonable excuse or lawful excuse. The time has come to clarify the law for everybody’s sake. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

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[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that there will obviously be regulations, because people do have fears about accessing the DVLA database.

At the moment, the only database that facial comparisons are made against is that of suspects, which is a substantial database of people the police have arrested in the past. It would be a bizarre outcome if the technology existed to find a serial rapist and the only way we could find them was on the DVLA database, but we buried our head in the sand and said that we were not going to look. This is just the start of an investigation, not a conclusion. No one would get charged as a result of being identified by this process, but it may well start an investigation that might exclude or include them. To not take up the possibility that you could identify them, either through the DVLA or other databases, is the wrong way forward.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes a forceful point, but my understanding is that that led to no charges. I certainly would not defend what the police did in those circumstances. Perhaps more relevantly, it has nothing whatever to do with the contents of the Bill or the proposals that the Government are putting forward in this proposed legislation.

Amendment 369 is an important amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, proposing that we should insert into the statute book a right to protest. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that it would be most inappropriate. It cannot be right to introduce a statutory right to protest when we are not introducing into the statute book, and rightly so, any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to freedom of speech or to religious freedom. The reason for that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that we already have the protection of the Human Rights Act, which is applied by our judges.

With respect, I do not accept the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he focused on the European concept, in the European Court of Human Rights, of the “margin of discretion”. But that is an international concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. There is something similar here—a discretionary area of judgment—but the European concept is an international concept that is not applied by the domestic courts. Then the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, “Well, we need to put a marker down in case future Parliaments interfere with the right to protest”. But nothing that we do today will prevent a future Parliament, should it wish to do so, legislating in a way we may think is inappropriate. That is a matter for the future Parliament, and a matter for debate at the time.

The third point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made was that the convention allowed for a restriction for the protection of morals. He said that was surely inappropriate. Well, yes, but I cannot think of any case where protest has been limited because of a moral view imposed by the police or any other authority. I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said—I wrote it down—that morals were a “dead letter” nowadays, which is perhaps a wider proposition than she intended to suggest. But Amendment 369 would be most unfortunate. It would cause confusion and achieve no sensible purpose, if I may respectfully say so.

I take a different view of Amendment 369A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I have signed it. It deals with Clause 133, which introduces this new offence of concealing your identity at a protest. No defence of reasonable excuse is included, despite the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its fifth report of the Session, proposed that there should be such a defence. The absence of such a defence is very puzzling, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, because in Clause 133(2) there are defences

“relating to the health of the person … religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

In Committee I gave an example of why a defence of reasonable excuse is required. The example—and it is a very topical example—was of a man or a woman who wishes to protest outside the Iranian embassy or at some other demonstration against the conduct of the Iranian regime. They may well have a very strong reason for concealing their identity, which is that they have relatives in Iran. Are we really to say that they are committing a criminal offence, despite the obvious need for them to conceal their identity in those circumstances?

With great respect to the Minister, I heard no convincing answer to that point in Committee. That is why I have joined the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in suggesting that a defence of reasonable excuse should be added to this new criminal offence. If the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House—and I hope he does, if the Minister cannot give any comfort on this—I will certainly support him.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise mainly to support the Government. It seems to me that they are broadly taking steps to stop intimidation of the public, not to stop intimidation of the Government, which is what those who support the right to protest seem to be suggesting. The amendments, on the whole, seem to try to restrict that right. For the reasons that many people have already said, I do not think it is necessary.

The job of the police is to ensure that peaceful protesters are able to protest and that they are not intimidated. It is not their job to maximise the impact of the protest, which is what the implications of facilitation seem to suggest. Other people’s rights have to be respected; in the heat of a protest it is very difficult for the police to get that right. It can be a little easier in preparation for the protest, if you are able to plan, but many of these decisions often have to be made during the protest. When there are thousands of people who are emotional and shouting, perhaps outside the Israeli embassy, it can have an intimidating effect on everybody. We have to think seriously about how the police are able to implement these amendments.

I accept that proportionality is a very important part of the ECHR—I would not argue against that—but it is quite hard for the cops to measure this on the ground. In Northern Ireland it became such an issue that we ended up with a Parades Commission, which took the issues away from the police. The way that legislation is going, I suspect it might be wiser to leave someone independent to make these decisions rather than the police. But while it is with the police, it has to be as simple as possible, not because the police are simple—I speak personally—but because it is not easy to get that balance right. This is an acute judgment, not one that is measured in a court.

I want to speak about two other issues. If Parliament decides that it wants face coverings, we have to think carefully about the reasonable excuse. I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I suspect that everybody will have a reasonable excuse. Imagine, as a police officer, confronting somebody about wearing a mask and trying to determine whether they have a reasonable excuse, together with four or five other people in a crowd. It would be almost impossible. Do they have a cold? That is one of the defences in the Act already. I think it would be almost unenforceable. I am not saying that it is wrong to have a reasonable excuse, but it is difficult to determine it during a protest.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Surely the police will go ahead with the arrest and then the courts will decide whether there was a reasonable excuse.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

By that time they will already be in a cell, facing the fact that they have been arrested. It is best to avoid that prospect and the dispute you might end up in with a crowd when having to make that decision. The police need as smooth a transition as possible when implementing legislation, so I would be really careful if we carried on with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Can the noble Lord answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about Iranians protesting outside the Iranian embassy, scared for their relatives in Iran?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I avoided having that conversation, because it is a good point. I introduced my points by saying that if a decision is made to impose a ban on masks, a reasonable excuse may be difficult to enforce. I am not expressing an opinion on the noble Lord’s very good point about whether it would capture Iranians who might be in fear of their life from the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is a reasonable point and I am choosing not to express an opinion on it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Can I pick the noble Lord up on one point? It is very interesting to hear him say that the law should be simple, because I have heard that from currently serving senior officers. Can he see that our accumulating more and more bits of law makes things not simpler but more complicated for the police? I have been on protests where the police have definitely been quite confused about the legislation. He ought to be arguing with the Government that we should make things much simpler.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I will finish here because this is Report, but 50 metres is too short, although I think vicinity works. I agree with the noble Baroness on clarity; I am not against that, but you have to leave the police some flexibility given the circumstances they face. I do not think vicinity is an unreasonable suggestion. We can make that work, but 50 metres will never work.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we have started the fourth day on Report with a wide-ranging and interesting debate on the general landscape of public order law. The noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fox of Buckley, have argued that there are too many statutory limitations on protest in this country. I do not agree, and I suspect I will find myself in much agreement with the Minister on those amendments.

First, I will speak to my Amendments 377C and 377D. Amendment 377C would extend the notification period for public processions from six to 28 days. Currently, Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 requires any person organising a protest to notify the police of their proposal to hold it with six days’ notice. The purpose of this period is to ensure that the police can plan their resource requirements effectively. They need to examine the route, number of attendees and timing, gather intelligence on the groups and people involved and assess the likelihood of violence and disorder. If the procession is likely to be large or the cause highly contentious, or if those involved have a history of causing disorder, they may very well need to make contingencies and possibly bring in more officers.

The short period of six days causes significant problems for the police, the public and the organisers of the protest, and it may take the police a substantial amount of time to gather all the available evidence and set conditions so the organisers can often only be notified of those conditions the day before the protest is due to take place. This does not give them adequate time to ensure that they can comply with those conditions, nor does it allow the public and businesses adequate time to adapt.

Policy Exchange’s polling demonstrated that the medium level of notice that respondents believed protest organisers should have to give to the police is 28 days. In its survey, 51% said organisers should have to give at least three weeks’ notice while 45% said the period should be at least four weeks. The 28-day period is also incidentally the same notice period as exists in Northern Ireland, and while I appreciate the different historical and political context in Northern Ireland, it does not seem unreasonable to extend that to England and Wales—especially given the substantial time and effort that police must pour into planning for large-scale protests.

Amendment 377D concerns the criteria on which the police may prohibit a protest. Currently, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 permits the police to prohibit protests if there is a likelihood that the protest will result in serious public disorder. However, that is the only criterion included in that section, meaning there is no ability for the police to prohibit a protest if there is a risk of serious disruption to the life of the community, nor does it allow the police to take into account their own resources and ability to maintain public safety when making their assessment. My amendment would extend the criteria for the prohibition of protest to include where the chief officer of police has a reasonable belief that the protest could result in “serious public disorder”, “serious damage to property”,

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

or that it would

“place undue demands on the police”.

Given the Government's commitment to reform of public order law, I would think they should be able to accept these two amendments. Before the Minister says they need to wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, into public order and hate speech to report, I gently remind him that the Government were perfectly happy to pre-empt that review and legislate to extend the legislation aggravators based on characteristics last week. If they were happy to do so for that provision, I do not see why they cannot accept mine. However, if the Minister finds himself unable to do so, I am minded to press them to a Division when called.

I will also briefly comment on the other amendments in this group. Amendment 369, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others, would create a new statutory right to protest. While the attention behind this is understandable, it is difficult to see what legal gap it is intended to fill. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has already explained, the right to protest is already protected through the common law and currently through Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporated domestically through the Human Rights Act.

However, it is important to recognise that we do not derive our rights in Britain from international treaties or even from domestic statute. The right to protest was protected before Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1998 and before we joined the ECHR. It is a right derived from ancient English liberty and our common law inheritance, so placing it into the Crime and Policing Bill in 2026 will not change a thing. I dare say if we were to leave the ECHR and repeal the Human Rights Act, we would still have our ancient freedom to protest intact.

What is more, creating a new declaratory clause risks adding greater complexity without adding meaningful protection. Indeed, by restating rights that are already well established, we may inadvertently create new areas of legal uncertainty rather than clarity for the police, local authorities and the courts, and for those reasons I cannot support that amendment.

A similar concern arises with Amendment 369A, which would introduce a reasonable excuse defence relating to concealing identity at a protest. Clause 133(2) already contains these defences. They include when a person is wearing a face covering for health reasons, religious observance or a purpose relating to their work, and that is a perfectly reasonable and pragmatic list of exceptions.

Amendments 372A and 372AA seek to narrow the circumstances in which conditions may be imposed on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. In doing so, they replace the current test by which a protest may intimidate with a requirement to demonstrate a specific purpose to intimidate. That is a significantly higher threshold. The difficulty is obvious. In practice, intimidation often arises from the circumstances and impact of a protest rather than from an explicitly stated intention. Requiring the police to prove purpose before acting risks tying their hands precisely when communities may feel most vulnerable.

On Amendment 373, as I stated in Committee, we on these Benches are supportive of the introduction of police powers to take into consideration cumulative disruption when placing conditions on protests and assemblies. I do not therefore agree with removing Clause 140. After all, the previous Government tried to introduce this in 2023 and it was the Liberal Democrats and Labour who voted it down in this House at the time, so it is good to see the Labour Party finally has come round to the Conservatives’ way of thinking.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, because it addresses a difficult area—something that falls short of terrorism and which causes problems for legislators, policing and the courts. Terrorism is fairly well understood. It is the application or the threat of violence for a political purpose; it is easily stated. In this case, it seems to me that there are some indications that there might be a gap. It is not the first time we have been confronted by this problem. Before terrorism was defined—probably by the terrorism which started in Northern Ireland—in the 1930s, we saw that people were parading on the streets for political motives, so legislation had to be introduced on uniforms and various other things that indicated that people were trying to use violence or political aspirations to influence the Government.

It seems that the gap that has evolved is around Palestine Action. There are probably three indicators of a need for a solution to a gap that has developed. First, we have had a criminal case in which a police officer was hit by someone with a hammer, and the people who appeared to have been involved have been found not guilty. That case has been appealed, but that one issue has obviously caused some concern for everybody affected—the police, in part, but mainly the businesses being attacked by this group. The second case is a civil case, which is already—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just correct the noble Lord? In that case, what happened was that the jury could not agree and there is a retrial of those serious criminal allegations.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

That is quite right, and thank you for that correction, although, clearly, they were not found guilty.

Secondly, the civil case is about prohibition. The High Court has decided that it does not prefer the Government’s judgment that Palestine Action should be a proscribed group. I find that constitutionally quite odd. I understand that sometimes, the court will come to a different opinion on legislation, but it seems to me that the Government, faced with the best information possible, have concluded that it should be proscribed, and the court has decided that that is not proportionate. Whatever the outcome on appeal—which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has alluded to and we will hear eventually—this needs to be resolved quickly because it is hard to understand.

Both cases might indicate that there were some doubts about the proscription of this group. Most of the time, terrorist groups are obvious. Terrorism is mass and indiscriminate violence that murders tens of people. We see it and it is very obvious. In this case I did wonder, but sometimes governments have information that the rest of us do not. One of the other signs, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, was that, when support began to be expressed for a proscribed group, people then said, “This is quite odd; why are we arresting them?” They did not have the same qualms about Irish terrorism or about ISIS when they were beheading citizens of this country. It indicates that, perhaps, there is something different about this group. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has identified a reasonable solution to that gap. Conspiracy alone is not a sufficient answer. It is possible to charge someone with conspiracy to commit a violent act or conspiracy to riot, but you cannot prosecute people who might fund that conspiracy. This amendment would start to address the protest group and the way it is funded and supported.

My final point—quite narrowly defined in this sense—is that this is about the intent to cause serious harm to public safety or to affect public policy and democracy. Both are substantial bars to pass before somebody could be convicted of this offence. The Government ought seriously to consider filling the gap with this amendment, or, if they do not, with something very much like it.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 371A, 419 and 441B, to which I have added my name. It is clear that attacking a police officer with a sledgehammer or breaking into an RAF base and damaging two planes, causing £7 million-worth of damage, is not a peaceful protest. Amendment 371A rightly targets that grey area between ordinary protest groups and groups that cross the threshold to be proscribed under terrorism law. These are groups whose purpose and practice involves the deliberate commission of criminal damage, riot, violent disorder and interference with national infrastructure.

When groups are legislated against, often, splinter groups form and these groups are left to fester. Amendment 371A would give greater power to the Secretary of State to deal with extremism at its root, rather than waiting for it to grow and meet the terrorist threshold. By this point, it becomes too late and the harms, which are sometimes irreparable, may have already occurred. Responsible governance means intervening before that point is reached. For those reasons, I support this amendment. I also pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, for his tenacity and I support his amendment.

Often, our approach has been far too reactive, notwithstanding the announcement being made in the other place. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, the Jewish community in this country knows all too well how rhetoric and ideological radicalisation can create a climate of fear. Between 2024 and 2025, at least 10 and probably more terrorism cases against British Jews or UK-based Israeli interests were uncovered. These plots were foiled thanks to the extraordinary work of the counterterrorism police and the Community Security Trust.

We have created an environment where extremism is allowed to grow unchallenged. Are we just going to wait until there is another attack on a synagogue or a credible plot against a Jewish school? At that point, it is too late. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, recognises that extremism rarely appears suddenly; it develops gradually through networks, narratives and campaigns that legitimise hostility. Left unchallenged, these dynamics can become embedded in communities and online spaces, creating an environment where more serious forms of criminality or even terrorism become more likely. Amendment 419 is about ensuring that our response to extremism is enduring, co-ordinated and strategic. Above all, it is about ensuring that the Government are equipped with the tools and the institutional framework necessary to address extremism before it escalates into violence.

Finally, Amendment 441B in this group, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, seeks to ensure that organisations which promote or support criminal conduct or which attempt to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic institutions of the United Kingdom are prohibited from receiving public funds. Such a safeguard is well overdue. It would ensure that taxpayers’ money cannot, whether deliberately or inadvertently, support organisations whose activities threaten public safety or the foundations of our democracy. Public funds should strengthen society, not subsidise those who seek to destabilise it.

It remains far too difficult to challenge organisations that continue to receive public support despite clear evidence that their leaders promote extremist ideologies, including those who openly aspire to replace democratic governments with a religious caliphate. This loophole allows public money to reach bodies fundamentally at odds with our democratic principles. This amendment would close that unacceptable gap. It would protect public funds from misuse and send an unequivocal message that any attempt to undermine the democratic institutions of the United Kingdom should not and will not be tolerated.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

My Lords, given the hour, I shall be brief. I support my noble friend Lady Stowell in the two amendments that she has so ably introduced, and I have been delighted to add my name to both of them.

I have worked all my life in consumer services: for 20-odd years in retailing, but then in telecoms and in the National Health Service, and, today, in hospitality—in horse racing. I should declare my interest as the chair or senior steward of the Jockey Club, given that we have the Cheltenham Festival next week, where we will have thousands of people in front-line, consumer-facing service roles at the racecourse.

I have not engaged in the Bill until this stage, so I apologise for that, but I am speaking to and have put my name to these amendments because I am bemused by the Government’s failure to support public-facing workers in all these other industries. I grew up in retailing and I love retailing, but if you have ever sat in a GP surgery with a receptionist, as I have, and watched them do their job, you will know that it is no different from being at the customer service desk at Tesco, which I have also done, dealing with the ups and downs of everyday life with the customers, the consumers, the citizens you are serving. We should be protecting them and treating them in exactly the same way. As the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has said, that is true for transport, finance, telecoms, energy and water. We should not exclude the hundreds of thousands, millions, of people who provide us with these essential services. We learned during Covid how important these essential front-line, customer service-facing roles are, and it breaks my heart, five years after the pandemic, to see a Government who say they support working people not supporting many front-line working people.

It is not just front-line working people who want us to protect them; their bosses do too. The CEOs of businesses in all the sectors I have just mentioned know that it is good business to protect them. Some 42% of front-line workers, according to the Institute of Customer Service, have experienced abuse in the last six months, as my noble friend Lady Stowell has said; 37% say they have considered leaving their role because of that hostility; and more than 25% have taken sick leave as a result. That costs productivity in our public services and it costs economic growth in our private sector. The chief executives of all these organisations know that, and they want us to make sure that we treat all those workers with the same respect that the Bill, at the moment, treats retail workers only, which is why I support these amendments.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because it is trying to achieve consistency in law. At the moment, the law protects a retail worker more, when in fact those who provide services are doing exactly the same thing. Broadly, they deal with the public and they are trying to get rules enforced. They are just trying to make sure that things work well.

My reading of the present advice on providing protection to retail workers is that they are protected if they provide goods, but not if they provide services. The consequence of that is that people who, for example, work in betting shops, theatres and cinemas do not receive the same protection that they would receive if they were providing that same retail worker service and also providing goods, and that seems inconsistent. Then there is the further group of workers that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred to: people who work in transport, such as taxi drivers. All of them face people who are often affected by drink or drugs, for example, and have to challenge bad behaviour, but they do not receive this protection. That seems odd. I find it odd that the Government do not want to protect that group of workers in the same way. For reasons of consistency, and because the workers I have described—those who work in betting offices, for example, where you get some pretty bad behaviour at times—deserve that protection, they ought to be included.

My final point is that although the present legislation excludes wholesale workers—should I name the companies? Perhaps not—you only get access to some of these wholesale or, I would say, retail sites by joining a club; you do not pay any money. I think we all know the ones I am talking about, where you get access to better prices merely by joining the club. Apparently, that is not retail. I think it is pretty much like retail. They still get bad behaviour on these sites. For all those reasons, I think this amendment regarding public-facing workers is a good idea and I encourage the Government to support it for the sake of consistency for those who provide services to us.

[Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief, partly to remind all noble Lords that the shop workers’ union, USDAW, under Joanne Thomas, the current leader, Paddy Lillis before her and, indeed, John Hannett—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett—has campaigned for years for freedom from fear for a predominantly female workforce facing violence at work. As we have heard, that got a lot worse through Covid. At the time, USDAW was pressing for legislation; nobody listened. I have to commend the Government for listening to the campaign from the grass roots all the way up to the top of USDAW for that protection for workers in that industry.

Having said that, I have looked at the very latest figures from the Health and Safety Executive and from the Labour Force Survey, which show that public-facing workers across a number of industries, sectors and jobs disproportionately face violence at work. More than that, I have heard it from workers themselves. Bus workers, transport workers and hospitality workers have been spat at, assaulted and threatened. I also alight on transport workers, because they too perform a significant act of public service in the work they do. They often face real threats and real assaults because of the job that they do.

I share my noble friend Lord Hendy’s hope that, even if the Government cannot support this amendment, my noble friend the Minister could at least commit to talk to colleagues in the relevant departments to get us around the table to look at a real strategy for prevention of violence and enforcement of the laws we have. Many workers still feel unsafe going to work to earn a living and no worker should face that threat at work.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment, and for the opportunity to discuss it with her and with the organisations she brought in for face-to-face discussions with us. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for his contribution and for our meeting.

I declare my membership of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, which I joined 47 years ago and which sponsored me as a Member of Parliament. I put that on the record. I must also say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I understand that he would prefer to have no offence. I understand that because when, as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, I tabled amendments to put these types of offences down, the then Government rejected them. I therefore understand where he is coming from, because that is consistent with the position of previous Conservative Governments.

In this case, we have a Labour manifesto commitment endorsed by the electorate. My noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned USDAW. I pay tribute to that union, which has collected evidence and, through three general secretaries, including my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, campaigned strongly for an offence against retail workers. The Labour Party listened to that in opposition and put in its manifesto—I cannot claim credit for this, because I was out of Parliament at the time—a commitment to legislate for that offence, which appears in the Bill before the House today.

I have heard the comments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, on why they think that the bespoke offence against assaulting a retail worker should be extended to all public-facing workers. Along with proposing a new broader offence of assault against public-facing workers, the noble Baroness has tabled an amendment that would place a duty on courts to make a criminal order in the event of a conviction.

I hate to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but I repeat the arguments that I put to her in Committee and elsewhere. Public-facing workers such as those mentioned by my noble friend, the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, are covered under existing legislation, such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which includes a range of violent offences, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. Further, the provisions of Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was introduced by the previous Conservative Government, makes it a statutory aggravating factor of assault against any public-facing worker. That offence means that if someone, having been charged with the serious offence of assault and having gone through a trial, is deemed to have committed assault against public-facing workers, the court has the power to add aggravating factors to that sentence. That covers every type of worker that has been mentioned by noble Lords today. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those public service workers performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. That is an important factor.

Noble Lords have asked why there is a specific offence against retail workers that is additional to the aggravating offence. That is a reasonable question to ask. In clauses that have been mentioned there is provision for additional prison sentence capacity, criminal restriction orders and an unlimited fine for this stand-alone offence. Retail workers are still covered by Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, so why have we put that extra power in place?

The reason for this—and why I declared an interest—is that USDAW has, to my knowledge, for 17 or 18 years campaigned regularly for this in the Freedom From Fear Campaign. It has done so under the three general secretaries that my noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned, and it has done so for a purpose—one that the Government share. Retail workers are fundamentally on the front line of upholding the laws passed by both Houses of Parliament on a range of matters. It is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of cigarettes, it is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of alcohol, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a knife, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a solvent, and it is a retail worker who protects the community by upholding all the laws on those issues that we have passed in this House and in the House of Commons. That is why USDAW campaigned for the specific offence, and it is why the Labour Party in government has been pleased to support the creation of that offence by putting it in the Bill.

That goes even further to the appalling shop theft situation. I do not call it shoplifting—it is shop theft. There has been a continued rise in shop theft over many years, and it is the retail worker who is on the front line saying, “Put that back”, calling the police and taking action in the shop. The Co-op, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and a whole range of retail organisations have campaigned for this, alongside USDAW, over many years. It has been thought through and there is an evidence base. It is a manifesto commitment, and we are trying to introduce that extra offence. I do not wish to see a train operative or members of customer services, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, mentioned, attacked with a knife. This is covered by common assault legislation from 1861 and by the 2022 Act as an aggravating offence. But the Government have put forward a stand-alone offence for shop workers for the reasons I have outlined.

Does that potentially create an anomaly? Let us discuss that and reflect on that view. But the manifesto commitment is clear, and we are delivering on that manifesto commitment. This is an important issue, based on evidence and campaigning by a range of bodies—retail organisations and trade unions—and it has my support. Therefore, I cannot support the noble Baroness—I have told her that—or my noble friend.

That is not to say that the Government accept that attacks on those members of staff are a normal part of what they should face. We are committed to driving down assaults and to enforcing, with the courts, the legislation on the statute book. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, asked what the Government are doing to reduce the attacks in the first place. This Government are rebuilding the police force—13,000 neighbourhood police officers—and have put in place, with this Bill, changes in shop theft legislation. This Government are focusing on retail crime in hotspots and on making sure that we drive it down. We will ensure that the police forces have retail crime as a major priority.

In the last 14 years before July 2024, police numbers fell, neighbourhood policing fell and the focus on the high street fell. It was not a Labour Government but a Conservative Government who did that. They refused the legislation on assaults on shop workers that I proposed in the House of Commons, they refused to take action on shop theft on high streets and they refused to stand up for the workforce. With due respect, I will not take lessons today from the Conservative Front Bench.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I check whether my assertion is accurate or whether I am wrong? Would someone enforcing an age limit in a betting office not be protected by the retail workers’ protection but someone enforcing an age restriction in an off-licence would be? It seems to me that the distinction is simply between providing a service and providing a good. If I am wrong in that, I withdraw my comment, but I am not sure that the Minister has said I am.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have clearly defined in the Bill what we believe a retail worker is. I accept that there are areas of interpretation for the courts, such as, for example—we have discussed this with colleagues outside the House—whether a post office is covered by the retail worker provision. Somebody might walk into a post office to buy Christmas cards or birthday cards and go to the post office counter—is that a retail worker? Those are areas where there may be some interpretation, but we have identified this as tightly as we can. It is a straightforward clause that defines a retail worker. I commend it, given that there has been a considerable amount of work by the Home Office in drafting the amendment, after a considerable amount of work by retail organisations and trade unions to develop the campaign.

I go back to my point that all attacks on all staff are unacceptable. Other areas are covered, but the reasons I mentioned on the specific provision of upholding legislation are why we have put in a specific offence against retail workers. That is why I commend those clauses to the House. I ask the noble Baroness—although I understand that she cannot do this—at least not to push her amendment to a vote.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I rise briefly to support this amendment. This country has been good at reducing fires. It has done it by designing things and places not to burn. We have never had the same determination about designing things not to be stolen. This is all about preventing crime by design. The secondary feature is that people do not tend to steal things that have no value. There are a lot of negatives, but fundamentally, if it has value, people will steal it. They do not steal it to deprive you of it but to sell it, often to fund their drug habit. This amendment is all about taking the value out of the stolen phone.

There is some success at the moment, in that some of these phones cannot be reactivated on UK systems, but as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, they are getting activated abroad. It is hard to stop them going abroad; very small portable devices put in containers are hard to discover. Although it was mentioned that the Met and others are having good success with drones and chasing, I guarantee that one day somebody will get badly hurt—either one of the people being chased or one of the cops. Chasing is, inevitably, dangerous. This is about stopping the chase and stopping the crime.

The 70,000 crimes mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, will be a bare minimum. Many people do not bother reporting them. There is no need to report them for many people. Sometimes they lose them in embarrassing situations, and they certainly do not report it then. We are talking about a large amount of crime that can have something done to prevent it.

My final points are these. There is no incentive at the moment for the phone companies to stop this crime, because when you lose your phone or have it stolen, you buy another one from them. The £50 million-worth of phones that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned means £50 million more for the providers of the phones. So why would they stop it? All they have is more business coming through the door. The business model is not helpful to preventing crime.

It is a common-sense measure. It is well thought out. The amendment looks like it will work, given its extent and comprehensiveness, and nobody has a better idea; or, if they have, I have not heard it. This does not cost the Government anything. It will possibly cost the manufacturers, but it will be marginal to the costs and profits they have already. It is a really good idea. It helps the police a bit, but it mainly helps the victims as it reduces their number. It means that you can walk down the street, come out of the Tube, take your phone out and not have somebody whip it out of your hand.

My final point is that it is not just about theft. Often people are injured when their phone is taken—it is violence as well as theft. Particularly with vulnerable victims, nobody knows where it will end. It can end up with a murder or a very serious crime. If we can do something about this, it will have an impact. It is achievable, and I recommend that the Government, if they do not accept the amendment, try to find a way to do it in the future.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 368 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on which he has campaigned so strongly. It addresses a crime that has become a blight on our streets: the industrialised theft of mobile devices. We must remove the profit motive from street crime. If a phone is useless the moment it is stolen, the thefts will stop. California proved it and the technology exists; the only thing missing is the will to legislate. I urge the Minister to move beyond collaboration and accept the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 318 I will speak to the other amendments in my name. Amendment 318 is a revised and strengthened version of a proposal that was kindly spoken to in Committee by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. It has been modified in light of comments made then, particularly from the Government Benches. It bears on disqualifying persons convicted of a serious cycling offence.

I suspect most of us, particularly those of us who spend any time in London, have experienced the enormous discomfort of being ridden past on the pavement at speed by a cyclist who has absolutely no interest in your comfort. If one has spent any time outside this Palace, one will also have noticed that the police have no interest in enforcing the law in these circumstances. It is up to us to do something to tighten the screws on cyclists like this. They make life for pedestrians extremely uncomfortable. The practice of continual and open law- breaking just brings the whole of the law into disrepute. It is really important that we tighten things up.

Amendment 319 would insert a new offence of riding or attempting to ride a cycle while disqualified. Such an offence requires accompanying sanctions. A licensing system seems to me entirely disproportionate; it would be a heavy weight of bureaucracy. I prefer the solution adopted by the Government in their approach to cycling offences in the Bill, which is to leave them to be enforced if circumstances allow—for instance, where somebody has been involved in a serious incident that the police have taken an interest in, or a member of the public makes a complaint that the police choose to follow up. That would sit easily with current policing practices. Continuing enforcement along these lines, though limited, would, if and when a prosecution or conviction was reported in the media, send a warning message to disqualified cyclists generally.

Turning turn to Amendment 321, the thrust of Clause 121 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those applying to motor vehicles, but it leaves out disqualification. This is a missed opportunity to provide a substantial deterrent to offending. Proposed new subsection (9A), to be inserted by Amendment 321, prescribes that the period of obligatory disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five and two years, respectively. As for the other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, they will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months.

Proposed new subsection (9B) extends the definition of “disqualified” so that it can apply to cycles in a manner that is in conformity with the wording of the new cycling offences already created by the Bill. Amendments 323 to 325 add “obligatory” to the entries inserted by subsection (11) in Part I of Schedule 2; without them the amendment of Section 34 set out in Amendment 321 would be of no effect.

Amendment 333 would prescribe the penalties and mode of prosecution for the offence created by Amendment 319, and it inserts a new schedule containing minor and consequential amendments to the Road Traffic Offenders Act which is fine-tuned as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle. Sections relating only to mechanically propelled vehicles are omitted.

As someone who frequently obstructs and remonstrates with pavement cyclists, I very much hope that my amendments will attract the support of the Government. I approve of the other amendments in this group and will listen to them with great interest. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendments I propose. There are three sets affecting two themes. Amendment 343 is about the registration scheme for cyclists, and the two other groups—Amendments 326 to 328, and Amendments 330 to 332—are about creating a system to award points for offences committed by cyclists against their driving licence. They have the same theme, which is trying to get more accountability for cyclists when they hurt people or commit offences.

I do not intend to take as much time as I did in Committee, because I think the argument is fairly straightforward and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has made it. In 2015, 444 pedestrians were injured by cyclists; in 2024, that had increased to 603 and, of that number, those seriously injured had risen from 97 to 181. These numbers are based on police reporting, where the police attended. It is clear that these are minimum numbers. As a correspondent reminded me recently, it is not a legal requirement for the police to record an accident that occurs between a cyclist and a pedestrian, because it does not involve a motor vehicle. The numbers do not include incidents where the police did not attend a collision, where the pedestrian did not need medical treatment or attend their GP or a hospital— I think we have a serious gap in that information as well, because the data is not recorded well or collected at all—or where the police were not told.

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Moved by

[Lord Hogan-Howe]

326: Clause 121, page 167, line 16, after “both”, insert “and up to 12 points on any relevant driver’s licence”

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to what the Minister said. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is quite right that there is a need for a joined-up response, but I did not hear it. It is a fair challenge to the people who are opposing the Government to get their act together, but it is the job of the Government to deliver a strategy that might make a difference and I did not hear it. This has occurred quite a few times now. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, made the point about reduced traffic departments. She is quite right that it has nothing to do with this. The traffic departments of this country have never had much to do with cyclists. This is a problem of enforcement; it is not to do with the fact that traffic departments have reduced over time.

What am I asking for? I suppose I am asking for a protest vote. Every time I raise this issue, there is a rumble. People around me say afterwards, “I agree with you, we ought to do something”, but nobody can quite agree what. I am calling on the Members on the Government Benches and others to ignore their Whips. There will be a very marginal impact on their careers. I would never argue that my solution is the only one that will work, but the Government have a duty to do something. As we have all said, it is not just about older people like us complaining about cyclists. It is a general opinion among people whose views we represent.

I may lose, but courage is not measured by picking fights only that you are going to win. It is sometimes measured by picking those that you may subsequently discover that you do not have support on. With that in mind, I would like to divide the House on this amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right and that point was very strongly made in trenchant remarks by my noble friend about the issue in Kidlington. He is right that fly-tipping disproportionately affects farmland and farmers have, as he knows, very little legal recourse. It also affects deprived urban areas. I believe that, in bringing forward action in primary and secondary legislation, we need to stigmatise those who would despoil the land.

I am a regular cyclist, and it is quite dispiriting and depressing to cycle around the rural parts of the city of Peterborough and south Lincolnshire and see the exponential growth in piles of fly-tipped material on farmland and at the fringe of roads and waterways—the River Welland and the River Nene being two rivers in our area. It is very depressing, but it is a growing phenomenon, and it relates to the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham with regard to the availability or otherwise of municipal facilities for the disposal of often significant amounts of building material.

The other thing, of course, is that this is very much linked, increasingly, to organised crime. Criminal gangs operate illegal waste operations, undercutting legitimate licensed waste contractors. Tough sanctions, particularly those that target the proceeds of such activity and can confiscate vehicles and even imprison ringleaders, are something that we should seriously think about and that have been pursued in other jurisdictions.

To finish, I will very briefly—I know this is Report, but now we have the opportunity to talk about these issues—acquaint your Lordships’ House with the fly-tipping action plan that Keep Britain Tidy brought forward and published at the end of last year. Its recommendations for tackling waste crime are to shut down rogue operators by introducing tamper-proof licensing; to have taxi-style licence plates and a central searchable register; to strengthen enforcement, with tougher sentencing, which of course these amendments would facilitate; to support councils with intelligence-sharing platforms and stronger representation in the joint unit for waste crime; and, finally, to make it easier for the public, with a national awareness campaign and mandatory retailer take-back schemes for bulky items such as sofas and fridges. They all seem to be sensible proposals that would not necessarily cost the taxpayer a huge amount of money.

This is a very serious issue. These amendments are proportionate and sensible and would not be overly burdensome financially on the taxpayer. On that basis, I strongly support them and I hope the Minister will perhaps address some of the specific issues I have raised in his response.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, broadly, I support these amendments. I would have thought the Government would welcome all of them, because they seem quite common sense. They are quite tactical at times, and I would just say that two strategic things need to be considered. One is the charging regime for businesses attending recycling sites. If the charges are set too high, it encourages people to find alternative arrangements. We might condemn it, but it is a bit like smuggling tobacco—when we set the tax wrong, the smuggling of tobacco from France increases exponentially. Getting that balance right is not easy, but if you look at where you can get rid of a fridge and what charge you will make if you are a business, that really is the context in which these offences have been committed. I am not trying to provide a defence for the people involved; it just seems to me that that is one of the things causing it.

The second thing is that it is a business, so they are doing it for money. I know that there are later amendments about it being an organised crime, but obviously you have to go after the assets ruthlessly, so that when you get them you go after their home or the business. That really starts to make an impact when they realise that their life will not continue in the way that it has. I am not sure we collectively—I include the police and the Environment Agency—have had that determination.

On the amendments, for me, Amendments 13 and 21 are vital. It seems bizarre that the person who suffered once would suffer twice when they have to pay to remove the problem, unless of course they are being paid to store it or have not taken reasonable steps to make sure it does not continue, such as calling the police, the Environment Agency or anybody else to try to help make sure that it does not happen again. Fundamentally, it cannot be right if a victim is asked to pay to remove a problem they did not arrange. It seems to me that at the moment it is being treated as a civil wrong when in fact we all agree that it is a criminal wrong. This shift of culture is vital.

The best people to try to help clear the problem—forget about whose fault it is—are the local authorities. They are the ones with the equipment, the people who are skilled, and, frankly, the recycling places and the tips to get rid of it now. The consequences are that we are seeing around the country health hazards growing: sometimes toxic waste; sometimes just rat infestations. We are seeing these things growing very near to where people are living with children or anybody. That cannot be right. Something has to be done, in the sense that somebody has to act quickly to remove the pile of stuff and make sure, so far as possible, that it does not return.

The other two amendments that I support are Amendments 14 and 20, which are two sides of a similar coin. They propose giving points on licences to offenders or taking their vehicles. We have seen that they have been effective measures. It does not necessarily stop people driving, but it restricts their mobility for a while. They can still drive, but the police have now got an opportunity to lock them up because they are driving while disqualified, so it is starting to inhibit their mobility. The second thing is, obviously, to take the vehicles. A large vehicle can be worth £20,000, £50,000 or £100,000. This starts to make a difference in their business model and that, it seems to me, is vital. Of course, the side benefit is that, where vehicles are seized because they have no insurance, no tax or no test, the police can do one of two things: they can either crush them and sell the scrap and get back any tax that remains on the vehicle, or they can sell the vehicle itself, so, actually, the money that is taken from the offender is then applied straightaway to law enforcement.

The Government might want to consider whether money taken in this respect is applied either through the Environment Agency or through other bodies to make sure that it enhances their ability to reduce the amount of organised crime involved in this horrible thing that is causing such misery around the country. Therefore, if a vote is called, I will certainly support Amendment 13, but I also support the other amendments because I think they are things that could work.

[Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of these amendments. In particular, as a landowner and someone who has had fly-tipping on their property, I can say that it is extremely dangerous, even with small amounts of fly-tipping, whereby you have the fridges and the small amounts of wood or timber, particularly where you have livestock and machinery and where you have children. It brings disease and all sorts of trouble. So, there is that small level of fly-tipping, but then we also have the larger waste crimes, which are carried out by criminal gangs.

I know that, in Northern Ireland, we had a huge site at Mobuoy, outside of Londonderry. Two criminals have been prosecuted and jailed: one got 21 months and one got one year. Between them, however, their criminal gangs and their businesses are believed to have benefited to in the region of £33 million from that dumping and that waste disposal on to individual people’s land. It is absolutely criminal and we need to do more to clamp down on this, otherwise it is going to expand. Obviously, in Northern Ireland we suffer as well from cross-border fly-tipping and people coming across the border to tip their rubbish in Northern Ireland. But in general, it is something that really needs to be clamped down on, simply because there are not enough convictions and there are not enough people being caught.

National Police Service

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is the right time because the challenges that the police service faces on an international basis—from organised crime, from drugs, from international terrorism—are ones that need to drive forward this programme. The second really important thing is that it has the support of the police themselves, from the director-general of the National Crime Agency to the Chief Constables’ Council. Thirdly, it will happen because this Government have the political will to make it happen.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hintze (Con)]

My Lords—

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

We will hear from the Cross Benches next.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support the White Paper. I think it is the right broad direction and it is decisive. As the noble Lord, Lord McCabe, indicated, it has been tried before and we did not get very far. There are a lot of questions on the detail, of course. On the commission that has been set up to recommend the number of forces, can the Minister tell us a little about the direction of travel the Government would like it to take? It could recommend anywhere between 43 and six and, of course, a figure towards 43 would probably damage the model he has described for national policing and some of the regional elements of it. Can he give us a flavour of how that model might materialise?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government want to see a reduction in the number of police forces because that will make local policing more effective, save money and provide a better local service. We have not as yet given an indication because we have established the commission, which will report by this summer—it is very quick. We will shortly announce a chair and terms of reference. The Government intend this to be a speedy exercise that we can influence and then to bring forward legislation to make those changes as soon as parliamentary time allows.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hogan-Howe]

435: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Police covenant: mandatory reporting on suicide and attempted suicide(1) The Secretary of State must ensure the collection and publication of data on suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff for the purposes of supporting mental health and wellbeing under the police covenant (see section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022).(2) Each police force in England and Wales must collect and submit annually to the Secretary of State—(a) the number of confirmed suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(b) the number of attempted suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(c) contextual information, where reasonably available, including duty status, length of service, role, rank, known occupational stressors, and access to mental health support. (3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and annually thereafter, lay a report before Parliament (to be known as the “Police Covenant Mental Health Report”) which must include, but is not limited to—(a) national and force-level data trends,(b) analysis of occupational contributory factors,(c) assessment of the adequacy, usage and evidence-based outcomes of mental health and suicide prevention provisions under the police covenant,(d) recommendations to address identified risks, and(e) a statement from the Chief Medical Officer for England.(4) The report under subsection (3) must—(a) be published and disseminated to all police personnel;(b) include commentary from the College of Policing on compliance, data quality and best practice at force level;(c) include contributions from staff representative bodies and trade unions.(5) Anonymised data, disaggregated by force area, must be published, subject to data protection and safeguarding.(6) Each Chief Constable must, at the end of every calendar year, provide a statement to the Secretary of State certifying that the requirements under this section have been met by their police force.(7) Where a Chief Constable fails to provide a certification under subsection (6) without reasonable excuse, the Secretary of State must notify HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.(8) The Inspectorate must have regard to a notification under subsection (7) in the course of its inspection of that police force under the police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) programme.(9) The Secretary of State must establish an independent advisory board, to be known as the “Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board”.(10) The Board must consist of persons with expertise in clinical care, occupational health, staff representation and academic research.(11) The functions of the Board are to—(a) advise the Secretary of State on guidance relating to suicide prevention and mental health in the police workforce,(b) set standards for the collection and reporting of relevant data, and(c) review and make recommendations on force-level responses to risks identified through data and inspections.(12) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of the Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board, including provision about—(a) the Board’s procedures,(b) its terms of reference, and(c) its reporting duties.(13) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) data collection standards,(b) statutory guidance,(c) audit mechanisms, and(d) such further oversight as may be considered necessary.(14) In this section, “police officer” and “police staff” have the same meanings as in section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support and move the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, to which I have added my name. I also support the other two amendments in this group. The reason for the amendments is that the Police Federation of England and Wales is concerned because it believes—but is not sure—that there is an increased rate of suicide among police officers, and it has a similar concern around police staff. For those noble Lords who do not know, about two-thirds of police work is done by police officers and about a third by employees who are police staff.

The Police Federation was concerned because it intuitively thought that the numbers were rising, so it sent out FoI requests to each of the 43 forces—in fact, there are also three non-Home Office forces. Unfortunately, it got only 34 replies, which has not helped it in determining whether there is a real problem. It could be worried for no cause, but at the moment it is struggling to establish the facts. The difficulty is that it cannot get hold of the data. I am really concerned about this, because it seems to me that it should not be that difficult.

I suspect that, even if the numbers of suicides are increasing, there are probably not going to be hundreds, even among a workforce of a quarter of a million. It is probably a relatively small number—probably tens rather than hundreds. Even for the biggest organisations, you would think that they would be able to find this data. For the smallest forces, surely they can remember the individuals. Some of the smaller forces we heard about in the police reforms announced yesterday have about 1,000 people, so there are not going to be so many that small forces could not remember whom this shocking thing had happened to. Police officers and police staff are generally relatively young people. They do not tend to die when they are in service, and when they die through suicide, it is a terrible shock for everybody involved.

There would be complications in gathering the data. As the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, proposes, it would be helpful to get the data not only about those who have committed suicide but also about those who have attempted it. Establishing whether a death is a suicide or not relies on a coroner; that is the only absolute way in which we can say that there has definitely been a suicide. Sometimes, to be fair, coroners are sympathetic. They realise that this can feel to the family like a judgment, and often they will find any way that they can, in law, to find an alternative, so getting hold of the data can be difficult.

Of course, who can say what an attempted suicide is? There is no absolute proof of that. I suspect that the occupational health units in each of the 43 forces have some data. Because that is medical data, however, they cannot always share it with the employer. If it is relevant just to that person but is not relevant to their employment; it is a confidential issue and, if the individual wants it kept secret, then that is entirely up to them, and the occupational health units might not be able to share it.

It is vital to get this data for a couple of reasons. One is to establish patterns, if there are patterns; for example, does it affect certain roles? We know already that it is an awful job for certain officers and staff who view, for example, child abuse images as part of their general work. To have to sustain that work over months and years, even with all the welfare support that they get, might make it an area that we would be worried about if we saw that there was an increase in the number of suicides; likewise, among firearms officers or dog handlers, male or female—the role does not really matter. We just need to understand what it is, obviously, to try to prevent it.

What worries me about not being able to get hold of this data—it ought to be possible to get at least some of it—is what it says about the relationship with the chief officers, the Police Federation and the unions. There is a statutory requirement for the chiefs to meet personally with the head of the federation every quarter, and to meet with the unions. I am sure my colleagues will also explain that. Beyond that formal requirement, we also meet them informally, usually about once a month. Chiefs should be meeting their federation reps at times such as bravery awards, and there are various other internal mechanisms.

If they are concerned, it is hard to imagine that they have not mentioned it. If they have mentioned it, why have they not got a response? Why has it ended up with FoI requests, three-quarters of which have been badly answered? In fact, some of those who did not reply were the biggest forces of all. Sometimes people take it that 30-odd out of 40-odd forces is three-quarters; it is three-quarters of the forces, but some of the forces are very big and some are very small, so we do not have any representative data.

My final point is for the Home Office. There are, broadly, two amendments here. One is very detailed from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, about not only how the data is gathered but what is done with it afterwards. My amendment just says that the Home Office might want to collect this data. I wonder whether the Home Office has asked for it and also been refused; perhaps the Home Office could be interested as well.

It is important for two reasons. First, when people are committing suicide in their employment, it matters that we establish whether it is their employment that is causing it, or there is something else that the employer has absolutely nothing to do with. The employer might have been able to help had they had some sensitivity to the problems that their staff are facing. Secondly, policing is about care. Those who serve must look after each other. My test is always that at 3 am, when everybody else has gone home, you cannot call the police if you have a problem, so you must rely on your colleagues.

It is vital for any employer to care for their staff because they want better performance, and to make sure that their staff can do what they are paying them a salary for. But in policing and the emergency services in particular, you must rely on each other and look after each other. If that is not done properly, or if there is anything we could do to help a person, but they then take their own life and we could have noticed, it is probably the worst example, and, surely, we would all want to do something about that. It matters for many reasons and that is why I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, and have tabled my own. I beg to move Amendment 435.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that, having heard what I have said, the noble Lord will today withdraw the amendment in Committee. Obviously, I will keep the House updated on the outcomes of the roundtable that has been organised. I will just say that the Committee amendment is helpful but the roundtable was an initiative that the Government were doing prior to this stage of the Bill and one that I know we want to see through. We want to get this right because it is important and I am grateful to noble Lords for raising the issue today. However, I ask them, at this stage at least, not to press the amendments, given what I have said.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister for such a constructive response and of course I thank everyone for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a point that I had not made in my speech but that I want to amplify: in collecting the data, we should consider people for at least 12 months after retirement. He mentioned one particular case, but we can all perhaps imagine others and, if there is a link, that would be interesting to look at.

I hope we do not have to end up with legislation, because, in a way, that would be an admission of failure. There are far better ways of achieving it without that, or the bureaucracy that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, mentioned. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for his usual powerful support for this and for saying it is common sense that this needs sorting out—there was no challenge on that from the Minister. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for their wholehearted support.

A couple of important things have through in the debate. First, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned the potential link to misconduct processes. If that is an issue, we need to understand why. We had an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, on a previous Committee day about potential deadlines or timelines for how long these things take; that cannot be unconnected. Whatever it is, we need to understand what it is about.

There is a second very important HR issue: are we recruiting people who understand the nature of the job they are about to embark on? Are we sharing the nature of the challenges? Are we supporting them at the beginning if they have things that they are not sure about? It is important, for the reasons we have all talked about, to make sure that this happens. I am really reassured about the round table. It would be really helpful if, by Report, we had a definite route forward, because I can see there are various routes.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Can I raise one point with the noble Lord? It seems to me—certainly from reflecting on my own police service—that one of the issues regarding suicide simply was the fact that police managers were unable to identify the issues when they arose. I wonder whether he, as a former commissioner and part of the inspectorate, has a view on that.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, makes a really good point: are we training our managers and supervisors to recognise the signs? For good reasons, occupational health units keep all this data together privately. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, mentioned a referral to the medical officer to see whether there was a problem; I wonder how many referrals are coming back the other way to let the manager know that this person might have an issue, not necessary to talk about suicide but to say there is a stress issue and they may need some support. Has it become a one-way valve that protects their privacy but reduces their safety? There are many facets to it that I hope the round table might address. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and thank the Government for their response.

Amendment 435 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hogan-Howe]

422A: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.

I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.

On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.

Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.

Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.

First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?

At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.

This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.

Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.

There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.

There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.

Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

--- Later in debate ---

There is a point in the general thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. There is a problem that needs to be resolved, but I suggest that the Government can resolve it without the legislative proposal before the Committee. I ask the noble Lord, who nobly volunteered to move the amendment, to now nobly volunteer to withdraw it.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is certainly a first for me.

I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.

I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 422A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.

I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.

Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?

Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.

While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.

First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for reminding us of his late-night work the other night, and I look forward to discussing that subject when we come back to it on Report. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing a practical police view to this very difficult debate. I come at this from a position essentially in favour of these clauses not standing part, for the reasons so far advanced by my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Black, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

This is a difficult question. Unquestionably, it is a difficult question. If it were not, we would not be here. We have, as parliamentarians, as legislators, to work out where the balance should lie between the desire for anonymity for police officers in these circumstances and the desire for openness, open justice and the ability of the public—not just the press but the public as a whole—to see what is being done in their name in the court system.

I hope I shall not go on too long merely repeating what others have already said, but it is worth reminding ourselves that the courts work on the basis of open justice. The public are entitled to watch, to read and to comment about trials, and to know who has been charged and prosecuted and with what result. There are exceptions to protect national security, vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences and children. We have a regime for, first of all, providing for reporting restrictions; secondly, for restricting public access to the courtroom and for holding all or part of some trials in private; and, thirdly, for withholding the name of witnesses—for example, under a witness order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. But a witness order under that provision is a special measure of the last practical resort, and requires the court to be vigorous in its consideration of the statutory hurdles that have to be overcome and to ensure that the defendant is not irreparably disadvantaged or denied a fair trial. Fourthly, we have within that regime provision for anonymity in investigations—for example, when considering fatal gang crimes involving the use of guns and knives by those aged 11 to 30.

Police officers are human—I underline the word “human”. They are a human example of state power—and I underline the word “state”. We respect and we admire them for their often dangerous and selfless work. We know from our own work here in Parliament how vital police officers are for our own protection. I was not far away from the scene of PC Palmer’s murder in March 2017. He was unarmed and later awarded a posthumous George Medal, but there were armed officers there who had to kill PC Palmer’s murderer. I heard those shots as I walked along the colonnade in New Palace Yard from my office in Portcullis House to take part in a Division in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, may well have gone through the same experience. I was grateful then, as I am to this day, to the police men and women on duty that day who ushered me and other Members of the other place to safety, regardless of their own.

But it is, in the final analysis, a matter of judgment on which side of this argument we need to come down—on the side of anonymity or on that of open justice. I bear in mind the need for armed police officers and their families to be protected from reprisals, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. I bear in mind the operational need not to discourage volunteers suitably qualified to become armed response officers or armed officers. We have been reminded this morning of the case of Martyn Blake, which created, I think, the genesis of these clauses.

However, I also bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands. I would not describe this as a constitutional outrage; it is a perfectly rational debate about which side of a difficult line one wishes to land. It is not a constitutional outrage to do one thing or the other. It is just advancing an argument. But I bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands for open justice, for public trust and for transparency in a justice system that applies to us all without creating different categories of defendant as a question of blanket rule. Blanket rules of the sort envisaged by Clauses 152 to 155 are, I suggest, best avoided where a stronger, focused case-by-case approval approach can be achieved—and it is, in my experience, already achieved under our current system.

In the last few days, we have seen the ICE officer shoot that woman driving her car in Minnesota. Of course I have only seen the news footage, but I suggest that, here, that ICE officer would be prosecuted for murder, subject to any defence he could advance. That case aside, we face the problem of some lawyers and campaigners using every police shooting as the basis of an anti-police pile-on, or for some other political campaign that they happen to support. In short, if we are, as I hope we will be, sceptical about Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill, we must prevent the appalling hunting parties against the police. Let us then pause and reflect before agreeing to these clauses.

I dare say we will not make a decision today, other than that the issue advanced by my noble friend Lord Black will be withdrawn. But we all have a little time between now and Report—we come here with the best of intentions and good will—to think a little more carefully about the practical solution to this, and whether we need to use the blunderbuss of legislation or whether we can still rely on judicial discretion, vigorously applied and well argued for in each separate case, to see where justice can be found.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him this? I respect his opinion, for obvious reasons, but one issue he did not address—it was one of my arguments for why these clauses should stand part—is the difficulty of proving the threat at the beginning of an investigation. It is not straightforward. We have to say that someone out there is going to kill this officer or try to attack them—that there is a threat to them in some way. Of course we all make our best attempts to assess whether that is accurate or not. He describes the present system as a blanket arrangement, but actually there is only an assumption, which can be removed, and in the Kaba case was removed. That leaves the officer at risk of that decision being automatic—that is, to be named if they cannot prove otherwise. Why should they bear the risk of being named, when the reverse could allow, first, an assumption they would not be named, and if later that changed, they could be named. What we can never do is name someone, then introduce anonymity—so it is a one-way valve that surely the law might help to respect.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

The matter that the noble Lord is bringing up is the very sort of discussion that ought to be had in front of the judge. Presumably, no prosecutor, and no one acting on behalf of a police officer who wished to maintain his anonymity, would advance an argument unless there were some basis for it. If someone went in front of the judge and said, “I’m generally fearful that, just because he’s a police officer who bears arms, he is likely to be the victim of reprisal”, I think they would probably need to do a bit better than that. I suspect nobody would go in front of the judge and make that argument unless they had something better than that.

I suspect that, in the usual run of things, there will be information. It may not be information that the court would wish the world at large to know about. It could be intelligence evidence. It could be other information that both the applicant—the applicant police officer or the applicant prosecutor—and the judge would agree should be kept private. That surely can be done now. We have all sorts of national security cases where evidence is not disclosed to the world at large. All I ask is: let us just think a little bit further. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall come to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and as the Government do in their clauses. But I have yet to be persuaded that we have got to the right answer today.