Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are what I will term minor drafting changes designed to clarify the operation of the new offences in Clauses 65 to 67 and 69.

Amendments 199 to 208 and 210 to 229 make minor changes to ensure that the operation of the child sexual abuse image-generator offence at Clauses 65 to 67 is clear and consistent across the United Kingdom. Amendments 230 to 233 make drafting changes to clarify the language used in the “paedophile manual” offence at Clause 69.

These amendments do not modify the policy intention behind these offences; rather, they make necessary clarificatory changes to ensure that they operate effectively. I beg to move and hope that the House will agree.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s technical amendments. We spent some time in Committee debating the definition of a “thing” used to generate horrific CSA images. I am pleased that the Government have tabled Amendment 201 to clarify that a “thing” explicitly includes a service.

Modern AI is not just a program sitting on a hard drive but an ephemeral, cloud-based service. By adopting this broader language, we ensure that those who provide the underlying infrastructure for CSA image generation cannot evade responsibility through technical loopholes. These may appear to be technical drafting changes, but they provide the necessary teeth for the primary offences in Clauses 65 to 67.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are largely consequential and minor drafting changes. They relate to the important topic of child sexual abuse image generators. I have little to say to this group other than that the topic which they address is one of serious and urgent concern.

The rapid emergence of generative AI has presented new and troubling challenges. The recent Grok AI scandal, in which an AI model generated harmful sexual content publicly, some of which involved children, highlighted the potential for mainstream tools to be misused in ways that normalise or distribute abusive material. That episode underlines why robust legal safeguards are essential as technology evolves.

The Government have continued to delay passing legislation regarding AI regulation, which was alluded to as far back as 2024. I thank the Minister for his assurances that the Government will continue to monitor developments in this area and work with industry to protect children from abuse and exploitation.

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[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I can see what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is saying about Third Reading, but it would be wiser to vote for this amendment now—if noble Lords have any conscience at all, they have to vote for it—and if it is slightly defective it can be amended at Third Reading. If we do not do it now, there is a huge risk of it not coming back.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I strongly support Amendment 209, which was so convincingly spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was very pleased to have signed it, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes.

This amendment is a vital safeguard against the “innovation first, safety later” culture of big tech. Although the Bill will rightly prohibit the creation of models specifically designed to generate CSA images, it remains silent on general-purpose models that can be easily manipulated or jailbroken to produce the same horrific results. As the unacceptable use of tools such as Grok—referred to by my noble friend Lady Benjamin in her powerful speech—has recently illustrated, we cannot leave the safety of our children to chance. We face a technological and moral emergency. The Internet Watch Foundation, represented at the meeting today which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and my noble friend mentioned, has warned of a staggering 380% increase in confirmed cases of AI-generated child exploitation imagery. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is right that the extent of this abuse is sickening beyond imagination.

The amendment would mandate a safety-by-design intervention, requiring providers to proactively risk-assess their services and report identified risks to Ofcom within 48 hours. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, pushed back against this proposal, arguing that it

“would place unmanageable and unnecessary operational burdens on … the National Crime Agency and Ofcom”.—[Official Report, 27/11/25; col. 1533.]

He further claimed that these measures risk creating “legal uncertainty” by “duplicating” the Online Safety Act. Both assertions need rebutting. First, protecting children from an industrial-scale explosion of AI-generated abuse is not an unnecessary burden; it is the primary duty of our law enforcement and regulatory bodies. Secondly, we cannot rely on the theoretical protections of an Online Safety Act designed for a world before generative AI. Ofcom itself has maintained what might be called a tactical ambiguity about how the Act applies to stand-alone AI chatbots and large language models.

Alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who we will support if she puts the amendment to a vote, we ask for an ex ante duty: providers must check whether their models can be used to generate CSAM before they are released to the public. Voluntary commitments and retrospective enforcement are simply not enough. The Government have already committed to this principle; it is time to put that commitment into statute. I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209 and ensure that we move away from ex post measures that address harm only after a child has been victimised.

The current definitions of “search” and “user-to-user” services do not neatly or comprehensively capture these new generative technologies. We cannot allow a situation where tech developers release highly capable models to the public without first explicitly checking whether they can be used to generate CSAM. Voluntary commitments and retrospective civil enforcement are simply not enough. We need this explicit statutory duty in the Bill today and I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 209, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of relevant online services to assess and address the risks that their platforms may be used for the creation, sharing or facilitation of child sexual abuse material, placing a strengthened duty on them to take preventive action. More than anyone in this Chamber, I fully recognise the intention behind strengthening preventive mechanisms and ensuring that providers properly assess and mitigate risks to children. Requiring companies to examine how their services may facilitate abuse is, in principle, entirely sensible. The scale and evolving nature of online exploitation means that proactive duties are essential.

However, I have some concerns about the proposed mechanism, on which I hope the Minister may also be able to provide some input. The amendment appears to rely on providers conducting their own risk assessments. That immediately raises several practical questions, such as what objective standard those assessments would be measured against, whether there would be statutory guidance setting out minimum criteria, and how consistency would be ensured across companies of vastly different sizes and capabilities. There also remains the crucial question of what enforcement mechanisms would apply if an assessment was superficial or inadequate. Without clear parameters and oversight, there is a danger that such a system could become uneven in practice.

I would welcome reassurance from the Minister as to how the Government intend to ensure that risk-based duties in this space are transparent and robust for the purposes of child protection. The question is not whether we act, but how. We all share the same objective of reducing the prevalence of child sexual abuse material and protecting children from exploitation. The challenge is ensuring that the mechanisms we legislate for are clear and enforceable in practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, in speaking on issues related to online safety, I seem to spend most of my time apologising for the fact that the Act is not as up-to-date, efficient or effective as it should be, but here is another example of where technology has overtaken the good work that we did all those years ago to try to bring forward that legislation.

I learned about this at the same meeting that has been referred to already. At first sight, it looks as though it is an answer to a lot of problems that we have with the way in which younger people in particular interact with the internet. Those of us who were involved in pursuing what is now the Online Safety Act will be aware that we were largely looking at the user end of the material and cycle, looking at the apps and their interactions, that were being generated by those who were involved in servicing the internet. We did not look at technology in the hardware side at all and had no real thought about anything that we were dealing with in the then Bill affecting it. Yet this seems a very interesting and easy-to-adopt technology that would solve a lot of problems in relation to issues about the spread of material, which we would think should not be available where there are things like age bars or other means of providing gaps in the access to it.

There are always going to be problems with how we manage the changeover between childhood and adulthood, and we are aware that the technology is moving fast on that as well. It may well be that what is current today may be out of date by the time this Bill becomes law. But the Government should look very closely at the way in which this technology operates to prevent, at the equipment level, access to material which should not be seen by children particularly.

There will, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has said, be issues about free speech, and I do not think we should underestimate those. There are obviously ways in which this could be used against societal values; but for the particularity of how children are to be protected, making it impossible for them to access material, which they should by law not see, on the equipment they buy seems a very useful way forward, and I commend it to Ministers.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Let me say from the outset that, in principle, on these Benches we conditionally support Amendment 239A, which has been spoken to so powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.

The noble Lord very clearly set out the urgent issues involved, as did my noble friend Lady Benjamin and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and all of us who were there in the same meeting which we have referred to before. We are at a technological and moral crisis point, as we have debated in a previous group regarding child sexual abuse material online. We face a children’s mental health catastrophe, and the ubiquity of child sexual abuse material is a central driver of that catastrophe.

The noble Lord, Lord Nash, has explained that his amendment would mandate that manufacturers and importers of smartphones and tablets ensure their devices satisfy a CSAM requirement to prevent the creation, viewing, and sharing of such material.

The question, however, clearly arises as to whether this would undermine encryption or privacy. We recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Nash, in his revised Amendment 239A, does indeed include a duty of privacy in his regulations. In my view, the thing to avoid is the chance that a technological fix of this kind could involve some degree of surveillance. I do agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that, at first sight, the technology looks extremely promising, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, mentioned, but, before taking this further, we need to be absolutely sure about the robustness of this technology and its impact on privacy.

By requiring software to be preloaded at the system level, we would move away from the model of parental controls and platform responsibility, and we would place the duty on the manufacturers who profit from these devices. Quite apart from that, we do, of course, also need to ensure that the platforms take action.

The Minister may promise further consultation, but we do not need much more consultation to know that the status quo is failing; we need to find a solution now rather than playing an endless game of digital catch-up. As other others have urged, I hope that the Government will take a look at this proposal urgently, closely and seriously.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses one of the gravest and most distressing areas of criminality: the sexual exploitation of children and the creation and circulation of child sexual abuse material. There will be no disagreement among noble Lords about the objective behind these amendments. The scale of this crime is deeply alarming and becoming increasingly technologically sophisticated. The question before us is not whether we act but how.

I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Nash. Once again, I entirely understand and support the underlying aim. The goal of ensuring that devices supplied in the UK have highly effective, tamper-proof system software capable of preventing the transmission or viewing of CSAM is a commendable one. Preventing abuse at source is always preferable to prosecuting it after the harm has occurred.

I recognise that Amendment 239A includes express provisions intended to safeguard user privacy, requiring that any such software must operate in a way that does not collect, retain, copy or transmit data outside the device, nor determine the identity of the user. It also provides for affirmative parliamentary approval of the regulations.

However, it is still hard to overlook the practical challenges that may arise from this amendment. Determined offenders frequently exploit encrypted platforms and modify operating systems, often using overseas-hosted services. A requirement limited to devices supplied for use in the UK could be circumvented by overseas purchases or software alterations. Even with privacy safeguards written into the regulation-making power, this amendment may still raise complex issues relating to encryption, cyber security, technical feasibility and enforcement. Mandating tamper-proof software across all relevant devices would represent a significant expansion of the regulatory framework established under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022.

While I strongly support the objective of forestalling child sexual exploitation and disrupting the circulation of abuse material, I am not yet persuaded that this amendment provides a workable legislative solution. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government are strengthening preventative technology and ensuring that industry plays a meaningful role in protecting children, while maintaining a framework that is technically feasible and legally robust.

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[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I also completely support these amendments, noble Lords will be unsurprised to hear. I have just a couple of points, because so many have been made very well already. I can feel the exhaustion of victims, still, in all this. The idea that you have to chase around all the different websites and service providers, and take it on trust, is just not acceptable: no way.

The Government have to be really careful when they make big announcements that get a lot of coverage like “One and done” or “A nudification tech ban is done”, which we will come on to later, because that leaves victims with a false sense of hope because, if we discover that that is not the case, that is just not good.

But obviously I want to thank the Minister for listening; that was a powerful point that was made before. I certainly will be backing these amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly—I hope as briefly as other noble Lords—to, first, thank the Government for the movement that they have made in tabling their amendments. Secondly, I support my noble friend Lady Doocey with her Amendment 277, which would extend the aspect of voyeurism. Thirdly, and in particular, I support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, nearly all of which I have co-signed, which address the devastating viral nature of non-consensual intimate image abuse, on which she has so effectively campaigned. Her amendments seek, I believe very effectively, to close the gaps that leave victims traumatised by the repeated uploading of their abuse.

In Committee, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, resisted the call from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for a statutory NCII hash register, arguing that it would lead to duplication of work already being done voluntarily by organisations such as the Revenge Porn Helpline and tech platforms. But voluntary compliance is not a systemic solution. CSAM is tackled systematically because it is mandated. NCII victims deserve the exact same proactive statutory infrastructure to prevent cross-posting and reuploads.

The Minister also resisted the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, which sought strict deletion orders, claiming that existing deprivation orders were sufficient. Yet research shows that only a tiny fraction of intimate image prosecutions result in deprivation orders, leaving abusers with copies of the images in their cloud accounts. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained exactly why we need the new orders very clearly.

In Committee, the Minister dismissed the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, which sought to tackle the degrading practice of semen images, claiming that the drafting was too broad and might inadvertently criminalise a woman fully clothed at a hen night posing with a novelty item. I very much welcome the change of heart by the Minister, the Home Office and the MoJ in that respect.

We are talking about the targeted sick degradation of women’s images online and the law must adapt to protect women from this rapidly growing form of abuse. I believe that when a conviction is secured, the court must have the power to order the destruction of images and the disclosure of passwords. Without this, the victim lives in perpetual fear of reupload.

I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, has made a very strong case for her amendments, which make substantial improvements to the government proposals. I welcome the government proposals, but I believe they could go further.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I associate myself with what my noble friend Lord Russell said about the remarkable contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I also thank the Minister for all her efforts today to explain the Government’s position, and for the amendments that she has brought forward on behalf of the Government.

Amendment 298 is very important because it seeks to regulate online harmful content, and I very much support the principle. However, I will raise an important quibble. Amendment 298 defines what is meant by “harmful material” by reference to a number of very specific matters that I think we would all agree should not be online, such as material that

“promotes or encourages sexual activity that would be an offence under the Sexual Offences Act”,

or any sexual act that is

“non-consensual, or … appears to be non-consensual”

or

“threatens a person’s life … or is likely to result … in serious injury to a person”,

et cetera.

I have no difficulty with that: I entirely agree with it. However, I am concerned that, in subsection (2)(b) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 298, “harmful material” also includes that which

“would be an offence under … the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or the Obscene Publications Act 1964”.

I am concerned that that would be a very unwise way for us to regulate online content. The reason is that that Act is notoriously vague and uncertain. It depends on jury assessments of what would “deprave and corrupt” a person. It does not seem appropriate or necessary to include that element of harmful conduct when the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, lists, in perfectly sensible and acceptable ways, the specific types of content that ought not to be online and that should be prohibited.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as with the last group, we on these Benches support the Government’s amendments, but we do not believe that they go far enough. Alongside the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Pannick, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her tireless work on the Independent Pornography Review and subsequently. We on these Benches fully support her amendments to ban step-incest pornography and content that mimics child sexual abuse, to implement age verification for those featured on porn sites and AI nudification apps and to establish vital parity between online and offline pornography regulation.

I will be extremely brief. Amendment 298 in particular would create parity between offline and online regulation. Offline content that would not be classified by the BBFC should not be legal online. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, rightly proposes a monitoring role for the BBFC to support Ofcom’s enforcement and I very much hope that the Government will concede on this. If the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are taken on board, the Government can easily alter that amendment at ping-pong.

I have also signed Amendment 281A. The Government’s nudification amendments are clearly too narrow. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has described, by limiting scope to UK products, they ignore the global nature of this harm. We must go further to capture possession and use of any software designed to produce these non-consensual images. I very much hope that we will be able to avoid votes on the four amendments that the noble Baroness has put forward, and that the Government will take them on board.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, the many amendments in this group all concern the regulation of online pornography. It is notable that many of the amendments have been signed by noble Lords from parties across the political spectrum, showing a very firm desire in your Lordships’ House to regulate harmful online pornography. I again thank my noble friend Lady Bertin for the extensive work that she has carried out in this area and I echo what has been said by several noble Lords this evening in support of her long-standing commitment to this cause. I also thank other noble Lords who have not only spoken this evening but been involved in efforts elsewhere to make the online pornography space safer for children and adults.

I will focus briefly on some of my noble friends’ amendments. Amendment 281A, as we have heard, would create an offence for the possession of software that can produce nude images of another individual. These Benches are fully supportive of this amendment. It goes a significant way in ensuring that women and girls are protected.