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21:30 - Division on Amendment 394 - Ayes: 44 / Noes: 153 - Amendment 394 disagreed.
Baroness Doocey
“Suspension of chief constables(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38 (appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Before suspending a chief constable under this section, the police and crime commissioner (or their successor) must—(a) be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the chief constable’s continued exercise of their functions would present a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the police force, or seriously undermine public confidence in the policing of the area, and(b) consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (or any relevant successor inspectorate) and have regard to its views.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require a police and crime commissioner (or their successor) before suspending a chief constable under section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and to be satisfied that suspension is necessary to avoid a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force or to public confidence.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 393 seeks to protect the operational independence of chief constables by introducing vital safeguards at the point of suspension—the moment when they are most vulnerable to political pressure in practice.
In Committee, I tabled an amendment addressing a later stage of the formal dismissal process. However, after listening to police representatives, it has become clear that the real problem arises much earlier. The unilateral power of suspension currently exercised by police and crime commissioners, without any duty to seek independent input, is a significant driver of the leadership instability we see today, with nearly one in five forces losing their chief constable every year.
Under the current framework, the independent inspectorate must be consulted before a chief is formally removed, yet suspension often pre-empts this and can be triggered on relatively vague grounds, including simply that a chief constable’s continued presence may be detrimental to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force. In practice, this suspension loophole means the mere threat of suspension is often enough to force a chief to resign just to avoid a very public confrontation.
This leadership churn has real-world consequences. In Devon and Cornwall, the disruption of having three chief constables in 18 months led to service shortfalls and diminished morale. The Government’s own recent White Paper admits that the PCC model has often “not facilitated effective management” and acknowledges
“tensions in the one-to-one relationship”,
which ultimately harm communities.
My amendment proposes two modest but critical adjustments. First, it would require the PCC to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that continued service poses a serious risk to efficiency or to public confidence, replacing the current vague thresholds. Secondly, it would extend the duty to consult HMICFRS at this earlier stage, creating consistency between the decision to suspend and the decision to remove.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. It is a measured proposal that would simply require a police and crime commissioner, before suspending a chief constable, to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so and to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.
Chief constables occupy one of the most demanding leadership roles in public life. They are responsible for operational policing, for thousands of officers and staff, and for maintaining public confidence in the rule of law. Therefore, decisions to suspend them are of the utmost seriousness, not only for the individual concerned but for the stability and effectiveness of the force they lead.
Recent events remind us why clarity in these processes matters. The policing of the Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture generated significant public and political debate about policing decisions and leadership accountability. In that context, the actions and judgments of the then chief constable of West Midlands Police, Craig Guildford, have been the subject of rightful scrutiny and commentary. There is potential concern about the necessity for the amendment, but I look forward to what the Minister has to offer on it.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. I say at the outset that she has a point: the process by which police and crime commissioners may suspend a chief constable should be looked at.
The noble Baroness has suggested that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services should be involved in this process. As I discussed in Committee, the inspectorate already has such a role for the enforcement of resignations or retirements of chief constables under the Police Regulations 2003. I am pleased to tell the noble Baroness that the Government agree with the suggestion she has made; I do not wish to surprise the noble Baroness.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope she can recover from that shock. I ask her to look at paragraph 134 of the White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, which we published on 26 January. It says:
“We will reform the process for the appointment, suspension and dismissal of Chief Constables to introduce greater fairness, transparency and balance into the process. This will include introducing a requirement for Mayors and Policing and Crime Boards to seek views from His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary before taking any action to suspend the Chief Constable”.
I confirm that we intend to bring forward the necessary legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows. We want to do that as part of the wider police reform package, so that it is not a piecemeal approach. There will be a wider police reform follow-through on the White Paper as soon as parliamentary time allows. It is a very ambitious programme. I want to make sure that we do not just deal with it in isolation. That reassurance is on the record, and on that basis I hope the noble Baroness will not push her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, tells me that it is a victory. I thank the Minister for that confirmation, and I am very pleased that it is not just when some chief constables are going to be sacked; it is actually at the stage I asked for in my speech. That is the key point. If they can be suspended and that does not require consultation with anyone, the fact is that practically all of them have just taken the view that they do not want a big public outing, so they have just resigned anyway. That is what I am trying to stop. The Minister has said that he is going to do exactly what I have asked for. Can someone write that down? I am delighted, and I therefore withdraw my amendment.
Lord Pannick
“(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I hope the Minister will give me as satisfactory a response in relation to this group as the other Minister just gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
Amendments 393B to 393F in this group are in my name. They address Clauses 168 to 171, which will create a presumption of anonymity for an authorised firearms officer who is charged with an offence in relation to the use of a weapon in the exercise of his or her functions. That presumption will apply unless and until that defendant is convicted of the criminal offence.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black of Brentwood, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for adding their names to these amendments. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, cannot be here tonight. They send their apologies. We will all miss their contributions, as they made powerful speeches on this subject in Committee. I also record my gratitude to Emma Snell of Justice and to Sebastian Cuttill of the News Media Association for their very helpful briefings.
Amendment 393B would replace this presumption of anonymity in the Bill with a power for the court to grant anonymity where it considers it necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the firearms officer or another person, such as a member of the officer’s family, or to prevent harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and to the principle of open justice. That, in essence, is the common-law position that applies now.
I recognise the need for courts to have this power to grant anonymity in appropriate cases, but it would be a mistake to legislate for a statutory presumption. That is because the criminal courts have long proceeded, and rightly so, on the basis that open justice is a core principle of our legal system. It is a core principle because it is essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Restrictions on reporting what goes on in our courts always need to be justified. In the context addressed by Clause 168, there are especially strong reasons for upholding open justice.
We are here typically concerned with the actions of a firearms officer acting on behalf of the state, whose use of a weapon has killed another human being. That event will have led the CPS to bring a criminal prosecution, which means that the CPS believes that two criteria are satisfied—first, that on the available evidence, the court is more likely than not to convict, and secondly, that it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. Of course, the prosecution must prove its case, but in this context the interests of open justice are very important in the public interest. The public, not just the family and friends of the deceased, surely have a strong interest in knowing what is alleged against whom.
Open justice, I suggest, is of particular importance at this time, when public confidence in our police force is low—perhaps lower than ever before. A presumption that the press cannot fully report a murder trial will, I fear, inevitably cause further damage to public confidence.
I accept that there will be cases where open justice should give way to the need to protect the defendant and his or her family. The court must have power to provide protection by requiring anonymity, but that must be because of information that provides a reasoned basis for concern that such protection is required in the particular circumstances of the case.
I also emphasise that Clause 168 would confer special protection on firearms officers. The Government do not suggest that other police officers or prison officers whose conduct may lead to the serious injury or death of another person should enjoy this presumption of anonymity, and rightly so. To confer this unique protection on firearms officers is unnecessary because a discretion for the court suffices, and it is wrong in principle because this is a context where the interests of open justice are at their strongest.
In Committee my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere—I am very pleased that he is in his place—suggested that firearms officers might be deterred from taking up such posts if there is no presumption of anonymity. That seems to me, with great respect, a weak argument when no other police officer enjoys such a presumption, when Clause 168 does not guarantee anonymity, when our amendments would allow anonymity in appropriate cases and when a firearms officer is far more likely to be concerned about the risk of prosecution than about the question of anonymity.
Also in Committee, my other noble friend—I do not have very many—Lord Hogan-Howe, whom I am also very pleased to see in his place tonight, emphasised the difficult and important job done by firearms officers. I recognise that, and I agree with my noble friend. That should be carefully borne in mind when decisions are taken in the public interest on whether to prosecute. Once a prosecution is brought, no defendant should enjoy a special presumption of anonymity. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe also drew attention to the fact that there are not many of these cases. That is no doubt true, but I suggest that adds nothing to the debate on how such cases should be treated when a prosecution is brought.
In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, emphasised that firearms officers can face serious death threats and intimidation—very regrettable but no doubt true. So can other police officers, and if there is information suggesting such circumstances or a risk of such circumstances, our amendments would allow the judge to protect anonymity. That is the right way to ensure both protection and open justice.
The other amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 393C and 393D, would ensure that the criteria for courts imposing restrictions are the same after conviction and pending an appeal, and Amendments 393E and 393F would ensure that courts have flexible powers to vary or revoke reporting restrictions or anonymity orders in the light of any changes. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to just two amendments, Amendments 393B and 394. Amendment 393B is the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has introduced about anonymity. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with him. However, I shared with him a few days ago that I have some sympathy with the general position. Police officers should be accountable and one of the main ways in which to be accountable is to be identifiable, which is why they wear numbers and now wear their names. That is important. I therefore hesitate before I argue for anonymity. I am not saying that it is a black-and-white question. However, on balance, I agree with the Government’s proposal, which is to provide anonymity for firearms officers. The assumption is changed from the present: it is that there will be anonymity unless the judge decides there will not be. That is the complete reverse of the situation today. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, prefers it as it is today, but would put it in statute rather than common law.
I am going to say more on Amendment 394 and the group of special people we rely on. It is important because, in the case we have heard about of Sergeant Blake and Chris Kaba, the man that he shot, there was clear information before the court that Mr Kaba was a member of an organised crime group. In fact, he was wanted for two firearms offences, so there was reasonable suspicion that he and others who were linked to him had firearms access. That will not always be the case. Despite that, the judge in the case decided to lift the anonymity that had been possible. I met Sergeant Blake a few months ago. The effect on his life and his family was significant. When someone has been named, it cannot be retracted, which is why it is so important to get it right at the beginning. That is why I prefer the Government’s position. It could be argued out but, once argued in, everybody is named and consequences flow from that. Sergeant Blake was incredibly understanding of what had happened. He was not overly critical of anyone at all. We as Parliament have to consider him as one example, but there have been others. So, I prefer the Government’s position and I think it is defensible.
Finally, I made a mistake when I was speaking about this in Committee. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, corrected me. He was quite right. I said that it was a small case. It was not about being a small issue but about a small number of people. That is the point I misapplied. I realise it is an important issue. It is also important that these officers get supported. This protection, which can be argued out, is more important than the general principle on this occasion. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that other officers have come under threat who do not carry firearms. They can also apply for anonymity. However, if you are shooting someone dead, it raises the threat and the risk level and I prefer the Government’s calculation. So, I support the Government and not the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Amendment 394 is about trying to get a higher bar before officers are prosecuted. Not too many officers have been prosecuted over the years, and everyone who has been charged has been found not guilty. Some lawyers have said, “Therefore, the system works, why do you worry?” The trouble is that it sometimes takes three to five years for that outcome to arrive, during which time the officers and their families are under incredible pressure. So it matters who gets charged and we have to consider this special group of people. Out of the 145,000 police officers, probably about 3,500 can carry a firearm. They deploy to around 17,000 incidents a year. That was in 2025 in England and Wales. They actually discharged their weapon in between five and 10 operations. They hit fewer people and not everyone who was hit died. My broad point is that they are not a trigger-happy group. There is no evidence that they regularly go out and shoot people. When it happens, it is a serious issue, and of course there should be some accountability. But we rely on them as volunteers. They do not get paid more, and if they ever change their mind—which I think was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carter—we have no way to force them to do it. You cannot order an officer to carry a firearm in our present regime. We are not America, where it is a condition of service. So we rely on them an awful lot and we prey on their good will quite a lot, too.
I do not want to address the legal issue in terms of these officers, but I want to bring our attention to the policy involved. We all have to bear in mind that there are probably three broad groups of firearms operations. Something happens in front of an officer or they get deployed quickly; it is a planned operation, they are going to arrest somebody in their home; or it is a crime in progress. It all comes down to the same thing. In that second in which you have to make a decision, you remain a human being. You have to decide whether you are going to shoot or not. On the whole, the evidence shows that they get it right. Should they kill someone or hurt them seriously, the whole system, the whole panoply of the state, descends on them. “Why did you do that?” That is not the problem for me.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, raised the issue of other professions. I do not know how many surgeons there are in the Chamber, but when a surgeon makes a mistake and slashes an artery, the whole world does not descend and say, “Why did you do that?” But it does when a firearms officer shoots. I realise there is some distinction, but the outcome is the same. The firearms officer is going to come under severe scrutiny during that period. We have to consider that they remain a human being who did their best that day. They did not go to work to try to kill someone. They went to work to try to do the job that we had asked them to do on our behalf. In an unarmed society with an unarmed police force, I believe that they are a special group.
As I come towards the end of my speech, I should say that I have met most of the officers who, over the past few years, have been charged. One is called Anthony Long. He was under inquiry for 11 years before he was cleared by a Crown Court jury. Each officer I have met who has been in this position has shown great humility. They are the sort of people you would want to give a gun to. It is not about just whether they can shoot straight; it is about the judgment they apply at that time. You want sensible, mature people.
Despite the fact that all these people had been under inquiry for so long, they were incredibly understanding of why they were in that position. They understood that there had to be an inquiry, and they were very understanding of all the different processes. I think that this group of people deserves our honour as well as their own. At the moment, I am afraid, the system—not individuals—is treating them badly. Somebody has to speak up for them, which is why, for me, these amendments have so much power. I realise that there are big legal issues that must be considered—no one is immune to that—but my passion has been to try to support these people in what is, I think, a very difficult job. There is evidence that they are doing it properly; over the past 40 years, there has been no evidence of them doing it badly. There have been no convictions of an officer.
My final point is that it seems as though, on the route to getting into a court, everybody makes the judgment that this is a criminal charge. There is the investigation, which the police sometimes did; now, it is the IOPC. The CPS makes a decision, then it is put before a jury. To me, that is where some common sense gets applied. The benefit of a jury is that we have the judgment of our peers. When they apply their judgment, they conclude that this group of officers is generally doing things right. I wonder why the system cannot do more for firearms officers to encourage them to carry on doing this and taking these very difficult decisions on our behalf without having, in that second, to worry about the consequences over the next few years. We cannot sustain that, and I do not think that they should. That is my reason for arguing for these two amendments.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 403 in this group is in my name.
The group that we are talking about raises the issue whether authorised firearms officers deserve any special protection if they are, or may be, prosecuted for their conduct or if they are convicted. Some would say that they are not so deserving, because it would not be giving equal treatment to all. Others, me included, believe that they most certainly need some additional protection, whether that is a presumption of anonymity, a higher threshold before a prosecution can be brought, a lesser penalty if they are convicted, or a combination of all three.
These are among the bravest people in society. They volunteer for the job so as to protect the public, even though it means exposing themselves to a high risk of death or injury. They are motivated by the highest ideals and deserve special consideration because of it. They are emphatically not in the same position as ordinary members of the public who injure or kill others with a firearm, so I support the statutory presumption of anonymity, which the Government commendably proposed. I also oppose Amendment 393B, which would impose conditions before there can be anonymity.
In fact, I do not think that there is a huge difference between the Government’s Clause 168 and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—whatever number it is. In essence, we are talking about what the default position should be and whether that can be rebutted in the interests of justice, one or either way. The Government have come down in favour of a presumption of anonymity, which is where I come down as well, but I do not think that there is a huge gap.
For me, it goes without saying that the safety of firearms officers and their families is at real risk because of the extensive publicity that such cases attract. Parliament should, therefore, presume that to be the case. However, even anonymity does not avoid the intense stress that such officers, who have put their lives on the line for the rest of us, must endure while waiting for trial, which can, of course, take years, so I agree with the principle behind Amendment 394: that a higher threshold should be set before such a prosecution can take place. Whether this should be as high a threshold as requiring the case to be exceptional before there can be a prosecution is a matter for debate, but I agree that the factors set out in proposed new subsection (5), which would be inserted by Amendment 394—
“the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—
should always be given particular weight.
Where a prosecution is brought, especially if there is no higher threshold for prosecution, my Amendment 403 is designed to mitigate the penalty imposed if certain conditions are met. I tabled this amendment in Committee. but the debate took place with just 10 Peers in the Chamber at 11.15 at night, so I have brought it back on Report. It is about whether police firearms officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment in the honest but mistaken belief that the degree of force is reasonable, and who would otherwise be entitled to rely on self-defence, should be found guilty of murder or manslaughter.
Thirty years ago, in the Lee Clegg case, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords recommended that, in these circumstances, law enforcement officers should not be treated the same as terrorists and other murderers if they use excessive force; and that they should be convicted of manslaughter, not murder. I find that a statement of the obvious. Quoting the Court of Appeal, Lord Lloyd of Berwick said:
“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorist or domestic murders, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.
However, Lord Lloyd ruled that it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law and that it was for Parliament to do so. Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity.
In rejecting my amendment in Committee, the noble Baroness the Minister said that it would
“create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population”.
But is treating police firearms officers differently from other murderers a two-tier justice system? Surely not. We are not treating like with like. Police firearms officers who go on duty, risking their lives to protect us all and, in the words of the Minister, are
“having to make life and death decisions in an instant”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 266.]
are emphatically in a different category from those who kill with an evil motive. The law should therefore treat them differently.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thoroughly welcome these sensible and proportionate amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which he more than ably explained. I was prompted to speak on Amendment 393B having just read the Government’s Protecting What Matters action plan. I have plenty to say on that, but your Lordships will be relieved that I am not going to do so now.
In the plan, the Government readily admit that trust in institutions is in decline and that social cohesion is fraying. I am concerned that, if Clauses 168 to 171 go through unamended, it could create a problem of further distrust in policing. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, saying that there is not a huge gap between the amendment and the Government in relation to presumed anonymity for armed police officers, the Government are proposing an unprecedented rejection of the principles around open justice and, more importantly for me, press freedom. I am concerned that the clauses will limit the ability of the press to report in any meaningful way on cases involving the use of lethal force by police officers.
Replacing the presumption of anonymity should not leave officers vulnerable or unsafe, but the amendment would allow the power to grant anonymity if there are specific risks to safety or if it is in the public interest, to prevent harm. This is a blunt instrument. It would set up a privacy regime that would shut the media out from scrutinising the state’s exercise of power with guns. I cannot see how the public will not see that as covering up when the media will be denied any meaningful opportunity even to contest such anonymity, let alone to report. That is the concern. I am sure that the Minister will explain.
It is interesting that the police have recently been asking for greater freedom to release more details in relation to some investigations. This is not in terms of armed police, but police forces have recognised that suppressing information can lead to misinformation. That can turn nasty if the public feel that there has been a cover-up.
That is a move to transparency to ensure public consent and build trust, which goes in the right direction. I am just worried, although it is not their intention, the clauses will be a step back from a duty to have candour and from the state being transparent when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, an armed officer representing the state takes another human being’s life. We should not just grant automatic anonymity in that way. We have to at least allow the media to ask questions and scrutinise.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.
I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.
I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.
I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.
The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—
“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—
are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.
I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.
That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.
I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.
Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.
The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.
If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just consider one thing? He made some very strong points. One thing that concerns the officers—although the noble Lord is quite right to identify that there have been relatively few criminal charges over the period—and the reason they are not persuaded by the CPS, or whoever is making the decision, taking into account only sufficiency of evidence and public interest, is that on every occasion the CPS has brought a criminal charge, the jury has disagreed with it. It leads you to wonder what led to that decision-making process, because all the points the noble Lord made about all that is considered do not survive the test of a jury when it arrives.
That is why there is this concern. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Is this the perfect solution? I am not a lawyer and not in a position to judge whether it is the best solution, but it is why this question is raised so frequently—not because of the frequency of the cases but of how often they have been cleared in a very short time after all the careful consideration by very good lawyers who come to a completely different judgment from that offered by a jury.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
The prosecuting authorities have decided in these cases, for whatever reason, that they think it appropriate to bring a prosecution, to bring the matter before a court where a jury determines what is right. We trust juries—I know that it is a contentious issue at the moment as to what extent we trust them and in what circumstances—but in cases of this sort juries will remain, whatever happens to the prospective reforms. It shows that juries are perfectly capable of taking into account all the pressures that face officers in the situation the noble Lord describes and they regularly do so.
I am content to leave it for the prosecution to decide whether there is a case. Of course, if, having heard the prosecution’s evidence, the judge decides that there is not a prima facie case, the case can stop at that stage. Then the matter comes before a jury, and the common sense of 12 citizens decides—almost inevitably, it seems, reflecting all the factors we have discussed—that in very rare circumstances would it be appropriate to convict an officer. Precisely as the noble Lord has said, these are rare circumstances; often, the officer has not discharged a gun in anger before—we are not talking about Los Angeles or New York—so I am content with the situation.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I should declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police, although I have not discussed this issue with the police.
I came this evening looking to support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but a couple of things that he said have caused me some concern. One is about the principle of open justice—yes, it is important to maintain public confidence, and it requires open examination of the evidence, but in police shooting cases, I am not sure that it is a requirement to identify the individual officer concerned. Exactly what happened during the incident has to be heard in open court and openly reported, but not necessarily the identity of the officer at that stage.
The noble Lord also tried to say that firearms officers did not have a unique role, but they do in the use of lethal force. They discharge their weapons on the understanding that it is highly likely that if they do, somebody will die. They aim at the largest body mass and therefore a fatality is the most likely outcome. That is something that no other police officer who is unarmed, or prison officer, as the noble Lord mentioned, would have to face. Therefore, the role of a firearms officer is unique for those reasons.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I spoke on this subject in Committee; I did so with considerable wariness given the strength and distinguished nature of the lawyers who were stressing the importance of open justice. I listened to their speeches incredibly carefully and the House owes them a great deal for coming forward and making the position clear.
I worry about the situation of firearms officers. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an incredibly important point. Firearms officers do not pick and choose which incidents they attend; they do not have the opportunity to take legal advice before they pull the trigger, and if they do pull the trigger, the likely outcome is death. That is very different from the situations that most police officers find themselves in.
The second point is that we owe them the presumption that we—the Government, their force, and society more generally—will support them in the work that they do, and if they find themselves in the circumstances that we are discussing this evening, their anonymity will be protected until such time as they are convicted, if that is what happens, because by the time their anonymity has been granted, it is too late. I believe that they need to have that certainty at the outset before they go on any missions, before they are deployed.
We ask firearms officers to go into harm’s way. They face intense physical danger from what they do. They are called only to the most serious incidents and stand the risk of being killed themselves. They face the risk of prosecution or perhaps disciplinary action for the shot they discharge, if indeed that is the outcome—which is, as we have heard, incredibly unlikely, but it does happen. We owe them the limited support of the presumption of anonymity, which could be waived if the situation demanded that. It is a big step indeed to go against the presumption of open justice and I fully recognise that—a very powerful argument has been put forward there.
There is one other point to consider that I do not think has been really explored this evening. The obvious conclusion if officers are worried that their names will be publicised should a legal action be brought is that they might hesitate in their duty. They might hesitate to pull that trigger and, in so doing, someone else, a member of the public, may be killed because there is doubt in the minds of those officers. That is something that we should consider very carefully as well.
I got to my feet with considerable temerity, as, apart from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I am the only non-policeman or non-lawyer present in the discussion so far. None the less, there are some points to bear in mind, and I support the approach of the Government.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 394 and to the other amendments in this group. Britain has a very proud and distinctive model of policing by consent. The defining feature of that model is that the overwhelming majority of our police officers do not routinely carry firearms and when firearms are deployed it is because the threat is so grave that lethal force may be necessary to protect life.
That responsibility falls on a very small and highly trained group of officers, and I do not think it hyperbole to say that police firearms officers are some of the bravest, most dedicated officers in the country. According to the latest Home Office statistics, as of 31 March 2025, 6,367 police officers were authorised to carry firearms in England and Wales. That compared with 6,473 the year before, so it is clear that their number is shrinking. That is not something we can afford. It is why my amendment would introduce a presumption against the prosecution of armed police officers where they had discharged their firearm. It would do this by requiring a prosecutor when considering bringing charges against an armed officer to apply the principle that it should be exceptional to bring a prosecution against that officer. This raises the threshold for prosecutions to be instituted. The CPS would have to clear a higher bar to do so.
I want to cast aside some incorrect aspersions. I am not suggesting that armed police officers should be above the law—I want to be absolutely clear about that. The higher prosecution threshold that would be introduced by proposed new subsection (4) of my amendment would still permit prosecutors to bring charges against officers where there are exceptional circumstances. All it is saying is that there must be an acknowledgment of the unique nature of the circumstances that lead to an officer discharging their weapon. Proposed subsection (5) would require prosecutors to give particular weight to the unique demands and exceptional stresses to which firearms officers are subjected, as well as the incredible difficulties of making time-sensitive, split-second decisions.
I want to impress this on the House. It is impossible to understand the immense pressure facing you when you are tasked with the responsibility of carrying a police firearm. I know—I have done it. I carried a firearm for a number of years while employed on counterterrorist duties. Imagine the toll it takes on you as a person. To make it worse, you always have the thought in the back of your mind that, if you do have to use your weapon, you might be hounded for years by the press, by protestors and even by the police force you so dutifully served.
To face the possibility of being dragged before the courts simply for doing your job, with your name splashed over all the papers, is enough to deter anyone, but we cannot afford that to happen. All police firearms officers are volunteers. We need these dedicated officers. We rely on them to protect us in this very building—they are outside, right at this very moment, standing ready to prevent any possible attack.
That is why I cannot support the amendments in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As I said in Committee, I am firmly supportive of applying the Government’s approach of a presumption in favour of anonymity. The amendments from the noble Lord would not, in my view, substantially alter the status quo, whereby the decision to grant anonymity is at the court’s discretion.
We all say that we must support the police, but support is expressed not only in words; it must be reflected in the structures of law and justice. Those who protect the public in the gravest of circumstances deserve a system that recognises the unique demands placed upon them. Above all, we must ensure that we protect those who protect us. If the Minister cannot accept my amendment, or if I do not hear warm words, I may well seek to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I apologise; I thought the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, was going to speak only to his amendment, but in fact he was summing up. I should have spoken first.
We have sympathy with the principles behind the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. They would replace the current presumption of anonymity with a more flexible, case-by-case judicial test, based on real risks to safety, the public interest and open justice. These are important safeguards and they align with our long-held position. From these Benches, we continue to support a carefully balanced presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who face criminal charges, one that can be rebutted when a court considers identification essential for justice or for maintaining public confidence. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would make anonymity the exception, rather than the starting point. That risks undermining the reassurance that these vital specialists need.
In these thankfully rare cases, where hesitation can cost lives, we believe the balance should rest with a rebuttable presumption. It offers protection to officers acting in good faith, without compromising transparency or creating any sense of special treatment. Just as importantly, it protects their families. For me, this is a key issue. Police officers’ children should not have to face abuse at school or live in fear of vigilante threats or gang reprisals. Our approach suggests a middle way, avoiding a chilling effect on recruitment while maintaining public trust through strong judicial oversight.
We are less sympathetic to Amendment 394. While armed officers face exceptional pressures, the proposed presumption against prosecution would send a damaging message that they are being judged by more forgiving standards than other citizens. That is not a principle we believe that we should endorse.
Finally, we understand that the aim of Amendment 403, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, is to reassure firearms officers that the law recognises the realities of split-second decision-making, but we fear that it would, in practice, create a special homicide defence available only to that group. We would rather continue to trust judges and juries to apply the existing nuanced law, which already allows for context and proportionality, than to carve out a lesser liability for one profession.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments illustrates exactly how sensitive and difficult these cases are, does it not? In some of the amendments, noble Lords are saying that firearms officers should be held to a different standard than the rest of the population, but, in the others, it is being argued that even a small additional protection for them and their families is too great a differential in treatment.
Against that background, I start with Amendments 393B to 393F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I met the noble Lord, together with the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black, and the News Media Association, and I thank them all for the interesting and constructive conversation that we had. The Government have considered the noble Lord’s amendments with great care. We understand, and entirely support, the principle of open justice and freedom of the press, but what is in issue here is trying to find the appropriate balance.
I am really sorry to have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I admire greatly, but the Government firmly believe that firearms officers face very real and specific risks from organised crime groups and violent offenders, and that this requires there should be a presumption that only their personal details should be withheld up until such time as they are convicted—and if they are acquitted, that their identity will remain protected.
In doing so, we recognise that firearms officers who are being prosecuted for discharging their firearm face a unique situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The threats they face before and after the trial are real and, unlike most defendants, if acquitted, they are simply unable to return to their old lives as innocent people. Firearms officers and their families have targets on their back, even if they are cleared of any wrongdoing.
This special set of circumstances requires a tailored response, and we believe that the Government’s proposals achieve the correct balance. Those who are opposed to establishing a presumption of anonymity until conviction have twin concerns: first, that there is insufficient evidence that this is necessary; and, secondly, that it represents the thin end of the wedge. I want to deal briefly with each argument in turn.
First, on the evidence that this is needed, there is no doubt that the threat faced by firearms officers is not theoretical. There are very real risks. As I set out in Committee, and will not repeat in detail, firearms officers can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation, which also extend to their families. As evidence for the need, there is real concern that the revelation of the identity of police officers who are being prosecuted is having a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of these essential officers. I am not sure that these are exactly the same statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has, but certainly those from the document on armed policing attrition and retention record that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers, or an 8.8% reduction. This is a very real concern.
What is important is that this measure does not force the courts to issue an anonymity order. It will not cause secret trials. Judges must still consider the interests of justice and they have an active duty to uphold open justice. Even if no party challenges the anonymity, they still must, in considering the interests of justice, assess whether a reporting direction is necessary and proportionate. Even when anonymity is granted, the proceedings will remain public and the evidence will be tested in open court.
I am afraid the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is under a misapprehension about what this involves. The only restriction is removing the identity, so they will be referred to throughout all proceedings as Officer A. Everything else will be reported, and, in the event that they are convicted, anonymity will be rescinded and their identity will become known.
A further concern has been the ability of the media to challenge the making of such an order. The Government absolutely understand the point, and we offer the following reassurances. First, by virtue of Criminal Procedure Rule 6.2, courts must actively invite media representations whenever anonymity or reporting restrictions are under consideration, and the judge must create the opportunity for scrutiny.
Secondly, HMCTS has delivered a package of reforms to strengthen media access and support open justice in criminal courts. As part of this reform, every criminal court now has a new circulation list called the reporting restriction application notice list. This list includes contacts from the media distribution list who have specifically agreed to have their details shared with applicants for advance notice. They will be added as mandatory contacts to all reporting restriction application notice lists held by criminal courts to ensure service on their members. In addition, HMCTS has established a media engagement group to improve processes to better serve media professionals in criminal courts.
Thirdly, the law grants the media the right to appeal any decision to make a reporting direction or an anonymity order to the Court of Appeal. But here is one of the most important points: if a judge refuses to make an anonymity order, the prosecution and the defendant have no right of appeal. That is one of the reasons that the Government have decided that the starting point should be a presumption that anonymity is granted.
Would this be the thin end of the wedge? These are unique circumstances. The number of trials is tiny. In the past 10 years there have been two criminal trials for murder or manslaughter as a result of a fatal police shooting. By way of comparison, there have been 13 fatal police shootings since 2019-20. Clauses 168 to 171 have been carefully drafted to strike a lawful and proportionate balance between fundamental rights and the need to protect our firearms officers and their families.
I turn to Amendment 394, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and spoken to powerfully also by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. It is one of two amendments that take the opposite view to that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
While we acknowledge, once again, the importance of firearms officers and the debt that we owe them, the Government are unable to support this amendment, for these reasons. It would fundamentally alter the basis upon which prosecutorial decisions are taken by introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution for a particular group of citizens, who in this case happen to be police officers. Without doubt, this would create a two-tier approach to prosecutions in the criminal justice system. All public prosecutorial decisions, as we have heard frequently this evening, are made in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which has statutory force. Its two-stage test has stood the test of time.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggests that the CPS is getting the decisions wrong because of the number of acquittals. With respect to the noble Lord, that rather misses the point. The CPS test is not to decide whether it prosecutes somebody who is guilty. If we knew they were guilty, we would not need the jury. The test is whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. That is an exercise of judgment as to whether it is more likely than not that there will be a conviction. If so, and if the public interest stage is satisfied, the case is put before a jury, who decide whether or not they are actually guilty.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I thank the Minister for giving way. I understand and accept the distinction that she makes. Over the past 20 or 30 years, the concern for the police officers involved is that, on every occasion that the decision has been made, it has been wrong so far as the jury is concerned. It has left the officers believing, sometimes, that the way that the CPS has discharged its problem—with a public outcry about the shooting—has been to test it in a court, rather than making its own decision for which it should be accountable. I understand the distinction that the Minister makes, therefore, but it is spooky that on every occasion the CPS has got it wrong so far as juries are concerned.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, again, that is a fundamental misunderstanding. If the CPS had got it wrong, the judge would have withdrawn it at half-time. It would never have got as far as a jury. The two things —one of them being the fact that the jury has acquitted—simply do not correlate.
The noble Lord’s amendment gives no indication as to how this proposed test would fit with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, save that we would then have a two-tier system, with one rule for the police and another for the citizens they police. It is hard to see how such a situation could command public confidence.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the unique position of firearms officers will be taken into consideration at both stages of the full code test. In cases involving fatal police shootings, the Crown Prosecution Service already considers whether the officer’s actions were necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, as the officer honestly believed them to be, recognising how difficult it can be to make fine decisions in the heat of the moment. It is the same law that applies to every citizen. Prosecutions in these cases are very rare, reflecting the high threshold already applied; an additional statutory presumption is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Lastly, I turn to Amendment 403 from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, which was, as ever, attractively advanced by him. The Government’s position remains as it was in Committee: there cannot be a separate criminal law for police officers in homicide cases. The current legal framework already offers robust protection for those who act under a genuine and honest belief, even if that belief later proves to be mistaken. In any event, the Law Commission is considering the offence of homicide, and the Government will consider its report carefully in due course.
I am grateful for the debate that we have had today. It is clear that there are strongly held views on both sides, but the Government believe that they have struck the right balance to protect our highly valued armed police officers while not standing in the way of the principles of open justice and a single-tier justice system. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an interesting and important debate on a vital question. I am also grateful to the Minister and her officials, who have devoted considerable time to meeting me and others concerned about this matter, for taking our concerns so seriously. My noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere made the point that there is much agreement on all sides, and there is. It is very important to emphasise that. We all agree that firearms officers do a vital job. They do it in the public interest, they do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and they have our thanks for their service.
Respectfully, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on Amendment 394, for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To say to the public that a particular category of defendant—firearms officers—should be prosecuted only if the circumstances are exceptional would send a terrible message to the public and damage public confidence in cases where someone has died by reason of the actions of an officer of state. Surely the standard principle should apply: the CPS asks itself whether a conviction is more likely than not and whether it is in the public interest for there to be a prosecution. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said, in assessing the public interest and whether a conviction is likely, the CPS of course takes into account all the circumstances; in particular, whether the officer is acting normally in the heat of the moment in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
I have a couple of points on my amendment in relation to anonymity. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the powerful point that firearms officers are unique in that they are licensed to shoot, and that, in almost all cases where they exercise that power, the likely outcome is death. I say to the House that this special and unique role makes it all the more important that open justice fully applies, unless there is information before the court suggesting that anonymity is needed.
The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made the powerful point that these officers deserve certainty, because otherwise, when they go out to work and are faced with an immediate threat, or what they perceive to be an immediate threat, they might hesitate before shooting as they are worried about the consequences for them. This would be very much against the public interest. I say to the noble Viscount that, under Clause 168, the firearms officer does not have certainty. All that the Government are providing is a presumption, and, as the Minister rightly emphasised, the court will decide, even with a presumption, whether anonymity should apply.
However, whatever noble Lords may think of my judgment on this, I can count, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Presumption against prosecution for alleged conduct by authorised firearms officers(1) Where a relevant prosecutor makes a decision to which this section applies, the prosecutor must, in making the decision—(a) apply the principle set out in subsection (4), and(b) comply with subsection (5).(2) This section applies to a decision of a relevant prosecutor as to—(a) whether or not proceedings should be brought against a person (“D”) for a relevant offence, or(b) whether or not any proceedings against D for a relevant offence should be continued,in England and Wales.(3) In this section, an offence is a “relevant offence” if—(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.(4) The principle referred to in subsection (1) is that it is to be exceptional for a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which this section applies to determine that proceedings should be brought against D for the offence or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued.(5) In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters—(a) the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and(b) the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments as are required by the nature of D’s functions as an authorised firearms officer.(6) The following are “relevant prosecutors” for the purposes of this section—(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions,(b) a Crown Prosecutor, or(c) any person to whom the institution or taking over of proceedings for a relevant offence mentioned has been assigned under section 5(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (conduct of prosecutions on behalf of the CPS).(7) In this section, “authorised firearms officer” means—(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, (b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 (cross-border aid of one police force by another) for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or(d) a member of the armed forces who—(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.(8) In this section—“conventional round” means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;“lethal barrelled weapon” has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;“member of the armed forces” means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);“relevant authority” means—(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;“relevant chief officer” means—(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;“relevant police force” means—(a) a police force in England and Wales,(b) the British Transport Police Force,(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would apply a presumption against prosecution for armed police officers where they discharge their weapons, and requires prosecutors to consider the unique burdens placed on armed officers.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 394 seeks a presumption against prosecution for alleged conduct by authorised firearms officers. I really think that we owe it to firearms officers, who have an exceptional responsibility, to provide this presumption against prosecution. I have to say that I did not hear the warm words that I was looking for from the Government Front Bench, so I am afraid that I seek to divide the House on this.
Lord Hanson of Flint
““law enforcement employer” has the meaning given by section 174(1);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of “law enforcement employer” in clause 174 to all of clauses 173 to 178.
“ScheduleNotification requirements for child cruelty offenders: child cruelty offencesPart 1Child cruelty offencesOffences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100)
1 An offence under section 27 of the Offences Against the Person 1861 (abandoning or exposing a child), if the offender— (a) was 18 or over, and(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c.12)
2 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (child cruelty) if the offender—(a) was 18 or over, or(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)
3 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)
4 An offence under section 1 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (female genital mutilation), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.5 An offence under section 2 of that Act (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.6 An offence under section 3 of that Act (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia), if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
7 (1) An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 of causing or allowing a person’s death, if the victim was under 18.(2) An offence under that section of causing or allowing a person to suffer serious physical harm, if—(a) the victim was under 18, and(b) the offender—(i) was 18 or over, or(ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.Part 2Corresponding service offences8 (1) An offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an offence listed in Part 1 of this Schedule.(2) Section 48 of that Act (attempts, conspiracy, encouragement and assistance and aiding and abetting outside England and Wales) applies for the purposes of this paragraph as if the reference in subsection (3)(b) to any of the following provisions of that Act were a reference to this paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Schedule lists offences which are child cruelty offences for the purposes of my first new clause inserted after clause 164.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a requirement to add civilian employees to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and British Transport Police advisory lists, where allegations are made against them after they resign or retire. This reflects the position for civilian employees of territorial police forces under section 88I of the Police Act 1996.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the meaning of “disciplinary proceedings” in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police.
Baroness Doocey
“Police training: independent review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish an independent review of the quality of in-service police officer training within police forces in England and Wales.(2) The review must—(a) assess the consistency, effectiveness and outcomes of all training provided to police officers after completion of their initial entry-level training, including all—(i) in-service training,(ii) workforce development programmes,(iii) refresher courses, and(iv) specialist training;(b) consider the extent to which training equips officers with the necessary skills, knowledge and professional standards to reflect the demands of modern policing, including—(i) digital skills,(ii) investigative skills,(iii) trauma awareness and conflict management, and(iv) processes by which police officers are informed of, and trained in, changes to the law, and(c) make recommendations for improvement, where appropriate.(3) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within 12 months of its establishment.(4) Within three months of receiving the review, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament containing their response and proposals to take forward the recommendations in the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to establish an independent review on police training.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 398 I will speak also to the other amendment in my name, Amendment 399. Systemic flaws in our training infrastructure leave front-line officers underequipped and the public at risk. Training should be the bedrock of policing excellence, not a Cinderella function that is both underfunded and undervalued.
In Committee, the Minister asked the House to wait for solutions in the Government’s White Paper. That document has now arrived but, instead of solutions, it proposes to streamline training, and even scopes a reduction in essential public and personal safety training. In the real world of policing, “streamline” is too often code for cutting corners. At a time when one-third of our officers have less than five years’ service—the most inexperienced workforce in decades—reducing the frequency of safety and de-escalating training is a dangerous recipe for increased injuries and risk of misconduct.
The White Paper offers licences to practise and digital passports. These are bureaucratic distractions, not real reform. We risk burying officers under accreditation paperwork while they struggle to build chargeable cases for complex modern crimes such as cuckooing, stalking and online fraud.
Most concerning is the shift towards learning on the job within everyday operational work. For an inexperienced force, this too often means picking up bad habits from equally inexperienced colleagues. Furthermore, by absorbing the College of Policing into the new national police service, the Government are asking the police to mark their own homework. No organisation can objectively evaluate its own systemic failings. An independent statutory review should be non-negotiable. We cannot keep adding new duties into the statute book—respect orders, offensive weapons laws and the rest—without a concurrent independent assessment to check whether the training system, last audited nationally in 2012, can actually deliver them.
Amendment 399 addresses another critical gap by placing a statutory duty on every police force to provide regular, high-quality mental health training. Mental health calls now constitute 15% to 25% of all police demand, yet too many officers lack the specialist training to manage them safely. The amendment seeks to establish a national minimum standard aligned with “right care, right person”, requiring every officer to complete initial training within six months of assuming front-line duties, followed by refreshers every two years.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for bringing back her Amendment 398. We broadly supported the intention behind her amendment in Committee, and we echo that today. It is of course not acceptable that there has been no independent review of the quality of the more than £400 million spent annually on training for eight years, and the statistics on police officer experience and unsolved crimes bear witness to that fact.
I am grateful that, since our debate in Committee, the Government have brought forward a White Paper that covers many aspects of policing, including training. That is a welcome step, but perhaps the Minister could outline some more specifics on the form that this reform will take? I am conscious that the College of Policing is still working on precise proposals, but an update would be very much appreciated. It is a positive sign that the Government recognise this gap in our policing and seem to be acting on it. As such, while we support the noble Baroness’s intention, we believe that letting the Government carry out their work is a more practical next step.
As we noted in Committee, while we also support the noble Baroness’s intention in Amendment 399 to provide the best possible care to those with mental health problems, we cannot support this specific measure. The Government made it clear in the Mental Health Act last year that they want to reduce the role of police in mental health decisions. We broadly support that. It reflects the belief that health workers, not the police, are the right officials to deal with mental health issues. Any police training must not blur this clear distinction. That said, I understand that police officers are often the first responders to situations concerning mental health patients, so I acknowledge the complexity of the issue and would welcome the Minister underlining the Government’s position on this in his reply.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for these amendments, which bring us back to the important issue of police training.
Amendment 398 would require the Home Secretary to commission an independent review of police training. As your Lordships’ House will be aware, the College of Policing is responsible for setting national training standards, including the police curriculum and accreditations for specialist roles. Our police reform White Paper set out our commitment to develop a licence to practise for policing. It will seek to create a unified system that brings together mandatory training with consistent professional development and well-being support.
As we work with the sector, we will examine the existing training landscape and look to the findings of the police leadership commission, led by my noble friend Lord Blunkett and the noble Lord, Lord Herbert. We will also consider how this model can build on the accreditations and licensing already delivered by the College of Policing in specialist operational areas.
As has been noted, both this evening and in Committee, the College of Policing is also developing a national strategic training panel, which will provide further sector-led insight into existing training. We would not want to pre-empt the outcomes of this work or create a burden of extensive reviews for the sector when much activity is under way through police reform. We therefore do not believe it necessary for the Home Secretary to commission an independent review of police officer training and development, as proposed in Amendment 398. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, as these issues have been examined comprehensively through existing work. I can assure her that it is a key element of our police reform agenda. Having published the White Paper, we will obviously progress that at the appropriate time and produce further reforms that may be necessary, which there will be further opportunities for your Lordships’ House and the other place to debate at length, whether through a legislative vehicle or not.
I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, was rather dismissive of introducing the licence to practise. Officers deserve a clear and consistent structure to empower them to learn, train and develop as skilled professionals. Once implemented, a licence model will provide greater assurance that the police have the correct training and well-being support to do their jobs and that there are regular reviews to ensure that they meet national standards. We recognise that we will not be able to introduce a licensing model overnight, but we have set out the first steps for a licensing model, including mandatory leadership standards and a strong performance management framework.
Amendment 399 seeks to ensure that police officers have the training required to deal with people suffering through a mental health crisis. As I indicated, the setting of standards and the provision of mandatory and non-mandatory training material is a matter for the College of Policing. It provides core learning standards, which includes the initial training for officers under the Police Constable Entry Programme. This underpins initial learning levels around autism, learning disabilities, mental health, neurodiversity and other vulnerabilities. Through forces utilising this established training, officers are taught to assess vulnerability and amend their approaches as required to understand how best to communicate with those who are vulnerable for whatever reason, and to understand how to support people exhibiting these needs to comprehend these powers in law and continue to amass specialist knowledge to work with other relevant agencies to help individuals.
We consider it impractical to expect, or indeed require, police officers to become experts in the entire range of mental health and vulnerability conditions, including autism and learning disabilities. Instead, the College of Policing rightly seeks to equip them to make rational decisions in a wide range of circumstances, and to treat people fairly and with humanity at all times.
I have said this a number of times: all forces are operationally independent of government. To seek to impose requirements on mandatory training risks undermining that very principle. Furthermore, each force has unique situations—different pressures, priorities, demographics and needs. To mandate that a small rural force must undertake the same training as a large urban force will not give it the flexibility it needs to best serve its local communities. Furthermore, the College of Policing is best placed to draw on its expertise to determine the relevant standards and training that the police require.
The training already provided equips officers with the knowledge to recognise indicators of mental health and learning disabilities; to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators; to understand their police powers; and to develop specialist knowledge to work with other agencies to help individuals. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, this is not about replacing real experts and mental health workers, in the NHS and other agencies, who are best placed to provide that specialist knowledge and expertise.
I hope that, on the basis of these comments and the work already under way, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think it matters who is responsible for training. What matters is that training is appropriate and that officers are trained.
I spent most of last year talking to chief constables in the whole of the UK. Their view was very different from what the Minister just said. Their view was that they do not get sufficient training, that training is piecemeal and that they have virtually no training in anything to do with mental health. I do not think they were just making that up; this was something that they genuinely believed. In fact, I am pretty certain about it.
Also, HMICFRS has reported time and again that training is inconsistent, the quality is weak, there are weak checks on force-run programmes, there is poor support for new officers and obvious risks in forces marking their own homework. These gaps demand independent scrutiny. That is not similar to what the Minister just said. Training is a vital ingredient for officers. We sit in this House and in the other place, and we make rules and regulations as to what should happen. But we do not make sure that the people on the ground facing these problems every day are equipped to deal with them. That is, frankly, a disgrace. The fact that there has been no independent check on police training since 2012 is almost beyond belief. However, it is late, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Duty to record algorithmic tools(1) Each police force in England and Wales must disclose its use of any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS).(2) Under subsection (1) “algorithmic tool” means a product, application or device that supports or solves a specific problem using complex algorithms.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on police forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 401 in my name. The amendment would place a clear legal duty on police forces to declare high-impact algorithmic tools using the Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standards, known as ATRS. It is currently just professional guidance, not a binding obligation, and compliance is dangerously patchy, with many live operational tools still undeclared publicly. Yesterday, a search of the public repository found only two entries for police AI tools, despite systems such as live facial recognition being in widespread use.
The Government’s White Paper promises a new registry through its police.ai initiative. However, without statutory backing, this risks becoming another underused voluntary scheme that takes years to implement while AI moves at a relentless pace. In Committee, the Minister claimed that the ATRS was too jargon-heavy and designed only for Whitehall. The ATRS contains dual tiers, a plain English narrative for citizens and technical details for experts. The real barrier is not jargon but commercial confidentiality clauses in procurement contracts. Without a statutory duty, forces cannot override these clauses, even where tools restrict rights and freedoms.
The Minister was also concerned about compromising operational effectiveness and scrutiny. The ATRS already builds in exemptions for national security and cases where disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. A statutory duty would codify these existing safeguards, not remove them. We are talking about tools of state coercion, predictive pre-crime models and risk-scoring 999 calls. The public are entitled to operational transparency to judge their fairness. Defendants cannot challenge what they cannot see.
My Amendment 401 responds to the national audit of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. It mandates a national plan, with clear milestones to modernise police data systems for real-time intelligence sharing. The Government’s White Paper admits that 90% of crime now has a digital element and that policing has fallen behind. Fragmented IT creates a back door for security vulnerabilities and a forensic backlog of 20,000 devices. The Minister insists that existing programmes offer more agility than a statutory plan, but this piecemeal approach is exactly what has failed us for 30 years.
I welcome the NPCC’s recent announcement of a national data integration and exploitation service. However, this is still at the scoping stage, offering only guidance. It lacks binding timelines and parliamentary oversight, which the serious failings exposed in the audit of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, suggest are urgently needed and that Amendment 401 would deliver. The Home Secretary says that she wants to go big or go home on police reform. This is her chance: a clear pathway towards a national strategic overhaul. A basic transparency duty must be part of that foundation. The service with the most intrusive powers should not work to a lower transparency bar than Whitehall. I beg to move.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I was going to speak on Amendments 400 and 407 in this group, but my noble friend Lady Doocey made such an excellent contribution that I will skip my speech on Amendment 400. I want to say, though, that I am not quite sure what the point is of me speaking on any amendment at this stupid time of day and with no chance of a meaningful Division to test the opinion of the House. What we are doing here is not scrutiny; it is just going through the motions. Nevertheless, I will go ahead with my speech on Amendment 407, if only to put my views on the record.
Amendment 407 is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, who is not here. As my name is also on the amendment, I may, I believe, speak to it on her behalf. Am I correct?
Lord Strasburger (LD)
Thank you. Amendment 407 asks us to make a practical decision about policing and tackling violence against women and girls. It is not—I repeat, not—about taking sides in a culture war. Recording biological sex in every case is about getting the basics right: honest crime figures, sound operational decisions and better protection for victims of violence. If we do not know clearly in our police data who is male and who is female, we cannot properly track male violence, spot patterns and target resources where they are most needed.
When police forces blur sex and gender identity, the data starts to go wrong. Hardly any perpetrators of sexual violence are women, so it takes only a small number of male offenders being recorded as women to make it look—wrongly—as if women are suddenly committing many more violent and sexual offences. That distorts our statistics, makes it harder to see the true scale of male violence against women, and risks bad safeguarding decisions.
If systems shift between recording sex, gender as perceived or self-identified gender, we lose track of the trends. We can no longer say with confidence whether male violence is rising or falling, or whether policy changes are working. When the public discover that “female” means one thing in one table and something different in another, trust in policing and government data inevitably suffers.
Professor Alice Sullivan is one of the UK’s leading experts in quantitative social science. She was appointed by the Government to independently review how public organisations can best collect data on sex and gender. Her review cuts through the confusion that currently exists. It says that, when the state needs sex data, it should ask a simple factual question about biological sex—“What is your sex: male or female?”—and that that must be kept separate from any voluntary questions about gender identity. It strongly recommends that all police forces record biological sex in all relevant systems.
Some people worry that this will force trans people to out themselves to the police. It should not and it does not have to. The police already record very sensitive information—religion, disability, sexuality—while respecting confidentiality, human rights and data protection law. The sex question is about biological reality for operational and statistical purposes. Held securely in background systems, it is not a licence to broadcast someone’s history or to deny their gender identity in day-to-day interactions. Where there is a need to understand gender identity, that can be done through a separate, clearly labelled voluntary question with strict safeguards.
The choice is stark. If we do not record biological sex, we accept distorted crime figures, poorer operational decisions, broken trend data and growing public mistrust. If we do record biological sex clearly and consistently, we give ourselves honest statistics, better safeguarding and a policing system that can see and therefore tackle the reality of male violence against women and girls.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 407, on the recording of sex in police data. It is a real shame that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, is unable to be with us because she would have introduced it very elegantly.
A year ago, in March 2025, Professor Alice Sullivan’s Review of Data, Statistics and Research on Sex and Gender came out. It pointed out:
“It is well-established that sex is a major determinant of offending and victimisation”.
The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, may have been going through the motions but he went through them very well by explaining clearly why this amendment matters. As he pointed out, it is very difficult for the Government to claim to have a target-based campaign to reduce violence against women and girls if they do not have consistent, accurate data in relation to women and girls. Although Professor Sullivan’s review was broadly welcomed by the Government, its recommendations have not yet been acted on. This amendment attempts to nudge some action from the Government.
The issue of delayed guidance is a constant problem. The Women’s Rights Network recently contacted the National Police Chiefs’ Council, inquiring whether it intends to now record sex accurately and address what it said was the “ideological corruption of data”. The NPCC’s reply says that
“updates to the collection and recording of sex and gender reassignment questions are pending subject to the issue of national guidance by the Office for National Statistics/Government Statistical Service following the UK Supreme Court ruling earlier this year”.
That is one pending answer. Individual police forces responding to a variety of organisations’ queries about the continued use of a variety of approaches to collecting sex data—including self-ID, recording a rapist as female and so on—say that they are waiting for guidance from the ONS and the GSS. Is there anyone not waiting for guidance? It feels as though this is a waste of time that is unnecessarily adding to confusion.
In Committee, I went into detail about differing and contradictory data collection practices across police forces. I will not repeat that, but recording practices vary not just between but within criminal justice agencies and even relevant government departments. As there are 40 different databases at a national level relating to criminal justice, the data that is being collected as we speak is full of discrepancies. The Home Office’s annual data requirement on demographic data, for example, advises police forces to record sex subject to a gender recognition certificate. Other mandatory Home Office standards—on police use of force, for example—require officers to record perceived gender, with a choice of male, female or other. There are also the multi agency public protection arrangements, which focus on protecting the public from the most serious harm from sexual and violent offenders, including convicted terrorists. They too conflate sex and gender in their data collection.
However, the Murray Blackburn Mackenzie criminal justice blog discovered via a freedom of information request that MAPPA provides police officers across the UK with
“51 options to record the gender identity of high-risk offenders”.
How does it help to keep the public safe, or aid operational coherence, to know whether a terrorist or paedophile is pangender, genderqueer, agender, bi-gender or gender-fluid, just to name a few of the 51 options they could fill in? I am not trying to be glib; I am just urging the Government to bring clarity and consistency to the collection of data on sex in relation to victims and perpetrators, because otherwise I think it is unfair to claim that there is anything like an evidence-based policy when it comes to sex and, indeed, gender.
We have recently had some exchanges about the new aggravated offences in relation to transgender people, and there are people who are transgender who claim that hate speech and hate crime against them has gone up. I am not challenging whether or not that is true. But to collate the data to make a case for that, one has to make a distinction in the collection of data between somebody who is transgender and somebody who says “I am a woman” who is in fact a transgender person who identifies as a woman.
I think that, for all victims concerned, let alone for understanding the nature of offenders, we need to have accurate, consistent data across all criminal justice agencies and all police forces. I hope that the Minister will at least give us an assurance that the recommendations of Professor Sullivan’s fine and important review—which is full of detail and evidence, with practical conclusions, and which the Government have welcomed—will be acted on. If we can get that assurance tonight, that would be brilliant. If there is any government reluctance to accept Professor Sullivan’s review, it would be really helpful to understand why—what the hold-up is—and maybe the Minister could explain that too.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, given what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said about the lateness of the hour, which I think we are all aware of, I want to be very short on my concerns about Amendments 406 and 407. I am sorry not to see the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, in her place.
My concerns about both amendments are about practicality and the dignity of people. In a nutshell, this is what they have in common: the police are going to be the race police and the sex police in addition to being the police, and they require police officers to make a judgment even against the way that the suspect—or the victim—defines themselves at any stage in the criminal justice process. I think that is a mistake.
How is this going to work? A victim goes to the police because they have experienced an assault or another serious crime. Whatever community or person they are, they will go to the police, and, under both these amendments, the police officer is required to interrogate whether they are who they say they are on sex and race grounds. I think this is a real mistake, and it will not help the police in the difficult work they have to do and certainly will not help all our communities in these difficult times.
I think that is one minute and 58 seconds. I hope noble Lords understand my point.
Lord Pack (LD)
My Lords, I wish to speak on a slightly different topic: my Amendment 409FA. I have tabled it because we face a three-pronged crisis. First, there is the growing evidence of foreign interference from Governments and individuals seeking to subvert our democracy. The case of the former Reform UK leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, who pled guilty to eight charges of bribery, is perhaps the most prominent example, but it is by no means the only one—as shown, for example, by MI5’s recent alert to MPs, noble Lords and parliamentary staff after finding that Chinese intelligence officers were attempting to recruit people.
Secondly, there have been far too many other political scandals involving misbehaviour by politicians, such as those involving the then Lord Mandelson, although he is, sadly, by no means the only person from this House, or due to join this House, who has recently been in the headlines for all the wrong reasons.
Thirdly, trust in politics and politicians is at a worryingly low level. A headline from the 41st British Social Attitudes survey, for example, was:
“Trust and confidence in Britain’s system of government at record low”.
Given recent events, it is a reasonable fear that future BSA data will show new record lows being hit. We therefore need to up our game. It is welcome that the Government are taking some steps to do so. The plans in the Hillsborough Bill to modernise the law over misconduct in public office are particularly welcome.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, after that, I had better begin by confessing a misdemeanour. Many years ago, I added my terrier’s name to the census as a “rodent operative” and gave her age in dog years. That illustrates that it is important that when we are gathering data it is, by and large, reliable.
In fact, the principles of GDPR should surely lead us to say that we have no business collecting personal data from people if we are not going to use it. If we are collecting data that is so remarkably corrupt as some of the data that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, talked about, it is useless. It tells us nothing about what is going on in society. It has no function—there is no valid use we can make of that data—so we should not be collecting it.
The first question for the police and the Government to ask themselves is whether they need the data. Do they actually need to record sex in all crimes and for all victims. If so, what will they use that data for? If they are going to use it, is it not important that it is accurate? They should choose, therefore, what data they record according to the use they are going to make of it. I therefore have a lot of sympathy with Amendments 406 and 407. I am, despite my past bad behaviour, in favour of accurate data.
I end by giving the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, a moment’s comfort. Once an amendment is on the Marshalled List, it is the property of the House—anybody can move it or address it.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak incredibly briefly, purely because the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. She personally spoke to the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, and she apologises. She was otherwise detained and sends her regrets.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as I said earlier, I am a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police. However, I have not discussed this subject with the police; these are my personal views.
With regard to Amendments 406 and 407, from my operational policing experience I know that the proportion of transgender men and women in the general population is very small. The proportion of offenders who are transgender is even smaller, and the number of transgender people who are convicted of violence is tiny. The number of criminal offences committed by transgender people is neither statistically nor operationally significant for the police.
On victim data, the most important operationally useful data for the police in relation to hate crime is how the victim identifies themselves. For other offences, it is what motivated the assailant—that is, what did the assailant perceive the victim to be? Did the assailant perceive the person to be female, in which case it is misogyny? Did they perceive the victim to be transgender, in which case it is transphobia? The birth sex of the victim is not that operationally significant for the police, nor is it likely to be statistically significant.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have one sentence to add to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The Office for National Statistics, in response to an FoI, said on the collection of data in relation to the “gender identity different from sex registered at birth” category:
“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”,
but there is not enough data to be able to do that. Why? Because the data is so low that it is statistically insignificant. It is not corrupt and it is not many more to twist it for women. We need to be factually accurate when looking at this issue.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I was not making the point it has been assumed I was making. This is about consistency, which is the point made by Professor Sullivan. Different police forces are collecting different data on gender identity or sex, sometimes conflating the two and sometimes using multiple variations on a theme. I then used the analogy of this happening across criminal justice. From the point of view of whatever evidence someone is trying to collect, as has just been pointed out, if we are going to collect data—and maybe we should not bother—will it be useful if it is different all over the country depending on the department?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am struggling to hear the question in the noble Baroness’s intervention. I repeat the point that the Office for National Statistics and the police data that is currently collected both say the numbers are so low they are insignificant and therefore unusable.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises two significant issues for modern policing: transparency in the use of algorithmic tools and the modernisation of police data and intelligence systems.
I turn first to Amendment 400, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We on these Benches recognise the intention behind the proposal. As policing increasingly makes use of complex digital tools, such as data analytics and algorithms, it is entirely right that questions of transparency and public confidence are taken seriously. However, as discussed in Committee, we should be mindful that policing operates in a sensitive operational environment. Any transparency framework must strike the right balance between openness on the one hand and the need to protect investigative capability and operational effectiveness on the other.
Amendment 401, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, addresses a different but equally important issue: the state of police data and intelligence systems. Few would dispute that technology within policing must keep pace with the demands of modern crime, and the challenge is not simply identifying the problem but determining the most effective mechanism to address it. Modernising policing technology is a complex and ongoing task that already involves national programmes, investment decisions and operational input from forces themselves.
For these reasons, while we recognise the important objectives behind these amendments, the question for noble Lords is whether the specific legislative approach proposed here is the most effective way of delivering them.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Cash seek to require the police to record the ethnicity and sex of a suspect. These are steps that these Benches wholly support. The importance of these measures can hardly be overstated. Recording ethnicity data has been recommended by experts of all professions, parties and associations. It is a requisite for enabling police to track and measure crime trends within certain communities and serves a secondary purpose of allaying or affirming arguments and claims about offending statistics, which currently are regrettably too often reduced to conjecture. Similarly, we support the recording of sex data as part of a larger drive to secure the rights of women by delineating sex from whatever gender identity an individual assigns themselves.
We are entirely supportive, therefore, of my noble friend Lady Cash’s amendments and are grateful to other noble Lords who have spoken in support of them tonight. I hope the Minister agrees that these are issues that should be above the political divide and that these amendments will improve operational efficiency. I look forward to his response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this wide-ranging debate on a wide-ranging group of amendments.
I begin with Amendment 400, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I fully agree—indeed, we have cross-party consensus here—with the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by the police and acknowledge the current lack of a complete or consistent national picture of police use of AI, as has been highlighted by the noble Baroness. However, the algorithmic transparency recording standard, or ATRS, was designed for central government and arm’s-length body use and is simply not the most effective or proportionate mechanism for delivering meaningful transparency in an operational policing context.
As we announced in the policing reform White Paper, the Government are taking forward a national registry of police AI deployments. The registry will be operated by the new national centre for AI and policing, which will be launched later this spring. This police-specific registry approach will address directly the concerns raised in Committee, and again this evening, about patchy disclosure, public confidence and accountability, while respecting operational independence.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, rightly noted the importance of having a flexible approach when it comes to operational policing. Locking policing into an inflexible statutory mechanism to disclose tools under the ATRS, even as an interim measure, would risk duplicative reporting, unclear disclosure expectations and putting additional administrative burdens on forces without improving public understanding or oversight.
The policing registry is an active programme of work designed specifically to close the transparency gap. It will adopt a tiered approach to transparency. All operational AI deployments will be recorded nationally, while a robust exemptions framework will protect genuinely sensitive capabilities from public disclosure, in a similar manner to how the Freedom of Information Act operates. This approach is designed to deliver clear narratives for the public, with named officers accountable for AI deployments in their force and strong compliance incentives. The Government fully expect police forces to utilise the registry and be transparent with the public about the algorithms they are using and the steps that have been taken to ensure they are being used responsibly. This is vital to building and maintaining public consent for the use of these powerful tools.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response and am pleased to hear that there is to be a new registry. I think the Minister said that it will be up and coming in a couple of months and that, critically, it will deal with the issues that I raised both in Committee and tonight on Report. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel
“Exception of the police from the public sector equality dutyIn schedule 18 (public sector equality duty: exceptions) of the Equality Act 2010, after paragraph 3 insert—“The Police
3A (1) Section 149 does not apply to any police force when exercising policing or law enforcement functions.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “police force” includes—(a) a police force maintained by a local policing body,(b) the British Transport Police,(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the Ministry of Defence Police.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 402, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, concerns the application of the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, specifically to policing and law enforcement functions. The amendment would ensure that police forces are left to focus on their core duties—to prevent crime and protect the public—without being constrained.
Every day, police officers must make difficult and sometimes instantaneous decisions in the most challenging circumstances, and their priority must always be public safety. This amendment provides a clear and limited exception from the public sector equality duty when, and only when, police forces are exercising their operational policing and law enforcement functions. Operational decision-making, which so often takes place in fast-moving situations, must be guided first and foremost by the need to prevent harm and uphold the law. Police powers are already limited by statute, such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, regulations, ethics codes, codes of practice, the IOPC and, of course, the courts, not to mention operational safeguards.
This amendment would ensure that clarity and focus are restored to the operational framework of the police. It would allow officers to concentrate on stopping crimes and protecting victims, without the risks that those decisions could later be questioned by a framework that was never designed with front-line policing in mind. I know that my noble friend Lord Davies and the Minister had a spirited debate in Committee on this topic. I must be entirely frank with your Lordships that I do not intend to test the opinion of the House on this matter. I would like to probe the Government, however, as to their rationale on retaining the current framework and its impact on policing. For those reasons, I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is me again. I declare my interest as a paid adviser to the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, particularly on issues of culture and leadership.
In the UK, we police by consent. That relies on public trust and confidence. Public trust and confidence, in turn, relies on the police treating every member of the public with dignity and respect, no matter their background or the community with which they identify. In addition, to ensure every police officer and member of police staff can be themselves and give of their best, the public sector equality duty is essential. Yesterday, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir Mark Rowley, told the London Policing Board that he was committed to continuing the work of the UK’s largest police force on diversity, equality and inclusion. If noble Lords will not take my word for how important the public sector equality duty is to policing, maybe they will take Sir Mark’s.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, introduced Amendment 402, which proposes that the police should be exempt from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, to ensure that they are
“solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions”.
I still have some difficulty in following the arguments for this amendment; I also raised this in Committee. I wonder whether the noble Lord seriously believes that applying the PSED takes away from the police carrying out their duties effectively. In speaking earlier to Amendment 400, my noble friend Lady Doocey mentioned the review by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and the importance of standards, training and inspection: the perfect circle that ensures police forces are working effectively. The PSED is absolutely at the heart of that.
A number of high profile cases have absolutely strengthened the need for the PSED. Indeed, it has been failings in policing that shocked the country, and every report on those incidents has talked about appalling attitudes to vulnerable people. On Monday evening, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, spoke about the murder of her son Stephen, and how that racist murder might have been stopped if the police had done their job earlier, when the harassment was escalating. Following the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the Macpherson report of 1999 was a means of changing the culture in public institutions, not just the police, to ensure that they had due regard to race equality decisions. This was later extended to disability and gender issues.
It was clear in Macpherson’s report then that the police were “institutionally racist” and had a lack of curiosity, in the Lawrence case, about the anti-social behaviour of young white gangs and what they were doing to local Black young people. The whole design of the PSED was to ensure that the police could do their job properly, without fear or favour, and support vulnerable communities. There are many excellent, moral and dedicated police officers who fulfil this every working day. Sadly, it has not always been consistent.
When sisters Bibaa Henry and Nicole Smallman were murdered in a park in June 2020, the public were appalled by the behaviour of the police. Photographs of the dead girls were taken and shared by police officers: this was racism and misogyny. In that case, more work was needed to change the culture of the Met. When Sarah Everard was murdered in March 2021 by a serving police officer, the country was shocked. The background story about misogyny in the force was equally shocking, as was the fact that, at work, the dreadful behaviour of the murderer had been tolerated and not dealt with. I raise these cases because each of the reports on these incidents keeps returning to the culture that engenders racism and misogyny in certain places in the police.
I have absolutely no doubt, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, that there is an enormous amount of work going on to change that culture, and in many forces it is working well. But without the PSED there would be no priority to have due regard to race, gender and disability. There would be no yardstick for the police inspectorate to look at and address culture. There would be no clear duty to ensure that staff are trained. Worst of all, it would be all too easy to slip back into the old ways. I am sure that the Conservative Front Bench would not want that to happen. The PSED is an important tool in the armoury of the police to keep us all safe, including those who are both vulnerable and at high risk. Please do not support Amendment 402.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We are here again. I do not expect the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to understand why I am not going to change my position. There is a view that, for all the reasons that have been given, equality is extremely important for a public sector body. I did not disagree with a single word that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, and I stand here to say that the public sector equality duty is one that this Government fully support.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is not going to press this amendment to a Division this evening. If he did, I would ask my noble friends to vote against it. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the police are the public, and they have the confidence of the public. The Peelian principles, on which the police were established all those years ago, are about the police reflecting the public, understanding the public and taking the public into account. The public are made up of people who have disabilities, people who are gay, lesbian and trans, and women who face particular challenges. The public are people who have protected characteristics. We need to understand that.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower said in Committee, the question that your Lordships must ask yourselves is what we want the police to prioritise. These Benches have argued that the answer to that question is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law.
This amendment is aimed at removing a layer of bureaucratic obligation that, in our view, is simply not fit for purpose for operational policing. Effective policing is a public good. The way to ensure that the largest number of people are met with dignity and respect is to ensure that the law is enforced effectively. However, in the light of all contributions, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Kidron
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“27A Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, an investigating person must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached the terms of that Act, OFCOM must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting related to potential digital harm during an investigation into the death of a child. Currently, there is no statutory guidance for police to follow regarding investigating digital harm.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.
I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.
Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide
“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”
under the Act
“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.
That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.
My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.
There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:
“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,
there may be some variety between different US states, and
“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.
This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.
The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.
I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.
I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.
The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.
Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.
Baroness Barran (Con)
My Lords, I too will speak very briefly, given the hour. I was also pleased to add my name to Amendment 431. For the benefit of Hansard, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, referred to Amendment 404—but I think she was talking about Amendment 431. Anyway, I am going to try to talk about Amendment 431. I agree with everything the noble Baroness said in her opening remarks.
I too will focus on subsection (4)(i) of the new clause proposed by the Government’s Amendment 429A, which reduces the time for which data would be preserved, from 12 to six months. I have been given to understand that part of the reason for that is because of the ECHR and the need to respect the privacy of those concerned, but it leaves bereaved parents in an unsatisfactory situation, and I wondered why the Government did it this way round and why there could not be a mechanism for automatically deleting any data the minute the inquest was completed and the data was no longer needed, rather than putting pressure on coroners to have to extend, and apply for an extension of, the notices. I would be grateful if the Minister could consider that.
Baroness Shawcross-Wolfson (Con)
My Lords, I will not detain the House at this hour. I thank the Minister for the progress the Government have made on this since we spoke about it in Committee—it really is a step forward. However, like other noble Lords, I urge the Minister to just go a little bit further, and, if she could possibly address the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that would be fantastic. I hope she will have good news for us when she stands up.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by placing on record my gratitude to all the noble Lords who have led the campaign on this important issue, none more so than the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has so ably championed this cause. I think it self-evident that we all acknowledge the harms that phones and social media are doing to our youth. I speak as a father of teenage children who are grappling with these very issues day to day.
This is most tragically brought to the fore when phones and social media lead to the death of children. Parents who face this unimaginable tragedy should be able to know what their child was accessing, and the evidence from these awful incidents should prove to the general public that steps have to be taken. I see no argument for why the police should not be required to collect evidence relating to potential digital harm, as indeed they are required to do for general causes of death. Similarly, if social media has in part led to the death of a child, the bare minimum that providers should do is to retain the data relating to the victim.
I too express gratitude to the Minister for considering the arguments raised in Committee and acting upon this. I understand that many in your Lordships’ House believe that Amendment 429A does not go far enough and that it does not place the desired duties on police forces. However, I welcome at least the start that this represents.
There is a tension, I fear, between what the Government are doing in your Lordships’ House—rightly, making concessions on the issue—and, at the same time, in the other place voting against further protections from online harms. The Minister’s amendment today places duties on providers. It is a short step from mandating data retention to enforcing age limits. This is not the time for that debate in its entirety, but it is worth putting it on the record. I reiterate my gratitude to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have campaigned on this important matter.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.
I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.
I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.
The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.
On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.
We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.
These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.
Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.
Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.
I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.
For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.
I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington
“Police covenant: mandatory reporting on suicide and attempted suicide(1) The Secretary of State must ensure the collection and publication of data on suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff for the purposes of supporting mental health and wellbeing under the police covenant (see section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022).(2) Each police force in England and Wales must collect and submit annually to the Secretary of State—(a) the number of confirmed suicides by serving police officers and police staff;(b) the number of attempted suicides by serving police officers and police staff; (c) contextual information, where reasonably available, including duty status, length of service, role, rank, known occupational stressors, and access to mental health support.(3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and annually thereafter, lay a report before Parliament (to be known as the “Police Covenant Mental Health Report”) which must include, but is not limited to—(a) national and force-level data trends,(b) analysis of occupational contributory factors,(c) assessment of the adequacy, usage and evidence-based outcomes of mental health and suicide prevention provisions under the police covenant,(d) recommendations to address identified risks, and(e) a statement from the Chief Medical Officer for England.(4) The report under subsection (3) must—(a) be published and disseminated to all police personnel;(b) include commentary from the College of Policing on compliance, data quality and best practice at force level;(c) include contributions from staff representative bodies and trade unions.(5) Anonymised data, disaggregated by force area, must be published, subject to data protection and safeguarding.(6) Each Chief Constable must, at the end of every calendar year, provide a statement to the Secretary of State certifying that the requirements under this section have been met by their police force.(7) Where a Chief Constable fails to provide a certification under subsection (6) without reasonable excuse, the Secretary of State must notify HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.(8) The Inspectorate must have regard to a notification under subsection (7) in the course of its inspection of that police force under the police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) programme.(9) The Secretary of State must establish an independent advisory board, to be known as the “Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board”.(10) The Board must consist of persons with expertise in clinical care, occupational health, staff representation and academic research.(11) The functions of the Board are to—(a) advise the Secretary of State on guidance relating to suicide prevention and mental health in the police workforce,(b) set standards for the collection and reporting of relevant data, and(c) review and make recommendations on force-level responses to risks identified through data and inspections.(12) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of the Police Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Advisory Board, including provision about—(a) the Board’s procedures,(b) its terms of reference, and(c) its reporting duties.(13) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) data collection standards,(b) statutory guidance,(c) audit mechanisms, and(d) such further oversight as may be considered necessary. (14) In this section, “police officer” and “police staff” have the same meanings as in section 1 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
My Lords, before I go into detail on Amendment 408, I thank the Police Federation of England and Wales for its tireless work on this issue.
If we are serious about the police covenant then we must be serious about the well-being of those who serve. We cannot claim to support officers and staff while failing even to measure properly the most tragic outcomes of poor mental health. The amendment is rooted in a simple principle: what is measured is what is acted upon. At present, the collection of data on suicides and attempted suicides in policing is too inconsistent and too limited. Without clear national data, patterns are missed, warning signs are overlooked and opportunities to save lives are lost.
The amendment would require proper annual reporting to Parliament, force-by-force data and analysis of occupational stress points. This matters because policing places extraordinary pressures on people—trauma, long hours, operational strain and repeated exposure to distress. We need evidence-based data, not just warm words.
The amendment would strengthen accountability. Chief constables would have to certify compliance. HMICFRS would be alerted where forces fell short. An independent advisory board would help to drive best practice. This is not just about getting figures and gathering data; it is about making sure that those figures are acted upon.
Behind every statistic is a human being—an officer, a staff member, a family member or a team member left grieving and asking whether more could have been done. This amendment would help us understand the scale of the problem, improve prevention and honour the spirit of the police covenant by protecting those who protect us. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, both the amendments in this group highlight a serious issue in policing. Many officers and staff are under extreme strain and we are not systematically measuring the scale of the problem. We support the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, for the mandatory recording and reporting of suicides and serious suicide attempts, a proposal backed by the Police Federation. Whether through his amendment or Amendment 409, it is important that we act now to bring this problem into clear view so that we can assess the risks and protect officers’ welfare, as we would with any other occupational hazard. It is therefore necessary to place a legal duty on forces and the Home Office to record these incidents and publish the figures so that appropriate support and interventions can be designed, and responsibility for preventable loss of life can be properly examined.
The police service rightly places emphasis on officer well-being, but these amendments would take a further step by increasing transparency so that we can understand what is happening to those who carry some of society’s heaviest psychological demands. Police officers are often the first to assist people in mental health crisis, but we must ensure that their own welfare is addressed. As my noble friend Lady Brinton observed in Committee, policing has often relied on signposting staff to external organisations rather than building internal support that is tailored to their needs.
First, however, we must remedy the lack of consistent data across forces. A unified system for collecting and publishing a mental health matrix would allow targeted evidence-based support that is timely and preventive. I hope that, in this instance, the Minister will recognise the importance of a clear duty to measure and report these outcomes as the basis for any serious strategy on officer well-being.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses the important issue of mental health and well-being for those serving in police forces. Amendment 408, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bailey, and Amendment 409, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seek to improve the collection and publication of data relating to suicide and attempted suicide among police officers and police staff.
The intention behind them is clear. If we are serious about supporting the well-being of those who serve in policing, we must first ensure that we properly understand the scale and nature of the challenges that they face. Policing is a profession that places extraordinary demands on those who undertake it. Officers and staff routinely encounter traumatic incidents and cumulative stress that comes from protecting the public in difficult circumstances, and I can personally vouch for that. While the vast majority serve with resilience and dedication, it is clear that these pressures can have a profound effect on mental health.
In Committee, my noble friend Lord Bailey spoke movingly about the importance of ensuring that the police covenant is underpinned by robust evidence. Without reliable national data, it is difficult to identify patterns, understand risk factors or evaluate whether the support structures currently in place are working as intended. The same point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who emphasised that better data is essential if we are to design effective prevention strategies.
There is already recognition across policing on the need to strengthen the evidence base in this area, and work is under way through national policing bodies to improve the collection of welfare data. However, the amendments before the House highlight the importance of ensuring that this work is transparent and capable of informing meaningful action. Ultimately, the police covenant reflects our collective commitment to those who protect the public. Ensuring that we understand and address the mental health risks faced by officers and staff is central to that commitment.
For those reasons, this group of amendments raises issues to which the Government should give careful consideration. I look forward to what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Hogan-Howe, for tabling the amendments in this group. I am conscious of the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, supported the amendment’s general direction of travel.
First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, that suicide and attempted suicide in the police workforce have devastating consequences. I and the Government recognise fully the need to address mental health and well-being in policing seriously and responsibly. As the noble Lord will know, the National Police Wellbeing Service already does vital work in tackling suicide risks to the police workforce, including work on prevention, postvention support for forces, a 24/7 mental health crisis line for anyone working in policing, and specialist trauma services.
I am grateful for the way in which the noble Lord has framed his amendment and brought it forward. However, I say to him respectfully that placing an additional statutory reporting duty in primary legislation is not, I feel, the right approach at this time. I say this for three broad reasons. First, much of the information sought by the amendments, particularly in relation to attempted suicide, is often clinical, confidential, medical data. In many cases, it cannot be lawfully or ethically shared with employers, so mandating this through primary legislation would be the wrong approach and would risk unintended consequences around confidentiality, trust and data integrity. In my view, that is a significant blockage in the amendment to date.
Secondly, I reassure the noble Lord that the absence of legislation does not mean the absence of action. This is a really important point. Police forces already collect data on deaths by suicide, and there is national co-ordination of that data. The challenge is not in getting forces to comply; it is in what we ask for from forces, how it is defined and, most importantly, how it is used to drive meaningful prevention. Again, I look forward to the future and looking at a revised national police service downstream, following the White Paper, where training, well-being and personnel functions are brought into the centre and where there is a smaller number of police forces on the ground. There will be a real focus on this, and I know it is important to do that.
Thirdly, I do not want to be locked into a rigid framework before necessary clinical, operational and ethical questions have been resolved. This is not simply a matter of reporting; it also requires high-quality support. In particular, as I think the noble Lord will accept, it demands a culture that understands that mental health challenges are there in police forces. Police officers see some horrendous things on the ground. They have really hard experiences and are very often traumatised. It is important that we embed in the culture of the police force how we respond to those issues. It is not simply about collecting statistics. I know that that is the noble Lord’s prime motivation but, ultimately, it should be about having an automatic, embedded culture that recognises the stresses and strains, helps identify them and puts in place measures to help people with their mental health.
That is why the Government are focusing their efforts on strengthening well-being support, trauma care and early intervention in the police White Paper, and also why my colleague, the Minister directly responsible for policing and crime, has engaged with police leaders, staff associations and experts to look at how we can improve the quality of the data and, more importantly, the quality of preventive action. As it happens, I had a useful discussion with the Police Federation at my party conference in Liverpool in October last year. We understand that there is a real issue to help support, but I do not believe that the amendments before the House on Report today would be the right solution at this stage.
With this recognition of the problem and a grateful Minister who says to the noble Lord, “Thank you for bringing this issue forward”, I hope that, on the basis of what I have said, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I thank the Minister for his response and for the nature of his response. I truly believe that the Government are beginning to focus on this long-lasting issue. My slight pushback and challenge are around the embedding of a culture. The organisation is so big and so diverse in its approach to this problem. Many forces do not collect the figures and certainly could not provide them when asked by the Police Federation. We need to ask them officially because, as was said, we need to embed that culture. By asking for those figures, we build a mechanism that embeds that culture.
However, in view of the Minister’s very generous approach to this subject, and my belief that the Government truly are beginning to focus on this, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes
Policing: devolution to Wales(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In section B5 (crime, public order and policing)—(a) omit “and policing”, and(b) omit line 41 “policing”.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve policing to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, my Amendments 409A and 409B concern the devolution of policing and youth justice to Wales. These are the same amendments that I tabled in Committee. I will keep my remarks brief, considering the late hour, but I hope that the Minister can provide further clarity, because the questions raised in Committee remain unanswered.
Not long after Committee, the police reform White Paper was published. There are some good things in it, particularly the focus on neighbourhood policing, but it does not address the unfairness of policing powers being withheld from Wales compared with the other devolved nations. At that time, the Minister stated that the White Paper’s proposals for Wales concern organisation rather than devolution and that devolving policing is not right for Wales at this time. However, I say respectfully that, if we are reorganising the whole system, this would seem to be precisely the moment to align responsibility with accountability through devolution.
The abolition of PCCs fundamentally reshapes the governance of policing. In England, functions will move to mayoral authorities, yet Wales has no equivalent structures. It is logical that the Welsh Government should be part of the answer, whatever that answer is, to the newly created gap. Yet we still do not know what model the Government envisage for Welsh police governance, whether devolution of policing even remains under consideration, despite consistent recommendations from independent commissions, or how Welsh financial contributions, already substantial, will be recognised. In 2024-25, only around 43% of policing expenditure in Wales came from the UK Government. The remainder came from Welsh government contributions and council tax. This remains a reserved matter in which the UK Government retain that decision-making power, yet Welsh citizens already fund most of their policing.
On youth justice, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that work is under way on the manifesto commitment that they have themselves. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, noted in Committee, Wales’s child-first approach has helped to drive
“a sharp and sustained decline in first-time entrants”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/1/26; col. 466.]
over many years. He also highlighted that children in conflict with the law often have “overlapping needs” and that the “jagged edge” of the current settlement can impede the joined-up support that those children require.
Crucially, many of us have argued that youth justice is a contained, high-impact area where devolution would be feasible and important, demonstrating new intergovernmental respect and co-operation. The Minister has previously referred to a programme of work in relation to youth justice. Today, I would like to find out more on the progress of this: what its scope is, when conclusions will be reached and, if legislative change is anticipated, through which vehicle and on what timetable. Without this detail, Parliament cannot scrutinise the direction of travel. Scotland and Northern Ireland have full responsibility for policing and justice. Wales remains the outlier.
I am not asking the House to decide on these matters today; I am asking the Government to provide the clarity that Wales deserves. When will proposals on Welsh police governance be published, what is the timetable for decisions on youth justice devolution, and how will accountability be secured for systems largely funded in Wales but not yet controlled in Wales? I look forward to the Minister’s response at the end of the debate. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
When we had a debate in Committee, Wales was squeezed into the very short time we had on the Thursday afternoon before a debate had to start. It is no one’s fault but Wales is being squeezed again. It is now 11.30 pm and this is serious—it is no-one’s fault, and I am not blaming anyone; it is the way the cookie has crumbled. It seems to me that what we want is a proper debate. On the previous occasion, in inviting the noble Baroness to bring her amendments back, the Minister promised a fuller debate. At this hour of night, I do not really think that is sensible, but I will say two things.
First, as the parliamentary process seems to produce no proper forum for the discussion of these serious issues, and the Minister said he had very serious arguments to support the non-devolution of policing, will he agree to have a proper meeting about these things so that we can look at how policing has operated in Scotland and Northern Ireland to the benefit of those two nations, and how it could benefit Wales? Secondly, why is Wales treated as though justice were an island removed from Wales? Justice is not an island; it is an integral part of policy. Separating out areas of justice from the rest of internal affairs is almost, I think, unique across the world to Wales as a self-governing nation.
On the two particular matters, I do not want to add much about policing, but I want to say a word about youth justice. Since the debate in Committee, the Government have published A Modern Youth Justice System: Foundations Fit for The Future. If I may say so, with genuine respect—I put that in because, sometimes, it is said of lawyers that, when they say “with respect”, they mean without any respect at all, but I mean this with genuine respect—the foreword written by the Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Minister for Justice presents an irrefutable argument for the way in which youth justice must be properly aligned with other services.
What is fascinating about that paper, however, is that there is not a single word about what is to happen to youth justice in Wales. There are excellent arguments as to what is to happen in England. Had we had a debate at a sensible hour, I was going to weary your Lordships, I hope not unduly, by looking at the arguments so powerfully made by the Deputy Prime Minister. This is not the time to embark on that argument: I would weary noble Lords unduly at this hour of night. In the first debate on Report, however, the Minister rightly emphasised how important it was that the Government stuck to their manifesto commitments when emphasising why we had to have a respect order. In the face of a powerful argument that did not add anything to what we already said, he said that it was a manifesto commitment. I therefore hope he will be able to explain the manifesto commitment to look at youth justice and its devolution, and say what is to be done.
I found it very disappointing listening to the evidence of one of the Welsh Ministers, Mr Irranca-Davies, of the Senedd’s Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee, when he was asked repeatedly about youth justice. He said that discussions were going on and they were working hard, but he could not say anything of any detail and hoped that they would be able to do something soon.
I very much hope for two things. First, I hope that the Minister and those who take a different view can have the opportunity for a robust argument, so that we can see what each side says. The report of the Silk commission, the report of the commission that I chaired, and the report of Rowan Williams and Laura McAllister’s commission all argued for the devolution of both these things, and no one has ever presented an argument as to why they are wrong. It seems to me that a robust discussion would be the best way forward.
I also hope that the Minister is able to explain tonight how the Government intend to honour the manifesto commitment and how the powerful logic of the Deputy Prime Minister’s arguments can be applied not merely to England—although I accept here, of course, that it is most important that they apply to England—but how they are to be applied to Wales.
Lord Jones of Penybont (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister will know that when I was First Minister of Wales, I strongly supported the devolution of policing, and my position has not changed. I fail to see why Wales alone, of the four nations of the UK, should not have the powers to shape policing and policing priorities.
I have heard arguments about crime being cross-border. Well, that is true of England and Scotland as well, and indeed of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for that matter. Simple co-operation between police forces is a way of overcoming that. I saw that in 2013 when we had the NATO summit in Newport. Police officers from all over the UK had come to help police that event.
The Minister will, I am sure, be relieved to know that I am not looking for him to agree with me tonight. I know the view of the UK Government that, currently, policing should not be devolved in Wales. Nevertheless, we now have a lack of clarity as to the future, because with the abolition of the PCCs, the suggestions that have been made about how policing will be made accountable in the future are based on English political structures that do not exist in Wales. We do not yet know what will happen in Wales. That is important because there are, of course, arguments that we have to make to ensure that Wales is properly recognised. Wales has its own civil contingency forum, language, laws and ways of policing that must be reflected in the future. With that in mind, does the Minister agree that a way must be found to take this forward? Will he agree to meet me, and perhaps others, to see how we can deliver better policing that nevertheless reflects Wales’s national distinctiveness?
I turn very briefly to Amendment 409B, in which I have a personal interest. This was a recommendation that came from the Brown commission, of which I was a part. Naturally, I fully support the devolution of youth justice. I was delighted to see this included in the manifesto that the Government were elected on in 2024 and I look forward to its delivery.
Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)
My Lords, when my noble friend was the First Minister, and slightly before that, when I was the Secretary of State, I was less of a campaigner for this issue than he was. But I recognise that times have changed over the last few years. I am told that devolution is a process rather than an event—something that I have witnessed myself over the last 20-odd years that I have been involved in Welsh politics at a ministerial level. But two or three things have occurred literally within the last year or so that mean we have to bend our minds to something that I was not all that keen on all those years ago.
First, as my noble friend said, the Labour Party manifesto indicated that youth justice and probation were now to be matters for the Welsh Government and the Welsh Senedd. Like my noble friend, I was a member of Gordon Brown’s commission, and that was something we all agreed on. I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response on those specific issues, which we must not forget.
On the issue of policing generally and its devolution, the view over a number of years was that it was quite hard to devolve policing without devolving criminal justice. The noble Baroness referred to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scotland historically has had both over many centuries. Northern Ireland has not—it did and then it did not after the collapse of the first Stormont arrangement. Indeed, when I was Northern Ireland Secretary, I held responsibility for criminal justice and for policing until the Good Friday agreement made the difference by recommending that both those issues should eventually be devolved to Northern Ireland, which they have been, and very successfully too.
Two things have occurred over the last few weeks. First, my noble friend the Minister came to the Chamber and told us that police and crime commissioners were to be abolished. I do not think that that was in the manifesto, but I entirely concur with it. However, if we are to abolish police and crime commissioners, the responsibility for accountability has to lie with somebody. In England, there are mayors and the new organisations which will follow the devolution Bill, but in Wales there are no such institutions. There are no mayors and no local authorities which currently have a responsibility for policing. We have to find out what happens in Wales when that Bill goes through. That makes us think more about general police devolution.
Secondly, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has now decided in the White Paper on policing that there will be far fewer police authorities and police boards in England. What happens then? Will the current four police forces in Wales be abolished? Will we have two or one for the whole of Wales? I do not know but obviously there will be a change if the White Paper affects Wales as much as England.
Those two issues mean that we have to bend our minds to what we do about policing in the months ahead. Those months ahead will inevitably be complicated by the fact that in 60 days’ time there will be an election in Wales, the outcome of which none of us knows but it will undoubtedly be something we have to deal with in a rather different way from how we have over the past 100 years.
Baroness Humphreys (LD)
My Lords, given the hour, my contribution to this debate will be a short one.
I first apologise for not having spoken to similar amendments on this subject in Committee because of illness. I express my gratitude to my noble friend Lady Brinton, who is no longer in her place, for taking my place on that occasion. My thanks go also to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for bringing the amendments in this group back for debate on Report.
On these Benches we agree with both Amendment 409A on the devolution of policing and Amendment 409B on the devolution of youth justice. They are in line with both Welsh Liberal Democrat and our federal Liberal Democrat policies. Had this debate taken place at an earlier hour, we would have joined the noble Baroness in the voting Lobby.
I will speak very briefly on youth justice, which was seen as an early candidate for phased devolution. The Welsh Government have been able to influence youth justice policy through devolved areas such as education, health and social services, and have established a youth justice system that prioritises prevention, rehabilitation and the rights of children over punitive measures.
According to a Senedd research document published in January this year,
“The Welsh Government has said that it has agreed with the UK Government for officials in both governments to work together to ‘explore options’ where responsibilities in the youth justice system could be ‘realigned’”,
as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to. What progress has been made there?
But despite that and other affirmative statements, the Senedd Equality and Social Justice Committee warned last year that
“the UK Government could row back its promises on the devolution of youth justice … in Wales”
Disappointingly, experience is showing us that this is what appears to be happening.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for bringing forward Amendments 409A and 409B, which raise the question of devolving policing and youth justice to Wales. As discussed in Committee, these amendments engage an important constitutional issue about the structure of the devolution settlement. It was argued that devolving these responsibilities could allow them to sit alongside other public services already devolved to the Welsh Government, such as education and health.
However, as was also noted, these matters currently form part of a single legal jurisdiction covering England and Wales. Policing and youth justice operate within that shared framework which supports co-operation between forces and national capability across the system. Changes of the scale proposed here would represent a significant constitutional shift. A matter of such importance cannot properly be considered through two amendments to an ever-growing policing Bill. Indeed, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd: he is absolutely right that this certainly requires more time. It would require a broader, more fundamental discussion about the future structure of the devolution settlement which, in respect of policing, we on this side, I am afraid, would resist. I look forward to the noble Lord’s remarks.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for returning to the issue on Report. We find ourselves in a very strange situation today where the noble Baroness who moved the amendment resides in Wales, the shadow Minister was a former Member of Parliament in Wales and resides in Wales, and the Government Minister is a former Member of Parliament in Wales and resides in Wales. We are having a bit of a Welsh fest today where every Member who spoke also resides in Wales. I apologise to my noble friends for keeping them here on this Welsh discussion. I have to say to the noble Baroness that I regret it being this late in the evening. It is slightly out of my control because of the way in which the debates have fallen.
As has been seen in the debate, there are a number of different views and within Wales there are a number of different views on this matter. The Government are still of the view, and the position remains clear, that policing operates effectively within a single integrated England and Wales criminal justice system, and it is really important that we examine that.
As my noble friends Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Jones of Penybont mentioned, there is a lot going on in the policing world at the moment, not just in Wales but in England. There will be legislation to abolish police and crime commissioners and an examination of the model for their replacement. As has been said, that model will include the mayoral model in England but also a local authority model. We have given a very strong commitment that the structures in Wales will be a matter for discussion in the review that is being undertaken, pending the legislation that will come before this House, when parliamentary time allows, to abolish police and crime commissioners.
A review of the number of police forces, currently 43, will be undertaken in the next few months and completed in the summer. There will be significant engagement with the Senedd, Welsh police forces, current police and crime commissioners, Welsh Members of Parliament and anyone else who wishes to have a view on what the format should be in relation to any revised structure in Wales. Self-evidently, there are a number of options: the existing four police forces; a smaller number of police forces; a single police force; and the different types of governance structure that could be put in place. That will be part of the discussion that is undertaken.
Lord Wigley (PC)
I am following what the Minister is saying with great interest because it responds to the numerous points that have been made about the reorganisation that is needed to make sure there is no vacuum. The point I would press is that we have an election for the Senedd coming up in May. Trying to get a coherent discussion, debate and conclusion at this point becomes extremely awkward. It would be good if it could be started immediately, before we find ourselves in the middle of an election, with the intention of bringing everybody on board very rapidly afterwards. The Minister will understand the challenges.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I fully do. The review that is being undertaken of force sizes throughout the whole of England and Wales will commence very shortly. The terms of reference, if they are not public already, will be very shortly. The input of the Senedd, the political parties, the current Administration and, potentially, an Opposition Administration in the Senedd is absolutely valid for that discussion. At the end of that period, we want to try to have an understanding of the preferred models through negotiation and discussion on issues such as force size and governance. That is really important because there has to be legislation at some point to abolish police and crime commissioners. In doing that, there will be opportunities to discuss force size and governance accordingly.
I would like to take up the suggestion of a meeting made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am very happy to meet any colleagues who have spoken today. It may be more appropriate that we do that either with the review team for force size and current structures or directly with the Police Minister, but I will reflect on that request and get back to the noble and learned Lord at a sensible hour to determine how we undertake that.
I understand the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys—another resident of Wales speaking, in effect, from the Front Bench, in this case on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. I have set down the principle: the Government do not believe that this reorganisation is about devolution. We have different views on that, but that is the principle of where we are. There are issues still to look at, such as force size and governance, that are for discussion to get the best deal for Wales and avoid, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has said, causing any interregnum in service. I plan to meet some new police officers in Wales shortly, and I will be engaged as someone who has an interest in the matter for this House.
The system currently provides operational resilience, shared capability and strong cross-border co-operation. We do not believe that fragmenting it would improve outcomes for victims or communities. That is the Government’s position. There is an honest disagreement here, but there are still issues that need to be resolved.
On the issue of youth justice, which was mentioned in the debate, it is true that the Ministry of Justice is working constructively with the Welsh Government on delivery and oversight arrangements. The manifesto committed to considering the devolution of youth justice and that work is under way. Consideration does not equate to immediate legislative change, which is why I cannot accept it in the Bill today. No decision has been taken to devolve youth justice through this Bill, but that work is under way. It is a complex issue, and we want to get the best outcomes, but that is the position. I hope the noble Baroness can accept that in the context that I put to her today.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
In looking ahead to a future legislative vehicle for progressing the devolution of youth justice, does the Minister have a specific timeline in mind and what stage of the programme have the Government got to?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I cannot give the noble Baroness a timeline or a commentary on that discussion, but what I can say, as I have said already, is that work is under way. This Government were elected for a five-year Parliament and work is under way—that is what I can say today. She will undoubtedly test us again, as there will be opportunities for questions and debates, and there will be legislative scrutiny whenever any legislation is brought forward on the question of police and crime commissioners. However, today, with the principled position the Government have taken, I cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendments on devolution or on youth justice. As I have said to her and other interested Members, a process is under way on the question of the structures and governance in Wales, which anybody can contribute to in the next few months. The work under way on the justice issue is being dealt with by my colleagues in the MoJ and by the Senedd.
Whatever happens in the election, there will be a Welsh Government of some form, though I do not know what that will be. We are discussing this with the Welsh Government now and we will discuss this with the Welsh Government afterwards. As the Minister responsible for devolution in the Home Office, I have regular meetings with counterpart Ministers in Wales on those issues, as do my policing colleagues. I hope that, with those reassurances at this late hour, the amendment can be withdrawn.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I thank the Minister for his answers and all noble Lords for contributing to the debate. What is most important from what we have gathered this evening is to ensure that, whatever arrangement is decided going forward, it is decided not just in England for how it can benefit and work for police forces in England but that there is particular engagement in Wales.
The Minister mentioned engagement with the Senedd and police forces in Wales, but making sure that it is genuine engagement, and that they can design what the system looks like for the benefit of Wales and not have just another version of what will happen in England, is important. I think that all of us who took part in this debate would welcome further discussion to find out more about the next steps. I am sure we will have further discussions about this, but today I will withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Police enforcement data(1) Police forces in England and Wales must publish annual data on the enforcement of the following offences—(a) shoplifting,(b) offences involving a blade,(c) phone theft,(d) fare dodging on public transport, and(e) offences involving bicycles and e-scooters.(2) In this section, “enforcement” means the investigation and collection of evidence in preparation for a prosecution.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 409D, I will speak to the other amendments in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson for his support on the crucial issues of police force publication of enforcement data, reducing police paperwork and the reform of disclosure to that end. I have discovered in a long career in business and in government that enforcement of the law is as important as the rules and the regulations themselves, and this is particularly true for neighbourhood policing.
It is not possible to identify and promote the best without comparative data. Better data on enforcement, publicly available, would both be a motivator for effective policy and help to hold the police to account. My amendment therefore takes in five areas of public concern that the great British public care about: shoplifting offences, offences involving a blade, phone theft, fare dodging on public transport, and offences involving bicycles and e-scooters. The Minister mentioned in Committee that the Home Office will introduce a sector-facing police performance dashboard this year. It will help chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse the sort of data that we are seeking, and to drive improvements.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. With the finishing post in sight, I will be extremely brief.
These amendments correctly identify a crisis at the heart of our police service. There is a consensus that our police are currently drowning in a sea of unnecessary paperwork, and my noble friend Lady Doocey’s policy paper, Policing Fit for the Future, makes the case with devastating clarity. It records the testimony of chief constables, who warn that low morale and heavy workloads are being compounded by
“archaic IT systems—some over 50 years old”
that force highly trained officers to spend more time as data entry clerks than as crime fighters. The Government’s own White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, acknowledges this failure. It rightly sets out a mission to “strip away the barriers” that prevent officers focusing on the public’s priorities. We on these Benches welcome the ambition to automate manual processes and deliver millions of hours back to the front line.
I am not going to go into detail on the amendments, but we cannot support them as drafted. They risk micromanaging the police through the statute book and could become relics of a different era within a few short years. However, I urge the Minister to take the spirit of these proposals to heart and ensure that they are reflected in the new national policing model.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward this group of amendments. Together, they address a theme that will be familiar to many across the House: the need to ensure that police officers are able to focus their time on policing rather than bureaucracy.
Amendment 409D concerns the publication of enforcement data for a number of offences that have become a source of considerable public concern, including shoplifting, offences involving blades, phone theft and fare evasion. We lend our strong support to the amendment. Greater transparency around enforcement activity can only help to strengthen public confidence and provide a clearer picture of how policing resources are being deployed.
Amendment 409E addresses the volume of paperwork that officers are required to complete. In Committee, it was rightly observed that administrative burdens can too often draw officers away from the front line. A review of the scale of those requirements and how they might be simplified would therefore be a sensible and constructive step.
Finally, Amendment 409F raises the question of data sharing and the efficiency of the systems that underpin case preparation and charging decisions. As many noble Lords will know, delays and inefficiencies in the exchange of information between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can slow down the progress of cases and place additional strain on already stretched resources.
There is a significant amount of work that goes into the redaction of police documents before they are sent to the CPS, often for the documents simply to be sent back because they are overredacted. Furthermore, many of the cases the police redact may not end up being prosecuted. It is clear that this is a significant waste of police time and money, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is right: it would make more sense for the CPS to take charge of the redaction of documents that may enter the public domain, given that it would have a far smaller number of documents to trawl through.
Taken together, these amendments all speak to a wider objective: ensuring that the system surrounding policing work is as efficient as possible, allowing officers to focus on preventing crime, catching offenders and protecting the public. The police should be spending as much time on the front line as possible, rather than being encumbered by unnecessary paperwork. I hope that the Minister will give them careful consideration and, as always, I look forward to his response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, we are nearly there. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for returning to these issues, which were thoroughly debated in Committee, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Davies of Gower, for their contributions to this short but nevertheless important debate. I know that the noble Baroness takes a keen interest in improving how police handle data and utilise their resources effectively. We share that objective and appreciate her constructive contribution to that discussion.
On the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409D, as announced in our police reform White Paper, the Government will introduce a police performance dashboard this year, which will allow chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse transparent and operationally significant data. This will allow forces to understand where they are performing well and where they can improve. The Home Office and the Office for National Statistics already publish extensive data, of course, on police-recorded knife crime, shoplifting and theft, and the outcomes assigned to these crimes. The published outcome data provides detailed information on what happened after a crime was recorded by the police, such as where a result is a charge or summons, out-of-court disposal, et cetera. Essentially, it links crimes to their investigative and judicial results, giving insight into how offences progress through the criminal justice system. Additional data is available through police.uk, where members of the public can access monthly crime maps and stop and search statistics. Transport authorities such as Transport for London also publish enforcement data on fare evasion. This is to say that the dashboards are still in development but will build on what we already provide in the public domain.
I know from her contributions to the Bill that the noble Baroness has concerns about how police are enforcing the law particularly around offences involving cyclists and e-scooters. The Home Office has recently established the police performance framework, which provides a strong mechanism for monitoring enforcement activity across all police forces in England and Wales. This framework is flexible and is currently scheduled for review in 2027-28. Mandating which offences the police publish enforcement data on through a fixed list in statute, as her amendment envisions, does not offer the necessary flexibility, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted, as to how the performance framework operates. In addition, it risks duplicating the work already being undertaken that I have outlined.
Turning to Amendment 409E, the Government have already gained valuable insight into how police time is used, through the 2023 Police Activity Survey, to which the noble Baroness referred. Given the usefulness of the results, the Home Office ran the survey again this year, with fieldwork taking place just last week. We expect to have results in the next few months and will consider how to ensure that they can enable police productivity improvements. From this activity, we expect to gain a detailed profile of how police time is used, as well as insights into productive and non-productive uses of that time. We have sponsored the Centre for Police Productivity in the College of Policing and launched the police efficiency and collaboration programme in 2024 to improve productivity and efficiency across police forces.
Furthermore, our recently published White Paper presents an array of the most significant reforms to policing for nearly 200 years. It outlines our plans to modernise the entire workforce, establish a new performance system to drive improvements in forces, strip out duplication and inefficiency and deliver £354 million of efficiency savings through a police efficiency and collaboration programme. I know that the noble Baroness is keen on efficiency savings, so I hope she welcomes that announcement.
Finally, on Amendment 409F, we support the noble Baroness’s desire to free up officer time by removing administrative burdens such as unnecessary redaction and improve the efficiency of case file preparation and the charging process. A large part of the redaction burden is driven by current disclosure practice, so we have collaborated with criminal justice partners to pilot a more proportionate approach to disclosure. The pilot, running in the Crown Prosecution Service’s south-east region, aims to reduce the redaction burden by reducing the unnecessary sharing of unused material and refocus efforts on what meets the test for disclosure. This should make case preparation more efficient and enable more timely and effective charging decisions. We are also working with policing to support the adoption of AI-enabled redaction technology. The majority of forces now have AI-enabled text redaction tools, and we are supporting those forces to adopt audiovisual multimedia redaction technology in the most efficient way.
In conclusion, we support the aims of these amendments, but given the work in train, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that they are not necessary at this stage. However, I will be very happy to meet her request to facilitate a meeting with the most appropriate Minister, so that we can take the discussion forward. In the meantime, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the Minister for his courteous reply. The prospect of a meeting is most welcome: I will be able to clarify one or two outstanding points in relation to the material that he has kindly set out. I was glad to hear about the pilot on redaction in the south-east. I hope that, in due course, that will either solve this problem of redaction, which we and the Lib Dems agree is a big problem, or show that some sort of legislation needs to be brought forward. However, in view of the Minister’s response and the lateness of the hour, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.