Bank of England and Treasury: Financial Relationship

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Written Statements

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I can announce today the conclusion of a Bank of England and HM Treasury five-yearly review of the Bank’s capital framework parameters, as set out in section 2B of the Bank and HM Treasury financial relationship memorandum of understanding.

The review concluded that:

The capital framework has been effective in delivering its intended objectives at inception in 2018: to ensure that the Bank is equipped with capital resources consistent with the monetary and financial stability remits it has been given by Parliament.

The existing parameters of the capital framework remain adequate to support the Bank’s balance sheet.^[1]

The existing Bank-HMT financial arrangements, as set out in the MoU, are sufficient to support the bank’s planned transition to a demand-driven operating framework fully backed by repo.^[2]

The Bank and HM Treasury will keep these arrangements under review during the Bank’s balance sheet transition to a new steady state in coming years, ensuring close engagement as per the existing governance and information sharing channels set out in the MoU.

The Bank and HM Treasury have updated the MoU accordingly, and this can be accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understanding-between-hm-treasury-and-the-bank-of-england-2025

^[1] The parameters of the capital framework include a target, a floor, and a ceiling. As set out in the 2018 letter from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor, the values of the capital parameters are £0.5 billion for the floor, £3.5 billion for the target and £5.5 billion for the ceiling. This letter can be accessed at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2018/governor-letter-210618.pdf

^[2] Further detail on the transition of the Bank’s operating framework can be accessed through the following attachments:

“Transitioning to a repo-led operating framework”—Bank of England https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2024/dp/transitioning-to-a-repo-led-operating-framework

“The importance of central bank reserves”—lecture by Andrew Bailey https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2024/may/andrew-bailey-lecture-london-school-of-economics-charles-goodhart

“Let’s get ready to repo”—speech by Victoria Saporta https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2024/july/victoria-saporta-speech-at-afme-seminar

[HCWS456]

Contingencies Fund Advance: National Savings and Investments

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Written Statements

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

HM Treasury has agreed additional resource DEL and capital DEL funding of £88,414,000 for National Savings and Investments (NS&I) as part of spending review 2025 phase 1 during the 2024 autumn Budget. The additional resource supports NS&I’s business transformation programme which will see it transition to a modernised operating model, with multiple service delivery partners. The funding also supports the capital DEL requirements for NS&I’s moving between offices in London.

Parliamentary approval for additional resource of £40,630,000 and capital of £17,120,000 has been sought in a supplementary estimate for NS&I. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £57,750,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.

[HCWS453]

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee room and will be circulated to Members by email.

We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sitting is available in the room. That shows how the clauses and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments and clauses grouped together are generally on a similar issue.

Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order that they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment, and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill, are taken when we come to the relevant clause.

The Minister is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments or clauses within that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of a debate on a group, I shall call the Minister again.

Clause 1

Recapitalisation payments

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 21, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove subsection (3), which prevents recapitalisation payments from being required where the Bank has directed a financial institution to maintain an end-state minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities exceeding minimum capital requirements.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 24, at end insert—

“(3A) No application to the scheme manager for recapitalisation payments may be considered by the Bank of England for a financial institution which has been directed to maintain an end-state Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) exceeding minimum capital requirements, unless permission has been given, through regulations, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

(3B) Regulations made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, subject to subsection (4), shall be made through Statutory Instrument under the negative procedure.”

This amendment would ensure financial institutions that maintain an end-state Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities exceeding minimum capital requirements are excluded from the provisions of the Bill, unless permission has been given through regulations.

[Emma Reynolds]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, but I am sure not the last, Ms Jardine. Government amendment 1 ensures that the Bank of England will have the flexibility to use the mechanism provided in this Bill in a broad range of circumstances. It does that by removing the provision added in the other place that prevents the Bank of England from using the new mechanism in relation to firms that have been directed to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, also known as MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities. I will also speak to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, which aims to ensure that the mechanism is used only for small banks.

I appreciate that this issue is of interest to many hon. Members, as we discussed it on Second Reading, and also to those in the other place, where it was debated. However, the Government’s position on the matter is clear: as I set out on Second Reading, the intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily to support the resolution of smaller banks. The Government reaffirmed that position in their draft updates to the code of practice to which the Bank of England must have regard when using its resolution powers, and in the written statement that my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Tulip Siddiq), made to the House on 15 October 2024.

The Government appreciate the intent of the amendment passed in the other place and of amendment 3, and are conscious of the intent to preserve flexibility to use the mechanism on firms transitioning towards holding their full allocation of MREL. I also appreciate the remaining key concern that, without restriction on the scope of the mechanism, the Bank of England could use it on the largest banks. I make it absolutely clear that that is not the Government’s primary policy intention. The Bank of England should always, first and foremost, rely on a firm’s MREL resources, ensuring that its shareholders and investors bear the losses, rather than turning to this mechanism.

However, having considered the matter carefully, the Government believe that it is still not desirable to limit the mechanism’s scope in the Bill. That would in effect hardwire in legislation the principle that the mechanism is unavailable for larger banks, and it is that hardwiring that the Government are concerned about. As we have seen and experienced, bank failures are highly unpredictable. The Government’s concern is that if the legislation is overly restrictive, that might mean that the mechanism is unavailable in the very unlikely circumstances of large bank failures in which public funds may still be exposed. We must remember, in relation to this Bill, that the primary objective is to protect the taxpayer. The Government consider it important that the mechanism’s use is not overly constrained in the legislation, ensuring that it provides comprehensive protection for public funds—that is, the taxpayer.

To explain the Government’s thinking on this issue in more detail, I will make three points. First, there may be very limited circumstances in which the flexibility to use the mechanism on larger firms would help to protect public funds. The largest and most complex firms are required to hold additional resources to be bailed in—known as MREL—which aim to provide a robust level of self-insurance for larger firms. The Bill’s mechanism can be used only where a firm is transferred to a buyer or a bridge bank upon failure—something that is not envisaged for a large bank, which is expected to be bailed in instead. To take the points together, large banks should therefore have sufficient of their own resources to meet their recapitalisation costs, and the mechanism is unlikely to be available for use on large banks, even with the scope in the Bill remaining broad.

However, it is theoretically possible that circumstances could emerge for which a larger bank is not sufficiently resourced, although these are highly unlikely. One example would be if the firm were subject to a large redress claim, resulting in a higher recapitalisation amount than envisaged. Another example would be if the market value of the firm’s assets changed over time. That could result in more losses than expected at the point of failure—again, resulting in a higher amount of recapitalisation. Those examples, however unlikely they may be, show that there is a clear benefit in having the flexibility to source additional resources from the mechanism, having already written down the firm’s available MREL. Restricting the scope in the Bill would prevent the mechanism from being available in these types of scenario, leaving public funds and therefore the taxpayer exposed instead.

Secondly, I reiterate that the Bank of England would first look to write down or otherwise expose to loss available MREL and would then consider use of the mechanism only if a sale to a buyer or transfer to a bridge bank were needed. Funds from industry are therefore not expected to be used to cover a large bank’s full recapitalisation amount. Instead, they are expected to be needed only for an additional shortfall over and above that which the firm’s resources could fulfil and once these resources have been written down or exposed to loss. Use of the mechanism would simply be a “top-up” to achieve recapitalisation, rather than covering all of a firm’s recapitalisation costs.

Thirdly and finally, the Government agree with the intent behind amendment 3, in that it is important for there to be sufficient safeguards to prevent any inappropriate use of the new mechanism on larger firms. I reassure the hon. Member for Wokingham that a range of safeguards is already in place, which the Government believe provide the necessary checks and balances. For example, the Treasury is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers through being consulted about whether conditions for resolution have been met. The Treasury would also need to approve any resolution action with implications for public funds. If the Bank of England requested a large sum from the financial services compensation scheme, which it could not provide through its own resources, it would have implications for public funds, as the financial services compensation scheme would need to borrow from the Treasury. This means that, in practice, Treasury consent would be required if the Bank of England had requested a large sum.

The Bill also includes some important mechanisms to ensure transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. For example, the Bill now requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor on the use of the new mechanism, and it requires the Chancellor to lay those reports in Parliament. The Bill also requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees—namely, the Treasury Committee and the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee—following the use of the mechanism. Those measures will ensure that Parliament can scrutinise the Bank of England’s actions in relation to the new mechanism. They were added to the Bill during the debate in the other place.

I hope that my explanations go some way to providing reassurance that the Government’s approach is the right one, and that ultimately, flexibility in the legislation is better for economic and financial stability, and for limiting the risk to public funds, which is what the Bill is all about. As a result, I hope that hon. Members can support the Government’s amendment, and I ask the hon. Member for Wokingham not to press his amendment.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Ms Jardine. I also thank the Minister, because we have had a fantastic time of agreement so far—but not on this particular point.

I will speak to Government amendment 1 and amendment 3 from the hon. Member for Wokingham. Government amendment 1 is aimed at reversing an amendment that was put in place by those in the other House. It was proposed by my colleague Baroness Vere, so we refer to it as “the Vere amendment”.

The Minister made quite a strong and convincing case for why the Bank of England feels that it needs the ability to use this type of financial services compensation scheme redress in the case of some of the larger banks. But what worried me, as I was listening to the Minister’s words, was that she was highlighting the fact that the MREL regime could fail. I spent three and a half years or so on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, coming up with this MREL stuff in the first place, and also on the Treasury Committee, analysing the banking crisis. We completely accept that there is no way we can legislate for any possible type of failure in the future. However, we can try to learn from mistakes. The Minister is suggesting that there is an exception—that the MREL regime is not right—but I would prefer the MREL regime to be looked at again to make sure that it operates properly.

The Minister makes the very good point that a bank could issue an MREL convertible bond, which converts into equity in the event of a default; and that the bank could be successful during the course of its life and the MREL bond is not, in fact, sufficiently big enough to meet the liabilities in the event of a default. To me, the answer is not to try to squeeze into place another bit of legislation that tries to fudge it. We should look more carefully at making sure that the MREL regime is right, although I completely understand her point that the regime is only going to make up the top-up. However, the problem is that if the Government are going for a growth agenda—we all know that the City of London and financial services institutions can grow quite quickly—we could end up with a situation in which quite a lot of money is being asked for by the other banks to be able to support this.

We will press this amendment to a Division and vote against it. I am glancing towards my Liberal Democrat friend, the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley, and I hope that enthusiastic nod means that we will not be by ourselves in doing so.

Liberal Democrat amendment 3 would bring back, in a slightly different form, the amendment proposed by Baroness Vere in the other place, but it adds something else that we are slightly worried about. Having looked at this on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards for a number of years, I have become quite a purist about it. The amendment restores a fundamentally important point but what worries me is that it looks to have a negative resolution statutory instrument to ensure that that happens.

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[Chris Coghlan (Dorking and Horley) (LD)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks and for supporting our amendment 3. We tabled that amendment because, when the Bill was first debated, the Minister spoke about it enhancing the resolution regime in response to the failure of small banks. We believe that that is appropriate. I guess it is an assessment of risk between mission creep—whether we allow this mechanism to apply to larger banks, with the risk of unnecessary costs falling on banks—and, as the Minister says, having an additional mechanism available in the event of a bank failure. I have a few things to say on that.

First, if the MREL capital of a bank is exhausted, frankly, we are probably looking at a public bailout in any case. I am sceptical whether the additional mechanisms in the Bill would absolve the taxpayer from needing to bail out the bank, so the risk of the Bank of England going beyond the intention of the Bill by imposing additional costs on banks seems to be higher than that.

The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is right about the need for speed. I should declare that I was a hedge fund manager during the Lehman collapse in 2008—I did not cause it—and I saw, first, how fast it happened, and secondly, that the consequences of not bailing out Lehman were far worse than they would have been had the US Government bailed them out. For me, that prompts the question why, 16 years later, we are looking at this mechanism being an effective device to prevent banking collapses, when a whole raft of reforms made from 2009 through to 2012—so the evidence would suggest, at least—have been effective, in that we have not had any bank failures in the UK since that date, as far as I am aware.

For those reasons we tabled amendment 3, but to the point made by the hon. Gentleman, I think the Government might be better served by doing a full review of banking regulation in the UK overall and assessing whether it is indeed effective in preventing the risk of a banking collapse, rather than tacking on small mechanisms beyond the intention of an existing Bill. We will therefore press our amendment to a vote.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Dorking and Horley for their contributions. Let me turn to the last point made by the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley and the first made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, the shadow Minister: the Government continue to have confidence in the regime for managing the failure of larger, more complex banks. The bail-in regime remains the right strategy for such firms to ensure that a firm’s shareholders and investors, rather than taxpayers, are on the hook if it fails.

The hon. Member for Dorking and Horley asked why we are doing this now, The reason we are doing this now is, first, the lot opposite started it—and we agree with them. [Laughter.] No, to put it more formally: the previous Government started down this track of reviewing what happened with Silicon Valley Bank. Rightly, in our view, they looked at what happened over that weekend; the shadow Minister has mentioned this.

The case of Silicon Valley Bank shows us a couple of things, and we were keen to learn lessons from it. First, the resolution regime works pretty well. However, we were fortunate that Silicon Valley Bank was an attractive proposition to HSBC. In the end, therefore, although these things are never easy, there were officials in the Treasury and the Bank who worked all weekend, and Ministers were involved; one of them is now a shadow Minister and one of them is a Back Bencher. However, if SVB had not been an attractive proposition, things might have been different. And this measure is to protect the taxpayer in that scenario.

We do not wish to throw all the pieces up in the air and see where they land; we are not doing a wholesale reform of the resolution regime. This is an important tweak but, in the scheme of things, a relatively minor tweak to what is a much broader regime to deal with these circumstances. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley. And we note that he had nothing to do with the global financial crash. [Laughter.]

[Chris Coghlan]

indicated assent.

[Emma Reynolds]

Coming on to the amendment, I am a little bit confused by the shadow Minister, because he rightly says—I agree with him about this—that it would not have been possible to use a negative SI, for example, during the weekend when everything was happening with Silicon Valley Bank. The Government at the time and the Bank of England rightly moved during that weekend to reassure the markets and everything was sorted, really—well, I say everything was sorted, but there was still more to do. However, the big decisions were made over that weekend.

If the Government had to lay an SI in order to give the Bank the permission to do that, it would not have been a good scenario. I think the shadow Minister is saying that he will back the other amendment, but not this one. I am a bit confused by his position.

[Mark Garnier]

To be absolutely clear, the Minister and I are absolutely as one on that particular point: to have a negative resolution SI, or indeed any SI, would hold up progress and create a lot of hassle. The substantive part of the amendment, which is the MREL bit, prevents us from being able to support the amendment, so we will vote against it. It is the other amendment—the growth amendment—that we will support. My apologies to the Chairman; I hope that is clear.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thought that was what the shadow Minister was saying, but it is good to get some clarification. I think I am not the only one who was a little confused.

As I said in my opening remarks, we do not support the amendment that the hon. Member for Wokingham tabled, but I understand the intent behind it and the concern that the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley raised.

A couple of other issues were raised; they go slightly beyond the bounds of the Bill, but I will respond to them anyway. As the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley knows, there is a consultation by the Bank of England on the MREL thresholds. That consultation closed recently and, as he would expect, the Treasury is working very closely with the Bank as it looks through the feedback to that consultation. That is not in the substance of this Bill, but it is a relevant consideration and I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we are working closely with the Bank on this issue.

I hope that I have addressed the concerns raised by Opposition Members, but I am sure that they will tell me if I have not done so.

[Mark Garnier]

Yes.

[Emma Reynolds]

I think we will get on to the amendment on growth and competitiveness in the next stage of line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 1, page 2, line 3, at end insert—

“(5A) As a further objective to the special resolution objectives in section 4 of the Banking Act 2009, when discharging its functions in respect of the exercise of recapitalisation payments under this section, the Bank of England must observe the competitiveness and growth objective.

(5B) The competitiveness and growth objective is facilitating, subject to aligning with relevant international standards—

(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom, and

(b) its growth in the medium to long term.”

This amendment would place a further objective on the Bank of England to consider the competitiveness and growth of the market before directing the recapitalisation of failing small banks through a levy on the banking sector.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine, in my first Public Bill Committee, which is a moment I suspect no MP forgets—or perhaps not. Amendment 4 would introduce a secondary objective for the Bank of England, which would require the Bank to consider market competitiveness and growth before directing the recapitalisation of failing small banks via a levy on the banking sector.

Amendment 4 seeks to address a few of the existing concerns with the Bill. For example, there are no clear limitations on how the Financial Services Compensation Scheme can be used as a source of funds for resolution, which means that there is no time limit on the extra levy imposed by the banking sector to repay the scheme. The amendment seeks to ensure that the Bank of England takes a holistic view of market competition and growth before making a resolution decision. It would therefore provide a strategy to reduce risk and to protect the sector. If the Bank of England determines that not issuing the mechanism could threaten market stability, the amendment would direct it towards resolution.

The amendment seeks to support market growth while ensuring that the financial burden on the banking sector remains fair and proportionate. It encourages a measured approach to financial resolution that protects both small banks and broader financial stability. I urge the Government to take the amendment on board when progressing the Bill.

[Emma Reynolds]

Growth and competitiveness—

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On resuming—

[Emma Reynolds]

Growth and competitiveness are fundamental priorities for this Government. Financial and economic stability are essential for growth and lie at the heart of the Bill. Risks to financial stability arising from bank failures, and the disruption they cause to continuity of critical services, can be seriously detrimental to growth and competitiveness. It is an obvious point, but one of the principal ways in which the authorities can impact economic growth is by maintaining financial stability.

Amendment 4, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, seeks to ensure that the Bank of England considers competitiveness and growth when using the new mechanism in the Bill. It does so by introducing a new objective that the Bank of England would need to consider alongside the special resolution objectives. This objective would be to facilitate the international competitiveness and growth of the UK economy, subject to aligning with relevant international standards.

The Government resist the amendment because we believe that, while well-intentioned, it may have profound consequences. I should start by noting that the aim of the Bill is to enhance the resolution regime, but in a way that avoids making more fundamental changes to the regime and the way in which the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers. As I said to the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley previously, this is more of a significant tweak than an overhaul, which it certainly is not. That is because the Government consider that, broadly, the regime works well, as demonstrated by the successful resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK. The Government believe that attaching a new objective such as this to the use of the mechanism in the Bill could complicate matters for the Bank of England in using the mechanism alongside its stabilisation powers.

This is the key argument: we know that, when managing a firm failure, the Bank of England may need to take a decision at pace in a highly complex and uncertain environment. That is distinct from the regular policymaking of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority, which of course have a secondary growth and competitiveness objective—for which there is cross-party support—but one that is applicable in the context of their general rule-making and policymaking roles. It would be quite different to say that this objective should apply to the Bank of England when taking urgent crisis management action in relation to an individual distressed or failing firm.

That reflects the different nature of the decisions that regulators take compared with the resolution authority, which has to act quickly and decisively in a crisis. It is therefore important that the Bank of England, as the resolution authority, has a clear and unambiguous basis on which to make such decisions. The Government believe that the special resolution objectives already provide that. As Members will appreciate, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure, and that any impacts on growth and competitiveness are properly considered. The Government believe that the existing framework strikes the right balance.

I would add that the question around how the Bank of England and others support growth and competitiveness is a complex matter, and it is not one that the Government believe should be, or can be, addressed in the Bill. I hope that I have provided a helpful explanation of the Government’s view on this issue, and I respectfully ask that the hon. Member for Wokingham withdraws his amendment.

[Clive Jones]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 4.

[Emma Reynolds]

As we have already discussed in considering Government amendment 1, as well as amendments 3 and 4, clauses 1 and 4 introduce the recapitalisation payment mechanism that is the core of the Bill. Clause 1 inserts a proposed new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which will allow the Bank of England to use funds provided by the FSCS to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution. This proposed new section also allows the FSCS to levy the banking sector to recover such funds.

Finally, the proposed new section requires the Bank of England to consult the FSCS before requesting funds, and it specifies the type of firms in the scope of the Bill. Clause 1 therefore gives the Bank of England the necessary power to protect taxpayers from risk when certain banking institutions fail. In turn, that will allow the Bank of England to protect financial stability, which of course supports the Government’s top priority of growth, by strengthening our economic stability. As has already been debated, clause 1 has been amended to remove a limitation on the scope of the mechanism, which was introduced in the other place. The Government are of the firm belief that, while this mechanism is not intended to be used for large banks, the unpredictable nature of bank failures warrants appropriate flexibility for the Bank of England to ensure that taxpayers and financial stability continue to be comprehensively protected.

Clause 4 sets out that the Bank of England must reimburse the FSCS for any funds the latter provided that are not needed to cover the relevant costs of resolving an institution. This includes funds that were not required, either because the costs and expenses were lower than the Bank of England expected or because the Bank of England recovered some funds during the resolution—for example, through the sale of the institution. This will provide clarity on how excess and recovered funds should be dealt with, and it provides a mechanism for ensuring that the FSCS does not contribute more than is necessary in support of the resolution. This is important to ensure that the mechanism works as intended, and that there is a process for returning funds to industry where possible. Together, clauses 1 and 4 form the backbone of the Bill and put in place the mechanism to further protect taxpayers from risk. I therefore commend both clauses, as they now stand, to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Reporting

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 3 and 5.

[Emma Reynolds]

Clauses 2, 3 and 5 relate to the reporting and accountability requirements on the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism. The Government added these clauses to the Bill in the other place, reflecting the understandable concerns raised about how the Bank of England will be held to account when using the new mechanism. Together, they aim to ensure that there is effective transparency and scrutiny when the mechanism is used, helping to provide important assurances following a resolution to the Chancellor, Parliament, industry and the public.

Clause 2 requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor following its use of the mechanism. These reports must relate both to the exercise of the mechanism and the stabilisation option it is used in connection with. The “final report” produced by the Bank of England is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the mechanism, with the content and timing of the report to be specified by the Treasury.

As alluded to in the published draft updates to the Bank of England’s code of practice, the Government expect such final reports to include a number of important points: first, an explanation of the choice to use the new mechanism; secondly, how the resolution conditions and objectives were considered and given regard to; thirdly, an assessment of the costs of using the mechanism compared with placing the firm into insolvency; and finally, an explanation of why any ancillary costs were considered reasonable and necessary.

Clause 2 also requires the Bank of England to produce an interim report within three months of using the mechanism, if the final report has not been provided within that period. This guarantees that scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions takes place in short order after a resolution involving the mechanism. The Chancellor will be required to lay any reports before Parliament, ensuring that there is appropriate transparency and accountability regarding the use of the mechanism. The Chancellor, however, will have the discretion to omit certain information from such reports when they are published if doing so is deemed to be in the public interest—for example, if reports contain commercially confidential information, or if disclosure could potentially frustrate an ongoing resolution process.

Clause 3 requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the Treasury Committee of this House and the Financial Services Regulation Committee of the other place as soon as is reasonably practicable after the recapitalisation mechanism has been used. This means that Parliament will be engaged promptly following the use of the mechanism. Finally, clause 5 requires the Government’s code of practice, which sets out how the resolution regime is expected to work in practice, to include guidance on the contents of the reports of the Bank of England, which it is required to produce under clause 2. Clause 5 places an important obligation on the Treasury to ensure that there is transparency over what the Bank of England should expect to include in such reports.

At this point, I note that the Government published draft updates to the code of practice, which set out the sorts of things that are expected to be included in reports by the Bank of England. For example, reports would be expected to include an explanation of the choice to use the recapitalisation mechanism, as well as an assessment of the costs of using the mechanism compared with putting the failing firm into insolvency. The Government will issue a full update to the code of conduct in line with the provisions in the Bill that are coming into force. As mentioned at the start, these clauses provide important clarity for the Bank of England, industry and Parliament on the accountability mechanisms that apply when the recapitalisation mechanism is used. I therefore commend clauses 2, 3 and 5 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will be brief, because I do not want to take up too much of the Committee’s time. I reiterate that accountability is an incredibly important part of the Bill; accountability of the Bank of England and the Treasury to Parliament is absolutely crucial. Having had the experience of spending my first five years in Parliament scrutinising this sector, the more information Parliament has when making legislation, the better it is for us all in producing good legislation.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 7.

Government amendment 2.

Clause 8.

[Emma Reynolds]

I will briefly speak to clauses 6, 7 and 8, which cover the more technical aspects of the Bill. Clause 6 makes amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It ensures that, where the FSCS makes a recapitalisation payment to the Bank of England, its ability to levy the banking sector is extended to cover such a payment. This is key to recouping the FSCS’s funds, and thus achieving the Bill’s aim of reducing potential risk to public funds in a resolution. The clause also stipulates that credit unions are exempt from levies for this purpose, which I am sure Members will agree is a sensible and proportionate approach, given that credit unions are out of scope of the resolution regime.

The rest of clause 6 makes minor amendments to existing legislation. It clarifies that a recapitalisation payment is not classed as a management expense of the FSCS, and it clarifies that payments that are made in error, in connection with the recapitalisation funds provided to the Bank of England, can be levied for, which is consistent with the approach for the other statutory functions of the FSCS.

Clause 7 makes amendments to the Banking Act 2009. It makes it explicit that funds provided by the FSCS, in resolution in connection with the new mechanism, would not count as extraordinary public financial assistance, reflecting that the new mechanism is intended to reduce risk to the kind of public funds described within this definition. The clause allows the Bank of England to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when calculating the extent to which certain liabilities are bailed in, when the Bank of England exercises its bail-in tool alongside executing a transfer. Without this, the Bank of England would not be able to consider the funds provided by the FSCS in instances where it exercises its bail-in tool. That might mean that the Bank of England would have to continue to write down certain liabilities, potentially including uncovered deposits, where doing so could negatively impact and destabilise the continued operation of the failed firm.

Clause 7 also gives the Bank of England the express ability to require the failing firm to issue new shares, allowing FSCS funds to then be used to pay for those shares, thereby injecting the funds into the firm. This will ensure that the Bank of England can move swiftly to recapitalise the failing firm. The clause also ensures that funds provided by the FSCS can be taken into account appropriately when deciding whether sale proceeds or compensation are due to those who owned the firm before it was transferred. This would avoid including value that was contributed by the banking sector in any assessment of the compensation payable to former shareholders and creditors, which would clearly be inappropriate and increase the cost of compensation to taxpayers.

Finally, clause 7 disapplies a requirement for the Bank of England to notify the Treasury as to whether a certain condition for providing financial assistance to a failing firm has been met, otherwise known as the 8% rule. The 8% rule states that resolution financing arrangements may be used only where the shareholders and creditors of the bailing institution have made a contribution equal in value to at least 8% of the institution’s liabilities. The Government have disapplied that requirement in their updates to the code of practice, as it is unlikely that the condition could be met by small banks since they will not hold sufficient loss-absorbing resources to reach the threshold. As such, the statutory notification requirement is redundant.

Finally, clause 8 sets out the procedural matters of the Bill, which I trust will cause no concern to hon. Members. At this point, I should note the Government’s second amendment, which removes the financial privilege amendment inserted in the other place. That is standard procedure and I trust that hon. Members will raise no objections. I hope hon. Members agree that the clauses are sensible provisions to ensure that the Bill works as intended and, as such, I commend them to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

You will be delighted, Ms Jardine, as I am sure the whole Committee will be, to hear that my contribution will be even shorter than the last one. The Minister rightly says that we are considering a lot of procedural-type amendments to do with the delivery of the Bill. I thank the Government for listening to industry over excluding credit unions from falling within the scope. It is incredibly important that we do not find lots of other people emerging into these sectors and suddenly finding themselves being part of a much more complicated area. On the procedural point of the Government amendment, we will absolutely support that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Extent, commencement and short title

Amendment made: 2, in clause 8, page 6, line 1, leave out subsection (5).—(Emma Reynolds.)

This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the House of Lords.

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Emma Reynolds]

I commend the Bill to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I thank everybody for their work. It is a great pleasure to see so many new Members of Parliament and former hedge fund managers; it is terrific. On so many occasions, I have joked about being a former investment banker and hedge fund manager, and now that I am a politician, I have the hat trick of the three most unpopular jobs known to humanity. For a next job, I will be a traffic warden. I thank everyone for their hard work.

[Emma Reynolds]

May I also take the opportunity to thank the officials of the House and you, Ms Jardine, as well as the Treasury officials who have worked so hard on the Bill? We still have some stages to go, but it is an opportune moment to do that.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Low-income Countries: Debt Cancellation

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 6th February 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

Thank you for calling me, Ms McVey. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, and I am sure not the last.

I thank the hon. Member for Southgate and Wood Green (Bambos Charalambous) for drawing attention to these issues and for bringing this debate on debt cancellation to Westminster Hall today. I also thank the other Members, whose speeches have made for a rich discussion on this issue. I will mention them briefly and then hope to come to everyone’s questions, should time allow. I thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for his kind words about my appointment—I am still early in my time in this role. I also thank him for underlining the importance of the role of charities in the development work that they do in low-income and vulnerable countries.

My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Dr Sandher) spoke with great passion about his experience working in Somaliland. He brings great insights to the House after working in that capacity previously. I thank the hon. Members for Melksham and Devizes (Brian Mathew) and for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding) for stressing that the UK needs to restore our leadership on international development. I will come to some of their questions later in my contribution.

I also want to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) for raising crucial points about the situation that many low-income countries vulnerable to the impacts of climate change find themselves in. I will say a little more about that, too.

The Government are highly concerned by the debt challenges faced by many low and middle-income countries, with 3.3 billion people living in countries that spend more on servicing their debt than on health or education—a point made by many hon. Members. Among low-income countries, 10 are currently in debt distress and 25 are at high risk, and there is an urgent need to address the vulnerabilities. As a Government, we are fully committed to tackling unsustainable debt burdens in a way that supports development needs and helps countries address those vulnerabilities.

We are acting in three key ways. I will attempt to answer questions, particularly from my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green who secured the debate, when discussing the three key ways. The first is on addressing liquidity challenges; the second is on ensuring effective debt restructurings; and the third is on promoting debt resilience.

First, on addressing liquidity challenges, we are working with international partners to address immediate liquidity pressures facing many countries, which are crowding out vital spending on climate, health and education. We support the IMF and World Bank’s three-pillar approach, which is designed to support countries with high debt repayments. The first pillar is focused on action from vulnerable countries to improve revenue mobilisation and implement sound economic policies. The second focuses on ensuring that countries receive new flows of finance at concessional rates from international financial institutions and other development partners. The final pillar looks at providing case-by-case action to reduce the cost of existing debt burdens where needed.

Secondly, we are working to address debt vulnerabilities through improving the effectiveness of debt restructurings for countries in debt distress. The G20 common framework remains the best mechanism for co-ordinating debt restructurings to address unsustainable debt burdens, but further progress is needed.

The UK is working closely with the G20 and other international partners to ensure the framework delivers more timely, orderly and predictable debt restructurings. I know that is high on the priority list of the South African G20 presidency this year. The UK will be pressing for rapid implementation of the lessons learned from the common framework, which were agreed under the Brazilian presidency of the G20 last year.

The private sector, which has been mentioned by many hon. Members, must also play its part in debt restructuring efforts. We are actively engaging with private sector partners—for example, through the global sovereign debt roundtable—to ensure continued private sector support for addressing the debt challenges faced by countries, leveraging the City of London’s leading role in sovereign debt markets.

Several Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green, mentioned the issue of private creditors and whether we needed legislation to force them to participate. The Government are not currently seeing evidence that private creditors are refusing to participate in debt restructurings. Recently, private bondholders have agreed to debt treatments for common framework countries, including Zambia and Ghana. We are working closely with the private sector through bilateral meetings, engagement with representative institutions and Paris club discussions.

Hon. Members also raised the issue of comparable treatment by private creditors. I reiterate that both Zambia and Ghana have reached agreements on debt restructurings with their private bondholders. Official creditors have deemed these comparable with their own restructurings.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green raised the need for UK leadership on debt relief, and we heard that from others, too. I highlight that the UK has a strong track record of pushing for effective and holistic solutions to debt challenges, including supporting the IMF’s three-pillar approach for countries facing liquidity challenges and pushing for more effective co-operation and co-ordination under the G20’s common framework. The UK also co-ordinates debt treatment through our membership of the Paris club and our commitments to the G20 common framework in partnership with other creditors.

This is a key point: unilaterally writing off debt owed to the UK would not be in the interests of the UK taxpayer—the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), mentioned the UK taxpayer, of course—which would be subsidising ongoing payments to other creditors if done unilaterally. The Government are therefore working closely with borrowers, official and private creditors, and the IMF and World Bank to strengthen the wider debt architecture and provide timely and co-ordinated restructurings for countries, where needed to support holistic debt sustainability for low-income countries.

The third way that the Government are pursuing this issue is through tackling unsustainable debt by promoting greater resilience in debt markets. In response to the shadow Minister, I mention that the UK is committed to provide sovereign financing on sustainable terms and to act in an open and transparent manner to support global debt sustainability.

We are playing a leadership role internationally in several key ways. The hon. Members for Melksham and Devizes and for Esher and Walton asked what the UK was doing to provide leadership.

[Jim Shannon]

My contribution, not that it was better than anybody else’s, put forward the idea that the countries we are helping with debt might be able to supply us with some goods as a way of paying us back, rather than making a financial repayment. Is that something that the Minister and the Government would look at?

--- Later in debate ---

[Emma Reynolds]

I am not sure that is something we are actively considering, but I will check and write to the hon. Gentleman.

In December 2024, we were the first country to publish our self-assessment against the G20’s operational guidelines for sustainable financing. In line with those guidelines, we publish annual reports on the total stock of debt owed to the UK, including reports on our new sovereign lending transactions.

Finally, we are committed to provide sovereign financing on sustainable terms, adhering to the OECD’s sustainable lending principles. My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green also suggested creating a private sector transparency register. The UK supports all initiatives to improve debt transparency and is open to considering proposals for such a register. We also acknowledge the ongoing work by Georgetown University in this area.

The UK has led the way in promoting debt resilience through the introduction of contractual innovations, an approach that the IMF has found to be working well. Under our G7 presidency in 2021, the UK developed two contractual innovations together with private sector stakeholders. The first relates to external shocks, which my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green mentioned in his speech. Climate resilient debt clauses help to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable countries by suspending debt repayments in the wake of external shocks, which frees up fiscal space for the country. The UK has led the way by including CRDCs in our own lending and calling for all lenders to adopt CRDCs by the end of this year.

Second, the UK helped to develop majority voting provisions, which are for use by the private sector specifically for syndicated lending. MVPs allow a majority of creditors to bind the minority to the terms of a restructuring and thereby mitigate the risk of a minority of creditors holding out in a restructuring scenario, which hon. Members mentioned in their contributions, and enable more efficient debt restructuring processes.

On Monday, at her speech at the London Stock Exchange, the Minister for Development, my right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), announced that the FCDO will provide technical assistance for borrower countries that intend to include majority voting provisions in their contractual agreements with private sector lenders.

I will now turn to a couple of questions that were asked during the debate. I apologise if I do not get to answer all the questions in the time available; I promise to write to hon. Members if I do not get to all of them. My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green asked about reforming the governance of international organisations. We agree that more needs to be done. First, we must change the international financial system in order to deliver a fairer deal for developing countries, including by using our board seats at the IMF and the World Bank, for a bolder approach on unsustainable debt. Secondly, we need to ensure that our system is more representative of those most in need, so we will make the case for not only fairer outcomes, but fairer representation in how we represent them.

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton, asked whether the Government would return to spending 0.7% of GDP on development, which the last Labour Government were very proud to commit to and reach. This Government remain committed to restoring ODA spending to 0.7% as soon as fiscal circumstances allow. Although the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts show that the tests have not yet been met, we continue to monitor these forecasts closely and remain one of the top ODA providers in the G7.

There were a number of questions about climate, including from my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill, and I want to make a few comments about that. To strengthen the resilience of vulnerable countries and free up fiscal space when responding to shocks caused by climate change, the UK has led the way in encouraging the broader adoption of climate resilient debt clauses, which suspend debt repayments, on a cost-neutral basis, in the wake of exogenous shocks. We welcome creditors who have committed to providing CRDCs, and encourage others to follow suit.

My hon. Friend also said that the common framework should be expanded to middle-income countries and offer an automatic suspension for countries that apply for restructuring. The UK is fully committed to making the common framework a success. We support expansion of the framework to middle-income countries and providing automatic debt standstills for countries that apply for restructuring under the framework. We continue to push for those reforms in the G20. I hope that answers her question on that point.

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Romford, for his contribution—I think this is the first time that we have debated this way. He asked about reassurance on sound economic policy and preventing corruption. We agree that any lending and policy must be agreed on a sustainable basis. First, the scale of debt treatments is set under the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis. Secondly, the UK is committed to acting in an open and transparent way, as we have shown by publishing our own self-assessment against G20 guidelines. The hon. Gentleman asked a number of other questions. He was talking about open-ended commitments and sustainability. I think we all agree we want to reduce the reliance of low-income countries on foreign debt. That is what this debate is about, and we want a sustainable solution. He asked about the role of China specifically. I am happy to write to him, in a follow-up to his questions, on that. All I will say now is that it is really important that we work with all international partners on this issue, because only by working multilaterally will we have success in the sense of providing sustainable solutions. We do not think we can act alone.

I thank all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions during today’s important debate. Together with the international community, we must work actively and urgently in order to address the significant debt challenges faced by vulnerable countries, and the Government are committed to doing just that.

Finance Bill (Fourth sitting)

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. The clause makes changes to the main rates of the climate change levy, or CCL, with effect from 1 April 2026. The Government are increasing the main rates of CCL on gas, electricity and solid fuels by the retail prices index to maintain the incentive for businesses and the public sector to be more energy efficient.

Since 2001, the CCL has encouraged businesses and the public sector to be energy efficient by adding a tax on the non-domestic supply of energy. The Government have announced a national mission to make Britain a clean energy superpower and accelerate our journey to net zero, and improvements in energy and resource efficiency will play a significant role in reducing industrial emissions in the 2020s. Delivering on this mission will help to make the UK energy independent, protect billpayers, create good jobs and tackle the climate crisis.

The previous Government followed a trajectory of rebalancing the gas and electricity rates over a five-year period to reflect that electricity emissions are progressively lowering due to the increasing contribution of renewable and lower-emission energy in electricity generation. The CCL rates for electricity and gas equalised in April 2024, and at the autumn statement 2023, under the last Government, rates were frozen for the year 2025-26.

Now that the rebalancing has been achieved, uprating the main rates on gas, electricity and solid fuels from April 2026 will continue to provide an incentive for energy efficiency. At autumn Budget 2024, this Government also announced that the main rate of CCL on liquefied petroleum gas will continue to be frozen. This is to ensure better consistency between LPG and other portable fuels—for example kerosene, which is zero rated under fuel duty—for commercial premises not connected to the gas grid.

The changes made by the clause will increase CCL rates on gas, electricity and solid fuels by RPI with effect from April next year. Non-domestic energy supply users will see an increase on their CCL bill of around 0.025p per kWh of gas or electricity supplied. The rate on solid fuels will increase by 0.2p per kg. However, participants of the climate change agreement scheme are eligible to pay reduced CCL rates in return for meeting negotiated energy-efficiency and carbon targets. The CCA scheme enables energy-intensive industries to receive discounts of up to 92% on their CCL bill. The new six-year scheme, announced on 16 October, will provide an estimated £1.9 billion of relief to 2,600 businesses in 53 industrial sectors over its lifetime. Overall, we expect a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions as a result of the clause compared with freezing the rates.

In conclusion, the changes made by the clause will help to incentivise businesses to improve their energy efficiency, thereby progressing the Government’s climate objectives, which are vital for the UK’s long-term economic prosperity and energy security. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Gareth Davies (Grantham and Bourne) (Con)]

As the Minister said, the clause amends the main rates of the climate change levy from April 2026, in line with RPI, for electricity, gas and other taxable commodities, while continuing to freeze the rate for LPG. We will not oppose the measures in the clause.

I was pleased to see the Government confirm their plans to extend the climate change agreement scheme at the Budget. The scheme allows energy-intensive industries to claim a discount on the climate change levy, subject to taking steps towards increasing their energy efficiency and reducing emissions. At autumn statement 2023, we announced a new six-year CAA scheme, and I am genuinely pleased that the Government have chosen to reaffirm our announcement and take that forward, following consultation.

However, as the Minister may expect, I want to raise an issue with her. It has been raised at oral questions, so will not be a surprise to her. There have been several reports in recent weeks about the UK chemicals industry that are directly relevant to climate change and the CCA scheme, as the Minister will know better than me. Sir Jim Ratcliffe has warned that the UK chemicals industry is at risk of “extinction”. His firm, INEOS, closed its synthetic ethanol plant at Grangemouth this month, which will result in the loss of many jobs. That was the last remaining synthetic ethanol plant in the country. Given the ongoing concerns, I would be grateful if the Minister could provide an update on what consideration has been given to the UK chemicals industry in calibrating these policies.

As the Minister knows, the UK chemicals industry is the third-largest manufacturing sector in this country. It contributes £30 billion to our economy and directly employs 138,000 people across the country in 4,100 businesses. I presume that the Chancellor has met representatives of the sector, but I would like to hear the Minister confirm that, given how topical this issue is, how concerned the industry is and how widely reported the issues have been.

[Mr Angus MacDonald (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire) (LD)]

As always, I speak on behalf of the highland industries. In rural areas, only electricity and kerosene are available; mains gas is not. Electricity users pay four times more for their energy than mains gas users, so a hotel on the island of Skye may pay £80,000, whereas one in a city may pay £20,000. That causes enormous issues for people in the windiest, coldest, darkest part of Great Britain. The reason for the big disparity is that the tariffs and taxes are largely on electricity, rather than gas, and of course electricity is largely renewable. In my constituency, people can see wind farms out of their window, yet we still pay four times more for our energy than people in cities. Will the Minister elaborate on what could be done to make us more competitive?

[Emma Reynolds]

I welcome the Opposition’s support for the clause. For quite some time there has been cross-party support for the CCA scheme. I welcome what the shadow Minister said about the Opposition’s support for the extension of that scheme for energy-intensive industries.

The shadow Minister asked me about the UK chemicals industry. As he said, it is a very valuable sector of our economy. It is obviously included in the climate change agreement scheme, which exists to ensure that businesses for which energy makes up a larger proportion of their operating costs, and that are at higher risk of carbon leakage, are supported to make changes to their processes to reduce their energy intensity. The example he provided is concerning, but we have introduced measures to help such industries to cope with the fact that they are energy intensive. I hope that answers his question. I do not know whether the Chancellor has met representatives of the sector, but I am happy to write to him on that.

The hon. Member for Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire spoke about the cost of energy for people in his constituency. As I said, the rates on kerosene are frozen, which is why we are not uprating the rates on LPG. That will go someway towards helping those in rural areas. I declare an interest: I am not on the gas either, so we also rely on this form of energy.

[Mr MacDonald]

LPG is not the issue; electricity, along with kerosene, is largely the issue. Very few people use LPG to heat their properties or businesses. It is electricity where the taxes are. I would be delighted to share information; I am doing a big thing about it shortly, so I have done a lot of research.

[Emma Reynolds]

Obviously kerosene is zero rated, but the effect of the clause is to increase the main rates of CCL on gas, electricity and solid fuels by RPI. That is in line with what we announced at the Budget, and takes forward those measures, so hopefully it will come as no surprise to hon. Members.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 9—Statements on soft drinks industry levy—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, make a statement to Parliament about the increase to the soft drinks industry levy introduced in section 78 of this Act.

(2) The statement under subsection (1) must include details of the impact on—

(a) encouraging reformulation of packaged soft drinks, and

(b) the UK soft drinks industry.”

This new clause requires the Chancellor to make a statement about the impact of increasing the soft drinks industry levy.

[Emma Reynolds]

Clause 78 legislates for the new rates of the soft drinks industry levy, to apply from 1 April 2025. The levy came into effect in April 2018—it was introduced by the previous Government, with cross-party support—and is considered a successful mechanism for changing behaviour and encouraging reformulation of packaged soft drinks, resulting in reduced sugar content. That is seen through the levy’s significant success in reducing the sugar content in UK soft drinks by 46%.

The levy applies to packaged soft drinks containing added sugar. It has a lower rate, which applies to drinks with a total sugar content of 5 grams to 7.9 grams per 100 ml, and a higher rate for drinks with 8 grams or more per 100 ml. Producers, manufacturers and importers of liable soft drinks must register, report, and pay the levy on the volume of liable soft drinks packaged in and imported into the UK.

The levy rates have not been increased since their introduction many years ago, in 2018, and so have gradually reduced in value against inflation. In 2018, SDIL made up approximately 11% of the price of a 330 ml can of full-sugar Coca-Cola; in January 2025, it makes up only 6%. Uprating the levy in line with inflation will ensure that it remains effective and continues to encourage reformulation, by protecting its value in real terms.

Clause 78 amends section 36(1) of the Finance Act 2017 to reflect the new rates of the levy to apply from 1 April 2025. Those are £1.94 and £2.59, per 10 litres of prepared drink, for the lower and higher bands respectively. The new rates reflect forecasted changes in the consumer prices index in the year to 1 April 2025, as well as an additional increment to help to catch up for previous inflation. The catch-up reflects the 27% CPI change between 2018 and 2024 and will be spread evenly over the five rate increases from 2025 to 2029. That is to support soft drink manufacturers to adjust to the higher rates. The rates have also been adjusted to apply per 10 litres rather than per litre, so that rate changes can be made in smaller increments to reflect changes in CPI inflation more precisely. To illustrate using the current lower rate, 18p per litre becomes £1.80 per 10 litres—I think people could have probably worked that one out.

We do not accept new clause 9, which would require the Chancellor to make an additional statement about the impacts of the measure. The Government do not consider that necessary, as a tax information and impact note detailing the anticipated effects of the measure was published at autumn Budget. I would also highlight that the Government are taking a gradual approach to restoring the original real-terms value of the soft drinks industry levy. From 1 April, the levy will still be worth significantly less, compared with general prices, than it was in 2018.

Clause 78 will protect the real-terms value of the levy and build on its significant success, by increasing both the lower and higher rates in line with inflation.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

As we heard from the Minister, clause 78 amends the Finance Act 2017 to uprate the soft drinks industry levy, to reflect the change in the CPI from April 2018 to April 2024. The uprating represents an increase of 27%. We support the soft drinks industry levy, but we have strong concerns about the backdating of the tax rate.

As we all know, the consumption of too many high-sugar drinks can lead to weight gain and the risk of medical conditions. It also leads to tooth decay, which is a particular concern for younger people. As the Minister pointed out, this levy was introduced by a Conservative Government with cross-party support to tackle those issues, and it has been a successful, highly effective policy, delivering against the stated objective of encouraging reformulation. The British Soft Drinks Association has said that the levy

“has achieved its intended goal of promoting significant sugar reduction and 89% of soft drinks are now non-SDIL liable. Reformulation has clearly not lost pace with the volume of soft drinks with less than 5g sugar per 100ml increasing by 17.5%> between April 2023 and March 2024.”

Our main concern is about the unprecedented backdating of this tax increase. New clause 9 would require a review of its impact. The decision to backdate inflation over an extended period, creating a 27% retrospective increase, appears to have no parallel in recent tax policy. The backdating is a fundamental departure from the predictability that should be at the heart of tax policy.

Given that the levy has been so effective, why do the Government see a need for such a large increase? As the British Soft Drinks Association points out, it appears that their rationale is primarily focused on revenue raising, rather than public health outcomes. The introduction of such retrospective elements requires close examination of both precedent and consequences, as demonstrated by examples of duty freezes and restarts in recent years.

Comparative excise goods such as alcohol, fuel and tobacco are reviewed annually. Where rates have been frozen across several years, they have not subsequently been subject to those missing years’ inflation rates being applied in this way. Figures from the House of Commons Library calculate what impact a similar backdated increase would have on fuel duty. Following the approach used for the soft drinks levy, if inflation since 2011 was added to fuel duty, using the RPI measure, the duty on a litre of petrol or diesel would increase from 57.95p per litre to 95.18p per litre—a rise of 64%. I am not sure about the Minister’s constituents, but I am pretty sure that mine would be very alarmed at the potential for such a backdated increase to be applied.

Are the Government establishing such backdated increases as a new norm within their tax policies? Companies making long-term investment choices need certainty—the Exchequer Secretary has used that word many times in Committee—to be able to plan and invest in the country. Can the Minister give us an assurance that the Government will not pull off similar tax raids in other sectors, particularly with regard to fuel duty?

We have also heard concerns about the impact assessment, which had limited engagement. The measure is expected to generate £95 million in revenue by 2029-30, yet the assessment does not model how established price elasticity in soft drinks will affect those projections. The assessment acknowledges that both reformulation and reduction in demand will occur, but provides no quantification of the effects. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that point.

The assessment also does not examine how changes to tax policy without consultation could affect future investment decisions, nor does it explore the market distortions of applying different principles to soft drinks as opposed to other categories of drinks. Will the Minister confirm that these issues have been considered? If they have not, will they be?

--- Later in debate ---

This increase comes at a time when the hospitality and drink sector is facing particular financial pressures, including new packaging regulations, the deposit return scheme and the infamous jobs tax. Does the Minister really think that applying such a large retrospective increase is the right thing to do at this time?

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister for reiterating that there was indeed cross-party support in 2018 when the previous Government introduced the soft drinks industry levy. I say gently to him that if the previous Government had kept the levy in line with CPI, we would not be in this situation.

The shadow Minister asked what considerations have been made about the impact of the measure. As I said in my opening speech about the clause, the catch-up reflects the 27% CPI change between 2018 and 2024. Because we have considered the impact on soft drinks manufacturers, it will be spread evenly over the five rate increases from 2025 to 2029. The shadow Minister should consider the fact that we are gradually spreading the increase.

It is worth considering the views of those who have supported the Government’s change. For example, Barbara Crowther, the children’s food campaign manager at Sustain, has said:

“It’s absolutely right that after six years, the government should now increase the penalties for all the companies who have not done enough to reduce the sugar levels in drinks, and we urge them to ensure all money raised by the levy is reinvested in children’s health.”

The levy has been globally recognised as a transformative health tax intervention. Modelling studies have associated it with up to 5,000 fewer cases of obesity in girls aged 10 to 11 and a 28.6% reduction in hospital admissions for tooth extractions for children under the age of five. Our Government take children’s health very seriously, particularly given the worrying levels of obesity in our society and the issues with children’s dental health. That is why we are bringing forward the change.

[James Wild]

Will the Minister address directly the point about backdating and say whether it represents a change in approach to taxation policy by this Government? They have introduced a 27% increase from the date when the levy was frozen. As I said, if that approach had applied to fuel duty, it would result in a 64% increase. People will be concerned; will the Minister give reassurance about the Government’s approach to taxation?

[Emma Reynolds]

It is a bit of an exaggeration to read into this change, which we have introduced because the previous Government failed to keep the levy in line with inflation, and somehow infer from that—

[James Wild]

What about fuel duty?

[Emma Reynolds]

I am coming to that. It is an exaggeration to infer from that that it becomes a new norm. It does not. I am certainly not going to write next year’s Budget or the year after’s Budget—that would be way above my pay grade in any case—but we are introducing this clause precisely because the former Government failed to keep the levy in line with inflation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Limited liability partnerships

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 80 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emma Reynolds]

Clause 79 closes a known route for tax avoidance by making changes to the taxation of chargeable gains when a limited liability partnership is in liquidation, and clause 80 closes a loophole through which some taxpayers have attempted to avoid the company tax charge known as section 455.

On clause 79, the Government have become aware of a scheme that is being exploited by tax-avoidance promoters involving the transfer of assets into an LLP that is then liquidated. At the time a member contributes an asset to the LLP, they are not charged tax on the gain accrued since the asset was acquired. This is because it is intended that they are taxed when the asset is disposed of, rather than the LLP itself. This is similar to the position for conventional hardships.

However, when an LLP is liquidated, it ceases to be tax transparent and becomes treated like a company, but the LLP is only charged tax on its gains since the contribution of the asset. As part of the liquidation, the liquidator could dispose of the LLP’s assets back to the contributing member or to a party connected to them, washing out the gains made prior to the asset being contributed to the LLP.

The changes made by clause 79 will create the new occasion when a deemed disposal arises for chargeable gains purposes, and will have effect where an LLP enters liquidation on or after 30 October 2024. This will ensure that, where a member contributes an asset to an LLP that subsequently enters liquidation, and the LLP disposes of the asset back to the member or to a person connected to them, they are taxed on the gains on the asset up to the time of its contribution to the LLP. The gain will be treated as accruing at the time that the LLP disposes of the asset.

On clause 80, a close company is a company owned and run by a small number of people. In a close company, there are fewer restrictions and less accountability around how the company and its owners interact. The tax charge known as section 455 is a charge on loans to shareholders left outstanding after the company’s year end. The charge is remitted if the loan is repaid. The Government are aware of the attempted use of co-ordinated or circular loan arrangements by shareholders in close companies to avoid the section 455 charge and thereby extract funds from their companies untaxed instead of receiving taxable earnings.

As a result of the changes made by clause 80, where shareholders use circular loan arrangements to extract value from their companies, a tax charge will be applied on the relevant amount withdrawn. This will ensure that such arrangements do not avoid a tax charge. The targeted anti-avoidance rule will also be updated to protect against future exploitation.

In summary, clause 79 makes changes to ensure that LLPs are not used to avoid tax chargeable gains. It forms part of a package of measures announced at the autumn Budget 2024 that are aimed at closing the tax gap, cracking down on avoidance and evasion and strengthening the powers of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to tackle promoters of avoidance schemes. The changes made by clause 80 will close a loophole that is exploited by a minority and ensure that anti-avoidance rules are more robust.

I should be clear the vast majority of close companies and their participators are compliant and pay any tax due. Clause 80 makes a sensible change that is proportionate, ensures fairness and will affect only those few who seek to avoid tax. Our commitment is to ensure a fair and just tax system, and this measure is a step towards upholding that promise.

[Gareth Davies]

The clauses tackle tax avoidance in limited liability partnerships and their participants, as the Minister pointed out. Tax avoidance is something that we took very seriously when in government, and made some great progress on, so we will not oppose this latest measure.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the Opposition for their support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

OECD crypto-asset reporting framework

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Emma Reynolds]

The clause makes changes to ensure that the Treasury has the power to make regulations to implement the cryptoasset reporting framework, which is also known as the CARF. The CARF was developed at the OECD, and the previous Government supported its development and committed to the UK’s implementing it, so I hope the Conservatives will support the clause.

The CARF will require cryptoasset service providers to collect, check and report information that identifies their non-UK-resident customers and their non-UK-resident customers’ cryptoasset transactions undertaken from 2026. HMRC will then receive and share relevant data with participating jurisdictions for tax purposes from 2027. Other participating jurisdictions will share their data with HMRC where it relates to UK resident customers of non-UK cryptoasset service providers. The increased tax information that the CARF will bring to HMRC is expected to generate additional revenue of £315 million across 2026-2029. The Government intend to make the regulations in 2025 so that the CARF applies to UK crypto businesses in the UK from 1 January 2026.

The changes made by the clause will amend existing legislation so that the CARF is added to the list of international arrangements for exchanging information. This will give the Treasury the power to make the CARF regulations to implement the CARF regime so that it applies to UK cryptoasset service providers from 1 January 2026. The clause is essential so that the Government can implement the CARF.

[Gareth Davies]

The clause provides the Treasury with the powers to make regulations for the OECD cryptoasset reporting framework which, as the Minister pointed out, we signed up for when in government.

I have one question, which has come up quite a lot in the industry and perhaps even in the Minister’s previous role outside politics, and it relates to the name. It is called the cryptoasset reporting framework, but many in the outside world refer to cryptocurrency. What is the Government’s position on what a crypto is? Is it a cryptoasset or is it a cryptocurrency? What is the difference? A lot of people would appreciate that clarification on this complex subject. As I said, we do not oppose the clause; we signed up to the framework when in government.

[Emma Reynolds]

In my view, a cryptocurrency is a type of cryptoasset, but I will check that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82

Duty on vaping products

[James Wild]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 82, page 95, line 14, at end insert—

“(2) In doing so His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs must have regard to the desirability of requiring a digital tax stamp to be applied to e-cigarette liquids.”

This amendment requires HMRC to have regard for requiring a digital tax stamp to be applied to e-cigarette liquids.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Wild]

After that intervention, I hope the hon. Member will support my amendment when I press it to a vote. The Government are moving in this direction, so let us get this in the legislation and get HMRC working at full throttle to make sure that it happens. I hope that he will feel able to support that.

As with any new tax, there are risks associated with the duty. The illicit market could be boosted, increasing the enforcement burden on HMRC and other Departments. Juul, one of the largest operators, believes that the Government should give HMRC sufficient enforcement powers. At the very least, they should mirror those in relation to tobacco duty. What steps are the Government taking to boost compliance powers and protect against illicit activity in this market?

Amendment 67 would require HMRC to have regard to the desirability of introducing a digital tax stamp. I am pleased that the Government intend to implement a vaping duty stamp scheme to help enforcement bodies and the industry to identify products that are non-duty paid. I note that in the Government’s further consultation on compliance measures to complement HMRC’s traditional compliance activity, the Government stated their intention, to which the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford referred, to incorporate a degree of digital tracing and authentication into the final stamp design.

Digital stamps are harder to counterfeit. They are less prone to damage and less likely to fall off products, and they allow for more information to be held and tracked by both the industry and HMRC. Juul points out that its experience in Canada, where it is required to apply physical duty stamps, has led it to believe that digital versions are far better for business and tax authorities alike.

Industry needs certainty. Given the Government’s digital by default approach to taxation, I hope that the Minister will be able to give a commitment today that the Government intend to require a fully digital tax stamp. Under an earlier clause, we spoke about removing a physical stamp from alcohol and spirits, for example, so I do not see why the Government would not be able to support my amendment 67.

We will not oppose clause 82, but I look forward to the Minister’s response to my specific points, and I intend to press my amendment to a vote.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister for his comments. If he will bear with me, I will speak generally about clause 82 before I address his amendment.

Clause 82 will make changes to ensure that HMRC can secure the resource it needs to implement the vaping products duty. The duty will be legislated for in this Bill and will come into force on 1 October 2026. It will be accompanied by a one-off increase in all tobacco duties to maintain the financial incentive to give up tobacco.

The chief medical officer is clear that those who do not smoke should not vape. Introducing a vaping products duty is part of the wider Government strategy to tackle vaping among young people—as the shadow Minister stated, there are worrying developments in the number of young people taking up vaping—and indeed among those who do not smoke, including via the Tobacco and Vapes Bill and the ban on disposable vapes. The vaping products duty is forecast to raise £525 million in revenue a year by the end of the scorecard, to fund vital public services such as the NHS, defence, education and stop smoking initiatives supporting a smoke-free UK.

In 2023, 12% of the UK’s adult population used e-cigarettes, the highest rate ever recorded. One million people in England now vape despite never having been regular smokers: a sevenfold increase in just three years, which is pretty shocking. As the shadow Minister said, vaping rates are highest among 16 to 24-year-olds, with 15.8% vaping daily or occasionally. Reducing affordability is part of the Government’s wider strategy to influence behaviour, especially given the addictive nature of these products.

Several countries have already introduced a tax on vaping. Approximately 50 countries have a national tax on vaping products, with most targeting liquid as the tax base. The majority target both nicotine-free liquids and liquids containing nicotine. The changes made by clause 82 will enable HMRC to prepare for the introduction of the new excise duty before it is formally provided for in primary legislation next year. It will allow for spending on IT systems and staff recruitment.

On the shadow Minister’s amendment 67, I thank him for his speech, and I agree that it is crucial to get the implementation of the Bill right. His amendment would require HMRC to

“have regard to the desirability of requiring a digital tax stamp to be applied to e-cigarette liquids.”

The Government deem the amendment unnecessary at this time, as HMRC is already giving due consideration to vaping duty stamps. The decision to introduce vaping duty stamps was supported by respondents to the vaping products duty consultation, who pointed to their use on vaping products in other jurisdictions.

The shadow Minister asked about the illicit vaping market. HMRC intends to exploit modern technology and digitalisation to ensure that the vaping duty stamps scheme targets the specific risks of the illicit vaping market. A technical public consultation on the design of the scheme ran from 30 October 2024 to 11 December 2024, and respondents submitted their views on digital duty stamps, physical duty stamps or a combined approach. We are currently analysing the responses to that consultation; no policy decision has yet been made. We will communicate in due course a policy decision to balance enforcement decisions and business operations. We will take on board the views of the shadow Minister; I thank him again for his amendment. The Government remain committed to working with industry to ensure that the scheme only creates burdens that are essential to tackle non-compliance, avoidance and evasion.

Let me try to answer the shadow Minister’s questions. He asked whether there is a risk that increasing tobacco duty and introducing a vaping duty will drive up illicit trade. The threat from illicit tobacco needs to be addressed by reducing its availability, rather than allowing it to dictate our public health and tax policies. We are consulting on additional robust compliance tools for tackling the illicit trade in vapes and will collaborate with Border Force to target the illicit trade when the duty goes live. HMRC and Border Force already have a strategy in place to tackle illicit tobacco. I hope that that reassures the shadow Minister.

The shadow Minister also asked about digital versus physical vaping duty stamps. Vaping duty stamps will support both enforcement and industry by identifying products that are non-duty paid and therefore illicit. They will also help HMRC to manage the revenue risk from the initial sell-through period and to limit the duty avoidance practice known as forestalling, which is clearing large quantities of excise goods from duty suspense immediately prior to a rate increase to avoid paying the new tax.

In regard to the shadow Minister’s amendment, the Government will not commit to fully digital stamps, as we are analysing consultation responses. A policy decision will be taken in due course, but I reassure him that we will take his views on board.

[James Wild]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response. However, the amendment would help set a clear direction. It is in line with the Government’s digital by default approach to taxation and reflects what was in the consultation document and what industry is calling for. It does not say that HMRC must introduce such a system; it simply says that HMRC

“must have regard to the desirability of requiring a digital tax stamp”.

I specifically worded the amendment to allow for precisely the point that the Minister has outlined. HMRC may decide that, contrary to the Government’s digital by default tax approach, a digital tax stamp is not necessary. In that case, all that has been required is for HMRC to have a proper look at introducing it. I will press amendment 67 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Emma Reynolds]

The clause will enable the commissioners for HMRC to prepare for the introduction of the UK carbon border adjustment mechanism and allow information to be disclosed for the purposes of developing the CBAM.

The Government are committed to reaching net zero by 2050. As we make progress to decarbonise, we must ensure that the effect of our efforts is not undermined by carbon leakage. I am sure that hon. Members know this, but for the benefit of the Committee, let me define carbon leakage: it is the movement of production and its associated emissions from one country to another to avoid higher decarbonisation efforts and costs. The best solution to carbon leakage risk would be international co-ordination on decarbonisation and carbon pricing. However, many countries do not yet have domestic carbon pricing mechanisms. Consequently, introducing the UK CBAM will reduce the risk of carbon leakage by placing a carbon price on carbon-intensive goods imported into the UK from 2027.

The new tax will enable a charge to be placed on the carbon emissions found in highly traded carbon-intensive goods imported into the UK from the aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, iron and steel sectors. A comparable carbon price will be placed on those goods, based on what they would have incurred if they had been produced in the UK under our domestic emissions trading scheme.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

I understand the principle of CBAM. However, in practice, if we import fertiliser to increase our food production here, for example, we will reduce our imports of food from elsewhere. It might not balance out exactly, but we would not be changing how much carbon we sent abroad, because we would just be taking it from another mechanism that is not included in the CBAM.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic. The purpose of CBAM, as I have said, is to ensure that if a product is produced using carbon in another country, we do not have leakage across the border. The overall impact will vary depending on the sector’s exposure to CBAM imports relative to the overall input costs and the extent to which it can substitute them. CBAM imports make up only a small proportion—about 1%—of average UK industry input costs. CBAM liabilities are expected to be small initially, and reliance on inputs of goods within scope across the economy is limited overall. I am not sure that I follow the logic that imposing CBAM on imported fertilisers will somehow have the effect that the hon. Lady suggests.

The UK emissions trading scheme is the UK’s primary carbon pricing mechanism. The scheme was established to increase the climate ambition of the UK’s carbon pricing policy while protecting the competitiveness of UK businesses. The UK CBAM will be implemented only in sectors where it will effectively mitigate carbon leakage risk and where delivery is deemed feasible. Other sectors that give rise to carbon leakage will be considered for future inclusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Wild]

As we heard from the Minister, the clause will enable commissioners for HMRC to prepare for the introduction of the CBAM, which will be charged on specific emissions-intensive imports into the UK from 1 January 2027. We will not oppose the measure, but I do want to raise a couple of points.

As the Minister said, the CBAM is a tax on emissions embodied in certain goods imported into the UK for which a carbon price has not been incurred overseas at a rate at least equivalent to the UK. While I appreciate that this is an enabling power, the Chartered Institute of Taxation, which I do not think has yet had a mention today, as opposed to Tuesday—I will get that on the record—has expressed some surprise at how basic the detail of the clause is, as it simply grants authority to introduce a CBAM and to request information from the UK Emissions Trading Scheme Authority or other national authorities. Will she give us a bit more of a flavour of when more detail about the CBAM’s operation will be forthcoming?

As well as queries about the CBAM’s implementation, I have heard concerns about the impact that it may have on businesses and consumers. The National Farmers Union has raised concerns about the impact that it may have on vital sectors. In particular, it may push up the cost of fertilisers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan said. That is a particular concern for the arable sector, where fertiliser makes up 12% of total farm costs. Higher costs could not come at a worse time when they also face the impact of the family farm tax.

The NFU has also raised concerns that such a tax could create an unlevel playing field for British farmers and growers. Consequently, a bit like for the changes to inheritance tax, the NFU will be developing its own impact assessment to fully understand the impact of this tax policy on the industry. I hope that the Minister will keep this measure under close scrutiny in the coming months. We will not oppose the clause, but I look forward to her response.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. I think from his comments that he knows this, but the clause is a paving measure for legislation that will be introduced. There will be further detail in draft legislation that will come in a future Finance Bill, so I cannot give him that detail today, but I take into account what he said. Draft legislation will be published so that affected industries can comment on it. I therefore reassure him that some of the issues he raised will be taken into account.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Correction of wrong cross-reference etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Emma Reynolds]

I hope the clause will not be controversial, although we are always surprised by Opposition Members. The clause will make changes to ensure that various errors and omissions in three pieces of legislation are corrected. I will go through them in turn.

First, subsection (1) will amend paragraph (d) of section 151I(1)—that is a confusing number—of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, which defines “financial inclusion” for the purposes of legislation on the provision of alternative finance in chapter 4. That definition includes persons who are authorised to provide credit. Authorisation of such persons was previously the responsibility of the Office of Fair Trading, but moved to the Financial Conduct Authority.

To reflect that change in responsibility, the definition of financial institution was amended in both the Income Tax Act 2007 and the Corporation Tax Act 2009. However, the mirror legislation found in the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 was overlooked, and subsection (1) will make similar changes to the Act to ensure that the definition of financial institution is consistent across the relevant capital gains tax, income tax and corporation tax legislation.

Secondly, subsection (2) corrects the procedure for making regulations under part 14A of the Corporation Tax Act 2009. The current wording requires regulations to be made by statutory instrument, subject to annulment by either House of Parliament. That is incorrect, as financial regulations are a reserved matter for the House of Commons only. The clause corrects the error by requiring regulations to be laid before the Commons only—take back control.

Lastly, subsection (3) corrects a typographical error in section 4 of the Taxation (Post-transition Period) Act 2020, concerning excise duty on the removal of goods to Northern Ireland. The correction removes a reference to section 42 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2023, and inserts the correct reference to section 47 of that Act.

In summary, the changes made by clause 84 will ensure that legislation accurately reflects the policy intent, and remove possible confusion for readers.

[Gareth Davies]

Let me just gather my speech. [Laughter.] Clause 84 makes some of the more technical and minor amendments to various pieces of legislation, so in the interests of good housekeeping if nothing else, His Majesty’s Official Opposition has no point to raise on the matter.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85

Interpretation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Finance Bill (Second sitting)

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 33 and 34 stand part.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

These clauses make changes to pension schemes established in, or administered by, persons resident in European economic area states and bring them in line the rest of the world.

Currently, individuals can transfer some or all of their UK pension savings to an overseas pension scheme, provided it is a qualifying recognised overseas pension scheme. Certain transfers to such schemes are subject to the overseas transfer charge, which is a 25% tax charge on the value of the transfer. However, provided they do not exceed the overseas transfer allowance, UK or EEA residents are excluded from this charge for transfers to qualifying overseas pension schemes in the EEA and Gibraltar. That exclusion was introduced to comply with EU fundamental freedoms that were in place at the time. As a result, some pension scheme members can benefit from double tax-free allowances by taking tax-free entitlements from both their UK scheme and their qualifying overseas pension schemes.

The changes made by clause 32 remove that exclusion from the overseas transfer charge for transfers from 30 October 2024. As a result, transfers will be subject to the overseas transfer charge unless another exclusion applies—for example, if the transfer is to a scheme established in a country where the member is a resident. That will reduce the number of tax-free transfers made and help to keep up to £1 billion of pension savings in the UK over the next five years.

Clause 33 concerns the requirements for schemes to be considered as overseas pension schemes and recognised overseas pension schemes. When the UK was a member of the EU, the requirements for schemes based in the EEA were different from those for schemes based in the rest of the world.

The changes made by clause 33 mean that a non-occupational pension scheme established in the EEA must be regulated by a pension schemes regulator in that country—provided there is such a regulator—to be considered an overseas pension scheme. If there is no such regulator, the scheme provider must be regulated for the establishment and provision of the scheme.

Furthermore, to be considered a recognised overseas pension scheme, a scheme based in the EEA must be established in a country with which the UK has either a double tax agreement that allows for exchange of information or a tax information exchange agreement.

The changes will take effect from 6 April 2025. They will align the requirements for schemes in the EEA with those for the rest of the world, and bring the requirements for non-occupational schemes in line with those for occupational ones.

Clause 34 concerns the requirements on administrators of UK registered pension schemes. Under the existing rules for such schemes, the scheme administrator can be a resident in the EEA, which can make enforcement of tax debts from the scheme difficult and costly for HMRC. The changes made by clause 34 would mean that, from 6 April 2026, all scheme administrators of UK registered pension schemes will need to be UK residents. That requirement will support HMRC’s enforcement activities, as there will be a UK resident for it to engage with.

In conclusion, the changes made by these clauses will bring the tax treatment of transfers to EEA and Gibraltar pension schemes, the conditions that EEA overseas schemes need to meet, and the requirements for EEA administrators of UK schemes in line with the rest of the world. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

As we have heard from the Minister, clause 32 reduces tax-free transfers from UK tax-relieved pensions by removing the exclusion from the overseas tax charge. The Government have also announced linked tax maintenance measures in the other clauses. Clause 33 makes changes to the conditions for overseas pension schemes and recognised overseas pension schemes established in the EEA, so that from 6 April this year, they must meet the same conditions as schemes established in the rest of the world.

Clause 34 makes changes to the requirements for pension scheme administrators for registered pension schemes so that they must be UK resident. The OTC was introduced in 2017 to prevent individuals reducing the UK tax due on their pensions by transferring them overseas, particularly to low-tax income jurisdictions, while still benefiting from UK pension tax relief. The 25% charge applies on transfers overseas, unless there is an exclusion from that charge at the point of transfer.

At the Budget in the autumn, the Government announced that they would remove the exclusion from OTC of transfers to qualified pension schemes established in the EEA and Gibraltar where the member is resident in the UK or an EEA state. Aligning the treatment to transfer made with those to the rest of the world will deal with the risk of a double tax-free benefit. The tax information and impact note states:

“Aligning the treatment of transfers to QROPS established in the EEA and Gibraltar with that of transfers to QROPS established in the rest of the world... reduces the risk of around £1 billion of UK tax-relieved pension savings being transferred overseas across the scorecard.”

Could the Minister confirm how many individuals use the current exclusion and at what cost? It would also be useful to know how much has been raised by the OTC since it was introduced in 2017.

Clause 32 brings to an end the exclusion that can currently be used to transfer to schemes in the EEA. According to the Society of Pension Professionals, in doing so, individuals can benefit from a double tax-free allowance of more than £2 million. The tax note acknowledges:

“There will be operational impacts on HMRC caused by removal of the exclusion… HMRC will need to make some changes to forms, guidance and processes to support this.”

Would the Minister provide an update on how far HMRC has got in preparing for those updates and changes?

As the Minister said, clause 34 provides that the scheme administrator must be resident in the UK. That means that, ahead of 6 April 2026, schemes will need to check whether their current scheme administrator will remain valid from this date. Again, the tax information and impact note confirms:

“Changing the rules on who can be a scheme administrator for a registered pension scheme, could mean that some individuals might not be able to pay further funds into a scheme if the pension scheme does not appoint a UK resident pension scheme administrator and is deregistered.”

How many individuals does the Minister estimate this will impact, and what guidance will HMRC provide to prevent individuals from falling foul of the rule change? Again, the Society of Pension Professionals has pointed out that it would be useful if the memorandum indicated how this could impact on schemes where all of its trustees act as the scheme administrator but some are EEA based and some are UK resident. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide some clarity on that point. As I have set out, we support this change, and I look forward to the Minister’s response to the technical questions I have raised.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. I hope to answer all of them and, if I do not, I promise to write to him with clarification. He asked some questions about the number of individuals. I can tell him that in 2023-24, there were 7,100 transfers to qualifying recognised overseas pension schemes, and the value of those transfers was £1.14 billion. There is an increasing risk that these transfers were being made tax free and that some of these individuals would have been benefiting from the double tax-free allowances. I note the hon. Gentleman’s support for eliminating the risk of that and not allowing people to benefit from double tax-free allowances, which is obviously the main intention of these clauses. He asked about HMRC being prepared and the operational challenges that it might face as a result of the changes. Treasury Ministers and officials work very closely with HMRC—we are in the same building—and these changes have been drafted and consulted on with HMRC, so I suspect that I can reassure him that everything is in order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emma Reynolds]

Clause 56 introduces a power enabling changes to be made to stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax in relation to financial market infrastructure sandboxes. The Government are committed to developing the UK’s capital markets and, as part of that, have announced that they will take forward the private intermittent securities and capital exchange system, known as PISCES. That power will be used to provide an exemption from stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax for PISCES transactions. This will be a carefully targeted exemption, representing a cost-effective approach to boosting growing private companies and supporting our capital markets.

PISCES is a new type of trading platform that will allow private companies to have their shares traded intermittently, supporting private companies to scale and grow, and boosting the pipeline of future initial public offerings in the UK. Using powers from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which was introduced by the previous Government, this Government will establish the regulatory framework for PISCES in a financial market infrastructure sandbox. That will allow the Treasury to temporarily modify or disapply certain pieces of legislation, to support market operators to trial new or developing technologies or practices, while still achieving appropriate regulatory outcomes. The Government published a response to the PISCES consultation paper at Mansion House on 14 November 2024. As part of this, the Government will lay a statutory instrument to establish the PISCES sandbox by May this year.

Clause 56 will allow the Treasury to make stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax changes by statutory instrument, in connection with any exercise of the time-limited FMI sandbox power in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. The power will be used to introduce an exemption from stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax for PISCES transactions, as announced at the autumn Budget. That exemption will boost the attractiveness of PISCES, incentivising investors and private companies to participate, and it demonstrates the Government’s commitment to the success of PISCES as part of our wider ambitions to reinvigorate UK capital markets and to deliver growth. The Government will introduce this exemption ahead of the first PISCES trading events. The effect of the exemption will be time-limited, in line with the duration of the PISCES sandbox.

Clause 56 introduces a stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax power in relation to financial market infra-structure sandboxes that will be used to provide an exemption for PISCES transactions. This will increase the attractiveness of PISCES and demonstrates the Government’s commitment to ensuring its success. The announcement of the exemption has been welcomed by stakeholders.

[James Wild]

As we heard from the Minister, clause 56 introduces a power enabling the Treasury to make stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax changes in connection with any exercise of the time-limited financial market infrastructure sandbox power. This power will be used to provide an exemption from stamp duty for PISCES transactions, and we warmly welcome these measures.

Like many other aspects of the Bill that we have discussed today, the PISCES trading platform was the previous Government’s idea, as part of our commitment to trial new or developing technologies and practices to help companies to scale and grow. While in government, we introduced significant reforms to the UK listings regime, supporting public markets and companies choosing to list in the UK. That included implementing Lord Hill’s listing review reforms. The PISCES consultation noted:

“A key challenge for private companies is that, at early stages in their growth, there are no standardised ways for shareholders to realise their gains…or to allow companies to rationalise their shareholder base by providing their early investors an exit route. Similarly, it is harder for investors to access companies that are not yet operating on public markets.”

PISCES provides a regulatory framework for the intermittent trading of private company shares on a multilateral system. I welcome the Government’s support for PISCES, which will form an important part of the UK’s offer to companies seeking to grow and list in the UK.

I would be grateful if the Minister provided an update on the impact that PISCES is expected to have by incentivising current and potential investors to buy shares on the system, bringing greater transparency and efficiency. I note that PISCES will run for an initial period of five years. Will the Minister commit to regularly updating the House on progress?

There will not be a public market-style market abuse regime; instead, the Financial Conduct Authority will be given rule-making powers over a disclosure regime. I am sure the answer will be yes, but can the Minister confirm that it is her expectation that the FCA will be properly focused on growth as it devises those rules, and that it will ensure that any new rules are proportionate to the objective that we are seeking to achieve?

The provisions of clause 56 relate specifically to exempting PISCES share transfers from stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax, a measure that, in their response to the consultation, UK Finance and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe said

“should be strongly considered by HMT in order to help incentivise use of the platform”.

They added that it is important

“to generally reduce frictions for companies and shareholders using the platform as far as…possible,”

and the FCA rules are important in that respect.

Stamp duty and SDRT both tax transactions that transfer securities between parties in exchange for payment. In 2023, the then Government held a consultation entitled “Stamp Taxes on Shares modernisation” and proposed a mandatory single tax on securities instead of separate taxes for electronic transfers and paper instruments. It was suggested that that approach would reduce complexity, and it was widely supported in the call for evidence responses and by the working group that was established. In considering the application of both taxes, I would be grateful if the Minister provided an update on this Government’s view on the previous Government’s proposals, and whether she plans to bring forward any changes in the future.

As I have set out, we support the measures, but I would be grateful for responses to the points I have raised.

[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister for the way he has approached this subject. He is correct, of course, that the previous Government consulted on PISCES in March last year. We responded to the consultation in November, alongside the Mansion House speech delivered by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor.

I am glad that there is cross-party agreement on these issues. When we were in opposition, we were very constructive in our feedback on such proposals. The shadow Minister is right that there are other reforms in this area, which came from the Lord Hill listings review and others—there were other reviews pertinent to capital markets when the Conservative party was in government.

The shadow Minister asked me a number of questions. On estimating the impact, it is really important to note that many stakeholders in the City and across financial services, not least the Investment Association, have welcomed this innovation. We know that investors and those in the market are interested in it, and I think there is great optimism about the demand for shares on PISCES. We still have to lay the statutory instrument, but the innovation is of interest to Members across the House, so I am very happy to update it on the development of PISCES.

On the shadow Minister’s questions about the FCA, we stress to the financial services regulators at every opportunity that any new rules should be proportionate, and I assure him that that is how I will approach my work with the FCA. On his final question, although I am quite new to this position, I am familiar with the demands for the simplification of stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax—we might make it a little bit easier to say, let alone to pay. I will absolutely prioritise looking at simplification, because any kind of simplification is good for the market and helps to get things going. I am happy to look at that, but I cannot give the shadow Minister an exact answer now.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Rate bands etc for tax years 2028-29 and 2029-30

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[James Murray]

The clause makes changes to the inheritance tax thresholds so that they continue at the current levels in 2028-29 and 2029-30. Subject to reliefs and exemptions, inheritance tax is payable if the net value of an estate exceeds the respective thresholds for two bands: the nil-rate band, for which the threshold has been £325,000 since 2009-10, and the residence nil-rate band, for which the threshold has been £175,000 since 2021. Those thresholds rise with the consumer price index each year, but have in recent years been frozen until April 2028, by the previous Government.

The changes made by clause 57 will fix the threshold at current levels for a further two years, until April 2030. This will raise £355 million in 2029-30.

High Streets: Autumn Budget 2024

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Thursday 23rd January 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) on securing the debate and thank her for sharing her story of working in her mum’s gift shop. It was very moving to hear that she has had direct experience of working in a shop on the high street. I also thank her for her survey of local small businesses on her seven high streets, which is an impressive number. She outlined very well the importance of the businesses there; I think she said that there are 197 retail, hospitality and leisure businesses, employing some 6,000 people. I thank her for sharing those statistics, and the feedback from those businesses.

I share the hon. Member’s passion for the regeneration of our high streets. I think it is a concern for Members across the House. High streets are focal points of economic activity, but most importantly—she said this in her speech—they are often a key part of the unique character of our communities. We know that high street businesses are contending with a range of challenges. She listed some of them, but I will list a couple: changing consumer shopping habits and the rise of online shopping, and a series of economic headwinds, including the pandemic, which we know was particularly difficult for small, independent businesses on the high street.

The Government are committed to reforming Britain’s economy to bring about a decade of national renewal. Creating an environment in which our high streets are able to flourish is critical to that commitment. In her speech, the hon. Member recognised the Government’s dire economic inheritance from the Conservatives, none of whom are in the Chamber. We had some very difficult decisions to make in the Budget, but it was necessary to wipe the slate clean to deliver the economic stability that high street businesses need.

[Mr MacDonald]

Will the Minister say why taxes were put on poor, struggling organisations, such as high-street shops and hotels, rather than the massive online businesses that are emptying our high streets? Why did she not consider imposing a higher rate of corporation tax or income tax, rather than hitting the poorest businesses in our society?

[Emma Reynolds]

The hon. Member pre-empts my next sentence, so I thank him for that. We have committed to reforming business rates, because we need a fairer system, fit for the 21st century. That important part of our reforms and plans will, I hope, benefit the businesses that the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted spoke about.

[Rachel Gilmour]

In recent weeks, I have been working with an excellent organisation called Family Business UK. Before Christmas, it did some research on the impact of agricultural property relief and business property relief on family businesses, and it is about to do another round of research. Do the Minister’s officials want to avail themselves of the results of that research, so that they have better context?

[Emma Reynolds]

Ministers are always happy to hear from hon. Members. I suggest that the hon. Member writes to the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury with that feedback. I should note that this is not my policy area; the Exchequer Secretary is visiting small businesses as we speak, so I am standing in for him, but I am sure that he will welcome that feedback from the hon. Lady.

I have listened carefully to the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted and tried to note down all her questions, but if I do not get to all of them, I am happy to write to her after the debate; I hope that is helpful. She asked whether there were any mitigations, and I think she asked us to cancel some of the plans in the Budget. I am afraid that I cannot give her that assurance. The changes to national insurance will come into force on 1 April. As I said, we had to make difficult decisions, and that was one of the most difficult.

The hon. Member asked whether we were meeting small businesses. The Exchequer Secretary is meeting a range of small businesses, as are Treasury officials, before formulating our plan to reform business rates, which I will talk about briefly. She asked questions about inheritance tax; I will write to her on that, to ensure she gets the right answer. She also asked about local government. I was not entirely sure about the question, so perhaps we can clarify that, and I will write to her on that as well.

Turning in more detail to the hon. Member’s points about national insurance, one of the toughest decisions we took in the Budget was to raise the rate of employer national insurance contributions from 13.8% to 15%, but we recognised the need to protect the smallest businesses. The Federation of Small Businesses asked us specifically about that, which is why we have more than doubled the employment allowance to £10,500. That means that more than half of businesses with national insurance contribution liabilities will either see no change at all or be taken out of paying national insurance contributions. As I said, that was a key demand from small businesses.

To support businesses, including those on the high street, the Budget honoured the manifesto commitment to not raise corporation tax; it set out the tax road map for this Parliament, in which we will not change corporation tax, which means we have the lowest rate in the G7. All that will support businesses, from restaurants to retailers, to invest. On the high street, we announced at the Budget major support for pubs; we are cutting alcohol duty on qualifying draught products, which make up approximately 60% of the alcoholic drinks sold in pubs. That represents an overall reduction in duty bills of over £85 million a year, and is equivalent to a 1p duty reduction on a typical pint.

The hon. Member raised concerns about the business rate system; let me address those in more detail. We very much believe that for too long, the business rates system has placed an unfair burden on high-street retail, hospitality and leisure businesses, as she mentioned. To support those sectors, we intend to introduce permanently lower tax rates for retail, hospitality and leisure properties with rateable values of less than £500,000 from 2026-27. That will allow us to provide stability after the ongoing uncertainty of the one-year retail and hospitality leisure relief, which has been extended year by year since the pandemic. That tax cut will be sustainably funded not by increases in taxes on working people, which we promised not to introduce, but through a higher tax rate on the most valuable 1% of business properties in the country. That will capture the majority of large distribution warehouses, including those used by online giants, as well as other out-of-town businesses that draw footfall away from high streets.

Those business rates reforms provide the certainty that businesses need to invest while protecting the public finances. The Government have already introduced to the House primary legislation that will provide the underpinning of those reforms, and the exact rates for the new multipliers will be confirmed later this year in the autumn Budget.

[Sarah Dyke]

Many rural town centres in Glastonbury and Somerton, and the businesses within them, are really worried about business rates. Will the Minister consider implementing a fundamental business rates overhaul for small businesses in rural areas?

[Emma Reynolds]

We need to treat all small businesses equally. I understand the hon. Lady’s perspective, but I do not think that it would be fair or easy to have a business rates system that distinguished between rural and non-rural. What is rural? I know the constituency of the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted rather well because I live not too far away. Tring is a town there, but other places in her constituency would be quite difficult to categorise as rural or non-rural, so I do not think that we can go down that route, although I understand why the hon. Member for Glastonbury and Somerton (Sarah Dyke) is trying to tempt us down it; I do not think that would work.

[Victoria Collins]

The Minister talks about business rates and mentioned Tring in Hertfordshire. A problem that a lot of local businesses have mentioned is that the rateable value is high because property costs are high, even if what they sell is of lower value. The difficulty is that they are paying a lot when they might not have high turnover. Will the Government consider mitigations for those running businesses in areas with high property costs?

[Emma Reynolds]

I am here in my ministerial capacity, of course, but I also represent High Wycombe in the south-east, so I understand her point, and promise to take it back to the Department, and to the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury.

Levelling the playing field for the high street is just the start, and we are committed to transforming the whole system in the longer term. As we set out in the “Transforming Business Rates” policy paper that we published alongside the Budget, the Government will create a fairer business rates system that protects the high street, supports investment and is fit for the 21st century. It is important that we work in partnership with high-street businesses to get the reforms right. I thank the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted for bringing the voice of small businesses in her constituency to our proceedings.

Government officials have undertaken a series of roundtable events to understand from businesses across all sectors and sizes how they think reform of the system can best be delivered. Over 200 businesses have already given their feedback at those roundtables. The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury is leading that work and engaging with a broad range of high-street businesses, as are officials in my Department.

[Richard Foord]

I appreciate that it is perhaps the Exchequer Secretary who would know this, but will the Government make sure that the reform of business rates that they are proposing is not negative for those small businesses with a very small rateable value that do not currently pay business rates at all?

[Emma Reynolds]

Indeed. The point of the reforms is to better protect small businesses. As the hon. Gentleman says, there are already small businesses that are protected, but we want to ensure that those small businesses that are above the current thresholds are also protected, and do not pay the rates that they pay at the moment. We want to make sure that small businesses on the high street are better supported—that is the whole point of the reforms—so I can reassure him that it will not get worse for small businesses. It may be the Exchequer Secretary’s area, but I know that much, so I thank the hon. Gentleman for the opportunity to respond to that question. We look forward to further engagement with businesses over the coming months on delivering a business rates system fit for the future.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted again on her first Adjournment debate in the House—it is also the first Adjournment debate that I have responded to as a Minister—and thank her for raising this important issue. This Government have delivered the economic stability that high-street businesses need to thrive, and we are committed to delivering the business rates reforms that will support high streets up and down the country.

Question put and agreed to.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability.

The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House.

The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest.

The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system.

The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK.

At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm.

As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution.

Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution.

The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism.

The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies.

Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish.

Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice.

Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position.

However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism.

More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism.

The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

[Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

I am enjoying listening to the Minister’s speech, and I am learning quite a lot. Will she do me and the House a favour by sharing her thoughts on how I can best describe the benefits of this Bill to the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme when I go home tonight? I am sure she knows far better than me.

[Emma Reynolds]

My hon. Friend flatters me. It is not that easy to explain in simple terms, but I will do my best. Essentially, if a small bank is in trouble, it is better for it not to go into insolvency but instead to go through resolution to protect its depositors. In the case of SVB, only 14% of deposits were covered by the financial services compensation scheme, because the scheme only covers deposits up to the £85,000 threshold. Had public funds been required to facilitate the sale of SVB to another purchaser—in this case it was HSBC, but it could have been another institution—it would have had recourse to public funds. We are seeking to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in all our constituencies are on the hook for the failures of small banks. Where a bank has high-quality assets, which was the case for SVB, we can avoid the insolvency situation and pay out to depositors who have deposits above the £85,000 threshold. That resolution would be funded by the financial services compensation scheme and ultimately the banks, which contribute to the scheme through a levy. I hope that answer helps my hon. Friend—I am sorry that it was a bit long.

Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. We have to bear in mind what we are seeking to do, which is ultimately to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure that we do not have to have recourse to public funds.

[Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)]

I welcome this Bill, but can the Minister assure the House that, at all times, the aim of the Government is to minimise the liability of the taxpayer? Where losses have to be sustained, they should be borne first by the shareholders, secondly by the bondholders and perhaps thirdly, and regretfully, by the deposit holders. That should be the order in which losses are sustained.

[Emma Reynolds]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who puts it very well. He will know that there was a different order in the case of Credit Suisse, but the then Government said at the time that that would not be their order of priority. We are seeking to protect the taxpayer in this Bill, and he is right: had there been a cost associated with the transfer of SVB, it would have fallen first to those people before falling to the taxpayer. If we pass this legislation, for which I hope there is cross-party support, we will avoid that eventuality, because if we follow the order of priority and get to the financial services compensation scheme, the cost will be paid through a levy on the banks in that scheme. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question.

The resolution regime is a critical source of stability when banks fail, because it ensures that public funds and taxpayer money are protected. This Bill delivers a proportionate and targeted enhancement to the resolution regime to ensure that it continues to provide that important stability. As I said at the start of this debate, it is therefore an important Bill that underpins the Government’s vision for economic growth, and I commend it to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I have no desire to detain the House for long, but I have some questions that I hope the Economic Secretary can address, continuing our conversation in the Delegated Legislation Committee earlier this week.

The Economic Secretary and I are both alumni of TheCityUK, so she will know that what financial services want most of all is certainty of regulation and decision making. They need to know that the playing field is level and predictable. While we are all patting ourselves on the back about Silicon Valley Bank, the consensus that everyone did a good job makes me slightly suspicious.

The Bank of England effectively made three decisions during the unravelling of Silicon Valley Bank that I want to put on the Economic Secretary’s desk for her to consider. Is more certainty required from the Bank of England on the triggering of those decisions?

First, the Bank of England denied Silicon Valley Bank short-term funding. SVB UK was solvent, as it would have to be as a UK subsidiary regulated by the Bank of England. It applied for £1.8 billion of short-term funding when it became clear that its parent company was in trouble. That funding was denied by the Bank of England, and I do not think there has ever been any significant examination of why the Bank took that decision.

Obviously, there was a run on Silicon Valley Bank, with depositors seeking to pull out their money, and the bank was unable to honour those withdrawals, which is why it applied for short-term funding. A possible alternative route could have been a temporary freeze on withdrawals and/or the provision of short-term funding, which could have allowed the bank to remain solvent in the UK. Understanding what triggered that decision, and how other banks in similar circumstances might be handled by the Bank of England in future, is key.

Secondly, as the shadow Minister said, the Bank of England initially decided to put Silicon Valley Bank UK into insolvency and rely on the £85,000 depositor guarantee and the £170,000 joint depositor guarantee. We do not know why the Bank changed its mind.

[Emma Reynolds]

I can tell I am going to enjoy discussing these matters with the right hon. Gentleman. I have looked into this since our exchange on Monday, and I want to clarify what happened on the Friday before the Monday in March 2023. The Bank of England issued a statement on the Friday evening saying that it intended to apply to the court to place SVB UK Ltd into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful further information. However, a buyer came forward over the weekend, which is what changed between the Friday and the Monday. It was judged to be both in the public interest and in the interest of SVB UK customers that this resolution on the Monday morning was preferable to the insolvency procedure that had been announced on the Friday.

[Kit Malthouse]

That is useful information about the Bank’s decision making. However, the Bank still decided to go for insolvency prior to a resolution mechanism. I find it hard to see that, within that 36-hour period, it had not canvassed whether there was a market for the bank. My point remains: if I were an investor or an overseas bank trying to establish and invest significant funds in a UK branch, I would like to understand why the Bank of England makes these decisions, and the criteria and parameters by which it is likely to make a decision either way. Then, of course, the final decision was taken to sell or transfer the bank to HSBC—for a minimal consideration, I think. I really want to understand what value was placed on that bank going to HSBC, as opposed to any of the other banks that might have been bidding for it.

At the heart of this is my worry about competition. When a bank is put in this resolution position, obviously it needs to move to another bank that has significant assets and can fulfil the rightful demands of its depositors to withdraw their funds. That will naturally be a bigger bank, and there is a possibility—although hopefully this will not happen, as we will not use resolution very often—that small, higher-risk challenger banks will find themselves unable to obtain short-term funding from the Bank of England because of their size, and will therefore be gobbled up by the leviathans of the banking system. Over time, there might be a natural move back towards where we were prior to all these challenger banks appearing—to having four or five massive banks that dominate the system in an uncompetitive way.

I am asking the Minister not necessarily to change the legislation, but to consider setting out in a code of conduct what consideration the Bank of England has to give to the competitive landscape when it is resolving a bank. When it transfers one small bank to another small bank as part of a resolution, for example, that wheel might be oiled with a bit of short-term funding, in the interests of maintaining that competitive landscape. The cost of that should not fall on the taxpayer; effectively, it should be a loan for repayment. One of the benefits, if you like, of the 2007-08 crash—one of the silver linings of that cloud—is that we have a much more diverse banking landscape than before. There was recognition that having these huge organisations that crash the entire global economy if they fail was dangerous for the western economy, and that a much more diverse landscape was therefore desirable. The problem with that, obviously, is that there is more inherent risk in those smaller banks. If there is more inherent risk, we are likely to see more resolution, and in time we may end up back where we were.

I support the Bill. I think that resolution is exactly the right way to go, and we should obviate the risk to the taxpayer. There are also negatives to the system, though, so I hope that the Minister, who I am sure will do the job with aplomb, will think carefully about the impact on the world of the Bank of England’s decision making and predictability; about what the Bank can do to provide transparency, whether through a code of conduct or indicators of practice; and about the impact of resolution on competition.

Oral Answers to Questions

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Tuesday 21st January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

8. What assessment she has made of the potential implications for her regulatory policies of recent trends in levels of money laundering in retail businesses.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

This Government are committed to tackling money laundering. Money laundering through cash-based high street businesses is a known issue, and the Treasury works closely with law enforcement agencies to monitor trends in criminality and ensure resources are deployed towards the most significant threats.

[Bradley Thomas]

Hard-working shopkeepers and entrepreneurs across the country, including in Bromsgrove and the villages, play by the rules and pay their taxes. What is the estimated loss of revenue to the Exchequer from money laundering in retail environments in towns and villages across the country, and what are the Government doing to crack down on this?

[Emma Reynolds]

It is right that we take a robust approach to money laundering, and we have a tailored approach to cash deposit limits to reflect the differences in needs and risk profiles across businesses’ customer bases. I am committed to working with the Financial Conduct Authority and others to ensure we strike the right balance—one that allows businesses to continue their operations but also ensures that we assess the risk posed by those who might be using their businesses to launder money.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

What additional support can the Government offer to Customs and Excise, local authorities and police forces in gathering supporting evidence that can then be provided to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs? High street money launderers are brazen fronts for significant criminal enterprises.

[Emma Reynolds]

We take this issue very seriously. The Treasury owns the money laundering regulations, but the FCA has a key role as a major supervisor, and we work very closely with the criminal enforcement agencies. Of course, those agencies are independent, but we are absolutely committed to clamping down on money laundering.

[Richard Baker (Glenrothes and Mid Fife) (Lab)]

10. What steps she is taking with Cabinet colleagues to uplift former mineworkers’ pensions.

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[Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)]

Neither the US Federal Reserve nor the EU Central Bank are engaged in active quantitative tightening, but the Bank of England is. The Bank of England is costing the public finances in the region of £13 billion a year as a result of a fire sale of UK Government bonds. Last time I spoke to the Chancellor about that, she said that that was because of the Bank of England’s operational independence, which we all value, but that is not a licence for impunity. What discussions will she have with the Bank of England about releasing UK Government debt in a way that benefits everybody in the UK?

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

It is our view that it is absolutely right that the Bank of England has operational independence. That is in line with international standards and what is happening in jurisdictions around the world, including in the United States and the eurozone.

[Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)]

Recent developments in the UK investment trust sector have once again shone a light on the crucial role that retail investors play in our financial markets. In her Mansion House speech last November, the Chancellor rightly prioritised leveraging domestic pension capital to drive the Government’s economic growth mission. Does the Minister agree that greater retail participation in UK financial markets also supports growth and democratises wealth, and will she meet me to discuss how the Government can better support access to financial markets for individuals, including in my constituency?

[Emma Reynolds]

I am always happy to meet my hon. Friend, who is a near constituency neighbour. We absolutely agree that retail investment is crucial. I want more progress on the advice guidance boundary and targeted support. I will be working closely, in my new role, with the Financial Conduct Authority to take that forward.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

Residents in my constituency will have been extremely concerned to read the news this morning that the Chancellor plans to announce next week the expansion of Heathrow. I invite her to tell us, on the Floor of the House this morning, yes or no: will the Government back expansion at Heathrow?

Draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Monday 20th January 2025 General Committees

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris.

The draft order relates to the 2023 resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK. It confirms that the former shareholder of SVB UK, which was the Silicon Valley Bank US parent entity, is not entitled to compensation following the transfer of the bank’s shares to HSBC UK Bank plc. The order has already been approved in the House of Lords.

In early March 2023, SVB UK experienced severe financial distress, resulting in rapid deposit outflows. That crisis, originating from its US parent entity, quickly spread to its UK subsidiary. By Friday 10 March, the Bank of England, acting as the resolution authority, declared its intention to place SVB UK into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful new information. Over the subsequent weekend, a private sector purchaser was identified. On Monday 13 March, the Bank of England exercised its power under the Banking Act 2009 to transfer the shares of SVB UK to HSBC UK Bank plc. The action was taken following consultation, with the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England reaching the judgment that the resolution conditions set out in the Banking Act had been met.

The Banking Act requires HM Treasury to make a compensation scheme order when the private sector purchaser power is exercised. This order is a mechanism to establish in law what compensation, if any, is due to former shareholders of the resolved firm. The Bank of England undertook a provisional valuation when placing SVB UK into resolution. That valuation found that SVB UK’s shareholder would not have made any recoveries had the firm been placed into a bank insolvency procedure. The shares had no value at the point that the firm was transferred and therefore no compensation is due to SVB UK’s former shareholder. The Bank of England then commissioned an independent valuation of SVB UK, which confirmed that no compensation is due to the previous shareholder of SVB UK. The order before us today confirms in law the findings of those valuations: that the former shareholder of SVB UK is not due any compensation.

I thank all staff of the PRA and the Bank of England’s resolution directorate for the swift and effective action they took regarding SVB UK, and indeed officials and Ministers at HM Treasury at the time. They worked tirelessly over the course of that weekend to deliver a solution that protected financial stability and achieved the objectives of the special resolution regime. The resolution of SVB UK shows that the UK’s resolution regime works well, as well as the importance of the UK having the necessary tools to handle bank failures effectively. The transfer of the firm to HSBC UK was a good result for SVB UK’s customers, who retained access to their money and the banking services they relied on; for taxpayers, with the firm being stabilised without any use of taxpayer support; and indeed for the UK economy, with the UK’s vibrant technology and innovation sector protected from severe disruption.

The compensation scheme order for SVB UK is a necessary step to formalise and conclude the resolution process, and to confirm that no compensation is due to the former shareholder. This decision is based on thorough valuations and adheres to the legal framework established by the Banking Act 2009. I thank the Committee for its attention and welcome any questions that the shadow Minister or other hon. Members may have regarding this matter.

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[Emma Reynolds]

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, for his kind words—we will be spending a lot of time together this week. I also thank him for what he said about shareholders and the principle of risk and return. We know that there is a correlation between the risk taken and the return due, but that does not always work out. Proportionate regulation encourages considered risk-taking, which we are in favour of; we want to see entrepreneurship in our economy. Maybe this is a more philosophical debate that we could have on another occasion, but I agree with a lot of what he said about shareholders providing scrutiny. We certainly should not criticise them for being shareholders, because we need good shareholders for the functioning of the economy.

Let me turn to the remarks of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire and attempt to answer all of his questions. Obviously, I was not in the Treasury that weekend—one of his colleagues was—so if he wants a very detailed description of those events, he probably should speak to the shadow Business Secretary, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). That is my first recommendation.

Secondly, there is certainly no litigation in this case. It is for the Bank of England, as the independent regulator, to weigh up and balance the different trade-offs involved in this sort of decision making. I cannot speak for the Bank of England, but I point out to him that only 14% of deposits would have been covered by the financial services compensation scheme. He might think that that would have been a better eventuality.

[Kit Malthouse]

That is not what I am implying at all. In this instance, I think that resolution was the right thing to do. What I am saying is that the Bank of England’s first decision, on the Friday, was to go for an insolvency and only pay out 14% of the deposits. It was only after pressure was brought to bear on a supposedly independent bank over the weekend that the strategy was changed to a resolution and the bank was transferred to HSBC. In fact, the Bank of England issued a press release to the effect that it was putting the bank into the insolvency procedure, and then over the weekend changed its mind. I am asking about the integrity and quality of the Bank of England’s decision-making procedure, given that it initially proposed to do exactly what the Minister says should not have happened.

[Emma Reynolds]

I cannot speak for the independent Bank of England, so I gently suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that if he has questions or concerns about the timing of the issuing of a press release on the Friday in March 2023, he should convey them to the Bank of England.

I will take up the right hon. Gentleman’s recommendation to look into the issue more closely, but I also gently say to him that—due to the work of officials in the PRA, the Bank of England and indeed the Treasury—overall we had a good outcome, because by the Monday morning, before the markets opened, we had a smooth transfer from SVB UK into HSBC. My point is that in the end depositors were in a much better position on the Monday morning than they had been on the Friday; regardless of the choreography, we got to the right outcome in the end.

I think that there has been consideration of the resolution process, although not necessarily of the timing of the events mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. Indeed, on Wednesday, myself, the shadow Minister—the hon. Member for Wyre Forest—and other hon. Members here present will debate the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill on Second Reading. That Bill has already been through the Lords. It seeks to ensure that in cases such as this one, we are protecting taxpayers. Indeed, what was good about this case was that SVB UK was in a relatively good economic position, but I could envisage a situation where that was not the case, and we will discuss such issues on Wednesday.

I commend the order to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.