(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the technical issues that we have experienced with the police national computer over the past week.
The records and information held by the police help to keep us safe, but they, like many other public bodies, have an obligation to ensure that the information they hold is properly managed. As I am sure you are aware, Mr Speaker, not all information and records held by the police can be held indefinitely. To ensure that the police are complying with their legal obligations in respect of the records they hold, a regular housekeeping process is undertaken to delete personal data and records from the police national computer and linked databases: in this case, data relating to individuals who were investigated by the police but where no further action was taken. This is undertaken for a variety of reasons, but chiefly to abide by legal obligations.
With such a large database, holding some 13 million records, an automated process is used to remove records that the police national computer has no legal right to hold. A weekly update was designed by engineers and applied to the police national computer, which then automatically triggers deletions across the PNC, and other linked databases. Last week, the Home Office became aware that, as a result of human error, the software that triggers these automatic deletions contained defective coding and had inadvertently deleted records that it should not have, and indeed had not deleted some records that should have been deleted. An estimated 213,000 offence records, 175,000 arrest records and 15,000 person records are being investigated as potentially having been deleted. It is worth the House noting that multiple records can be held against the same individual, so the number of individuals affected by this incident is likely to be lower. Operational partners are still able to access the police national computer, which holds, as I say, over 13 million records. Clearly this situation is very serious, and I understand that colleagues across this House will have concerns, which of course I share.
By your leave, Mr Speaker, I want to set out for the House the steps that we have taken to deal with this complex incident. On the evening of 10 January—the same day the Home Office became aware of the incident—engineers put a stop on the automated process to ensure that no further deletions took place. All similar automated processes have also been suspended. Early last week, Home Office civil servants and engineers worked quickly to alert the police and other operational colleagues, and established a bronze, silver and gold command to manage the incident and co-ordinate a rapid response. The gold command provided rapid guidance for police forces and other partners to ensure that they were kept abreast of the situation.
Secondly, Home Office officials and engineers, working closely with the National Police Chiefs Council, police forces and other partners, immediately initiated rapid work, through the gold command, to assess the full scale and impact of the incident. This included undertaking a robust and detailed assessment and verification of all affected records, followed by developing and implementing a plan to recover as much of the data and records as is possible, and to develop plans to mitigate the impacts of any lost data. This is being done in four phases. Phase 1 involves writing and testing a code to bring back accurate lists of what has been deleted as a result of the incident. Phase 2 will involve running that code and then doing detailed analysis on the return to fully analyse the records that have been lost and establish the full impact. Phase 3 will be to begin the recovery of the data from the police national computer and other linked systems. Phase 4 will involve work to ensure that we are deleting any data that should have been deleted as usual when this incident first began. Phase 1 of the process has taken place over the weekend, and I am assured that it has gone well. The second phase is now under way, and I will hopefully have an update in the next few days.
While any loss of data is unacceptable, other tried-and-tested law enforcement systems are in place that contain linked data and reports to support policing partners in their day-to-day efforts to keep us safe: for example, the police national database or other local systems. The police are able to use these systems to do simultaneous checks.
I urge patience while we continue our rapid internal investigation and begin the recovery. I hope the House will appreciate that the task in front of us is a complex one. Public safety is the top priority of everyone working at the Home Office, and I have full faith that Home Office engineers, our partners in the National Police Chiefs Council and police forces throughout the country, with whom we are working, are doing all they can to restore the data. Although that is rightly our immediate priority, the Home Secretary and I have commissioned an internal review as to the circumstances that led to this incident, so that lessons can be learned. I will update the House regularly on the process. I commend this statement to the House.
I am grateful to the policing Minister for his statement and for advance sight of it, and I am grateful to him for his briefing over the weekend, but I must ask where the Home Secretary is. The loss of hundreds of thousands of pieces of data—data so important for apprehending suspects and safeguarding vulnerable people—is extraordinarily serious. It was the Home Secretary who needed to show leadership and take control. That is what previous Home Secretaries have done in a crisis. On the Passport Office, Windrush and knife crime, whatever their mistakes, Home Secretaries came to and answered to this House; they did not just offer a media clip, as has happened today. This Home Secretary, who is failing on violent crime and failing on the Windrush compensation scheme, with chaos on border testing, and who was found to have broken the ministerial code, will now not even answer to Parliament and the public on this most serious of issues. The Home Secretary likes to talk tough, but when the going gets tough, she is nowhere to be seen.
Will the Minister tell us when the Home Secretary first knew about the data loss and why the public had to find out from the media? Given that the initial reports were of 150,000 items of data, and the figure now seems to be over 400,000, can the Minister be sure of how much data has actually been lost? In his statement, the Minister said that on 10 January the process of deletion was stopped, but will he confirm that the faulty script was introduced into the police national computer on 23 November, meaning that the problem was not identified for 48 days?
The Minister said in his statement on Friday that
“the loss relates to individuals who were arrested and then released with no further action”.
This is serious in itself. For example, let us consider cases of domestic abuse: when suspects are released, the data becomes very important to protecting victims and making further arrests. In a letter, Deputy Chief Constable Malik, the National Police Chiefs Council lead for the police national computer, said that the deleted DNA contains
“records…marked for indefinite retention following conviction of serious offences.”
This is, therefore, not only data on individuals released with no further action; it includes data about convicted criminals, so will the Minister now correct the statement that he issued on Friday?
Will the Minister confirm whether 26,000 DNA records and 30,000 fingerprint records held on separate databases have been deleted? Will he assure the House that the engagement with the PNC to delete the Schengen information system—SIS II—database was unrelated? What is the full impact on the UK visa system from the data loss, and how is it affecting ongoing police investigations and intelligence gathering?
The PNC and the police national database are due to be replaced by the national law enforcement data programme, but the assessment by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority is that the successful delivery of the project is in doubt. Is it still in doubt? If so, why? There are reports that 18 months ago senior police outlined that the Home Office was not investing in the PNC and that it presented a significant risk to the police’s ability to protect the public. Was that warning heeded?
Finally, if it is not possible to recover data via the process currently under way, what contingency plans are in place to seek to recover the data via other means? Does the Minister accept that maintaining the security of this vital data is critical to addressing crime, bringing criminals to justice and keeping our communities safe, and that if the Home Office is not doing that, it is failing the public?
The hon. Gentleman has given me a long series of questions, which I shall try to answer as efficiently as I possibly can. Once the error became clear to the team, they escalated it up through the Home Office, first of all on Monday, and then through Wednesday into ministerial and other offices, in accordance with normal protocols.
As to the scale of the data, while the figure of 400,000 has been quoted, that is an accumulation of the various bits of information that may or may not have been deleted. As I said, a number of bits of information may apply to one individual, so the number of individual records on the PNC that might be affected could be smaller, but we will not know exactly until later this week, once the programme that is being analysed has come to an end.
As for when the script was introduced, that was indeed six weeks prior to what is called the weeding date, which is when the deletion was due to take place. That is standard practice, to load the script into the system some weeks before it is due to run. It did not run until the Saturday, when the error within it became immediately apparent.
As to the records that are affected, I am informed that the records that have been deleted are those that relate to people who were apprehended or put under investigation by the police. When there was subsequently a declaration of no further action to be taken, if there were prior convictions or offences on the police national computer, my information—what I have been told thus far—is that that those will remain. Only information relating to that specific incident, which was no further action, may or may not have been deleted. To a certain extent, that helps to mitigate some of the risk.
It is also worth pointing out that, as I said in my statement, there are other databases, both locally and those held nationally, such as IDENT the fingerprint database or the national DNA database, which may also be searched. The PNC draws its data from a number of other databases and when, because of our legal obligations, a deletion request is put on to the police national computer, it cascades deletions down through the other databases in accordance with the law. Those subsequent deletions were halted immediately, and that should help us, we hope, with recoverability of the dataset.
The hon. Gentleman asked about SIS II. That is indeed unrelated, and visa processing was suspended for approximately 24 hours. Everybody whose customer service threshold could not be met as a consequence of that was informed, but processing was resumed pretty quickly. We are assessing the impact on ongoing police investigations, while we analyse the report that has been run, which will give us the full picture of what has actually happened on the system.
Having said that, policing partners and the Home Office have put in place mitigations, not least informing other police forces—as Nav Malik did—that they should be making subsequent checks of their own and other databases, not least the police national database, which is a separate database from the police national computer and holds intelligence and other information.
On the national law enforcement data project, the replacement of the PNC, while that process has had its fair share of problems, it is fair to say we have undergone a reset. There is now a renewed sense of partnership working between the Home Office and the police, to make sure we get that much needed upgrade in technology correct.
The hon. Gentleman’s final point was about accepting the maintenance of data. He is absolutely right: we accept that it is very important that we, and indeed police forces and other governmental bodies that hold people’s personal data, do our best to maintain its integrity and to do so as faultlessly as possible. In these circumstances, we were attempting through this code to comply with our stringent legal obligations to delete personal data where it cannot be held by us or by other databases. Sadly, human error introduced into the code has led to this particular situation, which we hope is rectifiable. I am more than happy to keep the hon. Gentleman updated, as I did on Saturday afternoon, when I briefed him.
I thank the Minister, the Home Secretary and the police leadership around the country for the very professional way in which they have responded to a most unfortunate error, an error that none of them wanted or made personally. Will he give us a little bit more encouragement, however, because is it not the case that there are now many good ways to retrieve data that has been wrongly deleted? Might we be looking at a remedy for this in a few weeks’ time, when the computer experts have finished their job?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that the initial assessment was some optimism about the ability to recover this data, not least because it is held in a number of areas. We will not have the full picture until we get to the end of this week, once we have analysed the report and, of course, looked at the data that we should have deleted but have not because of this error. However, he is quite right that we should be optimistic about that and recognise that all is not lost. There are other ways that this data can be cross-checked, in particular as part of a police investigation. We are working with our policing partners to ensure that they make full use of that, so that they can proceed as usual with their investigations.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. Two weeks ago, the Home Secretary was boasting that the United Kingdom is now a safer place because of Brexit. However, before it was disbanded by the Government, the Select Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union heard detailed expert evidence explaining why the United Kingdom is not a safer place as a result of the law enforcement part of the Brexit deal. One of the key reasons is that we have lost real-time access to Europe-wide databases on criminal records, DNA, fingerprints and, indeed, intelligence. That is not just my view but the expert view of Lord Ian Blair, the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and Lord Peter Ricketts, the former National Security Adviser. Now that situation has been further exacerbated by this loss of important fingerprint, DNA and arrest history records, which the police use for real-time checks on our own UK-wide databases.
Mr Speaker, you really couldn’t make it up, yet curiously the Home Secretary is nowhere to be seen. Instead, she has sent her junior Minister to take the flak. I have two areas of questions for him. First, was this data cleaning operation in any way connected to the removal of records from the police national computer following the end of the transition period? Does the 400,000 figure include the 40,000 records that were removed from the police national computer post Brexit, or is it on top of that? Secondly, given the UK-wide nature of the database, what discussions have taken place with police forces in the devolved nations? Will the Minister commit to full co-operation with Police Scotland and other devolved forces until this issue is resolved?
On the hon. and learned Lady’s two substantive questions, this had absolutely nothing to do with SIS II—the Schengen information system. These were, as I said earlier, deletions in line with our legal obligations not to hold data for people who are not of continuing interest to the police, under legislation that was enacted by this House some years ago. On the conversations with police forces, obviously the National Police Chiefs Council lead has cascaded throughout policing the information required to put in place mitigations. We will also, of course, co-operate as closely as possible, and I will be keeping my opposite number in the Scottish Government informed.
As to the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) and the hon. and learned Lady about the Home Secretary, I can only apologise that they are facing someone who is an inferior to their own status, but they will understand that the Home Secretary has an enormous draw upon her duties. She takes her duties in this House extremely seriously—there is no doubt about it—but I have been much more, I guess, embedded with this over the last few months, as one would expect for a Minister of State who is standing by his Home Secretary, doing her bidding.
I thank the Minister for providing the House with more detail on this unfortunate issue. Can he confirm that the police have a full understanding of what has happened and that appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that it is not repeated?
That is absolutely right. I understand that the police were informed, along with the senior levels of the Home Office, on the Monday after the incident occurred, and they are part of the Gold group command that is dealing with the incident. As hon. Members will have seen from the letter that was leaked to The Times—the detailed letter that was sent round policing—the NPCC lead on this matter is very much at the table, working with us to ensure that we rectify it as soon as possible.
It is very hard to understand how 400,000 records could be deleted from such a crucial system without there being a proper back-up system in place. If this was the normal weekly process as ever, why was new coding being used? If new coding is often used, why are there not built-in safeguards? Is it true that Ministers were warned many months ago that their approach to the police national computer and database posed a significant risk to policing’s ability to protect the public? What did the Home Secretary do about that?
With a large database of something like 13 million records, it is routine to use mini-programs that run on the database to deal with data. As I understand it, this new coding was put in place as a weeding request from policing itself. Obviously, to ensure that this does not reoccur, one of the questions that we will have to answer is: what went wrong not only in the writing of the code that introduced this error but in the quality and system checking that then sat behind it? Once we have gone through the exercise of ensuring that we have rectified this as much as we can, that will be exactly the kind of lesson that we learn.
There have been concerns about the process of replacing the police national computer and the police national database, but over the last few months, the Home Secretary and I have worked hard to put reset processes in place around that project. I am confident that we are now on a better footing to move forward to a brighter future for police technology.
This incident is not without precedent—the Minister will recall that in 2007, 25 million child benefit records were lost. Can he confirm that everything possible will be done to remedy this and to learn whatever lessons need to be learned?
My hon. Friend is right that, over the years, there have been a number of issues around governmental handling of data. It is a large and complex issue, and we are dealing with huge amounts of data that are very difficult to handle. He can be assured, and I hope the rest of the House will be, that we are working flat out to get on top of this problem and to rectify it. The first stage of our plan has gone well. The second stage is under way, and I expect to report better progress to the House in due course.
The Times reports today that the Home Office was warned in July 2019 that police databases were “creaking” and that they operated on
“end of life, unsupported hardware and software”.
It further reports that the Home Office response was that it would only “fix on fail”. In other words, knowing that there was likely to be failure, the Home Office decided to just let it happen and fix it if it had to. Can the Minister tell the House whether there was ministerial involvement in that response, and if there was not, does he not think there should have been?
I was not necessarily in post at that point, so I do not know whether there was ministerial involvement in that particular decision. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that we have been working quite hard over the last year or so to get the technology projects in the Home Office—the national law enforcement data programme and the new communications network for the police—back on track. They have had their fair share of problems—that is no national secret—but I am confident that things are in a better position now than they were before.
While I understand the issues claimed in The Times today around the police national computer, it is worth pointing out that this issue had nothing to do with the state or otherwise of the hardware and software of the police national computer. It was pure human error in coding and was not necessarily a reflection of the age of that system. We are committed to putting in place a brand-new system. That project is now back on track after a reset, and I am confident that over the next two or three years, we will see a significant change in the way UK policing uses technology.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, instead of attempting to score political points from this unfortunate error, the Opposition parties should be engaging constructively and working in the national interest?
Yes. It is the hope of all Government Members that Opposition Members will work constructively with us. I had a very constructive briefing over the weekend with the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds); the shadow Policing Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones); and the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). We are committed to as much transparency as the House requires, because with a large, complex database, when human error is introduced, these kinds of issue need to be exposed so that we can all learn from them, whatever situation, political or otherwise, we are in.
The Home Secretary likes to talk tough on crime, but the shocking loss of 400,000 records is a major failing on her watch and she is incapable of facing up to it. She should be here before the House today. The Policing Minister talked in his statement about mitigation. Can he give the House an absolute guarantee that no investigation has been or will be compromised because the deleted information could not be cross-referenced?
The hon. Gentleman again casts aspersions on the Home Secretary, who is one of the hardest-working politicians I have come across in my 20-odd years in politics, and I think it is deeply unfair to make that claim. As he knows, it is perfectly usual for Ministers of State to take urgent questions or indeed make statements in this House, and we are doing no different from what a Government that he supported did in the past.
We will know the full extent of the impact of this issue over the next few days, as our plan swings into action, and we are working very closely with police forces across the country, through the National Police Chiefs Council, to make sure that any operational impact is obviated or mitigated.
I thank the Minister for his statement and for what I know is his personal commitment to resolving this matter. He will appreciate that offences are sometimes continued, which may be for lack of evidence, but that material that is retained may subsequently become valuable if it can be cross-checked in the event of arrests for subsequent offences. Will he make sure that obtaining a back-up of such material, which can be of importance to future prosecutions or investigations, is a top priority, and that all the other related criminal justice agencies will be kept fully informed of progress on this matter?
In his usual succinct way, my hon. Friend puts his finger on the button of the issue. We are working very hard at the moment, as I say, to scope exactly what has happened and make sure we can retrieve exactly the sort of data that he refers to from the various other databases on which it is held—both at force and indeed at national level, or even, for example, at forensic provider level. There is some optimism that we may be able to do that, although we will not know for certain until later this week.
Having said that, as my hon. Friend will know from his very distinguished career at the Bar, the police have a number of other databases and sources of information from which they can seek corroborating evidence or otherwise through an investigation, and as I said before, we are working closely with them to make sure that those mitigations are in place while we get this problem sorted out.
Millions of people, including me, watched ITV’s excellent recent drama series “The Pembrokeshire Murders”, which showed how painstaking police examination of old DNA evidence helped to convict a brutal serial killer many years after he committed his heinous crimes. Is it possible—and I think the public and victims of crime deserve an honest and candid answer from the Minister on this—that records that could help to convict serious offenders in the future have been lost forever?
It is worth stressing, as I said before, that this data loss relates to people who have been subject to no further action from the police, and any biometric data—DNA, fingerprint or otherwise—that may have been deleted from the police national computer relates only to that offence for which no further action has been taken. At the moment—I am trying to be candid with the hon. Gentleman, as he urged me to be—I cannot give him an exact picture of what the downstream impact is, but it is worth pointing out that the police national computer is not the only place in which records such as the DNA records he refers to are held. We obviously have a separate DNA database, and then forensic providers who provide those samples also have their own DNA databases, and there is obviously intelligence that remains on the police national database as opposed to the police national computer. However, our primary effort at the moment is to scope the scale of the issue, and then to seek the rectification that both he and I would be keen to see.
I thank my hon. Friend for updating the House so swiftly on this unfortunate incident of human error. Can he confirm that everything humanly possible is being done to rectify it, and will he commit to updating the House on the recovery of the data?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. I can assure him that we are doing everything we possibly can. We have a very dedicated engineering team who have been working flat out since the incident occurred, including over the weekend, to seek rectification. As soon as I have more information about phase 2, I will make it known to the House through whatever channel is agreed with Mr Speaker.
The Minister has told the House this afternoon that the affected records apply to cases where individuals were arrested and then released with no further action. However, a letter sent from the National Police Chiefs Council to senior officers stated that records potentially deleted in error include records that have previously been marked
“for indefinite retention following conviction of serious offences”.
In light of what the Minister has told the House and in light of his earlier statement of 16 January, was the National Police Chiefs Council incorrect to make that statement to senior officers?
No, the person from the NPCC was not incorrect, I do not believe, although the picture has evolved, it is certainly true to say, over the past few days. The information I have been given thus far is that where an individual may be on the police national computer for a number of offences over time, but on this occasion, for a particular offence, was released with no further action, it is only the information that relates to that particular offence for which there was no further action that may or may not have been deleted.
Having said that—I guess it is safe to put this caveat in—we are in the process of analysing exactly what the impact of this loss has been. Once that becomes clearer, I will be more than happy to give the hon. Gentleman and others in the House the assurance that they need or, indeed, to give the wider conclusions of what that report is telling us. These are all initial views of what we believe may well have been happening. The first phase of our recovery plan has gone well; the second phase, which is analysing what the report is telling us about this frankly huge database, will come in the next few days, and then I will be able to give more certain answers.
Can my hon. Friend confirm for my constituents in Hertford and Stortford that the police national computer database is a really important tool to help our brilliant police and that, thanks to the swift action he has outlined, it remains so, notwithstanding what is an isolated incident of human error?
My hon. Friend speaks the truth, which is that the police national computer sits at the heart of British policing, providing enormously helpful information to police forces across the country seeking to apprehend criminals. It is still in use—it is still being used as we speak for the reasons that it needs to be, not least because we are talking about a very small percentage of the database overall that has been affected—and that is critically why we have committed to investing in a replacement for the police national computer, which is a system that I guess is a legacy from the past. We want to ensure that the police have the best technology and the best data handling available to them, so that they can do their best to fight crime on our behalf.
The Minister will be well aware that this news will have caused great alarm right across the country, and certainly to the residents of Warwick and Leamington. Can he explain to us what assessment he has made in terms of safeguarding and those who are vulnerable, including the victims of domestic abuse? Does he agree that now is not the time to be cutting 87 back office staff from Warwickshire police, including the domestic abuse unit and all the corporate knowledge that goes with that?
As I say, we are in the middle of phase 2 of our recovery plan, which is assessing precisely the scope of the issue we are facing and then moving into the recoverability of the data, so that we can mitigate exactly the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman mentions. As to decisions made by the police and crime commissioner for Warwickshire, I hesitate to inject an element of politics into this matter, but it should come as no surprise that the police and crime commissioner for Warwickshire is a Conservative, and it has routinely been rated as a very high-performing force.
I am grateful for the update that has been provided to the House and the work that is being done to try to recover these records, but does my hon. Friend agree that the strength of condemnation of the Home Secretary from those on the Opposition Benches contrasts with their desire to install as Home Secretary someone who previously said we should not have any of these kinds of records in the first place?
My hon. Friend raises a very pertinent point. Of course, we were trying in this process to do what the law tells us to do, which is to respect people’s privacy and to delete data that we are supposed to delete. It is possibly true that some Members on the Opposition Benches—not, I have to say, the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), but others on those Benches—have an interesting relationship with the notion of the police using and interpreting data. This is an issue of technical complexity, which software engineering experts in the Home Office are grappling with day by day. We will bring more information as we have it, but safe to say—I know that my hon. Friend takes a strong interest in policing and the policing family—we are doing our best to ensure that the police are in as good a position as they can be to continue to fight crime.
Let us head over to Northern Ireland with Jim Shannon—a virtual Jim Shannon!
My goodness, Mr Speaker; thank you very much, whether virtually or in person, but virtually today.
I thank the Minister for his most comprehensive statement. My concern lies in the fact that there are cases that are sensitively linked to Northern Ireland. I would appreciate an understanding that contact has been made with the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to go over how the data breach may have affected Northern Ireland citizens and residents and, further, whether it is felt that victims of crimes in particular may be affected and what steps are to be taken if they are affected.
As I say, the whole of UK policing has been involved, through the National Police Chiefs Council, in the effort both to comprehend the scale of the problem and then to put in place mitigation. The hon. Gentleman is quite right; as usual, victims of crime are uppermost in his mind, as they are, hopefully, in all of ours. I will be able to tell him later in the week, hopefully, what the precise impact might or might not have been and what the mitigations that we put in place will do to ensure that victims are not impacted while we recover this data and get ourselves back on an even keel.
I thank the Minister for his statement. Can he confirm that the human error that caused this problem is being designed out of the system and that it would be more helpful for the Opposition to hold to account their own police and crime commissioner in the west midlands, who recently saw more than 16,000 crimes go unrecorded?
It is often hard to design out human error in a system that interacts with humans, but my hon. Friend is quite right that one of the lessons that we need to learn from this process—and we will in time—is not necessarily just how the human error occurred so that we can prevent that from happening in the first place, but how the quality assessment system that should have picked it up over time before it ran did not do so. I suppose the reassuring bit of this incident is that the moment that script did run on the system, it rang alarm bells in the Home Office and a rectification plan swung into place. That should give some assurance that we are at least on top of problems where they occur; the next step is to ensure that they do not occur in the first place.
As to my hon. Friend’s wider point about the conduct or otherwise of the west midlands police and crime commissioner, I think it will become pretty clear in the run-up to the police and crime commissioner elections in May, as people focus on crime performance, where they should put their cross in the box.
This extraordinarily serious scandal happened on the Home Secretary’s watch, yet, disappointingly, she is not here. As a former police officer, I know at first hand the value of the PNC. The reality is that the loss of fingerprints and DNA evidence will mean that the police are unable to tie suspects to crime scenes. In essence, this will result in criminals walking free and evading justice. Will the Minister outline what steps are being taken to ensure that this sort of loss never happens again?
I do not know whether I ought to be taking offence at the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion of my obvious lack of suitability to appear before such an esteemed audience as Her Majesty’s Opposition, given their seeming obsession with the Home Secretary. I would have thought the most important thing was to ensure that the integrity of police data is as good as it can be and that the police are in the best position possible to fight crime. As I outlined in my statement—for the hon. Gentleman’s sake, I will say it once again—we are in the process of making sure that we understand the scale of the problem and then putting in place rectification and retrieving the data that is required. The stage that follows that is learning exactly the lesson that he wants us to learn, which is how we can ensure this it does not happen again.
I thank my hon. Friend for updating the House; he is more than capable of doing this. A previous shadow Home Secretary stated in the Chamber in 2018:
“The state has no business keeping records on people who are not criminals.”—[Official Report, 11 June 2018; Vol. 642, c. 640.]
Does my hon. Friend agree that the outcry from the Opposition Benches is indeed in contrast to that statement?
My hon. Friend, in his usual forthright way, identifies the perhaps interesting relationship that Opposition Members have had with UK policing and, indeed, the data and intelligence tools required by the police to put them in the best position to fight crime. I know that he and I will stand shoulder to shoulder, whatever the Opposition might say, to ensure that British policing gets the best technology and information it needs to ensure that it can fight crime in my constituency and in his, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, as it has been doing over the past 12 months.
The Home Secretary’s office claimed four days ago that no records of criminal or dangerous persons had been deleted. Can the Minister tell the House whether he knows that to be categorically true?
One of the things that I said in my early statements was that I had asked officials from the police to confirm to me their initial assessment about what risk was posed to the public, and we are awaiting the conclusions of that particular report before I can give the hon. Gentleman a categorical answer. What we do know is that these particular records that were deleted related to people who were released by the police with no further action. They were either arrested or under investigation, but for that particular crime they were what is called NFA. To a certain extent, that gives some assurance, but I am afraid I cannot I give him the full picture, possibly until later this week or early next week. I am fully committed to doing that.
Can my hon. Friend confirm that those who are currently relying on police national computer data for investigations will be able to rerun their searches once the recovery work on the police national computer is complete?
I can confirm that. The moment we have recovered the data and put things back as they were, and made sure that we have deleted the data that we should have deleted but had not, we will be encouraging police forces across the country to rerun their searches. It is worth reiterating what I said earlier, which is that there are other databases on which these searches can be run, and we are encouraging police officers and, indeed, working with the National Police Chiefs Council, to make sure that those mitigations are used as fully as possible by UK policing.
Could the Minister please update the House on whether the computer glitches reported today are having any impact upon recruiting? Could he also update us on the observation that police forces across the UK may be rejecting applications from re-joiners?
It is very ingenious of my hon. Friend to get the uplift into this particular statement, but I welcome his ingenuity. The uplift is not affected at all. Recruitment is going well and, as he knows, we are ahead of target. He has raised with me the issue of his particular force not necessarily accepting applications from re-joiners. I am in the process of bottoming out that particular issue. As soon as I have an answer for him, I will let him have it.
Mr Deputy Speaker, you would have thought that the Home Secretary would be fronting up a statement on an issue as important as this, but I guess that requires a commitment to the job that she appears to lack. The National Police Chiefs Council was told that the loss and mis-matching of biometrics and DNA samples matched were hampering the investigation of crimes. Are they also interfering with the operation of the visa and immigration system? Will we see visas granted that should not be and visas denied that should have been granted?
First of all, may I object to the hon. Lady offering such a calumny against the Home Secretary? The Home Secretary is 200%—if that is possible—committed to the job. Throughout the covid pandemic, and indeed before, she has been at the helm on the bridge at the Home Office working as hard as any politician I have come across in my 20-odd years in frontline politics. It is deeply, deeply unfair to cast aspersions on her commitment, not least because even before she became Home Secretary I believe she was chair of the all-party group on victims of crime and has a long-standing commitment to doing the best for those who have been subject to heinous acts by others.
On the hon. Lady’s question about visas, there was a brief delay in the processing of visa applications for about 24 hours while the risk was assessed. It was deemed that the process could continue and nobody has subsequently been delayed.
I thank the Minister for coming to the House so swiftly to update us and for committing to continue to do so if there are further developments. Will he confirm that the Home Office is working with the police and partners to try to recover the data and assess the full extent of the problem?
What a novelty to be asked a question in person! I can confirm what my hon. Friend says. We are working extremely closely with policing partners—the National Police Chiefs Council, the National Crime Agency and others—who use the computer system for their vital day-to-day work. They are involved in the gold group on this particular incident and obviously there have been ongoing conversations between the Home Secretary, the chairman of the National Police Chiefs Council and others to make sure we are in lockstep in our plan to mitigate and then restore the database to its previous integrity.
Will the Minister confirm that among types of crime that very often lead to no further action are those involving domestic abuse? In that case, can he give an absolute guarantee to the House that there will be full recovery of all the data, or do we put at risk victims of domestic abuse when we know that building up a pattern of criminal behaviour is so important for the police and other agencies to bring offenders to book and to protect victims of domestic abuse?
As I have said before, I am afraid I cannot, as yet, give the absolute cast-iron guarantee that the hon. Gentleman seeks on the restitution of the data. The early indicators are optimistic that we will be able to retrieve it, but until we have analysed the report that has been run today, we will not know for sure. That will take a few days. It is, however, worth pointing out to him that there are other systems elsewhere where the police retain intelligence about criminals and identifying markers, whether database or fingerprints. For example, for somebody who has been accused or for whom there is intelligence around domestic abuse, that detail may well be held on the police national database, which is a separate system to the police national computer. From that, the sort of person he is talking about may well be identifiable. However, I am afraid I cannot give him a full picture until, probably, the early part of next week.
My hon. Friend has repeatedly said that this dreadful state of affairs was caused by human error. Can he confirm to the House that there is no suggestion of any criminal intent? Can he also confirm that one of the strengths of the system is that when this error happened, it immediately set off alarm bells, so that action could be taken?
My hon. Friend has a background in technology, so it is quite right that he should raise such pertinent questions. On his first question, no, there is no allegation of wrongdoing over and above error. On his second, he is absolutely right that we should be reassured by the fact that this human error was picked up the moment that it ran on the system. The ability to keep deleting items was stopped, and general instructions were sent out to the linked databases to stop them also deleting data, so we caught it pretty much as soon as it was happening. The question now is how quickly we can rectify it.
If these 400,000 lost records are not recovered, this human error will have an impact on public safety, will it not?
We will not know entirely until we have analysed the reports, but early indications were optimistic about recovery, as I say, because data is held elsewhere. If, in some circumstances, data is irrecoverable, we will have to consider other mitigations with policing partners to make sure that we remain as safe as we can in this country.
In a few weeks’ time, Colin Pitchfork, who raped and brutally murdered two teenage girls in my South Leicestershire constituency some 30 years ago, will have a parole hearing. I know that the Minister is not responsible directly for the Parole Board, but he is responsible for public protection. First, can he write to me confirming that any records lost did not pertain to Colin Pitchfork? Secondly, and more importantly, can he give an assurance at the Dispatch Box that my constituents, if Colin Pitchfork is released, will not be put at risk by any of the records lost?
I would be more than happy to write to my hon. Friend, as he requests. It is worth pointing out that the issue we are dealing with is people who have been subject to police investigation, or arrested and released with no further action. That would seem to exclude Mr Pitchfork from consideration. However, I will make sure in writing to my hon. Friend. He and I will both want to make sure that the offender management system, which is administered by the Ministry of Justice, ensures that the conditions put on that individual when, or if, he is released mean that people in my hon. Friend’s constituency, who wish to be safe, remain safe.
I thank the Minister for his statement, and for responding to questions from Members. For cleaning purposes, this sitting is now suspended for three minutes.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has today published the provisional police grant report (England and Wales) 2021-22. The report sets out the Home Secretary’s determination for 2021-22 of the aggregate amount of grants that she proposes to pay under section 46(2) of the Police Act 1996. A copy of the report will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
Today the Government are setting out the provisional police funding settlement for 2021-22. Overall funding for the policing system will total up to £15.8 billion, a £636 million increase on the 2020-21 funding settlement. Within this, available funding to police and crime commissioners (PCCs) will increase next year by up to an additional £703 million, assuming full take-up of precept flexibility. This would represent an increase to PCC funding in cash terms of 5.4% on top of the 2020-21 police funding settlement.
Recruitment
The additional funding for PCCs includes an increase of £415 million to Government grants for the recruitment of a further 6,000 additional officers by the end of March 2022, the second year of the police uplift programme (PUP). This increased investment for year 2 will allow PCCs and their forces to continue building on the excellent progress made so far in year 1 of the PUP, where, so far, 5,824 of the year 1 target of 6,000 officers have been recruited.
We are expanding the scope of the police uplift programme for year 2 to bolster capability in serious and organised crime units across forces and counter-terrorism policing. Strengthening policing’s presence in the organised crime units will help us meet our manifesto promise to counter the growth of serious and organised crime, including fraud, county lines, child abuse and cyber-crime. The uplift in counter-terrorism policing will ensure they have the resources needed to maintain capacity against a changing and increasingly complex threat picture. Recruitment allocations for year 2 of the programme are set out in the tables available as an attachment online.
To ensure that progress in recruitment is maintained, and to track the use of this investment efficiently, the Government will continue to ring-fence £100 million of the additional funding. PCCs will be allocated their share of ring-fenced funding in line with their funding formula allocation, and will be able to access the funding as they progress against their recruitment targets. Further information will be set out as part of the grant agreements for 2021-22. Each PCC will be awarded a local (territorial policing) officer recruitment target as in year 1, and for year 2 will also be provided a regional and organised crime unit officer target, also in line with their funding formula allocation. The ROCU uplift will be funded through PCCs using the same mechanism. As ROCU functions require more experienced officers, forces will release existing officers to ROCUs and replace them with the additional officers recruited via the PUP to ensure overall workforce growth.
Funding for the recruitment of officers in counter-terrorism policing will be paid to forces through dedicated counter-terrorism policing grants.
Precept
As set out as part of the spending review 2020, PCCs will also be able to raise further funding through precept flexibility, subject to confirmation at the final local government finance settlement. PCCs will be empowered to increase their band D precept by up to £15 in 2021-22, without the need to call a local referendum. If all PCCs decide to maximise their flexibility, this would result in up to an additional £288 million of funding for local policing next year. It is for locally accountable PCCs to take decisions on local precept.
In addition to this, PCCs will receive a portion of the £670 million of additional grant funding announced for local council tax support as part of the spending review 2020. This funding will help local authorities to continue reducing council tax bills for those least able to pay, including households financially hard hit by the pandemic. Further details on the proposed allocation methodology have been announced as part of the policy paper on covid-19 support in 2021-22.
Capital funding
This settlement will provide PCCs with £12.3 million funding for capital expenditure. £52.3 million capital funding will be spent on national priorities and infrastructure including police technology programmes, the College of Policing and serious organised crime programmes.
Counter-terrorism policing
It is important that we ensure counter-terrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threat we face. That is why funding for CT policing will total up to £914 million in 2021-22. This continued investment in CT policing will support record high numbers of ongoing counter-terrorism policing investigations and enable the UK to respond more quickly and effectively to keep the country safe from a range of threats, wherever they take place.
In addition, CT policing will receive £32 million for a new CT operations centre. The new CT operations centre will co-locate partners from across law enforcement, the UK intelligence community and the criminal justice system to improve the way in which we respond to a range of threats, including terrorism, and some elements of hostile state activity and organised crime.
PCCs will be notified separately of force-level funding allocations for CT policing, which will not be made public for security reasons.
National priorities
The Home Office will continue to invest in law enforcement through funding for national policing priorities.
This settlement of £1.1 billion in 2021-22 for national policing programmes and priorities builds on the Government’s commitment to reduce serious violence and crime and clamp down on county lines. This will allow us to “surge” the police’s response to violent crime where it is most prevalent, expand police capacity to tackle online drivers of violence and build stronger evidence on how to prevent homicides. We are continuing to invest in violence against women and girls, and the scourge of domestic abuse.
Tackling serious and organised crime and delivering our manifesto commitment to strengthen the National Crime Agency (NCA) is also a critical part of the Government’s wider crime reduction agenda. As criminal networks become increasingly adaptable and resilient, we need to ensure that the funding is available to support the police in disrupting organised criminal activity. To this end, this settlement will protect funding for the NCA to target drug trafficking, child sexual exploitation and abuse, economic crime and organised immigration crime. ROCUs, which are an essential part of this approach, will also see their officer numbers boosted as part of the PUP. This will unlock the outcomes we all want to see for the country—more of the highest harm criminal enterprises disrupted and dismantled, more disruptions and convictions of high harm organised criminals, reducing the cost of serious crime to our economy, and increasing confidence in the UK’s financial system.
Transformation and reform
The Government will continue to support the completion of national transformation policing programmes delivering enhanced national capabilities across policing. This will include: continuing delivery of the Single Online Home digital platform to forces and providing better engagement between the police and the public; completing the roll out of the National Enablers programme to ensure all forces have the enabling tools that support collaboration and agile ways of working in response to covid-19 and access to cyber-security capabilities to increase resilience; helping forces to deliver a fully accredited, more integrated and sustainable forensic service; maintaining investment in forensics, including digital forensics, to build capability across policing and for new officers; and further development of the national data analytics solution to support preventative policing interventions and the formation of the new National Crime and Justice Lab through the use of data analytics to identify perpetrators and protect the vulnerable to effectively reduce crime. We are also increasing funding for the National Police Chiefs Council to boost co-ordination of, and response to, national issues and providing strong central support so chief constables can focus on fighting crime.
I have established and chair the Strategic Change and Investment Board (SCIB), which forms part of the sub-governance of the National Policing Board. The SCIB will oversee all national law enforcement programmes; it will co-ordinate, prioritise and drive investment in and delivery of national capabilities across the policing system to ensure they support Government priorities around crime prevention and reduction. The SCIB will also oversee the investment in major technology programmes and, through the newly established Digital and Technology sub-board, it will support delivery of complex technology programmes and prioritise policing’s future investment requirements.
Outcomes and efficiency
The Government expect the police to continue to build on the progress made on improving efficiency and productivity in return for the significant increase in investment. As such, the Government expect to see:
6,000 further officers—on top of the first tranche of 6,000 to be recruited in 2020-21—recruited by the end of March 2022. The Government will ring-fence £100 million of the funding for the uplift, which will be paid to forces in line with their progress in recruitment.
£120 million of efficiency savings from across the law enforcement sector—which are reflected in the funding set out as part of the settlement—delivered in 2021-22. We expect these to be delivered through a combination of improved procurement practices (including the delivery of £20 million of savings through BlueLight Commercial) as well as savings in areas such as estates, agile working and shared/enabling services. We expect the policing sector to work with the Home Office in setting up and supporting a new Efficiency in Policing Board. The board will improve the evidence base on efficiencies delivered to date, identify opportunities for gains over this and future SR periods, share best practice in relation to the delivery of efficiencies, and monitor and support delivery of gains.
Policing needs to ensure that high quality data is collected and utilised effectively to support local delivery, identify efficiencies and support the National Policing Board’s drive to deliver the best possible policing outcomes for the public. The Home Office and National Police Chiefs Council will bring together in one document their strategies, plans and initiatives for improving data collection and use across the sector and with key delivery partners such as criminal justice agencies.
This settlement sets out the Government’s continued commitment to supporting and investing in our police. I am extremely pleased with the progress forces have made on recruitment, and we are firmly on track to meet the first-year target. This year has once again highlighted the police’s exceptional bravery and commitment to public service. Sector leaders, frontline officers and staff have responded with speed and flexibility to the unprecedented challenges brought about by the covid-19 pandemic. Since March 2020, forces have redesigned their working practices, adapted to implement new and evolving covid-19 regulations and collaborated to ensure all personnel have had the necessary equipment and support to do their jobs safely. Officers and staff have worked tirelessly with the public to build understanding of the rules intended to control this deadly virus, all the while continuing to tackle crime and disorder in our communities. This is policing at its best, and I would like to express my immense gratitude for these continued exemplary efforts.
I have set out in a separate document, available online, the tables illustrating how we propose to allocate the police funding settlement between the different funding streams and between police and crime commissioners for 2021-22. These documents are intended to be read together.
Attachments can be viewed online at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-12-17/HCWS663.
[HCWS663]
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberOur police forces face unprecedented challenges and have the critical role of maintaining public order. They will continue to engage, explain and encourage people to follow the rules, but will enforce where necessary. We have provided £30 million extra surge funding to support additional enforcement and we continue to work closely with our policing partners to ensure they have the necessary powers.
There are widespread reports in West Yorkshire of people breaking restrictions when in gyms. This is incredibly frustrating for pubs that are forced to close, with many on the brink of extinction. Can my hon. Friend reassure those pubs, which are watching from the sidelines, that the same robust approach will be applied in all settings?
I know my hon. Friend has a background as a former publican and that his local pubs are very dear to his heart as a key plank of his local communities. We have done everything possible economically to try to support them, but he is quite right that we should, where at all possible, try to maintain a level playing field in terms of enforcement. He will know that the responsibility for enforcement indoors largely falls to local authorities, environmental health and trading standards, but his question today is a good reminder to everybody involved in enforcement that it must not only be fair, but be seen to be fair.
Has the Minister seen some of the quite shocking footage of the policing of demonstrations that is available online, and is he aware that the police have been visiting restaurants and demanding people’s names and addresses? What is happening to our country?
I know my right hon. Friend is not given to hyperbole and that he has expressed his concern about the enforcement regime around the regulations over some weeks now. The enforcement from place to place is obviously an operational matter for the chief constable in that particular locality, but we are trying, where at all possible and in close conjunction with the National Police Chiefs Council, to maintain a sense of fairness and proportionality, using the “Four Es” where we can. I would just point him to the very small number of enforcement notices that have been handed out against the vast population of the United Kingdom—only in the tens of thousands against a population of 65 million—which shows that encouraging the British people to follow the regulations is largely working.
We are surging police capacity in the forces most affected by violent crime. We have just consulted on serious violence reduction orders, which would make it easier for the police to stop and search individuals previously convicted of knife crime. We are also investing millions in early intervention to stop young people being drawn into violence in the first place.
In Warwickshire, knife crime has risen by 300% since 2014. Just this year, on 15 January in Leamington Spa, we had one murder and one attempted murder—both stabbings. On 28 May, we had one murder—a stabbing. On 12 November, we had a stabbing, with serious injuries. The Government claim that we have as many officers as we did in 2010. We do not. We are about to lose 125 posts in Warwickshire—police, intelligence officers—so does the Minister understand why the public no longer trust the Government with law and order?
The hon. Gentleman is rightly concerned about knife crime in his constituency, as am I. While he again seeks to make a connection between police numbers and the level of crime—an argument that was made endlessly before the election—I point out, as somebody who paid a leading role in the battle against the last surge in knife crime, between 2008 and 2012, when police officer numbers were at an all-time high, particularly in London, that the connection is not direct. However, there is much more that we can and will do on knife crime. Although absent the covid effect on crime, we are seeing some signs of a turn in the current surge in knife crime, there is still much more to do in his constituency, as there is across the country.
I acknowledge the work that the Minister did while he was working for the Mayor of London to tackle knife crime, reducing numbers, but also in the last year, with a welcome reduction of 19% in knife crime offences. Of course there is more to do. Every life lost is a life wasted and a family ruined, and we must do more. I was very supportive of the introduction of knife crime prevention orders, and I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me how many orders have been issued since the trials were rolled out this spring.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his concern about this issue, which affects his constituency as it does many others, and he is right to raise it. Unfortunately, the introduction of knife crime prevention orders, which were scheduled to come in in London, has not yet happened, largely because of the impact of the covid pandemic and the absorption of capacity. However, there has been very significant activity on this issue, not least three weeks ago with a national week of intensification of Operation Sceptre, the anti-knife crime operation, which saw 2,005 arrests and well over 10,000 knives taken off the streets in the space of one week. That is an indication of the scale of the problem to which we are addressing ourselves with some urgency.,
We are determined to dismantle county lines, which is why we are investing £25 million over two years to surge our law enforcement response to these ruthless criminal gangs. This includes investment in the national county lines co-ordination centre, targeted operational activity in three major exporting police force areas, and increased disruption on the road and rail network.
With schools often having to send children home this year, very vulnerable young people have been preyed upon by these terrible gangs. Will my right hon. Friend welcome the decision of West Mercia’s police and crime commissioner, John Campion, to commission the Children’s Society to provide extra help and diversionary activities for these young people?
My hon. Friend rightly recognises that these gangs particularly prey on and target vulnerable children when they are outside the school environment, often those who have, sadly, fallen out of school and cease to attend. So initiatives such as the one she outlines sound absolutely on the money in terms of the type of work we need at a granular level in constituencies across the country. Having worked with the Children’s Society as a Back Bencher, I know what enormous value and experience it can bring to these efforts, and I applaud the efforts of her local PCC to do this.
Mr Speaker, before I answer the question, may I apologise to you and to the House for having used the word “granular” in my previous answer? If it is not unparliamentary language, then it ought to be.
The Government’s response to the call for evidence on violence and abuse towards shopworkers was published in July. We are working with retailers on a programme of work to drive down this crime. We are developing communications materials to give the message that abuse is not tolerated, encouraging retailers to report these crimes and provide better support to victims.
Like many colleagues, I support USDAW’s Freedom from Fear Campaign and recently visited and met staff at my local Co-op. I was astonished to hear that, across its 12 stores in Cambridge, some 3,000 incidents have been reported already this year. That is an incident in every store every day, so how much worse does it have to get before the police take this more seriously and the Government take some action?
I join the hon. Gentleman in being appalled at the level of abuse and, indeed, violence that shopworkers often face. We are doing a huge amount to try to deal with it. Along with the retail crime steering group, we are working closely with police forces to press down on this particular issue. I have written to all chief constables in recent months outlining the need to ensure that every crime that takes place in a shop is investigated as much as it possibly can be. Interestingly, just last week, I met the head of security at the Co-op to talk about the work that it is doing with a company called Facewatch, which is using facial recognition technology to alert staff to repeat offenders who are entering the store, allowing them to intervene before the interaction is likely to become violent and abusive.
In a recent survey of its members, the shopworkers’ trade union USDAW found that 85% had been verbally abused, 57% had been threatened and 9% had been assaulted this year. Given those shocking statistics and noting the unsung role that these retail staff have played in ensuring that shops remain open during the pandemic, does the Minister agree that they need greater protection, and does he support the private Member’s Bill of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), which seeks to create new offences for assaults on retail workers?
I do agree with the hon. Gentleman that shopworkers deserve all the protection that we can afford to them in the conduct of their duty, which has never been more crucial than during the recent pandemic and the lockdown where we saw the critical part that they play in making sure that the nation is fed. Having said that, we do not yet see the case for a specific offence of assault on a shopworker, notwithstanding the fact that conviction for an assault on those performing a public service—a category that such workers would fall into—is already an aggravating factor in sentencing. The Sentencing Council is, I gather, shortly to begin its work in reviewing the sentencing of assault. I urge the hon. Gentleman, with whom I have discussed these matters many times, to put his evidence into that consultation, as will the Government, to ensure that those who assault people working in a retail environment receive a commensurately serious offence such that others will be deterred from doing the same.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
General CommitteesBefore we begin, I remind Members to observe social distancing and to sit only in places that are clearly marked. Hansard colleagues would be most grateful if Members could send their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Antique Firearms Regulations 2020.
It is a great pleasure to appear under your guiding hand for the first time, Mr Mundell. The regulations were laid before the House on 9 November. This country has some of the toughest gun controls in the world, and we keep them under review to safeguard against abuse by criminals and terrorists. The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 banned certain rapid-firing rifles and devices known as bump stocks, and we have just begun a three-month surrender-and-compensation scheme to take these and other dreadful weapons out of civilian possession. On 24 November, we launched a public consultation on a range of firearms safety issues, including security requirements for high-powered rifles. The draft regulations before us today will prevent criminals from exploiting a lack of clarity in the law to gain possession of antique firearms for use in crime.
Under the Firearms Act 1968, antique firearms that are possessed, purchased, sold or acquired as a curiosity or ornament are exempt from most of our firearms laws, including licensing control. Unfortunately, the Act does not define “antique firearm”. The Home Office issues on guidance on which firearms can safely be regarded as antique, but criminals have been taking advantage of the lack of legal definition to obtain old but functioning firearms.
The number of antique firearms recovered each year in criminal circumstances increased from four in 2007 to 96 to 2016. The number of recoveries has since decreased, but remains unacceptably high. Ammunition capable of being used with the firearm was also present in more than of half of recoveries. Sadly, there have been six fatalities since 2007 linked to the use of antique firearms. There have been several notable convictions in recent years, with substantial sentences being handed down by the courts. For example, a former firearms dealer was convicted and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment in 2017 for supplying antique firearms to criminal gangs.
The problem was highlighted in 2015 by the Law Commission, which recommended a statutory definition of “antique firearm” to stop criminals exploiting the lack of legal clarity. The Government accepted the recommendation and included provisions in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to define “antique firearm” in regulation. The Home Office held a public consultation to seek views on the detail of the definition.
After careful consideration of the feedback, and following discussions with expert stakeholders on the technical aspects, I am pleased that we are now able to bring forward these important regulations. They will define in law which firearms can safely be regarded as antique, and therefore exempt from control, and which should be subject to licensing. They are based closely on the existing Home Office guidance, so will be familiar to law enforcement, collectors and dealers alike. They specify a cut-off date of manufacture, after which a firearm cannot qualify as an antique. They also specify a range of propulsion systems and obsolete cartridges that are safe to be regarded as antique.
When read with the relevant provisions in the Firearms Act 1968, the regulations will mean that to be regarded as an antique a firearm must be held as curiosity or ornament, have been manufactured before 1 September 1939 and either have a propulsion system specified in the regulations or be chambered for one of the obsolete cartridges also specified in the regulations. In the light of concerns raised by law enforcement, the list of obsolete cartridges does not include seven types which, together with their associated firearms, feature most often in crimes involving antique firearms. That means that those particular firearms will no longer be regarded as antique.
I realise that omitting those seven cartridges will not be popular with collectors, who will see a drop in the value of the associated firearms. However, public safety is paramount, and it is the Government’s duty to protect communities from gun crime. We are, however, being balanced in our approach to the problem. Existing owners of such firearms will be able to retain them on a firearms certificate, and we will make commencement regulations to allow a transitional period of three months for them to do so. We have also added another 23 obsolete cartridges to the list following advice from law enforcement that they will not present a danger to the public. That brings additional firearms into the definition of antique.
I want to ensure that the regulations remain relevant and effective, so there will be annual reviews to consider the latest developments in the criminal use of antique firearms. We will also carry out a full review of the regulations every three years, and law enforcement and representatives of collectors and dealers will be involved in those reviews. Public safety is our top priority, and the draft regulations will tackle the criminal of such firearms. I commend them to the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady, although she slightly stretched the envelope in terms of the subject of the debate to bring in wider issues of violence, with which I have to say that I broadly agree. We all recognise that there has, sadly, been a rise in violence, and the reasons are complicated, but we are fully dedicated to driving it down. She will be reassured that recruiting 20,000 police officers will form a significant plank in our efforts to drive down violence and crime, as the Prime Minister and I did successfully in City Hall between 2008 and 2012, as I said earlier on the Floor of the House.
As for the hon. Lady’s question about resources, the change can be tackled by forces and, indeed, the Home Office within existing budgets. In fact, it has been broadly welcomed by law enforcement across the country.
Question put and agreed to.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsI am today publishing the 2019-20 annual report and accounts for the College of Policing limited [HC 987]. This will be laid before the House and published on www.gov.uk. The report will also be available in the Vote Office.
[HCWS637]
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Offensive Weapon Act 2019 surrender and compensation scheme commences today. This is an important part of the Government response to tackling serious violence and keeping dangerous weapons off our streets.
The scheme is being run in advance of the Government commencing the prohibitions relating to rapid firing rifles and certain knives and other offensive weapons provided for by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.
The scheme allows for the surrender to the police of certain knives such as zombie knives and cyclone knives, other offensive weapons, rapid firing rifles and their ancillary equipment and bump stocks. The arrangements apply in England and Wales and extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland with respect to firearms and ancillary equipment only. The lawful owners of these items will be able to claim financial compensation in most cases.
The scheme will run for three months between 10 December 2020 and 9 March 2021 inclusive.
I will place in the Libraries of both Houses a copy of the guidance to the public on the scheme, the claims form, a standard values list of compensation that will be paid for surrendered weapons and a list of designated police stations in every force where weapons can be surrendered. These documents are being made available to the public on gov.uk.
[HCWS636]
(4 years ago)
Written StatementsI have today launched a public consultation to seek views on a range of firearms safety issues.
The firearms laws in this country are among the toughest in the world and the Government keep them under constant review to ensure they continue to safeguard the public.
While lawful shooting is well regulated and generally safe, there remains a risk of firearms falling into the hands of criminals, or in the case of air weapons, being misused. The Government are therefore consulting on how to reduce these risks in certain areas of firearms control where concerns have been raised with us by law enforcement and others.
This consultation looks at how we might address the potential threat posed by high muzzle energy rifles through enhanced security arrangements to reduce the risk of them falling into the wrong hands.
We are seeking views on improving the controls on air weapons, including safe storage. This follows on from a Home Office review of the regulation of air weapons initiated after the tragic death of 13-year-old Benjamin Wragge, who was killed accidentally with an air weapon in 2016.
Views are also sought on how we might address vulnerabilities presented by the current exemption from licensing that applies to miniature rifle ranges, and whether to make it an offence to possess component parts of ammunition with intent to unlawfully manufacture complete rounds
The consultation will end on 16 February 2021.
A copy of the consultation paper will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and is available on the Government’s website at gov.uk.
[HCWS596]
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure for me as well to serve under your chairship, Ms Eagle. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West on having progressed the Bill to Committee stage. I thank the Minister for his letter to me yesterday expressing the Government’s commitment to the Bill, taking the time to clarify their position on the issues raised on Second Reading, and explaining the amendments tabled by the Government.
The Opposition broadly support and welcome the Government amendments, which seek to strengthen the Bill by tackling the issue of the appeals process in clause 8, which goes hand in hand with the new regulatory powers granted to the regulator. We also support the tidying-up amendments to ensure that the clauses do not overlap with other measures that also clarify the scope of the new powers.
The Bill is long overdue. I am sure that all Members will agree that there is a need to put the regulator on a statutory footing to be able to ensure that the standards set by the regulator are met. If enforcement action were not available to the regulator, the standards could not be properly implemented, so we need provision for the regulator to enforce the standards. Forensic science has advanced so much in the last 40 years that it must surely be self-evident that where someone’s liberty is at stake and where the criminal standard is proved beyond reasonable doubt, we should expect high standards from those carrying out forensic science work, and those standards must be capable of being enforced. Voluntary compliance with standards will simply not do.
When we think about Rachel Nickell and Stephen Lawrence, for instance, and how we brought their cases to justice, and how the Birmingham Six were successful in their appeal following new forensic evidence, it is clear why what the Bill sets out to achieve is so important. The integrity of our criminal justice system is at stake; we must not get this wrong. Select Committees in the Commons and the other place have highlighted the pressing need to put the regulator on a statutory footing, and the Government have repeatedly said that they will do so, so I am pleased that they are finally taking steps to make sure that that happens.
In my experience of speaking to forensic scientists in the lead-up to this debate, it is clear that for many of them it is a vocation. In the traditional areas of forensic science there is wide compliance with standards, but that is not the case in other areas such as the newly emerging field of digital forensics, where the level of compliance with ISO standards is less than 30%. Because there is more reliance on digital evidence in criminal justice now, the level of non-compliance to a voluntary standard in that field is very worrying indeed. That is why the measures in the Bill are so important. The outgoing Forensic Science Regulator, Dr Gillian Tully, stated that she can get average compliance across all forensics up to 75% under the current system, but that the final 25% can be achieved only with enforcement powers. That is what the Bill sets out to achieve.
Clauses 2 to 4 establish the code of practice and set out a statutory footing for forensic science standards to be followed. Clauses 5 to 7 give the regulator enforcement powers to ensure that the code is complied with. The powers of investigation include the power to require production of documents and the provision of other information, with the sanction of legal measures in the High Court as an ultimate last resort for failure to comply. The Bill is exactly in line with the Government’s own forensic science strategy of 2016, which recommended giving the regulator statutory powers to identify and sanction forensic service providers who failed to maintain standards. It is long overdue. While I wish it was going further, I accept that the Bill is a welcome starting point.
I want to put on the record my thanks to Dr Gillian Tully for her years of service in the post, her dedication and commitment and the respect which she has commanded, and for leaving the post of regulator in good shape. I thank the Minister for indicating support from the Government and I look forward to the Bill passing on to its next stage-.
It is a pleasure to be here, Ms Eagle. I congratulate the hon. Member for Bristol North West on getting the Bill to this stage and on his constructive attitude throughout our discussions and discussions with officials about the amendments. I thank other hon. Members for attending today, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West, who previously made a brave attempt at a similar measure, which was sadly foiled by the parliamentary timetable. Nevertheless, here he is to join in the triumph of the hon. Member for Bristol North West.
I do not intend to rehearse the extensive arguments that were made on Second Reading on the Floor of the House. It was a very long debate with a surprising level of interest from Members across the House on a Friday; it was nevertheless helpful and included many tributes to Dr Tully, which I associate myself with again this morning. She has done a great job and her influence here in the Bill is strong. We wish her well for the future.
The Bill is a key part of our plan to ensure that police, prosecution and defence in criminal proceedings are adequately, sustainably and proportionately served by high-quality scientific analysis of the relevant evidence. The Bill will provide the Forensic Science Regulator with statutory powers, which will enable it to issue compliance notices against forensic providers who are failing to meet the required quality standards, and will protect the criminal justice system. Scientifically robust evidence is one of policing’s most important tools for investigating crime. These powers, to be used as a last resort, are necessary and will support the effective delivery of justice and help restore confidence in the criminal justice system.
By your leave, Ms Eagle, I will take the Committee through our amendments, not least because I am conscious we have an audience at home to whom we have a duty to outline what we are doing as we change the law of the land. I do not propose to go through the various clauses, which have been outlined. It is a relatively simple Bill, establishing a relatively simple principle, but there are some amendments to fine-tune the legislation.
Amendment 1 provides that any person who is required to provide information to the Forensic Science Regulator as part of the regulator’s investigations does not breach any obligation of confidence or any other restriction on the disclosure of data, howsoever imposed. Any person who is required to provide information to the regulator may not be required to disclose information in breach of data protection legislation or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
Amendment 2 removes the express power for the first tier tribunal to award costs on an appeal against a refusal to issue a completion certificate, as the tribunal’s power to do so is governed by existing legislation.
Amendment 3 enables the recipients of a compliance notice served by the Forensic Science Regulator to bring an appeal to the first tier tribunal against the decision of the regulator. The amendment also sets out the grounds under which a person may bring such an appeal and the remedies that the first tier tribunal may grant. Grounds for an appeal of a compliance notice are that the decision was based on error of fact, the decision was wrong in law, the decision was unreasonable or that any step or prohibition specified in the notice is unreasonable.
Amendments 4 and 5 remove the express power for the first tier tribunal to award costs on an appeal against the refusal to issue a completion certificate, as the tribunal’s power to do so is already governed by existing legislation. It also makes an amendment consequential to amendment 3. Amendment 6 enables the upper tribunal to suspend a compliance notice pending the conclusion of an appeal for the first tier tribunal to the upper tribunal. Amendment 7 enables the regulator to provide assistance relating to forensic science activities carried on in England and Wales to any person, and not just advice, as currently worded. We hope that amendment will remove ambiguity.
Amendment 8 removes the ability of the forensic science regulator to disclose information to another public authority merely because it is relevant to the other authority’s functions. That means that the regulator is empowered to disclose information only where doing so is necessary to enable or assist the other public authority to carry out its functions. This amendment ensures consistency with data protection legislation.
Amendment 9 amends clause 1 so that the Bill does not affect the exercise by any persons other than the regulator of functions in relation to the regulation of forensic science activities. This is to ensure that the duties and powers of other bodies or regulators who oversee scientific activities, such as in the area of forensic pathology, are not affected by any of the provisions of the Bill.
Amendments 10 and 11 modify the short title and long title of the Bill. to reflect the fact that there are no clauses related to biometrics or a biometric strategy within. This is because the Government could not support the biometrics elements that were initially proposed.
The hon. Member for Bristol North West made a good point about the future of police technology. As I think I outlined on Second Reading, the Government have a manifesto commitment to create a framework within which law enforcement can operate as it adopts new and evolving technology in this area, particularly in relation to technologies that could be deemed to be biometrics, data or forensics, for which we have a variety of regulatory regimes at the moment, and about which we need clarity.
In particular, technology that could be deemed by the public to be intrusive needs to have democratic consent. One of the issues that is raised, for example in clause 3, is that the code of practice that the Forensic Science Regulator will put in place has to come to the House and be laid before the House to get expressed consent by affirmative action, and indeed must be approved by the Secretary of State. We are very keen that people know that, where such technologies are used and are developing fast, we as democratically elected politicians have a say and have influence on an ongoing basis. Some of the legislation is about allowing forensics to have the agility to adopt new technology, but I hope and believe that we will be able to bring those measures forward, certainly before the next election, because it is in our manifesto. I hope that we can do so as soon as possible, because technology is racing away from us.
Scientifically robust evidence is one of policing’s most important tools in investigating crime. These powers to be used as a last resort are necessary, and they will support the effective delivery of justice and help to restore confidence in the criminal justice system.
On that note, I urge the Committee to accept amendments 1 to 11 and to agree that clauses 1 to 13 stand part of the Bill.
I have nothing further to add, Ms Eagle.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberOur police forces have played a critical role during the pandemic and have been quick to respond to the changes and challenges that we all face. The Government have been clear that they will provide police forces with the support, both moral and physical, that they need to continue protecting the public and keeping communities safe through the coronavirus pandemic. This has included £30 million of additional covid surge funding.
I welcome the approach that my hon. Friend and the Home Secretary are taking to support brave police officers up and down the country. Lawful protest is the cornerstone of a democracy, but does my hon. Friend agree that it is wholly unacceptable for groups of protesters to come together and put police officers at risk by breaking social distancing rules, given that the police have a responsibility to keep the public safe?
It is no surprise that my right hon. Friend should put the welfare of police officers to the front of his mind, as should everybody in this country. Our police officers are out there on the frontline keeping us all safe, and it is true that a large gathering has the potential to expose them to a greater possibility of infection by the virus than would otherwise be the case. We have seen extraordinary resilience from our police forces throughout the whole pandemic. Indeed, absence has often been below business as usual. That is important because, besides covid compliance enforcement, we still have crime to fight, and if people want officers to be there at the other end of a 999 call and available to come to their aid in an emergency, they need to ensure that they do not expose them to a greater risk of infection than they would otherwise face.
In the first lockdown, we saw a number of large demonstrations and protests, including in Henley, that threatened frontline officers. In this lockdown, are we going to abolish them or try to prevent them from happening to protect officers and, indeed, the public?
I know that Henley has seen its fair share of problems over the past few months, and it is no surprise that my hon. Friend should raise them, as he often does, in this House. All large gatherings are now illegal under the coronavirus regulations, and I am afraid that that includes legitimate protests that would otherwise be tolerated. We are facing an extraordinary challenge as a country, with many vulnerable individuals, older citizens and others exposed to risks that they have never seen before, and we all have an individual duty towards our collective health. We hope and believe that the police will be able to encourage the vast majority of our fellow citizens to observe the regulations, but where they do not, enforcement is an option, as we have seen over the past weekend.
Lancashire has 750 fewer police officers than it did in 2010. Let us compare that with Surrey, which has only eight fewer officers. The discrepancy is because Lancashire is more reliant on Government grant than Surrey, which, as a relatively affluent area, is more reliant on council tax precepts. Given that the Government have promised to recruit 20,000 police officers in the next two years, when is the Department going to recruit them and base them in areas that have seen the biggest cuts, such as Lancashire?
I am pleased that our pledge to recruit 20,000 extra police officers is so popular, particularly in Lancashire. The hon. Lady will be pleased to know that 100 of the 153 that were allocated to Lancashire out of the first 6,000 had already been recruited by 30 September. They join the 5,834 that we have recruited towards our 6,000 target, which was due by next March; as Members can work out from the maths, we are well ahead of target. As for where those officers are based, that is a matter for the chief constable, who makes that operationally independent decision, in collaboration with the police and crime commissioner in the county.
Let me start by thanking the Minister for meeting me and the Daniel Fox Foundation, which is based in St Helens, does great work on knife crime in my constituency and was very encouraged by his support. We know the impact of coronavirus on our health and the economy, but it also has serious implications for public safety and the country’s security. There were anti-lockdown protests on the streets this weekend, but we see deliberate, harmful disinformation online all day, every day. So when ensuring that the police have what they need to meet all covid-related challenges that they face, what resources is he providing to them and the security and intelligence services to robustly counter the false online conspiracy theories, which are designed by nefarious elements, at home and abroad, to undermine our collective efforts to beat this virus?
First, let me say that I enjoyed our meeting with the Daniel Fox Foundation. I am pleased that in the hon. Gentleman’s part of the world, St Helens, as in the rest of the country, we are standing shoulder to shoulder in the fight against knife crime. Sadly, we are having to do so once again, but it is a fight that we will and must win—I am sure there will be more about it later today. On misinformation and disinformation, he is right to say that unpleasant and untrue stories are circulating, whether anti-vaccine stories or the crazy stuff about 5G. Both the National Crime Agency and the security and intelligence services are engaged with our partners in the private sector in removing as much of that disinformation as we can. We have a role to play in this House as well, in standing together as democratically elected politicians and recognising that we charge others with assisting us in providing advice and data and that we must respect and acknowledge their views as being the basis on which decisions are made legitimately. That is the right way forward. I welcome the Opposition Front-Bench team’s support on that thus far, and indeed into the future.
Police community support officers are a valued part of the police workforce as a key liaison point between local communities and policing, and we are all, I know, grateful for their service. Decisions about the best use of resources at the frontline, including the deployment of PCSOs, are for chief constables and democratically accountable police and crime commissioners based on their local knowledge and experience.
The Minister will know that Cambridgeshire has recently announced that the number of PCSOs is to be halved. The reason, in the words of the chief constable, was
“to ensure budget gaps can be met next year”.
Will the Minister do the right thing: bridge the gap and allow Cambridgeshire to keep our PCSOs?
I am very pleased to say that we have already started augmenting the resources available to Cambridgeshire police, with an award of £10.9 million last year, in the largest police settlement for a decade. Happily, it has already recruited 62 of the 99 allocated police officers, which I know will be making a huge difference in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, as they will across the whole of the county.
We recognise the importance of a timely response to 101 calls and the role that technology can play in the relationship between the police and the public, which is why we are supporting national programmes developing new ways for the public to contact the police. Gloucestershire constabulary is a key beneficiary of the Single Online Home for policing, a digital 101 service.
I thank the Minister for that response, but the actual response on the 101 service is quite often far too long, and people then revert to the 999 service, putting undue pressure on it. I have a meeting with the chief constable of Gloucestershire on Wednesday, and I will certainly make those points to him. Is there any more the Government can do to improve the 101 service?
It is no surprise that a Member of Parliament who is himself very accessible to his constituents on an almost 24/7 basis should want the same for the police. While I would love to sit behind my desk in Whitehall and manage these things from the centre, the truth is that the response times and the disposition of 101 is a matter for the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable in his county. I know that, if he meets them, they will listen to him carefully, because it is extremely important, as he says, that when people pick up the phone to the police—whether it is the 101 service or the 999 service—they do get a good and efficient response. There is nothing that can undermine the confidence of a person in their police force than getting just a recorded message or, indeed, a call that is never answered. Some of that solution is technological and we think that much can be achieved through the Single Online Home, and I urge him to explore it as a reporting mechanism. I wish him good luck with his meeting, and look forward to hearing the conclusions of it.
We are taking action on every level to cut knife crime. This week sees the instigation of Operation Sceptre—a nationally organised week of intensification against that crime. We are also investing millions of pounds in prevention and early intervention to stop young people being drawn into violence in the first place.
In 2017, my constituent Ryan Passey was killed with a knife inside a nightclub in Stourbridge. Absurdly, the perpetrator was acquitted. I am grateful for the work done by the Government so far on sentencing, but does the Minister agree that we need to be tough not just on sentencing, but on all aspects that have thus far allowed the perpetrators of knife crime to go free?
My hon. Friend raises a terrible case. The family of Mr Passey have our deep condolences. Over the past 12 years, I have met far too many parents of children and young people who have sadly been murdered and killed on our streets and in nightclubs, often by people who they regard as friends. Back in the early part of the previous decade, we thought we had beaten knife crime, but unfortunately it is back. My hon. Friend is quite right that we need to concentrate on every aspect of this—from enforcement through to prevention and, frankly, long-term work with young people that shows them that carrying a knife is dangerous not only to others, but fundamentally to themselves. There is a better way. We all need to stand shoulder to shoulder with my hon. Friend and her constituents to show young people that way in life.
West Midlands police are receiving up to £620.4 million in funding this year—an increase of more than £49 million on last year. We have also invested £12 million over two years in bolstering their capacity to respond to violent crime swiftly and robustly and given £6.7 million for a violence reduction unit across the west midlands to address the root causes of crime.
Recently, West Bromwich town centre has seen an appalling spate of crime, and I thank the Home Secretary for her support on this so far. Last week, I held a meeting with the town’s main stakeholders and local police to see what we can do. Will the Minister continue to work with me and the police to put more officers on our streets, to make West Bromwich East safer, so that we can be proud of our town centre once again?
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing this to my attention. I had a look at some of the incidents that have taken place in West Bromwich town centre, and it is a shocker, to be honest. Hopefully, using the convening power of her office, she can pull all the various groups together, and the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable will pay attention too. I recently had a good meeting with West Midlands police to discuss their general violence reduction, with a particular focus on reducing murder. It sounds like West Bromwich could do with some attention, and I am grateful to her, as I know her constituents will be, for bringing that focus to an area that obviously needs it.
The police funding settlement for 2020-21 set out the biggest increase in funding for the policing system since 2010, with Dorset police receiving up to £144.3 million in funding. That is an increase of £8.8 million on the previous year. We are giving the police the resources they need to fight crime and keep the public safe.
Can I thank the Minister very much for his answer? My constituency of West Dorset is served very ably by Dorset police, and they have historically managed their finances very well, but in the national funding formula, we do not fare quite so well, being below average, with 48%, compared with the average of 64%. Could he give me some reassurance that the police in Dorset are valued as much as other police forces around the country?
My hon. Friend need have no fear: every officer and every force in the country stand in equal regard by the Home Office, although I know that Dorset police are close to his heart. I will say two things. First, it is very important that the good people of Dorset elect a Conservative police and crime commissioner in May next year who can continue that good financial management. Secondly, I remind him of the commitment that I gave at the Department’s last questions session. While the police funding formula is currently the best basis we have for allocating funds across all forces in England and Wales, it is a bit elderly, and we have undertaken to review it before the next election. During that review, I know that he, along with all the other Members of Parliament from Dorset, will be lobbying hard to ensure that that beautiful county comes out of it well.
(4 years ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray, in what is a very well-timed debate, given the increasing period of difficulty and complexity the whole country is going into, which will yet again present challenges for our frontline emergency workers, not least the police. I am grateful to Members for their heartfelt contributions and their recognition of the amazing job the police have done during the lockdown, alongside their emergency worker colleagues.
Our brave workers, across all emergency services, do an extraordinary job in the most difficult of situations, keeping us safe, day in and day out. Those jobs can be tough. Many of them face more danger in a week than most of us will see in our lifetime. I am only too aware of the sacrifices that our police officers and other emergency workers make to protect us. They face the danger so we do not have to. That has never been more apparent than over the past few months. They continue to serve our country courageously, day after day, and I cannot speak highly enough of the bravery, commitment and sacrifice they make each day during these difficult times. As somebody who has spent a lot of my adult life involved in policing, I have seen that on a particular and singular basis on the frontline, many times.
I am glad that the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones) mentioned spitting and the appalling situation of police officers being spat at, particularly with covid about. It has caused great anxiety for many police officers. Will my hon. Friend assure me that there are robust punishments in place for those individuals who use covid as a weapon?
I am just coming to that point, if my hon. Friend will bear with me for a moment. I hope that my speech will cover most of the issues that have been raised during the debate, but I will come to one or two questions at the end.
A number of Members made the point that it is completely right that we should support and protect our emergency workers to the greatest extent possible. It goes without saying that an assault on an emergency worker is completely unacceptable in any circumstances. There is no excuse for it—there is no excuse in background, circumstance, resourcing or any other wider issue.
Throughout the year, we have heard reports of people deliberately spitting and coughing on emergency workers in an attempt to weaponise the virus against those who look to protect us. Such behaviour is utterly disgraceful, and personally I cannot understand what is going through the twisted mind of somebody to do such a monstrous thing. It is vital that those offenders face the full force of the law. Their actions constitute an assault.
Throughout the year, we have seen examples of tough sentences imposed on those using coronavirus as a threat against emergency workers. In April, an individual was sentenced to a total of two years in prison for assaulting police officers, including biting and coughing at them, claiming they were infected with coronavirus. Someone who deliberately coughed at a police community support officer and assaulted another officer was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment a week after the incident.
However, the Government want to go further and send a clear message that those kinds of attacks will not be tolerated. That is why we recently announced our intention to legislate to double the maximum penalty for assaults on emergency workers from 12 months to two years—an example that I hope colleagues north of the border in Scotland will follow.
We must also look at what happens when much more serious attacks take place—so serious that in some instances they have claimed the lives of those who put themselves in harm’s way to protect us. The deaths of Sergeant Matt Ratana, whose moving funeral I had the privilege of attending virtually this morning, and PC Andrew Harper epitomise the kind of bravery and extraordinary sacrifice that will not be forgotten. We are determined to do everything in our power to protect those who put our safety before their own, by ensuring that the police have the tools and resources they need to keep themselves and us safe.
The Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor were pleased to meet Andrew Harper’s widow, Lissie, who has been mentioned by a number of Members, to discuss Harper’s law, and I hope to meet her myself soon. We will continue to work with the Ministry of Justice to ensure that assaults on emergency workers are handled with appropriate severity across the criminal justice system, and that includes the Crown Prosecution Service and the judiciary. It might be interesting to compare the sentences given for assaults on police officers, for example, with those given for assaults on judges.
Dealing with traumatic incidents and helping people who often experience traumatic events can have real consequences, and not only for the victims. These are not jobs that can be left at the office: the pressure of the role will leave its mark on a person’s personal and family life. That is why the Government have invested £7.5 million in a new national police wellbeing service. Following two years of development and piloting, that wellbeing service was launched in April last year, providing evidence-based guidance, advice, tools and resources that can be accessed by forces, as well as individual officers and staff. There is an emphasis on prevention and on helping forces to identify mental health issues early through psychological screening, giving officers access to support before a problem takes hold. The wellbeing service offers a wide range of services, from practical workshops to individual guidance.
However, as hon. Members have mentioned, the Government are going to go even further to ensure that our police get the support and protection they need. We have accelerated work to introduce a police covenant, and remain absolutely committed to ensuring that it has a meaningful impact on those working within, or retired from, policing roles, whether paid or as a volunteer. We expect to establish a robust governance structure in the coming months to drive progress, and policing partners have already been involved in those discussions. The covenant will be enshrined in law, and the Home Secretary will have a duty to report annually on progress. Our focus will be on health and wellbeing, physical protection, and support for families. We will continue to work closely with policing partners to ensure the covenant has a lasting impact on our police.
Those of us who have been out with police officers, as hopefully many Members have been, know that they confront violent situations every day to keep the public safe. The recent review of officer and staff safety conducted by the National Police Chiefs’ Council highlighted a number of areas where improvements can be made and where partners can work together to improve the protections for our police. To carry out their vital roles and stay safe, it is essential that police are equipped with the right protection, training and tools, including the latest, most accurate Taser, body armour, and body-worn cameras, as the review quite rightly highlighted. This, along with the police covenant, provides an opportunity for us to make a significant difference to the lives of those working in policing and their families.
However, we should not forget that there are other emergency service workers who are worthy of protection, not least in the NHS. The NHS violence reduction strategy aims to protect those workers against deliberate violence and aggression from patients, their families and the public, and to ensure offenders are punished quickly and effectively. We also know from the tragic events of Grenfell Tower and from major incidents like Whaley dam the extent of the physical and psychological challenges our firefighters can face, as hon. Members have referenced.
In 2018, the Government launched the fire and rescue national framework, directing all fire and rescue services to have in place a people strategy to support their staff, including a specific focus on mental health and wellbeing. I am pleased that this has inspired positive action, and that the National Fire Chiefs Council’s wellbeing board continues to instigate positive change across the sector, focusing on prevention, early intervention and individual support.
The emergency services are among the most selfless and courageous members of our society. They deserve every support and protection we can give them, and I know it will have been heartening for them to hear the unequivocal support they have received from every Member who has spoken this evening.