Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
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The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability.
The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House.
The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest.
The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system.
The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK.
At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm.
As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution.
Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution.
The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism.
The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies.
Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish.
Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice.
Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.
There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position.
However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism.
More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism.
The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.
Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)
I am enjoying listening to the Minister’s speech, and I am learning quite a lot. Will she do me and the House a favour by sharing her thoughts on how I can best describe the benefits of this Bill to the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme when I go home tonight? I am sure she knows far better than me.
Emma Reynolds
My hon. Friend flatters me. It is not that easy to explain in simple terms, but I will do my best. Essentially, if a small bank is in trouble, it is better for it not to go into insolvency but instead to go through resolution to protect its depositors. In the case of SVB, only 14% of deposits were covered by the financial services compensation scheme, because the scheme only covers deposits up to the £85,000 threshold. Had public funds been required to facilitate the sale of SVB to another purchaser—in this case it was HSBC, but it could have been another institution—it would have had recourse to public funds. We are seeking to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in all our constituencies are on the hook for the failures of small banks. Where a bank has high-quality assets, which was the case for SVB, we can avoid the insolvency situation and pay out to depositors who have deposits above the £85,000 threshold. That resolution would be funded by the financial services compensation scheme and ultimately the banks, which contribute to the scheme through a levy. I hope that answer helps my hon. Friend—I am sorry that it was a bit long.
Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. We have to bear in mind what we are seeking to do, which is ultimately to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure that we do not have to have recourse to public funds.
Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)
I welcome this Bill, but can the Minister assure the House that, at all times, the aim of the Government is to minimise the liability of the taxpayer? Where losses have to be sustained, they should be borne first by the shareholders, secondly by the bondholders and perhaps thirdly, and regretfully, by the deposit holders. That should be the order in which losses are sustained.
Emma Reynolds
I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who puts it very well. He will know that there was a different order in the case of Credit Suisse, but the then Government said at the time that that would not be their order of priority. We are seeking to protect the taxpayer in this Bill, and he is right: had there been a cost associated with the transfer of SVB, it would have fallen first to those people before falling to the taxpayer. If we pass this legislation, for which I hope there is cross-party support, we will avoid that eventuality, because if we follow the order of priority and get to the financial services compensation scheme, the cost will be paid through a levy on the banks in that scheme. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question.
The resolution regime is a critical source of stability when banks fail, because it ensures that public funds and taxpayer money are protected. This Bill delivers a proportionate and targeted enhancement to the resolution regime to ensure that it continues to provide that important stability. As I said at the start of this debate, it is therefore an important Bill that underpins the Government’s vision for economic growth, and I commend it to the House.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I have no desire to detain the House for long, but I have some questions that I hope the Economic Secretary can address, continuing our conversation in the Delegated Legislation Committee earlier this week.
The Economic Secretary and I are both alumni of TheCityUK, so she will know that what financial services want most of all is certainty of regulation and decision making. They need to know that the playing field is level and predictable. While we are all patting ourselves on the back about Silicon Valley Bank, the consensus that everyone did a good job makes me slightly suspicious.
The Bank of England effectively made three decisions during the unravelling of Silicon Valley Bank that I want to put on the Economic Secretary’s desk for her to consider. Is more certainty required from the Bank of England on the triggering of those decisions?
First, the Bank of England denied Silicon Valley Bank short-term funding. SVB UK was solvent, as it would have to be as a UK subsidiary regulated by the Bank of England. It applied for £1.8 billion of short-term funding when it became clear that its parent company was in trouble. That funding was denied by the Bank of England, and I do not think there has ever been any significant examination of why the Bank took that decision.
Obviously, there was a run on Silicon Valley Bank, with depositors seeking to pull out their money, and the bank was unable to honour those withdrawals, which is why it applied for short-term funding. A possible alternative route could have been a temporary freeze on withdrawals and/or the provision of short-term funding, which could have allowed the bank to remain solvent in the UK. Understanding what triggered that decision, and how other banks in similar circumstances might be handled by the Bank of England in future, is key.
Secondly, as the shadow Minister said, the Bank of England initially decided to put Silicon Valley Bank UK into insolvency and rely on the £85,000 depositor guarantee and the £170,000 joint depositor guarantee. We do not know why the Bank changed its mind.
Emma Reynolds
I can tell I am going to enjoy discussing these matters with the right hon. Gentleman. I have looked into this since our exchange on Monday, and I want to clarify what happened on the Friday before the Monday in March 2023. The Bank of England issued a statement on the Friday evening saying that it intended to apply to the court to place SVB UK Ltd into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful further information. However, a buyer came forward over the weekend, which is what changed between the Friday and the Monday. It was judged to be both in the public interest and in the interest of SVB UK customers that this resolution on the Monday morning was preferable to the insolvency procedure that had been announced on the Friday.
Kit Malthouse
That is useful information about the Bank’s decision making. However, the Bank still decided to go for insolvency prior to a resolution mechanism. I find it hard to see that, within that 36-hour period, it had not canvassed whether there was a market for the bank. My point remains: if I were an investor or an overseas bank trying to establish and invest significant funds in a UK branch, I would like to understand why the Bank of England makes these decisions, and the criteria and parameters by which it is likely to make a decision either way. Then, of course, the final decision was taken to sell or transfer the bank to HSBC—for a minimal consideration, I think. I really want to understand what value was placed on that bank going to HSBC, as opposed to any of the other banks that might have been bidding for it.
At the heart of this is my worry about competition. When a bank is put in this resolution position, obviously it needs to move to another bank that has significant assets and can fulfil the rightful demands of its depositors to withdraw their funds. That will naturally be a bigger bank, and there is a possibility—although hopefully this will not happen, as we will not use resolution very often—that small, higher-risk challenger banks will find themselves unable to obtain short-term funding from the Bank of England because of their size, and will therefore be gobbled up by the leviathans of the banking system. Over time, there might be a natural move back towards where we were prior to all these challenger banks appearing—to having four or five massive banks that dominate the system in an uncompetitive way.
I am asking the Minister not necessarily to change the legislation, but to consider setting out in a code of conduct what consideration the Bank of England has to give to the competitive landscape when it is resolving a bank. When it transfers one small bank to another small bank as part of a resolution, for example, that wheel might be oiled with a bit of short-term funding, in the interests of maintaining that competitive landscape. The cost of that should not fall on the taxpayer; effectively, it should be a loan for repayment. One of the benefits, if you like, of the 2007-08 crash—one of the silver linings of that cloud—is that we have a much more diverse banking landscape than before. There was recognition that having these huge organisations that crash the entire global economy if they fail was dangerous for the western economy, and that a much more diverse landscape was therefore desirable. The problem with that, obviously, is that there is more inherent risk in those smaller banks. If there is more inherent risk, we are likely to see more resolution, and in time we may end up back where we were.
I support the Bill. I think that resolution is exactly the right way to go, and we should obviate the risk to the taxpayer. There are also negatives to the system, though, so I hope that the Minister, who I am sure will do the job with aplomb, will think carefully about the impact on the world of the Bank of England’s decision making and predictability; about what the Bank can do to provide transparency, whether through a code of conduct or indicators of practice; and about the impact of resolution on competition.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)
I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to this debate, which were small in number but high in quality. I also thank those who contributed in the other place, or by responding to the consultation that brought the Bill forward. As today’s short debate has demonstrated, there is broad support, both political and industrial, for the Bill. I thank hon. Members on the Conservative Front Bench for their kind words and constructive approach, particularly, to echo the shadow Economic Secretary, previous Treasury Ministers, not least the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Jeremy Hunt), who brought us to where we are today.
The enhancements to the UK’s resolution regime are relatively modest, targeted and proportionate. That regime was established in the wake of the global financial crisis, and its powers were put to the test when Silicon Valley Bank UK failed in March 2023. That episode demonstrated that the regime was broadly working as intended, but it is right to learn the lessons from that experience. The first of those lessons is that the implications of a firm’s failure cannot always be anticipated before the event, and sometimes it can be in the public interest to use resolution powers even on small firms that were not deemed systemic prior to their failure. That was the case with Silicon Valley Bank UK, and insolvency would have had implications for public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system.
The second lesson is that there is a potential gap in the resolution framework when it comes to managing the failure of such firms. They do not hold the additional resources to absorb losses and facilitate recapitalisation in the event of their failure. Silicon Valley Bank was well capitalised, and it was possible to find a willing buyer in HSBC. However, such an outcome may not be possible for a small bank with a shortfall in capital. At present, such a shortfall would have to be met through the use of public funds, and there is cross-party support for reducing that risk.
We also wish to increase the options available to the Bank of England for managing the failure of a small bank. The Bill does so without imposing any new up-front costs on the banking sector, or fundamentally altering the broader resolution framework, which has been shown to work well. It rightly does not alter the public interest test that underpins the Bank of England’s decision on whether to use its resolutions powers or place a firm into insolvency. I will return to that point shortly.
The shadow Economic Secretary raised a number of points. I broadly agree with his description of the events around Silicon Valley Bank UK. It was a helpful summary of developments. I can confirm that the Government welcome the amendments made in the other place, with the one exception raised by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, which I know we will discuss further in Committee.
We have been clear that the powers are to be used for smaller banks, but that does not mean that use of the powers will become the default. Insolvency for small banks remains the default approach. The shadow Economic Secretary also raised the wider question of banking taxation. I am sure we will discuss that in the months and probably even years to come. Our view is that banking taxation remains competitive, but his comments have been noted, and we will always keep that matter under review.
The hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) focused on the proposed size limits for banks. As I have mentioned, we do not think that what she suggested is the correct way forward, but we will continue to discuss it. The intention is that the powers will be used in the case of small banks, but the lesson of the last 20 years—not just in the UK, but around the world—is that flexibility is important when it comes to resolving bank failures. She asked whether a wider growth objective should be inserted for the Bank of England. This is a narrow Bill, and we do not think it is the right place to discuss wider issues about the Bank’s approach. The public interest test, which the Bank is already required to apply when it comes to resolution and questions of bank failure, provides much of the protection that she seeks.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) asked about the impact on ordinary workers. That is a good question, and we always need to come back to it. Another lesson of the last two decades is that a stable and strong banking sector is an important underpinning for a strong economy, and for rising wages right across the country.
I started my career in the Treasury in the years when the UK and other advanced economies were having to swiftly relearn that banks can, and do, fail, and that the consequences of them doing so in an unmanaged way are very big and very bad indeed. The lesson from that crisis was clear: a comprehensive resolution regime is important for protecting financial and economic stability and public finances in bad times, but also for underpinning confidence in the financial system at all times. This lesson is especially significant for the UK, as the financial services sector plays such a vital role in our economy—a point that was powerfully made during the debate. We have also learned that it is important for the Bank of England to have a range of tools available for managing firm failures, because those failures can be unpredictable. The best tool for managing the situation is not always apparent prior to the point of failure, as evidenced by the failure of Silicon Valley Bank UK. That is why, despite the UK’s resolution regime having worked well in practice, the Government believe that it is important to learn the lessons of the banking sector volatility of 2023.
The targeted enhancements in the Bill provide the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit for responding to the failure of smaller banks, while also protecting public funds. The Bill also supports the Government’s growth agenda. Although it is common to focus on the trade-offs between regulation and growth, confidence in and the stability of the banking sector are key to supporting long-term growth.
I am glad to have heard this afternoon that there is broad support for this Bill in the House. Assuming that support continues for at least the next few minutes, the Government look forward to engaging further with hon. Members in Committee. I commend this Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 13 February 2025.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Gen Kitchen.)
Question agreed to.
Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the payment out of the National Loans Fund of any sums payable out of the Fund by virtue of the Act.—(Emma Reynolds.)
Question agreed to.
Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the imposition of charges for the purpose of meeting expenses incurred by the scheme manager of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in connection with the recapitalisation of a financial institution.—(Emma Reynolds.)
Question agreed to.