Employment Rights Bill

Tuesday 11th March 2025 Commons Chamber

Debate resumed.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is always a pleasure to follow the King. [Laughter.]

I rise on behalf of my constituents in Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere and Liphook who are opposed to this fundamentally anti-business Bill. Nothing has highlighted more clearly than this debate the old adage that where we think the Labour party is wrong, it thinks that we are evil. Nothing that has come from Labour Members has given any consideration to the absolutely correct concerns that the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith), raised in his opening remarks.

The Bill, which has been bodged both in Committee and today, has been put together simply to assuage the union paymasters that fund so many Labour Members. The Bill highlights Labour’s complete misunderstanding of how to help business, employees and, of course, the economy overall. We have a Government who talk about growth but legislate to destroy it.

The Government claim to be pro-growth and pro-business, yet the Bill is precisely the opposite. The Institute of Directors has warned that it will lead to slower growth, deter investment and bury business under an avalanche of unnecessary regulation. Even the Government’s own impact assessment, which Opposition Members have mentioned on a number of occasions, concedes that business will face a staggering £5 billion in additional costs: an economic straitjacket that will choke innovation and job creation. Labour Members seem to have failed to realise that being pro-business, as the Conservatives are, is being pro-worker, because if businesses do not exist there will be no one to employ workers.

In my constituency alone we have over 5,000 businesses, the vast majority of which are small and medium-sized enterprises. Many of them operate in the education, retail and hospitality sectors, which rely on flexibility to survive, yet the Bill’s attack on zero- hours contracts threatens to wipe out opportunities for students, part-time workers and those juggling multiple jobs to make ends meet.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Among the 5,000 small businesses in my hon. Friend’s constituency, has my hon. Friend come across one that is in favour of the Bill or lobbied him to vote for it?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I am happy for the Minister to come to Farnham and Bordon—or Haslemere, Liphook or any other of my villages—to meet all the people who tell me what a damaging effect the Bill will have on their small business. As my hon. Friend pointed out, the simple fact is that the Government have not consulted small business properly. If they had, the Bill would be scrapped.

I think of the University for the Creative Arts students who rely on flexible work and the NHS paramedic in Farnham picking up extra shifts at the Nelson Arms, as I mentioned earlier. Those are real people whose livelihoods are at risk because of the Bill. That is why I support new clause 83 and amendment 283 on zero-hours contracts and employment tribunals.

UKHospitality has been clear that for 90% of workers on zero-hours contracts, that is their preference. The sector relies on these contracts to manage fluctuating demand, and removing that flexibility could devastate those businesses and lead to job losses. There is no job security for those who do not have a job. The House of Commons Library briefing actually supports that, confirming that zero-hours contracts provide essential flexibility for both employers and, most importantly, employees. That is why I support new clause 83 and amendment 283, which would demand a review of the impact on employment tribunals of the provisions concerning zero-hours workers before the Government recklessly legislate against them. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development has already made it clear that banning zero-hours contracts will hurt the very workers the Government pretend to protect. But yet again, Ministers plough ahead, blind to the economic damage that they are about to unleash.

I turn to amendment 286 and new clause 86 on unfair dismissal and business confidence. The Government’s proposal to grant employees the right to claim unfair dismissal from day one is another reckless intervention, and one that is raised with me by small businesses day in, day out. The amendment and new clause seek to introduce an impact assessment before clause 21 and schedule 2 come into force. Without that, we have to be clear that businesses will be discouraged from hiring in the first place. Flexibility in employment is not one-sided; it benefits both workers and their employers.

Similarly, the right to request flexible working must be assessed properly. New clause 84 and amendment 284 rightly demand that the Secretary of State assess the impact of clause 7 before it comes into force. Rushed policymaking will not help workers or businesses; it will create uncertainty and drive investment away. That is why it is essential that we accept new clause 87 in the name of the shadow Secretary of State, because we need an impact assessment of how the Bill will affect businesses.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I fear the clock may not have started for my speech, so I will draw to a close. [Hon. Members: “More! More!”] In that case, I shall carry on! No, no; I am conscious of my hon. Friends who wish to speak.

This Government seem to have learned nothing from history. We have heard history lessons from Government Members, most of which have seemed to take us back to the 1970s. Economic success does not come from shackling businesses with red tape or giving trade unions unchecked power. It comes from fostering an environment where employers can hire, invest and grow.

[Steve Witherden (Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr) (Lab)]

I am proud to declare my membership of Unite the union and the NASUWT, and I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Before I was elected, I was a teacher for 20 years. Today, as we welcome this transformative legislation, I think of my former students. Their lives will be significantly improved by better wages, stronger workers’ rights and a fairer economy.

I welcome the Bill, which will drastically limit the exploitative use of fire and rehire. Just outside my constituency, but affecting many of my constituents directly, more than 500 Oscar Meyer workers are striking against the company’s appalling use of the practice. By creating a new right to claim automatic unfair dismissal if someone is reemployed on varied terms to carry out the same duties, the Bill takes a vital step towards dignifying employees with security and autonomy.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend is giving one of his trademark passionate speeches. Does he agree with me, as a former teacher myself, that removing fire and rehire will give the young people that he used to teach the confidence that when they go into the workplace, they will look at careers and not just jobs?

[Steve Witherden]

I wholeheartedly agree with everything my hon. Friend has said. I am also pleased to see Government new clause 34 encouraging greater employer compliance and increasing compensation for workers subjected to fire and rehire by raising the maximum period of the protective award from 90 to 180 days.

Amendment 329, tabled in my name, seeks to further protect against that harmful practice, ensuring that any clause in an employment contract that allows an employer to change the terms without the employee’s consent would be unenforceable, especially in cases of unfair dismissal related to a refusal to accept changes. That would further help redistribute the power imbalance between employers and employees, which currently allows low wages and poor working conditions to become commonplace. The Bill also takes crucial steps towards banning exploitative zero-hours contracts, ensuring that all workers have predictable hours and offering security for their day-to-day lives. I am pleased to see amendments extending such protections to agency workers.

We have all felt the effects of a system that has left so many behind: flatlined wages, insecure work and falling living standards. It is therefore not just my former pupils but millions across the country who will benefit from the biggest upgrade to rights at work in a generation. I am proud to support our Labour Government in this historic step towards better quality employment across the country, and I look forward to the full delivery of the plan to make work pay. Diolch yn fawr.

[Alison Bennett (Mid Sussex) (LD)]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 10, which would make carer’s leave a paid right. We have an opportunity to give carers in employment a fair deal right across the country, while also bolstering our economy. The Government have an opportunity to build on the Carer’s Leave Act 2023, introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain), and take the next step in providing working carers with the flexibility they need to juggle work and care.

Carers UK estimates that the value to the economy of carers being able to work is £5.3 billion. When I have met major blue-chip employers such as Centrica and HSBC, and their employees who have benefited from those corporations’ carers policies, they are clear that having those policies in place to support caring is not only good for the employees, but makes them better employees for the employer. The employers really benefit from having members of staff who support them and are also able to do the best for their families.

17:17

Backing our Liberal Democrat amendment to make carer’s leave a paid entitlement would be the right thing to do on a human level and would also support the Government’s growth agenda. For a Government on a mission to spend less while also delivering growth and better living standards, this is a no-brainer. We must do everything we can to help those carers who can and want to work to do so. Currently, the Government have simply indicated that they will review the implementation of carer’s leave and consider whether there is a need to change the current approach. I say to the Government in the strongest possible terms that change is needed and the time is now.

The 2.8 million people who juggle a job and caring responsibilities are going above and beyond to care for those they love while also contributing to our economy. Many of them are on low incomes, they are often women, and they cannot afford to use their right to carer’s leave unless it becomes a paid right. We must acknowledge their work with a fair deal for them. I know that this is something the carers in my constituency deserve. They deserve better. We must be adaptable to the changing needs of our population while also seeing the benefits. This really can be a win-win.

My Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are also pushing for an amendment to make caring a protected characteristic. When people apply for jobs, equality monitoring forms do not ask them whether they have unpaid caring responsibilities. There is also no direct requirement for simple, reasonable adjustments for carers in the workplace. I feel that this would make all the difference, encouraging those who might otherwise leave employment to stay, making our economy more resilient and protecting their own families’ finances. We know that being a carer makes people much more likely to fall into poverty.

Carers UK’s research also tells us that almost half of all those who left employment early to fulfil a caring responsibility say that they would have stayed in employment longer, had carer’s leave on a paid basis existed. It seems clear that paid carer’s leave helps carers and those they care for, and it is good for our economy. I hope the Government can see that with the same clarity and do the right thing in supporting these vital Liberal Democrat amendments.

[Mrs Russell]

I need to highlight to the House that I am a member of the Community and USDAW trade unions, and I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I would like to speak to various bits of this legislation today. There is so much in it, and I know that so many of us on the Government Back Benches are really pleased with what we are bringing forward.

The first part of the legislation that I want to address is clause 22, which will bring forward in future legislation more protections for women who are pregnant, on maternity leave and in the period immediately following their maternity leave. I have spent the past 13 years representing large numbers of women who were either made redundant while pregnant, on maternity leave or trying to come back from maternity leave, or whose employer suddenly woke up one morning and decided that they were underperforming, often within 24 hours of their announcing their pregnancy. I had a client who had been headhunted and brought into the company, was totally stellar, doing incredibly well and got promoted, but then announced her pregnancy and within a week she was on a performance plan. HR explained to her that because they were, you know, kind and did not want to do that to her while she was pregnant, they were very generously offering her a settlement agreement so that she did not have to go through that.

Lots of perfectly decent people do not understand why they are losing their jobs, and it is because they are pregnant. Pregnant Then Screwed found that 12.3% of women who have had a baby have either been sacked, constructively dismissed or made redundant while pregnant, on maternity leave or within a year of their maternity leave ending. It is a widespread problem, so it is fantastic that the Bill contains clause 22, which will allow the Minister to bring forward steps to expand the available protections. I would like to know how quickly we can do that, because pregnant women out there need that protection literally today.

[Lola McEvoy]

My hon. Friend, who has great expertise in this area, is making an eloquent speech. Does she agree that dismissals of pregnant women or new mothers are dramatically under-reported because of the use of non-disclosure agreements in a lot of companies while they are taking action against them?

[Mrs Russell]

I could talk about NDAs at some length, but I do not have time to today. They are definitely problematic, and they are definitely concealing the extent of the problems that women suffer when they announce their pregnancies.

The second element I like in the legislation is the improvements to the right to request flexible working. Those on the Conservative Benches have questioned why we would do this. The answer is that the term “part-timer” is still a term of abuse in this country. While that is still something that people say fairly regularly within workplaces and popular parlance, we still have a problem, so this legislation should help to improve that.

Conservative Members have talked a lot about clause 17 and the third-party harassment elements, and it is worth getting into some of the detail. The defence for an employer for failing to protect their staff from third-party harassment is taking all reasonable steps to prevent that harassment from occurring. Employment tribunals have been interpreting the meaning of “reasonable” for a long time, and in a discrimination claim there is essentially a three-part judiciary: a judge with legal experience, someone with employer experience, and someone with employee experience—sometimes from a trade union, but sometimes from elsewhere. When they talk about “all reasonable steps”, it is only reasonable steps; it is not every single step in the entire history of the universe that anyone could ever dream up or imagine.

[Wera Hobhouse]

The hon. Member is speaking powerfully. Does she agree that this amendment is being used by the Conservative party to condone something offensive and despicable, and that they are trying to defend the indefensible?

[Mrs Russell]

I completely and utterly agree with the hon. Member. Actually, a lot of what is coming from Conservative Members is scaremongering. A lot of those discussing this behave as if employees with unfair dismissal rights were unexploded bombs. All the people I represented did not want to bring tribunal claims; they just wanted to have been treated fairly and reasonably in the first place. They were typically extremely destressed by their experiences, and for quite a lot of them, their mental health had deteriorated substantially in the course of what they had gone through. I do not think that when people have unfair dismissal rights a little bit sooner, they will all be rushing to employment tribunals the moment that something goes slightly wrong in their workplace. What most people want to do every morning is get up, go to work, do a decent job, get paid for it and go home. That is what we will continue to see after this legislation passes: that most employers want to look after their employees perfectly reasonably, and most employees want to do a perfectly decent job.

[Joe Robertson]

I have been rather unsuccessful this afternoon in finding someone on the Government Benches who has concerns about the £5 billion cost to businesses that this Bill will bring. Will the hon. Member express concern over the £5 billion cost and the downward pressure on growth that this Bill brings, according to the Government’s own assessment?

[Mrs Russell]

My primary concern is that those on the Conservative Benches talk about employees as if they are, as I said, unexploded bombs, and they talk about employers as if they are unlikely ever to recruit anyone ever again, and I just do not believe that to be true. Most employers will make a sensible assessment of whether having an additional member of staff will benefit their business and then they will recruit them. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Thank you.

It is really important that we cut through the disinformation and scaremongering, and that when we take the legislation forward, ACAS has good information ready to go. It already has great information online— I encourage employers who are worried to look up ACAS information videos on YouTube and look at its factsheets. We must make it clear to people that they have access to sources of free advice, which is important for small businesses, so that they can see what is and is not required of them. The position being stated today is bluntly exaggerated and quite damaging as a result.

[Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)]

I rise to speak in favour of my new clause 105. The labour abuse that it seeks to address is the wrongful use of substitution clauses by gig economy workers. To guarantee fairness and justice in the labour market, it is crucial that there be transparency, which can be delivered through the introduction of a comprehensive register of all dependent contractors. That will help to ensure that employment rights are upheld and pay is not suppressed through illegitimate competition, but it will also support the enforcement of right-to-work checks. The unlawful employment of migrants with no right to work here is not good for taxpayers, British workers or migrants who follow the rules, yet substitution clauses allow what have become known as “Deliveroo visas”—the industrial scale abuse of our immigration and labour laws.

Before addressing the substance of my new clause, I also commend new clause 30 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox), which I have sponsored. It would give special constables the right to take time off to carry out their police duties. Other public service volunteers, such as magistrates and councillors, receive that right.

I turn to my new clause 105. Ministers have said that they will consult on employment status and moving towards a two-part legal framework that identifies people who are genuinely self-employed. I support that ambition, and I am grateful to the Minister for his warm words in Committee, but my new clause provides a way to resolve a particular abuse and hold big employers in the gig economy to account.

There are 4.7 million gig economy workers in the UK, including 120,000 official riders at Uber Eats and Deliveroo, two of the largest delivery companies in the country. For years we have heard stories of the rampant labour market fraud and visa abuse committed by contractors related to those companies. From late 2018 to early 2019, there were 14,000 fraudulent Uber journeys, according to Transport for London. In addition to Uber and Deliveroo, Amazon and Just Eat have been linked to labour market abuses. Much of that abuse has come through the legal loophole created by substitution clauses.

Amazon tells its couriers that it is their

“responsibility to pay your substitute…at any rate you agree with them”

and

“you must ensure that any substitute…has the right to work in the UK”.

It is a dereliction of duty to pass responsibility for compliance with criminal and right-to-work checks on to workers, but those companies clearly have an interest in maintaining a status quo in which undocumented migrants take the lowest fees in delivery apps.

Data from the Rodeo app shows the effect of that abuse on riders’ order fees. Just Eat riders saw their fees drop by 14.4%, from £6.53 in 2021 to £5.59 in 2023. There was a 3.4% drop for Uber Eats order fees—from £4.36 to £4.21—during the same period. Deliveroo has blocked its order fee data from being published. Those figures are not adjusted for inflation, but it is clear to see how pay and conditions have worsened for riders. By undercutting domestic workers—British workers—and exploiting those with no legal right to be here, companies are privatising profits and socialising costs. Promises from such companies to introduce tougher security checks have not made the problem go away. We should all be appalled by this state of affairs, because nobody should be above the law.

During random checks two years ago, the Home Office found that two in five delivery riders who were stopped were working illegally. In the same month, 60 riders from Uber Eats, Deliveroo and Just Eat were arrested in London for immigration offences, including working illegally and holding false documentation. Last month, Deliveroo sacked more than 100 riders who shared their accounts with illegal migrants. But that is only the tip of the iceberg: insurance companies report unauthorised riders involved in motor and personal injury cases.

That is happening because undocumented migrants are renting rider accounts for between £70 and £100 a week. Profiles have been bought for as much as £5,000. The i Paper found more than 100,000 people on Facebook groups where identities have been traded for years, including one group that gained around 28,000 members in less than 18 months.

Illegal migrants are using social media apps to rent accounts and share information on a significant scale. Today, we only have figures from press investigations, but we can find copious examples across the internet with ease. Legal workers have reported problems to the police and the Home Office, but that has fuelled tensions as they compete for orders and has even led to violent clashes between legal and illegal riders in Brighton and London, including physical beatings and damage to bikes.

People working illegally for these big companies are working longer hours round the clock for lower fees, never knowing when their last payday might be. They use group chats to share information and evade Home Office immigration raids. We do not even know how many substitute riders there are for these companies at any given time. A spokesman for the App Drivers and Couriers Union says:

“Unfortunately there is this loophole that allows some bad people to come through. They are not vetted so they could do anything.”

16:14

[Sir Gavin Williamson]

Obviously, my hon. Friend hopes that the Government will support his new clause. What does he think would stop the Government supporting this very sensible measure straightaway?

[Nick Timothy]

I do not see why the Government should not support this new clause. This seems to be an obvious example of labour market abuse, but the difference with many of the provisions in the Bill is that my new clause does not directly benefit trade unions who pay for the Labour party.

Sadly, we know that there have been many sexual assaults and attacks committed by substitute workers. New clause 105 proposes the robust regulation of substitution clauses. Amazon, Uber, Deliveroo and the rest would have to do their due diligence and, just like everyone else, ensure that all their riders are who they say they are and have the right to work in this country. Introducing such a change would reduce labour abuse, protect our communities and deliver a fairer labour market.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)]

I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Just to inflame matters more, I am the chair of the RMT parliamentary group as well.

Next Monday is the third anniversary of the P&O scandal. Members might recall what happened: 800 members of staff—RMT members, largely—turned up for work and were sacked by video. Many of them were marshalled off their vessels by trained bouncers and guards who dealt with them roughly. The reaction across the House and across society was that this was repellent and should not happen in a civilised society. The Labour party then made a commitment that it would introduce legislation that would install in law the seafarers’ charter, and that is exactly what the Bill does, so I welcome it wholeheartedly and congratulate the Minister on doing this. But as he can guess, we see this as just the first step, because there is so much more to do, particularly in this sector, where many workers are still exploited compared with shore-based workers.

Government new clause 34 extends the maximum period of the protective award from 90 days to 180 days. We were looking for an uncapped award, to be frank, because P&O built into the pricing the amount it would be fined as a result of its unlawful behaviour, so that did not matter to P&O—it simply priced that in.

In addition, we were looking for injunctive relief, and I thank the Government for entering into discussions about that. Many employers can get injunctive relief on the tiniest error by a union in balloting procedures, but workers cannot. We are asking for a level playing field. We hoped that an amendment would be tabled to the Bill today, but it has not been. We hope the Government will enter into those discussions and go further.

[Andy McDonald]

I wonder whether my right hon. Friend recalls the evidence of Peter Hebblethwaite, the chief executive of P&O Ferries, to the Business and Trade Committee. He made it clear that he deliberately broke the law and had no regard for it. Was my right hon. Friend as horrified as I was to see that in this House, and as disappointed at the lack of response from the Conservative party?

[John McDonnell]

I think that across the House it took a long while to recover from the anger at the behaviour that was displayed in front of the Select Committee. The chief executive was acting with impunity because he had been able to price in those sorts of fines, and it was a cross-party view that we were angry about that behaviour. That is why the charter is so important to us, and why injunctive relief that is open to trade unions would provide an adequate starting point for getting some form of justice.

A range of other issues need to be addressed, including schedule 4, where the Government are introducing the ability to monitor the behaviour of companies. Harbourmasters monitor some of that behaviour as well, with declarations that companies are abiding by basic health and safety practices—some practices in the past have been frankly terrifying. We want health and safety to be about more than just basic legislation; it is also about rosters and how long people are working. We still have ferry contracts where people are working for 17 weeks without a break. We want to ensure that the regulations cover rosters, as well as holiday pay, sick pay, pensions and ratings training, so that we can start to get some form of accountability within the sector. That is not much to ask for, yet we have given shipping owners £3 billion of tonnage tax exemptions in return for the employment of British seafarers, and I do not think we got a single job as a result of that £3 billion. There is a need for proper regulation of the sector.

I tabled an amendment to ask the Government to stand back once a year and bring a report to the House on how implementation of the Bill is going, and to update us on the implications for maritime law and International Labour Organisation conventions, and the impact on the sector. A lot of debate on this issue has been about ferries, but we want to ensure that the provisions apply to all vessels, not just ferries. One point made by those on the Labour Front Bench when considering the Seafarers’ Wages Bill was that if a ship came into a harbour 52 times a year, the legislation would apply. Now—I do not know why—that has been extended to 120 times year, which means that thousands of workers will lose out because the measure will not apply to them. Will the Government have another conversation about that and see whether we can revert to the original position of the Labour party all those years ago when these scandals happened?

There is not much time but, briefly, I am interested in the extension of sectoral collective bargaining right across the economy. We are doing it with social care, but what I have seen from proposals in the Bill does not look like sectoral collective bargaining to me; it looks simply like an extension of pay review bodies. Indeed, the Bill states that any agreements within those organisations cannot legally be accepted as collective bargaining.

The Bill is not clear about how members of the negotiating body are appointed or by who. We were expecting that it would be 50% employers and 50% trade unions, and I tabled an amendment to try to secure that. We think that the negotiating body should elect its own chair, not that the chair should be appointed by the Secretary of State. We want such bodies to be independent and successful, because I see that as the first step in rolling out sectoral collective bargaining in many other sectors of our economy. That is desperately needed because of the lack of trade union rights and the low pay that exists.

The Bill is a good first step, but there is a long agenda to go through. I look forward not just to the Bill proceeding, but to the Minister bringing forward an Employment Rights (No. 2) Bill in the next 18 months.

[Wera Hobhouse]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 74, which appears in the name of the right hon. Member for Sheffield Heeley (Louise Haigh). I pay tribute to her and to my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) who have campaigned on these issues for a long time. New clause 74 seeks to ban non-disclosure agreements that prevent workers from making a disclosure about harassment, including sexual harassment—we have talked about sexual harassment in the workplace for the last four or five hours.

NDAs were initially designed to protect trade secrets by restricting the sharing of certain information, but in recent times they have taken on an entirely different and quite sinister role. They have essentially become the default solution for organisations and individuals to settle cases of misconduct, discrimination and harassment, keeping the extent of such incidents unaccounted for. Incorporating clear provisions to ensure transparency in cases of harassment would strengthen protections for all workers.

Data from Can’t Buy My Silence has revealed some deeply worrying statistics about the misuse of NDAs. In a survey of more than 1,000 people who experienced harassment and discrimination in the workplace, 25% reported being forced to sign an NDA, while an additional 11% stated that they could not say due to legal reasons, implying that they had also signed an NDA. Four times as many women as men sign NDAs, and they are used disproportionately against women of colour.

In Committee, the Minister said that the Government had “reservations” about changing the law in this way, as there may be “unintended consequences”. I struggle to understand why the Government have committed to banning universities from using NDAs in cases of sexual misconduct, harassment and bullying but have not committed to extending those protections to other sectors. NDAs are clearly being used in a totally different way to what they were designed to achieve, and we must stop this before more victims are silenced. I heard the Minister say earlier that he is at least looking at what new clause 74 is trying to achieve.

Despite my concerns about the misuse of NDAs, the Bill as a whole has many very positive provisions. Importantly, it finally legislates to protect workers from third-party harassment. I brought that forward in my original Bill that became the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023, which recently became law. However, it was blocked by amendments made to the Bill in Committee in the House of Lords by the Conservative party, so that such liability and protection from sexual harassment by third parties in the workplace was not created. We have already discussed that several times this afternoon.

I am most pleased that the Government have committed to making workplaces safer through this protection, because that is what this is all about. Creating safer workplaces is good for everyone, including businesses, despite what the Conservative party says. A study by Culture Shift found that 66% of businesses believe that preventing sexual harassment is very important. I do not know what Conservative Members are talking about when they say that their inboxes are full; I have not seen a single email from a business writing to me to say that it is worried about protecting its own employees from third-party harassment. According to WorkNest, three quarters of employers are still concerned about protecting employees from harassment by third parties. Businesses are concerned that they cannot protect their workers from third-party harassment; they clearly want these protections to be included in the Bill.

Too many people still suffer from third-party harassment at work. Amendment 288, which tries to remove those important provisions, is plain wrong. Employers have a duty to ensure the safety of their employees from not just other employees, but third parties who may interact with them in the workplace. That responsibility should be part of their broader commitment to workplace safety. If the Conservative party is truly committed to a world without harassment and sexual harassment in the workplace, why is it still condoning offensive language and behaviour as “banter” and “free speech”, rather than taking a step to support businesses and protect workers from sexual harassment in the workplace, as proposed in the Bill?

I am grateful that the Government have ensured the completion of my Act as it was intended a year or two ago. Although I remain concerned about the misuse of NDAs, I welcome many of the provisions in the Bill. I will be proud to walk through the No Lobby when we come to vote on amendment 288, and I hope that all right-minded people will join me there.

[Jess Asato (Lowestoft) (Lab)]

I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am a proud member of the trade unions USDAW, Unison and GMB, and I am also proud to have worked at a domestic abuse charity for six years. That is why I rise today to speak in support of new clause 22, which I have tabled with the support of colleagues from across the House. I am an officer of the all-party parliamentary group on domestic violence and abuse, the secretariat of which is ably provided by Women’s Aid. I have tabled this new clause following evidence presented to the APPG, with the drafting support of the law firm Hogan Lovells.

17:45

New clause 22 would require employers with five or more employees to publish a domestic abuse policy outlining the support they provide to workers who are victims of domestic abuse. Some 2.3 million people, predominantly women, experience domestic abuse each year. This is not a niche issue, but one that pervades every level of society, often with devastating effects. For example, we know that around 100,000 people in the UK are at high or imminent risk of being murdered or seriously harmed by an abuser.

Some Members may wonder how domestic abuse relates to employers, and may question whether the new clause is necessary. To them, I say that domestic abuse is a workplace issue. Up to 75% of women who experience domestic abuse are targeted at work. We know that perpetrators often harass women at their workplace, through phone calls or by arriving unannounced. Abusers can also be colleagues; research by the TUC found that 16% of victims surveyed said that their perpetrator worked in the same place that they did. For example, Jane Clough, a 26-year-old nurse, was stabbed 71 times in 2010 by her former partner, an ex-ambulance technician, outside the hospital where they had worked and met.

Victim-survivors need, and deserve, more support from their workplaces. A number of trade unions and the TUC have campaigned on this issue, alongside domestic abuse charities, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and survivors themselves. One survivor told the domestic abuse charity SaveLives:

“Everyone at work knew. They must have done…I wished someone…had said something, asked me how I was. I think if my manager had known what to do or say, she would have liked to help, but the conversation just seemed too hard, perhaps.”

It is important to note that the previous Government introduced guidance on this issue alongside the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. However, without a mandatory duty on employers, the support that victims can expect remains a lottery. The Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse estimates that only 5% of employers have a policy.

Of course, domestic abuse also has a financial impact, both on victims and the organisations they work for. Over one in five women take time off work because of abuse, and 86% of victims say that abuse negatively impacts their work performance due to them being distracted, tired or unwell. Abuse stunts career progression, and research undertaken by Vodafone and KPMG has found that the potential loss of earnings for each victim is £5,800 a year. This clearly has severe knock-on impacts for businesses and the economy. In 2019, the Home Office estimated that domestic abuse costs the UK economy around £14 billion a year in lost economic output. A mandatory domestic abuse policy is therefore pro-worker, pro-business and pro-growth. Indeed, a study in New Zealand found that introducing domestic abuse protections in the workplace has cut costs for businesses in that country and led to increased levels of productivity.

Embedding domestic abuse in the ethos and practices of companies here in the UK is a vital step. I am happy to say that some organisations have already taken that step, led by the pioneering Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse, which supports over 1,800 businesses—large and small—that collectively comprise over a quarter of the UK workforce. I am glad that companies such as Sainsbury’s, Argos and Poundland already offer employees paid leave to enable victim-survivors to attend medical or legal appointments, or to seek safe accommodation. However, we need all workplaces and all victims to be covered. Victim-survivors deserve far more support than they currently receive, and workplaces are often the only safe place for victims to seek support and safety, but a culture of shame or stigma, a fear of not being believed, or even a concern about losing their job due to disclosure is failing victims. Supporting those victims should be seen as a key duty that would secure their health and safety.

I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging the Government’s commitment to victims of abuse in the forthcoming violence against women and girls strategy, but we would like to see something more—at least a taskforce consisting of domestic abuse charities, employers and trade unions, with, crucially, input from survivors and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. That would complement the VAWG strategy. We need a much clearer commitment from the Department to proceed with this important matter. I look forward to working further with Ministers across Departments, and to working with my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Alex McIntyre) on his ten-minute rule Bill to introduce paid leave for domestic abuse survivors, because victims of domestic abuse cannot wait.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

Let me begin by drawing attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

As other Conservative Members have already pointed out, the flaws in this Bill are numerous. It will damage businesses and, ultimately, employment opportunities, and I am deeply concerned about its consequences for our economy both nationally and in my constituency. The Government have said that they want to grow the economy, but the Bill will penalise and stifle those who do just that. Businesses of all sizes, investors and entrepreneurs—these are the people who grow our economy. Only if we grow our economy can we invest in our much-needed public services, and only then can we provide the significant increases in defence investment that are needed more than ever at this time. We ought to be empowering businesses to deliver growth, but the Bill adds burdens on business to such an extent that, by the Government’s own admission, it will cost the economy up to £5 billion a year. In fact, I believe that that is a fairly conservative estimate and that it will probably cost much more.

Survey after survey has shown that business confidence has gone through the floor, although I do not need a survey to tell me that, because my inbox has received a steady stream of messages from local businesses reaching out to share the detrimental impacts of the Budget and their concern about the impact of measures in the Bill. Every week I visit and meet business owners across my constituency, and the message is consistent and clear: how can the Government expect the economy to grow when it penalises the growth creators?

Amendment 289, tabled by the Opposition, offers a reasonable and pragmatic compromise to mitigate the unintended consequences of placing a duty on employers to prevent third-party harassment in the hospitality sector. I have listened closely to the debate on that issue, so let me say strongly that harassment of any sort is absolutely wrong. I do not for one moment condone or excuse any kind of harassment, in the hospitality sector or, indeed, in any other area. The reality is, however, that in a pub, a restaurant, a social setting or a hospitality setting, things may be said that are not acceptable. As has already been made clear, this is not condoning sexual harassment; it is making clear that we simply cannot legislate for people’s words or language in every context. We must have free speech. Surely it is reasonable to protect our landlords and restaurant owners in the hospitality sector, and to include provisions exempting them in the Bill, if it has to be passed at all. It cannot be fair to expect landlords to be responsible for every conversation that takes place on their premises.

It has been made clear to me by the many landlords and restaurant owners across my constituency whom I have met since my election—whether it be Woody who runs the Swan in Tarporley and the Lion at Malpas, or Jarina at the Rasoi and the Bulls Head—that employee welfare is a top priority for them. I know that they do everything they can to treat staff exceptionally well, and to protect them from third-party harassment. They want their staff to be safe and secure, but making such businesses liable for other people’s behaviour and language is a step too far, and will have a detrimental impact on our hospitality sector.

Let me end by reiterating my deep and fundamental concerns about the Bill as a whole. I will not be supporting it today. There are Opposition amendments that would improve it, and I hope that they will be supported, because they are pragmatic and give a glimmer of hope to businesses faced with what is otherwise very damaging legislation. I also hope that when Labour Members vote this evening they will consider the consequences of the Bill and the ways in which it is detrimental to growth, something that the Government have sought to pursue.

[Sarah Owen (Luton North) (Lab)]

I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and the fact that I am a trade union member.

This Government were elected on the promise to deliver the biggest boost to workers’ rights in a generation, and that is exactly what this Bill will do. The previous Government oversaw a system that left working people paying the price for economic decline through insecurity, poor productivity and low pay. The measures in this Bill will make a serious difference to working people’s lives. Nine million people will benefit from day one protection against unfair dismissal, the around 4,000 mothers who are dismissed each year after returning from maternity leave will be protected, and 1.3 million people on low wages will receive statutory sick pay for the first time. In Luton North and elsewhere, these rights will make a real and meaningful difference to people, especially those in new jobs, on lower incomes or with insecure contracts.

As a former care worker, I know that fair pay in adult social care—bringing workers and employers together to agree pay and conditions across the whole sector—will be transformational and is long overdue. During covid, when many carers risked their lives and those of their families to care for others, the last Government handed out claps, gave out bin bags in place of personal protective equipment, and sent carers off to food banks. This Government are delivering the recognition that social care is skilled, valued and vital to a thriving society.

I will speak in my role as Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee. Our Committee’s report in January showed the need for bereavement leave following pregnancy loss. I give my wholehearted thanks to all who gave evidence, which led to our report and the amendment that followed. I thank Members from across the House for their support, and I especially thank the brave women who shared their experience of losing a pregnancy with our Committee. All of them had only the option of sick leave, and every single witness said it is time for a change.

Granting sick leave to grieve the loss of a pregnancy is not appropriate. First, it means that women workers are left fearful that human resources processes will kick in following the accrual of sick leave. Secondly, it wrongly reinforces the feeling that there is something wrong with their bodies. Thirdly, it makes them feel unable to talk about their miscarriage with both their employers and their colleagues, as they should be able to do. It is as if miscarriage is something shameful to approach one’s boss about.

From small businesses to big businesses, such as the Co-op Group and TUI, many employers already offer bereavement leave following miscarriage, as does the NHS, which is the largest public sector employer of women. They all show that doing the right thing is good for workers and good for business, and I am so pleased to hear the Minister commit to working with the other place to introduce miscarriage bereavement leave. This Labour Government will make the UK only the fourth country in the world to recognise the need for bereavement leave following miscarriage, which is truly world leading. We will be a leading light in a world that seems to be taking a backwards step on women’s rights.

Although such leave is not paid, as outlined in my amendments, it is a significant step forward. It not only provides rights, but goes a long way towards furthering how we talk about pregnancy loss in society as a whole. Miscarriage should no longer be ignored and stigmatised as a sickness. People have been moved to tears of joy, relief and raw emotion on discovering that their loss is now acknowledged and that things will change. Later tonight, in the privacy of my home, I will probably be one of those people.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Lady for her passion and compassion, for her honesty and for talking about this subject in the Chamber. We all recognise her commitment to the task that she has set herself, and this Government will deliver it for her. I welcome that, because we have all lost loved ones. We have mothers and sisters who have had miscarriages, and we have family members and colleagues who have had miscarriages. That is why we commend the hon. Lady for making a special contribution.

[Sarah Owen]

I thank the hon. Member for his kind intervention, and I thank many Members for their support throughout the years. I experienced pregnancy loss while I was an MP, and the kindness of colleagues in this place got me though, but at no point did any of them wrap their arms around me and say, “Get well soon”; they all said, “I’m sorry for your loss.” I am so glad that today the Minister has committed to the law reflecting society’s view on miscarriage.



I thank the Department for Business and Trade team, and especially the Minister, for meeting the challenge set by the Women and Equalities Committee. Each of the Committee members is committed to this, and it was enabled by our excellent Clerks. I thank the Members who have supported my amendment—and our amendments —and so many people for their campaigning work. Many Members have been very kind and have expressed gratitude to me for tabling the amendment, but this was actually a team job, with team work and campaigning spanning many years.

18:00

That campaigning work included inspirations such as Myleene Klass, my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam (Olivia Blake) and the former Member Angela Crawley, as well as brilliant organisations such as the Miscarriage Association, Tommy’s, Sands and Pregnant Then Screwed, and all their supporters. However, I want to say a special thank you to Vicki and her team at the Miscarriage Association. Both professionally and personally, she is a voice for so many during their darkest times—thank you.

This change means that the law will finally catch up with society’s views on pregnancy loss. It is a giant leap forward in the recognition that miscarrying is a bereavement, not an illness, and workers will legally have the right to grieve.

[Laurence Turner]

It is a particular pleasure to follow a former colleague of mine, my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Sarah Owen). What she has said will have a special resonance with the many people who are following this debate in this Chamber and beyond. She has done a valuable public service, and we thank her for it.

As is customary, I draw attention to my declarations in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and to my membership of the GMB and Unite trade unions.

Because time is limited, I will restrict my comments to Opposition amendment 290 on the School Support Staff Negotiating Body. This amendment seeks to disapply the SSSNB’s statutory remit from both academies and local authority maintained schools, which makes it substantially different from and more damaging than the similar amendment brought forward in Committee. If it was carried, it would reduce protection for many school support staff workers in employment.

The vast majority of school support staff are already covered by collective bargaining, almost 80% directly and the rest indirectly. However, the existing agreement, through the National Joint Council, does not serve support staff or employers well. Last year, teaching assistants were paid just £17,400 on average, and 90% of those workers are women. I have spoken to some who have relied on food banks and payday loans to make ends meet. There are 1,800 school support staff workers in my constituency of Birmingham Northfield, and they deserve better. Most schools struggle to recruit for those roles, according to research by the National Foundation for Educational Research, and at one point during the pandemic the role of teaching assistants was the second hardest to recruit for after that of HGV drivers.

This is not just about pay. As the Harpur v. Brazel case showed, substantial liabilities also exist for employers because of unclear and outdated terms and conditions. As the Confederation of School Trusts, representing academy employers, has said, the time has come to move school support staff out from under the local government negotiating umbrella. Indeed, the request from school employers was for the Bill to establish a floor, not a ceiling.

That point was addressed in Committee, so we might ask why this amendment has been brought forward. It is in contradiction to the amendment that the Opposition tabled in the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Public Bill Committee. After all, it was the Conservatives who put the School Teachers Review Body on a statutory footing back in the early 1990s, so why will they not support the same step for school support staff? Similarly, they are not seeking to amend the Bill in respect of the adult social care negotiating body, despite the similarities between the two occupations.

I fear that the answer is that school support staff—the majority of people who work in schools—are suffering from the soft prejudice of unequal knowledge and interests that divide the workforce into professionals and ancillaries. This outdated attitude should be confined to the dustbin of history, where it belongs. It was rejected in this place almost 20 years ago, when the process that led to the SSSNB began. This is not a measure whose time has come; it is long overdue.

I wish to say a little about the importance of the measure for special educational needs and disabilities. Classroom-based support staff spend the majority of their time supporting SEND learners. They are essential to schools’ models of inclusion.

[Chris Vince]

My hon. Friend is giving an excellent speech and referring to a really important group of people. As a former teacher—I mention it quite often— I recognise the huge importance of what school support staff provide to the classroom. Does he agree that they support not just learners but teachers too, and have a wider influence on the school community?

[Laurence Turner]

I agree. My hon. Friend makes a very important point. When we look back at the national agreement in the early 2000s which led to the expansion of school support staff roles, the justification was that they would alleviate pressure on teachers and add to the quality of teaching in classrooms. That is exactly what school support staff workers in my constituency and his do every day.

School support staff roles are essential for SEND support, but the contracts those staff are employed under are so squeezed that no paid time is available for professional development or training. In other words, we cannot resolve the SEND crisis without contract reform, and we cannot achieve that contract reform if the drift and delay, which is the legacy of the 2010 decision to abolish the SSSNB, continues. I urge the Opposition, even now, to think again and not press their amendment to a vote.

In the time remaining, I wish to say a few words about the provisions on hospitality workers and their right not to be subject to third-party harassment. When the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse), who was formerly in her place, brought forward her private Member’s Bill in the last Parliament, it contained the same provisions that are being advanced now. At the start of the debates in the House of Lords, the extension of the protection to “all reasonable steps” was supported by the Government of the day. Baroness Scott, leading for the Conservative party, said that the measures would not infringe on freedom of speech; in fact, they would strengthen it. The Conservative Front Benchers were right then and they are wrong today.

The Bill is incredibly important. Employment law in the United Kingdom has tended to advance by increments; the Bill measures progress in strides. I am proud to have had some association with it through the Public Bill Committee. I thank the departmental team who were part of the process and the other members of the Committee. I will be proud to vote in favour of the extensions to rights in the Bill when they are brought forward to a vote tonight.

[Andy McDonald]

As a proud trade unionist, I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

Today marks a truly historic moment: the most significant expansion of employment rights in more than a generation. I extend my congratulations to the Secretary of State and the Deputy Prime Minister for their efforts, and express my enormous gratitude to the employment rights Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders), for his time and engagement with me over recent months in discussing the measures in the Bill. I also wish to acknowledge the dedication of Bill Committee members, as well as the countless trade union officers, academics, Labour party members and staffers who have worked tirelessly for decades to bring us to this day. This is a milestone we have long strived for. On a personal note, I extend my sincere thanks to the Prime Minister for entrusting me, while in opposition, with the responsibility of delivering Labour’s Green Paper, “A New Deal for Working People”.

I speak in support of the Government’s amendments and will touch on my own tabled amendments selected for discussion. Specifically, I support Government new clause 32 and Government new schedule 1, which will extend guaranteed hours protections to nearly 1 million agency workers. This is a crucial step, aligning with my own amendment 264, and I am pleased to see the Government taking it forward. The TUC has rightly emphasised that for these rights to be effective, they must apply to all workers. Including agency workers is essential to prevent unscrupulous employers from circumventing new protections by shifting to agency staff. Exploitative tactics employed by a minority of employers, designed to avoid responsibilities and deny workers job security, remain a deep concern, which is precisely why I have consistently advocated for a single employment status.

I tabled new clause 61 because I believe that establishing a single status of worker is a necessary step to ending unfair employment practices. The Government’s “Next Steps to Make Work Pay” document, published alongside the Bill, states their intent to consult on moving towards a single worker status. On Second Reading, I noted that we cannot truly eradicate insecure work until we establish a clear and unified employment status. Since then, the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, Margaret Beels, has told the Business and Trade Committee that

“the whole business of employment status needs to be addressed”,

adding that

“you can probably consult until the cows come home on this issue…it is about time to do something about it”.

The TUC also urged a rapid review of employment status to prevent tactics such as bogus self-employment from proliferating as employers respond to new rights.

I welcome the Business and Trade Committee’s recommendation that the Government must prioritise their review of employment status and address false self-employment

“so that these reforms are rolled out alongside…the Employment Rights Bill.”

I acknowledge the new clause tabled by the Chair of the Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which seeks to establish a deadline for this consultation. I urge the Government to accelerate progress on this front, but take reassurance from the fact that this issue is well understood at the highest levels.

I turn to collective redundancy and the unacceptable practice of fire and rehire. ACAS reported in 2021 that the use of fire and rehire tactics by employers was prevalent in the UK and had increased since the pandemic. Nearly a fifth of young people say their employer has tried to rehire them on inferior terms. Many will recall how P&O shamelessly broke the law, choosing to pay compensation rather than comply with its legal obligations because it calculated that replacing its workforce with cheaper labour would ultimately be more profitable.

I welcome the Government’s consultation on collective redundancy and their introduction of new clause 34, which doubles the maximum protective award for unfairly dismissed workers to 180 days’ pay. However, while this may deter some employers, I question whether it is a sufficient deterrent to prevent further abuses. The TUC has raised concerns that merely doubling the cap will still allow well-resourced employers to treat breaching their legal obligations as the cost of doing business. The TUC instead proposes a stronger deterrent: the introduction of interim injunctions to block fire and rehire attempts—an approach I have sought through new clause 62.

Mick Lynch, the outgoing general secretary of the RMT, told the Bill Committee that unions should have the power to seek injunctions against employers like P&O. He rightly pointed out:

“The power is all with the employers,”––[Official Report, Employment Rights Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2024; c. 59, Q57]

and that unions currently lack the legal means to stop mass dismissals before they happen. My new clause offers a solution, giving employees immediate redress through an injunction if they can show that their dismissal is likely to be in breach of the new law, ensuring that they remain employed with full pay until a final ruling is made. I encourage the Minister to address this issue in his response and to indicate an openness to considering injunctive powers in this Parliament.

[Richard Burgon]

My hon. Friend has played such an important role in the development of these policies. He is making a wide-ranging speech—in his remaining remarks, will he reflect on the importance of not just individual rights, but collective rights?

[Andy McDonald]

My hon. Friend highlights a critical issue—this is about making that shift and reversing the decline in collective bargaining. We should be looking for the International Labour Organisation standard and, as per the European Union, to get to 80% collective bargaining coverage across the piece.

I also note the concerns of the TUC and Unite regarding Government new clauses 90 to 96, on the “one establishment” issue, and urge them to engage with the unions on these issues.

Much has been said about wealth creators, but there needs to be a recognition that working people are wealth creators and they are entitled to their fair share. The Chair of the Business and Trade Committee calls for consensus. At the core of this discussion has to be that good, well-paid, secure, unionised employment is good for our constituents, our businesses and our economy, and this crucial Employment Rights Bill is an essential step along that road to a brighter economy and a brighter future for all our people.

18:15

[Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)]

It is an absolute honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald), and I know the whole House will join me in thanking him for all the work that he has done in shaping the Bill before us today.

The Employment Rights Bill, which I am also proud to have played a small part in shaping, represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity. The Bill is a testament to the values that we stand for: a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work; dignity; protection; bargaining powers for workers; and a safety net for the most vulnerable when they need it the most.

There is much to celebrate in the Bill, as we have heard in the many excellent contributions today. I have also put my name to many of the amendments that we have heard hon. Members speak to in the House. I do feel that all of them are designed to strengthen the Bill further. However, given the time constraints, I shall focus my remarks on my amendments relating to statutory sick pay.

As we all know, and as has been said very eloquently today, the current system of statutory sick pay is not just insufficient, but completely and inexcusably broken. We have the worst system in Europe, which is shameful. Workers are entitled to just 17% of the average weekly wage, yet the cost of living does not suddenly plunge by 83% when they are sick. Their rent, their energy bills and their grocery tabs are not discounted, so why does SSP remain such a paltry sum? Being forced to survive on £118.75 a week—if they are lucky enough to get that in the first place—leaves workers exposed to financial hardship. It forces many to make the difficult decision to go to work when they are unwell.

It is therefore quite right that the Government have put forward major, necessary and welcome reforms. They include: removing the three-day waiting period, so that workers are entitled to sick pay from day one of illness; and extending sick pay to all workers by removing the lower earnings limit and implementing a fair earnings replacement percentage of 80%.

These reforms will directly benefit more than a million low-paid workers, a disproportionate number of whom continue to be those from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds, women and young people. There is much more that we can do to strengthen the Bill, which is why I have tabled two amendments, which will do just that and ensure that no worker is left behind. Amendment 7 calls for sick pay to be aligned with the national living wage. Let me make it clear that uprating SSP is popular with businesses as well as with workers. Six in 10 employers agree that the rate is simply too low for workers to survive on. We know that because the poverty rate among those claiming SSP is more than double that among the overall working population.

Amendment 7 makes it clear that if a person is working full time, they should not be paid poverty wages when they are unwell. No one should have to choose between their health and their financial security, which is why my amendment would immediately raise SSP to around 67% of the average weekly wage, putting us on a par with many of our European counterparts.

My new clause 102 is about ensuring fairness. Although I welcome the Government’s proposed system, the reality is that 300,000 workers may actually end up worse off than they are today. Those who earn slightly above the current lower earnings limit of £123 up to £146 per week would receive 80% of their earnings, which is lower than the SSP rate that they would receive today.

We cannot allow anyone to be left behind. Although removing the waiting period puts more money in people’s pockets from the beginning of the illness period, workers taking more than four weeks off due to long-term conditions, going through cancer treatment, recovering from serious operations or suffering from mental health crises will face the biggest losses under the new system.

[Chris Hinchliff (North East Hertfordshire) (Lab)]

Research has found that the cost of presenteeism to the private sector in mental ill health alone is £24 billion a year. Does my hon. Friend agree that shows that reforming our statutory sick pay is the most pro-prosperity, pro-productivity policy that we can pursue?

[Imran Hussain]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he makes the case brilliantly against some of the nonsense arguments about productivity that we have heard from the Conservative Benches today. It is the right thing to do, but also it will lead to much improved productivity and a better, healthier, happier workforce, as well as being much better for the employer.

My amendment and new clause would ensure that every worker receives, at the very least, the same amount of sick pay that they would have done under the current system, and not a penny less. I urge the Government to support them, as they are very much in the spirit of this legislation.

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South and Mid Down) (SDLP)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend and his colleagues on advancing the Bill—eight months into their mandate, we are at the remaining stages. In Northern Ireland, 13 months after restoration, the proposed NI “good jobs” Bill has not even been introduced, and doubt is growing as to whether it will pass in this mandate. Once again, workers and businesses in Northern Ireland are paying the cost of dither and lack of ambition. Does he agree that those same barriers to people on sick pay also apply to women on maternity leave? Would he support in principle my new clause 23, which would raise statutory maternity pay for women in work to the living wage for the later parts of maternity leave?

[Imran Hussain]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend makes the case brilliantly. I would support that in principle, because the challenges are exactly the same. I said at the beginning of my speech that many of the amendments, if not all—not the ones tabled by the Opposition, but the reasonable ones from the Government Benches—are constructive and designed to improve the Bill further.

My hon. Friend the Minister and I have had the great pleasure of working together for many months on the Bill, so he will know that I come from a position of sincerity to strengthen the Bill further. I fully understand that amendment 7 is a probing amendment, which will not be voted on in Lobbies. However, it does reflect the ambition that we should rightly have because it is shameful, frankly, that we are in the situation of offering among the lowest statutory sick pay. Our partners across Europe, quite rightly, are much better on this.

I ask the Minister to seriously consider new clause 102. Again, it does not ask for any immediate action today; it asks the Government to come back to the House in three months to report back that nobody will be worse off as a result of these measures. I do not think that is ever an intended consequence of the Government’s excellent measures, so I look forward to my hon. Friend engaging with me further on that.

Finally, I want to end by paying tribute to the millions of workers who are the backbone of our economy. It is my hope that, with the amendments and new clauses that we have proposed today, we can take significant steps towards a society that rewards workers instead of punishing them, that treats them with dignity instead of malice, and where no one must choose between their health and their livelihood.

[Ian Byrne (Liverpool West Derby) (Lab)]

I place proudly on the record that I am currently a member of Unite and GMB. I refer hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I take the opportunity to pay tribute to my good friend Terry Jones, a brilliant Scouse trade unionist who sadly passed away this morning. He supported the Bill wholeheartedly.

Forty-five years after Margaret Thatcher began her war on trade unions, the Bill is hugely welcome and long overdue. It is a step to turn back the tide and strengthen the power of workers. In a former life as an industrial organiser for Unite the union, I saw how difficult it was to build industrial strength in workplaces because of the restrictive legislation supported by previous Governments of all colours. The Bill will hopefully begin at long last to turn back that tide.

Hon. Members have already discussed key measures in the Bill, and there is so much to welcome. I congratulate the Minister on his efforts in getting the Bill to this place, and I also congratulate him and his team on taking two points off Arsenal, which helped us no end on Sunday.

The Bill needs to be not the end, though, but the beginning of a renewal of trade union rights. If we want to tackle the injustices done to the working class from low pay and poverty to sordid inequality, we need to empower the institutions that were founded to fight for the working class. Be in no doubt about the scale of the problem: 60% of those who use the nine food pantries run across Liverpool are in work, including public sector workers from nurses to Department for Work and Pensions workers. Let that sink in: 60% of those relying on emergency food aid are in work. That tells us how broken the labour market is for so many people.

Economic growth goes hand in hand with fixing the broken economic settlement, hence the importance of the Bill. I will focus my comments on the amendments but, for the record, tomorrow we will debate two new clauses that I have tabled about upholding trade union rights and outsourcing. My amendments for debate today—amendments 326 and 327—are aimed at strengthening protections against unfair dismissals, but in my brief time I will focus on amendments tabled by colleagues.

My hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) has tabled a series of crucial amendments to strengthen the Bill. He deserves a huge amount of credit for getting the Bill to this place. His amendments include amendments 265 to 267, which would enhance the Bill’s provisions against zero-hours contracts. Those contracts leave workers with precious little control over their lives, allowing bosses to dictate shifts with little or no notice, with workers vulnerable to gross exploitation. It is no wonder that workers overwhelmingly prefer regular contracts. For example, when Wetherspoons introduced the option of guaranteed hours for its workforce, 99% of workers opted for that, with just 1% choosing the zero-hours contract model. The amendments would help ensure that when we say we are banning exploitative zero-hours contracts, we actually mean it.

My hon. Friend has also tabled new clauses 62 to 65, which would strengthen the Bill’s protections against the disgraceful practice of fire and rehire. I saw in my own family the devastating impact that this cruel practice can have in destroying livelihoods when my brother was a victim of fire and rehire at British Gas. This immoral practice should never again be able to be used by rogue employees as a weapon against the working classes of this country. I fully support those strengthening new clauses.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain) has tabled amendment 7, which would raise statutory sick pay to the level of the national living wage, and new clause 102, which would guarantee that workers do not lose out under the new fair earnings replacement proposals. We should have learned from the pandemic that no one should be forced into work when they are ill. Those amendments and others would help to make that a reality. I really hope that the Minister and Front-Bench Members are listening.

The devastating consequences of Thatcherism’s assault on working-class communities and trade unions are seen in towns and cities across the country. Once vibrant industrial towns have been hollowed out and industries destroyed, with insecure work replacing well-paid, unionised jobs. The never-ending doom loop must be broken if we are to rebuild communities that at the moment feel forgotten, betrayed and abandoned by successive Governments since Thatcher. The Bill must be a decisive step in breaking away from a failed settlement and finally building a country that works for us all.

[Lola McEvoy]

I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am a proud trade union member and in my career, I have campaigned for more rights for support staff and teaching assistants in schools, for better bargaining rights for care workers, for people to have contracts that affect the hours they work and for statutory sick pay from day one. I am proud that the Bill will deliver all those things—and much more—for working people up and down the country.

I rise to speak to the issue of parental leave, which has come up in relation to many amendments and in contributions from Members across the House. Since I was elected in July, I have spoken three times in the Chamber about the terrible inequality around dads’ rights and paternity pay, including in my maiden speech during the International Men’s Day debate and again in the debate on this Bill in last October. I therefore welcome the clauses that support dads’ rights and will encourage more men to take their paternity leave entitlements.

18:30

In the last Parliament, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis) introduced a private Member’s Bill that came into force in April 2024. The Protection from Redundancy (Pregnancy and Family Leave) Act 2023 extended the protected period from redundancy for parents. The protected period is the length of time during which a member of staff must be offered an appropriate, suitable post should their job role be at risk of redundancy. That protected period applies to the mother for 18 months after her child is born, to adoptive parents for 18 months after their child arrives in England, Scotland or Wales from overseas or the date on which the adoption placement starts, and for 18 months for those taking more than six weeks of shared parental leave. Those are the only groups of parents included in the extension to the protected period, which means that dads taking paternity leave are left out. Dads may benefit from the protections if they adopt a child, which is great, or if they take more than six weeks of shared parental leave, but dads who take paternity leave have no such protections, and that is obviously wrong.

In Darlington, dads and mums raise parental leave and dads’ rights on the doorstep all the time. Pregnant Then Screwed estimated that 74,000 mothers a year lose their jobs while pregnant or taking maternity leave. That is appalling, and my hon. and gallant Friend’s Act will protect women from that utterly awful motherhood penalty. He was right to take action to protect working mums; however, I urge the Government to take action to extend the protections to dads in the upcoming parental leave review.

Clause 22 directly amends the Employment Rights Act 1996 to offer further protections to pregnant women, which is absolutely right. Once again, the additional rights extend to mums, parents taking adoptive leave and parents taking shared parental leave. We rightly want those people to be protected. The rights also extend to bereaved fathers, which is important, but they do not extend to those taking paternity leave.

In anticipation of the argument that dads can benefit from shared parental leave, I want to outline why it does not work as a policy or law. Five per cent of dads take shared parental leave. That is because it is a bit of a gimmick. First, the second partner—most often the father of the child—is more likely to take a smaller share of the shared parental leave, which is often less than six weeks and therefore would not qualify for additional redundancy protections. Secondly, and further to that argument, shared parental leave is itself a policy that is tough on mothers. Mothers who want to go back to work should be able to do so, and if they want to go back early and not use their full maternity rights, we obviously support that. My views are not in conflict with the rights of mothers, but are in addition to and in support of them.

Shared parental leave, however, is an anti-mother policy, and that is why only 5% of fathers and partners take it. Fathers, mothers and babies need time together. They need time to bond, time to heal and time to adjust to the earth-shattering experience of becoming a parent, together. In practice, dads, who are often the breadwinners, go dutifully back to work, sleep-deprived and under heavy societal pressure to provide for and protect their new families. They have to keep that job, and that is because so many women face maternity discrimination.

I absolutely appreciate the effort and scale of this landmark legislation and appreciate the vast-reaching scope of the measures it contains. It will improve many lives. I am a pragmatist and am hopeful that we can get an increase in paternity pay. For now, however, I simply ask for parity for paternity—for dads’ rights. Seventy-two per cent of the public support more protections for dads, but only a third of new dads take paternity leave. Something is badly wrong there and I urge the Minister to listen to the campaign group The Dad Shift, which says that an estimated 4,000 dads a year who take paternity leave lose their jobs because of it.

My generation and those younger than me are the keenest yet for more family time, but their primary concern is paying the bills. The rate of paternity leave, the huge swathes of discrimination for returning mothers and the lack of protections mean that dads cannot even take what they are entitled to. We have to change that. I am proud of this Bill and proud of our Government, and I am very hopeful for dads.

[Ms Polly Billington (East Thanet) (Lab)]

I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and declare that I am a proud member of the GMB.

I stand to speak against amendment 289, which would exclude the hospitality sector and sports venues from the Bill’s duty for employers not to permit harassment of their employees. The first time I was harassed at work was when I was 14 years old, waiting tables at a charity event. The second time was when I was 16, in a bistro, except this time I was being paid for the experience. After that, it was when I was a student working in a bar, then when I worked in a canteen, and then in a warehouse. It is because of that experience—one shared by people of both sexes and all ages, but particularly the young and particularly women, across this country—that I was, I am not going to lie, absolutely gobsmacked by the amendment tabled by the shadow Secretary of State for Business and Trade, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith), to the protection from harassment clause, which would exclude those working in the hospitality sector or sports venues.

The Conservative party is arguing that some kind of harassment is okay and that if you are working in the hospitality sector or in a sports venue, it is fine. Tories seem to believe that if you go to a pub, your right to harass bar staff is greater than their right not to be harassed. I have to say, that is quite an extraordinary thing to argue for, but I am glad that they are at least being honest with us. Jobs in hospitality often involve insecure work on low pay that is reliant on tips. In Margate, Ramsgate and Broadstairs, thousands of people work in jobs like that, and I do not see why it should be deemed acceptable for them to be harassed in their job, but not people who work in an office.

[Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)]

I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and I am a proud member of the GMB. Does my hon. Friend agree that even more concerning are the calls from the Opposition Benches, and particularly from the former Home Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman), for the Equality Act to be scrapped, which would mean that laws covering sexual harassment and equal pay would be completely removed from the workplace? This is a really troubling agenda from the Conservatives, and I believe it is in keeping with this amendment.

[Ms Billington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. It is indeed a very worrying direction of travel from the Conservatives.

We on the Labour Benches think that people should not be allowed to harass any workers. I honestly did not expect this to be a controversial aspect of the Bill for the Conservatives. Perhaps I am being uncharitable, so I would really appreciate it if the shadow Secretary of State, who is now in his place, could answer a few questions. When did it become Conservative party policy to allow staff to be harassed? Why does that apply only to staff working in hospitality and sports venues and not to all workers? Why is it all right to harass bar staff but not office staff?

[Alison Griffiths]

I know that the hon. Lady has not been in the Chamber for most of the debate, so she will have missed many of the discussions where my hon. Friends have explained the nuance of our position on this, which relates to the law of unintended consequences where publicans and nightclub owners could be responsible for policing the words of their customers. That is clearly not a tenable situation, but I will repeat the words of all of my colleagues on this side of the House: sexual harassment is abhorrent. We do not condone it in any shape or form, and I ask her to withdraw the insinuation that anyone on this side of the House has any truck with such behaviour.

[Ms Billington]

I would like to emphasise that I listened closely to the opening speeches when the hon. Lady’s colleagues were talking about amendment 289. I heard clearly, for example, some confusion over whether sexual harassment was a crime or a civil offence, so I will not take any lessons from the Conservatives on their understanding of employment law or, indeed, what is considered acceptable at work.

The amendment is utterly disgraceful. I am proud that this Labour Government have brought forward a Bill to stop workers being harassed wherever they work. It is just a shame that the Conservative party does not agree. The hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith), and apparently the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Alison Griffiths), think that it is wrong that pub landlords will have to be responsible for kicking out customers. He talked about it being a “banter ban”, but pub managers have always known the importance of keeping rowdy behaviour in limits and protecting their staff and customers from being pestered or being made the unwilling butt of so-called jokes. This law—

[Alison Griffiths]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Ms Billington]

No, I will not give way.

This law will strengthen their hand. I say, in the words of the greatest pub manager of all time—Peggy Mitchell—to the proposers of the amendment, “Get outta my pub!”

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Quite. I call Dr Jeevun Sandher.

[Dr Jeevun Sandher (Loughborough) (Lab)]

What a speech to follow. I cannot quite claim to be Peggy Mitchell, but I will try to live up to that brilliant remark.

I rise as a proud member of the GMB. I happily refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I will speak to new clauses 37 and 38, which relate to part 3 of the Bill. They will strengthen the bargaining power of social workers and, by doing so, create a stronger working relationship between employees and employers that both sides will invest more in. That means higher wages for those who look after our parents, more training and a healthier social care workforce. Both sides will invest more; both sides will benefit more. Pro-worker, pro-business, pro-growth—that is what these amendments and this Bill will achieve.

Before entering this place, I was a trade union rep, and I worked with my colleagues to help stop a 33% pay cut in my workplace. Workers speaking with one voice meant a happier and more productive workplace—one voice to set out what it means to increase productivity. That is why this is a pro-growth Bill.

Social care workers are among the lowest paid in our economy. One in six are legally paid less than the minimum wage. Little proper certification, reward or recognition for skills means that there is little training. Poor conditions mean that almost half suffer from work-related stress. Low pay, little progression and poor conditions are the reasons why a third of social care workers leave the sector each year. That is what this Bill and these new clauses will fix. The Adult Social Care Negotiating Body will mean more social care workers speaking as one voice, gaining higher wages, better conditions and more training. Those benefits do not just appear on payslips; they mean less time spent worrying about paying the bills, and more time with our families and reading to our children. They make workers more productive and benefit employers—they make life worth living.

Those on the Opposition Benches say that life cannot improve. They have talked a lot of fear instead of hope and the change we can achieve. They will likely vote against our amendments and against the Bill. In doing so, they would deny their constituents better wages and, indeed, a better life. We cannot simply sit back and hope that wages rise, that training will magically appear, or that conditions will get better on their own. We have to act to make it so. The Bill and the amendments do exactly that by giving social care workers the power to speak with one voice to negotiate higher wages, better training and better conditions, benefiting employee and employer—pro-worker, pro-business and pro-growth. That is what the Bill stands for. That is what I stand for. That is what we stand for.

18:45

[Neil Duncan-Jordan (Poole) (Lab)]

I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

Having been a trade union activist for 40 years and a regional official, I have a genuine sense of pride in seeing the Bill make its way through Parliament. It is truly transformational and seeks to address the imbalance that has existed in the workplace for far too long. Many of the amendments before us strengthen existing rights so as to ensure that unscrupulous employers are unable to frustrate, delay or act unreasonably when dealing with their workforce, either collectively or as individuals.

Other amendments, such as new clause 101 in my name, seek to introduce new rights and protections for groups of workers who have hitherto been forgotten or overlooked. My new clause calls for the establishment of a regulatory body for foster carers. Currently, those who employ foster carers—local authorities, charities and independent fostering agencies—also serve as de facto regulators, with the power to register and de-register workers. That puts too much power in the hands of the employers, and, according to the foster carers branch of the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain, it illustrates a structure within the sector that fails to bring consistency, transparency, fairness or decent outcomes for the children and young people in their care.

A new regulatory body would therefore accredit educational institutions to provide standardised training courses. Once completed, those courses would remain on a carer’s work record. At the moment, every time a foster carer starts with a new provider, they are required to do the training again. That is both unnecessarily costly and time consuming. The body would also be responsible for maintaining a central register of foster care workers, and would ensure proper standards of care and deal with fitness-to-practice cases. As with the very best regulatory bodies, it would include those with lived experience of foster care.

One of the key roles of that proposed body would be to standardise the employment rights available to carers, such as maximum working hours, entitlement to statutory sick pay and protections against unfair dismissal, while also considering the important issue of collective sectoral bargaining. Through that, we would hope to see improvements in pay, minimum allowances, holidays and pension entitlements. As the UK continues to lose foster carers at an alarming rate, now is the time for that basic oversight, which will help to ensure we have enough safe and loving homes for the vulnerable children who need them.

My amendments 316 to 323 relate to the issue of redundancy. Over the years, I have negotiated with a number of employers over hundreds of redundancies, and I am seeking to improve the legislation based on that first-hand experience. Amendment 316 would require an employer to hold meaningful consultation even if they were preparing to make fewer than 20 staff redundant—something that many good employers already do, of course—whereas amendments 317 and 318 would introduce greater sanctions for those who fail to consult properly. Amendment 319 would treat workers dismissed under fire and rehire as having been made redundant and would ensure that they receive greater remuneration as a result.

Amendments 320 to 323 all seek to improve the level of redundancy pay by removing the 20-year cap on entitlements; by ensuring that someone with 10 years and six months’ service, for example, receives 11 years’ redundancy pay rather than 10; by basing the statutory redundancy calculation on months rather than weeks; and by ensuring those with less than two years’ service also have the right to redundancy payments.

Of course, there are many reasons why redundancies occur, but at the moment, the rules and sanctions around this issue enable some unscrupulous employers to exploit the situation and treat their staff unfairly. These amendments seek to address that imbalance, and I hope the Government will consider ways in which the issues I have highlighted can be included in the legislation.

[Nadia Whittome]

I am a proud trade unionist, and I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

I commend the Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister for introducing this landmark legislation, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald), who did a huge amount of work on it as shadow Minister. All of them have dedicated their lives to standing up for working people, and this Bill is a culmination of that work and the work of trade unionists over many, many years.

I would like to speak in support of new clause 73. My own experience of taking time off work as an MP and the contrast with the experience of those on statutory sick pay made it clear just how badly reform is needed. Some years ago, when I needed to take a leave of absence because of the severity of my post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, I received full pay and a phased return, but for many workers, that is a million miles from their experience. The UK has some of the worst sick pay entitlements in Europe. The fact that the Bill means that sick pay will be paid from day one, instead of after day three, is very welcome, as is the removal of the eligibility threshold, increasing access for more than 1 million low-paid workers. However, we must acknowledge that without increasing the rate, the low level of statutory sick pay will continue to place a terrible burden on those who are already poorly paid. That is why amendment 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), is so important.

Those are far from the only issues. Another problem is the inflexibility of statutory sick pay, and that is why I have worked with the mental health charity Mind to table new clause 73. More than 8 million working-age people have long-term health conditions and experience challenges at work. Statutory sick pay currently does not allow for a proper phased return or for workers to reduce their hours during periods of ill health. Statutory sick pay can only be paid for a full day of sickness. If a worker needs a half day, for instance, SSP cannot be used to cover the hours they are not working.

If we force people to return to work before they are ready, whether that is because they cannot afford to remain on statutory sick pay or because a phased return is not an option for them, they are far more likely to be trapped in a cycle of poor mental wellbeing and to fall out of work completely. New clause 73 would mean that sick pay was paid pro rata, by hours rather than days, to allow for that greater flexibility.

Years of successive Government reviews have come to the same conclusion: a flexible statutory sick pay model would improve lives and better support people to remain in work. I have appreciated Ministers’ engagement with me on this issue, and I hope the Government will commit to looking at it further, especially as the cost to the Government would only be administrative. However, the impact it would have on people’s lives is huge.

The Labour movement fought long and hard for the right to sick pay and proper support for those with long-term illness and disability, whether in work or not, because our movement and our party exists to stand up for the whole of the working class. At a time when more people are affected by sickness and disability, it is crucial that this Government support them and do not scapegoat them for the failures and the political choices of the Conservative party.

[Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab)]

As a young worker in the late 1980s, I experienced the precarious nature of the world of work, along with many of my peers. Lack of knowledge about our rights and the fear of being sacked if we complained about our terms and conditions politicised me and made me a lifelong trade unionist and a member of Unite and Unison. I wish to speak to new clause 92, on rolled-up holiday pay for irregular hours workers and part-year workers, and new clause 93, entitled “Working Time Regulations 1998: records”, which are tabled in my name. Like most colleagues in this House, and along with the trade union movement and the millions of workers who will benefit from its provisions, I warmly welcome the Bill and thank everyone who has campaigned for it long and hard.

The majority of people spend a huge portion of their lives in work. Work should be an opportunity to be fulfilled, to live fully, to support ourselves and our family, to develop as individuals, and to contribute to society. In reality, however, for too long and for too many the world of work has been, and is, a world of uncertainty and ruthless exploitation, often stripping people of their dignity and their worth. For millions there is a struggle to obtain secure work, and that strengthens the hand of employers to drive a hard bargain to benefit their balance sheet and their profits. For those who can secure work, working life can remain unclear and insecure. It can include irregular and uncertain employment, uncertainty about hours, payment, and vital matters such as holiday pay and entitlement. While others in the House boast of their endless push for so-called flexible labour markets, the reality is very different for those on the other side of the employment contract—for the workers.

The previous Government spoke about cutting so-called red tape, when they really meant reducing people’s working rights and strengthening the powers of boardroom billionaires. My proposed new clauses are in relation to certain sectors, although they would benefit all workers. It is widely known and acknowledged that some employers use so-called rolled-up holiday pay as a device to tackle their obligations to provide paid time off for holidays. Holidays and breaks from work are essential for workers, and a recognised factor in delivering an effective organisation in the public and private sectors. So-called rolled-up holiday pay is a mechanism by which an employer adds holiday pay to basic pay throughout the working year, but does not provide it separately at the time of taking the holiday. It is acknowledged, including by ACAS, that that creates a risk that a worker may feel under pressure not to take any holiday, or to take less holiday than they are entitled to. That is particularly a risk for those who work in sectors of the economy where the work is irregular, and along with that, their work also tends to be lower paid. The pressure on such workers is immense. New clause 92 seeks to address that risk—a risk accepted and addressed by rulings from the European Court of Justice.

New clause 93 would ensure that working time is accurately recorded by employers. Colleagues across the House may recall that the recordkeeping requirements under the Working Time Regulations 1988 were watered down by amendments tabled by the previous Government in November 2023, following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. They believed that it was too cumbersome to require employers to maintain accurate records on behalf of employees, referring to it as “time consuming” and “disproportionate reporting.” What a load of rubbish. With advances in modern technology, there is no excuse for an employer to fail to accurately and precisely keep records of the working time contributed by a worker. The onus of managing records should be shifted from employees to allow them to focus on their own roles without added administrative requirements.

This Government’s Employment Rights Bill will deliver a new deal for working people, and I wholeheartedly support it, but I urge the Minister to take account of the issues I have raised and to accept new clauses 92 and 93, which would strengthen the Bill’s provisions and increase protection for the sections of workers who need it the most.

19:00

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and I am a proud member of Community.

It is an honour to speak as this landmark Bill hopefully passes its next stage, finally bringing to an end an era of insecurity and low pay under the Conservative party. This landmark Bill brings in day one rights for workers, a fair pay agreement for social care workers and greater entitlement to statutory sick pay. My speech will focus on and highlight the way in which the Bill and some of its amendments strengthen the rights of care workers and carers, the majority of whom are women.

We have heard already in this debate many proposals from hon. Members on the Government Benches to go further than the excellent proposals before us to strengthen day one rights for employees. My hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Sarah Owen) spoke movingly about pregnancy loss and bereavement, and, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), talked about the need for stronger entitlements to parental leave. All of that will have a really positive impact, particularly on women.

I draw attention particularly to the day one right that strengthens flexible working by default. I invite the Minister to consider giving guidance to employers that they should require flexible working to be advertised. The Fawcett Society has made a particularly strong case for the importance of that for women, and I know that that is also true for carers. If, before applying for a job, they do not know that they can secure that flexibility, many will not even apply. Some 40% of women who are not currently working said that if flexible work was available to them, it would enable them to do paid work, so we are missing out on huge potential for businesses.

The Fawcett Society survey in 2023 said that 77% of women agreed that they would be more likely to apply for a job that advertises flexible working options, while 30% had had to turn down a job offer when employers were unable to offer the flexible working that they needed. While the Bill makes excellent provisions, I urge the Minister to respond on how we can implement that in practice, so that carers and particularly women can have the confidence to apply for jobs and know that they can have those flexible working requirements.

[Mr Joshua Reynolds (Maidenhead) (LD)]

I thank the hon. Lady for her warm words about carers. Will she therefore support Liberal Democrat new clause 10, which would make paid carer’s leave an entitlement?

[Anna Dixon]

The hon. Gentleman may know that I am the co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on carers. We are very pleased that there are now unpaid leave requirements for carers; on other occasions, I have urged the Government to look into going further with paid entitlements for carers. There is a real opportunity to enable the 3 million carers in paid employment to remain in employment and to stop the loss of an estimated 600 people per day who leave work due to their caring responsibilities. While that is not part of this Bill, hopefully the Government and the Minister will respond to that.

That is the first area of the Bill that I really welcome. The second, which has huge benefit for care workers, is its provisions on pay and conditions through pay agreements. I echo some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Dr Sandher), who is no longer in his place, about the huge benefits that these will bring to so many of our valued adult social care staff.

The establishment of the new Fair Work Agency will ensure that everyone is playing by the same rules, and strengthening powers to deal with modern slavery and labour abuse will further extend protections to care workers. Many care workers have come to this country on overseas visas and, having paid extortionate fees in their country of origin, have found themselves tied into accommodation here, on zero-hours contracts and being exploited by the care companies. As such, the provisions in the Bill are very welcome. We know that too many care workers live in poverty; research by the Health Foundation suggests that one in five care workers cannot afford the essentials, either for themselves or for their children. I am proud to be sitting on the Labour Benches as we bring forward fair pay agreements, along with the abolition of exploitative zero-hours contracts, which will finally provide security for our valued social care workers.

In implementing these changes, it is really important that we establish a framework to help home care workers in particular—some of whom I met recently—who are not paid for their travel time or their sleep-in hours, despite the fact that such practices should be illegal. As we take forward the fair pay agreement in adult social care, I urge the Minister to work with colleagues to ensure it is accompanied by an ethical charter for care providers to sign up to. This Government have already shown how serious they are about valuing those who do so much to care for, and provide support to, disabled adults and older people in this country.

The third area I want to mention, which other colleagues have talked about and which my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain) has addressed in his new clause 102—[Interruption.] Madam Deputy Speaker, I keep looking at the clock. I believe there is an issue; would you please advise me on my remaining time?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Yes, the clock has stopped. You started at 7 pm, but you did take an intervention, so I think you can go for one more minute.

[Anna Dixon]

Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Very briefly, I am delighted that the Government are strengthening statutory sick pay. During covid, many care workers were forced to go into work—at their own risk, and risking those they were caring for—because they were not eligible for statutory sick pay, so strengthening it is an excellent move.

In conclusion, this Bill, together with the proposed Government amendments and some of those suggested by my hon. Friends, will ensure that the 1.5 million people working in adult social care can get fair pay, guaranteed hours, statutory sick pay and day one rights. It is good for workers, and it is good for women.

[Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)]

I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and my Unison membership.

I welcome the Bill, which is a once-in-a-generation chance to give more power to working people—including those in Ealing Southall—and I support the Government amendments to provide decent sick pay to 1.3 million low-paid workers. I do not support the Opposition’s amendments, which attempt to tie us up in knots in an effort to block working people from getting the rights they should be entitled to.

I particularly want to consider the impact of the Bill and the Government amendments on disabled people. Currently, almost 3 million people are off work long-term sick—a record high. Of course, some of those are disabled people who are unable to work. However, there are also many disabled people who desperately want to work, but who have been kicked out of their job because their employer refused to make simple changes that would allow them to succeed.

In my previous role as national disability officer for the country’s biggest trade union, Unison, we worked with Disability Rights UK and Scope to develop the disability employment charter. That charter is a list of improvements to help disabled people get, and keep, employment. Over 240 employers, both large and small, signed up to say that they backed the ideas in the charter—they backed disabled workers’ rights—but the previous Conservative Government saw it all as red tape. They did not listen, and they refused to introduce those changes. They left millions of disabled people who want to work stuck on benefits, and the Opposition’s amendments today are just more of the same.

Those 240 employers that signed the disability employment charter, and the many disabled workers who have been pushed out of their jobs, will be heartened to see the changes being introduced in the new Employment Rights Bill. Many of those changes implement the demands of the charter, including allowing flexible working, more support for trade union disability reps, and strengthening sick pay. Those 240 employers would reject the Opposition’s many amendments whose aim is to frustrate this support for disabled workers.

People are often surprised to learn that low-paid workers are not entitled to statutory sick pay, and that unless the employer company has its own scheme, they can claim statutory sick pay only after three days of being ill. During the pandemic, that led to social care staff, in particular, feeling forced to work when they had covid, potentially passing the illness on. Lack of access to sick pay is a public health issue, and this new law will ensure that low-paid workers no longer have to choose between not being paid and going to work sick. It will also give disabled workers time off to recover from illness rather than struggling into work., becoming sicker, and potentially falling out of employment for the long term. Being paid to take a few days off to recover could save them, and the economy, a lifetime of being left on the scrapheap.

[Anna Dixon]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Deirdre Costigan]

No, because many Members are waiting to speak.

I welcome Government amendments 80 to 85, which specify the level of sick pay that low-paid workers will now be able to expect from day one. I know that some employers wanted to pay a bit less and trade unions wanted a bit more, but 80% is a compromise. I certainly do not support the delaying tactics of the Opposition, who have sought impact appraisals that already exist and show that these changes will lead to an increase in productivity and growth if we can get disabled people working when they want to do so.

This transformative Bill responds to a key demand of the disability employment charter for a default right to flexible working. For many disabled workers, the ability to organise their hours around taking medication and dealing with pain or fatigue will mean being able to keep their job rather than ending up sick or being marched out of the door. In line with the charter, this new law also introduces paid time off for trade union equality representatives, a subject that I know we will discuss tomorrow. Negotiating reasonable adjustments can take time, and input from a trained person, whose priority is to keep the worker in his or her job, will make all the difference.

However, Unison research has established that nearly a quarter of disabled workers who asked their employers for reasonable adjustments waited a year or more for help, and some never even received a reply. You cannot do a job that causes you pain, or sets you up to fail, so it is no wonder that disabled people end up out of the door. The disability employment charter calls for a new right to a two-week deadline for at least receiving a reply to a reasonable adjustment request. Currently there is no deadline for such a response, although in the case of flexible working requests the employer must respond within eight weeks. I have had constructive discussions with the Minister for Social Security and Disability, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Sir Stephen Timms), and I am hopeful that we may see such a deadline included in the “Get Britain Working” plan, which complements the Bill.

Many good employers already support disabled workers, and I pay tribute to the 240 who have backed the disability employment charter and rights for those workers. The Bill and the Government amendments will ensure that there is a level playing field, so that bad employers cannot undercut those who want to do the right thing. They will ensure that more disabled workers can keep jobs that they value, and can contribute to the growth that we need to get our economy working again.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call Alex Sobel, and ask him to keep his remarks to four minutes.

[Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)]

I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and my 28-year membership of the GMB union.

New clause 72, which stands in my name, would place a duty on employers to investigate whistleblowing concerns and establish internal channels for reporting and managing whistleblower disclosures. In recent years we have seen scandals rock the country in which whistleblowers raised the alarm at an early stage only for their warnings to be ignored and for disastrous consequences to follow. Scandals with thousands of victims, such as the Post Office Horizon case, the Grenfell Tower fire tragedy and the collapse of Carillion, involved whistleblowers raising the alarm only to face a wall of silence. We saw the very worst of that at Yorkshire cricket club in my constituency when Azeem Rafiq suffered years of racist harassment and abuse. Despite the number of players who admitted to racist remarks or actions, the club’s leadership refused to accept their mistakes and refused to release the full report, instead releasing an edited summary. Only when Azeem appeared before the Culture, Media and Sport Committee did the full scale of institutional racism at the club become known.

These failures have a tragic human cost, and they often place a significant strain on the taxpayer. According to the report “The Cost of Whistleblowing Failures”, the avoidable costs incurred owing to the failure to listen to whistleblowers in the Post Office Horizon, Carillion and Letby cases was £426 million.

It is unacceptable for the taxpayer to have to bear the burden of failed systems and a failed legislative framework, which is why we need a new legal duty on employers to investigate whistleblowing. New clause 72 would ensure that employers must take “reasonable steps” to investigate any protected disclosure made to them. It would compel large employers to establish internal channels and appropriate procedures for reporting. By ensuring that disclosures are investigated, we can prevent scandals such as Horizon from occurring and ensure that harm in the workplace is dealt with early. The new clause is proudly pro-worker and pro-business, and would tackle one of the long-standing issues with our current whistleblowing legal framework for workers. The status quo provides only an after-the-event remedy for whistleblowers, and this new clause would ensure that there are channels for whistleblowers from the start.

18:24

YouGov and Protect’s research found that 76% of workers want a legal duty on employers to investigate whistleblowing concerns, and new clause 72 would deliver on the long-standing demands from workers. In the light of recent scandals, businesses are realising the value of whistleblowers in helping to root out wrongdoing and harm within their own companies. In its report on the Post Office scandal, the Institute of Directors recommends that

“all employers should be required to meet standards for whistleblowing and follow recognised procedures.”

New clause 72 would require employers to take “reasonable steps”, meaning that vexatious or insignificant concerns would not always require an investigation. This is a once-in- a-generation opportunity to revolutionise whistleblowing law.

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 was groundbreaking for its time, but the UK has since fallen behind our comparator jurisdictions, such as the EU and Japan, on whistleblower protections. I hope that the Government will consider supporting new clause 72 or equivalent measures, which would be good for workers, businesses and taxpayers. I also hope that the Minister will meet me to discuss this matter following today’s debate. Through this new clause, we can take action to ensure that whistleblowers are supported, that businesses are given the tools to root out wrongdoing, and that taxpayers are spared from having to bail out state scandals.

[Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)]

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and the fact that I am a proud trade union member. I give my full support to the measures in this landmark Bill.

In Derby we make things, from nuclear reactors that power submarines to the trains, cars and aeroplane engines that get people and goods where they need to go, and food production operations that help put food on our tables. We do not just have large companies with big economies of scale; we also have thousands of small and medium-sized companies. Many businesses that I have visited—large and small—are investing in their workforce, want to pay them properly and want to provide stable, secure work that enables their employees to build lives and families, but they want a level playing field so that they are not undercut by competitors that do not play by the rules, that avoid their responsibilities and that exploit those who work for them.

When people are stuck in insecure, low-paid work, planning for their future is impossible. It is wrong that so many people have no idea whether they will have five hours of work or 50 in a week, wrong that they have no idea whether they will earn enough to pay their bills, and wrong that they can have paid for childcare, be on a bus to work and get a call saying they are no longer needed. What is shocking is that we have 2.4 million people in irregular work, such as those on zero-hours or low-hours contracts, or in agency jobs. I am proud that this Government, through this Bill, are taking action to end exploitative zero-hours contracts, and that amendments 32 and 33 will ensure that agency workers are also protected.

On Second Reading of this groundbreaking Bill, I spoke about the importance of enforcement. A right is not worth the paper it is written on unless it is enforced; and the provisions that we make, the guidance that we set and the laws that we pass are only as strong as the enforcement.

For part of my career as a barrister, I had the honour of representing working people, but I always knew that for the many who did seek justice through tribunals, there were many who did not feel able to take action. The Low Pay Commission has found that low-paid and exploited workers can be reluctant to speak out about abuses of their rights. Last year we celebrated the 25th anniversary of a Labour Government bringing in the national minimum wage, but the Low Pay Commission estimates that one in five workers receiving it were not provided with the correct pay in 2022.

On Second Reading, I called for the strengthening of the Fair Work Agency, which will enforce the national minimum wage, statutory sick pay and a wide range of rights, such as holiday pay, so that everyone plays by the same rules. I am hugely pleased to see that new clauses have been tabled that would strengthen the powers of the Fair Work Agency. As we will talk about tomorrow, new clause 57 would give the agency powers to bring proceedings to an employment tribunal on behalf of workers. That could make a huge difference for workers, and it helps protect businesses from being undercut by acting as a real deterrent. The sooner that these measures are in place, the sooner enforcement can begin and justice can be delivered, and this will bring us better protections, better productivity and better growth.

[Justin Madders]

First, I think I need to mention that my hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead Central and Whickham (Mark Ferguson) is celebrating his 40th birthday today, and what a great way to spend his birthday. He is one of the people who have worked tirelessly over many years in different guises to help us get where we are today.

Given the number of speeches and contributions, it is just not going to be possible to pay tribute to everyone in the time I have, or indeed to reference every speech and every amendment, but I will do my best to cover as much as possible.

I will start with my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Nadia Whittome), whose new clause 73 relates to significant structural changes to the statutory sick pay system. I thought she made a very personal and persuasive speech, and I agree with her that phased returns to work are an effective tool in supporting people to stay in or return to work, helping to reduce the flow into economic inactivity and the cost to businesses of sickness absence. By removing the waiting period, employees will be entitled to statutory sick pay for every day of work missed. This better enables phased returns to work—for example, by supporting someone who normally works five days a week to work a three-day week, being paid SSP for the other two days. That simply would not have been possible under the existing system. We are committed to continuing to work closely with employees and employers to develop and implement a system that is fair, supportive and effective in kick-starting economic growth and breaking down barriers to opportunity, and we will continue to have conversations about that.

Turning to new clause 102 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), I pay tribute to him for his work as a shadow Minister in this area. The changes we are bringing in through this Bill mean that up to 1.3 million low-paid employees will now be entitled to statutory sick pay, and all eligible employees will be paid from the first day of sickness absence, benefiting millions of employees. The new percentage rate is consistent with the structure used for other statutory payments. It is simple to understand and implement, and with the removal of waiting periods, the internal modelling from the Department for Work and Pensions shows that most employees, even those who may nominally earn less per week, will not be worse off over the course of their sickness absence.

I believe the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Heeley (Louise Haigh) was her first from the Back Benches, and I do not think she will be on them for very long if she continues to make such contributions. I thought it was an excellent speech, and the way she spoke about her constituent Mr B really hammered home the importance of tackling non-disclosure agreements. I would like to pay tribute to her ongoing efforts to ensure that victims of misconduct and bullying can speak up about their experiences, and get the help and support they need.

I want to thank the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) for originally tabling the amendment, and for meeting me last week to share, sadly, another horrific story about the abuse of NDAs. I also thank the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) for her contribution in this area.

There are legitimate uses of NDAs, but I want to be clear—we have heard too many examples of this today—that they should not be used to silence victims of harassment or other misconduct. I understand that hon. Members want to ensure equal protection in relation to NDAs concerning harassment across the economy, and I absolutely hear what they have said. However, we have to acknowledge that this would be a far-reaching change, and it would be to take a significant step without properly engaging with workers, employers and stakeholders, and assessing the impact on sectors across the economy. I want to reiterate that I recognise that non-disclosure agreements are an important question that warrants further consideration, and we will continue to look at the issues raised. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Heeley said that she wants me to go further, and I look forward to engaging with her and with organisations such as Can’t Buy My Silence.

New clause 30, in the name of the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox), would give employees who are special constables the right to time off work to carry out their voluntary police duties. I join him in paying tribute to special constables, who make an invaluable contribution to policing across the country. It would not be appropriate, however, to support additional legislation on this matter without a comprehensive analysis on the impact such a change could bring to policing. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we debated it in Committee and my officials have been in discussion with colleagues at the Home Office to learn more about the topic. Further engagement is continuing with the staff association for special constables and the Association of Special Constabulary Officers. I recognise that the legislation is now half a century old and needs a considerable look. We cannot support the amendment tonight, but I am glad that there is at least one Member on the Conservative Benches who supports increasing employment rights.

Turning to new clause 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), I want to start by recognising the key role that paternal leave plays in supporting working families. The arrival of a child is transformative for all parents. The Government understand and value the vital role that fathers and partners play in raising children, and we want to support them to do that. I commend my hon. Friend for her work in this area.

We already have a statutory framework in place that guarantees eligible employed fathers and partners a protected period of paternity leave, ensuring that they cannot be required to work while claiming that leave, or be discriminated against by their employer for taking it. However, I recognise what my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Lola McEvoy) said about the limitations on those protections. I also pay tribute to her for her work on this issue.

Paternity leave is available to the father of the child or the mother’s partner irrespective of their gender, and the leave can be taken by the father or partner at any point in the first year following the child’s birth or adoption. I acknowledge the wider point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington, which is that we need to do more to ensure that the parental leave system as a whole supports working families. As a Government, we have committed to doing that. I recently met The Dad Shift, Pregnant then Screwed and Working Families to discuss that very issue.

Through the Bill, we are making paternity leave and unpaid parental leave day one rights, meaning that employees will be eligible to give notice of their intent to take leave from their first day of employment, removing any continuity of service requirement. That brings them both into line with maternity leave and adoption leave, simplifying the system. We are also committed to reviewing the parental leave system. The review will be conducted separately from this Bill. Work is already under way across Government on planning for its delivery and will commence before Royal Assent. We are scoping the work already under way across the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department for Business and Trade, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. We of course want and expect to engage widely with stakeholders as part of that review process, and I would expect my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow to engage with us in that respect.

New clause 6, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), would partially reinstate, to the Equality Act 2010, a similar measure that was sponsored by the previous Labour Government. This Government continue to have sympathy with its aims. We all know that the statutory questionnaire was sometimes found to be a helpful, informative tool. While the Government will not support new clause 6, we will be giving close consideration to the impact of the repeal of the statutory questionnaire and any steps that may be needed during this Parliament.

[Ms Creasy]

I am very pleased to hear confirmation that the review into parental rights, which I understand will begin in June, will go ahead. The Minister talks about stakeholders. Will he confirm whether they will include our trade union colleagues, because many of us are very happy to withdraw our amendments tonight on the basis that working people can be part of the conversation?

[Justin Madders]

I would fully expect us to consult with all relevant parties, so I do not think my hon. Friend need have any worries in that respect.

I pay tribute to two people who have been instrumental in shaping our thoughts on this issue: my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne). They tabled amendments on employment status. It is important to say that we are taking action in respect of those who work for umbrella companies. We have been clear that some reforms in the plan to make work pay will take longer to undertake and implement. We see consulting on a simpler two-part framework as a longer-term goal, but I assure them both that I remain committed to that. I also hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East says in relation to his concerns about fire and rehire. We will be looking very closely at how our reforms work in practice.

New clause 17 seeks to create a legal definition of kinship care to be used to establish eligibility for kinship care leave. New clause 18 aims to establish a new kinship care leave entitlement for employed kinship carers, with a minimum of 52 weeks of leave available for eligible employees. I am pleased to say that the Government’s Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill will, for the first time, create a legal definition of kinship care for the purposes of specific measures in the Bill. By defining kinship care in law, the legislation will ensure that all local authorities have a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes kinship care. I am also pleased to say that the Government have recently announced a £40 million package to trial a new kinship allowance. This is the single biggest investment made by this Government in kinship care to date and will enable children to be raised within their communities by their extended families.

New clause 10—another Liberal Democrat new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling)—which we debated in Committee, would commit the Government to introducing an entitlement for employees with caring responsibilities to be paid their usual wage while taking carer’s leave. While we have stressed the Government’s commitment to supporting employed unpaid carers and I have been engaging with Ministers and relevant bodies on the matter, the Carer’s Leave Act 2023 only recently gave employed carers a new right to time off work to care for a dependant with a long-term care need, so we are reviewing this measure and considering whether further support is required.

I recognise that many of their amendments and new clauses come from a good place, but the Liberal Democrats have to decide whether they are going to be Manchester United or Manchester City; their speeches were littered with concerns about the increase in costs from the Bill, yet every new clause and amendment seems only to add to those costs. I understand that they are coming from a good place, but they have to decide whether or not they support the Bill. I hope they can make that decision before tomorrow night. At least the Liberal Democrats are here, unlike the new kids on the block, who are absent from the Benches behind them—I pay tribute to them for actually turning up today.

I will now address the points raised by the Opposition on harassment, as set out in amendments 288 and 289, in the name of the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). Those amendments seek either to exclude the hospitality sector and sports venues from the Bill’s obligations for employers not to permit the harassment of their employees by third parties or to remove clause 18 altogether, thus depriving employees of protection from all types of harassment by third parties under the Equality Act. Let us be clear: this Government are committed to making workplaces and working conditions free from harassment, and we must therefore protect employees from third-party harassment.

I want to underline two important points in relation to clause 18. First, on the expectations it places on employers, I would like to assure the House that employers cannot and are not expected to police or control every action of third parties; instead, employers simply need to do what is reasonable. What is reasonable will, of course, depend on the specific circumstances of the employer. Further, the steps that an employer can reasonably take in respect of the actions of third parties in its workplace are clearly more limited than the steps it can take in respect of its employees, and employment tribunals will, of course, take that into account when considering the facts of the case.

The second point relates to the threshold for what constitutes harassment. Far too often, I have heard objections to clause 18 implying that employers will be liable if their staff are offended by comments made by third parties, which is not the case at all—a fact reflected, I think, by the Conservatives supporting a similar measure in the previous Parliament. In his opening remarks, the shadow Minister asked what evidence there was that this clause was needed. The NHS staff survey for 2023 revealed that a quarter of all staff had suffered harassment, bullying or abuse from patients or service users, while a Unite survey said that 56% of its members had suffered third-party harassment. Presumably that is why UKHospitality, in its written evidence to the Bill Committee, said that it supported the measures in principle. I will work with them to ensure that we protect everyone in the sector, because I believe that everyone who works in this country deserves protection from harassment. I think it is incredible that the Opposition cannot see a problem with arguing against that.

I will turn to new clause 105 on substitution clauses, which was tabled by the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). I think it is fair to say that we are aware of the risks. I have been working closely with the Minister for Border Security on illegal working by irregular migrants in the gig economy and the role that substitution clauses play in facilitating that. We will continue to work closely with the Home Office on this issue.

The Opposition also tabled new clause 87, which seeks to require the Secretary of State to have regard to the UK’s international competitiveness and economic growth when making any regulations under parts 1 and 2 of the Bill. The Government are already laser-focused on this key objective. Our plan to make work pay is a pro-growth package and sets out an ambitious agenda to deliver our plan for change by ensuring that employment rights are fit for a modern economy, empower working people and contribute to economic growth.

The plan will bring the UK back into line with our international competitors and directly address our low-growth, low-productivity and low-pay economy. [Interruption.] Conservative Members may be laughing, but they are the people who delivered that economy for so many years. International competitors and growth are at the heart of what we do. We will pay close attention to the potential impacts as we develop regulations to implement the measures in the Bill.

On small business support, I remind Members that I had a meeting with representatives from Inkwell, who said that introducing these changes will help create a happy and productive workplace and create a level playing field for employers. That is exactly what we want to achieve with the Bill. We understand that the best businesses want to look after their staff and that treating them well is good for business, good for workers and good for the wider economy. The Opposition’s narrow view seems to be that anything that is good for workers is automatically bad for businesses. We absolutely reject that analysis.

In conclusion, giving people a baseline of security and respect at work is fundamental. It is clear that we need a change from the system where people do not know what hours they will get from one week to the next, where people with caring responsibilities never get the same benefits of flexibility as their employers, where a minority of rogue employers can fire and rehire at will, and where care workers and teaching assistants have all been undervalued for far too long. It is time to end these injustices. It is time to make work pay.

19:36

Debate interrupted (Programme Order, this day).

The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question agreed to.

The Deputy Speaker then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).

New Clause 33

Collective agreements: contracting out

“(1) The Employment Rights Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 27BUA (inserted by section (Agency workers: guaranteed hours and rights relating to shifts)) insert—

‘CHAPTER 4B

Collective agreements: contracting out

27BUB Zero hours workers, etc

(1) This section applies in relation to—

(a) a duty imposed on an employer in respect of a worker, and

(b) a right conferred on a worker in respect of an employer, by or under any provision of Chapter 2, 3 or 4.

(2) The duty or right is excluded if—

(a) the worker is employed by the employer under a worker’s contract (“the contract”),

(b) a relevant collective agreement contains—

(i) terms that expressly exclude the duty or right, and

(ii) terms that expressly replace the excluded duty or right,

(c) the terms within paragraph (b)(ii) are incorporated into the contract, and

(d) the employer notifies the worker in writing of the incorporation and effect of those terms.

(3) A relevant collective agreement is a collective agreement that is—

(a) in writing, and

(b) made by or on behalf of—

(i) one or more trade unions which each have a certificate of independence, and

(ii) the worker’s employer.

27BUC Agency workers

(1) This section applies in relation to—

(a) a duty imposed on a hirer or a work-finding agency in respect of an agency worker, and

(b) a right conferred on an agency worker in respect of a hirer or a work-finding agency, by or under any provision of Chapter 4A (including Schedule A1).

(2) The duty or right is excluded if—

(a) the agency worker is supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer by virtue of a worker’s contract (“the contract”) that the agency worker has with another person (“the other party”),

(b) a relevant collective agreement contains—

(i) terms that expressly exclude the duty or right, and

(ii) terms that expressly replace the excluded duty or right,

(c) the terms within paragraph (b)(ii) are incorporated into the contract, and

(d) the other party notifies the agency worker in writing of the incorporation and effect of those terms.

(3) A relevant collective agreement is a collective agreement that is—

(a) in writing, and

(b) made by or on behalf of—

(i) one or more trade unions which each have a certificate of independence, and

(ii) the other party.

27BUD Supplementary provision

(1) For the purposes of sections 27BUB and 27BUC, it does not matter whether—

(a) terms in a collective agreement that expressly replace a duty or right relate to the same subject matter as the duty or right, or

(b) a collective agreement ceases to be in force after the terms mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(b)(ii) or 27BUC(2)(b)(ii) are incorporated into the contract (within the meaning of section 27BUB or 27BUC, as the case may be), provided the terms continue to be incorporated.

(2) Where the duty to make a guaranteed hours offer under Chapter 2 or 4A is excluded by virtue of terms that are incorporated into a contract with a worker or, as the case may be, an agency worker, as mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(c) or 27BUC(2)(c), during the offer period, the duty ceases to apply.

(3) Where—

(a) the duty to make a guaranteed hours offer under Chapter 2 or 4A is excluded by virtue of terms that are incorporated into a contract with a worker or, as the case may be, an agency worker, as mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(c) or 27BUC(2)(c),

(b) a guaranteed hours offer has already been made in compliance with the duty, and

(c) the worker or agency worker has not accepted the offer, the person who made the offer may withdraw it during the response period by giving a notice to the worker or agency worker.

(4) The notice must include a statement to the effect that the offer is withdrawn in consequence of the exclusion of the duty to make a guaranteed hours offer as a result of the incorporation into the worker’s or agency worker’s contract, as mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(c) or 27BUC(2)(c), of terms contained in a collective agreement that expressly replace that duty.

(5) A worker or an agency worker to whom a notice is given in reliance on subsection (3) may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that subsection (3) did not permit the notice to be given.

(6) Where a complaint is presented under subsection (5)—

(a) by a worker, sections 27BH and 27BI apply in relation to the complaint as they apply in relation to a complaint under section 27BG(5)(b);

(b) by an agency worker, paragraphs 9 and 10 of Schedule A1 apply in relation to the complaint as they apply in relation to a complaint under paragraph 7(7)(b) of that Schedule.

(7) Subsection (8) applies where—

(a) the duty to make a guaranteed hours offer under Chapter 2 or 4A is excluded by virtue of terms that are incorporated into a contract with a worker or, as the case may be, an agency worker, as mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(c) or 27BUC(2)(c), and

(b) the duty ceases to be excluded as a result of the terms ceasing to be incorporated into the contract (including where the contract ceases to be in force).

(8) In applying Chapter 2 or 4A for the purposes of the duty after it has ceased to be excluded—

(a) in any case where there was a reference period in relation to the duty as it had effect before being excluded, that reference period is to be disregarded,

(b) in relation to a worker and the worker’s employer, sections 27BA(5) and 27BF(3) have effect as if the first day on which the worker is employed by the employer is the day after the day on which the terms cease to be incorporated, and

(c) in relation to an agency worker and a hirer for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker works, paragraphs 1(5) and 6(3) of Schedule A1 have effect as if the first day on which the agency worker so works is the day after the day on which the terms cease to be incorporated.

27BUE Regulations

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision for the purposes of section 27BUB or 27BUC.

(2) The regulations may, in particular, make provision about—

(a) the effect on a duty in Chapters 2 to 4A of terms being or ceasing to be incorporated as mentioned in section 27BUB(2)(c) or 27BUC(2)(c),

(b) the form and manner in which a notice under section 27BUD(3) is to be given, and

(c) when a notice under section 27BUD(3) is to be treated as having been given.

27BUF Interpretation

(1) Terms used in this Chapter that are used in—

(a) Chapters 2 to 4 (rights relating to zero hours workers, etc), or

(b) Chapter 4A (including Schedule A1) (rights relating to agency workers), have the same meaning as in those Chapters or that Chapter (including that Schedule).

(2) In this Chapter, “certificate of independence” means a certificate issued under section 6 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

(3) In section 203 (restrictions on contracting out), in subsection (2), before paragraph (a) insert—

“(za) does not apply to terms of a collective agreement or contract that exclude a duty or right by virtue of provision made by or under Chapter 4B of Part 2A,”.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause adds a new clause (intended to go after NC32) which provides for the exclusion of duties or rights under new Chapters 2 to 4A of Part 2A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (inserted by clauses 1 to 3 of the Bill and that new clause) under the terms of collective agreements.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Collective redundancy consultation: protected period

“(1) Chapter 2 of Part 4 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (procedure for handling redundancies) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 189 (duty to consult representatives: complaint and protective award), in subsection (4), in the words after paragraph (b), for ‘90’ substitute ‘180’.

(3) In section 197 (power to vary provisions), in subsection (1)(b), for ‘periods’ substitute ‘period’.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would allow an employment tribunal to impose a higher protective award on an employer who is in breach of the requirements to consult representatives in a collective redundancy.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

Duty to keep records relating to annual leave

“(1) The Working Time Regulations 1998 (S.I. 1998/1833) are amended as follows.

(2) In Part 2 (rights and obligations concerning working time), after regulation 16A insert—

‘Records relating to annual leave entitlement

16B.—(1) An employer must—

(a) keep records which are adequate to show whether the employer has complied with the entitlements conferred by regulations 13(1), 13A(1), 15B(2) and 16(1) and the requirements in regulations 14(2) and (6) and 15E(2);

(b) retain such records for six years from the date on which they were made.

(2) The records referred to in paragraph (1)(a) may be created, maintained and kept in such manner and format as the employer reasonably thinks fit.’

(3) In regulation 29 (offences), in paragraph (1), after “the relevant requirements” insert “or with regulation 16B(1)”.

(4) In regulation 29C (restriction on institution of proceedings in England and Wales)—

(a) the existing provision becomes paragraph (1);

(b) after that paragraph insert—

‘(2) But paragraph (1) does not prevent the Secretary of State from instituting proceedings in England and Wales for an offence under regulation 29(1) in respect of a failure to comply with regulation 16B(1) (duty to keep records).’” —(Justin Madders.)

This new clause imposes an obligation on employers to keep records to show that they have complied with certain entitlements conferred on workers by the Working Time Regulations 1998 in relation to annual leave. Subsection (3) of the new clause makes it an offence, punishable with a fine, to fail to comply with this duty.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 36

Extension of regulation of employment businesses

“In section 13 of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 (interpretation), for subsection (3) substitute—

‘(3) For the purposes of this Act “employment business” means the business (whether or not carried on with a view to profit and whether or not carried on in conjunction with any other business) of participating in employment arrangements.

(3A) “Employment arrangements” means arrangements under which persons who are, or are intended to be, in the employment of a person are, or are intended to be, supplied to act for, and under the control of, another person in any capacity.

(3B) “Participating in” employment arrangements means doing any of the following in connection with the arrangements—

(a) being an employer of the persons who are, or are intended to be, supplied under the arrangements;

(b) paying for, or receiving or forwarding payment for, the services of those persons, in consideration of directly or indirectly receiving a fee from those persons;

(c) supplying those persons (whether or not under the arrangements);

(d) taking steps with a view to doing anything mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c).’”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would expand the scope of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 to cover other types of business that participate in arrangements under which persons are supplied by their employer to work for other persons (such as “umbrella companies”).

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 37

Power to establish Social Care Negotiating Body

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the Secretary of State may by regulations provide for there to be a body in England known as the Adult Social Care Negotiating Body for England.

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, the Welsh Ministers may, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, by regulations provide for there to be a body in Wales known as the Social Care Negotiating Body for Wales.

(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, the Scottish Ministers may, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, by regulations provide for there to be a body in Scotland known as the Social Care Negotiating Body for Scotland.

(4) Any power of the Welsh Ministers or the Scottish Ministers to make regulations under the remaining provisions of this Chapter may not be exercised without the agreement of the Secretary of State.

(5) In this Chapter—

‘the appropriate authority’—

(a) in relation to the Adult Social Care Negotiating Body for England, means the Secretary of State;

(b) in relation to the Social Care Negotiating Body for Wales, means the Welsh Ministers;

(c) in relation to the Social Care Negotiating Body for Scotland, means the Scottish Ministers;

‘Negotiating Body’ means a body established by regulations under this section.”—(Justin Madders)

This new clause would enable the Welsh Ministers and the Scottish Ministers, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, to establish a Social Care Negotiating Body for Wales and for Scotland respectively. As a result, Chapter 2 of Part 3 is amended to enable regulation-making powers conferred on the Secretary of State by Chapter 2 also to be exercisable by the Welsh Ministers and the Scottish Ministers. These powers may not be exercised without the Secretary of State’s agreement.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 38

Agency workers who are not otherwise “workers”

“(1) This section applies in any case where an individual (the ‘agency worker’)—

(a) is supplied by a person (the ‘agent’) to do work for another (the ‘principal’) under a contract or other arrangements made between the agent and the principal,

(b) is not, as respects that work, a worker, because of the absence of a worker’s contract between the individual and the agent or the principal, and

(c) is not a party to a contract under which the agency worker undertakes to do the work for another party to the contract whose status is, by virtue of the contract, that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.

(2) The provisions of this Chapter (other than this section) have effect as if there were a worker’s contract for the doing of the work by the agency worker made between the agency worker and—

(a) whichever of the agent and the principal is responsible for paying the agency worker in respect of the work, or

(b) if neither the agent nor the principal is so responsible, whichever of them pays the agency worker in respect of the work.

(3) For the purposes of Part 2 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protection of wages), as it applies in relation to the entitlements conferred by sections 38(2) and 39(5)—

(a) if at any time the agency worker and the person who, as a result of this section, is the person’s employer for the purposes of this Chapter would not (apart from this subsection) be regarded as the worker and the employer for the purposes of that Part, they are to be so regarded;

(b) it is to be assumed that there was a worker’s contract between those persons at that time.

(4) If there would (in the absence of this section) be no worker’s contract between the agency worker and the person who, as a result of this section, is the person’s employer for the purposes of this Chapter, for the purpose of enforcing any entitlement conferred by section 38(2) or (3) or 39(5) or (6) in civil proceedings on a claim in contract it is to be assumed that there is (or was) such a contract between those persons.

(5) Any reference in this section to doing work includes a reference to performing services, and ‘work’ is to be read accordingly.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause reproduces the provision previously found in clause 46(2) to (4) that ensures that the provisions of Chapter 2 of Part 3 also apply in relation to agency workers who are not otherwise “workers” as defined by clause 46. It also ensures that, where an agency worker does not have a worker’s contract, this does not prevent the agency worker from bringing a claim in an employment tribunal under Part 2 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, or in civil proceedings on a claim in contract, for a failure to pay the remuneration to which the agency worker would be entitled as a result of an agreement or regulations under Chapter 2.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 10

Carer’s leave: remuneration

“(1) In section 80K of the Employment Rights Act 1996, omit subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) In subsection (1)(a), “terms and conditions of employment” includes—

(a) matters connected with an employee’s employment whether or not they arise under the contract of employment, and

(b) terms and conditions about remuneration.””—(Steve Darling.)

This new clause would make Carer’s Leave a paid entitlement.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

19:37

Division 114

Ayes: 95

Noes: 323

New Clause 30

Special constables: right to time off for public duties

“(1) The Employment Rights Act 1996 is amended is follows.

(2) In section 50 (Right to time off for public duties), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) An employer shall permit an employee who is a special constable, appointed in accordance with section 27 of the Police Act 1996, section 9 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 or section 25 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, to take time off during the employee’s working hours for the purpose of performing their duties.

(1B) In section (1A), “duties” means any activity under the direction of a chief officer of police.’”—(Sir Ashley Fox.)

This new clause gives employees who are special constables the right to time off to carry out their police duties.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

19:50

Division 115

Ayes: 189

Noes: 324

New Clause 87

Regulations under Part 1 and 2

“When making regulations under Parts 1 and 2 of this Act, the Secretary of State must have regard to the following objectives—

(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom; and

(b) the economic growth of the United Kingdom in the medium to long term.”—(Greg Smith.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State, when making regulations under Part 1 and 2 of the Bill, to have regard to the objective of the international competitiveness of the economy and its growth in the medium to long term.

Brought up.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

20:05

Division 116

Ayes: 106

Noes: 340

Clause 1

Right to guaranteed hours

Amendments made: 8, page 3, line 5, leave out

“section 27BW for power to make provision about”

and insert

“Part 1 of Schedule A1 for provision about guaranteed hours and”.

This amendment is consequential on NC32 and NS1.

Amendment 9, page 3, line 30, at end insert—

“(7A) If, during a reference period—

(a) a worker was employed by an employer under one or more worker’s contracts of the type described in subsection (3)(a)(i) and one or more worker’s contracts of the type described in subsection (3)(a)(ii), and

(b) the hours that the worker worked under the worker’s contract, or the worker’s contracts, that are of the type described in subsection (3)(a)(ii) did not exceed the minimum number of hours,

the worker’s contract, or the worker’s contracts, that are of the type described in subsection (3)(a)(ii) are to be disregarded in the application of this Chapter (other than this subsection) in relation to the worker and the reference period (and accordingly that worker’s contract, or those worker’s contracts, are to be treated as not existing).”

This amendment deals with the possibility of a worker being employed by an employer during a reference period under a zero hours contract or zero hours arrangement and under another type of contract where the requirement on the employer to make work available is limited to a number of hours not exceeding a number specified in regulations.

Amendment 10, page 4, line 8, leave out

“make work available to the qualifying worker”

and insert

“provide the qualifying worker with work, and the qualifying worker to do work,”

This amendment confirms that the number of hours in a guaranteed hours offer are hours that the employer will be required to provide and the qualifying worker will be required to work.

Amendment 11, page 4, line 18, leave out from “the” to “or” in line 20 and insert “offered number of hours are to be provided and worked,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

Amendment 12, page 4, line 22, leave out from “the” to “and” in line 24 and insert “offered number of hours are to be provided and worked,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

Amendment 13, page 4, line 27, at end insert—

“(3A) Where no regulations are in force under subsection (2) that apply in relation to an offer by an employer to a qualifying worker, the offer is a guaranteed hours offer for the purposes of this Chapter only if it also proposes terms and conditions relating to when the offered number of hours are to be provided and worked (which need not be on particular days of the week, or at particular times on those days, or by reference to a particular working pattern of days or times of day).”

This amendment caters for the scenario where there are no regulations in force under proposed section 27BB(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or none that apply to the offer in question. In this scenario, a guaranteed hours offer will still have to propose terms and conditions relating to when the worker will work the guaranteed hours even though it will not have to set out particular days and times, or a particular working pattern.

Amendment 14, page 4, line 32, leave out “, whether an” and insert

“that apply in relation to an offer, whether the”.

This amendment makes a minor drafting change because regulations under proposed section 27BB(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 may make provision subject to exceptions (see proposed section 27BX of that Act inserted by clause 4).

Amendment 15, page 4, line 42, at end insert “, and

(c) the qualifying worker did not work for the employer under any other worker’s contract during the period beginning with the first day of the relevant reference period and ending with the day the offer is made.”

This amendment adds a further condition that must be satisfied if a guaranteed hours offer is to take the form of an offer to vary a worker’s terms and conditions of employment as opposed to an offer to enter into a new worker’s contract.

Amendment 16, page 5, line 10, after “(2)” insert

“or subsections (1) and (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 13.

Amendment 17, page 5, line 17, after “(2)” insert

“or subsections (1) and (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 13.

Amendment 18, page 6, line 27, after “(2)” insert

“or section 27BB(1) and (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 13.

Amendment 19, page 11, line 26, at end insert—

“( ) Where—

(a) an employer is permitted by section 27BUD(3) to withdraw a guaranteed hours offer (withdrawal of offer following incorporation of terms of collective agreement), and

(b) the employer withdraws the offer by giving notice under that section, subsection (1) of this section ceases to apply in relation to the offer when the notice is given.”

This amendment clarifies that where an offer is withdrawn as a result of the duty to make the offer being excluded by terms of a collective agreement that are incorporated into a worker’s contract the worker cannot accept the offer.

Amendment 20, page 12, line 39, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 and insert—

“(i) where regulations are in force under subsection (2) of section 27BB that apply in relation to the offer, subsections (1) and (3) of that section (read with any regulations in force under subsection (4)(a) or (b) of that section), or

(ii) where no regulations are in force under subsection (2) of section 27BB that apply in relation to the offer, subsections (1) and (3A) of that section (read with any regulations in force under subsection (4)(a) of that section).”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 13. It also makes a minor drafting change (see the explanatory statement for amendment 14).

Amendment 21, page 13, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that—

(a) the duty imposed by section 27BA(1) applies to the worker’s employer in relation to the worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) the guaranteed hours offer that the employer has made to the worker in relation to that reference period is on terms requiring the employer to provide, and the worker to do, less work than would have been the case if the employer had not, during that reference period—

(i) limited (by whatever means, including termination of a worker’s contract or an arrangement) the number of hours of work made available to the worker, or

(ii) decided to make work available to the worker in the way that the employer did, for the sole or main purpose of being able to comply with the duty by making such a reduced offer.

(3B) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that the duty imposed by section 27BA(1) would have applied to the worker’s employer in relation to the worker and a particular reference period if the employer had not, during that reference period—

(a) limited (by whatever means, including termination of a worker’s contract or an arrangement) the number of hours of work made available to the worker, or

(b) decided to make work available to the worker in the way that the employer did, for the sole or main purpose of preventing the worker from satisfying, in relation to that reference period, one or more of the conditions in section 27BA(3)(b) to (d).”

This amendment adds additional grounds of complaint to the ones listed in proposed section 27BG of the Employment Rights Act 1996 to cater for cases where an employer has sought to manipulate or avoid their obligations to make a guaranteed hours offer.

Amendment 22, page 13, line 14, leave out “or (3)” and insert “, (3) or (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21.

Amendment 23, page 13, line 17, leave out from “is” to end of line 19 and insert “—

(i) treated as having been withdrawn by virtue of section 27BD(2) or regulations under section 27BD(6) , or

(ii) withdrawn in accordance with section 27BUD(3) (withdrawal of offer following incorporation of terms of collective agreement).”

This amendment is consequential on NC33.

Amendment 24, page 14, line 6, after “27BG(3)” insert “or (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21. It has the effect of providing for a six month time limit (from the making of the guaranteed hours offer) to apply in relation to complaints under the subsection (3A) inserted by that amendment.

Amendment 25, page 14, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under section 27BG(3B) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after what would have been the last day of the offer period (as defined in section 27BG(7)) if the duty imposed by section 27BA(1) had applied.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21.

Amendment 26, page 15, line 8, leave out from “is” to end of line 10 and insert “—

(a) where the complaint is under section 27BG(1), (2), (3), (5) or (6), such number of weeks’ pay as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations;

(b) where the complaint is under section 27BG(3A) or (3B), such amount as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations.”—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21.

Clause 2

Shifts: rights to reasonable notice

Amendments made: 27, page 15, line 39, at end insert—

“and the shift is to be worked under the contract referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).”

This amendment clarifies that a shift of which reasonable notice must be given under proposed new section 27BJ(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is one that is to be worked under a contract referred to in that provision.

Amendment 28, page 16, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert—

“(c) the shift is to be worked under that contract but no part of it corresponds to the time of a shift provided for by the contract as described in paragraph (b).”

Proposed new section 27BJ(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is about employers giving reasonable notice of shifts to workers who have contracts of a specified description that guarantee some work and provide when some or all of that work will be done. This amendment limits the notice requirement to shifts that are to happen at times that do not overlap with the times provided for by the contract. But see also amendment 29.

Amendment 29, page 16, line 30, at end insert—

“(5A) Where—

(a) the conditions in subsection (2)(a) and (b) are met in relation to a worker and a worker’s contract,

(b) the worker is to work (or is working) a shift under that contract all or part of which corresponds to the time of a shift (a “guaranteed shift”) provided for by the contract as described in subsection (2)(b),

(c) the employer requests or requires the worker to start earlier, or end later, than is provided for by the contract (as described in subsection (2)(b)) in relation to the guaranteed shift, and

(d) the earlier start or later end is to result in an additional number of hours being worked above the number of hours to be worked in the guaranteed shift, the additional hours are to be treated for the purposes of this Chapter as a separate shift (and accordingly as one that meets the condition in subsection (2)(c)).”

This amendment will produce the result that workers who have contracts of a specified description that guarantee some work and provide when some or all of that work will be done will be entitled to reasonable notice of extensions of their guaranteed shifts.

Amendment 30, page 17, line 35, leave out from “see” to end of line 36 and insert

“Part 2 of Schedule A1 for provision about rights of agency workers to reasonable notice in relation to shifts).”

This amendment is consequential on NC32 and NS1.

Amendment 31, page 17, line 37, leave out “, or a longer shift,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 29 and 33.

Amendment 32, page 17, line 41, leave out from “applies” to end of line 42 and insert

“(even though the conditions in section 27BK(1) have not been met).”

This amendment clarifies the effect of proposed section 27BL(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Amendment 33, page 17, line 42, at end insert—

“(2A) Section 27BJ(5A) applies for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section as if section 27BJ(5A)(c) referred to what the worker suggests rather than what the employer requests or requires.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 29.

Amendment 34, page 18, line 2, after “request” insert “(a “multi-worker request”)”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 35.

Amendment 35, page 18, line 5, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of section 27BK, where an employer has made a multi-worker request to a worker in relation to a shift, references to the cancellation of the shift include the worker not being needed to work the shift because one or more others have agreed to work it.”

This amendment clarifies how the provision in proposed section 27BK of the Employment Rights Act 1996 about cancellation of a shift is to operate where the request to work the shift was made to more workers than were needed to work it.

Amendment 36, page 18, leave out lines 6 to 17.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment removes proposed section 27BL(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 from the Bill. This provision is no longer considered necessary; where appropriate, a request will in any event be treated as a request to work a new shift.

Clause 3

Right to payment for cancelled, moved and curtailed shifts

Amendments made: 37, page 20, leave out lines 28 to 40 and insert—

“(3) A shift is also a “qualifying shift”, in relation to a worker and an employer, if—

(a) it would be (or would have been) worked, or is being worked, by the worker for the employer under a worker’s contract of a specified description,

(b) the contract provides on what days and at what times, or in accordance with what pattern of days and times, that work, or some of that work, is to be done by the worker, and

(c) no part of the shift corresponds to the time of a shift provided for by the contract as described in paragraph (b).

(4) Where—

(a) the conditions in subsection (3)(a) and (b) are met in relation to a shift,

(b) all or part of the shift corresponds to the time of a shift (a “guaranteed shift”) provided for by the contract as described in subsection (3)(b),

(c) the employer requests or requires, or the worker suggests, that the worker starts earlier, or ends later, than is provided for by the contract (as described in subsection (3)(b)) in relation to the guaranteed shift, and

(d) the earlier start or later end is to result in an additional number of hours being worked above the number of hours to be worked in the guaranteed shift, the additional hours are to be treated for the purposes of this Chapter as a separate shift (and accordingly as a “qualifying shift”).”

This amendment is the equivalent for clause 3 of amendments 28, 29 and 33 to clause 2.

Amendment 38, page 21, leave out lines 41 to 44 and insert—

“(10) In this Chapter, references to a request to work a shift made by an employer to a worker include a request (a “multi-worker request”) made by the employer to the worker and one or more others in circumstances where the employer does not need the shift to be worked by all of those to whom the request is made.”

This amendment is partly consequential on amendments 39 and 41. It is also being made for reasons of consistency with the equivalent provision in clause 2.

Amendment 39, page 21, line 44, at end insert—

“(11) For the purposes of this Chapter, where an employer has made a multi-worker request to a worker in relation to a shift, references to the cancellation of the shift (however expressed) include the worker not being needed to work the shift because one or more others have agreed to work it.”

This amendment clarifies how the provision in proposed section 27BP of the Employment Rights Act 1996 about cancellation of a shift is to operate where the request to work the shift was made to more workers than were needed to work it.

Amendment 40, page 23, line 7, leave out from “see” to end of line 8 and insert “Part 3 of Schedule A1 for provision about rights of agency workers to payment for cancelled, moved and curtailed shifts);”.

This amendment is consequential on NC32 and NS1.

Amendment 41, page 23, line 8, at end insert—

“(aa) in relation to the cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift that an employer has requested a worker to work, unless the worker reasonably believed, whether on agreeing to work the shift or at some later time before the cancellation, movement or curtailment, that they would be needed to work the shift;”

This amendment produces the result that, in cases within proposed section 27BP(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a worker will not be entitled to a payment for a short notice cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift unless at some point prior to that they reasonably believed they would be needed to work the shift.

Amendment 42, page 23, line 14, leave out from “regulations” to “the” in line 15 and insert

“has produced the effect that the employer is not required to make”.

This amendment makes a drafting change to proposed section 27BR(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 for reasons of consistency.

Amendment 43, page 23, leave out lines 19 and 20 and insert—

“(a) any information the disclosure of which by the employer would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether a disclosure would do so, the duty imposed by that subsection is to be taken into account);”.

This amendment has the effect that personal data may be included in a notice given by an employer under proposed section 27BR(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 but only in so far as the disclosure of the information would not contravene data protection legislation.

Amendment 44, page 23, line 24, at end insert—

“(3A) In subsection (3)(a) “the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(9) of that Act).”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 43.

Amendment 45, page 25, line 2, leave out “is inadequate or untrue” and insert “—

(i) does not refer to any provision of the regulations;

(ii) does not contain an explanation or contains an explanation that is inadequate or untrue.”

This amendment sets out what a worker can present a complaint about in relation to a notice under proposed section 27BR(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Amendment 46, page 25, leave out lines 25 to 29.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment removes proposed section 27BT(7) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 from the Bill. This provision is no longer considered necessary and, depending on how the power in proposed section 27BR(1)(b) was exercised, it might not have produced an appropriate outcome in some cases.

Clause 4

Amendments relating to sections 1 to 3

Amendments made: 47, page 26, line 17, leave out from first “the” to end of line 19 and insert

“meaning given by section 27BUA;”.

This amendment is consequential on NC32.

Amendment 48, page 27, leave out lines 9 to 14.

See the explanatory statement for NC32.

Amendment 49, page 27, line 22, after “3” insert

“and (Agency workers: guaranteed hours and rights relating to shifts)”.

This amendment is consequential on NC32.

Amendment 50, page 27, line 22, after “3” insert

“and (Collective agreements: contracting out)”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC33.

Clause 7

Right to request flexible working

Amendment made: 79, page 29, line 12, at end insert—

“(7) In section 202 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (national security), in subsection (2), after paragraph (e) insert—

“(eza) Part 8A,”.”—(Justin Madders.)

Clause 7 of the Bill amends Part 8A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 to require an employer who refuses an employee’s application for flexible working to explain why the employer considers it is reasonable to refuse the application. This amendment would enable the disclosure of information under Part 8A to be restricted where it would be contrary to the interests of national security.

Clause 9

Statutory sick pay in Great Britain: lower earnings limit etc

Amendments made: 80, page 30, line 1, leave out “£116.75” and insert “£118.75”.

Clause 9 in its current form amends section 157(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 so that the weekly rate of statutory sick pay in Great Britain would be the lower of £116.75 and a percentage of an employee’s normal earnings to be set out in regulations. This amendment, together with the Minister’s other amendments to clause 9, would mean that the weekly rate of statutory sick pay in Great Britain would be the lower of £118.75 and 80% of an employee’s weekly earnings. The change from £116.75 to £118.75 is to account for annual uprating that is expected to come into effect on 6 April 2025.

Amendment 81, page 30, line 2, leave out “the prescribed percentage” and insert “80%”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 80.

Amendment 82, page 30, line 4, leave out paragraph (b). —(Justin Madders.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 80.

Clause 11

Statutory sick pay in Northern Ireland: lower earnings limit etc

Amendments made: 83, page 30, line 34, leave out “£116.75” and insert “£118.75”.

Clause 11 in its current form amends section 153(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 so that the weekly rate of statutory sick pay in Northern Ireland would be the lower of £116.75 and a percentage of an employee’s normal earnings to be set out in regulations. This amendment, together with the Minister’s other amendments to clause 11, would mean that the weekly rate of statutory sick pay in Northern Ireland would be the lower of £118.75 and 80% of an employee’s weekly earnings. The change from £116.75 to £118.75 is to account for annual uprating that is expected to come into effect on 6 April 2025.

Amendment 84, page 30, line 35, leave out “the prescribed percentage” and insert “80%”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 83.

Amendment 85, page 30, line 37, leave out paragraph (b). —(Justin Madders.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 83.

Clause 18

Harassment by Third Parties

Amendment proposed: 288, page 34, line 32, leave out Clause 18—(Greg Smith.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

20:18

Division 117

Ayes: 105

Noes: 409

Clause 22

Dismissal during pregnancy

Amendments made: 86, page 36, line 15, at end insert—

“( ) Part 5B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (redundancy during a protected period of pregnancy) is amended as follows.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 87.

Amendment 87, page 36, line 24, at end insert—

“( ) After section 49D insert—

“49E Section 49D: supplemental

Regulations under section 49D may—

(a) make provision about notices to be given, evidence to be produced and other procedures to be followed by employees and employers;

(b) make provision for the consequences of failure to give notices, to produce evidence or to comply with other procedural requirements;

(c) make provision for the consequences of failure to act in accordance with a notice given by virtue of paragraph (a);

(d) make special provision for cases where an employee has a right which corresponds to a right under section 49D and which arises under a contract of employment or otherwise;

(e) make provision modifying the effect of Chapter 2 of Part 14 (calculation of a week’s pay) in relation to an employee who is or has been absent from work during, or after, a protected period of pregnancy;

(f) make provision applying, modifying or excluding an enactment, in such circumstances as may be specified and subject to any conditions specified, in relation to a person during, or after, a protected period of pregnancy;

(g) make different provision for different cases or circumstances.””

Section 49D of the Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended by clause 22, enables the Secretary of State to make regulations about redundancy or dismissal during, or after, a protected period of pregnancy. This amendment would enable the regulations to make supplementary provision in connection with that, such as procedures to be followed by employers and the consequences of failing to follow those procedures. These powers mirror supplementary powers conferred by Part 8 of the 1996 Act in relation to types of family leave such as maternity and paternity leave.

Amendment 88, page 36, line 25, leave out from beginning to “after” and insert “In the heading of Part 5B,”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 87.

Clause 24

Dismissal for failing to agree to variation of contract, etc

Amendment made: 89, page 37, line 29, leave out “substantially the same duties” and insert

“the same duties, or substantially the same duties,”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment makes a minor drafting change.

Clause 25

Collective redundancy: extended application of requirements

Amendments made: 90, page 39, line 8, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) before subsection (1) insert—

‘(A1) Subsection (1) applies where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant within a period of 90 days or less—

(a) at least the threshold number of employees (see section 195A), or

(b) 20 or more employees at one establishment.’;

(b) in subsection (1), for the words from ‘Where’ to ‘the employer’ substitute ‘The employer’;

(c) in subsection (1A), for ‘(1)’ substitute ‘(A1)’;

(d) after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) This section does not require the employer to—

(a) consult all of the appropriate representatives together, or

(b) undertake the consultation with a view to reaching the same agreement with all of the appropriate representatives.’;

(e) in subsection (4)—

(i) in paragraph (c), at the beginning insert ‘where the employees whom it is proposed to dismiss as redundant are at only one establishment,’;

(ii) after paragraph (c) insert—

‘(ca) where the employees whom it is proposed to dismiss as redundant are at more than one establishment—

(i) the total number of employees of any such description employed by the employer, and

(ii) details of the establishments at which those employees are employed,’.”

This amendment and other amendments to this clause would mean that the Secretary of State can by regulations, in a case where employees are being made redundant at more than one establishment, prescribe a higher number than 20 of those employees for the purposes of determining when the obligations in sections 188 and 193 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 apply in relation to those employees. The number may be determined by reference to criteria set out in the regulations (for example, by reference to a particular percentage of total employees). This amendment also clarifies that, although consultation under section 188 must be carried out with all appropriate representatives, it need not be carried out with all appropriate representatives together or with a view to reaching the same agreement with all appropriate representatives.

Amendment 91, page 39, line 12, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) omit subsection (1);

(b) before subsection (2) insert—

‘(1A) Subsection (2) applies where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant within a period of 90 days or less—

(a) at least the threshold number of employees (see section 195A), or

(b) 20 or more employees at one establishment.’;

(ba) in subsection (2)—

(i) for the words from ‘An employer’ to ‘period’ substitute ‘The employer’;

(ii) omit paragraphs (a) and (b);

(bb) after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) The notice must be given—

(a) before the employer gives notice to terminate an employee’s contract of employment in respect of any of the dismissals;

(b) at least 30 days before the first of the dismissals takes effect, or, where the employer is proposing to dismiss 100 or more employees as mentioned in subsection (1A), at least 45 days before the first of the dismissals takes effect.’;

(bc) in subsection (3), for ‘(1) or (2)’ substitute ‘(1A)’;”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Amendment 92, page 39, line 15, at end insert—

“(d) in subsection (6), omit ‘(1) or’;

(e) in subsection (7), for ‘(1)’ substitute ‘(2)’.”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Amendment 93, page 39, line 15, at end insert—

“( ) After section 195 insert—

‘195A Construction of references to threshold number of employees

(1) In this Chapter references to the threshold number of employees are references to the number of employees determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(2) Regulations under this section may (among other things) provide that the number is—

(a) a specified number;

(b) a number determined by reference to a specified percentage of employees;

(c) a number that is the highest or lowest of two or more numbers, whether those numbers are specified numbers, determined by reference to a specified percentage of employees, or determined in another way specified in the regulations.

(3) But the regulations may not provide in any case for the threshold number of employees to be lower than 20.

(4) For the purposes of determining a number by reference to a specified percentage of employees, the regulations may make provision for determining how many employees an employer has, including (among other things)—

(a) provision about the time by reference to which that determination is to be made;

(b) provision excluding employees of a specified description from being taken into account in that determination.

(5) Regulations under this section may make different provision for different purposes, including (among other things)—

(a) different provision in respect of different provisions of this Chapter;

(b) different provision in respect of different descriptions of employer.

(6) Regulations under this section may contain such incidental, supplementary or transitional provision as appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient.

(7) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.

(8) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section (whether alone or with other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument is laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(9) In this section “specified” means specified in the regulations.’”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Amendment 94, page 39, line 15, at end insert—

“( ) In section 193A (redundancies of ships’ crew)—

(a) in subsection (1)(a), omit ‘193(1) or’;

(b) in subsection (2), for ‘section 193(1) or (2)’ substitute ‘section 193(2)’.”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Amendment 95, page 39, line 17, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) in paragraph (a), for ‘188(2) and 193(1)’ substitute ‘188(1A) and 193(2A)(b)’;

(b) in the words after paragraph (b), for ‘188(2) and 193(1)’ substitute ‘188(1A) and 193(2A)(b)’.”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Amendment 96, page 39, line 21, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) in subsection (1)(b), for the words from ‘20 or more employees’ to ‘or less,’ substitute ‘within a period of 90 days or less—

(i) at least the threshold number of employees (see section 195A), or

(ii) 20 or more employees at one establishment,’;

(b) in subsection (4)(a)—

(i) for ‘and as if’ substitute ‘and, where relevant, as if’;

(ii) for ‘(1)(b)’ substitute ‘(1)(b)(ii)’.”—(Justin Madders.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 90.

Clause 26

Collective redundancy notifications: ships’ crew

Amendment made: 97, page 40, line 1, leave out “after ‘or (2)’” and insert “before ‘to the competent authority’”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 94.

Clause 31

Power to establish the Adult Social Care Negotiating Body

Amendments made: 98, page 48, line 32, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“(1) Where the appropriate authority provides for there to be a Negotiating Body under section (Power to establish Social Care Negotiating Body), the authority may by regulations make further provision about the Negotiating Body.”

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 99, page 49, line 16, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 100, page 49, line 19, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority ”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 32

Matters within the Negotiating Body’s remit

Amendments made: 101, page 49, line 39, leave out third “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 102, page 49, line 41, before first “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 103, page 49, line 41, before second “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 104, page 50, line 1, before “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 105, page 50, line 2, before “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 106, page 50, line 3, before “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 107, page 50, line 4, before “social” insert “relevant”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 108, page 50, line 5, after “(1)” insert—

“‘relevant social care worker’ , in relation to a Negotiating Body, means a social care worker employed in, or in connection with, the provision of social care in the area for which the Negotiating Body is established;”

This amendment is consequential on NC37. It ensures that the matters within each Negotiating Body’s remit must relate to social care workers employed in, or in connection with, the provision of social care in England, Wales or Scotland as applicable.

Amendment 109, page 50, line 6, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”. —( Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 33

Meaning of “social care worker”

Amendments made: 110, page 50, line 8, leave out from “means” to end of line 10 and insert—

“(a) in relation to England, a person who is employed wholly or mainly in, or in connection with, the provision of social care to individuals aged 18 or over;

(b) in relation to Wales or Scotland, a person who is employed wholly or mainly in, or in connection with, the provision of social care to any individual.”

The effect of this amendment is that a Negotiating Body established for Wales or Scotland may consider matters relating to people working in adult or children’s social care.

Amendment 111, page 50, line 11, leave out “adult”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 110.

Amendment 112, page 50, line 13, leave out “aged 18 or over”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 110.

Amendment 113, page 50, line 16, leave out from “assistance,” to end of line 20.—( Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 110.

Clause 34

Consideration of matters by the Negotiating Body

Amendments made: 114, page 50, line 23, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 115, page 50, line 24, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 116, page 50, line 30, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 117, page 50, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 118, page 50, line 34, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 119, page 51, line 4, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 120, page 51, line 6, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”. —( Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 35

Reconsideration by the Negotiating Body

Amendments made: 121, page 51, line 9, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 122, page 51, line 9, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 123, page 51, line 10, leave out “Secretary of State, the Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority, the authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 124, page 51, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 125, page 51, line 14, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 126, page 51, line 19, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 127, page 51, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 128, page 51, line 32, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 129, page 51, line 34, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”. —(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 36

Failure to reach an agreement

Amendments made: 130, page 51, line 37, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 131, page 51, line 38, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 132, page 52, line 2, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 133, page 52, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”. —(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 37

Power to ratify agreements

Amendments made: 134, page 52, line 9, leave out first “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 135, page 52, line 10, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 136, page 52, line 11, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”. —(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 38

Effect of regulations ratifying agreement

Amendments made: 137, page 52, line 15, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 138, page 52, line 16, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 139, page 52, line 17, after second “the” insert “social care”.

This amendment makes a minor drafting change.

Amendment 140, page 52, line 20, after “the” insert “social care”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment makes a minor drafting change.

Clause 39

Power of Secretary of State to deal with matters

Amendments made: 141, page 52, line 27, leave out first “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 142, page 52, line 27, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 143, page 52, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 144, page 52, line 32, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 145, page 53, line 3, after second “the” insert “social care”.

This amendment makes a minor drafting change.

Amendment 146, page 53, line 6, after “the” insert “social care”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment makes a minor drafting change.

Clause 40

Guidance and codes of practice

Amendments made: 147, page 53, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 148, page 53, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “authority”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 149, page 53, line 14, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 150, page 53, line 16, after “made” insert “by the authority”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 41

Duty of employers to keep records

Amendment made: 151, page 54, line 6, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations under this section that provide for any of those provisions of that Act to apply in relation to such records may provide for section 49 of that Act (restrictions on contracting out) to apply, with or without modifications, in relation to the application of those provisions by the regulations.”—(Justin Madders.)

Clause 41 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring employers to keep records for the purposes of Chapter 2 of Part 3. The regulations may also provide for provisions of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 relating to the keeping of records, for example section 10, which confers a right to access records, to apply in relation to records kept for the purposes of Chapter 2. The amendment would enable section 49 of that Act also to be applied by the regulations. Section 49 operates to prevent an agreement from seeking to limit or exclude the operation of the 1998 Act or prevent a person from bringing proceedings under that Act in an employment tribunal. Any provision of a social care worker’s contract that sought to prevent the worker from, say, accessing records kept by virtue of clause 41 would therefore be void.

Clause 42

Enforcement of matters relating to pay

Amendment made: 152, page 54, line 8, leave out clause 42.—(Justin Madders.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 250.

Clause 43

Regulations under section 37 or 39: supplementary

Amendment made: 153, page 55, line 4, leave out from “submitted” to “or” in line 5 and insert

“by a Negotiating Body to the appropriate authority,”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 45

Status of agreements, etc

Amendments made: 154, page 55, line 18, leave out first “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 155, page 55, line 18, leave out second “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 156, page 55, line 23, leave out “the” and insert “a”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Clause 46

Interpretation of this Chapter

Amendments made: 157, page 55, line 25, at end insert—

“‘the appropriate authority’ has the meaning given by section (Power to establish Social Care Negotiating Body)(5);”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 158, page 55, line 32, at end insert—

“‘enactment’ means—

(a) an Act of Parliament,

(b) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales or an Act of Senedd Cymru, or

(c) an Act of the Scottish Parliament;”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37. It would enable, for example, regulations made by the Scottish Ministers setting up a Negotiating Body to make consequential amendments of Acts of the Scottish Parliament.

Amendment 159, page 55, leave out line 33 and insert—

“‘Negotiating Body’ has the meaning given by section (Power to establish Social Care Negotiating Body)(5);”.

This amendment is consequential on NC37.

Amendment 160, page 56, line 1, after “‘agency worker’” insert “, ‘relevant social care worker’”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 108.

Amendment 161, page 56, line 12, leave out subsections (2) to (4).—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC38.

New Schedule 1

Agency workers: guaranteed hours and rights relating to shifts

“Before Schedule 1 to the Employment Rights Act 1996 insert—

“Schedule A1

Agency workers: guaranteed hours and rights relating to shifts

Part 1

Right to guaranteed hours

Right for qualifying agency workers to be offered guaranteed hours

1 (1) A hirer must make a guaranteed hours offer to an agency worker in accordance with paragraph 2 after the end of every period—

(a) that is a reference period in relation to that agency worker and that hirer, and

(b) in relation to which the agency worker is a qualifying agency worker of the hirer.

(2) Paragraph 4 makes provision for exceptions to this duty, including in certain cases where the agency worker stops working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer.

(3) An agency worker is a qualifying agency worker of a hirer in relation to a reference period if—

(a) during the reference period the agency worker worked for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer for a number of hours (the “reference period hours”),

(b) the reference period hours satisfy such conditions as to number, regularity or otherwise as are specified, and

(c) when the agency worker worked the reference period hours, it was not as an excluded agency worker.

(4) In relation to an agency worker and a hirer for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker works, each of the following is a “reference period”—

(a) the initial reference period, and

(b) each subsequent reference period.

(5) “The initial reference period”, in relation to an agency worker and a hirer for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker works, means the period—

(a) beginning with—

(i) where the agency worker is working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer on the day on which sub-paragraph (1) comes into force (“the commencement day”), the commencement day, or

(ii) where the agency worker is not so working, the first day after the commencement day on which the agency worker is working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, and

(b) ending with the specified day.

(6) A “subsequent reference period”, in relation to an agency worker and a hirer for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker works, means a period beginning and ending with the specified days.

(7) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule—

(a) references to a “hirer” are to a person for and under the supervision and direction of whom agency workers are supplied to work;

(b) references to a “qualifying agency worker” are to an agency worker who is a qualifying agency worker of a hirer in relation to a reference period by virtue of sub-paragraph (3), and

(c) the reference period in relation to which the agency worker is a qualifying agency worker of the hirer is referred to as “the relevant reference period”.

(8) Nothing in this Part of this Schedule prevents a hirer from making one or more other offers to a qualifying agency worker to enter into a worker’s contract, at the same time as making a guaranteed hours offer.

(9) Regulations made under sub-paragraph (3)(b), (5) or (6) may, in particular, include provision to take account of time when an agency worker does not work for a specified reason.

(10) In this paragraph, “excluded agency worker” means an agency worker who is of a specified description.

Requirements relating to a guaranteed hours offer

2 (1) An offer by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker is a guaranteed hours offer for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule if it is an offer to enter into a worker’s contract and the worker’s contract will require the hirer to provide the qualifying agency worker with work, and the qualifying agency worker to do work, for a number of hours that reflects the reference period hours in the relevant reference period.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that an offer by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker is a guaranteed hours offer for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule only if it also satisfies the condition in sub-paragraph (3).

(3) The condition referred to in sub-paragraph (2) is that—

(a) the offer sets out—

(i) the days of the week, and the times on those days, when the offered number of hours are to be provided and worked, or

(ii) a working pattern of days, and times of day, by reference to which the offered number of hours are to be provided and worked, and

(b) those days and times reflect, or that pattern reflects, when the qualifying agency worker worked the reference period hours in the relevant reference period.

(4) Where no regulations are in force under sub-paragraph (2) that apply in relation to an offer by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker, the offer is a guaranteed hours offer for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule only if it also proposes terms and conditions relating to when the offered number of hours are to be provided and worked (which need not be on particular days of the week, or at particular times on those days, or by reference to a particular working pattern of days or times of day).

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how it is to be determined—

(a) whether an offer reflects the number of hours worked by a qualifying agency worker during a reference period;

(b) where regulations are in force under sub-paragraph (2) that apply in relation to an offer, whether the offer reflects when hours were worked by a qualifying agency worker during a reference period.

(6) A guaranteed hours offer—

(a) must not propose a worker’s contract that is a limited-term contract unless it is reasonable for it to be entered into as such a contract, and

(b) must (in addition to what is required by or under sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) or sub-paragraphs (1) and (4)) propose terms and conditions of employment—

(i) that, taken as a whole, are no less favourable than the terms and conditions relating to matters other than working hours and length of employment under which the qualifying agency worker worked for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer during the relevant reference period, or

(ii) where paragraph 3 applies, that comply with sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph.

(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)(a) it is reasonable for a worker’s contract to be entered into, between a hirer and a qualifying agency worker, as a limited-term contract only if—

(a) it is reasonable for the hirer to consider that the qualifying agency worker is only needed to perform a specific task and the worker’s contract provides for termination when the task has been performed,

(b) it is reasonable for the hirer to consider that the qualifying agency worker is only needed until the occurrence of an event (or the failure of an event to occur) and the worker’s contract provides for termination on the occurrence of the event (or the failure of the event to occur), or

(c) it is reasonable for the hirer to consider that there is only a temporary need of a specified description (not falling within paragraph (a) or (b)) for the qualifying agency worker to do work under the worker’s contract and the worker’s contract is to expire at a time when it is reasonable for the hirer to consider that the temporary need will come to an end.

(8) A guaranteed hours offer—

(a) must be made by no later than the specified day,

(b) must be made in the specified form and manner, and

(c) must be accompanied by specified information relating to the offer.

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about when a guaranteed hours offer is to be treated as having been made.

(10) In this paragraph, “reference period hours”, in relation to a qualifying agency worker and a relevant reference period, has the same meaning as in paragraph 1(3).

Requirements relating to a guaranteed hours offer: supplementary

3 (1) This paragraph applies where, during the relevant reference period, the terms and conditions relating to matters other than working hours and length of employment under which the qualifying agency worker worked for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer were not the same throughout the relevant reference period.

(2) Where this paragraph applies, the guaranteed hours offer may propose terms and conditions of employment (in addition to what is required by or under paragraph 2(1) and (2) or paragraph 2(1) and (4)) that, taken as a whole, are less favourable than the most favourable terms and conditions relating to matters other than working hours and length of employment that the qualifying agency worker had when working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer during the relevant reference period, but only if—

(a) those proposed terms and conditions, taken as a whole, are no less favourable than the least favourable terms and conditions relating to matters other than working hours and length of employment that the qualifying agency worker had when working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer during the relevant reference period, and

(b) the proposal of those terms by the hirer constitutes a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

(3) If a hirer relies on sub-paragraph (2) when making a guaranteed hours offer to a qualifying agency worker, the hirer must give to the qualifying agency worker a notice that—

(a) states that the hirer has done so, and

(b) explains how the proposed terms and conditions constitute a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

(4) A notice under sub-paragraph (3) must be given by no later than the same day, and in the same form and manner, as the guaranteed hours offer (see paragraph 2(8)).

Guaranteed hours offer: exceptions to duty to make offer and withdrawal of offer

4 (1) The duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) on a hirer in relation to a qualifying agency worker does not apply if, during the relevant reference period or the offer period, the qualifying agency worker stops working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in relevant circumstances.

(2) A guaranteed hours offer made by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker is to be treated as having been withdrawn if, during the response period, the qualifying agency worker stops working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in relevant circumstances.

(3) Relevant circumstances occur where—

(a) the qualifying agency worker declines to continue working under the supervision and direction of the hirer other than in circumstances in which the qualifying agency worker is entitled to do so without notice by reason of the hirer’s conduct;

(b) the hirer tells the work-finding agency, or other person, that has been supplying the qualifying agency worker to the hirer to stop supplying the qualifying agency worker and—

(i) the hirer’s reason for doing so (or, if more than one, the hirer’s principal reason for doing so) is a qualifying reason, and

(ii) in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the hirer’s undertaking) the hirer has acted reasonably in treating the reason (or the principal reason) as a sufficient reason for telling the work-finding agency, or other person, to stop supplying the qualifying agency worker.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b), “qualifying reason”, in relation to a qualifying agency worker, means a reason falling within sub-paragraph (5) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify telling a work-finding agency, or other person, to stop supplying an agency worker doing work of the kind which the qualifying agency worker was supplied to the hirer to do.

(5) A reason falls within this sub-paragraph if it—

(a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the qualifying agency worker to do work of the kind which the qualifying agency worker was supplied to the hirer to do,

(b) relates to the conduct of the qualifying agency worker, or

(c) is that the qualifying agency worker could not continue to do work of the kind which the qualifying agency worker was supplied to the hirer to do without contravention (whether on the part of the qualifying agency worker, on the part of the hirer or on the part of the work-finding agency or other person that supplied the qualifying agency worker) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any legislation.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) not to apply, or for a guaranteed hours offer that has been made to be treated as having been withdrawn, in other specified circumstances.

(7) Where, by virtue of sub-paragraph (2), a guaranteed hours offer made by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker is treated as having been withdrawn, the hirer must, by no later than the end of the response period, give a notice to the qualifying agency worker stating this to be the case.

(8) Where, by virtue of regulations under sub-paragraph (6)—

(a) a hirer who would otherwise have been subject to the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) in relation to a qualifying agency worker and a particular reference period is not required to make a guaranteed hours offer to the qualifying agency worker, or

(b) a guaranteed hours offer made by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker is treated as having been withdrawn, the hirer must give a notice to the qualifying agency worker that states which provision of the regulations has produced the effect referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) (as the case may be).

(9) A notice under sub-paragraph (8) must be given by a hirer to a qualifying agency worker—

(a) where it is required to be given by virtue of paragraph (a) of that sub-paragraph, by no later than the end of the offer period;

(b) where it is required to be given by virtue of paragraph (b) of that sub-paragraph, by no later than the end of the response period.

(10) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the form and manner in which a notice under sub-paragraph (7) or (8) must be given;

(b) when a notice under sub-paragraph (7) or (8) is to be treated as having been given.

(11) In this paragraph—

“capability”, in relation to a qualifying agency worker, means the qualifying agency worker’s capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality;

“the offer period”, in relation to a qualifying agency worker and the hirer for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker worked, means the period beginning with the day after the day on which the relevant reference period ends and ending with—

(a) the day on which a guaranteed hours offer is made to the qualifying agency worker by the hirer, or

(b) if no guaranteed hours offer is made before the day specified under paragraph 2(8)(a) as the last day on which the hirer may make such an offer to the qualifying agency worker, that last day;

“qualifications”, in relation to a qualifying agency worker, means any degree, diploma or other academic, technical or professional qualification relevant to the work which the qualifying agency worker is supplied to the hirer to do;

“the response period”, in relation to a guaranteed hours offer made to a qualifying agency worker, means the period—

(a) beginning with the day after the day on which the offer is made, and

(b) ending with the specified day.

Acceptance or rejection of a guaranteed hours offer

5 (1) Where a hirer makes a guaranteed hours offer to a qualifying agency worker and the offer is not treated as having been withdrawn by virtue of paragraph 4(2) or regulations under paragraph 4(6), the qualifying agency worker may, by giving notice to the hirer before the end of the response period, accept or reject the offer.

(2) Where a qualifying agency worker gives notice under sub-paragraph (1) accepting an offer, the qualifying agency worker and the hirer that made the offer are to be treated as entering into a worker’s contract in the terms of the offer on the day after the day on which notice is given.

(3) But a qualifying agency worker and a hirer may agree, for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2), that the worker’s contract is to be treated as being entered into on a later day than the day mentioned in that sub-paragraph.

(4) If a qualifying agency worker to whom a guaranteed hours offer has been made does not give notice under sub-paragraph (1) before the end of the response period, the qualifying agency worker is to be treated as having rejected the offer.

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the form and manner in which notice under sub-paragraph (1) must be given by a qualifying agency worker to a hirer;

(b) when notice given by a qualifying agency worker to a hirer under sub-paragraph (1) is to be treated as having been given.

(6) In this paragraph, “the response period” has the same meaning as in paragraph 4.

(7) Where—

(a) a hirer is permitted by section 27BUD(3) to withdraw a guaranteed hours offer (withdrawal of offer following incorporation of terms of collective agreement), and

(b) the hirer withdraws the offer by giving notice under that section, sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph ceases to apply in relation to the offer when the notice is given.

Information about rights conferred by Part 1 of Schedule A1

6 (1) Where—

(a) a work-finding agency has a worker’s contract or an arrangement with an agency worker by virtue of which the agency worker is (or is to be) supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of a hirer, and

(b) it is reasonable to consider that the agency worker might become a qualifying agency worker of a hirer in relation to a reference period (whether the initial reference period, or a subsequent reference period, as defined in paragraph 1), the work-finding agency must take reasonable steps, within the initial information period, to ensure that the agency worker is aware of specified information relating to the rights conferred on agency workers by this Part of this Schedule.

(2) A work-finding agency that is subject to the duty in sub-paragraph (1) in relation to an agency worker must take reasonable steps to ensure that, after the end of the initial information period, the agency worker continues to have access to the specified information referred to in that sub-paragraph at all times when—

(a) the worker’s contract or (as the case may be) the arrangement so referred to continues to be in force, and

(b) it is reasonable to consider that the agency worker might become (or might again become) a qualifying agency worker of a hirer in relation to a reference period.

(3) “The initial information period”, in relation to an agency worker and the work-finding agency with which the agency worker has a worker’s contract or an arrangement by virtue of which the agency worker is (or is to be) supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of a hirer, means the period of two weeks beginning with—

(a) where the worker’s contract or arrangement is in force on the day on which paragraph 1(1) comes into force (“the commencement day”), the commencement day, or

(b) where it is not in force on that day, the first day after the commencement day on which it is in force.

(4) But where, on the day referred to in sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (b), it was not reasonable to consider that the agency worker might become a qualifying agency worker of a hirer in relation to any reference period, sub-paragraph (3) is to be read as if it provided for “the initial information period” to mean the period of two weeks beginning with the day on which it becomes reasonable so to consider.

Complaints to employment tribunals against a hirer: grounds

7 (1) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) applies to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) by the end of the last day of the offer period, the hirer has not made an offer to enter into a worker’s contract in compliance (or purported compliance) with that duty (whether because the hirer does not consider that the agency worker is a qualifying agency worker in relation to the reference period or for any other reason).

(2) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) applies to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) the offer that the hirer has made to the agency worker in relation to that reference period to enter into a worker’s contract is not a guaranteed hours offer as described in—

(i) where regulations are in force under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 2 that apply in relation to the offer, sub-paragraphs (1) and (3) of that paragraph (read with any regulations in force under sub-paragraph (5)(a) or (b) of that paragraph), or

(ii) where no regulations are in force under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 2 that apply in relation to the offer, sub-paragraphs (1) and (4) of that paragraph (read with any regulations in force under sub-paragraph (5)(a) of that paragraph).

(3) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) applies to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) the guaranteed hours offer that the hirer has made to the agency worker in relation to that reference period does not comply with paragraph 2(6).

(4) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) applies to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) the guaranteed hours offer that the hirer has made to the agency worker in relation to that reference period is on terms requiring the hirer to provide, and the agency worker to do, less work than would have been the case if the hirer had not, during that reference period—

(i) limited (by whatever means) the number of hours of work that the agency worker was requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and a work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or

(ii) caused the agency worker to be requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and a work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in the way that the agency worker was,

for the sole or main purpose of the hirer being able to comply with the duty by making such a reduced offer.

(5) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) would have applied to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period if the hirer had not, during that reference period—

(a) limited (by whatever means) the number of hours of work that the agency worker was requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and a work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or

(b) caused the agency worker to be requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and a work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in the way that the agency worker was,

for the sole or main purpose of preventing the agency worker from satisfying, in relation to that reference period, the condition in paragraph 1(3)(a) or (b).

(6) A complaint under sub-paragraph (2), (3) or (4)—

(a) may be presented whether or not the offer in question has been accepted by the agency worker, but

(b) may not be presented in relation to an offer that is—

(i) treated as having been withdrawn by virtue of paragraph 4(2) or regulations under paragraph 4(6), or

(ii) withdrawn in accordance with section 27BUD(3) (withdrawal of offer following incorporation of terms of collective agreement).

(7) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that a hirer—

(a) has failed to give to the agency worker a notice under paragraph 4(7) or (8);

(b) has given to the agency worker a notice under paragraph 4(7) or (8)(b) in circumstances in which the hirer should not have done so;

(c) has given to the agency worker a notice in purported compliance with paragraph 4(8) that does not refer to any provision of the regulations or refers to the wrong provision.

(8) In this paragraph, “the last day of the offer period”, in relation to a reference period, means the day specified under paragraph 2(8)(a) as the last day on which a guaranteed hours offer may be made in relation to that reference period.

Complaints to employment tribunals against a work-finding agency: grounds

8 (1) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal, against a relevant work-finding agency, that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) applies to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, but

(b) during that reference period the relevant work-finding agency—

(i) limited (by whatever means, including termination of a worker’s contract or an arrangement) the number of hours of work that the agency worker was requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the relevant work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or

(ii) caused the agency worker to be requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the relevant work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in the way that the agency worker was,

for the sole or main purpose of enabling the hirer to comply with the duty by making an offer to the agency worker on terms requiring the hirer to provide, and the agency worker to do, less work than would otherwise have been the case.

(2) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal, against a relevant work-finding agency, that the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) would have applied to a hirer in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period if the relevant work-finding agency had not, during that reference period—

(a) limited (by whatever means, including termination of a worker’s contract or an arrangement) the number of hours of work that the agency worker was requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the relevant work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or

(b) caused the agency worker to be requested or required, by virtue of a worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the relevant work-finding agency, to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in the way that the agency worker was,

for the sole or main purpose of preventing the agency worker from satisfying, in relation to that reference period, the condition in paragraph 1(3)(a) or (b).

(3) A complaint under sub-paragraph (1)—

(a) may be presented whether or not an offer has been made by the hirer to the agency worker and, if it has, whether or not the offer has been accepted by the agency worker, but

(b) where an offer has been made, may not be presented where the offer is—

(i) treated as having been withdrawn by virtue of paragraph 4(2) or regulations under paragraph 4(6), or

(ii) withdrawn in accordance with section 27BUD(3) (withdrawal of offer following incorporation of terms of collective agreement).

(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), references to a “relevant work-finding agency”, in relation to an agency worker, a hirer and a reference period, are to a work-finding agency with which the agency worker had a worker’s contract or arrangement by virtue of which the agency worker was (or could have been) supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer during the reference period in question.

(5) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that a work-finding agency has failed to comply with—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 6(1);

(b) the duty imposed by paragraph 6(2).

Complaints to employment tribunals: time limits

9 (1) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(1) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the last day of the offer period (as defined in paragraph 7(8)).

(2) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(2) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day when the offer referred to in that provision is made.

(3) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(3) or (4) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day when the guaranteed hours offer referred to in that provision is made.

(4) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(5) or 8(2) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after what would have been the last day of the offer period (as defined in paragraph 7(8)) if the duty in paragraph 1(1) had applied.

(5) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(7)(a) relating to a notice unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on or before which the notice should have been given (see paragraph 4(7) and (9)).

(6) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 7(7)(b) or (c) relating to a notice unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on which the notice is given.

(7) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 8(1) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the last day of the offer period (as defined in paragraph 7(8)).

(8) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 8(5)(a) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the last day of the initial information period (see paragraph 6(3) and (4)).

(9) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under paragraph 8(5)(b) unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which the agency worker first becomes aware of the failure to which the complaint relates.

(10) But, if the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under paragraph 7 or 8 to be presented before the end of the relevant period of six months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

(11) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1) to (9).

Remedies

10 (1) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under paragraph 7 or 8 well-founded, the tribunal—

(a) must make a declaration to that effect, and

(b) may make an award of compensation to be paid by the respondent to the agency worker.

(2) The amount of compensation under sub-paragraph (1)(b) is to be such amount, not exceeding the permitted maximum, as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances to compensate the agency worker for any financial loss sustained by the agency worker which is attributable to the matter complained of.

(3) In ascertaining the financial loss sustained, the tribunal must apply the same rule concerning the duty of a person to mitigate their loss as applies to damages recoverable under the common law of England and Wales or (as the case may be) Scotland.

(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2), “the permitted maximum” is—

(a) where the complaint is under paragraph 7(1), (2), (3) or (7) or 8(5), such number of weeks’ pay as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations;

(b) where the complaint is under paragraph 7(4) or (5) or 8(1) or (2), such amount as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations.

(5) For the purposes of determining the permitted maximum for an award of compensation to be paid by a hirer (where the complaint is under paragraph 7(1), (2), (3) or (7))—

(a) the amount of a week’s pay is (subject to paragraph (b)) the amount of average weekly remuneration received by the agency worker for working for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer in the reference period in question;

(b) the amount of a week’s pay is not to exceed the amount specified in section 227(1) (as amended from time to time).

(6) For the purposes of determining the permitted maximum for an award of compensation to be paid by a work-finding agency (where the complaint is under paragraph 8(5))—

(a) the amount of a week’s pay is (subject to paragraph (b)) the amount of average weekly remuneration received by the agency worker, in the relevant period, for working for and under the supervision and direction of a hirer (or, if more than one, all of the hirers taken together) by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement between the work-finding agency and the agency worker;

(b) the amount of a week’s pay is not to exceed the amount specified in section 227(1) (as amended from time to time);

(c) “the relevant period” means—

(i) where the worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the work-finding agency ceased to be in force on or before the date the complaint was presented to the employment tribunal, the period of 12 weeks (or, if it was not in force for 12 weeks, the shorter period for which it was in force) ending with the latest day before the last day on which it was in force on which the agency worker worked for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or (if more than one) one of the hirers, referred to in paragraph (a);

(ii) where the worker’s contract or arrangement between the agency worker and the work-finding agency did not so cease to be in force, the period of 12 weeks (or, if it had not then been in force for 12 weeks, the shorter period for which it had been in force) ending with the latest day before the date on which the complaint was presented to the employment tribunal on which the agency worker worked for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer, or (if more than one) one of the hirers, referred to in paragraph (a);

(d) Chapter 2 of Part 14 does not apply (and this paragraph applies instead), where the agency worker to whom compensation is to be paid is an employee of the work-finding agency.

Power to change the effect of Part 1 of Schedule A1

11 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision that, in relation to specified descriptions of agency workers, has the effect that—

(a) a hirer is not required by this Part of this Schedule to make a guaranteed hours offer, and

(b) a work-finding agency, or another person involved in the supply or payment of an agency worker, is instead required to make a corresponding or similar offer (and is liable to have a complaint against them presented to an employment tribunal on grounds corresponding or similar to those in paragraph 7).

(2) The provision referred to in sub-paragraph (1) may be made by amending this Act (or otherwise).

(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) may make consequential provision, including provision amending—

(a) an Act of Parliament (including this Act);

(b) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales or an Act of Senedd Cymru;

(c) an Act of the Scottish Parliament.

Part 2

Shifts: rights to reasonable notice

Application of Part 2 of Schedule A1

12 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in relation to a shift that would be (or would have been) worked, or is being worked, by an individual as an agency worker.

(2) But nothing in this Part of this Schedule applies in relation to a shift that would be (or would have been) worked, or is being worked, by an individual as an agency worker if, in relation to the agency worker, the shift is an excluded shift.

(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, “excluded shift”, in relation to an agency worker, means a shift of a specified description.

(4) Regulations under sub-paragraph (3) may, in particular, specify a description of shift by reference to—

(a) the amount payable for working the shift being more than a specified amount;

(b) the number of hours to be worked during the shift, whether alone or taken together with other shifts of a specified description, being more than a specified number;

(c) the shift corresponding to the time of a shift provided for by a worker’s contract between the agency worker and a work-finding agency or another person involved in the supply or payment of the agency worker (and where the regulations so specify a description of shift, the regulations may include provision similar or corresponding to section 27BJ(5A)).

(5) In the application of this Part of this Schedule in relation to an agency worker and a shift, references to—

(a) “the work-finding agency” are to the work-finding agency with which the agency worker has a worker’s contract or an arrangement and by virtue of which the agency worker would work (or would have worked) or is working the shift;

(b) “the hirer” are to the person for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker would work (or would have worked) or is working the shift.

Right to reasonable notice of a shift

13 (1) An agency worker is entitled to be given, by the work-finding agency or the hirer, reasonable notice of a shift that the agency worker is requested or required to work by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement that the agency worker has with the work-finding agency.

(2) It is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that notice of a shift is not reasonable notice if it is given less than a specified amount of time before the shift is due to start.

(3) In this paragraph and paragraphs 14 and 15, “notice of a shift” means notice of how many hours are to be worked during the shift and when the shift is to start and end.

Right to reasonable notice of cancellation of or change to a shift

14 (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies in relation to an agency worker where—

(a) the agency worker has been given notice of a shift by the work-finding agency or the hirer, and

(b) where the shift is one that the agency worker has been requested (rather than required) to work, the agency worker has agreed to work it.

(2) The agency worker is entitled to be given, by the work-finding agency or the hirer, reasonable notice of—

(a) the cancellation of the shift;

(b) any change requested or required by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement that the agency worker has with the work-finding agency consisting of—

(i) a change to when the shift is to start or end;

(ii) a reduction in the number of hours to be worked during the shift because of a break in the shift;

(but this is subject to paragraph 17).

(3) It is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that—

(a) notice of the cancellation of a shift is not reasonable notice for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) if it is given less than a specified amount of time before the shift would have started (if the shift had not been cancelled);

(b) notice of a change to when a shift is to start is not reasonable notice for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) if it is given less than a specified amount of time before the earlier of—

(i) when the shift would have started (if the shift had not been changed), and

(ii) when the shift is due to start (having been changed);

(c) notice of any other change to a shift is not reasonable notice for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) if it is given—

(i) less than a specified amount of time before the shift is due to start;

(ii) on or after the start of the shift.

Paragraphs 13 and 14: liability of work-finding agency and hirer

15 (1) The work-finding agency is liable for a breach of paragraph 13 or 14, in relation to an agency worker and a shift, to the extent that it is responsible for the breach.

(2) The hirer is liable for a breach of paragraph 13 or 14, in relation to an agency worker and a shift, to the extent that it is responsible for the breach.

(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, the hirer is not responsible for a breach of paragraph 13 or 14 in relation to an agency worker and a shift (and accordingly is not liable for the breach) if—

(a) the hirer gives notice to the work-finding agency of the shift or (as the case may be) of the cancellation of, or change to, the shift, and

(b) that notice is such as to enable the work-finding agency to give reasonable notice to the agency worker under paragraph 13 or 14.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide, in relation to an agency worker and a shift, that the work-finding agency is solely responsible for a breach of paragraph 13 or 14 (and accordingly is solely liable for the breach) where the hirer is a person of a specified description.

Paragraphs 13 to 15: supplementary

16 (1) Where an agency worker suggests working a shift and the work-finding agency or the hirer agrees to the suggestion—

(a) nothing in paragraph 13 applies in relation to the shift as suggested by the agency worker, but

(b) paragraph 14(2) applies (even though the conditions in paragraph 14(1) have not been met).

(2) In paragraphs 13 and 14, references to a request made to an agency worker to work a shift include a request (a “multi-worker request”) made to the agency worker and one or more others in circumstances where not all of those to whom the request is made are needed to work the shift.

(3) For the purposes of paragraph 14, where a multi-worker request has been made to an agency worker in relation to a shift, references to the cancellation of the shift include the agency worker not being needed to work the shift because one or more others have agreed to work it.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the form and manner in which notices under paragraphs 13 to 15 must be given;

(b) when notice under those paragraphs is to be treated as having been given.

Interaction with Part 3 of Schedule A1

17 (1) Where a work-finding agency—

(a) is required to make a payment to an agency worker under paragraph 21(1) in relation to a shift that is cancelled, moved or curtailed at short notice, or

(b) would have been required to make such a payment in relation to the shift but for provision made under paragraph 23(1)(c),

nothing in paragraph 14(2) is to be taken to have applied in relation to the cancellation, movement or curtailment of the shift that gave rise to, or would have given rise to, the requirement to make the payment.

(2) Terms used in this paragraph have the same meaning as in paragraph 21.

Complaints to employment tribunals

18 (1) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that the work-finding agency or the hirer is liable for a breach of paragraph 13 or 14 in relation to the agency worker and a shift.

(2) Where, in determining whether a complaint under this paragraph is well-founded, the tribunal must determine whether reasonable notice has been given, the tribunal must have regard, in particular, to such of the specified matters as are appropriate in the circumstances.

(3) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under this paragraph unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with—

(a) where the complaint is that the work-finding agency or the hirer is liable for a breach of paragraph 13 in relation to the agency worker and a shift, the day on which the shift was due to start;

(b) where the complaint is that the work-finding agency or the hirer is liable for a breach of paragraph 14(2) in relation to the agency worker and the cancellation of a shift, the day on which the shift would have started (if the shift had not been cancelled);

(c) where the complaint is that the work-finding agency or the hirer is liable for a breach of paragraph 14(2) in relation to the agency worker and a change to a shift, the day on which the shift as changed was due to start or, where the shift was changed on or after its start, the day on which the shift started.

(4) But, if the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint to be presented before the end of the relevant period of six months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

(5) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3).

Remedies

19 (1) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under paragraph 18 well-founded, the tribunal—

(a) must make a declaration to that effect, and

(b) may make an award of compensation to be paid by the respondent to the agency worker.

(2) The amount of compensation under sub-paragraph (1)(b) in relation to a complaint is to be such amount, not exceeding the specified amount, as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances to compensate the agency worker for any financial loss sustained by the agency worker which is attributable to the matter complained of.

(3) In ascertaining the financial loss sustained, the tribunal must apply the same rule concerning the duty of a person to mitigate their loss as applies to damages recoverable under the common law of England and Wales or (as the case may be) Scotland.

(4) Where an employment tribunal makes an award of compensation under sub-paragraph (1)(b) to an agency worker in relation to a shift and both the work-finding agency and the hirer are respondents, the amount of compensation payable by each respondent is to be such amount (if any) as the tribunal considers just and equitable having regard to the extent of each respondent’s responsibility for the breach to which the complaint relates.

Part 3

Right to payment for cancelled, moved and curtailed shifts

Application of Part 3 of Schedule A1

20 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in relation to a shift that would be (or would have been) worked, or is being worked, by an individual as an agency worker.

(2) In the application of this Part of this Schedule in relation to an agency worker and a shift, references to—

(a) “the work-finding agency” are to the work-finding agency with which the agency worker has a worker’s contract or an arrangement and by virtue of which the agency worker would work (or would have worked) or is working the shift;

(b) “the hirer” are to the person for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker would work (or would have worked) or is working the shift.

Right to payment for a cancelled, moved or curtailed shift

21 (1) A work-finding agency must make a payment of a specified amount to an agency worker each time that, by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement that the agency worker has with the work-finding agency, there is a cancellation, movement or curtailment at short notice of a shift—

(a) that the agency worker has been informed they are required to work for the hirer (by virtue of that worker’s contract or arrangement),

(b) that the agency worker has been requested to work for the hirer (by virtue of that worker’s contract or arrangement) and the agency worker has agreed to work, or

(c) that the agency worker has suggested working for the hirer and it has been agreed (by virtue of that worker’s contract or arrangement) that the agency worker is to work,

(but see paragraph 23 for exceptions to this duty).

(2) A payment that a work-finding agency is required to make under sub-paragraph (1) must be made by no later than the specified day.

(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, “short notice” means—

(a) in relation to the cancellation of a shift, notice given less than a specified amount of time before the shift would have started (if the shift had not been cancelled);

(b) in relation to the movement of a shift, or the movement and curtailment (at the same time) of a shift, notice given less than a specified amount of time before the earlier of—

(i) when the shift would have started (if the shift had not been moved, or moved and curtailed), and

(ii) when the shift is due to start (having been moved, or moved and curtailed);

(c) in relation to the curtailment of a shift where there is a change to when the shift is to start (but there is no movement of the shift), notice given less than a specified amount of time before the earlier of—

(i) when the shift would have started (if there had not been the change), and

(ii) when the shift is due to start (the change having been made);

(d) in relation to the curtailment of a shift where there is no change to when the shift is to start, notice given—

(i) less than a specified amount of time before the shift is due to start;

(ii) on or after the start of the shift.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about when notice of the cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift is to be treated as having been given to an agency worker for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule.

(5) In this Part of this Schedule, references to the “movement” of a shift (however expressed) are to any change to the day on which or the time at which the shift is to start that is a change of more than a specified amount of time.

(6) In this Part of this Schedule, references to a request made to an agency worker to work a shift include a request (a “multi-worker request”) made to the agency worker and one or more others in circumstances where not all of those to whom the request is made are needed to work the shift.

(7) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, where a multi-worker request has been made to an agency worker in relation to a shift, references to the cancellation of the shift include the agency worker not being needed to work the shift because one or more others have agreed to work it.

Regulations under paragraph 21: supplementary

22 (1) Regulations under paragraph 21(1) may not specify an amount to be paid to an agency worker in relation to the cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift that exceeds—

(a) where the shift is cancelled, the amount of remuneration to which the agency worker would have been entitled had they worked the hours that will not be worked because of the cancellation;

(b) where the shift is moved, or moved and curtailed (at the same time), and no part of the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed, corresponds to the time of the shift (“the original shift”) before it was moved, or moved and curtailed, the amount of remuneration to which the agency worker would have been entitled had they worked the original shift;

(c) where the shift is moved, or moved and curtailed (at the same time), and part of the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed, corresponds to the time of the original shift (but part does not), the amount of remuneration to which the agency worker would have been entitled had they worked the part of the original shift that does not correspond to the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed;

(d) where the shift is—

(i) curtailed but not moved, or

(ii) moved and curtailed (at the same time) and the shift as moved and curtailed is to start and end within the time of the original shift,

the amount of remuneration to which the agency worker would have been entitled had they worked the hours that will not be worked because of the curtailment, or the movement and curtailment.

(2) Regulations under paragraph 21(1) may, in particular, include provision specifying different amounts depending on the amount of notice that was given of the cancellation, movement or curtailment.

(3) Regulations under paragraph 21(3) may not specify an amount of time that exceeds 7 days.

Exceptions to duty to make payment for a cancelled, moved or curtailed shift

23 (1) The requirement to make a payment under paragraph 21(1) does not apply—

(a) in relation to the cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift if, in relation to the agency worker, the shift is an excluded shift;

(b) in relation to the cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift that an agency worker has been requested to work, unless the agency worker reasonably believed, whether on agreeing to work the shift or at some later time before the cancellation, movement or curtailment, that they would be needed to work the shift;

(c) in other specified circumstances (whether circumstances relating to the work-finding agency, the hirer or otherwise).

(2) In sub-paragraph (1)(a), “excluded shift”, in relation to an agency worker, means a shift of a specified description.

(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may, in particular, specify a description of shift by reference to—

(a) the amount payable for working the shift being more than a specified amount;

(b) the number of hours to be worked during the shift, whether alone or taken together with other shifts of a specified description, being more than a specified number;

(c) the shift corresponding to the time of a shift provided for by a worker’s contract between the agency worker and a work-finding agency or another person involved in the supply or payment of the agency worker (and where the regulations so specify a description of shift, the regulations may include provision similar or corresponding to section 27BP(4)).

(4) Where, by virtue of regulations made under sub-paragraph (1)(c), a work-finding agency is not required to make a payment to an agency worker in relation to a shift under paragraph 21(1), the work-finding agency must give a notice to the agency worker that—

(a) states which provision of the regulations has produced the effect that the work-finding agency is not required to make the payment, and

(b) explains why the work-finding agency was entitled to rely on that provision so as not to make the payment to the agency worker under paragraph 21(1).

(5) But sub-paragraph (4) does not require a work-finding agency to disclose—

(a) any information the disclosure of which by the work-finding agency would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether a disclosure would do so, the duty imposed by that sub-paragraph is to be taken into account);

(b) any information that is commercially sensitive;

(c) any information the disclosure of which by the work-finding agency would constitute a breach of a duty of confidentiality owed by the work-finding agency to any other person.

(6) In sub-paragraph (5)(a) “the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(9) of that Act).

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the form and manner in which a notice under this paragraph must be given;

(b) the day on or before which it must be given;

(c) when a notice under this paragraph is to be treated as having been given.

(8) The duty in sub-paragraph (4) does not apply if, before the day on or before which the notice must be given, the work-finding agency or another person has paid to the agency worker an amount in relation to a number of hours that is at least equal to the amount of the payment that the work-finding agency would have been required to make to the agency worker under paragraph 21(1) in relation to the same number of hours but for regulations made under sub-paragraph (1)(c).

(9) Sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 24 applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (8) of this paragraph as it applies for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of that paragraph.

Contractual remuneration

24 (1) The right of an agency worker to receive a payment from a work-finding agency under paragraph 21(1) does not affect any right of the agency worker in relation to remuneration under a worker’s contract (whether with the work-finding agency or another person) (“contractual remuneration”).

(2) Any contractual remuneration paid to an agency worker in relation to a number of hours goes towards discharging any liability of the work-finding agency to make a payment to the agency worker under paragraph 21(1) in relation to the same hours.

(3) Any payment made by a work-finding agency to an agency worker under paragraph 21(1) in relation to a number of hours goes towards discharging any liability to pay contractual remuneration to the agency worker in relation to the same hours.

(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), the hours to which a payment under paragraph 21(1) relates are—

(a) where a shift has been cancelled, the hours that would have been worked (by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement between the work-finding agency and the agency worker) if the shift had not been cancelled;

(b) where a shift has been moved, or moved and curtailed (at the same time), and no part of the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed, corresponds to the time of the shift (“the original shift”) before it was moved, or moved and curtailed, the hours that would have been worked (by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement between the work-finding agency and the agency worker) during the original shift;

(c) where a shift has been moved, or moved and curtailed (at the same time), and part of the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed, corresponds to the time of the original shift (but part does not), the hours that would have been worked (by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement between the work-finding agency and the agency worker) during the part of the original shift that does not correspond to the shift as moved, or as moved and curtailed;

(d) where a shift has been—

(i) curtailed but not moved, or

(ii) moved and curtailed (at the same time) and the shift as moved and curtailed is to start and end within the time of the original shift,

the hours that would have been worked (by virtue of the worker’s contract or arrangement between the work-finding agency and the agency worker) if the shift had not been curtailed, or moved and curtailed.

Complaints to employment tribunal

25 (1) An agency worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that, in relation to a shift, the work-finding agency—

(a) has failed to make the whole or any part of a payment that the work-finding agency is liable to make to the agency worker under paragraph 21(1);

(b) has unreasonably failed to give to the agency worker a notice under paragraph 23(4);

(c) has given to the agency worker a notice in purported compliance with paragraph 23(4) that—

(i) does not refer to any provision of the regulations or refers to the wrong provision;

(ii) does not contain an explanation or contains an explanation that is inadequate or untrue.

(2) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under sub-paragraph (1)(a) relating to a payment unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on or before which the payment should have been made (see paragraph 21(2)).

(3) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under sub-paragraph (1)(b) relating to a notice unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on or before which the notice should have been given (see paragraph 23(7)(b)).

(4) An employment tribunal must not consider a complaint under sub-paragraph (1)(c) relating to a notice unless it is presented before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on which the notice is given.

(5) But, if the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this paragraph to be presented before the end of the relevant period of six months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

(6) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2) to (4).

(7) Where—

(a) an agency worker presents a complaint to an employment tribunal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) that, in relation to a shift, the work-finding agency has given to the agency worker a notice in purported compliance with paragraph 23(4) that refers to the wrong provision of the regulations or contains an explanation that is inadequate or untrue, and

(b) the work-finding agency claims that it was provided by the hirer with information for the purposes of the notice that was wrong, inadequate or untrue,

the work-finding agency may request the employment tribunal to direct that the hirer be added as a party to the proceedings.

(8) A request under sub-paragraph (7) must be granted if it is made before the hearing of the complaint begins, but may be refused if it is made after that time; and no such request may be made after the tribunal has made its decision as to whether the complaint is well-founded.

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that sub-paragraph (7) does not apply in relation to a hirer of a specified description.

Remedies

26 (1) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under paragraph 25(1)(a) well-founded, the tribunal must—

(a) make a declaration to that effect, and

(b) order the work-finding agency to pay to the agency worker the amount of the payment under paragraph 21(1) which it finds is due to the agency worker.

(2) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under paragraph 25(1)(b) or (c) well-founded, the tribunal—

(a) must make a declaration to that effect, and

(b) may order the work-finding agency to make a payment to the agency worker of such amount, not exceeding the specified amount, as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances.

(3) But an employment tribunal may not make an order under sub-paragraph (2)(b) relating to a notice given in purported compliance with paragraph 23(4) if the tribunal makes an order under sub-paragraph (1)(b) relating to the same payment to which the notice related.

(4) In determining—

(a) whether to make an order under sub-paragraph (2)(b), and

(b) if so, how much to order the work-finding agency to pay, an employment tribunal must have regard, in particular, to the seriousness of the matter complained of.

(5) If, following the making of a request under paragraph 25(7), an employment tribunal has added the hirer as a party to the proceedings and the tribunal—

(a) finds the complaint under paragraph 25(1)(c) well-founded (so far as relating to the notice referring to the wrong provision of the regulations or containing an explanation that is inadequate or untrue),

(b) makes an award of compensation under sub-paragraph (2)(b), and

(c) also finds that the hirer did provide the work-finding agency with information for the purposes of the notice that was wrong, inadequate or untrue,

it may order that the compensation is to be paid by the hirer instead of by the work-finding agency, or partly by the hirer and partly by the work-finding agency (with the amount of the compensation payable by each being such amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in the circumstances).

Recovery of payment by work-finding agency from hirer: pre-existing arrangements

27 (1) Where, in compliance with paragraph 21(1), a work-finding agency makes a payment to an agency worker in relation to a shift that the agency worker was to be, or was, supplied to work by virtue of a pre-existing arrangement involving the work-finding agency and the hirer, the work-finding agency is entitled to recover from the hirer the proportion of the payment (up to the full amount of it) that reflects the hirer's responsibility for the shift having been cancelled, moved or curtailed at short notice.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that sub-paragraph (1) does not apply in relation to a hirer of a specified description.

(3) A "pre-existing arrangement" means an arrangement—

(a) that was entered into on or before the last day of the period of two months beginning with the day on which the Employment Rights Act 2025 was passed, and

(b) that has not been modified by the work-finding agency and the hirer after the last day of that period.

(4) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to a payment made in compliance with paragraph 21(1) includes a payment made by virtue of an order under paragraph 26(1)(b).

(5) Sub-paragraph (1) applies whether the agency worker was to be, or was, supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of the hirer by the work-finding agency or by another person.””—(Justin Madders.)

This new schedule inserts new Schedule A1 into the Employment Rights Act 1996 which makes provision for agency workers which is similar to the provision made in relation to certain non-agency workers by clauses 1 to 3.

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

Schedule 1

Consequential Amendments Relating to Sections 1 to 3

Amendments made: 51, page 121, line 6, after “27BT,” insert “No. 51, 27BUD(5),”.

This amendment is consequential on NC33.

Amendment 52, page 121, line 6, at end insert—

“(b) after “177 of” insert “, or paragraph 7, 8, 18 or 25 of Schedule A1 to,”.”

This amendment is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 53, page 121, line 14, at end insert—

“(aa) after paragraph (cf) (inserted by sub-paragraph (a)) insert—

(cg) a payment under paragraph 21(1) of Schedule A1 to this Act (agency workers: payment for a cancelled, moved or curtailed shift),”;”.

This amendment is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 54, page 121, line 16, leave out “(cg)” and insert “(ch)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 53.

Amendment 55, page 122, line 9, at end insert—

“(iv) section 27BUD(5), or”.

This amendment clarifies that the right not to be subjected to any detriment applies where a worker brings a complaint under section 27BUD(5).

Amendment 56, page 122, line 17, leave out from “has” to end of line 21 and insert

“(as the case may be)—

(a) failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 27BA(1), 27BD(7) or (8) or 27BF(1) or (2), a duty imposed by section 27BJ or 27BK or the duty imposed by section 27BP(1) or 27BR(2), or

(b) behaved as described in section 27BG(3A) or (3B),

but, for subsection (1)(d) or (e) to apply, the claim must be made in good faith.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21. It restructures and restates what is in the existing provision and adds the provision in paragraph (b).

Amendment 57, page 122, line 23, after “non-compliance” insert

“, or (as the case may be) alleged behaviour,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21.

Amendment 58, page 123, line 5, at end insert—

“6A After section 47H (inserted by paragraph 6) insert—

“47I Agency workers and Schedule A1 rights

(1) An agency worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by a relevant person done on the ground that the agency worker—

(a) accepted, or proposed to accept, an offer to enter into a worker’s contract made in compliance (or purported compliance) with the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1,

(b) rejected, or proposed to reject, an offer to enter into a worker’s contract made in compliance (or purported compliance) with the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1,

(c) declined to work a shift (or part of a shift) on the basis of a reasonable belief that there had been a failure to comply with a duty imposed by paragraph 13 or 14 of Schedule A1 in relation to the shift,

(d) brought proceedings under—

(i) paragraph 7 or 8 of Schedule A1,

(ii) paragraph 18 of Schedule A1,

(iii) paragraph 25 of Schedule A1, or

(iv) section 27BUD(5), or

(e) alleged the existence of any circumstance which would constitute a ground for bringing any proceedings within paragraph (d).

(2) The reference in subsection (1)(b) to an agency worker who rejected an offer includes a reference to an agency worker who is to be treated as having rejected an offer (see paragraph 5(4) of Schedule A1).

(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (1)(d) or (e) whether or not there has been (as the case may be)—

(a) a failure to comply with the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1), 4(7) or (8) or 6(1) or (2) of Schedule A1, a duty imposed by paragraph 13 or 14 of Schedule A1 or the duty imposed by paragraph 21(1) or 23(4) of Schedule A1, or

(b) behaviour of the type described in paragraph 7(4) or (5) or 8(1) or (2) of Schedule A1,

but, for subsection (1)(d) or (e) to apply, the claim must be made ingood faith.

(4) It is sufficient for subsection (1)(e) to apply that the agency worker made the nature of the alleged non-compliance, or (as the case may be) the alleged behaviour, reasonably clear to either the relevant person or (if different) the person against whom proceedings could be brought.

(5) An agency worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by a relevant person done on the ground that—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1 applies in relation to the agency worker and a particular reference period, or

(b) the relevant person believes that that duty so applies.

(6) This section does not apply where—

(a) the worker is an employee of the relevant person, and

(b) the detriment in question amounts to dismissal within the meaning of Part 10.

(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a “relevant person”, in relation to an agency worker, if the person is (or has been)—

(a) a work-finding agency with which the agency worker has a worker’s contract or an arrangement by virtue of which the agency worker is (or is to be) supplied to work for and under the supervision and direction of another person;

(b) a person for and under the supervision and direction of whom the agency worker is (or is to be) supplied to work;

(c) a person who is (or is to be) involved in the supply of the agency worker to a person falling within paragraph (b) or the payment of the agency worker for work done for such a person.

(8) In this section—

“agency worker” has the same meaning as in Part 2A (see section 27BUA);

“reference period” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of Schedule A1 (see paragraph 1(4));

“work-finding agency” has the same meaning as in Part 2A (see section 27BUA).””

This amendment is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 59, page 123, line 10, at end insert—

“(2A) After subsection (1BA) (inserted by sub-paragraph (2)) insert—

(1BB) An agency worker (within the meaning of Part 2A) may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that the agency worker has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47I.””

This amendment is consequential on amendment 58.

Amendment 60, page 123, line 11, at end insert—

“(4) After subsection (2A) insert—

“(2B) On a complaint under subsection (1BB) it is for the relevant person (within the meaning of section 47I) to show the ground on which any act, or deliberate failure to act, was done.”

(5) In subsection (4), in the words after paragraph (b), after “hirer” insert “, or a relevant person (within the meaning of section 47I),”.

(6) In subsection (6), after “49” insert “, except so far as relating to an alleged detriment in contravention of section 47I,”.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 58.

Amendment 61, page 123, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) After subsection (1A) insert—

“(1B) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under section 48(1BB) well-founded, the tribunal—

(a) must make a declaration to that effect, and

(b) may make an award of compensation to be paid by the relevant person (within the meaning of section 47I) to the complainant in respect of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates.””

This amendment is consequential on amendment 58.

Amendment 62, page 123, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) In that subsection, after “(7A)” insert “and (7B)”.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 58.

Amendment 63, page 123, line 24, at end insert—

“(5) After subsection (7A) (inserted by sub-paragraph (4)) insert—

“(7B) Where—

(a) the complaint is made under section 48(1BB),

(b) the detriment to which the agency worker is subjected is the termination of a worker’s contract between the agency worker and the relevant person, and

(c) that contract is not a contract of employment,

any compensation must not exceed the compensation that would be payable under Chapter 2 of Part 10 if the agency worker had been an employee and had been dismissed for a reason specified in section 104BB (and “agency worker” and “relevant person” have the same meaning in this subsection as in section 47I).””

This amendment is consequential on amendment 58.

Amendment 64, page 124, line 3, at end insert—

“(2A) An employee who is dismissed is also to be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee—

(a) brought proceedings against the employer under section 27BG(3A) or (3B), or

(b) alleged the existence of any circumstance which would constitute a ground for bringing such proceedings.

(In relation to other proceedings under section 27BG, see section 104.)

(2B) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (2A) whether or not the employer has behaved as described in section 27BG(3A) or (3B) but, for subsection (2A) to apply, the claim must be made in good faith.

(2C) It is sufficient for subsection (2A)(b) to apply that the employee made the nature of the employer’s alleged behaviour reasonably clear to the employer.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 21.

Amendment 65, page 124, line 15, at end insert—

“9A After section 104BA (inserted by paragraph 9) insert—

“104BB Guaranteed hours: agency workers

(1) An employee who is dismissed by a relevant person (who is their employer) is to be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee—

(a) accepted, or proposed to accept, an offer to enter into a worker’s contract made in compliance (or purported compliance) with the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1, or

(b) rejected, or proposed to reject, an offer to enter into a worker’s contract made in compliance (or purported compliance) with the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1.

(2) The reference in subsection (1)(b) to an employee who rejected an offer includes a reference to an employee who is to be treated as having rejected an offer (see paragraph 5(4) of Schedule A1).

(3) An employee who is dismissed by a relevant person (who is their employer) is also to be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee—

(a) brought proceedings against the employer under paragraph 8(1) or (2), or

(b) alleged the existence of any circumstance which would constitute a ground for bringing such proceedings.

(In relation to other proceedings under paragraph 8, see section 104.)

(4) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (3) whether or not the employer has behaved as described in paragraph 8(1) or (2) but, for subsection (3) to apply, the claim must be made in good faith.

(5) It is sufficient for subsection (3)(b) to apply that the employee made the nature of the employer’s alleged behaviour reasonably clear to the employer.

(6) An employee who is dismissed by a relevant person (who is their employer) is also to be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if—

(a) the duty imposed by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule A1 applies in relation to the employee and a particular reference period, or the employer believes that that duty so applies, and

(b) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employer sought to avoid the necessity of that duty having to be complied with in relation to the employee and the reference period.

(7) In this section—

“reference period” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of Schedule A1 (see paragraph 1(4));

“relevant person” means a person falling within subsection (7)(a) or (c) of section 47I.””

This amendment is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 66, page 124, line 23, at end insert “, or

(c) the reason specified in subsection (2A) of that section (read with subsections (2B) and (2C) of that section).”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 64.

Amendment 67, page 124, line 23, at end insert—

“(b) after subsection (7BZA) (inserted by paragraph (a)) insert—

“(7BZB) This subsection applies if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was—

(a) the reason specified in subsection (1)(a) or (6) of section 104BB,

(b) the reason specified in subsection (1)(b) of that section (read with subsection (2) of that section), or

(c) the reason specified in subsection (3) of that section (read with subsections (4) and (5) of that section).””

This amendment is consequential on amendment 65.

Amendment 68, page 124, leave out lines 26 to 28 and insert—

“(gha) any of the following provisions of section 104BA applies—

(i) subsection (1)(a) or (3),

(ii) subsection (1)(b) (read with subsection (2) of that section), or

(iii) subsection (2A) (read with subsections (2B) and (2C) of that section),”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 64.

Amendment 69, page 124, line 28, at end insert—

“(b) after paragraph (gha) (inserted by paragraph (a)) insert—

“(ghb) any of the following provisions of section 104BB applies—

(i) subsection (1)(a) or (6),

(ii) subsection (1)(b) (read with subsection (2) of that section), or

(iii) subsection (3) (read with subsections (4) and (5) of that section),”.”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 65.

Amendment 70, page 124, line 38, at end insert—

“(4) After subsection (2) insert—

“(3) The remedy of an agency worker (within the meaning of Part 2A) for infringement of any of the rights conferred by Parts 1 to 3 of Schedule A1 and section 47I is, where provision is made for a complaint to an employment tribunal, by way of such a complaint and not otherwise.””

This amendment is consequential on NS1 and amendment 58.

Amendment 71, page 125, line 4, leave out from “is” to end of line 6 and insert “—

(a) where the complaint is under section 27BG(1), (2), (3) or (5), the latest day of the reference period to which the complaint relates on which the worker was employed by the employer under a worker’s contract;

(b) where the complaint is under section 27BG(6)—

(i) the date on which the complaint was presented to the employment tribunal, or

(ii) if the worker was not employed by the employer under a worker’s contract on that date, the latest day before that date on which the worker was so employed.””

This amendment supplements the amendment of section 225 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 by adding a calculation date for determining the permitted maximum for an award of compensation where an employer breaches an information duty imposed by proposed section 27BF of that Act (resulting in a complaint under proposed section 27BG(6)).

Amendment 72, page 125, line 6, at end insert—

“(A2) Where the calculation is for the purposes of section 27BI as applied by section 27BUD(6)(a) in relation to a complaint under section 27BUD(5), the calculation date is the latest day of the reference period to which the complaint relates on which the worker was employed by the employer under a worker’s contract.”

This amendment is consequential on NC33.

Amendment 73, page 125, line 10, at end insert—

“( ) in subsection (1), in paragraph (b) of the definition of “week”, after “86” insert “and paragraph 10 of Schedule A1””.

This amendment is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 74, page 125, line 19, after “27BU(2),” insert “27BUE,”.

This amendment will make regulations under section 27BUE (see NC33) subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 75, page 125, line 19, leave out “27BW,”

This amendment is consequential on amendment 48.

Amendment 76, page 125, line 19, at end insert—

“(b) after “209,” insert “or under paragraph 1(3)(b), (6) or (10), 2(2), (5) or (7)(c), 4(6), 11(1), 12(3), 13(2), 14(3), 15(4), 21(1), (3) or (5), 23(1)(c) or (2), 25(9), 26(2) or 27(2) of Schedule A1,”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NS1. The regulation-making powers referred to in this amendment are the ones that will be subject to affirmative parliamentary procedure.

Schedule 2

Right not to be unfairly dismissed: removal of qualifying period, etc

Amendments made: 77, page 126, line 15, at end insert

“or subsection (2A) of that section (read with subsections (2B) and (2C) of that section)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 64.

Amendment 78, page 126, line 15, at end insert—

“(ja) subsection (1)(a) or (6) of section 104BB, subsection (1)(b) of that section (read with subsection (2) of that section) or subsection (3) of that section (read with subsections (4) and (5) of that section);”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 65.

Amendment 240, page 126, leave out lines 23 and 24.

This amendment ensures that, when section 108A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (inserted by paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Bill) comes into force, section 104I of that Act (inserted by clause 24 of the Bill) will not apply to the dismissal of an employee if, at the time of dismissal, the employee has not yet started work.

Amendment 241, page 128, line 39, at end insert—

“( ) in paragraph 160 (right not to be subjected to detriment: compensation), in sub-paragraph (2)(b)—

(i) for “124(1)” substitute “124”;

(ii) at the end insert “(ignoring any different sum specified as the limit for a dismissal that meets the conditions in section 98ZZA(2) and (3) of that Act).”;”.

Paragraph 156 of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides that a worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by the worker’s employer resulting from, among other things, the worker supporting recognition of a trade union. Paragraph 160 of that Schedule provides that the compensation payable where such detriment consists of the termination of the worker’s contract is subject to a limit calculated by reference to the maximum amount of a compensatory award for an employee who has been unfairly dismissed. This amendment would make it clear that the relevant figure for this calculation remains the standard maximum, not any different amount specified for cases where an employee is dismissed during the initial period of employment.

Amendment 242, page 130, line 5, at beginning insert—

“(1) The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 24 (enforcement of right not to be subjected to detriment), in subsection (4)(b)—

(a) for “124(1)” substitute “124”;

(b) after “section 123 of that Act” insert “(ignoring any different sum specified as the limit for a dismissal that meets the conditions in section 98ZZA(2) and (3) of that Act)”.”

Section 23 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 provides that a worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by the worker’s employer resulting from, among other things, the worker seeking to enforce the right to the minimum wage. Section 24(3) and (4) of that Act provides that the compensation payable where such detriment consists of the termination of the worker’s contract is subject to a limit calculated by reference to the maximum amount of a compensatory award for an employee who has been unfairly dismissed. This amendment would make it clear that the relevant figure for this calculation remains the standard maximum, not any different amount specified for cases where an employee is dismissed during the initial period of employment.

Amendment 243, page 130, line 28, at beginning insert—

“(1) In Part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008 (pension scheme membership for jobholders), Chapter 3 (safeguards: employment and pre-employment) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 56 (enforcement of right not to be subjected to detriment), in subsection (4)(b)—

(a) for “124(1)” substitute “124”;

(b) at the end insert “(ignoring any different sum specified as the limit for a dismissal that meets the conditions in section 98ZZA(2) and (3) of that Act).””—(Justin Madders.)

Section 55 of the Pensions Act 2008 provides that a worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by the worker’s employer resulting from, among other things, the worker seeking to enforce the duties imposed by that Act in relation to pension enrolment. Section 56(3) and (4) of that Act provides that the compensation payable where such detriment consists of the termination of the worker’s contract is subject to a limit calculated by reference to the maximum amount of a compensatory award for an employee who has been unfairly dismissed. This amendment would make it clear that the relevant figure for this calculation remains the standard maximum, not any different amount specified for cases where an employee is dismissed during the initial period of employment.

Schedule 3

Pay and conditions of school support staff in England

Amendments made: 244, page 138, line 8, leave out “(6)” and insert “(7)”.

This amendment corrects an incorrect cross-reference.

Amendment 245, page 138, line 39, leave out “(6)” and insert “(7)”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment corrects an incorrect cross-reference.

Bill to be further considered tomorrow.