Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

My amendment would not, as in the householders case, result in an officer’s acquittal, since that cannot be justified in the case of trained firearms officers. There needs to be accountability and a criminal penalty. As the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords said all those years ago, a manslaughter conviction is a far more proportionate penalty than treating them as murderers.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thoroughly welcome these sensible and proportionate amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which he more than ably explained. I was prompted to speak on Amendment 393B having just read the Government’s Protecting What Matters action plan. I have plenty to say on that, but your Lordships will be relieved that I am not going to do so now.

In the plan, the Government readily admit that trust in institutions is in decline and that social cohesion is fraying. I am concerned that, if Clauses 168 to 171 go through unamended, it could create a problem of further distrust in policing. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, saying that there is not a huge gap between the amendment and the Government in relation to presumed anonymity for armed police officers, the Government are proposing an unprecedented rejection of the principles around open justice and, more importantly for me, press freedom. I am concerned that the clauses will limit the ability of the press to report in any meaningful way on cases involving the use of lethal force by police officers.

Replacing the presumption of anonymity should not leave officers vulnerable or unsafe, but the amendment would allow the power to grant anonymity if there are specific risks to safety or if it is in the public interest, to prevent harm. This is a blunt instrument. It would set up a privacy regime that would shut the media out from scrutinising the state’s exercise of power with guns. I cannot see how the public will not see that as covering up when the media will be denied any meaningful opportunity even to contest such anonymity, let alone to report. That is the concern. I am sure that the Minister will explain.

It is interesting that the police have recently been asking for greater freedom to release more details in relation to some investigations. This is not in terms of armed police, but police forces have recognised that suppressing information can lead to misinformation. That can turn nasty if the public feel that there has been a cover-up.

That is a move to transparency to ensure public consent and build trust, which goes in the right direction. I am just worried, although it is not their intention, the clauses will be a step back from a duty to have candour and from the state being transparent when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, an armed officer representing the state takes another human being’s life. We should not just grant automatic anonymity in that way. We have to at least allow the media to ask questions and scrutinise.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.

I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.

I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.

I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.

The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—

“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—


are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.

I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.

That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.

I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.

Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.

The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.

If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.

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[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Thank you. Amendment 407 asks us to make a practical decision about policing and tackling violence against women and girls. It is not—I repeat, not—about taking sides in a culture war. Recording biological sex in every case is about getting the basics right: honest crime figures, sound operational decisions and better protection for victims of violence. If we do not know clearly in our police data who is male and who is female, we cannot properly track male violence, spot patterns and target resources where they are most needed.

When police forces blur sex and gender identity, the data starts to go wrong. Hardly any perpetrators of sexual violence are women, so it takes only a small number of male offenders being recorded as women to make it look—wrongly—as if women are suddenly committing many more violent and sexual offences. That distorts our statistics, makes it harder to see the true scale of male violence against women, and risks bad safeguarding decisions.

If systems shift between recording sex, gender as perceived or self-identified gender, we lose track of the trends. We can no longer say with confidence whether male violence is rising or falling, or whether policy changes are working. When the public discover that “female” means one thing in one table and something different in another, trust in policing and government data inevitably suffers.

Professor Alice Sullivan is one of the UK’s leading experts in quantitative social science. She was appointed by the Government to independently review how public organisations can best collect data on sex and gender. Her review cuts through the confusion that currently exists. It says that, when the state needs sex data, it should ask a simple factual question about biological sex—“What is your sex: male or female?”—and that that must be kept separate from any voluntary questions about gender identity. It strongly recommends that all police forces record biological sex in all relevant systems.

Some people worry that this will force trans people to out themselves to the police. It should not and it does not have to. The police already record very sensitive information—religion, disability, sexuality—while respecting confidentiality, human rights and data protection law. The sex question is about biological reality for operational and statistical purposes. Held securely in background systems, it is not a licence to broadcast someone’s history or to deny their gender identity in day-to-day interactions. Where there is a need to understand gender identity, that can be done through a separate, clearly labelled voluntary question with strict safeguards.

The choice is stark. If we do not record biological sex, we accept distorted crime figures, poorer operational decisions, broken trend data and growing public mistrust. If we do record biological sex clearly and consistently, we give ourselves honest statistics, better safeguarding and a policing system that can see and therefore tackle the reality of male violence against women and girls.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 407, on the recording of sex in police data. It is a real shame that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, is unable to be with us because she would have introduced it very elegantly.

A year ago, in March 2025, Professor Alice Sullivan’s Review of Data, Statistics and Research on Sex and Gender came out. It pointed out:

“It is well-established that sex is a major determinant of offending and victimisation”.


The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, may have been going through the motions but he went through them very well by explaining clearly why this amendment matters. As he pointed out, it is very difficult for the Government to claim to have a target-based campaign to reduce violence against women and girls if they do not have consistent, accurate data in relation to women and girls. Although Professor Sullivan’s review was broadly welcomed by the Government, its recommendations have not yet been acted on. This amendment attempts to nudge some action from the Government.

The issue of delayed guidance is a constant problem. The Women’s Rights Network recently contacted the National Police Chiefs’ Council, inquiring whether it intends to now record sex accurately and address what it said was the “ideological corruption of data”. The NPCC’s reply says that

“updates to the collection and recording of sex and gender reassignment questions are pending subject to the issue of national guidance by the Office for National Statistics/Government Statistical Service following the UK Supreme Court ruling earlier this year”.

That is one pending answer. Individual police forces responding to a variety of organisations’ queries about the continued use of a variety of approaches to collecting sex data—including self-ID, recording a rapist as female and so on—say that they are waiting for guidance from the ONS and the GSS. Is there anyone not waiting for guidance? It feels as though this is a waste of time that is unnecessarily adding to confusion.

In Committee, I went into detail about differing and contradictory data collection practices across police forces. I will not repeat that, but recording practices vary not just between but within criminal justice agencies and even relevant government departments. As there are 40 different databases at a national level relating to criminal justice, the data that is being collected as we speak is full of discrepancies. The Home Office’s annual data requirement on demographic data, for example, advises police forces to record sex subject to a gender recognition certificate. Other mandatory Home Office standards—on police use of force, for example—require officers to record perceived gender, with a choice of male, female or other. There are also the multi agency public protection arrangements, which focus on protecting the public from the most serious harm from sexual and violent offenders, including convicted terrorists. They too conflate sex and gender in their data collection.

However, the Murray Blackburn Mackenzie criminal justice blog discovered via a freedom of information request that MAPPA provides police officers across the UK with

“51 options to record the gender identity of high-risk offenders”.

How does it help to keep the public safe, or aid operational coherence, to know whether a terrorist or paedophile is pangender, genderqueer, agender, bi-gender or gender-fluid, just to name a few of the 51 options they could fill in? I am not trying to be glib; I am just urging the Government to bring clarity and consistency to the collection of data on sex in relation to victims and perpetrators, because otherwise I think it is unfair to claim that there is anything like an evidence-based policy when it comes to sex and, indeed, gender.

We have recently had some exchanges about the new aggravated offences in relation to transgender people, and there are people who are transgender who claim that hate speech and hate crime against them has gone up. I am not challenging whether or not that is true. But to collate the data to make a case for that, one has to make a distinction in the collection of data between somebody who is transgender and somebody who says “I am a woman” who is in fact a transgender person who identifies as a woman.

I think that, for all victims concerned, let alone for understanding the nature of offenders, we need to have accurate, consistent data across all criminal justice agencies and all police forces. I hope that the Minister will at least give us an assurance that the recommendations of Professor Sullivan’s fine and important review—which is full of detail and evidence, with practical conclusions, and which the Government have welcomed—will be acted on. If we can get that assurance tonight, that would be brilliant. If there is any government reluctance to accept Professor Sullivan’s review, it would be really helpful to understand why—what the hold-up is—and maybe the Minister could explain that too.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, given what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said about the lateness of the hour, which I think we are all aware of, I want to be very short on my concerns about Amendments 406 and 407. I am sorry not to see the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, in her place.

My concerns about both amendments are about practicality and the dignity of people. In a nutshell, this is what they have in common: the police are going to be the race police and the sex police in addition to being the police, and they require police officers to make a judgment even against the way that the suspect—or the victim—defines themselves at any stage in the criminal justice process. I think that is a mistake.

How is this going to work? A victim goes to the police because they have experienced an assault or another serious crime. Whatever community or person they are, they will go to the police, and, under both these amendments, the police officer is required to interrogate whether they are who they say they are on sex and race grounds. I think this is a real mistake, and it will not help the police in the difficult work they have to do and certainly will not help all our communities in these difficult times.

I think that is one minute and 58 seconds. I hope noble Lords understand my point.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have one sentence to add to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The Office for National Statistics, in response to an FoI, said on the collection of data in relation to the “gender identity different from sex registered at birth” category:

“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”,


but there is not enough data to be able to do that. Why? Because the data is so low that it is statistically insignificant. It is not corrupt and it is not many more to twist it for women. We need to be factually accurate when looking at this issue.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I was not making the point it has been assumed I was making. This is about consistency, which is the point made by Professor Sullivan. Different police forces are collecting different data on gender identity or sex, sometimes conflating the two and sometimes using multiple variations on a theme. I then used the analogy of this happening across criminal justice. From the point of view of whatever evidence someone is trying to collect, as has just been pointed out, if we are going to collect data—and maybe we should not bother—will it be useful if it is different all over the country depending on the department?

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am struggling to hear the question in the noble Baroness’s intervention. I repeat the point that the Office for National Statistics and the police data that is currently collected both say the numbers are so low they are insignificant and therefore unusable.