Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right that the threat picture is complex: it is changing and there are evolving and enduring threats appearing at all times. The Government will continue to look at how and where it can support those in scope, especially small and medium-sized enterprises in the standard tier. For example, we are looking at developing some tools and templates, where appropriate, and looking at what we can do to help support training needs. The guidance I mentioned, to which my noble friend referred, was published. It is designed to assist those who are responsible for premises. Obviously, we will continuously get feedback from organisations before implementation at a date to be determined in the future.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that this law is known as Martyn’s law—that is Martyn with a “y”—in tribute to Martyn Hett, who was one of the victims of the terrible Manchester Arena attack in 2017. When this legislation was enacted, the Government announced that it would take two years before its implementation in 2027. Does that remain the Government’s expectation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We were very clear when the legislation was passed that we needed to have a period of implementation for a number of reasons, not least so that small and medium-sized organisations and others could have the guidance. We are on track to deliver this within a timeframe around, we hope, that two-year period. The statutory guidance, which I published on 15 April, is the first step; that came after extensive consultation with businesses and the private sector. The next step is to ensure that organisations have the ability to examine that guidance and look at it. The final implementation date is still to be determined, but it will certainly not be before two years.

Antisemitic Attacks

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 27th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Self-evidently, at times, the Muslim Brotherhood undertakes activity that directs antisemitism. That is not acceptable. I was not a Minister when the report was received from Sir Charles Farr, whom I knew well when I was previously a Minister in the Home Office. We will look at that judgment and examine again what the noble Lord raised today.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister rightly said that it is vital for politicians of all parties to stand up against antisemitism. Does the Minister share my disgust at the comments of the leader of the Green Party, Mr Zack Polanski, who suggested that the problem was a “perception of unsafety” and antisemitism for the Jewish community? He suggested that antisemitism had been “weaponised” against Jeremy Corbyn as the former leader of the Labour Party. Does the Minister share my concern that the Green Party is now providing a home for antisemites?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Antisemitism is not a perception. People have died in Manchester as a result of antisemitism. It is not a perception; it is something that we have to tackle. The leader of the Green Party and the Greens can speak for themselves. I speak for the Labour Party, the Government and, I hope, the whole House when I say that antisemitism has no place in our society, we have to root it out and those who apologise for it are not fit to hold public office.

Student Visas

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 27th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend has been a constant advocate of tackling fraud in the system, and I pay tribute to his work on that. We keep this under review at all times. It is in nobody’s interest to have fraudulent applications or for individuals to use a different route and subsequently to apply on a fraudulent basis. That is why we have taken the steps we have with the asylum student brake on the four countries I mentioned and why we have a rigorous process for assessing claims.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that a further problem is that only one in six failed asylum seekers is then returned to their country of origin. What are the Government doing to address this serious problem?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. He will know that the Government are taking extremely serious action on the removal of people who do not have the right to be here. That involves several mechanisms. First, we have to speed up the results of asylum claims in the first place. Then, when individuals have failed, we need to ensure that there is an appeal process, if required, that is speedy and efficient. Then, if people’s claims have not been accepted, we need speedy removals. I do not have the figures to date in my head, but there has certainly been an improvement. If the noble Lord will allow, I will write to him with the figures on removals that we have made in the past two years.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 27th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, despite everything that the Minister has said on proscription of the IRGC, we are now in something of an Alice in Wonderland world. The Prime Minister has told the media in recent days that the Government propose to introduce further legislation to address state threats. Such legislation has been reported by the BBC, among others, as enabling the Government to ban state-related organisations such as the IRGC. The Prime Minister has said that the King’s Speech next month will commit to such legislation. Yet the Terrorism Act already permits such a ban: Section 1(4) states that terrorist action includes action outside the UK; the public affected includes the public of a country outside the UK; and the Government affected means the Government of another country as well as the Government of the UK. Therefore, terrorism is specifically international. Section 3, as we know, permits the proscription of terrorist organisations without limiting them to UK organisations or UK terrorism.

The Government know this. As we heard last week, the Deputy Prime Minister, David Lammy, and the present Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper—herself a former Home Secretary—specifically called for proscription of the IRGC while in opposition, just as we on these Benches have consistently called for it. Nobody but nobody has said that there has been no power to proscribe the IRGC because it is state-related.

The EU, led by France and Italy, as well as Australia, the United States, Canada and several of the Gulf states, have all proscribed the IRGC. Yet the Government, despite previous Labour policy, have promised Parliament only an anodyne statement about

“the general policies and procedures of the Secretary of State in relation to the Secretary of State’s powers under Section 3”.

Last week, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, called that patronising. It is worse than that. Despite their previous policy, the Government rely only on the repeated mantra that they will not give a running commentary on decisions on proscription.

The IRGC is connected, on very substantial evidence, not only to the appalling oppression and murder of protesters in Iran in December and January, but to multiple acts of terrorism in the UK and abroad. There are clear links with antisemitic attacks here and elsewhere in Europe and the world, including on synagogues. The UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre, responsible for monitoring and assisting international shipping, has reported on large numbers of attacks on cargo ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz, which are carried out by the IRGC or connected entities.

We recognise, of course, that the Government have a strong view on the Iranian regime, as the Minister rightly said, yet they have said to Parliament that we are not entitled to an explanation of why the IRGC is not to be proscribed but must wait for further legislation targeted at state-related organisations for such proscription. Yet, if indeed the new legislation is to involve the implementation of the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, in his recent report updated in January, that was aimed at improving legislation on state threats under the National Security Act and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act. For the proscription of the IRGC under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act, such new legislation is unnecessary and a red herring.

We should continue to demand a proper and timely explanation of what the Government intend to do and when, subject, we agree of course, to the provision of confidential information being restricted to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We support the Conservative Motion B1, and if the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, wishes to test the opinion of the House, we will vote for his Motion.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the House should take account of two factors. My understanding of the advice from the much-respected Jonathan Hall, the Government’s adviser on terrorism legislation, is that specific new legislation is required to ensure that malign state actors can be proscribed and dealt with.

Secondly, the House should take account of the fact that, on a visit to Kenton synagogue last Thursday—one of the synagogues that has been subjected to a disgraceful firebomb attack—the Prime Minister gave what I understand to be a very clear commitment:

“We go into a new session in a few weeks’ time, and we’ll bring that legislation forward”.


It is true that the Prime Minister has not specifically committed to proscribe the IRGC, but my understanding is that that is because the Government never give advance notice of who they are going to proscribe. If the Government do not carry out these commitments, do not bring forward legislation and do not implement it very speedily, I would regard that as a very serious breach of faith and this House will no doubt have much to say about it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Thursday 16th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on the work that she has done on the issues that have been raised in the House about pornography and online harm. I add my thanks to my noble friend and her honourable friend the Minister in the other place for the very competent amendment they have made in Motion W to the pardons on the decriminalisation of abortion.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, thanks should certainly be paid to the Minister for all her hard work in this area, but the House will also wish to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Owen, for their hard work over many years, their persistence, their judgment and their success in a very difficult area of law and society. I suggest that although this House is very often criticised—sometimes with justification—the debates on this issue and the way we have moved the law forward with the very great assistance of the Government show this House working at its very best.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, both noble Baronesses have spoken extremely eloquently today. It has been a privilege, from these Benches, to be part of the cross-party coalition for both their campaigns. I pay tribute, as others have, to both of them for their persistence throughout the passage of the Bill.

In particular, these Benches have strongly supported the comprehensive framework introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, who has tirelessly campaigned on non-consensual intimate images, and we welcome—this is a tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—the Government’s concessions today under Motion G, in particular the move to place the 48-hour take-down requirement firmly into the Bill. We also welcome the Government’s decision in Motion J to include a statutory non-consensual intimate image register. As the South West Grid for Learning and the Revenge Porn Helpline rightly stated this week, embedding this register in law is a “transformative move” and a “hugely important step forward” in protecting victims at scale. Again, I congratulate the noble Baroness on securing this.

However, although we celebrate this progress, the Government’s amendments will continue to require scrutiny in two crucial areas. First, on the new statutory NCII register, the devil will be in the detail. As the SWGfL has highlighted, key questions remain around how this register will be operated in practice and, most importantly, enforced. Secondly, the Government’s amendments on image deletion orders under Motion H still fall somewhat short. During the debate in the other place on Tuesday, a Government Back-Bencher praised these amendments, believing that they would ensure that

“courts are properly mandated to destroy those intimate images”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/4/26; col. 740.]

However, the Government’s amendment explicitly uses “may”, leaving deletion entirely at the judge’s discretion. Nevertheless, I believe that the noble Baroness has achieved a huge amount through this process. We on these Benches entirely understand why she may choose not to press Motion G1, and she should take the greatest possible pride in what has been achieved so far.

On the second half of this group, on the regulation of online pornography, I likewise pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, who has worked tirelessly to expose the appalling loopholes that currently allow commercial pornography platforms to operate with light-touch self-regulation. The Government’s amendments in lieu under Motions K and L may be said to fall short of the robust statutory safeguards that this House originally agreed on. On age and consent verification, the House voted to make it a requirement for platforms to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their sites. The Government have taken this out, replacing an immediate duty with a

“duty to review and report”

to Parliament within 12 months, followed by unspecified regulating powers. I very much accept that the noble Baroness is somewhat wary, but I accept her view on the way forward.

Furthermore, the Government’s amendments dilute the ban on step-incest pornography. They have caveated the offence so that it applies only to depictions of step-incest where one of the persons is portrayed to be under the age of 18. This misses the point of establishing parity with the offline Sexual Offences Act, where sexual relations between stepparents and stepchildren are illegal regardless of age due to the inherent power imbalances.

The Government have also failed to match the ambition of Amendment 505, which brings us to Motion Y. In the other place on Tuesday, the Minister claimed that Amendment 505 was unnecessary. She argued that the Government’s new offence of “supplying” nudification tools, combined with future powers to regulate chatbots via Ofcom, is sufficient, but a promise to eventually introduce secondary legislation to tell search engines to reduce the visibility of these apps does nothing to stop individuals possessing, downloading and using these tools to abuse women right now.

Great weight is being placed on the “sprint” delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent to achieve greater parity between the regulation of online and offline pornography. We very much hope that this will bear fruit in due course. On the mimicking of children, as the noble Baroness has indicated, this has been quite a battle with government. She has settled on the criminalisation of the depiction of children under 16. I know that she would have preferred that it was 18, but the Government have claimed that widening it is operationally difficult and would put too much pressure on law enforcement. However, they have promised that they will commit, on the Floor of the House, to address this in the parity work via regulation but not the criminal law.

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I urge the House to insist on this amendment, which would retain the statutory protections that we previously agreed. To disregard the lessons of Southport now that the Fulford report is before us would be a profound dereliction of duty. We are legislating to prevent future tragedies; we must not pass a law that risks repeating them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will say a few words in relation to Motion N1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on extreme criminal protest groups. The House should be thanking the noble Lord for his enormous efforts and dedication in relation to this important subject over many years.

There is no doubt about the gravity of the mischief that the United Kingdom is facing. There are extreme criminal protest groups and, sadly, people who believe that the way to advance their political views—to which they are perfectly entitled—about Gaza, Israel and other subjects is impermissibly to use violence against people and to smash up property. It is disgraceful, and the law needs to deal with these people powerfully and effectively. It is symptomatic of a malaise in our society: we saw this the other night at Finchley Reform Synagogue, and with the setting fire to ambulances in north-west London. It is all disgraceful, and every effort must be made by the law to ensure that this type of action can be addressed and remedied.

I supported the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in his amendment on Report, which has now been considered by the Commons. However, I understand—and hope it is the case—that he will not be pressing his Motion today to divide the House. I am sure that is right, and it is right for the reasons the Minister gave.

Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has made some powerful points that need to be considered carefully in relation to how we deal with extreme criminal protest groups. We have heard that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, will be reporting next month.

There is also the appeal relating to the proscription of Palestine Action, which will be heard in the Court of Appeal the week after next. I very much hope—it is a matter for the court, of course—that the Court of Appeal will give judgment before the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, issues his report. He will obviously wish to take account of that judgment, as will the Home Office.

It is important to stress that there are two important issues raised by the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The first is whether the law is at its most effective if it requires that, before proscription can occur, a particular body has to be labelled as terrorist. I entirely understand that the actions of Palestine Action have been recognised by the Government to fall within the statutory definition of a terrorist group. The Divisional Court judgment, which has been much criticised, accepts that Palestine Action is indeed a terrorist group. However, there is a real issue here: does it undermine the efficacy of proscription for a body such as Palestine Action to be labelled as terrorist given that, for most people, terrorism has a connotation that many people would not regard as satisfied by a protest group, objectional and damaging though it is? That is something the Home Office needs to give further thought to.

Secondly, the other point which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, emphasised in his Motion—it is a real point—is that the current law does not just proscribe organisations such as Palestine Action; it makes it unlawful for people to stand in a public place and say, “I support Palestine Action”. That has led to hundreds of otherwise law-abiding individuals being arrested, which poses real problems for the administration of justice in this country. It may be better to have a proscription law that does not criminalise the mere expression of support for a body such as Palestine Action, however objectional and unlawful the conduct of that organisation is. Perhaps we should confine the illegality to those who organise such a group, finance it and do more by way of support than simply sitting in a public place saying that they sympathise with that organisation. Those are difficult questions. Jonathan Hall has made some powerful points in relation to them. I am simply saying that I hope the Home Office will give further thought to these matters. I am sure it will.

I thank the Minister because he has laboured hard on this Bill, which covers so many areas. He has responded with sensitivity, tact and courtesy to a wide range of subjects, for which he has all our thanks. He will no doubt be pleased to know that it is absolutely inevitable that these subjects will return to the House. We very much look forward to hearing his further comments under future legislation.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I sincerely apologise to the Minister for not being here for the beginning of his speech. He will be glad to know my athleticism, as I was running down the corridor, allowed for me to be in time for his reference to Motion T, which I will speak to briefly. It deals with the glorification of terrorism. I thank all those who supported the amendment on Report. I believe that, in doing so, we have collectively underlined the importance of dealing with this issue, which is becoming a gateway to extremism and, worse, terrorism.

I thank the Minister in particular for his engagement and that of his officials, and for the constructive way in which they have engaged around the whole issue. As a result, I will not push Motion T1 to a vote today but look forward to engaging in the review that will be put in place after the Bill becomes law. I particularly welcome the opportunity to engage around the review’s terms of reference. I hope it will take the approach of engaging widely to ascertain how a narrative is taking hold in our society here in the UK that it is somehow acceptable to glorify terrorism to effect change, and look at the real damage it can cause to society.

I also hope the review will take note of the fact that there has not been a single prosecution in Northern Ireland, despite the obvious ongoing glorification of terrorism there. I know that the Minister, and many in this House, recognise that this is a growing issue. If there is any doubt that it is very much a real and live issue, a brief glimpse at my social media feeds following Report in this House will confirm this to be the case. One particularly brazen poster said that he wished

“the provos had killed your da when they attacked him. Up the Ra”.

That is a reference to the attempted murder of my father by the IRA in 1979. Of course, that is something that I have become quite resilient to, but it is entirely unacceptable that people can glorify terrorism as a way to make change happen.

Over Easter, when many of us were relaxing with our friends and family, some of those who are content to glorify the actions of the IRA broke into a Church of Ireland Sunday school in a village near to where I live and ransacked it. We know that they were supporters of the IRA because they wrote “Up the Ra” over the 10 commandments. I was pleased to see the local Roman Catholic community condemn that vandalism, but there was complete silence from the political wing of the IRA—in other words, Sinn Féin—and nothing from its local representatives or the self-appointed “First Minister for all”.

As we have said throughout this debate, this is not just a Northern Ireland issue. Here in London, just yesterday, Finchley Reform Synagogue endured what police are calling an antisemitic hate crime, when the shul was attacked in an attempted break-in and firebombing incident. This shul is not only a place of worship for the Jewish community; it also hosts a nursery, a homeless shelter and a safe place for refugees to gather.

Those are two attacks that happened very recently in two different parts of the United Kingdom, in two different faith buildings, both motivated by hate. As Sarah Sackman, the MP for Finchley and Golders Green, said yesterday, we cannot

“allow this to become the ‘new normal’”.

There is a definite need to deal with the glorification of terrorism. It has real consequences for young people being led into extremism and thinking that terrorism is somehow cool and edgy, rather than learning about the fact that it leads to division, pain and hurt, mostly to their neighbours. The radicalisation of children should concern us all in this House.

I thank again all noble Lords who supported the amendment on Report, for highlighting the issue. I thank the Government for responding positively with the announcement of the review led by Jonathan Hall; I look forward to engaging with him. Therefore, I will not move Motion T1.

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[Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)]

I stress that the Deputy Speaker made it clear that people who arrive late for the debate are not allowed to speak. I think it is difficult for the noble Lord, having heard the explanation and the discussion, to stand up and speak. I am sorry.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

We are a self-governing House. If it is the will of the House that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, speak briefly from the Front Bench, I suggest that we should hear him.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I hope I will be permitted to speak briefly. I have followed the arguments on all these matters throughout these proceedings.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. As ever, she has spoken fantastically convincingly to her amendments, which sit in a broader set of aims that we have heard in Committee and on Report—at many stages. While recognising that the Government have moved considerably, I believe that we are debating this again in the context of a flood of women coming forward as survivors of non-consensual image abuse. As the harms are ever increasing, I am putting my faith in the noble Baroness’s interpretation of what is still necessary. Her amendments do something really important. I have spoken about this before and will do so on a later Bill this afternoon, but we need to tackle the issue of enforcement.

We cannot keep on adding duties to the Online Safety Act and expecting something to be different at the other end. In fact, we are adding a burden for people without giving them the tools by which that burden could be alleviated. The noble Baroness’s amendments have sought to create a more streamlined and agile system by allowing for fines every 24 hours in which an image is not removed. We have to find an incentive for tech to come to terms with the regulator, and the noble Baroness is doing just that. Unless we put a ticking clock on online services for failing to respond to harms to children and women, we cannot hope that women and children will be safe.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, puts her finger on it: enforcement is key here, and it is key because we all know that without serious enforcement, these companies, which will be acting in breach of the law, will simply not comply. What will make them comply are substantial fines to hit them in the pocketbook. That is the only thing that will make them comply, and that is why I support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I point out briefly that the essence of where the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, is coming from is that she speaks directly from the experience of the victims who have suffered from this. It is the victims themselves who have been struggling with the existing system, often in vain and with huge amounts of frustration. It is the victims who have been looking at the Government’s well-intended amendment, and on the basis of their own experience and knowledge, bitterly won, they feel strongly that it does not go far enough. They want others who are being abused at the moment, and trying to get some sort of redress, not to go through the same agony and pain that they have. I implore the Government to listen carefully, because this is the victims speaking directly to them. It is not the regulator; these are the victims, and the victims who are coming through the pipeline should be prioritised above all.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

It reveals a Government unequal to the great task of governing the nation with which the electorate has entrusted it.

I particularly regret it because it brings disgrace to the Mother of Parliaments and, indirectly, to a country which, although it had no hand in the matter, could always hold its head high when its neighbours suffered instability, revolution and dictatorship. They could take comfort because, as has so often rightly been said, we have a constitutional way of solving our differences.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I know the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawlor and Lady O’Loan, feel very strongly about this matter, and they are perfectly entitled to do so. But we debated this at length in Committee: we had four hours-worth of debate then. We debated it for two hours last week on Report. Both noble Baronesses expressed their views very powerfully and at length, but the House did not agree with them. The House voted for this clause and I respectfully suggest that it is entirely inappropriate for us to debate it again.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Taken together, these amendments would introduce basic, evidence-based safeguards. They are about ensuring that youth diversion orders, if they are to exist, are tailored, workable and fair to the child. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will press her amendment to a vote, because I strongly support it. I would like to force a vote on mine as well but, obviously, the House is going to be very tired by the end of this Bill, so I will not—she said bitterly.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am saddened by the attack from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Ministers, because they have sat through hours of debate on the Bill and listened most patiently. I have not always agreed with them, but they have responded with the utmost courtesy. They should be thanked, rather than criticised, for their efforts.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group. We accept the Minister’s amendments, which seem entirely reasonable.

I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, we believe that they are somewhat misguided. Youth diversion orders, whatever one may think of them, will be implemented as a means of dealing with some of the most serious offences committed by people of the age of criminal responsibility. We should not be making concessions to people who have committed or intend to commit terrorism offences. We believe that engaging in these acts forfeits any right to the conditions of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409H as a primary consideration.

Similarly, regarding Amendment 409J, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I entirely understand and acknowledge the issue she is trying to grapple with. Our position, however, is simple: court proceedings should be carried out in the language of the land. That said, the Government do offer translation services, and I ask the Minister to set out measures that are already in place to ensure that offenders understand orders that are made by the courts.

Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, youth diversion orders must be underpinned by the principle of proportionality. Amendment 417A would ensure that they are being used in this expected manner. We particularly support the intention behind Amendment 409G—that youth diversion orders will be a serious step to take, and that ensuring that multi-agency evidence backs up the decision to issue an order is therefore incredibly important. Similarly, the sharing of data on terrorists and terrorism networks is becoming an increasingly urgent need. Any step that improves the efficiency of the sourcing and sharing of information between authorities is welcome, so we also support this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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In some ways I can see the problem. I do not know that this amendment will tackle it. It could bring into scope a whole range of activities that are superficially offensive, and undoubtedly hurtful to anyone who has been a victim of terrorism, but mean that we do not do what we need to do, which is a much harder job—have these arguments out in public regularly and call it out, as it were. Arresting them and carting them away just turns them into a new kind of martyr, in my mind, and we do not want to give anything to their martyr status. I can see the aim, but I do not think this is the method.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that this amendment is not going to solve all problems in this area, but it is going to make a significant contribution. She is concerned about hard cases, and she identifies some of the possible hard cases. My answer to that is that the CPS will prosecute only in a case where it believes there is a more than 50% chance of a conviction and it is in the public interest. Many of the examples that she gives are most unlikely to satisfy those criteria.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, if noble Lords in this House do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is giving the answer to a problem that is a reality within our society, then I hope that the Minister, if he is not accepting this, will tell us what the answer is. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about going into the campuses and talking to these young people. You will never shame the likes of Gerry Adams, so just trying to talk them away is not going to solve the problem.

I am speaking for those in Northern Ireland who went through 30 years of terrorism. Every day you went out, your loved one went to the gate and watched you get into the car, believing it was the last time they would see you. Society cannot live under that. It should not be asked to live under that. Therefore, if the Minister says this is not the answer to the problem, I respectfully ask him to give us the answer and not close his eyes to reality. We have to deal with it, and we need to deal with it now.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name. Like many noble Lords, I was surprised by the decision of the High Court that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, in view of her detailed description of its terrorist activities in her House of Commons Statement on 23 June 2025.

In reading the High Court judgment, I was struck by the inconsistency of the arguments of the learned judges. At the beginning of the judgment, they set out the details of Palestine Action’s Underground Manual, which is standard textbook terrorist stuff: guidance to form small autonomous secret cells and to recruit only trusted participants. Then there is operational terrorist tradecraft: instructions to use secure email and VPNs, to conduct reconnaissance, and to pick targets based on complicity with the Israeli arms industry. It then has a section on targeting and tactics, with lists of defence firms, universities, financial firms and government buildings, and practical advice aimed at serious property damage to disrupt those targets.

The court then concludes that proscribing the organisation was “disproportionate” and that the Home Secretary did not follow her own policy, even though it said that

“the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.

I submit that the Home Secretary must have the absolute right to proscribe an organisation based on the advice that she has received from our advisory bodies.

In coming to her decision, the Home Secretary sought copious advice on the terrorist nature of Palestine Action. As all noble Lords know, the Home Office and the FCDO do not proscribe organisations willy-nilly. We all complained about their failure to proscribe the IRGC. The Home Secretary had reports from a proscription review group, a cross-departmental group including counterterrorism policing, which encompasses specialist police officers from many police forces. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the CTP gave their reports.

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre produced its assessment. JTAC comprises counterterrorism experts from United Kingdom intelligence agencies, police forces and government departments. Its report is very significant and was summarised as having concluded:

“Although most of its activity could not be classified as terrorism within the definition in Section 1 of the 2000 Act … Palestine Action had ‘commit[ted] or participate[d] in acts of terrorism to the extent of the attacks at Thales, Glasgow … at Instro Precision (a subsidiary of Elbit) in Kent … and at Elbit in Bristol … JTAC noted that those participating in the Bristol attack had ‘entered the [Elbit] warehouse, using weapons including sledgehammers, axes and whips’ and ‘during the attack two responding police officers and a security guard were assaulted and suffered injuries. One police officer had been assaulted with a sledgehammer and sustained a serious back injury’.


JTAC noted that Palestine Action had cleverly issued videos of the damage to property but not its violence against the responders.

We now come to the crucial question of proportionality. From reading the evidence, I am certain that the Home Secretary’s proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate, and a necessary response to an escalating campaign that threatened critical national infrastructure. The statutory test, the court admits, was satisfied. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits proscription where an organisation

“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.

The Home Secretary concluded that Palestine Action met that test and laid an order, which was approved by both Houses of Parliament.

Operational intelligence supported that decision. The JTAC assessment concluded that the group had conducted incidents resulting in serious property damage and that the Underground Manual provides

“practical advice and advocates for serious property damage”.

That assessment links the manual and the recorded actions to the statutory definition of property damage designed to influence government. The High Court judgment itself accepted that three of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorist offences, which strengthens the factual basis for proscription.

The proscription was proportionate because of the severity and escalation of conduct. The pattern of over 300 direct actions with increasing frequency and severity, including attacks on defence suppliers and critical infrastructure, supports a conclusion that ordinary criminal law and targeted prosecutions were insufficient to address the systemic risk. It was proportionate because of the targeting of national security supply chains. Where actions against defence firms and related infrastructure create heightened national security risks, proscription is a legitimate, proportionate tool to protect those interests where the conduct is political and aimed at influence.

Proscription was also proportionate because policy and process safeguards were engaged. The Home Office relied on PRG and JTAC operational inputs and then laid the order before Parliament—steps that reflect the five policy safeguards that the Secretary of State must consider after concluding that it satisfies the terrorism test: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities, the threat to the UK, its presence in UK, and the threat to British nationals overseas.

Of course proscription interferes with Article 10 and 11 rights to peaceful free association and expression, but it is narrowly aimed at an organisation which has been shown to promote or prepare acts meeting the statutory terrorism definition. Where evidence shows a real risk to infrastructure, violence and public safety, the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights is justified and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the court said:

“We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate”.


Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Home Secretary was in breach of convention rights because there might be some supporters of Palestine Action who are not advocating destruction and violence but general support for the organisation. However, if these people want to protest about Israel or Gaza or anything else, then they can do so, but not under the umbrella of an organisation advocating violence and damage and terrorism.

The court went on to say:

“Real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action has organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism as defined at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. Those actions are small in number but they are still significant and it is also significant that these actions have happened in the United Kingdom … It is significant that Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration”.


Indeed, Palestine Action has lauded those who took part in the actions.

The court said:

“It is, further, significant that the contents of the Underground Manual provide good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.


Let me just repeat that last sentence. The court concluded that Palestine Action intends to continue with terrorist activities

“to promote the use of violence, regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.

But then the court makes an extraordinary statement:

“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”.


So that is all right, then. The court has decided that three terrorist actions were not enough to justify the Home Secretary’s decision. How many does it want? Five actions, 10 actions, 15 terrorist actions, or to wait until persons—innocent people—are killed?

The Home Secretary has a duty to protect the public, not the court, and she should not be second-guessed in this way on the facts when there is clear evidence of terrorist activity. Even if it is only three serious incidents, there was the danger of escalation. The court said:

“When striking the balance between issues such as these, the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.


I agree about the latitude and my Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that only the Secretary of State can make that judgment based on the advice of all the anti-terrorist organisations at her disposal, and at her own discretion. She is the one who answers to Parliament, to us, on the rightness and wrongness of her decision. My Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that supporters of any proscribed group who were arrested after that group was proscribed and before it was de-proscribed can be prosecuted for such an offence.

Of course, my amendments will be technically flawed, and my noble friend on the Front Bench will object on principle, with perhaps good reason, but I believe the concept is right. I hope that the Minister will bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to implement what I am advocating here. If he will not, will he tell the House what he proposes to do to reverse this perverse decision?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the House, that the judgment in Palestine Action to which he objects is under appeal and the Court of Appeal, in due course, will pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the High Court decision and the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision. These criticisms, with some of which I certainly agree, are premature. What matters is not what the noble Lord thinks or what I think, but what the Court of Appeal says and, if necessary, what the Supreme Court says on such an important matter.

In any event, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a noted constitutionalist, that it is in principle wrong to seek to remove the power of the courts to assess the legality of judgments of the Home Secretary. Surely, it is a very valuable protection of the rule of law in this country that the courts pronounce on legality and Parliament does not remove the power of the courts to do so.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I have no objection to the court pronouncing on a point of law. However, on this occasion, it was not pronouncing on a point of law but making a judgment on the facts of the case and disagreeing with the Home Secretary on the facts.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am not defending the Divisional Court’s judgment, but it would say that it was intervening on a point of law, because a point of law covers whether the Secretary of State was lawfully entitled to form the conclusion that she did in the circumstances. However, as I say, this is all highly premature.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

393B: Clause 168, page 219, line 13, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will give me as satisfactory a response in relation to this group as the other Minister just gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

Amendments 393B to 393F in this group are in my name. They address Clauses 168 to 171, which will create a presumption of anonymity for an authorised firearms officer who is charged with an offence in relation to the use of a weapon in the exercise of his or her functions. That presumption will apply unless and until that defendant is convicted of the criminal offence.

I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black of Brentwood, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for adding their names to these amendments. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, cannot be here tonight. They send their apologies. We will all miss their contributions, as they made powerful speeches on this subject in Committee. I also record my gratitude to Emma Snell of Justice and to Sebastian Cuttill of the News Media Association for their very helpful briefings.

Amendment 393B would replace this presumption of anonymity in the Bill with a power for the court to grant anonymity where it considers it necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the firearms officer or another person, such as a member of the officer’s family, or to prevent harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and to the principle of open justice. That, in essence, is the common-law position that applies now.

I recognise the need for courts to have this power to grant anonymity in appropriate cases, but it would be a mistake to legislate for a statutory presumption. That is because the criminal courts have long proceeded, and rightly so, on the basis that open justice is a core principle of our legal system. It is a core principle because it is essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Restrictions on reporting what goes on in our courts always need to be justified. In the context addressed by Clause 168, there are especially strong reasons for upholding open justice.

We are here typically concerned with the actions of a firearms officer acting on behalf of the state, whose use of a weapon has killed another human being. That event will have led the CPS to bring a criminal prosecution, which means that the CPS believes that two criteria are satisfied—first, that on the available evidence, the court is more likely than not to convict, and secondly, that it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. Of course, the prosecution must prove its case, but in this context the interests of open justice are very important in the public interest. The public, not just the family and friends of the deceased, surely have a strong interest in knowing what is alleged against whom.

Open justice, I suggest, is of particular importance at this time, when public confidence in our police force is low—perhaps lower than ever before. A presumption that the press cannot fully report a murder trial will, I fear, inevitably cause further damage to public confidence.

I accept that there will be cases where open justice should give way to the need to protect the defendant and his or her family. The court must have power to provide protection by requiring anonymity, but that must be because of information that provides a reasoned basis for concern that such protection is required in the particular circumstances of the case.

I also emphasise that Clause 168 would confer special protection on firearms officers. The Government do not suggest that other police officers or prison officers whose conduct may lead to the serious injury or death of another person should enjoy this presumption of anonymity, and rightly so. To confer this unique protection on firearms officers is unnecessary because a discretion for the court suffices, and it is wrong in principle because this is a context where the interests of open justice are at their strongest.

In Committee my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere—I am very pleased that he is in his place—suggested that firearms officers might be deterred from taking up such posts if there is no presumption of anonymity. That seems to me, with great respect, a weak argument when no other police officer enjoys such a presumption, when Clause 168 does not guarantee anonymity, when our amendments would allow anonymity in appropriate cases and when a firearms officer is far more likely to be concerned about the risk of prosecution than about the question of anonymity.

Also in Committee, my other noble friend—I do not have very many—Lord Hogan-Howe, whom I am also very pleased to see in his place tonight, emphasised the difficult and important job done by firearms officers. I recognise that, and I agree with my noble friend. That should be carefully borne in mind when decisions are taken in the public interest on whether to prosecute. Once a prosecution is brought, no defendant should enjoy a special presumption of anonymity. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe also drew attention to the fact that there are not many of these cases. That is no doubt true, but I suggest that adds nothing to the debate on how such cases should be treated when a prosecution is brought.

In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, emphasised that firearms officers can face serious death threats and intimidation—very regrettable but no doubt true. So can other police officers, and if there is information suggesting such circumstances or a risk of such circumstances, our amendments would allow the judge to protect anonymity. That is the right way to ensure both protection and open justice.

The other amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 393C and 393D, would ensure that the criteria for courts imposing restrictions are the same after conviction and pending an appeal, and Amendments 393E and 393F would ensure that courts have flexible powers to vary or revoke reporting restrictions or anonymity orders in the light of any changes. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an interesting and important debate on a vital question. I am also grateful to the Minister and her officials, who have devoted considerable time to meeting me and others concerned about this matter, for taking our concerns so seriously. My noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere made the point that there is much agreement on all sides, and there is. It is very important to emphasise that. We all agree that firearms officers do a vital job. They do it in the public interest, they do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and they have our thanks for their service.

Respectfully, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on Amendment 394, for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To say to the public that a particular category of defendant—firearms officers—should be prosecuted only if the circumstances are exceptional would send a terrible message to the public and damage public confidence in cases where someone has died by reason of the actions of an officer of state. Surely the standard principle should apply: the CPS asks itself whether a conviction is more likely than not and whether it is in the public interest for there to be a prosecution. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said, in assessing the public interest and whether a conviction is likely, the CPS of course takes into account all the circumstances; in particular, whether the officer is acting normally in the heat of the moment in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

I have a couple of points on my amendment in relation to anonymity. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the powerful point that firearms officers are unique in that they are licensed to shoot, and that, in almost all cases where they exercise that power, the likely outcome is death. I say to the House that this special and unique role makes it all the more important that open justice fully applies, unless there is information before the court suggesting that anonymity is needed.

The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made the powerful point that these officers deserve certainty, because otherwise, when they go out to work and are faced with an immediate threat, or what they perceive to be an immediate threat, they might hesitate before shooting as they are worried about the consequences for them. This would be very much against the public interest. I say to the noble Viscount that, under Clause 168, the firearms officer does not have certainty. All that the Government are providing is a presumption, and, as the Minister rightly emphasised, the court will decide, even with a presumption, whether anonymity should apply.

However, whatever noble Lords may think of my judgment on this, I can count, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 393B withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I am an unworthy substitute for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but I am afraid it is one of those occasions when real life catches up with your Lordships’ House; it has stopped her being here today. She supports the amendment. When you start to think about it, it comes under the heading of a no-brainer: there should be a consistent approach. If you are taking on an economic activity to transport something across the country, you should have a rough idea about a consistent approach to transporting it. If you have not, there should be a very good reason. There does not seem to be one, other than it having been decided that they will be charged at this rate.

Heritage railways are a nice cause, but there are more widespread and universal economic impacts from this if you transport goods on our main transport system without incurring extra, sometimes prohibitive costs. It would be comparatively easy for the Government to at least bring them into line and give them some steer as to a realistic level of charge to be placed on them. At the very least, admin considerations around this can be cut down. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that it is all in hand and that the Government have a timetable for making sure anybody involved in this knows what is happening, so that everybody can say “thank you very much” and move on to the next issue.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment. I suggest that if, as I hope, the Minister agrees that regulations are needed, they should not just deal with consistency but impose a substantive limit on the fees to be charged. It seems that in this context, as in many others, the maximum that should be charged is the cost incurred to police forces.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, although the movement of abnormal loads may seem like a niche and marginal activity, my noble friend Lord Attlee, who recently retired from your Lordships’ House, laid out a compelling argument in Committee for why that is not the case. The heavy haulage industry is a vital component of our national infrastructure and construction sectors, yet the framework governing when police escorts are required and how much may be charged for them is inconsistent.

It is wonderful that my noble friend Lord Parkinson has now taken up the mantle on this matter. He began his contribution by outlining his concerns about the use of heavy haulage by the heritage railway industry, an issue also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester. The issues are wider than that. In Committee, Earl Attlee spoke with considerable authority on this matter and set out the difficulties that parts of the industry have experienced. In particular, he highlighted the sharp increase in charges in certain areas and the absence of any national framework governing those fees. In some cases, police forces have charged for a full shift of officers, even where the escort itself may take a very short period of time. Industry representatives have raised understandable concerns that such practices can result in costs that far exceed the cost of the haulage operation itself.

The overwhelming majority of police forces apply the relevant legislation in good faith and without difficulty. The problem appears to arise in only a minority of forces, where the absence of national guidance has led to practices that the industry considers disproportionate. The result is uncertainty for hauliers, increased costs for major infrastructure projects and, ultimately, inefficiency within a system that should be operating smoothly.

Therefore, the amendment seeks to ensure that there is a clear national framework. It sets out when police escorts are truly necessary, as opposed to private self-escorts, and would establish a transparent schedule of fees. It also sensibly seeks to allow police forces to apply to the Secretary of State for flexibility in genuinely exceptional circumstances. Put simply, the amendment balances the need for consistency with the operational realities that police forces face. For those reasons, I am grateful both for the tireless campaigning of Earl Attlee and to my noble friend Lord Parkinson for continuing to push the Government on this matter.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I join all the speakers in the debate on this small but important issue in praising the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who, after almost 34 years of service in this House, retired just a few days ago. It would be remiss of me not to join in paying tribute to him, his work and the tenacity with which he pursued this issue, including recruiting the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester to take up the cudgels on his behalf. He was a true champion of the heavy haulage industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, said, it is important that we focus on this not just because of the impact on the Heritage Railway Association—as dear as it is to many hearts in your Lordships’ House—but because of the importance it has to our economy, including all the construction and infrastructure that we wish to provide.

Earl Attlee took great pride in being the only Member of your Lordships’ House to hold an HGV licence. I hope that, in his absence, he is pleased to know that that knowledge gap has been bridged in some part by my newly introduced noble friend Lord Roe of West Wickham. By virtue of being a firefighter, he holds—or at least held—an HGV licence for the purpose of driving fire engines. I think that Earl Attlee would have appreciated that.

Moving to the matters before us in the amendments, as noble Lords have explained, the amendment relates to setting criteria specifying when a police escort is required and charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads and would require the Secretary of State to establish a framework to regulate such fees. While I recognise that the aim of the amendment is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe that a new statutory framework is necessary.

Changes have already been made to support greater consistency. In May last year, the National Police Chiefs’ Council published new guidance outlining when police escorts should be provided for abnormal loads. This was developed in collaboration with policing, industry and national highways. The NPCC Abnormal Load Guidance 2025 is the national framework used by all UK police forces to determine whether an escort is required and, if so, whether that escort must be provided by the police or can be undertaken as a self-escort. Furthermore, a national framework setting out charges for escorting these loads already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the cost of policing in specific circumstances. Fee levels are set out in the guidance on special police services by the NPCC, and this is updated annually.

Introducing a standardised regulatory framework—as I said in Committee, and I will repeat it here—undermines the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. We cannot escape this fact. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country and are influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic additions and the availability of police resources.

To be clear, the Government take this issue seriously. As we have heard, following a meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, my colleague, Policing Minister Jones, wrote to West Midlands Police to pass on her concerns. I am grateful for the commendation from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner, of that correspondence. As a result, I understand that West Midlands Police is undertaking an independent, expert evaluation to assess the force’s compliance systems and processes against the NPCC guidance.

It is important to allow time for the recent guidance to have effect before considering further action. Furthermore, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose, the NPCC has committed to formally review its abnormal loads guidance 12 months after publication; that is, in May of this year—a couple of months’ time.

I understand noble Lords’ concerns around the adherence of police forces to this guidance. Therefore, I can confirm that the Government will write to the NPCC following Royal Assent of the Bill to remind forces of the need to follow the guidance I have mentioned.

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and, in the same spirit, my noble friend Lord Faulkner asked what weight could be given to the guidance issued by the NPCC and what actions might be pursued by West Midlands Police as a consequence. As I have already said, West Midlands Police is undertaking a review. This is NPCC guidance, which it is itself reviewing to make sure that it remains current and responsive to issues that emerge over time.

There is always a balance between having inflexible statutory guidance, inflexible statutory regulation and guidance that is operated locally. We are currently on the side of the latter. Within that, this is national guidance. Police forces will pay great attention to that. They will pay even greater attention to the idea that, to quote my noble friend Lord Faulkner, the Policing Minister is “on the case” with this. With respect, I think that is an appropriate level of intervention. The Government are aware that it is an important issue. We will always keep our eyes on it and make sure that we can have a level of scrutiny to ensure that police forces behave respectfully toward hauliers while maintaining their local operational independence.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Will the letter that the Minister mentioned make the point that it is unacceptable in principle for police forces to seek to make a profit via the imposition of these fees?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I would need to go back and check on the correspondence for the noble Lord, but this is about making sure that this is covering costs, rather than anything else.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have real reservations about Amendment 385, which I am afraid I cannot support. I am glad that my noble friend is not thinking of testing the opinion of the House.

I speak as a cyclist and I fear, for the reason touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that what is proposed in Amendment 385 is likely to damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists. The truth is that, when bicycling, we all wear a variety of things that are capable of disguising our identity. I did this morning. One always wears a helmet, very frequently one wears goggles or spectacles, either as sunglasses or to keep the rain out, and when it is cold one wears a ski mask or scarf around the bottom of one’s mouth. All these things are capable of concealing one’s identity. I saw several people doing this today when I was bicycling in from King’s Cross. This will damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists.

I ask, rhetorically, what kind of person is the police officer likely to stop? Most probably, I suspect, it will be a person from an ethnic minority, who may be young too. Anybody who has been in Parliament as long as I have knows the trouble that you have from stop and search. That is proportionate, because the carrying of weapons is a serious risk. I acknowledge that it is perfectly correct that cyclists on occasion conceal themselves in order to seize bags and mobiles—that is true—but the remedy is disproportionate.

Furthermore, the amendment gives rise to an interesting question of principle. If it is right to impose this restriction in respect of cyclists, what about motorcyclists? They come into exactly the same category and are perfectly capable of snatching a bag or mobile, and most of them now have visors over their helmets. So, what are you going to do about that?

My own view is that, yes, there is a problem, but this is a disproportionate remedy. It will impact on innocent cyclists, as I venture to describe myself, and it will damage relationships between the police and the cycling community. I was very glad to hear that my noble friend indicated he will not test the opinion of the House because, had he done so, I would have voted against him.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hear the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about Amendment 385. It would confer a power on a constable to stop a cyclist without any basis, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that they are committing an offence or are about to commit an offence, when they may have, as the noble Viscount said, a perfectly good reason to be wearing a face mask. They may have influenza, which they do not wish to share with others, or they may be concerned to avoid diesel or petrol fumes on the road. Moreover, the amendment would confer an unrestricted power on the constable to require the person concerned to remove the face covering, with the sanction of a fine or imprisonment, without any requirement on the constable to consider whether that individual has a proper reason for wearing a face mask and without any defence of reasonable excuse. I too could not support such an amendment.

In Amendment 387A, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a powerful case about the mischief which afflicts local communities. My only concern is whether her proposed new clause would do much, if anything, to address this real mischief. The remedy would still depend on enforcement action by local authorities or the police, and would still depend on evidence which is difficult to obtain. I appreciate that police forces are independent, but the Government need to do all they can to encourage them to take action to deal with these problems. If that requires further resources then they should have further resources, but it should be a priority for effective policing.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Buscombe in the thrust of what she is seeking to achieve with her Amendment 387A. I do not think I heard my noble friend say that this would be a panacea or the answer to this complex situation, which clearly needs a multi-agency response. There seems to be a widespread agreement or understanding that there has recently been a substantial proliferation of essentially cash-only businesses on our high streets for nefarious purposes.

Many businesses may well be totally legitimate and carrying on as they have done for many years, but, as one example, in a town not very far away from where I live in the West Country, I recently counted 10 barbers or nail bars in a relatively short street. There are not enough nails or hair within that area, when, only a couple of years ago, approximately two would have sufficed. Either there has been a massive demand by the locals for these services or there are other motives. It seems clear that the police, trading standards and the Government know what is going on.

It is incumbent on the Minister, when he replies to the debate, to acknowledge the scale of what is happening and to give the House an indication of how a truly multi-agency and tough, robust approach will be taken to this issue to nip it in the bud. Where the public see acceptance of widespread law-breaking, there needs to be action for the law to continue to be respected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, can I add my two-penn’orth to this? I declare my interest as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee, but I am speaking more as a serving Bishop. I have to hear disciplinary complaints against clergy. Sometimes those clergy have committed something which is being investigated first by the police. To answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often the police tell us, “We don’t want you interfering until we have finished”. If the result of the criminal proceeding is that the person is convicted, I can then do quite a summary process in terms of applying a penalty or perhaps depriving that member of the clergy from serving in their parish, perhaps banning them from ministry for a time or for life. But all of that is very much on that balance of probabilities, on the civil standard. It is very different from the criminal standard.

There are many cases where the police investigation may not lead to a trial or may lead to a trial and acquittal but there are still major issues around the suitability of that person to be a minister of religion, such as their safeguarding ability. I need to be able to reassure my people in my diocese by following a proper disciplinary process on exactly the same facts as the criminal case was dealing with, but to that very different standard of proof.

Again, as chair of police ethics, I think the ability of the police to be respected by the public, for me, demands that there are occasions when somebody who has been acquitted at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt should still then face the disciplinary matter at that civil standard of the balance of probabilities, so I could not support this current amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.

The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.

Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.

The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.

Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.

I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.

In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.

It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.

Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.

We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I accept that, to a certain degree.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.

I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.


That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.

It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I know a young man who has just got his driving licence. He is very excited and sees it as a rite of passage; he is now a grown-up. He has joined the club of drivers and he shows his driving licence with pride. I can assure noble Lords he has no idea that applying for a driving licence means that he is joining a vast biometric police database, a club of police surveillance, and his mugshot will be treated like one of those Most Wanted gallery of rogues images.

This is a corruption of public trust. The public apply for one thing, only for it to be subverted and used for something else. It seems to me to be duplicitous and behind the backs of the public. Currently, police forces can directly access and search DVLA data only in relation to road traffic offences and must phone the DVLA in relation to other offences. I note that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would not prevent police forces accessing DVLA data for law enforcement purposes, but it should not be the default position. It is important to create this safeguard to prevent such data being used to conduct, in effect, phishing exercises of facial recognition. Therefore, we need this amendment to be taken seriously and I will be interested in what the Minister has to say.

This is not some paranoid dystopian vision. In a recent submission to the Home Affairs Committee, the National Police Chiefs’ Council stated that police chiefs were indeed seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition. That would be a huge expansion of police surveillance powers, granting them access, as we have heard, to the biometric data of tens of millions of citizens. We cannot overestimate how important it is that we do not just nod this through but take seriously the risk to civil liberties. It is why the noble Baroness’s Amendment 380, which creates a safeguard, is so important: to protect the civil liberties and privacy of innocent driving licence holders.

I conclude with a quote from Big Brother Watch, which says that this represents

“a disproportionate expansion of police powers to track and identify citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs”.

In a way, it is an abuse of the police to ask them to use these underhand methods, and it is therefore vital that there are safeguards in law to prevent this happening, particularly because it is happening behind the backs of ordinary people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.

There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Baroness is very eloquently making her case on the basis of a lack of consent. I suggest to her that the police regularly use material that people have not given their consent for them to use—for example, their fingerprints and saliva.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?