Baroness Ludford
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(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
Order—that was an intervention.
I have two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. Why does the noble and learned Baroness think 50 countries have found this not to be a problem? Abortion is decriminalised in virtually every country that has had abortion legislation since the 1967 Act. So, I am wondering why the noble and learned Baroness thinks that is a problem. My second question is: why does the noble and learned Baroness think that adding further complications, which the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would, would make this any better?
You cannot have two interventions.
I do not know the answer to the first question. I have not looked at what goes on in other jurisdictions; I do not know how well it works or whether it works. Secondly, it seems to me that there should be a lot of changes to the way this is all dealt with. If the police investigated the man as well as the woman, one would hope they would not pursue their investigations.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, it is Committee. Everyone can have a turn, as long as they stick to the speaking limits, so perhaps we could just take it around the Committee.
I would just be grateful, and I will be brief, to get a clarification—
Before the Government Whip sits down, could he please remind the Committee that interventions have to be brief and cannot go on into speeches? Can he also remind the Committee that those who have put their names to these amendments should be heard prior to those who have not?
Lord Katz (Lab)
First, there are no points of order in our self-regulating House. Secondly, the noble Baroness makes the point about interventions very ably. Thirdly, as I said, there is time for everyone in Committee to both move their amendments and speak to other amendments, so I suggest we just take it in a reasonable order. I will leave it to the Committee to decide who speaks next.
My Lords, I will be brief—I would just be grateful for a clarification. I strongly believe in women’s rights, including reproductive rights, and I do not want women in distress subjected to criminal investigation, if at all avoidable. But I am struggling to understand why Clause 191 is considered not to amend the Abortion Act, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, among others, asserts. I noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, said it would be “toothless” if Clause 191 is agreed.
If I have understood it properly, people other than the pregnant woman concerned would still be committing a criminal offence if they gave any kind of assistance. That is why it is considered that the Abortion Act 1967 is not in fact amended. The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, referred to repealed abortion offences, so we seem to be relying on the fact that only the woman herself would be regarded as decriminalised. I am not generally happy about decriminalisation, such as in relation to drugs. I prefer dotting the “i”s and crossing the “t”s and having legalisation—or not.
Have I understood that correctly? Maybe it is only when we come to the Minister that I will get full clarification as to whether or not we are amending the Abortion Act 1967, which I broadly support, even though it is a compromise. I have never supported the simple but simplistic “a woman’s right to choose”, because there are other considerations. I support the Abortion Act as a compromise on a difficult subject, as I think many people do, but I seek clarification that the Abortion Act is not being amended and that we would simply decriminalise the woman concerned while supposedly leaving the rest of the Abortion Act as it is.
What our amendment does is disapply the Abortion Act so far as the mother and late-term abortions are concerned.
Then I am not terribly attracted by the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am rather more attracted by that of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, although I have heard the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about that.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I assist the noble Baroness? Clause 191 is perfectly clear in that no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. It simply does not affect the criminal offences that are committed by any person, whether a doctor or otherwise, who assists a woman. There are precedents for that distinction in the Suicide Act 1961. The act of suicide is lawful, but it is unlawful to assist.
I do grasp that point, although I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for assisting me. In a broader sense, can it be relied on that Clause 191 would not have a wash effect over the Abortion Act 1967, which has been subjected to various attempts at amendment but has largely held the course since 1967? I understand all the very good reasons for it, but how we can be sure that this decriminalisation of the woman concerned would not ultimately lead to an amendment of the Abortion Act 1967.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Verdirame has explained, my noble friend Lady Wolf cannot be here today, so I will pick up some of her points in this intervention as she is not here to make them herself. If we want to change the law, many say that Clause 191 will improve the situation for women’s bodily autonomy. I am all for that, but only after a considered debate, which we had in the past when we amended the Abortion Act 1967 to bring it into conformity with changing medical science and social attitudes. It is not as though we are stuck in aspic. This Bill is not the place to do so, as the breadth of amendments that this clause has attracted demonstrates.
I will concentrate mainly on the Covid-era regulations which permitted the obtaining of pills by post at any point of gestation, whereas previously, later stages required face-to-face consultation between the pregnant woman and doctors under the Abortion Act. This may have been necessary during lockdown, and it is a failure on the part of the then Government not to have contemplated a review after lockdown ended. As things stand, Clause 191 will facilitate changes where decriminalisation of late-stage and full-term abortions may well create additional dangers to women’s health, as pointed out at Second Reading by numerous noble Lords. It will also open the door to coerce women to seek late-term abortions against their own wishes. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is not in her seat, but I think that is the point that she was trying to get to in her intervention.
If there is no sanction in law, what reason can one give a controlling partner who insists that it is perfectly permissible in law? Decriminalisation suggests that there is nothing to prevent the woman from aborting late-term through the convenience of pills by post, virtually no questions asked. So you have the perverse effect that, alongside the certainty of greater autonomy for women, we may well see the risk of coercive control and deception. I am sure that is not what the movers of this amendment in the other place sought.
My noble friend Lady Wolf made the point that while home-based abortions have become common, they normally use two drugs in the form of pills: mifepristone, which blocks progesterone, needed in pregnancy, but does not kill the foetus; and misoprostol, which basically causes cramping, bleeding and the emptying of the uterus. If taken early in pregnancy, the result is the same as an early miscarriage, in effect, and in England and Wales it is allowable for abortions up to 10 weeks of gestation.
The pills are advertised as simple to use and as creating early miscarriages with bleeding and perhaps some bits of tissue. So the descriptions are reassuring and encouraging. However, the reality may be very different and life-threatening to the woman, who, whatever her reasons for wishing to terminate the pregnancy, may not appreciate the complications. Pills by post do not require further safeguards than those put into place by the 1967 Act other than a phone or virtual call, which is the least satisfactory method of ascertaining stress, emotional distress or, indeed, coercive pressure.
I want to share with the Committee some examples of emotional pressure. Noble Lords may be aware of the case of Stuart Worby in December 2024. I am grateful to the prosecuting counsel, Edmund Vickers KC of Red Lion Chambers, for giving me some background information to this case. I should add, before I say anything further, that the victim is subject to lifelong anonymity.
In December 2024 the judge summed up the details of the case. A central aspect was that the victim married the defendant after the commencement of the pregnancy. He wished to terminate the pregnancy, but she wished to keep her baby, with or without him. He set about securing the termination without her knowledge and used a female friend to obtain abortive drugs from an online private clinic. The judge pointed out that he must have known that this was dangerous for his wife, as he knew she was many weeks past the time limit to use the drugs safely.
When Mr Worby received the drugs, he first added mifepristone to food and drink. The next day he told the victim that he wanted to try something sexually new in bed, which involved blindfolding her and tying her up. The real purpose was to insert the second type of medication, misoprostol, into her vagina. Shortly after he had done that, she became unwell, and the next day she suffered a miscarriage, losing the baby that she so badly yearned for. The judge’s remarks explained that the offence of administering poison to bring about a miscarriage was made more serious by Mr Worby’s prolonged research and planning over many weeks, by his involving others, by bringing about a miscarriage, and by the devastating effect it had on his then wife’s dream of having a child.
This sorry tale attempts to demonstrate that it is not only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the woman who may wish to terminate her pregnancy or the unborn child. There is a further factor here: the partner, the husband or other members of the family who may seek coercion.