Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Bishop of Manchester Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, can I add my two-penn’orth to this? I declare my interest as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee, but I am speaking more as a serving Bishop. I have to hear disciplinary complaints against clergy. Sometimes those clergy have committed something which is being investigated first by the police. To answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often the police tell us, “We don’t want you interfering until we have finished”. If the result of the criminal proceeding is that the person is convicted, I can then do quite a summary process in terms of applying a penalty or perhaps depriving that member of the clergy from serving in their parish, perhaps banning them from ministry for a time or for life. But all of that is very much on that balance of probabilities, on the civil standard. It is very different from the criminal standard.

There are many cases where the police investigation may not lead to a trial or may lead to a trial and acquittal but there are still major issues around the suitability of that person to be a minister of religion, such as their safeguarding ability. I need to be able to reassure my people in my diocese by following a proper disciplinary process on exactly the same facts as the criminal case was dealing with, but to that very different standard of proof.

Again, as chair of police ethics, I think the ability of the police to be respected by the public, for me, demands that there are occasions when somebody who has been acquitted at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt should still then face the disciplinary matter at that civil standard of the balance of probabilities, so I could not support this current amendment.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 392 in my name is about fairness, discipline and humanity.

First, misconduct investigations that drift on for months and years are damaging to everyone involved—the officer, the family, the complainant and public confidence in the system. Secondly, where these cases run on endlessly, the consequences can be severe. Long investigations place huge strain on mental health and, in the worst cases, such prolonged uncertainty has been linked to suicide. That alone should make this House pause and ask whether the current system is working as it should. Thirdly, I want to stress that this amendment does not block proper investigation and does not touch criminal matters. It simply says that, after 12 months, there should be independent scrutiny by a legally qualified person so that cases can move on properly and an officer can either be brought back into service or removed from the service without delay. Finally, swift justice is a matter for all involved. It matters for the innocent officer who should not be left in limbo. It matters for the complainants who deserve prompt and credible outcomes. Justice delayed helps no one; this amendment would bring greater urgency, greater accountability and a greater sense of fairness to the police disciplinary system.

Morale in the police force, particularly in the Met, is very low and one of the things that officers continually point to is the length of investigations when an officer is accused of something. This is not to say whether the officer is innocent or not—that is a whole other affair—it is the length of the investigation. If you speak to any of your local bobbies, particularly if they are an officer, they are likely to tell you they are considering leaving. When you probe a bit deeper, this question of investigations always comes up. One of the major roles of this Government now has to be to improve police morale by doing the right thing and making the whole system fairer.

I come from the Black community, the community arguably most over and under policed simultaneously in this country. If we are to have a police force that can actually care for the people who have the most interaction with the police, we need to raise their morale. I commend this amendment to the House. It could be a very good step in the right direction to make these investigations fair and to raise police morale.