Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Current hate speech law goes too far in criminalising words and thoughts. Basic freedoms are being trampled on. Frank expression of thoughts, fears or perceptions is suppressed. Setting people free to speak their mind can indeed result in ugly or upsetting scenes. Most of us wish to be courteous and hate upsetting anyone, but some people get upset easily. Moreover, bad actors can and often do claim to be, or perform being, upset. No free society should encourage that by overcriminalising words. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 382F, an amendment that, carefully and proportionately, takes on tackling the problems of the ever-growing number of overlapping Acts and statutes that are used to limit free speech. If public order laws on protest are, to quote the Liberal Democrat Benches from the other day, a confused mess, the labyrinthine patchwork affecting free speech is an impenetrable quagmire. The noble Lord has done a real public service here by carefully going through how, inadvertently and often by mission creep, censorious laws undermine democratic speech rights and are actually damaging the UK’s reputation internationally.

I am not just talking about JD Vance or Elon Musk, who I have heard commented on in this House and dismissed sneeringly by many in Westminster as spreading just Trumpist misinformation or hyperbole. We need to recognise that even the bible of globalist liberalism, the Economist, no less, featured a cover last May proclaiming “Europe’s free-speech problem”, identified the UK as one of the most censorious on the continent and provided a lot of evidence. There has been lots of discussion all over the political spectrum in relation to the idea of 12,000 arrests a year, 30 a day, for speech offences that spring from laws that the amendment seeks to rein in, and for which this House is responsible. We are talking here about crime and policing, and the police are expected to treat speech offences as criminal acts and to police them.

Since the introduction of hate crime laws, which I remind the Committee is a relatively recent concept popularised from the mid-1980s, the legislative and regulatory implications of restricting hate and words that are said to have caused distress have proliferated, and it has grown into a real tangle of tripwires. In that tangle, many people in the police and the CPS, and even politicians, seem confused about what one can say legally and what is verboten.

I am sure that noble Lords will remember the extraordinary story of the Times Radio producer, Maxie Allen, and his partner, Rosalind Levine. They were the couple who were arrested by six uniformed officers, in front of their young children, for posting disparaging messages about their daughter’s school in a private WhatsApp group. It received a lot of publicity, and they have just been paid £20,000 for wrongful arrest, although they have not received an apology. What stood out for me about that story was that when the police officers went into her house, Ms Levine asked what malicious communication offence they were being accused of. The detective did not know, had to Google it and then read out what Google said. That strikes me as not healthy. We as legislators have a responsibility to tackle this. Too often, we just pass more and more laws, with more restrictions on freedom, and never stop to look at whether anything on the statute book can be repealed, streamlined or rolled back.

I commend the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for his detailed, well-thought out and proportionate attempt at tackling the way the law has grown and the negative impact that is having on democratic free speech. I also want to commend him for his courage in taking on this issue. As we know, and he referred to this, if anyone takes on hate speech laws, you just think, “Oh, my goodness, he’s going to be accused of all sorts of things. He’s going to be accused of being a bigot. It’s a risk”, so when he told me he was doing this, I gulped. It is horrible to be accused of being a racist, a misogynist, homophobic, a hatemonger, or whatever, but that is the very point. Being accused of being pro-hate speech, if you oppose hate speech legislation, is itself silencing of a democratic discussion on laws and we as legislators should not be bullied or silenced in that way. Ironically, the best tool for any cultural shift in relation to prejudice, in my view, is free speech. To be able to take on bigotry, we need to be able to expose it, argue against it and use the disinfectant of free speech to get rid of the hate, whereas censorship via hate speech laws does not eliminate or defeat regressive ideas; it just drives them underground to fester unchallenged.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has laid out the key legal problems in his approach to this, especially in relation to the lack of precision in terminology used across speech-restricting laws. He has raised a lot of real food for thought. Perhaps I can add a concern from a slightly different perspective, to avoid repeating the points he has made. For me, there is another cost when law fails to clearly define concepts such as abusive or insulting words, grossly offensive speech, and what causes annoyance, inconvenience and needless anxiety—these things are littered all over the law. It is that the dangerously elastic framing of what speech constitutes harm or hate has been deeply regressive in its impact on our cultural norms. There has been a sort of cultural mission creep which has especially undermined the resilience of new generations of young people. The language of hate speech legislation now trips off the tongues of sixth-formers in schools and university campus activists. When they complain that they disagree with or are made to feel uncomfortable by a speaker or a lecturer and say that they should be banned for their views, they will cite things straight out of the law such as, “That lecturer has caused me harassment, alarm and distress”. Where did they get that from? They will say that those words are perceived as harmful and that if they heard them, it would trigger anxiety—even claiming post-traumatic stress disorder is fashionable. It is because we have socialised the young into the world of believing that speech is a danger to their mental well-being, which has cultivated a grievance victimhood. It is a sort of circular firing squad, because the young, who feel frightened by words which they have picked up and been imbued with from the way the law operates, then demand even more lawfare to protect themselves and their feelings from further distress. They are even encouraged to go round taking screenshots of private messages, which they take to the police, or they scroll through the social media of people they do not like to see whether there is anything they can use in the law.

The law has enabled the emergence of a thin-skinned approach to speech, and this has been institutionalised via our statute book. The police do not seem immune to such interpretations of harmful words, either, and I am afraid that this can cause them to weaponise the power they have through this muddle. It wastes police resources and energy, an issue very pertinent to this Bill.

I will finish with an example. In August 2023, an autistic 16 year-old girl was arrested for reportedly telling a female police officer that she looked like her lesbian nana. The teenager’s mother explained that this was a literal observation, in that the police officer looked like her grandmother, who is a lesbian. The officer understood it as homophobic abuse, so a Section 5 public order offence kicked in on the basis of causing “alarm or distress” by using abusive language. If you witness the film of the incident, seven police officers entered the teenage girl’s home, where she was hiding in the closet, screaming in fear and punching herself in the face. You may ask who was distressed in that instance. The girl was held in custody for 20 hours and ultimately no charges were brought. But we must ask whether the statute book has created such confused laws and encouraged police overreach, and whether it encouraged that young police officer, who heard someone say the words “lesbian nana”, to immediately think, “arrest her, hold her for 20 hours and say that she is causing distress”. What has happened to the instincts of a police officer when they think that this would be the answer?

Many people to whom I speak about the problem addressed by this amendment suggest that it has been overstated. They say that, yes, the police are a bit too promiscuous in arresting people, but the numbers charged and convicted are fairly stable. In fact, a journalist recently told me that in some instances they are going down. But as legislators, should we not query whether this implies that the laws are giving too much leeway to the police to follow up malicious, trivial and politicised complaints? This creates the chilling consequence of the notion of process as punishment: you might not be charged, but you are arrested, and law-abiding citizens are humiliated and embarrassed with the cops at the door. We must take this amendment very seriously, and I hope that the Minister will give us a positive response.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, it is a delight to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who hit the nail on the head: in fact, she hit many nails on the head, and I agree with everything she said.

I support Amendment 382F because it restores the proper boundary between criminal law and free expression. Criminal sanctions must be reserved for conduct that poses a real risk of harm, threats, menaces and conduct intended to intimidate, not for speech that merely offends or causes hurt feelings. Section 127 of the Communications Act and related provisions currently include abusive and insulting material, and even communication that causes “anxiety”—a formulation that has produced inconsistent enforcement and a chilling effect on legitimate debate.

Should I have reported my MS consultant when he told me the good news and the bad news? The good news was that he knew what it was, and the bad news was that it was MS. He wanted to check how spastic I was. That word, “spastic”, can sound like a terribly insulting term, but it was a medical reference to my condition. This morning, I got a text message reminder: “Your UCLH appointment with the spasticity walk-in clinic at Queen Square will take place early tomorrow morning”. We must make sure that we do not treat all words which may seem insulting as actually being so. The law should be precise and proportionate. Vague criminal offences that hinge on subjective reactions invite over-policing in online life and risk criminalising satire, political argument and robust journalism. Recent parliamentary analysis shows that arrests under communications offences have increased, while convictions have not kept pace, suggesting that resources are being spent on low-value prosecutions rather than on genuine threats to safety. Legal commentary also suggests the difficulties courts face in applying terms like “grossly offensive” and “insulting”, and that undermines predictability and fairness.

This amendment would not leave victims without recourse. Civil remedies, harassment injunctions, platform moderation and targeted civil criminal offences for stalking, doxing and credible threats remain available and should be strengthened. That combination protects vulnerable people while ensuring that criminal law is not used as a blunt instrument against free expression.

Of course, there are trade-offs. Decriminalising insults means some distress will no longer attract criminal penalties, but the correct response is not to expand criminal law; it is to improve support for civil remedies and focus policing on genuine threats. That approach better protects both free speech and personal safety.

For these reasons, I urge the Minister to support Amendment 382F in order to defend free expression, sharpen the law so that it targets real harm, and ensure that our criminal justice system focuses on threats that endanger people rather than on words that merely offend them.

--- Later in debate ---

Sadly, the woman in my case was not caught, mainly because no one moved until after she had gone. My concerns are that we need the full panoply of protection for vulnerable members of our community, who often experience much more than any of us can see or understand. This will also, by the way, assist the police in trying to do their difficult job. In practical terms, this means that the police must be able to record incidents that may not amount to a criminal offence, because in many cases it is the course of conduct—that is the phrase used in the business—that together amounts to harassment or other offences. If the police cannot do that, they would find it almost impossible to get enough evidence to charge someone with, for example, antisemitic or racially aggravated harassment, or even stalking. I really hope that the noble Lord is prepared to withdraw his amendment and that we can have a sensible debate about where some of the boundaries are with freedom of speech and damage to individuals.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Before the noble Baroness finishes, I did not want to interrupt what I thought was a very helpful contribution that laid out the kind of dilemmas that we face, but I will just ask for a couple of points of clarification to see where we might agree or disagree. In relation to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, does she recognise that the concept of harm has now become so broad—in terms of psychological harm, for example—that it has become possible to say that any speech is harmful, and that this has led to the mess that we are in? There is physical harm, as opposed to, “I think that speech is harmful”. Anytime I have been cancelled from speaking, it was on the basis that I would cause harm to the students or pupils. It is a concept of me turning up with a baseball bat, about to do some harm to them, whereas actually they were anticipating, ahead of me speaking on issues usually related to free speech, that I would harm them psychologically and they would be damaged. Is that not a problem for legislators in the context of this amendment? Secondly—

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I remind the noble Baroness that while she is able to ask questions for clarification, interventions are meant to be brief and I urge some brevity, given the progress we have made in Committee so far this afternoon.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I will ask this very briefly, then. Is there a problem that young people and the police do not appear to be able to distinguish between microaggressions and genocide? Is it one line?

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.

That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise, but it is the return of the double act.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for tabling this amendment and for his excellent explanation of it. If the previous group was tricky then, yikes, getting rid of hate crime has me asking what I am doing here. I am going to carry on regardless and try to unpack why I think this is so important.

One thing that I am very aware of is that the accusation of hate crime or hate speech in any way can make you stutter and stammer and look the other way. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, told of the abuse that she received and how everybody stayed quiet until the incident was over and then rushed up to her. That reminded me of what it feels like at the moment to have unpopular views. Very often, you are attacked, and then people will come up to you afterwards, squeeze your arm and whisper, “I agree with what you said”, but they do not say it out loud. There are an awful lot of people who look away because they are frightened that they will be accused of supporting hate.

The best example, and one that this House has discussed endlessly, is the consequences for the thousands of young women in towns throughout the land who were abused, raped and sexually assaulted because people in official positions—social workers, teachers and people who knew that young women were being abused in that way—were frightened that, if they complained, they would be accused of Islamophobic racist hate. And so they were quiet. The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes that clear, as does all the other discussion on that question. In other words, this one is difficult, but we have got to keep going.

What is a hate crime? For the purposes of legislators, Lord Sumption, who has already been quoted, explains it this way:

“The Crown Prosecution Service and the police have agreed to define a hate crime as anything which is perceived by the victim or anyone else to be motivated by hostility or prejudice. In other words, the definition which they use is subjective. If the complainant thinks it is a hate crime, then it is a hate crime”.


That is extraordinarily dangerous, as it inevitably makes it impossible to deny the charge, to say, “I am not a hate criminal, and what I have just said is not a crime”. You have no defence, but it empowers a complainant as a victim who cannot be challenged. It has been proven that this is incredibly divisive in society. It incites people to adopt a victim label. In a period of identity politics and protected characteristics, it undermines equality before the law.

In reference to something else that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, in the 1980s, I was active in anti-racist politics. We sought equality before the law rather than discrimination, and made an argument focusing not so much on words but on making sure that people were treated equally, not spoken to nicely in different terms—although that was a bit of an argument, it was never something that was demanded by those of us involved in those fights.

Ironically, the aim of hate speech laws for many people is to create a kinder and nicer society, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not in her place, reminded us at Second Reading, and I am paraphrasing here, certain legislation in the early 1990s raised public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society and eradicate an emotion like hate. Indeed, that is a theme that the Economist feature that I mentioned earlier picks up. It says:

“The aim of hate-speech laws is to promote social harmony. Yet there is scant evidence that they work. Suppressing speech with the threat of prosecution appears to foster division … When the law forbids giving offence, it also creates an incentive for people to claim to be offended, thereby using the police to silence a critic or settle a score with a neighbour. When some groups are protected by hate-speech laws … others … demand protection, too. Thus, the effort to stamp out hurtful words can create a ‘taboo ratchet’, with more and more areas deemed off-limits. Before long, this hampers public debate. It is hard to have an open, frank exchange about”


controversial issues such as

“immigration, say, if one side fears that expressing its views will invite a visit from the police”.

That is really what the amendment is getting at. Removing hate crime from the statute books would not mean living in a hateful society. Hate crime on the statute books actually encourages people to be divisively, toxically antagonistic to each other.

On aggravated offences—the idea that you get a longer sentence if it is alleged that you are motivated by hate and the concept of stirring up hate—removing specific acts that are crimes from thoughts or the speech behind them dangerously conflates speech and action. When hate crime laws require that the authorities infer a perpetrator’s belief and assign greater punishment based on ideological motive, that can lead to some perverse criminal justice outcomes, which matter to legislators. In the CPS report on recent hate crime prosecutions there was a telling, shocking example. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for

“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.

Actually, 20 weeks seems a bit low to me, as it goes. Then the detail was revealed: the CPS explains that, for assaulting his father, his sister and a police officer, the person who was found guilty received a community order. They received the 20 weeks in prison for the racist slur. So for the assault you can retain your freedom, but for the racist words you get 20 weeks in jail. Is that not confusing?

There are endless examples that I could cite. It is no wonder that young people in particular, rather than being super-sensitive, as was described earlier, are actually super-sensitive to words they find difficult. They think that speech is violence and cannot distinguish between physical threats, physical harm and what they imagine to be harmful speech, which in turn justifies using physical violence against hate speech that they hear. That was brutally illustrated by the assassination of Charlie Kirk—someone whose politics I did not agree with but who was basically seen to be a hate criminal and, if all speech is violence, you can use violence back. I think these are regressive cultural fruits of vaguely drafted laws that give a vast and subjective discretion, and that is adding to the atmosphere of toxicity and cancel culture.

I know that all roads lead back to the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, but I ask the Minister whether he can explain the point of the review if, when he is looking at provisions such as public order offences and some of these issues—I know he is very concerned about free speech—we are going to just say that the status quo works. Hate crime legislation is getting us in a mess. The Minister says that he absolutely disagrees, but the Government have asked for a review of these very ideas.

Surely the Minister might be open-minded to that review, if not to the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and me, or other people who have spoken. Might there be some flexibility from the Minister in thinking that, just possibly, legislators before this Government brought in some bad laws and that, at the very least, we should look at them again? It just may be that hate crime legislation is making society more hateful, is making young people more anxious and frightened and is bad for democracy.

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in opposition to this amendment, but I will resist the temptation to give a Second Reading speech. My understanding is that it would abolish the entire statutory framework relating to hate crime and hatred-based offending.

I have been a blatant homosexual for many decades, and part of that look means that you evoke some hatred as you walk around the streets—the streets of Cardiff in 1993, certainly, when no hate crime legislation existed in relation to sexual orientation. The message I got at that age was that the state agreed with the offences that I was experiencing, because I did not know that the state supported me.

Within the last year, when I was in Shoreditch, a group of men surrounded me and my partner. They got up in our faces and used unequivocally homophobic language. We did not report it as a hate crime, but we were frightened and discombobulated. My response was, “But it’s Shoreditch”, which was my middle-class shorthand for, “There are so many lesbians in this area. What exactly are you going to do if you think that this hate is going to be acceptable here?” I did, however, feel utterly supported by the state a year ago, because I knew that legislation existed that made that kind of offence unacceptable.

As has been outlined, there is no single offence of hate crime. What exists is a framework across several Acts. There are aggravated forms of certain basic offences, and I look forward to the Government’s amendment on Report, as in their manifesto, relating to disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. There is enhanced sentencing, where hostility is proved on grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity. There are offences such as stirring up racial or religious hatred. It is my understanding that this amendment would dismantle that network in its entirety.

Those who have concerns about the recording of non-crime hate incidents, which I have sympathy with, or about proportionality in relation to hate crime, which I also have sympathy with, can and should address those matters directly. But those issues are distinct: wholesale repeal of criminal protections is not a measured response, in my view, to broader free speech concerns.

I find it impossible to ignore the context. Official Home Office figures record 137,550 hate crimes in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025. As a resident of Bethnal Green, I am acutely aware of hate crime in relation to antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. It exists across all the streets; the graffiti is going up and up in relation to both those things. On antisemitism specifically, the same Home Office bulletin records 2,873 religious hate crimes targeted at Jewish people in the year ending March 2025, and notes that the previous year saw a very sharp rise and spike following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict. In addition, the Community Security Trust recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the calendar year 2024. I share that data because what we measure, we manage. Understanding these spikes and seeing these patterns matter. What the hate crime legislation gives us is a mechanism for measuring and managing those spikes and incidents.

Where reporting shows acute risk, His Majesty’s Government have acted. In October 2023, the Conservative Government increased the Jewish community protective security grant to £18 million for 2023-24, and that figure was maintained in 2024-25. That is right and proper as a reasonable and justified response to that spike in hate crime, which was measured because this legislation exists.

One can believe deeply in freedom of expression; I sympathise and actually agree more than people might think with the previous amendment, and with some of the comments we have had so far. But the law must recognise and respond to crimes intended to intimidate whole communities. In my view, this amendment would remove the very tools that allow the police and the courts to identify, mark and properly sentence hostility-motivated offending. For those reasons, I would request that this amendment be withdrawn.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

That was a very useful and nuanced contribution from the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to notice the rise, for example, of antisemitic hate against Jews. The amount of hate crimes being recorded, however, has gone up hugely, despite the proliferation of hate crime legislation. Does that not rather imply that hate crime legislation is not stopping hate crime?

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is a really important question, and I will try to remember to keep speaking in the third person, because I do want to just talk.

Has the proliferation of legislation helped prevent hate crime? During the past two decades we often saw increases, and we would question whether those increases were a product of increased hate crime, or an increased awareness of the legislation that led people to report. I am aware that, being of my generation, I am reluctant to report. There is a part of me that thinks, “You had it coming, and you should probably have taken your tie off for that walk down that street. You brought it on yourself”, added to which I do not want to waste police time. There is a conditioning that goes on with minority communities, and it takes some changing in how we think about these things to give communities permission to say that they did not have it coming, they do not deserve it, and that they have the right to talk to the police about those incidents.

I welcome the increase in reporting. Nevertheless, there has been an overreliance on using some of this legislation for incidents that should not constitute a hate crime. What happens when those cases are brought and those complaints are made, and how they are investigated, absolutely requires examination and thought. However, that does not justify the wholesale removal of hate crime legislation, which is a disproportionate response to the problem that has been identified.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is a fair question. I would only say that, generally speaking, if you have a large crowd and a significant number within it wearing masks, the chances of you telling them all to take them off are very limited. If I understand the proposal, it is to prevent people arriving at the march with a mask rather than having to deal with it once they arrive. If you have to deal with it, you will have to deal with it. That is the only thing I would say: having allowed people to mask up, you cannot then expect officers to deal with a crowd of 5,000 or 6,000—it is just impractical. That is the argument against it, but I understand why the argument is made.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I broadly agree with the excellent comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in moving this, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I was reminded, when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us of the exemptions, that retrospectively, having been arrested or having had your mask removed, or what have you, you can say, “I was wearing this mask for health reasons”, or for work reasons, or for religious observance. The fact that there are exemptions for those reasons and not for others indicates what a ridiculous situation it is. Why have those three things only as reasons why you are allowed to wear masks? Let us just think about it. At what work would you be allowed to wear a mask? Could you say, “Well, I deliver pizzas so I have a helmet on”? Everyone could then turn up wearing a helmet saying that it was to do with their work. That just does not make any sense.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Indeed, the amendment, if it were enacted, would raise the expectations of people such as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that there is a right to protest that will expand on current rights. It will not because Amendment 369, were it to be introduced into our law, would have to give way to other express statutory provisions that give powers to and impose duties on the police and others, so it would cause confusion. Are we really going to incorporate into our law express statutory provisions that echo each and every one of the protections under the European Convention on Human Rights? I doubt whether this is a sensible way to legislate.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 369 because I like the fact that it creates a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest so that:

“A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate”.


That is the balancing that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained so well in his introduction. It is undoubtedly the case that there is a balancing act.

I am pleased to support the amendment because I feel it has never been more necessary to reassert why the right to protest matters. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, advising us to not panic—I did not mean that to be quite the pun that it came out as—I feel there is a danger of complacency here. I think that restating this in this amendment is essential. The fact that we need to restate the importance of the right to protest as a fundamental right in a healthy democracy gives us an urgency in championing and guarding carefully and closely what I think is under threat. It allows protest that, as the UN notes,

“enables individuals to express themselves collectively and to participate in shaping their societies”.

It is

“a system of participatory governance”.

I worry that if people believe that that right to protest is being eroded consistently, that leads them to take more dangerous, extreme measures. The right to protest is political free expression. We have all watched over the last week or so the protests in Iran and the absolute bravery of those protesters; it strikes me that we are happy to cheer them on and say how important it is. Closer to home, we have to carry on and expressly say that political ideas expressed on the streets that challenge the status quo allow people to express anger and their dissidence and opposition. That is worth restating.

I think there has been a relentless attempt at curbing such democratic expression. Since I have been in this House, which is for more than five years, there seems to have been a relentless stream of laws threatening the right to protest. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, just explained, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023 have substantially expanded police powers to impose restrictions on protests and to arrest people for breach of these restrictions, as well as increasing sentences for peaceful protest offences and lowering the threshold for what would constitute serious disruption to the life of the community.

Those laws have been passed and are ongoing, and they have led to legislative crackdowns on peaceful protests—but here we are again, because it is never enough. It seems to me, as I have argued before, that every time the law is changed those laws are not enforced, or the police or people in authority say, “We can’t do anything. We need more laws and more restrictions”, and so it goes on and on. As this has been the third piece of primary legislation in less than five years to chip away at the right to protest, we should be worried.

That is why I put my name to Amendment 371 looking for a review of the existing protest framework. There is an awful lot of legislation now that can control and curb one’s right to protest. I am delighted about the Macdonald review, by the way, but we need to make sure that the law is fit for purpose. We should not just keep adding on laws all the time. I fear the impact of the Acts on freedom of association, freedom of expression and so on, so I support both amendments.

I want to admit something, though. I do not want to be naive. Despite what I have just said, I know that protests have changed in many ways. This is the balancing act. As we enter into a new discussion now on all aspects of protest, I am aware that I also need to be open-minded. I am completely principled on the right to protest, but I understand that we have to take certain things into account. I have watched demonstrations and protests over the last few years in which intimidation, antisemitic slogans and toxic, intimidating behaviour have happened. I have seen that myself; I cannot deny it. It is also true that there is a more violent vibe around some protests. I genuinely could not believe that pro-Palestinian protests happened after the Manchester synagogue murders; I just could not get over that.

It is not just on that question—I do not want to obsess on that question. There is a whole range of issues in which I am interested. When I have been to events, I have been approached, or rather screamed at, by masked-up, unpleasant, scary protesters. I do not want to deny that. I am also aware of the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, pointed out—he was using the examples of the likes of Just Stop Oil in the past—in some protests it is almost as though disruption has been used to bully people into adherence rather than persuading the public to agree, and that has made me feel uncomfortable. But that is all the more reason why we need to review what is on the statute book. Is it fit for purpose? We cannot just keep adding laws, becoming more repressive and more draconian, and hoping that we are going to sort it all out. That is what I fear.

By the way, in response to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I do not support, I remind him of the kind of disruptions that one gets at modern demonstrations. You have a situation where, for example, a protest outside an asylum hotel organised by the Pink Ladies—for those who know who they are—is met with Stand Up to Racism protesters, who are protesting against the protesters, and there is a clash. It is then argued that it is disrupting the local community and that both protests should be banned.

It strikes me that that is not very helpful, because it is perfectly legitimate, for example, to say that you are worried about people being put into local hotels as asylum seekers. I cannot just say that, because I support those concerns, I then want to ban the Stand Up to Racism protesters who are worried about them.

We also have to be aware of the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has explained, protest does disrupt communities. Somebody—I cannot remember who now—talked about the farmers. I was actually outside Downing Street on a protest with farmers on Budget Day. What was shocking was that the farmers had been banned from driving their tractors even though, until the day before, it had been long agreed that they would be allowed to have a protest of tractors on that stretch. The night before, the tractors were banned and farmers were arrested for trying to drive them in the vicinity. I am aware that the argument that it is too disruptive and would disrupt people can be used in ways that are very unhelpful.

I would remind people as well about the terrible scandal that is emerging in relation to what happened at the Aston Villa match, from which Israeli fans were banned. I know people who went to that match. When protesters went in solidarity with the action of people who were fighting antisemitism, they organised a vigil at that football match in Birmingham. They were fenced in by the police and treated almost as criminals, even though in fact they were showing solidarity with Jewish people in the local area.

The reason I am giving those examples is that we have to admit that it is a bit complex. Therefore, just saying that protests that are disruptive of everyday life will be banned would be a very dangerous precedent, and I disagree with it. But I concede that it is a hard argument and we should therefore take it seriously, not just keep passing laws to ban protesting even more.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra has made a very pragmatic speech on the difficulties of fare evasion and the extraordinary complexities of the ticketing and fares system in the UK. Of course, I note that the Government are legislating in this area as part of the broader GB Railways Bill that is coming down the tracks, as it were. I really do not believe that there is a single individual in the United Kingdom who could answer 20 questions about the cheapest fare from A to B crossing C and get it right. It is an extraordinary system, and I quite agree that many people are making inadvertent errors, which should absolutely be taken into consideration.

Equally, the Minister will have heard me talking about enforcement on many occasions throughout the passage of the Bill. The law is brought very quickly into disrepute if the laws that law-abiding people see as absolutely necessary are avoided by a determined criminal element. We have all seen it. We have all seen it on the Tube, with people barging through, tailgating and hopping over the barriers. I have seen two officials of London Underground at Green Park station late in the evening, chatting to one another—someone comes barging past and they do absolutely nothing. If that continues, then I suggest we get ourselves into a very difficult situation indeed. So, when the Minister comes to respond, I ask that he talks about enforcement and about the attitude of the police to combat this serious issue which robs the railways and London Underground of hundreds of millions of pounds and is unsustainable.

I think that, on the ticketing issue and the fare issues, the answer really lies in technology. I think that apps have made this much more straightforward. It is absolutely a task for computers to find the best ticket from A to B, but there are plenty of people who do not use those, who are not particularly computer literate and who prefer a paper ticket. So, it is perhaps more complex than it seems from the outside, but I really think we have to put more effort on enforcement in this difficult area.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, briefly, because very good points have been made, I am tempted to say, yes, we need to increase penalties or threaten people with prison, because fare dodging does drive me mad, particularly on the Tube. It is partly the brazen, quite violent and intimidatory way that it happens for ordinary people: you are pushed out of the way and you just do not know what to do. We are not all Robert Jenrick with a camera: you want to intervene, you want to say something, you want to have something happen, but it does not happen. What has occurred is a normalisation of anti-social behaviour. The difficulty is whether we can legislate against that, because it seems to me that, partly at least, this is cultural and we have a situation where members of the public look away.

But I do think there is a problem with staffing. Whether TfL staff in particular are intimidated or whether they are indifferent, it is hard to tell, but I can assure noble Lords that they are not intervening very much. Despite the fact that this has had a lot of publicity recently, I have seen that it carries on, it seems to me, all the time. Even if you talk to the staff, they look the other way. It is one of those things: you do not want to be a grass and so on—by “you” I do not mean the noble Viscount—but I can see people feeling “I don’t necessarily want to go and report on that person, and I’m not sure what to do”. In other words, the public are stymied and are not quite sure how to respond. It is ironic, because we are constantly told that we should respect public-facing staff, and that is absolutely right, but if the public-facing staff do not respect us as members of the public, it makes it difficult. So, I am not convinced, despite the good intentions of this amendment, that it is the solution, because I am fed up with laws being added to the statute book that nobody enforces—it seems to me to bring the law into disrepute.

I want to add a note about the difficulties of buying tickets on national rail and knowing whether you are using the right ticket. I can assure noble Lords that I have made mistakes, but one reason that you can make a mistake is if you have a ticket for a fixed time and the train is late and you get on another train, you can actually be reprimanded for being on the wrong train when in fact it has just arrived at the time that the train that you were going to get should have arrived or has not arrived. I will not bore noble Lords with the details, but anyone who has travelled on trains regularly will know what I am talking about—and then to be sneered at by a member of staff. It seems to me that the danger here is that the innocent could indeed find themselves at the receiving end of a more draconian enforcement, whereas the culprit, as it were, gets away with it.

I also want to draw attention to the dangers of fast-track court processes. I really hate this single justice procedure, and it is worth noting that TfL are the people who use it most to prosecute people. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made the point that you can appeal to magistrates. Well, not in that instance, because you are not in the courtroom; it is all happening behind your back. I just worry about injustice occurring. On the other hand, I would like to hear from the Government what strategy they have: not relying on one person with a video camera to expose this, but a campaign about fare dodging would do no harm, because it is public money and the public get very irritated by it. I do not think we need an amendment, but I would not mind some action being taken.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments, although I think we have strayed slightly away from the intentions of the mover of the amendment. Amendment 365 is another amendment from the Conservative Benches increasing penalties for fare dodging. As other speakers have said—and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, acknowledged this—the key to enforcement is consistency in how these regulations are applied and, currently, that is not the case. I hope that Great British Railways, when it takes over the franchises, will guarantee some common training and work in that area, which will stop the blindingly obvious things that we see. I have seen it at Westminster station here, where three people have just burst a barrier and there have been two staff members there with their arms folded almost waving them through: “It’s not my job, go”, and off they went.

I will just make one comment. I do not think the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said it with any intention, but I have never found any staff on British railways to be sneering and offensive, but we have to understand that sometimes they are dealing with people who make a professional life of travelling on the railways without paying. I have been on a train down to London, and sitting across from me was a gentleman with a son who looked about 10 years of age with a little iPad. When we had got almost to Milton Keynes, about two miles out, a ticket collector came through and the man had a single off-peak ticket to Macclesfield, which is the next station from Stockport. He was not going buy another ticket—“I’m not buying a ticket. You can’t throw me off this train. I’ve got a child with me”. That is the dilemma that the train manager faces. It is emotional blackmail, and how often does this happen? But the train manager was very polite. He dealt with him, and just asked him to either buy a ticket with his credit card, or he would have to get off at Milton Keynes and there would be a policeman waiting for him there. That seemed impossible to do, but he made a quick phone call, we pulled into Milton Keynes and the chap had to get off, because there was some peer pressure from other passengers, I must admit, and there was a policeman waiting for him. That sends a real message about the connectivity of what guards can do without having to get into a confrontation with passengers.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has explained all my reservations about these clauses very articulately, so I will not repeat them. They add an unnecessary implication that the public are a threat to emergency workers. Why are religiously and racially aggravated offences being highlighted here, as though members of the general public were somehow prone to that kind of behaviour? It is an unhelpful signposting because, as has been rightly pointed out, if emergency workers are dealt with aggressively or harassed in any way, we have laws to deal with it. To highlight this implies that there is something extra to be added, that there is a problem out there of the public going around racially abusing workers, and that there are particular offences in mind. Duplication of law ends up being virtue signalling. I am not sure that virtue is being signalled, but none the less it seems to be a box-ticking exercise rather than an effective piece of lawmaking.

I am also very worried about the notion of “insulting behaviour”. I am probably guilty of it; one does get frustrated sometimes. What on earth does it mean? It is entirely subjective. What is insulting behaviour? It would be helpful for the Minister to give us illustrations and examples of what constitutes insulting behaviour. How will people be charged with this? It immediately makes people fearful of raising complaints or of being frustrated in public. If the ambulance has not turned up for a long time and your husband is dying of a heart attack, you might be a bit fraught. Somebody might interpret that as insulting behaviour. It might be perfectly rational, reasonable behaviour and not criminal. I am worried that this is creating a toxic atmosphere where none need be there. I cannot understand why it is there.

The words “likely to cause” feel far too much like pre-crime. What is “likely to cause”? These are criminal offences. If you are charged with them, you will be seen potentially as a hate criminal. Therefore, the Government have to give us a very detailed explanation as to why they feel these clauses are needed, so that we can scrutinise it. As they are presently given, I am not happy at all. I will support any move to have them removed from the Bill.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we take a very different view and strongly support Clauses 107 and 108, which recognise a simple reality. Emergency workers can face racially or religiously aggravated abuse whenever and wherever they are carrying out their duties, including in private homes. They cannot choose their environment or walk away from hostility. Their professional duty is to step into what are at times chaotic, volatile situations, and to stay there until the job is done. The law should follow them into those settings and make clear that such targeted hostility is no more acceptable in a hallway or a living room than it is on a street corner. This debate has shown that the issue is not about policing opinion or curtailing lawful expression but about drawing a firm line between free speech and deliberate acts of intimidation directed at those who protect the public.

These clauses are drafted to catch only behaviour that crosses that line in aggravated circumstances, and they sit alongside, rather than in place of, the wider framework of public order and hate crime. In our view, striking them out would send the wrong message, undermining our commitment to those who protect us. Looking ahead, it will of course be vital that their use is monitored and that guidance for police and prosecutors is kept under review, so that the balance struck here remains both proportionate and effective in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As ever, we will reflect on what has been said. The judgment we have made is as in the clauses before this House, as introduced and supported by the House of Commons. There will be opportunity, if the noble Lord so wishes, to table amendments on Report to reflect any view that he has, but this is the judgment we have made.

The principle of today’s discussion is that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, believes we should strike out these clauses. That is not a principle I can accept—I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on that. Whatever reflection takes place on this, our principle is that we have included these clauses for a purpose, which I hope I have articulated, and I wish for the Committee to support that principle.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Nobody here is going against the principle that we should not racially or religiously insult, harass or be vile to people. We are talking about changing the criminal law and ensuring that the concerns of the Constitution Committee—not mine or those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, or anyone else—are looked at again, so that the “real life” that the Minister referred to in justifying this reflects the fact that in many instances emergency workers are called when people are at the height of distress. I appreciate that people will, can and do say all sorts of things, but I am concerned that that distress will be that much more aggravated, and a toxic atmosphere created, if people can too loosely start saying, “I’m going to call the police on you”, when somebody subjectively interprets behaviour as insulting.

It is reasonable for us to raise this in Committee. Instead of saying that he disagrees with us on principle, is the Minister prepared to look at what the Constitution Committee has said, and what is being reflected on here, to see whether, in order to keep to his principle, the wording of criminal law can be tightly drawn so that we do not criminalise ordinary people in distress who say things that somebody might subjectively see as insulting? That is dangerous, illiberal, potentially threatening behaviour from a Government to the public.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think I am being illiberal, although I accept that the noble Baroness may have a different view on that. Later in the consideration of amendments, we will come to those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that seek to further define some of the aspects of Clause 109. I am happy to look at the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but the judgment we have made is that these clauses should remain part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has asked that they be removed. That is a clear difference between us. I have explained why they should be included; he has explained why he believes they should not. If he wishes to take that stance on Report, we can have a discussion about that.

For ease of recall, I have just been passed a copy of a long letter about the Bill and these clauses, which I have been reminded that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, on 12 November. The letter answers some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised. I do not know whether this four-page letter has been made public, but I am happy to place a copy of it in the Library for the noble Lord and anybody else to examine.

Obviously, there will be the opportunity on Report for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to again table his clause stand part notices and/or for any Member of the House, once they have had an opportunity to look at the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to table amendments to meet the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has mentioned. We support these clauses, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will reflect on that and not seek to remove them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I shall need to go back later and do my own sums, but that still seems to me a little bit excessive.

I am not opposed to the proposed new clauses, and I agree with the thrust of them; this is an important issue. But my concern is with turning a broad legal duty, which these two proposed clauses suggest, into concrete and repeatable workplace practice. There are some practical difficulties. First, you get hidden and underreported incidents. We all know that victims often do not report harassment or stalking—and then there are no incident logs, which may underrate the risk. The risk can come from colleagues, managers, contractors, clients, customers or the public, including online, making responsibility and control much harder to map. That might put a simply impossible obligation on employers and impose a very heavy burden on small employers, which would probably not have an HR or personnel department or the security expertise to assess all the potential risk.

Designing “gender-responsive” measures into practical and proportionate steps seems to me to be a very difficult thing to do; a lot of careful tailoring would be required to deal with different people and roles. That may be beyond the capability of many employers, particularly small ones. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has looked at the HSE advice, already published, which I think includes detailed guidance on managing work-related stress and preventing work-related violence. That includes information on creating policies to address unacceptable behaviour. Perhaps the voluntary advice it gives could be expanded to deal with the elements at the core of these new clauses.

I also look to what ACAS does. This is what it says on its website:

“‘Vicarious liability’ is when an employer could be held responsible if one of their workers discriminates against someone … The law (Equality Act 2010) says a worker and an employer could both be held responsible if the discrimination happens ‘in the course of employment’. This means something that’s linked to work … This could be at work or outside the workplace, for example at a work party or through social media that’s linked to work”.


That is what ACAS says about discrimination, but I simply wonder whether the better course of action might be not to pass this proposed new clause into law but to get HSE and ACAS to take the thrust of the suggestions and design new guidance that delivers what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, want.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, has just left the Chamber, but when I saw him here, I assumed that he was going to speak on this matter. Had he spoken, he would probably have said, “Please do not give any more powers to the Health and Safety Executive”. He was a victim of one of the excessive criminal trials. When he was commissioner of the Met, one of his officers was pursuing a burglar. The burglar ran on to the roof of a factory, and the police officer chased him, fell through the skylight and was seriously injured. The Health and Safety Executive took the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to court for failing to provide a safe working environment for the officer. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said: “I stood in No. 1 court of the Old Bailey—the court that had the trials of murderers, serious criminals and traitors—accused by the Health and Safety Executive of not taking enough care of my workers. When my lawyer asked the chap from the Health and Safety Executive, ‘What should the officer have done?’, he said, ‘Well, he should have stopped; he should have sent for a cherry-picker and scaffolding to make sure it was safe’”. The noble Lord said, “I looked at the jury, and the jury looked at the face of this idiot, and within minutes I was cleared, because a sensible jury knew that that was a ridiculous thing to say”.

That is the only danger of giving these powers to an organisation like the Health and Safety Executive. It may use the bulk of them safely most of the time, but on occasions you will get silly decisions. I should say in conclusion that that case of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, is a very good reason why we should keep juries, rather than having a single judge.

I perceive difficulties in putting this proposal into law, but I hope that a solution can be found whereby the Health and Safety Executive, ACAS or others can pursue the contents of new clauses without recourse to legislation.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have some serious reservations about Amendment 348 and the related Amendment 349. I spoke at length against them when a similar amendment was tabled to the Employment Rights Bill, and I shall not repeat everything that I said then.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked about looking at the drafting. That was interesting, because one of my problems is with the wording of this repeated amendment. It is all over the place, quite dangerous and very broad, and it could get us into all sorts of unintended trouble. Let me illustrate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, spoke passionately and excellently about some the real live problems of sexual harassment at work, and many of us will recognise that. As I say, I have concerns about the language of this amendment. It refers to having a legal mandate for employers to introduce

“proactive and preventative measures to protect all persons working in their workplace from … psychological and emotional abuse”.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that “psychological and emotional abuse” is a very broad term. The nature of “proactive and preventative measures” might involve stopping something that is very hard to define and could result in real overreach. It could be quite coercive and manipulative.

However, I am particularly nervous about the use of the “gender-responsive” approach that is advocated, particularly in relation to training. We are told in the amendment that

“a ‘gender-responsive approach’ means taking into account the various needs, interests, and experiences of people of different gender identities, including women and girls”.

Women and girls are not a subset of “gender identities”—whatever they are. That is insulting, and gender identities are at the very least contentious. This language confusion, for me, drags the amendment into a potential political minefield. I am familiar with the way in which gender-responsive approaches are being used in the workplace at the present time to undermine women and girls.

I was fortunate enough today to have a meeting here in Parliament with the Darlington Nurses Union. The Darlington nurses are in dispute with their NHS employer because they felt sexually unsafe in their single-sex nurses’ changing room—which, by the way, was fought for as part of health and safety at work in the past. They had a place where they could get changed and they felt unsafe when a gender-inclusive policy allowed a male who identifies as a woman to use their space. This has led to all sorts of problems in relation to what safety at work is. They felt as though there was a degree of sexual harassment going on, and so forth. I am just pointing out that this is a difficult area, so can we at least acknowledge it?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is repeating, to some extent, some of the perfectly sensible points that she made in the debate earlier in the year. I just point out that, in Committee, these are probing amendments: no more, no less. It is accepted from the get-go that they could be improved, and what I think would be helpful for the Committee is not a long list of the things that are wrong with the amendment—we accept that there may be some things that are wrong with it—but some suggestions, if the noble Baroness is unhappy with the wording, as to what might be put in its place if, as I think is the case, she acknowledges that there is a problem that needs to be dealt with.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

That is a fair comment. The point that I was going on to make was that she was suspended for misgendering using a gender-inclusive policy similar to that advocated in this amendment.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

What would the noble Baroness use instead?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I suggested then that I was not happy with the wording of an amendment, and it has simply been repeated. I made a speech that I thought was reasonable at the time. This is actually not the same speech, but I am raising some of the issues. I ask, as I asked earlier, why would we use that approach to protecting women and girls when women in the workplace are at present actually the victims of some of these gender-related policies? Therefore, if the amendment comes back as a more straightforward, narrowly defined amendment about sexual harassment at work, I would be much more interested in hearing about it. It is the amendment that is repeated, not just my speech. It is exactly the same wording that I objected to before. No account has been taken of any of the criticisms made in Committee, at the probing stage, so I think I can reasonably say that I would like us all to not repeat ourselves, including with this amendment.

[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

I want to come back really briefly on the language of “gender-responsive approach”. That is not a “gender-inclusive approach”: it is based on the ILO convention that our Government ratified, along with the rest of the global community, and relates to the fact that more women than men face misconduct at work. I wanted to clarify the language there, but I do take those points.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

This amendment is not about identity; it is about safeguarding. It is about ensuring that a person who has committed a serious sexual offence cannot obtain a certificate—that should be a privilege to obtain—that changes their legal sex in a way that compromises the safety of women. I would be very grateful if the Minister could answer some specific questions when he comes to respond. Could a convicted sex offender obtain a GRC while serving a prison sentence for sexual offences? Could a convicted criminal offender obtain a GRC while serving a prison sentence for any other offences? Could either of these groups obtain a GRC after their convictions are spent? Will the long-awaited guidance from the Government include in its scope any changes to the GRC policy framework? I look forward to the Minister’s reply, and I commend my amendment.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. Both amendments have been spoken to very well and very strongly.

I want talk about one particular case, of a sex offender called Clive Bundy, who was in prison for some years for sexually abusing and raping his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin, from a young age. It was incestuous sexual abuse and rape. He went to prison in 2016 and before he was released, he declared he was a woman. Bundy then changed his name via deed poll, very generously helped and abetted by the prison authorities, to aid his release.

I have spoken about this issue in this House before, and there are a number of reasons why it has been brought to my attention. One reason is that Clive Bundy changed his name to Claire Fox—consequently, I know about it. Claire Fox now wanders freely. However, the most important reason is that I was contacted by his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin. Before we had the Supreme Court ruling, I raised this a number of times in a number of Bills to note that Ceri-Lee Galvin as a victim had been badly betrayed by this story. She was never told that her incestuous, rapist father was being released, because he was not—Claire Fox was. And of course, guess what? If you google Claire Fox, you will get horror stories, but they are about me and not him.

In all seriousness, it was a deed poll change. Therefore, Clive Bundy might well be on the sex offenders register, but Clive Bundy does not exist. Claire Fox exists, but Claire Fox is Clive Bundy the rapist and is therefore free to live in the same town as his daughter, which he has done, and he has harassed her. I will not go into the details, but Ceri-Lee Galvin has been incredibly brave in giving up her anonymity to talk about this story to the press various times. As she says, she cannot get anywhere when she tries to lobby on this point.

Therefore, in theory, Claire Fox—Clive Bundy—is not on the sex offenders register and can apply to work with young children in the local area, where her daughter goes to nursery, and nobody knows that this person is a child rapist. There must be something that the Government can do to strengthen the safeguarding, which I know is their intention in this group of amendments. Therefore, the two non-government amendments should be seriously taken up by them. They would not contradict their aims but would ensure that their aims are more than just written on paper but actually protect victims and future victims.

It is not a question of making a moral judgment. I do not care whether Clive Bundy thinks that he is a woman; that is irrelevant to me. I do not even care that he has taken my name—which, by the way, is a fashionable thing to do; to use a gender critical name is apparently a form of trolling which happens in America quite a lot. But that is irrelevant. The point is how we protect people when have a sex offenders register that does not reflect reality.

By the way, special privacy measures are given, meaning that when I have asked questions in the past, I have been told that because this person has chosen to change gender and is therefore now Claire Fox, they cannot investigate Clive Bundy. If Clive Bundy as Claire Fox turns up for a meeting to volunteer with the Girl Guides, no one can even ask whether they are the same person. We cannot even go there. This is ridiculous and it is not what the Government want. Therefore, I hope the Government are open to these two very important amendments on deed poll and gender recognition certificates.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I want first to pick up on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, and both her comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and ask the Minister a question. Am I right in thinking that given that the Prison Service—and I think also the Probation Service—must do a full assessment of risk on any transgender prisoner, the protections they seek are already there?

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for raising the case of Karen White. The Scottish Prison Service apologised because it did not do what it should have done: a full risk assessment. Had it done that, she would not have been placed on a women’s wing. I therefore hope the Minister can confirm that the protections for the public, particularly for victims, remain, because now, following the Karen White case in particular, real care is taken to make sure the law is followed. I would find it extraordinary if crimes were just dropped off the list because somebody had a transgender recognition certificate—so could the Minister confirm that this is not the case?

Turning now to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment, we on these Benches also welcome Clause 87, but it needs strengthening. My noble friend’s amendment is very clear: we have to be able to stop offenders changing their names without the knowledge of the police. That also plays into the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Research from the Safeguarding Alliance has shown that key legislation is being made redundant because of a loophole that people can use to get through the cracks. This is not just about transgender issues; it is about people just changing their name regardless of their gender. Frankly, this makes Sarah’s law and Clare’s law utterly useless. I hope the Minister is prepared to consider this.

The remaining amendments in this group, from the Government, look as though they are sensible adjustments to the arrangements regarding sex offenders obtaining driving licences in Northern Ireland. We look forward to hearing from the Minister in more detail on those.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My understanding of the position is that the individual is on the sex offenders register, regardless of the name that they are currently providing. The risk is around the individual. If a registered sex offender seeks to change their name, the provisions in the Bill will apply, as proposed in the Bill here today.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

On a final clarification—possibly the Minister will write to us, because there is some confusion—I have always said that it is about managing risk and that it has nothing to do with gender. When I have raised this issue in the past, my concern has been that once gender is added into the mix, risk somehow gets forgotten slightly.

First, the point of the sex offenders register is not just for the authorities to know that they are there but for all sorts of institutions to know. I have been told in the past that an enhanced privacy privilege is given to those who change gender. Is that not true? Therefore, even probing that means that we will leave it well alone.

Secondly, in relation to DBS checks and so on, a change of gender, a change of identity—forget the politics of it—can mean that nobody knows that you are the person on the sex offenders register. If the DBS check is in one name, there is no way of knowing that you are the same person who is the rapist. That was why I used the Clive Bundy-Claire Fox example—Clive Bundy, as Claire Fox, would not show up on DBS checks or be on the sex offenders register if they went to work with children. That cannot be right or what the Government intend.

Maybe I have got it all wrong, but nobody from the Government has reassured me. By the way, my questions and amendments in the past were to the previous Government, so this is not having a go at this Government. This has been an unholy mess over two Governments.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It may help the Committee if I say that both the original name and the new name would be recorded. For clarity, where a DBS check applicant has changed their names, they are required to state all names that they have been previously known by on the application form. In submitting that form, applicants sign a legal declaration declaring that they have not knowingly provided false information. Failure to disclose previous names and deliberately avoiding detection of previous convictions would lead to an individual being liable for prosecution. I hope that helps to clarify the position with regard to the amendments. I invite the noble Lords not to press them at this stage.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am on the “how to change your name” government website, which says that if you are a sex offender, violent offender or terrorist offender, you must go to your local prescribed police station where you are known within three days of changing your name. It is a criminal offence if you do not tell the police straightaway. There will be probation and other things going on in the background as well.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is worth clarifying that this group of people are not necessarily the kind of people I trust. This idea that a local sex offender—or terrorist, since we have been talking about Bondi Beach—thinks, “God, it would be against the law if I didn’t declare that I’ve changed my name”, and would be frightened by the possibility that they would be breaking the law, seems a tad naive.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.

Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.

Facial Recognition Technology: Safeguards

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a very interesting question. The Home Office is examining the use of drones and how they can be used in relation to a range of matters. If my noble friend will allow me, that matter is important in the context of the Question but is also potentially tangential to it. I will examine what he said and we will discuss it further.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, will the Minister explain how the Government will assess and balance other liberties, such as privacy and the right to be anonymous? He rightly pointed out that this technology might be aimed at targeting the bad guys or missing people, but it requires mass surveillance. How does the Home Office seek to protect the innocent majority of people from undue state observation, surveillance and, actually, an attack on their rights?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

First, there is a consultation about the very issues the noble Baroness raises and oversight of the technology. Secondly, this is not about individuals who are not known to the police; it is about individuals who are on a watch-list who might be wanted, individuals who have already committed a crime who are trying to be matched with a facial recognition camera, or verification from a body-worn camera along the lines that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, mentioned. The noble Baroness should put her comments in the consultation and be reassured that this is about a select group of people before facial recognition technology.

Violence Against Women and Girls

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I find it quite upsetting to see some of the images and messages that are put out from people who, in some cases, currently face criminal charges in other countries. It is important that, through the work that my noble friend Lady Smith of Malvern is doing, we work with schools and communities to ensure that young men in particular respect everyone in society, and that they are not taken down some of the very false routes that currently appear on much of social media.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, first, what is the timescale for the independent commission on grooming gangs in terms of appointing a chair, publishing the terms of reference, and so on? Is there any urgency there? Secondly, as these rape gangs are arguably the most shameful examples of state indifference to, even collusion with, the sexual abuse of thousands and thousands of young white working-class girls, does the Minister understand that delays and excuses imply that the commitment regarding violence against women and girls can come over rather cynically—as just a slogan rather than action?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I assure the noble Baroness that it is not a slogan; it is a manifesto commitment to halve the level of violence against women and girls over a 10-year period as a matter of some urgency. She will know that we have been trying to recruit a chair for the national grooming inquiry over many weeks, and we are still trying to do that. The anticipation is that we will, I hope, achieve that as quickly as possible. We have enabled a Member of this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, to assist us in that recruitment, and this very afternoon we will have debates in this House on the Crime and Policing Bill on those issues. It is the Government’s intention to establish the inquiry as soon as possible, and I will keep this House updated.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown, but she may not need much support, having received the much-coveted gold star from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who, I am very proud to say, supports a later amendment of mine on raising the age of criminal responsibility—which, I am ashamed to say, is barbarically only 10 in England and Wales. The UN recommends that it be 14. In Scotland it is 12 and the heavens do not seem to have fallen.

I have a couple of specific points to make in support of my noble friend’s amendment. If I may, I will be as bold as to predict what my noble friend the Minister and his advisers might be about to say in response. If they are about to say that my noble friend’s definition is unnecessary because the definition can be taken from the offence itself in Clause 40, I would like to get in first with two points to counter that. If I am pessimistic and wrong, so be it. Noble Lords know that I do not mind looking a fool.

The first point, which has already been made clearly by my noble friend Lady Brown, is that we need a definition that is about not just a specific criminal offence but interagency working and interventions across services, well in advance of any investigation or prosecution for a criminal offence.

I do not think the second point has been made yet. If the Committee compares the elements of my noble friend’s definition with the definition of the criminal offence in the Bill, it will see that the Government’s approach misses something very important that is to be found in my noble friend’s definition: enabling the child, not just causing the child, to engage in criminal conduct. That addition is important because “causing” is a harder thing to prove and a greater step in grooming. Currently, the Government’s definition is

“causing the child to commit an offence”,

or, indeed, “facilitating” somebody else to cause the child to commit the offence.

To prove causation in law is a serious matter. Enabling—making it easy, making the tools of the trade available, providing the opportunity—is a lower threshold, which is appropriate in the context of children. My noble friend made the point that currently in law they are treated as victims but also as perpetrators, and sometimes it is a matter of luck as to whether you will find the adult and the public service who will take the proper approach, in my view, of always treating the child as a child and as a victim, and not criminalising them. This is the point about “enabling”.

My noble friend the Minister is very experienced in these matters. Whatever he comes back with, I would like him and his advisers to consider the question of the lower threshold of enabling, not just causing. If there is to be a further compromise that includes some element of my noble friend Lady Brown’s amendment, I hope that that is taken on board.

The most formative time in my professional life was as a Home Office lawyer. I know what it is like to work on big Bills and to defend them as originally crafted and drafted. But it is wise, especially in this House, to take good advice and to bend a little when it might improve legislation for the benefit of victims.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:

“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.


That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.

However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.

My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness on how she moved the amendment. It is very nice to see a Government Back-Bencher introducing an amendment and taking part; I wish we had slightly more of it.

To bring one back to Professor Jay’s review of child criminal exploitation, she made several important recommendations, of which the first and arguably most important is at the heart of what we are talking about at the moment. She called for a single, cohesive legal code for children exploited into criminal activity, and detailed what that needed to contain. The noble Baroness’s amendment goes to the heart of that matter. Having well-meaning explanations put into advice or regulation is not enough. There needs not only to be a common understanding across all government departments and agencies involved in dealing with these children and gangs; it needs to be completely clear for the police in particular, who are clearly looking into the criminal activity, exactly what it is and what it is not.

With the next amendment, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and I shall speak, we will talk about ways in which a child who is both a victim and perpetrator can be defended—but we will discuss that in the next group. As for this group, I think that I probably speak for all noble Lords who are concerned about this issue in saying that absolute clarity about the definition, so there is no argument about it whatever, would be a giant step forward. The best-meaning attempts to deal with child criminal exploitation over the past decade have been hindered severely by the lack of consistency.

I ask the Government to listen very carefully to what the noble Baroness has asked for. She has said clearly that her wording may not be perfect—I think that in many Bills the wording is not necessarily perfect, even in the final Act—but we have a chance to get this right. I look forward to what the Minister says in response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 21 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which have just been moved so well. I agree with all the amendments in this group, although I am not quite sure and have reservations about Amendment 2 on lowering the age to 16.

The proposition seems to me straightforward. The powers to tackle anti-social behaviour are currently contained in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. So, before the state affords itself even more powers—which, by the way, often duplicate what we already have—should we not assess whether what we have actually works in improving outcomes for victims and fundamentally reducing anti-social behaviour, which is what we want? We should note that 82% of anti-social behaviour practitioners surveyed by Justice have called for such a review of existing powers and criticised the lack of proper consultation, or even engagement, by the Government. It is shocking that there has never been a formal review of the 2014 Act, and that data on the use of existing orders is not collated centrally, nor their use monitored, by government. Surely the Minister agrees that the Government should be working to identify and address problems that are inherent in existing anti-social behaviour powers and orders before creating more, and that that would be an evidence-based approach to this question.

We are largely focusing on respect orders in this group. They are almost duplicates of anti-social behaviour injunctions but will provide, the Government has argued, more effective enforcement. Experts and practitioners in fact suggest that they could confuse enforcement agencies. What is more, as respect orders are so close to ASBIs, the fear is that they will just reproduce and increase the problems with those injunctions, which research shows are overused, inconsistently applied and sweep up relatively minor behaviour problems alongside more serious incidents. At the very least, can the Minister explain why the discredited ASBIs are staying on the statute book? Why not just dump them?

If, as the Government tell us, the key difference with respect orders is to deal with persistent and serious anti-social behaviour, that should be made explicit in the legislation. Otherwise, the danger is that they just become another overused part of a toolkit, handed out promiscuously. That is a particular concern because of the use of the phrase by the Government and in the Bill that these orders are “just and convenient”.

“Convenient” is chilling, because—here is the rub—respect orders are formally civil orders but, in essence, are criminal in character. I am worried about the conflation of civil and criminal in relation to respect orders, which the noble Lord explained so well. The Government are removing that rather inconvenient problem of a criminal standard of proof because it has all that tiresome “beyond reasonable doubt” palaver that you have to go through. However, if you are found guilty, as it were, there is a criminal punishment doled out via a respect order and you can, as we have heard, receive up to two years in prison, which rather contradicts some of the emphasis in the Sentencing Bill on trying to stop people going to prison and keeping them in the community—so this is not entirely joined-up government either.

At Second Reading I quoted Dame Diana Johnson, who made clear the “convenience” point by explaining that the problem with a civil injunction such as an ASB is that,

“if a civil injunction is breached, the police officer has to take the individual to court to prove the breach”,

and she complained that there was no automatic power of arrest. That bothersome inconvenience has been overcome by creating a new respect order, which Dame Diana enthusiastically states

“combines the flexibility of the civil injunction with the ‘teeth’ of the criminal behaviour order”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/11/24; cols. 795-96.]

However, that convenient mash-up of a legal solution is something that we should be wary of. It has a dangerous precedent, showing that a cavalier attitude to legal norms and justice can lead to great injustice.

When I read all this, I thought of the single justice procedure, which we were told would allow public authorities to bring cheap and speedy prosecutions for law breaches, such as not paying the BBC licence fee or dodging transport fares. However, with quick prosecutions conducted in such a way—and, in that instance, behind closed doors, as exposed brilliantly by Tristan Kirk, a journalist at the Evening Standard—we have seen thousands of people on an industrial scale being found guilty, often of small unintended mistakes. We have to remember that, if you try to bring about justice quickly and using these new methods, you can cause huge amounts of problems. There are harrowing stories of people who are very ill, people who have dementia and even people who have died, who have been victims of these single justice procedure issues.

I hope the movers of the amendments in this group will recognise that fast-track systems of convenience can lead to some terrible unintended consequences. I am reminded, in similar vein, of the growth of those monstrous non-crime hate incidents—again, a legalistic mash-up that have caused so many problems for free speech, using paralegalistic language and confusing us over what constitutes guilt. I was therefore glad to see the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in this group, and I look forward to his comments later.

This group of amendments is one to which I would like to hear the Minister respond positively. They are well intentioned—no one has been dismissive of anti-social behaviour—but we do not think respect orders are fit for purpose and, on the other hand, anti-social behaviour orders in general are in a mess. At least let us review what works and what does not before we move forward.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled and de-grouped this clause stand-part notice because it would be helpful to the Committee to probe the real purpose of respect orders. We have no plans to insist that this part of the Bill be removed on Report.

This Government appear to be making the same errors as those of the previous Labour Administration. The Blair Government seemed to believe that, the more they legislated on crime and anti-social behaviour, the less of that behaviour there would be. We saw Act after Act, many repealing or amending Acts that they had passed merely a few years before. This flurry of lawmaking meant that, by the end of its term in office, Labour had created 14 different powers for police to tackle anti-social behaviour and criminality. My noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead undertook to simplify this system by condensing all these measures into just six powers. However, with this Bill we see that old pattern of the new-Labour years re-emerging. This Bill creates four new powers: respect orders, youth injunctions, housing injunctions and youth diversion orders. I cannot see what real-world impact this will make.

As I said at Second Reading, the concept of respect orders appears to be little more than a gimmick. It is legislative action to make the Government appear to be tough on anti-social behaviour when in fact they are not. Respect orders are no different from the existing anti-social behaviour injunctions. Applications for both are made by the same list of people to the same cause. The requirements that can be placed on the respondent are the same for ASB injunctions and respect orders. Both permit the making of an interim order or injunction. Both permit the exclusion of a person from their home in the case of serious violence or risk of harm. Both permit the variation or discharge of the order or injunction. They are, in almost every aspect, exactly the same.

The only difference is that one is a civil order and the other a criminal order. The Bill creates a criminal offence of breaching a condition of a respect order. A person found guilty of that offence on conviction or indictment is liable to a jail sentence of up to two years. Anti-social behaviour injunctions, however, do not have a specific criminal offence attached to them. A person who breaches a condition of an ASB injunction does not commit an offence of breaching the injunction. The Government have argued that this difference makes their respect orders tougher and therefore justified. However, this overlooks two important facts.

First, the court granting the ASB injunction can attach a power of arrest to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 9 of that Act states that

“a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant”

where they believe that the person has breached a condition of their injunction. The person arrested for a breach of their injunction can then be charged with contempt of court, which carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is entirely understandable that the Government wish to introduce a specific criminal offence of breaching conditions. It is easier to prosecute someone who breaches their respect order than to prosecute someone for contempt of court for breaching their injunction. That is not least because a police officer would have to know that a person had an injunction against them, that they had breached the condition and that their injunction contained a power of arrest. It is also because, even though ASB injunctions are civil orders, the criminal standard of proof is applied when determining whether a person has breached a condition.

I understand this entirely, but it does not explain why the Government are seeking to replace injunctions in their entirety. Surely, given that every other aspect is the same, it would be far easier and more expeditious to retain the injunctions and simply amend them to create an offence of breach of conditions. That would mean that the ASB injunctions remain in place but they have the same power of enforcement. Why did the Government not follow this route? Why did they not simply amend the anti-social behaviour injunctions, as opposed to creating a whole new class of order?

The answer cannot be that one is a civil order and one a criminal order because, as I have demonstrated, the civil order could easily have been upgraded to criminal status by way of legislative amendment. I would hazard a guess and say that the reason is perhaps bluster. Is it not the case that the Government wanted to seem to be tough on crime, so they came up with a rehash of ASBOs with a slightly catchier name? These new respect orders will likely have little effect on reducing anti-social behaviour. What would have a positive impact would be to increase the number of police officers. Unfortunately, the Government have failed on that front. Since they entered office, the total police officer headcount has fallen by 1,316. That record to date stands in stark contrast to the previous Government’s successful recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers during the last Parliament.

If the Government are serious about getting tough on crime, they should stop the gimmicks and start with enforcement. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have listened to the quite detailed discussion that we have had so far in our attempt at line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill in relation to respect orders. Weighing up the pros and rather more cons, I am very aware that what I am going to say might seem glib about anti-social behaviour. People listening in might think, “This crowd who are raising problems of civil liberties are not aware of the real scourge of anti-social behaviour and the impact and the misery that it can cause on ordinary people’s lives”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, gave us a taste of what that anti-social activity can feel like in local areas. I recognised the descriptions from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of young people potentially running amok in local areas. Where I live, that has been known to happen, so I recognise that.

--- Later in debate ---

Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which deals with confiscation, has 86 clauses and 2,000 hoops for prosecuting authorities to jump through before they can get their hands on criminal money or property. If noble Lords flick through the Bill to Schedule 16, they will find 39 or 40 pages of detailed amendments to that Act. I shall probably deal with a few of those amendments when we come to it. That is a huge number of amendments just to confiscate the proceeds of crime. We do not need any of that here, and I suggest that all financial penalties or fines, such as we will have in this clause, should have an automatic confiscation order attached for failure to pay within a reasonable time. There would be no need to go back to court and no more bogus sob stories about inability to pay. Society and victims deserve that the convicted person pays his dues. My amendment would ensure that that happens.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, of course I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, opposing the increases in these fines, but I think we need to go further and for a variety of reasons abolish these on-the-spot penalties per se, which is why I have tabled this clause stand part notice.

You cannot overestimate how much public space protection orders and community protection notices trivialise what we understand to be dealing with anti-social behaviour. We have just had a long discussion about what anti-social behaviour is. These orders are part of the toolkit to deal with anti-social behaviour and they end up targeting individuals for the most anodyne and mundane activities, and banning everyday freedoms.

The use of fines has, in a way, led us to not take seriously what real anti-social behaviour is, because these fines are given out for such arbitrary, eccentric reasons. PSPOs and CPNs can be issued on a very low threshold, are entirely subject to misuse—there is lots of evidence showing that—and often criminalise, as I said, everyday activities. For example, PSPOs are often used to ban young people gathering in groups—which seems to me to be a dangerous attack on our right to assembly—despite the fact that the statutory guidance states that PSPOs should target only activities that cause a nuisance and should not criminalise

“everyday sociability, such as standing in groups”.

That is what it says, yet they are constantly used in that way and seem to be unaccountably doled out.

There are now over 2,000 PSPOs in England and Wales, and each of them contains up to 35 separate restrictions. That means that tens of thousands of new controls are being issued on public spaces all the time. As we heard earlier, they are imposed in different geographic areas, making prohibitions on different types of activities for different citizens from one place to another. You can be in one town where an activity is legal and then go to the next town and the same activity is illegal. We discussed some of that earlier.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out and as Justice has drawn our attention to, the inconsistent use of PSPOs creates a “postcode lottery” for victims but also for perpetrators. Justice says that this

“undermines the rule of law by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location rather than the circumstances”.

I hope we can send the Minister the research done by Justice and by the Manifesto Club that has already been referred to so that he can see from the freedom of information requests to local authorities just what kind of activities are being issued with PSPOs and CPNs, and therefore what these fines are being used to tackle. I assure the Committee that it is innocuous activities, not anti-social behaviour. There are councils that are banning kite-flying, wild swimming, as we have heard, and using camping stoves.

I thought it was interesting that, recently, the Free Speech Union forced Thanet District Council to scrap its imposition of a sweeping public spaces protection order that would have banned the use of foul or abusive language in a public space in the Thanet area, so you would have been able to swear in one area but not in another. I understand that it might have raised a lot of money, but that is not necessarily the same as dealing with anti-social behaviour.

Actually, the councils themselves do not do the dirty work of enforcement. Instead, they outsource that to private companies, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has explained so well the dangers of using these private firms. We have a geographic breakdown of the national way of dealing with anti-social behaviour, and now we have an almost feudal way of collecting fines from it. These kinds of fines mean that orders might well be issued for all the wrong reasons—for income-generating, commercial purposes to meet targets that are about raising money rather than tackling anti-social behaviour—and increasing the fines will surely only incentivise that practice further.

I urge the Minister to consider that the noble cause that the Government are associated with here is dealing with anti-social behaviour, but using private companies to fine people in such a cavalier way discredits the whole cause. It is damaging the reputation of that noble cause. There is no transparency or oversight mechanism for these companies. There is one ban that I would like to bring in, and that is fining for profit. I hope the Minister will consider at least reviewing this and looking at it closely.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I do not intend to rehearse the arguments already put so effectively by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Suffice to say that we on these Benches fully support Amendment 23, as £500 is an extortionate amount of money for the type of behaviour that fines are designed to address and will simply result in private companies making even greater profits than they do at the moment while pushing those already struggling further into debt. For these reasons, we have serious reservations about the implications of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

The orders create a postcode lottery for victims. Charities warn that, in some parts of the country, orders are handed out like confetti. This undermines public trust by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location.

Overall, the use of these powers needs to be subject to much stricter safeguards. The Government must ensure that there is proper oversight of their use and that the law is applied equally, openly and proportionately.