(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I call Secretary Robert Buckland to move Second Reading. He is asked to speak for no more than 20 minutes.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
It is a great pleasure to open this Second Reading debate, albeit with a sense of déjà vu. Those of us who had the privilege of being in the House on 2 October last year will not have failed to be moved by the many powerful contributions we heard, including from the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield), who recounted her own very personal and heart-wrenching experience of domestic abuse. She was not alone in showing great courage by bringing home to this House the devastating impact of domestic abuse on the lives of survivors, as this Bill has also brought forth very personal accounts from, among others, the hon. Members for Bradford West (Naz Shah) and for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris). On that occasion, I was able to share my own personal experiences, as a young barrister, of domestic abuse. I will not repeat them today, because I have no doubt that we will hear some memorable speeches in this debate—more testimony, adding power to what has already been said.
After the last debate, some Members approached me privately to share with me their own domestic abuse experiences—stories that are still raw and still cannot be told. For many of us, the sounds and sights witnessed in our homes, often as children, still haunt us many years on. The experiences we have heard recounted by Members are, sadly, all too frequently repeated across the country. I have heard no more harrowing account recently than that of Claire Throssell, whom I had the privilege to meet last October. Claire’s young sons, Jack and Paul, were killed at the hands of her abusive partner. No one can imagine the pain and suffering that she has had to endure, but we owe her a debt of gratitude for giving such a powerful voice to the survivors of domestic abuse.
Gratitude is also due to Tracy Graham, a victim of controlling and violent domestic abuse who this year chose to speak out, go public and share her experiences with my local community in Swindon via the new Swindon domestic abuse support service, which I helped to launch just before lockdown, seven weeks ago. Tracy is not only a domestic abuse ambassador for the service, but is volunteering with the local police as well, to help to support domestic abuse victims who are going through what she went through. She truly is an inspirational young woman—one of many who are standing up, stepping forward and sharing their harrowing experiences, to the benefit of current and future survivors and victims.
It is right, in this time of covid-19, to dwell a little on the impact that this pandemic is having on victims of domestic abuse and their families. We are seeing evidence of it in the increased calls to domestic abuse helplines. My local refuge had an increase in referrals of 80% in one week, and the helpline in my local area had an increase in the number of calls of nearly 30%. People are speaking up and speaking out about domestic abuse, but it is happening even at this time of great crisis.
The phrase “Stay at home”, which we so associate with the directions to deal with covid-19, should be words of reassurance and comfort. The home should be a place of safety, both physical and mental. The concept of the home as a refuge is such a strong one, yet for too many people it is not a refuge. At this time of lockdown, that fear, distress and suffering is multiplied. I assure all victims that help is available. The police continue to respond to incidents of domestic abuse, and anyone in immediate danger should not hesitate to call 999 and the emergency services. Where necessary, the existing civil order framework can be used to remove a perpetrator from the family home in order to protect victims of abuse.
We are working with and listening carefully to domestic abuse and victims organisations to make sure that we understand what their most pressing needs and priorities are, and we are committed to ensuring that victims have a comprehensive package of support available. We have launched a new campaign to signpost victims to the support services available and provided an additional £2.6 million to ensure that the national helplines have the capacity to respond to increased demand.
In addition, we are working with the domestic abuse commissioner to ensure that refuges and other organisations that provide frontline support to victims will be able to access the £750 million fund set aside by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor to bolster charities that are responding directly to the pandemic. I am happy to say to the House that allocations under the charities package will be made very shortly indeed. The Home Secretary and I have together been very much engaged in tailoring the requests to ensure that help is targeted where it will make the most difference. Having spoken to police and crime commissioners, I know that many are making available extra resources for safe accommodation.
I am grateful to the Home Affairs Committee for the report that it published yesterday on the pandemic’s impact on victims of domestic abuse. I welcome the Committee’s support for our public information campaign and the additional funding. We will of course respond promptly to the Committee’s recommendations.
In short, this is a concerted period of direct action being taken by the Government. Measures are being taken to address directly the concerns that I know the shadow Home Secretary, the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), whom I welcome to his post, will raise in due course.
Let me turn to the Bill, which is necessarily about strengthening protection and support for victims in the longer term. I share the frustration of Members from all parties that we are having to repeat a number of stages of this Bill, which was initially championed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May). All parties want to see this Bill on the statute book, but we have to put to good use the time available to us since the election to make it an even stronger Bill than the one that came before the House last October.
The aims of the Bill are fourfold: first, to raise awareness of this insidious crime; secondly, to better protect and support victims and their children; thirdly, to transform the response to the criminal, civil and family justice systems; and, fourthly, to improve performance across all national and local agencies. I shall take those objectives in turn.
If we are to tackle domestic abuse effectively, it is vital that the nature of that abuse is properly understood and recognised. Part 1 of the Bill sets out a statutory definition of domestic abuse. It will apply for the purposes of the whole Bill, but we also expect it to be adopted across all agencies that have a shared responsibility for combating this crime and for helping survivors to rebuild their lives. The definition makes it clear that domestic abuse is not confined to violent or sexual abuse, but includes controlling or coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and economic abuse, too. Identifying and calling out domestic abuse in all its manifestations is just a first step. We then need to protect and support victims. In terms of protection, a number of civil orders are already available to help to safeguard survivors, but the existing landscape of occupation orders, non-molestation orders and domestic violence protection orders is complex, and none are, arguably, wholly adequate to the task.
The new domestic abuse protection order—DAPO—will bring together the best elements of the existing civil order regimes. It will be available in the civil, criminal and family courts. It will be flexible, in that the court will determine the length of an order and decide what prohibitions, and positive requirements too, are appropriate to attach to it, including conditions that may compel the respondent to attend perpetrator programmes or require them to wear an electronic tag. The new DAPO will also have teeth, with a breach of conditions being a criminal offence punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.
We want to get these new orders right so that they work for victims and their children, the police, the courts and others who will have to operate them. We will therefore be piloting these new orders in a small number of areas before rolling them out nationally.
But protecting victims from abuse is never enough on its own. We also need to ensure that they are effectively supported as they reset their lives. The Bill, as reintroduced, includes a significant new measure to that end. When a victim of abuse has to flee their home and seek sanctuary in a refuge or other safe accommodation, it is not enough simply to provide that person with a safe place to sleep. In such circumstances, victims and their children need access to counselling and mental health support, advice about follow-on housing, help in enrolling children in a new school, or specialist support, such as translation services or access to immigration advice. We know that refuges and other providers of safe accommodation struggle to provide such support so, to plug that gap, the Bill will place new duties on tier 1 local authorities in England. Under part 4 of the Bill, such local authorities will be required to assess the need for accommodation-based support for all victims of domestic abuse and their children in the area. Having identified that need, the relevant local authorities will then be required to develop, publish and give effect to a strategy for the provision of such support in their locality.
Of course, these new duties will come at a cost—some £90 million a year, we estimate. I assure the House that my right hon. Friend the Housing Secretary is committed to ensuring that local authorities are appropriately resourced as part of the spending review.
I know from my own experience of the legal system that appearing as a witness in criminal, civil or family proceedings can be—shall we say—a daunting experience, so we need to make sure that the victims of domestic abuse can give their best evidence in court. In the criminal courts, that often means being able to give evidence hidden from view of the alleged perpetrator or via a video link. The Bill provides that these and other so-called special measures will be automatically available to victims. In the family courts, for a long time, there have been calls for a bar on the practice of perpetrators being able to cross-examine in person the victims of domestic abuse. Such an experience is bound to be traumatising for victims—it must stop. We have listened to the views of the Joint Committee that examined the draft Bill. Indeed, the Bill as reintroduced now extends the circumstances in which the automatic prohibition on cross-examination in person applies, which is a welcome further step to safeguard and prevent the perpetuation of abuse through the courts.
I know that there are wider concerns about the experiences of victims of domestic abuse in the family courts, which was why we established last year a specialist panel to examine how effectively the family courts respond to allegations of domestic abuse and other harms in private law proceedings, including around the provision of special measures. I aim to publish very shortly the panel’s recommendations, together with the Government’s response. One way we can improve the experiences of victims is by better integrating domestic abuse-related proceedings right across the various jurisdictions in our courts.
With that in mind, we committed in our manifesto to pilot integrated family and crime domestic abuse courts. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor set aside £5 million in his March Budget to allow that important pilot to progress. Again, I expect to be able to inform the House soon as to how the trial of these new integrated domestic abuse courts will be taken forward. I will take a close personal interest, to make sure that there is a genuine bringing together of the jurisdictions around the victim, around the family—around those people who need the support and benefit of any orders and sanctions that the court might impose.
It is not only the courts where there is room for improvement. The new independent domestic abuse commissioner will help drive consistency and better performance in the response to domestic abuse right across the relevant local and national agencies. The relevant agencies will be under a statutory duty to co-operate with the commissioner, and will be required to respond within 56 days to any recommendations that the commissioner makes. We are lucky to have Nicole Jacobs, who brings a wealth of experience to the role, and I fully expect her to perform her functions without fear or favour.
I know that, on the previous Second Reading, a number of hon. Members argued for the post to be full time. We reviewed—with Nicole Jacobs—the appropriate time commitment for this role and have now extended it from three to four days per week. The Minister for safeguarding, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), will keep this matter under review as we transition to the statutory arrangements provided for in part 2 of the Bill.
We did not want to wait until the Bill became law to make that appointment, and I am very glad we did not, because Nicole Jacobs is already making a huge difference. One area where we want to draw on her experience is in the provision of community-based support. As I described, the provisions in part 4 of the Bill will make sure that victims of domestic abuse in safe accommodation receive the support they need, but of course most victims of abuse remain in their own home, and they need to be able to access appropriate support while doing so.
Victim support services are provided in the community by police and crime commissioners, local authorities and other agencies, but the landscape is, frankly, complex, and there are undoubtedly gaps in the current provision. In order to determine what action needs to be taken, we must better understand the existing routes by which these services are commissioned and funded. To that end, the domestic abuse commissioner has agreed to undertake an in-depth exploration of the current community-based landscape of support. Once we have her findings and recommendations, we will work with her to understand the needs identified and to develop the right options for how best to address them.
Finally, I will say a few words about the amendments put forward in the last Session by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) and the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman). It is absolutely right that we reinforce current case law that a person cannot consent to violence that leads to serious injury or death. To be clear, there is no such thing as the rough sex defence. I had a productive meeting with both Members to discuss the issue, and, as I made clear to them, we are looking at how best to address it. It is a complex area of criminal law, and we need to ensure that any statutory provisions have the desired effect and do not have any unintended consequences; we do not want to inadvertently create loopholes or uncertainties in the law that can then be exploited by those who perpetrate crimes. I am confident that we will be able to set out our approach in time for Report, and I am grateful for the continuing constructive engagement on this important and sensitive issue.
Domestic abuse is one of the most prevalent crimes in our society—let us be honest and frank about that. It is staggering that some 2.4 million people experience domestic abuse each year, and unforgivable that, on average, more than two individuals, the majority of whom are women, are killed each and every week in a domestic homicide.
Tackling domestic abuse needs to be everyone’s business, from prevention to protection to prosecution to support. Legislation alone can never have all the answers, but I believe that this landmark Bill will make a significant contribution and I commend it to the House.
I thank all Members who have contributed to today’s debate. I also thank those Members who tried to contribute but, because of the new procedures, were unable to speak. I thank each and every one of the 87 Members who put their names forward.
The harrowing stories that we have heard today underline the horror of domestic abuse and the devastation that it leaves in its wake. Time after time—not just today, but in debating previous iterations of the Bill—we have heard stories of families shattered and of lives torn apart or even ended by this terrible crime.
One of the most moving speeches today was, of course, that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who talked incredibly emotionally about Natalie and her family, and the experiences that Natalie had before she died. I went to his constituency to meet Natalie’s family, the Andrews, and they set out to me very clearly the journey of domestic abuse that Natalie had suffered before that fateful night. I know that my hon. Friend wanted to include in his speech the sentence that this perpetrator got for his behaviour—a mere three years and eight months for that course of conduct. It was a case that I am sure will live with many of us for a very long time indeed.
Another speech that I would like to highlight for its power was that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher), who brought to the Chamber his perspective as a child living in an abusive household. Many Members have raised the plight of children living in abusive households, which I will deal with in more detail in due course, but I want to thank him for being brave in laying those experiences before us in the Chamber. It does help victims; I know that for a fact.
The speech made by the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield) on the Bill’s last Second Reading was one of those parliamentary moments that those of us who listened to it will remember for a great deal of time. One of the most moving aspects of her speech today was setting out the wall of support that she has received and the network of women who have risen to support her. I wish her and that network all the very best.
Other Members set out the experiences of their constituents most eloquently. My hon. Friends the Members for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken) and for Brecon and Radnorshire (Fay Jones) and the hon. Member for Luton North (Sarah Owen) really did justice to their constituents. If these stories are difficult to listen to, they are unimaginable to live through. In all their stark horror, those stories and all the stories that we know through the experiences of our families—or, indeed, in our own families—and of our friends, colleagues and constituents show us why this Bill is so urgently needed.
We all understand this. It is to the credit of all the parties that the Bill enjoys cross-party support. I know that there will rightfully be discussions about various aspects of it in due course, but it is to our collective credit that the parties can unify around this Bill. I would like to thank the hon. Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) for her work in her previous role, and I welcome the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) to her position. I spoke to her this week, and she said that it was the only job she would accept— I absolutely believe her, so I am delighted for her.
I am conscious that I have to sit down by 6.34 pm, otherwise the Bill falls. We do not want that to happen, so forgive me if I do not address all the points that have been raised. I will write and put a copy in the Library to answer the detailed points that Members have raised.
I must take the trouble to mention the maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Hyndburn (Sara Britcliffe). It is a rather extraordinary experience to want to pay tribute to colleagues but not be able to see them in the Chamber. She described herself as the youngest MP, the first female MP for her constituency and the first Member of Parliament to make a virtual maiden speech—what an extraordinary set of achievements. I was so grateful for her speech, because she told us movingly about the struggles that her mother had with substance misuse and the terrible loss that she endured as a child. I can only say to her that I think any mother watching her today would have been extraordinarily proud. I also pay tribute to her father, who had to step into the role of sole parent in such difficult circumstances, and wish him a very happy birthday, which he is having to celebrate alone in these circumstances.
I thank the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) for his steadfast support for the Bill. We have had to remove some sections from the Bill because the Assembly is back, but I pay tribute to him for his contributions to the Bill thus far, and to the Northern Irish Assembly and the Minister there, who I hope will be bringing legislation forward quickly.
We have worked tirelessly to ensure that the risks of domestic abuse in the covid-19 crisis are understood and met. We must be clear with anyone contacting us regarding domestic abuse cases that social distancing does not prevent people from leaving their homes for a place of safety if they need it because they live in an abusive household. Since social distancing came into force, we know that domestic abuse charities have reported a surge of activity in people contacting helplines and accessing web-based services, and we are working closely across government and the charitable sector to ensure that vulnerable people can access the support they need.
Local authorities have access to a £3.2 billion support fund to bolster their services, and the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) and my hon. Friend the Member for East Surrey (Claire Coutinho) both raised a point about refuge accommodation in the circumstances. The Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Thornbury and Yate (Luke Hall), wrote to local authority leaders yesterday about domestic abuse services and has suggested help with additional accommodation sources, should local authorities require that.
Other colleagues have mentioned the report by the Home Affairs Committee on that topic, and I very much thank the Committee for its report. I want to reassure Members about the actions we are taking. We have been working closely with the domestic abuse commissioner to ensure that frontline charities will receive a share of the £750 million charitable support package announced by the Chancellor. I cannot go into details at this point, but we are actively working on it. Of course, we have also announced £2 million in addition to that to support technological capability for domestic abuse services, and a further £600,000 from the Ministry of Justice to allow victim helplines to stay open longer. The national campaign, which I know many hon. Members have been kind enough to join, was launched by the Home Secretary earlier this month to raise awareness of domestic abuse and help victims to access support.
Many colleagues have raised the topic of migrant victims. We understand the problems that such victims face, and we are absolutely committed to ensuring that all victims of domestic abuse are treated first and foremost as victims, regardless of their immigration status. As part of our response to the Joint Committee’s report, we undertook to complete a review. We have now completed the evidence gathering phase of the review, including focus groups and a final call for evidence from the sector, but if we are to put in place new support mechanisms, we need a clearer evidence base so that it can be targeted properly to meet the needs of those for whom it is intended. That is why today I am announcing that later this year we will invite bids for grants from a £1.5 million pilot fund to cover the cost of support in a refuge or other safe accommodation. We will use the pilot to assess better the level of need for that group of victims and to inform spending review decisions on longer-term funding. We aim also to publish a full response to the Joint Committee’s recommendation ahead of Report, and we will of course take into account the comments made during this debate.
Another large topic for discussion was that of children. My right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), who did so much in her previous role to spearhead this legislation, my hon. Friends the Members for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) and for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher), and the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Sam Tarry), all described the impact that domestic abuse can have on children. It is vital that we recognise that in the statutory functions of the domestic abuse commissioner. Indeed, the hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Vicky Foxcroft) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston) both explained about ACEs and the impact that domestic abuse has on them. One of the key functions of the commissioner will be to encourage good practice in the identification of children affected by domestic abuse and the provision of protection and support. Clause 66 places a duty on the Home Secretary to issue guidance on the effect of that.
I wanted to move on to the gender definition and mention my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) and the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Lilian Greenwood), but I think I will be denied the time to do that. So, in closing, this debate has shown the House at its very best. Across the country, far too many people are experiencing the awful reality of domestic abuse. There is not a single constituency untouched by this terrible crime. Bringing an end to this awful crime is our collective responsibility. Legislation alone cannot provide all the answers, but where it can, the Government are steadfast in our determination to see this Bill enacted and implemented as quickly as possible.
To those suffering today, I can say only this: you are not alone. Help is available, and we will do everything in our power to protect you. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Domestic abuse bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Domestic Abuse Bill:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
2. Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 25 June 2020.
3. The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
4. Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
5. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
6. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
7. Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Mr Marcus Jones.)
Question agreed to.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you very much for joining us. We will now hear oral evidence from Somiya Basar and Saliha Rashid. We have this session until 2.45 pm. Please introduce yourselves, and then I will invite members of the Committee to ask you questions.
Somiya Basar: Ladies and gentlemen, I am Somiya Basar.
Saliha Rashid: My name is Saliha Rashid. I am a survivor of gender-based abuse, and I am also a campaigner. I am here today representing a group of survivors that have been part of Women’s Aid’s “Law in the making” project.
Q
Saliha Rashid: Yes, I come from a community where, growing up, I was always told that because I am blind and a woman, I could not have high aspirations or become independent. When I sought support to become free of this and to become independent, I found many barriers. There was a lack of understanding in relation to disability and issues around gender-based violence. I found that services were not accessible. There was a lack of information in accessible formats.
As a group of survivors, we come from a diverse range of backgrounds, and we have had different experiences, but, quite commonly, we have all experienced reaching out to a system that has failed to support us—a system that has been unable to meet our diverse needs and, for many of us, a system has been re-traumatising and re-victimising.
Q
Saliha Rashid: I think that for disabled survivors there needs to be a statutory duty conferred on all organisations to provide information in accessible formats. I support the campaign by Stay Safe East around repealing the carers’ defence clause in part 5 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which is on domestic abuse. I think that awareness-raising is a key priority for our group, because we have found a lack of awareness around these issues, both within statutory and non-statutory services.
Q
Saliha Rashid: No, I think there need to be adequately funded services for disabled survivors, as well as for survivors from other minority groups, such as LGBT survivors and BAME survivors.
Q
Lucy Hadley: We really welcome the Bill. There has been a long wait to see it here in Parliament, and we are really pleased that it is back. The current context shows how urgently we need to improve protection and support for survivors. There is currently a real postcode lottery in access to support across the country, which is one of the main reasons why the domestic abuse commissioner can make a massive difference to survivors and their access to support.
The impact of covid-19 has been clear: women are telling us that abuse is escalating but it is harder to leave. At the same time, 85% of the service providers we spoke to in March said they had had to reduce or cancel elements of their service provision. The pandemic has landed on top of a difficult funding crisis for our sector. It is vital that the Bill brings forward the legal protections and support that survivors need, and that that is backed with the sustainable funding that life-saving specialist domestic abuse services require across the country. The domestic abuse commissioner, in mapping that provision and monitoring services, can make a real difference in access to support for survivors.
Andrea Simon: I agree. The domestic abuse commissioner in particular is a welcome addition to the Bill. We welcome the powers to ensure that public bodies respond to the commissioner’s recommendations, and the commissioner’s remit in tackling the postcode lottery in service provision.
I think you heard earlier, when the commissioner gave evidence, that we must go further in terms of resourcing a wider range of the community-based services that VAWG victims rely on. It is currently a crucially missed opportunity in the Bill that we do not have a statutory duty that speaks to that wider provision.
It is really important for the End Violence Against Women Coalition that the Bill sets up the crucial principle of equal access to protection and support for all survivors of domestic abuse. We cannot have a situation in law that leaves certain victims behind. In particular, we highlight that migrant victims of domestic abuse are currently left out of the protective measures proposed in the Bill.
Q
Lucy Hadley: Yes, we do. There is a wider question about the mechanisms through which funding is delivered, and it is also about the amount of funding. We currently see year-long funding pots, and commissioners who do not take a strategic approach to domestic abuse and violence against women and girls service provision. We need to overhaul not only the means of long-term, three to five-year funding—secure funding, across the different public bodies that fund support for survivors, whether they are local authorities, police and crime commissioners or the healthcare sector. We also need to ensure that we are funding these services in a more secure way, stopping competitive tendering where it is no longer required, and ensuring that local authorities and other public bodies are held accountable forfunding these services securely and in the long term. That is where the commissioner can really help.
Q
Lucy Hadley: I think the protection order could be really welcome. Our main concern, and what we hear most of all from survivors, is that poor enforcement is the problem with the protection order system. There are a range of protection orders—non-molestation orders, occupation orders and the domestic violence protection order—and survivors’ No. 1 concern with that is poor enforcement.
In our Law in the Making project, which engaged a group of survivors in the development of the Domestic Abuse Bill—you heard from one of those survivors earlier—one woman told us, “My last 11 years were built on 13 harassment warnings, four restraining orders and one non-molestation order, averaging a breach a month.” It is not easy to get a protection order, and when we do get them they are not enforced, time and time again. For us, the key concern with the DAPO is the implementation and the enforcement, and that applies to the new requirements on perpetrators, whether they are requirements to attend a perpetrator programme or to attend drug and alcohol programmes. If that is not in force, and there are not the resources to ensure that the programmes that people are accessing are safe, well monitored and enforced by the police, we are concerned that the orders will not do what they promise to do.
Q
Lucy Hadley: Yes, and that is really important. It has been a problem with the DVPO to date, and it is really welcome that that is included.
Q
Andrea Simon: I would say that it does not go far enough in enshrining one of the key principles of the Istanbul convention: article 4(3), which speaks specifically about types of discrimination and how the implementation of the convention by parties should involve taking measures to ensure that the rights of victims are secured without discrimination on any of the grounds that are listed in article 4(3). One of those grounds is migrant status; we do not feel there is enough legal protection in the Bill to ensure that there will not be discrimination in the provision of services and support to migrant victims. To remedy that, it is important to insert the principle of non-discrimination into the Bill. That should be applied to any statutory duty on local authorities, or a wider statutory duty on public authorities to ensure that when they are discharging their responsibilities under the Bill, they are doing so mindfully and in accordance with the requirement under the Istanbul convention not to discriminate against certain categories of victim.
Q
Lucy Hadley: Just to be clear, it was £27 million for domestic abuse and a further £13 million for sexual violence; I think the other funding pots were for vulnerable children and for other vulnerabilities during this time. That money is absolutely essential; it is really welcome. As I mentioned before, covid-19 has hit this sector at a time when it was already really vulnerable. It has been experiencing a funding crisis for a very long time, so it is vital that the money reaches the services that are protecting and supporting some of the most vulnerable people during this period.
What our member services tell us is that one-off funding pots provide them with no security and no ability to plan ahead or retain and recruit staff for the long term. What we would really like to see underpin the Bill’s very important statutory duty on local authorities to fund support in accommodation-based services is a commitment to long-term funding, so that year on year, services or local authorities do not have to competitively bid into different funding pots. That would provide us with a framework, so that services could plan ahead, get on with doing what they do best, which is supporting vulnerable women and children, and not spend significant amounts of time on tendering processes or bids for different funding pots.
We have estimated that fully funding the Government’s statutory duty would cost £173 million a year in England; that would ensure that the national network of refuges could meet demand. As we know, we are 30% below the recommended number of bed spaces in England, and 64% of referrals to refuges are turned away, so we would like a long-term funding commitment underpin the duty.
Q
Lucy Hadley: The duty will include requirements on local authorities to report back to Government. We would really like stronger national oversight of the duty, because refuges are a national network of services. Two thirds of women in refuges are from a different local authority area, so we cannot just leave this to local authorities. We would like to see the national oversight proposed by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government clarified in the Bill. That would help with the national oversight of those different local approaches that you are talking about.
We would really like to see police and crime commissioners and other funders get much more involved in funding support for domestic abuse. That is where the commissioner’s role in mapping and monitoring service provision is really important. There are concerns that a statutory duty on accommodation-based services alone is not the same as the duties that the commissioner has.
Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of this very valuable session. I thank our two witnesses very much for giving evidence.
We now move on to the next session. As the Committee is aware, one of our witnesses is giving evidence down the phone, so we will pause for a minute while we make the connection.
Examination of Witnesses
Ellie Butt and Suzanne Jacob OBE gave evidence.
Q
Suzanne Jacob: Drive is a very important tactical intervention against perpetrators of domestic abuse. It deals specifically with high-harm and high-risk individuals, which means that they pose a risk of serious harm or murder to one or more family members. It is making a difference, and we are extremely proud of the consortium of organisations and funders who have supported it. It has been a very good team effort so far.
Drive responds to one particular cohort of those who use abuse. There is a very broad spectrum of individuals who use abusive behaviours in their family life. With 80-plus other organisations, we are calling for not just Drive but DAPOs and other really important tactical provisions to be set within the context of a comprehensive strategy about the perpetrators of domestic abuse. In exactly the same way, for years we have had a really concerted strategy called Pursue around counter-terrorism, and we have had the same for organised crime. It is overdue, and it could be a really good sign of the Government’s ambitious intent to have a strategy around those who use abuse.
Q
Suzanne Jacob: I think it is really helpful. We are very supportive of the amendment, which Members will have seen, around quality assurance for those programmes. Quality as well as quantity is vitally important when it comes to perpetrator responses, because the risks are very great and we know that, as with any industry, you can get the corner shop or backroom options, trying to do things on the cheap, which is not safe and not effective. So we very much welcome the provision and we would like to see something further, and something solid, in there about the quality assurance process for that.
Q
Ellie Butt: We really welcome that amendment. It is something that we worked with other organisations in this sector and the homelessness sector to bring about. It is important particularly for survivors without children, who currently are not entitled to priority need automatically. It will be an enormous help for that group of survivors and we welcome it.
I think there is a lot more to do around housing for survivors of domestic abuse. Hopefully we will come on to talk about it, but the legal duty for refuges is particularly crucial, because there still are not enough places to meet demand; but, yes—absolutely—it is brilliant that that change is being made, and it will offer protection to that particular cohort.
Thank you. Colleagues will have lots of questions, so I am going to draw myself in, as it were, now.
Q
Ellie Butt: We really welcome the creation of the role of domestic abuse commissioner and the appointment of Nicole Jacobs, who I think is already doing brilliant work in this field. We think her particular strength will be understanding what service provision is going on, mapping that and looking at its quality—the gaps—and reporting and making representations to the Home Office and Parliament about it.
Something that I would really like to see, as well, is her bringing in areas of Government that I think currently do not do enough work in this field. For example, the Department for Work and Pensions has an enormous role here. Something that the Bill is going to do is define economic abuse, within the definition of domestic abuse. That is brilliant, but we want to see much more in terms of protecting survivors of economic abuse. We want to see some changes to the welfare benefits system to bring that about, including making advance benefit payments grants, rather than loans, for survivors of abuse, and the single household payment system being made into a separate payment system. I think Nicole has the capacity in her role—or whoever might follow in that role—to look at what those Departments, which we do not usually hear about when we talk about domestic abuse, are doing. I think there is an awful lot of potential there.
It is also important, though, to recognise that her role is currently a part-time role, with a relatively small budget. She can do lots in bringing issues to light and improving our understanding, but major gaps still need to be rectified through changes to the law and funding, and policy as well.
Q
Suzanne Jacob: I think you have heard from many of the witnesses today what an incredible ordeal family court is at the moment. Anything that can improve that process is important to do, so we at SafeLives are very supportive of the amendments that Women’s Aid has suggested, in terms of going further and getting rid of cross-examination from all parts of the court process when someone is facing an alleged abuser or ex-abuser. That is really important.
There are also a number of other suggested changes from other organisations around the role and expertise of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, for example, which we think are important. There is currently something innately adversarial about the family court process, which makes it an incredibly painful thing for both adults and children to go through. Many, many women who go through the family court process would tell you that they would rather they had just stayed with the abuser rather than go through family court, which is a horrible indictment of our current processes.
Q
Ellie Butt: Yes, absolutely.
Q
Ellie Butt: I would agree with that. Some of the measures in the Bill have the potential to have a positive impact, but there are some significant problems that need ironing out for them to achieve that potential, particularly the duty to assess need and provide for domestic abuse safe accommodation. There are some big questions about that, one of which is the funding—it really needs to be fully funded to work. Colleagues at Women’s Aid have estimated that that is about £175 million a year. Then what happens to those services that do not fall within that duty? There is a real risk that we could lose those, which is exactly what we do not want.
The Bill has been criticised in places for being too focused on criminal justice. While I think a full range of reforms is needed in all the different areas of life that affect survivors of domestic abuse, there are particular changes that we can make to the criminal law that would increase protection for survivors. Something we at Refuge work on a lot is abuse through technology. There is a big gap in the criminal law at the moment around threats to share intimate images, and survivors do not have recourse. It is a hugely powerful tool of coercion and control, particularly post separation, and there is a real gap there that the Bill could address quite straightforwardly. There is a lot in there, and I take your point, but I also think we need to take the opportunity we have now and make it as good as it can be.
Q
Ellie Butt: Yes, she is very welcome.
Is she welcome to come in?
Ellie Butt: Of course. Well, not right now, because we are all working from home—but absolutely. Minister Victoria Atkins has visited the helpline. The domestic abuse commissioner would be more than welcome to do that.
Q
Ellie Butt: Absolutely. I am sure that she can and, at the same time, draw attention to what is not being done and where gaps are. You will have heard already that domestic abuse services are largely run on a shoestring. I would say this, but I think Refuge does brilliant work and lots of the organisations in the sector do brilliant work, but there is absolutely room for that to be scrutinised, for improvements to be made where they need to be made, and for gaps to be filled where they are not funded and there is unmet need.
Q
Ellie Butt: We support the argument that children need to be in the definition of domestic abuse. Children are victims in their own right; they are never just witnesses. There are some small improvements being made in understanding that, but it needs to go much further.
One thing that struck me when I first started working for Refuge and has never stopped is that on any given day, half the people in our refuges—we provide around 48 refuges—will be children, yet we receive little to no funding to do work and support them directly; we fundraise for that. That is not right. These are hugely vulnerable children who have experienced the trauma of growing up in a house with one parent who is abusive. We need to do so much more for children, including providing specialist services for them.
Q
Lyndsey Dearlove: I spent a couple of years as a MARAC co-ordinator, and I managed a MARAC in London. In that time, the provision of support for young children was about whether they met the threshold for social services, and in that instance, the support was about keeping them safe. At no point was there any offer of provision to enable children to look at their own mental health and examine their traumatic experience, because that provision just did not exist within the community.
Q
Lyndsey Dearlove: A multi-agency risk assessment conference falls very much in line with the co-ordinated community response model, which is about bringing as many organisations together as possible and them all seeing that domestic abuse is a core issue. It entails a group of individuals who are named by their organisations to present and represent the cases on which they work. The majority of MARACs focus on the entire family: provision is put in place to keep the victim safe along with their children, but they also focus on prevention and holding the perpetrator to account.
When MARACs work well, they can be really effective. However, one of the challenges with MARACs is that although we have a huge need for people’s cases to be heard, the threshold for reaching and being heard at MARAC is often being deemed to be high risk. Obviously, risk is incredibly dynamic when it comes to domestic abuse, and with MARAC being once a month, your risk can change from day to day: you could have been able to use it, but then you cannot.
Q
Lyndsey Dearlove: I think it is very important for us to recognise it, and it needs to be recognised by the professionals within the criminal justice system. We know from numerous experiences—it is something that victims of domestic abuse tell us nearly every day—that domestic abuse does not end at the point of separation, and that in the criminal justice system, especially around family courts, children are consistently used as a weaponised tool to control and prevent somebody from moving on into a new space.
Q
Giselle Valle: Because in our experience what happens is that the police focus very quickly on immigration status. Once they find that somebody’s immigration status is not secure, they outright deny the service and say, “Just go back to your home country,” or they refer them to the Home Office so that they get sent back to their country. This process ensures not only that the women will not be supported, but that perpetrators are actually getting away with it, just on that basis alone.
Q
Giselle Valle: In our organisation it is quite prevalent. A referral to the Home Office instils such fear that it is really difficult to convince women to go to the police, even when they are supported by our organisation. A freedom of information request—I think it was one or two years ago—revealed that about 60% of police forces in the country make referrals to the Home Office, which essentially closes the door on women who are experiencing domestic abuse and thinking about reporting it to the police, but who realise it would be highly dangerous for them and sometimes for their children, so they refrain from doing so.
Q
Giselle Valle: The question was about referrals to the Home Office. They said, “Yes, we do.”
Q
Giselle Valle: I think the question is about referrals, not about checking immigration status. It is about actual referrals to the Home Office.
Q
Lyndsey Dearlove: I think there are two parts to it. The Bill now speaks to big issues, but there are some practical issues that can make a real difference for children who have experienced domestic abuse. Some of that is about looking at their interaction with the NHS and at how they can maintain their appointments. One woman, who has allowed me to tell her story, came into our refuge after she had waited about 18 months for a referral to a speech therapist; she was concerned about her daughter’s speech. The social worker in the area told her that she had to leave and move into a refuge. After arriving in the refuge, she waited another 8 months for a referral to speech therapy. She was then rehoused, but her child was too old to benefit from speech therapy. Having a protected status on NHS waiting lists can be really important and can enable somebody to make the decision to leave and flee, without having that as a hindrance.
The other factor is looking at children’s access to schools and making sure they have that as soon as possible. Within primary schools the time can be quite reduced, dependent on which area of London you are in. If you are talking about secondary schools and GCSEs, getting a child back into school and into a school rhythm is exceptionally important. We now see that children have been forced to travel, pre-covid-19, across two or three boroughs. Unfortunately, in one instance, a gang picked up this young person, whose movement was known because they were going backwards and forwards, and used them to transport drugs. We know those opportunities increase vulnerabilities for children. If we can do some of the really simple, practical measures that can reduce that, they do make a big difference.
Thank you. So that people can indicate, if they are not on the list, I am now going to call Minister Chalk, then I have Mike Wood, Christine Jardine, Peter Kyle and Liz Twist.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Yes.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Yes, of course.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Of course it is, and the interaction between a victim and a defendant is often present in a range of material ways.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: It seems to me to strike the right balance. There is often the need for an urgent move to be made to remove the risk, and that seems quite right to me. I lament very strongly the loss of pre-trial bail conditions. They are a simpler way to do it than a notice like this, so please do restore pre-trial bail to the police.
Q
The final thing I want to ask about briefly is special measures directions and the ability for people to give their best evidence. Do you welcome what is in the Bill to allow vulnerable people to feel more comfortable about the court process, and to do themselves justice when they are before a court speaking about something that may be very traumatic for them?
Dame Vera Baird: But it does not go nearly far enough, Minister. You have extended special measures in criminal proceedings so that they are automatically available for a domestic abuse victim—absolutely excellent —but in family proceedings, and indeed in civil proceedings, people who are vulnerable or intimidated are just as vulnerable or intimidated as they are in criminal proceedings, and just as much in need of giving their best evidence. I really have no understanding of why you do not just extend special measures to all courts. They are subject to proper identification of vulnerability and a process that follows, and the judiciary have the final say. It seems to me that that is far and away the best thing to do. It is very straightforward and simple, and can give people that advanced assurance that they are going to be able to give their evidence in a protected way. That is obviously what you are aiming for by extending them to domestic abuse victims in criminal cases.
Q
The Bill places a duty on tier 1 local authorities to provide support services to domestic abuse victims and their children in safe accommodation. Do you welcome that? What can we do to help you and your colleagues to implement that?
Simon Blackburn: We absolutely do welcome the duty and we want to make sure that local authorities are equipped to enact that duty in an appropriate way. There are a number of points to make.
Although the provision of safe and secure accommodation for victims, survivors and their children is absolutely fundamental, it represents a failure in all the systems. We should not be in a place where that is the only thing that local authorities are doing. There should be early intervention and prevention work taking place to make sure that women are not being removed from their homes and that, wherever possible, it is the perpetrators lives that are being disrupted.
Funding for domestic abuse services comes from the Government to a variety of different actors; local authorities are only one of those. Some funding is distributed directly to the third sector, some to police and crime commissioners and some to parts of the health service. It is important that we think about whether an opportunity ought to apply to those organisations as well. I do not think local authorities are the only people that can fix this.
In broad terms, we welcome the emphasis and the responsibility, but we want to see early intervention, prevention and community-based services given as much weight as accommodation-based services.
Q
Simon Blackburn: It is important that the needs of children are put at the forefront of what local authorities do. In all social work assessments that should come through and be very clear. There will be differences in practice between one local authority and another. There may be a more informal disposal—for want of a better word—such as asking parents to engage with parenting classes or providing family support. The point at which that tips over into the local authority offering a formal assessment of need will vary from one area to another, depending on the services available. What should be consistent throughout is the threshold at which, for instance, a section 47 inquiry begins, because a child is deemed to be at risk of significant harm. That should not vary from one area to another.
In terms of the boards and partnerships that you refer to, I would think there would need to be somebody senior from the children’s social services department on that board. It is also possible that some form of guardian ad litem, or some independent representative of the needs of children, could sit on that board.
Q
Simon Blackburn: It is clear that victims and their children are in need of priority assistance and certainly local councils would not shy away from that. There are, however other groups of people who local councils have been asked to give priority to, such as former servicemen and women, ex-offenders and victims of modern slavery. The council housing and social housing stock can only be so elastic. For instance, in my own local authority in Blackpool, were a victim or survivor to require a four-bedroomed house, I have five such houses and they are all occupied at the moment, with a waiting list potentially between five and 10 years.
We would need to look at some flexibility in terms of funding, and at discharging that duty potentially in the private sector—where, of course, it is not possible for a local authority to guarantee a lifetime tenancy, because we would be dealing with a private sector landlord. Given sufficient stock, absolutely, but we know there are major challenges across the board for local authorities up and down the country in building enough council and social houses. We absolutely would not shy away from the duty.
Q
Simon Blackburn: In terms of the definition?
The definition of domestic abuse in clause 1 of the Bill. What influence do you think that will have on commissioners when they are designing and commissioning services?
Simon Blackburn: I think it is potentially quite transformative. In the past it has been possible for people to interpret domestic abuse very narrowly. The broadening of the definition and the fact that we are taking things such as economic abuse into account certainly enable local authorities and other commissioners, such as police and crime commissioners, to look for more provision of specialist services, as Sara said earlier on, rather than asking providers to deliver things in which they do not necessarily have expertise. Of course, that comes down to the total quantum of money available to deliver on that, but I would welcome the expansion of the definition.
Thank you very much. I will leave Sara to my Welsh colleagues.
I will run through who I have seen so far. I have Rebecca Harris, Liz Saville Roberts, Fay Jones, Liz Twist, Virginia Crosbie, Nickie Aiken and Jess. Rebecca Harris?
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I will not be heckled—this is the easy bit.
Hansard has asked for you to email your written notes or speeches, because obviously these are not normal circumstances, to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Today we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session. In view of the limited time available, I hope that we can take these matters without much debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion that was agreed by the Programming Sub-Committee on Tuesday.
I beg to move, TABLE Date Time Witness Thursday 4 June Until no later than 12.30 pm Nicole Jacobs, Designate Domestic Abuse Commissioner Thursday 4 June Until no later than 1.00 pm Southall Black Sisters Thursday 4 June Until no later than 2.15 pm Latin American Women’s Rights Service Thursday 4 June Until no later than 2.45 pm Somiya Basar; Saliha Rashid Thursday 4 June Until no later than 3.15 pm Women’s Aid Federation of England; End Violence Against Women Coalition Thursday 4 June Until no later than 3.45 pm Refuge; SafeLives Thursday 4 June Until no later than 4.15 pm Hestia; Gisela Valle, Step Up Migrant Women UK Thursday 4 June Until no later than 4.30 pm Dame Vera Baird QC, Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses Thursday 4 June Until no later than 5.00 pm Local Government Association; Welsh Women’s Aid
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 4 June) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 June;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 June;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Wednesday 10 June;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 11 June;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 16 June;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Wednesday 17 June;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 37; Schedule 1; Clauses 38 to 62; Schedule 2; Clauses 63 to 73; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings on the Bill shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 25 June.
I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone, alongside my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, the co-Minister for this important piece of legislation. We want to get on and hear the evidence from our commissioner, the first witness, so I will be brief. The motion provides the Committee with sufficient time to scrutinise this landmark Bill. I welcome the fact that it will enable us to hear evidence from 14 witnesses, including survivors of domestic abuse, so I invite the Committee to agree it.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Q
Pragna Patel: Absolutely. Of course I do. I think the evidence has been gathered, and it is there; that is my difference with the view that we need to collect more data and evidence. Over the duration of this Bill, there have been various roundtables, ministerial meetings, submissions to the Home Office, internal reviews, submissions to the last call for evidence. In all these ways, evidence has been submitted to show how migrant women, particularly those with no recourse to public funds and on non-spousal visas, are being left behind and left devoid of protection. There is a lot of evidence out there, and it is gathered. Government themselves have funded us, through the tampon tax, to provide that evidence.
Q
Pragna Patel: We produced the findings, which we have also let you have. That is an evaluation of the tampon tax funding for no-recourse women.
How many victims?
Pragna Patel: There are a number of tampon tax funds, but altogether between them, from 2017 to date, we have probably helped in the region of 500 women.
Q
Pragna Patel: No. We would say that half were and half were not.
So 250 of the 500 were eligible, but 250 were not—
Pragna Patel: Were not eligible.
Q
Pragna Patel: We have asked several times for the time limit to be extended, in recognition of the fact that women who are on non-spousal visas have complex immigration histories, and the evaluation findings suggest that we need a longer period of time to support them in order for them to resolve those immigration difficulties. Up to six months or so would be an average.
Fair enough, but of the 250—
Pragna Patel: Half of them at least, because our evidence shows that about two thirds of the women who come to us and our partner agencies in relation to the no-recourse fund that we provide are women who do not have spousal visas, and therefore need at least three months, if not longer—up to six months, or sometimes a little more—to resolve their immigration matters.
Q
Pragna Patel: Not many would have sought help through the national referral mechanism, because trafficked women only represented a small proportion of the women who came to us for help.
Q
Pragna Patel: Not many of them were what we would classify as trafficked victims. Many of them were women who were in abusive marriages and relationships, whose relationship or marriage broke down due to domestic abuse. It is not an accurate reflection to say that many of those women could have been referred to the national referral mechanism.
I am not saying that; I am just asking for your findings.
Pragna Patel: Perhaps a handful.
Q
Pragna Patel: No, we are talking about a six-month period in which the evaluation findings suggest that many of the women could be helped to resolve their immigration matters or be well on their way, and helped to deal with the barriers they need to overcome in order to stand on their own two feet. In terms of the evidence you need, the evidence we have provided is exactly the evidence that you will get if you do another pilot project.
Minister, I must apologise, but I can see what will happen if I do not stop you—I will not get the other Back-Bench Members in. This always happens. I apologise to the witness. We could do a two-hour session, but we only have half an hour, so—
Q
Pragna Patel: We are worried that the pilot project will delay matters and will delay the needed protection measures, and that it may be followed up by yet more pilot projects. We are worried that the pilot project has been allocated £1.5 million, whereas the tampon tax that we currently have has allocated £1.9 million. It is only helping 130 women over two years, so we cannot see how the £1.5 million that you have allocated for a pilot project will support many women or will garner the kind of evidence that you will need and that is not already available to you now.
Thank you. I am going to change the order slightly, because Mr Wood kindly gave up his slot last time. Mike, I will come to you now, if that is okay.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship as always, Ms Buck. I thank everyone who has contributed to the debate and those colleagues who have not risen to their feet to speak. I know that there are a few who consider these matters very important and have given them great thought throughout the debate, and who will do so as we go forward.
I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, for setting out the case for the amendment. I wholeheartedly agree that it is vital that we recognise that children are direct victims of domestic abuse. Growing up in a household of fear and intimidation can affect children’s wellbeing and development with lasting effects into adulthood. Children who are exposed to domestic abuse are more likely to experience mental health difficulties, to be excluded from school, and to become victims of domestic abuse in later life.
Many colleagues talked about adverse childhood experiences, including my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn, who cited one of the highest percentages of looked-after children in Wales and is obviously very concerned. That is something that I have to consider, not just in the context of domestic abuse, but in my work at the Home Office on gangs and violence against women and girls specifically. That factor has many repercussions beyond the immediate impact in the household where the abuse occurs. I am very alert and alive to that.
I thank the hon. Member for Blaydon for our virtual meeting on Friday and for clarifying that the issue that she mentioned is now no longer taken on age. I make that point because in a moment I will describe the journey on which the Government have been with the definition so that there is transparency and no mystery about why the definition is phrased as it is. In the Westminster Hall debate, the argument was made that there should be no minimum age threshold. I said frankly during that debate that although it was a balancing exercise, we had come down on the side of keeping the age of 16 as the threshold. I was very pleased that on Friday, having had our discussions—I hope I am not misquoting—there seemed to be consensus about keeping that age in the definition.
I will explain the Government’s approach so that there is no misunderstanding that we are not in any way taking into account the terrible impact that domestic abuse has on children. The approach that we have taken with the definition is to describe the relationship between the abuser and the abused—the immediate victim of the abuse—and to define categories of abusive behaviours. That will be relevant when we look at other clauses as, understandably, people want particular manifestations of behaviour to appear in the Bill. We draw people back to the fact that we are looking at categories of behaviour because, sadly, there are countless ways of emotionally abusing someone, for example, and—as Members of this House will know—if we listed everything in statute, it would take quite some doing to change or update it, whereas statutory guidance is more flexible and we can update it.
The basis of the definition in the Bill is to focus on the relationship between the abuser and the direct victim, and to define the categories of behaviour. The definition does not address the impact of abuse on adult victims. I would not dream of trying to define in statute how Claire Throssell, for example, experienced the harrowing and awful things that happened to her. Nor would I dream of trying to put into statute some of the experiences described by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. We cannot do justice to them in the Bill.
That is the approach that we have taken, and that is why we place so much emphasis on the statutory guidance. That will be the document that commissioners and police forces look at to work out how to interpret the Bill at local level. Just as we have not put the impact of abuse on adult victims in the Bill, we have not done so with the impact of abuse on child victims. Instead, we will rely on the statutory guidance. We have, however, referred in the definition to the fact that perpetrators can use children in their abuse towards their victims. Clause 1(5) states that the perpetrator’s
“behaviour may be behaviour ‘towards’ B”—
the victim—
“despite the fact that it consists of conduct directed at another person (for example, B’s child).”
We have, therefore, put in the Bill the fact that the perpetrator may not confine their abusive behaviour towards the immediate victim, but that it can be directed through a child or another person as well. We have also emphasised the statutory guidance set out in clause 79(2)(b) in which the Secretary of State must issue guidance about
“the effect of domestic abuse on children.”
I just wonder—this might be a massive ask—if the Committee could see that guidance, or have sight of at least that section about what we are going to discuss throughout the Bill.
I very much appreciate the request, but, sadly, I cannot provide the Committee with a copy at this point. When it comes to the transparency of the journey to this point, the guidance has not been created by a silo of Home Office officials who did not talk to anyone else. We have involved, consulted and asked other people, and that has included asking the designate domestic abuse commissioner for her views. Indeed, she mentioned last week that she had seen it. Other charitable sectors have been very much involved and consulted in the drafting of the guidance. Sadly, covid-19 has had an impact on our ability to draft the guidance so we have not been able to publish it in time for the Committee, but we are aiming to publish it in draft form before Report. I hope that members of the Committee will be able to see it before the next procedural stage, and I apologise for it not being available now. We want people’s views on it. All sorts of colleagues have been asking me whether certain things are being included in the guidance, and I have been saying to them, “This will be open for people to give their views on it.” Of course, I welcome views on it.
I wonder to what extent the Minister has considered the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011, and the fact that when we are dealing with children we are at the jagged edge of devolution—between the laws affecting Wales and those in England—as well as considering how the interplay will work with these measures.
The hon. Lady probably does not know this, but she may be committing a parliamentary first. The old hands that have previously sat on Bill Committees will know that part of a Minister’s job is to keep talking while her officials furiously scribble notes that are handed to her to enable her to accurately answer difficult questions. Sadly, I do not have that ability, but Members may see me looking at my mobile phone. I would be grateful if the hon. Lady would indulge me and allow me to return to that later, because she asks a specific question. In general, I am, of course, aware of the jagged edge, as she describes it.
Part of me feels that I may be a little bit boring in this Committee, because I have a duty to say, “Look at what has been done in Wales and look at the responsibilities that lie in Wales.” I fear—this came up in the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill—that we have two pieces of legislation in operation and this piece of law will affect the legislation that I have mentioned. We will create wonderful events, or we may unexpectedly create tensions out of the divergence test. It is important that that is considered at this stage.
Very much so. May I postpone my answer until we debate the amendment that the hon. Lady has tabled on Welsh devolution, so that I can address the point about clause 11? We are aware that good work is going on in Wales on domestic abuse through the devolved authorities. Where matters are devolved, we have the “jagged edge”, as she describes it: some areas in Wales are devolved and some are not. It is perhaps a little clearer cut in Scotland, but we are clear that we want to work with our Welsh colleagues, and I hope that the commissioner gave reassurance last week. I think I am right in saying that the Home Office has helped to fund the work on adverse childhood experiences has been conducted by the South Wales Police. We see that as a really important piece of work with the police and crime commissioner in South Wales, and we hope that it will help the rest of the country as the findings are evaluated.
Perhaps my intervention will give the Minister’s officials time to get a note to her on the previous question. I realise that this might turn into a sketch from “The Two Ronnies”, with her answering the previous question to mine, but we will deal with that when it arises.
Can the Minister explain why there is a conflict between establishing the rights of a child in the Bill and having it in guidance? From what I have heard so far, I do not understand why we cannot have both.
At the risk of turning into a sketch from “The Two Ronnies”, I am told that we will be consulting Welsh Ministers on the precise point raised by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd, so I am grateful for that.
In relation to the intervention from the hon. Member for Hove, it is not a question of conflict. I was trying to explain the journey of the Government’s drafting of the definition. I do not wish anyone to think that children have been forgotten or ignored in the course of drafting the Bill. I hope that the references to children that we have scattered through the Bill—clause 66 is a good example—show our thinking on that.
I do. I am going to complete the journey, because I suspect that where I end up will, I hope, answer some of those concerns. I take on board carefully the views of children’s charities.
We have made sure that the domestic abuse commissioner is required to recognise the impact on children in her statutory functions, which can be seen in clause 6. Of course, we also have local authorities. My hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster set out the responsibility and the ways in which local authorities can help to deliver services on the ground. Indeed, I was most interested to hear about the domestic abuse strategy introduced by her council under her leadership. That is a very sensible point to be making and it is why, in part 4 of the Bill, where we put the responsibility on tier 1 local authorities to provide support to victims of domestic abuse in safe accommodation, we have expressly referred to victims and their children in that duty.
The need for statutory agencies to recognise and respond to the impact of domestic abuse on children is already embedded in the Bill. Councillor Simon Blackburn gave helpful evidence last week—he has experience as a former social worker, but also as the current leader of Blackpool Council and through his work in the Local Government Association—about the safeguarding legislation in respect of children and how, in some cases, although I accept not all, the safeguarding legislation will kick in.
I also remind colleagues that in clause 54—this has not necessarily come to light yet in the evidence, but I hope it will do so in due course—as part of that duty, tier 1 local authorities are required to set up local partnership boards for domestic abuse. One of the members of that board must represent the interests of children who are victims of domestic abuse.
The theme of children, and the impact on children, already runs throughout the Bill, but I take very seriously the concerns that members of the Committee have voiced and, indeed, the concerns of children’s charities and the witnesses we had last week. I am going to reflect carefully on this debate, and I invite the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw her amendment.
We are now moving on from the definition to talk about exactly who we mean by “connected parties”. The amendment is a response to calls from people with disabilities and organisations within the disability rights sector that have been in touch with us to express their concerns about whether they are seen in the Bill.
As we said in the debate about whether children should be in the Bill, we recognise that there is a need for much more detailed and in-depth guidance. In relation to domestic abuse, we are potentially missing some real opportunities that genuinely need to be responded to with law—the courts of our land—but are currently not covered by the area of “connected parties”. The issue is those whose connection to a person is that they are their carer. We are not necessarily talking about paid carers.
Carers UK announced yesterday that 4.5 million people have become unpaid carers during the coronavirus crisis, so it is not a minority issue or something that happens only in certain areas. People who very much rely on others for their care might not currently be covered by what is outlined in the Bill as a connected party. They might never have been married or had a civil partnership. They might never have been divorced, which got a bit easier yesterday, and they might not be related. I should tell my husband that it got easier to get divorced yesterday—
He has been in touch already. [Laughter.]
The reality is that for lots of people a connected party to their wellbeing, their life, or what people would call their family, is a bit like in working class communities, although I am sure it happens in others: a woman lives down the road and her husband borrows somebody’s dad’s ladder, so they call her auntie, even though she is absolutely no relation whatever. We have to understand that in lots of people’s lives, connected people might not be what we would naturally recognise.
On the definition of “personally connected”, I want the Bill to reflect the realities of all domestic abuse victims. I want all victims to be able to access services, justice and support when needed. I think we would all agree that no victim should be left behind. We are taking our time—my gosh, it is quite a lot of time—to get the Bill right and see it through. It will never be perfect, but we should make every effort to make it as perfect as it can be.
Clause 2 defines what it means to be personally connected. In other words, the clause sets out the relationship between a victim and a perpetrator that comes under the definition of domestic abuse. The list includes what we would typically expect: as I have already laid out, those in intimate personal relationships with each other. However, my concern is that the clause, as it stands, fails to recognise the lived experiences of disabled victims of domestic abuse, who are among the most vulnerable. Their abuse often goes unnoticed.
The crime survey for England and Wales found that individuals with long-term illness or disability were more likely to be victims of domestic abuse. A 2016 report on intimate personal violence by the Office for National Statistics found that 16% of women with long-term illness or disability had experienced domestic abuse. Disabled victims are also more likely to experience domestic abuse for a longer period of time: 3.3 years, on average, compared with 2.3 years for non-disabled victims. With that in mind, I want the Bill to make it easier for disabled victims of domestic abuse to be recognised. To do that, we have to accept the reality of disabled people’s lives, where significant relationships are perhaps different from those of a non-disabled person with an unpaid carer.
Ruth Bashall, the chief executive of Stay Safe East, said that disabled people
“have emotionally intimate relationships with the people who, in very large inverted commas, ‘care’ for us, and the experience of abuse by those people is exactly the same as domestic abuse: the coercive control, the violence, the financial abuse and so on.”
It is important that we recognise, based on the evidence presented to the Committee, that a large number of disabled people will have no relationship with anyone except for the people who “care” for them. This type of close relationship can easily take on a problematic power dynamic that closely mirrors familial or intimate partner violence. As I have said, we can see how that might occur. I have been doing shopping and taking money from people who needed me to go to the shops for them. It would, if I were that way inclined, not be particularly difficult to build a relationship, a rapport and a need from me in that person that I could then exploit over a number of years. I would not do that, obviously.
In response to the Joint Committee’s report, the Government said that they did not propose to review the personally connected clause at the current time. Paragraph 60 of the their response states:
“If they are personally connected to their carer, this will be covered by our definition of domestic abuse. Otherwise, abuse of disabled people by their carers is already covered by existing legislation.”
What we heard from Saliha in the evidence session last Thursday was that, as a disabled victim of domestic abuse, she often finds that she is not understood by one or the other. As I have said this morning, her experience as a victim of gender-based violence or domestic abuse is often not expected, dealt with or understood by disability agencies, and vice versa: as a disabled person, she finds getting access to mainstream domestic violence services difficult.
We have to be very careful, when writing this Bill, not to ignore those intersecting groups of people and just say, “Well, there’s already existing legislation that would cover it.” It would not cover it from the point of view of domestic abuse because, as we all know, that has been lacking from our laws, and that is what we are here to try to improve.
I urge the Government to rethink their position for a number of reasons. First, it is not appropriate to say that abuse of disabled people by their carers is already covered by different legislation. This is a Domestic Abuse Bill for all victims. Therefore, if the abuse of a disabled person meets the definition of domestic abuse—if it is financially controlling, or if it involves sexual, economic or psychological abuse—but it is not by somebody in one of the connected party groups, that disabled person would not be left with many places to turn to take the case of domestic abuse to court or wherever.
If a disabled person meets the definition, that ought to be recognised and covered by this legislation, not something else. We cannot just keep saying, “Well, if you’re in this group you’re covered by this, and if you’re in this group you’re covered by this.” I would have thought that we would want to make a Domestic Abuse Bill that covers everybody.
I would go even further, and suggest that the Government’s response is a bit dismissive and fails to recognise the gender-based nature of domestic abuse solely because the victim is disabled. We cannot have domestic abuse covered by other legislation just because the person is disabled.
Secondly, while I appreciate that section 42 of the Care Act 2014 places a duty on local authorities to carry out safeguarding inquiries if they suspect abuse, that is no reason why disabled victims should not be represented in this Bill. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that local authorities are failing even to identify victims, even those who are at highest risk. Between 2015 and 2016, none of the 925 referrals of disabled victims to domestic abuse services were from adult safeguarding—zero.
I would be so bold as to bet that every piece of single adult safeguarding guidance in every adult safeguarding group that exists in every single local authority has domestic abuse written within it somewhere, and says that the vulnerable adults can be victims of domestic abuse. In all my years, I have literally never once referred a victim of domestic abuse to adult social care, because that is not what adult social care is for.
If I were to ring up my local authority or, I would even wager, Westminster City Council and say, “I’ve got this woman and she’s a victim of domestic abuse, and I see that that’s written into your adult social care board, so can I get a social worker out to see her later? She’s suffered some violence over the years and a bit of emotional abuse recently, the kids are getting a bit—”, the idea that an adult social worker would go out and see that victim is for the birds. The fact that zero referrals —none—to domestic abuse services of disabled women came from adult social care speaks to the evidence.
That is why we are proposing to amend the Bill to include carers in the definition of “personally connected”. Including carers will raise awareness and, I hope, help the police and local authorities to adopt better practices—for example, on something as simple as questioning a victim separately from the carer, which I imagine happens quite rarely. It is vital that those sorts of policies are put in place. The amendment provides an opportunity for us to tackle the profound inequalities faced by disabled survivors.
Stay Safe East sent a number of case studies, such as this one:
“A disabled woman was targeted by a man who was homeless. He gradually gained her trust and over a period of months, she began to see him as her friend, then as ‘better family than my own’. He assisted her first with shopping (while taking her money), then with household tasks and eventually with personal care. His controlling and intimidating behaviour towards the woman’s carers led them to withdraw the support, leaving him in complete control of the disabled woman’s life.”
To anyone who has ever worked in domestic abuse services, that sounds exactly like what a domestic violence perpetrator does—isolate, control and ensure there is no one else there to turn to. The quote continues:
“There was physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse. The man then brought his friends into the woman’s home; they further intimidated her. When she was eventually able to seek help, her health had deteriorated due to neglect. Whilst the actions of the man and his friends could be described as ‘cuckooing’ (a term used by the police to describe taking over a person’s home for criminal or other purposes), they also constitute domestic abuse: the woman had a ‘close personal connection’ with the abuser which left her dependent on him and open to abuse.”
I am sure the Minister would say that the woman would have been able to get support from this service or that service, but why should she not be able to access direct support from domestic abuse services? Why would we not want to compel councils, for example, to commission services specifically for victims of domestic abuse who are disabled? Should the police take that case, on different grounds, using different legislation from a different law —[Interruption.] The very polite Member for Cheltenham is leaving; take care. It is a lovely constituency.
It is not fair to say that the woman had not been a victim of domestic abuse. It is not fair that she would not then be entered into the system that would allow her to access the specialist support that comes with understanding control, power and her own sense of worth in the world.
Another case study notes:
“A neighbour befriended a woman with learning disabilities, became her carer and provided her with support. He then demanded sex and verbally abused her because she would not have sex with him.”
These women experienced abuse by people who had in effect become their family, and with whom they had a close personal connection. They experienced this abuse as domestic abuse. In lots of the cases that Stay Safe East sent, when these women sought help, they were often refused services as victims of domestic abuse—they did not fit the current definition, and they suffered for months before being able to access the right, more specialist support.
Disabled people face huge barriers in getting support from the services that are available today and that we all hope to see improved. They still find it very difficult to access domestic abuse services; by and large, only one or two beds available in an area will be accessible.
With regard to specialism in learning disability support, for example: with the greatest will in the world, people like me and the women who work in the refuge where I worked are not specialists in dealing with people with learning disabilities. We did not have specialist training. With 19 women and 28 kids in the building each night, and people coming and going because of housing emergencies, where is the level of specialism that might be needed in our refuge for somebody with severe autism? Everybody does their best, but the specialism that can be found for disabled victims is often provided only by disabled voluntary sector providers, who do not deal with the manifest issue of recovering from the trauma of domestic abuse. We have to find a way to make sure that if a disabled person is the victim of domestic abuse, they get the same service as they would if they were not disabled—I am not saying that it is perfect for everyone, by any means.
Again, I cannot help but go back to the evidence from the victim Sal. She told the Committee that that was exactly what had happened to her: her parents had abused her, stating that she would never be able to do anything or go anywhere, and she had to allow them to control her because as a disabled woman in society she would not be able to cope. We have to hear her voice and make sure that we make the Bill as inclusive as possible, so that it can help as many people as possible.
I will try to finish in eight minutes. I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for setting out the case for her amendments.
Clause 2 defines “personally connected” for the purposes of the definition of domestic abuse in clause 1. We believe that the personal relationship between the perpetrator and the victim is central to the nature of domestic abuse, which is why our clause 2 definition of “personally connected” covers two individuals who are or have been in an intimate relationship or have a familial relationship, as defined. We believe that the connection between the two—the victim and the perpetrator—is central not just to our understanding in the Bill but, frankly, to the public’s understanding of what domestic abuse is.
The hon. Lady set out the horrors that disabled victims have faced. We absolutely agree that the abuse of a disabled person by their carer is as unacceptable as any other form of abuse, but we fear that the impact of the amendment would be to broaden the scope of the definition of “domestic abuse” by capturing a range of people who are not personally connected. That would widen the definition beyond how it is commonly understood.
The examples of exploitation that the hon. Lady gave could, as she says, be dealt with by other legislation. I myself have prosecuted carers for stealing the life savings of an elderly woman with dementia; we were able to catch that exploitation and the resulting loss with existing legislation, under the Theft Act. There are other examples of exploitation; it is not something that we like discussing in day-to-day life, but the fact is that there are forms of exploitation across many, many walks of life.
Another example within my portfolio is county lines gangs. Gang leaders ensnare vulnerable children as young as 11, 12 or 13, build relationships with them and build up the trust that the hon. Lady described in her examples. They offer them food or new pairs of trainers, and when the children have accepted those “gifts”, they are part of the gang—they are sent out to work: to rob, steal and deal drugs. That is exploitation.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing amendment 49, in clause 2, page 2, line 34, at end insert—
“‘provider of care’ means any person (‘A’) who provides ongoing emotional, psychological or physical support to another person (‘B’) with the aim of enabling B to live independently, whether or not A is paid for this support;”.
An amendment to ensure a carer of a person with disabilities is included in the definition of “personally connected”.
Just to recap, I was setting out to the Committee that there are many forms of exploitation that can take place in all walks of life. I was giving the example of county line gangs grooming and recruiting young children with, frankly, paltry offers given the price they pay for the items they receive, such as food or a new pair of trainers. The police have been imaginative in dealing with gang leaders, including through prosecution under modern slavery legislation, because they draw out before the court that element of grooming and long-term exploitation and manipulation. I give that just as an example.
I completely understand where the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley is coming from, but we have tried to guard against addressing all forms of exploitative behaviour in the Bill, because we do not want inadvertently to dilute that central golden thread that runs through all of our understanding of domestic abuse: namely, that it is focused around a significant personal relationship, whether as a family member or as a partner. That is the core of the definition. If an unpaid carer is a family member, they will be caught by the definition. If they are a partner—as she said, many people have taken on caring responsibilities in the last couple of months because of the covid-19 crisis—they are covered by the Bill. I would not want anyone to think that carers per se are excluded from the Bill, but we have focused the definition around the central point of the personally connected relationship.
Abuse of disabled people by their carers can be covered by existing legislation. Section 42 of the Care Act 2014 places a duty on local authorities to carry out safeguarding inquiries if they have reason to suspect that an adult in their area with care and support needs is at risk of abuse or neglect. There have been steady overall increases in the number of concerns raised and inquiries conducted under that section. In 2018-19, for concluded section 42 inquiries where a risk was identified, the reported outcome was to have either removed or reduced the risk to the individual in 89% of inquiries, which is an increase of 63% from 2017-18.
The statutory guidance supporting the Care Act also places a duty on local authorities to ensure that the services they commission are safe, effective and of high quality. The Care Quality Commission plays a key monitoring role to ensure that care providers have effective systems to help keep adults safe from abuse and neglect. The offence of ill treatment or wilful neglect provided for in section 20 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 was introduced specifically to tackle the abuse of people who are dependent on care services. In addition, we have introduced tougher inspections of care services by the CQC and made sure that the police, councils and the NHS work together to help vulnerable adults.
The plight of disabled victims of domestic abuse will feature in the statutory guidance. Indeed, there is the national statement of expectations document for local commissioners—we have not discussed it much because it is not strictly on the Bill—through which specialist needs are and will be addressed.
I hope that we have reassured the Committee that we are alive to the risks to people who are disabled. Some carers who fall into the “personally connected” definition will fall foul of the Bill, but for those carers who do not, there is already existing legislation to tackle exploitative behaviour where it transpires. With that, I invite the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for her thoughtful response. I appreciate what she said about the Care Quality Commission and its coverage, but it would have had absolutely no jurisdiction in the cases I outlined. Disabled victims are telling us that they are experiencing domestic abuse and feel that they are not in the definition. I look forward to the statement of expectations very much; I am pleased to hear that there will be expectations on commissioning in this area, but we want to get these people in the Bill. We will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
This amendment and the previous amendment speak to a common motivation to protect against an abuse that takes place in our society among many abusers of different relations of the powerful against the weak. I know that we are all motivated by a desire to address that.
I was a magistrate in a general court for several years before specialist domestic abuse courts were even envisaged and came into being. I saw a whole range of different contexts of abuse, but I wanted to be a part of the domestic abuse courts because it spoke to something special: a specific context of abuse based on a very intimate relationship. I do not want to dilute that, because that direction of travel—to have fought so hard to get recognition for domestic abuse as the uniquely invidious and insidious crime that it is—is something I do not want to go against.
While I completely empathise with the desire to prevent abuse wherever we find it, I believe that the direction of travel that is encapsulated in this landmark Bill is where we want to go. That is why I would resist attempts to dilute that aim, context and direction of travel.
I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd—gosh, I took a deep breath before trying to say that. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford has summed it up beautifully, if I may say so. I absolutely understand the motivation for the right hon. Lady’s amendment.
As we were saying earlier, exploitation takes many forms. I know that the hon. Member for Hove has shone a bright light on the concept of sex for rent. I keep coming back to this golden thread of the relationship. I think everyone understand that that is what the concept of domestic abuse centres around, so that is the approach we have taken with the definition.
We considered the Joint Committee’s recommendations very carefully. Our concern was that including “household” in the definition may have the unintended consequence of diverting people’s attention from those relationships where people do not live together. I am sure we can all think of examples of incredibly abusive relationships in which the two people in that relationship do not happen to live together.
I will give an example: I visited a fantastic women’s centre a month ago, which has independent sexual violence advisers and independent domestic violence advisers working together. The IDVAs could identify certain serial perpetrators in their local area who were in relationships with not one woman, but with several women at the same time. By definition, that perpetrator could not live with all of the women simultaneously, but was visiting them and conducting his abuse against many women at the same time. I am anxious that we do not inadvertently, with absolutely the right intentions, divert people’s attention away from the central purpose of the Act. We have also tried to ensure in clause 2 that where a relationship has ended, that is still considered within the definition, because we are alive to the fact of abuse after a relationship has ended.
Finally, we would not want to broaden the definition to such an extent that it covers areas, such as landlords and tenants, that I do not believe people think of when they think about domestic abuse. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford has said, it has taken us an awfully long time to get to where we are, and I hope we can work on ensuring that victims who are in abusive relationships have our attention and focus. These other forms of exploitation should also have focus—just not in this piece of legislation.
I appreciate the Minister’s response. I am slightly concerned about the fact that she talked about one man with a number of relationships with different people, and then a relationship that is over. There is something slightly contradictory about that.
Because of the times in which we are living through, our awareness of the impact of domestic abuse and the misery caused by it, and the awareness of our police forces, will have changed since this Bill was originally drafted. I therefore leave the Minister with a sincere plea to be alert to the fact that we need to learn on our feet very quickly.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Appointment of Commissioner
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I am grateful for that additional example. I am very aware of the case study that my hon. Friend refers to, even though I was not going to bring it into my few words. It illustrates an incredibly important point: having the support of Parliament is an empowering force behind any public appointment. Furthermore, it offers increased credibility. It starts with a commissioner having the respect of—and a functional relationship with—not just the Government who made the appointment, but Parliament.
In our system of democracy, we take very seriously the relationship between Government and Parliament. Parliament will play a part in scrutinising, so if it has a hand in appointing, there is buy-in from the start. It really is a win-win for Parliament to be involved via the Select Committees.
The appointment has already gone ahead, and I do not think that anybody would say that Nicole is either not qualified for the job or not a welcome appointment to it—but this is certainly something that we need to think about for the future. In my earlier example, it is very clear that even though the public appointment went ahead and had the backing of Government and Ministers, the role has never lived to up to the expectations that were set for it when it was first created. I implore Ministers not just to submit future commissioner appointments to an appointment hearing with the Home Affairs Committee, but to give the Committee the power of veto.
I realise that giving power away is not in the DNA of the Home Office. It is not the normal trajectory that we see from Home Office Ministers, but there are times when giving power away is a very empowering act that leads to a much more functional relationship between Government and Parliament, Parliament and the appointee, and the appointee and Government.
The Home Office has already appointed the commissioner, and it is worth putting it on the record at this point that the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, which scrutinised the previous and similar legislation to that which we are examining today, was not happy that that happened. It said, in paragraph 287 of its report, that
“we were surprised to learn that the process of recruiting a designate Commissioner had almost been completed before Parliament had had any opportunity to consider—still less to recommend any changes to—the draft Bill setting out proposals for the Commissioner’s remit and powers… We consider this unsatisfactory.”
I agree, and I suspect many Members in this room agree. They are free to do so, because there will not be a vote at the end of our discussion on this clause.
We all appreciate the enthusiasm of Ministers and the Home Office to get this appointment out the door, but I have to say that, even though we agree with and celebrate the appointment of Nicole Jacobs, the Minister and Government got away with it this time. Had that appointment not had the backing of the sector and of Parliament, it would be very hard to establish the credibility that this role needs within the sector.
I hope that my words will have made an impression. We purposefully did not put down an amendment to this clause, because we did not want to press this point, but we do want to impress it on people in the strongest possible terms that the joint relationship between Parliament and Government in making the appointment in future is something that will tangibly strengthen the role.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his constructive and considered comments on this matter. I thank him also for reminding me of the Investigatory Powers Bill, proceedings on which, it is fair to say, were more fiery than those on this Bill.
I very much take on board what the hon. Gentleman says, in that we have always been very conscious that the commissioner must have access to Parliament and must be accountable to Parliament in the sense of laying annual reports. Indeed, we have made it—I suspect that we will come on to this in a little while—their responsibility as a commissioner to lay their annual report before Parliament. They, not the Secretary of State, will lay it, decide when it is laid and so on. We have been very careful to ensure that.
Going back, I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman raised about the Joint Committee. I will explain the reason why we appointed the designate domestic abuse commissioner. I personally interviewed a number of impressive candidates for that role, and there were a couple of reasons why we wanted to appoint the designate domestic abuse commissioner.
First, we knew that the legislation would take time to get through the House and we felt that the commissioner could start the groundwork without their statutory powers, because of course the statutory powers are in the Bill. There was groundwork that she could start with—for example, setting up her office, building relationships and beginning to work out where there were particular areas of work that she wanted to focus on. That could all start, and I have personally found the designate commissioner’s assistance, over the last couple of months in particular, absolutely vital, because she has been key in drawing together the charities that are working on the frontline in the covid-19 crisis. She has a Monday call—she referred to it in her evidence and was kind enough to invite me to attend one of the calls—where she speaks to the sector across the country. She then processes that information and data for the Government, so that we are able to formulate policies to help in the very time-sensitive manner that we have been able to. I really value her contribution.
The commissioner will, of course, be accountable to Parliament through Select Committees, as the hon. Gentleman said. I certainly expect the Home Affairs Committee to call her, and the Justice Committee may choose to call her too, so there will be accountability.
I am very grateful to the Minister for her tone and the content of her words. What will she do if one of those Select Committees refuses to endorse a candidate that she puts forward? That is the key question. What will she do if it does so, after having a considered set of deliberations, based on sincere and non-partisan evidence? How would she react to that?
Let us take a step back, because I would not want the hon. Gentleman to think that we appointed the designate commissioner on a whim. There is a very careful and methodical appointments process. He can imagine the scrutiny carried out by the legal advisers in the Home Office, the Cabinet Office and elsewhere, who pay attention to how we conduct these appointment processes. It is the same for other commissioners. I also have responsibility for the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, and I do not think anyone would claim that Dame Sara Thornton is not independent and is not an extremely powerful voice in tackling the world of modern slavery. We have careful and methodical appointment processes. I am confident in the two appointments that I have been involved in, and I hope that we have weeded out the sorts of concerns that he is flagging. Once the appointment is made and the Bill is passed, if substantial changes are not made to it, we expect to be able to follow that through.
The Minister is being very generous and warm-hearted. I am not sure how she will be in a few days, but for now I fully embrace her generosity. What is the point of a Select Committee scrutinising somebody’s record and background, with a view to a public appointment, if it does not have any power over whether the appointment can go ahead afterwards? Would its time not be best spent doing something else if its conclusions mean nothing when it comes to the final decision?
I again come back to the responsibility of the Minister making the appointment. It is a real responsibility; it is certainly something that weighed heavily on my shoulders. I am conscious that if we miss what we are trying to achieve with the appointment, that will have an impact on not just the commissioner, but the Minister and the Department. Just as the commissioner is accountable to Select Committees, so too are Ministers. Given that we follow the public appointments process, I am satisfied that we will recruit the right person for that role and equivalent roles.
I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I draw his attention to the drafting of clause 3. Subsection (3) is there to ensure that the commissioner is not regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. We say that that supports their independence. I suspect that that will be a feature of amendments to come. With the appointment, we have wanted to ensure that the commissioner is able to start using her statutory powers when the Bill receives Royal Assent. The Committee has already heard reference to the mapping exercise of community-based services that the commissioner will undertake once she has her powers under clause 8. That is something that we have sought her help on, and we very much look forward to her assistance on that.
We want the commissioner to be a powerful voice; we want her to stand up for the victims of domestic abuse and hold public authorities to account where necessary, as is set out in clause 14. I am pleased that the designate commissioner has been welcomed by those working on the frontline, and people who are perhaps not so involved in the day-to-day concerns about domestic abuse can see that she is an expert appointment. She has more than 20 years’ experience, and she is bringing her expertise and drive to this crucial role.
The Minister has mentioned the designate commissioner’s experience and suitability for the job a number of times. I would never want to give the impression that I do not agree with the designate commissioner’s suitability for the job, and it is very important for the sector, in the absence of an appointment based on legislation and on parliamentary scrutiny and hearings, to hear the cross-party support for the designate commissioner. I hope that the Minister will accept our support for her as well when she makes her remarks.
I do not think that anyone read into the hon. Gentleman’s constructive comments about this appointment anything other than that he was doing his job of scrutinising the wording of the Bill, and I am pleased that the designate commissioner has managed to gain such support in such a short period of time.
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Funding
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
These clauses all relate to the powers of the domestic abuse commissioner; there is a huge area of the Bill about her powers and how this role is going to work. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hove and the Minister have said, we all welcome the commissioner.
I want to make some brief comments about the issue that clause 4 deals with, which is funding. It arises from a constructive concern that I had during the evidence sessions and on Second Reading, which is that it appears that if there is something that the Government have not yet got an answer for, possibly for a completely good reason, there is a tiny bit of a willingness for them to say, “We’re going to ask the commissioner to do this thing for us.”
For example, on Second Reading, there was a push from all sides of the House, as there was from the sector and from the commissioner herself, around the provision of community-based services. Off the top of my head, the statistic is that 70% of all domestic violence victims are supported in community-based services. The vast majority of people will never end up in refuge accommodation, and that is something that we should continue to facilitate; refuges are absolutely not for everyone.
What concerns me and what we heard from some in the sector—I think it came from the voice in the room that was Suzanne from SafeLives—is that what was announced on Second Reading related to a mapping exercise rather than a duty. In the Bill, we see—it seems like we will see it in many weeks’ time—a duty on refuge accommodation, which we certainly all welcome, but there is definitely a desire, which I share, to see a similar duty on community services.
It seems that rather than a duty, the Government are proposing a mapping exercise—they proposed it on Second Reading—by the commissioner, to understand what community-based support exists. As Suzanne told the Committee in her evidence—I have to say, I think I could probably do it here now. If I did not come to the Committee tomorrow, I could probably map out community services, because droves and droves of evidence have been gathered about what community-based support services exist. I feel for the Government, because people like me put in questions such as, “How many bed spaces are there?”, when I know full well what the answer is. I understand the concern and the need to map services, and to make sure that we are funding things.
What concerned me a little on Second Reading and in the evidence sessions was that there were a huge number of questions from Members asking the sector what they felt the commissioner should be doing: “What is the commissioner going to do for my group of women? What is the commissioner going to do about this and that?”. They were completely reasonable questions to ask, although largely they were asked not of the commissioner, but of the voluntary sector aides and the victims. With the greatest respect to Nicole and her position, I am not sure most victims of domestic violence are too concerned with who the commissioner is, but the sector is.
What concerns me is the commissioner’s funding model. I know that there was some argy-bargy and push and pull about the number of days, which letters presented to the Committee on the previous Bill said would be increased. What worries me on staffing, which is dealt with in the next clause, and funding is that the commissioner will end up with all these jobs because, rather than taking direct action, we do another review or more mapping. It starts to ramp up the amount of funding that somebody will need to take on all this extra responsibility.
I want to be absolutely certain and to understand from the Minister what the mechanism is if the commissioner says: “I cannot afford to do this exercise that you have said I should do because I no longer have the funding.” What I do not want to see is Parliament scrutinising the domestic abuse commissioner—she and whoever takes the role after her will undoubtedly many times in their career sit in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee—and her being forced to answer: “I couldn’t afford to do this exercise or this report into x because we just didn’t have the budget.”
There seems to be a tendency to push things on to the commissioner that would once upon a time have sat with civil servants in the Home Office. I want an understanding of how the review process and funding will be taken forward and what grounds it will take to make a case to increase the budget, including increases that might be needed for the local boards that are associated with this part of the Bill. I therefore seek reassurance from the Minister.
There is a game that gets played—although certainly not by the Ministers in this Committee—of the devolution of blame. We devolve power, whether it is to Wales or Scotland or to local authorities, whereby the Government hold the whip hand. I am certain that all Governments of all flavours have done this. The Government hold the whip hand in deciding the funding formula or within what constraints that money may be spent. When problems arise we say, “Well, that’s Birmingham City Council’s fault because they are rubbish.” Again, if I was given £1 for every time I heard the invocation of the Welsh NHS, I could fund all community services. What worries me and what I do not want to see is an underfunded commissioner, with the Government saying, “That is the commissioner’s responsibility,” given that ultimately all this policy—everything that flows from the Bill and everything that happens in every single one of our local authorities—
Absolutely. I am not asking for a bottomless pot of funding for the commissioner for ever and ever. I am sure that, even if the Minister were to ask really nicely, the Treasury would tell her no—although it would seem that that is not so much the case now, given that my husband is furloughed at home. The reality, though, is that I do not want to put the commissioner into that position. The Minister invoked the position of the independent anti-slavery commissioner. Of course, we have seen—perhaps not from this appointment, but from previous appointments, when Kevin Hyland was commissioner—that he very much felt there were problems in that particular area. Will the Minister reassure me, first, that we will not be expecting the commissioner to do the job that we do here, the legislators, people with a mandate and elected to office, and that we will not apportion blame where children’s services, for example in local areas, have not been suitably encouraged by the commissioner; and secondly, that where there is a real need for her to do something on which she will then have to answer to a Select Committee, for example, that she will be resourced properly?
I appreciate that this debate has been probing clause 4 and the resources available to the commissioner. We have provided the commissioner with an overall annual budget of over £1 million, which, among other things, will provide for 10 to12 staff to support the commissioner in carrying out her functions. In addition to the money from the Home Office, under clause 8(3) we have given the commissioner the power to charge a person—and when we say “person”, we are not talking about an individual but an authority or an organisation—for providing them with advice or assistance under subsection (2). We appreciate that exercises such as mapping community-based services will take a great deal of staff time and resources: it will take relationships across the country.
On the subject of mapping, I remember that just after I was appointed, two and a half years ago, my officials had done a very quick and dirty analysis of community-based services in a particular county—I will not name the county. They had found that there were something like 80 charities in one county who were working to help victims of domestic abuse. They ranged from the largest, national-type charities to the sort of charities where it is my great privilege to meet and discuss their work with their founders, who perhaps have set up a charity to commemorate a loved one who has been killed by a partner, for example. In their individual ways these charities work sometimes at a very local level to provide services. I wish that trying to map that was as easy as one would like it to be, but it is a difficult task, which is why we are asking the commissioner to do that for us. That is not because she is going to be in charge of policy creation but because, with the powers she will have under the Bill, the commissioner will be able to request that information from the public authority, as set out in the Bill. Then she will be able to produce advice and a report.
That touches on the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised earlier about the meaning of the word “encourage”, and I apologise for not responding to it sooner. We believe that clause 14 is very powerful when read in conjunction with clauses 13 and 15. Clause 14 sets out the powers to request information and assistance from public authorities. Clause 15 sets out the requirement that the public authority must respond within 56 days to the report or the analysis by the commissioner. They report not just to the commissioner, but to the Secretary of State. I do not want to cast aspersions on any particular type of public authority; the public authorities mentioned in clause 14 include nationally known organisations as well as local councils and authorities. If there is a report by the commissioner condemning the conduct of one of those public authorities, and the authority has to respond within 56 days, that is quite a powerful tool for the commissioner. As we have already discussed, the commissioner is also required to lay annual reports before Parliament. It may well be that, as part of her general functions under clause 6, she will want to express her views on the conduct of public authorities in her annual report. Again, I do not want to direct her—she is independent—but this is a way to keep the commissioner and public authorities accountable.
On funding, we know that being in Government is about making tough choices. We have funding for the Home Office to be allocated across a whole host of deserving causes, including policing, counter-terrorism and maintaining a fair and effective immigration system. The budget we have set aside for the domestic abuse commissioner is what we have allocated. In setting that budget, we have looked at the budgets of other commissioners to ensure that it compares favourably, which it does. We will keep the budget under review, and the commissioner will discuss with the Secretary of State her budgetary needs for the forthcoming year. We have provided the commissioner with the available resources, because we want her to be able to fulfil her functions as set out in clause 6. It is not about attributing blame, but about trying to ensure that this new, powerful appointment will help us tackle domestic abuse and that, at both national and local levels, we can utilise what she will bring with her laser-like focus on domestic abuse. Her power and authority flow from clause 6, and I hope we will see real differences—not just nationally but in our constituencies over time, as public authorities realise that they are accountable not just to the public, but to the commissioner.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Staff etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I just want to say a few words about the clause. Again, the Opposition do not oppose it or seek to amend it, but we want to ensure that we get it right. I accept the Minister’s previous comments on clause 4, and I was really pleased that she mentioned the role of the voluntary sector and did so in a way that reflected the complex tapestry of the voluntary sector. The fact that there might be many dozens of organisations— perhaps 80-odd—working in one area is something that I am very familiar with, having worked in the voluntary sector previously.
Duplication is a challenge that I faced when I ran the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, the umbrella body that co-ordinated the work of the voluntary sector. We did a lot of work on duplication and on trying to get third-sector organisations to work together and to share expertise and resources. That is more essential now than it ever has been, but it is not a problem that affects just the voluntary sector. I also had the pleasure of being an adviser in the Cabinet Office for almost two years, in 2006 and 2007. When we did one of our what seemed like annual reviews on waste and duplication in the civil service, we found that two committees in the Department for Education were looking at duplication. Just when someone thinks they have seen it all in one sector, they move to another and look beneath another rock.
However, these are important things to bring into our deliberations on clause 5. Clause 5 essentially gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint staff for the commissioner and to appoint the resources for it, and therefore gives the Secretary of State quite considerable oversight and input into the effectiveness of the personnel, or the commissioner, with regards to their ability to work and to be productive, directly impacting the scale of work that they can undertake.
Clause 5(1) states:
“The Secretary of State must provide the Commissioner with—
(a) such staff, and
(b) such accommodation, equipment and other facilities,
as the Secretary of State considers necessary for the carrying out of the Commissioner’s functions.”
The key thing here is what
“the Secretary of State considers”,
not what an independent observer or what the commissioner herself considers appropriate for the job. There are two aspects to this: how resources are deemed appropriate in the first place, and whether that is done in conjunction with the commissioner, which I assume it would be in a functional relationship; the Minister is nodding, which is reassuring. However, it is also to do with the appointments themselves, because the Home Office retains the power to oversee and involve itself in some aspect of the recruitment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned the former independent anti-slavery commissioner. He gave stark evidence before the Joint Committee, which it is worth referring back to, because this is what we have to avoid going forward. It certainly shines a light on what is potentially within the scope of the Bill as drafted. On page 77, paragraph 298 of the Joint Committee’s report says:
“Kevin Hyland told us he was concerned that the Secretary of State would have too much control of the Commissioner’s budget—
referring to the commissioner for domestic abuse—
“the staff employed and the content of the Commissioner’s reports. He pointed particularly to the power wielded by the Secretary of State through control of the Commissioner’s budget, noting that immediately he took up his post, the Home Office had proposed a reduction in the funds that Parliament had been told he would be given.”
Immediately after that commissioner was appointed, the Home Secretary tried to reduce the funds that Parliament had informed him he would have. These powers for the Home Secretary all exist in the Bill as it stands before us.
The bottom half of that same paragraph says
“he described the process of appointment as ‘unbelievable’, adding: ‘Sometimes I would select staff, and seven months later they had not arrived, or when they did arrive they sometimes waited two or three months for pay. In my 30 years in the police, I never, ever saw that happen once.’ He also described his experience of producing reports which, because they had to be approved by the Secretary of State, had to go through a long process of negotiation with and modification by a number of officials, with the final report not fully representing his views.”
We will come back to the latter point in discussions on future clauses. He raises in his testimony something on which we really need assurance from the Minister. The wording of the Bill as it stands is
“as the Secretary of State considers necessary”.
Therefore, the power is with the Secretary of State, the timing is with the Secretary of State and the amount of resource is with the Secretary of State.
I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not accept his premise in relation to the independent anti-slavery commissioner. I am happy to say that I have a good working relationship with the current commissioner—I think it is good, anyway—and I am not aware of concerns as described by Mr Hyland in relation to the current commissioner. I take that relationship very seriously.
On the control of the Home Secretary in the clause, as the hon. Gentleman put it, I point him to subsection (2) which says:
“Before providing any staff, the Secretary of State must…consult the Commissioner, and obtain the Commissioner’s approval as to the persons to be provided as staff.”
In other words, the appointments cannot happen without the commissioner’s approval. The Secretary of State must also consult the commissioner before providing any accommodation, equipment or other facilities.
Let us be clear: the commissioner is an independent office holder. Ministers cannot and will not dictate their work plan, nor determine their recommendations. We expect the commissioner to provide robust and challenging advice and recommendations to national Government as well as local commissioners. However, we need a degree of ministerial oversight, as with all public bodies.
The Minister says that the Home Office does not have the power to direct workflow, but the Home Office does set the framework, and that does dictate the scope and scale of work undertaken. Does she therefore agree that the Home Office has significant input into what work is undertaken?
The draft framework document we published alongside the Bill for colleagues to look at was produced in conjunction with and agreed with the commissioner. Therefore, some of the details we have discussed thus far on this part of the Bill are in the framework document. It is a public document—we are trying to be transparent—and it is made with the agreement of the commissioner, which I think is really important. The reason there has to be a degree of ministerial oversight is so that, for example, we ensure that public money is spent according to Treasury principles. The relationship between the Department and the commissioner will be codified in the framework document as provided for by clause 10.
In terms of the employment of staff, although staff will be employed by the Home Office as civil servants, the Bill, as I say, expressly provides that individual appointments must be approved by the commissioner.
I am pleased to say that the commissioner already has one member of staff as a designate commissioner. Her statutory powers are not yet in force, because we await the passage of the Bill, and the recruitment process will continue as the powers are approved.
It is very much for the commissioner to run her own office. We want a good working relationship with the commissioner. It is in everyone’s interests. That is the basis on which I and, I know, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, conduct our relationships with, for example, the Victims’ Commissioner, in the case of my hon. Friend, and the commissioners for domestic abuse and modern slavery, in my case.
Just to clarify, the arrangement is the same as was described by the previous modern slavery commissioner. The Home Office does not select the individual staff, but internal Home Office recruitment processes might well play a part if it is a matter of secondment, or if there are other processes that need to go through the channels of the Home Office. I am not one of those people who bash the public sector—I think we see excellence in recruitment, human resources and the management of personnel in the public sector—but sometimes things can be slow, and the purpose of an independent commissioner is to bring expertise and entrepreneurialism—the approach from outside—into the heart of Government. Will the Minister assure us that that pace and speed will be matched by Home Office work when it comes to requests by the commissioner?
Order. Interventions need to be short. I do not want to be too heavy about it, but I will be if I have to.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that appointments to the commissioner’s office—precisely because they are civil servants—will of comply with civil service terms and conditions and recruitment practice. I hope colleagues will view those as being of a very high standard—objective and meritocratic. As to urging the Home Office to move speedily, I take that challenge forward. We will use our best endeavours because we want the commissioner to be as powerful as she can be as quickly as possible.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
General functions of Commissioner
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I note that we are having a wide-ranging debate, and jumping from one clause to another, and I will take some advantage of the fact that the clause is about the general functions of the commissioner to give some general, broad input on this clause and some of those to follow.
As has already been said by pretty much everyone —probably even including myself, although it is hard to remember now—we very much welcome Nicole’s appointment, and we welcome the invention of a commissioner full stop. In fact, I remember not knowing this building at all well and being brought down here, when the now Victims’ Commissioner was a Member of Parliament. The Labour party was running a women’s manifesto-building session, in one of the rooms here for victims of domestic violence and those who worked with them. It was long before I even stood for the council, and I just came to this building and gave evidence. One of the things we pushed for then, probably in about 2011, was the creation of a commissioner, so it is incredibly welcome that we are now starting to see those powers come into play. I hope that they will be a catalyst for change in domestic abuse policy. They will certainly allow us to find gaps—or, as the Minister has outlined, over-supply—and, more importantly, solutions to fill those gaps.
In the Joint Committee report published on 14 June, a number of concerns were raised by witnesses and the Committee about the role of the commissioner. Those concerns were also raised at the aforementioned evidence session. Today, I still think that some of them have not been allayed. My hon. Friend the Member for Hove has gone over some of those issues, but there are a few things I wanted to pick up specifically around the commissioner’s general functions.
The domestic abuse commissioner has the potential to effect real change in the way domestic abuse services operate. However, for that potential to be realised, we must first ensure that the Bill is amended to resolve the substantial concerns that could stymie the commissioner’s remit in terms of independence, resource and power. We have laid some of the amendments to do that.
With regard to the remit, which is in clause 6, my first point is not a complaint but rather a comment as to the operation of the commissioner’s role and how best she can make a positive contribution to combat domestic abuse. Notwithstanding comments from witnesses to the Joint Committee and the subsequent recommendations, the Government have made it clear that the role of the commissioner and the Bill are limited to domestic abuse and do not cover other forms of violence against women and girls. One notes from our debates earlier around the definition of domestic abuse that the words “sexual abuse” are within that definition. That has not been ignored. Around 56% of all reported rapes happen within people’s marriages. One of the most amazing facts—I say this to schools when I go and visit—is that raping your wife was only made illegal in 1991. So, John Major, that and the cones hotline are things to be very proud of.
The level of sexual violence in domestic abuse cases is shocking, and there is some concern about the functions of the commissioner, whose role is—to be very purist—about domestic abuse. What is her interaction to be with rape and sexual violence organisations such as Rape Crisis England and Wales, for example? That is yet to be ironed out.
Okay. I just want to ensure that there is an independent process so that if there are problems, they can be solved. I close my remarks on that point.
The commissioner is a welcome position. Almost all the functions laid out in all parts of the Bill regarding the commissioner are to be welcomed and need little amendment. I commend the Ministers and the civil servants involved. I wish to seek some assurances specifically around the independence of the commissioner.
I do not propose to repeat what we have already said, because this theme runs through our discussions. We are conscious of the need for the commissioner not just to be independent, but to be seen to be independent. We have listened to the Joint Committee and its recommendations on this point.
Taking a step back, the Government cannot be accused of being shy of scrutiny on this Bill. The Bill, as published in its original iteration, was scrutinised by the Joint Committee. As those who have been in the House for a while know, that does not happen to every Bill; it is an unusual process. The reason we did that is precisely because we wanted to involve the House in the consideration of the draft Bill before it became the Bill that Parliament would consider formally.
Although politics has got in the way of the Bill’s progress, we have used those chapters in the Bill’s history to good effect, I hope. For example, since the second iteration of the Bill that came before the House, which managed to reach the first day of Bill Committee just before the General Election, we have been able to insert the duty on local authorities into the Bill. That would have had to be done by way of amendment.
We have changed parts of the Bill in relation to the role of the commissioner, because we listened to what the Joint Committee said. We also listened to what the previous Bill Committee said. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred in passing to the fact that the working hours of the commissioner have been changed. In consultation with the designate commissioner, we have extended her role from three days to four days a week, because she told us she was doing four days of work a week. We have listened to that and we have moved.
We also moved in relation to the Joint Committee’s recommendations about the laying of reports and strategic plans. In the original iteration, that was conducted through the Home Secretary. As happens with many reports, the report would be given to the Home Secretary and the Home Secretary would lay it before Parliament. We changed that in relation to reports and strategic plans so that the commissioner will lay them directly before Parliament, and she will choose the timing for doing so within the confines of the requirements of clause 12 in relation to strategic plans. We did that because we want her to be able to stand apart from Government and to lay her reports before Parliament as part of her role.
We have further amended the Bill to remove the requirements for the commissioner to submit strategic plans to the Home Secretary for approval. We have changed that so that the Home Secretary is simply consulted on them, and that is significant. I hope it reassures Bill Committee colleagues that, within the framework that we must have for any public role paid for through public funds—we have to have control and ministerial oversight—we have set that out in a way that safeguards independence. I hope people agree.
Clause 6(2) states:
“The things that the Commissioner may do in pursuance of the general duty under subsection (1) include… (g) co-operating with, or working jointly with, public authorities, voluntary organisations and other persons, whether in England and Wales or outside the United Kingdom.”
Does that include the commissioner working with organisations that are also within the United Kingdom but not in places specified in the Bill—in Scotland or in Northern Ireland?
That is a very good point, and I am sure that I will have an answer to it very soon. My hon. Friend has highlighted what we have also tried to achieve in the Bill, which is to respect the devolution settlements we have with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Colleagues will know that the second iteration of the Bill had substantial parts dedicated to ensuring that victims of domestic abuse in Northern Ireland had the same protections as we have in England and Wales, but now that the Northern Ireland Assembly has been reinstituted, it has taken back responsibility and can deal with these issues in Northern Ireland, which is great news. I wish them Godspeed.
I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the incidental powers set out in clause 9, which states:
“The Commissioner may do anything which the Commissioner considers will facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of the Commissioner’s functions.”
As an aside, the commissioner “may not borrow money”—that is very helpful. I feel that my hon. Friend’s point requires further reflection, and we will do that.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley is absolutely right to raise the point about sexual violence and rape. She is correct to say that this has been one of those knotty subjects where we have listened to a range of views. It was my great pleasure to almost respond on Second Reading to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), who—I think it is probably fair to say—takes a different approach to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley on this matter. We have endeavoured to ensure the definition is gender-neutral, so that we capture victims regardless of gender, but in the statutory guidance we make it clear that it is a gendered crime, because we think that is an important part of the overall consideration of the legislation.
In terms of working with rape and sexual violence charities, the Victims’ Commissioner has responsibility for that. She is a formidable commissioner and does not hold back from establishing and proving her independence on a regular basis, for which we are most grateful. Taking a step back, the Victims’ Commissioner and designate domestic abuse commissioner clearly have a very good working relationship. They are both highly professional women. With the quality of people we appoint to commissioner roles—although personalities can be really positive and important—I would expect them to behave professionally with each other, and I have very much seen evidence of that. There may well be times when the Victims’ Commissioner and the DA commissioner join forces in drawing the Government’s attention to issues—they have done so in the last couple of months with the covid-19 crisis—and we welcome that. I hope that reassures hon. Members.
In terms of the advisory board—I apologise for the fact that I am jumping around—the advisory board is for the commissioner to appoint. I will step back from giving a suggestion of what she may or may not wish to do with that, because to do so would, I suspect, undermine all my previous arguments. It is for the commissioner to appoint, and she, I am sure, will be watching this line-by-line scrutiny very carefully. I suspect that the other points that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised fit more comfortably in our consideration of clause 7 and the amendments attached to it. If I may, I will hold my fire—that does not feel like a terribly consensual way of phrasing it; I will keep my powder dry instead—on that matter.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Reports
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 7, page 5, line 7, leave out “direct” and insert “request”.
This amendment changes the Bill so that the Secretary of State may request, rather than direct, the Commissioner to omit material from a report.
I can think of very few areas in which that will come up as a matter of dissent, so it appears that it can be only a fear of something that might make the Home Office look bad once we remove the option of protecting the identity of the victim and of what might be before the courts, understandably. It seems that it is only there to direct where the victim may have said something bad about the Home Office.
The Minister disagrees and her dissent to my hon. Friend’s comment is on the record. Whether one agrees or disagrees with my hon. Friend, her point is that it is open to interpretation. People in that situation who are observing from the outside could quite reasonably be left with that interpretation. The amendment actually seeks to protect the Home Office from precisely the circumstances to which she refers, because if the independent commissioner publishes advice that is hard for the Home Office to see, that will spark a public debate between the two that would benefit the sector and show that the independent sector has an independent commissioner, and that the Home Office takes a different view. The buck will always stop with the Home Office, and rightly so.
Clause 8(5) states:
“Before publishing any advice given under this section, the Commissioner must send a draft of what is proposed to be published to the Secretary of State.”
We all understand why that would be the case and why the Home Office would be very keen to engage in that, but if there is a functional relationship at the heart of this, we do not need the power of legislation to engage constructively with each other. From the testimony and the evidence that we heard just last week from the designate commissioner for domestic abuse, it is very clear that she is straining at the bit to be open and constructive, and to engage not just with the Home Office, but with Parliament and all other stakeholders. The Home Office does not need the power of legislation to instruct somebody to do the very thing that is at the heart of a functional relationship between two organisations of this nature.
I accept that the Home Office is cautious and that Home Office Ministers are right to be cautious. The Home Office deals with law enforcement and the denial of people’s liberty. That is why the Home Office always has to be very careful with such pieces of legislation, and I know that the two Ministers take incredibly seriously the responsibility and the burden of the decisions that are made in the name of the legislation that they pass and uphold in their work. The inclination to retain as much overall power as possible defeats some of the objectives that the Home Office seeks to achieve. Although it must be an overwhelming temptation—even for understandable reasons—I urge the Home Office to have faith in the people whom it appoints.
Because of the previous conversations and exchanges that we have had, I think that we have had some fascinating exchanges already in the proceedings on the Bill today, and I believe that the Minister has been very sincere in her determination as to the way the commissioner is appointed in future. But this is really important: if we are to take the Minister at her word, why does she need the power in legislation to have the final word all the time? If the person appointed has been through an inscrutable process within the Home Office and if their background is absolutely first rate, why does the Minister need the power always to instruct them, to direct them?
I believe that the person described in the appointment process is the sort of person who does not need to be kept on a tight leash and who would benefit from more freedom in the role. That is the sort of thing we could test in this legislation, and it would then have an impact on future appointments and the creation of other roles. I think that this role would be more fruitful, productive and effective if it were approached in a less paternalistic way.
When Nicole Jacobs’s appointment was announced last September, the Home Office statement heralded the role as one that
“will lead on driving improvements”.
Quite rightly, the designate commissioner’s qualifications to do just that were highlighted, and that speaks for itself. But time and again, the legislation that puts her role on a statutory footing limits the freedom that she has to do just that. Reading it, one would be forgiven for thinking that it is less a statutory footing and more a meddlers’ charter. The Home Secretary has the right to meddle in almost every aspect of the commissioner’s role, from the advice that is given publicly to the reports that are produced. For every aspect of the key work that is done by the “independent” commissioner, the Home Secretary, the Home Office and a plethora of officials at different levels have the right to involve themselves in the way the work is done. I do not think that is in line with what Ministers, in their hearts, really want to happen. I think they are saying that they want to have a certain relationship, but when it comes to defining it in law, they cannot quite bring themselves to put in writing what is in their heads and hearts.
Aspects of part 2 of the Bill give more power to the Home Secretary than to the commissioner herself, and part 2 is designed to create the commissioner. This is really serious: the moment a Home Secretary “directs” the commissioner, the commissioner ceases to be—in the words of the Home Secretary herself, in the statement released on the appointment—
“a voice for those who need it most.”
I say that because if the Home Secretary has changed the words that the independent commissioner uses, they are the words not of the independent commissioner but of the Home Secretary. That is the very moment at which the sector itself will start to lose faith. We will have a sector and victims and survivors losing faith in their voice, their advocate, the person who has the best access to Parliament, to Government and to every Department of Government, not just the Home Office—she has the right, under the Bill, to engage with Departments right across Government. Once faith in that role is gone, it will be very hard to get it back and the ability of the commissioner to advocate, to give voice and to bring about change will be diminished.
I do not believe that is what Ministers want, and I do not believe that is the intent of the legislation. I truly believe that what they want is a commissioner who has the right to act, in the words of the Home Secretary, as
“a voice for those who need it most.”
What we cannot do, as any parent knows—I am not a parent—is tell a child, “You have the right to a voice, but I’ll tell you what to say.” That just does not work. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley would not even attempt to do such a thing in her household—I have met her children and know that they would see straight through it.
I am going to tackle head-on the criticism about reports, but first I want to make it plain why the reports are so important and to explain how they come about. It is for the commissioner to decide what her reports concern. It is for the commissioner to publish every report that is made under clause 7. It is the commissioner who decides what she will report on. In practice, the reports will flow from the strategic plan set out in clause 12, but it is the commissioner who has that power.
These thematic reports will be an absolutely central part of the commissioner’s work. They will be the key mechanism for discharging the commissioner’s functions under clause 6, and they will identify and publicise good practice but also highlight areas for improvement. I emphasise again that the reports must be published. There is no facility in the Bill for reports to the swept under the carpet or delayed. The commissioner publishes them, not the Home Secretary. A great deal of the commissioner’s power comes from clause 7.
The hon. Gentleman quite rightly raises subsection 4, which states:
“The Secretary of State may direct the Commissioner to omit material from any report under this section before publication if the Secretary of State thinks the publication of that material—
(a) might jeopardise the safety of any person, or
(b) might prejudice the investigation or prosecution of an offence.”
There is nothing in subsection 4 that says, “Oh well, if the report makes the Government look bad, the Home Secretary can omit that.” There is nothing that says, “It’s not terribly helpful, and the timing is bad.” There are two very narrow grounds: jeopardising the safety of any person; and prejudicing the investigation or prosecution of an offence. Because we are so careful about the commissioner’s independence, we have taken the trouble in the draft framework document—the draft document drawn up in consultation with and approved by the commissioner—to try to set out a framework. Therefore, in the—I accept—diminishingly small possibility that the subsection will be used, there is a clear process as to how such disagreements can be resolved.
The ultimate sanction is not, I think, the Home Secretary redacting a name, a location or whatever is needed to protect the person named in the report; it is the last paragraph of the framework document, which says:
“If agreement is not reached with the Home Secretary, the Commissioner may include a note in their report…stating that certain information was omitted at the direction of the Home Secretary, but which the Commissioner did not agree was necessary to protect an individual’s safety or to support the investigation or prosecution of an offence.”
I do not want to speculate about how such circumstances may arise, but I am clear that if a report had a note like that in it, I would expect to be answering an urgent question on it the very next day.
The Minister comes right to the heart of the matter, as she characteristically does. However, when she was having debates and discussions with officials and colleagues about how to approach this part of the Bill, why was it decided that the final say should stay with the Home Secretary, with the commissioner needing to publish a note saying that she disagrees, rather than the other way round, with the independent commissioner able to publish what she likes while the Home Secretary publishes a little paragraph pointing out the bit that she did not agree with?
It comes down to accountability at the Dispatch Box. As I say, there is a diminishingly small likelihood of that happening, but that does not mean that we can ignore it. I speak as someone who used to prosecute serious organised crime and spent a great deal of my career as disclosure counsel redacting documents and asking for protection from courts for documents that may, or have the potential to, undermine and jeopardise the safety of people for a variety of reasons, so this is something close to my heart. The power to omit this very narrowly constructed category of information is there to protect a person or to protect the prosecution or investigation of an offence. Accountability for that must fall ultimately on the Home Secretary or the Minister at the Dispatch Box.
I will give an example. I have tried not to speculate, because we all know, particularly in this field, that the ability of human beings to commit harm and to hurt other human beings seems almost infinite at times. Apologies that I cannot give details; I am treading very carefully for reasons that will become clear. A little while ago I was alerted to a mother and her family who had had to flee a house where there was a violently abusive relationship—she was fleeing in fear of her life. The circumstances of her fleeing were, shall we say, notorious in the local community, because the wider family have a reputation and presence in the local community that reaches far beyond the Bill. A person in public life inadvertently, for completely innocent reasons, made a comment about the manner in which that family fled. The concern—it was a very real concern—was that that public official, who had not really understood the ramifications of their commentary, had inadvertently put that victim and her family at significant risk.
Forgive me; I cannot go into more detail because I do not want to alert, but I put that forward because there are occasions where we have to look at not just the immediate circumstances but the possible ever-flowing ramifications that may result from a seemingly innocent assertion. I have complete faith in the designate domestic abuse commissioner that we will not get to a place where we are having to put notes in reports. I have to maintain this very narrowly constructed caveat to this otherwise wide-ranging and free power to safeguard any people or to safeguard investigations or prosecutions for offences that may not be immediately apparent when looking at the very specific circumstances of a case.
To give reassurance as well, I have asked whether this provision is in other pieces of legislation. It is in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and indeed, it is wider there because the Home Secretary can also omit material for the purposes of national security. If one thinks about modern slavery, that makes sense because of international criminal gangs. I reassure the Committee that this provision exists in other legislation, it is very narrowly defined there and it is not about making the Government look bad or look good. It is about safeguarding people’s safety.
The Minister is incredibly reassuring on the point. With regard to the case she is talking about, I do not wish to gather any details. I have handled cases about misdemeanours of people in this place or of their friends, as we all know, and I seek similar reassurances that this power will never be used in a case that might be used to protect a friend of somebody in power or somebody in this place.
The hon. Lady does not just need my reassurance. We have this framework—I appreciate it is a slightly tortuous process—where a very senior civil servant makes the first decision. It then goes to the Home Secretary and we then have the commissioner with the ability to put that note in the report. We have the reassurance of a very senior civil servant, with all the responsibilities the civil service bear in relation to ensuring they act within the Nolan principles and so on. We have that safeguard. We then have the Home Secretary, who has their own responsibilities under the ministerial code and being at the Dispatch Box, and then we have the commissioner being able to put that in her report. I hope that reassures hon. Members about this aspect of the report and clause 8. I invite the hon. Member for Hove to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I will withdraw the amendment.
The Minister will note from the theme of the comments I have been making during the two sittings today that my Front-Bench colleagues and I are concerned not only by the specific parts of the Bill that give power to interfere with the commissioner’s work. Added up, there is the opportunity to make the commissioner’s work overly bureaucratic, slow and sometimes focused too much towards pleasing the paymaster and not enough towards serving the victims and survivors, for whom the commissioner exists to give voice. This was a good possibility to ventilate those in a focused way, but I hope the Minister realises that we feel strongly about the independence of the commissioner. We will talk about this more later, on other amendments on aspects of the commissioner’s independence.
I hope the Minister recognises the strength of feeling towards a hands-off approach. There was a period in Parliament when there was a very rapid turnaround in Ministers on the Front Bench. Time after time we heard, “I don’t want this to happen; my intention isn’t this.” Then three weeks later another Minister with another direction would say, “No, I am really focused on this.” That is why getting the letter of the law right is necessary, and why we need the Bill absolutely nailed down.
Absolutely. There definitely needs to be a cohesive relationship between the Senedd, the UK Government and the commissioner to ensure that all gaps are filled and that nobody falls through the gaps, in terms of competency of what is devolved and what is not, so I absolutely would support that.
I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd for standing up for Wales. I do not want to get into a comparison of rural areas, but I do not have a court in my constituency either, nor do I have any train line, but that is a campaign for my constituency—other than the Lincolnshire Wolds steam railway, I should say.
I quite understand why the right hon. Lady has raised this, and I hope that she is reading particularly clause 11(4); she will see that we have been meticulous in respecting the devolution settlement in Wales and drafting the membership accordingly. The reason subsection (4)(b) refers to
“charities and other voluntary organisations that work with victims of domestic abuse in England”,
is that we respect that under the devolution settlement Wales is able to do, and indeed is doing, so much to look after its own victims. The same goes with healthcare services and social care services in England; they are specified precisely because of the devolution arrangements.
We have been very sensitive to the wish of the Welsh Government to continue their own programmes of work on this—indeed, the right hon. Lady has set out some of them—so we have been clear that the commissioner’s remit in Wales is restricted to reserved matters such as policing and criminal, civil and family justice. The membership of the advisory body, as set out in subsection (4), reflects the division of responsibilities.
However, in addition to seeking advice from the advisory board, the commissioner is not prevented from consulting Welsh bodies, whether devolved or not, to learn from their experience or to conduct joint work. I welcome that sort of co-operation and I expect the commissioner to work closely with the Welsh Government’s national advisers.
It is important to bear in mind that the designate commissioner last week made clear her intention to work hand in hand with the Welsh Government. I think she told us last week that she speaks to them on a weekly basis. That is evidence that we must bear in mind of the way in which we can work so closely together.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is about respecting the devolution settlement and being alive to different approaches that each may take, while also supporting each other and co-ordinating work. I hope that explains why the compulsory membership of the board is set out as it is. Of course, the commissioner can appoint up to four members outside that list, and I trust her good judgment to get the balance right. I reflect on the fact that we have been having conversations about how independent the commissioner must be, and we have tried in to keep that balance right.
Will the Minister consider the risk of being open to the accusation that victims in Wales therefore have no voice with the domestic abuse commissioner?
I think that would be very unfair on the commissioner. Let us not forget that, alongside the advisory board, the commissioner will be required to establish a victims and survivors advisory group. That is in the terms and conditions of her employment, and it is left to the commissioner to draw the group together herself. Again, I am sure she is watching these scrutiny proceedings very closely, and she will have listened to that concern.
I will draw back from making any requests or directions of the commissioner in that regard, but she has been clear throughout this process that she is keen to respect devolution, but also to work closely with the Welsh Government and Welsh national advisers where it is appropriate and possible to do so. As I say, given that there is the flexibility, given that we have heard from the commissioner herself about her intentions and given that she is required to establish a victims and survivors advisory group, I hope that the concerns expressed by the right hon. Lady will be allayed.
I will withdraw the amendment for now, but I will hope to raise this further with the Minister in future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the hon. Gentleman, and I wish him well with the cough because I suffer from exactly the same problem. You never know when it is going to come on—if I start to have a coughing fit, please, that is the reason.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone.
I thank the hon. Member for Hove for emphasising yet again the exhaustive scrutiny that the Bill has received. When we look over the history of the Bill and its scrutiny, we see that he is right to say that few other pieces of legislation in recent history have received such scrutiny. Yesterday, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley said that we had “got away with it” this time with the appointment of Nicole Jacobs, but, on behalf of the commissioner, I should say that it is not a question of getting away with it.
We had a recruitment process in line with the public appointments process, which is carefully managed and objective. I interviewed Nicole myself, and she was the stand-out candidate. That is why I advised the Home Secretary to appoint her. I know that the hon. Member for Hove does not mean to do this, but the more it is suggested that Nicole, the designate commissioner, will somehow not be independent, the more I fear that that risks undermining her. We have to accept that Ms Jacobs is a professional, highly qualified and highly experienced person in the world of domestic abuse. We should welcome her appointment, which shows that the system has worked.
I absolutely echo the Minister’s words about Nicole Jacobs—and, I am sure, anyone who had been given the position.
May I ask if that same process was followed in the appointment of Kevin Hyland as the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner? Where does the Minister feel that that relationship broke down, to the point that his evidence on this Bill led to concerns that are now shared by me, Parliament, my hon. Friend the Member for Hove, the Home Affairs Committee and so on?
I cannot speak to that appointment process, because I was not the Minister at the time, although I know that, personally, I had a good relationship with Mr Hyland at the tail end of his tenure.
Clearly, however, I was involved in the appointment process for the current Anti-slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton. I asked officials to double-check this: I do not believe that she has voiced any concerns about her independence in the year—it must be at least a year—that she has been in role. I remind the Committee that Dame Sara is a former chief constable and was chair of the Association of Chief Police Officers before the National Police Chiefs Council was set up. She is, again, a very highly qualified, highly experienced professional with decades of public service under her belt.
In exploring these issues, I would not for a moment wish to risk undermining the work or reputations of Dame Sara, Ms Jacobs or any of the commissioners that we have heard reference to.
There is absolutely no sense that anybody here wishes to undermine the commissioners—we also work with those commissioners. We wish to empower them. We are concerned about relationship breakdown, and not necessarily with the current commissioner. Can the Minister speak more to the relationship with the previous Anti-slavery Commissioner, which definitely broke down?
Forgive me, but I am returning to the Bill, which is what we are concerned with now.
I am very happy to talk about the Children’s Commissioner, who is sponsored by the Department for Education. I do not know whether anyone has been listening to the news recently, but I do not think anybody could accuse Ms Longfield of not being independent or not expressing her views pretty forcefully and vehemently. Only yesterday there was a statement in the House about the issues she has raised.
I am keen for us not to fall into the bearpit that the Chair has already identified. We are not talking about the specific officeholder; we are talking about the role. We need to make sure that we get the role right so that future holders of the office are able to exercise powers correctly and so that the powers encourage a certain type of behaviour, rather than relying on a character who can find their way through unideal rules, making the best of it.
I am absolutely focusing on the powers available. Ms Longfield is exercising her powers as a commissioner who is sponsored by the Department for Education, just as Dame Vera Baird is—I think the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred to Dame Vera’s political background. I have to say that she was appointed by a Conservative Government. She is very capable and experienced, with decades of public service under her belt. Again, the appointments process identified the correct candidate and she uses her powers to great effect. No one can accuse Dame Vera of holding back when she feels there is a need to hold the Government to account.
The point is that the powers and the offices already exist, they work, and it is on that basis that we have listened to the Joint Committee’s recommendations. We have made changes between the first iteration and this iteration of the Bill. For example, clause 13 has been changed. It was the case that the Home Secretary would lay a copy of the report before Parliament, but we listened and took on board what the Joint Committee recommended. We have now changed that so that it is the commissioner who must arrange for a copy of her report to be laid before Parliament—it is the commissioner who decides when that happens, within the realms of the reporting framework and the financial year and so on. It is the commissioner who decides what is in that report, with that tiny, narrow exception that we discussed yesterday, which mirrors the previous clauses. I am grateful that the hon. Member for Hove withdrew that amendment; I took it that he was satisfied with my explanation.
I would very much argue that the domestic abuse commissioner is empowered. She has oversight by a Department—the Home Office—as does pretty much every other commissioner, with the three exceptions that we have identified, including the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, which by definition reports directly to Parliament. We have followed that model, but adapted it to take into account the matters raised by the Joint Committee.
In recommending the clause to the Committee, I pray in aid the fact that, when Ms Jacobs appeared before the Public Bill Committee in the previous Session, she was asked about sponsorship of her office by the Home Office. She replied that she felt
“confident about the hosting at the Home Office.”––[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2019; c. 9, Q10.]
In separate evidence to the Public Bill Committee last October, Zoë Billingham, who is one of Her Majesty’s inspectors of constabulary and fire and rescue services, said:
“The fact that I have a relationship with the Home Office does not undermine my personal statutory independence as an HMI or our organisation’s independence.”––[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2019; c. 43, Q70.]
I fully appreciate why hon. Members want to debate and explore the issue, but I hope that they will be reassured by the fact that office holders do not have a problem, and feel confident about the hosting at the Home Office. What is more, we have listened to the Committee and adapted the measures so that the commissioner has the direct relationship with Parliament that Members feel is so important.
I briefly make the point that you cannot have it both ways—or, rather, the Minister cannot have it both ways. You, Mr Bone, can obviously have it any way you like.
The Minister cannot say that the commissioners speak up freely, and give examples of that, but ignore what they say, and have a reporting line for them. Every one of the commissioners that she mentioned believes that the commissioner for domestic abuse should report somewhere other than the Home Office.
The Minister is right to quote Nicole, because she is a formidable and generous advocate. She has been given the role, and was clear from the outset about the reporting lines, which she accepted when she began to apply for the job. However, I remind the Minister that last week, in giving evidence, she made it clear in her opening exchange with me that she would welcome greater independence from the Home Office. She was clear about that.
I will lay the argument to rest, and accept the arguments of the Minister. I hope that she sees the sincerity with which we make our argument, which in no way impugns our belief that Nicole Jacobs will be a fantastic advocate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Duty to co-operate with Commissioner
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 14, page 10, line 2, after “London” insert “in its capacity as a local authority”
This amendment clarifies that the reference to the Common Council of the City of London in the definition of “English local authority” in clause 14 is to the Common Council in its capacity as a local authority.
I can be brief. The amendments are technical ones to clauses 14 and 57. Clause 14 uses the term “English local authority” while part 4 of the Bill uses the term “local authority”. In both cases, the definition of those terms includes the Court of Common Council of the City of London.
The City of London Corporation has both public and private functions, so it is appropriate that public legislation should apply to it only in respect of its public functions. The amendments to clauses 14 and 57 therefore provide that the references to “the Common Council” relate to its capacity as a local authority.
Amendment 30 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14 is about the duty to co-operate with the commissioner. We addressed parts of it yesterday. It is an absolutely crucial part of the commissioner’s powers. The commissioner may specify public authorities as laid out in subsection (3) to co-operate. We can add to the list in due course by regulations, but the public authorities listed in subsection (3) may not be removed. In this case I would recommend the clause to the House, although I appreciate that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley might have some things to say about it.
We went over this extensively yesterday. I just want complete clarity for the record—don’t worry, I will not go on for 50 minutes, although I could. I want to feel absolutely certain about this issue. When the commissioner says something to any one of the authorities—the list is absolutely fine—and they have the duty to respond, where in the system does the duty to act come in? Does that fall within the reporting line to the Home Secretary, who will then help the commissioner to ensure that action is taken? As somebody who often seeks a response from the Government, what I am actually seeking is action.
Yes, of course. There are organisations on the list that are directly accountable to the electorate, such as local authorities, or are accountable via elected officials such as police and crime commissioners. We expect those bodies to be mindful and act on what the commissioner recommends. There will be consequences for them at the ballot box if they do not do so, which is the case for Ministers as well as any other Member of Parliament.
As for the other bodies, we are mindful of the independence of the police, the British Transport Police and organisations such as the Criminal Cases Review Commission, so there will be a delicate balancing act between what Ministers can do and the independence of those organisations. As with other commissioners, where a public body is given fully reasoned recommendations by the commissioner in her report, they would be expected to respond to that, and that includes action.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 15 to 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Power to give a domestic abuse protection notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 signifies the beginning of part 3 of the Bill, which introduces domestic abuse protection notices and domestic abuse protection orders. These are very important aspects of the Bill. It may help if, before turning specifically to clause 19, I recap why we are creating the new protective orders, and the significant value that they will provide to victims and to agencies in holding perpetrators to account.
Responses to our public consultation in 2018 emphasised that the multitude of orders currently available in domestic abuse cases, which include non-molestation orders, occupation orders, restraining orders and domestic violence protection orders, can be confusing for victims and, indeed, practitioners. Each of those orders is available in different circumstances, does different things and has different consequences for breach. No single order provides victims with the comprehensive protection that they need to rebuild their lives. Our intention, in creating the new DAPOs, is to bring the strongest elements of the existing protective order regime together in one comprehensive and flexible order, and for DAPOs to become the go-to order in domestic abuse cases.
Clauses 19 to 23 create the new domestic abuse protection notice, which is designed to provide victims with immediate protection and breathing space from the perpetrator following a crisis incident. The notice will be issued by the police and could, for example, require the perpetrator to leave the victim’s home for up to 48 hours. Issue of the notice triggers an application by the police to a magistrates court for a DAPO, an order, which, if made by the court, provides the victim with longer-term protection.
Unlike the current domestic violence protection notices and orders, the new domestic abuse protection notice and order can be used to protect victims from all forms of domestic abuse and not just from violence or the threat of violence. However, it will not always be the case that there is a single crisis incident that necessitates the issuing of a notice by the police. Furthermore, we know that some victims do not want to involve the police in their case at all; they just want the abuse to stop. That is why the Bill provides for a range of flexible application routes to obtain an order, enabling not just the police but victims themselves or any other person, with the leave of the court, to apply for a DAPO. In addition, it is open to a judge or magistrate to decide to make a DAPO as part of existing proceedings in the criminal, civil or family courts.
The DAPO is designed to be fully flexible, so that it can be tailored by the court to meet the needs of the victim, based on the specific facts of each individual case. That is one of the order’s most important characteristics. Unlike the existing domestic violence protection orders, which have a maximum duration of just 28 days, DAPOs can be flexible in duration and can therefore provide victims with longer-term protection if needed. It will be for the court to determine the duration of an order or, if necessary, to decide that it should be open-ended until such time as the court makes a further order.
The Bill also provides courts with the flexibility to attach to the order not only restrictions but positive requirements, depending on what is necessary in each case to protect the victim from abuse. For example, the conditions attached to a DAPO could range from basic non-contact requirements and an exclusion zone, right up to requirements to wear an electronic tag or to attend a behaviour change programme. Crucially, breach of an order will be a criminal offence, subject to a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
We know how important it is to get the implementation of the new orders right and to ensure that the whole process is as simple as possible for victims, the police and others to navigate. That is why we will issue statutory guidance on the orders and also pilot them in a small number of areas prior to any national roll-out. The Bill expressly provides for that.
We must acknowledge, however, that the creation of the new protective order will not by itself deliver a better response to domestic abuse. The success of DAPOs will rest on a strong, multi-agency approach to ensure that these orders are the protective tool that they are intended to be. Everyone will have a role to play in this: the justice system, other statutory agencies, and specialist domestic abuse organisations will be expected to work together to manage those who are subject to an order and, most importantly, keep victims and their children safe.
Clause 19 confers a power on a police officer to issue domestic abuse protection notices. It sets out the two conditions that must be met in order for the police to issue a notice. The first condition is
“that the senior police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that P”—
the perpetrator—
“has been abusive towards a person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected”,
in line with the definitions we discussed yesterday, contained in clauses 1 and 2.
As I have mentioned, unlike with the current domestic violence protection notice, this clause provides that the new notice can be used to protect victims from all forms of domestic abuse, not simply from violence or the threat of violence, which the Joint Committee commented
“removes a key weakness of the previous scheme.”
Furthermore, it does not matter if the abusive behaviour that provides grounds for the issue of the notice took place outside England and Wales.
The second condition is that the police officer
“has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to give the notice to protect that person from domestic abuse.”
The requirements imposed by the notice, which are provided for in clause 20, have effect in all parts of the United Kingdom, not just in England and Wales. For example, if a notice required the perpetrator not to make contact with the victim in any way, the perpetrator would breach the notice by sending a text message or email to the victim from Scotland. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
I feel I have been remiss in not having yet said that it is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Bone, as others have. I will not start with an inspirational quote, though I am sure you have given plenty in your time.
I thank the Minister for a detailed and forensic walk through the new DAPO system. It can sometimes feel like we say all these things in all these different scrutiny bodies, but absolutely nothing comes of it; however, from what the Minister has walked us through, I can see how different systems have evolved over time and over the course of lots of conversations. For people who love scrutiny, worry not: it does sometimes get heard.
I feel very hopeful about the new system of DAPNs and DAPOs. The Opposition, along with most witnesses who reported to the Joint Committee, strongly support any tool that gives the police and courts greater powers to protect victims of abusive relationships. We very much welcome the fact that the new orders just require abusive behaviour—rather than violent behaviour—as a precondition, although time will tell how that plays out on the ground. For too long, judges have looked for evidence of scars and bruises, rather than the emotional pain that victims suffer, so this is a real step forward, and one of which the Government should be proud.
The Opposition are also pleased to see the introduction of criminal sanctions—I believe that another amendment on this topic will be debated later—with the power of arrest for a breach of the order. For too many years, I have worked with women and children for whom the orders in place to protect them were not worth the paper they were written on. For far too long, victims have been left to argue with police forces about what constitutes a breach.
As modern technology has advanced—certainly since I started working in the field of domestic abuse—we have seen a host of new ways in which a perpetrator, or those connected with one, can breach an order. Sending posts through a family member on Facebook, for example, is a very common one that I have seen time and again. When the victim has highlighted that as a breach of an order with the police, it has not been acted on. This is not necessarily just a complaint about the police. I am not suggesting that they can act on literally everything; they have their own set of circumstances.
I want to add my voice in supporting the belief that the orders will be a step change in the courts. As a magistrate, I have grappled with many restraining orders and non-molestation orders, and with bail conditions. One of the frustrations I have seen on the bench arises from the desire to know what tools we have to do more, particularly for what seem like minor offences, when someone is not breaking down someone’s door, but writing Facebook messages, or text messages, to their mum or sister.
Many in the police and the courts recognise that the point of crisis for women—in my experience, it is mainly women, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley said—is when they try to break away from an abuser. That is the moment of greatest danger for a woman, because the perpetrator can see the control slipping away. That is a moment of desperation, when the perpetrator wants to reassert that control, and will use every tool and every trick in the book to do so.
In my experience, the courts and the police are crying out for the tools that they can use, and for the clarity and scope that the measures introduce. I am optimistic, and I believe that lots of people in the system are crying out for just this kind of measure. It will be very welcome and effective.
Forgive me, Mr Bone, but I should explain that, because we do not have box notes, I am having to use my phone. If I may, I will deal with a couple of points that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised. A lot of the questions that she posed sit with other clauses in the Bill, and I do not want to detract from the magnificent occasion that will be my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice getting to his feet and talking through some of those clauses, so I will defer to him.
The hon. Lady raised the issue of police fees and recognised that the Government have accepted the Joint Committee’s recommendation, which means that, for the two-year pilot, we will cover the police’s court fees for applying for the orders. We very much want to use the pilot to understand the resource implications of the new orders for the police and other agencies, and to use that to inform our considerations in future.
When she spoke to the Public Bill Committee in 2019, Deputy Chief Constable Louisa Rolfe, the National Police Chiefs Council lead on domestic abuse, said:
“The cost of the DAPO would be the least of our concerns. There are many positive aspects to the DAPO…Policing is not deterred by cost and I have some examples of that. We have a strong record of sometimes stepping in where other agencies are not able to.”––[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2019; c. 27, Q47.]
In any event, as I say, we have said that we will cover the cost in response to the concerns raised by the Joint Committee.
In terms of training, we will provide statutory guidance on the new orders, to ensure that the police and other frontline practitioners use them effectively and consistently to protect victims and their children. We will consult with the commissioner, the police and others on the guidance before it is issued, and we will ensure that the police and other frontline practitioners have enough time to prepare for the introduction of the new orders.
The Judicial College has a regular training programme for all judges and magistrates, and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service provides training for court staff. We will work with both those partners to assess how to incorporate training on DAPOs into their ongoing training programmes.
I do appreciate the back and forth of this forum. I am pleased to hear that about the guidance. Will there be some overview to check whether that training has been done? What body might that sit with? I understand that the Minister may have to get the answer from somebody else.
Obviously, in relation to the judiciary, it will be the Judicial College. The College of Policing plays a vital role in training constabularies across the country to ensure consistency, as do chief constables.
To move away from the Bill momentarily and reflect on the last couple of months, the Home Secretary, I and others have had daily operational calls with the NPCC and other chief officers, and I have been struck by how much domestic abuse has been absolutely at the top of every chief constable’s mind in the last month or two. Some innovative policing practice has been going on, precisely because we are worried about the effects of lockdown.
I know that chief constables take that training responsibility very seriously. Of course, the Home Office has a role to play as well. The hon. Lady said that training is a constant theme in these discussions, which it is, but we should acknowledge that we are in a better place than we were, certainly 10 years ago and, actually, five years ago. I hope that I will be saying that in another five years as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I was struck by what the Minister said about the problem of not having the officials here, and so not having inspiration fluttering from behind. If it is of any help to the her in these exceptional circumstances, if she is stuck on a point, I am happy to come back to the matter later, because the Committee would then be better advised.
Like every other area of the UK, the constituents of Ynys Môn who suffer domestic abuse are supported by a range of agencies, including police, local authorities and charitable organisations. These organisations provide housing, counselling, education and other services that are vital to keeping safe those escaping domestic abuse. However, as those organisations are all too aware, the issue of domestic abuse goes well beyond the home. Domestic abuse-related stalking and harassment cases make up more than 60% of cases heard at magistrates courts, and more than one third of all reported stalking and harassment takes place at work or at home. It is difficult for those suffering domestic abuse to escape when their abuser follows them.
We all know from evidence provided by organisations such as Refuge that the current injunction system is of limited effectiveness. I therefore welcome the introduction of domestic abuse protection orders, which are a critical part of the Bill. The orders will enable anyone who suffers domestic abuse of any kind to access services knowing that they will be supported and protected beyond the home.
May I start by saying that I have some sympathy with the aim of the amendments? I recognise that the targeting of the victim’s place of work is often a tactic used by domestic abuse perpetrators to cause distress and exercise coercive control. I have been a strong supporter of the work of the Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse, which aims to help businesses and employers take practical steps to help members of their workforce who suffer from domestic abuse. They can often be very small steps, including allowing time off for a victim to go and seek medical help, but they can also include much larger ideas, such as setting up a bank account so that she can siphon money off to get a little bit of independence from the perpetrator. I am very interested in what employers can do to help their employees who are suffering from domestic abuse. Indeed, the Government are looking into this. Only yesterday, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy launched a consultation calling for evidence on what more can be done by employers to protect their workforce against domestic abuse. That is very much the direction of travel of this Government.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn mentioned stalking, and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred to some terrible cases in which victims have been murdered at their workplace. The story that always comes to my mind is that of Hollie Gazzard, as I lived not very far from Gloucester at the time. That was a horrendous case, and her parents have been quite extraordinary in doing what they have done to try to stop other families suffering in the same way. Our efforts to address the issue of stalking have included the introduction of stalking protection orders, which have a similar format to these orders. We have tried to mirror in DAPOs things like the positive requirements and the criminal breach that are in stalking protection orders, so that there is a protection order for stalking if the facts fit one, but if the facts are better suited to a DAPO, those orders will be available as well—subject to the approval of the House, of course. A huge amount of work is going on to recognise the role that the workplace can play in a victim’s life, and in the attempts of a perpetrator to continue their aggressive or coercive behaviour.
To be clear, clauses 19 to 23 relate to the notices, and these are emergency orders. They are issued not by a court, but by a senior police officer, and the perpetrator has no opportunity to make representations against the imposition of the notice. They apply for a very short period—for 48 hours—so that we can give a bit of space to the victim, and so that the police or others can take steps to make the formal application for an order before a court. These emergency orders are different in nature. They are much more restrictive, because obviously if they are issued by a police officer rather than a court and the perpetrator does not have the chance to make representations, we have to reflect that in the nature of the orders. That is why the list of conditions in clause 20 is exhaustive, and they relate in particular to the occupation of the premises shared with the victim. These were drafted because they mirror the existing provisions in the domestic violence protection notices that are in operation at the moment, but I will consider what the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley and others have said about introducing the workplace into these notices.
There is one caveat. The hon. Lady has talked about the notices more generally. I hope, Mr Bone, you will forgive me if I veer into clause 21. The reason we are being very careful and methodical is that clause 21(2) requires the police to consider, before issuing a notice that restricts the perpetrator’s access to the premises, the opinion of other people who work on those premises. In very small workplaces, that may be practicable, but in a workplace of thousands—the House of Commons, a Government Department or elsewhere—there would be significant logistical challenges. We will look into the overall principle, but we flag that as a practical concern about amendments 59 and 60. We also have to bear in mind as we look at these amendments that a victim may not wish to disclose their abuse to their employer.
The purpose of amendments 61 to 65 is to make equivalent amendments to provisions that may be made by a DAPO. The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham may deal with those specifically in relation to the clauses on orders. It may be that they are not quite as necessary in orders as they are in notices, given that orders will be considered by a court and there is much more freedom for the court to impose necessary restrictions.
I welcome the Minister’s comments. I am happy about the announcement of a Government review, although a number of reviews about workplace violence against women and girls are outstanding after a number of years. That is not the Minister’s responsibility, but the issue of non-disclosure agreements, for example, has been raging, as part of a review and consultation, for three years since the Weinstein affair.
I welcome the Minister’s commitment to this particular issue. I do not think that anybody wants victims to be controlled in that way in their workplaces. I recognise the concerns about when people work together and that, in those instances, it will potentially be much easier to have that conversation in court. I am happy to withdraw the amendment on the proviso that the Government have given, having said that they will listen and try to take that on board and see how it could work. I welcome that, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Matters to be considered before giving a notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21 relates to matters that must be considered by the senior police officer before giving a notice. Again, I emphasise the difference between a notice and an order. First, the police officer must consider the welfare of any child whose interests the officer considers relevant to ensure that any safeguarding concerns are addressed appropriately. The child does not have to be personally connected to the perpetrator for their interests to be relevant and could therefore be the victim’s child from a previous relationship.
The police officer must also take reasonable steps to find out the opinion of the victim as to whether the notice should be given. However, as set out in subsection (4), the police officer does not have to obtain the victim’s consent to give a notice, which I think the Committee—I observe the nodding heads—is in agreement with. That enables the police to protect victims who may be coerced by the perpetrator into expressing the opinion that a notice should not be given or who are fearful of the consequences should they appear to be supporting action against the perpetrator.
Where the notice includes conditions in relation to the premises lived in by the victim, reasonable steps must be taken to find out the opinion of any other person who lives in the premises and is personally connected to the perpetrator, if the perpetrator also lives there. For example, if the perpetrator had caring responsibilities for a family member with whom they shared the premises, it would be important for the police to be aware of that. Consideration must also be given by the police officer to any representation that the perpetrator makes in relation to the giving of a notice, although that is not a formal process as with the courts.
I want to be absolutely clear that the primary consideration in determining whether notice should be given must be the protection of the victim and their children. We will ensure that that is set out clearly in the statutory guidance.
The decision that the officer has to make on whether he asks permission from an alleged victim or issues the notice without the support of the victim is going to be very difficult. What guidance will the Home Office issue to assist frontline officers in making that decision in a way that is consistent within and across police forces?
The hon. Gentleman raises a sensible point. There will be moments where an officer has to judge the situation as it is presented to her or him. We will be issuing statutory guidance and, as with the statutory guidance on the Bill, that will very much be in consultation with the commissioner and frontline charities.
These sorts of decisions have to be made regularly by officers. During the current crisis, officers are making decisions about whether they visit certain premises to check that people are okay and the potential impact of that. There will be difficult decisions, but we will very much engage with people in a transparent way to make sure that the guidance is in a good place before it is issued formally.
A point that has been raised with me is that training in domestic abuse for junior police officers is often much more thorough than that which their senior officers have experienced, and that, as well as guidelines, specific training for those officers who will be making the decisions could be very useful.
That is not the case with all senior officers. Deputy Chief Constable Louisa Rolfe, who is the NPCC lead on domestic violence, is a very senior officer and an absolute expert. I take the point that officers at different stages in their career will have different levels of experience and training. I am sure the guidance will help address that so that we have a wealth and diversity of experience in the decision-making process.
I will be brief. I have a number of concerns about the notice, some of which have, quite rightly, already been raised. Louisa Rolfe is currently a West Midlands police officer—she is just about to leave that post—and an excellent one at that, but I get the point that has been raised.
Last night, a journalism award was given to someone who investigated what happens when there is domestic abuse within the police force. In this instance, we are putting so much of the onus on the individual police officer. If a social worker suffers domestic abuse or is accused and convicted or perpetrating domestic abuse, or any other type of abuse, the LADO process—the local authority designated officer—is followed. They go through that process at work and are not allowed to work on certain areas. I just want to make sure that something similar applies in this case. Individual police forces are huge; a variety of people work for them. If issues were raised in an officer’s case, that kind of process would ensure that they were taken into consideration when deciding who within the force gives out notices. I imagine that that sort of situation would be vanishingly rare, but it is worth noting.
On breach of a notice, we are talking about victims who do not give consent. As the Minister said, I nodded—I totally agree—but if a victim breaches a notice, I do not want that to end up being used against them in court. A lot of issues came up in the sad case of the suicide of Caroline Flack—
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
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I was just discussing the issue of a notice being breached on behalf of the victim. I had started to say that in the case of Caroline Flack, who sadly took her own life, there was a notice between her and her partner that they had not breached. In that instance, the partner would be considered the victim in the context we are discussing. That case has highlighted in the public’s mind the fact that when a victim is told not to contact somebody, there will always be pressures, for lots of different reasons, and certainly if the victim shares children with the perpetrator.
In a case where somebody is struggling with their mental health or wishes to reach out, I just want some assurance about how it might play out in court if a breach of these notices occurred on the side of the victim—that is, if a victim breached a notice for pressure reasons, or even for humanitarian reasons. I have seen lots of cases in the family courts, for example, where the fact that orders have not been kept to has been used against victims. I wondered what we might think about breaches of these particular notices from the victim’s point of view.
The hon. Lady’s question relates to clause 23, but my answer will be given on the basis that we are debating clause 21. Before I answer, I want to clarify that when I said the perpetrator could not make representations, I was thinking of court representations. I suspect that the officer can take representations into account if they arrive at the scene and the perpetrator says something to that officer, or whatever.
In relation to breaches, again, we need to be careful about the language we use. The notice will be between the police, who issue it, and the perpetrator; it does not place any restrictions on the victim. However, with other types of orders, there are of course circumstances in which non-contact orders have been made and the person being protected by that non-contact order contacts the person on whom it is placed.
That must be a matter for the court. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has set out, the person being protected may well have had perfectly reasonable grounds for making contact, but that must fall into the arena of the court. I do not think we could interfere with that, because the judge will have to engage in that balancing exercise when considering the orders, as opposed to the notices we are debating at the moment. I am sorry that I cannot provide the hon. Lady with more information than that, but in those circumstances I recommend to the Committee that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Breach of notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will address this clause briefly, because the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has raised a query about it. Clause 23 relates to a perpetrator who is alleged to have breached the grounds of their notice. If a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in breach of a notice, they can be arrested without warrant, held in custody and brought before a magistrates court within 24 hours, or in time to attend the scheduled hearing of the application for a domestic abuse protection order—whichever is sooner. It is fair to say that these are very strong powers, which I hope shows the seriousness with which we believe the alleged perpetrator should be viewed, but also the seriousness with which the police and the courts view these notices.
The Bill also provides the police with a power of entry when they are arresting someone for breach of notice, and that is stronger than the current domestic violence protection notice provisions, which do not go quite that far. This additional power of entry will improve the police’s ability to safeguard victims and to gather vital evidence at the scene of an incident.
One of the most striking features of the clause is set out in subsection (2), which states:
“A person arrested by virtue of subsection (1) must be held in custody”.
These are indeed strong powers, but they send a very clear signal that the law and law enforcement are on the side of the alleged victim at such times. It is a very welcome move and will give confidence and respite to any alleged victims in future, so we thank the Government for delivering it.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I am pleased that he sees what we are trying to achieve with this clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Meaning of “domestic abuse protection order”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sorry. Just to explain, I am obviously very keen that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, plays his part, but this shows that there is real interaction between both our Departments on the Bill, so we have had to do a certain amount of carving-up between us.
It is my pleasure to introduce clause 24. We are moving now from the provisions in the Bill about notices to those about domestic abuse protection orders. Clause 24 defines a DAPO for the purposes of part 3 of the Bill and signposts the subsequent provisions in this chapter relating to the making of an order.
The definition in subsection (1) provides that a DAPO is
“an order which…places prohibitions or restrictions or both on the subject of the order, namely, the perpetrator for the purpose of protecting another person, namely, the victim from abuse and in accordance with Clause one, the victim must be aged 16 or over”
and “personally connected” to the perpetrator.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Domestic abuse protection orders on application
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
One key advantage of the DAPO over other existing orders is that it can be obtained via a range of different application routes. Unlike the current domestic violence protection order, which can only be applied for by police to a magistrates court, or the non-molestation order, which can only be applied for by victims to the family courts, the DAPO provisions allow far greater flexibility in who can apply for an order, and to which court the application may be made.
Clause 25 sets out who can apply for a DAPO: namely, the victim, the police, a relevant third party specified in regulations, or any other person with the leave of the court. The provision for relevant third parties, which is to be set out in the regulations, ensures that such parties would be able to apply for an order directly without first obtaining the leave of the court. We will use the pilot of the orders to assess whether the current provisions for anyone to apply with the leave of the court are sufficient, or whether it would be beneficial to enable local authorities, for example, to make an application without first having to seek leave of the court. If there is a case for expanding the list of persons who can apply for a DAPO as of right, we can provide for that in regulations at a later stage.
Subsections (3) and (4) set out which police force, including the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police, should lead on an application for an order in different circumstances. Where a notice has already been given, the application must be made by the police force that gave the notice. Where the police wish to apply for a stand-alone order without a notice having been given, the application should be made by the force for the police area in which the perpetrator resides currently or intends to come into. The purpose of the provision is to make it absolutely clear which police force has responsibility for applying for a DAPO in order to avoid any confusion, duplication of effort or delay in putting protective measures around the victim.
The clause also sets out to which courts applications can be made. Police applications are to be made to a magistrates court, as is the case for domestic violence protection orders, and other applications are to be made to the family court. To ensure that DAPOs are widely accessible in other circumstances where they may be needed, the clause also allows for applications to be made by a victim during the course of certain proceedings in the family and civil courts, as specified at clause 28.
The clause is very robust and replaces an incredibly confusing picture of which orders one can get where. As somebody who has filled in the paperwork for pretty much all of these orders, I do not think I could explain it right now. It is very complicated, but we have a clear listing of exactly who can do what. What the Minister has said about regulations being laid around relative third parties is an important point. I know that the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill and also anyone who works in this building will have potential concerns about the misuse of third parties applying for DAPOs. I cannot imagine many circumstances in which they could be misused, but unfortunately perpetrators are particularly manipulative and can sometimes find ways to do that, so I will be interested to see the regulations on third parties when they are laid and how much that will be in consultation with the victim and, in fact, the perpetrator. We are infringing on people’s rights. Although I want to see those rights inhibited in lots of cases, they are none the less rights that we are here to fight for.
The Minister has outlined the police force area in which the DAPO is filed. This is always a complicated thing, but does she foresee any problems with resource in the police force area? I raise this because of personal experience in having orders in my own cases. I am not very popular in Manchester for some reason. I feel desperately sorry for Greater Manchester police. When coming to take statements from me to look at options around protections for me personally, it takes a whole day out of a police officer’s time to come all the way to Birmingham and sit in my house, sometimes for nine hours.
Is there a plan that could be put in guidance around police force partnerships where there is a big geographical spread? In these cases, most likely people will be close by, but when women go into refuge they can move across the country, often from Birmingham to Wales, for some reason—I do not know why, but it is close and we like the water. I have concerns about victims feeling, “Oh, that’s really far away,” or, “Gosh, I’m bothering the police.” I have certainly felt myself that I am bothering Greater Manchester police and that I might just give up on this because it is such an effort for them to drive there.
Those are not reasonable things, and we cannot mitigate people’s feelings in the law. As the Minister said, we do not try to put people’s feelings into the law, because we would never be able to represent them properly, but I think this has to be considered. The clause is well written and substantive in its detail.
On the potential for conflict between the different areas for the victim and perpetrator police forces, we absolutely understand that. We very much expect those sorts of issues to be drawn out through the pilot. Interestingly, any police force can issue a notice to the perpetrator in response to a crisis incident, whether or not it is the police force where the perpetrator resides. That prevents any delay in protecting the victim and means that the forces do not have to reach a decision in each case on who should issue the notice. Clause 25(3) provides that whichever police force issues the notice to the perpetrator must then apply for the order against them.
We are very alert to the issue of distances. That is why in subsection (8)(b) we have ensured that a victim cannot be compelled to attend the hearing or answer questions unless they have given oral or written evidence at the hearing. That means that the police and other third-party applicants can make evidence-led applications that do not rely on the victim’s testimony. Of course, where the application is supported by evidence provided by the victim, the court should have the opportunity to hear from the victim in person. We will ensure that there are guidance materials for victims to make it clear what they can expect from the DAPO process and to address any concerns they may have about the DAPO application hearing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Applications where domestic abuse protection notice has been given
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26 covers the steps that the police must take to apply for a DAPO following the issuing of a domestic abuse protection notice. Subsections (2) and (3) set out that the application for a DAPO must be heard in a magistrates court within 48 hours of the notice being given. That 48-hour period gives the police time to make the application for the order while giving the victims breathing space from the perpetrator until more comprehensive and longer-term protective measures can be put in place through the DAPO.
Clause 22 requires the police giving the notice to ask the perpetrator to provide an address at which they may be given notice of the hearing of the application for the order. Clause 26 provides that if the notice of the hearing is left at this address or, in cases where no address is given, reasonable efforts have been made by the police to give the perpetrator the notice, the court may hear the application without notice to the perpetrator. That is to ensure that the sorts of manipulative individuals that we have heard about cannot try to frustrate this process by simply not turning up.
To ensure that the victim remains protected if the hearing of the DAPO application is adjourned by the court, subsections (7) and (8) ensure that the notice continues to have effect until the application for the DAPO has been determined or withdrawn. The perpetrator can be remanded if they have been brought before the court after breaching the notice. Again, these are very powerful measures, and I hope that assures the Committee about the strength that we want to give to the police, the courts and those who are trying to stop perpetrators and protect victims, and about our determination to support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Remand under section 26(8) of person arrested for breach of notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Thank you very much.
I am glad that all hon. Members are taking this seriously. It is a pleasure to serve under your expert chairmanship, Mr Bone, and to be one of the Ministers leading on this Bill. When I was a Back Bencher, together with another Member of Parliament, I ended up doing some work on stalking laws to try to increase the maximum sentence for stalking, so if I could have chosen any Bill to be a Minister on, it would have been this one. It is a real pleasure to be here. I am delighted to see my shadow, the hon. Member for Hove, and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. We share a common endeavour in wanting to make this the best piece of legislation.
Clause 27 is a procedural clause that sets out how long a person can be held on remand if they are arrested for breach of a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice and the magistrates court adjourns that hearing. A magistrates court can normally remand a person for up to eight days, but clause 27 sets out that the court can also remand the person if a medical report is required. In such cases, a person can be remanded for only up to three weeks at a time if they are remanded in custody, or up to four weeks at a time if they are remanded on bail.
If the person is suffering from a mental disorder and a report is needed on their mental condition, they may be remanded to hospital so that such a report can be produced. That can be for up to a maximum of 28 days at a time or a total of 12 weeks if there are multiple stays in hospital.
If the court decides to remand a person on bail, it can attach any conditions necessary to prevent the person from obstructing the course of justice—for example, interfering with witnesses. These are standard provisions that largely replicate the approach taken for remand following breaches of other types of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders, occupation orders and antisocial behaviour injunctions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Domestic abuse protection orders otherwise than on application
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28 makes provision for the court to make a domestic abuse protection order of its own volition during other ongoing proceedings that do not have to be domestic abuse-related. It is an important provision that shows the flexibility of the legislation.
The family court will have the power to do so in cases where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings, which means that the family court will be able to make an order in other ongoing proceedings where the court becomes aware that an order would be beneficial. For example, if an issue of domestic abuse is raised during ongoing child contact proceedings, the victim would not have to make a separate application to the court to obtain an order. Instead, the court can make an order of its own volition as it sees necessary. That is an important element of flexibility, and indeed robustness, built into the legislation.
In criminal courts—I am conscious that we have expertise here in the form of a former magistrate, which is excellent—as with the current restraining order, the court will be able to make a domestic abuse protection order on either conviction or acquittal. To that extent it is similar to a restraining order, which can also apply in the event of an acquittal. Importantly, however, the DAPO is an improvement on the current restraining order because it can impose positive requirements as well as prohibitions on the perpetrator. All Committee members will recognise that, although we of course want to protect victims first and foremost, we also want to stop further abuse happening, so anything that can be done to ensure that people are rehabilitated and see the error of their ways is a positive thing for society as well as, of course, for the victim.
In the case of a conviction, that will allow the court to, for example, set an order with a longer duration than the sentence passed, to ensure that the victim receives the protection they need beyond the length of their sentence. In the case of an acquittal, it will ensure that the victim still receives protection if the court thinks that is necessary.
The court will also be able to make a DAPO of its own volition during other ongoing civil proceedings where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings.
We will specify the type of civil proceedings in regulations, but initially we expect it to cover civil proceedings in which issues of domestic abuse are most likely to be raised or revealed in evidence, such as housing-related proceedings.
I feel that, now Minister Chalk is on his feet, I should have some things to say; I do not want to leave him out.
I cannot say how important the idea that the court can put in place an order on acquittal in these circumstances is to somebody like me, who has watched many cases fall apart over the years. I am always slightly jealous of the Scottish system of not proven, because in too many cases in the area of violence against women and girls, it may well be that the balance of evidence needed cannot be provided either at the magistrates court or at the Crown court in these circumstances, but there is still gross fear among all involved that the fact that it is not proven does not mean that it did not happen.
The idea that, on acquittal, courts could put these orders in place is a huge step forward, ideologically and politically speaking. My concern—I am almost doing myself an injustice on what I am going to say about some of the amendments later—is what the Ministry of Justice foresees as a review mechanism to ensure where this is going, how it is working and how regularly the family courts are dishing out such orders.
If everybody was like Essex police force, I would be jumping for joy. I do not hope for this, but maybe one day somebody will perpetrate a crime against me in Essex and I will see how brilliant the force is at orders, as we heard from the evidence earlier. What worries me is whose responsibility it will be, after a year or two years—even after the pilot scheme—between the Ministry of Justice, the head of the family courts structure and the chief prosecutor at the head of the Crown Prosecution Service, to see how readily these orders are being used in our courts.
I have already said this once today, but often people like me put in annoying questions to people like the Minister, such as, “Can you tell me how many times this has been used in these circumstances?”, and very often the answer that we receive back is, “We do not collect this data nationally”, or, “We do not hold this data in the Department.” I want a sense of how we are going to monitor this, because while I know this just looks like words on paper, to people like me it is deeply, deeply important that the courts could take this role.
However, I have seen too many times that, even the powers that the courts have—certainly the family courts, which no doubt we will come on to tomorrow—are not always used wisely and well, so I want an understanding of how specifically we are going to monitor the use of the courts giving out the orders, which is new in this instance. How are we going to test that it is working and try to improve its use? I would be very interested in even just a basic data gathering each year of how many were done on acquittal, how many were done on conviction and how many were done in family court proceedings where both parties were part of proceedings.
With regard to the family court, and in fact in all these circumstances—whether it is a notice or an order; whether a police officer has to make a decision there on the doorstep or we are talking about orders—how are we going to deal with some of the “he said, she said”? I have seen an awful lot of counter-claims in the family courts. Often somebody will talk about being victimised as part of domestic abuse, and it becomes: “Well, actually, she was domestically abusing me,” or, “He was domestically abusing me.” I wonder whether any thought has been given to how, in giving out DAPOs in a family court, we do not end up with potentially two people, both with an order against each other—or maybe that could happen.
I will say a couple of things. First, I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s observation that the powers are very stark but very welcome. It is important to note why they are in place. It is not uncommon that cases cannot necessarily be proven to the criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt. The tribunal has to be satisfied that it is sure; however, there can be serious lingering concerns that, were it to apply a test of the balance of probabilities, it would have no difficulty in finding that the abuse had taken place.
It is to cater for those circumstances that the courts can now impose really quite robust measures to ensure the protection of complainants and the rehabilitation of perpetrators. They are important powers, and benches and courts will want to exercise them wisely. Inevitably, they apply to individuals who have not been convicted of any offence. The courts will therefore need to tread carefully to ensure that justice is done, but they have shown themselves well able to do that for many centuries.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point very well that, for some of the issues that we are tackling with the legislation, the powers already existed in other pieces of legislation, but the courts, in their conservatism, refused to exercise them. As my hon. Friend asked, will the Minister ensure that his Department gives the right steer to the courts, which the president of the family division can translate into something that is actionable on the front line in family courts up and down the country?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Ultimately, he will understand why I say that a very proper distinction exists between the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary are proudly and profoundly independent, and they will take their course and impose the orders if they think that it is in in the interest of justice to do so. Of course, we must ensure that courts are properly aware of the powers available to them. I have no doubt that the president of the family division, and indeed the Lord Chief Justice in the criminal sphere, will use their good offices to ensure that that takes place.
On the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether we can look after the event to check that the powers are being used, first, there is, as she knows, the issue of the pilot. That provides a significant period to establish whether the orders are being taken up. Secondly, the Office for National Statistics has an annual publication of DA statistics that includes the different orders, so we will be able to get a sense of the extent to which they are being applied.
I hope that this will not sound overly fastidious, but one should not necessarily automatically read reluctance into a low level of use in one part of the country compared with others. It may be, because each case turns on the facts, that it was not appropriate in those circumstances. However, as a general observation, we will keep an eye on it, and there will be data on which the hon. Lady will no doubt robustly hold the Government to account. I beg to move.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
For the benefit of the Committee, and perhaps for the Minister, I should say that you do not need to beg to move stand part clauses, because they are already in the Bill; the only thing that you have to move are the amendments—but you, sir, are one of many Ministers who make that mistake.
Clause 29
Conditions for making an order
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Thank you, Mr Bone—that’s my career over.
Clause 29 sets out two conditions that must be met before the court may make a domestic abuse protection order. The first is that the court must be satisfied—on the balance of probability, as I have indicated—that the person has been abusive towards the victim. Our intention with the DAPO is to bring together the strongest elements of the existing protective order regime.
One of the key benefits of existing civil protection orders is that if a victim who needs protection from abuse is not able to gather sufficient evidence to meet a criminal standard of proof, they can still apply to the courts for protection. We have ensured that that will be the case for the DAPO as well by explicitly providing for a civil standard of proof: on the balance of probabilities. The Joint Committee in examining the draft Bill were content with the application of the civil standard.
In the Bill, we have made it clear that domestic abuse includes many different types of abusive behaviour, as we have heard, including physical and sexual, as well as controlling, economic and emotional abuse. That is a novel and important departure. That means the court will be able to take into account all the abuse present in the case when deciding whether to make an order.
That is a step forward compared to current domestic violence protection orders, which require either violence or the threat of violence before a notice can be issued or an order made; we understand that this is currently interpreted to mean physical violence only. Members of the Committee will immediately see the extent to which the ambit has been broadened.
The second condition is that the court must be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the victims of domestic abuse or those at risk of domestic abuse. Once the threshold is met, the court may impose only those requirements that it considers are necessary to protect the victim. Incidentally, that necessary threshold is important in ensuring that the measure is compliant with our responsibilities under the European convention on human rights.
The clause also specifies that an order can be made only against a person who is 18 or over. We recognise that younger people can be involved in abusive relationships, which is why we have included 16 and 17-year-olds in the new statutory definition of domestic abuse. There is, however, a balance to strike. We do not want to rush to criminalise young people, in line with our youth justice guidelines, as DAPOs carry a criminal penalty for breach, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.
Pausing on that, it is important to recognise that DAPOs will be imposed on somebody who is not guilty of any crime, yet breach of them is punishable by imprisonment: these are robust powers, and that is why we have circumscribed them carefully in the way that we have. I do not need to beg to move, so I shall just sit down.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Matters to be considered before making an order
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This clause concerns matters to be considered before making an order. Similar to the provisions at clause 21 in relation to a notice, clause 30 sets up particular matters, which the court must consider before making a domestic abuse protection order.
First, the court must consider the welfare of any person under the age of 18, whose interests the court considers relevant, in order to ensure that any safeguarding concerns can be appropriately addressed. The person does not have to be personally connected to the perpetrator and could, therefore, for example, be the victim’s child from a previous relationship.
The court must also consider the opinion of the victim as to whether the order should be made. As set out, however, in subsection (3), the court does not have to obtain the victim’s consent in order to make an order. We have already discussed why that is desirable. It enables the court to protect victims who may be coerced into withholding their consent, or who are fearful of the consequences should they appear to be supporting action against the perpetrator.
Where the order includes conditions in relation to premises lived in by the victim, the court must consider the opinion of any other person who lives in the premises and is personally connected to the victim or, if the perpetrator also lives in the premises, to the perpetrator. For example, if the perpetrator has caring responsibilities for a family member, the court would need to consider the family member’s opinion on the making of an order excluding the perpetrator from the premises.
I wonder whether the Government foresee a child being included in that instance. If it was an elderly relative, that is reasonable. But are we saying here—or perhaps it will be in the much-awaited guidance—that if a child was living in the house, their opinion might be sought?
Yes, I think it would be and I think that is appropriate. One thing that certainly the criminal law has done over the last 20 years is start to recognise that people under the age of 18 have views that are sometimes worth hearing. In the past, they were almost kept out of court, but now of course we try to facilitate their giving evidence. I would imagine that that would be the case in these circumstances and that a court would want to hear that.
It will be for the court to weigh up the different factors to come to its decision on whether a DAPO is necessary and proportionate in order to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Making of orders without notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31 makes provisions for making an order without giving prior notice to the person who is alleged to have been abusive. These are standard provisions and consistent with existing protection orders. Before making an order, a court would normally inform the relevant person of the hearing taking place. However, as with existing orders, we recognise that in some cases an order may be urgently required. Clause 31 enables the court to make an order without notice in those cases where it is just and convenient to do so.
When deciding whether to make an order without notice, a court must first consider the risk to the victim if the order is not made immediately and the risk that the victim would be deterred from pursuing the application if the order were not made immediately. This measure also allows the court to take action in cases where it believes that the person alleged to have been abusive is aware of the proceedings but deliberately evading service, in order to ensure that the victim can still receive the protection that they need. In other words, it provides scope to the court, if it thinks that an individual is seeking to frustrate justice, simply to go ahead in the normal way and ensure that the protection is put in place.
If an order is made without notice, the court must schedule a return hearing as soon as is just and convenient, to allow the affected person to make representations about the order. That is in line with the usual procedures for current protective orders, and you may feel, Mr Bone, that it is in the interests of justice. If an order is made without notice, the individual who is subject to it should have the opportunity to make representations as soon as is just and convenient.
It is worth mentioning that subsection (2) of clause 34, which makes further provision about electronic monitoring requirements, provides that an electronic monitoring or tagging requirement may not be imposed on a person in their absence. I trust that the reason for that is obvious, but if anyone wants to ask me about it, they can.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Provision that may be made by orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32 concerns provision that may be made by orders. The Committee will recall that we heard earlier about provision that may be made by notices. This is the twin in respect of orders.
Clause 32 provides courts with the flexibility to impose in respect of a DAPO not only restrictions but positive requirements, depending on what is necessary in each case to protect the victim from all forms of abusive behaviour. Subsections (4) to (6) provide examples of the kinds of conditions that could be imposed by a DAPO, but subsection (3) expressly provides that those are not exhaustive.
It is up to the court carefully to tailor the conditions of the DAPO to meet the needs of the individual victim and take into account the behaviour of the perpetrator. The reason is that circumstances are varied and it is important to ensure that the court considers each case on its merits, and the circumstances as they apply, and ensures that the conditions are tailored accordingly.
Specifically with regard to what we were discussing earlier in relation to workplaces, does the Minister foresee that that could be one of those issues that could be discussed in the court—that there would be an allowance for the workplace to be included, with leave of the court?
Absolutely; I do not see why not at all. In fact, when the hon. Lady was making those points in respect of notices, I did fast-forward to clause 32, and it is deliberately broadly cast. Clause 32(2) says:
“The court must, in particular, consider what requirements (if any) may be necessary to protect the person for whose protection the order is made from different kinds of abusive behaviour.”
It is very pleasing to hear that—it is reassuring. I urge that the point is made explicitly in the guidance that will go along with all the orders. I wanted that on the public record.
It may be in the guidance but, I respectfully suggest, does not necessarily need to be in it. When a court comes to consider what it will or will not do, it may look at this measure and say, “Are we precluded from banning him from her workplace? If the answer to that is no, we will go ahead and do it, regardless of what is in the guidance.” It may be that it will be in there anyway, but I am confident that, as the Bill is set out, it is drafted sufficiently widely—deliberately so—for the courts to see their way to do justice and impose protections as they see fit.
One benefit of this approach to legislation is that it allows scope for creativity in the individual court to tailor to a specific circumstance that might not be predictable. In such circumstances, how can other courts learn from that innovation? It is obviously the responsibility of the judiciary, including the president of the family division of the High Court, but we have learnt from bitter experience that some courts and judges are almost impervious to change—I speak with respect to the former one before us. How does the Department seek to use innovation on the frontline in family courts to ensure that family courts in other parts of the country benefit?
May I gently push back on that? I understand the hon. Gentleman’s observations about the need to ensure that one modernises and so on, but if we think for a second about the sorts of conditions that the court is likely to impose, those will be along the lines of conditions routinely imposed in respect of bail, for example—not to contact an individual, not to go within a certain a postcode, not to go to a school, not to visit the home or not to contact relatives directly or indirectly.
I am confident that the courts will be well able to impose those conditions without requiring any particular leap of imagination. They will welcome and embrace these powers, which are deliberately drawn widely, so that the courts may apply their everyday experience of the world to understanding what is required to do justice and to provide protection in an individual case.
On the issue of keeping an eye on this, there are data and statistics, which will be published in due course. It will be open to hon. Members, the domestic abuse commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner to keep a close weather eye on that. I know that the hon. Member for Hove will do precisely that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33
Further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 33, page 21, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) A domestic abuse protection order that imposes a requirement to do something on a person (“P”) must—
(a) specify the person who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with that requirement; and
(b) meet the standard published by the Home Secretary for domestic abuse behaviour interventions, if the requirement is to attend an intervention specifically designed to address the use of abusive behaviour.”
On coronavirus, we have been in constant contact with charities and the police locally to understand how DVPOs are working. Where there have been problems, as in the hon. Lady’s point about homelessness, we have sent out guidance repeatedly to local authorities to say that they must include perpetrators in their rehousing programmes, precisely so that DVPOs can be enforced.
It will be a very thin silver lining to what has been an enormous cloud over our country. The Minister is absolutely right: we have been learning some things in this period. Because of the availability of resource in our police forces as a result of the reduction in other areas of crime, this will in some regards be a high point—a gold standard—in terms of how we act in domestic violence cases. If there was certainty in a police force area, built in partnership with a local authority, that there would absolutely be a place for a perpetrator to stay, I can almost guarantee that the police would be much more active in the DVPO area, because that is what we have seen during the coronavirus crisis.
There should be five elements of a perpetrator strategy. We need criminal justice systems and other public and voluntary services, such as housing, health and education. We need training, and clever and tough working, to hold perpetrators to account. We need proven interventions and behaviour change programmes for all perpetrators available everywhere, and we need education to prevent and raise awareness of abusive behaviours. We need regulation to end poorly run programmes, some of which are actually dangerous. And we need ongoing research to ensure that we know what stops abuse, particularly within groups that are currently under-served by these kinds of preventive interventions, such as LGBT groups.
Essentially, money is needed. A sustainable and predictable source of funding would save millions in policing, justice and health costs—perhaps even billions, given the Home Office costings on the cost of domestic abuse. Leadership is ultimately needed to make it happen. It is pleasing to see that the domestic abuse commissioner is taking a proactive stance on this. She will need backing from Ministers in all Departments to look beyond their important response to victims to the other side of the coin: the people causing the harm.
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend’s contribution, and I entirely agree with its content. I think there is agreement across the House that we want credibility and consistency for perpetrator programmes to ensure that individuals who have been led into error by their behaviour do not continue to do so, at dramatic cost to both individuals and society more widely. We are absolutely clear that if we do not hold perpetrators to account for their actions, we will not be able to tackle the root cause of domestic abuse. We agree that it is essential for any perpetrator programme imposed as part of a DAPO to provide a high-quality, safe and effective intervention.
Although we support the aim of the amendments, we respectfully think that there is a better way of achieving the end result that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley seeks. At the heart of our response is the idea that quality assurance needs to be looked at in the round, in relation to all domestic abuse perpetrator programmes, not just those imposed by a DAPO, as is provided for in the amendments. Before I develop that point, I will say that consistency and credibility are important not just for the perpetrator or the victim, but for the courts themselves, so that they have confidence that when they impose orders, they will get results. Also, courts may not feel the need to lock someone up if they can reach for an order—whether a DAPO or a community order—in which they have confidence.
It is really important to note that not all domestic abuse perpetrator programmes come via a DAPO. First, a family court could make a referral into a perpetrator programme by, for example, imposing an activity, direction or condition in connection with a child arrangement order. Secondly, the police, probation service and local authorities could work together to impose a programme as part of an integrated offender management programme. Thirdly, there could even be self-referral: there may be individuals who have had a long, hard look at their behaviour and thought, “I need to address this. I am, off my own bat, going to seek a referral into such a programme.” Respect runs a helpline offering information and advice to people who have perpetrated abuse and want to stop.
I am at pains to emphasise that while we want to make sure any programmes delivered via the gateway of a DAPO achieve high standards and are consistent and credible, we should not forget that other programmes are being delivered outwith DAPOs, via different gateways, and we want to ensure that those programmes meet the same standard. Otherwise, we would end up in the perverse and unsatisfactory situation of having a DAPO gateway programme that is great, but other ones that are not.
We propose to take this work forward by using some of the £10 million announced by the Chancellor in this year’s Budget for the development of new interventions for domestic abuse perpetrators. We will work with the domestic abuse commissioner and specialist domestic abuse organisations—along the lines that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley indicated—to undertake mapping and evaluation of the range of perpetrator interventions currently available, and explore what works for different models of quality assurance for domestic abuse perpetrator behaviour change programmes.
By the way, there is already a wealth of promising evidence that we can draw on as part of this work. For example, the Government have already invested through the police transformation fund in a number of innovative approaches to managing perpetrators, including the Drive project led by Respect and SafeLives, to which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley alluded, as well as the whole-system approach to domestic abuse in Northumbria and the Women’s Aid “Make a Change” programme. There is a lot out there, and we need to draw the threads together.
We continue to support the important work of Respect, which is helping to ensure through its service standards that programmes targeted at a range of perpetrators are delivered safely and effectively. We will also draw on the ongoing work of the Ministry of Justice’s correctional services accreditation and advice panel, which accredits programmes for perpetrators who have been convicted of an offence.
It is important to note that clause 66 contains important provisions that allow for exactly what we want to achieve.
Turning to new clause 27 on the perpetrator strategy, I reassure the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley that we have heard the call to action for a perpetrator strategy. We commend the work of the Drive partnership of Respect, SafeLifes and Social Finance, who have done so much to change the narrative and to shift the focus from, “Why doesn’t she leave?”, to, “Why doesn’t he stop?”.
I want to be absolutely clear that we fully recognise the need for increased focus on perpetrators and are ambitious in our aim to transform the response to those who have caused this appalling harm, but to have an increased focus on tackling perpetrators, we do not need to make inflexible provision in the Bill for a one-off strategy. We have made clear our commitment to this work through our allocation of £10 million in this year’s Budget for preventive work with perpetrators. Over the past three years, we have funded a range of innovative approaches to working with perpetrators and we are beginning to build a solid evidence base on what works through some of the programmes I have mentioned: Drive, a whole-system approach to tackling domestic abuse, and “Make a Change”.
We have undertaken work to improve the response to the perpetrators through the criminal justice system. As was set out in the consultation response published alongside the draft Bill, we are taking action to improve the identification and risk assessment of perpetrators. The College of Policing has published key principles for police on the management of serial and dangerous domestic abuse perpetrators, and we are expanding the range of interventions available to offenders serving community sentences.
We recognise the concerns; that is why we want to ensure that we develop and properly test a whole-system approach, in particular through the piloting of DAPOs. It might well prove counterproductive to develop a new strategy without awaiting the learning from those pilots. I hope that, in the light of our intention to work towards that fully comprehensive package of perpetrator programmes and our wider programme of work to confront and change perpetrator behaviours, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will see her way to withdrawing the amendment.
I recognise what the Minister says about the fact that perpetrator programmes are used elsewhere. Very often in children’s services, I have seen people sent on perpetrator programmes that, I am afraid to say, are useless. If only everything was as perfect as it is in Westminster.
I apologise if I did not cover all the boroughs in London. I did not come up with the amendments all by myself; the specialist sector is working with us to ask for these things, and the reality is that, as sometimes happens in this place, we will say how something is on the ground and we will be told that that is not the case. We will be told, “Actually, no; it’s going to be fine because we are going to have a whole-system approach.”
What the Minister says about a whole-system approach is needed wherever perpetrator programmes are issued, rather than just in DAPOs. I could not agree with him more on that point. I shall allow him as many interventions as he likes, and I will speak for as long as it takes for him to get the answer. If he is saying to me that, at the other end of this very notable approach and funding that the Home Office and the Government are putting in place, we will end up with an accredited system that stops the bad practice and the poor commissioning of services, of course I will withdraw the amendment.
Is the Minister saying that we will work towards a standard that will have to be met and that will be compelled—not dissimilar to the standard that we will hopefully come on to tomorrow, where we compel local authorities with a duty? There, I believe, we will be writing a set of standards that the local authority in its commissioning process has to live by, so that it cannot just say, “We’re doing any old domestic abuse services.” There has long been talk at MHCLG about having standards to go with any duty. Is the Minister telling me that we will end up with an accreditation system, which is essentially what I seek?
The whole point of the approach we are taking is to seek standardisation across the piece. Words like “accreditation” can mean all sorts of things, but certainly it is the case that our absolute aim is to draw on the best practice that we have referred to and combine it with the experience we glean from the pilots to work out what we think is best practice, to clarify what that best practice is and to do everything we can to promulgate that best practice. One can use words like “accreditation” or “standardisation”, but we want to use the mechanisms within the Bill—pilot and guidance—to do precisely what the hon. Lady is aiming for. We recognise that clarity, consistency and credibility are the hallmarks of an effective order, and that is precisely what we want to achieve.
I welcome what the Minister says. I suppose the reality is that if that does not happen, I have no recourse beyond changing this Bill. Actually, I can just stand in this building and say, “Things aren’t working and we don’t have good perpetrator systems,” but it will largely fall on deaf ears. It might not—we cannot know which ears it will fall on—but, largely, when people come and say that things are not working in whatever we are talking about, it is very hard.
I have a Bill in front of me, and I can attempt to compel this to happen. However, on this occasion—because I would never describe the Minister as having deaf ears, and I am quite confident in my own ability to keep on raising the issue until the right thing happens—I accept and welcome what the Minister has outlined, and I look forward to working on it with him, the commissioner and the sector. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Further provision about electronic monitoring requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34 sets out the circumstances in which a court can impose electronic monitoring requirements on a person as part of an order, and the nature of such requirements. The clause specifies that the electronic monitoring requirements may not be imposed if the person is not present at the hearing. The clause also specifies that, if there is a person other than the perpetrator who will need to co-operate with the monitoring requirements in order for them to be practicable, they will need to give their consent before the requirements can be imposed. That may include, for example, the occupier of the premises where the perpetrator lives. The court must also have been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring requirements are available in the area, and it must be satisfied that the provision can be made under the arrangements available. Any order that imposes electronic monitoring requirements must also specify the person who will be responsible for their monitoring.
Where electronic monitoring requirements are imposed, the person must submit to being fitted with the necessary apparatus and to the installation of any associated equipment, and they must co-operate with any inspection or repair that is required. They must not interfere with the apparatus, and they must keep it in working order—for example, by keeping it charged. I trust that the Committee will agree that proper procedures should be in place when a decision is made by the court that electronic monitoring is required.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Breach of order
I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 36, page 23, line 29, leave out
“section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003”
and insert
“paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020”.
This amendment, and amendments 32, 34, 35 and 37, update references to existing legislation in the Bill to refer to the equivalent provision made by the Sentencing Bill that was introduced into Parliament in March (which will introduce the new Sentencing Code).
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Government amendments 32, 34, 35 and 37.
New clause 15—Consequential amendments of the Sentencing Code—
“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80 (order for conditional discharge), in subsection (3), at the end insert—
‘(f) section 36(6) (breach of domestic abuse protection order).’
(3) In Chapter 6 of Part 11 (other behaviour orders), before section 379 (but after the heading ‘Other orders’) insert—
‘378A Domestic abuse protection orders
See Part 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020 (and in particular section 28(3) of that Act) for the power of a court to make a domestic abuse protection order when dealing with an offender for an offence.’”
This New Clause makes two consequential amendments to the Sentencing Code as a result of Part 3 of the Bill. The first adds a reference to clause 36(6) to the list of cases where an order for conditional discharge is not available. The second inserts a signpost to Part 3 of the Bill into Part 11 of the Sentencing Code, which deals with behaviour orders.
Am I permitted to speak to all the amendments? They are all quite technical.
At this stage, we are debating all the amendments I referred to. You have to move only amendment 31 at this moment, but you can talk about them all.
That is eminently sensible.
These are minor and technical Government amendments. Clause 36 provides that a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence. Where someone is convicted of such an offence, clause 36(6) provides that a conditional discharge is not an option open to the court in respect of the offence. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, a conditional discharge means that the offender is released and no further action is taken unless the offender commits another offence within the specified period, at which point they can be sentenced for the first offence at the same time as the new offence.
Misconduct by members of the armed forces and by civilians subject to service discipline, which is an offence in England and Wales—or would be, if it took place there—may also be charged as a service offence under the disciplinary regime of the Armed Forces Act 2006. It means that a breach of a DAPO may come before the court martial and other service courts.
Amendment 33 to clause 36—I will come to amendments 31 and 32 in a moment—makes equivalent provision to clause 36(6), whereas—
It is that kind of flexibility in the Chair that we have grown to love and admire. Thank you very much, Mr Bone.
I was saying that amendment 33 makes equivalent provision to clause 36(6). When a service court convicts someone of the offence of a breach of a DAPO, a conditional discharge is not an option that is open to the service court in respect of the offence. Amendments 38 and 39 would make consequential amendments to the extent clause—clause 71—to ensure that the extent of new clause 36(6)(a), inserted by amendment 33, aligns with the extent of the Armed Forces Act 2016. That is a long-winded way of saying that we need to make sure that this measure dovetails with the 2016 Act in respect of the conditional discharge implications.
Amendments 31, 32, 34, 35 and 37, which I hope are on your list Mr Bone, make amendments to part 3 of the Bill—as we know, part 3 provides for DAPOs—and clause 59—
“Prohibition of cross-examination in person in family proceedings”—
and are consequential on the sentencing code. In turn, new clause 15 makes two consequential amendments to the sentencing code as a result of part 3. The first adds a reference to clause 36(6) to the list of cases where an order for conditional discharge is not available. The second inserts a signpost to part 3 of the Bill into part 11 of the sentencing code, which deals with behaviour orders, such as a DAPO.
Members may be asking, “What on earth is the Sentencing Bill?” The Sentencing Bill, which was introduced in the House of Lords on 5 March 2020, provides for the new sentencing code. The new code, which will be transformational for practitioners, is a consolidation of the law governing sentencing procedure in England and Wales. It brings together the procedural provisions that sentencing courts need to rely on during the sentencing process, and in doing so it aims to ensure that the law relating to sentencing procedure is readily comprehensible, and operates within a clear framework and as efficiently as possible.
Amendment 31 agreed to.
Amendments made: 32, in clause 36, page 23, line 36, leave out from “under” to “(conditional” and insert “section 80 of the Sentencing Code”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.
Amendment 33, in clause 36, page 23, line 37, at end insert—
“(6A) If a person is convicted of an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an offence under this section, it is not open to the service court that convicted the person to make, in respect of the offence, an order under section 185 of that Act (conditional discharge).
In this subsection “service court” means the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court.”.—(Alex Chalk.)
Conduct that is an offence under the law of England and Wales (or would be if it took place there) may be charged as a service offence, so a breach of a domestic abuse protection order may be dealt with by a service court. This amendment therefore makes provision corresponding to that made by clause 36(6), prohibiting a service court from giving a person a conditional discharge for breaching an order.
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Arrest for breach of order
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37 relates to arrest for breach of order and it makes provision for breach of a domestic abuse protection order to be dealt with as a civil matter— that is, as a contempt of court. A breach of an order is a criminal offence under clause 36, which we did not debate, whereby a police officer can make an arrest without a warrant under powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
However, we understand that some victims may be concerned about their partner or ex-partner being convicted of a criminal offence for breaching the order. Where an order is made by the High Court, the family court or the county court, clause 37 makes provision for the victim—the original applicant for the order—or any other person with leave of the judge to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest to be issued. That means that the court can then deal with the breach as a civil matter as a contempt of court. We consider that this allows effective action to be taken by the court following breach of an order, while still providing an option for victims who do not wish to criminalise their partner or ex-partner.
Schedule 1 makes further provision regarding remand under clause 37, where breach of a DAPO is being dealt with by the court as a civil matter. It sets out the procedure whereby the court may remand the person who has been arrested for breach. The process set out is consistent with existing law and replicates the approach the court already takes in regard to remand in such cases. It is sometimes necessary for the court to adjourn the hearing in order to allow for evidence to be prepared. In such cases, the court may decide to remand the person in custody or on bail.
Remand would usually only be used in cases where the court considers that the person arrested for breach is at a high risk of either committing further breaches or evading the return hearing. That may include, for example, if the court considers that person a flight risk.
Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 38
Notification requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38 provides that all DAPOs will impose notification requirements on the perpetrator, requiring them to notify the police of certain personal details within three days, beginning with the day on which the order is made. The perpetrator will have to provide details of their name, together with any aliases that they use, their home address and any changes to those details. This will help to ensure the police have the right information at the right time in order to monitor the perpetrator’s whereabouts and the risk posed to the victim.
These provisions have been drafted to capture a number of different scenarios, including if the perpetrator has no one fixed address, leaves and then returns to the UK or becomes homeless, helping to ensure their compliance with the notification requirements. There is also a power for the Home Secretary to specify by regulations further notification requirements, which a court may attach to a DAPO on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate. For example, details of the perpetrator’s work place, whether they hold a firearms licence and details of new applications for a spousal visa.
We will use the pilot of the orders to assess whether the current provisions are sufficient or whether it is necessary for the police to be notified of additional information by the perpetrator in order to protect victims. If so, this can be set out in regulations at a later stage.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
Offences relating to notification
Amendment made: 34, in clause 40, page 26, line 22, leave out “section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” and insert “paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020”.—(Alex Chalk.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40 simply provides that breach of the notification requirements without reasonable excuse is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. Again, this sends a very strong message to perpetrators that the Government, as well as the courts, the agencies, the police and so on, take any breaches of these orders very seriously indeed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Variation and discharge of orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41 is about the variation and discharge of orders. Another example of the DAPO’s flexibility is that the requirements imposed by the order can be varied so that the courts can respond to changes over time in the perpetrator’s abusive behaviour. That is important for the complainant, so to speak, as well as for the person who is subject to the perpetrator order. It is important that he—it will usually be a he—can come back to the court to seek to vary it if appropriate. That is why the clause is drafted as it is.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Nature of certain proceedings under this Part
Amendment made: 35, in clause 45, page 31, leave out line 15 and insert
“sections 79, 80 and 82 of the Sentencing Code”—(Alex Chalk.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.
Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Special measures for witnesses
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46 relates to special measures for witnesses. It ensures that victims in DAPO proceedings will be eligible for special measures when giving evidence. As some Members will know, special measures are used to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give their best evidence, and can include giving evidence from behind a screen, giving evidence remotely via a video link, giving pre-recorded evidence in chief, or giving evidence through an interpreter or another intermediary. Many witnesses in criminal and family proceedings already benefit from access to special measures when giving evidence, and we are strengthening those provisions for victims of domestic abuse in criminal proceedings through clause 58.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Guidance
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 47— Review of domestic abuse protection orders and notices—
“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of this Act being passed conduct a review into the operation and use of domestic abuse protection orders and notices.
(2) The review must take account of—
(a) the extent to which domestic abuse protection orders and notices have been used;
(b) data on the effectiveness of domestic abuse protection orders and notices in tackling and preventing domestic abuse;
(c) the views of those for whose protection orders and notices have been made.
(3) In designing and conducting the review, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner,
(b) the Welsh Ministers,
(c) organisations providing support to victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse,
(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) Upon completion of the review, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report setting out—
(a) the findings of the review, and
(b) the action the Secretary of State proposes to take in response to the review.”
This new clause would ensure that both DAPOs and DAPNs are reviewed to ensure that they are operating effectively and serving the purpose that they were intended for.
Clause 47 requires the Government to issue statutory guidance on the new notices and orders to the police, and to any third parties specified in regulations who may make a standalone application for an order. The recipients of that guidance must have regard to it when exercising their functions. The Government are also required to consult the commissioner before issuing or revising any guidance under the clause. This provision is crucial to help to ensure that frontline practitioners have the knowledge, understanding and confidence to use DAPOs effectively and consistently, in order to help victims and their children.
Topics to be covered by the guidance include how the different application pathways for a DAPO operate, when to consider applying for a DAPO and how to prepare robust application conditions, which may be included in a DAPO, and how to work with victims effectively, highlighting the importance of robust safety planning and referral to appropriate victim support services. We will develop the guidance in collaboration with the police and sector experts, ensuring that it is of high quality and relevant to the frontline practitioners using it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Powers to make other orders in proceedings under this Part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause relates to powers to make other orders in proceedings under this part. I will speak briefly on this, because it is important. Clause 49 makes provision for DAPO proceedings to be included in the definition of family proceedings in the Children Act 1989 and the Family Law Act 1996, if they are taking place in the family court or the family division of the high court. In practical terms, that will ensure that family judges have access to their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in the course of DAPO proceedings.
For example, if a family judge is hearing an application to make or vary a DAPO, and concerns around child contact arrangements are raised, the judge will be able to make an order under the Children Act without a separate application having to be issued. We consider that that will provide clarity and flexibility to the court, as judges will be able to use their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in any DAPO proceedings to best protect victims of domestic abuse and their children.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 50 to 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Hope springs eternal for what I am covering here being in the regulations. Had we seen the regulations, we would not have to debate whether it is going to be in them. Unless the regulations are drawn according to clearly defined grounds, I fear that there is a real risk that people will just say, “Yes, I am a provider for victims of domestic violence.”
I just draw the hon. Lady’s attention to subsections (9) and (10). Subsection (9) reads:
“The power to make regulations under subsection (8) may, in particular, be exercised to make provision about—
(a) the procedure to be followed by a relevant local authority in preparing a strategy;
(b) matters to which a relevant local authority must have regard in preparing a strategy;
(c) how a relevant local authority must publish a strategy;
(d) the date by which a relevant local authority must first publish a strategy;
(e) the frequency with which a relevant local authority must review its strategy.”
Subsection (10) states that, in making the regulations,
“the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner,
(b) relevant local authorities, and
(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
We are trying to be as open and transparent as possible in drawing up these regulations.
I absolutely agree, and I have no reason to doubt that there will be transparency in drawing up the regulations. However, I am not entirely sure why we cannot include in the Bill our opposition to that sort of accommodation. The amendment would require that the relevant accommodation, as defined in regulations, must be safe for survivors and their children and that the definition must include refuge services. All I am seeking is assurances that that will be included in the Bill. What is the point of making laws unless we are going to lean on them when things go wrong? We need a document that states that.
Again, by way of safeguarding, the local authorities are doing what is intended by the Bill. I draw the hon. Lady’s attention to clause 55, which states that the local authority
“must submit to the Secretary of State an annual report in relation to the exercise of the authority’s functions under this Part during the year.”
That is how the Secretary of State can ensure that individual local authorities are doing what they should be doing and meeting the expectations of the Bill.
I again thank the Minister, but with the greatest respect to the Secretary of State, unless something is written into the Bill, I do not know whether she will agree with what I am saying about what determines safe accommodation. All I seek to do in amending the Bill is a belt-and-braces job to ensure that that is the case—that what is perceived as good refuge accommodation is written into the Bill.
Gentle for the Minister is sometimes brutalising for those on the receiving end. Is it not true that a lot of the Bill, in particular at this point, relies on regulations? That means that we will have to rely not only on those Ministers currently in post but on the whim of future Ministers as well. That is why it is important that we nail down the Bill’s intentions. Rather than criticism of the to and fro in Committee, would it not be great to hear Ministers explain the intention, so that the next incumbents of their roles can see properly what the Bill is intended to do?
I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady from Scotland, which is not currently covered by the Bill. The Home Office is, of course, in charge of the policy that covers Scotland with regard to this area of immigration and the destitution funding that is put in place in those circumstances. She is right that there are hundreds of voices—nay thousands, according to the petitions on this—on one side of the argument, with regard to the need for access to support for all migrant victims of domestic abuse. It seems that there are some in this place, on the other side of the House, who do not agree. However, on Second Reading and in the Joint Committee, every specialist agency, all the commissioners and every expert involved—I have not asked Chris Whitty, but I imagine he might fall on my side about this—stated that the Bill needs to do more and that it needs to look at specific issues around migrant women.
This is not some radical left-wing approach, unless the right hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) could be considered a radical left-winger. Indeed, the issue was raised by the onetime Immigration Minister on Second Reading. We will speak to the issue in far greater detail next week, but without such provision the ability to ratify the Istanbul convention is null and void. I cannot understand why we would put together a Bill about domestic abuse victims that did not explicitly support every single one of them. That is the simple fact about what we have at the moment.
Throughout the amendment runs the thread of non-discrimination, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh West pointed out. We cannot pass a Bill that discriminates or has a blind spot on the effects of domestic abuse on young children. By providing an inclusive and holistic approach—by working with all those affected—we can truly tackle domestic abuse. These new clauses provide an opportunity for us to make changes now, not in 12 months’ time, and ensure that all victims of this horrific crime are supported.
If I may, I will first explain the duty in clause 53, because the amendment is relevant as it is key to what is intended. I want to be sure that everybody understands what clause 53 does.
We are clear that it is critical that victims of domestic abuse are able to access specialist support, in safe accommodation, when they need it. At the moment, nobody has responsibility to provide this support and, as a result, coverage is patchy, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out. That is why I am pleased that we have included part 4 in the Bill, which will put in place duties on tier 1 local authorities in England to ensure a clear framework for needs assessment, commissioning and reporting on outcomes, so that everyone has a chance of accessing the support that they need within safe accommodation.
Clauses 53 to 57 will together ensure a consistent approach to support in safe accommodation for victims and children who are forced to leave home to escape domestic abuse, with national coverage across local authorities. Clause 53 places a duty on each relevant local authority to assess the need for domestic abuse support for victims and their children within its area. Local authorities are best placed to assess the needs of victims in their area, considering the different requirements of all victims, including those with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, as well as victims and their children who may come in from outside the local authority area. The local authority must then prepare and publish a strategy for the provision of support within its area, give effect to that strategy, and monitor and evaluate its effectiveness.
Order. As the Minister started in this vein, it would be appropriate to have the stand part debate for clause 53 now. She is already speaking to it.
Thank you, Mr Bone. That is very helpful.
Clause 53 defines “domestic abuse support” as
“support, in relation to domestic abuse, provided to victims of domestic abuse, or their children, who reside in relevant accommodation”.
Such support may include the overall management of the service, the provision of emotional support and practical advice such as on housing options, specialist support for victims with protected characteristics, and children’s support.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised the spectre of Ibis and other hotel chains. To be clear, the duty only covers support within safe accommodation services. In the majority of cases, the costs of rent and eligible services charges will be met through welfare benefits, housing benefit in particular, so this measure is very much focused on the specialist services within safe accommodation.
How do we stop—I quote someone’s email—an “HMO daddy”? How do we stop them claiming to offer all of those things? What will we put in place that is beyond what is currently in place to assess use of the housing benefit system, which, I hasten to add, is not working?
Part 4. I will take the hon. Lady through it carefully, so that she understands how we have cross-checking systems in this part, in addition to all the checks in the rest of the Bill, including the commissioner and local authorities.
The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government will specify in regulations a description of “relevant accommodation”. That is intended to be a broad definition in recognition of the diversity of housing in which the victims of domestic abuse and their children may live, from refuges to dispersed housing units. That is one of the complexities that we have had to deal with during the covid-19 crisis.
Clearly, people at the beginning stage of fleeing their accommodation will be in a different state of mind, different physical states and a different state of trauma after receiving specialist support in safe accommodation and when looking to enter the next stage of their life. Therefore, that diversity of accommodation must be reflected in the regulations. That will help to ensure that victims get the right support in the right place for them, which includes refuge accommodation, specialist safe accommodation, dispersed units of accommodation, sanctuary schemes, and move-on or second-stage accommodation.
The duty will require each relevant local authority to give effect to its strategy in carrying out its functions. Before publishing the strategy, the local authority must consult the domestic abuse local partnership board established under clause 54. Looking at the membership of that board, the hon. Lady understandably expressed concerns such as whether we were collecting or aware of data from A&E departments, but we have set out that not just tier 2 local authorities should be represented on the board, if appropriate to the local area, but victims of domestic abuse, children of domestic abuse victims, voluntary organisations and charities that work with victims of domestic abuse, persons who have responsibilities in relation to healthcare services in the area, and policing and criminal justice representatives.
We have very much taken on board the requests in the consultation and elsewhere for a multi-agency approach to this problem. That is very much the direction of travel at national level. Through clause 54, we are insisting that it is the direction of travel at local level.
May I ask the Minister to comment on community services? The references to the provision of accommodation services are welcome, but she will know that there is a concern in the children’s sector in particular—but not only that sector—about the provision of community services, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has described, are a large part of the services for children. Will she comment on how that can be secured?
I am going to, but a little bit later in my speech, because I am concerned to ensure that everybody understands the purposes of this part. I sense that there may be a little bit of misunderstanding; I want to make sure we are all clear and will deal with that point later.
The duty will require consultation with the local partnership board—local partnership boards do not exist at the moment; they will be a really important factor in local areas—and will ensure that the local authority draws on the expertise of local domestic abuse services in its area. That provides for local accountability, requiring as it does the consultation.
The strategy that is created by the tier 1 local authority must be kept under review and any alterations, amendments or replacement must be published. That is in lockstep with everything else we are trying to do with the Bill, through the commissioner’s reports, the strategy plans and so on—making sure that this is transparent. At the moment, it will not be very easy in some areas to understand what the local strategy is. We want this section, with all the other parts of the Bill, to make that really clear.
The relevant local authorities have been picked as being tier 1 local authorities because of their larger geographical coverage, which is often coterminous with the footprint of other key partners such as police and crime commissioners, which supports planning of services. Providing support across a wider area will also help those victims who need to move further to stay safe. My own county of Lincolnshire is one of the largest counties in England and is an example of where a tier 1 local authority can help. Someone who lives in one corner of the county may be an hour and a half or two hours’ drive away from my constituency. They have that breadth of service provision and knowledge. That is how we have selected the authority, but we are also clear that tier 2 local authorities, where they exist, must play their part, which is precisely why we want them to be part of the partnership boards.
Of course, tier 1 authorities also have related responsibility in governance arrangements to draw on in leading this work, including their work on adult social care, health and wellbeing boards, community safety partnerships and children’s services.
In London in particular, tier 2 authorities will be critical to the success of this system, because they will have responsibility for housing and in some parts they commission domestic abuse services as well. We are putting the joined-up approach that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley and many others in the sector have been crying out for into the Bill in part 4 at local level.
I am listening carefully to the Minister, as I did to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley before her. However well-meaning the amendment is—no one can doubt that it is well-meaning—everything the Minister is saying reinforces the impression that the Bill is driving progress and consistency across local government across England. Does she worry, as I do, that the amendment might stymie that progress across local authority areas and prove a block to what we are trying to achieve?
I agree with my hon. Friend that the amendments are clearly coming from the right place, but we share that concern. The system that is being constructed in the Bill has been constructed as a result of intense reflection on consultation and in conversations with our charitable partners, service providers and so on. This is the end of a very intensive exercise of reflection and working out what can best help victims at a local level.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley also raised a fair point about assessing local need for accommodation-based support when victims may have to flee across boundaries. I am alert to that, and we will be developing a standardised needs assessment form to support local authorities in carrying out their needs assessment. Our statutory guidance will make clear the need for all areas to provide support to victims and their children from outside the area, and to work with other local authorities to allow victims easy movement from one area to another, while ensuring their safety.
There are some services that survey national need, such as dedicated services that support the needs of BAME and LGBT+ victims and people of faith. Our statutory guidance will make it clear that local area needs assessments should take those vital services into account.
Clause 54, as I have said, sets up the local partnership boards. A board will support the relevant authority in undertaking a robust local assessment of the need for domestic abuse support in its area. It will support the relevant authority in developing and publishing a local strategy based on the needs assessment. Through the duty to appoint a board, which must reflect the range of skills and expertise of different local partners—I suspect the local board in Birmingham will look different from that in Cumbria, because they are different areas with different populations and needs, and it is precisely that flexibility and responsiveness that we want throughout the Bill—the clause will help to ensure that an effective local domestic abuse strategy is put in place, informed by a needs assessment that has been tested by those who support victims of domestic abuse and their children day in, day out. Those strategies are not being imposed from Whitehall. They are being drawn up in local areas, where the needs are best understood.
The clause sets out the minimum requirement for board members. I have already outlined who is included in that. However, there is flexibility to appoint others as well. Relevant local authorities will be able to decide whether an existing board can fulfil the requirements or whether to create a new, dedicated board to fulfil the duty. Again, we are trying to be as flexible as possible, because we accept the point that some areas have managed to make much more progress in providing the services than others. Clause 54 is an important provision.
Clause 55 relates to the requirement on tier 1 local authorities to submit an annual report to the Secretary of State on how they are doing. The Secretary of State will make regulations about the form and contents of the report, and so on, but local authorities will be responsible not just to the local partnership board and, as democratically elected councils, the voting public, but to the Secretary of State. I imagine that the commissioner, who herself has reporting requirements under the Bill, will pay close attention to those annual reports.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley may be reassured to know, although it is not on the face of the Bill, that as part of the annual report there will be a national steering group. It will be led by an MHCLG Minister and established to monitor and evaluate delivery of the new duty. Therefore, there will be the safeguard of the clause 54 requirements, as well as clause 55, and in addition we will set up an expert steering group, on which the commissioner will sit, to consider the analysed information provided by local authorities.
When the Minister talks about a national steering body, could she clarify whether she means England and Wales, or England only?
Of course, it will respect the devolution arrangement. I like the phrase “jagged edge”; it describes it well. The group will work within the devolution arrangement. As has been the case throughout the Bill’s passage, we are happy to compare and work with our Welsh partners to ensure a consistent approach and to ensure that there is learning, and so on. We have taken an open approach throughout the Bill.
The group will review the operation of local needs assessments and the provision of domestic abuse support in safe accommodation across the country, specifically considering specialist provision for those who share relevant protected characteristics and services that serve a national rather than a local need. That will allow best practice to be shared and will highlight areas that may need further support to provide the consistent coverage expected by victims and the Government.
Clause 56 deals with guidance in addition to local partnership boards and the annual reports. The Secretary of State will also issue guidance to local authorities in England on exercising their functions in part 4. The clause places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult with the domestic abuse commissioner, local authorities and other persons considered appropriate by the Secretary of State. Subsection (2) requires local authorities to have regard to the guidance when exercising a function to which it relates. We are pleased to say that the guidance —which has been welcomed by local authorities—is to help them to deliver these vital services at local level. It will clearly outline the Government’s expectations for local authorities in delivering this duty.
We recognise that there is a balance between giving local authorities the flexibility to meet particular local needs and the requirement for a consistent approach to the provision of support within safe accommodation across the country. The guidance will help to provide a standardised approach to enable that to happen. We will make it clear in the guidance how that duty interacts with other duties and requirements on local authorities, such as those relating to homelessness.
I hope that colleagues with particular expertise will understand that the guidance will, I suspect, be quite a weighty document in its own right. It will sit alongside the statutory guidance that we have talked about for the Bill as a whole, precisely because we want it to be a working document for practitioners on the ground. We aim to have the draft guidance published in time for the Lords Committee stage. The report stands to be reviewed as necessary, of course. That sets out the framework of the clauses, and I will go into more detail on some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley and her colleague the hon. Member for Blaydon.
Once again, I emphasise that the statutory duty is to provide support to victims and their children within safe accommodation. Our concern is that new clauses 19 and 20 would apply more broadly to local and other relevant public authorities. The Committee may not be aware that responsibility for the provision of victim support services—including services targeted at perpetrators in order to support victims—has sat with police and crime commissioners since 2014. Local authorities will be bound by the new statutory duty to provide support to victims of domestic abuse residing in safe accommodation within their areas, but responsibility for wider victim support and perpetrator programmes will remain with police and crime commissioners.
Since 2014, PCCs have been funded by the Ministry of Justice to support victims of crime in their local areas and to address the specific needs identified in their local communities. That funding totalled some £68 million in 2019-20. PCCs have unique insight into the crime profiles and demographics of their local areas and thus the ability to allocate funding to those victims in need. Their autonomy to fund victim support services to meet local need should be preserved.
To create a duty that is workable and takes advantage of the considerable knowledge of local and public bodies, it must be placed on the specific authority that holds responsibility for particular services. Just as the new duty in part 4 will apply only to tier 1 local authorities, the commissioning of support for victims in the community must remain with PCCs and, in some cases, clinical commissioning groups. Interventions with perpetrators in the community must remain with PCCs, local authorities and, in some cases, CCGs. There is a variety with community-based services that there is not so much with refuge accommodation.
I know that the hon. Lady cited the fact that 13% of refuge accommodation is not commissioned by local authorities. We accept that. We are looking, as I have said, at the overwhelming majority of refuge accommodation.
I thank the Minister for picking up that point. The point that I wanted to pick up on was her two uses of the phrase “in some cases CCGs”. Would it not be nice if it were “in all cases”? Does the Minister think there are CCGs in the country that do not have victims of domestic violence living in their areas?
Sorry, I am not quite clear. Every single police and crime commissioner has victims of domestic abuse in their area, clearly, as do local authorities and, where appropriate, CCGs. To my mind, this is part of the diversity of provision of services. In some cases, it will be appropriate for CCGs to provide services, but I would not say it should be CCGs exclusively.
Will the Minister elaborate on that point and say in which CCG areas that would not be appropriate? She is saying that certain CCGs, for whatever reason, would not have to provide services for victims of domestic abuse.
I am not going to cite, out of the hundreds of CCGs, the ones that are appropriate and not appropriate. I assume that what the hon. Lady is trying to get to is that this should be viewed as a medical issue as much as a policing and crime issue. I welcome both approaches. That is precisely why we are introducing the multi-agency approach at local level, through local partnership boards, whereby health services will be represented, whereas they are not at the moment. Policing and criminal justice will be represented, whereas they are not at the moment. Children will be represented, whereas they are not at the moment. This is the multi-agency approach that we are trying to achieve.
The Government do, however, recognise the need to explore the provision of community-based services to domestic abuse victims to ensure that those victims are receiving the right support to cope and recover from this terrible crime. Equally, we are clear that if we do not hold perpetrators to account for their actions and challenge them to make real sustainable changes to their behaviour, we will not stop the cycle of violence and abuse.
Before establishing the new statutory duty in relation to accommodation-based support, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government consulted at length with local authorities, the domestic abuse sector and other organisations involved in supporting victims, to identify the barriers to provision of safe accommodation. That identified the lack of accountability and sustainable funding for the provision of support in safe accommodation as the key issue. Through that detailed engagement, it was possible to design a statutory duty that would tackle that. I am delighted to say that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government has confirmed that the new statutory duty will be appropriately funded.
I thank the Minister for allowing me to intervene again—this is almost greedy on my part. She was talking about all the organisations that took part and what they said about what the barriers were. Could she enlighten us on what they said the barriers were in relation to migrant women?
I will deal with that later in my speech. The hon. Lady took some 55 minutes—it is not a competition, but I have to do this justice by drawing out the points as we develop the argument. As with clauses 1 and 2, I want to explain the journey that we have taken to arrive at the statutory duty.
I think we would all acknowledge that the current funding arrangements for community-based services are complex. Although responsibility sits with PCCs, services are funded from myriad routes, including PCCs, local authorities, health partnerships and community safety budgets. That is true of both services for victims and programmes targeted at perpetrators, particularly those who have not been convicted. It would not be right to define what should be available by way of services for community-based support, without conducting a similar investigation as took place for support within safe accommodation and consulting the sector on any proposals.
To that end, the domestic abuse commissioner has agreed to lead an in-depth investigation into the current community-based support landscape, and the Government are committed to addressing its findings. We believe that that work needs to come to fruition before we can properly understand how any wider duty should be framed, on whom it should be imposed, and at what cost. It is also right that we fully consult on any expansion of the duties in part 4. I should add—in trying to describe the interlocking and interweaving web of accountability that runs through the Bill—that the commissioner will publish her report under clause 8, and we are required to respond to it within 56 days. The Bill therefore sets a time limit by which the Government are to respond.
In addition, a number of other areas of work across Government are already taking place to improve the experience of victims who seek help, such as the refresh of the national statement of expectations that is due to be published later this year. That will set out the best practice for commissioning all violence against women and girls services. We are also developing a cross-Government victim funding strategy, which is due to be published by the end of the year. Those developments are part of a cross-Government drive to ensure that domestic abuse victims in the community are receiving the support that they need, and that good-quality work with perpetrators is the norm.
I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the general duty on the Secretary of State set out in new clause 19(1) is necessary or helpful at this time. As we have already debated, the Bill establishes in law that the domestic abuse commissioner’s statutory remit will include the encouragement of best practice in the prevention of domestic abuse and the provision of protection and support to victims and others affected by domestic abuse. As part of her remit, she will necessarily look at the availability and quality of perpetrator programmes and make recommendations based on her findings.
On new clauses 19 and 20, it is worth pointing out the jagged edge, as I have called it: the new clauses do not reflect the devolution settlement in Wales. A number of relevant public authorities listed in new clause 20 operate in the devolved sphere, and we would not normally legislate on devolved matters in Westminster without the consent of the Senedd.
The other amendments in the group relate broadly to the existing provisions in part 4. Again, although I appreciate the intention behind the amendments, they would add more detailed requirements to the Bill, thereby reducing the flexibility of local authorities to meet particular local needs and set up a local partnership board in line with local needs and existing partnership arrangements. I do not believe that they are necessary because much of what they seek to achieve will be in the statutory guidance and laid down by regulation.
Clause 53 places a duty on each relevant local authority in England to assess the need for domestic abuse support for victims and their children within its area. In assessing needs, relevant local authorities will consider the differing requirements of all victims, including those with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, as well as victims and their children who come in from outside the local authority area. The local authority will then be required to publish a strategy, which will take effect as I have set out.
Order. The Minister is talking about the other amendments; I should point out to the Committee that amendment 77, as printed, refers to line 21, when it should refer to line 25—it is just a typing error. As the Committee knows, we cannot adjourn at 1 pm while the Minister is still speaking; a speech cannot be interrupted.
Sorry, I had thought that we might go on until 2 pm. In that case, I will be very quick; I hope I have set out the framework of the guidance. I am extremely grateful to Mr Bone for that clarification.
We recognise the concerns that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has set out. I emphasise in relation to new clause 48 that the importance of national oversight is accepted, as can be seen from the setting up of the Minister-led expert steering group. We very much hope that those who are involved in that group will be able to make their views clear and look at the reports with all of the interlocking safeguards we have.
I will sum up by saying that we believe amendment 67 and new clauses 19 and 20 are at best premature, and that the other amendments are unnecessary. We recognise the importance of community-based services for those affected by domestic abuse and the need to address offending behaviour. As I have said, we are committed to investigating, in collaboration with the commissioner, what needs to be done to ensure that victims who stay in their own home, together with their children, are receiving the support they need, and that perpetrators are appropriately challenged and supported to change their behaviour.
I will not keep Members for a long time, and I recognise the Minister’s generosity towards other members of the Committee. She has not covered some of the issues that she said she would cover, whether those raised in my speech or through interventions on myself or her. I recognise the reason for that; no doubt we will have plenty of time to debate those issues as the Committee progresses.
I will just pick up on a few small things. The Minister has clarified that the regulations she mentioned will be laid at Lords Committee stage, as opposed to the guidance that she has promised will be laid before the House on Third Reading. As regards the guidance about local authorities’ commissioning of specialist refuge accommodation, the Minister has suggested that some of the things we are suggesting may be premature. I have been having meetings and conversations about these regulations for six years, beginning before I was elected, in the days when MHCLG was still DCLG. I have met with pretty much every housing Minister or MHCLG Minister about this issue, so it does not feel particularly premature to me. However, I look forward to the regulations coming before the Lords Committee.
So much of this regulation is based on trust, and all I was saying to the hon. Member for Cheltenham was that although I like part 4 of the Bill, I think there are areas in which it could be better, clearer and more robust to future-proof it. I will not press amendment 67 or new clauses 19 and 20 to a vote now, because I think the duty on community services is something that the whole House would wish to discuss—and the Lords would certainly wish to see discussed—on Report, and then maybe at the amendment stages in the Lords. I thank the Minister for responding to many of the issues I have raised, which has allayed some concerns, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. Long before I ever see a victim in court, there has been a huge process to get there and to provide the right support. Independent domestic violence advisers and different support mechanisms are in place; there are supporting people who come in and sit with the victim in court, but it is a hugely traumatic experience and support is needed throughout that process.
I would add a point about a common theme among perpetrators. When, in normal criminal cases, shoplifters or burglars or other violent offenders are convicted and sent to prison, there is a shrug of the shoulders—it is a part of their life; a general hazard of the criminality that they are involved in. When I have had—I will use the phrase—the pleasure to convict a perpetrator and send them to prison, it is noticeable that all the power has all of a sudden been stripped away. Their indignance and fury is palpable; you can sense it and see it. That is what makes it a different crime and a different experience, and that is why special measures are important. I speak to that experience.
Will my hon. Friend indulge me for a moment? I take the point that the hon. Member for Hove made about the geography and layout of court buildings. Some we cannot change because they are very old. Has my hon. Friend seen the measures that clever judges can introduce to control when defendants are permitted to turn up according to the conditions of bail? For example, the defendant is not permitted to arrive at court until 20 minutes before the court case starts, so that the victim has time to get into the building and into the witness room, or wherever she will be based, and there is no risk of crossover. Does my hon. Friend agree that little tweaks such as that can make a difference?
Absolutely; I completely agree. We cannot legislate for everything you can do in a court—every courtroom is set out differently. I have seen a lady with two teenage daughters, with the husband, and some really clever dynamics were needed to keep everyone separate, including in the toilets. In my experience, such measures have been very positive. There have been specialist domestic violence courts. Everyone is keenly aware of what is needed and is trying to think ahead for the kinds of measures that can make justice effective and make sure that justice is done. Such measures are all part of that.
I am delighted to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Buck. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford for her excellent contribution. It speaks to the strength of the Committee that its members have real-world experience and can apply it to the important matters that we are here to discuss.
Before turning to the amendment and new clause, it is worth taking stock of where we are in terms of the court process and the framework in which the amendment and new clause sit. Over the last 10 years or so—probably a bit longer—the environment for victims and witnesses has been completely transformed. It was not so long ago that a complainant in a case of serious violence or a serious sexual allegation had to turn up at court and eyeball the defendant. It required an extraordinary effort of will, and a lot of people just thought, “This isn’t worth the candle.”
Legislation was introduced that provided the opportunity for screens and giving evidence via live link. At the time, that was considered utterly revolutionary. People were clutching their pearls, saying, “That’s it; justice is dead in our country; there is no opportunity for people to get a fair trial” and so on. The culture has changed. Now, at plea and trial preparation hearings such orders are routinely made and, lo and behold, juries—indeed, benches of magistrates as well—seem to find it perfectly straightforward to make a judgment in the interests of justice on the facts in front of them.
Setting that context helps to bring us up to the situation at the moment. Let us imagine some facts for a moment. The allegation is one of sexual assault on the London Underground. At that early hearing, before the Crown court, long before the trial has even been scheduled, the judge will ask the prosecutor, “Are there any applications for a special measures direction?” The prosecutor will stand up and say, “Yes, there is a complainant in this case and it is an allegation of a sexual nature, so I will be inviting the court to make a special measures direction in the normal way.” That is precisely what will happen, because it will be automatic.
I pause to note one further point. If the complainant says, “Forget this. I don’t want a screen, and I don’t want to give evidence on a live link; I want to be there in the well of the court, because that is how I feel I will get justice”, that will be accommodated as well.
The Minister says that the report will be published in the coming weeks. Does he expect that we will see it prior to Report stage of the Bill, or potentially prior to Committee stage in the Lords, as he has leaned on for one particular review? I ask only because I am seeking to understand what will be given to me as I consider whether to push new clause 45 to a Division.
I invite the hon. Lady to listen to the end of my remarks. If I can put it in these terms, the words I will use at the end are carefully phrased. I invite her to listen to those and then decide. A huge amount of work has gone into this panel, and getting to a place where we are ready to publish is the stuff of enormous effort. We are moving as quickly as we can, and it will be published as quickly as possible.
On the civil courts, there are no specific provisions in the civil procedure rules that deal with vulnerable parties or witnesses. However, judges have an inherent power, where the court is alerted to vulnerability, to make a number of directions or take steps to facilitate the progression or defending of a claim or the giving of evidence by a vulnerable party.
To summarise considerably, I am sure that the Minister is aware that the Civil Justice Council returned earlier this year with the civil procedure rule committee. One of its recommendations was a new practice direction to address vulnerability. I wonder whether he could consider that.
The hon. Lady must have a copy of my speech, because I will come to that point in just a moment.
The directions that a civil court can make include, but are not limited to, giving evidence via video link, by deposition, by the use of other technology or through an intermediary or interpreter. On the hon. Lady’s point, following the April 2018 publication of the interim report and recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, the Ministry of Justice commissioned the Civil Justice Council—an advisory body responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating modernisation of the civil justice system—to consider the issues raised by these recommendations, and to compile a report that was not to be restricted only to victims and survivors of child sexual abuse.
The CJC published its report, “Vulnerable witnesses and parties within civil proceedings: current position and recommendations for change”, in February 2020. It made a number of recommendations, as the hon. Lady rightly points out. On special measures, the CJC report concluded that, in the civil jurisdiction, the issue is one of awareness and training, rather than lack of legal powers or framework. This goes back to my point on the role of this place in promoting awareness while recognising that discretion should be available to the court. That was the CJC’s conclusion. Its suggestion was that special measures were best left to the flexibility of court rules. The Government are considering how the recommendations in the independent report should be taken forward.
What is evident from the evidence received by the family panel and the Civil Justice Council is that the current position is unsatisfactory. The question is how best to improve the situation and ensure that vulnerable witnesses in the family and civil courts receive assistance to give their best evidence, in a way analogous to what the Bill already provides for in the criminal courts. We have the report from the Civil Justice Council to guide us but do not yet have the report of the family panel. However, I hope and expect that we will have it shortly, and it is right that we should consider the panel’s findings before legislating.
I am sympathetic to the intention behind these proposals. If the hon. Member for Edinburgh West would agree to withdraw her amendment I can give her and the shadow Minister an assurance that, between now and Report, we will carefully consider both proposals, and how best to proceed. If they are not satisfied with the conclusions the Government reach, they are of course perfectly entitled to bring amendments back on Report.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 59
Prohibition of cross-examination in person in family proceedings
Amendment made: 37, in clause 59, page 39, line 32, at end insert—
“(aa) section 80 of the Sentencing Code;” —(Alex Chalk.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Let me say a little about clause 59. In fact, the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd was starting to talk about it, so I will set out some context. The clause contains provisions to prevent unrepresented perpetrators of abuse from cross-examining their victims in person in family proceedings. It also makes provision to give family courts the power to appoint a qualified legal representative to undertake the cross-examination instead, where necessary.
The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, which undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, recommended that the automatic prohibition of cross-examination be extended so that it would apply when the victim could provide evidence of abuse, as in the legal aid regime. We have accepted the recommendation in full, and the clause now gives full effect to it.
Some of the most vulnerable members of society come before the family courts, and we are determined to offer them every protection and to ensure that every vulnerable victim or witness coming to the family courts has confidence that the court will not be used to perpetrate further abuse against them. Currently, family judges have a range of powers to make sure that difficult courtroom situations are handled sensitively for vulnerable witnesses. In proceedings where both parties are litigants in person and concerns of domestic abuse have been raised, that may include carrying out cross-examination by way of the judge or the justices’ legal advisers putting questions to the parties themselves. Alternatively, the judge can decide that an alternative form of evidence, such as pre-recorded cross-examination from criminal proceedings, is sufficient.
However, there are cases in which those alternative forms of evidence or cross-examination will not be sufficient to test the evidence in the case thoroughly. We must recognise that for the judge to step into the arena to ask those questions is often—how can I put it politely?—suboptimal. In those instances, the court currently has no power to appoint an advocate to carry out the cross-examination in place of the parties themselves. That can lead to situations in which the court is powerless to prevent a victim from being cross-examined in person by their abuser.
I am sure we would all feel uncomfortable about a situation in which evidence was not challenged. The whole point of an adversarial process is to tease out inconsistencies and omissions in the evidence. If that is not happening, the proceedings are not fair, so it is important that there should be scope within the trial process for frailties in the evidence to be ruthlessly exposed.
We recognise that the issue has been the subject of close attention in the House and among experts in the field. Victims have told us that being subject to cross-examination in person in this way can be retraumatising, and judges have told us that the situation is an impossible one for them to manage. I entirely sympathise. We are determined that the court should never be used as a forum to perpetuate further abuse, and that it should have sufficient powers in all cases to prevent abuse from being perpetrated through court processes.
The purpose of the clause is therefore to introduce a prohibition on victims being cross-examined in person in specified circumstances. In addition, the clause gives the court the power to appoint an advocate, paid for from central funds, for the purpose of cross-examination where there are no satisfactory means to cross-examine the witness or to obtain the evidence, where the party does not appoint a legal representative or themselves to do so, and where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
I welcome what the Minister is saying, but on the specific instances he is outlining of who exactly would be able to assess this, does he foresee an element of the judge’s discretion also allowing them to go to central funds where they believe enough that cross-examination would cause distress, regardless of whether there may previously have been a conviction or an order in place? As we all know, there is a disparity between conviction and order rates on the one hand, and domestic violence rates on the other.
Courts have a common law discretion to manage their own proceedings, but it will be important for us to assist the them as much as possible by setting out the categories that should trigger the exemption. Although courts can act of their own motion, it is none the less important to prescribe to an extent that the provision applies in circumstances where somebody has been convicted, charged or cautioned. I will develop that point in the following passage.
In the light of the recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the clause now makes provision that the automatic ban will also apply in other cases where a witness has adduced specified evidence of domestic abuse. The evidence will be specified in regulations and, as recommended by the Joint Committee, we intend for this evidence to broadly replicate that which is used to access civil legal aid. That is probably the point that the hon. Lady was driving at.
The prohibitions also apply reciprocally, to prevent a victim from having to cross-examine their abuser in person. Where the automatic ban does not apply, the clause also gives the court a discretion to prohibit cross-examination in person where it would be likely to diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence or cause significant distress to the witness or the party. That is the point about a court’s discretion: the judge has the individuals in front of them, can hear from them and can make a decision based on that.
In any case where cross-examination in person is prohibited, either under the automatic prohibition or at the discretion of the court, the judge must consider whether there is a satisfactory alternative means by which the witness can be cross-examined or the evidence can be obtained. That would include means that already fall under the judge’s general case management powers, such as putting the questions to the witness themselves or via a legal adviser, or by accepting pre-recorded cross-examination. I suppose one might imagine cases where the things that need to be cross-examined on are so narrow in scope that it would not be worth the aggravation of instructing independent counsel if the judge can do it and do justice in that way. It is important that the court can act of its own motion and flexibly, and the clause retains that flexibility.
If there are no satisfactory alternative means, the court must invite the prohibited party to appoint a legal representative to carry out cross-examination on their behalf. If they choose not to, or are unable to, the clause gives the court the power to appoint a legal representative—an advocate—for the sole purpose of conducting the cross-examination in the interests of the prohibited party. The court must appoint an advocate where it considers this to be necessary in the interests of justice.
There could be circumstances where it is not possible to protect the prohibited party’s rights to access to justice and/or a family life without the appointment of such an advocate. This might be in circumstances, for example, where the evidence that needs to be tested by cross-examination is complicated, because it is complex medical or other expert evidence, or because it is complex or confused factual evidence, say from a vulnerable witness. The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in connection with the role of that advocate.
The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the fees and costs of a court-appointed advocate to be met from central funds. We understand the particular skill and care that is needed to carry out cross-examination of a vulnerable witness effectively. We will be designing a full fee scheme to support these provisions, in consultation with the sector and interested parties, prior to the implementation of the Bill.
This clause seeks to ensure that, in future, no victim of domestic abuse has to endure the trauma of being questioned in person by their abuser as part of ongoing family proceedings. It makes a big difference, and I commend it to the Committee.
It is rare but pleasing when one agrees so fully with the person one shadows, and I am grateful to him. I do not want to shock the Minister—I do not want him to be clutching his pearls as I say such words—but it is certainly the situation we find ourselves in on this clause. We are not opposing or seeking to amend the clause; we agree fully with it and what it seeks to achieve.
However, I want to spend a bit of time explaining how we got to where we are, because it is important. It is important that we make sure the record reflects the situation that this clause seeks to rectify and the impact that the cross-examination by perpetrators of victims has had on people. In so doing, I speak on behalf of a great number of advocates, both in Parliament and outside, over a great period of time. I can speak for myself on this issue, but I am very aware of the fact that I am also speaking on behalf of a lot of other people.
I had personal experience of this issue very soon after getting elected in 2015. Soon after the election, I was sitting on the floor of my campaign office among the detritus of a very vigorous campaign, sorting through things and trying to figure things out, when a very fragile, very vulnerable and very damaged woman suddenly appeared in the doorway. She came in to see me, and said, “Are you the new MP?” I said yes, and she said, “I saw your leaflets. You look like a friendly person. I am now going to flee my relationship, and I will only speak to you about it.” We sat in the corner of the office, and this woman was bruised and bleeding. She had literally escaped from the relationship, and I, as an MP of a few days, was thinking on the inside, “Oh my God, what do I do in this situation? How do I help this extraordinarily vulnerable person?” I just did the best I possibly could, and that involved brokering a relationship between her and the police, about which she was terrified. She was scared of the authorities because the authorities had let her down so many times, repeatedly. I supported that woman, and she went into a protective programme. She now has a new identity and a new life, and although she will never ever be able to escape the horrors of what she went through, she certainly has an opportunity to discover new, more fruitful aspects of life, which she was prevented from doing before.
One of the aspects I experienced very soon after the process of supporting her began was the experience of the family court. I could not believe what I heard when she came to see me after some hearings in the family court, where she was made to share the space of the person she had fled. Having seen her on the day she fled her relationship, it was horrendous to hear that she was forced into the same waiting room as this person, had to be in the same space when their relationship was discussed and, crucially, was cross-examined by him.
At the same time, another constituent came to see me in my surgery. She had just been cross-examined by her abusive partner for the third time. She had previously been hospitalised; the perpetrator had broken more than a dozen or her bones and repeatedly raped her. On the third appearance in the family court, she was shaking so violently that she needed assistance to get to the taxi afterwards. On the journey home, the taxi driver had to stop and help her out of the taxi so that she could vomit on the pavement.
That was happening to people who I was sitting with and who I represented in Parliament. I could not understand that the very institutions that existed to protect people like them were facilitating the abuse—in front of judges, in a room with police officers, abuse was happening, and nobody was offering support. To my shame, I could not quite believe that this was possible in 21st-century Britain. When I came back to Parliament, I sought out my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and asked him about it. I said, “I am hearing this thing, but I can’t believe it is possible.” He, as the former Director of Public Prosecutions, said, “It is happening, and there is a big campaign out there to try and change it.”
I could not believe that it was still happening, so I went to speak to Ministers. Repeatedly, Minister after Minister told me that a cultural change was needed in the criminal justice system, not a legislative change. I could not accept that. Having gone to speak to judges to understand why change was not happening, and having repeatedly spoken to Ministers, I found it incredibly hard to believe that the Government were not seeing or understanding the abuse. Of course, they were seeing it, but they were refusing to change. There are many lessons here, and I hope Back Benchers realise that persistence is one of them.
On 15 September 2016, I secured a Backbench debate that was led by Angela Smith, the then Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. We had gone with a cross-party group to get a Backbench debate. There were several Tories in the group, and we worked as a formidable team. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley was not part of the group that went to the Backbench Business Committee, because she sat on the Committee and was supposed to be impartial, but it was clear from her facial expressions where she stood on the issue.
During the debate itself, I was able to put on record the most shocking example of this abuse that I have ever come across. In the eight or nine months leading up to the debate, I met dozens of women who had gone through such abuse. The most shocking case was that of Jane Clough—some people in this room will be aware of her case. I am not the sort of person who normally quotes himself, but in going through all the different debates that have taken place in Parliament in the last five years on this issue, I read some of the examples I put on record, and I want to quote directly from one debate. My reason for doing so is that I want Members to realise, and I want the record to reflect, that this example has been on the House of Commons record for almost four years.
Before turning to the specific point, I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Hove said, and it was clear that he has taken a close interest in the issue. I thank him for the energy that he has clearly applied to it. As I was listening to him, I heard about Bills that had fallen, elections that had come and UQs that had happened, and I was reminded of Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, who said: “Laws are like sausages; it is best not to watch them being made.”
That is absolutely right and I felt it about this. Inevitably—not inevitably, but not uncommonly—it can take time to get there, but we are absolutely delighted with where we have arrived at with this important legislation. It is important to note, too, that it takes place in the context of other important legislation that it was possible to get over the line earlier, such as on coercive control or modern slavery. The Bill sits within that wider context in which we take some pride.
I will first address the issue of spent convictions, friends and so on, and that will allow me to go back to a point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, when she in effect said, “What happens in circumstances where it is not necessarily a conviction or a caution, but something else?” If hon. Members turn to page 40 of the Bill, that is the relevant part of clause 59, which deals with how the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 will be amended. The clause having dealt specifically with issues of conviction and caution, proposed new section 31U—“Direction for prohibition of cross-examination in person: other cases”— states:
“In family proceedings, the court may give a direction prohibiting a party to the proceedings from cross-examining…a witness in person if…none of sections 31R to 31T operates to prevent the party from cross-examining the witness”—
that relates to people protected by injunctions, convictions or other matters—and
“it appears to the court that—
(i) the quality condition or the significant distress condition is met, and
(ii) it would not be contrary to the interests of justice to give the direction.”
In other words, it would be open to the party to indicate to the court: “Yes, I don’t automatically qualify, but I’m going to provide a statement that indicates that it would adversely affect the quality of the evidence I can give were I to be cross-examined by the other party.” I hope that that will give the courts confidence that flexibility is deliberately built into the system.
To return to my concern about the lack of communication between jurisdictions, on spent convictions we are going quite a long way down the road as to what communication is necessary. Is the Minister confident that there is sufficient communication, or that there will be in the wake of the legislation, to ensure that such situations are safeguarded against?
Yes, I am confident, but it goes back to the earlier point that we were making about culture. If, by dint of the legislation, the family judges, when deciding whether to make one of the orders, are alive to the fact that they will need to consider whether someone has a conviction or a caution, that will, in and of itself, encourage and require the co-operation of the police. In other words, the court will have to find out what is on the police national computer in respect of the other party.
I am confident that courts will see their way to ensuring that those lines of communication are in place. Quite apart from anything else, if a judge finds himself, or herself, in a situation where he cannot make the order because he has not been provided with the information he needs, we can be very sure that he is likely to say something about that. That will, I am sure, elicit change in the fullness of time, so the short answer to the hon. Lady’s question is yes.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Offences against the person committed outside the UK: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61 extends the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in Northern Ireland in the same terms as clause 60 extends the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in England and Wales. We did not go into clause 60 in any detail, but that is what it is about.
Clause 61 gives effect in Northern Ireland to our obligations under article 44 of the Istanbul convention, as it applies to article 35, which covers physical violence, and article 39, which covers forced abortion and forced sterilisation. Like clause 60, it does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to certain offences against the person, including actual or grievous bodily harm and murder and manslaughter, in circumstances where the courts do not already have such jurisdiction. That will mean that a UK national or a person habitually resident in Northern Ireland who commits one of the offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Northern Ireland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Amendments relating to offences committed outside the UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause simply reintroduces schedule 2, which contains amendments relating to offences committed outside the UK. As with clauses 60 and 61, the amendments are necessary to ensure compliance with article 44 of the Istanbul convention. Part 1 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences other than those set out in clause 60 under the law of England and Wales. Part 2 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of Scotland. Part 3 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences not including those set out in clause 61 under the law of Northern Ireland.
Schedule 2 contains amendments to a number of enactments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Together with clauses 60 and 61 and provisions in the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly that give extraterritorial effect to the new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, schedule 2 will ensure that the UK complies with the jurisdiction requirements of article 44 of the Istanbul convention.
Part 1 of the schedule covers England and Wales and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 33, which covers psychological violence, article 34, which covers stalking, and article 36, which covers sexual violence, including rape. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under sections 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which is about coercive control. It will mean that a UK national or a person habitually resident in England and Wales who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in England and Wales. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.
Part 2 of the schedule covers Scotland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to articles 33 to 36 and article 39. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to the common law offence of assault, to offences under sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and to the offence of stalking under section 39 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010.
That will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Scotland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Scotland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.
Part 3 of the schedule, as the Committee will be cottoning on to by now, covers Northern Ireland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 34 and 36. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under article 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 and part 2 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, again where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over. It will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Northern Ireland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Northern Ireland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.
I simply want to welcome specifically the terminology of “habitual resident” within the UK. The Minister and I have met a number of different families over the years who have suffered violence, and I am afraid to say that those cases we get to see usually involve murder in a different country. Where the perpetrator of the crime was back here in Britain and was not a British citizen but was habitually resident in this country, the authorities had found that their hands were tied. While the measures seem perfunctory and were a lot of words for the Minister to say, to families they mean a huge amount, so I welcome them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 63
Polygraph conditions for offenders released on licence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This clause is about polygraph conditions. It is an important clause that relates to conditions for offenders released on licence. It is one of a number of measures in the Bill directed at strengthening the effective management of domestic abuse perpetrators. It allows the Secretary of State for Justice to introduce mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for offenders convicted of a relevant domestic abuse-related offence. The relevant offences include murder, specified violent offences and the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour under the Serious Crime Act 2015. Necessarily, this is a new departure to some extent, but it is kept within tight limits, as members of the Committee would expect.
The domestic violence disclosure scheme, which I will refer to from this moment forward as Clare’s law, was introduced in 2014 after Clare Wood was murdered by her ex-boyfriend, George Appleton. For those who are unfamiliar with the case, Clare Wood had made several complaints to the police about George Appleton before her death. Those complaints included criminal damage, harassment, threats to kill and sexual assault. A panic room had been installed in her house following an attempted rape.
Clare was unaware that George Appleton had a history of violence against women and had been jailed for three years in 2002 for harassing another woman, and for six months a year earlier after breaching a restraining order. However, he was still able to enter Clare’s home, strangle her and set her on fire. The Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded that Clare had been let down by individual and systematic failures by Greater Manchester police.
Clare’s law was designed to set out procedures that could be used by the police in relation to disclosure of information about previous violent, abusive and offending behaviour by a potentially violent individual towards their partner where that might help to protect that partner from further violent and abusive offending. There are two procedures for disclosing information: the right to ask, which is triggered by a member of the public applying to the police for a disclosure, and the right to know, which is triggered by the police making a proactive decision to disclose information to protect a potential victim. Disclosures are made when it is deemed that there is a pressing need for the disclosure of the information to prevent further crime.
While there is no doubt that Clare’s law was introduced with entirely good intentions—I am not here to challenge that at all—there is some concern that this well-intentioned piece of legislation is currently not operating as it should be, and concern about some alarming instances where, as it operates currently, it could be causing more harm.
First, Clare’s law has had limited use since its creation in 2014. According to data from March 2018, there were 4,655 right to ask applications, resulting in 2,055 disclosures, and 6,313 right to know applications, resulting in 3,594 disclosures, so it can be seen clearly that disclosures are not made in every case. In comparison, in the same time period there were just shy of 1.2 million recorded domestic abuse cases in England and Wales, so we are talking about a very small number of cases that seem to be using the scheme. That in itself is not necessarily evidence that it is not working, but I think it is descriptive of where it may work in some places and not others.
In addition, there appears to be a postcode lottery regarding disclosures. It is assumed that that variation is due to the vague nature of the pressing need test that currently exists in the law. For example, in 2019 Kent had an 8.5% disclosure rate for right to ask disclosures, while Hampshire had a 99.5% rate. That is worrisome, but what is of even greater concern is that the average time taken for each disclosure is 39 days. I imagine all will agree that in cases of domestic abuse, that mitigates quite a lot of the potential prevention and could potentially heighten a victim’s risk.
In addition, while there was a review of the initial pilot phase of Clare’s law and a review one year on, those reviews were procedural and did not consider the impact of the scheme on domestic abuse or analyse the scheme’s value for money. There is therefore no evaluation of whether the disclosures made have any benefit to the person they are made to. In fact, one survey indicated that 45% of early-wave recipients of information went on to be victimised by the partner they warned about. In normal language, that means that 45% of the people who have been given the information following one of the variety of requests under this law went on to be victimised and abused by that person.
One such example is Rosie Darbyshire, who was murdered with a crowbar by her partner Ben Topping. Having made an application for information under Clare’s law on 28 January, she was killed just over a week later on 7 February. She was left unrecognisable after sustaining more than 50 injuries.
Other concerns include the impact of coercive and controlling behaviour where women are unable to contact the police or where contact from the police would only serve to make matters worse. At the beginning of a relationship—I think we can all understand this, and it applies not just to women but anyone—women are often not alive to the risk of domestic abuse. Only when it is too late are they advised of their partner’s past.
Gemma Willis from Teesside, reporting to the BBC, was only advised of Clare’s law after her partner was arrested following smashing her head into a window, slashing her neck with a trowel, hitting her with hammers and threatening to kill her family. Also reporting to the BBC, Dr Sandra Walklate from the University of Liverpool said of the scheme:
“We have no real way of knowing whether it’s working or not”.
While clause 64 operates to place Clare’s law on a statutory footing, the proposed amendments are designed to safeguard against circumstances and the case studies outlined above. The amendments would mean that police should evaluate whether disclosures made under Clare’s law are having a positive impact on the safety and empowerment of victims. I am not seeking for police forces just to do a paper-shuffling exercise: “A request has come in. What will we do with this request? Does it meet the tests as set out in the law?” I am rather seeking for police forces to run some manner of risk assessment on the impact of this disclosure being made, not on the perpetrator but on the victim.
The amendments would also require police to undertake an exercise to establish the efficacy of the disclosures that have been made in the past few years, to simply have a look over how well it is working. The pressing need test, which I have already referred to, would be refined and clarified to create uniformity with future disclosures. Based on information set out, it cannot be argued that my amendments are anything less than essential for the Government, if they want to ensure that Clare’s law is as good as it could be and that the protective effect it was intended to have does not, in some cases, cause harm.
I would like to take a moment to reflect on the extraordinary campaigns, charities and local efforts, through which families, such as the Wood family, often find the strength and resilience somehow to campaign and carry on when they have suffered a devastating loss in their family. We have heard why Clare’s law is called Clare’s law: her family felt that had she been aware of her murderer’s background, she would have been able to stop the relationship earlier.
There are so many efforts in the world of looking after and helping victims of domestic abuse, both at the national and local level, where people have done the most extraordinary things. I want to put that on record, because I am very conscious of it as we work through the Bill and our non-legislative work.
We absolutely acknowledge that there is much more to be done to raise awareness of the scheme, primarily with the public, but also with the police. We want to increase the number of disclosures and ensure that the scheme is operated consistently across all police forces.
I am indeed content. I look forward to working with the Minister to ensure that the law—it bears somebody’s name and is their legacy—truly does what Clare’s family wish it to do. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Grant of secure tenancies in cases of domestic abuse
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Part 7 of the Bill is a collection of important measures, although there is perhaps not a common theme running through them other than that. The clause relates to secure tenancies and contributes towards the Government’s wider aim to support victims of domestic abuse to leave their abusive circumstances, and to ensure that they and their families have the stability and security they need and deserve.
Clause 65 does two things. First, it will ensure that victims of domestic abuse who have or had a lifetime social tenancy, and who have had to flee their current home to escape abuse, will retain the security of a lifetime tenancy in their new social home where they are granted a new tenancy by a local authority. The provisions apply to all local authorities in England and protect all lifetime social tenants in such circumstances, regardless of whether they hold a secure local authority tenancy or an assured tenancy with a private registered provider of social housing—usually a housing association.
Secondly, the clause will safeguard domestic abuse victims who hold a joint lifetime tenancy and who want to continue living in their home after the perpetrator has moved out or been removed from the property. It does this by providing that, if the local authority grants them a new sole tenancy, it must be a lifetime tenancy. The provisions apply when the tenant is a victim of domestic abuse, and they extend to situations where a member of the household—for example, a child—has suffered domestic abuse. In the year to the end of March 2019, nearly 1,500 local authority lettings were made to social tenants who cited domestic violence as the main reason they left their former social home. Although that is a small proportion of new tenants overall, the provisions would protect more than 1,000 households affected by domestic abuse.
The measures largely mirror current provisions in the Secure Tenancies (Victims of Domestic Abuse) Act 2018. That Act, which delivers on a 2017 manifesto commitment, ensures that when the mandatory fixed-term tenancy provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 are brought into force, the security of tenure of victims of domestic abuse will be protected. After listening carefully to the concerns of social housing residents, the Government announced in August 2018 that we had decided not to implement the mandatory fixed-term tenancy provisions at that time. In order to ensure that victims of domestic abuse are protected, we also announced that we would legislate to put in place similar protections for victims of domestic abuse where, as is the case now, local authorities offer fixed-term tenancies at their discretion; the clause gives effect to that commitment. The clause also amends the definition of “domestic abuse” in the 2018 Act to bring it in line with the definition in this provision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you, Mr Kyle. That has now been placed on the record, and I hope that it will satisfy everyone.
Clause 66
Power of Secretary of State to issue guidance about domestic abuse, etc
I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 66, page 49, line 36, after “64” insert
“, (Homelessness: victims of domestic abuse)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment NC16.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 41 and 42.
Government new clause 16—Homelessness: victims of domestic abuse.
New clause 13—Homelessness and domestic abuse—
“(1) Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness: England) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 177(1) and (1A) (whether it is reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation) for each instance of “violence” substitute “abuse”.
(3) After section 177(1A) insert—
“(1B) In this Act, ”abuse” means—
(a) physical or sexual abuse;
(b) violent or threatening behaviour;
(c) controlling or coercive behaviour;
(d) economic abuse (within the meaning of section 1(4) of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020);
(e) psychological, emotional or other abuse.”
(4) At the end of section 189(1) (priority need for accommodation), insert—
“(e) a person who—
(i) is homeless as a result of being subject to domestic abuse, or
(ii) resides or might reasonably be expected to reside with a person who falls within sub-paragraph (i) and is not the abuser.“
(5) In section 198 (referral of case to another local housing authority):
(a) In sub-section (2)(c) for “violence” substitute “abuse”;
(b) In sub-section (2ZA)(b) for “violence” substitute “abuse”;
(c) In sub-section (2A) for “violence (other than domestic violence)” substitute “abuse (other than domestic abuse)”;
(d) In sub-section (3) for “violence” substitute “abuse”.
(6) Article 6 of the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002, SI 2002/2051, is amended in accordance with subsection (7).
(7) In Article 6,
(a) after “reason of violence” insert “(other than domestic abuse)”;
(b) after “threats of violence” insert “(other than domestic abuse)”.”
This new clause amends Part 7 Housing Act 1996, concerning local housing authorities’ duties to homeless applicants, for England. It updates the definition of “domestic violence” to that of “domestic abuse” and removes the requirement that a person who is homeless as a result of domestic abuse must also be vulnerable in order to have a priority need.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. I am pleased today to be able to bring forward new clause 16, which will amend the Housing Act 1996 to give those who are homeless as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse priority need for accommodation secured by the local authority. The Government believe that it is vital that domestic abuse victims who are homeless or at risk of homelessness are supported to find an accommodation solution that meets their needs and reflects their individual circumstances.
In April 2018 the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 came into force. That Act, for the first time, puts prevention at the heart of the local authority response to homelessness, irrespective of whether those seeking support are a family or an individual on his or her own, and notwithstanding what has put them at risk. That means that all households that are homeless or at risk of homelessness should be provided with an offer of support from their local authority to find appropriate accommodation.
Since the 2017 Act was implemented, more than 200,000 households have had their homelessness successfully prevented or relieved. However, for those who need more support, it is right that the local authority should have a duty to house them immediately and secure accommodation for them. Under homelessness legislation, a person who is pregnant, has dependent children or is vulnerable as a result of having to leave accommodation because of domestic abuse, already has priority need for accommodation.
However, the Government are now going further. Through new clause 16, the Government will automatically give domestic abuse victims priority need for accommodation. That change will mean that consideration of vulnerability will no longer be required for domestic abuse victims to be entitled to accommodation secured by the local authority. If the authority is already satisfied that an applicant is homeless as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse, that victim and their family should not need to go through an additional layer of scrutiny to identify whether they are entitled to be accommodated by the local authority. The amendments to the Housing Act will help ensure that victims do not remain with their abuser for fear of not having a roof over their head. Alongside the announcement made in the spring Budget to extend exemption from the shared accommodation rate to victims of domestic abuse, that should support victims to move into a place of their own where they can feel safe and secure.
New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, who is not here today, would have the same effect as the Government’s new clause 16. The one difference is that the hon. Gentleman’s new clause would also extend priority need status to other persons residing in the same household as a victim of domestic abuse. I want to assure the Committee that such provision is not needed. Where an applicant has priority need, the Housing Act already requires local authorities to provide accommodation that is “suitable” for the household. There is therefore no need for each member of the household to have priority need. Amendments 40 to 42 are consequential on new clause 16.
Diolch yn fawr, Ms Buck. It is my pleasure to speak to new clause 13, which outlines the need for more stringent housing support for those fleeing domestic abuse in their current households. Colleagues may recall—I certainly will not forget it, and will be dining out on it for a while—that last week the Minister kindly coronated me as the princess of Wales. I was most flattered by the proclamation and make no apologies for speaking up for people across Wales. I plan to use my new-found royal status to ensure that the voices of Welsh victims of domestic abuse are heard and protected in the Bill.
We all know that with great royal power comes great responsibility. I will be using my voice today to focus on themes that are relevant across the board in England. It is clear that domestic abuse has no boundaries; it does not care what nation you are from or what language you speak. It is imperative that we ensure that collaborative working between both nations covered by the Bill can continue if we are to strengthen the spirit of the Union.
I am delighted to speak to new clause 13. I pay tribute to the hard work of my colleague the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark for prioritising the housing needs of survivors of domestic abuse. Sadly, he is unable to join us today, and I know that all Committee members wish him well.
The Government’s change of heart following the brilliant campaign by the all-party parliamentary group for ending homelessness is a welcome step, and these changes will undoubtedly save lives. The campaign was supported by MPs across the House, and a number of organisations in the domestic abuse sector were involved. I hope that colleagues will afford me the opportunity to list the organisations that played a vital role and that are standing together against domestic violence: Crisis, Women’s Aid, Refuge, the Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance, St Mungo’s, Surviving Economic Abuse, Shelter, Homeless Link, Depaul, Centrepoint, Hestia, Changing Lives, the Chartered Institute of Housing, The Connection at St Martin-in-the-Fields, and Latin American Women’s Aid.
It is clear that in England there is a gap in the support offered to those fleeing domestic abuse. These are very real people who are making the brave and bold decision to flee from an unsafe household. We must remember that, because it can be easy to lose sight of that as we sit in this place and discuss the technicalities of the Bill. They should be our priority, but the current system is failing them.
Research by the APPG last year showed that nearly 2,000 households fleeing domestic abuse each year in England are not provided with a safe home, because they are not considered to be in priority need for housing. Colleagues may be aware that during the APPG’s inquiry into domestic abuse and homelessness in 2017, there was clear evidence that local authorities in England were consistently failing to provide people fleeing domestic abuse with the help they need.
I was particularly concerned to read about the vulnerability test being used as a gatekeeper tool by local councils across England. I am pleased that we will now be able to reverse that trend and provide those who are fleeing domestic abuse with a real opportunity to rebuild their lives, yet the amendment still does not go far enough. Despite initial informal commitments from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to adopt the APPG’s amendment word for word, there are now some key differences in the final amendment, which could undoubtedly lead to some domestic abuse victims in England who require housing support falling through the cracks.
The APPG’s amendment would ensure that anyone in a household who applies for homelessness assistance in England due to domestic abuse would qualify for automatic priority need and have a legal right to a safe, permanent home. It is extremely disappointing that the wording of the Government’s amendment means that survivors would be required to physically make the application for homelessness assistance themselves in order to receive automatic priority need. Both the domestic abuse and homelessness sectors have expressed concern that the Government’s amendment fails to guarantee adequate protection to survivors of domestic abuse.
Colleagues will be aware that a note from the APPG, containing more information, was circulated to Committee members recently. I am aware that the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), in his capacity as co-chair of the APPG, recently wrote to Ministers and received a reply indicating that the Government do not intend to change their position on this. The Government response states:
“Allowing a member of the household to make the application could allow a perpetrator to manipulate the situation and frame themselves as the ‘new partner’, using the victim to obtain accommodation for their own gain and allow the abuse to continue.”
However, the domestic abuse sector does not agree.
The APPG’s amendment makes it clear that priority need status for settled housing can be guaranteed regardless of whether the homelessness application is made directly by someone in the household who is experiencing domestic abuse. In comparison, the Government’s amendment would not allow for other members of the household to make the application. So many examples spring to mind of where domestic abuse victims could slip through the cracks under the terms of the Government’s amendment, such as children who have had to flee an abusive situation with their mother.
Specifically, this is relevant in a context where only the mother has been abused but the children are not able to reside with their mother, perhaps due to parental addiction or the children being adults. Similarly, if a mother and her children were facing abuse by an adult child against one or more siblings who are under 16, but not against the mother, they would not be entitled to seek urgent support. I hope colleagues will forgive my listing the technicalities of those situations, but they are very real and present in all the communities that each of us represents and serves.
Allowing a member of another household to make an application for homelessness assistance on behalf of an individual who is the victim of domestic abuse is a vital safeguarding mechanism for those fleeing abuse. The strength it takes to flee an abusive household is undeniable, but it will not always be safe or suitable for victims of abuse to make an application for assistance in person. In many cases it will be too dangerous for them to leave their home until they know that they have somewhere safe to seek refuge, or there could be logistical issues, such as where a victim is receiving hospital treatment. For other groups of people considered to be in automatic priority need for settled housing in England, it is already the case that someone else in the household is able to make the application—for example, if a woman is pregnant, their partner is able to make an application on their behalf. The same principle must be extended to people who are fleeing domestic abuse.
Having spent some time discussing the provisions needed in England, I will turn my attention back to my home nation of Wales, to highlight the impact that the truly groundbreaking Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 has had. In Wales, the Labour Government have implemented legislation that puts a duty on the devolved public sector to prevent, protect and support. This has increased understanding and built referral routes to specialist support, allowing local authorities to work alongside and in conjunction with those specialists in order to ensure rapid support for those who need it. After a decade of funding cuts to local authorities across the UK, it is clear that those local authorities are under pressure, particularly when it comes to the housing crisis that we see up and down the country. I urge the Government to reconsider and allow more flexibility for domestic abuse victims who are seeking urgent housing support.
Finally, I hope that colleagues will indulge me as I use some key case studies to highlight the importance of a more accessible system for applying for homelessness assistance. At Women’s Aid, one service user said:
“After a year of fallout, I was still homeless and on my backside—it felt like I was worse off for going through ‘the system’.”
A key worker from Solace Women’s Aid—a fantastic charity based in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark—said:
“A lot of women I work with have a secure tenancy. They really don’t want to leave the secure tenancy. But then often they might not have a lot of choice… some women will prefer to…take massive risks…than leave it.”
One case highlighted by Crisis was that of Danielle, who was made homeless when her relationship ended, after her neighbour called the police following a two-day beating. Despite visible bruising and a letter from her partner admitting the abuse, she was told by the council that she needed to provide further evidence of her vulnerability, and that she was not a priority. So she ended up homeless and sofa-surfing for more than two years.
An anonymous survivor said that he had escaped a three-year abusive relationship where, on occasion, his partner had locked him in a room for five days and beaten him so severely that he was confined to a wheelchair. When he approached the council, he was refused help with finding a safe home, which left him with no option but to sofa-surf for several months. Eventually, a charity that supports victims of domestic abuse helped him to deal with the council, and he is now socially housed.
It is clear from those testimonies that we have an opportunity to change the course of people’s lives and affect their ability to regain their independence following a period of domestic abuse. It is not unreasonable to allow for a more flexible system to ensure that victims can get access to the housing support they need. That additional power would improve people’s ability to flee, and could be hugely powerful as a lifeline for those in need. The new clause is well written, with substantive detail. I ask that the people I have talked about be made a priority.
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. In the spirit of the Bill, and of the Committee, let us welcome the fact that we are making changes in the area in question. It is fantastic that new clause 16 has been tabled.
There is a sliver of disagreement between the Government and the hon. Members for Pontypridd and for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, on the role of other people in the household. We have heard a great deal—just in the Committee Room, let alone in our experiences outside it—of the manipulative nature of some perpetrators and their ability to seize an opportunity against their victim, use it for their own ends and do incredible damage to the victim. Also, the children are often victims. Victims of domestic abuse may be vulnerable and at risk of such manipulation—of being controlled by the perpetrator, whether that is a partner in an intimate relationship, as described in clauses 1 and 2, or indeed a family member. It was against that backdrop that we drafted the clauses.
Our primary concern, on the sliver of disagreement between us, is that an abusive partner could apply for new housing under the approach suggested by the hon. Lady, to the detriment of the victim and the gain and advantage of the perpetrator. Clearly no one wants that.
I take the point about the need to ensure that the system is sensitive to the needs of victims. Indeed, I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East, who has led the campaign with the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, wrote to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Member for Thornbury and Yate (Luke Hall), who responded on 10 June. In the course of the correspondence and conversations, the hon. Lady’s concerns were clearly canvassed as well. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary told my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East that there is already the flexibility in the system to take care of cases where someone has difficulty making their own application, whether that is because they are in a hospital bed or because they are in a refuge that they cannot leave.
The homelessness code of guidance covers such circumstances. Paragraphs 11.13 to 11.16 make it clear that where a face-to-face appointment does not meet the applicant’s needs, assessments can be completed on the telephone or internet, or with the assistance of a partner agency. As for the case studies that the hon. Lady raised, I very much hope that, under new clause 16, Women’s Aid and the other fantastic organisations that we all support would be able to help the victims who could not make applications face to face because of their circumstances.
The hon. Lady raised the issue of secure tenancies. Again, that is addressed in the Bill, in clause 65. Our slight disagreement, as I have said, is on the point about a perpetrator’s ability to manipulate.
We want victims to have full control and ownership of their homelessness application and the accommodation offer from the local authority. That is what new clause 16 manages to achieve.
The Minister used the term “all victims”. Does the new clause cover those victims who are working in this country but have no recourse to public funds?
We will come to debate that set of circumstances tomorrow. In terms of homeless applicants, including victims of domestic abuse, we are dealing with this within the confines of the regulations as they apply at the moment.
Amendment 40 agreed to.
I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 66, page 49, line 42, after “children” insert “;
(c) the support employers should provide to victims of domestic abuse, including through the provisions of paid leave.”
This amendment would ensure that employers are provided with guidance about the support they should provide to victims of domestic abuse, including provision of paid leave.
I did not do this last week, but I just want to say a massive thank you to the people in the Public Bill Office. The amount of work that has gone into these amendments might be clear from the number of times that I stand on my feet. It is important to thank the people who sit in the background doing all that work, having an argy-bargy with all of us as we try to table amendments. They are a godsend, so I want to say a massive thank you to them.
This amendment goes back to the Committee’s conversations last week about workplaces. In part, the Government’s announcement of a review of domestic abuse in the workplace potentially covers what this amendment seeks to do. It did not exist when I tabled the amendment.
This amendment is about workplace guidance, which would ensure not only that a victim is supported, but that secondary benefits are offered to other employees, who would be indirectly affected by the abuse happening at their workplace. Without guidance, we expect employers just to know what to do. In many cases, which I spoke of last week, they have considered terminating employment in order to protect their business and their employees, removing the only lifeline that a victim might have. Often, when we try to change things in the workplace—certainly in relation to an equalities framework—the argument we get back is, “This will be too onerous on big and small business.” Over the past couple of years, however, I have seen that businesses are truly interested in trying to do something about this.
I was called to one of those fancy things where lots of businesses sit around a table in a fancy building. It was so fancy that I saw Anna Wintour from Vogue in the lift—she was exactly as Members might imagine. Businesses from all over the country came to listen to me talk about what they might be able to do to help domestic violence victims in their workplaces. Various companies, such as Lloyds and Vodafone, have offered two weeks’ full pay to victims of domestic abuse.
Studies by those organisations—EY, for example, has done a specific study, such is the nature of its business—show that although that right was appreciated and used when needed, no employee had taken the full two weeks off as part of their paid employment. Those organisations are trying to be proactive. We have to make sure that that is available for everybody.
During my work on sexual harassment at work, I was often on the phone to fancy people in Los Angeles who ran the Time’s Up campaign. I constantly used to say, “We mustn’t forget about Brenda in Asda. We mustn’t forget that the person we are talking about is actually a woman called Brenda in Asda.” The same applies to the amendment, which seeks an element of paid leave as well as guidance for employers who want to do more than simply step forward and be the goodies and go to fancy lobby lunches to talk about these issues. We have to truly seek to change that.
The Government have suggested that they are going to hold a consultation and review what exactly that will mean. I have absolutely no doubt about what the findings will be. They will be the same as those reached over a number of years by different groups, including the all-party parliamentary group on domestic violence and abuse, working alongside the Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse and the TUC. An unusual group of people have been working on this for a while. There are rabble-rousing union stewards working alongside some of the poshest organisations I have ever worked with. Those meetings are always a delight. We have taken evidence from New Zealand, for example, where that right already applies.
I will not press the amendment to a vote. It was tabled before the Government announced any sort of action in this area. It is merely a probing amendment, given that businesses have told us that they would not find onerous.
The amendment brings us to the role that employers can and should play in supporting employees who are victims of domestic abuse. The Government expect all employers to show compassion when faced with cases of domestic abuse. It is important that the Government help employers to support victims. We recognise the excellent work of organisations that provide guidance to help employers to do more. The Employers’ Initiative on Domestic Abuse, for example, does great work and has increased the services that it can provide employers during covid-19, because it recognised its ability to send messages through its network of support. We very much support and applaud that sort of work.
Public Health England, in partnership with Business in the Community, which is a business-led membership organisation, provides an online domestic abuse toolkit, including advice on developing a workplace policy and guidance on practical workplace support. Although not specifically designated for victims of domestic abuse, some existing employment rights can help to support victims who face particular circumstances. For example, statutory sick pay may be available where the employee is suffering from physical injury or psychological harm. The right to request flexible working may also help in circumstances where working patterns or locations need to change. We committed in our manifesto to taking that further and consulting on making flexible working the default. In addition to the statutory right, many employers offer compassionate leave or special leave to their employees to enable them to take time to deal with a wide range of circumstances. That leave is agreed between the employer and the employee, either as a contractual entitlement or on a discretionary basis.
We accept, however, that that framework of rights may not work for every circumstance faced by victims of domestic abuse. There may be more that the Government can do to help employers better support those who are experiencing abuse. That is why the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy last week launched a review of support in the workplace for victims of domestic abuse. I always like to give the end date of such consultations so that colleagues are nudged into responding if at all possible: the end date is 9 September 2020. I ask colleagues to please submit their views and those of their networks of contacts, charities and businesses.
The review invites contributions from stakeholders, covering the practical circumstances that arise in relation to domestic abuse and work, best practice by employers, and where there is scope for the Government to do more to help employers protect victims of domestic abuse. We will also host events to build the evidence base further, before publishing the findings and an action plan by the end of the year. Our view is that the Government review provides the right framework for identifying how the Government can best help employers to support victims of domestic abuse. It creates a firm basis on which to make progress.
I am pleased that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has indicated that this is a probing amendment, so I invite her to withdraw it.
I thank the Minister. If anyone in this room were faced with an employee—and I have been in this situation a number of times—going through a court case, I cannot imagine that anybody, no matter whether they were working here or elsewhere, would expect that person not to be paid or even to be paid statutory sick pay for that period. However, that is the reality for the vast majority of people. Victims of domestic abuse need access to a specific sort of leave. That would change the culture in an organisation, and including information about it in the big pack that people receive on their first day would be a real sign that they could speak to their boss about it.
Asking for sick leave or compassionate leave because you have been raped is completely different from doing so because your mother has died. It is much easier for someone to ask their boss for leave because a relative has died than to do so because they might have been raped the night before. If someone’s house was broken into, they would ring their boss in the morning and say, “My house has been broken into. I can’t come in today because the police are coming.” That is a different conversation from, “My husband beat me up last night. I’m sorry I can’t come in, but the police are coming over.” It is not the same. We need to change the culture from the top down, to make sure there is a marker that shows people that if they have to go to court—which can take weeks and weeks—and if they need to flee, something can be done.
The Minister mentioned different guidance. The TUC says that its guidance on domestic abuse is the most downloaded piece of guidance ever from its website. Let us hope that culture is changing and that the review mentioned by the Minister shows real courage on what needs to change in the workplace. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I thank the hon. Lady for her powerful speech and for setting out the case for the amendment.
We know that domestic abuse in teenage relationships has the potential to shape adult lives. We know that it can be severe and can have many consequences outside the two people in the relationship. We are clear that the impact of domestic abuse on young people, including those in abusive relationships, exists and that we need to ensure that agencies are aware of it and of how to identify and respond to it.
The Bill’s definition states that behaviour is domestic abuse if parties are aged 16 or over. I note that that was supported by the Joint Committee and, indeed, by the evidence we heard from Lucy Hadley of Women’s Aid and Andrea Simon of the End Violence against Women Coalition at the evidence session of this Bill Committee. We are of the view that having a minimum age of 16 years does not deny that younger children are not impacted or affected by domestic abuse, including in their own relationships.
I have no doubt that the amendment is well intentioned. However, having established that minimum age as the threshold in the definition of domestic abuse, it follows that any statutory guidance issued under clause 66 of the Bill, which relies on the definition in clause 1, cannot and should not as a matter of law, address abuse between people who are aged under 16.
That is not to say that the guidance issued under clause 66, which addresses abuse between older teenagers, cannot have wider application. There are other sources of guidance for younger age groups. We intend to publish a draft of the guidance ahead of Report and, in preparing that draft, we have worked with the children’s sector, among others, to include the impacts of abuse in older teenage relationships within the guidance. Clearly, we will continue to work with the children’s sector to ensure that the guidance is as effective, thorough and accessible as it can be before it is formally issued ahead of the provisions in clauses 1 and 2 coming into force.
As the Minister knows, I have concerns about this—I spoke to her when in listening mode. At the evidence session two weeks ago, for me the powerful evidence was from the Local Government Association spokesperson, the leader of Blackpool Council, whom I questioned specifically. He said that he felt that under-16s were dealt with under the Children Act. Does my hon. Friend agree that there are other ways of dealing with the matter?
I thank my hon. Friend for her contributions, her canvassing of views sympathetic to the situations faced by teenagers under 16, and her work on that. She is right to point out the evidence of Councillor Simon Blackburn. He is an experienced councillor and also, in a previous life, was an experienced social worker. He contributes on behalf of the Local Government Association in all sorts of forums on which he and I sit—not just on domestic abuse, but on other areas of vulnerability.
I appreciate that it sounds rather lawyerly to focus on the age range, but we are careful not to tamper inadvertently, albeit with good intentions, with the strong safeguarding mechanisms in the Children Act. That is why we are not able to accept the amendment to the guidance, given that the guidance is based on the definition in clauses 1 and 2. However, other forms of information are available and as of September relationships education will be introduced for all primary pupils, and relationships and sex education will be introduced for all secondary school pupils. That education, particularly for primary schools, will cover the characteristics of healthy relationships, and will help children to model the behaviours with knowledge and understanding, and cover what healthy relationships look like. Of course, as children grow up and mature, the education will grow and develop alongside them, to help them as they are setting out on those new relationships.
In addition, the important inter-agency safeguarding and welfare document produced by the Department for Education called “Working together to safeguard children” sets out what professionals and organisations need to do to safeguard children, including those who may be vulnerable to abuse or exploitation from outside their families. It sets out various scenarios, including whether wider environmental factors are present in a child’s life and are a threat to their safety and/or welfare.
Finally, of course, the courts and other agencies should also take into account relevant youth justice guidelines when responding to cases of teenage relationship abuse, avoiding the unnecessary criminalisation of young people, and helping to identify appropriate interventions to address behaviours that might constitute or lead to abuse. As I have said, I appreciate the intentions underlying the amendment, but I return to the point that the age limit was on careful reflection set at 16 in the definition, and so the statutory guidance must flow from that.
Having heard the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I agree that consultation is necessary, but I see that as making the point. Consultation is necessary and we need the data to be able to figure out how much of it is due to borderline personality problems and social background, and how much of it is misogyny. We can only do that by having the police gather the data.
Where misogyny has been identified as a hate crime by police forces, it has helped the way that they address the causes and consequences of violence against women and girls. The proposal in this amendment is not theoretical. Police forces around the country are already doing this, showing the positive impact it can have. In 2016, Nottinghamshire police were the first. Their proposals have gone some way to allowing the Nottinghamshire authorities to see exactly where there are problems and how to deal with them. For four years, women and girls there have been able to report crimes that they regard as hate crimes and misogynistic.
This amendment has, as I said, wide support from women’s groups. Let us not wait for the Law Commission before we start working on it. If misogyny is the soil in which domestic abuse flourishes, we have the opportunity with this Bill to root it out, not just to pick up the pieces. We have to support victims and survivors, and we have to encourage perpetrators away from the crime. But if we can identify the different causes of abuse, we can tackle the cause and begin to reduce and eliminate domestic abuse.
The Government are clear that all hate crime is completely unacceptable and has no place in British society. That is why we have tasked the Law Commission to review current hate crime legislation. By way of background, I should say that the Law Commission was asked to review both the adequacy and parity of protection offered by the law relating to hate crime and to make recommendations for its reform.
The review began in March last year, since when the Law Commission has tried to meet as many people as possible who have an interest in this area of law; it has organised events across England and Wales to gather views. Specifically, the Law Commission has been tasked with considering the current range of offences and aggravating factors in sentencing, and with making recommendations on the most appropriate models to ensure that the criminal law provides consistent and effective protection from conduct motivated by hatred towards protected groups or characteristics. The review will also take account of the existing range of protected characteristics, identify any gaps in the scope of the protection currently offered under the law, and make recommendations to promote a consistent approach.
The Law Commission aims to publish its consultation, as the hon. Lady said, as soon as it can, and I again encourage all hon. Members to respond to it. Given that this work by the Law Commission is under way, we do not believe that the time is right for specific guidance to be issued on this matter. Our preference is to await the outcome of the Law Commission’s review before deciding what reforms or other measures, including guidance, are necessary. However, I point out that in clause 66(3) we do put the gendered nature of this crime in the Bill. It states:
“Any guidance issued under this section must, so far as relevant, take account of the fact that the majority of victims of domestic abuse in England and Wales are female.”
And of course the guidance itself will reflect that.
The hon. Lady raised the Istanbul convention. We are making good progress on our path towards ratification. We publish an annual report on progress, with the last one published in October 2019. Provisions in the Bill and other legislation before the Northern Ireland Assembly will ensure that UK law is compliant with the requirements of the convention in relation to extraterritorial jurisdiction and psychological violence, so we are on our way. I very much hope that on that basis the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Following the Minister’s comments, there is just one reservation remaining. If misogyny is a hate crime, we can gather the data. Does the Minister accept or appreciate that perhaps we could start doing that before the Law Commission has reported?
The Law Commission, in all its reviews, is incredibly thorough and of course independent. How long it takes is, I have to say as a Minister, sometimes a little bit frustrating, but that is because it is so thorough, so I cannot criticise the commission for that. I would prefer the commission to do its work so that we have a consistent body of evidence that I hope will enable the Government to draw conclusions as to the adequacy of the existing arrangements, and take steps from there.
I wonder by which instrument the hon. Member for Edinburgh West and I might seek to ask the Government whether they will be implementing any recommendations from the Law Commission.
I confess that I had not given thought to that particular detail. Far be it from me to suggest to ingenious Back Benchers how they can hold the Government to account. As I have said, we have the Law Commission review under way, and when the commission has reported, we will, of course, in due course publish our response to that review.
Having heard the Minister’s comments, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 66, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Power of Secretary of State to make consequential amendments
Amendment made: 41, in clause 67, page 50, line 27, after “64” insert “, (Homelessness: victims of domestic abuse)”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment NC16.
Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Understandably, questions have been asked about the territorial extent of the Bill, so I think it right to explain it. This is a standard clause setting out the territorial extent of the provisions in the Bill, the majority of which apply to England and Wales, or to England only. Following discussions with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, the Bill also includes some limited provisions that apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Part 6 of the Bill extends the extraterritorial reach of the criminal courts in each of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, to cover further violent and sexual offences. The provisions are a necessary precursor to enable the United Kingdom as a whole to ratify the Istanbul convention, as they will ensure that the law in each part of the UK meets the requirements of article 44.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 71, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 73
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I would like to speak to this, as I have a sense of mischief today. The clause provides for the short title of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 73 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 15
Consequential amendments of the Sentencing Code
‘(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80 (order for conditional discharge), in subsection (3), at the end insert—
“(f) section36(6) (breach of domestic abuse protection order).”
(3) In Chapter 6 of Part 11 (other behaviour orders), before section 379 (but after the heading “Other orders”) insert—
“378A Domestic abuse protection orders
(none) See Part 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020 (and in particular section 28(3) of that Act) for the power of a court to make a domestic abuse protection order when dealing with an offender for an offence.”” .—(Alex Chalk.)
This New Clause makes two consequential amendments to the Sentencing Code as a result of Part 3 of the Bill. The first adds a reference to clause 36(6) to the list of cases where an order for conditional discharge is not available. The second inserts a signpost to Part 3 of the Bill into Part 11 of the Sentencing Code, which deals with behaviour orders.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 16
Homelessness: victims of domestic abuse
‘(1) Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 (homelessness: England) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 177 (whether it is reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “domestic violence or other violence” substitute “violence or domestic abuse”;
(b) for subsection (1A) substitute—
“(1A) For this purpose—
(a) “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
(b) “violence” means—
(i) violence from another person; or
(ii) threats of violence from another person which are likely to be carried out.”
(3) Omit section 178 (meaning of associated person).
(4) In section 179 (duty of local housing authority in England to provide advisory services), in subsection (5)—
(a) for the definition of “domestic abuse” substitute—
““domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;”;
(b) omit the definition of “financial abuse”.
(5) In section 189 (priority need for accommodation)—
(a) in subsection (1), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(e) a person who is homeless as a result of that person being a victim of domestic abuse.”;
(b) after subsection (4) insert—
“(5) In this section “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”
(6) In section 198 (referral of case to another local housing authority)—
(a) in subsection (2), in paragraph (c), for “domestic violence” substitute “domestic abuse”;
(b) in subsection (2ZA), in paragraph (b), for “domestic violence” substitute “domestic abuse”;
(c) in subsection (2A), in paragraph (a), for “domestic violence” substitute “violence that is domestic abuse”;
(d) for subsection (3) substitute—
“(3) For the purposes of subsections (2), (2ZA) and (2A)—
(a) “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
(b) “violence” means—
(i) violence from another person; or
(ii) threats of violence from another person which are likely to be carried out.”
(7) In section 218 (index of defined expressions: Part 7), in the table, omit the entry relating to section 178.
(8) In article 6 of the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 (S.I. 2002/2051) (vulnerability: fleeing violence or threats of violence)—
(a) the existing text becomes paragraph (1);
(b) after that paragraph insert—
“(2) For the purposes of this article—
(a) “violence” does not include violence that is domestic abuse;
(b) “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”
(9) In consequence of the repeal made by subsection (3), omit the following provisions—
(a) in Schedule 8 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004, paragraph 61;
(b) in Schedule 3 to the Adoption and Children Act 2002, paragraphs 89 to 92.” .—(Victoria Atkins.)
This New Clause makes two key changes to Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 in relation to homelessness in England. First, it amends section 189 to give homeless victims of domestic abuse priority need for accommodation. Second, it amends Part 7 to change references to “domestic violence” to references to “domestic abuse” within the meaning of clause 1 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
No defence for consent to death
‘(1) If a person (“A”) wounds, assaults or asphyxiates another person (“B”) to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act causing death, it is not a defence to a prosecution that B consented to the infliction of injury.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the death occurred in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter.”—(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause would prevent consent of the victim from being used as a defence to a prosecution in domestic homicides.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Diolch, Ms Buck. I will be brief. I do not want to repeat the powerful words of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, but it is important to make the point that previous sexual behaviour is not, and should never be, taken as evidence of consent to a particular encounter. Neither should experience of or interest in any particular act be used to suggest that it is possible for someone to consent to their own murder, as has been the case in the past.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hove said that the media are complicit in sexualising and sensationalising horrific acts of violence and causing huge further trauma to the families of victims. Those victims—mainly women—and their families need anonymity.
A BBC study in 2019 found that more than a third of UK women under the age of 40 had experienced unwanted slapping, choking or gagging during consensual sex. Of the women who experienced those acts, 20% said they had been left upset or frightened. It is vital that women’s voices should no longer be silenced.
It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. I thank colleagues for those helpful and powerful contributions. I want to begin my remarks by echoing a point that was made: we should not be shy in this place about making observations that are sometimes uncomfortable.
It seems to me a fact that there is a worrying and increasing normalisation of acts that are not just degrading but dangerous. Because we live in a liberal, open, tolerant society we of course do not want to step into the bedroom. We do not want to intrude into people’s private affairs, but when what they do leads to someone’s death we should not have any compunction about taking the steps necessary, first to ensure that people are safe, secondly to ensure that justice is done, and thirdly to send a message: if someone wants to behave in that way, when the consequences come to pass, on their head be it.
I am grateful to the Opposition Front-Bench spokespersons for making the case for the new clauses. Before addressing those in detail, I pay tribute, as others have, to my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest, who is the constituency MP of Natalie Connolly and her family, and to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham. They have run a formidable campaign and have engaged closely and constructively with the Government. I pay tribute to them for that.
The Minister is making a good point. As he knows, the opportunity to amend legislation does not come up often, and we often do not get the chance to amend the perfect piece of legislation. Using all his wit, experience and erudition, he is able to find the failings in the new clause, but a principle is at stake. If he is saying that this is not the ideal piece of legislation or method to achieve those aims, will he spend a bit of time telling us what is, whether he will back it and whether he will make it happen swiftly?
I invite the hon. Gentleman to listen carefully to what I say in due course, and I hope that he will not be unhappy—
Disappointed—thank you. Do you want to make the speech?
The concern with the new clauses, among other things, is that they do not necessarily replicate the dictum in Brown. To those who are not familiar with this, a case more than 20 years ago, Crown v. Brown, laid down some case law—a point adverted to by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that we recognise needs to be clarified. The point that I will develop in due course, which I think will find favour with the hon. Member for Hove, is that that is precisely what we intend to do. The concern is that these new clauses, for the reasons I have indicated—I will not go into any detail on new clause 5, because it is a similar point that I would seek to make—limit the application of the principles in Brown to offences that occur in a domestic abuse situation. I heard the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley say sotto voce, “Isn’t a Tinder date an intimate personal relationship?”. The reality is—I speak as someone who has defended as well as prosecuted—that the job of a defence advocate is to find whatever wiggle room there is in the law. Our job here is to close that down.
As I have indicated, the prosecution would have to show also that this activity was either not consensual, or was consensual and also amounted to domestic abuse. Again, defence counsel will be seeking to ask, “Is this really domestic abuse in circumstances where it is consensual?”. You can immediately see the arguments that would be made in court. The key is for us to close that down and give practitioners—but, more importantly, people—absolute clarity about what is and what is not acceptable. As I said at the outset, we need to ensure that any change made is clear, and does not inadvertently create loopholes or uncertainties in the law.
I invite the hon. Member for Hove to accept that despite the difficulties, we have been anxiously and actively considering for some considerable time how we can best ensure greater clarity in the law. We aim to set out the Government’s approach in time for Report.
On behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, I thank the Minister for his comments and the considered way he made them. We particularly thank him for the timeframe he outlined. Making a statement before Report is incredibly important; we need to move swiftly. The Minister knows better than anyone that if the same thing happened to one other person in the coming weeks, it would be an absolute travesty, so we need to make sure that these loopholes are dealt with quickly.
I hear what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I leave it where it stands. I understand and I agree. I turn to new clauses 6 and 7. Those who have argued passionately in respect of the so-called rough sex defence will acknowledge that perhaps this point is contingent on that. There are also real practical difficulties with new clauses 6 and 7. Let me develop them briefly.
New clause 6 requires the personal consent of the personal Director of Public Prosecutions where a charge or plea less than murder, for example manslaughter, is applied or accepted in cases of domestic homicide. That sounds unobjectionable. It would be perfectly sensible if the DPP was readily able or had the capacity to give that kind of personal consent. However, there are practical problems with it. Let me set out the context. A statutory requirement of this nature is, and should be, extremely rare. It should only be imposed where a prosecution touches on sensitive issues of public policy, not simply sensitive issues, which are legion in the criminal justice system. The only recent example of this consent function applies to offences under the Bribery Act 2010, and last year, a Select Committee undertaking post-legislative review of the 2010 Act recommended that the requirement for personal DPP consent be reconsidered.
We have to acknowledge that the Crown Prosecution Service handles a high volume of serious and complex casework nationwide, and it is important that prosecutors have the confidence to take their own legal decisions. Introducing requirements for personal DPP consent could serve to undermine or frustrate this approach. It would also, I am bound to say, potentially sit uneasily alongside other very difficult decisions that prosecutors have to make. Suppose, for example, in the context of a terrorist prosecution, that because of the way the evidence emerged, or because of new lines of enquiry, a decision was made to take the defendant off the indictment in respect of a bomb plot, but the prosecution said, “We are going to continue to prosecute him in respect of possession of materials that might be of assistance to a person planning an act of terrorism.” These are immensely difficult and sensitive decisions. However, there is neither the capacity nor the wherewithal for the DPP to make those personal decisions all the time.
It is sad to note that there is a high volume of cases involving domestic homicide, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley well understands. It means that charging decisions need to be made urgently, and sometimes at a speed, where no personal DPP involvement is possible.
These considerations apply equally to cases in which a lesser plea may be accepted. If pleas are offered in court, prosecutors are required to make a decision in an incredibly short period of time after speaking with the victim’s family, and the DPP could not be involved in that level of decision making. I invite the Committee to consider the circumstances, supposing it is in court: because of the way that the evidence has come out, there is the consideration of whether a lesser plea should be accepted. The hon. Lady pointed out that this does not always happen, but if the family have been properly consulted, it is no kindness to that family to say, ‘Do you know what? We’re not going to make a decision on this, which would let you begin to heal and put this behind you. We’re going to put this off for two or three weeks while the DPP has to consider it.’ Court proceedings will be suspended awkwardly, and the poor family will be left hanging.
Forgive me for stating the obvious, but it bears emphasising that the real remedy is for good prosecutors––the overwhelming majority are good and do their duty with diligence, conspicuous ability and conscientiousness– –to liaise with the family in a compassionate and inclusive way. I understand the desire for additional scrutiny in such significant and sensitive cases, but I assure the Committee that the Crown Prosecution Service already has systems in place to check and challenge decision making in these circumstances. Internal CPS policies require that chief crown prosecutors are notified of any and all homicide cases. It is likely as well that domestic homicides would be subject to a case management panel with a lead lawyer and either the deputy chief crown prosecutor or the chief crown prosecutor, so there is senior oversight.
The point that I really want to underscore is that because cases of domestic homicide inevitably have a lasting and dreadful impact on victims’ families, people deserve support and compassion, particularly as criminal proceedings can be upsetting and difficult to follow. Procedures are in place to ensure that is given. Where there is an allegation of murder, the police very often appoint a family liaison officer as a matter of course to assist with the process. I speak as someone who has prosecuted several murder cases. The role that liaison officers play is absolutely fantastic. Otherwise, the poor family turn up in court with no idea what an indictment is, wondering “What on earth is this examination-in-chief stuff? What is this plea and trial preparation hearing?”. The liaison officer role is invaluable, and needs to be supported by prosecutors speaking to family members, as they increasingly do.
Like the hon. Gentleman, I have been involved in a number of murder cases, and he is right that family liaison officers are worth their weight in gold. Does he think that there needs to be a more formalised link between the prosecutor and the family liaison officer—a referral pathway, or standard of practice that had to be met in each case? It could help us work towards having a less patchy approach if we had a formalised target.
There are, in fact, formal arrangements in both spheres. Family liaison officers have to operate within certain guidance, and in my experience, by and large, they do so extremely well. At the risk of stating the obvious, it comes down to the calibre, kindness and empathy of the individual. In my experience, they are very good at their job and play an invaluable role.
As for the prosecution, as little as 20 years ago, there used to be almost a benign disdain for witnesses. Prosecutors simply did not engage with them. That does not happen now; they meet witnesses and family members before the trial begins. Very often, they will speak to them at the end of the day to explain what has happened. The relationship between prosecutors and family liaison officers tends to dovetail extremely effectively. I do not think that there is a need for further guidance. The key is to ensure that both parts of the criminal justice system—the police and the prosecution—do their job. In my experience, people are increasingly extremely conscientious in that regard. That is important, because people’s sense of whether they have got justice will often depend on the conversations they have at the end of the day, when the matter has been explained to them.
I have never heard a journalist wanting the rule that prevents reporting from naming victims of sexual violence overturned. Has the Minister?
What I can say, from my experience in court, is that it is not unusual for the press to seek to overturn reporting restrictions where they are imposed at the discretion of the court, so although the hon. Gentleman may be right that in fact there is not a particular drumbeat in respect of sexual offences, I hope that the Committee will not be gulled into thinking that the press do not very often seek to overturn reporting restrictions that are imposed. The arguments that are made are, “Why should we be having secret justice?”, and so on. Those arguments are very often dispatched by the court; they are considered not to be valid, and then they are sometimes taken on appeal and so on. The only point that I am seeking to make is that we must be careful in this area and strike a balance, so that we do not find ourselves bringing the law into disrepute.
As a journalist and as someone who has taught law for journalists, I point out that although we might challenge discretionary interdicts and super-interdicts—I cannot remember what they are called in England—the principle of defending the anonymity of victims of sexual assault, sexual crimes, is never challenged in court. The only challenge is to discretionary non-identification where a public interest case can be made for that being overthrown. I find it difficult to believe that the press would actually want victims of domestic abuse named in the papers, unless there was some outlandish public interest.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that of course it is not open to a journalist to seek to displace the reporting restrictions that have been imposed by force of statute. I was seeking to make the point, which I do not think she disagrees with, that it is not uncommon for the press to suggest that a court, in imposing reporting restrictions in an individual case, has overreached itself, gone beyond the bounds, and misapplied the balance. Sometimes, by the way, those applications are upheld at first instance or on appeal.
There is a judgment to make, and we have to recognise that there is a particular public interest, when the allegation is of sexual violence, in taking the step of exceptional interference. That justification exists in relation to sexual offences. However, we have to take great care before extending it further, not least because—of course, domestic violence and domestic abuse are incredibly serious, for all the reasons that we have expressed—women, and it is usually women, can be victims of all sorts of other offences. Then it becomes a question of how far we go—where do we draw the line? That is something that requires careful thought.
I apologise to members of the Committee for taking so long to explain the Government’s position on the new clauses. As I have sought to explain, we fully understand the anguish and hurt felt by the family of Natalie Connolly and many others, and, as lawmakers, we will and should do what we can to minimise such anguish on the part of bereaved families in the future. For the reasons that I have set out, the Government cannot support a number of the new clauses, but as I have indicated before, we expect to set out the Government’s approach in respect of the rough sex issue in time for Report. In those circumstances, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw the new clause.
I will withdraw the new clause. I am very pleased to hear that there is an intention to deal with the matter on Report, and I speak entirely for the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham in that regard. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
May I begin by thanking the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for a characteristically forceful argument? At the start, I acknowledge this: non-fatal strangulation is a wicked crime and deeply unpleasant. It is unpleasant for the reasons the hon. Lady set out: it is calculated to degrade and to terrify, and in the course of doing so to ensure that the victim has that profound sense that this could be it—their time could be up. That is why it is such a cruel, offensive and unpleasant crime. I also say by way of preliminary remarks that I am aware of the Centre for Women’s Justice campaign for this new offence of non-fatal strangulation. I wish to put on record my gratitude for their written evidence to the Committee.
I understand the concerns that have prompted the new clauses and I will address them directly. Before doing so, I want to say a little about the existing provisions in the law. In fairness, the hon. Lady did refer to them but there are a couple of points that would assist the Committee if they were teased out a little further.
Several offences can already cover non-fatal strangulation and they range in seriousness from common assault, also known as battery—my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford, a magistrate, will know that well—to attempted murder. Within that spectrum, there remain a number of other offences referred to by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. Strangulation could also be part of a pattern of behaviour amounting to an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour; I shall come back to that in a moment. There is also assault occasioning actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm, or section 20 assault, and grievous bodily harm with intent, or section 18 assault.
I want to step back for a moment to consider a non-domestic context, just to make some of this clear. For the sake of argument, suppose there is a queue outside a nightclub and somebody wishes to queue barge. He steps in and decides to grab the victim by the throat, throttle them and push them up against the wall. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley indicated, if that left no marks but the complainant was prepared to make a complaint to the police in the normal way, it is likely that would be charged as a battery. She is right that the charge would have to be laid within six months. It would be heard before the magistrates court—again, she is absolutely right—and would carry a custodial penalty. Even if no mark is left, that assault—it could be a punch on the nose but it could also be strangulation—would be covered in that way.
It is worth emphasising that, if that throttling or that strangulation was carried out in a more extreme way such as to leave marks, it is likely that would cross the threshold of harm which is more than merely transient or trifling. That might sound like rather archaic language, but that is the threshold for ABH. Why is that important? Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is not limited to being tried in the magistrates court; it can be tried on indictment in front of judge and jury and there the sentencing power is a full five years’ custody.
The reason I mention that is because if there is one advantage that has come from these things, it means people are much better able now to gather evidence than they were in the past. It used to be the case that you had to go down to the police station, the force medical examiner had to photograph you and so on. Now, people can get those photographs at the time. The mere fact that two, three, four or five hours later those marks may have gone matters not a jot. If the individual can show that the assault occasioned actual bodily harm, that can lead to trial on indictment and a very serious penalty.
To continue with my example of what happens in the nightclub queue, if the throttling went further and it led to some of the dreadful injuries the hon. Lady referred to—a fractured larynx, tinnitus, neurological injury leading to droop or PTSD—although it is a matter for the independent prosecutor, it is likely that would be charged as grievous bodily harm. If it is grievous bodily harm with intent, because all the surrounding circumstances indicated that that was intended given the harm done, the maximum penalty for that is life imprisonment, and that is an indictable-only matter.
That is the law as it exists at present, and the same legal principles apply in a domestic context as apply in the non-intimate context of a fight in a pub queue. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point: “Well, that’s all terribly interesting, but what about elsewhere in the world?” It is important, while we are mindful of our peers, particularly those in the common law jurisdictions, that we got ahead of the game to a considerable extent with section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. It is worth taking a moment to consider what that ground-breaking piece of legislation introduced—the coercive control stuff.
We are guilty in this place of sometimes saying, “Right, we’ve passed this. Move on. What’s the next exciting and shiny piece of legislation we can pass?” Section 76 is of enormous import in terms of providing prosecutors—I will come to the hon. Lady’s point in due course about whether prosecutors are doing the right thing—with the tools that they need to protect victims. Section 76 says that if the defendant
“repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another…that is controlling or coercive”,
at a time when the perpetrator and the victim are personally connected, and the behaviour has a serious effect on the victim and the defendant
“knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect”
on the victim, that is a criminal offence, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.
I wish to dwell on that for a moment, because behaviour is said to have a serious effect within the meaning of that section. It can be proved in two ways. First, if it causes the victim to fear on at least two occasions that violence will be used, or it causes the victim serious alarm or distress, which has a substantial adverse effect on their day-to-day activities. I mention that point because if, as the hon. Lady says, and I am absolutely prepared to accept it, more often than not in an intimate context this is part of a pattern of behaviour—all too often an escalating pattern of behaviour—the tools exist, should the prosecuting authorities seek to use them, to seek the conviction, punishment and disgrace of the perpetrator.
The question then arises of whether police and prosecutors are using the levers available to them. That is a really important point, and it is the central message that I take from the hon. Lady’s speech, which was effectively saying: “I recognise that there are a whole load of statutory provisions here, but why don’t we create a new statutory provision to really focus minds and ensure that this appalling behaviour is prosecuted?” I understand that argument, but we have to ensure that we do not, in that sensible endeavour, risk confusion in the law.
I will say one final thing about the current state of play within the law. There is, as the hon. Lady indicated, a specific offence under section 21 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which makes it an offence to
“attempt to choke, suffocate, or strangle any other person, or…to choke, suffocate, or strangle”
a person in an attempt to render that person
“insensible, unconscious, or incapable of resistance”
with intent to commit an indictable offence. Typically, that is strangling someone in order to rob them, to steal or whatever it may be. I am aware that there can be some evidential difficulties in prosecuting a section 21 offence, particularly if there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, of injuries, such as reddening and minor bruising to the skin. However, that sits in a wider context of the legislation that exists. There are other options for prosecutors to fill the gap.
There is a risk too, I respectfully suggest, that creating a new offence could limit the circumstances covered, and create additional evidential burdens when compared with existing offences. In other words, we would potentially have a situation where we created a new offence, and prosecutors said, “Hang on—this look a bit like strangulation to me, so we need to look at this new offence. Do we have all the mental elements—the mens rea and the actus reus of the offence—and can we make them out? If not, we shouldn’t charge,” instead of saying, “Hang on—there are a whole load of offences that we could properly charge: common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and grievous bodily harm with intent. They might have existed for 150 years, but they do the job.”
The key issue, going back to the point that the hon. Lady raised, is whether police and prosecutors are recognising this as a serious matter, and I will come on to that briefly in a moment. Before I do, though, I wish to say something on the clause as drafted. It is always worth going back to the text. New clause 8 says:
“A person (A) commits an offence if that person unlawfully strangles, suffocates or asphyxiates another person (B), where the strangulation, suffocation or asphyxiation does not result in B’s death.”
Sometimes what is important is what is not said, as opposed to what is said. That on its own, if it suddenly came into law, would be deficient, because it says nothing about whether the offence is triable either way, is indictable only or is summary only. It does not say what the sentence would be. It would be sitting there in splendid isolation. That is not a criticism, but as it is presently drafted, that would be a problem. As I say, that is not a criticism, it is just an observation that we certainly could never pass it in its current form.
I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the hon. Member for Pontypridd for speaking to the new clauses.
We agree with the underlying objective behind new clause 12. It is of course vital to have the right systems and processes in place to identify and manage serial perpetrators of domestic abuse, and it is unacceptable that a domestic abuse perpetrator—particularly a known convicted offender—should be able to go on to abuse further victims. We therefore recognise the need for robust management of those dangerous offenders. However, we consider that the outcome can be achieved more effectively and, importantly, more safely through other means. As for new clause 49, we consider that existing legislation already provides for the management of the serial domestic abuse and stalking offenders we are concerned about.
Deputy Chief Constable Louisa Rolfe, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on domestic abuse, was clear in her oral evidence to the previous Public Bill Committee in October that better use of established police systems is the best way to grip dangerous individuals. She referred to the Bichard inquiry following the tragic deaths in Soham of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, which recommended that information about dangerous perpetrators should not be dispersed over multiple different systems. Her testimony was persuasive, and highlighted the fact that a new, separate register would introduce
“unnecessary complexity cost and, most importantly, risk.”—[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2010; c. 27, Q48.]
Furthermore, several witnesses at an oral evidence sitting of this Committee also questioned whether the creation of a new bespoke register was the right way forward. Suzanne Jacob made reference to the recommendations of the Bichard enquiry and Ellie Butt pointed to the vital importance of multi-agency working to manage the risk posed by perpetrators. In addition, Dame Vera Baird advised:
“It is probably better to think in terms of an institution that is already present…than it is to invent another separate way of recording the fact that they are a perpetrator.”—[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 4 June 2020; c. 65, Q157.]
As the Committee will be aware, and as witnesses at the oral evidence sitting highlighted, the police already have systems in place for recording and sharing information about domestic abuse perpetrators. Offenders who have been convicted of stalking or domestic abuse-related offences are captured on the police national computer and, where appropriate, they will also be recorded on the ViSOR dangerous persons database, which enables information to be shared across relevant criminal justice agencies.
Section 327 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 already allows for those domestic abuse and stalking offenders who are assessed as posing a risk of serious harm to the public to be actively risk-managed under MAPPA. Individuals who commit offences listed in schedule 15 to the 2003 Act and who are sentenced to 12 months or more are automatically eligible for management under MAPPA category 2 when on licence. Those offences include domestic abuse-related offences such as threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, and attempted strangulation, as well as stalking offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. When their licence ends, offenders can be managed under MAPPA category 3 if they are assessed as posing a risk of serious harm to the public. There is also discretion for other convicted domestic abusers who are assessed as posing a risk of serious harm to be managed under MAPPA category 3. Indeed, operational guidance makes it clear that this should be actively considered in every case.
The Government do, however, recognise the need to strengthen the use of current systems. Work is already under way to review the functionality of the violent and sex offender register, and the College of Policing has issued a set of principles for police forces on the identification, assessment and management of serial or potentially dangerous domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators. Work in this area will be supported by the provision of £10 million in funding for perpetrator interventions, which was announced in the Budget, to promote a better response to perpetrators across all agencies that come into contact with them.
The Bill also provides the police with an additional tool to help improve management of the risk posed by domestic abuse perpetrators. The police will be able to apply for a new DAPO that requires perpetrators who are subject to an order to notify the police of their name and address, and of any changes to this information. That will help the police to monitor the perpetrator’s whereabouts and the risk they pose to the victim. The Bill also includes the power for a DAPO to impose further additional notification requirements, to be specified in regulations that the court may consider on a case-by-case basis. The DAPO provisions include an express power to enable courts to use electronic monitoring or tagging on perpetrators to monitor their compliance with the requirements of the DAPO.
The aim of new clause 12 is to provide police with a statutory power to disclose information about a perpetrator’s offending history to their partner. However, Clare’s law already facilitates that. The domestic violence disclosure scheme relies on the police’s existing common-law powers, which are fit for purpose. The right-to-know element of the scheme provides a system through which the police can reach out proactively and disclose information to a person’s partner or ex-partner about that person’s violent or abusive offending history in order to prevent harm. As we have already debated, clause 64 places guidance for the police on Clare’s law on a statutory footing, which will help to improve awareness and consistent operation of the scheme across all forces.
I am very keen to emphasise—this is a concern that the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd has set out—that the burden should not be solely on victims. It is right that a victim can apply for a DAPO or can apply under the right-to-ask scheme, but the police can—indeed, are expected to—take the initiative in appropriate cases to apply for a DAPO or proactively make a disclosure under the right-to-know element of the domestic violence disclosure scheme, as I have just outlined. Given the views of the witnesses from whom we heard in oral evidence to this Committee and its predecessor, and the ongoing work to improve the systems and the MAPPA arrangements that I have set out, I hope hon. Members are reassured, and that the right hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for her detailed response. This is a probing amendment, which I am happy to withdraw. The only thing that I want to say comes from the London Assembly, and from cross-border issues arising within the boroughs of the Met. Dauntless Plus, which deals with 600 or so of the most dangerous repeat offenders in London, reaches 1% of repeat offenders. Present arrangements seem not to be achieving what I am sure we would all wish them to achieve. I hope the Minister will keep a close eye on their effectiveness in future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Local Welfare Provision schemes
“(1) Every local authority in England must deliver a Local Welfare Provision scheme which provides financial assistance to victims of domestic abuse
(2) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on the nature and scope of Local Welfare Provision schemes and review this biannually in consultation with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and other such individuals and agencies he deems appropriate.
(3) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must provide local authorities with additional funding designated for Local Welfare Provision, to increase per year with inflation.
(4) For the purposes of this subsection “domestic abuse” is defined in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”—(Christine Jardine.)
This new clause would allow victims of domestic abuse to access a local welfare assistance scheme in any locality across England.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I would like to apologise to the Committee in advance: as luck would have it, for the first time in two years of printing things too small for me to read, I do not have my glasses with me. Bear with me and I will do my best.
No, that is not what they say. I would like to speak to this cross-party new clause tabled in my name, which would ensure that emergency financial support was available to victims and survivors of domestic abuse across England, in the form of effective local welfare provision. It is supported by the crisis and destitution sector, from the Children’s Society to the Trussell Trust, as well as financial experts, including the Lloyds Bank Foundation for England and Wales, Smallwood Trust and Surviving Economic Abuse.
The Bill, for the first time, acknowledges economic abuse, which creates economic instability and often prevents women in particular from being able to leave an abusive situation, as they lack the financial resources to do so. Defining economic abuse is just the first step. It must be possible to enable those who find themselves in that situation to militate against this form of abuse. The Committee must look at whether we can provide a welfare safety net for all survivors that empowers them.
Local welfare assistance schemes often offer financial assistance to applicants in emergencies. At their best, this type of crisis support works in partnership with other organisations and provides a kind of wrap-around holistic support that other types of welfare cannot, but they are underfunded and underused, and consequently get forgotten.
Without question, cuts to local authority services and changes in the social security system have disproportionately impacted women. That social security system should act as a financial safety net for survivors of domestic abuse, but it does not. Too many survivors are still having to take out payday loans and rely on food banks or, if they are lucky, grants from charities.
Research from Women’s Aid recently found that a third of survivors who left their abusive partner had to take out credit to do so. Smallwood Trust estimates that 70% of their applications for financial assistance are received from women who are fleeing, or have fled, domestic abuse. Given that the Trussell Trust’s most recent food bank figures found an 89% rise in need since the same time last year, with 107% more children needing support, there can be no question but that the welfare safety net for our most vulnerable has gaping holes in it.
Before the creation of local welfare provision, the discretionary social fund, run from the Department for Work and Pensions, was often seen as an essential form of financial support for victims of domestic abuse. Community care grants were often used to enable survivors to establish a new home after a period in refuge accommodation. Since responsibility for those grants has shifted to hard-pressed local authorities, which do not have any statutory obligations to provide this form of support, getting them has become a postcode lottery.
The Children’s Society found that one in seven local authority areas in England now has no local welfare support provided by the council, and that in too many other areas, local welfare provision is far too difficult to access. Some 60% of local authorities had put in place stipulations about routes that had to be taken first before applying for local welfare assistance, including borrowing from friends or family, taking up a commercial loan or using a food bank. That is not acceptable.
Even when a local authority does provide an assistance scheme, Smallwood Trust has suggested that access is often dependent on what time of year one applies for help, and whether the pot is already empty. Analysis of council spending on local welfare provision by the Children’s Society found that in 2018-19, local authorities spent only £41 million on local welfare assistance schemes, out of a possible funding allocation of £129 million for local welfare provision. At their best, those schemes can offer assistance where universal credit cannot. They can be a further source of support while survivors wait for their first universal credit payment, or they can support those not on universal credit who need emergency support, perhaps to buy a new fridge, or a bed for their child, in their new home away from abuse. During the pandemic, some local authorities are even using creative methods to offer emergency financial assistance to vulnerable applicants with no recourse to public funds.
Local welfare and assistance is important to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people in our communities. That is why, in 2013, the national social fund crisis loans and community care grants were abolished and local authorities were empowered, with maximum flexibility, to deliver services as they saw fit, according to local needs. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West will agree, I hope, that local authorities are best placed to determine what support is required for the most vulnerable in their area, given their expertise in the local communities that they serve. That was set out by the then Work and Pensions Secretary in 2014, when he found that local authorities delivered support more effectively than was the case under the social fund, as help was targeted at those who needed it most and joined up with wider social care.
I assure the hon. Member that we fund local authorities to deliver such important duties. In 2016, just over £129 million was included for local welfare provision schemes as a notional allocation within the English local government financial settlement. That allocation was increased to £131.7 million in 2020-21. In response to the coronavirus, we have also announced £3.2 billion of un-ring-fenced funding for local government to meet additional pressures arising from the pandemic and continue to deliver frontline services.
The hon. Member rightly focused on the overall economic situation of the victim. We included economic abuse in clause 1 because we accept that it is not just about bank accounts or money in the purse; it can take many forms. Similarly, the economic situation of the victim includes not just payments that she may be receiving by way of benefits, wages or salary, but her overall situation. That is why the statutory duty for tier 1 local authorities in England to provide support to victims of domestic abuse and their children in safe accommodation is part of the picture. Local welfare assistance schemes enable support in such circumstances, such as support for victims of abuse in women’s refuges to become established in the community. The work that the domestic abuse commissioner will undertake to explore in depth the provision of community-based support is part of the economic picture as well.
A principle that I think we all share and are working towards is that we all want victims and survivors to be able to stay in their homes with their children—if anyone has to leave, it should be the perpetrator. That is what we are trying to get to, but of course I appreciate that there will be situations in which that is not possible, and we are attempting to address that through the Bill.
We are committed to working with the commissioner on community-based services and on the range of services and needs that she will address during her tenure. We believe that it would be a little premature to look at that before she has the chance to undertake that work.
I thank the hon. Member for raising the issue. I hope that the indications that I have given of the Government’s overall approach to helping victims will help to reassure her.
I thank the Minister for her reassurance. I know that the issue is of concern to a lot of people; all of us in this House deal with constituents every week for whom it is a barrier to safety that they simply cannot afford either to leave or to get the abuser to leave—it works against them either way. However, I accept the Minister’s assurances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 18
Guidance: Child maintenance
“(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to the payment of child support maintenance where the person with care of the child is a victim of domestic abuse.
(2) Guidance issued under this section must take account of—
(a) the potential for the withholding or reducing of child support maintenance to constitute economic abuse under section 1(4) of this Act;
(b) the need for enforcement action to prevent non-payment; and
(c) the difficulties faced by victims of domestic abuse in obtaining evidence to support an application for a variation of a child support maintenance calculation.
(3) The Child Maintenance Service must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.
(4) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult
(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and
(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued under this section.” —(Christine Jardine.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the Child Maintenance Service to tackle the problem of abusers continuing economic abuse by withholding or reducing child maintenance payments.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I thank the hon. Member for Edinburgh West for the exposition of her new clause and the way she did it, which was of real assistance to the Committee and certainly to me. Again, I absolutely commend and underscore the spirit and intention behind the new clause. I hope to provide some context that she will find reassuring.
Domestic abuse touches the lives of many DWP customers, and the Child Maintenance Service takes the safety of its customers extremely seriously. The new clause seeks guidance; the hon. Lady wants the Secretary of State to issue guidance relating to the payment of child support maintenance where the person with care of the child is a victim of domestic abuse. We have issued guidance already, and we have gone further by actually implementing—guidance is one thing, but it is when it moves on to training that it makes a big difference.
That training feeds into precisely the point the hon. Lady raises in subsection (2):
“Guidance issued under this section must take account of (a) the potential for the withholding or reducing of child support maintenance to constitute economic abuse under section 1(4) of this Act”.
Absolutely. We get that point, and that is precisely what the training is designed to achieve. It has been created with input from Women’s Aid, and it trains caseworkers on domestic abuse to identify the types of abuse, including economic abuse. By the way, that is not optional training; it is mandatory training—that is point one. Point two is that the DWP has introduced a complex needs toolkit, which includes a domestic abuse plan specifically, to give clear steps for a caseworker to follow in order to support customers, and it also outlines the support available to caseworkers. That toolkit is regularly reviewed and strengthened based on customers’ insight.
It may be helpful to the Committee if I set out other ways in which the Child Maintenance Service currently responds to cases involving domestic abuse. This goes to the point raised by the hon. Lady about how victims go about accessing support. First, the CMS can waive the application fee for victims of domestic abuse. Secondly, it provides advice and support to help victims of domestic abuse use the direct pay service where no further charges apply to ensure there is no unwanted contact between parents. Thirdly—picking up a point made by the hon. Lady—the CMS can act as an intermediary for parents to facilitate the exchange of bank details and ensure that personal information is not shared. Fourthly, the CMS will provide information to parents on how to set up a bank account with a centralised sort code, which avoids parents being traced. Fifthly, where the parents have reported domestic abuse, agents are trained to signpost clients to additional sources of support. I do not suggest that it is a one-stop shop, but, none the less, they are trained in what support is out there.
The bottom line is that the CMS will not tolerate parents failing to meet their obligations to support their children. Where a parent fails to pay in full and on time, enforcement action will be taken. I mention enforcement because the second limb of subsection 2 says:
“Guidance issued under this section must take account of…(b) the need for enforcement action to prevent non-payment”.
Let me turn directly to enforcement. The Child Maintenance Service has a range of strong enforcement actions at its disposal. They include deducting directly from earnings; seizing funds directly from a paying parent’s bank account, either as a lump sum or as regular payments; and a good deal in addition.
I deeply respect that the Minister is reading out exactly what should happen, but has he ever tried to get money out of the CMS for one of his constituents?
I have. I am perfectly prepared to accept that no organisation always works precisely as one might like. That is inevitably the case, but I am not suggesting that that is my usual experience. By and large, we have been able to deliver for my constituents in Cheltenham, while recognising, as I do, that there is always room for improvement. Perhaps we shall leave it there.
The Government have gone further and extended the powers to cover joint and certain business accounts, removing the opportunity for paying parents to put their money beyond reach. Where appropriate, the Child Maintenance Service will use enforcement agents to seize goods, forcing the sale of the paying parent’s property. The Child Maintenance Service may also apply to a court to have the paying parent committed to prison or disqualified from driving. In addition, we have introduced the ability to disqualify non-compliant parents from holding or obtaining a British passport, which we believe will act as a strong deterrent.
The impact of all that is important, and this goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. Of course, we have our anecdotal experience—mine, by and large, has been pretty good, but I accept that other colleagues will have had different experiences—but it is important to look at the data. Compliance with the CMS Collect and Pay statutory scheme has increased from approximately 57% in the quarter ending December 2017 to 68% in the quarter ending December 2019, according to Child Maintenance Service statistics to December 2019. In addition, 723,500 children are covered by Child Maintenance Service arrangements, reflecting an increase of 158,300—almost 30%—since the quarter ending December 2017. That is from the same statistics source.
Given all those measures, the central point is that, while the new clause seeks guidance, what is already in place is guidance and training, and that training is informed by Women’s Aid, as I said. In the circumstances, our view is that no new clause is necessary at this stage, because the Child Maintenance Service already has sufficient enforcement powers and has further strengthened its procedures, training and processes to support customers who suffer domestic abuse.
We will, however, continue to monitor the impact of Child Maintenance Service enforcement powers, as well as the support provided to help domestic abuse victims to use the service safely. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West, who clearly takes a close and principled interest in this matter, will watch that closely but, with that assurance, I hope she feels able to withdraw her new clause.
I thank the Minister for his reassurance but, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, he describes the ideal—it is not how we find it works. If we could get closer—just closer—to the ideal, we might all be satisfied. However, given his reassurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 21
Duty of the Secretary of State to take account of matters relating to gender
“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State in performing functions under this Act to take account of the point that domestic abuse is a subset of violence against women and girls, which affects women disproportionately.”—(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause establishes the gendered nature of domestic abuse in statute.
Brought up, and read the First time.
In our Committee’s evidence session, we heard from Sara Kirkpatrick, the CEO of Welsh Women’s Aid, who said this, and I heartily agree:
“Some really exciting things have come out of the Welsh legislation, particularly the idea of taking that broader lens…of violence against women and girls”––[Official Report, Domestic Abuse Public Bill Committee, 4 June 2020; c. 66, Q158.]
I know that I am harping on about Wales again, and I make no apology for it. We know that domestic abuse impacts everyone—men, women and children—but we also know that it is women and girls who suffer the most frequent and severe abuse. It is important to acknowledge that in order to enable practice and support to be tailored to the specific needs of the person experiencing abuse, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach.
The Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 includes all forms of violence and abuse against women and girls, including domestic abuse, rape and sexual violence, stalking, forced marriage, so-called honour-based violence, female genital mutilation, trafficking and sexual exploitation—including through the sex industry—and sexual harassment in work and public life. None of these forms of abuse are mutually exclusive, and policy and service provision should reflect that.
I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling the new clause. I hope that she knows that I always enjoy debating the issue of gender with her, because those debates draw us out of the nitty-gritty of the Bill’s text and make us think about wider and bigger topics. I very much accept that she will get all sorts of abuse tonight on Twitter, but may I gently remind her that Twitter is not the real world? I say that as someone who came off Twitter a few years ago and I have not missed it for a second.
My bigger concern when it comes to raising awareness of domestic abuse relates to a more common misunderstanding. It is not necessarily that women are disproportionately victims and survivors, because from my experience, I think that that is pretty well understood. What worries me is the idea that “She must leave him.” I hope that, through the Bill, and the work that we are all doing, we are beginning to change that conversation, but I absolutely understand why the hon. Lady has raised this issue.
The hon. Member for Pontypridd took the words out of my mouth: anyone can be a victim of domestic abuse, regardless of their age, gender or ethnicity. We have had to reflect that fact in the definition. We have followed the lead of the drafters of the Istanbul convention in adopting that gender-neutral stance. There is no reference to gender in their definition of the act of domestic violence. The explanatory report published alongside the convention expressly states that the definition is gender neutral and encompasses victims and perpetrators of both sexes.
However, we very much want to reflect the fact that the majority of victims are female, which is why we set out in clause 66, following careful consideration by the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the requirement on the Secretary of State regarding the guidance; the guidance reflects that fact. I appreciate that the definition is incredibly important, but the people commissioning services, training and looking at how their local services are working will be drawn to the guidance, in addition to the Bill, and will want practical help with it. That is how we adopted the definition.
We have made it clear that the definition has two fundamental elements: the first deals with the relationship between the abuser and the abused, and the second deals with what constitutes the categories of abusive behaviour. If the definition is to work for victims and survivors, it must work for all, regardless of gender or other characteristics. Interestingly, we have not been able to identify any other English-language jurisdiction that adopts a gender definition in relation to domestic abuse.
Other than Wales—forgive me. Gosh, that was probably a career-ending slip. I take the hon. Lady’s point about Wales. Apart from England and Wales, we have not been able to find other examples, although it may be that the hon. Lady’s Twitter feed will be inundated with them tonight. We place the emphasis on the draft statutory guidance. Believe me, I am under no illusions: hon. Members in the Committee and outside will be paying close attention to the guidance. I very much hope that, at the end of the informal consultation process, the guidance will be in a shape that meets with the approval of members of this Committee.
I thank the Minister. I know that she fundamentally wants a system in which commissioning is gendered and recognises the fact that the vast majority of these crimes happen to women. I agree with that.
If I read all the things that were tweeted at me in any one day, I would lose the will to live. It is important, on today of all days, to remember that the aggression towards Members sometimes features in real life, and that anyone who is willing to stand up and say what they feel about something can pay a heavy price.
I recognise what the Minister has said, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Children affected by domestic abuse: NHS waiting lists
“The Secretary of State must by regulations ensure that children who move to a different area after witnessing or being otherwise affected by domestic abuse as defined by section 1 of this Act are not disadvantaged in respect of their position on any NHS waiting lists.”—(Jess Phillips.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I thank the hon. Lady. I will deal first with the NHS and then move on to schools. I think there is agreement across the Committee that it is important to recognise the impact of domestic abuse on children and the trauma it can cause. The role of the NHS is to give the best care to address the immediate and continuing health needs of such children. It is a key principle that access to the NHS is based on clinical priority, so when patients move home and between hospitals, the NHS should take previous waiting times into account and ensure, wherever possible, that they are not disadvantaged as a result. A child’s need to access and receive health services will be assessed, and services will be provided according to clinical need, which will consider the individual needs of the child. We have to trust clinicians to take decisions about a patient’s treatment.
On schools, I agree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley that vulnerable children, including those who have been affected by domestic abuse, should be able to access a school place quickly, and that any gaps in their education must be kept to an absolute minimum. As I have said before, wherever possible, we want victims, survivors and their children to stay at home and the perpetrator to leave, but in some cases, sadly, that is not possible for their safety.
Before I explain the Government’s position on that, I will highlight an important distinction between seeking school places in the normal admissions round, such as the start of the school year, and doing so outside that process, which is called in-year admission. As we know, it is important that children who have experienced or witnessed domestic abuse are more likely to seek a school place outside the normal admissions round and to require the in-year process. During the review of children in need and the 2018 consultation on domestic abuse, we heard about the difficulties and delay that such children face in accessing new school places when moving into refuge after fleeing domestic abuse. Improving the in-year admission system is the most effective way to get vulnerable children back to school as quickly as possible.
The in-year application process varies between local authorities and can be particularly difficult to navigate for disadvantaged and vulnerable families, including those who have been victims of domestic abuse, because the school may already be full, and oversubscription criteria are unlikely to be helpful at that point. To ensure that this does not prevent children experiencing domestic abuse from accessing the school places they need, the Government have committed to make changes to the schools admissions code to improve the in-year admissions process. That will ensure that all vulnerable children can access a school place as quickly as possible.
That is not to say that the current system does not support the admission of our most disadvantaged children when they apply for a school place in year. Fair access protocols are in place to ensure that vulnerable children who need a school place outside the normal admissions round can secure one as quickly as possible, but we know from consultation that there is confusion about how fair access protocols should work, which means that sometimes they do not work as effectively as they should do. In some areas, fair access protocols are used as the default way to place every in-year applicant, rather than as a safety net for vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
I am pleased to state that we intend to consult on changes to the school admissions code to better support the in-year admission of vulnerable children, including those in refuge or safe accommodation. In practice, that means making changes to the provisions relating to the in-year admissions process and fair access protocols by introducing a dedicated section in the code that will set out a clear process for managing in-year admissions. We are also proposing to provide greater clarity in the code on fair access protocols, which will improve their effectiveness by making clear their purpose and what they should be used for, and by setting out a clear process by which they should operate.
We will also extend the categories of children who may be admitted via the fair access protocol, specifically to include children on a child in need or child protection plan and children in refuge and safe accommodation. That will ensure that those children are secured a school place quickly, keeping disruption to their education to an absolute minimum.
The Minister has talked at some length about the schools provisions, which are important to ensure that children have quick access to a school near them. Will she say some more about the NHS provisions in new clause 22? She has talked about clinical priority but, as most of us know—not just from children, but from other situations—moving from one health area to another means that there is inevitably a setback. The new clause is intended to address that.
I understand that, but the problem is that we are now rubbing up against the fundamental principle of the NHS, which is that it is based on clinical need and priority. Clearly, if a child is in the most urgent clinical need, we would absolutely expect them to be at the front of the queue to receive help, but there will be different gradations depending on the condition, the length of the condition and the way in which it manifests. We have had to keep to the fundamental principle that that must be clinician-led, because we could not, with the best will in the world, hope to categorise exhaustively in the Bill the many ways, quite apart from domestic abuse, in which children may suffer or be ill
I think this is fundamental, really. Simply moving house can put someone back in a queue when clinical priorities are assessed in that new area. What we are all trying to do—as, I am sure, is the Minister—is ensure that the principle is one of clinical priority, rather than where someone is on a waiting list. This change is absolutely vital.
Very much so; that is the key principle on which the NHS operates. The hon. Lady will appreciate that I am neither a doctor nor a Health Minister. I take her point about waiting times, but once the clinicians have assessed the clinical need, they must surely be the ones to determine what sort of treatment the child receives, as well as when and where.
I can see that the hon. Lady is perhaps not with me on that, but it explains our position. We stick to the principle of the clinician and the clinical need leading on this matter. Of course, I accept the point about different areas.
I am sorry to keep pushing this, but I know that it occurs for other groups of people who are disadvantaged. People receiving alcohol or drug treatments, for example, may move from one area to another and lose all their connections. We are talking about clinical priority within a different group, so although someone might have reached the top of the queue in one place, they might not somewhere else. The amendment seeks to ensure that those children get the best chance that they can.
Again, that comes back to the principle that, wherever possible, we do not want victims and survivors to have to move and be put in that new place. The hon. Lady articulates very well one of the many ways in which it is incredibly traumatic for the survivor to have to leave the family home to flee to the other side of the country with the children. In some cases, the survivor has to do so because of the danger of the perpetrator, but where we can, let us try to keep her and her children at home, so that they do not have to put up with such concerns about things that are terribly important on a day-to-day basis, but sadly become another consequence of fleeing.
There is absolutely no doubt about it, and a good jobcentre worker is worth their absolute weight in gold. I have a gold star system for the ones in my local jobcentre, who are excellent in lots of circumstances. The hon. Lady is absolutely right. However, when we are talking about domestic abuse and universal credit, we have put in a huge amount, and maybe that could have been avoided if we had looked at some of the impacts of how this policy was going to be rolled out. For example, on the issue of split payments in universal credit, we are now asking jobcentre staff potentially to intervene directly when two people are sitting in front of them, saying, “So, would you like split payments?” It is rocky terrain for a jobcentre worker to have to try and deal with that.
In fact, if we look at the take-up of split payments, we see that it remains persistently low, compared with the number of victims of domestic abuse who are claiming universal credit. That situation means that there is potentially a need for the complete redesign of jobcentres, so that there are permanent private spaces for every single person who might need one, and so that people can be talked to separately. There are all sorts of things that can be done to make the situation better, and training at the frontline is absolutely key in that.
However, that roll-out of universal credit was not done in my own area; I had to go and ask what was being done. I have sat in the Department for Work and Pensions with Ministers and asked them what they are going to do about these issues. The issue of split payments was very much an afterthought, and I suppose that all I am asking for in new clause 24 is that it is not an afterthought but is built into the system from the very beginning. However, the hon. Lady is right—frontline staff are worth their weight in gold.
The way that universal credit has been designed means that women are forced to choose between staying with a perpetrator or being unable, in lots of cases, to feed themselves and their children. That cannot be right and cannot be allowed to continue. Although the reasons why a woman might return to a perpetrator can be complex, it should not surprise anyone in this room that their not having enough money to provide for themselves and their children is the most common factor. In a survey for Refuge, one refuge worker said,
“the changeover to Universal Credit has caused a significant delay in accessing benefits when women arrive at the refuge. The five- week waiting time means women have to survive with their children with no income, and only a few food bank vouchers. This means that many struggle with whether they’ve made the right decision to leave, if they can’t even feed their children on their own.”
Of course, the Government response is that advance payments are available for those who experience hardship during the minimum five-week wait. That is true, but the crucial thing about advances is that they are loans, which must be paid back immediately from the very first payment, at the rate of up to 30% of the person’s payment. In offering such loans, we are offering women the choice of having no money now or not having enough money for many, many months afterwards.
We must remember that this is often the period when women are traumatised, and supporting their traumatised children, while trying to rebuild their lives in a new place without their support network. They might well be going through the criminal justice process, or the family courts, or both. The system requires them to do that either without a penny, or with some money but in the knowledge that they will spend at least the first year of their life away from their perpetrator struggling to make ends meet, as they have to pay that loan back.
Specialist services supporting survivors tell me that many women they support do not take advantage of the advance payment, even though they desperately need it. Those women are frightened about the consequences of taking on debt at the very beginning of their life away from the perpetrator. Those who have experienced years of economic abuse might have thousands of pounds in debts that they were coerced into taking, with their perpetrator fraudulently putting their names against a variety of debts. That is very common. They know that they will likely spend the next decade paying that debt off and they do not want to start their new lives by volunteering for even more debt.
Those fears are often well founded. Research from Citizens Advice shows that people who take out an advance loan from the Department for Work and Pensions are more likely to get into further debt as they struggle to pay the loans back. The answer to this is to get rid of the five-week wait—some well-trodden evidence regarding everybody, but there we go. In the case of domestic abuse victims, the answer is to pay benefit advances to survivors of domestic abuse as grants, rather than loans.
It is hard to overstate how much of a positive difference that would make to women and children up and down the country. It is the difference between a woman in a refuge hoping the food bank has not run out of baked beans and a woman in a refuge being able to treat her child to a yoghurt or some sweets after dinner on their first day in a new school. It is the difference between a woman feeling hopeful that she made the right decision and can look forward to a life without abuse or a woman feeling that she has no choice but to go back, because she simply cannot afford to live away.
When I explain to Ministers the impact of the five-week wait and repayment of advances for survivors, they often tell me that they cannot treat different groups differently under universal credit or that it is impossible because people would lie and pretend to be victims—usually they say both. In fact, last week the Ministers wrote to me saying that paying advances as grants to survivors includes significant fraud risk.
On treating people differently, there are many exceptions in our social security system. The Minister herself already referred to the shared accommodation exemption for victims of domestic abuse, which is a recent change. It is a strength that there are differences for different people. It makes our system work better and better protect people.
There are already exemptions for survivors of domestic abuse in the benefits system. For example, the domestic violence easement means that survivors do not have to comply with job-seeking conditions of benefits for a few months while they focus on their safety. The destitution domestic violence concession, which we will no doubt discuss at length tomorrow, is a crucial example from immigration rules, which provides a lifeline to survivors on spousal visas. Exempting survivors of domestic abuse from repaying benefit advances would be another important difference for survivors of domestic abuse that ensures the system works as a safety net for them and not as a barrier.
On the point of making it up, as someone who has worked in specialist domestic abuse services, I can tell you that it is a thousand times more likely that a woman will minimise the abuse that she has suffered, or think it is not abuse because they have started to believe what the perpetrator is telling them—that it is their fault and they are making it up. I understand, however, the Government’s desire to ensure that public money is not received fraudulently and therefore accept that some level of evidence is needed.
The best model for providing evidence is the legal aid gateway, which sets out the evidence requirements for survivors of domestic abuse to access legal aid. The same framework can be used here. This is an affordable policy that would make an extraordinary difference. I urge the Committee to support new clauses 38 to 40, which would ensure that benefit advances are treated as grants and do not need to be repaid.
I will now briefly turn to new clause 41, which would exempt survivors of domestic abuse from the benefit cap. The benefit cap limits the total level of benefits that a household can receive. It was introduced in 2013 and has impacted 250,000 households since the limit was lowered in 2016. While the cap was one of a number of policies intended to reduce our deficit, the Government’s own evaluation shows that only 5% of households moved into work because of the benefit cap; 95% did not.
Instead, the cap largely impacts lone parents and those with an illness or disability. Seven out of 10 capped households are single parent families, of which 69% had at least one child under the age of five and 24% had a child under two, according to figures from May 2019. Around 90% of single parents are female, so it is unsurprising that single female parents make up 85% of all households whose benefits have been capped, but the cap is having a particularly devastating impact on survivors of domestic abuse and increasing the barriers that women face in leaving an abuser. There is no free childcare before the age of two, meaning that lone parents with young children often do not work enough hours to avoid the impact of the cap. The issue is particularly acute where a women has fled domestic abuse and is far from her support network, so is unable to rely on friends or family for childcare and is perhaps unable to work due to the abuse she has experienced.
Although survivors are exempt from the cap while living in refuges—another exemption that has been put through—they are not exempt as soon as they leave. That is severely restricting survivors’ ability to find a safe new home and move on from refuge, as their benefits might not cover the cost of housing, either in social housing or in the private rented sector. It is leading, essentially, to bed-blocking, where women who are ready to leave a refuge are stuck in the service, blocking spaces that other survivors fleeing abuse desperately need.
The impact of the cap on survivors was made starkly clear in the case of R v. the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, which considered the legality of the benefit cap. Two of the claimants in the case were survivors. One was living in statutory overcrowded housing and was unable to move herself and her family anywhere suitable and safe due to the cap. Another was stuck in a refuge because the cap meant that she could not afford any move-on housing, and she was therefore blocking a much-needed space for another survivor. They told Women’s Aid that they felt financially penalised for escaping domestic abuse.
I know that the Department for Work and Pensions states that discretionary housing payments, which are paid by local authorities, are available for survivors in such circumstances. However, DHP allocations remain inconsistent, short term and dependent on different councils’ policies and practices—it is yet another postcode lottery. They are not monitored by the Government centrally, so it is impossible to know whether they are providing an effective solution.
The Department for Work and Pensions has repeatedly claimed that the benefit cap is saving money. As I have highlighted, however, the cap creates significant hardships, and the Department therefore gives back a significant proportion of the money it takes from claimants by providing funding for discretionary housing payments to local councils in order to help them support capped claimants. The circular process of transferring public money from one budget to another fails to consider the impact that has on families, particularly survivors, who rely on less stable support and are certainly under somebody’s “discretion”.
The Department does not include in its figures the cost of DHPs included in administration costs, nor does it consider the increased cost to local authorities through temporary accommodation or the wider cost that the hardship created by the cap might have on other public services. Women’s Aid is concerned that the DHP allocation remains inconsistent, short term and dependent on different councils. The DWP confirmed that it has not carried out a full cost-benefit analysis of the cap. In 2018-19, however, the DWP allocated £60 million of DHP funding for local authorities in Great Britain to support capped households.
For those reasons, I urge colleagues to support new clause 41 in order to exempt survivors of domestic abuse from the benefit cap. To summarise, the Bill must do more for survivors of abuse, including those suffering economic abuse, than merely define what is happening to them. The new clauses would ensure that the Bill has a legacy of not only recognising that money is used to control and abuse, but making significant changes to reduce the number of women who are forced to stay with their abusers because they cannot afford to leave.
With regard to new clause 24, the Department is already obliged to consider the impacts of its policies through existing equality assessments, in accordance with the public sector equality duty. Moreover, the Department reviews, and is consistently striving to improve, services, working with partners who are experts in the areas that they support. This has included the roll-out of a significant training programme and the implementation of domestic abuse points of contact in every jobcentre.
Can the Minister not see the problem with a woman going in and asking for a split payment, and then returning home that evening?
That is why we do not have it as a default. We are sensitive to that precisely because it will not work for some women. It has to be done led by the victim—led by the survivor—and not imposed universally. I will come on to our concerns about the default position in a moment but, if I may, I will carry on building the argument towards that.
The Department will also signpost individuals affected by abuse to specialist support and will work with them to ensure that they are aware of the other support and easements available under UC. Those include special provisions for temporary accommodation, easements to work conditionality and same-day advances. That approach ensures that victims are supported, while simplicity is maintained for others.
In July last year, the universal credit digital claims system was changed to encourage claimants in joint claims to nominate the bank account of the main carer for payment. We continue our support of payment of universal credit to the main carer through that messaging. This strikes the right balance between encouraging positive behaviour and allowing claimants to choose how best to manage their finances.
The proposed change in approach would be inappropriate for some vulnerable people who struggle to manage their money—for example, if one partner has addiction issues or is a carer for the other. A number of practical issues would present further challenges to vulnerable people. For example, 1.3 million adults in the UK do not have a bank account—most of them are on low incomes or unemployed.
The current process does not require both claimants to have bank accounts. The Government are working to improve financial inclusion, but it remains the case that the introduction of split payments by default could result in unnecessary payment delays for joint claimants when one partner does not have a bank account. It is necessary, therefore, to retain a single payment option.
Moreover, a move to split payments by default does not eliminate risk. Sadly, we know that, irrespective of how someone receives their money, perpetrators use a broad spectrum of abusive tactics to dominate and control their partners. That is the point about split payments being rolled out as a default.
The DWP has rolled out a significant training programme and implemented domestic abuse single points of contact in every jobcentre. That means that jobcentre customer service managers and work coaches have the right knowledge, tools and local relationships to support customers who are experiencing or fleeing domestic abuse. The Department continues to support survivors of domestic abuse through a range of measures, including signposting to expert third-party support, special provisions for temporary accommodation and other measures that I have mentioned, including easements to work conditionality.
We are achieving positive cultural change in jobcentre sites and, while we accept there is always more to learn, our departmental awareness of and support for those who have suffered or are suffering domestic abuse is better than it has ever been. I appreciate that the hon. Member feels strongly about her proposed measures, but I hope that I have reassured other colleagues about the steps that the Department for Work and Pensions is taking to support those who receive benefits, whether legacy benefits or universal credit.
Often the words that get read out bear no relation to the experience that we feel on the ground, whether as a benefit claimant or and as somebody supporting benefit claimants. With that idea that single payments are somehow safer and better, it is noble of the Minister to try to argue that universal credit going to one person in the household is better for victims of domestic abuse, but it is genuinely—
I chose my words very carefully. What I said was that this must be led by the victim herself. I fully accept the point that the hon. Member made when she intervened on me. For some victims, walking in at the end of the day and saying, “I’m getting my UC separately,” may be a trigger. That is why we have to be led by the victim/survivor, rather than having split payments by default.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is great to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Bone—welcome back to the Committee. I rise to speak to new clause 25, on the repeal of provisions about defence for controlling or coercive behaviour offence.
Domestic abuse against disabled people is simply not discussed enough. They are hidden victims. When abuse against disabled people is raised, it is usually in the context of adult safeguarding processes, which labels disabled people as vulnerable adults and which disabled survivors and specialists in the field tell us is failing them.
The new clause reflects 10 years’ worth of casework by Stay Safe East, one of only two organisations in England and Wales led by disabled women supporting disabled survivors, and its partner organisations, in an advisory group on domestic abuse and disability. That is two specialist disability and deaf services for a disabled population of 10 million people.
The data on abuse against disabled people is grim. Disabled adults are at least 1.5 times more likely to be a victim or survivor of violence than non-disabled adults. Disabled women are at least three times more likely to experience domestic abuse from family members, be that their partner, parents, siblings, adult children or other family members. Some of the abusers will also be the person’s carer. It is highly likely that those figures are an underestimate, as the only example—the crime survey—is not in an accessible format for deaf and disabled people to participate in, and many survivors cannot access external help.
The rate of domestic abuse against disabled men is also higher than against non-disabled men, but disabled women are more likely to experience repeated, sustained and more violent abuse than disabled men. Disabled children, and particularly disabled girl children, are more likely to experience sexual violence and physical abuse than non-disabled children. What is more, disabled people may have other people in their lives who have a level of control, whether that is unpaid carers or paid carers from an agency, or a personal assistant.
This is the case for disabled women across all communities, of all ages and all backgrounds. Disabled women face specific forms of abuse at the hands of partners, family members and paid or unpaid carers: control of communication; control of medication; restricting access to disability support; using a person’s impairment to control them—for example, playing on their mental health or taking advantage of the fact that they have learning disabilities—forced marriage on the grounds that the partner “will look after you when I am gone”; and constantly abusing women because of their impairment. That, in itself, is a form of hate crime.
Abusers hold the very real threat that, “They will take your kids away from you” over a disabled woman. In the experience of both Stay Safe East and SignHealth, a deaf-led service for deaf survivors of domestic abuse, deaf or disabled mothers are at much higher risk of losing their children through the courts or other domestic abuse. In some cases, the courts opt to place children in the care of an abusive father rather than letting them live with a disabled mother, who is considered a poor parent for reasons simply of her disability, and providing support to keep the children with her.
Unfortunately, disabled victims who are able to speak out against this face multiple barriers to gaining safety and justice. Poor access to refuges or emergency accommodation; voice phone-only contact with many services, which excludes deaf women and those without speech; services not set up to deal with victims who need long-term support; a lack of quality, accessible information or British Sign Language interpreters; no access to counselling—the list is very, very long.
Worst of all is not being believed by police, social workers or health workers because they are disabled women, which is something that is frequently reported by deaf and disabled women who approach the two specialist organisations. A little-known clause, now subsections 76(8) and (9) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, introduced what has been dubbed “the carers’ defence” by disabled survivor groups. It introduced a worrying caveat into what was a piece of legislation to protect victims of abuse, by allowing an abuser who is facing charges of coercive control to claim that they were acting in the best interests of the victim.
That provision was originally brought to the attention of legislators through the efforts of Sisters of Frida, a disabled women’s collective, and Stay Safe East, but it became part of the 2015 Act. Although the clause may have been introduced with the best of intentions, to avoid unnecessary prosecution of carers who were, for example, preventing somebody with dementia from going out alone because they were at risk, there is a real risk that it could be used by abusers to claim that they are acting in the best interests of somebody they are controlling with malicious intent.
That is especially true of people who might be seen to have capacity issues, such as deaf people, people without speech, people with cognitive issues as a result of a stroke, people with learning difficulties and people with mental health challenges. That, of course, is a substantial number of potential victims among those who face the greatest barriers to safety and getting justice.
For example, the parents of a young woman with mild learning disabilities stopped her going out alone, only letting her go to college with a chaperone, on the grounds that she was at risk from strange men. The parents had failed to teach their daughter about safe relationships, had removed her from personal, social, health and economic education lessons in school, and had controlled her friendships with her peer group. The family claimed that they were protecting her. The young woman initially believed that her parents were doing their best for her, but as she grew up she came to realise that she could make her own decisions. It subsequently emerged that, on top of all the coercive control, the family were taking the young woman’s benefits, and there was also physical abuse.
The section gives a clear message to disabled survivors and victims generally: “Your decisions are not your own, and abusers can claim to be acting in your best interests.” “For her own good” is an expression we often hear abusers using, even if they are abusing that very interest, and the courts will let them get away with exercising abuse of power over their victims.
In a context where disabled survivors are the least likely to speak out, and where, if a case does go to court, the chance of a successful outcome for the victim is very low, especially for disabled victims, that is not the message that we want legislation on domestic abuse to give to survivors or, for that matter, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or abusers. The Care Act 2014 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 both provide sufficient protection for genuine carers who face malicious allegations. A law to protect victims is not the place for a clause that protects potential abusers.
All too often, concerns about disabled victims are ignored. The Government now have a real opportunity to listen, and we urge the Minister to take full advantage of that opportunity. We are talking about a group with many intersectional and very complex challenges, which provide additional areas for abusers to exert control and abuse.
This is the first of two debates on different aspects of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. As the hon. Member for Hove has indicated, new clause 25 seeks to repeal the defence in section 76(8), which has been labelled by some as the “carers’ defence”.
Currently, the coercive or controlling behaviour offence allows for such a limited defence if the accused believes that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. It is important to note that the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that in all the circumstances of the case their behaviour, while apparently controlling, was reasonable. This defence is intended to cover cases, for instance, in which the accused was the carer for a disabled spouse, and for medical reasons had to compel their partner to take medication or to stay at home for their own protection.
It is worth taking a moment to consider the sorts of circumstances in which that defence might apply. Imagine a situation in which neighbours walk past a home and see someone who wants to get out of the front garden and on to the road, and is in some distress at not being able to do so. That neighbour calls the police, and the police then investigate. It emerges that the person trying to get on to the road is, very sadly, suffering from dementia, and their partner is a person of unimpeachable integrity and good character—a decent, loving partner of many years’ standing who has shown nothing but care and compassion for that individual, but who is concerned that if they get out on to the road, they will be a danger to themselves and others. Is it seriously to be suggested that that person should be at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace?
That is not what has been outlined. It has already been clearly stated that provisions in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would allow for that exact defence. Also, can the Minister not imagine a situation in which if a victim in that exact circumstance says she is a victim of domestic abuse, that might be the case?
Of course it might be the case, but the important thing is that this defence allows a proper opportunity for a tribunal of fact to consider that, and I think it is absolutely right that it should do so. It is worth noting that under section 76 the burden is on the individual to advance that defence, and for a tribunal of fact to then consider whether it has been disproved. In other words, if that individual advances something that is utterly implausible, a jury—or indeed a bench of magistrates—would have little difficulty in exposing it as such.
It is important to note that we are leaping straight from a hypothetical, in which a woman with dementia is trying to climb over a fence, to court. However, between those two stages we have the first responders. Having experienced the training, care, compassion and expertise of the frontline responders in the prevention team of Sussex police, I would find it extraordinary if a frontline responder could not tell the difference between these scenarios, or certainly determine whether there is enough evidence to pursue the kind of prosecution that the Minister is describing.
We have to be very clear about this. If an individual does not have that defence, considering the elements of section 76, we would be left with a person who is apparently being caused some distress—as would be evident to the first responder, or indeed to a police officer, who might have to effect an arrest—and the distress would appear to have been caused by that person’s liberty having been restricted. In those circumstances, unless the individual has the defence that they were exercising proper control in the interests of the other person, they are at risk of being arrested and prosecuted. That would be a serious concern, would it not?
I should also add—I do not think this point is controversial—that there is an exemption within section 76 concerning under-16s. In other words, where people are in a position of responsibility for somebody who is under the age of 16 and may have to inhibit that person’s liberty, that is considered perfectly understandable and justified. The argument would therefore be this: why is it that in circumstances where, sadly, an individual is at risk and vulnerable, it should not be open to that carer—who everyone accepts is loving, decent and caring—to say that this was in the interests of the individual?
I accept the hon. Gentleman’s premise that it is possible that some people would seek to advance an unmeritorious defence. That is absolutely right, but I respectfully say to him that when he says, “The courts let them get away with it,” he is unfairly labelling the courts. In my opinion, the courts have shown themselves well able to see through a spurious defence. The carer who seeks to try it on and to abuse this proper defence will be given short shrift by a bench of magistrates, or indeed by a jury. We should trust juries and courts to do justice in each case.
Why does the Minister not think that the courts and juries can be trusted on the rough sex defence?
Because juries have to have a rough sex defence to consider. That is our job. Our job is to create the statute.
No, it is not the same at all. If the hon. Lady will listen for a moment, the point is that there is, on the face of a statute, a defence that the jury can consider. They get to consider it only if a judge is satisfied that there is a prima facie defence—in other words, if what the defendant is advancing is patently and transparently unmeritorious, it may well not even go to a jury. A judge might say, “This is such a load of old nonsense that it doesn’t even cross the threshold for a jury to decide.” It is simply where there is a prima facie case. We should trust juries to say, “Is there something in that, or is there not?” It is not for us to adjudicate in every single case. Trust juries; trust the people. It is different from the point that the hon. Lady was making about rough sex, because there was a lacuna in the law. Our job is to fill the lacuna and then leave it to juries, who have shown for many centuries that they are well placed to do justice in a specific case.
I will make a final point on this issue, because I do not want to dwell too long on it. If the policy were not in place, there is a danger that the same people that the hon. Member for Hove quite properly wants to stand up for, and who we want to stand up for—namely, people with disabilities—could be disadvantaged if people take the view of, “Hold on a moment. By doing what I think is genuinely and objectively in the best interests of an individual, I am at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace. Do you know what? Why on earth should I be doing that? Why should I be putting myself at risk in that way.” We have to ensure that we do not inadvertently, and despite the best intentions, find ourselves making life more difficult for the people we want to support.
The Minister is a very effective advocate, but the bottom line is that all the agencies representing frontline victims and survivors are speaking with unanimity. They want the law changed and the new clause struck off, because they say it is affecting their service users. There is no organisation out there working with service users that is defending the clause; it is only him.
With respect, that is not a fair characterisation. Parliament had the opportunity to consider the Bill in 2015. It went through Committee stage in this House, and it went through the House of Lords. It was Parliament’s will that it should exist. What is now being suggested, less than five years later, is that we should sweep away something that was there in the past. In my respectful submission, the case for that has not been made.
Of course, all matters are considered with care, particularly matters of this kind of sensitivity, but we have to be alive to the fact that sometimes, if we remove such a defence, we risk making the position far worse for the people we want to protect. We see that time and again when people are concerned that if they are not given the opportunity to advance their defence and simply to say, “Listen, you decide whether I have got this wrong.” If they do not have the option at least to put forward their defence so that 12 people who have no prior knowledge can make a fair decision, it would be unfair on them and would risk unfairness to people with disabilities.
The final point that I want to make is that the equivalent domestic abuse offence in Scotland contains a similar defence, under section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, as does the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, which is clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly. This is not an outlier provision, I respectfully submit.
Notwithstanding the very proper concerns expressed by the hon. Gentleman, I invite him to consider that, set in a wider context, seeking to exclude the provision is not necessary. In the light of my explanation, I invite him to withdraw the new clause.
I will discuss some of the potential foibles of the 2015 Act, which we have already mentioned. I say graciously before I start that Parliament does not always get everything right, and I loathe the culture in which we have to call something a U-turn, when actually evidence and other things change, different things come to light and people change their minds. That is okay, but we are not allowed to do that in politics without it being labelled a certain thing. I totally support the legislation but, specifically in the coercive control measures, there are some errors. In reality, only time and test ever measure these things.
In discussing the new clause, I will focus on post-separation abuse, but I will first talk briefly about economic abuse by way of context, as they are closely linked in this instance. I welcome the inclusion of economic abuse in the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill, recognising how that is often hidden but incredibly destructive as a form of abuse. The Bill now acknowledges and names the experience of the victims and their families, supporting them to find justice by holding a perpetrator to account across a full range of abusive behaviours.
That move has been hugely welcomed, particularly by organisations that work with victims and see day in, day out how perpetrators use economic abuse to exert control, whether to trap the victim so that they cannot afford to leave, or to force them into destitution after they have left, so that they are unable to move on and rebuild their lives. One of those organisations is the UK charity Surviving Economic Abuse, which exists solely to raise awareness of economic abuse and to transform the responses to it.
The term “economic abuse” may be new to domestic abuse legislation, but that form of abuse is certainly not new. One in five women in the UK report having experienced economic abuse from a current or former intimate partner, and 95% of domestic abuse victims report that they have suffered economic abuse. It is widespread.
Economic abuse makes the victim dependent on the perpetrator and limits their choices and their ability to leave. The behaviour is insidious and might not be recognised by the victim. The perpetrator might introduce it as an offer to help, or to take away the worry and burden of dealing with finances, seemingly in a caring way, or they might have simply assumed control through force, threats and coercion.
Through economic exploitation, the perpetrator looks to benefit from the victim’s economic resources and, in so doing, sabotages their economic independence. That exploitation may consist of things such as demanding that the victim alone pays the household bills, while the perpetrator spends their own money on whatever they like. The perpetrator may also build up debt in the victim’s name, through coercion or fraud, or steal or damage the victim’s property, which then has to be replaced. In my experience, the thing that is seen the most is the build-up of debt in someone’s name; certainly that is the thing that people struggle to live with thereafter.
This all has a hugely destabilising impact on the victim’s economic wellbeing and, again, limits their choices and ability to leave. Economic abuse can leave victims trapped and destitute, either while in a relationship with the perpetrator or post separation as they navigate life with inescapable debt, insecure housing and financial hardship. Economic safety underpins physical safety. Building an independent life can, for many victims of economic abuse, feel impossible.
Why is the new clause vital? To answer that question, I want to talk about economic abuse following the end of intimate partner relationships. Economic abuse does not simply stop when the relationship ends. Control continues through joint resources, and in fact the perpetrator can still sabotage the victim’s resources even if they do not know where the victim is. An abuser might wipe out money in a joint account that a victim relies on, or refuse to pay an overdraft so that penalties build up and the victim cannot afford to continue paying it. The end of a relationship does not prevent the abuser from taking away a victim’s home, interfering with their ability to work and earn money, or constantly taking the victim to court in connection with their children. It also does not mean that the abuser suddenly forgets the victim’s personal information, which can be used to apply for credit in their name.
In reality, economic abuse can continue, escalate or even start after separation. Research has shown that economic abuse is actually more prevalent post separation. It is clear why: when other forms of control may have been removed, controlling an ex-partner’s access to economic resources, such as by refusing to pay child maintenance, which we heard about yesterday, or refusing to sell a jointly owned home to free up much-needed money, may be the only way in which the abuser can continue to control the victim—and what powerful and destructive control that can be.
Victims can be left with such significant debts and poor credit ratings that they are unable to move on or rebuild their lives, yet at present legislation does not afford victims the protection that they need. The link between economic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour is stark. Analysis by Surviving Economic Abuse of successful prosecutions for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence shows that six in 10 involve economic abuse, yet limitations within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence mean that, at present, victims of economic abuse post separation are unable to seek justice.
As a result, the perpetrator can continue to control their ex-partner for years and even decades. That is because, for the abuser’s actions to fall within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, perpetrator and victim must have been “personally connected”, as defined in the Serious Crime Act, and that definition differs from what we have in the Domestic Abuse Bill, which clearly states that someone has been in a relationship or is no longer. That is clearly outlined in this new and better definition.
Under the Serious Crime Act, two people will be considered as personally connected if they are in an intimate relationship with each other, or they live together and either are family members or have previously been in an intimate relationship with each other. The result is that where a couple are no longer in an intimate relationship and they do not live together, behaviour by one of them towards the other cannot fall within the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour.
That is why the new clause is vital. We know from research and what we have heard throughout the progress of the Bill that coercive control continues after the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator has ended and they are no longer living together. That is particularly true of forms of abuse that do not rely on physical proximity or the continuation of intimate relationships with the perpetrator, economic abuse being the key example.
Surviving Economic Abuse has shared the story of a woman in this position, and I want to share it with Members. Layla—not her real name—was married for more than 20 years to her abuser and has three children. Throughout the marriage, her husband was controlling and coercive, both economically and emotionally. He would do things such as pressure her to transfer money into his bank account and force her to let him use her credit card. He ran up debt on her credit card and, after separation, forced her to release hundreds of thousands of pounds of equity from the mortgage. Layla continues to pay the debts that he has put in her name, including bank loans of £70,000. He continues to use her contact details rather than his own, so she is being regularly chased by creditors for money. She has also been regularly visited by bailiffs demanding payment of the abuser’s debts, which she has to pay.
Layla has been to the police, but they said that
“the continuing economic abuse cannot be considered under the coercive control offence as the perpetrator had left her.”
Where is the justice in that? We must change that and bring the definition of “personally connected” as it is defined in the Serious Crime Act in line with what we have in the Bill, so that victims such as Layla no longer face the possibility of being a victim of economic abuse going unchallenged for the rest of their lives.
The Bill recognises that abuse can continue post separation and that it does not require the abuser and victim to be in an ongoing relationship or living together. Through the new clause, which has been called for by Surviving Economic Abuse and which has support from SafeLives and many other organisations in the violence against women and girls sector, we can bring those definitions in line with each other so that the intentions of the Bill are not undermined by other legislation, and victims are protected by law and can seek justice. The new clause does that by removing the requirement for intimate partners or family members to be living together for the abuser’s actions to fall under the controlling and coercive behaviour offence.
I thank the hon. Lady for her excellent and helpful representations. The context is that I entirely agree with the premise of her point. If I can crystallise it, she is in effect saying, “Look, one of the most pernicious ways you can abuse another individual is through economic abuse.” It is worth stepping back for a second to say that, although we recognise that in this room, if we went back as little as 15 years ago, that might have been a moot point. People have come to realise that this is a particularly potent and cruel weapon to use, and that acknowledgement is a thread that is increasingly starting to run through the law.
The hon. Lady rightly points out that the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates the offence of coercive control, but the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill is one reason why it is it such an important piece of legislation. If someone had been asked what domestic abuse was 15 years ago, they would probably have said, “Domestic abuse is domestic violence, isn’t it?” No, because clause 1(3) says:
“Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following—
(a) physical or sexual abuse;
(b) violent or threatening behaviour;
(c) controlling or coercive behaviour;
(d) economic abuse (see subsection (4));”
When we turn to subsection (4), it says:
“‘Economic abuse’ means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect
on B’s ability to—
(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or
(b) obtain goods or services.”
I wanted to take stock of where we have come to, because that will inform some of the points that I make in response.
The final thing that I will say by way of context is that the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, which I am taking through the Committee of the whole House this afternoon, considers precisely this issue. When we say that a minimum of six months is the appropriate period for people to move on from a relationship, where some have said that it should be longer, one of the important rebuttal points is, “Hold on a minute. If someone needs to move on with their lives, potentially from an abusive relationship, they need to make sure that it can happen within a reasonable period so that the economic abuse cannot be perpetuated.” We absolutely get that point, and I would say—I hope not immodestly—that we have spearheaded it.
I entirely agree with the Surviving Economic Abuse charity raising the issue, and it has done an important public service in doing so. To turn to the specific point, as we have heard, the new clause seeks to address another aspect of controlling or coercive behaviour. As the hon. Lady indicated, there have been calls from Surviving Economic Abuse and other domestic abuse charities and victims to expand the offence under section 76 of the 2015 Act by removing the living together requirement for former partners. As the offence stands, it applies only to controlling or coercive behaviour between intimate partners or former partners and family members who are living together.
I am sure that hon. Gentleman does look at it.
The 1997 Act was amended to include section 2A, which deals with the “Offence of stalking”. Section 2A says:
“A person is guilty of an offence if… the person pursues a course of conduct… and… the course of conduct amounts to stalking.”
Then, however—this is what I think is brilliant—the 2012 Act goes on to look at the sorts of behaviour that might constitute stalking. Subsection (3) says:
“The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular circumstances, are ones associated with stalking… following a person… contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any means… publishing any statement”
relating to that person. It continues:
“monitoring the use… of the internet… loitering in any place… interfering with any property in the possession of a person… watching or spying on a person.”
The reason why that is important is that it sets out the sorts of behaviour that could be stalking, but it is not exhaustive.
The reason why I say of all that is that if someone at the end of a relationship, when the two people are no longer living together, engages in a course of conduct that, to the man or woman on the Clapham omnibus, is a bit like stalking—whether or not that means trying to exert economic control—there is the potential for offences there, and I will come on to them while I am still sympathetic to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
I am particularly mindful of that because in my own county of Gloucestershire—the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle has already mentioned this—Hollie Gazzard was brutally murdered. Those who have been victims of stalking say that it is like murder in slow motion, because of so much of what precedes it in terms of stalking behaviour. My point is that that can include economic abuse as well.
However, Surviving Economic Abuse argues further that stalking and harassment offences, although relevant, are not designed specifically to prosecute the sort of behaviour we are discussing. I accept that, but it is also fair to point out that, because of the way that stalking offences are drafted, it is not beyond the wit of man or woman to conceive of how they could be included, based on the facts of a specific case.
In addition, the new statutory definition of domestic abuse includes ex-partners among those defined as “personally connected” and does not have a “living together” requirement. Therefore, an amendment to the controlling or coercive behaviour offence could be seen as conforming within the definition in clause 1.
However, the case is not clearcut, given that the offence is still relatively new, and there is currently limited data available in support of a change. Because the case is not clearcut, the Government committed, in response to our 2018 consultation on domestic abuse, to conduct a review of the offence, as the hon. Lady is aware.
The hon. Lady loves a review, she says sotto voce.
Although Home Office officials have made good progress with the review, I am afraid that it has been one of the casualties of the covid-19 pandemic, which has meant that focus has had to be reapplied to supporting victims of domestic abuse at this time. However, the review is in place, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her acknowledgement and understanding of the situation.
We hope to conclude the review by the early autumn, because it is important that we have a sound evidence base for any changes to the offence, but we have heard what the hon. Lady says; the points she made are not improper or unmeritorious, and we invite her to await the outcome of the review. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, and on the understanding that we aim to complete the review by early autumn, the hon. Lady will see her way to withdrawing the new clause.
Absolutely, and I feel that I have the ear of the Minister in this particular regard. The case is quite clear to me; in the circumstances he has outlined, he is absolutely right. If he thinks that people do not read the statute here, I should say that they certainly do not in Stechford Police Station.
The reality is, what would the charge be? I find it difficult to think that the copper, in reality, on the ground, is going to say, “Actually, I think this will be a stalking charge.”
I grappled with this as a Back Bencher when we wanted to increase the maximum sentence, and for precisely that reason—would a police officer, or the CPS, think it was worth the powder and shot to charge someone with stalking when the maximum sentence was only five years? It is now 10 years, because of the private Member’s Bill. If someone engages in a course of conduct that seriously damages an individual, be it by economic abuse, or by hanging around outside the school gates or whatever, the courts have the power to impose what lawyers pompously refer to as “condign punishment”. That provides a powerful incentive for police officers, who want to do justice in the case, to reach for the lever available to them.
I appreciate that, and I hope that that would happen in these cases. However, the cases that I am sure will inform the review that the Minister talks about show people often left without an option, rather than with a plethora of different statutory instruments that they could use. The reality is that lots of people simply get sent away with no further action. However, I take on board what the Minister has said about the review. As everyone knows, I absolutely love a review—for the benefit of Hansard readers, I am being sarcastic. I will await the autumn. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 29
Domestic Abuse: immigration and nationality legal aid
“(1) The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows: in Part 1 of Schedule 1, delete paragraphs 28 and 29 and insert—
‘Immigration and nationality: victims of domestic abuse
27A (1) Civil legal services provided to a victim of domestic abuse in relation to rights to enter, and to remain in, the United Kingdom and to British citizenship, but only in circumstances arising from that abuse.
27B (2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
27B (3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.
27B (4) In this paragraph—
“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
“victim” includes the dependent child of a person who is a victim of domestic abuse.’” —(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause would provide for legal aid for survivors of domestic abuse (and their dependent children) in relation to their immigration or nationality status or rights insofar as the need for legal aid arises from the abuse’
Brought up, and read the First time.
I absolutely do think that, but obviously not all of them, by any stretch of the imagination. We were told that we were taking back control, but the only thing I feel we actually took back control of was the extra quid I have to pay when I have my period. We will not have to pay the tampon tax anymore. Some of the most vulnerable people in our society are relying on the good will of various pilot projects here, there and everywhere, and we are not expressing in our laws that we see those victims. I recognise that that fund has helped lots of people, but we have an opportunity to change this permanently.
Just to be careful, the tampon tax funding was to assess the nature and scale of the women who cannot claim DDVC. Of course, women who do claim DDVC—there are about 2,500 of them—are not dependent on tampon tax funding. That is business as usual for the Home Office. It is funded by the taxpayer year in, year out.
I absolutely agree. I love the DDVC and what I am asking for is business as usual for the people serving coffee. I want the situation to be business as usual for everyone. Business as usual should mean that in this country, if someone, no matter who they are, gets punched in the face, or raped in the evening, we say “D’you know what? We’ll help you.” That is the kind of country that we want to live in.
As I was saying, with both the proposals currently in the pilot projects there is a failure to appreciate the urgency and seriousness of the risk of abuse and destitution that abused migrant women and those on non-spousal visas face. Pilot projects take considerable time—sometimes years—to complete and evaluate, and can be followed by further pilot projects. That simply delays the introduction of the urgent measures that are needed now to protect abused migrant women.
Also, I am not sure why we would not write the pilot project in question into the Bill, because, as everyone knows, there are a number of pilot projects in it. Domestic abuse protection orders are in a pilot project, and so is polygraph testing. The Bill loves a little pilot project. The Home Office has been stalling on addressing the need to implement immediate protection measures for migrant women. It is not good enough just to have an ongoing internal review. We need action.
The internal review has been supplemented by a series of meetings, including ministerial roundtables and periodic calls for evidence, as well as engagement with the sector organisations on a regular basis. I am disappointed that the Home Office has not yet published the outcome of the review, ahead of Committee, so that it could be properly scrutinised, and that it has chosen instead to announced a proposed pilot project.
My position, which reflects the overwhelming views of the sector—the police, the Victims Commissioner, the domestic abuse commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner and social services—is that the domestic violence rule and all the ways in which it works brilliantly should be extended to all migrant survivors. That brings me to new clause 35, which would do exactly that. If I could have anything of all the items in the group—and I recognise that I do not get everything I want—it would be new clause 35.
The domestic violence rule was introduced in 2002. We did not call it that in 2002; it was called the Sojourner project, which I like to say with a Birmingham accent. It was introduced to provide migrants on a spousal or partner visa with a way to apply for indefinite leave to remain when the relationship had broken down because of domestic violence.
In 2012, the destitution domestic violence concession was introduced. It gave domestic violence rule applicants three months of temporary leave and a right to have access to limited state benefits while an application for indefinite leave under the domestic violence rule was considered. The domestic violence rule and destitution domestic violence concession work. Well done to the Home Office. Bravo. It did a great job. It works. It is not perfect, but it does a good job.
That twin-track approach provides a vital lifeline for domestic violence victims on spousal and partner visas, because it allows survivors to resolve their immigration status as well as having access to emergency funding. Ultimately that helps them to become independent of the perpetrator and the state. Yet currently the domestic violence rule and destitution domestic violence concession do not extend to migrant victims on non-spousal visas. That includes victims who are on student or other visas such as work permit holders and domestic workers. We have essentially created a two-tier system. What I find unusual about that two-tier system is that, in my experience of some of the more problematic issues in the visa system and its use for safeguarding, the spousal visa bit is not what I would favour.
Between April 2015 and March 2016, 67% of users who accessed the Southall Black Sisters no recourse fund, supported by the tampon tax, were on non-spousal visas. A survey conducted by Southall Black Sisters between November 2012 and January 2013 found that 64% of 242 women did not qualify for the DDVC and were without a safety net. Similarly, Women’s Aid reported that over a one-year period, two-thirds of its users with NRPF were not eligible for statutory support because they were on non-spousal visas and had no recourse to public funds.
I am not wholly sure that we will be hearing from all the immigration solicitors that I have come across in my life. I think there is a definite problem in the system with regard to some immigration advice that I get to see being charged for and paid for.
I thank the hon. Lady for making that incredibly important point. When somebody is prosecuted by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, it is a serious issue of unscrupulous, unqualified, unethical individuals giving legal advice, and that is a particularly shabby thing to do when know the impact on the victim is known.
It certainly is. In these circumstances, people turning up to my office, having forked out £5,000 for a form that they could definitely have filled in by themselves, even if English is not their first language, is a phenomenon. I am afraid to say, I even have some come to my office and ask me to refer people directly to them, as if, like a quid pro quo, they will give free legal advice if we send people. It is a wild west situation.
That brings me to new clause 29, which seeks to provide migrant survivors with legal aid. Often, the cases are complex and it cannot be left to specialist BAME organisations to provide that legal advice. As I mentioned, there is already a deficit in specialist BAME services. Failure to protect all migrant women from abuse has wide-ranging financial and societal consequences —consequences that exceed the cost of extending eligibility of the DV rule and the DDVC.
The economic cost of supporting migrant women with NRPF is often borne out. We might not be paying for it at the Home Office, but it is often borne out by local children’s services, local councils, health and education services, the police and the criminal justice system, as well as by non-statutory agencies. Many women rely on section 17 support under the Children’s Act 1989, which would not be the case if they were eligible for the DV rule and the DDVC. We end up somehow paying for it with either lives lost or some other scheme somewhere along the line.
In its briefing paper on migrant women, Southall Black Sisters highlighted that London boroughs in 2017-18 supported 2,881 households with no recourse to public funds, at a cost of £53.7 million. That was primarily linked to the discharge of their duties under the Children’s Act 1989. The average duration of local authority support is under two and half years, with 30% of families being made dependent for 1,000 days or longer, often because of Home Office delays in resolving immigration claims. One of the primary groups referred to local authorities with NRPF is single mothers who are subject to domestic abuse. The majority of households no longer require local authority support when they are granted leave to remain, because they go on to find work. Surely that is what we all want to see happening.
What assessment have the Government made of how much it would cost to extend the domestic violence rule to all migrant victims? I guess it would cost less than the millions run up by the statutory and non-statutory services to support migrant women. It would be cheaper, and it would certainly be kinder. Although it would perhaps not be so ideologically pure, it would be the right thing to do. Furthermore, by hindering access to life-saving support, there are wider implications for the Government’s international human rights commitments and obligations to combat violence against women and girls.
In their October 2019 report on the ratification of the Istanbul convention, the Government amended the status of their progress on article 4.3, which is the non-discriminatory section, and on article 59, which includes measures to protect victims whose residency status is dependent on a partner, from “compliant” to “under review”—going backwards. As a consequence of their inadequate response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, the Government must now use the opportunity provided by the Bill to ensure meaningful protection for all women.
I am nearly done—worry not—because I want the Minister to have plenty of time to respond. In the evidence session, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle talked about the national referral mechanism after it was raised by another Member. In fact, a victim of domestic violence was asked during the evidence session whether she had been referred to the national referral mechanism. As somebody who used to be one of the people administering the national referral mechanism and who ran one of the trafficking services for many years—in fact, I helped to set it up with the Salvation Army as one of the sub-contractors—I want to express, for the benefit of the Committee, some concerns about the cross-over with the national referral mechanism in such cases.
The national referral mechanism has never been used to deal with cases of domestic abuse; that was never its intention. I read the guidance during the weekend after the evidence session. The only mention of domestic abuse in the thousands of pages of guidance suggests that when people identify a victim, they should use some of their experiences with victims of domestic abuse, because victims might react similarly and might not want to talk. That is literally the only mention.
There is some mention of forced marriage and sham marriage in the guidance. However, I have been speaking to the providers this week and have been asking them about how many cases they have seen where those are factors. It is vanishingly rare. Lots of the providers offer both domestic violence services and trafficking services. There is Ashiana Sheffield and Black Country Women’s Aid, where I used to work. They provide both domestic violence services and trafficking services, which are completely distinct. There has never been any suggestion that migrant victims with no recourse to public funds would be able to get through the NRM. As someone who has taken referrals through the NRM, I can tell Members that if a person tried to take these cases through that mechanism—probably with some immigration lawyer helping them to do so—it would count against them. It would look as if they were gaming the system, because these cases inevitably would not get through the NRM. Almost no migrant women on non-spousal visas would be able to access the NRM: it is not for them. They have not been exploited, there are not means, and there are not the three main things that are needed to make a trafficking referral.
However, well over five days ago, I tabled some named day questions to the Home Office. I have not had a response, but I have chased them again this morning; maybe the Minister can answer some of those questions. I asked whether the Secretary of State for the Home Department would
“publish all correspondence between her Department and the contract provider for the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract on the inclusion within that contract of support services for victims of domestic abuse with no recourse to public funds.”
I also asked the Secretary of State
“how many applications to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) made reference to forced marriage in the last full reporting year; of those how many people were (a) accepted into the NRM and (b) had their application declined.”
Southall Black Sisters, working with a number of other agencies, has circulated a pretty comprehensive guide to why these particular victims would not qualify. That is not to say that the NRM is not a good system; these victims just would not qualify for it, and it is quite laborious to try to put them through it, so I am not sure why we are currently wagering on the NRM.
Sorry, I am just getting over the shock of that!
It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that the Bill is good strong legislation and that its primary focus is on supporting victims of domestic abuse, regardless of their race, religion, ethnicity or immigration status. We should remember, in all of this, that it could be, at any point, not just someone we do not know, but our sister, our friend or our colleague. It could be any one of us and we should put ourselves in that position and ask ourselves what we would want the Bill to do to defend us.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. I welcome the opportunity to debate this issue in Committee, because very often, with the best will in the world, the very nature of parliamentary questions and oral questions and so on is that they are quick and the next question is heading up and so on. I am pleased that we can spend some time debating this issue today.
I say that because I wish it was as easy as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has painted—I really do. I think she has the measure of me by now; she could not accuse me of not being compassionate, of not understanding or of not wanting to do the very best that we can for victims of domestic abuse. Against that background, I must not be led by my heart alone, but must also use my head to deal with some of the points and suggestions that have been made.
Let us focus first on that about which we all agree: that victims of abuse should first and foremost be treated as victims. Where we differ perhaps is on how we achieve that, the nature of the support and how it is best provided. For the benefit of those who do not have copies of the new clauses in front of them, they do not deal with services, provision of refuge spaces and so on; they deal only with the provision of legal aid and changes to immigration status. I say that because I am painting the journey that we have taken over the last year on the pilot project. It is very important to bear in mind that, even though the new clauses are being debated, the Government have committed to the pilot project to get some data and evidence on which we can create specific and careful policy.
New clause 29 seeks to extend entitlement for legal aid to migrant victims in relation to their immigration and nationality status. The legal aid scheme is targeted at those who need it and the Government have always been clear that publicly funded immigration advice is available to some particularly vulnerable individuals. The destitution domestic violence concession is run by the Home Office and was created because we understood that there is a problem with victims of domestic abuse who came to this country on spousal visas with legitimate expectations about setting up their lives and those of their family here. We were alerted to and saw that there was a problem, and the DDVC was created.
Under the DDVC, victims are eligible for legal aid when applying for indefinite leave to remain or for residence cards, subject to the statutory means and merits tests—that three-month period can be extended. I have looked at the figures myself; indeed, I looked at the form this morning to refresh my memory. It is a simple form—certainly simpler than some of the forms that the Home Office produces—and it is, I would say, a light-touch form, precisely because we appreciate that it may be used by traumatised victims and we want to be sensitive to their states and circumstances. It is a light-touch form just to log them into the system, as it were, and from that, the benefits—legal aid and so on—can flow where they apply.
People who are not on a spousal visa and who are not therefore eligible for the DDVC may still be eligible for help with legal aid through the exceptional case funding scheme, so long as relevant criteria are met. That scheme is specifically designed for cases in which the failure to provide legal aid could risk a breach of an individual’s human rights. In those circumstances, provided that an applicant passes the means and merits test, legal aid must be granted. The Ministry of Justice is making changes to the scheme to ensure that it is easy to follow and accessible to all, including by simplifying the forms and guidance and working with the Legal Aid Agency to improve the timeliness of decisions.
In the situations that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, such as leave to enter, leave to remain and citizenship, victims of domestic abuse can already apply for legal aid through the exceptional case funding scheme, if they are not already eligible under DDVC. One of the consequences of new clause 29 would be that domestic abuse victims would be eligible for legal aid for applications under the EU settlement scheme.
The scheme has been designed to be streamlined and user friendly, and the majority of applicants would be able to apply without the need for advice from a lawyer. Indeed, the latest figures, as of 30 April, show that 3,220,000 applications have been completed. Again, it is not an arduous process. We have deliberately tried to make it as streamlined as possible, while ensuring that the requirements are met in terms of years lived in the country, precisely because we want to help people—our friends, our family—stay in the country in January next year.
The Home Office has put in place measures to ensure that people who may have difficulty with the online scheme have help. We appreciate that age or different circumstances may mean that not everybody is as tech savvy as the younger generation, so we have put help in place. Even then, we have legal aid as a safeguard, if it is necessary. While we recognise the importance of providing support to domestic abuse victims, we consider that the current scope of legal aid and the availability of the exceptional case funding scheme already ensure that victims of domestic abuse can access legal aid when they need to.
New clauses 35 and 36 seek to provide at least six months of leave and access to public funds to all victims of domestic abuse who do not fall within the spousal visa DDVC scheme. This would mean that all migrant victims of domestic abuse would have a route to indefinite leave to remain and ensure that they could access publicly funded support.
If I understand the objective of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley correctly, she wants to extend the DDVC scheme and the domestic violence rule to cover all migrant victims of domestic abuse, to place the DDVC in the immigration rules, and to lift immigration restrictions for any migrant victim of domestic abuse. I will try to break down the figures and I will go into them further in a little while. I appreciate the help from the sector. The hon. Lady was a little unkind to me when she described the way in which we have used the sector. We appreciate the help that the sector has given us on this, but we want to consolidate it and build on it, which is why we are investing in a pilot project later this year.
Southall Black Sisters responded to the Home Office as part of our work over the last year. Again, I will go into that more in a moment. Of the people that they helped in 2019-20, 43% of the women had a spousal visa on arrival and/or upon their contact with services. In Southall Black Sisters’ assessment, the next most frequent category of immigration status among people they helped was right down at 8%. That gives us an idea about how many immigration statuses and routes there are, which is a factor that the Government must take into account.
The next most common category of women that they helped, after those on spousal visas, was those who were seeking asylum. Happily for people who are seeking asylum, there is a whole network of support for them. It goes without saying that not every person who applies for asylum is a victim of domestic abuse, but, again, we have listened to the sector. We have changed the system for people who are in the asylum system and are experiencing abuse, so that they get a few top-up payments to help them access the specialist support services they need, including safe accommodation.
After the category of asylum seekers, which was 8%, there are three categories with 5% in each. Those categories are EU dependants, people who had overstayed on their visitor visas and people who were described as overstayers on unspecified visas. I say that to give context to the variety of circumstances that victims may find themselves in, but I am afraid that treating them in a blanket way gives us cause for concern.
Personally, Minister, I do not care how people came into the country if they have been beaten up.
Anyway, with regard to asylum, when the Minister states here in front of the Committee that we give specialist support to victims in the asylum system, I would absolutely love to hear about some of that specialist support. For example, if someone was a victim of domestic abuse and they entered into National Asylum Support Service accommodation in my constituency, what is the specialist support they would get in that accommodation?
Members will no doubt allow me just to flick through the timeline; for those who are not in the room, it is a thick document, so it may take me some time to find the—
If the Minister would like me to intervene again, and tell her what support is—
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I just thought that I ought to make it clear that while I am in the Chair, I have no views on the matter before the Committee, although many of you will know that I did chair the all-party group on human trafficking and modern slavery, and I was not aware that that subject was going to come up for debate today. Please be assured that while I am in the Chair, I am neutral.
Have I spoken for enough time, Minister?
May I record my thanks to the Chair, and also acknowledge the work that he has done on this topic, and the difficult questions that he asks me on occasion during Home Office oral questions? I am extremely grateful to him.
There is a Home Office policy entitled, “Domestic abuse: responding to reports of domestic abuse from asylum seekers”, which is dated 16 July 2019. I am told that the policy changes set out in that document provided a concession whereby victims of domestic abuse in asylum support accommodation can apply for top-up payments to cover the cost of transferring to a specialist domestic abuse refuge.
We are listening and we are very much trying to be led by the evidence. However, I will make the point that we need a firmer evidence base. That is not a criticism of the charities involved, but we need to understand this very diverse group of people, who are diverse in terms of their experiences; we need to understand the nature of the abuse and the ways in which they have come to be in our country. That is relevant because—[Interruption.] It is relevant, and I will go on to say why in a moment. We also need to understand the experiences that they may have at home with their family members, and so on. Understanding all of that is important to ensure that public money is spent in the best way possible under our policy.
The Joint Committee that scrutinised the Bill considered similar changes to the DDVC and domestic violence indefinite leave to remain, or DVILR. I have to say that its recommendations fell short of the proposals to incorporate the DDVC scheme within the immigration rules. I also have to say that we are not attracted to the approach being set out today either. The DDVC scheme is an administrative scheme and it has worked successfully on that basis since its introduction in 2012. As a concession operated outside the rules, it can be applied flexibly and can readily be amended as the need arises. Placing the scheme within the rules would remove this flexibility.
In response to the Joint Committee’s recommendation, we undertook a review into the overall response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, and we intend to publish the findings ahead of Report. Just to give an idea of the lengths we have gone to with this review, we examined 100 cases in which the claimant had applied for indefinite leave to remain on the grounds of domestic violence. We specifically looked at the length of time spent in the UK, and at whether the claimant had arrived on a partner visa or had formed their partnership after arrival in the UK. We also looked at the main providers of third-party evidence in these cases and whether or not they were being accommodated in a refuge with access to public funds. Gender and other characteristics were also recorded.
We gathered evidence from a range of stakeholders and held a number of workshops and discussion sessions, to obtain more detailed information and views about the difficulties that migrant victims face. Indeed, some of those meetings and the submissions from the organisations concerned are in the body of work from the past year.
I am pleased that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned Women’s Aid. It was not excluded from the review or any of our work on the matter. Indeed, it was warmly invited and welcomed. Those Welsh colleagues who are concerned that Wales should not be under-represented will be pleased to know that dial-in details were sent to Welsh Women’s Aid as well. In those workshops, with all the organisations that we would expect, including Bawso, Amnesty, Southall Black Sisters and Step Up Migrant Women, we have had frank discussions about what they experience on the ground and what the women they look after face. The results of the review will be published before Report, but I want to set out that the Government have prepared, and continue to prepare, an intensive and detailed piece of work.
I fear that new clause 35 is based on a misunderstanding of the purpose and rationale for the DDVC and the domestic violence rule. They were and are intended to provide a route to settlement for migrant victims who hold spousal visas. They were designed in that way because the victims in question would, had the relationship not broken down as a result of domestic violence, have had a legitimate expectation of staying in the UK permanently. To compare that with the situation of someone on a visitor visa, such a person comes to the country without a legitimate expectation of staying in the country. I am afraid that the head has to rule the heart in this instance. We have immigration policies and, indeed, the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill is being debated in the Committee Room next to this. We have to try to ensure that immigration policy is maintained. None the less, we need to ensure that there is support for victims when they require it, to help them escape their dangerous relationship.
Neither the DDVC nor the domestic violence rule was designed to support those without the legitimate expectation of remaining in the country. We are concerned that expanding the scope of both provisions would undermine the specific purpose that gave rise to them and introduce a route to settlement that might lead to more exploitation of vulnerable migrants or, indeed, of our immigration system.
I do not expect the Minister—or even you, Mr Bone—to be able to filibuster long enough to answer this question, to be perfectly honest, but what evidence is there under the current system, in whatever form and in relation to whatever visa, of women lying about domestic violence to get immigration status? Can I have that evidence, compared with the evidence for those who are turned away? My experience recently—and I respect the point that people sometimes use domestic violence legislation to break the rules—is that sometimes they use it to drive to Barnard Castle. [Interruption.] It is the truth, then. I understand why she thinks people lie.
No. I am sorry—can I just try to bring the tone down? Thus far, we have managed to discuss this incredibly emotive subject in a responsible and constructive way. I shall try to continue to do that. I do not for a moment say that people who apply are lying. I absolutely do not say that. What I am worried about, and what I see with modern slavery, for example, is that the people who manipulate, exploit and take advantage will use every way they can find to do it.
I will give the hon. Lady an example, and then after I have developed this point I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnorshire, and then to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West.
I recently had one of my regular meetings on the topic of serious violence and county lines gangs. Predominantly young men and boys are targeted by county lines gangs in what we call exporting areas—big cities—to go out to the county to sell drugs.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 35—Victims of domestic abuse: leave to remain—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of this Act being passed, lay a statement of changes in rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the immigration rules”) to make provision for leave to remain to be granted to any person subject to immigration control who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom.
(2) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules for the granting of indefinite leave to remain to any person subject to immigration control who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom; and the statement must provide for those rules to be commenced no later than one month of the laying of the statement.
(3) The Secretary of State must make provision for granting limited leave to remain for a period of no less than 6 months to any person eligible to make an application under the immigration rules for the purposes of subsection (2); and such leave shall include no condition under section 3(1)(c)(i), (ia), (ii) or (v) of the Immigration Act 1971.
(4) The Secretary of State must make provision for extending limited leave to remain granted in accordance with subsection (3) to ensure that leave continues throughout the period during which an application made under the immigration rules for the purposes of subsection (2) remains pending.
(5) Where subsection (6) applies, notwithstanding any statutory or other provision, no services shall be withheld from a victim of domestic abuse solely by reason of that person not having leave to remain or having leave to remain subject to a condition under section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971.
(6) This subsection applies where a provider of services is satisfied that the victim of domestic abuse is eligible to make an application to which subsection (3) refers.
(7) The Secretary of State must, for the purposes of subsection (5), issue guidance to providers of services about the assessment of eligibility to make an application to which subsection (3) refers.
(8) In this section an application is pending during the period—
(a) beginning when it is made,
(b) ending when it is finally decided, withdrawn or abandoned, and an application is not finally decided while an application for review or appeal could be made within the period permitted for either or while any such review or appeal remains pending (meaning that review or appeal has not been finally decided, withdrawn or abandoned);
“person subject to immigration control” means a person in the United Kingdom who does not have the right of abode;
“provider of services” includes both public and private bodies;
“services” includes accommodation, education, employment, financial assistance, healthcare and any service provided exclusively or particularly to survivors of domestic abuse.”
This new clause would make provision in the immigration rules for the granting of indefinite leave to remain to migrant survivors of domestic abuse and limited leave to remain to a survivor who is eligible to make an application for indefinite leave to remain.
New clause 36—Recourse to public funds for domestic abuse survivors—
“(1) The Immigration Acts are amended as follows.
(2) In section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 after subsection (10) insert—
“(11) This section does not apply to a person who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom.”
(3) In paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 after sub-paragraph (b) insert—
“(ca) to a person who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom, or”
(4) In section 21 of the Immigration Act 2014 at the end of subsection (3) insert “or if P is a victim of domestic abuse”.
(5) In section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may not make or maintain a condition under subsection (1)(c)(ii) on leave granted to a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom; and it is not a breach of the immigration laws or rules for such a victim to have recourse to public funds.”
(6) For the purposes of this section, evidence that domestic abuse has occurred may consist of one or more of the following—
(a) a relevant conviction, police caution or protection notice;
(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders), including a non-molestation undertaking or order, occupation order, domestic abuse protection order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;
(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic abuse;
(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference;
(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic abuse;
(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming injuries or a condition consistent with being a victim of domestic abuse;
(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she is satisfied on the basis of an examination that a person had injuries or a condition consistent with those of a victim of domestic abuse;
(h) an undertaking given to a court by the alleged perpetrator of domestic abuse that he or she will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;
(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in providing services to a person in respect of allegations of domestic abuse;
(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic abuse support organisation; or
(k) other evidence of domestic abuse, including from a counsellor, midwife, school, witness or the victim.
(7) For the purposes of this section—
“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
“victim” includes the dependent child of a person who is a victim of domestic abuse.”
This new clause seeks to ensure that certain provisions under the Immigration Acts – including exclusion from public funds, certain types of support and assistance and the right to rent – do not apply to survivors of domestic abuse.
Before we adjourned for lunch, I was speaking about county lines gangs, to demonstrate how vulnerable people can continue to be manipulated and exploited for the aims and advantages of those who are doing the manipulation. When we talk about county lines gangs, most people think of boys and young men being recruited, but we are now getting stories about girls being recruited—not necessarily to do the drug running, although they can be used by the perpetrators to conceal weapons and drugs, but to launder the proceeds of crime.
The perpetrators, the gang leaders, are very deliberately recruiting young women because they want to use their bank accounts, and they do so on the basis that because someone is a girl or young woman, the authorities will not trace her, track her or be on the lookout for her as much as they would be—they say—for young men. They also tell the girls, as part of their manipulation, that even if they do get caught, the consequences, because they are girls, will not be so bad for them.
I say that because in the context of the argument about manipulation and how perpetrators can use and skew systems to their advantage, I am highly cynical when it comes to the ability of perpetrators to do that. That is one reason why, when we talk about how careful we have to be about how the system is constructed, so that it cannot be misused, I do so very much with those cynical perpetrators in mind.
I will return to the fundamental principle of providing support, on which we all agree. It is why, as part of our journey to discovering the scale and extent of the problem but also the most effective ways of helping migrant women or people with no recourse to public funds, we have allocated £1.5 million to a pilot project to support migrant victims to find safe accommodation and services. In addition to offering emergency support, the pilot will be designed to assess the gaps in existing provision and gather robust data that will help to inform future funding decisions. The review that we have been carrying out and are due to publish, or aim to publish, by Report stage, has highlighted that there are significant gaps in the evidence base for migrant victims who are not eligible for the destitution domestic violence concession.
Since 2017, we have provided more than £1 million from the tampon tax fund to support migrant victims with no recourse to public funds. That has helped to deliver much-needed support for a number of individuals, but regrettably the funding has not provided the necessary evidence base to enable us to take long-term decisions. The evidence is at best patchy as to the kinds of circumstance in which support is most needed, how long victims need support, what kind of support works best and how individuals can leave support to regain their independence. That demonstrates a need for further work to ensure that we have a strong evidence base from which we can make sound decisions, and that is what the pilot fund is for.
May I ask the Minister to clarify her comments? Some people could interpret them to mean that the evidence not being there is a reason not to provide any service for some people, whereas some service might be provided for some people by the pilot. Can the Minister clarify that the Government will look at how they can give as much provision for as many people as possible until we are able to get the evidence to better target it going forward?
I very much appreciate the way in which the hon. Gentleman raised that. We have systems in place at the moment. I hope that, particularly on the topic of legal aid, I have been able to provide examples of women who were not eligible for DDVC getting access to legal aid support. We accept that there is more to do. We are coming at the matter with an open mind and an open heart. We want to get the evidence, so that in due course we can put in place the systems that will provide the best support. That, as well as helping people in their immediate circumstances, is the intention behind the pilot project.
I turn now to the matter of immigration control. We believe that lifting immigration controls for all migrant victims of domestic abuse is the wrong response. Successive Governments have taken the view that access to publicly funded benefits and services should normally reflect the strength of a migrant’s connections to the UK and, in the main, become available to migrants only when they have settled here. Those restrictions are an important plank of immigration policy, operated, as I have said, by successive Governments and applicable to all migrants until they qualify for indefinite leave to remain. The policy is designed to assure the public that controlled immigration brings real benefits to the UK and does not lead to excessive demands on the UK’s finite resources, and that public funds are protected for permanent residents of the UK.
Exceptions to those restrictions are already in place for some groups of migrants, such as refugees or those here on the basis of their human rights, where they would otherwise be destitute. Those on human rights routes can also apply to have their no recourse to public funds condition lifted if their financial circumstances change. Equally, migrant victims on partner visas can already apply for the destitution domestic violence concession, to be granted limited leave with recourse to public funds.
However, lifting restrictions for all migrant victims would enable any migrant, including those here illegally, to secure leave to remain if they claim to be a victim of domestic abuse. For the reasons I have set out, we believe that the provisions in new clause 35 would be open to abuse and undermine the legitimate claims of other migrant victims and the public support on which our immigration system relies.
Will the Minister outline exactly why she thinks the new clause would give everyone indefinite leave to remain? That is certainly not the case, if I may speak so boldly. We are asking for limited leave to remain for a six-month period, with a view to making an application for indefinite leave to remain. Will the Minister just highlight that the Home Office, even in the case of spousal visas, still has every right to refuse indefinite leave to remain to anyone it likes?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for clarifying. I am afraid that that is not the interpretation that lots and lots of officials who have pored over the new clauses have drawn. Perhaps that highlights the complexity of the area and the law. We have to be absolutely clear about our phrasing and intentions when we draft clauses that will have a huge impact on immigration policy, over and above the cases of the immediate victims whom we seek to help.
Does the current system of domestic violence destitution and the DV rule guarantee indefinite leave to remain for those on spousal visas? If it were extended to other groups, surely they would live under the same rules.
I do not want to labour the point, but the purpose and remit of the DDVC and the domestic violence rule has been misunderstood. The DDVC and the rule were, and are, intended to provide a route to settlement for migrant victims who hold spousal visas, because they have a legitimate expectation of staying in the UK permanently. That is the nature of their status. That is why we say it is not, sadly, an easy transfer across for people on other types of visas, such as visitor visas—or, indeed, for people who have arrived here illegally. That is why it is a painstaking process to work out what we can do to help such victims with the immediate circumstances of their abuse, so that the immigration system plays its part and takes its course in the way that it would do for anyone on those different types of visas.
I appreciate the sensitivities of talking about illegal immigrants, but it is important to acknowledge that we have to balance the interests of people who apply properly for immigration routes, as well as the immigration interests of individual victims. That is why the Government keep coming back to the argument that the starting point for the process should not be people’s immigration status; it should be the care that they need to help them flee an abusive relationship, giving them the support they need to recover from that and to lead happier and healthier lives.
I talked about the human rights routes. People on human rights routes can also apply to have their no recourse to public funds condition lifted if their financial circumstances change. Equally, migrant victims on partner visas can already apply for the DDVC to be granted limitedly, with recourse to public funds. We are committed to the needs of victims, which is why we have introduced the pilot to help us understand the particular pressures and needs of these vulnerable people.
I started my speech by setting out the Government’s commitment to helping victims. I made the point that victims must be treated as victims and get the help they need. That is absolutely what we are focused on, which is why the next steps in our programme of work in this very difficult area are to publish the results of the review and then conduct the pilot, so that we can assess and implement the practical support that these vulnerable people need.
Let me explain to somebody who may never have filled in a domestic violence destitution fund form or have had to apply the DV rule in this or any of its forms. The reality is that even if someone has a spousal visa, it does not guarantee them indefinite leave to remain. They still have to apply through every single one of the same rules through which they would ordinarily apply—unless the Home Office is changing the policy and saying that anyone who applies will automatically be given leave to remain. That is absolutely not my experience.
There is a problem when I stand here representing my experience of years in the field, and with masses of experience of immigration cases in my constituency—more, I feel safe in saying, than any hon. Member present, except perhaps the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster. It is very difficult when Ministers say that what I have experienced is not the case, or that all the victims who have given evidence—some of whom are our friends or family, and certainly our constituents—are wrong to say that the system does not work. There are lists of easements, but the reality on the ground is completely different. I understand what the Minister is saying and certainly what hon. Members want to see with regard to evidence gathering. Lord knows we live in a time when policy is made very quickly, and some people will prove that we needed better evidence for some of it. We live in interesting times. I have absolutely no doubt that that is what is required.
I do not see the point of a review if the evidence is not taken up by the Home Office. Even if all the evidence pointed the other way, I cannot see that the Home Office would come up with a different argument. The desire of all of us for the evidence is a sort of moot point. We are trying in this Bill to protect victims of domestic violence—it’s literally what it says on the tin.
I think it is. I do not get any uptick in sticking up for this group of people because migrant communities are not allowed to vote. People have seen a problem and they are trying to fix it. It is as simple as that. On the issue of leave to remain, I hear what—
I rise to protect my officials more than anything else. New clause 35(2) states:
“The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules for the granting of indefinite leave to remain to any person subject to immigration control who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom”.
That is the hon. Lady’s new clause, and that is how we have read it.
Okay. That is absolutely fine. I was about to say to the Minister that I hear what she says about the concern that we might let a few too many in the country. I will take the issue up on Third Reading and speak about it every day until we get to Report and I will ensure that people speak about it in the Lords.
The Minister has probably never taken a call in a refuge and had to tell someone that they could not come because they had no recourse. She can say that I speak with my heart and not my head, but I have had to use my head to turn women away. I have had to have women’s children removed from them.
I do not act as an emotional being; I am emotional about the right thing to do. We are here to protect victims of domestic violence. We do not expect to ask them which countries they have travelled from when they present. I will take away what the Minister says about possible confusion. The amendments that will be laid before the House will be clear that, just as for those on spousal visas, there is no guarantee whatever of indefinite leave to remain, as the Minister well knows, in the scheme.
In fact, not everybody gets indefinite leave to remain. The data collected centrally is widely available. All we ask is that for a period everybody will be able to access support and be given a fair chance to make an immigration application. It is as simple as that. I do not want to stand here and let it pass. The point still stands whether we want to call them illegal or whether we want to talk about which particular visa they might have. If anyone does not have asylum accommodation in their constituency, they are free to come to mine to see whether they would like to put victims of domestic violence in it. It’s really cracking.
There will be people exactly as I have outlined. It does not matter what sort of visa they are on. As I have said, there will be people who we come across every day to whom we are currently saying, “This Bill isn’t for you. This Bill doesn’t help you; I am sorry you got beaten up, but you are on your own.” That is the reality of this law, until it is changed. I will do everything I can to change it and I have a better chance of doing that in front of the whole House—either this one or the other place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 30
Use of bail in domestic abuse cases
“(1) Section 34 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (limitations on police detention) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (5)(a) for the word “applies” substitute “or subsection (5AB) applies”.
(3) In subsection (5)(b) for the word “applies” substitute “or subsection (5AB) applies”.
(4) In subsection (5A) insert after the words “applies if”, “subsection (5AB) does not apply and”.
(5) After subsection (5A) insert—
“(a) This subsection applies if—
(i) it appears to the custody officer that there is need for further investigation of any matter in connection with which the person was detained at any time during the period of the person‘s detention; and
(ii) the offence under investigation is an offence that amounts to domestic abuse as defined in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
(b) save that the person shall be released without bail if the custody officer is satisfied that releasing the person on bail is not necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances (having regard, in particular, to any conditions of bail which would be imposed and to the importance of protecting the complainant);
(c) before making a determination to release without bail or a determination as to any conditions of bail to impose, the custody officer shall conduct an assessment of the risks posed by not releasing the person on bail (including, in particular, to the complainant);
(d) before making a determination of a kind referred to in paragraph (c) the custody officer must inform—
(i) the person or the person’s legal representative and consider any representations made by the person or the person‘s legal representative; and
(ii) the complainant or the complainant’s representative and consider any representations made by the complainant or the complainant’s representative; and
(e) an officer of the rank of inspector or above must authorise the release on bail (having considered any representations made by the person or the person’s legal representative and by the complainant or the complainant’s representative).””.—(Peter Kyle.)
This new clause reverses the presumption against use of bail in the 2017 Act for these categories of offences, and introduces a risk assessment with prior consultation with the parties.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Good afternoon, Mr Bone. These two new clauses concern how bail is used in domestic abuse cases as a result of the changes to the bail regime as enacted in the Policing and Crime Act 2017.
As reported in the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the Policing and Crime Act 2017 restricted the length of pre-charge bail to 28 days in most circumstances and mandated that extensions could be authorised by police officers, but only if the officer authorising the extension had reasonable grounds for believing the investigation was being made “diligently and expeditiously.” That was a legislative response to cases such as that of broadcaster Paul Gambaccini who was repeatedly released on bail for more than a year while being investigated, but then subsequently cleared of all charges and not charged with anything at all.
We can contrast the scrutiny that that Bill received with that on this Bill, as it was reported to the Joint Committee that
“the consultation prior to the 2017 bail reforms did not hear from any women’s organisations, or victims’ groups, and that only policing bodies, organisations representing suspects and defence lawyers participated.”
Though well-meaning and made in response to a legitimate cause where pre-charge bail had been misused, the changes have had a devastating impact on victims of domestic abuse, as the police have drastically reduced the use of bail for perpetrators accused of rape and domestic violence, which has put survivors at an increased risk, as the alleged offender is being released without any conditions. That point was reinforced in the Joint Committee by Deputy Chief Constable Louisa Rolfe of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, who agreed that,
“the reduction in pre-charge bail in domestic abuse cases had been significant”
and, more worryingly, told the Committee,
“that it could be difficult to convince a judge of the need for bail when a case progressed to court or if he or she had not been on police bail.”
A 28-day initial grant of bail is simply not enough time for an already stretched police force to gather the plethora of evidence needed in most domestic abuse cases. In evidence to the Joint Committee, Deb Smith of the Police Superintendents Association said:
“To get a charge on a domestic abuse case, there clearly has to be a significant amount of evidence gathered. That is almost always going to be nigh-on impossible in the first 28 days, even if somebody is released on bail. Then obviously we go to the superintendent’s extension for the three months, and even that is a challenging timeframe in which to get all the evidence required to satisfy a charge—third-party material, mobile phone records and so on.”
Once again, I find myself quoting the safeguarding Minister, because she herself admitted that, in the case of pre-charge bail:
“It is almost as though the pendulum has swung the other way, and we need to get it back in the middle by ensuring that for cases where it is appropriate to go beyond 28 days, people are being released on pre-charge bail with conditions as necessary and proportionate.”
It is encouraging that the Government have admitted faults with the current regime and I acknowledge that change has been promised, with a preliminary consultation on proposals for reviewing pre-charge bail legislation having just closed on 29 May. However, considering the opportunity offered by the Domestic Abuse Bill—it is right here before us and we know what the problem is—I do not think survivors and people at risk should have to wait for a possible police protection and powers Bill for the changes to appear.
I hear the Government’s argument that there are risks associated with making piecemeal changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 through the Domestic Abuse Bill. However, the way in which the changes in the 2017 Act have affected domestic abuse victims must be restated. The Government’s own figures show that in the first three months of the new law, use of bail conditions in domestic abuse cases dropped by a staggering 65%.
New clause 30 would reverse the general presumption against bail and require a risk assessment by officers in cases where there are allegations of domestic abuse on the impact of imposing or not imposing bail. It strongly mirrors the Home Office’s proposals on pre-charge bail and would therefore not conflict with the eventual legislative outcome of the wider Home Office review.
New clause 31 is a simple amendment that would extend the initial bail period in domestic abuse cases from 28 days to three months. We know from the police’s testimony to the Joint Committee that the 28-day limit is particularly problematic in domestic abuse cases. Increasing it to three months would reduce the burden of bureaucracy created by bail extensions in domestic abuse cases and make bail a more workable tool for the police. It would avoid the situation that currently arises, where bail is lifted after 28 days and victims find it difficult to obtain a non-molestation order without a recent incident, leaving them without any protection at all. Three months on bail is very different from the indefinite bail that existed before the 2017 Act, so the new clause would address the legitimate concerns that led to that legislation being enacted.
I urge Ministers to consider both new clauses in the context of the immediate relief they could offer domestic abuse survivors. It is reassuring that the Minister committed to the inclusion of victims of domestic abuse in the statutory guidance, but I urge Members to take advantage of the opportunity we have before us. We know that we are heading into a period when both Houses of Parliament will be gridlocked with legislation. Despite the potential extension of the parliamentary terms and revocation of recesses, we are heading into a period when the House will be jam-packed with legislation. As we head towards 31 December and our leaving the European single market and customs union, it is certain that next year will be an even heavier legislative period than this one. We have a Bill in front of us, we know what the problem is and there is a simple solution—please, Minister, do not make us wait.
I say at the outset that I have sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s position. We are conscious of the unintended consequence of the well-intentioned reforms to pre-charge bail in 2017. We are committed to ensuring that the police have the powers they need to protect the public, and that our criminal justice system has at its heart the welfare and best interests of victims.
Over the past few years, crime has become more complex, and the police are dealing with more digital evidence and new challenges. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 introduced a number of reforms to pre-charge bail to address legitimate concerns that suspects were spending too long under restrictive conditions, with no oversight. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman gave an example of that. The 2017 reforms allowed individuals to be released under investigation and introduced a presumption in favour of release without bail, unless its use was considered necessary and proportionate. They limited the initial imposition of pre-charge bail to 28 days. I must emphasise that the police can still use pre-charge bail when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and they have our full support in that.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued guidance highlighting that police should use pre-charge bail when there are risks to victims and witnesses, and the need to regularly review cases where such suspects are released under investigation.
On risk, the new clause seeks to amend the Bill to ensure that a proper risk assessment is done. Somebody in a case involving me was recently released under investigation, and no risk assessment of my safety was done.
Obviously, I am concerned to hear that. I take the point about risk assessment and will raise it with the NPCC lead. The hon. Member for Hove referred to the forthcoming police powers and protections Bill, but in the interim I very much want that to be considered.
We have worked closely with policing partners and other partners across the criminal justice system to track its implementation and monitor its impact, and we know that the use of pre-charge bail has fallen significantly. We have listened carefully to these concerns, and in November, as the hon. Gentleman said, we announced a review of pre-charge bail to address concerns raised about the impact of current rules on the police, victims, those under investigation and the broader criminal justice system. We launched a public consultation in February, which closed on 29 May. We received more than 1,000 responses, which we are analysing before deciding how best to proceed.
However, I very much take the point about the needs before the police powers and protections Bill is introduced, but our concern is that we cannot deal with this in a piecemeal, offence-specific manner; we have to take a holistic approach to changing the pre-charge bail system. This Bill is not the correct vehicle for that but, as the hon. Gentleman said, the police powers and protections Bill announced in the Queen’s Speech may well be.
I need to put something on the record. It is always ideal to look at these matters in the round, in the holistic way that the Minister mentions. However, when we see an attack in public, outside, suddenly the Government find the ability to review things, such as early release programmes, and to introduce very specific pieces of piecemeal legislation, if I may describe them in those terms. The Bill is before us. We cannot wait any longer. We believe that every life matters, and we think the fact that victims out there feel threatened by this should be power enough to force a specific change here until we get that holistic report and legislation that she seeks.
I think the hon. Gentleman is referring to the new powers in relation to terrorism offences, if I have understood correctly. That is a discrete part of the criminal justice system. Pre-charge bail has the potential to apply to pretty much every criminal offence, with the exception of the murder; it would clearly be very unusual for anyone facing a murder charge to be released on bail. Again, we have to look at the system in a holistic way, which is what we are planning. However, I will raise the point about risk with the NPCC so that in the intervening months, while the Bill is still going through Parliament—let us not forget that that does not finish when we finish here tonight; the Bill has some scrutiny ahead of it—we get the message through to the police chiefs, in addition to what we have already said, that this matter is of particular concern to the Committee.
At the risk of sounding like a one-trick pony, I want to talk about some of my experience in court, touching on some things that we have just been speaking about, or that will be referred to later when the hon. Member for Hove speaks again about court.
My experience is that magistrates consistently deal with difficult cases. It is difficult to balance the rights of a victim and the rights of a defendant. I have not talked much about defendants, but it is true that we see a lot of defendants who have terrible stories to tell. In my maiden speech, I said that being a magistrate had changed my perspective on the world, because I had never seen the kinds of lives that were coming up in front of me, and not just of the victims but of the defendants.
I told the story of a boy who walked in on my first day, when I was still being mentored. He was 18 and it was his first appearance in an adult court. He looked about 10—he was tiny—and he was grey. I said to my mentor, “God, he can’t be in this court, surely,” and they said, “No, I know him from the family courts.” He was malnourished because his parents were drug addicts and he was never fed properly. He was grey because he was malnourished and he had been injected with heroin to keep him quiet as a child. But he had burgled an elderly couple’s house. There are lots of victims in a courtroom and it almost does not matter where they are sitting. It is a constant battle as a magistrate to weigh up the rights of the defendant and the rights of the victim.
That touches on bail, which is an unpopular thing to talk about in court, because in some ways everyone is a threat and everyone can go on to do nasty things to nice people, but magistrates have to weigh up the right of habeas corpus—the right of a defendant to have liberty until he has been convicted of a crime. That is really difficult to weigh up, because it involves thinking about the risks to the victim, the defendant’s right to liberty and the presumption of innocence.
That is why the holistic approach that the Minister is talking about is important, because it will touch on not just domestic abuse cases, but the precedents and the impact that has on the court system and the rights of defendants in the court system. The hon. Member for Hove mentioned the pendulum, which it is important to get right. I think the more holistic approach is genuinely the right way to go on that.
I apologise to the Committee; I am stepping into the shoes of the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, as he is about to appear on the Floor of the House, so please spare me particularly detailed questions and I will do my best.
We absolutely recognise the life-saving sanctuary that refuges provide for victims and their children, and we believe that existing legislation and court procedure rules state clearly that parties actively engaged in family proceedings are not required to disclose their address or that of their children, unless directed to do so by the court. Furthermore, parties may apply in any event to withhold such information from other parties.
When adequate information about the location of a child is not known to the court, the court can order any person who may have relevant information to disclose it to the court. In the first instance, details of the child’s address and who they are living with are disclosed only to the court and not to other parties. The court determines how this information should be used, based on the case details. Where there are allegations of domestic abuse, the court can and does treat this information as confidential, and holds it. We therefore believe that subsection (2) of the new clause is not required.
Subsection (1) would prevent the service of a court order at a refuge’s residential address, other than with the permission of the court following an application made under subsections (3) and (4). I fully appreciate that victims living in a refuge are fearful for their safety, and that their experiencing or witnessing the service of an order at a refuge would be very distressing. However, where courts are concerned about the welfare of a child, they must be able to take rapid and direct action to locate them. Direct service of an order at a refuge’s residential address may sometimes be necessary, for example when urgent concern about a child’s welfare demands it. Therefore, provisions to limit how documents may be served in specific places could have the unintended consequence of endangering a child.
I would like to reassure hon. Members that the courts may already direct completely bespoke service arrangements, based on the facts of a case. The family procedure rules 2010 provide clear powers for the courts to order service at alternative places, such as at an address other than a refuge’s residential address, and set out the procedure for making such applications.
In summary, we believe that the important outcomes sought by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley are already provided for in existing legislation and court rules. However, I want to reassure the Committee that we are committed to protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse who live in refuges. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham met the deputy president of the family court on Monday and raised these concerns, among others, and we will work with the deputy president to explore whether amendments to the family procedure rules 2010 could strengthen safeguards for victims and their children who live in refuges. On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
I will withdraw the new clause, and I am heartened by the fact that the hon. Member for Cheltenham, who is no longer in his place, has spoken to the divisional lead in the family court. This is one of those situations where there may very well be regulations in place to allow the outcomes we want, but something is still going wrong, and an assessment and a change in this area is needed.
I understand the deep concerns that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle, has needing to think through the potential for harm to come to a child, although I would argue that, in refuge services, there would be somebody there in the vast majority of cases. There are quite strict and stringent safeguarding measures in place in refuges to ensure that children come to no harm. However, I am pleased to hear what she said and will speak to the other Minister about it another time, when he is not debating the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 33
Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases
‘(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection 76(5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(3) In subsection 76(6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(4) After subsection 76(8F) insert—
“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence;
(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse;
(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to at subsection (8G)(b);
(d) subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.”
(5) In subsection 76(9) after “This section, except so far as making different provision for householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.’ —(Peter Kyle.)
This new clause seeks to clarify the degree of force which is reasonable under the common law of self-defence where the defendant is a survivor of domestic abuse.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to provide domestic abuse survivors the same legal protection that householders have in cases of self-defence. Householders have a legal protection when they act in self-defence against an intruder, but no such protection is available to survivors acting in self-defence against their abuser. At its base, just think what that means: we are able in law to defend ourselves, to a defined threshold, against people who enter our homes and cause us harm, but we are unable to have the same defence against people who already live in the home and seek to cause the same harm. The new clause seeks to rectify that imbalance.
Common-law defences are outdated and ill fitting in the context of domestic abuse, leaving survivors with no effective defence. The Bill presents an opportunity to modernise the law by ensuring that the available legal defences reflect the improved public understanding of domestic abuse. This issue gained prominence with the case of Sally Challen last year, who had her murder charge for the hammer attack she inflicted on her husband downgraded to manslaughter in recognition of the effect of decades of coercive control that she had endured. That judgment reflects our new understanding of how domestic abuse can effect survivors and lead to offending behaviour, so it is only right that the Domestic Abuse Bill recognises this.
Evidence from the Prison Reform Trust shows that the common-law defence of self-defence is difficult to establish in cases of violent resistance by a survivor of domestic abuse against their abusive partner or former partner, as a jury may well conclude that the response was disproportionate without taking into account the long history of abuse. The self-defence proposal would make it easier for victims and survivors to establish that they were acting in self-defence, providing them with an equivalent protection to those using force against an intruder into their home. This is a really important distinction: all we are asking for is the same threshold to be allowed against people perpetrating violence from within the home as that allowed against people perpetrating violence who enter the home.
The definition is also now successfully established in statute. Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is the basis for the new clause. Subsection (5A) allows householders to use disproportionate force when defending themselves against intruders into the home. It provides that, where the case involves a householder,
“the degree of force used by”
the householder
“is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as”
the householder
“believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate”.
[Interruption.] I believe I am being heckled by Siri—I think I might have either turned someone’s lights on or off or ordered their shopping. A householder will therefore be able to use force that is disproportionate, but not grossly disproportionate. A CPS guideline states:
“The provision does not give householders free rein to use disproportionate force in every case they are confronted by an intruder. The new provision must be read in conjunction with the other elements of section 76 of the 2008 Act. The level of force used must still be reasonable in the circumstances as the householder believed them to be (section 76(3)).”
In deciding whether the force might be regarded as disproportionate or grossly disproportionate, the guideline states that the court
“will need to consider the individual facts of each case, including the personal circumstances of the householder and the threat (real or perceived) posed by the offender.”
The new clause would add the same provision and that same test of proportionality of force to cases of domestic abuse.
The Government have gone to great lengths to consider the different forms that domestic abuse can take, but there is not the same recognition of the criminal acts that can result from that abuse. We will go on to discuss the need for statutory defence further, but the new clause would go some way to addressing a difficulty survivors can have in court currently in self-defence cases.
The current Secretary of State was instrumental in providing the increased protection for householders when she was a Back Bencher. The coalition Government put forward their self-defence amendment for householders with the following comments by Lord McNally:
“All we are saying is that if householders act in fear for their safety or the safety of others and in the heat of the moment use force which is reasonable in the circumstances but seems disproportionate when viewed in the cold light of day, they should not be treated as criminals. Force which was completely over the top—grossly disproportionate, in other words— will still not be permitted.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 December 2012; Vol. 741, c. 881.]
The new clause would see the Government apply the same sympathy and understanding to domestic abuse survivors that that Act provides in those situations.
I am very pleased to reply in this debate. I understand that the new clause has been put forward by the Prison Reform Trust, and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, had the opportunity to speak in detail about this clause and other matters with representatives from the Prison Reform Trust, the designate domestic abuse commissioner, the Victims Commissioner and others a couple of weeks ago, so this has had his personal attention, as well as mine now.
The new clause aims to give a victim of domestic abuse the same level of protection as those acting in response to an intruder in their home. It has been suggested that that would address a current gap in the law and improve recognition of the links between victimisation and offending. It would, in effect, extend the provisions of section three of the Criminal Law Act 1967 so that a victim could be judged on the facts as he or she believed them to be.
We do, of course, recognise the harm suffered by victims of domestic abuse, and indeed there are several defences potentially available in law to those who commit offences in circumstances connected with their involvement in an abusive relationship. That includes the full defence of self-defence. In addition, the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill should assist with clarifying the wide-ranging and pernicious nature of domestic abuse and alerting all those involved in the criminal justice system to it. It does not seem to us that there is a gap in the law, nor does it seem to us that the situation of a householder reacting, perhaps instinctively, to an intruder in their home is directly comparable to the situation of a person who has been the victim of a pattern of violent and abusive behaviour, including behaviour that would constitute an offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.
The section 76 provisions in the 2008 Act largely cover a very specific circumstance where an intruder, who will in most cases be unknown to the defendant, puts the householder in a position where they are reacting on instinct or in circumstances that subject them to intense stress. By comparison, in domestic abuse cases the response may well not be sudden and instinctive, but one that follows years of physical and/or emotional and mental abuse, where the current law on self-defence and loss of control will allow that to be taken into account. Accordingly, it remains appropriate that the law on self-defence or loss of control be applied, rather than extend this provision to a wider set of circumstances.
This may well be probing the bounds of my knowledge of legal expertise, but am I right in saying that, should the protection be defined in law, the Crown Prosecution Service, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies would take that into account before getting to court? Putting this on the face of the Bill could well save survivors of abuse from the process of going to court in the first place.
It is in law. It is good, settled law. The law of self-defence is very much in law. We, in this place, understandably concentrate on statute law, but case law and common law have power in influencing the criminal courts, alongside statutes.
As for the CPS taking account of it, it is obliged to apply the code for Crown prosecutors when considering whether to charge. It is a two-stage process. First, there is an evidential test of whether there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction and, secondly, there is a public interest test. Any prosecutor looking at that test properly who has been alerted to the defence of self-defence, either by way of interview, from conversations with defence solicitors or from police officers at the scene of the crime, should be aware of that. They are obliged to take those factors into consideration when making the decision about whether the evidential and the public interest tests are met. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s concern.
We understand that it is said that there are difficulties with establishing the common law defence of self-defence in cases of reactive violence by a survivor of domestic abuse against their abusive partner or former partner. We understand the rationale of the new clause as being that a jury may well conclude that the response was disproportionate, without taking account of the long history of abuse. The joy of the jury system, as we have already discussed, is that each case is tried on the facts by 12 members of the public, who sit on a jury. I would be loth to try to replace their decision-making process and their responsibilities in statute.
We understand the concerns, but we believe that the existing defence is well settled in law and can help victims in the situations that the hon. Gentleman has described, so I invite him to withdraw this clause.
I will withdraw the motion because I believe that other people will want to interrogate this matter in greater detail at other stages of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New clause 34
Proceedings under the Children Act 1989
“Proceedings under the Children Act 1989
‘(1) Part I of the Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 (the welfare of the child) after subsection (2B) insert—
“(2C) Subsection (2A) shall not apply in relation to a parent where there has been domestic abuse which has affected the child or other parent.
(2D) Evidence of domestic abuse may be provided in one or more of the forms set out in regulation 33(2) of the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012.”
(3) Part II of the Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.
(4) In section 9 (restrictions on making section 8 orders) after subsection (7) insert—
“(8) No court shall make a section 8 order for a child to spend unsupervised time with or have unsupervised contact with a parent who is—
(a) awaiting trial, or on bail for, a domestic abuse offence, or
(b) involved in ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic abuse offence.
(9) In subsection (8)—
“unsupervised” means where a court approved third party is not present at all times during contact with the parent to ensure the physical safety and emotional wellbeing of a child;
“domestic abuse offence” means an offence which the Crown Prosecution Service alleges to have involved domestic abuse.’”—(Peter Kyle.)
This new clause seeks to change the presumption that parental involvement furthers the child’s welfare when there has been domestic abuse. It also prohibits unsupervised contact for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for domestic abuse offences, or where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Definitely not, Mr Bone; I checked with all those involved in the case, and it is done—worry not. I have just been sending wild WhatsApp messages to that very effect. Also, I shall not mention anybody’s names or those of the courts.
The allegations were that the father had exposure his genitals to his daughter and that he had been sucking her toes and fingers while she was asleep. The judge said that if the father stopped doing this he could continue to have unsupervised contact with his daughter. The judge commented that when he was a barrister he had successfully ensured that a convicted paedophile could have unsupervised access to his children. The mother tried to tell the judge that the father has a history of domestic abuse, but the judge replied that she did not look like a victim of domestic abuse. He said that the father’s behaviour sounded more like a man losing his temper, rather than domestic violence. The judge dismissed the request for supervised contact between father and daughter.
In January 2020, allegations were made about the father’s sexual assault on his daughter. A criminal investigation into child sexual exploitation is ongoing but unsupervised contact is still ordered. This woman has no legal representation. She is not eligible for legal aid due to the means test. She has joint property ownership but no financial means to instruct a solicitor. Solace has described the severe impact this has had on the survivor: a complete distrust of the justice system—she felt like she was the one on trial even though she was there as the survivor and a mother trying to protect her daughter from her predatory father. She was met with disdain and not believed, whereas the father was met with sympathy.
I am almost certain that the Minister will refer to—the hon. Member for Cheltenham would have referred to it—practice direction 12J, which is meant to deal with this so that it does not happen in courts. It is routinely ignored in many cases. In this example, where presumption overrules even the child’s best interests, it is clear that there is a serious problem in our current system.
The hon. Members for Hove and for Birmingham, Yardley have set out fully the legal frameworks that exist, and I will not repeat them. I will bring to the Committee’s attention the fact that the current legislation places absolute primacy on the welfare of the child and does not seek to fetter judicial discretion regarding the factors they can take into account when making an order under the legislation.
I appreciate that this is a sensitive and complex issue. That is why the Ministry of Justice last year established an expert panel on how the family courts deal with allegations of risk of harm in private law children proceedings. The panel has considered the issue of parental contact, informed by the over 1,200 submissions of evidence it received. Its recommendations will be published in the coming weeks.
I have no doubt that the hon. Members for Hove and for Birmingham, Yardley, and other members of the Committee, will want to return to this matter once they have had the opportunity to consider the expert panel’s report. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member for Hove to withdraw the new clause.
As the Minister expects, I will withdraw the new clause, because we do want to assess that. We want to ensure that this issue gets as much debate between us as possible before the next stage, as well as at the next stage and beyond. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 37
Victims of domestic abuse: data-sharing for immigration purposes
“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim of a domestic abuse in the United Kingdom that is processed for the purpose of that person requesting or receiving support or assistance related to domestic abuse is not used for any immigration control purpose without the consent of that person.
(2) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that the personal data of a witness to domestic abuse in the United Kingdom that is processed for the purpose of that person giving information or evidence to assist the investigation or prosecution of that abuse, or to assist the victim of that abuse in any legal proceedings, is not used for any immigration control purpose without the consent of that person.
(3) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 shall not apply to the personal data to which subsection (1) or (2) applies.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to—
(a) persons from whom support or assistance may be requested or received by a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom;
(b) persons exercising any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality; and
(c) persons exercising any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
“consent” means a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the victim or witness, by an express statement of that person signifying agreement to the processing of the personal data for the relevant purpose;
“immigration control purpose” means any purpose of the functions to which subsection (4)(ii) and (iii) refers; “support or assistance” includes the provision of accommodation, banking services, education, employment, financial or social assistance, healthcare and policing services; and any function of a court or prosecuting authority;
“victim” includes any dependent of a person, at whom the domestic abuse is directed, where that dependent is affected by that abuse.”—(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that the personal data of migrant survivors of domestic abuse that is given or used for the purpose of their seeking or receiving support and assistance is not used for immigration control purposes.
Brought up, and read the First time.
As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has explained, new clause 37 seeks to prevent personal information about victims of domestic abuse from being shared for the purpose of immigration control in cases where the individual has not given their consent. The new clause seeks to ensure that migrant victims are not deterred from reporting domestic abuse or seeking support for fear that immigration enforcement action will be taken against them.
The Government share that objective, and it was shared by the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, which made a related recommendation in its report. Before I turn to the issue of consent, the hon. Lady may recall our response to the Joint Committee last year. The Government were clear that all victims of domestic abuse should be treated first and foremost as victims. That is set out in relevant guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
Although we were unable to hear from Deputy Chief Constable Louisa Rolfe, the national policing lead on domestic abuse, during the Committee’s oral evidence session, she did give evidence on the previous iteration of the Bill. She was clear that there would be circumstances in which information sharing between the police and immigration authorities is in the interests of safeguarding victims of abuse. It can help resolve a victim’s uncertainty about their immigration status.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine made a point about removing the perpetrator’s ability to coerce, control and manipulate. It can also help prevent victims from facing enforcement action if they are identified by immigration enforcement in an unrelated system. On the particular constituency point that the hon. Lady raised, I ask her to speak to me afterwards as I would like to investigate further.
To ensure the victim’s needs are put first, the National Police Chiefs’ Council strengthened its guidance in 2018, setting out a clear position on exchanging information about victims of crime with immigration enforcement to encourage a consistent approach across the country. That gives us confidence that data sharing will operate in the interests of the victim.
Turning to the points on consent, alongside our duties to protect victims of crime, the Government are equally duty bound to maintain an effective immigration system, not only to protect public services but to safeguard the most vulnerable from exploitation because of their insecure immigration status. The public expects that individuals in this country should be subject to our laws, and it is right that when individuals with an irregular immigration status are identified they should be supported to come under our immigration system and, where possible, to regularise their stay.
I take on board what the Minister is saying, but I keep coming back to the fact that a crime has taken place: it is domestic abuse; it is violence against women. We are making it difficult for the authorities to act in a lot of cases by making the victim afraid of coming forward and we are not identifying people who are a danger, and not just to those women but to others.
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. It is the balancing act that the Government must employ, and not just on this subject matter. Where there are competing interests, we have to try to find that balance and we take that very seriously. We listen very carefully to concerns that are raised—I am very happy to discuss individual cases outside the glare of the Committee—but we have to abide by our duty to ensure that there is an effective immigration system. We have to balance that against our duties towards the victims.
The data exchanged between the police and law enforcement are processed on the basis of it being in the public interest, as laid out in articles 6 and 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
The problem with consent is that it can be withdrawn at any time—that is the point of consent. As such, it cannot be the basis on which public bodies, such as the Home Office, discharge their duties in the interests of all of the public. To require consent would, we fear, undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control.
I emphasise that we must, of course, keep the NPCC guidance under review, and we work with it to do just that. There are other ways of scrutinising the conduct of the police and, indeed, the Government. We know that there are two forms of legal action on this subject at the moment. Clearly, we will reflect on the findings of those cases when they are delivered.
I very much understand the motivations of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley in tabling the new clause, but I must balance the interests of victims with the need to ensure that our immigration system works as effectively as possible.
I do not doubt the Minister’s sincerity in wanting to ensure that this matter is sorted out. She invoked the public, and she is right that the public would expect people to live within the rules. However, I think if we asked the general public, “Would you rather a rapist was not reported or that somebody got to stay in the country a bit longer?”, they would be on the side of ensuring that crimes are properly investigated and that people come forward to help deal with those crimes.
All I am trying to do is send a clarion call to victims: “You will be safe and you will be supported if you come forward.” All we are ever trying to do in the field of domestic abuse is to increase the number of people who come forward. That is why we would never ever criticise when domestic abuse figures go up, although it would be easy to use it as a blunt tool and do that; in fact, we all celebrate the idea that more people are coming forward. That is all I seek to do with the new clause. I do not doubt that the Minister agrees and wishes to ensure that that is always the case.
What I would ask, as the situation is reviewed and as we work with the NPCC, is for some sort of evidence—once again, we are calling for an evidence base—that when these matters are passed on to immigration control, it is less about enforcement and more about safeguarding. I am sure that, over a period of time, that data could be collected.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 42
Joint tenancies: removal of a tenant
“(1) This section applies where there are two or more joint tenants under a secure or assured tenancy and the landlord is a local housing authority or a private registered provider of social housing.
(2) If one joint tenant (“A”) has experienced domestic abuse from another joint tenant (“B”) then A may apply to the county court for an order B is removed as a joint tenant.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) it sufficient that the domestic abuse was directed at A or to anyone who might reasonably be expected to reside with A.
(4) On such an application, the court must take the following approach—
(a) the court must be satisfied that the tenancy is affordable for A, or will be so within a reasonable period of time;
(b) if the court is so satisfied, then—
(i) if B has been convicted of an offence related to domestic abuse as against A or anyone who might reasonably be expected to reside with A, the court must make an order under this section;
(ii) if B has been given a domestic abuse protection notice under section 19, or a domestic abuse protection order has been made against B under section 25, or B is currently subject to an injunction or restraining order in relation to A, or a person who might be reasonably expected to reside with A, the court may make an order under this section.
(c) for the purposes of subsection 4(b)(ii), the court must adopt the following approach—
(i) if B does not oppose the making of such an order, then the court must make it.
(ii) if B does oppose the making of such an order then it is for B to satisfy the court that – as at the date of the hearing - there are exceptional circumstances which mean that the only way to do justice between A and B is for the order to be refused.
(d) if the application does not fall within subsection (b), then the court may make such an order if it thinks it fit to do so.
(5) Where A has made such an application to the court, any notice to quit served by B shall be of no effect until determination of A’s application or any subsequent appeal.
(6) Notwithstanding any rule of common law to the contrary, the effect of an order under this section is that the tenancy continues for all purposes as if B had never been a joint tenant.
(7) For the purposes of this section, an “offence related to domestic abuse” means an offence that amounts to domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of this Act.
(8) In section 88(2) Housing Act 1985, after “section 17(1) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (property adjustment orders after overseas divorce, &c.)” insert “, or section [Joint tenancies: removal of a tenant]Domestic Abuse Act 2020,”.
(9) In section 91(3)(b) Housing Act 1985, after subsection (iv), add “(v) section [Joint tenancies: removal of a tenant] Domestic Abuse Act 2020.
(10) In section 99B(2) of the Housing Act 1985 (persons qualifying for compensation for improvements) paragraph (e), after subsection (iii) add “(iv) section [Joint tenancies: removal of a tenant] Domestic Abuse Act 2020.””—(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause would facilitate occupiers of social housing removing one joint tenant from the tenancy agreement where there has been domestic violence. The tenancy would then continue (so preserving existing rights). The court must be satisfied that the applicant can or will be able to afford the tenancy.
Brought up, and read the First time.
No, they absolutely are carrying out their statutory duty, but the statutory duty is only about refuge—unlike the statutory guidance regarding servicemen and women, which is that they are allowed to move without local connection, recognising that base life does not necessarily mean that they are based in a place, so they might not have a local connection, as well as tipping the hat to people who deserve a break when they are presenting to homelessness services. It is essentially the same thing—recognition that people living in certain circumstances might need extra help. I am sure the hon. Lady does not wish to be political about this, but I could list lots of Tory councils that turn away victims of domestic abuse, and many that have no current provision for refuge, but send their victims to a neighbouring local authority; that is not uncommon. The way some councils choose to fund this is to fund it elsewhere, which I think is problematic and will certainly be furthered by the new statutory duty.
The Government will pay for this statutory duty, which may lead to people having to present to homelessness teams in different areas when they do not have a connection to the local area. That is the problem I am trying to overcome. Together, the new clauses will help to ensure that all women and children fleeing domestic abuse can access safe housing where and when they need to. I urge colleagues to support new clauses 43 and 44 to bar local authorities from imposing dangerous local connections restrictions on survivors of domestic abuse.
I apologise at the start because, just as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley went into the fine detail of housing law, so, sadly, will I. I will try to cut it down.
We understand the motivation behind new clause 42. Abusers seek to control their victims in many different ways, and threatening to make their victims homeless or actually making them homeless by ending a tenancy is a particularly pernicious form of control. However, we have concerns about the drafting of the new clause, as it would apply only to local authority and housing association periodic tenancies, whereas most social tenants have periodic tenancies that are often known as lifetime tenancies, which generally mean that they can stay in their home for the rest of their life, provided they comply with the terms of the tenancy. A social tenancy with lifetime security of tenure is a valuable asset, which is why the Bill includes provisions designed to protect the security of tenure of victims of domestic abuse when granted a new tenancy by a local authority.
Notwithstanding the general position on security of tenure, current law provides that if any joint tenant of a period tenancy serves a notice to quit, it brings the whole tenancy to an end and the landlord can seek possession. The rule is of long standing; it has been established in many cases over the years and was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. It aims to balance the interests of each joint tenant and the landlord. For example, it would allow a victim of domestic abuse who has had to flee her home to ensure that she is no longer bound by the full obligations of the tenancy, which she is no longer able to enjoy. We recognise that the rule may be problematic in some cases of domestic abuse where the perpetrator can use it to exert control. I appreciate that the aim of the new clause is to find a way around that, to enable victims of abuse to remain in their current home, without fear that the abuser may seek to terminate the tenancy.
We are concerned about a number of areas of the new clause. It would allow the victim to apply to the court to remove the perpetrator from the tenancy, which is intended to effectively transfer the tenancy into the victim’s name. Where there are other joint tenants, it would have the effect of transferring the tenancy into the names of the victim and of those other joint tenants. As my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington pointed out so eloquently—perhaps he should have declared an interest as a long-standing solicitor, as he was bringing his expertise into this—it means that victims may face the prospect of unresolved or remaining debts and costs because of any damage that the perpetrator may have caused to the property. The perpetrator will not be liable, as they will have been removed from the tenancy.
The new clause also fails to provide for how the interests of third parties may be taken into account by the court, including those of the landlord, any other joint tenant or any children in the relationship. A decision to grant a tenancy lies with a landlord. Where a landlord has decided to grant a tenancy to two or more individuals jointly, this new clause means that the number of tenants may be changed without reference to the landlord as the property owner.
It is important to bear in mind that landlords may have other reasons, outside of affordability, for deciding to grant a joint tenancy. In addition, this could amount to an interference with a housing association landlord’s own rights under the human rights legislation. Since this engages other parties’ human rights, we need to consider carefully what is the right approach in order to balance those rights, and ensure that any interference is proportionate and justified.
I understand that officials from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government are engaging with the domestic abuse sector and other relevant stakeholders on these issues, regarding the termination of joint tenancies. I am happy to give a commitment that we will continue to consider the issues with the sector, with a view to arriving at a workable solution.
Turning to new clause 43, this seeks to amend section 199 of the Housing Act 1996, which defines local connection. Local connection relates to how local housing authorities establish and carry out their statutory homelessness duties under part VII of the Act. If an applicant does not have a local connection, as defined by section 199, a housing authority can refer that applicant to another housing authority where they do have a local connection and can access this support. However, under that legislation, the authority must ensure that the conditions for referral are met. This means that a housing authority cannot refer an applicant to another authority if they, or anyone who might reasonably be expected to reside with them, would be at risk of violence.
The homelessness code of guidance makes clear that a housing authority is under a positive duty to enquire whether the applicant would be at such a risk, and stipulates that authorities should not impose a high standard of proof of actual violence in the past when making its decision. The changes the Government propose to make in this Bill, in order to ensure that domestic abuse victims are considered to be in priority need for homelessness assistance, will be strengthened further by amending section 198 of the Housing Act 1996, so that a local authority cannot refer an applicant if there is a risk of not only violence but domestic abuse, as defined in the Bill.
Local connection is also a factor in how many local authorities determine priority for social housing. The allocation of social housing is governed by part VI of the Housing Act 1996. Local authorities must give reasonable preference for social housing to certain groups of people, including those who are homeless or who need to move for medical or welfare reasons. To help them determine the relative priority of applicants who fall into these groups, they may, but are not obliged to, use local connection as defined in section 199. Existing statutory guidance, to which authorities must have regard, makes it clear that they should consider giving additional preference within their allocation schemes to people who are homeless and require urgent rehousing as a result of domestic abuse. Existing legislation and guidance should therefore ensure that the intended purpose of new clause 43 is already in effect. It is not correct to say that a victim of domestic abuse needs to have a local connection for the purposes of a homelessness application, and lack of local connection should not prevent victims of domestic abuse from getting priority for social housing.
May I take a moment to thank my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine for his non-point of order? It is right that my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) be mentioned in Committee. Ministers are always encouraged by the Whips to engage with Back Benchers. It is an important part of the job to listen, consider views and try, where possible, to accommodate them. At the best of times that can be, depending on the Back Bencher, an interesting exercise, but Members can imagine what it is like to try to do Back-Bench engagement with a former Prime Minister who introduced the Bill that is the subject of that engagement: it is on a whole new level. I am delighted that she was mentioned again in the scrutiny of the Bill.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for raising the point covered by the new clause. As she said, it stems from a campaign by the Prison Reform Trust. I note that my hon. Friend the Under- Secretary of State for Justice met trust representatives, the designate domestic abuse commissioner and the Victims Commissioner recently, to discuss the issue, among others. It has very much had his attention, as it now has mine.
We of course recognise the harm that is suffered by victims of domestic abuse. That is why the aim of the Bill is specifically to target it and raise awareness and understanding of its impact. It seeks to raise the profile of domestic abuse in all its forms, particularly given its pernicious nature, and to improve the effectiveness of the justice system in providing protection for victims and bringing perpetrators to justice. It also seeks to strengthen the support for victims and survivors provided by statutory agencies. The definition should help further in clarifying the wide-ranging nature of domestic abuse for all those involved in the criminal justice system, at every level.
There are several defences that are potentially available under the law. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised some cases in her speech. I have to deal with the fact that we have these defences. The hon. Lady herself acknowledged that there will be occasions where those involved in the system do not apply the law in the manner that Parliament intended. None the less, we still have to respect the independence of the judiciary, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police in ensuring that our criminal justice system works. She mentioned the defences of duress and self-defence, which are full defences. In homicide cases we have the partial defences of loss of control and diminished responsibility.
I recognise that legal representatives and the CPS should be made aware, as soon as possible, of domestic abuse histories and their impact, in the course of making charging decisions and when considering guilty pleas. That needs to be balanced alongside the recognition of the harm done by the perpetrator of a crime and the impact on the victim, in order to ensure, wherever possible, that people do not revert to criminal behaviour. That is reflected in the law, which continues to evolve and aims to strike the right balance between these factors.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley relies on the model set out in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We have concerns that that model would create anomalies with other offences. For example, there is a range of offences, mainly serious sexual or violent offences, to which the section 45 defence does not apply, in order to avoid creating a legal loophole for serious criminals to escape justice. The offences that are excluded are set out in schedule 4 to the 2015 Act, which schedule 1 seeks to replicate. Identifying the trigger point resulting in the behaviour that caused the offence remains problematic. If that defence is to be raised, the issue would become at what point in time and in relation to which type of level of domestic abuse the defence became available. Establishing such a threshold would be incredibly difficult. To clarify the circumstances in which the defence would be permissible would likely reduce the applicability or effect of the new defence to the parameters already set out in existing defences. Additionally, a full defence for a defendant subject to domestic abuse would create anomalies with defendants subject to other forms of harm, such as sexual harassment from strangers. Those are anomalies I am sure that none of us would want to see.
Let me deal with the point about the Modern Slavery Act. In earlier debates I talked about the evolving methodology of gang leaders and their efforts to ensnare young people into their gangs. We have in mind that we hear from law enforcement partners that the statutory defence for victims of modern slavery is being misused, primarily by the gang leaders, to persuade the young people they are manipulating and exploiting that it does not matter if they are caught, because they will get off anyway. That will not be the case, particularly for the sorts of serious offences that are not set out in the schedule. This comes back to the point about the ability of perpetrators and those who would exploit and manipulate other human beings, and their never-ending capacity to find new ways to do so—we are concerned about that aspect as well. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned a female victim of a gang being instructed to have sex with members of that gang—sadly, that is a factor that we know happens in gangs. Gang leaders find many ways to exploit vulnerable people in all walks of life, but particularly in those very hard-edged crimes. We are working with criminal justice partners to assess how the modern slavery defence is used in practice and the repercussions of that.
Existing full and partial defences cover circumstances in which a defendant is also the victim of domestic abuse. Indeed, full defences, including duress and self-defence, are defences to any crime, which, if pleaded successfully, result in acquittal. I refer to the debate that I had with the hon. Member for Hove about the decision-making process that the CPS must go through before the decision to charge is taken. At every stage of the criminal justice process, there are checks and balances. For example, at half-time, when the prosecution has closed its case, if the prosecution has failed to establish a case such that a judge feels confident to leave it to the jury, the judge will stop that case there and then. The jury will not be asked to deliver a verdict because the judge has ruled that, at the half-time submission, the evidence is insufficient and the prosecution has not done their job.
We have those checks and balances all the way through to the closing speeches. When I used to prosecute cases, I would always say to the jury, “If you find yourself using the words, ‘Possibly,’ ‘Likely,’ or ‘Probably,’ I have not done my job proving the case against the defendant beyond reasonable doubt.” Those are the sorts of checks and balances that have been worked out over time to ensure that the guilty are convicted and the innocent are acquitted.
Partial defences, such as diminished responsibility and loss of control, reduce a charge for murder to manslaughter. Very recently, the incredibly moving case of Sally Challen not only demonstrated that partial defences can be employed, but showed the improvement in our understanding over a matter of years. Ms Challen was convicted in 2010 and a matter of years later, we have a better understanding of domestic abuse, and her appeal was successful.
Those checks and balances are important to ensure that, wherever possible, victims make their background and circumstances known. I very much hope that the Bill’s success in raising awareness about the sorts of things that the Committee has debated in such depth and degree will ensure that the justice system is as effective as it can be in providing victims and survivors with as much protection as possible—I am sure that I will work on that with colleagues from across the House. On that note, I will conclude.
It seems almost unfair on the Minister that I get the last word on a Bill that she introduced, but that is the system. I welcome what she said, and I will take up that issue with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Cheltenham, and with the Prison Reform Trust.
I am very interested in—but unsurprised about—the idea that, in the Modern Slavery Bill, there is potential to say, “You are going to get away with it,” without recognising that what we are talking about here is mostly minor crimes—nothing that causes harm to others, no sexual abuse and no domestic abuse. However, it is very much the case that in patterns of abuse, people end up abusing other people. That is a complex area and we want fairness both for those who are accused and for those who are suffering. I will withdraw the new clause, and everybody can finally be done with the millions of amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
On a point of order, this is the moment at which it is customary to say a few words to mark the end of our deliberations in Committee and to reflect on the intensive scrutiny that the Bill has received, but also to thank certain people for their help in assisting the Committee with our scrutiny. These thanks come very much from my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham as well as from me. He is busy elsewhere in the Palace, but he is very keen to thank people as well.
First, I thank you, Mr Bone, and Ms Buck. You have both managed to keep us in order at an appropriate distance, which is a skill. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham; it has been a genuine pleasure to work on this stage of the Bill with him. He has shown just what an expert he is as a Justice Minister, having been in the job for only a very short period. He is a real joy to work with and has really made his mark already.
They are not often thanked, but I also thank my Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point, who has been excellent in ensuring that, on most days—every day, in fact—we finish on time. She has also been very generous with the hand sanitiser. I genuinely thank the Opposition Front Benchers. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has brought all her experience outside this place into the Committee room, and I sincerely thank her for that. I thank the hon. Member for Hove for his very pertinent but charmingly articulated points, which can often be deadlier than shouting and creating a fuss. I also thank the hon. Member for Blaydon, the Opposition Whip—our Whips play an incredibly important part in ensuring that the Committee works properly and works to a timetable.
Of course, I thank the Clerks, who have had to, with other colleagues in the House, really test what the Palace—and this room—can accommodate in these very difficult circumstances. Thanks, of course, go to Hansard. It seems like a lifetime ago that we were in Portcullis House and being instructed that Members sat at the back of the Public Gallery would have to shout for Hansard—what extraordinary times, but we managed it. I would normally thank the Doorkeepers; we have not had any Doorkeepers, but I thank them anyway.
I thank the officials and lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Department of Work and Pensions, the Department for Education, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Health and Social Care—seven Government Departments have been involved in the Bill thus far. Special mention must go to a certain Charles Goldie, the Bill manager. This is, I believe, the 20th Bill—[Interruption]—the 21st Bill that Charles has manoeuvred through Parliament in expert fashion. To put that in context, last night, when we were dealing with one of today’s new clauses—the reasonable force clause—I discovered that the 2008 Act on which the hon. Member for Hove was relying was managed by a certain Charles Goldie.
I do not want anyone to feel left out, so I must thank Kate in my private office, who has been doing amazing work alongside Robert, who is the MOJ private secretary. They have really tried to get around the awful fact that we cannot have box notes, so Kate has been tapping away furiously. I thank her very much for everything that she does.
I thank the other members of the Committee for what has been really interesting, thoughtful and thought-provoking scrutiny. I hope that they feel that they have both contributed to and gained from that. I look forward to their contributions at the next stage.
Finally, I thank all the witnesses who contributed, both in person and in written form. Particular thank go to the organisations that work on the frontline with domestic abuse victims and survivors, and to the victims, who were very brave and came to give live evidence before the Committee to tell us their lived experiences. Thanks to them all—that is why we are trying to pass this piece of legislation.
Thank you, Minister, for that totally bogus point of order. It was one of the longest points of order that I have ever had, but perhaps one of the best.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 16—Special measures in family proceedings: victims of domestic abuse.
Government new clause 17—Special measures in civil proceedings: victims of specified offences.
Government new clause 18—Prohibition of cross-examination in person in civil proceedings.
Government new clause 20—Consent to serious harm for sexual gratification not a defence.
New clause 1—Pornography and domestic violence: research—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission research into the impact of pornography consumption on levels of domestic violence.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay the research before Parliament within 12 months of this Act being passed.”
New clause 2—Research into the incidence of domestic abuse within different living arrangements—
The Secretary of State must commission research on the incidence of domestic abuse in the context of different forms of relationship including marriage, civil partnerships and cohabitation, with special respect to both adult and child wellbeing and reporting to the House with this research and policy recommendations within 12 months of this Act becoming law.”
New clause 3—Report on domestic abuse incidence and sentencing—
The Secretary of State must provide a report to the House reviewing trends in the incidences of domestic abuse and sentencing for domestic abuse offences over the last ten years in England and Wales with a view to making policy recommendations including with respect to increasing both minimum and maximum sentences for domestic abuse offences and present to Parliament within the 12 months of this Act becoming law.
New clause 4—No defence for consent to death—
‘(1) If a person (“A”) wounds, assaults or asphyxiates another person (“B”) to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act causing death, it is not a defence to a prosecution that B consented to the infliction of injury.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the death occurred in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter.”
This new clause would prevent consent of the victim from being used as a defence to a prosecution in domestic homicides.
New clause 5—No defence for consent to injury—
‘(1) If a person (“A”) wounds, assaults or asphyxiates another person (“B”) to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act causing actual bodily harm or more serious injury, it is not a defence to a prosecution that B consented to the infliction of injury or asphyxiation.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the actual bodily harm, non-fatal strangulation, or more serious injury occurred in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter.”
This new clause would prevent consent of the victim from being used as a defence to a prosecution in cases of domestic abuse which result in serious injury.
New clause 6—Consent of Director of Public Prosecutions—
In any homicide case in which all or any of the injuries involved in the death, whether or not they are the proximate cause of it, were inflicted in the course of domestic abuse, the Crown Prosecution Service may not without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, in respect of the death—
(a) charge a person with manslaughter or any other offence less than the charge of murder, or
(b) accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter or any other lesser offence.”
This new clause would require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions if, in any homicide case in which any of the injuries were inflicted in the course of domestic abuse, the charge (or the plea to be accepted) is of anything less than murder.
New clause 7—Director of Public Prosecutions consultation with victim’s family in domestic homicides—
‘(1) Before deciding whether or not to give consent to charging a person with manslaughter or any other offence less than the charge of murder in an offence of homicide in which domestic abuse was involved, the Director of Public Prosecutions must consult the immediate family of the deceased.
(2) The Lord Chancellor must make arrangements, including the provision of a grant, to enable the immediate family to access legal advice prior to being consulted by the Director of Public Prosecutions under subsection (1).”
This new clause would require the Director of Public Prosecutions to consult the immediate family of the victim before charging less than murder in a domestic homicide and provide the family with legal advice so they can understand the legal background.
New clause 8—Offence of non-fatal strangulation—
A person (A) commits an offence if that person unlawfully strangles, suffocates or asphyxiates another person (B), where the strangulation, suffocation or asphyxiation does not result in B’s death.”
This new clause will create a new offence of non-fatal strangulation.
New clause 9—Offence of non-fatal strangulation in domestic abuse context—
A person (A) commits an offence if that person unlawfully strangles, suffocates or asphyxiates another person (B) to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act, where the strangulation, suffocation or asphyxiation does not result in B’s death.”
This new clause will create a new offence of non-fatal strangulation in domestic abuse offences.
New clause 10—Prohibition of reference to sexual history of the deceased in domestic homicide trials—
If at a trial a person is charged with an offence of homicide in which domestic abuse was involved, then—
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and
(b) no question may be asked in cross-examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial,
about any sexual behaviour of the deceased.”
This new clause will prevent the victim’s previous sexual history being used as evidence to prove consent to violence in a domestic homicide case. This draws on the legislative measures in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to prevent rape defendants raking up or inventing complainants’ previous sexual history.
New clause 11—Anonymity for victims in domestic homicides—
‘(1) Where a person (“A”) has been accused of a domestic homicide offence and where the person (“B”) against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed has died in the course of sexual activity, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as B shall be included in any publication.
(2) The matters relating to a person in relation to which the restrictions imposed by subsection (1) applies (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in that subsection) include in particular—
(a) the person’s name,
(b) the person’s address,
(c) the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by the person,
(d) the identity of any place of work,
(e) any still or moving picture of the person.
(3) If, at the commencement of the trial, any of the matters in subsection (2) have already appeared in any publication, the judge at the trial may direct that no further reference to any of these matters may be included in any publication.
(4) If any matter is included in a publication in contravention of this section, the following persons shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale—
(a) where the publication is a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, any editor and any publisher of the newspaper or periodical;
(b) where the publication is a relevant programme—
(i) any body corporate engaged in providing the programme service in which the programme is included; and
(ii) any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper;
(c) in the case of any other publication, any person publishing it.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
“domestic homicide offence” means an offence of murder or manslaughter which has involved domestic abuse;
a “publication” includes any speech, writing, relevant programme, social media posting or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public (and for this purpose every relevant programme shall be taken to be so addressed), but does not include an indictment or other document prepared for use in particular legal proceedings.”
This new clause will provide the victim of a domestic homicide with public anonymity.
New clause 12—Domestic abuse: report on incidence and sentencing—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of Royal Assent being given to this Act, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on—
(a) the incidence of domestic abuse in England and Wales since 1 January 2010, and
(b) sentencing for any offence where judgment was handed down after 1 January 2010 and it was alleged that the behaviour of the accused amounted to domestic abuse.
(2) A purpose of a report under subsection (1) shall be to inform a decision on whether or not to increase the minimum or maximum sentence for any offence where it is found the behaviour of the accused amounted to domestic abuse.
(3) “Domestic abuse” shall, for the purposes of this section, have the meaning given in section 1 of this Act.”
New clause 13—Screening for acquired brain injury in domestic abuse cases—
‘(1) A woman who has been the subject of domestic abuse shall, with her consent, be screened for traumatic brain injury, and other forms of acquired brain injury, including concussion.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a woman has been the subject of domestic abuse if—
(a) she is the person for whose protection a domestic abuse protection notice or a domestic abuse protection order has been issued, or
(b) she is the person against whom it is alleged that domestic abuse has been perpetrated when the accused is charged with an offence that amounts to domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of this Act.
(3) In the case of subsection (2)(a), the screening shall take place within two weeks of a domestic abuse protection notice or a domestic abuse protection order being issued.
(4) In the case of subsection (2)(b), the screening shall take place within two weeks of a charge being made for an offence where it is alleged that the behaviour of the accused amounts to domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of this Act.”
New clause 14—Acquired brain injury screening for female prisoners—
‘(1) All female prisoners must be screened for traumatic brain injury, and other forms of acquired brain injury, including concussion, within two weeks of starting their sentence.
(2) A purpose of the screening will be to assist in a determination as to whether a prisoner has been the subject of domestic abuse.
(3) If the screening shows that there is an acquired brain injury—
(a) an assessment must be made of whether such an injury has been acquired as a result of domestic abuse, and
(b) the prisoner must be given appropriate rehabilitation treatment and advice.”
New clause 19—Anonymity of domestic abuse survivors in criminal proceedings—
‘(1) Where an allegation has been made that a relevant offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the survivor.
(2) Where a person is accused of a relevant offence, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed as the survivor shall during the survivor’s lifetime be included in any publication.
(3) This section does not apply in relation to a person by virtue of subsection (1) at any time after a person has been accused of the offence.
(4) The matters relating to a survivor in relation to which the restrictions imposed by subsection (1) or (2) apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in that subsection) include—
(a) the survivor’s name;
(b) the survivor’s address;
(c) the identity of any school or other educational establishment the survivor attended;
(d) the identity of any place where the survivor worked;
(e) any still or moving pictures of the survivor; and
(f) any other matter that might lead to the identification of the survivor.
(5) At the commencement of a trial at which a person is charged with a relevant offence, the judge may issue a direction for lifting the restrictions only following an application by or on behalf of the survivor.
(6) Any matter that is included in a publication in contravention of this section must be deleted from that publication and no further reference to the matter may be made in any publication.
(7) If any matter is included in a publication in contravention of this section, the following persons shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale—
(a) where the publication is a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, any editor and any publisher of the newspaper or periodical;
(b) where the publication is a relevant programme—
(i) any body corporate or Scottish partnership engaged in providing the programme service in which the programme is included; and
(ii) any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper;
(c) in the case of any other publication, any person publishing it.
(8) For the purposes of the section—
“publication” means any material published online or in physical form as any well as any speech, writing, website, online news outlet, social media posting, relevant programme or other communication in whatever form which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public;
a “relevant offence” means any offence where it is alleged by the survivor that the behaviour of the accused amounted to domestic abuse;
“survivor” means the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.”
This new clause provides lifetime press anonymity for survivors of domestic abuse, and reflects similar protections for survivors of sexual assault enshrined in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. It prevents identifiable details from be published online or in print, and creates a new offence for breaching this anonymity.
New clause 21—Register for domestic abuse—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for the creation of a register containing the name, home address and national insurance number of any person (P) convicted of an offence that constitutes domestic abuse as defined in section 1 of this Act.
(2) Each police force in England and Wales shall be responsible for ensuring that the register is kept up to date with all relevant offences committed in the police force’s area.
(3) Each police force in England and Wales shall be responsible for ensuring that P notifies relevant police forces within 14 days if they commence a new sexual or romantic relationship.
(4) A failure to notify the police in the circumstances set out in subsection (4) shall be an offence liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
(5) The relevant police force shall have the right to inform any person involved in a relationship with P of P’s convictions for domestic abuse as defined in section 1 of this Act.”
This new clause would require that any person convicted of any offence of domestic abuse as defined in section 1 must have their details recorded on a domestic abuse register to ensure that all the perpetrator’s subsequent partners have full access to information regarding their domestic abuse offences.
New clause 22—Recourse to public funds for domestic abuse survivors—
‘(1) The Immigration Acts are amended as follows.
(2) In section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 after subsection (10) insert—
“(11) This section does not apply to a person who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom who provides evidence in one or more of the forms set out in section [Recourse to public funds for domestic abuse survivors] of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”
(3) In paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 after sub-paragraph (b) insert—
“(ba) to a person who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom who provides evidence in one or more of the forms set out in section [Recourse to public funds for domestic abuse survivors] of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020, or”.
(4) In section 21 of the Immigration Act 2014 at the end of subsection (3) insert “or if P is a victim of domestic abuse”.
(5) In section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may not make or maintain a condition under subsection (1)(c)(ii) on leave granted to a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom who provides evidence in one or more of the forms set out in section [Recourse to public funds for domestic abuse survivors] of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020; and it is not a breach of the immigration laws or rules for such a victim to have recourse to public funds.”
(6) For the purposes of this section, evidence that a person is a victim of domestic abuse may consist of one or more of the following—
(a) a relevant conviction, police caution or protection notice;
(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders), including a non-molestation undertaking or order, occupation order, domestic abuse protection order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;
(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic abuse;
(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference;
(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic abuse;
(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming injuries or a condition consistent with being a victim of domestic abuse;
(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she is satisfied on the basis of an examination that a person had injuries or a condition consistent with those of a victim of domestic abuse;
(h) an undertaking given to a court by the alleged perpetrator of domestic abuse that he or she will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;
(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in providing services to a person in respect of allegations of domestic abuse;
(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic abuse support organisation; or
(k) other evidence of domestic abuse, including from a counsellor, midwife, school, witness or the victim.
(7) For the purposes of this section—
“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;
“victim” includes the dependent child of a person who is a victim of domestic abuse.
(8) Within 12 months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission a review into the operation of the provisions in this section.
(9) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report setting out the findings of the review.”
This new clause seeks to ensure that certain provisions under the Immigration Acts – including exclusion from public funds, certain types of support and assistance and the right to rent – do not apply to survivors of domestic abuse. There will be a review into the operation of this provision.
New clause 23—Commissioning specialist domestic abuse services for victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse—
‘(1) It is the duty of relevant public authorities in England and non-devolved relevant public authorities in Wales in the exercise of their functions to commission sufficient specialist services for all persons affected by domestic abuse regardless of status.
(2) To ensure compliance with the duty under subsection (1) public authorities must—
(a) regularly assess population and support needs changes in their area;
(b) take account of any strategy to end violence against women and girls adopted by a Minister of the Crown; and
(c) co-operate to discharge the duty.
(3) The Secretary of State may issue regulations making provision for the resolution of disputes between public authorities relating to the discharge of the duty under subsection (1).
(4) In relation to the provision of domestic abuse support as defined by section 54(2), each relevant local authority may discharge the duty under subsection (2)(a) through compliance with its obligations under section 54(1)(a).
(5) In performing the duty under subsection (1) a relevant public authority must secure sufficient specialist services for (among others) the following persons—
(a) any victim of domestic abuse aged over 18;
(b) any child aged under 18 who experiences or witnesses domestic abuse;
(c) any person aged over 18 who exhibits abusive behaviour towards another person to whom they are personally connected;
(d) any child aged under 18 who exhibits abusive behaviour towards another person to whom they are personally connected.
(6) In performing the duty under subsection (1), a relevant public authority must where necessary secure specialist services designed to meet the particular needs of a group that shares a status to ensure appropriate and effective service provision.
(7) In this section—
“abusive behaviour” is behaviour that is abusive within the definition in section 1(3).
“domestic abuse” has the meaning given by Part 1 of this Act.
“personally connected” has the meaning given in section 2 of this Act.
“relevant public authorities” are public authorities with statutory functions relevant to the provision of specialist services, including but not limited to—
(a) Ministers of the Crown and Government departments;
(b) local government in England;
(c) NHS Trusts in England;
(d) Police and Crime Commissioners;
(e) prison, police and probation services.
“status” means a status for the purpose of Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, and combined forms of any such status.
“specialist services” include but are not limited to the following when provided in connection with domestic abuse, whether provided by a public authority or any other person or body—
(a) protective measures and action taken to protect persons against domestic abuse;
(b) residential accommodation, including refuge services and other relevant accommodation and support as defined in section 54(2);
(c) counselling and other support;
(d) advocacy services;
(e) access to welfare benefits;
(f) perpetrator programmes;
(g) financial support;
(h) legal services;
(i) helplines;
(j) services designed to meet the particular needs of a group that shares a status to ensure appropriate and effective service provision, including separate or single-sex services within the meaning given in Part 7 of Schedule 3 the Equality Act, and “communal accommodation” within the meaning given in paragraph 3 of Schedule 23 to the Equality Act 2010.
“victims of domestic abuse” includes—
(a) persons towards whom domestic abuse is directed and
(b) persons who are reasonably believed to be at risk of domestic abuse.”
This new clause would establish a statutory duty on relevant public authorities to commission specialist support and services to all persons affected by domestic abuse. This includes refuge and community-based services; specialist services for groups with protected characteristics; services for children and young people; services for perpetrators.
New clause 24—Proceedings under the Children Act 1989—
‘(1) Part I of the Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 (the welfare of the child) after subsection (2B) insert—
“(2C) Subsection (2A) shall not apply in relation to a parent where there has been domestic abuse which has affected the child or other parent.
(2D) Evidence of domestic abuse may be provided in one or more of the forms set out in regulation 33(2) of the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012.”
(3) Part II of the Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.
(4) In section 9 (restrictions on making section 8 orders) after subsection (7) insert—
“(8) No court shall make a section 8 order for a child to spend unsupervised time with or have unsupervised contact with a parent who is—
(a) awaiting trial, or on bail for, a domestic abuse offence, or
(b) involved in ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic abuse offence.
(8A) In subsection (8)—
“unsupervised” means where a court approved third party is not present at all times during contact with the parent to ensure the physical safety and emotional wellbeing of a child;
“domestic abuse offence” means an offence which the Crown Prosecution Service alleges to have involved domestic abuse.””
This new clause seeks to change the presumption that parental involvement furthers the child’s welfare when there has been domestic abuse. It also prohibits unsupervised contact for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for domestic abuse offences, or where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse.
New clause 25—Effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must take steps to ensure that all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, receive—
(a) equally effective protection against domestic abuse, and
(b) equally effective support.
(2) In this section—
“status” includes a status for the purpose of Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence and any combined forms of such status.
“victims of domestic abuse” includes persons who are reasonably believed to be at risk of domestic abuse.”
This new clause ensures all victims of domestic abuse are protected, regardless of their status, in line with Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention).
New clause 26—Victims of domestic abuse: leave to remain—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of this Act being passed, lay a statement of changes in rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the immigration rules”) to make provision for leave to remain to be granted to any person subject to immigration control who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom.
(2) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules for the granting of indefinite leave to remain to any person subject to immigration control who is a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom; and the statement must provide for those rules to be commenced no later than one month of the laying of the statement.
(3) The Secretary of State must make provision for granting limited leave to remain for a period of no less than 6 months to any person eligible to make an application under the immigration rules for the purposes of subsection (2); and such leave shall include no condition under section 3(1)(c)(i), (ia), (ii) or (v) of the Immigration Act 1971.
(4) The Secretary of State must make provision for extending limited leave to remain granted in accordance with subsection (3) to ensure that leave continues throughout the period during which an application made under the immigration rules for the purposes of subsection (2) remains pending.
(5) Where subsection (6) applies, notwithstanding any statutory or other provision, no services shall be withheld from a victim of domestic abuse solely by reason of that person not having leave to remain or having leave to remain subject to a condition under section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971.
(6) This subsection applies where a provider of services is satisfied that the victim of domestic abuse is eligible to make an application to which subsection (3) refers.
(7) The Secretary of State must, for the purposes of subsection (5), issue guidance to providers of services about the assessment of eligibility to make an application to which subsection (3) refers.
(8) In this section—
an application is “pending” during the period—
(a) beginning when it is made,
(b) ending when it is finally decided, withdrawn or abandoned, and an application is not finally decided while an application for review or appeal could be made within the period permitted for either or while any such review or appeal remains pending (meaning that review or appeal has not been finally decided, withdrawn or abandoned);
“person subject to immigration control” means a person in the United Kingdom who does not have the right of abode;
“provider of services” includes both public and private bodies;
“services” includes accommodation, education, employment, financial assistance, healthcare and any service provided exclusively or particularly to survivors of domestic abuse.”
This new clause would make provision in the immigration rules for the granting of indefinite leave to remain to migrant survivors of domestic abuse and limited leave to remain to a survivor who is eligible to make an application for indefinite leave to remain.
New clause 27—Victims of domestic abuse: data-sharing for immigration purposes—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim of a domestic abuse in the United Kingdom that is processed for the purpose of that person requesting or receiving support or assistance related to domestic abuse is not used for any immigration control purpose without the consent of that person.
(2) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that the personal data of a witness to domestic abuse in the United Kingdom that is processed for the purpose of that person giving information or evidence to assist the investigation or prosecution of that abuse, or to assist the victim of that abuse in any legal proceedings, is not used for any immigration control purpose without the consent of that person.
(3) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 shall not apply to the personal data to which subsection (1) or (2) applies.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to—
(a) persons from whom support or assistance may be requested or received by a victim of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom;
(b) persons exercising any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality; and
(c) persons exercising any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
“consent” means a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the victim or witness, by an express statement of that person signifying agreement to the processing of the personal data for the relevant purpose;
“immigration control purpose” means any purpose of the functions to which subsection (4)(ii) and (iii) refers;
“support or assistance” includes the provision of accommodation, banking services, education, employment, financial or social assistance, healthcare and policing services; and any function of a court or prosecuting authority;
“victim” includes any dependent of a person, at whom the domestic abuse is directed, where that dependent is affected by that abuse.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that the personal data of migrant survivors of domestic abuse that is given or used for the purpose of their seeking or receiving support and assistance is not used for immigration control purposes.
New clause 28—Enabling access to abortion in abusive relationships—
‘(1) The Abortion Act 1967 is amended as follows.
(2) At the end of section 1 add—
“(5) Subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to the termination of a pregnancy by a registered medical practitioner who is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the woman is unable to access treatment for the termination of pregnancy in a hospital or a place approved by the Secretary of State under subsection (3) by reason of the abusive behaviour of a person with whom the woman is personally connected within the meaning of section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.””
In cases of domestic abuse where a woman seeking an abortion is subject to coercive control, this new clause would remove the legal requirement for attendance at a hospital or licensed premises in order to access lawful abortion services.
Amendment (a), line 4 after “apply to the” insert “medical”
Amendment (b), line 6 after “faith,” insert
“that the pregnancy has not exceeded nine weeks and six days and”
Amendment (c), line 10 at end insert—
‘(3) This section may not take effect until the Government has conducted an inquiry into the safety, number, and impact of abortions carried out under the temporary coronavirus crisis provisions where the place of abortion was the woman’s home, and has laid a Report on this before Parliament.”
New clause 30—Local Welfare Provision schemes—
‘(1) Every local authority in England must deliver a Local Welfare Provision scheme which provides financial assistance to victims of domestic abuse.
(2) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on the nature and scope of Local Welfare Provision schemes and review this biannually in consultation with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and other such individuals and agencies the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(3) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must provide local authorities with additional funding designated for Local Welfare Provision, to increase per year with inflation.
(4) For the purposes of this subsection “domestic abuse” is defined in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”
This new clause would allow victims of domestic abuse to access a local welfare assistance scheme in any locality across England.
New clause 31—Guidance: Child maintenance—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to the payment of child maintenance where the person with care of the child is a victim of domestic abuse.
(2) Guidance issued under this section must take account of—
(a) the potential for the withholding or reducing of child maintenance to constitute economic abuse under section 1(4) of this Act;
(b) the need for enforcement action to prevent non-payment; and
(c) the difficulties faced by victims of domestic abuse in obtaining evidence to support an application for a variation of a child maintenance calculation.
(3) The Child Maintenance Service must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.
(4) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and
(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued under this section.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the Child Maintenance Service to tackle the problem of abusers continuing economic abuse by withholding or reducing child maintenance payments.
New clause 32—Assessment and management of serial and serious domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators—
Within six months of the commencement of this Act, a Minister of the Crown must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament reviewing arrangements for assessing and managing the risk presented by serial and serious harm domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators.”
New clause 33—Monitoring of serial and serious harm domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators under MAPPA—
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 325 (Arrangements for assessing etc risk posed by certain offenders) —
(a) in subsection (1), after ““relevant sexual or violent offender” has the meaning given by section 327” insert—
““relevant domestic abuse or stalking perpetrator” has the meaning given in section 327ZA;”;
(b) in subsection (2)(a), after “offenders” insert “(aa) relevant domestic abuse or stalking perpetrators,”.
(3) After section 327 (Section 325: interpretation) insert—
“327ZA Section 325: interpretation of relevant domestic abuse or stalking perpetrator
(1) For the purposes of section 325—
a person (“P”) is a “relevant domestic abuse or stalking perpetrator” if P has been convicted of a specified offence and meets either the condition in subsection (2)(a) or the condition in subsection (2)(b).
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the conditions are—
(a) P is a relevant serial offender;
(b) a risk of serious harm assessment has identified P as presenting a high or very high risk of serious harm.
(3) An offence is a “specified offence” for the purposes of this section if it is a specified domestic abuse offence or a specified stalking offence.
(4) In this section—
“relevant serial offender” means a person convicted on more than one occasion for the same specified offence; or a person convicted of more than one specified offence;
“specified domestic abuse offence” means an offence where it is alleged that the behaviour of the accused amounted to domestic abuse within the meaning defined in Section 1 of this Act;
“specified stalking offence” means an offence contrary to section 2A or section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
(5) Within six months of the commencement of this section, a Minister of the Crown must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament reviewing the interpretation of the term “relevant domestic abuse or stalking perpetrator” for the purposes of section 325.
(6) A report under subsection (5) must give specific consideration to arrangements for assessing and managing the risks of domestic abuse or stalking posed by perpetrators convicted of offences other than a specified offence.
(7) Subject to a report under subsection (5) being laid before both Houses of Parliament, a Minister of the Crown may by regulations amend this section.”
This new clause amends the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides for the establishment of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (“MAPPA”), to make arrangements for serial domestic abuse or stalking perpetrators to be registered on VISOR and be subjected to supervision, monitoring and management through MAPPA.
New clause 34—Threat to disclose private photographs and films with intent to cause distress—
In the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, after section 13 insert—
“33A Threat to disclose private photographs and films with intent to cause distress
(1) It is an offence for a person to threaten to disclose a private sexual photograph or film of a person to whom they are personally connected without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film if the threat is made to either—
(a) the individual who appears in the photograph or film, or
(b) another individual who is intended to tell the individual who appears in the photograph or film,
(2) But it is not an offence under this section for the person to threaten to disclose the photograph or film to the individual mentioned in subsection (1)(a).
(3) For the meaning of “consent” see section 33(7)(a).
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable —
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both), and
(b) (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine (or both).
(5) (5) For the purposes of this section, “personally connected” has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020.”
New clause 35—Duty to co-operate: children awaiting NHS treatment—
‘(1) The Commissioner must within 6 months after section 14 comes into force issue a request under that section to the NHS bodies in England mentioned in subsection (2) to co-operate with the Commissioner to secure that the objective set out in subsection (3) is met within 12 months after that section comes into force and continues to be met.
(2) The bodies are—
(a) every clinical commissioning group established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006, and
(b) every other NHS body in England (as defined in section 14(7)) whose co-operation the Commissioner thinks is necessary to secure that the objective set out in subsection (3) is met.
(3) The objective is that where a child affected by domestic abuse has been referred for NHS care or treatment in the area (“Area A”) of a clinical commissioning group as a result of being so affected moves to the area (“Area B”) of another clinical commissioning group, the child receives that care or treatment no later than it would have been received in Area A.”
New clause 36—School admissions—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months after this section comes into force, secure that the school admissions code issued for England under section 84 of the Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998 (“1998 Act”) contains such provision as the Secretary of State considers necessary to achieve the objective set out in subsection (5).
(2) The Secretary of State must secure that the Commissioner is consulted about any proposed provision under subsection (1).
(3) The Welsh Ministers must, within six months after this section comes into force, secure that the Welsh Government school admissions code issued under section 84 of the 1998 Act contains such provision as the Welsh Ministers consider necessary to achieve the objective set out in subsection (5).
(4) The Welsh Ministers must secure that the Commissioner is consulted about any proposed provision under subsection (3).
(5) The objective is that—
(a) oversubscription criteria for admission to any school to which the school admissions code applies give the same priority to children falling within subsection (6) as to looked-after children (within the meaning of section 22(1) of the Children Act 1989), and
(b) the Code contains appropriate guidance about admission of children who have moved home to avoid domestic abuse or who are otherwise affected by domestic abuse.
(6) A child falls within this subsection if the child—
(a) is in the care of, or provided with accommodation by, a body exercising a function in respect of children affected by domestic abuse which, if the body were a local authority, would be a social services function of the kind mentioned in section 22(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, or
(b) has moved home as a result of being affected by domestic abuse.”
Amendment 3, clause 1, page 1, line 15, after “abuse”, insert “(see subsection (4A))”
This amendment would provide the ability to further define specific abuse.
Amendment 25, page 2, line 3, after “that” insert
“, unless A believed they were acting in B’s best interest and the behaviour in all the circumstances was reasonable,”
This amendment is alternative to Amendment 1. It clarifies that economic abuse has to be unreasonable and not cover incidents of the withholding of money where it is intended to be in a person‘s best interest – e.g. someone caring for another or the partner of a gambling addict who gives consent. This amendment uses similar wording to the defence for controlling and coercive behaviour.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 3, after “effect”, insert “without permission, consent, necessity or any other good reason”
The aim of this amendment would be to specify that economic abuse has to be deliberate and unreasonable not just the withholding of money, for example, with lawful authority or good reason – e.g. someone caring for someone or the partner of a gambling addict who gives consent etc.
Amendment 2, page 2, line 5, leave out “acquire, use or maintain money or other property” and insert
“maintain their own money or personal property”
The aim of this amendment would be to specify that economic abuse must involve the person’s own money and not the lawful property of someone else.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 6, at end insert—
‘(4A) “Psychological, emotional or other abuse” includes but is not limited to—
(a) parental alienation, false allegations of domestic abuse by A against B, or
(b) A deliberately preventing B having contact with their child or children for no good reason.”
This amendment gives specific examples of domestic abuse – parental alienation, false allegations of domestic abuse and the prevention of contact with a parent for no good reason.
Amendment 24, page 2, line 6, at end insert—
‘(4A) “Psychological, emotional or other abuse” includes but is not limited to—
(a) parental alienation, or
(b) A deliberately preventing B having contact with their child or children for no good reason.”
This amendment is alternative to Amendment 4. It gives specific examples of domestic abuse – parental alienation and the prevention of contact with a parent for no good reason.
Amendment 5, page 2, line 6, at end insert—
‘(4B) “Parental alienation” is defined as a child’s resistance or hostility towards parent B which is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by parent A.”
This amendment defines parental alienation.
Amendment 6, page 2, line 7, leave out subsection (5)
This amendment removes the potential creation of two victims of a single act of abuse.
Amendment 7, page 2, line 10, leave out subsection (6)
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 6.
Amendment 11, clause 6, page 4, line 3, after “the” insert “objective”
This amendment aims to ensure there is no bias and that pre-conceived notions do not form part of the identification of domestic abuse process.
Amendment 12, page 4, line 8, after “abuse” insert “;
(e) a gender-neutral approach to domestic abuse”
This amendment would recognise explicitly that domestic violence affects everyone regardless of their sex.
Amendment 13, page 4, line 23, at end insert—
“(h) monitoring the estimated number of actual victims of domestic abuse compared to those prosecuted for such offences according to the sex of the victim and making recommendations to address any differences in outcomes between the sexes;”
This amendment would make sure that male and female perpetrators of domestic abuse are prosecuted in similar relative numbers.
Amendment 14, page 4, line 23, at end insert—
“(i) monitoring the estimated number of actual victims of domestic abuse in same sex relationships by gender.”
This amendment would ensure that those in same sex relationships are separately monitored in line with the gender neutral approach to domestic abuse.
Amendment 40, clause 7, page 5, line 2, leave out “the Secretary of State” and insert “Parliament”
This amendment changes the provision enabling the Commissioner to report to the Secretary of State to one enabling the Commissioner to report to Parliament.
Amendment 41, page 5, line 5, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—
‘(3) The Commissioner must ensure that no material is included in the report which—
(a) might jeopardise the safety of any person, or
(b) might prejudice the investigation or prosecution of an offence.
(4) The Commissioner must send a copy of any report published under this section to the Secretary of State.”
This amendment is linked to Amendment 40.
Amendment 15, clause 11, page 6, line 38, after “Board”)” insert
“through an open recruitment process”
This amendment would ensure that members of the Advisory Board are appointed via an open recruitment process.
Amendment 19, page 7, line 7, after the first “of” insert
“each of (a) male and (b) female”
This amendment would ensure that different people separately representing the interests of male and female victims are appointed to the Advisory Board.
Amendment 46, page 7, line 7, after “abuse” insert—
“in England;
“(aa) at least one person appearing to the Commissioner to represent the interests of victims of domestic abuse in Wales”
This amendment would require representation for domestic abuse victims in Wales, ensuring that both the interests of domestic abuse victims in England and Wales are equally addressed.
Amendment 20, page 7, line 9, after “with” insert
“each of (a) male and (b) female”
This amendment would ensure that different people separately representing the interests of male and female organisations are on the Advisory Board.
Amendment 16, page 7, line 11, leave out paragraph (c)
This amendment would remove the necessity for a representative of health care providers to be on the Advisory Board to make space for representatives of both male and female victims/groups.
Amendment 17, page 7, line 14, leave out paragraph (d)
This amendment would remove the necessity for a representative of social care providers to be on the Advisory Board to make space for representatives of both male and female victims/groups.
Amendment 44, page 7, line 21, after “abuse” insert “;
(g) at least one person appearing to the Commissioner to represent the interests of charities and other voluntary organisations that work with victims of sexual violence and abuse that amounts to domestic abuse in England”
This amendment will add a representative of sexual violence and abuse specialist services in a domestic context to the Commissioner’s advisory board.
Amendment 18, page 7, line 24, leave out subsection (6)
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 17.
Amendment 42, clause 13, page 8, line 16, leave out from “must” to “on” and insert “report to Parliament”
This amendment changes the requirement for the Commissioner to submit an annual report to the Secretary of State to a requirement to report to Parliament.
Amendment 43, page 8, line 25, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—
‘(3) The Commissioner must arrange for a copy of every annual report under this section to be laid before Parliament.
(4) Before laying the report before Parliament, the Commissioner must ensure that no material is included in the report which—
(a) might jeopardise the safety of any person, or
(b) might prejudice the investigation or prosecution of an offence.”
This amendment is linked to Amendment 42.
Amendment 21, clause 55, page 36, line 11, after the first “of” insert
“each of (a) male and (b) female”
This amendment would ensure that different people separately represent the interests of both male and female victims on the domestic abuse local partnership boards.
Amendment 22, page 36, line 15, after “with” insert
“each of (a) male and (b) female”
This amendment would ensure that different people separately represent the interests of both male and female organisations on the domestic abuse local partnership boards.
Amendment 45, page 36, line 22, after “area” insert “;
(h) at least one person appearing to the authority to represent the interests of charities and other voluntary organisations that work with victims of sexual violence and abuse that amounts to domestic abuse in its area”
This amendment adds a representative of Sexual Violence and Abuse specialist services in a domestic context to the Local Authority’s advisory partnership.
Government amendments 27 to 29.
Amendment 26, page 46, line 38, leave out Clause 64.
Amendment 8, clause 67, page 51, line 12, leave out paragraph (b)
This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 6.
Amendment 23, page 51, line 15, at end insert—
‘(4) If it transpires that the local authority has been given incorrect information or that it has taken into account false allegations of domestic abuse as the basis for granting a tenancy, it must revoke the secure tenancy within 7 days of receiving this information by giving the tenant 28 days notice to quit in addition to passing on such information to the police, where they are not already involved, as soon as is practicable thereafter.”
This amendment makes provision for someone who has made false allegations of domestic abuse to lose the home they gained under these false pretences.
Amendment 35, clause 68, page 51, line 28, at end insert—
‘(2A) The Secretary of State must issue guidance under this section which takes account of evidence about the relationship between domestic abuse and offences involving hostility based on sex.
(2B) In preparing guidance under subsection (2A) the Secretary of State must require the chief officer of police of any police force to provide information relating to—
(a) the number of relevant crimes reported to the police force; and
(b) the number of relevant crimes reported to the police force which, in the opinion of the chief officer of police, have also involved domestic abuse.
(2C) In this section—
“chief officer of police” and “police force” have the same meaning as in section 65 of this Act;
“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of this Act;
“relevant crime” means a reported crime in which—
(a) the victim or any other person perceived the alleged offender, at the time of or immediately before or after the offence, to demonstrate hostility or prejudice based on sex,
(b) the victim or any other person perceived the crime to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards persons who are of a particular sex, or
(c) the victim or any other person perceived the crime to follow a course of conduct pursued by the alleged offender towards the victim that was motivated by hostility based on sex;
“sex” has the same meaning as in section 11 of the Equality Act 2010.”
Amendment 47, page 51, line 28, at end insert—
‘(2A) The Secretary of State must issue separate statutory guidance on domestic abuse that also constitutes teenage relationship abuse and such guidance must address how to ensure there are—
(a) sufficient levels of local authority service provision for both victims and perpetrators of teenage relationship abuse,
(b) child safeguarding referral pathways for both victims and perpetrators of teenage relationship abuse.
(2B) The guidance in subsection (2A) must be published within three months of the Act receiving Royal Assent and must be reviewed bi-annually.
(2C) For the purposes of subsection (2A), teenage relationship abuse is defined as any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse, which can encompass, but is not limited to psychological, physical, sexual, economic and emotional abuse, including through the use of technology, between those aged 18 or under who are, or have been in a romantic relationship regardless of gender or sexual orientation.”
This amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish separate statutory guidance on teenage relationship abuse. The statutory guidance would cover not just victims of teenage domestic abuse but extend to those who perpetrate abuse within their own teenage relationships.
Amendment 9, page 51, line 30, leave out from “that” to the end of line 31 and insert
“victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse in England and Wales are both male and female.”
This amendment removes the sex specific reference to females, to include male victims of domestic abuse and reflect the fact that both men and women are perpetrators of domestic abuse.
Government amendment 30.
Amendment 10, page 51, line 31, after “female”, insert
“and this should in no way exclude male victims from the protection of domestic abuse legislation and services for survivors.”
This amendment is an alternative to Amendment 9.
Government amendments 36, 37, 31, 32, 38, 33, 34 and 39.
Homes should be places of love and safety, but for 2.4 million people across the country they are not. We want the abuse to stop, and we want victims to live, peaceful, safe and happy lives. That is why the Government are bringing forward this Domestic Abuse Bill.
Domestic abuse does not just affect adults. It affects the children living in abusive households too. The Government have always recognised the devastating impact that domestic abuse has on a child who sees, hears or experiences it. Indeed, the need to consider the effects on children runs through the Bill, through the draft statutory guidance and in our non-legislative work. As I hope is acknowledged, our approach throughout the extensive scrutiny of the Bill has been to listen, and that is exactly what we have done. We have listened carefully to my right hon. Friends the Members for Maidenhead (Mrs May) and for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller). We have listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken) in Committee, as well as other Members across the House, including the hon. Member for Blaydon (Liz Twist), who have encouraged us to do more. I am, therefore, pleased to introduce new clause 15 to the Bill, which states that children who see, hear or experience domestic abuse are victims.
As with the statutory definition in clauses 1 and 2, we expect the new clause to be adopted more generally by public authorities, frontline practitioners and others responding to domestic abuse. Indeed, it is vital that locally commissioned services consider and address the impact of domestic abuse on children.
We have also listened to the harrowing experiences of victims going through the family and civil courts. It is vital that victims of domestic abuse are supported to give their best evidence in court and to minimise the distress that this can cause. The Bill on introduction already ensured that victims of domestic abuse are automatically entitled to special measures in criminal proceedings, meaning that they can, for example, give evidence from behind a screen or via a video link. New clauses 16 and 17 now extend that automatic eligibility to victims giving evidence in family and civil proceedings.
In May last year, the Ministry of Justice established a panel of experts to review how the family courts deal with the risk of harm to children and parents in private law children’s cases involving domestic abuse and other serious offences. The panel received more than 1,200 submissions and the report was published just a couple of weeks ago. The submissions highlighted that many victims of domestic abuse feel extreme anxiety about appearing in the family court and coming face to face with the perpetrator. Anyone who has tracked the progress of this Bill, or who has worked with and listened to victims outside the confines of this Chamber, will know just how terrible some of those experiences can be. The panel has recommended that the provisions in the Bill concerning special measures in the criminal courts should apply to all private law children’s cases in which domestic abuse is alleged. New clause 16 does that, and new clause 17 achieves the same in civil proceedings.
However, we have gone further with regard to civil proceedings, as new clause 18 prohibits cross-examination in person where such cross-examination by the perpetrator is likely to diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence or would cause significant distress to the witness. This new clause also prevents the victim from having to cross-examine the alleged perpetrator in person, with counsel being appointed by the court, if necessary. In each scenario, such cross-examination can serve to re-traumatise victims and, again, prevent them from giving their best evidence in court. Cross-examination in person is already prohibited in the criminal courts. The Bill, on introduction, extended the prohibition to the family courts and, on the recent recommendation of the Civil Justice Council, we will now ensure that the bar applies across all courts. These changes will have a profound impact on victims in all our constituencies who are seeking justice.
I wholeheartedly support everything that the Minister has said, but one additional factor that can make it more difficult for a victim of domestic violence to feel secure in this system is that they have had a brain injury which might not have been diagnosed. So all the anxiety, loss of memory and loss of executive function may be completely misunderstood by many other people around her. Is it not time that we made sure, as my new clause 13 would do, that all victims of domestic violence and abuse are screened for acquired brain injury?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I, of course, pay attention to the fact that he has had a long-standing campaign on this matter. I have looked carefully at his proposals, and the Government have two chief concerns. The first is that any clinical need of the individual must, of course, be a matter for doctors. I would be very worried about making a blanket application for anyone who is a victim of domestic abuse, not least because we know that, as clause 1 sets out, domestic abuse can take many forms and is not just restricted to physical violence. So I believe that the correct way to deal with the very important point he raises is to enable clinicians to make that judgment. The second point relates to screening. I understand that the UK screening authority would have to consider whether such a universal programme should be introduced. I believe that it has looked at this relatively recently and has concluded that the evidence is not there. If I may, I will return to the text of my speech now. I will hear his arguments develop during the course of this afternoon and comment further if need be.
On the subject of justice, one of the most chilling and anguished developments in recent times has been the increased use of the so-called rough sex defence. This is the subject of the last of the Government’s new clauses on Report, new clause 20. Before I develop the argument for the new clause, I would like to pay particular tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who have been unrelenting in their work to secure justice for victims about whom the most difficult and violent claims can be made by defendants in the course of a criminal trial. They have been absolutely committed in their campaign to clarify the law. Indeed, I seem to remember that my hon. Friend raised this issue in the first Second Reading debate in October, which reminds us all of the journey that this Bill has had. They have called on the Government to codify the law in relation to the use of violence in consensual sadomasochistic sexual acts and the so-called rough sex defence. I am incredibly grateful to them for their continued and constructive engagement on this important and sensitive issue. I also note the support that Members across the House have given to these provisions, and I thank everyone for their work on this.
The Minister is setting the scene very clearly regarding what is important and what we wish to see happening, and I congratulate her on that. The increase of this type of activity by some 11.6% on worldwide internet traffic has concerned me. This is not just about getting at people individually; it is also about getting at the people who are the drivers who make it happen. What has been done to ensure that those who buy into that system—some might do so inadvertently, but they none the less find themselves in a difficult situation—and who make it available and make it happen can be caught?
If I have understood the hon. Gentleman correctly, he is not just addressing the use of this so-called defence in our courts but reflecting on the wider impact of pornography, particularly internet pornography, on violence towards women and girls in particular. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) will be raising this in her speech and if I may I will respond to her in that part of the debate, but I very much take on board his point.
The hon. Gentleman will know that part of the problem that has emerged in the last 15 to 20 years is that, whereas in the old days cases were reported freely in the newspapers and so on, such cases are now also reported on the internet. In that regard, I must pay particular tribute to the family of Natalie Connolly, who have suffered in more ways than anyone can really contemplate. I am pleased—and I hope they are satisfied—with the developments that have resulted from the hard work of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. I hope that Natalie’s family are satisfied with what we have reached in this Bill.
We have been clear that there is no such defence to serious harm that results from rough sex, but there is a perception that such a defence exists and that it is being used by men—it is mostly men in these types of cases—to avoid convictions for serious offences or to receive a reduction in any sentence when they are convicted. As my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor indicated on Second Reading, this area of law is extremely complex. It is therefore important that anything that is placed in the Bill does not have unintended consequences. In acting with the best of intentions, we do not want to inadvertently create loopholes or uncertainties in the law that can then be exploited by those who perpetrate such crimes.
If I may, I would just like to take a moment to thank my friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk). As the co-Minister on the Bill, he has brought all his legal expertise to the consideration of how we can address the mischief and the upset, which we all want to address, in a way that does not have unintended consequences.
May I join the Minister in doing that? This issue has bedevilled criminal law cases going back to the 1920s and 1930s. The attempt in the past has been to fit appropriate legal protections within the framework of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. It is particularly to be welcomed that we have now moved away from that rather antiquated straitjacket and have something that is fit for purpose. The work the Government and my hon. Friends have done is immeasurably important to legal practitioners, as well as to victims.
I am happy to take that intervention and I thank my hon. Friend, the Chair of the Justice Committee, for his support.
In new clauses 4 and 5, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest have, broadly, sought to codify the principles set out in current case law in this area, namely that which resulted from the case R v. Brown. That case involved a group of men who participated in sadomasochistic activities. We have taken up the challenge set by the right hon. Lady and my hon. Friend and, working closely with them, have tabled new clause 20 to achieve just that. More specifically, the new clause aims to make it clear that consent to serious harm for sexual gratification is not a defence in law. The new clause codifies, and therefore restates, the general proposition of law expressed in the case of R v. Brown, which is that a person may not consent to the infliction of serious harm and, by extension, their own death. Those interested in such matters will note that we have been careful to preserve the position in relation to sexually transmitted infections, but we have done so in a way very much in keeping with current case law. I hope that the House has been reassured that new clause 20 achieves the objective of providing the confirmation and clarification of the law requested.
I am very conscious that many Back Benchers wish to speak—sadly, many have put in to speak but will not be called due to the level of interest in this important piece of proposed legislation—but, if I may, I will take a little time to address an issue that I know is of great importance not just to those of us in this place, but to those who work in the world of tackling domestic abuse and, of course, to the victims themselves. That is the issue of migrant women, in particular migrant women who have no recourse to public funds. If I may, I will deal with new clauses 22, 25 and 26 in this part of my speech.
I hope hon. Members received a “Dear colleague” letter this morning from me and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, explaining our position. We are absolutely committed to doing what we can to support all migrant victims of domestic abuse as victims first and foremost. In 2012, we introduced the destitution domestic violence concession—the DDVC—to support migrant victims of domestic abuse who are living in this country on the basis of certain partner visas. Such people have come to the UK with the intention of living here permanently with the reasonable expectation of obtaining indefinite leave to remain. The DDVC is not available to people who enter the country on other visas, such as visitor, student or work visas, or, indeed, to anyone who is here illegally. This is because in order to obtain such visas they will have confirmed that they are financially independent and therefore require no recourse to public funds, and their stay will be for a defined period of time. They do not, therefore, have a legitimate expectation of securing indefinite leave to remain. Simply extending the DDVC to all migrant victims is therefore not the way to address the needs of migrant victims who currently cannot claim under that scheme. We need to find a way of ensuring that they have adequate support, rather than provide a pathway to indefinite leave to remain or a blanket lifting of the no recourse to public funds condition.
I welcome the points that the Minister has made on other topics, but on this one, if she wants to do further research and investigation why not just lift the provisions and requirements on no recourse to public funds in the meantime, until the research is completed and she has more information about what she wants to do next?
The right hon. Lady makes a point that I know would, at first blush, be attractive, but the problem is that we do not have that bedrock of evidence. We are coming to the Dispatch Box with an open heart, and I hope that it is acknowledged across the House that that has been our approach throughout the Bill proceedings. I do not know whether she has had a chance to read the report that we published last week into the work that the Home Office has done. There has been some very good work by charities, through the tampon tax funding and so on, but we are unable to put in the figures that we need to in order to undertake the sort of reform that she is urging upon us. We must have the data to ensure that anything that we are putting forward in the longer term best meets the needs of victims and is sustainable.
A person who comes to this country on, for example, a six-month visitor visa falls under one of the categories that one of the witnesses gave evidence to the Joint Committee on, in the evidence that was given to us as part of this review—the Southall Black Sisters. The right hon. Lady will know that people on visitor visas, who may be here for six months, will have made representations to the Home Office specifically on their financial circumstances, and we want to ensure that we can treat such people fairly and give them access to the help that they need. It is why we are very keen to focus on support rather than to follow the urgings of others that we deal with immigration status before we look at support. We want to help these victims to access help first and foremost as victims.
The pilot programme is to determine how we ensure that victims can obtain immediate access to support, and that any future strategy meets the immediate needs of victims and is fit for purpose. Support for migrant victims is a very important issue for all of us. We recognise that, which is why we are committed to launching the pilot project as quickly as possible. We are currently reviewing the options for implementing the pilot and expect to make further announcements in the summer, ahead of its launch in the autumn. We must resist the urge to act before we have the evidence on which to base comprehensive proposals, to ensure that measures are appropriate.
As I say, I want to give plenty of time to Members to debate the Bill at this important stage of its scrutiny. Before I do, I thank hon. Members—I hope I do not speak too soon—for the very constructive, collegiate approach we have taken, all of us, on this Bill. I know some very different viewpoints may be held on particular issues that will be debated in this Chamber this afternoon, but I know that the House will keep at the forefront of its mind that we are debating this Bill because we all want to help victims of domestic abuse and we all want the abuse to stop.
As the Minister has said, there is a lot of interest, not surprisingly, in wanting to take part in this debate. For the first four non-Government contributors, I will allow seven minutes, and thereafter the limit will be five minutes. Even with that, I am afraid not everybody is going to get in.
My right hon. Friend knows that in recent days a range of views have been expressed, including by two Royal Colleges, on new clause 28 and what it seeks to achieve. Indeed, there are difficulties with the new clause. The Government therefore consider that the right way forward is to undertake a public consultation on whether to make permanent the current covid-19 measure allowing for home use of early medical abortion pills up to 10 weeks’ gestation for all eligible women. Does that reassure her?
I thank my hon. Friend for that commitment and look forward to the consultation coming forward. It is important that we have the opportunity to look further at how these emergency regulations have worked during the period of covid and that we understand how they can assist women. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor will say something about this in his closing comments. I do not know whether the appropriate place is via new legislation or via the consultation that my hon. Friend referred to, but there is clearly a real need for debate and for this House to be able to express its view and understand the issue thoroughly.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) spoke with her usual forcefulness, and she will know that I have found common ground with much of what she said. I welcome her support for the broad direction of the Bill. I also welcome her comments about the need for us to find a mechanism to support migrant women who are the victims of domestic abuse. I have said this previously in the Chamber and I have no doubt that I will say it again. I vividly recall sitting around a table with my hon. Friend the Minister; my hon. Friend the Member for Charnwood (Edward Argar), who was then in the Ministry of Justice; the noble Baroness Williams, who I think was the Victims Minister; Southall Black Sisters and other charities; and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, who I always regard as an expert on these matters. There was consensus around the room that we have to find a way to treat the migrant victims of domestic abuse as victims first. I am sure that there are differences of opinion—as there were in the room that day—as to how we best do that. I very much hope that the pilot projects of which my hon. Friend the Minister has spoken will be able to provide us with the data that we need so that we can find a long-term, enduring solution to help, and help effectively, victims of domestic abuse who are here perhaps with no legal public funds or with insecure immigration status that means they are dependent on their partner for their right to be in the UK.
Whether it is the much-needed changes that are to be introduced in respect of the family courts—I welcome new clauses 16, 17 and 18—or other measures, it is crucial that we find a way to make our court system support the victims of domestic abuse. We must find a mechanism whereby it supports the children who might otherwise be obliged to come into contact with perpetrators. I welcome the fact that we are moving to a position wherein the legal process will no longer be able to perpetuate abuse.
My hon. Friend the Minister has worked hard on the Bill, and I welcome the changes that have been introduced. I commend her for having made such enormous progress. It has been a difficult journey for a Bill much delayed. We are not there yet, but I sincerely hope that our noble Friends in the other place do not delay the process much further. I commend my hon. Friend her for her very hard work.
I will come on to that; I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution.
I want to quote someone who works regularly with victims of domestic abuse. She says:
“This proposal in reality is actually a gift to male abusers who want their partners to abort.”
New clause 28 will not help abused women. It could put them in a worse position, and it is dysfunctional. I tabled amendments (a), (b) and (c) to illustrate that fact. I want to thank the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) and my right hon. Friends the Members for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) for underlining and accepting that. Amendments (a) and (b) address the fact that there is no 10-week gestation limit, which is potentially dangerous, and that this potentially includes surgical abortions outside clinically approved settings, which is similarly concerning. Amendment (c) relates to the vital need for some sort of review of the current emergency legislation before any extension of the legislation is brought forward. I thank the Minister for her proposal of a consultation. Will she confirm that it will be a proper inquiry?
I emphasise that the Government are neutral on the very sensitive topic of abortion, but I hope that my hon. Friend and others across the House who hold a range of views—genuine views—on this topic will take comfort from the fact that the Government intend to launch a public consultation, as I outlined in my earlier intervention, and I thank her for her work.
I thank the Minister for that. On that basis, I will not press amendment (c) to a vote, and nor will I press amendments (a) and (b), because they have achieved their purpose, which was to point out the flaws of new clause 28.
Mr Speaker has—quite rightly, for constitutional reasons—ruled new clause 29 as out of scope. This is a domestic abuse Bill; it should not be hijacked by those continuously campaigning on another issue and constantly looking for opportunities in this place to add badly worded amendments to Bills with unforeseen implications and complications.
We have already seen the outcome of such an approach with the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019. This House should, I hope, be very wary of repeating that. I support the Government’s endeavours to tackle domestic abuse: let us ensure that that is the focus of this Bill.
It is fair to say there were moments in the past two and a half years where I did not quite believe that I would be able to stand at the Dispatch Box and deliver the winding-up of the Bill’s Report stage, so it is a genuine pleasure to be here doing exactly that.
We have seen extraordinary contributions from across the House, not just in this debate but over the history of this Bill and its progress through Parliament. We have heard from Members who have bravely given their own experiences of the abuse they themselves suffered, whether that was the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield), who moved us all on Second Reading in October last year or, indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher), who brought to the Chamber his own experiences as a child living in an abusive household. Those are but two examples; there are, sadly, many, many more examples we have heard, both through the direct experience of colleagues, but also through the experiences we have all tried to bring into the Chamber.
There are people we know as soon as their names are said—names such as Clare, Rachel and Holly. We know their stories. If one thing can be drawn from today’s debate and the progress of this Bill, it is that we do not just talk about them and the experiences they endured and the experiences that were forced on them, but that we talk about the legacy their lives have had. Their legacy is written throughout this Bill.
As the Minister, I have to, of course, try to respond to the many points that have been made in the debate, and I apologise that I simply will not be able to do so. To give some indication of just how much cross-Government working there has been on the Bill, as well as the work in Parliament, there are now seven Departments—and counting—working on it. During briefing sessions for the Committee sage, the officials briefing me had to have a queueing system because they could not all fit on a conference call. That gives an idea of how many people have been involved in the Bill, and I thank each and every one of them, because I will not have the honour of doing so on Third Reading.
I will jump now to some of the substance of today’s debate. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) and many Opposition Members, as well as my right hon. Friends the Members for Maidenhead (Mrs May) and for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine), raised—understandably and rightly—support for migrant victims. I reiterate the Government’s commitment to helping victims and to the support for migrant victims scheme, which I announced on Second Reading. We expect to make announcements in the summer about this. We will be working with charities. We are working with the domestic abuse commissioner—I spoke to her about this only on Friday. We want this scheme to have the trust and involvement of everyone who is as concerned about migrant victims as we are. We are aiming to publish the framework of the scheme ahead of Lords Second Reading, and we very much hope that everyone will feel able to support it.
If the approximately 3,630 women who we imagine might want to access this scheme a year breaches the £1.5 million that the Government have allocated, will the Government turn people away, or will they make more funds available?
The hon. Lady has rather set out the problem we have, which is measuring the number of women. She will know that we already help around 2,500 women under the DDVC. She will also be aware that, alongside the pilot project, we have the tampon tax funding, which is continuing. I very much see the two schemes running in tandem.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh West has tabled new clause 27, which concerns the firewall. She will know that the police are facing a super-complaint relating to police data sharing for immigration purposes and that there is a judicial review outstanding. Obviously, we have to wait for those cases, but in the meantime we are working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that the guidance it issues does the job that is required, so I ask her not to press the new clause.
Members across the House dealt with new clause 23. We all want to support domestic abuse victims and their children, regardless of where they reside. We must, however, ensure that any new statutory duties are properly considered, costed and robust. The new duty on tier 1 local authorities in part 4 of the Bill is the product of extensive consultation and engagement with local authorities and sector organisations. The same cannot be said of new clause 23. The Government are committed to gathering this evidence, and I am grateful to the domestic abuse commissioner for agreeing to lead an in-depth investigation on this. We have to be able to understand where services are and are not provided, to identify best practice and to consult fully with our charities, local authorities and other important parties before considering any statutory commitments. Any new duty must also be properly costed, taking into account existing provision. We expect the commissioner to set out her recommendations in a report under clause 7, and as those who have been following closely will know, we and others will then have 56 days in which to respond. We will act on this, and we will respond promptly.
If I may, I will make some progress.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley in particular raised new clause 24, and she urged us to act on this—we are doing so. Alongside publishing the family harms panel report, we published the Government’s implementation plan for that report. The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), is acting on the advice of the panel, which gave careful consideration to the issue of the presumption of contact. The panel concluded that an urgent review of the presumption should be undertaken—it did not conclude that we should legislate immediately. My hon. Friend is beginning this work. He is convening the Family Justice Board this month, and we hope and anticipate that this work will be completed by the end of the year. We share the sense of urgency, and we will act on it.
The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, raised new clauses 32 and 33, and new clause 21 has also been raised during the debate. On new clause 21, there was compelling testimony from several witnesses who gave evidence in Committee against the introduction of a separate register, as proposed in new clause 21, because that might diminish, rather than increase, safety. However, we are very conscious of the concerns that the right hon. Lady and others have raised.
We continue to work to keep the effectiveness of risk management processes under regular review, as well as to modify the processes in accordance with emerging evidence and good practice. For example, the College of Policing is testing a revised domestic abuse risk assessment process, with a view to rolling out an improved model across all police forces. Individual forces are also trialling enhanced risk assessment models, and there will be an evaluation of the new stalking protection orders as well. So there is work to be done, and we will very much keep it under review.
My right hon. Friends the Members for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) and for Basingstoke both raised important cases of threats to disclose—indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) raised this as well—and we very much understand their concerns. Threats to disclose, regardless of the connection between the offender and the victim, can in many circumstances already be captured by a range of offences. However, the Law Commission is conducting a review of the law relating to the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images with a view to assessing the currency of the law. In the meantime, we are working with the College of Policing to ensure that the police have all the information they need to make the right charges and arrests, where appropriate.
I will in a moment, if I may.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) introduced new clause 28, and may I thank the House for its thoughtful consideration of this new clause? As I set out earlier, the Government consider that the right way forward is to undertake a public consultation on whether to make permanent the current covid-19 measure allowing for home use of early medical abortion pills up to 10 weeks’ gestation for all eligible women. In answer to the question she asked earlier, I can confirm that we will keep the current covid-19 measures in place until the public consultation concludes and a decision has been made. I understand that the hon. Lady has been good enough to indicate that, in those circumstances, she will not push the new clause to a vote. I thank her and other Members for their consideration and their responses.
Very quickly, my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) raised important issues regarding research. As Minister for Women, I commissioned research into the impact of pornography on attitudes towards women and girls. This research is to be published soon, so I invite my hon. Friend and other hon. Members who are concerned about this to save their fire for the online harms White Paper and the research that will be published. Again, of course the Government will keep under review the concerns that my right hon. Friend raised in relation to the circumstances of domestic abuse.
I know that the hon. Gentleman wants to intervene—very quickly.
The Minister knows perfectly well that I do not want to divide the House on my amendments, because I want the whole of the House to be supporting women who have suffered acquired brain injury. Will she simply guarantee that she will meet me and other Members of the group before this goes to the House of Lords so that we can clear up any misunderstandings there may have been?
Yes. I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman.
If I may, I am going to gallop to the finish. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions—whether remotely, or they are not even here at all—such as those of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friends the Members for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) and for Newbury (Laura Farris), who talked so movingly and rightly about the consequences of the rough sex provisions.
May I sum up by saying that this Bill is not just for the victims that we have heard about in this Chamber? It is for the victims that we have not been able to help in the past and it is for preventing the harm to victims in the future, including children, that we bring this Bill forward. This is a Bill in which we can all take pride. We are doing some great work with this, and I thank each and every hon. Member for their help in getting us to this stage.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
It is a real pleasure to have made it to the first Third Reading of this Bill. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) and I were reminding ourselves, there were two Second Reading debates, and the fact that we have reached Third Reading is a significant milestone not just in the history of the Bill, but for the millions of people who have either suffered in silence or who have had their stories told, either here or to courts and other proceedings up and down our country.
The passing of this Bill by the House marks an important milestone in our shared endeavour to provide better support and protection for the victims of domestic abuse and their children. It is the culmination of over three years of work and I again pay tribute, in particular, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for championing this Bill, as well as to all right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed. We know that this Bill went through a draft Bill procedure —one that I commend and support in particular in this instance, because the prelegislative scrutiny that was undertaken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and her colleagues in that Joint Committee made it clear and ensured that this Bill, as it came to the House, was already in a strong state.
The Bill was improved during the course of debate. It was scrutinised properly in Committee. I am grateful to the Committee members of all parties, who not only did their duty but threw themselves into the process with enthusiasm, vigour and purpose. It shows that, contrary to how some of the commentariat often scoff at the Committee process in this House, the process is not only alive and well but working well. That is a vote of confidence in a vital part of line-by-line scrutiny
The Bill now expressly recognises the devastating impact of domestic abuse on the lives of children growing up in a household where one parent is being abused by another. Such children are also the victims, and it is right that the Bill recognises that, allowing them to gain better access to the protection and support they need.
During the passage of the Bill, we have also strengthened protection for victims in court. No victim of domestic abuse should be re-traumatised as a result of being subjected to cross-examination in court by their abuser. Such cross-examination in person is already prohibited in the criminal courts, and the Bill now extends that protection to the family and civil courts.
We must also do everything we can to enable the victims of domestic abuse to give their best evidence in court. That might mean, for example, giving evidence from behind a screen or via a video link. Again, that principle should apply in all court proceedings. As a result of an amendment, we now have automatic eligibility for special measures in criminal, family and civil proceedings.
We have also delivered on our commitment to make the law crystal clear in relation to the so-called rough sex defence. We now have it enshrined in statute that no one can consent to serious harm, or indeed their own death, for the purposes of sexual gratification. I join in commendation of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), both of whom have met me on several occasions to discuss these matters and to whom I am grateful, and, most importantly, the family of Natalie Connolly, who have assiduously campaigned on this issue.
I raised on Report the link between rough sex and pornography, with recent surveys indicating that there is indeed a link. Would the Secretary of State be good enough to give a little more information on the assurance I sought that the Government would take early action to address concerns about harms resulting from pornography?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the way in which she brought the issue to the debate via her amendment and the constructive approach she has consistently taken. Yes, I can give her that assurance, which will come in several forms. Research is being done by the Government Equalities Office on this sensitive and important issue. That will be published soon, and through legislation and the online harms policy, which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is responsible for, we have again a vital opportunity for early action to deal with the issue she rightly raises.
The Bill has been a prime example of how the Government, parliamentarians and campaigners have come together to identify an area where the law falls short and done something about it, yet we recognise that, in relation to a number of other issues, there is still more to be done. The recent publication of the report by the expert panel on harm in the family courts and the Government’s implementation plan affords, I think, a unique opportunity for the family justice system to reform how it manages private family law cases involving children. I put on record my own personal commitment to the process. That report was uncompromising, it made for difficult reading and it was critical, but I felt strongly that it had to be published, warts and all, because if we are going to deal with this problem, we have to be honest about the failures of the past, and through that process of honest assessment come up with something better. We owe it to the families who look to the court as a place of resolution rather than a place of further abuse, strife, hurt and horror.
The panel received more than 1,200 submissions of evidence and the report provides significant insight into the experience of victims of domestic abuse in family courts. It is a launch pad for the actions that we are going to take to better protect and support children and domestic abuse victims throughout private family law proceedings. There is more work to be done, because I strongly believe that although the adversarial principle is an important one and serves to advance the interests of justice in many settings, in private family law proceedings in particular we have to look for a better way to resolve the issues and to achieve a higher degree of justice for everybody involved, not least the children whose voices must be heard and who, despite the best efforts of the Children Act of 30 years ago, still do not necessarily get their voices heard in the way that we owe it to them to allow.
While my right hon. and learned Friend is in the mood to concede and be generous, might I ask him to look again at the issue of maximum and minimum sentences? He is of course right that during legal proceedings victims should be treated with the respect and regard that they deserve, but once people are convicted, there needs to be exemplary sentences—there needs to be just deserts. Will he look at that issue through the prism of the new clause that I tabled, which I have no doubt inspired and impressed him?
My right hon. Friend he tempts me into new territory. As the Government and I develop a White Paper on sentencing reform that will be published later in the year, we will have ample opportunity to engage properly on such issues. My right hon. Friend knows that I come to this role with, shall we say, a little bit of form on the issue of sentencing and a long experience in it, and I want to use that White Paper as the opportunity to set something clear, firm and understandable that will only increase public confidence in the sentencing system in England and Wales.
Before I move on to the question of migrant victims, I pause to pay warm tribute to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) and, indeed, to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), who is part of my ministerial team at the Ministry of Justice. Together, they did not just do their duty, but did it with zeal, passion and a deep commitment to the issues. I know that that commitment is shared by Opposition spokesmen, too, and pay tribute to them for their assiduous work on this issue. True cross-party co-operation can move mountains, and this Bill is an emblematic example of that important principle.
Let me return to the important issue of migrant victims of domestic abuse and the review that has been conducted. We acknowledge that more needs to be done to support migrant victims who do not qualify under the destitute domestic violence concession or other mechanisms—that is very clear—but we do need to assess precisely that need, as outlined by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle. That is why the £1.5 million pilot scheme that is to be launched later in the year will provide support additional to the mechanisms that have already been discussed. It will also provide the evidence necessary to help to inform decisions about a long-term solution.
The provision of better protection and support for victims of domestic abuse and their children is at the very heart of the Bill. In the first Second Reading debate —on the previous version of the Bill—I told my own story about being a young barrister dealing with a domestic abuse case, one of many that were dealt with somewhat differently, shall we say, in those days from how they are dealt with now. That does not necessarily mean that we should be complacent about where we have come to with regards to how we deal with domestic violence, but it is right to say that if the phrase “It’s only a domestic” has not previously been consigned to the history books, this Bill will make sure that it is. We owe it to the 2.4 million victims a year to ensure that the justice system and local support services work better for them.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for the kind remarks he made earlier. He has just outlined the importance of this Bill. Will the Government do everything they can to ensure that, in timetabling it through the other place, it is given the priority it needs to ensure that we can get it on the statute book as soon as possible?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, and with alacrity I give her that undertaking. I know that my colleagues in the other place will share the same ambition that we have here, and I will work with them to make sure that the Bill makes its proper passage through that House so that we can give it the Royal Assent that we all want it to attain.
Ultimately, we all just want the abuse to stop, but in the meantime we must, and we will, do everything we can to protect vulnerable people, to protect victims and their children, and to offer them the safety and support they so desperately need and deserve. I commend this Bill to the House.
In the last few minutes remaining, I want to thank the Government for bringing forward this important Bill and for listening. I thank Ministers and the Labour shadow Front-Bench Members, who have been such passionate advocates for improvements to the Bill. I also thank Members across the House who have tabled important amendments, proposals and reforms, and have very much come together in the kind of cross-party spirit that we would expect in dealing with such a terrible crime—a crime that destroys lives and haunts children’s futures for very many years to come.
We have already come a long way since the Home Affairs Committee’s report on domestic abuse two years ago, and since I raised with the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), questions about having a domestic abuse commissioner back in—I think—2012. We have seen great progress as a result of cross-party working and the decisions that the Government have taken to put these measures into practice. We all owe thanks to the many organisations that work so tirelessly every single day to support domestic abuse victims right across the country and to rescue families, put lives back together and give people a future.
I join the tributes to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield). Her words and her bravery in speaking out have already provided great comfort and growing confidence to many other people across the country who have experienced something similar. Her reaching out and saying, “You are not alone”, has been extremely powerful.
We also need to think with some humility about what happens next. Although we may have come together and agreed legislation, legislation does not solve everything. This is not just about how legislation is used, but about how Government policies work, how partnerships work and how things happen right across the country. That humility should be even greater at this moment, because we have come together to say how important this legislation is at the same time that domestic abuse has been rising during the coronavirus crisis. It is to all those who are still suffering that we owe an ever greater commitment to help them and to rebuild their lives.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I want to place on the record my thanks to all the officials who have laboured very hard in both the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice on this matter, and I seek your guidance on how to do so.
As the most brilliant lawyer in the Chamber—[Interruption.] —in the House, the Lord Chancellor has made his point perfectly. Rarely have I seen a Bill with such co-operation from everyone right across the House, wonderfully worked on by the Clerks, and rarely have I seen a Third Reading conclude with everybody so satisfied and pleased at the result.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Relevant documents: 21st and 28th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee
My Lords, I am pleased to be moving the Bill for two reasons: first, it is at last here in your Lordships’ House and, secondly, from my point of view it is not often that I bring Bills to this House that are universally welcomed. For those reasons, it is a particular pleasure to be introducing this Second Reading.
I want to dedicate everything that we will achieve through the Bill to all victims and survivors of domestic abuse; to all those courageous people who have spoken out about their experiences, whether in Parliament or outside it; and to those who do not lack courage but are still too traumatised to speak about their experience, maybe even decades after it first happened. We should be their voice. It is important that we see the Bill as a start. Other Bills will follow, but the Bill today is a great start in dealing with this most awful of crimes. I say to noble Lords, and I know they understand, that we should not let the best be the enemy of the good.
A person’s home should be a place of safety and security, and a person’s relationship with their partner or other family member should be based on love, mutual respect and understanding, but for some 2.3 million people a year that is not the case. Many such people have to face physical or psychological abuse on a daily basis, which can make their lives insufferable. Some pay the ultimate price: on average, two people are killed each week at the hands of their current or former partner. It is only fitting that I pay tribute to Claire Throssell, who received an MBE in the New Year’s honours list for her tireless work campaigning for children experiencing domestic abuse. She lost her own two sons, Jack and Paul, who were killed by her ex-partner.
We have seen that the Covid-19 pandemic has served to exacerbate the problem as victims have been trapped in their home with their abuser. Police-recorded crime data shows that incidents of domestic abuse increased 7% in the period of April to June last year compared with the same period in 2019. These are horrendous statistics and they mask many individual personal tragedies, lives ruined and children traumatised, many of them for life. If there was ever an issue deserving of our attention and needing decisive action, this is it.
Of course, legislation alone cannot solve society’s ills, but it can play an important role in driving change and empowering those who need help, and I firmly believe that is the case with this Bill. I welcome the fact that the Bill comes before your Lordships’ House having already been the subject of extensive scrutiny, a point well made by the Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill. A draft Bill, published in January 2019, underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses, and I pay tribute to the significant contributions to that process by my noble friends Lady Bertin, Lord Farmer, Lady Sanderson and Lady Chisholm—they are all sitting behind me, which is great—the noble Baronesses, Lady Armstrong and Lady Burt, and the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Blair. As a result of that invaluable pre-legislative scrutiny and the consideration given to the Bill in the House of Commons, I hope that I present to your Lordships’ House today a much-strengthened Bill.
Let me turn to the detail of the Bill. The measures in it are best described around four objectives. They are: to promote awareness, putting domestic abuse at the top of everyone’s agenda; to better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children; to transform the response of the criminal, civil and family justice systems to domestic abuse; and to improve performance across local and national agencies.
We cannot tackle domestic abuse effectively without first having a shared understanding of the nature of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. The new, all-purpose statutory definition of domestic abuse in Part 1 is directed to this end. Historically, domestic abuse has been associated with physical or sexual violence only, but such a narrow view is to misunderstand the very nature of this type of abuse. Domestic abuse can take many forms, including threatening, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse and psychological or emotional abuse.
The statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73 will, among other things, expand further on the different types of abuse and the forms they can take. This will include types of abuse which are experienced by specific communities or groups, such as migrant victims or ethnic minorities. The guidance, which we have already printed in draft, will also recognise the disproportionate impact of domestic abuse on women.
The statutory definition of domestic abuse includes a minimum age of 16 years so that we do not confuse domestic abuse and child abuse. We fully recognise, however, that children growing up in a household where one adult is abusive towards another are as much victims of domestic abuse as the person being directly abused. Children affected by domestic abuse can live with those consequences for the rest of their lives; Clause 3 expressly recognises this and will help to ensure that such children receive the support they need.
The second aim of the Bill is to better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children. In affording protection, civil orders can play an important role. There is already a variety of such orders, principally domestic violence protection notices and orders, occupation orders, non-molestation orders and restraining orders. The fact that there are so many of these orders can be confusing to victims, and none of them is arguably fully up to the task.
In providing for a new domestic abuse protection notice and domestic abuse protection order in Part 3, we have adopted and built upon the strongest elements of the existing orders. The domestic abuse protection notice will provide immediate protection following a domestic abuse incident, while the domestic abuse protection order—or DAPO—will provide flexible, long-term protection for victims. The DAPO is designed to provide more comprehensive protection to victims than the existing civil orders. It will be available in the criminal, civil and family courts, and will give courts the flexibility to determine which prohibitions and positive requirements are required in each case. This might include, for example, prohibiting the perpetrator from going within a specified distance of the victim’s home, or conditions compelling the perpetrator to attend a perpetrator programme or requiring them to wear an electronic tag.
Breach of a DAPO will be a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. We want to ensure that we get these new domestic abuse protection orders right so that they work for victims, the police, the courts and others who will have to operate them. We will therefore pilot DAPOs in a small number of areas before rolling them out nationally.
It is far preferable if we can prevent abuse happening in the first place rather than having to respond after the event. One important preventive tool which already exists is the domestic violence disclosure scheme, also known as Clare’s law. There are two elements to the scheme: one is the “right to ask” and the other is the “right to know”. Under the right to ask, someone can ask the police to check whether a current or ex-partner has a violent or abusive past. If records show that an individual may be at risk of domestic abuse from a partner or ex-partner, the police will consider disclosing the information. The right to know enables the police proactively to make that disclosure if they receive information about the violent or abusive behaviour of a person that might impact on the safety of that person’s current or ex-partner. We know that Clare’s law has not always operated as effectively and consistently as it should across the country, so the Bill puts on to a statutory footing the guidance to the police underpinning the scheme to help improve its operation and thereby better protect potential victims of abuse.
Victims of domestic abuse and their children also need the right support at the right time. For those in refuges or other safe accommodation, this means having access to, for example, counselling services and advocacy support to help them access NHS services, schooling or welfare benefits. This also includes tailored support for victims with disabilities, those with more complex needs, LGBTQ+ or black and minority ethnic victims. Part 4 introduces a new duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to ensure that such support is available in their area for victims of domestic abuse and their children within safe accommodation. Noble Lords will have seen that following the spending review, the Government have committed £125 million to fund this new duty in 2021 and 2022.
Those who are forced to flee their own home as a result of domestic abuse will also benefit from Clause 71, which will require local authorities to give priority need status to all victims who are homeless and eligible for assistance. Victims will therefore no longer need to prove they are vulnerable as a result of their abuse in order to access accommodation secured by the local authority.
Where victims of domestic abuse look to the justice system for protection, including for their children, to seek civil redress or to secure justice for criminal wrongdoing, we need to ensure that the criminal, civil and family courts deliver for them. All too often, victims have found the experience of giving evidence in court traumatising and an occasion for their abuser to perpetuate the abuse all over again. To help to address this, Part 5 includes two important reforms.
First is the prohibition on cross-examination in person, which already applies in the criminal courts. This will be extended to the family and civil courts. In cases where this prohibition applies the courts will, where necessary, be able to appoint a publicly funded advocate to conduct the prohibited cross-examination. Secondly, Part 5 streamlines the rules governing eligibility for special measures for domestic abuse victims giving evidence in the criminal, civil and family courts. Victims of domestic abuse will no longer have to demonstrate that they are vulnerable. This will give victims the option of giving their evidence, for example, from behind a screen or via a video live-link. As now, it will be for the court to determine whether to make a special measures direction in any particular case, taking into account whether such a direction would improve the quality of the victim’s evidence.
In criminal proceedings relating to domestic abuse it is imperative that justice is done, with perpetrators being appropriately convicted and punished for their crimes. As this Bill was going through the House of Commons the Government listened to concerns, voiced by Harriet Harman and Mark Garnier among others, that in too many cases domestic abuse perpetrators were arguing that their victim’s death was the result of consensual “rough sex gone wrong”. In the case of R v Brown, the former Appellate Committee of this House established in 1993 the principle that consent to serious harm for sexual gratification is not a defence and that, by extension, nor would consent apply where such sexual activity resulted in the victim’s death. The Bill clarifies the law by enshrining this principle in statute.
Finally, Part 2 of the Bill, providing for the office of a domestic abuse commissioner in law, will help to level up the response to domestic abuse across local and national agencies. The designate commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, is already providing very strong leadership on domestic abuse issues and acting as a powerful voice for victims. The commissioner will play a key role in overseeing and monitoring the provision of domestic abuse services in England and Wales. To facilitate this work, the Bill will arm the commissioner with appropriate powers; in particular, they will have the power to publish reports and lay them before Parliament. These reports will hold local commissioners of domestic abuse services, statutory agencies and government departments to account and make recommendations on how they can improve their responses. Specified public bodies will be under a duty to co-operate with the commissioner. They and government Ministers will be required to respond to each recommendation made to them within 56 days.
Domestic abuse gives rise to some of the gravest and most challenging crimes, including coercive control, serious assaults, rape and murder. We owe it to victims and survivors to treat domestic abuse with the seriousness it deserves and to help these people rebuild their lives. Protecting and supporting victims and their children and bringing perpetrators to justice lies at the heart of our approach. The measures in the Bill are directed to these ends and I commend it to the House.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for what I think has been one of the most thoughtful debates I have ever heard in your Lordships’ House. No age group has been left out of the debate, including the unborn child and the foetus.
From the young to the old, the disabled, LGBTQ+ people and BME people—all strata of society are affected by this horrific crime. Of course, it does not respect social niceties either. Just because you are middle class does not mean that you will escape it. The problems of poverty exacerbate it, but nobody is safe from its clutches where the perpetrator wishes to strike.
I begin by welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, to the Labour Front Bench. I thought that was a storming first Front-Bench effort.
At this early stage in my remarks, I also want to refer to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. His talents, experience and expertise know no bounds. It seems that he can speak with great authority on so many things. I have in my mind a picture of him and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, in 1975, not knowing that what they had started then would be advanced all these years later, moving from the comment of “I’m not sure there’s anything the committee can do about it”—from a Home Office Minister, of all people—to the statutory duty on local authorities now being fulfilled 50 years later. I do not know whether I am proud or downright ashamed of that, but thank goodness we are at the point that we are now.
I also join other noble Lords in paying tribute to my right honourable friend Theresa May for her efforts to begin to get this Bill going. I also thank the PM for particularly noting in his remarks yesterday that people who need to flee abuse are absolutely not subject to some of the lockdown restrictions that others are.
I welcome the overwhelming cross-party support for the provisions in the Bill. Noble Lords supported the introduction of the statutory definition of domestic abuse, including the express recognition that children are victims in their own right. There was support, too, for enshrining in law the office of the domestic abuse commissioner; for the new domestic abuse protection notice and the domestic abuse protection order; for the new duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to provide support to victims and their children within safe accommodation; for the prohibition on cross-examination in person in the civil and family courts; for automatic eligibility for special measures; and for the clarification of the law in respect of the so-called “rough sex” defence.
This is not to say that all noble Lords regard every one of the provisions in the Bill as perfect. A number of noble Lords raised points of detail and substance, and I will respond to some of those in a moment. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not name-check everyone who spoke, else I will lose my entire 20 minutes in doing so.
Before responding, I acknowledge that the general welcome for the provisions in the Bill was accompanied by calls for it to be extended into new areas. There were three in particular, but the first two raised were the provision of community-based support for all victims and access to safe accommodation by migrant victims who have no recourse to public funds. A number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Chisholm and Lady Bertin, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Polak, the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt, Lady Armstrong, Lady Lister, Lady Hussein-Ece and Lady Wilcox of Newport, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, talked about this, as did other noble Lords. In fact, almost every noble Lord talked about it, and we recognise that more needs to be done to ensure adequate provision of community-based support, but it would not be right to impose new duties on public authorities in this Bill without first understanding the gaps in existing provision and consulting with local authorities, police and crime commissioners and others who would be subject to any new duty.
To this end, the domestic abuse commissioner is undertaking an in-depth exploration of the current community-based support landscape. The commissioner is due to complete this work towards the end of the year. Alongside this, we are also developing a victim funding strategy to deliver sustainable provision to all victims. I understand the point that my noble friend Lady Sanderson made, but we do not think the duty on first-tier local authorities for community-based service in some way overrides that provision. That is the point that she was trying to make. On completion of the projects, the Government will work with the commissioner to understand the needs identified and develop options for how best to support victims, wherever they reside.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox, Lady Burt, Lady Lister, Lady Gale, Lady Crawley and Lady Meacher, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Woolley, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lady Helic—practically the whole House—talked about the needs of migrant victims. We are clear, first and foremost, that all victims of domestic abuse must be treated as victims first. Noble Lords will have heard me say that before and I say it again. We committed in our response to the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill to review the Government’s response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, and we published our findings last July. This highlighted that, although we have received some evidence, there is currently a lack of robust data to demonstrate which cohorts of migrant victims are likely to be in most need of support.
To address the evidence gap, on 15 December we launched a £1.5 million support for migrant victims pilot scheme, which will start next month and run to March 2022. This will enable us to take well-grounded and evidence-based decisions on how best to protect these victims in the long term. Both the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, and my noble friend Lady Helic talked about engagement with Southall Black Sisters. I have engaged with them previously in a round table, and my honourable friends Vicky Atkins and Alex Chalk have also engaged with them extensively. We have engaged with many groups across the sector and certainly with them.
The noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, talked about co-operation across borders. It is absolutely essential, both to fulfil the provision and to make sure that people do not abscond from their obligations of facing justice.
I will address some of the points raised in the debate. We have heard from more than 90 speakers; I cannot respond to all the points, but I will attempt to. If I do not address all the points, I will certainly write to noble Lords.
The point I will mention first is GPs charging for letters, because it was one of the last points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I know that, as she said, it has been troubling him for some time. While GPs can levy a fee for this service, due to it being classified as private work that sits outside the core GP contract, the BMA has now advised GPs not to charge for such letters. Back in January 2018 we made changes to legislation that aimed to make it easier for victims or those at risk of domestic abuse to obtain and provide the evidence required to access legal aid. We continue to work with the GPs committee to improve the process for GPs and victims in relation to evidence of domestic abuse.
Another issue that came up a lot was the crime survey upper age limit. My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower took the wind out of my sails by answering the question for me, but I shall answer it again. I first got the answer from my noble friend Lady Sanderson. Last month the Office for National Statistics announced that it would remove the upper age limit from the Crime Survey for England and Wales. I know this announcement will be welcomed by noble Lords and organisations such as Age UK that have campaigned for this change.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, among others, argued for the introduction of a data-sharing firewall so that migrant victims can approach the police safe in the knowledge that their details will not be passed to Immigration Enforcement. I understand the national policing lead on domestic abuse is clear that there will be circumstances in which information sharing between police and immigration authorities is in the interests of safeguarding the victim of abuse. We are committed to considering existing data-sharing procedures in the light of the policing inspectorate’s findings of a police super-complaint that relates to current police practice in this area.
Probably the biggest issue of the day was non-fatal strangulation. Many plaudits were paid to my noble friend Lady Newlove; I will join with them. She was supported by practically every Member who spoke, arguing for the new offence of non-fatal strangulation. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made the interesting point that we should take time to interrogate whether a generic offence would be better. I will not answer yes or no to that, but there are several existing offences that relate to non-fatal strangulation. They cover a range of seriousness, from attempted murder to common assault and battery. In addition, non-fatal strangulation could be part of a course of action under the controlling or coercive behaviour offence or be covered by the specific offence under Section 21 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
Even though we are currently of the view that this range of offences already covers the diverse circumstances and levels of seriousness that may be involved in non-fatal strangulation, we are certainly willing to listen, and this debate has had quite a lot of evidence given to it on what might be needed. The Government will keep this matter under review and assess any evidence that emerges. Noble Lords have talked about New Zealand; the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, talked about Brazil. We will look at other practices around the world and consider whether a new specific offence is required. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, wisely said that we need to reflect on this and make sure that we come up with good law in this area.
The other big issue raised by noble Lords was revenge porn and, specifically, threats to disclose. My noble friend Lady Morgan asked about the steps that the Government are taking to protect victims from threats to disclose private sexual images without consent—known as “revenge porn”. Threats to disclose, regardless of the connection between the offender and the victim, are in many circumstances already captured by a range of existing offences. However, we acknowledge that there are concerns about the effectiveness of the current criminal law in this area. That is why the Law Commission is conducting a review of the law relating to the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images, including, but not limited to, the “revenge porn” offence in Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I understand that the Law Commission will launch a consultation shortly. I encourage noble Lords and others to contribute their views.
The controlling or coercive behaviour offence—the post-separation abuse that goes on—was widely mentioned as well. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt, Lady Lister, Lady Andrews and Lady Hayman, my noble friends Lady Sanderson and Lord Goschen, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, argued for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence to be extended to cover post-separation abuse issues. This offence was created in 2015 to fill a gap in existing legislation around patterns of controlling or coercive behaviour occurring during a relationship. Cases of controlling or coercive behaviour that occur outside the parameters of the offence are captured by the separate stalking and harassment offences. That said, we are finalising a review into the effectiveness of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence to ensure that it is fit for purpose and adequately protects victims from abuse. The review has unfortunately been delayed by the pandemic—one noble Lord mentioned that—but we aim to publish the outcome in time for Report stage.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester called for the Government to introduce a statutory defence for victims whose offending is driven by their experience of domestic abuse. We recognise the harm suffered by victims of domestic abuse, which is why a number of defences are potentially available in law to those who commit offences in circumstances connected with their involvement in an abusive relationship. These include the full defences of duress and self-defence as well as, in homicide cases, the partial defences of loss of control or diminished responsibility. In light of these existing defences, we are not persuaded in this case that a statutory defence is necessary, but we will continue to monitor the position.
My noble friends Lady Bertin and Lord Farmer, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baronesses, Lady Watkins and Lady Royall, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, called for a perpetrator strategy, the expansion of perpetrator programmes and the better management of perpetrators. We continue to work with local areas to support effective commissioning of domestic abuse services, including high-quality, safe perpetrator programmes. Indeed, in this financial year, we are investing more than £7 million into direct perpetrator-focused interventions through police and crime commissioners to prevent abuse. Our forthcoming domestic abuse strategy provides an opportunity for us to build on the foundations of the Bill in order to transform the response to domestic abuse. The strategy will include specific work to tackle perpetrators and to prevent offending.
The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, called for the creation of a new Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements category for serial domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators. At this point, I pay tribute to her work and that of John Clough on this. She knows that we do not have plans to introduce a new MAPPA category, but I certainly commend her for raising it. Our focus is on ensuring that we make better use of the existing MAPPA framework and related police systems, such as VISOR, rather than creating new categories.
Noble Lords, particularly the noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox, Lady Burt and Lady Jones, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friends Lady Gardner of Parkes, Lady Altmann and Lady Helic, expressed concerns about the handling of child contact cases in the family courts and the issue of parental alienation. My noble friend Lord Moylan also stressed something really important: the importance of ensuring that justice is upheld. We must never lose sight of that.
Last June we published the findings of the expert panel established to examine how effectively the family courts respond to allegations of domestic abuse and other serious offences in private law proceedings. While the current law is clear that the welfare of the child is paramount in making decisions about contact, the panel concluded that in some cases involving domestic abuse the courts are not striking the right balance between the child’s right to a relationship with both parents and the well-being of both the child and the parent victim.
That is why we have committed to undertake a review of the presumption of parental involvement as it currently stands. The review will consider how the presumption is currently applied by the courts, as well as reviewing the existing body of research in this area. However, while we fully recognise the need for swift action in the light of the panel’s findings, we also need to ensure that the full spectrum of issues and potential impacts can be considered in the round. The presumption of parental involvement is wide-ranging and we must be certain that any changes are fully considered.
Most noble Lords talked about support for children through the Bill. My noble friends Lady Chisholm, Lord Polak, Lady Stroud, Lady Verma and Lady Jenkin, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin and Lady Watkins, rightly drew attention to the devastating impact that domestic abuse can have on children and young people. I talked about the foetus earlier—those adverse impacts start when that child is in the womb.
Growing up in a household of fear and intimidation can impact children’s health, well-being and development, with lasting effects into adulthood—in fact, all their lives. That is why we amended the Bill in the Commons expressly to recognise that children who see, hear or experience domestic abuse are victims in their own right. The Bill includes a number of other measures to better protect and support child victims of domestic abuse. One of the domestic abuse commissioner’s key functions will be to encourage good practice in the identification of children affected by domestic abuse and the provision of protection and support to people, including children, affected by domestic abuse.
Another issue raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Warwick and Lady Donaghy, and my noble friend Lady Eaton was accommodation-based support, and how we had costed the new duty on tier 1 local authorities provided for in Part 4. MHCLG engaged with local authorities and service providers in estimating the cost of the new duty to ensure that it is funded appropriately.
The funding covers the estimated cost of providing unmet need for support in safe accommodation for victims and their children, as well as needs previously supported through MHCLG short-term challenge funds. The Women’s Aid estimate included costs of all services, including those with existing funding. On the basis of evidence, MHCLG estimated the cost at £125 million for 2021-22. It will undertake a post-implementation review, two years following the commencement of the duty, to assess its delivery, including the level of funding and the allocation method.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Burt and Lady Donaghy, and my noble friend Lord Bourne all raised the role of employers. We all expect employers to be particularly sensitive when dealing with a colleague who is experiencing domestic abuse. On 9 June 2020, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy announced a review of support in the workplace for victims of domestic abuse, including a call for written evidence, which closed on 9 September and received 126 responses. BEIS is currently considering the evidence gathered and the appropriate next steps, and will publish a response and action plan shortly.
I wonder whether I have more time. I usually go well over time, but not on this occasion. The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Marks, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Royall, raised the issue of legal aid. We are currently conducting a review of the means test, as part of which we are specifically considering the experience of victims of domestic abuse. As part of this, we have made a public commitment to look at the capital thresholds for victims of domestic abuse, where these apply. At the moment, the legal aid agency can apply an eligibility waiver for victims of domestic abuse applying for an injunction or other orders for protection, which means that an applicant for a protective injunction may be eligible for legal aid, even if they have income or capital above the thresholds in the means test, although they may have to make a financial contribution towards their legal costs.
We have already—in April 2020—widened the evidence requirements for domestic abuse victims, making it easier for them to obtain and provide the evidence they need to access legal aid. It will also reduce the risk of genuine victims being unable to obtain the required evidence.
There are a few issues that I have not addressed, including the commencement of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act. I may have to refer to other government departments, but I will write to noble Lords whose points I have not addressed.
I think we have made an excellent start to a Bill that I hope will become an excellent Act.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, the Bill currently defines domestic abuse as involving two people aged over 16. As has been said, the amendment would expand this definition to include a relationship where one person was under 16 and the other over 16. It appears that the definition would apply where the victim was over 16 but the perpetrator was not. We have doubts about the definition in the Bill being changed in this way, but I understand from what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said that this is a probing amendment.
Teenage relationships, and the victims of teenage relationship abuse, have specific needs, which should be addressed through a separate strategy tailored to them and recognised as an issue separate from both child abuse and the abuse that takes place between adults. As I said, we recognise that this is a probing amendment, but our concern is that if the age of the perpetrator in the definition is lowered—as appears to be the effect of the amendment in the circumstances set out in it—we would end up prosecuting and treating some perpetrators under 16 as, in effect, adults, which is not a road we believe we should go down. However, the issue of younger person or teenage abuse raised by the amendment is an important one, which the Government should address through a specific strategy and guidance for this group of victims and perpetrators. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
My Lords, I join the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in thanking all the many organisations that have collaborated with us on the Bill to date; communication has been incredibly constructive in virtually all cases. As she said, no one demurs from supporting this Bill; the question for debate is how we get there. I am grateful to her for affording us the opportunity to debate the minimum age of 16 in the definition of domestic abuse.
The amendment would expand the definition of domestic abuse to include a relationship in which person A, the abuser, is aged under 16 and person B, the victim, is aged 16 or over. Clause 1 as drafted provides that the behaviour of person A towards another person, B, is domestic abuse if
“A and B are each aged 16 or over and are personally connected to each other, and … the behaviour is abusive.”
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, abuse in relationships where the victim or both parties are under 16 years of age will be treated as abuse of a child and subject to existing criminal offences, and legislation relevant to safeguarding procedures will be followed. In cases where the abuser is under the age of 16 and their victim is over the age of 16, as in this amendment, appropriate safeguarding responses will be followed which, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just pointed out, seek to avoid the criminalisation of children.
I apologise to the noble Lord. Would the Minister like to come back on that particular point?
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We might have got the choreography slightly wrong, but I am always amenable to answer questions, even though the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has clearly signalled her intention to withdraw her amendment.
I am not diminishing the seriousness of this compared to children who may involve themselves in terrorism. I will not be dealing with the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, but the noble Lord will know our other legislation—for example, one of the central premises of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 was to ensure that children who took a wrong step in their early years were not criminalised for the rest of their lives. Terrorism has very serious implications on people’s lives—not that domestic abuse does not. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Parkinson, who is sitting beside me, will elucidate further on that when we get to that Bill.
I now apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Would you like to complete your speech please? Do you wish to withdraw your amendment?
My Lords, this is a solid piece of legislation and I hope that the process on which we are embarking will make it better. I remind the Committee that I sit as a family magistrate in London, so I regularly deal with all types of family-related cases, including parental alienation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, gave a heartfelt speech; I found it very moving. She has clearly endured the most difficult of circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, gave closely, carefully and well-argued support of the amendments to which she put her name.
In family courts, as everyone has acknowledged, you quite often hear allegations of parental alienation, and a normal scenario is different from what we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer. A more normal scenario is that the parents are separated, the father has not seen the children for a while—too long—and he makes a private law application to see his children. The mother says there has been domestic abuse—or there have been allegations of domestic abuse—and the father makes a counter allegation, almost as a defence, saying that the mother is alienating the children against the father. That scenario is quite common. It is for the courts to try and sort it out, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, got it right when she said that both domestic abuse and parental alienation allegations can be either true or false. It is the job of the court process to sort that out.
I want to add two other observations. First, it is the duty of the court to get the best result for the child; we are not there to get a fair result for the parents. The question that we often ask ourselves is: “How do we get the voice of the child into the court?” One usual way of doing that is through Cafcass; there is an interview with a very experienced Cafcass officer who gives their view about what would be best for the child, and that view can be examined in the court. The way that Cafcass looks at these issues will be examined later in other amendments.
There is another way of doing it, which happens very rarely. I have not done it myself, but I have done it in public law cases, and that is where the child tells the court what they want. In the scenario where I was involved, a child was going to be taken into care by social services, and I have to say, it was extremely moving. The children whom I have done this for were well aware of the realities of the situation, and they were very aware that they were saying different things to the court—to me as the magistrate—than they had been saying to their parents. My experience is that children understand these situations; they can be toxic and extremely difficult, but nobody should underestimate children’s ability to understand the difficulty of their family situation.
I do not come down for or against these amendments, as such. It is a difficult situation. Other noble Lords made the point that there are many ways that parents can undermine and be unpleasant to each other that are not to the benefit of the children. One noble Baroness referred to the Bill as a potential Christmas tree of abusive relationships, and this does not help, because there are many varieties that one sees in court. Nevertheless, the central point I make to the Committee is that it is the court’s role to come up with the best solution for the child, not what is fair for the parents.
My Lords, first, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Meyer, who is right to highlight the protection of children. I acknowledge, empathise and sympathise with her terrible experience of parental abduction, which, as she said, led to her being alienated from her children for years. We know that domestic abuse has devastating consequences, not only for adult victims but for their children, which is why the Bill rightly recognises children as victims in their own right. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, this is very much part of the court proceeding, as has also just been articulately outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Some of the protections that have been outlined in the Bill, such as preventing cross-examination in courts, mitigate this in some ways.
I also agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in questioning the judicial training that must support the outcome of such proceedings, whatever it is. We know that child arrangement cases involving domestic abuse or allegations of abuse often include allegations of alienating behaviours, where one parent seeks to undermine or frustrate the other parent’s relationship with their children, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, also outlined. These actions, as my noble friend highlights in her amendment, are often referred to as “parental alienation”.
My noble friend Lady Helic, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, pointed out how the term has so often been used to sidetrack from the issue of domestic abuse. She pointed out that the pro-contact culture of the courts quite often leads to the wrong decisions being made.
To answer my noble friend Lord Polak, there is no widely accepted definition, nor a commonly held framework, for parental alienation. Instead, views are wide-ranging: some focus on the parent’s behaviour, some focus on the child’s behaviour and others focus on the impact or outcome of the behaviour. For these and other reasons, I refer instead to “alienating behaviours”. That phrase is used in the guidance, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Bennett, point out. The guidance will be subject to consultation after Royal Assent. The beauty of the House of Lords is of course its scrutiny of Bills. To that end, we very much welcome views on how to deal with this issue.
Alienating behaviours can include a range of attitudes and actions. Some are subtle, such as drip-feeding negative views, while others are more obvious, such as deliberately flouting child arrangement orders. I am clear that these behaviours are wrong and problematic, but they are not limited to cases involving domestic abuse. They occur in the context of acrimonious separation and other high-conflict cases, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I have sympathy with my noble friend’s wish to address these behaviours, but I submit that the definition in Clause 1 for the purposes of the Bill is not the right context in which to do so.
Alienating behaviours should be considered primarily in terms of the impact on the child. Most noble Lords referred to that and to the potential emotional and psychological harm to the child that can result, for example, from repeatedly hearing negative views about a parent or being prevented from spending time with a parent. From the perspective of risk of harm to the child, the relevant legal framework is provided for in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, together with the Section 31(9) definition of harm in that Act.
I accept that alienating behaviours can, in some circumstances, be indicators or manifestations that point to a wider pattern of psychological or emotional abuse. To be absolutely clear, I do not accept that alienating behaviours should be defined as domestic abuse in their own right. However, in circumstances where such behaviours are indicative of a wider pattern of emotional or psychological abuse, we can be confident that the Clause 1 definition already applies and renders the proposed amendment unnecessary.
Our approach in Clause 1 is to define domestic abuse by reference to different types of abusive behaviours and not by reference to the form in which those behaviours may be expressed or manifested. If we were to include within the Clause 1 definition a list of possible indicators under each type of abuse, we would risk appearing to give more weight to one form of behaviour and therefore creating a hierarchy of behaviours. Should a particular indicator or manifestation of psychological or emotional abuse not be listed, it may be deemed to be less serious or, worse, not a form of abuse at all.
The arena in which we can most effectively address alienating behaviours as potential indicators of a recognised type of domestic abuse is the statutory guidance under Clause 73, which has been published in draft. I have gone through how that will be consulted on. It has been created and continues to be edited in consultation with the sector. As I said earlier, we welcome further suggestions on how the guidance can be further strengthened, including in the area of alienating behaviours. Once the Bill is enacted, the Home Secretary will formally consult the domestic abuse commissioner and other key stakeholders before the guidance is promulgated.
I note the points by my noble friends Lady Gardner of Parkes and Lady Chisholm that the unintended consequences might be to swing the pendulum of this good Bill the other way. My noble friend Lady Newlove warns of parental alienation creating a loophole in which to perpetrate abuse. I give the final word to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, who warns that, if these amendments are accepted, victims might be painted as abusers.
I hope that, in the light of this explanation and our commitment to address alienating behaviours in the statutory guidance, my noble friend Lady Meyer can withdraw her amendment.
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale.
My Lords, I am very grateful for this opportunity to speak after the Minister. I did not submit my name for the speakers’ list for this group because I could not rely on the train from Scotland getting me here on time, but I am delighted that I managed to make it in time to hear the powerful and important speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer.
When I first saw this amendment at the end of last week, unaware as I was then that it would become perhaps the most controversial and debated issue of our first day in Committee, I flinched. I understand the motivations behind it and there have been powerful speeches on both sides of the debate, but I fear that the Bill’s purpose, which we celebrated earlier this month at Second Reading—to empower victims of domestic abuse to be confident enough to deal with their circumstances, and to ensure that perpetrators are properly punished—would be undermined by the amendments. These amendments could disempower victims of domestic abuse and therefore run contrary to the rest of the Bill.
On reading the amendment on Friday morning, I immediately imagined a situation where a woman is about to flee the home, even temporarily, and the man says, “But under the Domestic Abuse Act I will pursue you for alienation.” A very high proportion of women facing that situation would stay where they were out of an additional fear, on top of all the fear they already experience. I will not tell my personal story here, but I can absolutely assure noble Lords that this happens and this would happen. We should hesitate and think very carefully about this issue in advance of accepting an amendment of this sort.
I was persuaded by the powerful cases made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Helic, but particularly by the wise words of the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, spelling out the need to take time over this issue, to consider it carefully, and to do the right thing for the victims of domestic abuse and the children who might be affected. For that reason I think the Government have the balance right by not including alienation in the Bill, but by referring to it in the draft statutory guidance. I therefore support the Minister’s submission.
I agree with the noble Lord’s very balanced view. It is absolutely right that we do not undermine what is very good legislation by acting in haste and regretting at leisure. The case study the noble Lord outlined was in the back of my mind as well.
My Lords, I have made so many notes that I do not know where to start. I thank all those who spoke very kindly, particularly those who support my amendments. Listening to the people who oppose them was really interesting. It made me realise how some people are quite misinterpreting their purpose. They are not about disarming women confronted by abusive men—quite the opposite; I am such a woman. False accusations are quite a different issue.
As I mentioned, it is for the courts to decide in their investigation or fact-finding hearings whether a situation is parental alienation, purposefully done by one parent using the child as a tool against the other. I do not know whether noble Lords can imagine how that feels. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said that she was in a situation like that, but it probably was not very much; it was probably a grandmother telling her that her mother was not very nice. However, many children are indoctrinated. Some people talk about children being in a cult, being constantly and continuously indoctrinated by being told that the other parent and the other family are bad. Those children live in fear of the disapproval of the parent who is alienating them.
The point I am trying to make is that parental alienation is about control; it is about one parent wanting to control the other. This is coercive behaviour. We might regret refusing to include parental alienation in the Bill because we would put children most at risk. My noble friend Lady Helic said that there is no data to prove parental alienation. I believe that there is, because many people are talking about it and are worried about it being used in some cases. Thousands of studies have been done, and I can gladly send them to the Minister. Noble Lords talked about Dr Gardner, who has been dead for 20 years. He was talking about parental alienation syndrome, but things have moved on since then. The fact that he came up with one idea that was then, properly, rejected does not mean that all the other research done afterwards is invalid.
I understand that some people feel very strongly that this is misused, but I go back to the point that it would be up to the courts. That is why we have courts and why, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, it is very important for more judges to understand what parental alienation is about. This is why we have Cafcass, and why this is recognised and in law in many countries. I do not know why we are having such a strong debate against it here. It fits in the Bill because it is used against one parent. Imagine being the parent against whom it is used: you are in a terrible position because your child dislikes you, he objects to seeing you and you cannot force the situation because you will upset him even more. It is a very efficient way to control one parent.
Lastly, the guidance will not help judges because it is not statutory. If parental alienation is just in the guidance it will not help to solve the issue earlier on.
I hope that the Minister and her department can talk with me about parental alienation to find another way to include it somewhere in the Bill—not in the guidance, but somewhere more prominent—and to make it clear that this is not anything to do with gender. I very much fear that this whole debate against parental alienation and a lot of stuff in the Bill are gender biased; there are male victims. I am talking here about children. I hope the Minister will accept discussing this further, so that we can find another way to include it in the Bill.
At this time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I look forward to coming back to it at the next stage.
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as noted in the register. We very much want the Bill to recognise the realities of abuse that different communities face, and to make sure that it will work in practice for victims of all backgrounds, religions, disabilities and so forth. We hope that the Minister will work with the Peers raising issues and look into their concerns.
I pay tribute to the noble Lords who tabled the amendments for the very experienced and knowledgeable way in which they have highlighted this matter, to ensure that the rights of Jewish women to end their religious marriages and secure a get are included as part of the statutory definition of domestic abuse. This would be on the grounds of domestic abuse by way of controlling and coercive behaviour and psychological abuse, and of economic abuse where that is a factor.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said in her detailed opening speech, the amendment is intended to help women who are unable to leave a failed marriage, and is specific only to Jewish religious laws; there is no intention to undermine the Jewish courts. Including it in the Bill would provide the opportunity to ensure that its provisions and protections were applicable to all, and that it specifically recognised the plight of those women, removing the shadow of abuse and control, and restoring their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith. That recognition would also offer them other protections under the Act, once the Bill is passed, if they were specifically included.
It is in line with a key objective of the Bill to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. Key is the ability of women to bring a case where they can retain control of the process as the victims, rather than as a witness in a prosecution having criminal sanctions as a civil party. Through tabling such an amendment, the issue can be usefully raised, and seeking legislative change could be ground-breaking for chained women.
This group highlights what so many noble Lords have been saying. The Bill must work for all victims, and to do this, it must grapple with the reality of how domestic abuse is experienced in all the different ways that it is by those living with it and those trying to escape it. I sincerely hope that the Minister can work with the noble Lords sponsoring this group of amendments to review this important issue and achieve a positive resolution.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments, particularly my noble friend Lady Altmann for her very good introduction. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, that it is not his noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar responding, but I know that he will be listening to every word I say and will correct me where I am wrong. I also thank him for some of the compelling stories that he outlined—some absolutely tragic cases which I know that all noble Lords will sympathise and empathise with. I thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this subject. It has been a real education for me, outlining the situations that some women find themselves in.
I will take these amendments one by one to address them properly. Amendments 3 and 5 would add a sixth limb to the list of behaviours in Clause 1(3) which count as abusive, namely the unreasonable refusal, or the threat thereof, to agree to the granting of a religious bill of divorce, or a get, which is necessary to dissolve a Jewish religious marriage. I am all too aware of the real hardship suffered by women refused a get by their husbands. As already outlined, such a woman is unable to remarry under the auspices of Orthodox Judaism. Furthermore, as a woman regarded in Jewish law as still being married, any children she goes on to have with another Jewish partner will themselves be severely restricted, as a matter of Jewish law, in who they are later able to marry. The term applied in Jewish law to such a woman, “agunah” or “chained”, is, as my noble friend Lady Altmann pointed out, both apt and tragic. I know that Jewish religious authorities are concerned about the problem, but they have not so far found a solution to it within Jewish religious law.
All too often this will be about the exertion of control by one spouse over the other, as noble Lords have pointed out. There could well be situations where the refusal of a get might constitute controlling or coercive behaviour, depending on the facts of an individual case, and this would sit better in the statutory guidance on domestic abuse provided for in Clause 73 than in the Bill.
The list of abusive behaviours in Clause 1(3) is deliberately drafted at a high level, to provide a clear and easily understandable summary of what constitutes domestic abuse. Including very specific circumstances in this list could lead to pressure to include other such circumstances, which would make the definition unwieldy. It could also create the impression that there is a hierarchy of abuse, which of course there is not. It is these more specific circumstances that the statutory guidance is designed to address, and I am more than happy to work with noble Lords to discuss what such content might look like.
Amendment 169 seeks to ensure that this guidance and the statutory guidance issued under Section 77 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 include in their discussion of controlling or coercive behaviour the unreasonable refusal to grant a get. We wish to avoid, as far as possible, prescribing in statute what statutory guidance must contain, which can arguably defeat the purpose of producing that guidance. My noble friend will be aware that, in response to significant concern from a large number of parties, Clause 73(3) does provide that guidance issued under the Bill must recognise
“that the majority of victims of domestic abuse… are female.”
However, including the specific issue of Jewish religious divorces similarly in the Bill would lead to pressure for a large number of other topics to be so included—as beautifully illustrated by my noble friend Lord Moylan—which could in practice end up reproducing much of the substance of the guidance in the Bill. My noble friend will have just heard my commitment to referring to this subject in the guidance.
Amendment 168 seeks to amend Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to ensure that the person who unreasonably refuses a get, and their spouse, are regarded as being in an intimate personal relationship with each other, and therefore count as personally connected, which is a prerequisite for the application of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, as noble Lords have pointed out. I understand the intention behind this amendment. My noble friend may be aware that in our White Paper on domestic abuse, published in January 2019, the Government committed to undertake a review into the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. That review, which has considered evidence surrounding the effectiveness of that offence, will be published before Report, and the Government will consider their position in relation to that offence after its publication, in the light of the content of the review and any other information brought to our attention. Therefore, my noble friend’s amendment may be slightly premature.
Amendment 170 seeks to ensure that the unreasonable refusal to consent to a get be regarded as a significant factor in the consideration of whether a person has suffered domestic abuse, particularly whether the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour has been committed; whether a domestic abuse protection order should be issued; and the production by relevant local authorities of strategies for the provision of domestic abuse support, as required by Clause 55. On the first limb of that, the determination of domestic abuse, my remarks about what it is appropriate to include in the Bill and what to include in guidance apply equally.
On the two limbs which refer to court proceedings, it would not be appropriate for the Government to direct the judiciary in this way as to what it might or must consider, and nor is it necessary. The conditions which must be satisfied before a court can make a domestic abuse protection order will already enable a court to make one in relation to this behaviour, if it amounts to abusive behaviour under Clause 1(3). It is therefore unnecessary to make specific provision that a court must consider this sort of behaviour. It would also be the first provision of its type in the Bill, and lead to pressure for other considerations to be included in the Bill as factors courts must consider.
On the final limb, relating to local authorities, we are not otherwise specifying what local authorities must consider when drawing up their strategies. Strategies will relate to general provision in the local authority area, and it would be very odd for the only such provision to refer to a situation which relates to a very small number of people at most. However, again, I reassure my noble friend that this issue will be considered in the statutory guidance, to which local authorities will refer. I hope that in the light of this explanation, my noble friend is happy to withdraw her amendment.
Amendment 15 would add an unborn child, from conception onwards, to the definition of a child under Clause 3 of the Bill, which addresses the issue of children as victims of domestic abuse. Clause 7 provides that the domestic abuse commissioner must encourage good practice in identifying victims of abuse, including affected children. Amendment 20 would specifically add
“babies in utero, infants and young children aged under two years”
to the definition of children affected by domestic abuse.
Amendment 172 provides that:
“The Secretary of State must make provision for publicly-funded trauma-informed and attachment-focussed therapeutic work to be made available to all parents of children aged under two years old where those children are victims of or otherwise affected by domestic abuse.”
Amendment 179 states that, where the Secretary of State issues guidance on the effect of domestic abuse on children, it must include,
“in particular babies who were in utero at the time of the abuse, and … babies and young children aged under two years old”.
We fully agree that there is a need to consider the impact of domestic abuse on young babies and the importance of protecting pregnant women and the child they are carrying, and, likewise, with the fact that trauma from domestic abuse at a young age can have long-term consequences.
Clause 3 now recognises children who witness or are impacted by abuse as victims of that abuse—that is children of any age, including babies. I noted with interest the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, based on her experience of how officials react when resources are limited and there is any doubt about what legislation requires them to do. Adequate resourcing will be crucial to delivering the objectives of this Bill.
I appreciate that this has already been said more than once, but I repeat that it has been estimated that 30% of domestic violence begins during pregnancy. It often escalates during this time as well, and represents a real danger to women. We know that domestic abuse during pregnancy increases the risk of miscarriage, infection, premature birth or injury to the child once born, and it is also a major factor leading to complications and death in, or related to, pregnancy.
The impact of domestic abuse during pregnancy does not end at the birth, and is associated with long-term harms to both women and children. Domestic abuse during pregnancy is associated with increased risk of perinatal and neonatal mortality, higher rates of depression among women, low birth weight and a range of long-term emotional, behavioural and traumatic impacts on children.
However, we do have concerns about the possible impact of the inclusion of babies in utero in the Bill. Despite the risk of harm and attack faced by pregnant women, the current long-standing offence of child destruction is rarely used and the need to prove the perpetrator’s intention to kill has made securing convictions difficult. Yet a national inquiry found that some 24%, I think, of 295 maternal deaths over a three-year period were women who had experienced domestic abuse. Of these 70 women, 19 had been murdered. This is an area that the Government should review. In the meantime, it would not be helpful to have references to babies in utero in the Bill without consultation or wider consideration of the impact this could have on legal principles of bodily autonomy.
This issue with the amendment as presently worded is one that the movers—the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top—have recognised, and I am sure it can be addressed.
Finally, I reiterate that we recognise the importance of the general issue that is raised by the amendment about early intervention to break the cycle of violence and ensure support for mothers and babies.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and particularly my noble friend Lady Stroud for tabling these amendments. She and I—as well as every noble Lord who has spoken—share the commitment to protecting all children who are victims of domestic abuse. I noted that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and indeed my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, outlined the very different developmental journeys that a traumatised child will take through their life compared to his or her non-traumatised counterpart.
These amendments seek to recognise the impact of domestic abuse on very young children, including unborn children. Amendment 15 would make explicit reference to unborn children as part of the definition of a child under Clause 3. Amendment 20 is similar in that it would make explicit reference to babies in utero, infants and children under two years old in Clause 7(1)(c)(iii), which provides for the function of the domestic abuse commissioner to encourage good practice in the identification of children affected by domestic abuse. Amendment 172 seeks to make provision for publicly funded therapeutic services for parents of children under the age of two who are victims of domestic abuse. Amendment 179 would make explicit reference to unborn babies and children under the age of two in the statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, I welcome the important contributions made by noble Lords on this difficult subject. It is important to recognise that domestic abuse does not happen in a neat silo; as so many noble Lords have commented, it is inherently bound up with wider issues of mental health and substance abuse.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who so strongly highlighted the impact of devastating cuts to our public services through a decade of austerity. I restate his comments about the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ call for the Government to reverse the cuts and enable local authorities to invest £374 million into adult services to cope with the increased need. Report after report now highlights the poor preparedness of our public realm to cope with this dreadful pandemic, as a consequence of the austerity decade, when council funding was cut to the bone.
Mental health services have been particularly impacted by this austerity, leading to a lack of services and long waiting times. Victims and survivors with mental health problems also face barriers accessing many other vital services due to strict eligibility criteria or not being able to engage in the way that services require. Too often, such barriers are leading to people being bounced around different services, having to constantly re-tell their story.
There is, however, an awareness of the complex and interrelated needs of those with mental ill health, but many services are unequipped to support them, and few services exist that can care for people with both mental health and substance misuse issues. This is despite research showing that substances are often used as a form of self-medication for unmet mental health needs and as a way of coping with abuse.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, spoke so knowledgably about, there is a close link between domestic abuse and alcohol, with the perpetrator drinking heavily. There are also instances of the victim drinking, leading to uninhibited behaviours, and this can trigger the abuse. Similarly, the victim may use alcohol and drugs to self-medicate. During the pandemic, there has been an increased level of alcohol consumption, exacerbating a known problem.
There is, therefore, a great need to ensure that the commissioner’s remit includes alcohol and other substances. She needs to be able to receive evidence on alcohol abuse to inform where support services must be improved, and to contribute directly to the national alcohol strategy.
In conclusion, the importance of multiagency and holistic working in this area cannot be overemphasised. It is important to recognise that mental health and addiction problems can create additional vulnerabilities that people perpetrating abuse may seek to exploit.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the complexities of alcohol and substance misuse and mental health and the correlation with domestic abuse, from the point of view of both the victim and—as my noble friend Lady Stroud said—the perpetrator. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling these amendments and her work in chairing the Commission on Alcohol Harm.
I will start with the final comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox of Newport. She and I are cut from the same cloth in knowing the effectiveness with which multiagency work can help in all sorts of ways. The way that agencies communicate with each other can get to the heart of some of the problems in society.
I also acknowledge the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott, Lady Hayter, Lady Jenkin and Lady Jolly, and thank the noble Lords, Lord Brooke and Lord Ribeiro, for their expertise and their input into the Alcohol Health Alliance’s report for the Commission on Alcohol Harm, which was published last year. It highlights these complex relationships between alcohol, mental health and domestic abuse. I welcome the report; it makes for important reading.
As the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has illustrated, there is a frequent coexistence of domestic abuse, mental health problems and the misuse of drugs and alcohol, with complex interrelationships between them. The relationships are nuanced, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is right to identify this. It is also clear that there is no excuse for domestic abuse, and it is vital that people affected by domestic abuse get the healthcare they need.
I reassure noble Lords that we intend to reflect the importance of joining up domestic abuse, mental health and substance misuse services in the statutory guidance to be issued under Clause 73. We have a number of other, parallel measures to ensure that the join-up should be reflected in local health commissioning and the support that people receive. Noble Lords will know that local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and other partners produce an assessment of the local population needs, called the joint strategic needs assessment. This should include consideration of the needs of victims and survivors. The assessment informs a local area’s health and well-being strategy and the commissioning of services, including mental health and substance misuse services.
I will say something about local authority spending because noble Lords have referred to it. Local authority spending through the public health grant will be maintained in the next financial year. Local authorities can continue to invest in prevention and essential front-line services. This includes drug and alcohol treatment and recovery services. We are working on increasing access to substance misuse services, and we have appointed Professor Dame Carol Black to undertake an independent review of drugs to inform the Government’s work on what more can be done to tackle the harms that drugs cause.
I also draw noble Lords’ attention to ongoing work in the health system to create new integrated care systems where NHS organisations, in partnership with local councils, voluntary service partners and others, take collective responsibility for managing resources, delivering NHS care and improving the health of the population they serve. The development of a new integrated care system is a real opportunity to improve the join-up between different services and provide truly integrated care.
I turn to the specifics of the amendments. On Amendments 21 and 29, which relate to the role of the domestic abuse commissioner, the Bill already confers on the commissioner a wide remit in tackling domestic abuse. She has already started to provide public leadership on domestic abuse issues by raising awareness of key matters and monitoring and overseeing the delivery of services to ensure that they are as effective, evidence-based and safe as they can be.
The description of the role states that the commissioner must adopt a specific focus on the needs of victims from groups with particular needs, which could include mental ill-health or substance misuse. However, as an independent office holder, it will be for the commissioner to determine her priorities, which will be set out in a strategic plan developed following consultation with her advisory board, the Home Secretary and others.
As for Amendment 42, which relates to the composition of the advisory board, Clause 12 already provides that at least one member of the board must be a representative of the health care sector, and there is sufficient latitude for the commissioner to appoint other specialists as she sees fit.
My Lords, the Committee has every reason to be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, because these are all very important announcements; I thank everyone involved, and it is very good to be speaking to this group. This subject is not just close to my heart but has been part of my life. I was very pleased to hear in the Minister’s response how many things are going to be in place to deal with alcoholism, in particular. I very much look forward to Dame Carol Black’s review—I know how brilliant she is—and I also welcome the news about sobriety tags. I just want to make a few points, some of them personal.
The link between alcohol and domestic abuse is well known, and yet, strangely, it is often not at the forefront of the debate. Some 55% of domestic abuse cases involve alcohol or some kind of substance, and women who drink themselves are 15 times more likely to be abused than women who do not. I am not going to repeat the stats; one only has to read the excellent contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on Monday night to get a good picture of how solid the evidence is. Drunk people, both men and women, are more likely to abuse or be abused than those who are not. Alcohol itself is not the culprit, and it should never be an excuse for behaviour. However, I believe that it is so tightly woven into the problem that it must be treated as part of the recovery process.
I am very glad that, as a result of the Bill, the crime of domestic abuse will be better dealt with and we will have more refuges. I also welcome the commissioner. But if we do not study, understand and treat alcoholism, then we are not doing our job.
Alcoholics, when they are drinking and when they are addicted to alcohol, are really difficult to deal with. Alcohol, as people say, is both cunning, baffling and powerful. I know that, in my life, I have drunk to excess. I do not drink now and I have not done for many years, but alcoholism will be with me for the rest of my life. It is very hard to break that cycle without help, and there are far too few treatment centres in this country. I know—again, from my own experience and that of people I know—that doctors and general hospitals do not like disruptive alcoholics, who are really hard to treat and who take up beds. They sober up and are then sent back into the world, where they start drinking again. People, especially women, keep alcoholism a secret. It is seen still as an issue of shame in this country, which is one reason I have always spoken publicly about it, throughout my life.
If we do not stop the cycle, the same thing happens again. Abuse is a spiral, in much the same way as addiction, and a drunk abuser will seek a victim. A woman who drinks herself and who has, probably as a consequence, the lower self-esteem that goes along with it, will almost inevitably partner up with the kind of bloke who will, ultimately, abuse her. That is what you do when you think you are not worth anything, because you are the person in our society who cannot handle alcohol like everybody else does.
Personally, I cannot think of a more difficult thing—it is almost impossible—than to be a woman with kids who is the victim of domestic abuse and a drinker herself. Yes, the council may find you a refuge, but, when that is over and you have to go back to the world, if you do not have some solid help to get through that addiction, you are going to end up back where you were, and the saga goes on and on.
The need to break this cycle must be a fundamental, core part of the commissioner’s remit. She needs all the expertise to support her and she needs money to enable her to make the right decisions. No one in their wildest miseries or nightmares would want to be addicted to any substance, from a bottle, a needle or a pill—it is a misery you would not wish on anyone. But once there, it takes some time and patience. I have been lucky; I have been able to afford the help I needed, but this should not be an issue of money.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said earlier in this debate, deep cuts have been made to addiction services in this country since 2013-14. It means that the 8.4 million potentially high-risk drinkers—that is an awful lot—and the hundreds with opiate addictions, are not getting the right help. It is an insane situation, because for every addict or alcoholic, it is reckoned that at least five people are swept into the madness and distress. It costs money: to the NHS, to the criminal justice system and to society.
WHO figures suggest that 50% of men who kill their wives are drunk or addicted. Helping people who drink or abuse substances through to the other side—through to a chance, literally, to rejoin the world as a useful member of society—would bring so many great benefits. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, spoke so wonderfully about on Monday night, so many children would have their lives transformed. As she said, the Commission on Alcohol Harm heard from children who were terrified to go home for fear of what their parent or parents might do. The Children’s Commissioner estimates that there are more than half a million children living in households where domestic abuse, along with drink and substance abuse, is prevalent.
The alcohol lobby is big and powerful. It has successfully fought demands for minimum pricing in England—though it lost in Scotland—a measure that is known to reduce harmful consumption. This stuff is everywhere. Adverts are well targeted, promising thrills and excitement, and they all too often use sexualised images of women to encourage purchase. This ought to stop. I am the last person who wants to see alcohol sales restricted in any way, but I am convinced that we cannot keep shoving this big problem to one side. Domestic abuse and alcohol are linked, and unless we break the addiction cycle, we will not break the other. We can no longer condemn both the victims and the abusers—who are, in my mind, sometimes also victims—to the shadows.
There is very little of what the noble Baroness said with which I would disagree. The cycle of abuse—whether that cycle is generational or whether it goes from spouse to partner and then reaches down to the children—is ever present and it needs to be broken. I agree that the links between alcohol abuse—not alcohol use but alcohol abuse—and domestic abuse are very well known. On people getting the help they need, it is absolutely clear that support for alcohol or substance misuse should mean that people can access the right services, which are commissioned by local authorities.
The noble Baroness made a point about the domestic abuse commissioner. It has been interesting in these debates that, on the one hand, the independence of the commissioner has been very much promoted, and I totally agree with that. On the other, we are by increment, through the debates in this House, trying to add additional remits and stymie her independence. She is an expert in her field. I know that she will make those links. I talk about troubled families quite a lot in the things that I say. That is because I have seen the way in which multi-agency interventions can be so effective at spotting things such as domestic abuse. The advent of that programme spotted an awful lot of domestic abuse previously unknown—and not only previously unknown but at the heart of the problems that these families were facing. We all know that when a big football match is on, women are quite often hyper-vigilant, knowing that, whatever way the game goes, they will bear the brunt of it—mainly as a result of the use of alcohol.
The noble Baroness also asked me about minimum pricing, which Scotland has introduced. We are keeping it under review as it is implemented in Scotland.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for what I consider to be a really quite overwhelming response to this set of amendments. We have had a very important debate. I would love to summarise what each person has said, but I am aware that the Committee has other amendments to get on to. I would like to highlight the fact that the toxic trio was launched into our debate on Monday by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley, and picked up again by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and it has been the focus around which many people have spoken. I am delighted to hear about the sobriety scheme and sobriety tags being brought in for alcohol-fuelled crime. I was part of that original amendment, some years ago, that allowed the pilot scheme to happen, and have seen the evidence from the US in particular of the efficacy in domestic situations as well. I am grateful in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, for that, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for putting local authority services so strongly on the table, with the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott, Lady Uddin and Lady Wilcox.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his very comprehensive introduction, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for setting out the case for her amendments.
We can all agree with the premise behind Amendments 23 and 28—namely, that we should promote the use of data and technology, as the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, said, in a cautious rather than cavalier way, to aid in the prevention, reporting and detection of domestic abuse.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who speaks on this Bill from a unique position, as both a former police officer and a survivor of domestic abuse.
The Domestic Abuse Bill introduces a range of new measures, including the use of data and technology to protect and support victims of domestic abuse and monitor perpetrators. For example, as we discussed earlier, the domestic abuse protection order can impose both prohibitions and positive requirements on perpetrators, including an electronic monitoring requirement, or tagging. I am happy that today I have made the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, so happy, because we have now come a long way since our disagreement on liqueur chocolates. That is an in-joke that only some noble Lords might get.
Victims of domestic abuse will be eligible for one or more special measures in the criminal, civil and family courts. Such special measures could include the use of a live televised link in a courtroom to enable a witness to give evidence during a trial or proceedings from outside the courtroom, and the use of pre-recorded video interviews before the trial or other proceedings.
The Bill provides for a pilot of mandatory polygraph examinations for domestic abuse offenders released on licence. I will not dwell on that now, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has indicated that he wants a debate on Clause 69 when we get there in a few days’ time. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, outlined the real benefits of machine-learning predictions for police. Of course, technology is already a key component of the police response to domestic abuse.
At this juncture, I will refer to the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Paddick, on the HMICFRS inspection of Greater Manchester Police and the victims of crime. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that what was unearthed should set alarm bells ringing, and I agree. He also said that if this is the first assessment, what will future assessments show to other police authorities? However, that is not a reason not to do it, and it will give cause for concern to other police authorities about how they might make improvements if necessary. We are not washing our hands of it. I brought the devolution Bill through your Lordships’ House some years ago. Devolution is an opportunity for local people to have a better determination of their own future through their elected representatives, in this case the mayor and the deputy mayor for policing.
We welcome HMICFRS’s decision to escalate the force to its police performance oversight group, which includes senior leaders from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Home Office. It met on Monday 26 January to scrutinise GMP’s plans for improvement and to consider whether additional support from within the sector may be necessary to support the force in quickly delivering the necessary step change in performance. We welcome HMICFRS’s decision to reinspect the force in six months’ time to assess progress; that is likely to be in May. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, we expect the mayoral response to the report to be published no later than 4 February.
Police forces use technological solutions to provide emergency protection to victims, such as TecSOS devices that provide victims with immediate connection to the police at the touch of a button, or the Hollie Guard app, which allows the victim to send an alert to chosen contacts if they are in danger, notifying them of the victim’s location and capturing audio and video evidence. There is also the Bright Sky app, which professionals and victims can use to access information and support on domestic abuse. It also enables the recording of evidence of abusive behaviour. Clare’s law also comes to mind, allowing data on partners’ previous abuse history, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also reminded me of the silent calling facility, which is such a benefit to people who cannot ask for help but who are in danger. As part of a police investigation of a domestic violence incident and any subsequent prosecution, the footage from body-worn video can also play a key part in building up an irrefutable case for the prosecution. As for the use of data, I agree that it is equally important to properly understand the needs of victims and to put in place the policies and services to meet those needs. That is why, for example, the first duty on tier 1 local authorities under Part 4 of the Bill is to assess the need for domestic abuse support in their areas. Robust and reliable data is the key to this in the context of Part 4 and elsewhere.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, outlined the benefits of machine learning in the assessment of risk. We have worked with the College of Policing to develop the domestic abuse risk assessment, which is an improvement on the established DASH risk assessment process. Evidence-based research helped us develop that, and with a number of charities, we have also developed the Domestic Abuse Matters training programme, which has been academically proven to increase officers’ empathy with victims, and their understanding of abuse. Things are improving. We have come a long way from the days when police officers saw domestic abuse as “just a domestic”.
While I support the underlying premise of Amendments 23 and 28, I hope that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord will agree that the amendments themselves are not needed, since Clause 7 already sets out broad functions for the domestic abuse commissioner in encouraging good practice for the prevention and detection of domestic abuse. This will include good practice in relation to the use of data and technology.
On Amendment 50, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, that the duty to co-operate with the commissioner, as provided for in Clause 15, extends to the provision of information. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill make this clear. This is one of those occasions when we believe it is preferable to keep the duty at a high level. There is always the risk, when a general proposition is followed by particular examples, of leaving the impression that the list of examples is exhaustive—or, indeed, that something is left out. We do not want inadvertently to leave the impression that the provision of information is the only form of co-operation.
Amendment 62 jumps ahead to Part 3 of the Bill. The amendment seeks to ensure that police take into account an individual’s previous criminality and convictions when considering issuing them with a domestic abuse protection notice. The matters to be considered listed in Clause 22 are designed to ensure that police take into account the impact of the notice on those directly or indirectly affected by it. The power to issue a notice enables the police to require an individual to leave their home for a period of up to 24 hours, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, when dealing with the immediate crisis. These provisions therefore provide an important safeguard by ensuring that the police give careful consideration to the impact of the notice on those affected when they are exercising this quite significant power. Again, the spirit of the amendment is certainly one that we can support.
When deciding whether a notice is necessary to protect a victim from domestic abuse, the police will consider a range of factors, including the history and the context of abuse, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, outlined. The College of Policing’s guidance on domestic abuse makes it clear that police should carry out comprehensive checks when responding to a domestic abuse incident, including: the alleged perpetrator’s history of abuse in relation to the victim, or previous victims; previous risk assessments; court orders or injunctions; convictions; and child protection information. Importantly, these checks ensure that intelligence on incidents and behaviours that have not resulted in a criminal conviction is considered. Furthermore, the draft statutory guidance for police on the domestic abuse protection notices and orders, which we published ahead of Committee, makes it clear that when deciding whether to issue a notice, the police should also consider other relevant information and evidence, such as incident reports from previous callouts, including those against other victims, and any intelligence from other agencies or organisations.
Having highlighted these important issues, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, in fact the Minister answered my question in almost her final sentence. It was about the status of callouts when considering this data. Police callouts are available to family courts and to sentencing criminal courts in domestic abuse cases. My question was going to be about the availability of that information to DAPOs, but I think that the Minister answered it in the affirmative.
I think the Minister’s answer will again be yes, as she clarified this issue in her last remarks. Clause 22, on these other matters, says
“a senior police officer must, among other things, consider”,
and then lists four issues that they must consider. Among those “other things” is of course someone’s previous record. I ask her to clarify that further.
I think it is yes to everything. The whole context has to be taken into account when issuing both a DAPN and a DAPO.
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and to the Minister for her sympathetic response.
I think we are all seeking the same thing. As the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia said, one cannot underestimate the importance of data in measuring crime, monitoring police actions and focusing on outcomes. That is why the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, to whom I am very grateful, emphasised the importance of the use of data and new methods of technology in helping to address what I think we all agree—this is part of the reason for the Bill today—has been the very patchy response to domestic abuse that we have seen in previous years. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, spoke very wisely about the better management and oversight of IT solutions and the contribution that they can make.
I listened with great care to the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. As she said, what sometimes sounds like common sense could be fatalistic and could undermine liberties. One would be unwise to dismiss that out of hand. As with many things, there are balances here: a balance of risks and a balance of opportunities. The issue for me is that the current methods of prediction are falling short and, from the LSE research, it looks as though we could find a way to get the predictive rate up. In view of the failures in relation to domestic abuse, this is a very important consideration indeed.
I was interested to hear my noble friend Lord Brooke talk about tagging. He is a real expert on the impact of alcohol on domestic abuse and more generally. I was grateful for his support, as I am to my noble friend Lord McConnell. He made some important remarks about being cautious over the use of data but acknowledged that my amendments themselves are not cavalier and, in a sense, are an encouragement to enable better practice in this area.
I was very touched by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who spoke very sensitively about his own experience and how we might learn from it. He was of course right to reflect on funding issues and the impact they have had on the police in using technology to support victims and tackle domestic abuse as a whole. My noble friend Lord Kennedy thought this was being proposed as a common-sense solution, and I very much agree with him.
The Minister was sympathetic, and I am grateful to her for that. She talked about the work that her department is doing with the College of Policing on risk assessment. It might be that she could encourage the college to talk to the LSE about its work to see whether that could inform further developments in future.
On Amendment 62, she has made it clear that the use of the phrase “other relevant information” essentially covers the point that I have raised, and interventions by my noble friends Lord Ponsonby and Lord Kennedy have confirmed that.
This has been a very good debate, and I hope it has been a constructive contribution to encouraging police forces to use data more effectively. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, I am happy to give my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I have great respect for the noble Baroness, but, again, have no expertise in this area. Of course, prevention is absolutely the key, and the point the noble Baroness made about the importance of ensuring that we take effective action to prevent children becoming abusers in the future is very important. You have to break this cycle, and I very much agree with the noble Baroness on that point.
I also think we have to be careful here that we are offering the right interventions at the right time. Professionals who are going to engage with partners and couples also need to be able to spot whether something is an area of conflict, but is not domestic abuse, or, equally, whether a situation is domestic abuse and actually needs a different intervention—they need to have the skills to understand that, and understand the difference. We would never want a situation where somebody remains in a relationship because they have had the wrong intervention. This is a very complicated area. We need professionals to provide the proper advice at the right time to ensure that if you can work to do that, fine, but equally there are times when people need to get out of a dangerous relationship. We need to ensure that professionals are able to spot that, and that you are building that knowledge and expertise into all the interventions that people can engage with.
On that basis, I am happy to support the amendments and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for tabling these amendments. I am pleased to see her looking so very much better. I hope that she is indeed feeling better, although she still has a bit of a cough. Her experience has been praised across the House, and I know how much she contributes to the debates in which she takes part. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, she brought into focus the real danger of the cycle of abuse and the importance of breaking it. As the noble Lord said, what we need here is the right interventions at the right time. There is strong evidence that conflict between parents, whether together or separated, can have significant impacts on children’s mental health and on long-term life chances. We can all agree on that.
We also highly value marriage, but must acknowledge that, for many reasons, such an arrangement will not suit everyone. Marriages have their difficulties; some couples do experience conflict and may decide that it is best for those involved to end their marriage. I recognise too the particular impact that this has on children and young people. That is not, of course, to negate the importance of couples’ counselling and access to psychological therapy services. They should not be underestimated and, in many cases, they lead to reconciliation of relationships, with steps to rebuild and repair. As the noble Baroness outlined, their value is immeasurable whatever the outcome of the relationship.
On mental health services, we are absolutely committed to our ambitions in the NHS long-term plan to expand and transform mental health services in England and to invest an additional £2.3 billion a year in them by 2023-24. Under the NHS long-term plan there will be a comprehensive expansion of mental health services, ensuring that an additional 380,000 adults can access psychological therapies by 2023-24. It also commits to providing access to such therapies for specific groups, including expanding access to evidence-based psychological therapies within special perinatal mental health services, and parent, infant, couple, co-parenting and family interventions.
I turn to the specifics of the amendments. Amendments 27 and 41 relate to the role of the domestic abuse commissioner. The noble Baroness will know that Nicole Jacobs has undertaken significant action already as designate commissioner, including raising awareness of domestic abuse. She will also be responsible for monitoring and overseeing delivery of services to ensure that they are as effective, evidence-based and safe as they can be, as well as publishing information about the range of provision that currently exists for victims and survivors.
The commissioner’s general functions include the provision of support for people affected by domestic abuse. Within that, Clause 7 already provides that the commissioner may assess, monitor and publish information about the provision of services to people affected by domestic abuse. That might include the provision of relationship counselling and psychological therapy. I assure the noble Baroness that the substance of Amendment 27 is already captured by the remit of the commission as set out in Clause 7.
The Committee has heard a combination of views about ensuring the commissioner’s independence and a number of views on what she should be tasked with. The commissioner has a challenging role and will undoubtedly face many demands on her—many of them from your Lordships’ House. Respecting the independence of her office, we should leave it her to determine her priorities, as set out in her strategic plan, informed by the views of her advisory board. If we start writing into the Bill particular issues that the commissioner should address, we risk creating an unhelpful hierarchy of priorities which will constrain her freedom of action. Specifying in the legislation what should and should not feature in her strategic plan would restrict and hinder the very independence that the role requires.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for explaining her amendments, which relate to the operation of the welfare system, including universal credit, and its impact on victims of domestic abuse. The Department for Work and Pensions is committed to providing a compassionate welfare system which provides the best possible support for all customers, including the most vulnerable in society, such as victims of domestic abuse. In answer to her question, we have regular discussions with the DWP and other government departments on domestic abuse because we see it as a whole-of-government issue and response.
Amendment 34 would place a legal duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to investigate one particular issue—the payment of universal credit separately to members of a couple—and lay a report to Parliament. I will come on to the substance of the concern about universal credit, but it is worth first making an observation about the approach taken in the amendment. My noble friend Lady Chisholm of Owlpen said that, as an independent office holder, it should be for the domestic abuse commissioner to set her own priorities as set out in her strategy plan, as provided for in Clause 13. I submit that we should not be mandating her to produce a report on universal credit or on any other matter, as is consistent with her title of being independent.
Aside from this question of the commissioner’s independence, I share absolutely the noble Baroness’s determination to support and protect victims of domestic abuse through the welfare system. However, on the underlying substance of the amendment, the Government do not believe that introducing split payments of universal credit between couples by default is appropriate. For many legacy benefits, a payment is already made to one member of the household, so the way that universal credit is paid is not a new concept. Additionally, evidence shows that the great majority of couples keep and manage their finances together. Consequently, most couples can and want to manage their finances jointly without state intervention.
We recognise that there are circumstances in which split payments are appropriate. Where a customer discloses that they are a victim of domestic abuse in an ongoing relationship, then, where suitable, the Department for Work and Pensions can make split payments available to provide them with access to independent funds. It is important that we allow the individual experiencing domestic abuse to decide whether split payments will help their individual circumstances. The department will also signpost individuals affected by abuse to specialist support, and work with them to ensure that they are aware of the other support and easements available under universal credit. These include special provisions for temporary accommodation, easements to work conditionality, same day advances and additional support for children conceived during an abusive relationship.
In July 2019, messaging was introduced to the universal credit digital claim system to encourage claimants in joint claims to nominate the bank account of the main carer for payment. We continue our support of payment of universal credit to the main carer through this messaging. This strikes the right balance between encouraging positive behaviour and allowing claimants to choose how to best manage their finances. A move to split payments with all couples would represent a fundamental change to the principles of universal credit. Operational challenges aside, the proposed change in policy would be inappropriate for some vulnerable people, for example where one partner is a carer for the other, or one partner has addiction issues.
There would also be practical challenges. For example, there are 1.3 million unbanked adults in the UK, and most are on a low income or are unemployed. The Government are working to improve financial inclusion, but it remains that a move to split payments by default could result in unnecessary payment delays for unbanked claimants. A split payment by default model might also reduce financial independence for women in some cases. Analysis suggests that about 60% of joint universal credit payments are made to women.
As I said, the Department for Work and Pensions is committed to providing a safety net welfare system that provides the best possible support for all customers, including the most vulnerable. To answer the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that is why the department has completed a significant training programme and implemented domestic abuse single points of contact for every jobcentre. These actions will help ensure that jobcentre customer services managers and work coaches have the right capabilities, tools and local relationships to support customers who are experiencing or fleeing domestic abuse. We are proud of the positive cultural change we have been able to achieve in jobcentre sites; and that departmental awareness of, and support for, those who have suffered or are suffering domestic abuse is better than ever.
I understand the intention of Amendment 150 is to ensure that victims of domestic abuse can receive universal credit advances in the form of grants. I note that the amendment affects the conditions only for the payment of budgeting advances. Budgeting advances provide one-off emergency payments for claimants or are related to obtaining or retaining employment, whereas new claim and change of circumstances advances provide claimants with an advance of their UC award. As currently drafted, the amendment will waive only the recoverability and eligibility criteria of budgeting advances for domestic abuse victims.
The Department for Work and Pensions offers new claim advances that allow claimants to access 100% of their estimated universal credit payment up front. We can help claimants, including victims of domestic abuse, to apply for an advance with payment being made within 72 hours or even on the same day, in some circumstances. With a universal credit advance, a claimant’s universal credit award will be phased across 13 payments in a year, rather than 12, and the maximum level of monthly deduction they will face is 30% of their standard allowance. Deferrals are also available for the phasing of new claim advances, meaning that claimants can extend the phasing of their 13 UC payments for up to an additional three months, in exceptional circumstances.
In addition, change of circumstances advances are available to claimants where a change of circumstances, such as the birth of a child, means that their universal credit award will significantly increase in the next payment. The additional payment of a change of circumstances advance would be used to cover the additional costs incurred by claimants until they receive their increased UC award at the end of their assessment period. These advances are phased across six months.
This amendment also seeks to make budgeting advances non-recoverable for victims of domestic abuse, alongside removing eligibility criteria. Budgeting advances are available to purchase one-off emergency items or for obtaining or retaining employment. To be eligible, claimants must have been in receipt of benefits for six months, have repaid any existing budgeting advance amount and earned less than £2,600 in the previous six months, if a single claimant. For claimants who receive a budgeting advance to obtain or retain employment, the six-month benefit criteria are waived and the required earnings threshold recalculated. This one-off payment of a budgeting advance is recovered over 12 months, although this can be extended to 18 months in exceptional circumstances.
If the Government were to issue universal credit advances as grant payments for victims of domestic abuse, as suggested by the noble Baroness’s amendment, this would raise equality concerns and inevitably lead to calls for the measure’s extension to other groups. Moreover, to mitigate the potential of increased fraud that universal credit grants could cause, we would have to introduce an additional manual assessment to verify the claimant’s circumstances ahead of payment. This could delay payment to claimants, when our first priority should be to urgently give individuals support.
Moving on to the other feature of the amendment, the Government do not feel that we should waive the eligibility criteria for budgeting advances. These eligibility criteria include a low-income threshold because we believe that, in the majority of situations, a claimant’s universal credit award will be able to cover the costs of emergency items. However, to support those in particular hardship, budgeting advances provide one-off payments for claimants who may not be able to afford these emergency items without additional support.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate, revolving around the role of the advisory board and whether we are looking for people with experience and expertise, or those who represent specific interests.
Clause 12(4) indicates that of the six specific types of people who must be on the board, five are described as representing specific interests and only one is not. It would be helpful if the Government could explain the basis for determining which persons as representatives, with one exception, the advisory board must include. If the Government can answer why they have listed the types of people who have to be on the board, it might help us to form a better view of exactly what the Government see as the role of the advisory board. I appreciate that Clause 12(1) states that the advisory board is
“for the purposes of providing advice to the Commissioner about the exercise of the Commissioner’s functions.”
However, that is pretty vague, and it would help if the Government said what kind of advice they are expecting this advisory board to provide about the exercise of the commissioner’s functions.
I would rather take the view that there must be a case for leaving the commissioner with greater scope than he or she will have for deciding who they want on the advisory board. It can currently have a maximum of 10 members, as laid down in the Bill, but the Government have already determined who six of those members will be. One finds this a bit of a contrast to the discussion on the previous group of amendments on a totally different issue. When it came to an investigation into universal credit and domestic abuse, it was suggested that we should not be tying the commissioner’s hands or telling them what to do. Yet when it comes to the advisory board, which can only have a maximum of 10, the commissioner is told in very specific terms who 60% of the membership of that board have got to be and who they are to represent—with one exception being a person with academic expertise.
Can the Government explain why they have come to the conclusion they have about the six people who must be on the board and who they should represent? Can they give some examples of the kinds of advice they think the advisory board might be able to give? Can they clarify the point that has been raised about whether they see people on the board as being representatives of particular groups, or whether they are looking for people whose primary assets are experience and expertise in this field? If we can get some answers to those questions, as well as the other questions asked in this debate, we might be able to better understand the Government’s thinking behind Clause 12.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. As noble Lords have outlined, these amendments all relate to the composition of the advisory board that will provide the commissioner with advice on the exercise of her functions. The advice could span a range of issues but is expected to contribute towards the development of the commissioner’s strategic plans, at the very least.
It is important that the advisory board contains a broad range of interests and represents a number of key statutory agencies and domestic abuse experts. I could start listing them, but then noble Lords might hold me to my words. But I can give examples. For example, they might have experience in housing or refuges or have medical experience, and so on and so forth. To maximise the effectiveness of the board, it is required to have no fewer than six members and no more than 10. That is to ensure that the board remains focused and provides clear advice to the commissioner.
Amendment 37 seeks to lift the upper limit on the membership of the board. We think that a maximum membership of 10 is appropriate to ensure that the board can operate effectively and efficiently. It does not preclude the commissioner from also seeking advice from other sources, but we need to avoid creating an unwieldy board which cannot then provide effective support to the commissioner.
In relation to Amendment 38, I do not believe there is any real practical difference here. To be able to represent, for example, the providers of health care services, I would expect the relevant member to have experience and expertise in this field. I suggest that we can leave it to the good judgement of the commissioner to appoint suitably qualified individuals.
Amendments 39, 40 and 43 all seek to add to the categories of persons who must be presented on the board. As I have indicated, we risk creating a board that is too unwieldy and therefore cannot effectively discharge its functions and support the commissioner in her role. An advisory board member could represent the interests of more than one group. For example, they could represent the interests of victims of domestic abuse, while also representing the interests of specialist charities. The structure provided for in Clause 12 confers sufficient latitude on the commissioner to include other key areas of expertise, such as in relation to children.
In addition to this board, through her terms and conditions of employment the commissioner will be required to establish a victims and survivors advisory group to ensure that it engages directly with victims and survivors in its work. The commissioner may also establish any other groups as she sees fit. While the appointments are a matter for the commissioner, I expect the membership of the victims and survivors advisory group to be representative of all victims of domestic abuse—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
The advisory board must be able to operate efficiently and effectively. It is important that it has a balanced membership, with expertise in critical areas relating to supporting and protecting all victims and bringing perpetrators to justice. Clause 12 strikes the right balance, setting out minimum and maximum representation but otherwise giving the commissioner the space to appoint the right individuals to the board. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to conclude the debate on her amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate with such constructive comments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, has explained, Amendments 51 and 54 seek to address what may be a gap in the domestic abuse commissioner’s powers in relation to ensuring that lessons are learned from domestic homicide reviews. These are abhorrent crimes; of course, every death is a tragedy, as is the suicide of a domestic abuse victim. Domestic homicide reviews are a valuable mechanism to understand what lessons can be learned from these deaths to prevent further tragedies. We recognise that there is room for improvement in the way these reviews are conducted and the lessons applied.
Section 9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 provides for domestic homicide reviews to be undertaken by police forces in England and Wales, local authorities, providers of probation services and relevant NHS bodies. The accompanying guidance states that reviews must be published on community safety partnership websites following approval from the Home Office, unless there are exceptional circumstances not to do so. To that extent, the review findings will be available to the commissioner, but I recognise that there is a case for going further.
In relation to England, most of the bodies I have listed—probation service providers being the exception—are already subject to the duty to co-operate with the commissioner under Clause 15. It would thus be open to the commissioner to use her powers under that clause to achieve the outcome sought by Amendment 54. In addition, we are ready to review the current guidance, in consultation with those who undertake domestic homicide reviews, with a view to including a standing expectation that the findings of these reviews are shared with the commissioner.
With regard to the other reviews referred to in Amendment 54, the guidance on domestic homicide reviews is clear that such reviews must be considered when the death of a person aged 16 or over has, or appears to have, resulted from domestic abuse. As a result, it is possible that homicide may be subject to more than one review, albeit each with a different focus and purpose. As a consequence, without further consideration of the interplay between the various reviews referred to in Amendment 54, we are not yet persuaded that it is necessary to place a requirement on the relevant public authorities to copy the findings of the reviews listed in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause where the review relates to a domestic homicide. However, as I have indicated, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, made his point about data being the key, if on further analysis there is a good case for such a requirement, the commissioner can use her Clause 15 powers to this end.
As to whether the list of specified public authorities in Clause 15 should be extended in the manner proposed in Amendment 51, this is again something we can consider further. Noble Lords will understand that we should fully consult the bodies in question before reaching a conclusion on this. We may not have sufficient time to complete such consultations ahead of Report but, in any event, Clause 15 contains a power to amend the list of specified public authorities by regulations.
On the broader point, I accept the concerns related to the collection of data on domestic homicides. That is why the Home Office has undertaken to create a central repository to hold all domestic homicide reviews. Once introduced, all historical reports will be collected to ensure that there is a central database on domestic homicides. It is also clear that the domestic homicides review process would benefit from the closer involvement of the domestic abuse commissioner. We intend to work with her to consider which parts of the review process would benefit from her involvement.
Finally, Amendment 189 would require regulations to remove a specified authority under Clause 15 to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. In our delegated powers memorandum we argued that the negative procedure affords an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny, given the constraints on the regulation-making power, notably the fact that it cannot be used to remove a body that is listed in the clause on enactment. Regulations can remove a body from the list of specified public authorities only if that body had previously been added to the list by regulations. In its report on the Bill, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee raised no objection to the negative power.
In conclusion, I am sympathetic to Amendments 51 and 54, but they require more analysis and consultation before we reach a firm conclusion. Moreover, the powers of the commissioner in Clause 15(1), the duty for a specified public authority to co-operate in subsection (2) and the regulation-making power in subsection (4) offer a way forward without the need to amend the Bill. That said, I would be happy to update noble Lords ahead of Report on progress regarding our consideration of these issues. With that undertaking, I hope that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank everyone who has participated in this short debate. Some of the statistics cited are absolutely fascinating, as are the insights that noble Lords are able to bring to a subject like this. I was interested to note that the Minister said that the commissioner already has the powers to require co-operation from all but one of the groups we are seeking to add, and yet the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee both alluded to the fact that the commissioner has requested these particular powers to be added. We will see whether we can get to the bottom of this.
I am heartened by the words of the Minister. She has said that she will update the House again before Report. That will be extremely helpful to the whole House and it will determine how we need to take things forward. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 53, proposed by my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, seeks to add a new clause to the Bill. Every noble Lord who has spoken in this debate has fully supported my noble friend’s amendment. The new clause would place a duty on all public authorities to provide training for their staff so that, when they engage with members of the public, they can spot the signs of abuse and can then ask the proper questions and offer appropriate help. As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath said, this is probably the most important amendment we have discussed today and one of the most important we have debated during consideration on this important and very good Bill.
People engage with public authorities through a range of services, such as local councils, the DWP and GPs. In some parts of the public sector, particularly the health service, people do ask such questions when they have somebody in front of them. As some noble Lords have said, although there may be training, it is very patchy and inconsistent. We are failing many victims. We want to be sure that we will have dealt with this problem by the time the Bill becomes law. When someone engages with the state, there must be people who can see the signs, understand the signals, ask the right questions and take appropriate action. Everyone must play their part in protecting the victims.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made reference to the police. There are some very good examples of excellent work that the police have done. I remember my visit to the domestic abuse unit at Greenwich, where really good work was taking place, in collaboration with the local authority, Greenwich Council. There was one case where officers had attended an incident and were suspicious about what was going on. They kept going back because they knew. Finally, they engaged with the person, got what they needed, got the person out and protected her. That understanding of the problem and engagement does not happen everywhere. We want every police force, across the whole of the United Kingdom, to follow that good example. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, the officers who get called to a disturbance in the early hours of the morning are often the first people knocking on the door, so it is important that the police service in particular can deal with this.
My noble friend Lady Crawley made the point that having trained inquirers who know what to ask and what to do is so important in making sure that we make the difference. I also took on board the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, about the importance of training to recognise the special needs of the BAME community when dealing with issues of domestic abuse.
So I fully support the amendment and am hopeful of a positive response from the noble Baroness. I look forward to getting a resolution of this issue.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, for tabling this amendment. The Government are in full agreement with its aims; we too want professionals to have the skills and confidence to ask the right questions about domestic abuse and take the appropriate action. I will not be making arguments about overburdening them, but rather suggesting how we think it might be achieved.
We absolutely want to embed understanding of domestic abuse in all agencies. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, what is the point if agencies do not know how to respond and cannot spot the signs? We want to ensure that there is strong recognition, from senior leadership through to front-line staff, of the importance of tackling domestic abuse. We want staff to ask about domestic abuse, because it is integral to their role and driven by professional curiosity. One of our concerns about introducing a statutory duty, to which noble Lords have alluded, is that it risks undermining professional judgment, and we do not want these sensitive and complex conversations to turn into some sort of tick-box exercise.
The Government are committed to taking wide-ranging action to improve understanding of domestic abuse across statutory agencies through guidance, targeted resources and training for responding agencies such as the police, social workers, healthcare professionals and universal credit work coaches. Work is already under way to strengthen the response from key agencies. In the health sector, front-line staff must undertake mandatory safeguarding training, which includes a focus on domestic abuse. The intercollegiate documents for child and adult safeguarding set out the core skills, competencies and knowledge expected for healthcare staff to be covered in the safeguarding training, and the level of training expected depending on their roles.
NHS England and NHS Improvement are strengthening safeguarding practice in local health systems through the updated NHS safeguarding accountability and assurance framework, and a new safeguarding commissioning assurance toolkit. Schedule 32 to the NHS standard contract sets out the service conditions for safeguarding, which include that the provider must implement comprehensive programmes of safeguarding training for all relevant staff and must have regard to the intercollegiate guidance on safeguarding training.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, our Amendments 55 and 56 in this group are designed to prevent information about victims of domestic abuse that could be used for immigration control being disclosed by the domestic abuse commissioner. These amendments go further than Amendment 154, as they talk about information provided to the domestic abuse commissioner whether a request for support has been made or not.
The danger is that the information, supplied by either the domestic abuse commissioner or somebody seeking support, is shared with the police. There have been numerous reported examples where the police have passed the details of victims and witnesses of crime to immigration officials, including a case in 2017 of a woman who alleged she was raped and kidnapped. She was first taken to a haven, a centre for victims of sexual assault, but was subsequently arrested and questioned about her immigration status.
In 2015, the last year for which I can find figures, police tip-offs to the immigration service of the details of crime victims and witnesses occurred on over 3,000 occasions—in one year. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said, such sharing of information makes genuine victims of domestic abuse less likely to come forward to receive the help and support that they so desperately need. These victims are likely to be even more vulnerable to coercive control than those with regular immigration status.
Amendment 154 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, similarly requires the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim of domestic abuse that is processed for the purpose of requesting or receiving support is not used for immigration control purposes, along with domestic abuse witness and victim data. We support these attempts to prevent the disclosure of this information for immigration control purposes.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Meacher, for setting out the case for these amendments, which seek to prevent personal information about victims of domestic abuse being shared for the purposes of immigration control. I recognise that the effect of Amendments 55 and 56 is more narrowly focused on the sharing of information under Part 2 but, in responding to these amendments and Amendment 154, I will focus my remarks on the broader issue.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will understand that I will leave the debate on migrant women, who feature in Amendment 148, until we get to it, because this group is about data sharing. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I point out that “hostile environment” was of course coined by the Labour Government back in 2007, not under my right honourable friend Theresa May.
The main purpose of these amendments is to make sure that migrant victims of domestic abuse are not deterred from reporting that abuse or seeking support for fear that immigration enforcement action will be taken against them. I want to be absolutely clear: our main priority is to protect the public and all victims of crime, regardless of their immigration status.
A number of noble Lords mentioned guidance on this. In our response to the Joint Committee in July 2019, the Government were clear that all victims of domestic abuse should be treated as victims first and foremost. This is set out in relevant guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council—in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox.
In addition, assistant commissioner Louisa Rolfe, the national policing lead on domestic abuse, in giving oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons, was clear that there will be circumstances where information sharing between the police and immigration authorities is in the interests of safeguarding a victim of abuse. There can be many benefits to sharing information, as it can help to resolve a victim’s uncertainty about their immigration status—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley—but, most importantly, it can remove the desperate situation in which the perpetrator’s controlling and manipulative behaviour continues because of their status: this too was referred to by the noble Baroness. When victims come forward for support, sharing information can help prevent them facing enforcement action, if they are identified by immigration enforcement in an unrelated setting.
To ensure that victims’ needs are put first, the National Police Chiefs’ Council strengthened its guidance in 2020, setting out a clear position on exchanging information about victims of crime with immigration enforcement to encourage a consistent approach across the country. This gives us confidence that data sharing will operate in the interests of the victim.
Alongside our duties to protect victims of crime, the Government are equally duty bound to maintain an effective immigration system, not only to protect our public services but to safeguard the most vulnerable from exploitation because of their insecure immigration status. The public rightly expect that individuals in this country should be subject to our laws, and it is right that, when individuals with an irregular immigration status are identified, they should be supported to come forward under our immigration system and, where possible, to regularise their stay. This data exchange is processed on the basis of public interest, as laid out in Articles 6 and 9 of the general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
The noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, also referred to the outcome of the super-complaint relating to police data that is shared for immigration purposes. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services published its report into the super-complaint in December last year and made a number of recommendations, which we are carefully considering and to which we will respond in due course. It is right that we properly take account of the recommendations in this report. In response to the report, we have committed to review the current arrangements and to publishing the outcome of the review within the six months set by the inspectorate, which is by June. I expect the outcome of this review to be implemented through further updates to the NPCC guidance or other administrative means, and that primary legislation will not be required. To enable us to complete this review in line with the inspectorate’s recommendations, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, withdraws her amendment.
My Lords, these probing amendments relate to the operation of domestic abuse protection notices. Clause 22 sets out the matters which the police must consider before issuing a notice. Among other things, the police must consider any representations made by the person on whom the notice is to be served. Amendment 61 seeks to probe whether any such representations can extend to the provisions included in the notice.
I agree fully with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the police should give full consideration to any representations on all parts of the notice, including any of the restrictions, as listed in Clause 21, that they consider imposing.
The draft statutory guidance, published in advance of the Committee stage, covers the considerations that the police must make before a notice is authorised. Although the current draft makes no specific reference to the consideration of representations in respect of individual provisions to be included in a notice, I would be happy to ensure that this point is addressed in the final form of the guidance.
Amendment 63, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to ensure that a risk assessment is carried out before a notice is given by the police to an alleged perpetrator. I fully support the intention of this amendment, which is to ensure that full consideration is given to the risks to victims when deciding whether to issue a notice. I think that probably brings into relief the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Sadly, police enforcement action against a domestic abuse perpetrator can lead to the perpetrator blaming the victim and seeking to retaliate. That is why it so important that these notices and orders do not require the victim’s consent and that victims can therefore distance themselves from police action against the perpetrator. It is why it is extremely important that the notice can be used to provide immediate protection to the victim. In the aftermath of an incident, police can use a notice to evict the perpetrator from the victim’s home and prohibit the perpetrator from contacting the victim for up to 48 hours. Last Wednesday, I inadvertently referred to 24 hours, for which I apologise. This provides the victim with breathing space to consider their options and for police and specialist services to support the victim with safety planning.
The notice is followed by an application for a DAPO which is designed to provide longer-term protection and can be tailored to respond to the level of risk to the victim. Therefore, if police involvement in the case and the giving of a notice to the perpetrator have led to an escalation of risk to the victim, the DAPO can include provisions to address this risk.
Robust risk assessment is central to the police response to domestic abuse. The College of Policing guidance on domestic abuse stipulates that a risk assessment must be carried out in all domestic abuse cases. The importance of risk assessment when using a DAPN or order is also set out in the draft statutory guidance for police which has been published ahead of Committee. This guidance makes it clear that it is essential that police use appropriate specialist domestic abuse risk assessment or screening tools in consultation with partner agencies to safeguard the victim and reduce the risk of further harm by the perpetrator. The guidance also includes information on safety planning action that police should undertake alongside the notice and order.
Amendments 65, 66 and 67 deal with breach of a notice. Clause 24 provides that, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in breach of a notice, they can be arrested without warrant, held in custody and brought before a magistrate’s court within 24 hours, or in time to attend the scheduled hearing of the application for a domestic abuse protection order—whichever is sooner.
Amendment 65 would make the process of holding the perpetrator in custody following arrest for breach of a DAPN an optional matter for the police. Although I understand noble Lords’ concerns regarding the blanket nature of this provision, this amendment could put a victim at increased risk of harm, coercion or retribution once an alleged perpetrator is released. The amendment could lead to further breaches occurring while the court hearing is pending and increase the need for protective measures for victims during that period.
Clause 24 also provides that if the court decides to remand the person on bail, it can attach any conditions that are necessary to prevent the person obstructing the course of justice, for example interfering with witnesses. These are standard provisions, which largely replicate the approach taken for remand following breaches of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders, occupation orders and anti-social behaviour injunctions.
Amendment 66 seeks to test whether a notice would continue in force following the court imposing bail conditions under Clause 24. I can advise the noble Lord that if a court were to remand a person on bail under Clause 24, the notice would continue in effect until the application for a domestic abuse protection order had been determined or withdrawn.
Amendments 67 and 70 seek to probe what constitutes interference with a witness. The term “interference”, which is used in other legislation relating to bail requirements, would capture direct or indirect contact with the witness and is intended to protect against someone influencing a witness’s evidence, or dissuading a witness from giving evidence, for example.
I hope that those two explanations satisfy noble Lords and that consequently the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will be happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these are indeed probing amendments. With our amendment to Clause 24, by using the term “may” rather than “must” about custody, we were proposing discretion, not precluding custody.
I am grateful to the Minister for her confirmation of various points and for her suggestion that the guidance is adjusted to cover the point made at the start of the debate. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 61.
My Lords, Amendment 71, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, would make the very sensible change from the vague requirement to allow the alleged perpetrator to make representations about the issue of a domestic abuse protection order from
“as soon as just and convenient”
in Clause 32(4)(a) to the more usual and precise “as soon as practicable”—or perhaps it should be “as soon as reasonably practicable”—to which Amendment 71 would add, “within five working days.” In addition to the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I would say that such orders can have profound, and not immediately obvious, unacceptable consequences for the perpetrator, alleged or otherwise—as my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned when she said that the process needed to be fair to both sides.
Amendments 72 and 73 limit conditions imposed by a domestic violence protection order granted without notice to only negative or prohibitive requirements, not positive ones. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, drew the comparison with TPIMs; I shall draw a different comparison. This legislation appears to be similar to that governing knife crime prevention orders made under the Offensive Weapons Act 2019. In the absence of the defendant, when an order is made without notice, only an interim knife crime prevention order can be granted, under Section 16(3)(a) of the 2019 Act, with proceedings on the knife crime prevention order itself being adjourned. The interim order can impose prohibitions that may be imposed under a full order, but none of the positive requirements. Why not here?
I ask the Minister, in support of this amendment, why such a distinction between, say, an interim domestic violence protection order and a full order is not part of this Bill. Consistency in legislation, particularly in the criminal law, where people must be able to understand clearly what is expected of them—an important part of the rule of law, to which this Government appear to be paying scant regard, judging by recent form—is important. It is not inconceivable that someone who is or has been subject to a knife crime prevention order may, at some stage, be subject to a domestic violence prevention order. Inconsistency such as that between this Bill and such recent legislation as the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is unhelpful and unwelcome.
As the amendments have the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, of an active magistrate, of a former Crown Court recorder and of a former Home Secretary, it would, at least in normal times, be difficult for the Minister to disagree. But I am sure he will.
My Lords, in response to that last comment, it is almost impossible for me not to rise to the occasion. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for setting out his case for the amendments. Of course I have listened carefully to everything in the debate, particularly because, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, the points have been put in a constructive spirit. I take on board, of course, the point made by a number of speakers, including in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the amendments have the support of the Magistrates Association.
Clause 32 sets out when the court can make a domestic abuse protection order without prior notice of the proceedings having been given to the alleged perpetrator. Typically, as is also the case with existing protective orders, the courts will provide the alleged perpetrator with prior notice of an application for a domestic abuse protection order and of the hearing. However, like existing protective orders, a DAPO can be made without prior notification if there is an urgent need. Clause 32 sets out that a court may make such an order without prior notification
“where it is just and convenient to do so”.
That is in subsection (1).
Clause 32 also specifies, in subsection (3), that before making an order without prior notice,
“the court must have regard to all the circumstances”
of the case. Without limiting the breadth of that requirement, the clause then goes on to list a number of specific factors, three of which I will draw attention to. The first is
“any risk that, if the order is not made immediately,”
the alleged perpetrator will cause significant harm to the victim. The second is whether the victim is likely to be
“deterred or prevented from pursuing the application if an order is not made immediately”.
The third is
“whether there is reason to believe that”
the alleged perpetrator
“is aware of the proceedings but is deliberately evading service”.
Those provisions are crucial for ensuring that the victim can obtain the protection they need in all circumstances.
However, we agree, of course, that the alleged perpetrator should be able to exercise their right to make a representation to the court after such an order—an order without notice—has been made. That is a basic principle of justice: courts normally operate on what has traditionally been called audi alteram partem—it is a pleasure that one can still use Latin in the court of Parliament, even if you cannot use it in the courts of justice any more—which obviously means “both sides must be heard”. Where that has not been the case, for reasons of urgency or otherwise, a hearing where both or all parties are present is then convened. Therefore, Clause 32 already specifies that, when the court makes an order without prior notice, a return hearing must be scheduled
“as soon as just and convenient”.
I recognise that the noble Lord’s Amendment 71 sets a time limit of five working days; I understand his reasons for doing this, but there are a number of problems with this approach, and I shall set out three. First, the amendment would make our approach inconsistent with other protective orders, which require return hearings to take place as soon as is just and convenient. We do not see reason to take a different approach on that point for DAPOs.
Having said that, each sort of protective order must be looked at in its own circumstances, along with the mischief and harm that the order is seeking to address. Therefore, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—that there should be a direct read-across from knife crime prevention orders as to positive and negative factors or the phrase “as soon as practicable”—the problem with such analogies is that they are different. One must look at each sort of order on its own terms.
Secondly, the period of five days is somewhat arbitrary. As the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, pointed out, in the current circumstances five days might or might not be realistic. I will resist the opportunity to respond to his points about backlogs in the justice system in this short debate; I have done so elsewhere. I will also resist responding to my noble friend Lord Cormack’s point about the article in the Times, which I have only skimmed and have not had a chance to read in detail. I suggest that it is better to have a just and convenient timescale.
This leads me to my third point: we would not want a court to be, or to feel, forced to hold a hearing within the five-day period if a slightly longer period might be more suitable—for example, if the respondent’s preferred counsel were available on the sixth day but not the fifth. Another example might be the judge who granted the initial order being available on the sixth day but not the fifth, when it might well be in the interests of the parties and the justice system for the same judge to hear the matter on an all-parties basis. Therefore, for those reasons, while recognising the reasons behind the amendment, we are not persuaded that it is required.
I now turn to Amendments 72 and 73 to Clause 33. The existing provisions in Clause 33 enable the court to impose “any requirements … necessary” for the protection of the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of domestic abuse. This includes both prohibitions and positive requirements. Any order the court makes must be necessary and proportionate to protect the victim. Although I, of course, respect the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, while sitting as a recorder, that one would not normally make a positive order in the absence of a perpetrator, it may be important to do so in certain circumstances, and the courts should have the flexibility so to act.
I agree with the noble Lord’s view that, while it is important that the court can impose the necessary requirements by making a DAPO, we must ensure that the alleged perpetrator is not punished for breaching any requirements they were not aware of. This is especially the case as a breach of positive or restrictive requirements may be a criminal offence. In this context, it is important to take on board the point of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, that we must not, if I may adapt his phrase, be taken for a ride in this important area.
For this reason, Clause 37 sets out that, where an order is made in the alleged perpetrator’s absence, the person does not commit an offence as regards breach of any of the requirements imposed by the order, whether restrictive or positive, until that person is aware of the existence of the order. This approach is consistent with other orders in this area. I assure all noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who made this point, that these are serious amendments, as has been said. We have considered them extremely carefully.
In the light of the explanations I have given this afternoon, I hope that the noble Lord is now content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his application, but I have to confess to being slightly confused or, at least, lacking some detail from his arguments. At one point, he said that the wording in the Bill is similar to other protective orders and that is why the Government do not support the amendments; yet, at others, he said that the reason why it is not consistent with other protective orders is that they are different.
I do not expect the noble Lord to be able to give me chapter and verse here and now as to why knife crime protection orders are different from domestic abuse protection orders, but I would be very grateful if he could write to me to explain why, on the one hand, the Government argue that the wording needs to be the same as other protective orders, while on the other, they argue that the amendments are faulty because they are different from other protective orders.
My Lords, there will be correlations and differences between various orders in this context. I can certainly undertake to write to the noble Lord on this point, but I hope I can go one better: if, in addition to a letter, a conversation would be helpful, I am very happy to offer that as well.
My Lords, I will start with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just made about the read-across between knife crime prevention orders and DAPOs. I would certainly be very interested in attending the meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has just offered because the earlier point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made was strong: that it is reasonably likely that perpetrators might be subject to both of those orders, so there is merit in having a similar approach, whether it is a knife crime prevention order or a DAPO. I would be very happy to join the meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has offered.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. I was interested in the comparison made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, between these orders and TPIMs. He said that these are much more widely drawn, which was an important point. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, sought to contrast treatment and punishment, which, I suppose, is a theme here—although we are not dealing with convicted criminals but prevention orders. The point I invariably make when I am sentencing in court or making an order like this is that, even if it is a punishment, it is for the benefit of the people who have positive requirements made of them in whatever that sentence might be. When I make that point, I invariably get a nod from the person I am sentencing, so people understand that point, in my experience.
I listened carefully to the explanation and summary given by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, but I think I have quite a strong pack of cards, if I can put it like that, and although I will withdraw my amendment I may consider coming back at a later stage.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments. Perhaps I may be forgiven for taking up the invitation from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to write to him. He is, with respect, entirely correct that there are a number of issues here. He asked specific questions to which he is entitled to receive specific answers. While I will do my best to answer some of his questions in my remarks, I will need to go through Hansard to pick up others and write to him.
These amendments relate to different aspects of how the domestic abuse protection order will be made. To be clear, and in response to a point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, these amendments relate to how DAPOs will operate when they are made normally, not only in the exceptional case when they are made on a “without notice” basis. I hope the Committee will permit me to go through the amendments in turn.
I hope that nobody understood my comments in the last debate to be dismissive, to use the word of my noble friend Lord Cormack. I referred to the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, as a recorder, the vast experience of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the fact that the amendments are supported by the Magistrates’ Association to underline that we have given these amendments the most careful consideration. I am sure that all noble Lords who have had significant engagement with my noble friend Lady Williams and me will accept we have gone out of our way to hear their concerns and engage with them.
On Amendments 80 and 81, Clause 34 sets out that a responsible person must be specified for each positive requirement imposed by a DAPO. The responsible person will have a duty to make the necessary arrangements to deliver the requirement, promote compliance and inform the police of any breaches.
Clause 34 also sets out that the courts must receive evidence about the suitability and enforceability of positive requirements from the responsible person before making an order. The responsible person will typically be a representative from the organisation delivering the particular programme that the person subject to the DAPO is required to complete, such as an organisation that delivers a perpetrator behaviour change programme or a drugs or alcohol treatment programme.
Amendment 80 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, would require the court also to consider evidence from probation or youth offending teams as appropriate, alongside evidence provided by the responsible person. While I agree with the noble Lord that the court should consider all the evidence necessary prior to making an order, I consider that the evidence provided by the responsible person will be sufficient to establish the suitability and enforceability of positive requirements without the specific requirement for further evidence from probation or youth offending teams. We do not consider it appropriate to require evidence from youth offending teams, as a DAPO cannot be made against a person below the age of 18.
I agree with the general aim of Amendment 81, which is to maximise the effectiveness of the requirement to attend drug, alcohol or mental health programmes. However, as I have just mentioned, Clause 34 already specifies that the court must consider the evidence provided by the responsible person in relation to the suitability and enforceability of the requirements prior to making a DAPO that imposes positive requirements. I understood that to be a point also made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The court will also be able to take into consideration any representations made by the person against whom the order is to be made, which I hope that responds to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Given these provisions, I do not believe that the specific agreement of the alleged perpetrator is also required to maximise the effectiveness of such programmes. I hope that that responds to one of the points of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
Amendment 82 relates to Clause 36, subsection (1) of which provides:
“A domestic abuse protection order takes effect on the day on which it is made.”
Clause 36(2) provides that where a DAPO already exists, the courts may make the new DAPO take effect when the existing DAPO ceases to have effect. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that there should be no gap in the protection provided where there is a transition from an old to a new DAPO. However, as Clause 36 already provides for this, we do not see reason to make the change proposed in Amendment 82.
As for the explanatory statement to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on whether the same provisions could be imposed under both orders, that is a matter for the court, which would look at all the circumstances of the case. One must remember in this context that the two orders might be sought and obtained by different applicants. I hope that that also answers the points of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but if, on a reading of the debate, it does not, I will, if I may, write to her with any additional points.
On Amendments 83 and 84, Clause 36 also provides that the DAPO can be flexible in duration, so that longer-term protection can be provided to victims if needed. I understand the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and other noble Lords about DAPOs being applied indefinitely, but the flexibility of the DAPO, including its duration, is central to its effectiveness, particularly when compared to existing orders. By contrast, the two-year limit proposed by the noble Lord is both hard-edged and somewhat arbitrary.
It is vital that victims can be provided with longer-term protection when needed. Clause 36 gives the court several options so that it may determine the duration of each DAPO based on the facts of the case before it. The order can therefore be in place for a specified period until the occurrence of a specified event or further order of the court. To give noble Lords a simple example: the victim is attending a course of study, which has two years and three months to go. Is she to be required to obtain a two-year order, which might prevent the perpetrator going near that place of study, then have to come back to obtain a further order for three months? If that were to be the case, one would ask, rhetorically, why it should be so.
As set out in Clause 36, the court may specify within the DAPO itself different durations for different requirements imposed by the order. The courts may also vary or remove certain requirements or discharge the order entirely where it is satisfied that the order is no longer necessary for the protection of the victim. It is important to note that the Bill already contains various mechanisms to protect the right of the person subject to the DAPO. Under Clause 33, the court can only impose requirements that it considers necessary to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of domestic abuse. Clause 34 requires the court to avoid, so far as is practicable, imposing any requirements that conflict with the person’s religious beliefs or interfere with their work or attendance at an educational establishment. Clause 36, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, noted, provide a maximum duration for any electronic monitoring requirements of 12 months.
I move on to Amendments 85 and 87 to Clause 37. The clause provides that failure to comply with any requirement imposed by a DAPO without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, or a fine, or both. That sends a strong message to perpetrators that non-compliance will not be tolerated. As specified in Clause 37, where a DAPO has been made without notice, the behaviour of the perpetrator can be considered a breach only if, at the time of the behaviour, the alleged perpetrator was aware of the existence of the DAPO.
I agree with the general aims of the amendments proposed by the noble Lord to Clause 37, which are to ensure procedural fairness so that criminal liability and punishment for breach of a DAPO will occur only where the breach is proved to the criminal standard of proof and where the perpetrator knows of the order’s existence. However, I do not believe that the amendments proposed are necessary. The criminal standard of proof—I am afraid that I do not have a Latin tag here for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—will apply automatically in any criminal prosecution for breach of a DAPO. As already mentioned, Clause 37 already specifies that the behaviour of the perpetrator can be considered a breach of the DAPO only if the perpetrator is aware of the order at the time of the relevant behaviour.
Let me say an extra word about each of those points. First, we believe that the civil standard of proof is appropriate for making what is a civil order. This is the position taken with a number of existing protection orders of this kind. I recognise that those on the now somewhat virtual Liberal Democrat Benches do not support this approach as a matter of principle and I understand their reasoning, but I do not agree with it. The principle that I have set out that a civil standard of proof is appropriate for such orders is now firmly established as part of our legal framework.
It is worth noting in this context that to the extent that the Joint Committee considered this question when examining the draft Bill, it is evident from its report that it had no issue with applying the civil standard of proof. For example, at paragraph 84 of the report, the Joint Committee said:
“The standard of proof required for a DAPO is the civil standard (balance of probabilities) which means a DAPO may be made in criminal proceedings even if the perpetrator has been acquitted.”
A similar point was made at paragraph 107. I have no doubt that if the Joint Committee had any concerns about applying the civil standard it would have made that clear.
One of the strongest elements of a DAPO is that it is a civil order, made on the civil standard of proof. That means that if a victim is not able to, or chooses not to, seek remedy through the criminal justice system, they can still access protection from the court. At the same time, we want to send a clear message to perpetrators that breach of an order will be acted on, which is why we have provided that breach of an order will be a criminal offence. As noble Lords will know, that is already the case with many existing civil orders, including restraining orders, non-molestation orders, knife crime prevention orders and serious crime prevention orders.
Breach of a DAPO does not lead automatically to criminal sanctions. The breach would need to be reported to the police, who would then investigate and refer to prosecutors for a decision on whether to pursue a prosecution. Criminal sanctions would be imposed only following a conviction for the breach offence in the criminal court, which would need to be proved to the criminal standard in the usual way.
The second point is the requirement proposed by the amendment that a perpetrator must be aware of “the requirements” of a DAPO and not only of its existence. I hesitate to disagree with a point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said was unanswerable. However, I am sure that the noble Lord will not take it amiss if I do, and I will explain why. Adding “the requirements” of the DAPO is likely to lead to a lot of uncertainty, much litigation, and less protection for victims. What are the “requirements” of a DAPO? What would that mean? Is it the terms of the DAPO or what the terms require you to do in practice? They are different things. What does it mean to be aware of the requirements of a DAPO? Is it to have read them, to have understood them, to have understood their legal effect or to have understood their practical effect? They are all different things. Therefore, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and to a similar point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I say that we generally require people to obey orders of the court once they are aware that an order has been made, and that a DAPO should be no different.
The Minister’s reply will obviously take some reading, which we will do. As regards the point on contempt, my question was about the experience of the model. I quoted a ministerial letter—not a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—about the why, or at least partly why. In any event, I thank him for responding to that.
My question is about the criminal standard for breach of an order. The Minister said that it applied automatically; he then used the phrase, “in the usual way”. When he writes his letter, perhaps he could add a paragraph explaining how it is automatic and where that comes from, so that we can understand its application. He referred to other civil orders and he might want to refer to whether those are silent in legislation as to the standard of proof when breached or whether they deal with the standard explicitly.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining the contempt of court point in more detail and for setting out the question of the standard of proof. I will be happy to include a paragraph on that in my letter as well.
My Lords, this has been a very wide-ranging debate with a lot of legal detail. I will respond to the fellow laymen who have taken part in the debate. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, I should say that I have found the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, to be very helpful and I certainly have not found him to be dismissive in any way. In fact, before this debate he went out of his way to help me and other colleagues.
I turn to my Amendment 81, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Although it is my amendment and it does say that there should be agreement to any drug, alcohol or mental health treatment, perhaps I may say a word against it. I believe that this should be a judicial decision. It is a difficult one and obviously it is better if the participants in the courses agree and sign up to them. Nevertheless, there are occasions where it is helpful to make this part of a court order. If there is some ambivalence, it can be made very clear that they should go on the courses. So, even though I moved the amendment, I believe that the decision on whether to make it compulsory should be a judicial one.
As I have said, this has been a wide-ranging debate and I too will read the response of the Minister and the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, very carefully. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this has been a thorough and wide-ranging debate. I support all the amendments under consideration in this group. Part of the downside of speaking last is that most of the arguments I was going to make have been made so I will not detain the Committee by repeating him—at least, not wittingly.
This is a welcome set of redefining measures aimed at beefing up the statutory duty the Bill imposes on local authorities to provide accommodation support and to widen the definition of what information should be considered in identifying trends and which groups of individuals should be included. They make the Bill more specific and spell out in an inclusive way who local authorities should be aiming to help. Nobody can accuse the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, of overlooking anyone. However, if we are not careful, we can make assumptions about who our typical victim is. Had my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece been well enough to speak tonight, she would have spelled out the plight of women from BAME communities, 70% of whom are unable to access accommodation-based services and rely specifically on specialist community-based services. I particularly support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in this respect. The little phrase “regardless of status” means that no one should be left out and that all victims are helped and treated according to need, not immigration status or anything else.
The amendments spell out the parameters of the assessment, not just what the local area considers they should be. Amendment 108 refers to a national needs assessment and a national strategy. For the first time, we could get a national picture of provision to see where is performing well and where is not in relation to a national yardstick of needs.
However, accommodation is expensive, so Amendment 89 makes clear that the relevant local authority must make sufficient resources available. The Government need to rethink the financial provision for these services. It is woefully inadequate, as many noble Lords have already pointed out. The quality and variety of accommodation is also important, as is who it is for. The injustice of the victim having to move out is also tackled, depending on the wishes of the victim.
Amendment 89 also requires authorities to publish the outcome of their monitoring and evaluation of the strategy of support provision. Data is so important, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said. Otherwise, how are we going to know how individual authorities are doing or whether the service they are providing is meeting the need? We do not know how far the provision of services varies by area and, as things stand, we do not know how they are fulfilling local needs. This amendment would help greatly.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the purpose of these amendments, which, as he said, seek to strengthen the provisions in Part 4 of the Bill. I welcome the strong support for the provisions in this part, which will place a duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to provide support for victims of domestic abuse and their children within safe accommodation. We all want these provisions to work as effectively as they can in delivering much-needed support. The issue before us is whether the framework provided for in Part 4, which would include the accompanying regulations and statutory guidance, is up to the task. I think it is and I will endeavour to persuade the Committee of that.
I will start with Amendments 89, 93, 95, 97, 98, 99 and 100 to Clause 55. This clause places a duty on each relevant local authority in England to assess the need for domestic abuse support for all victims and their children in relevant accommodation. As my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham said, this will be specified by the Secretary of State in regulations. If I were standing here before your Lordships tonight saying that national Government would assess the needs of local areas, there would have been a bit of an uproar. Local authorities are best placed to assess the particular needs of victims and their children in their local area, and in assessing needs, relevant local authorities will consider the differing requirements of all victims, including those with protected characteristics as well as victims who may come in from outside the local authority area. That last point is an interesting one because, as was pointed out by, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, many victims of domestic abuse will come from outside the local authority area because they will be fleeing their abusers.
My noble friend Lord Young of Cookham also talked about—I do not know in relation to what—the question of refuge addresses never being disclosed. If he has any evidence in that regard, I would really like to know. I have been to see many refuges and, while I have been told their general area, I have never been told the address. This is quite a concerning point, if indeed it turns out to be the case. He and other noble Lords also talked about funding. I agree that funding has to be sustainable and has to be enough. Regarding the £125 million that has gone towards this, MHCLG considered two areas: first, the cost of and need for support in safe accommodation; and, secondly, the administrative cost of delivering new functions. MHCLG engaged with local authorities and service providers to reach this new burden estimate.
Local authorities will then need to prepare and publish a strategy for provision of the support, as identified by an assessment of the needs within their area; give effect to the strategy; and monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy. The statutory guidance issued under Clause 58, which we have now published in draft, will set out the Government’s clear expectations and requirements regarding the delivery of the duties. Local authorities should ensure that the strategy clearly sets out a holistic approach to delivering the tailored support required by all victims in safe accommodation in their area. This guidance will be clear that local authorities should give effect to their strategies by meeting the support needs of all victims of domestic abuse and their children, based on a robust local needs assessment.
I share the concern of the noble Lord that some particularly vulnerable victims of domestic abuse face barriers to accessing support. As set out in the Equality Act 2010, local authorities are already subject to a public sector equality duty and must already have due regard to how to reduce disadvantages faced by people with protected characteristics and how to meet their particular needs in all the services they provide. However, to further underline the importance of supporting vulnerable victims, we intend to make it clear through guidance that local authorities should consider all the additional barriers that may prevent victims with relevant protected characteristics accessing support in refuges and other safe accommodation when they need it.Local authorities should set out in their strategy an agreed approach to address those barriers, and will need to take the advice of their local partnership board as they do that, working with partners including tier 2 local authorities in their area, specialist domestic abuse providers, PCCs and health bodies.
The guidance will also make it clear that local authorities should set out the different support needs identified through the local needs assessment, and the current provision of support for victims in the local authority area, highlighting any gaps identified. This includes setting out the identified support needs of children within safe accommodation and how they will be adequately met.
We will recommend in the guidance that local authorities have a clear approach to monitoring and evaluating local delivery against their local strategies, and they will need to undertake full evaluations at least on an annual basis to comply with the reporting requirements in Clause 57. We will also recommend that local authorities should publish their evaluation and monitoring approaches and outcomes. My noble friend Lord Bourne asked about Wales. Part 4 deals with devolved matters, so it is up to the Welsh Government to make the appropriate provisions for Wales.
Amendment 96 relates to consultation. This is already required by Clause 55(4), and the duty to consult applies not only to the initial strategy issued under that clause but to all subsequent iterations of the strategy. We will also make clear in the guidance that local authorities must consult the local partnership board, tier 2 authorities within the area, and such other persons as they consider appropriate, before publishing their strategy and any subsequent revised versions of the strategy.
The draft guidance recommends that local authorities should provide a clear consultation mechanism providing an up-to-date version of the strategy, as well as adequate time and a clear timeframe for organisations to review and feed back. In addition, the guidance is clear that local authorities should set out a clear process that organisations and individuals can use to raise concerns about the local strategy and authorities’ approach in addressing the needs identified.
I recognise that there is a balance to strike between providing local authorities with flexibility to meet particular local needs while ensuring a consistent approach to the provision of support within safe accommodation across the country. I believe the clauses as drafted, supported by regulations and comprehensive statutory guidance for local authorities, will provide that balance.
As I have said, we have recently published the guidance in draft, and in doing so consulted Women’s Aid, Imkaan and Refuge. I appreciate that noble Lords, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, local authorities and others will not yet have had an opportunity to examine it in detail. We would welcome feedback and will consider any suggestions for improving the guidance. Once the Bill is enacted, we will then formally consult on the final form of the guidance, as Clause 58 requires, before promulgating it alongside the coming into force of the provisions in Part 4.
I appreciate the intention behind Amendment 102, but I have concerns that we risk building in far too much rigidity and bureaucracy into the composition of the local partnership board and unduly constraining the flexibility that local authorities have to appoint and run their local boards in a way that meets their particular needs.
Clause 56(2) sets out the minimum required members of the board. In addition to a representative from the relevant local authority, the board membership must include at least one person representing the interests of each of the following: tier 2 local authorities in the relevant local authority area; victims of domestic abuse; children of domestic abuse victims; charities and other voluntary organisations that work with victims of domestic abuse in the area; persons who provide or have functions relating to healthcare services in the area; and policing and criminal justice agencies in the area. That list is the minimum requirement, but local authorities will have the freedom to invite on to the board additional members, such as those the noble Lord has suggested in his amendment—accepting that there is considerable common ground between the list in Clause 56(2) and that in Amendment 102.
We think that Clause 56 as drafted adopts the right approach, specifying the minimum required members of the board to ensure the right expertise, but providing local authorities with flexibility to best meet local circumstances, including if appropriate by setting up reference groups to support the board. Relevant local authorities must have flexibility to decide whether an existing board, expanded or reconstituted, can fulfil these requirements, or whether to create a new dedicated board in order to fulfil this duty.
My Lords, I should be very grateful if the Minister would provide details of the information that the Government anticipate will be collected by local authorities, as illustrated in some of the provisions proposed in Amendment 89. I would be very happy for her to do that by letter but I should very much appreciate having that before Report.
I am happy to provide my noble friend with that information.
First, I thank the Minister for her very full reply. I also thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate.
I suppose that, in summary, the issues we have been talking about have related to definitions—for example, of “relevant accommodation” and “specialist domestic abuse support”—and to non-discrimination against, for example, specialist refuge services and the need to support all victims, not least those with protected characteristics. There is then the issue of refuges being a national network of services and not just being about local needs and what local authorities are doing. There is also the issue of resource, including funding. The point was made very powerfully by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath that we will not achieve very much with the Bill if the necessary money is not provided to make sure that the Bill’s intentions can be delivered properly and in full.
I rather got the impression from the Government’s reply that, basically, none of the amendments have any merit with regard to being put into the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister said that the Government agree with the thrust of a number of them, but what slightly concerned me was that one or two of the points made in the debate, and I think that I was among those who made them, indicated that there is a feeling that the guidance that has been issued so far—for example, on definitions—does not exactly deliver. The reasons why we felt that were set out in some detail, but I do not think that we have had a response to that point this evening.
If I did not misunderstand the Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government, I think she said that there would be consultation on the statutory guidance once the Bill got Royal Assent. Many people would like to see some discussion on the guidance at a point when some changes can be made, before the Bill gets Royal Assent. I hope that the Minister will be prepared to have some discussions about this group of amendments before Report, perhaps indicating what the Government’s intentions are in respect of the statutory guidance that has been issued—whether they see any areas for further change and amplification of what is in there, in line with some of the comments made in this evening’s debate.
I will obviously leave things at that. I have a feeling that we will return to these amendments on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I too was delighted to add my name to this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has already made an excellent case for why all child contact centres should be accredited, and I will not detain the House by repeating those arguments.
I have some difficulty understanding why the Government are reluctant to accept the case for all child contact centres to be accredited. It is not a cost to them, after all, and even if there were a cost attached, I would argue it would be worth it. This is the only example of a child service that does not require universal accreditation or regulation. But it places the child in a potentially dangerous and damaging situation because they may not be supervised by trained staff in an appropriate and consistent environment.
The Government, in a letter to the National Association of Child Contact Centres, confess to not knowing about the nature and extent of unaccredited child contact centres. So, they do not know the size of the problem or the standards that these centres are operating at. Of course, accreditation does not guarantee a child’s or a parent’s safety, but it would ensure safeguarding risks are accounted for. There would be quality and consistency in all child contact centres. We know that children, as well as mothers, get killed. Why on earth would we take the risk of having untrained staff manning unaccredited child contact centres?
The courts and Cafcass should refer children to accredited centres. We have the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to thank for that. If an accredited centre is good enough for these children, why should it not be good enough for every child? Would the Minister reflect, before he responds, on whether he is willing to take the risk?
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for introducing this amendment and I recognise, of course, the reasons why she has tabled it. This has been a short but extremely valuable debate on a crucial part of the architecture of the law in this area. I am afraid that I cannot confirm to my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering that I came across cases like this in my practice but I can confirm that, when he sat as a judge, my father always told me that family law cases, which raised issues such as we have been debating this evening, were the most important and often the most difficult that he came across.
I suspect that there is a broad measure of agreement across the Committee. We all agree that the provision of child contact centres is extremely important in supporting families and enabling parents to have contact with their children, while providing a safe environment that protects children and adults from potential harm. When moving her amendment, the noble Baroness made three points of principle from which I do not demur at all: first, the courts must always give careful consideration to the circumstances of each case; secondly, the child must be at the centre of the debate and the focus of what is going on; and, thirdly, we must have high standards. There is nothing between us on any of those points. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, set out from his personal experience—magistrates are not professional but, given the amount of time that the noble Lord puts into it, I ought perhaps to have said his professional experience—and, as we accept and know, the National Association of Child Contact Centres, the NACCC, as the sole accreditor of such services in the private law sector, provides an invaluable service, and the same high standards are required in the provision of services in the public law sector.
That said, I question whether statutory accreditation of all child contact centres is, in fact, the best mechanism to achieve the objective of the amendment: namely, to ensure domestic abuse protections as well as the maintenance of safeguarding for children and families. The family court cannot refer families to a non-accredited child contact centre as part of a child arrangements order. In private law cases, a traditional protocol has been in place for nearly two decades, guiding courts to refer families to child contact centres and services which are members of the NACCC and therefore subject to agreed national standards and an accreditation process.
Since 2018, Cafcass and the NACCC have established a memorandum of understanding under which Cafcass will refer to and commission only NACCC-accredited centres and services. Cafcass will therefore not advise any parent to attend a non-accredited centre or use non-accredited services. As set out by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the Government are keen to work with the NACCC to improve information and signposting to accredited child contact centres as part of an improved range of information and support for both separating and separated parents. In so far as local authorities are concerned, in discharging their statutory obligation under Section 34 of the Children Act 1989—to promote contact between children and their parents and other family members, including siblings and grandparents—local authorities are already subject to legal, inspection and accountability frameworks to protect and safeguard children in their care.
I recognise that local authorities increasingly outsource to external providers to deliver the service on their behalf. This is particularly the case when a local authority child contact centre might be in one location while the child has a foster care placement some distance away. Rather than requiring the child to travel a significant distance to undertake contact, the local authority may consider it to be in the child’s best interest to remain at a location closer to their home. This means that the local authority may outsource a provision to an external provider to deliver the contact on the local authority’s behalf. I hope that provides one answer to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, as to why the Government do not accept the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. It was not my intention to be specious. I was trying to be accurate and constructive. I have already said that I will engage with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, if she provides evidence that there is a systemic problem with the current arrangements that cannot be resolved by the existing mechanisms. That was a genuine offer. I am sure that the noble Baroness will take me up on it. I will be very happy if she does.
My Lords, the Minister has invited comments about potential systemic problems. I draw his attention to one group of cases which he did not refer to: people who self-refer to contact centres. They are not sent there by social workers or by the courts, but are self-referring for their own reasons—trying to sort out the issues themselves. They could easily end up at unregulated contact centres, which may well be cheaper, so if the noble Lord is looking for systemic problems, I suggest that this may well be one.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for that point. As I said in my response to the main debate, even unaccredited centres are still subject to the various requirements that I set out, but I am very conscious of the noble Lord’s expertise in this area. In a previous answer, I committed to writing a long letter to him. I do not want to add to it now, but perhaps he and I can have discussions, with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, which include the point he raises. I hope that is helpful.
I am most grateful to the Minister for his response, and for saying that he will meet me and, I hope, the other noble Lords who have put their names to this amendment and whose experience is extremely important. I find it difficult to understand why the Government do not want to close this loophole. It seems terribly important to ensure that there is adequate safeguarding of children. I have a real worry that the commissioning process is more likely to fail now that there are increasing pressures on local authorities, and that the need to ensure accreditation has become even greater. Sadly, in some areas, the local authority does not have a great deal of choice as to the services that are there, so I would question the flexibility to pick and choose implied in the Minister’s response. I will certainly make every effort, with those who have co-sponsored the amendment, to get as much data as we can for him.
As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, who certainly knows more about this than any of the rest of us, highlighted, this is the only service which is not nationally accredited. This seems remarkably dangerous. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, rightly pointed out that it is self-referrers who may use centres that are not accredited, and they will quite often have alcohol, drug or other problems they are trying to sort out. How they behave towards the children there must be observed carefully by people who know what they are looking for and have been properly trained, and where the whole service has been assessed against some standard criteria. In terms of the commissioning process, I would have thought that it would help local authorities to have those standards against which to check the services that they have on their patch and that they may be putting money into.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, pointed out, in a way it is completely at variance with the whole principle of the Bill if we do not include an amendment, with either this wording or something similar, in the Bill. The whole Bill is aimed at decreasing domestic abuse and protecting people from further abuse. It is not meant to be a straitjacket; it is meant to be a really supportive framework. However, if we do not have high standards in that framework, I fear that some of the most vulnerable—that is, the children—will drop through the gaps and we will see more children getting killed.
While for the moment I will withdraw the amendment —I am grateful for the support of everyone, including the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—I think we will need to come back to this at a later stage. I look forward to meeting the Minister. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, my noble friend Lord Polak, and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate have spoken to one of the core aims of this Bill, which is the provision of support to victims of domestic abuse and their children and, in particular, the provision of community-based support.
I am going to start with Amendment 176, because it has been the most spoken about and most clearly addresses this objective. If there is one thing on which we are all united—the central tenet of this Bill—it is that domestic abuse victims receive the support they need. This can be seen in the new statutory duty, included in Part 4 of the Bill, to provide support to domestic abuse victims and their children within safe accommodation. However, extending the duty in Part 4 is not without its challenges, as my noble friend Lady Bertin said.
The duty as it stands applies to tier 1 local authorities in England, and as such there is no ambiguity in where responsibility and accountability lie. Amendment 176 proposes something rather wider, applying to local authorities in England, local policing bodies in England and Wales and clinical commissioning groups in England. The drafters of the amendment are to be commended for seeking to navigate the devolution settlement in Wales, and I suspect that Amendment 177 is intended to complement Amendment 176 by addressing the position in Wales.
In placing a duty across three categories of public authority, the amendment could risk creating uncertainty about where the responsibility for discharging the duty actually resides. To that extent it lacks the clarity of the Part 4 duty, although I note the provision in the new clause for conflict resolution. I do not suggest that this is an insurmountable problem with the amendment.
It is important to recognise that there are already significant community-based support services available to victims of domestic abuse and other crime. Since 2014, Ministry of Justice funding has helped police and crime commissioners to support victims of crime within their local areas, addressing the specific local needs identified within their communities. This funding totalled £68 million in 2019-20. The strong knowledge held by police and crime commissioners about demographics and crime in their local areas allows them to allocate funding to those victims in need.
Clearly, local authorities and clinical commissioning groups also have a role to play, as have others. I recognise, however, that the current commissioning landscape is complex. I understand the need to ensure that whatever arrangements are in place, they are delivering comprehensive service provision and that the needs of victims are being met. It is essential too that perpetrators are held to account for their actions and challenged to make long-term, meaningful changes to their behaviour.
However, I put it to noble Lords that Amendment 176 is putting the cart before the horse. We cannot and should not legislate before fully understanding the current landscape of provision, knowing where the gaps are, how best to fill those gaps and what it is going to cost, as my noble friend Lady Sanderson said. This is the methodical process we went through before introducing the provisions in Part 4, backed up by £125 million in new funding. We need to adopt a similar process to community-based support.
For this reason, I welcome the domestic abuse commissioner’s commitment to leading a detailed mapping exercise into the current community-based support landscape, the pilot of which has already commenced in four local authority areas. That work is due to be completed towards the end of this year. The Government are committed to addressing the findings of this review and, should we find that there is a need for legislative changes, it is right and proper that we should consult on those so we can consider the views of the affected public authorities. In answer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, there will be further opportunities to legislate in this area, including the upcoming victims’ law.
This exercise will do for community-based services what the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government did for accommodation-based services in significant depth before establishing the new duty in Part 4 of the Bill—I was a Minister in MHCLG when the whole process began. It held lengthy consultations with local authorities, the domestic abuse sector and victim support organisations before committing to the best course of action. Only through thorough engagement and investigation was it possible to understand whether legislative change was truly necessary and design a statutory duty that would appropriately address the needs of victims.
I recognise the concerns that the statutory duty in Part 4 may affect the existing provision of community-based services. As I have indicated, we are allocating £125 million to local authorities in 2021-22 to fund the new duty. As my noble friend Lord Polak said, the recent spending review has also secured an additional £40 million to victims of crime, including domestic abuse, in the community. Those details were announced today. This is on top of the additional funding we have provided to meet the immediate needs arising from the pandemic. I hope this provides reassurance that the Government take seriously their commitment to supporting all victims.
Of course, the argument can be made for more investment, but noble Lords will understand that we cannot make the case to the Treasury without the evidence to back it up. The commissioner’s mapping work is central to having that knowledge and understanding to enable us to make the case for more money. I know that Nicole Jacobs takes a different view, and it is an area where we will respectfully just have to agree to differ. It is her role to advise the Government and it is our clear responsibility to back up any new statutory duties with clear evidence of unmet need and a full understanding of the costs involved.
Additionally, the new domestic abuse strategy, complementing the refreshed violence against women and girls strategy, will further focus government attention on the needs of domestic abuse victims and perpetrators. Alongside this, the refresh of the national statement of expectations, due to be published later this year, will set out best practice for commissioning all violence against women and girls services. Finally, we are launching a victim funding strategy, to be published this year, to ensure that funding and commissioning practices for all victims are as effective as possible. I agree with my noble friend Lady Sanderson on the need for sustainable funding.
Amendment 101 seeks to ensure that all survivors of domestic abuse have access to a local welfare assistance scheme in any locality across England. We understand the importance of local welfare and assistance to provide an emergency safety net at times of unexpected need. Local authorities are best placed to understand the needs of the most vulnerable in their communities. That is why changes were introduced in 2013 to give local authorities the maximum flexibility to deliver emergency support as they see fit, according to local needs. The 2014 local welfare provision review found that local authorities were able to effectively target support at those who needed it most, joined up with wider social care.
The Government have provided local authorities with £131.7 million for local welfare assistance through the local government finance settlement in 2020-21. It is for local authorities to decide how best to use that funding, but in doing so they should ensure there is support for those most in need, including domestic abuse survivors.
We are committed to ensuring that people experiencing or fleeing domestic abuse have the local support they need. In particular, economic hardship should not be a barrier to someone leaving an abusive partner. In addition to local welfare support, those escaping domestic abuse can seek financial support through the welfare system.
Finally, on Amendment 177, I recognise the need for effective partnership working across the reserved-devolved demarcation line in Wales. I put it to my noble friend that the mechanisms are already in place to enable PCCs to co-operate with local authorities and health boards in Wales, including through community safety partnerships and the forthcoming new serious violence duty. While PCCs will not be subject to the serious violence duty, as with their existing functions in relation to community safety partnerships, PCCs may choose to collaborate with local partnerships and take a convening role to support the development and implementation of the local strategy.
Given these considerations, the amendments are, I suggest, premature. The Government recognise the importance of community-based services for those affected by domestic abuse. As I have said, we are committed to investigating, in collaboration with the domestic abuse commissioner, what needs to be done to ensure that victims who stay in their own home with their children are receiving the support they need. So that this work can go forward, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.
My Lords, I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response, particularly on Amendment 176, for which I thank her. None the less, does she not accept that favouring accommodation-based services, as set out in Part 4, is bound to impact on local authorities’ spending decisions and make them move funding towards accommodation-based services at the expense of community-based services? How will the Government ensure that a proportion of the additional £125 million goes to community services? Will it not be possible for us to give Ministers regulation-making powers to bring in a duty on community services after the mapping exercise has been completed? That would at least give us some way to ensure that the Government have statutory provision in the light of the mapping exercise.
My Lords, the Part 4 duty in the Bill does not preclude the provision of community-based services. I understand what the noble Lord is saying: because local authorities have the duty to provide accommodation-based services, that means they will not provide community-based services. However, I do not think it does. There is a recognition that we need to explore this further, hence we have committed the domestic abuse commissioner to doing this mapping exercise. That work clearly needs to be explored, but it is very hard to make a bid to the Treasury without knowing exactly where the gaps lie. That is not to say there are no gaps—I am sure there are— but we are just not clear on what the actual ask of the Treasury will be.
As to whether we can ensure that some of the money given to local authorities goes to community-based services, local authorities clearly know the needs of their area, and I hope that they would allocate the money accordingly.
My Lords, the Minister gave the arguments that were given when the Social Fund was replaced by local welfare assistance schemes. Can she explain how the one in seven local authorities that do not have a local welfare assistance scheme will assess and meet the needs of domestic abuse survivors through such schemes when they do not exist in their area?
The noble Baroness asks a very pertinent question. If those schemes do not exist, how are they going to be provided for? I will do some digging before Report and perhaps I can get back to the noble Baroness with some of the fine detail.
I thank all noble Lords for this wide-ranging and well-informed debate. I promise not to detain noble Lords, but I sense a groundswell of support from all sides of the House and from outside the House, including from the commissioner herself, for this issue of community- based services, and concern about the unintended consequences of decoupling community-based services from accommodation-based services.
I know that the Minister is doing her absolute utmost to make this Bill the best that it can possibly be, but I do not recognise her comment that local authorities are utilising local welfare funds effectively—the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, came back on that point after the Minister’s response. The Minister raised the practicalities of implementation and asked for evidence to back this up if she is to go back to the Treasury and ask for some more money. We might well get our heads together and see if we can give it to her. That would be a great solution on all sides.
In the meantime, we will reflect carefully on what the Minister said and, of course, reserve the right to return to the issue at a later stage. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, I can be very brief in the light of what the two previous speakers have said on this amendment.
The purpose of this group of amendments, and a later group, is simply to provide consistency of protection for victims and survivors of abuse, across both the family and civil courts. These amendments would replicate in the civil courts protections that the Government already agree are needed in the family court. This seems an exceptionally reasonable ask. We support the aim of and reason for the amendments, as set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I will be interested to hear from the Government why they have chosen to draft the Bill with this distinction between the courts.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained, these amendments seek to bring the procedure relating to special measures in civil courts in line with the provisions in family courts. We agree with the fundamental aim set out by the noble Lord: to ensure fair proceedings, meaning proceedings that are fair not only to the parties but to witnesses.
In that context, the Government’s starting point when considering the experience of vulnerable witnesses in the civil courts stems from the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which published its interim report and recommendations in April 2018. The inquiry recommended
“that the Ministry of Justice provides in primary legislation that victims and survivors of child sexual abuse in civil court cases, where they are claiming compensation in relation to the abuse they suffered, are afforded the same protections as vulnerable witnesses in criminal court cases.”
As the inquiry put it, this was to ensure that victims and survivors of child sex abuse can provide the best evidence in civil court cases.
While the Government had some sympathy with the recommendation, we also agreed that the issues raised by this recommendation needed further consideration, including whether it was right in principle to extend the protections to other vulnerable witnesses. The Government therefore sought expert help from the Civil Justice Council, which was asked to consider the vulnerability of parties and witnesses in civil actions, not just in relation to claims arising from sexual assault or abuse but more widely. The Committee will be aware that, after extensive consultation and expert input, the Civil Justice Council published its report in February last year. It conceded that there was no single or coherent set of rules in the Civil Procedure Rules dealing with vulnerability in the same way as there was in the Family Procedure Rules.
In this context, we must remember an important point, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, alluded. Civil cases, by their nature, have the potential to cover a much broader range of circumstances where there is no prior close connection between the parties; for example, where a victim is suing an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse or in an action against the police or an employer where abuse is alleged. Of course, I take on board the noble Lord’s examples of cases where the parties may be corporate but, none the less, there are individual witnesses who are victims.
Having considered the matter, and in relation to special measures, the Civil Justice Council report did not go as far as recommending that it should be enshrined in primary legislation. Rather, it was felt that it was best left to the flexibility of court rules since—this is an important point—judges in civil proceedings already have inherent powers to order the provision of special measures under the Civil Procedure Rules when it is considered necessary. However, the Government took a slightly different view, taking the recommendations that came from the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which I have already mentioned.
As the Civil Justice Council report highlighted, vulnerability in the civil courts is not limited only to victims of domestic abuse. Some people may have mental or physical conditions that render them vulnerable and hamper their access to justice. Others, as with victims or survivors of abuse, may be vulnerable solely by reason of the subject matter of the proceedings before the court. This, as the report suggested, may affect their ability to participate in proceedings or give their best evidence.
We want to avoid—this is a risk—unnecessarily prolonging cases because of satellite litigation which revolves around the granting of special measures where the case is not contingent on vulnerability. At the same time, as I said, we need to ensure that the justice system is fair—that is, fair for all. Therefore, we must be careful to focus this provision on only the circumstances in which it is needed.
Even though the approach is different in civil courts, judges in civil proceedings already have inherent powers to order the provision of some special measures under the Civil Procedure Rules when it is considered necessary. I hope that this goes some way towards addressing the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which was shared by the other two speakers in this short debate; I acknowledge their contributions, of course, but I think it is fair to say that they largely agreed with the approach taken by the noble Lord. In that context, the Civil Procedures Rule Committee continues to examine the issues faced by vulnerable witnesses in civil courts.
While we want to ensure parity between each jurisdiction, we also need to build in allowances for the differences—and there are differences—between them. This is why the provisions in respect of cross-examination and special measures in civil cases differ from those in family proceedings.
In the light of my discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, and in the light of all the contributions in this short debate, let me say—in clear terms, I hope—that we very much appreciate the arguments raised in relation to fairness and the concerns around availability of special measures for those who will need them in the civil courts. We will consider this issue carefully ahead of Report and continue to listen to arguments. Of course, I remain open to discussion with both the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others.
In the light of that confirmation and undertaking, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, first, let me say how grateful I am to the noble Lords who spoke.
It was interesting to hear my rather dry opening supplemented by the personal experience of the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, in courts in Australia. She made the valuable point that, generally speaking, litigants and witnesses are not used to being in court—it is a new experience for them and this adds to their concern, which is of course amplified in the case of vulnerable witnesses and parties. She also gave the interesting and important example of family farms giving rise to very personal disputes, where there is often a background of abuse. I am bound to say that, in my years of practice on the Western Circuit before doing more of what I do now, disputes about family farms were endless. They are to be taken into account. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his support as well.
The Minister has given a considered response and ultimately made an undertaking to me and others. I am grateful for the way he has dealt with the amendments. However, I am bound to say that nothing I heard from him justifies the distinction to be drawn between the protection afforded in family proceedings and the protection available in civil proceedings. I got the impression that he understands the reasons why we have disputed that distinction.
I do not accept that a system based on the Civil Procedure Rules for protection in civil proceedings is anything like as good as a system based on statute, as the arrangements in family proceedings will be following this Bill. If a statutory arrangement is good enough for family proceedings and is applicable as appropriate for those, I would suggest that it is appropriate for civil proceedings as well. Nor do I accept that there is a realistic prospect of satellite litigation arising regarding the availability or withholding of special measures. That seems most unrealistic and, in any event, even if it were realistic, it would be no more realistic in a set of measures based on legislation than it would be presently in a set of measures based on the uncertain application of the rules of court. I welcome the Minister’s commitment to further engagement. I regard this as a very important issue, and I will of course speak to him, as no doubt will others, between now and Report in the hope of achieving agreement. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I agree with the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Redfern, in a broader context. On the particular issue in this group, I have listened very carefully to the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reinforced by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. The noble Lord talked about a risk assessment before cross-examination if someone has a history of abuse. Presumably he is referring to somebody with a history of abuse but whose convictions are spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, talked about repeat offenders. Repeat offending is very common when it comes to domestic abuse, but I wonder whether a perpetrator with a history of abuse, a repeat offender, is less likely to have spent convictions or cautions.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is an important piece of legislation that allows offenders to move on from their previous offending, but my understanding is that if a court decides that justice cannot be done without the conviction or caution being taken into account, the court can take account of a spent conviction. This potentially means that a court could prevent cross- examination of a victim of domestic abuse if it decided that a spent conviction or caution was relevant.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s understanding of the legislation as it is. We have no objection to the Government’s amendments in this group.
My Lords, I will begin with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, so ably spoke, and will then turn to the government amendments, which deal with various technical and drafting changes to the same clause.
As has been explained to the Committee, Amendment 114, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would remove a qualification of the automatic prohibition on cross-examination in family proceedings by those convicted of, cautioned for or charged with specified offences, and their cross-examination by the victim or alleged victim. The removal of this qualification would mean that spent convictions and cautions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 would continue automatically to trigger the prohibition, irrespective of how old they may be or how circumstances might have changed. I respectfully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is a very important provision. It enables a line to be drawn and people to move on.
It is in that context that, at the moment, the form of the Bill is that spent convictions and cautions should automatically trigger the prohibition only where evidence in relation to the conviction or caution is admissible in relation to the current family proceedings. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reminded us, and as the Government fully acknowledge, the damage caused by domestic abuse may often last for decades, sometimes a lifetime, and well beyond the point at which a conviction or caution is spent. One must also consider the point made by my noble friend Lady Redfern, that the court process is daunting, especially for victims of abuse. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right to test the adequacy of Clause 63 in guarding against cross-examination which remains inappropriate despite convictions or cautions being spent. I am sure that all Members of the Committee will have been moved by the personal testimony of my noble friend Lady Newlove, when she explained the effect that such cross-examination can have.
However, the Government believe that Clause 63 provides adequate protection in such circumstances. We must bear in mind that the automatic prohibition on cross-examination is also triggered where a protective injunction is in place—that is the force of the new Section 31S—or where prescribed evidence of domestic abuse is provided to the court; that is the force of the new Section 31T. Moreover, and of greater importance here, given the sometimes more historical nature of abuse, is what we intend should become Section 31U of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. This is an important provision, which provides context against which the noble Lord’s amendment should be considered.
New Section 31U is in deliberately broad terms and provides for a wide discretion to meet the particular facts and circumstances of the case before the court. It enables the court, either in response to an application or of its own motion, to prohibit cross-examination where it would diminish the quality of evidence or cause significant distress, so long as to do so is not contrary to the interests of justice. Any such direction will remain in place until the witness is discharged, unless it is revoked by the court in specified circumstances; for example, if circumstances have materially altered. Therefore, to answer the point made by my noble friend Lady Newlove, we consider the Bill sufficient in cases of spent convictions, because that provision enables the court to impose the ban if it appears to the court that the two conditions in new subsection 1(b) are met. That provision would therefore also deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, concerning cases of past injunctions or restraining orders. New Section 31U is a very broad provision that enables the court to respond to the facts of a case and ensure that a suitable order is made. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is important that the court has this ability, for the reasons that I have set out, under new Section 31U. I hope that this gives the Committee, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, what they sought, which, according to my note, was clarity and assurance. I hope that I have provided both.
My Lords, we support this amendment for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as amplified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, my noble friend Baroness Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale.
This amendment recognises that in cases involving domestic abuse, just as in any litigation, engagement between the parties is not limited to conducting the case, giving evidence, cross-examining witnesses and making submissions to the judge. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out that the inadequacy of arrangements that govern cross-examination alone make such arrangements difficult to justify.
There is often a need for the parties to consider and discuss the conduct and progress of the case, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out. That is usually done through their advocates. Yet when the parties are perpetrator and victim of domestic abuse, and are unrepresented, the need for engagement can become an occasion for intimidating behaviour or bullying of the victim by the perpetrator. That need not even be deliberate, though it often is. Even if intimidation is not explicit in court, it may be effected by implied threats of what might happen later, or even by fear on the victim’s part—even if without justification —of what might happen later.
As discussed in earlier groups, the mere presence of the parties together in court can cause distress, intimidation, or trauma to victims. The outcome can be that victims are deterred from bringing proceedings at all. The experience of the proceedings can be grossly traumatic, to the extent of causing lasting harm, and just outcomes can be made that much more difficult to achieve. So, it is completely right that the court should be able to prohibit engagement by a party that unduly distresses the victim in the way set out in this amendment, whether that engagement be direct by the perpetrator or indirect through others. Yet, if the parties have no means to engage at all, there may be opportunities missed for resolving conflict or, at least, for making the issues clearer and enabling the court to achieve safer outcomes.
In cases where the parties are not represented, it is obviously sensible for there to be provision for representation to be arranged. As the amendment proposes, that should involve, in appropriate cases, the instruction of a court-appointed lawyer—not just for the perpetrator but for the victim as well. That is what the amendment proposes and I firmly believe it is right to do so. For my part, I believe that justice would be best done by ensuring that full legal aid is available for both parties to domestic abuse proceedings throughout those proceedings, which often last through several hearings, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, my noble friend Baroness Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, have said. The noble Lord, Lord McConnell, also highlighted the real risk of deterring litigants from bringing or pursuing proceedings once they are under way, by the absence of arrangements for representation.
This amendment does not go as far as we would like, but I know many noble Lords believe that full legal aid for both parties should be the outcome. Meanwhile, it would fill an important gap by preventing intimidation of victims by perpetrators during the course of proceedings, while keeping the door open to engagement between lawyers, which may smooth a path to resolution.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, this amendment —to which my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern has added his, if I may respectfully say, very weighty name—seeks to expand the scope of the prohibition of cross-examination provided for in Clause 63 by prohibiting the perpetrator from engaging directly or indirectly with the victim during proceedings where that engagement would cause them significant distress. It goes on ultimately to provide for the potential appointment of a legal representative, chosen by the court, to represent both parties to ensure a fair process in the interests of justice in such cases. I can assure the Committee, in particular in response to the points made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and others, that because this amendment has been supported by the Magistrates’ Association, we have given it very careful consideration.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, I am as every bit as concerned as her, and indeed the noble Lord who is proposing the amendment, to ensure that domestic abuse victims are adequately protected in the family courts. It is for that reason that the Government are already taking decisive steps to act on the recommendations of the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, in response to which we published our implementation plan in June 2020.
The Bill contains various measures designed to protect domestic abuse victims in family proceedings and across the other jurisdictions. In that context, I bear in mind the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale: the human impact that domestic abuse has, and that it can require some bravery to go to and appear in court in those circumstances, a point also made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Therefore, within the court environment, our provisions on special measures made it clear that the victims of domestic abuse and other parties or witnesses are eligible for special measures such as a screen during proceedings, where the court is satisfied that the quality of their evidence is likely to be diminished due to their vulnerability. In that context, on the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, regarding the position of children, Clause 3(2) provides that any reference in the Bill to a victim of domestic abuse
“includes a reference to a child who … sees or hears, or experiences the effects of, the abuse, and … is related to A or B.”
Therefore, the Bill is structured very much with victims of domestic abuse, who may include children, firmly in mind.
It is not entirely clear from the noble Lord’s amendment whether the intention is that “direct or indirect engagement” during proceedings be confined to the court setting, by which I mean what goes on in the courtroom itself, or extend more widely for their duration, as set out in debate by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. There is often a need for what my noble and learned friend called personal and direct contact between parties in such proceedings. In that regard, one must bear in mind that under Part 3 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, the court can make a participation direction. That can include the use of special measures, which are a series of provisions to help a party or witness to participate or give evidence in court proceedings. That is a range of measures available both to parties and witnesses to enable them to participate in an appropriate manner.
Beyond that, the courts have a range of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders and restraining orders, that can be made to protect victims when they are not within the confines of the court building. In addition, when introduced by the Bill, domestic abuse protection orders can be used to protect victims of domestic abuse outside the courtroom during proceedings. That is because the DAPO brings together the strongest elements of the existing protective orders into a single comprehensive and very flexible order that we believe will provide more effective and longer-term protection than the existing protective orders for victims of domestic abuse and their children. I underline the point that there may be circumstances in which children are also victims. So, for example, if children are giving evidence inside court, special measures may well be applicable and the prohibition on cross-examination may also apply.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for setting out the rationale for these amendments. As he said, I deferred my comments on the particular point of an advocate’s duty to this group because his amendments directly raise that issue. I am grateful to him for the discussions we had about this matter, as indeed we have had about several matters arising from the Bill.
Amendments 122 and 127 would have the same effect in relation to a qualified legal representative appointed by the court to conduct cross-examination in family and civil proceedings respectively. It is the Government’s intention that such a court-appointed representative is not responsible to any party. They are, in effect, appointed by and responsible to the court in relation to their conduct of the cross-examination, having regard to guidance issued by the Lord Chancellor in connection with this role under what we intend should become Section 31Y(1) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
As I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, accepts, the amendments would alter fundamentally the representative’s role by making them responsible to the party who has been prohibited from carrying out such cross-examination. While the tabled amendments contain safeguards to counter the resulting tension between being responsible to the prohibited party on the one hand and needing to protect domestic abuse victims on the other by requiring the representative to have regard to protective directions issued by the judge, this does not affect the Government’s view that, as a matter of principle, the representative who has been appointed by the court should not be responsible to the party. That is particularly the case when that party could have, but has not, appointed his own lawyer. Had he done so, a court-appointed lawyer would not have been required and the lawyer appointed by him would have owed him a duty.
Therefore, the Government do not want this to become a client-lawyer relationship. The advocate is appointed for only one function: to ensure that the best evidence is obtained fairly from the witness in cases where the party is prohibited from conducting the cross-examination by themselves. Altering this and introducing such a relationship between the party and the advocate would, in the Government’s view, be a mistake.
The rules pertaining to the advocate scheme will be set out in statutory guidance and relevant procedural rules. Consistent with what I have been explaining to the Committee, the focus will be on ensuring that the function of a cross-examination is carried out—that the witness is questioned on the evidence that they have provided. Before these provisions are commenced, we will work with relevant stakeholders to develop and finalise statutory guidance, to be issued by the Lord Chancellor, for the appointed legal representatives to assist them in discharging this role. We will work with the appropriate rule committees to develop suitable court rules and practice directions to provide a clear structure and process for the operation of these provisions.
For those reasons, we take issue with the proposal in the amendment. Although I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said about SIAC and court-appointed advocates there, those are completely different circumstances and there is no read-across from SIAC to these provisions. The way that the Bill is set out reflects the Government’s deliberate intention and the clauses have been designed with this in mind.
The framework for the provision of publicly funded legal representation is set out in the LASPO Act. While I have listened carefully to the arguments made on this point, both today and in previous discussions, I do not agree that we should mix the different purposes of LASPO and these clauses as has been proposed. As anticipated by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I refer to the review that I mentioned in the last debate.
Amendments 123 and 128 relate to the provision of legal aid. Legal aid is available for family cases where there is evidence of abuse, subject to domestic violence, or child abuse evidence requirements, and the relevant means and merits tests. We have expanded the acceptable forms of evidence and removed all time limits on providing that evidence. As I have said, we are also reviewing the means test. The Government are clear that victims of domestic abuse must have access to the help that they need, including to legal aid. The review of the means test is assessing the effectiveness with which that test protects access to justice. As I said in the last debate, we are specifically considering the experience of victims of domestic abuse. I will not repeat the other points I made in that context in the previous debate.
However, legal aid may also be available through the exceptional case funding scheme, where a failure to provide legal aid would breach or risk breaching the ECHR or retained enforceable EU rights. As I have explained, the Bill includes provisions that give the court a power, in specified circumstances, to appoint a publicly funded legal representative to conduct cross-examination. Where a prohibition on cross-examination applies, the court would first consider whether there are alternatives to cross-examination and invite the party to appoint a legal representative to conduct the cross-examination. In circumstances where the party does not, the court considers whether it is in the interests of justice so to appoint. Therefore, publicly funded legal representation is intended to conduct the cross-examination, but not to go beyond it. That is the sole reason why the advocate is appointed.
In that context, we must appreciate the need to protect against unnecessary expenditure of public funds or alteration of the legal aid regime without a wholesale and proper examination of the ramifications of doing so. In circumstances where this provision for a publicly funded advocate is put in the Bill for a limited and specific—if I can still use that phrase—purpose, it would be wrong in principle for us to conduct a review of legal aid provisions in Committee.
I fear that I may not have been able to persuade the noble Lord, as I was not able to persuade him earlier, of the merits of the Government’s approach. I am sure he will tell me that I have not, but I hope that I have been able to explain the Government’s approach and thinking on this issue. In those circumstances, I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, unquestionably the Minister—to whom I am very grateful, for both his engagement and his considered and careful response—is right about one thing, which is that he has not convinced me of the difference in responsibility to the client between court-appointed advocates and normal lawyers. I accept that the role of legal representative would be altered by my amendments, and that is all to the good.
One point made by the Minister can be considered in a way that he did not. It is a precondition to the appointment of a legal representative by the court that the client or party who would have conducted the cross-examination, but for the prohibition, should have been given the opportunity to instruct his own lawyer. That lawyer would have had full responsibility to the client in the normal way—full duty of care, answerable in negligence and everything else. Generally, Members of the House will appreciate that the reason that that condition is not often met—in other words, the client does not appoint a lawyer—is lack of funds, not that he or she, usually he, does not wish for the lawyer to have a responsibility to the client. There is very little distinction to draw between the two cases, apart from the fact that the rich client gets the lawyer and the poor client has a court-appointed lawyer.
The Minister referred to the safeguards that I built into the amendments in their directions to the judge—
“such directions as the Court may give to protect the witness from significant distress or to prevent the quality of the witness’s evidence from being diminished.”
There may be further room for discussion about those directions and the guidelines within which cross-examination by a lawyer with a responsibility to the client could take place. I will carefully read the guidance that he mentions by which court-appointed lawyers will conduct their cross-examinations.
I completely reject the Minister’s explanation that SIAC involves different issues, as a justification for removing the responsibility. It is precisely because SIAC special advocates and their appointment involve different issues that the responsibility is removed. I explained that in opening. That point does not seem to have been treated with full understanding.
Of course I will withdraw this amendment to enable further review. The point about legal aid is one of accessibility. We know that there is a review under way and I accept that we should not be reviewing this question in Committee, but the problem is one of evidential and financial accessibility. Until both parties can be represented in domestic abuse proceedings, it is difficult to see that proper representation will be achieved. With those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has explained, these amendments intend to bring the provisions relating to prohibition of cross-examination in civil courts into line with the provisions on the same measure in family courts. As the noble Lord explained, we have covered some of the questions of principle already in earlier groups. He indicated that he was therefore going to be brief—as he indeed was—and I hope that both he and the Committee will not take it as any disrespect if I am equally brief in response, given that we have canvassed the points of principle already.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, described herself as a “support act”, an appellation with which I respectfully but firmly disagree. She spoke eloquently in an earlier group of her personal experience of seeing how court procedures operate in cases involving domestic abuse, and her contribution to this short debate has been equally valuable. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, will forgive me if I gently point out to her that she should not apologise for not being a lawyer. What is apparently, based on my short time here, a repeated cause for apology in this House is generally regarded as a badge of honour everywhere else.
Turning to the substance, let me explain that the approach we have taken in civil cases differs from that taken in family proceedings for good reasons. The clause dealing with banning cross-examination of vulnerable parties or witnesses stems from the report by the Civil Justice Council, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, also referred, and which I spoke about when commenting on the amendments to Clause 62.
The council recommended that the prohibition of cross-examination by a self-represented party should be extended to cover civil proceedings, thereby ensuring some parity with the criminal and family jurisdictions. Importantly, however, the Civil Justice Council cautioned that the ban or prohibition should not be absolute: rather, it should be left to the court’s discretion, given that, as I explained in an earlier group, the civil and family jurisdictions are very different as regards the types of cases, with the civil jurisdiction having a much wider range. As I also said earlier, those cases can have a much broader range of circumstances, where there is no prior close connection between the parties, as there would generally be in the family courts. We have therefore tailored our approach to allow for those differences, which is why the provisions in respect of cross-examination in the civil jurisdiction differ from those in family proceedings. I hope that that explains my thinking to the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
In response to points made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Fox of Buckley, I say it is important that two things are fundamental. First, it is important that protection is available to all witnesses who need it—this was the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. In response to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, the court will of course look at all circumstances in that regard. The overriding concern is to ensure that justice is done in the particular case, which is why leaving it to the discretion of the judge in an individual case to decide when a ban is necessary is based on an unlimited range of factors, including, obviously, the views of parties to the proceedings, any past convictions or the behaviour of parties during the trial. That is how we suggest this matter is best resolved.
Having said all that, I respectfully say that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has put forward, as one would expect from him, a cogent and well-argued case for his amendment. As such, while we consider that the approach taken in the Bill in relation to the civil courts is well founded, and certainly not—to use a word adopted earlier in this debate—illogical, I hear the arguments he put forward and undertake to consider these amendments further ahead of Report. I will continue to listen with interest to any arguments made by him or others in this regard. Therefore, given this undertaking, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, once again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, has proved herself much more than a support act. I say to her and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that there is a crying need in these legal debates for experience from outside the law to inform our debates and bring the lawyers down to earth.
Many noble Lords may well have formed the view that the differences between the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and me are arcane legal arguments, in some senses—but we can only have those arcane arguments in a relevant way if we have real-world experiences to back them up. Some of these will be ours, but the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, not only clearly demonstrated how the principles that apply to cross-examination in civil proceedings also apply in family proceedings; she also graphically described the personal experience of witnesses in court proceedings. I challenge anyone to explain why that experience differs between the two types of proceeding, where witnesses are, or are liable to be, victims of domestic abuse and are vulnerable.
Although I greatly valued the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I do not agree with her that this legislation or these and other amendments overstate the significance of vulnerability or trauma, when the evidence is serious and extensive of how deep vulnerability can go, how serious the trauma can be and how long-lasting it can be as a result of domestic abuse. That is the reason why the Government have brought this Bill; it is why it is widely welcomed around the House and the reason for the protections that are afforded to witnesses and parties in court proceedings.
I come to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who frankly accepts the differences and parallels between us in respect of cross-examination in cases of special measures. I do not accept that a discretionary system in relation to the prohibition of cross-examination is an acceptable substitute. One of the principal reasons for this is that a party or witness has no assurance that there will be a prohibition in a discretionary case. She—or, in some cases, he—is totally reliant on judicial discretion having regard, as the Minister says, to all sorts of other factors, including previous convictions and all the circumstances of the case, in relation to knowing whether a prohibition of cross-examination will be extended. This means that such a witness or party is exposed to the risk that there will be direct cross- examination, which they may well be unable to face.
I am very grateful to the Minister for his undertaking that he will consider these amendments further; I know that that undertaking is given with every intention that he will do so. I and others remain completely open to discussing these amendments with him and refining them if necessary, but we hold the basic belief that vulnerable witnesses need protection from direct cross-examination on exactly the same basis in civil cases as is to be extended in family cases. Saying that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 124.
My Lords, there has been a varied response to the Bill. What has come out of it is that nothing is as simple as it might appear in situations of the kind described. The somewhat harrowing example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, underlines that.
As we have heard, Amendments 130 and 130A seek to change the presumption that it is in the welfare of a child to have unsupervised contact when one parent has either a domestic abuse conviction or court proceedings against them. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, told us that she does not like presumptions and that we need to consider all the circumstances—that has certainly come out of this afternoon’s debate.
As we know, the presumption of the courts is that it is in the welfare of the child for both parents to have access now, everything else being equal. However, when one parent is accused of abusing or has abused the other parent or the child, or they are subject to a Crown prosecution case, everything is most decidedly not equal. We have discussed enough times during the course of the Bill just how difficult and stressful a domestic abuse situation can be for a child, who can be used and abused as a pawn between warring partners. And it can get far, far worse than that.
Several noble Lords used statistics to back up this argument. Mine come from the charity Refuge, which, in partnership with a Sunday Mirror journalist, conducted an investigation which found that, between 2004 and 2019, 63 children were killed at the hands of a domestic abuse perpetrator who had contact with their children after being convicted of a serious criminal offence. Refuge reports that the actual figures of child harm are even higher, with many children dying from other causes, such as neglect. This is the danger of under- estimating the risk that perpetrators can pose to their children. It does not apply to all perpetrators, of course; many who have committed domestic abuse against their partners are different altogether with the children—a point another noble Lord made.
We should also consider how previous matters are taken into consideration. In particular, my colleague and noble friend Lord Marks gave an example of a previous situation in which domestic abuse took place, perhaps in a previous life. But domestic abuse still figures in that situation, so if an alleged perpetrator has a previous domestic abuse conviction, it would be better to be safe than sorry.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, moved Amendment 130A, as an amendment to Amendment 130, which takes matters a little further to include fact-finding hearings in the family courts, which most commonly concern domestic abuse. In such hearings, it is for the person making the allegations to prove that they are true. The judge considers on the balance of probabilities whether the allegations are true or not. The presumption in Amendment 130 is therefore extended while the hearings take place. I think it is better that, where there is a previous conviction, even with another partner in a different situation, it is still far better to be safe than sorry.
I hope that the Minister will be minded to consider these amendments carefully and, if necessary, make changes to make them a little better on Report.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, Amendment 130, formerly in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, seeks to make it clear that the presumption that parental involvement furthers the child’s welfare cannot apply where there is evidence of domestic abuse. It also seeks to prohibit unsupervised contact for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for domestic abuse offences or where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse.
Amendment 130A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, extends this. It seeks to prohibit unsupervised contact for a parent pending a fact-finding hearing in family proceedings or where domestic abuse is alleged or is proven—either in such a fact-finding hearing or as the result of a criminal conviction for a domestic abuse offence.
Before proceeding, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I make two overarching points. First—and I say this respectfully, given my short time in this House—the debate we have just had shows the value and importance of Committee stage. A number of contributors have listened to and considered the points that have been made and, on occasion, have changed their position. There is nothing wrong with that. If I have one regret—and again I say this respectfully—it is that our PR means that the value of these Committees is not as well understood outside this House as it is within it.
Secondly, in the last debate, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, made the point that what seems an arcane legal matter to lawyers—and perhaps to others in this Chamber—is improved by real-world experience and examples. In this debate, contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, have done just that. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that anecdote is not evidence and that we must have research. I will come to this issue later in my remarks. Hearing the case of an eight year-old girl unlocking the front door to catch a bus to get to her father’s house is a powerful example. The image of a child saying his last words to a fireman in a smoke-filled attic will stay with me, and rightly so. It reminds me that, although we are debating words on paper, they have consequences in the real world. I am sure that many, if not all, noble Lords will feel the same.
I have a great deal of sympathy for the aims of these amendments, and I agree that more needs to be done to ensure that the courts take proper account of the impact that domestic abuse can have on children’s well-being and safety. To that extent, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that we should seek to remove stress from children, in so far as we can. That was why, late last year, following the recommendations from the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, the Government launched a review on the presumption of parental involvement. Importantly, the panel did not call for immediate legislative change. Instead, it recommended a full review. They were right to do so. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said and as noble Lords will be aware, this review is under way. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said, it will give us important data, research and a considered analysis.
The review will focus on the presumption—and its exception—and the impact on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of these provisions. It will allow us to build a stronger evidence base and ensure that any changes brought about as a result are rooted in a solid understanding of the effect of the presumption and the associated evidence on child welfare. It would therefore be premature to amend the legislation relating to the presumption, including Section 9 of the Children Act—as proposed in the amendment—before gaining the in-depth evidence from the review.
It is worth highlighting that the current legislation on the presumption makes it clear that it should be disapplied where there is risk of harm to the child. This means that the risk of harm from a parent perpetrator of domestic abuse should already be taken into account by the courts. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, reminded us, Section 1 of the Children Act 1989 makes the child’s welfare paramount. It should also ensure that courts consider the risk of a child suffering harm, or further harm, when deciding on any aspect of the child’s upbringing.
Some noble Lords asked how contact between a child and a parent who has committed domestic abuse, or against whom it has been alleged, could ever be in the best interests of the child. The short answer is that this is not an easy question, but it is for the courts to decide in each case, taking into account all the evidence presented to them. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has vast experience in this area. She gave us an example of such a possible case. She also made an important point about judicial training, which we shall come to in a later group.
In addition to my general point that this issue is catered for in the current statutory architecture, there are two further problems to which the amendments would lead. First, domestic abuse is only one of many circumstances which may impact on a child’s well-being and safety. By expressly referring to it, these amendments could be seen to give domestic abuse prominence over other valid considerations which the court should take into account in deciding whether such an order would be in the best interests of the child—for example, other sexual or violent offending, or a history of or allegations of child abuse. I say this without downplaying in any way the importance and effect of domestic abuse.
Secondly, as a number of contributors have said, the second part of the amendment would lead to an automatic ban. The court could not exercise discretion. If we legislate to create automatic bans on a particular form of contact, there may be concerns that we are not allowing courts to take sufficient account of whether there are risks to the child in the particular circumstances of the case. Risks and rights must be weighed carefully, allowing courts to assess each case on its merits. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, gave an example where, on the facts of the case, a court might want to permit contact.
Other noble Lords, who are not lawyers, have also contributed to this debate. My noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge summarised it very well—so much so that he led the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, to tear up his speech. This must be a rare, if not unique, occurrence. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said it was “likely” that the court would reach such a conclusion. This is the point I am making: it may be likely, but we should not force the court to do so. We should not remove the court’s discretion. Ultimately, the court should make the decision, based on all the facts of the case. Furthermore, it is not clear from the terms of the amendment whether such bans, if they prevent unsupervised contact following a conviction or finding of fact, would or should be capable of being lifted or modified if the risks in an individual case materially change. I respectfully agree with my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes when she said that she was not persuaded that the amendment was necessary, and that it might have unintended consequences.
I also agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull: that nothing is as simple as it first appears in this area of the law. There are risks on all sides in this area, so to speak. There are risks of contact and, as my noble friend Lady Altmann reminded us, there are risks in preventing contact as well. I therefore suggest to the Committee that the approach in the current legislation, which was identified and explained by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, with, if I may respectfully say so, her customary clarity, is the correct one.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Bertin and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who have spoken to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. The amendments relate, as has been said, to a number of different aspects of the family courts. I hope it will be convenient for the Committee if I take each amendment in turn.
I turn first to Amendment 131, tabled by my noble friend Lady Bertin, which, as she says, is a probing amendment. It recognises the crucial role of refuges in supporting victims of domestic abuse and their children. I must thank my noble friend for her time in being willing to discuss with me this amendment, and indeed others.
The amendment raises two important issues. I will first address that of the disclosure of the residential addresses of refuges. Existing legislation and family court procedural rules allow parties to apply to withhold their address and that of their children from other parties. There is therefore no requirement for those engaged in family court proceedings to disclose their address. During family court proceedings, when adequate information about the location of a child is not known to the court, the court can order any person who may have relevant information to disclose it. In those circumstances, details of the child’s address and who they are living with are disclosed only to the court, not the other parties, in the first instance. The court then determines how that information should be used. Where there are allegations of domestic abuse, the court can and does hold that information as confidential. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that this was of critical importance and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said it was essential, and I do not dissent from that.
Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause would prevent the service of a court order at a refuge’s residential address. I fully appreciate that victims living in a refuge are fearful for their safety, and that receiving or witnessing the service of an order at a refuge could be very distressing. In that context, I take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that one must bear in mind the position of other occupants of the refuge as well. In that context, therefore, the two cases illustrated by my noble friend Lady Bertin are concerning.
However, I am clear that there are contexts in which the court may need to serve an order on a party at the refuge they are staying in, and where not doing so may pose unintended risks to the safety of children involved in family law proceedings. For example, there may be a concern that a child might imminently be taken out of the jurisdiction. The welfare of the child is of key concern in family court proceedings. Where the courts have urgent welfare considerations, they must be able to take swift action to locate the child. We must not risk impeding the court’s ability to act immediately to safeguard a child by limiting the addresses at which an order can be served.
As my noble friend has outlined, the courts may already direct bespoke service arrangements based on the facts of a case. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 allow for court orders to be served at alternative addresses, such as the refuge office address, if that is suitable. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, it may not always be suitable. As such, I am confident that the important outcomes sought by my noble friend are already provided for in existing legislation and court procedure.
I should add in this context that the Family Procedure Rules, as I have said, allow for parties to apply for their contact details to be kept confidential from other parties. But even where such an application has been made, parties retain responsibility for ensuring that any form or document they submit to the court does not contain the information they wish to keep private. We have to consider in this context documents received from other people, such as medical reports or financial statements. It is difficult, if not impossible, for court staff to check all documents submitted to the court for any unintentional—I emphasise unintentional—disclosure of contact details.
Therefore, given that background, I submit that the proposed clause is unnecessary and, perhaps more importantly, would bring with it some obviously unintended, but very real, potential risks to some of our most vulnerable children. Existing legislation and rules allow for the protections sought through this amendment. But we recognise that, as we have been told in a number of cases this evening, concerns have been raised in individual cases before the courts. The Government are committed to protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse, and of course this extends to those residing in refuges in particular. We actively work with members of the judiciary, who are committed to exploring whether and how existing procedures and guidance could be strengthened to ensure that those residing in refuges are protected.
Before I turn to the next amendment, I once again thank my noble friend Lady Bertin for raising this issue, both by way of this amendment and in her discussions with me on this matter. It is clear that, across the Committee, we share the same aim—the only real question is how we best achieve it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, Amendment 132 seeks to place a duty on courts to share information relating to victims or those at risk of domestic abuse, and imposes an obligation on the family court to consider making a barring order where information shared by another court identifies that court proceedings may be being used to continue abusive behaviour towards the victim.
I have a great deal of sympathy for the aims of this amendment, and I agree that better information sharing, in particular between the family and criminal courts, on the issue of domestic abuse is important. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was kind enough to acknowledge that there were some drafting issues with this amendment. Indeed, there are such issues, and therefore I hope the Committee will find it helpful if I reply on the questions of principle and not on points of drafting.
The Government are actively considering what more can be done to improve the sharing of information between civil and criminal courts dealing with family proceedings, including through the development of integrated domestic abuse courts, which will be piloted later this year and seek to progress family and criminal cases in parallel. I hope that goes some way to meeting the concerns expressed this evening by my noble friend Lady Newlove.
In particular, I draw to the Committee’s attention the recent amendment to the Criminal Procedure Rules, which comes into effect on 5 April. This will impose a duty on parties to criminal proceedings to alert the criminal court to any related family proceedings, and it encourages the exchange of relevant information with a court dealing with those proceedings. We consider the issue of information sharing between the jurisdictions to be more appropriately addressed through procedural rules, rather than in primary legislation, because the court processes are somewhat technical in nature, I am afraid—and, of course, one has to bear in mind the often technical nature of management information systems.
Alternatively, there is also the issue here of judicial guidance, where the court has a discretion over what information should be shared and with whom. I assure my noble friend Lady Verma that, in that context, the position particularly of women from minority communities, who may be more affected by the sometimes siloing nature of our court processes, is kept very much in mind. How to access support and manoeuvre one’s way through the system once one is in it is of central importance in this context.
I move on to the related but separate issue of the use of Section 91(14) orders under the Children Act 1989, often referred to as “barring” orders. The amendment proposes that the family courts are placed under a duty to consider such an order where it appears, based on information shared by another court, that cases are being brought by a perpetrator of abuse as a means to carry on their abusive behaviour.
The noble Lord is right to raise the issue of perpetrators using the family courts as a means to continue their abuse, highlighted in the report by the Ministry of Justice’s expert panel on harm in the family courts, published in June last year. The sad fact is that domestic abuse perpetrators do sometimes use the courts as a way of perpetrating their abuse, often bringing their victims back to the courts repeatedly, which, obviously, can be retraumatising. In our response to the report, the Government committed to exploring how we could further clarify the availability of Section 91(14) orders in the family courts to further protect victims of domestic abuse.
The amendment proposed by the noble Lord would place a duty on courts to consider making a Section 91(14) order, but only where relevant information has been shared by another court. We are determined that courts should never be used as a forum to perpetrate further abuse. In that context, I am clear that further clarification is indeed required to the law on barring orders to ensure that the use of Section 91(14) is available to parents and children to protect them where further proceedings would risk causing them harm or further abuse. The evidence suggests that these orders are currently underused in circumstances involving domestic abuse and that they could be an effective tool to further protect victims and survivors.
In answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Newlove as to when we will come back with further thoughts on this matter, the short answer is: before Report. Therefore, I thank the noble Lord for drawing attention to this matter, which we are actively considering. We are considering what more can be done to ensure the effective use of Section 91(14) orders in domestic abuse cases. As I have said, we will consider this issue carefully ahead of the next stage of the Bill.
I turn now to Amendment 133, on training for judiciary and other professionals in the family court. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that this amendment was the most important of the group. I am tempted to agree, though that is not in any way to undermine the importance of any other amendment. To use a word that I think was used by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, training is critical in this area.
My Lords, first and foremost, I offer my sincere thanks to my noble friend Lady Newlove, the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Wilcox, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London for the clear case they have submitted today before the Committee on why the offence of non-fatal strangulation is necessary. All the matters that we have discussed today are important, but this may well be the most important. In that context, I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not acknowledge each of the contributions individually, both because of time and because, if I may say, many of the contributions were to the same effect. I will seek to respond to the substantive points made without always a personal reference; I hope I will be forgiven for that.
I must, however, make a personal reference to my noble friend Lady Newlove. I join with others in paying sincere tribute to her for the way in which she has promoted this issue. She explained how non-fatal strangulation can be terrifying and the effects long lasting. As the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, said, it is often used as a method of control and, to adopt the phraseology of the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox of Newport, there is a real and visceral effect. I also mention in particular the personal and very moving speech by my noble friend Lady Bertin, with her mention of some circumstances very close to her.
As noble Lords will have noted, there are two amendments on non-fatal strangulation before the Committee. Amendment 137 would have general application: it would apply to all cases where non-fatal strangulation or suffocation has occurred, including cases where non-fatal strangulation or suffocation featured as a factor during a domestic abuse incident. By contrast, Amendment 138 creates the same offence, but the application is limited to cases of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation where this occurs in a domestic abuse context. The maximum penalty for the new offence in each proposed clause is the same—that is, on conviction or indictment, seven years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.
I am aware that the proposal to create a stand-alone non-fatal strangulation offence stems from campaigns conducted last year by the Centre for Women’s Justice and We Can’t Consent to This. Specific clauses to create a new offence were tabled in another place, although they were different to those before us today. Those proposed clauses were, however, withdrawn on Report in the other place and were not put to a vote.
Before setting out the Government’s position on this matter, let me start by saying that we entirely sympathise with and fully understand the strength of feeling. We unequivocally support the intention behind these amendments and have given a firm commitment to legislate for a new offence of non-fatal strangulation. I hope that, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London explained, this will indeed lead to a reduction in the appalling details that we may have to hear in the future. In answer to my noble friend Lady Redfern, that would be a stand-alone offence.
Several contributors have mentioned the position in other jurisdictions. It is right to say that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and several states in the USA have created a non-fatal strangulation offence. Those offences have been cited by the two groups that I mentioned as offering a basis on which any new offence in England and Wales could be modelled. Those stand-alone offences, however, differ across those jurisdictions. Some apply widely but are dependent on certain factors being met, such as the victim not giving consent, or the act causing them to lose consciousness. Other variations of the offences are narrower in scope, in that they are restricted to instances of strangulation that occur in a domestic abuse context. Those offences are not without criticism. Some people claim that they are too broad and can capture behaviour that is not intended to harm and should not be criminalised.
It is also worth pointing out that the offences in those jurisdictions have not been placed on the statute book without significant prior review to assess their impacts on other areas of law. In addition, most of those legislative measures tend to be accompanied by a package of non-legislative measures—for example, programmes for seeking to change perpetrator behaviour, toolkits for the police to assist in identifying non-fatal strangulation cases and guidance for agencies to support victims of non-fatal strangulation.
I also draw the attention of the Committee to the current law and how non-fatal strangulation is currently captured. Such behaviour can be captured, depending on the seriousness of the crime, under offences ranging from common assault and battery to attempted murder. However, in addition to those offences, there are others that can cover non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. For example, it can be part of a pattern of behaviour amounting to an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour under Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Additionally, a specific offence under Section 21 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 makes it an offence to attempt to choke, suffocate or strangle any person, or to choke, suffocate or strangle a person in an attempt to render that person insensible, unconscious or incapable of resistance. That offence also requires there to be an intention by the perpetrator to commit another indictable offence.
It is that range of offences that initially led the Government to believe that the law was sufficient in covering the diverse circumstances and levels of seriousness that may be involved in non-fatal strangulation cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, set out, one would not want to create a stand-alone offence if it were not necessary to do so. However, we have now been persuaded that this may not be the case.
We are also aware of claims of evidential difficulties in prosecuting any allegation of strangulation, particularly if there is no—or insufficient—evidence of injury, not even reddening or minor bruising to the skin. Further, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out in relation to the Section 21 offence, there is the additional requirement for evidence that another indictable offence had been intended, and that may create difficulties.
Our concern had been that the same difficulties would apply to any new offence, as there would still be a requirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt that a serious offence was intended. We have also been concerned about the risks associated with creating a new offence and that it could limit the circumstances covered and create additional evidential burdens when compared with existing offences.
More importantly, as was pointed out by a number of contributors, non-fatal strangulation is relevant to and found in, but plainly not limited to, domestic abuse circumstances. Although I understand and accept that it is more likely to occur in a domestic abuse setting, it is nevertheless the Government’s position to ensure that if we create a new criminal offence, it applies equally to all parts of society, does not create any loopholes, or conflict or impact on other parts of the legal framework.
I turn now to the detail of the amendments: as drafted, both are deficient and could not be accepted by the Government. Importantly, both amendments seek to create a new offence to criminalise conduct that is already unlawful. In addition, the proposed maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment for conviction or indictment is problematic—the level of the penalty needs careful consideration. Our main concern here is that seven years exceeds the maximum penalty for serious offences such as GBH, when the injury caused by non-fatal strangulation may be significantly less than the injuries that amount to GBH.
There are other significant problems. The amendments do not deal with the element of consent, do not consider any exemptions and do not provide explanation of how they would work with, and alongside, the current legal framework. The amendments are also limited to a person’s breathing, or blood circulation, or both, being impeded manually—by hand or through the use of an aid. We are, however, aware of offences of this nature where a person’s breath or blood circulation has been impeded in other ways, such as the use of other body parts—a knee placed hard upon a neck, for example—or, simply, using bodyweight.
As noble Lords will have seen in the media over the weekend of 9-10 January, the Government have now committed to creating a new offence of non-fatal strangulation, for which the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, characteristically generously, was thanking Ministers. It will be important, however, to ensure that any new offence is proportionate—I hear the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and I will come back to it—allows for more prosecutions to be brought and for convictions to be secured. There is a number of legal and technical issues to be addressed for this to be achieved that are not addressed by the amendments as currently tabled.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, as has been said, rightly pointed to some of these issues on Second Reading, and we should not underestimate the challenges of getting this right. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for passing on the later comments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I can say, particularly given his reference to Professor David Ormerod, that officials have already taken up the offer of meeting the learned professor. They have had initial discussions with him and will continue to have such discussions, which I am sure will be extremely useful.
As I am sure noble Lords will agree, it is important for any new offence to work in practice and not pose difficulties for other parts of the law. In creating any new offence of non-fatal strangulation, the Government will have to consider several factors. Let me set out just four. First, the Government will have to consider whether the behaviour should be captured through a single offence or through two offences to capture lower-level and more serious cases of non-fatal strangulation. Secondly, we have to define the term “strangulation and suffocation,” and consider whether any terminology about serious harm requires definition. Thirdly, although I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, we have to consider the issue of consent—when consent becomes invalid is a notoriously thorny legal issue. Fourthly, we have to consider the application of public policy exemptions, such as for some sports or medical treatments.
My Lords, we on these Benches fully support Amendments 139, 140 and 145, in the names of my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and others. The issues addressed in these amendments have been raised in the other place by my honourable friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, Jess Phillips, and others during the Bill’s consideration there.
The amendments, as noble Lords have heard, are modelled on existing law and should not cause the Government any trouble whatsoever; I look forward to the Minister’s response. My noble friend Lady Kennedy explained the problems women face when they have killed a partner, having been the victim of abuse for years and years and then find themselves in the dock. The amendments seek to address that and reflect the realities of domestic abuse.
Everybody has been very complimentary about the Bill—it is a very good Bill, long overdue and we wish it success—but to become really effective legislation, it must incorporate these amendments or government amendments with the same intent. It is reasonable to afford the victims of domestic abuse who act in self-defence, often in their own homes, reasonable protection. They are compelled to defend themselves, having suffered years of abuse. As my noble friend Lady Kennedy reminded us—we have heard it many times before—on average, two women a week are killed by their partner or former partner. That is an horrific figure.
Amendment 139 would provide domestic abuse survivors with the same legal protection as householders have in cases of self-defence. Members have referred to such cases. Amendments 140 and 145 are modelled on Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and would give victims of abuse a statutory defence where they have been compelled to offend as a result of experiences of domestic abuse.
We have heard excellent speeches in this short debate from all noble Lords, particularly from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I endorse all the comments of noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Bradley, in particular, made a compelling speech. He raised the issue of mental health, its effect on women prisoners and the need for proper context to be taken into account when deciding to prosecute cases. I look forward to the response from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. If he cannot accept these amendments, I hope he will tell the Committee that he understands the issue and will go away and reflect on it, and maybe come back on Report.
My Lords, I first offer my sincere thanks and appreciation to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for outlining the case for these amendments. In response to her early comments, I can assure her that I have indeed listened to her and benefited from discussing these matters with her, both outside the Chamber in advance of today’s proceedings and in listening to her most diligently this evening. She has considerable experience in this area of the law.
In effect, these amendments seek to create two new defences: first, a defence of reasonable use of force by victims of domestic abuse who, in self-defence, react to violence from an abusive partner; and, secondly, a new statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit a criminal offence. While in tonight’s debate the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, focused on the first of those defences, I have had the benefit of discussing both issues with her. I have read briefings on both and therefore hope that my reply will meet the points she has made inside and outside the Chamber. None the less, I will take each amendment in turn, because they raise different issues.
Amendment 139 is on the reasonable use of force. The Government are aware that what is being sought here is an extension to the current provisions to enable victims of domestic abuse to have the same level of protection as those acting in response to an intruder in the home. I am aware that the proposed new clause stems from a campaign by the Prison Reform Trust seeking to clarify the degree of force that is reasonable under the common law of self-defence where the defendant is a survivor of domestic abuse. It has been suggested by the Prison Reform Trust that the common-law defences are unsuitable in the context of domestic abuse.
In that context, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Hamwee, explained, the amendment seeks to build on existing provisions in Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, with the intention that, as with householders, the degree of force used by the defendant would have to be “grossly disproportionate” rather than simply “disproportionate” by reference to the circumstances that the victim believed them to be, and to take into account other factors set out within Section 76. It has been suggested that this would fill a gap in the law.
Let me start by saying what I hope does not need to be said, given the terms of the Bill and what has been said in Committee on this and previous occasions. The Government recognise the harm suffered by victims of domestic abuse. Several defences are potentially available in law to those who commit offences in circumstances connected with their involvement in an abusive relationship, including the full defence of self-defence. In addition, the broad definition of domestic abuse in the Bill should assist, I hope, with identifying and clarifying the wide-ranging and pernicious nature of domestic abuse, and alerting all those involved in the criminal justice system to it.
It is worth mentioning at this point that the courts—by which I mean the judges—have developed the common-law defences and their relationship to domestic abuse. We should perhaps pay tribute to the judges for having recognised the nature and impact of coercive and controlling behaviour in the application of the criminal law and in sentencing, as well as in family and civil law. It is sometimes the case that the courts are quicker, more nuanced and more flexible in developing the common law than Parliament can ever be in introducing, by their very nature, more rigid and narrowly drawn statutory provisions. For fans of the common law, of which club I am an enthusiastic member, that is an important point to bear in mind.
There is also a need to balance recognition of the abuse suffered and its impact on the victim with the need to ensure that, wherever possible, people do not resort to criminal behaviour. The Government believe that the balance is currently reflected in the law, which continues to evolve and which aims to strike the right balance between those factors.
My Lords, I thank the House for the opportunity to ask this question, which applies to all these amendments but particularly to Amendment 139, to which my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb is a signatory. She was unfortunately unable to take part in this debate.
My noble friend would have referred to the fact that the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill allows blanket legal protections for undercover police and informants. The forthcoming overseas operations Bill creates similar new protections against prosecution for military personnel acting overseas. The Government have fought intensely for these protections against prosecution for the police and the military; they have fought against many attempts in your Lordships’ House to reduce or check these protections. In that context, how would the Minister explain—having granted such broad protections to the police and military, even in cases of fundamental wrongdoing—why the Government should refuse what are comparatively far more limited legal defences for survivors of domestic abuse, particularly with such well thought-out and well drafted amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for that question. I do not wish to be thought flippant in any way, but the short answer is that the situations are different, and therefore you have different considerations and different legal results. However, if she will permit me, given that I am not personally acquainted with that sort of detail—certainly of the overseas operations Bill—to respond to her this evening, I will add to my reply in writing.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister. I have two questions which rather puzzle me. First, he talked at length about praising judges for how they can quickly and flexibly adapt the common law of self-defence to new cases and how beneficial it is for it to be dealt with in that way, rather than with rigid primary legislation. Can he therefore explain why Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was thought necessary?
Secondly, the Minister talked about the option to retreat in domestic abuse cases. Referring to the two scenarios that I spoke about from personal experience, I certainly had the option to escape out of the flat—luckily it was a ground-floor flat—when somebody was trying to break the front door down in the burglar scenario, but when my abusive partner had me up against the kitchen wall, I had very limited options to retreat. I cannot see how the option to retreat is more valid in the burglar situation than it is in the domestic abuse situation. Perhaps the Minister can help me.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for those questions. First, Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act dealt with a specific circumstance, whereby Parliament considered that that instance ought to be reflected by way of a specific statutory defence. The question for this evening is whether there is a suitable read-across into the matters we are discussing. For the reasons I sought to explain, I suggest that there is not.
Secondly, as to the option to retreat, I hope I made it clear that I was not saying that there is always an option to retreat in domestic abuse cases; I was making the point that there is generally very little option to retreat in the householder case. Again, that is an instance where you cannot simply read across to the domestic abuse case. I hope the noble Lord is content with those responses, but I am very happy if he wants to take those points up with me hereafter so that we can discuss them.
My Lords, I understand the points that the Minister has made about the common law developing—that is inherent in it—but, like my noble friend, I want to pursue the point about flexibility. If the courts were that flexible—I suppose this is a rhetorical question—would we be moving and speaking to these amendments?
The proposed new clause in Amendment 140 is modelled on—but, I accept, does not completely repeat—the provisions of Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act, referring to “the person’s circumstances”. As far as I am aware, I have not received the briefing from the Prison Reform Trust, but does the Minister accept that the remarks of the right reverend Prelate and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, go very much to the point about a person’s circumstances? The Minister referred to concern about misuse. At Second Reading, I think I made the point that if there is misuse we should be looking at the misuse, not at not applying a defence which should be a good defence in general.
Finally—again, I suppose this is rhetorical—with regard to the balance, and we are for ever searching for the right balance, does the Minister agree that, given the fast-developing understanding of domestic abuse and its impact, civil society will likely pretty quickly, in parallel, be developing its ideas about what is the right balance?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for those various questions. On the issue of the person’s circumstances, I hope I set that position out in my reply. Perhaps it is the sort of point I could set out to her in writing in a couple of paragraphs, if she would not mind.
We are concerned when defences may be being misused; I made it clear that there are some concerns with the victims of slavery defence in that context. On the last point, which I think the noble Baroness accepted was somewhat rhetorical, she is certainly right that we always seek a balance. The point she makes that the law must keep up with the expectations of civil society is a profound one; it is, indeed, one of the big advantages of the common law. I am sure, therefore, that the issues raised by these amendments will continue to be discussed. The question before the Committee this evening is whether the legislature should provide for explicit statutory defences in these terms. For the reasons I have sought to set out, in my opinion, it should not.
My Lords, I should tell the Committee that I turned a page too soon in my opening address on these amendments. I did not have the chance to really lay out the second of the statutory defences I am promoting, in Amendment 140.
I regret that I used the term “read-across,” because there are always lawyers who will use language literally. Of course, I did not mean it is an absolute read-across to talk about a householder as distinct from a victim of abuse, but the gravamen is the same. The core of it is about somebody put in fear in the place they want to feel safe: their home. I cannot think of any domestic homicide where I have represented a woman who has killed her partner or ex-partner that did not happen within a household—a place where she was hoping to feel safe but did not, and where experience had taught her to feel fear and terror.
I am afraid I have to say to the Minister that some time, I will take him by the hand into a women’s prison and have him sit down and listen to the accounts of women, by asking them to look him in the eye and tell him their stories. They are so often there because of childhood abuse, having been brought up in abusive households and with direct experience of partner abuse. We could almost empty our prisons without them having women who are there because of their mental health. They are not mentally ill for no reason; almost invariably, it is because of the kind of abuse we have heard about in the debates on this Bill.
I say this respectfully, but the Government are again falling into the trap of saying there are nice victims and bad victims, or of saying: “We will change the law for the good, conforming victims but not for the victims who somehow transgress”. These are the victims who, in the end, defend themselves because they are so in terror for their lives, who are so in fear of a partner that they commit a crime—carrying the drugs from A to B or hiding them in their sock drawer, for example. All I am saying is that there is a double standard in this debate: as soon as you move to that which involves crime and a woman, or anybody who is abused, is in the dock, then suddenly your compassion for the issue of domestic abuse somehow dissipates.
I am very concerned that there is not enough real consideration of the toll of abuse: we are moving into the field where somebody ends up transgressing the law but it is really because of what they are experiencing. If a psychiatrist were to speak to this Committee, they would tell noble Lords that when somebody has experienced fear for their life—we have heard about it in relation to strangulation—and thought “I am going to die at the hands of this person”, and then suddenly smells that level of fear again, in the air, in those circumstances they might take a knife and defend themselves, or take a heavy weapon and hit somebody fatally on the head. The test of “reasonableness” or whether the force was “disproportionate” has to be read in the context. That is why I am saying that it would have to be “grossly disproportionate” for it not to afford a defence of self-defence for somebody who has experienced long-term and serious abuse.
What we are seeing here are the very double standards that are so often experienced by victims of abuse and by women. It goes back to the nature of law and its patriarchal roots. It is about saying that, yes, women who are abused deserve all our compassion but if they overstep the mark, they do not.
Our prisons are full of women who have had these experiences—indeed, I have acted for women who have ended up killing a partner. They do not do it because they suddenly want to wreak vengeance; they do it in exactly the circumstances of the householder who feels in absolute terror for their life.
The failure to make those links and to understand this may be because one has not spent enough time sitting in a cell with people who are coming up for trial. I can tell the Committee that that is the circumstance, and if you can afford, because the Daily Mail demands it of you, to lower the standard of reasonableness and be more flexible for a householder—as indeed you should—then that kind of flexibility should be available to those who have been experiencing long-term abuse.
I ask that the noble Lord look again at the double standard that is operating here. It is partly, of course, because Governments always want to play the law-and-order card and do not want to be seen to be soft on people who commit crime. But very many of the women who end up in prison did what they did because they were under the coercion and control of somebody else, and were absolutely in fear of that person. I really regret the response I have received from my friend, the noble Lord. I ask him to take his great lawyer’s skills and go back to the drawing board again, because he is missing something very important here, which is about justice for women. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, with great regret, and I am really disappointed in the ministerial response.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for tabling these amendments and spotting this loophole in the Bill. It is good to have this debate today. As she has said, marital rape can happen in a country where it is not illegal locally, and we would then not be able to prosecute the offence here in the UK. Nobody in this Committee wants that situation. I hope the Government will confirm that they either accept her amendments, or accept that she has identified a very serious loophole and bring in their own amendments on Report.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bertin has, as she has explained, tabled an amendment which seeks to ensure that UK citizens who commit marital rape in countries where such behaviour is not criminal may be prosecuted in the UK. Such countries are thankfully in the minority. We of course want to prevent any exploitation of more lax laws on marital rape elsewhere.
I hope that the Committee will allow me a moment to put these amendments into context so that we can understand the legal architecture that we are talking about. Schedule 2 contains amendments to various enactments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Together with provisions in the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly—it gives extraterritorial effect to the new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland—and Clauses 66 and 67, it ensures that the UK complies with the jurisdiction requirements of Article 44 of the Istanbul convention. That article requires the UK to be able to prosecute criminal conduct set out in the convention when that conduct is committed outside the UK by one of our nationals or by a person who is habitually resident here. Part 1 of the schedule covers England and Wales and deals with cases under Sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over. Parts 2 and 3 cover Scotland and Northern Ireland on a corresponding basis.
In keeping with the normal principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is a requirement that a prosecution for one of the relevant sexual offences—which includes rape—may be brought in the UK only where the offending behaviour is also an offence in the country where it happens. That is called dual criminality, which respects the notion that generally it is inappropriate for the criminal law of state A to be applied to conduct that occurs in state B where that conduct does not offend the law of state B. In most circumstances, the dual criminality requirement is not a barrier to prosecution because serious sexual offences against adults are likely to be criminal in most other countries. However, it could mean that, in some circumstances, UK authorities would not be able to prosecute someone for a marital rape committed outside the UK if such behaviour is not included in or exempt from the equivalent offence in the other jurisdiction. As it stands, the Bill applies a dual criminality requirement for the relevant sexual offences committed outside the UK by UK nationals and UK residents. My noble friend’s amendment would remove the dual criminality requirement for UK nationals, but not for UK residents. As explained by my noble friend, and by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, the effect of this would be that the UK could prosecute UK nationals who commit marital rape against adult victims in countries where such behaviour is not criminal, but could prosecute UK residents who commit marital rape of adult victims abroad only if the behaviour is also criminal in the country where it is committed.
In principle, that is the right approach, as the link to the UK is stronger where the offending behaviour is perpetrated outside the UK by a UK national, rather than by a non-UK national ordinarily resident in the UK. Existing law already makes that distinction with regard to extraterritorial sexual offences where the victim is under 18. The amendments extend only to England and Wales and, as my noble friend identified, one would need to alter the drafting if they were to go further. However, I do not want to focus on the drafting issue. I am grateful to her for raising this important issue and possible lacuna in the Bill. Marital rape is abhorrent behaviour, and I agree that we should consider carefully the case for amending the Bill to cater for it. But—it is an important but—as the extraterritoriality jurisdiction provisions are UK-wide, we need first to consult the devolved Administrations to ensure a consistent approach across the UK. To that end, I respectfully invite my noble friend to withdraw her amendment on the clear understanding that we will give this matter serious and sympathetic consideration ahead of Report.
My Lords, shall we see if we have the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, on the call? I do not think we do, sadly, in which case I call the Minister.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, seeks to strike out—alone among the clauses in the Bill—Clause 69. I will endeavour to persuade him, and the rest of the Committee, that this clause, like others, can play an important part in protecting victims of domestic abuse. Right at the start, however, I join the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in thanking those at the MoJ who provided the presentation made to them. This was a very good example of how that sort of interaction—what one might call a learning session—can help everyone when we debate these matters in Committee.
Clause 69 allows the Secretary of State for Justice to introduce mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for offenders convicted of a relevant domestic abuse-related offence. The relevant offences have included, until now: murder, specified violent offences, and the controlling or coercive behaviour offences set out in the Serious Crime Act 2015.
Polygraph examinations are already successfully used in the management of sexual offenders supervised by the National Probation Service. The clause extends the use of testing to include—in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—high-risk domestic abuse perpetrators: those who have been released from custody having served a sentence of 12 months or more and are on licence.
The polygraph testing is used to monitor an offender’s compliance with other licence conditions, such as those restricting contact with their victim, requiring the offender to notify the probation officer when they form new relationships, or prohibiting entry into an exclusion zone; for example, around their victim’s home. It is also used to monitor dynamic risk factors such as alcohol or substance misuse.
I will try to respond to a number of questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but if I miss any out, I undertake to write to him after reviewing the Official Report.
The policy underpinning these provisions does not allow offenders to be recalled to custody for failing a test. I use the word “fail” being cognisant of the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, we are not talking here about failing in the normal sense of the word. Indeed, I think the noble Baroness explained her approach to polygraphs as being somewhere between a yes and a no; that might be applicable to the polygraph itself. The clause does, however, enable offenders to be recalled for making disclosures during testing which, when considered with other evidence, suggest that the risk can no longer be managed in the community.
The offender can also be recalled to custody if he or she refuses to take the test or tries to trick it in some way; for example, by controlling their breathing. However, in response to the questions put to me, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that disclosures made voluntarily by the offender during the polygraph examination may reveal that they can no longer be safely managed in the community. Those circumstances would also lead to a return to custody. The important point to bear in mind in that regard is that that is no different from a situation in which an offender makes such disclosures without the polygraph licence condition.
Polygraph testing can be required as part of the licence conditions imposed on an offender following their release from custody. It can be imposed only where it is deemed necessary and proportionate to the risk posed. Importantly, in its report on the draft Bill the Joint Committee did not object in principle to extending polygraph testing to domestic abuse offenders; it sought assurance on two issues.
First, it sought an absolute assurance that no statement or data derived from a polygraph test would be used in criminal proceedings. The Joint Committee acknowledged that this appeared to be the effect of the draft Bill. In that regard, the provision in Clause 69 must be viewed alongside the existing provisions relating to polygraph testing in the Offender Management Act 2007. Section 30 of that Act provides unequivocally that any statement or any physiological reaction made by an offender during the polygraph session may not be used in criminal proceedings in which that person is a defendant.
To be clear, however, this does not preclude information derived from a polygraph examination being shared with the police, who may decide to use the information to conduct further inquiries. If, as a result of those inquiries, the police obtain other evidence that suggests that an offence has been committed, charges may be brought against the offender.
The second concern raised by the Joint Committee was that polygraph testing should not become a substitute for careful risk analysis—a point that, I think, was also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I assure the Committee that the use of polygraph examinations will not replace any other risk assessment tools or measures, such as the multiagency public protection arrangements—MAPPA—but will provide an additional source of information that would not otherwise be available.
The evaluation of the pilot mandatory polygraph testing for sexual offenders concluded that offender managers found polygraph testing very helpful. To date, 5,000 tests of that type have been carried out on 2,249 offenders, and 1,449 tests have resulted in the offenders making significant disclosures that led to either a refined risk management plan or recall to custody.
With regard to the qualifications of those carrying out the examinations, I assure the Committee that they are carried out by qualified and experienced probation officers who have completed three months’ residential training to become accredited polygraph examiners, and all polygraph examinations are quality assured by an independent external provider.
However, while the use of polygraph examinations is tried and tested, as I have said, in the context of the management of sex offenders, the Government accept that domestic abuse perpetrators represent a different cohort of offender. That is why we are committed to piloting the provisions in Clause 69. I draw the Committee’s attention to the commencement provisions in Clause 79, which expressly provides for such piloting; we will begin this as soon as is practicable after Royal Assent.
We intend to run a three-year pilot in the north of England, involving about 600 offenders. Half will be subject to testing and half—the control or comparison group—will not. The Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing, in collaboration with the University of Cambridge, will conduct an independent evaluation of the pilot, and only if the results were positive would we roll out testing across England and Wales. In response to the specific question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in conjunction with his Amendment 191, I am happy to commit that the Government will lay a copy of the evaluation report before both Houses prior to any decision on wider rollout, enabling noble Lords to consider the findings in full. I hope that that is helpful in response to his question.
Given the benefits that we have seen with the use of polygraph testing to help us to manage the risk posed by convicted sex offenders, I apprehend that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, now sees the merit, at least in principle, of analysing the question of whether we can use the same procedure with regard to serious domestic abuse perpetrators. Indeed, last week, we heard calls for the more efficient and effective use of technology to protect victims of domestic abuse—Clause 69 does just that.
With the repetition of the point that I will go through the Official Report, because there may be one or two questions that I have not directly answered but which deserve and will get a written answer from me, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his challenge to Clause 69, which I commend to the Committee.
My Lords, I am afraid that we have had no luck getting in contact with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
My Lords, it might be most efficient for me to do just that. I will add it to the list of questions and respond in writing.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate, which has been excellent. I can categorically attest to the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is not a misogynist. The noble Baroness, Lady Bull, talked about how the behaviour of parents has almost a direct correlation with how their children might behave when they grow up. The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, talked about the trans community; the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, might have looked at my notes because the words I have written in response to her remarks are almost identical to what he said: that hate crime laws in England and Wales protect identity characteristics such as race, religion or sexual orientation, or groups such as trans or disabled people.
I thank noble Lords for all their comments, including the very thoughtful comments of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the abuse of parliamentarians—it is horrific to see the comments that people have made—much of which is misogynistic. The opening gambit of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, was the tragic case of Kellie Sutton, which shows two things, one mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It shows the failure to include domestic abuse in the MAPPA arrangements and the need for more effective use of Clare’s Law; the Bill remedies that, as it puts the guidance on a statutory footing. Noble Lords have talked about police forces that record misogyny. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, rightly pointed out that those which record misogyny also record misandry.
I will be quite clear about the Government’s position on hate crime. All crimes that are motivated by hatred are totally unacceptable and have no place in this society. That is why, in 2018, as part of our updating of the Government’s hate crime action plan, we asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of current hate crime legislation, including considering whether other protected characteristics such as sex, gender and age should be included. We asked it to review both the adequacy and the parity of protection offered by the law relating to hate crime and to make recommendations for reform. This review began in 2019; over the course of that year and last, the Law Commission tried to meet as many people as possible who had an interest in this area of law, organising events across England and Wales to gather views and, of course, evidence, which the noble Lord so often talks about.
The noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Kennedy and Lord Lucas, stressed the importance of data in our considerations. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about opening a debate with the police; I am sure that, following the Law Commission’s findings, such a debate will be opened up. However, we have specifically asked the commission to consider the current range of offences, aggravating factors and sentencing, and to make recommendations on the most appropriate models to ensure that the criminal law provides consistent and effective protection from conduct motivated by hatred towards protected groups or characteristics.
The review also took account of the existing range of protected characteristics, identifying any gaps in the scope of protection currently offered under the law and making recommendations to promote a consistent approach. The consultation to support the review closed on Christmas Eve of last year. That consultation focused on whether sex or gender should be added to hate crime laws, noting that misogyny by itself might introduce inconsistency to hate crime laws—as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also pointed out.
We will respond to the review when it is completed. Given the range and depth of the work undertaken by the Law Commission, we do not think it would be appropriate to prejudice the outcome of its work, including by issuing guidance or requiring the collection of statistics along the lines proposed by the amendment. As I have said, the noble Lord rightly wants to see evidence-based policy. The work of the Law Commission will add significantly to that evidence base. I hope the noble Lord will agree that we should allow it to complete that work rather than pre-empting it. We will consider what changes need to be made once we have had the opportunity to fully consider the Law Commission’s final recommendations. On the basis of these comments, I hope that the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank everybody who took part in this wide-ranging debate. I thought it was appropriate for it to be introduced by a member of the weaker sex, but I thank everybody of whatever sex for their contributions. I thank my colleague in the other place, Stella Creasy. She and I had the pleasure of spending quite a bit of time together at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, where I got to know her. She has been a doughty champion of trying to get misogyny recognised as a rather pervasive element in modern society and I applaud her for her efforts, which have been supported across the Chamber in another place.
The noble Lord, Lord Young—with his usual erudition and from his commanding height—laid out just how extensive the Law Commission’s interim report is. I, too, waded through 40-odd pages, and I confess that I did not look at about 500 footnotes in detail, but it is very impressive and goes very deep. What comes out of it very clearly is that the case for the prosecution is proven: misogyny is something that actually exists, is tangible and has a very unpleasant effect on a lot of people. However, finding out that it is bad is the easy bit; the difficult bit, which is what the Law Commission is trying to do now, is translating that knowledge—that truth—into legislation in a form that will have a materially beneficial effect on the very large number of victims of misogyny. That is the difficult piece to try to get right. Frankly, the more data that we have to help us try to understand how to do that effectively, the better.
My noble friend Lady Bull laid out some of the international context. This is not something that takes place only in our disunited kingdom, it is an international syndrome and a shameful one. The existence of gender-based hostility is a fact of life and it has probably always been with us from Neolithic times. The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, quite rightly made the point that we must have the right information. I am to some extent agnostic on the technical issues of sex versus gender and all the rest of it. That is not a battle that I am going to fight. I do not feel qualified to do so, but I am quite sure that the Law Commission will look at that in detail as it is looking at all the other elements.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about the pervasiveness of misogyny, based in part, I suspect, on her own experience and that of others that she has seen. It is shameful. She also made an extremely good point about the value of really good police domestic abuse training. I do not know to what extent there is a template for best practice and what good really looks like. I suspect that, as ever, some police forces are doing it infinitely better than others. Can the Minister tell us how much knowledge the Home Office has of where best practice is in existence or being evolved and, if so, what is it doing, or what does it aspire to do, to try to make sure that that is applied everywhere, not just in those police forces that are ahead of the game?
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, talked about the importance of enhanced information, but he rightly made the point, as a lawyer, that hate crime is a difficult and very sensitive area, and data really will be king. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, I saw the reports about the way in which female athletes have been tormented and abused because they cannot go to the normal stadia and places to exercise. It is absolutely deplorable that one should be trying to do what one loves and has a passion for—indeed, what one may be representing one’s country for—and is subject to abuse on the street. I cannot even imagine what that would be like. I hope that if I witnessed someone doing something like that, I would give them a piece of my mind—not that they would probably take much notice.
The noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, also pointed out that misogyny is a recruiting tool for hate groups. In doing research for this debate, I went down one particular rabbit hole that I found on the internet: a very bizarre male forum in which feminism is regarded as the root of many of modern society’s ills and as a conspiracy to belittle men and reduce their role. It was eye-closing, rather than eye-opening, to try to read it, but it exists and we cannot ignore it. We have to try to do something about it.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, quite rightly, with his extensive experience, laid out some of the heffalump traps that exist legally and in the way in which the police might try to apply this. He knows far more about it than I do, but I would defer to the Law Commission to try to work its way through some of the complexities that he outlined. I probably agree that they do not necessarily need to be in primary legislation; that is not the object of this probing amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, again, referred to the importance of data and the role of social media. Like him, I greatly look forward to the arrival of our new colleague: his friend and mine, Vernon Coaker. When he arrives, he will be a sterling addition to your Lordships’ House. I also—since I am married to one—agree with the noble Lord on the very important role of powerful women.
The Minister quite rightly mentioned the pervasive influence of the home that one is fortunate or unfortunate enough to grow up in, and how that influences one’s views. We both have shared history in the importance of timely, accurate and informative data. I think we all agree that although we know this is here, we still do not really understand its full complexity, how to record it accurately or how to respond to it. I hope that the Law Commission will come up with some answers, but the pandemic has acted like a pressure cooker on an awful lot of what is going on. Many women and children are suffering unspeakable oppression at the moment and I am very conscious that, while it is neat and tidy to say that we will wait for the Law Commission findings to come out, there is a feeling among most of us who have spoken that it would be good to do as much as we can in the interim to acknowledge that this is a live and shameful issue, rather than just sit on our hands hoping that the Law Commission will pull a rabbit out of the hat.
On that basis, I thank everybody who has taken part. I thank the Minister for listening so politely and answering as I expected she might, but I hope that she and her colleagues will consider whether more could be done, given the circumstances that so many of these women and children are in, to try to send some message to police forces about the benefits that other police forces which have trialled this are having from it, and to encourage them to look at it seriously. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these are two good rounding-out amendments, well argued for by all speakers, and I fully support them both. Like the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, I would have signed Amendment 146A too, if I could have.
Clause 71(5) deals with priority need for victims, as we have heard. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, introduced Amendment 146A, which seeks to extend the application of priority need for housing for homeless victims of domestic abuse to those who live with, or might be expected to live with, the victim. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, explained that this already works perfectly well in Wales. I am sure that the Government have looked at that and seen it for themselves.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bull, described the lengths to which an abuser will go to find out where the victim has gone, which is why it may not be possible for the application to be made in person. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, reinforced the need of so many victims to get right away. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, there is a great shortage of housing, which causes a lot of consternation. It is much better on every level for the perpetrator to move. I am just trailing my amendment that tries to achieve this, which is Amendment 163, coming on Wednesday.
Amendment 147, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, tackles the local connection issue for a victim fleeing an area. It would ensure that, even if the victim were not from that area, this would not count against them for housing priority, hence them being designated with a local connection. It stops local authorities from refusing survivors on the grounds of no legal connection. The example from the noble Lord, Lord Randall, shows exactly why this is needed. Both these amendments make a great deal of sense, and I hope that your Lordships’ House is minded to support them.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I come first to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. He explained that Amendment 146A seeks to amend Clause 71 to allow those who are not experiencing domestic abuse themselves, but are in the same household as someone who is, to be given priority need status. I share his ambition to make sure that all victims of domestic abuse and their household are supported by ensuring that they have access to a suitable offer of safe and secure accommodation. I agree that it is vital that domestic abuse victims who are homeless, or at risk of homelessness, are supported to find an accommodation solution that is safe, meets their needs and reflects their individual circumstances. We think that this amendment is unnecessary because, when an applicant has priority need, the Housing Act 1996 already requires local authorities to provide accommodation that is available for occupation and is suitable for the whole household.
We see several risks with this amendment. We know that victims of domestic abuse may be vulnerable and at risk of being exploited, manipulated and controlled by those in their lives, including family members, the perpetrator or a new partner who may also be abusive. Allowing someone else in the victim’s household to be in priority need would mean that that person, not the victim, would be the primary contact with the local authority. They would receive all correspondence and the offer of accommodation would be in their name. For this reason, it is important that the victim of domestic abuse alone has the priority need for accommodation, guaranteeing the victim control of the application and the rights to secure the accommodation as it will be in their name. I recognise and share my noble friend’s intention to ensure that all victims are able to access accommodation, and that the process of making an application for homelessness assistance should not be a barrier to accessing support. However, for the reasons that I have set out, I disagree with him on how best to achieve that intended outcome.
I agree that it is vital that domestic abuse victims can be supported to make a homelessness application. That is why the Government have made clear in the published draft Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities that they should be flexible in their approach to taking homelessness application from victims, by enabling victims to be supported in making that application by a family member, friend or support worker if they wish to be. The guidance also reinforces that local authorities should facilitate interviews by phone or online, where this is most appropriate for the victim, and make sure that translation services are available. Lastly, the guidance highlights that local authorities, where appropriate, should accept referrals from concerned parties, allowing someone else to make the initial approach on behalf of the victim, provided that they have the victim’s consent and the application can be safely verified with the victim. In short, we believe that there is already provision in place to achieve the outcomes sought by my noble friend in his Amendment 146A.
Amendment 147 in the name of my noble friend Lord Randall seeks to amend the Housing Act 1996 to give victims of domestic abuse a local connection to all local authorities in England when seeking homelessness assistance under Part 7 of that Act. The existing legislation and guidance on this matter is clear that a housing authority cannot refer an applicant to another housing authority where they have a local connection if they or anyone who might be reasonably expected to reside them would be at risk of domestic abuse in that area. The Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities makes clear that a housing authority is under a positive duty to inquire where the applicant would be at risk of actual or threatened domestic violence. It stipulates that authorities should not impose a higher standard of proof of actual violence in the past when making their decision. If an applicant is at risk, they can present at another local authority.
As such, protections are already in place for victims of domestic abuse that ensure they are not housed in a local authority area where there is any risk of violence or abuse. The local connection test seeks to keep a degree of fairness to ensure that those who live locally are prioritised and that no one authority gets oversubscribed. The current provisions in place under Section 198 of the 1996 Act strike the right balance to support victims.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, talked about when women often flee to other local authorities, and the situation with social housing need. They are absolutely right that many victims of domestic abuse are forced to flee their homes to seek that safety and support in a refuge or other form of temporary accommodation. It is often in another local authority area because, of course, why would you stay where you were in danger? In November 2018, the Government issued statutory guidance for local authorities to improve access to social housing for victims of domestic abuse who are in refuges or other forms of safe temporary accommodation. The guidance here makes absolutely clear that local authorities are expected not to apply the residency test for victims who have fled to another district. I hope, with the points I have made, that my noble friend would be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for this opportunity, having listened to a very interesting debate. At Second Reading I raised the issue of cross-border co-ordination within the United Kingdom—at that time, particularly in connection with European protection orders and how to ensure that an appropriate system would be in place within the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. It strikes me that it is also an ongoing issue with those that flee across one of the internal borders of the United Kingdom and then seek housing. I would be grateful for any reflections that the Minister might have on what implications these amendments—or their rejection, as she is recommending—would have for women who have flown across borders, and for the internal arrangements that are in place between the local authorities of the whole United Kingdom, not just England.
Clearly, this Bill does not extend to the jurisdiction in Scotland, but I absolutely understand the point that the noble Lord is making. I will write to him with any updates on that because, of course, a woman should not be prohibited or stopped from receiving support just because she has crossed a border. I will write to him further on that and I thank him for raising the issue.
My Lords, I am grateful to all of those who took part in this debate and particularly to the Minister for her reply, which I will come to in a moment. The initial speech was made by my noble friend Lord Randall, who made a forceful speech about the importance of flexibility on local connection. He referred to the postcode lottery due to the different local authorities interpreting the guidance in different ways. In a sense, his plea was the same as mine, namely that it is not enough to leave this to guidance; one wants a legal assurance on the face of the Bill. My noble friend, and others who supported Amendment 147, will want to reflect on the Minister’s reply to that section of the debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, reminded us that in Wales the amendment is, in effect, already in place, and that there has been no abuse of it. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put our debate in a slightly broader context, and reminded us of the need for move-on accommodation in order to free up capacity in the refuges, and she is absolutely right. I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for Front-Bench support for the amendments and I am sorry that he was not quick enough off the mark to add his name to my amendment. I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, who rightly pointed out that the application for housing, if it is known to come from the survivor, can be a trigger point in a relationship and provoke a violent reaction. This is why it is important that somebody, who she referred to as an ally, should be able to make the application on behalf of the victim to avoid exactly that risk. My noble friend Lord Cormack said that, unlike the previous amendment that was a probing amendment, these amendments meant business. The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, was too modest to say that she spoke with the authority of a former Housing Minister, which of course adds weight to the representations that she has made. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for Front-Bench support from the Liberal Democrats. She used the opportunity to trail an important amendment later on, which puts the emphasis on the perpetrator moving out of the building rather than the victim.
The Minister, my noble friend Lady Williams, is of course a former Minister at the Department for Communities and Local Government as it then was, and so she will have a first-hand knowledge of the issues that we discuss. I am sure that she remembers the passage of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, if not always with happy memories.
I was grateful to my noble friend for saying she entirely shared the objectives of those behind the amendments. She made two points in rebuttal. She referred to the Housing Act 1996, requiring that the accommodation should be suitable for the whole household; however, the whole household may not want to move—it may just be the victim. She did not quite address the point that in Wales and Scotland they have already resolved the issues she described and enabled an application to be made, as I understand it, on behalf of the primary victim.
I very much hope there can be a way through. My noble friend said the guidance says that the initial approach can already be made with consent by a third party. If the initial approach can be made with the consent of the victim, it is not absolutely clear why the substantive approach could not also be made. While I am happy to withdraw the amendment, I very much hope we can have some discussions to see whether we can give the assurance that I think the whole House wants and avoid the issues my noble friend raised in her response. In the mean time, I repeat my thanks to those who have contributed and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this has been a comprehensive debate. As noble Lords have explained, Amendment 148 would insert a new clause to ensure that those whose immigration status would exclude them from benefits and the right to rent can receive support and find a place to live if they are the victim of domestic abuse in circumstances that would otherwise leave them destitute and homeless. It sets out clearly what evidence must be produced to show they are a victim of domestic abuse.
As noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, abusers use survivors’ immigration status as a means of coercive control. As noble Lords have said, no one should be prevented from escaping domestic abuse because they cannot afford to leave or because they have nowhere to go, not least those who are additionally vulnerable because of their immigration status. Amendment 151, led by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, requires the Secretary of State to make changes to the Immigration Rules to extend the number of victims of domestic abuse who can apply for, and be granted, indefinite leave to remain. It proposes that they should be granted limited leave to remain for not less than six months to enable this, or longer if the application is awaiting a decision, including access to support and accommodation during that time. As noble Lords have said, it is likely that victims of domestic abuse could be in danger were they to be forced to return to their country of origin, as the example graphically described by the right reverend Prelate demonstrated. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, has said, while the current pilot is welcome, it is not necessary. We know all we need to know to take the issue forward—a point reinforced by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece have explained, Amendment 160 gives effect to Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence—the Istanbul convention—that requires all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, to receive equal protection against domestic abuse and equally effective support and, as such, encapsulates the essence of Amendments 148 and 151. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, has said, if Amendments 148 and 151 were agreed to, we could ratify the Istanbul convention. As he said, either this is a landmark Bill, or it is not. I agree with the noble Lord: this all comes down to money—money that the Government appear to be unwilling to spend.
It is concerning that the Home Office has responsibility both for providing support for domestic abuse survivors and for enforcing immigration legislation. With only 5.8% of refuge places available to survivors who have no access to public funds, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has said, something clearly needs to be done. With those affected numbering in the low thousands, it would not take much to implement these recommendations, and we support them. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, failing to take action would make it feel as though the state were complicit in these women’s suffering.
My Lords, the amendments in this group centre on support for migrant victims of domestic abuse. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lady Helic for proposing the new clauses.
All Members of the Committee will share the view that anyone who has suffered abuse, regardless of their immigration status, should first and foremost be treated as a victim. Where we differ, perhaps, is on how support is best provided to meet that end. Amendments 148 and 151 seek to provide, for all migrant victims of domestic abuse, at least six months of leave to remain, a route to indefinite leave to remain and access to publicly funded support. Amendment 160 seeks equally effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, while also referring to Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention.
If I have correctly understood noble Lords’ objectives in tabling these very thoughtful and well-intentioned amendments, they are seeking to expand the existing destitute domestic violence concession and the domestic violence rule to cover all migrant victims of domestic abuse: to place the DDVC in the Immigration Rules, as well as lifting immigration restrictions, for any migrant victim of domestic abuse. The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill recommended that the Government consider similar changes to the DDVC and DVILR. However, its recommendations did not include proposals to incorporate the DDVC scheme in the Immigration Rules.
As noble Lords will be aware, in response to the Joint Committee’s recommendations the Government committed to a review of the overall response to migrant victims of domestic abuse. That review has been completed and its findings were published on 3 July 2020. We were grateful to the specialist sector for the views and evidence provided during the review. However, it was unclear which groups of migrants are likely to be most in need of support, how well existing arrangements may address their needs, how long they might need support, and how they could be supported to move on from safe accommodation. It was clear, however, that a robust evidence base is needed to ensure that funding is appropriately targeted to meet the needs of migrant victims.
My issue with Amendment 151 is that it is based on a misunderstanding of the rationale for the DDVC and the domestic violence rule. Both were, and are, intended to provide a route to settlement for migrant victims who hold spousal visas. The system was designed in this way because, had their relationships not broken down as a result of domestic abuse, these victims would have had a legitimate expectation of staying in the UK permanently. Neither the DDVC nor the domestic violence rule was designed to support those without this legitimate expectation. This Government are concerned that expanding the scope of both would undermine the specific purpose that gave rise to them and introduce a route to settlement that might lead to more exploitation of our immigration system—or indeed of vulnerable migrants.
For this reason, at Second Reading in the House of Commons, the Safeguarding Minister announced that the Government would invite bids for grants from the £1.5 million support for migrant victims scheme. Such grants will look to cover the cost of support in a refuge or other safe accommodation for migrant victims of domestic abuse who are unable to access public funds. The Government will use the scheme to better assess the level of need for these victims and inform spending reviews about longer-term funding, which is very important. The competition for the scheme was launched on 15 December and closes on 8 February—today. The scheme will then run until 22 March, which answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
As I have indicated, our review has highlighted that a better evidence base is needed for migrant victims who are not eligible for the DDVC. Since 2017, the Government have provided over £1 million from the tampon tax fund to support migrant victims with no recourse to public funds. While clearly this fund has helped to deliver much-needed support for a number of individuals, and much has been learned, regrettably we require a more complete and reliable evidence base to enable us to make those long-term decisions. We particularly want to establish a robust dataset that we can interrogate about the circumstances in which support is most needed, the duration of support needed, what kind of support works best, and how individuals exit from support to regain their independence. We would like to do this work to ensure that the information that we need is available to inform future policy-making and that the decisions taken are sound.
I turn to Amendment 160. The support for migrant victims scheme and the associated evaluation work clearly illustrate that the Secretary of State is taking steps to ensure effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse. This scheme will be available to all migrant victims at the point of need while their eligibility for the scheme is assessed and other routes of support are explored.
The Government have been clear that migrant victims of domestic abuse should be treated first and foremost as victims, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, and others, said. Data collected through the course of this scheme will provide the information that we need to assess current provisions and ensure that effective protection and support is available to migrant victims of domestic abuse. Therefore, while I am grateful to my noble friend and appreciate the sentiment and intention behind her amendment, we do not believe that this is necessary in light of the action that we are already taking. The provisions in the Bill apply equally to all victims of domestic abuse, whatever their status, including the ability to apply for a domestic abuse protection order or the provisions in respect of special measures and the prohibition of cross-examination in person.
A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lady Helic and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Health and Lord Griffiths, have talked about the Istanbul convention. It is important to recognise that legislation is not needed to comply with Articles 4 and 59 of the convention. As set out in the latest annual report on our progress towards ratification of the convention, which was published on 22 October last year, the position on whether the UK is compliant with Article 4(3) of the convention to the extent that it relates to non-discrimination on the grounds of migrant or refugee status, and with Article 59, relating to residence status, is of course under review, pending the evaluation and the findings from the support for migrant victims scheme.
On the suggestion in Amendment 148 that the no recourse to public funds condition is lifted for all victims of domestic abuse, the Government believe that this is the wrong response. It is not subject to further definition in any way and would be a disproportionate and costly method of providing support for migrant victims. It is worth recognising that the principle of no recourse to public funds was established as far back as 1971, and no Government have sought to reverse that position. Successive Governments have taken the view that access to publicly funded benefits and services should reflect the strength of a migrant’s connections to the UK and, in the main, become available to migrants only when they have settled here.
These restrictions are an important plank of immigration policy, operated, as I have said, by successive Governments and applicable to most migrants until they qualify for indefinite leave to remain. The policy is designed to assure the public that controlled immigration brings real benefits to the UK, rather than costs to the public purse. It does this by prohibiting access to public funds other than to those with indefinite leave to remain, refugees and protected persons, and those granted discretionary leave.
Nevertheless, exemptions from those restrictions are already in place for some groups of migrants. These include refugees or those here on the basis of their human rights where they would otherwise be destitute. Those on human rights routes can also apply to have their no recourse to public funds condition lifted if their financial circumstances change and there is a risk of destitution, imminent destitution, risk to the welfare of a child or exceptional circumstances. Equally, as I have said, migrant victims on certain spousal visas can already apply for the destitute domestic violence concession to be granted limited leave with recourse to public funds.
I thank the Minister for her considered response and want to acknowledge her support and compassion for migrant victims of domestic abuse. The issue for me is still the one that has been raised throughout this debate of how we guarantee long-term protection for migrant women with insecure immigration status, given all we have heard about the mismatch in timing between the pilot scheme and this Bill. So I really welcome discussion with the Minister as we determine whether to bring this matter back at a later stage.
The right reverend Prelate is right to raise the point about sustainability, long-term solutions and what happens after the pilot scheme has taken place. It is precisely because we want to identify where the gaps lie and where long-term funding might be needed that we have done this pilot scheme. With that, as I have said throughout the course of this debate, it is our intention to review the matter when that pilot scheme has finished. But the point about funding is one that is well made, because we can have all the legislation in the world and if the funding is not in place there is no point.
I start by thanking the Minister for her very full and comprehensive reply to this debate. I also thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, in which there has been a high degree of unanimity as far as the nature of the contributions is concerned and the objectives that we all want to achieve.
The Government have basically set out why they do not believe that the amendments we have been discussing meet the Bill as far as they are concerned. They have laid some stress on their point that a one-year pilot scheme is about to commence to better assess the level of need for this group of victims. It is, as the Minister has said, to run through until March 2022. Clearly, on that basis, as far as the Government are concerned, not a lot is going to happen to address the problems that have been identified in the near future.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester pointed out in her very effective contribution that the amount offered to run the pilot project would not meet the needs of all vulnerable migrant women who need crisis support. She also pointed out that the data the pilot scheme may collect is already available. Indeed, it has been published and submitted. I do not think that the Government, in their response, exactly made it clear what information they do not feel they have already, that has not been provided in the data that has been published and submitted. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester also pointed out that the pilot scheme did not guarantee change following its conclusion.
This Bill is surely the opportunity to provide legislative protection to all victims and survivors of domestic abuse, including migrant women who are among the most vulnerable. I had thought that was a government objective. I have no doubt the Minister would say that it is—or at least I hope that is what the Government would say. It does seem that it will be a little way ahead in the future before anything will get resolved. We have a serious issue that needs addressing now and not, maybe, at some unspecified date in the future.
I do not think we have heard, in the Government’s response, how the Government intend to address the immediate problem that exists already. I hope it might be possible, between now and Report, for there to be further discussions on this issue—which will involve a number of people, judging by the number of contributions to the debate and all the people who have added their names to the amendments that we have been discussing. But I share the view of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that it would be helpful if there could be further discussions about the issues have been raised before Report. I suspect, at the moment, that the issues we have been talking about now for one and three-quarter hours will be brought before the House again on Report, unless discussions provide a solution to the issues we have been talking about. I hope that proves to be the case and that the Minister will ensure those discussions take place. In the meantime, though, I withdraw Amendment 148.
I will just pick up on a point that was made by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull. It concerns what was said during the debate on this or a similar amendment in the Commons, when the Government used an argument to deflect the amendment to the effect that we should await the outcome of the review of coercive control legislation due to be completed by “early autumn”. Last autumn was being referred to. It now appears that we might receive some further information—I hope, the outcome of the review—before Report. No doubt the Minister will confirm that or otherwise when she responds.
The point I want to make is that this is far from the first amendment on a key domestic abuse issue that the Government have told us at some stage that they cannot accept because they are awaiting the outcome of a review, pilot scheme or mapping exercise. That suggests that they know that there are real problems that need addressing but have not determined how in time for the Bill. The Bill has already been a long time on its still-unfinished journey to becoming an Act. I am not sure that this is a satisfactory situation. So often we are told that an amendment is unacceptable because there is a review, pilot scheme or mapping exercise outstanding.
My name is attached to Amendment 149 which, as expected, was moved so comprehensively and persuasively by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett. It adds a new clause, which would ensure that those who were previously personally connected are protected from any coercive and controlling behaviour, including economic abuse, that occurs post separation. As we have heard, economic abuse makes the victim dependent on the perpetrator and limits their choices and ability to move. One in five women in the UK reports having experienced economic abuse from a current or former intimate partner, and 95% of domestic abuse victims report that they have suffered economic abuse. It is widespread.
Through economic exploitation, the perpetrator looks to benefit from the victim’s economic resources and, in so doing, sabotage their economic independence. The perpetrator may also build up debt in the victim’s name through coercion or fraud, or even steal or damage the victim’s property, which then has to be replaced. Building up debt in the victim’s name is common and leaves the victim struggling to live with it thereafter. When this happens, the impact on the victim’s economic well-being is hugely destabilising and limits their choices post separation. Economic safety underpins physical safety, and building an independent life can, for many victims of economic abuse, feel impossible. I will not continue further. I had some more points to make, but I know that time is pressing and I am sure that they have already been made.
I conclude by saying that we support Amendment 149, which addresses the deficiency that I referred to earlier: that the post-separation situation is not covered and that currently, victims of economic abuse post-separation are unable to seek justice. We also support the objectives of Amendment 157, which was introduced by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for setting out the case for their amendments, which seek to extend the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for tabling his amendment, which seeks to repeal the so-called carer’s defence. I join others in paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and all the work that she has done in this area. I am grateful, too, to my noble friend Lady Verma, for pointing out the very particular problems faced by some BAME ladies. My noble friend Lady Sanderson illustrated so well how society, including notable broadcasters, has, over time, got to grips with an understanding of coercive control and the terrible harm it causes.
I will address Amendments 149 and 157 before turning to Amendment 171. Amendment 149 seeks to remove the current requirement in the offence of living together in the case of former partners as well as family members. Amendment 157 seeks to remove the current requirement in the offence of living together in the case of relatives who are perpetrating abuse but who do not live with their victim.
Controlling or coercive behaviours are an insidious form of domestic abuse that have long-term debilitating effects on victims and survivors. Such behaviours, intended to harm, punish and frighten, can be perpetrated within intimate and family abusive relationships. The offence of controlling or coercive behaviour applies, as it stands, to those who are personally connected. That means that it applies to intimate partners regardless of whether they live together, ex-partners who live together, or family members who live together. The offence does not currently apply to ex-partners or family members who do not live together. The rationale behind this is that there are other criminal offences—stalking and harassment—that may be used to prosecute controlling or coercive behaviours post separation, or in cases where family members do not live together. Indeed, the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour was specifically introduced to close a gap in the law with regard to abuse by intimate partners or family members in the same household.
Turning to surviving economic abuse, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, along with other noble Lords and domestic abuse organisations, rightly highlight that controlling or coercive behaviour often begins, continues or intensifies when the victim and perpetrator no longer live together. They further argue that the stalking and harassment offences are not specifically designed to prosecute this sort of behaviour. Supporters of this amendment also make the point that controlling or coercive behaviour occurs between family members who do not live together, an example being adult children who inflict economic abuse on their elderly parents. Furthermore, as my noble friend Lord Goschen pointed out, the new statutory definition of domestic abuse includes ex-partners among those defined as personally connected and does not have a “living together” requirement. Therefore, an amendment to the controlling or coercive behaviour offence could be seen as conforming to the definition in Part 1 of the Bill.
There are convincing arguments on either side of this debate, and the case for change is not clear-cut. The offence of controlling or coercive behaviour has been in force for just over five years. Consequently, there is only limited evidence on which to build a case for amending the legislation. Given its relative newness, there is also work to be done to further embed the offence throughout the criminal justice system.
Additionally, though not specifically designed to cover controlling or coercive behaviours, the stalking and harassment offence is broad enough that it may apply to post-separation abuse. This includes forms of economic abuse so rightly highlighted by Surviving Economic Abuse. It is also worth noting that the stalking and harassment offence has a maximum sentence of 10 years, whereas for controlling or coercive behaviour it is five years.
The Government are committed to ensuring that any changes to legislation are made on a sound evidential basis. To support this, in 2018 we committed to conducting a review into the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. Though the Home Office has made good progress with the review, it has been unavoidably delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has necessitated refocusing our efforts to support victims throughout this difficult time. We will be publishing the review findings ahead of Report. As the case for change here is not clear-cut, we will continue to consider the evidence for and against change, including the review into the offence, ahead of Report. In coming to a final view, we will reflect very carefully on this debate.
Amendment 171 seeks to repeal what has been labelled by some as the “carer’s defence”, under Section 76(8) to 76(10) of the 2015 Act. This allows for a limited defence where the accused believes that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. The defence is limited as it is not available in cases where the victim fears that violence will be used against them. In addition to believing that he or she was acting in the best interests of the victim, the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that while their behaviour might have appeared controlling, it was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. The defence is intended to cover cases where the accused is genuinely acting in the best interests of the victim: for example, if the accused has a caring responsibility for a disabled partner and for medical reasons must compel their partner to take medication or stay at home against their will, for their own protection or well-being. Again, it is important to note that this defence is not available in cases where the victim feared that violence would be used against them.
Supporters of this amendment have put forward three main arguments: first, that it is necessary to protect vulnerable victims who have disabilities or mental health issues from coercion or control; secondly, that the defence has the potential to prolong the abuse of disabled victims and prevent them from accessing equal justice; and, thirdly, that alternative legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act, may be used by the accused to argue that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. This would render the defence unnecessary. However, the Government consider this defence entirely necessary. There will be specific circumstances in which it is possible that the accused’s behaviour, while it might be considered controlling in a different context, is justified and reasonable given the nature of their caring responsibilities. There is a real risk that, without such a defence, a person may be wrongfully convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour when in fact they were indeed acting in a person’s best interests.
As is the case with all legal defences, it is for the courts and juries to decide merit on a case by case basis, and whether the threshold for the defence has been met or not. There are similar or equivalent defences in Scotland, in Section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, and in the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, in Clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, which has recently completed its passage through the Northern Ireland Assembly.
In conclusion, while I cannot support Amendment 171, I undertake to consider further Amendments 149 and 157. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
This amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would add a new clause to the Bill to provide lifetime press anonymity for survivors of domestic abuse. It reflects similar protections for survivors of sexual assault enshrined in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. It prevents identifiable details being published online or in print and creates a new offence for breaching this anonymity.
This issue has risen up the agenda because stories are published in which victims and survivors of domestic abuse, as well as family members and children, are named. When these stories then make their way on to websites, victims have no anonymity but the people who choose to make comments do have anonymity.
Apart from the protection for survivors of sexual assault enshrined in the 1992 Act, I believe the Serious Crime Act 2015 grants anonymity to and protection for victims of female genital mutilation, and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 grants anonymity to victims of any human trafficking offence. If I am right, that is three examples of anonymity given to three categories of victims. If the Government are not enthusiastic about this amendment—which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said is a probing amendment—no doubt they will explain in their reply why they consider that survivors of domestic abuse do not require the same protection as survivors of sexual assault, victims of female genital mutilation and victims of any human trafficking offence.
My Lords, I hope I can be relatively brief in my reply—not because the point is not important, nor indeed out of a lack of respect for any of the contributions we have just heard, but because there is a single and critical point, fundamental to the administration of justice, which lies at the heart of this debate.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, explained, this probing amendment is designed to protect the identity of complainants in domestic abuse cases by the automatic application of reporting restrictions from the point when the allegation is made. Although the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred us to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, I dare say that the principle of open justice goes back much further than that. We are all familiar with the adage that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. That statement, with which we are all familiar, I am sure, recognises that automatic reporting restrictions of this kind are an exceptional interference with open justice. Therefore, we make those reporting restrictions available only when there is a real need to do so.
The most familiar precedent is in relation to complainants who allege that a sexual offence has been committed against them. In those circumstances, there is a clear justification for preventing the reporting of the complainant’s identity, because there is an overriding need for anonymity to be guaranteed from the outset so that victims of a type of offence that still carries considerable stigma are emboldened to come forward and tell the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, there are a couple of other such other examples in the law, but each of those is an exception to the general rule. We must be very careful, I would suggest, to limit those exceptions to cases where it is demonstrably required. Therefore, while I listened with care to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his personal and, if I may say, moving testimony, we do not consider that, as a matter of generality, domestic abuse cases in which no sexual offence has been committed fall into the same category such that they require automatic protection in the same way.
However, as a number of noble Lords identified, that does not mean that victims of domestic abuse should be denied anonymity where they both request and need it. The courts have discretionary powers to impose, on application, reporting restrictions prohibiting the naming of a witness, where the court is satisfied that being identified would diminish the quality of that witness’s evidence. I suggest that there is sufficient discretion before the courts to meet cases where reporting restrictions are required. To go further would be an unjustifiable interference with the extremely important principle of open justice.
I hope, therefore, given that this is a probing amendment —and while of course I am always willing to discuss anything with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment at this stage.
My Lords, I realise this is a tricky subject to legislate on, but I think there is a problem and we need to fix it in some way. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, for their largely sympathetic comments. I heard the Minister say that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In that case, I would like him to go, perhaps, one of these days, to the High Court and see what is happening in the spy cops inquiry, where Judge Mitting—or rather the Met—is giving anonymity to many police officers who have committed crimes. Therefore, it does seem to me that somehow there is justice for some and not for others. I will, of course, withdraw the amendment now, but I still think this is a problem and that there has to be some way of sorting it out.
My Lords, I support Amendment 161 and thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for tabling it and for being so tenacious. It is an honour to speak after the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. We cannot on the one hand spend years putting together a great Bill like this that says to victims, “We hear you; we are there for you; we want to help you escape”, and on the other hand stand by and allow those same victims to be potentially charged £150—an extortionate amount for many people—for proof of that abuse.
Domestic abuse does not discriminate. You can be a victim of abuse whether you are rich or poor. Unfortunately, while this fee remains, it does and will discriminate against poorer victims. Many of them will go without legal representation, many will return to an abuser and many will be seriously injured or worse as a result of being unable to access the legal remedies that are supposed to keep them safe. I know that the Department of Health has a fair amount on its plate right now, but it should endorse this small change to the Bill. It could have an immeasurable impact on people’s lives when they are at their most vulnerable.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for raising this matter—I am tempted to say “again”, but of course I should really say “again and again”. The list of engagements which he set out was impressive, and I fear I may not be able to provide satisfaction to the noble Lord where so many of my illustrious forebears have already failed. If I can put it this way: what he has said this evening has only increased my resolve to try to sort out this issue, not only because it is plainly an important matter to be addressed, as so many have said, but because it means that I will escape the horrid fate of being added to the noble Lord’s list.
The Government, as will be clear from what has been said by my forebears and what I have just said, wholeheartedly agree that vulnerable patients should not be charged by doctors for evidence to support them in accessing legal aid. That being the case, we are sympathetic to the spirit of this amendment. The issue requires further consideration ahead of Report for the reasons I will briefly set out. While I cannot commend this amendment to the Committee today, I will be looking at it in detail between now and Report. I should also take the opportunity to point out a couple of technical issues with the amendment, which I hope will also be helpful.
I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, was able to meet with the Minister for Prevention, Public Health and Primary Care and representatives from the British Medical Association ahead of today’s debate to discuss the issue. I think it fair to say that everyone who attended this meeting was seized fully both of the issue and of its importance. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said, we do not want to do anything to prevent or discourage victims of domestic abuse coming forward, and that includes questions of cost. That said, it is fair to say that there was some anecdotal evidence at the meeting which pointed to this perhaps being a diminishing problem, particularly since, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London reminded us, the BMA issued advice to its members last year that they should not charge for this service, advice which they recently reinforced.
Following that meeting, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, graciously undertook to provide what evidence he had of this being a continuing issue so that we could consider the matter further. We look forward to receiving that evidence and continuing our discussions. However, as matters stand this evening, we remain to be persuaded that this issue needs to be resolved through primary legislation.
The position is that GPs can provide services in addition to NHS contracted services. They are classified as private services, for which they have the discretion to charge the patient. Letters of evidence to access legal aid is one such private service. It is therefore up to an individual GP practice to decide whether a charge should be levied and, if so, what it should be. However, as I indicated, as part of the 2020-21 contract agreement, the BMA recommended to all GPs that a charge should not be levied for letters of this kind. That is a welcome recognition by the BMA that, as was said, vulnerable patients with limited means should not be expected to pay for such letters. We recognise and commend the vast majority of GPs who are following that guidance, but it is a non-binding recommendation. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, we are informed of anecdotal examples where patients can be charged up to as much as £150 for that evidence.
As I said, I should make a couple of observations about the drafting of the amendment, although I recognise that these can be readily addressed in a further iteration of it. First, as currently drafted, the amendment refers to
“providing a letter … for the purposes of regulation 33(2)(h) of the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations.”
That regulation was amended by later civil legal aid procedure regulations in 2017, so there is now no such regulation as presently referred to in the amendment. That is something that could be addressed in further drafting, and I respectfully suggest that it is.
Secondly, the amendment relies on the definition of a “general medical services contract” in Section 84 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which applies to England only. I assume that that is the case because, as the noble Lord is aware, the health service is a devolved matter in Wales and therefore this issue is a matter for the Welsh Government. I thought that it was worth making that point clear as well.
I return to the main point, on which, if I may respectfully say so, we have heard a number of very cogent speeches. I have not yet mentioned the contribution of my noble friend Lady Bertin, which was equally forceful. The Government remain committed to exploring options around this issue with the medical profession to ensure that vulnerable patients are not charged, and I would welcome the noble Lord’s continued help in this regard. In particular, once he has been able to provide what evidence he has of GPs continuing to charge victims of domestic abuse for these letters, we will be happy to have further meetings with him ahead of Report.
I hope that in the meantime he will feel able to withdraw his amendment, but he can rest assured that I have it ringing in my ears that I will face a similar amendment on Report if we cannot satisfactorily resolve the matter before that stage. I commit to working with him and to doing all I can to reach that satisfactory conclusion.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken—the noble Baronesses, Lady Bull and Lady Bertin, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London—for their support. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for his very careful and considered response. It was very welcome.
The noble Lord made reference to the meeting. It was a very good meeting. We actually had four Ministers from three departments on Zoom—I have never had that before—so in that sense I was very pleased. Clearly, Ministers are taking this seriously, and I appreciate that very much.
Obviously, the technical issues can be ironed out. I am not a draftsman, but I am sure that we can get that sorted out. We have been raising this issue since 2016. The negotiations have been going on for a very long time, but we do not seem to have gone beyond the fact that everybody is against it, no one wants to do it, but no one wants to do anything about it. We have not moved on much from that position today.
As I said, I hope that I will not have to push the amendment to a vote at a later stage. I hope that I can work with the noble Lord to resolve this issue but, if that does not happen, we will divide the House. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for bringing this much-needed amendment to the House and recognising that the changes that have occurred in the past few decades, since the widespread introduction of mobile phone technologies and social media coverage, have irreversibly changed the way in which we communicate. The inherent dangers of the misuse of that communication have become increasingly prevalent. As the noble Baroness said, we are living our lives online, and today’s debate is into its ninth hour.
As a former teacher of media studies, I taught my students that the medium is the message—but, like many of my colleagues, I had no idea at that time how exploitative the medium would become. The key element to this amendment is that the Bill as it stands does not do enough to ensure that survivors of technology-facilitated abuse have sufficient protection in the criminal law. Threats to share intimate or sexual images and films are an increasingly common tool of coercive control that can have enormous negative impacts on survivors of abuse. While the sharing of intimate and sexual images without consent is a crime, threatening to share is not, leaving survivors of this form of abuse without the protection of the criminal law.
During my reading for this topic, I was powerfully moved by a key report, Shattering Lives and Myths, by Professor Clare McGlynn and others at Durham Law School. This was launched at the Supreme Court last year, and it sets out the appalling consequences to victims of intimate images being posted without consent on the internet. Nearly half of the victim-survivors the researchers spoke to had experienced threats to share nude or sexual images and videos without consent. While many of these threats were followed by non-consensual sharing, there must be a recognition that threats to share such images can in and of themselves have significant life-threatening impacts.
The domestic abuse commissioner designate has also supported this addition to the law, saying:
“The threat to share an intimate image … is an insidious and powerful way that perpetrators of domestic abuse seek to control their victims, and yet the law does not provide the protection that is needed. Threats to share these images play on fear and shame, and can be particularly dangerous where there might be multiple perpetrators or so-called ‘honour-based’ abuse is a factor. What’s more, the advent of new technologies enables perpetrators to make these threats even where such images do not exist, but there is no clear criminal sanction for this behaviour.”
Lack of support leaves victim-survivors isolated, often attempting to navigate alone an unfamiliar, complex and shifting terrain of legal provisions and online regulation. There needs to be a recognition in the Bill that image-based sexual abuse is a sexual offence, and an adoption of a comprehensive criminal law to cover all forms of image-based sexual abuse, including threats.
The Domestic Abuse Bill is the most appropriate vehicle to make this change: victims and survivors would benefit almost immediately, and it would help them in preventing further abuse and getting away from their perpetrator. This amendment can close that gap in the law, and I urge its support in this Committee.
My Lords, I will start with the point made by my noble friend Lady Bertin. It is of course late; I am conscious of that. But I have to say that it is worth staying up late to hear the debate we have just had, with the quality of the contributions to which we have all just listened. Therefore, I will take a little time—I hope not too long—to respond to the debate, because this is obviously a very important issue.
I listened with great care to the way in which the amendment was presented and explained by the four noble Baronesses who proposed it. My noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes explained in detail how the threat to disclose such images can lead women to give way on matters that are of the utmost importance, whether that be contact with children or telling the perpetrator where they are now living. The story of Natasha that she shared was powerful and was added to by the stories of Rachel and Alison, which we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley. It is right to say, as my noble friend Lady Morgan put it, that this is an issue essentially of timing and not necessarily of principle. I will come back to that point a little later.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
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My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that this has been a very good debate. I join noble Lords in commending the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, who has done a huge amount of work in this area and with whom I have worked over several years now. I think she would join me in paying tribute to John Clough—his daughter met her death at the hands of a serial stalker—and his family. I also pay tribute to Cheryl Hooper; I had not heard that story until my noble friend Lady Newlove talked about it today.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, that it is a classless crime. When I visited my noble friend Lady Barran’s charity, SafeLives, way back when and heard the various testimonies, it really underlined the fact that it does not matter who you are or where you are from: this can affect you. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also gave a very moving testimony. I also echo my noble friend Lord Farmer’s point about the cycle of abuse. I join him in paying tribute to the troubled families programme which, as its name suggests, takes a whole-family approach to the issue of domestic abuse.
I will deal first with Amendment 164 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. This seeks to amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 so that individuals convicted of more than one domestic abuse or stalking offence should automatically be subject to management under Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements. Management under MAPPA may result in these individuals being recorded on ViSOR, the dangerous persons database.
The amendment also seeks to place a duty on the Government to issue a report six months after Royal Assent to review these changes to the Criminal Justice Act. This review would include details of consideration given to assessing and managing the risks of domestic abuse or stalking posed by perpetrators convicted of offences other than those outlined in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for stalking or an offence for behaviour that amounts to domestic abuse within the meaning of Clause 1 of the Bill.
I agree with the intentions behind this amendment. We want to make sure that we have the right systems in place to allow the police and partner agencies to identify the risks posed by high-harm, repeat and serial perpetrators and to act accordingly to protect victims. However, the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 already provide for these offenders to be managed under MAPPA arrangements.
Individuals who are convicted of offences listed in Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act and sentenced to 12 months or more are automatically eligible for management under MAPPA category 2 when on licence. These offences include domestic abuse-related offences such as threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, and attempted strangulation, as well as harassment and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress within the Protection from Harassment Act. There is also discretion for people who have been convicted of other domestic abuse or stalking offences and who have been assessed as posing a risk of serious harm to be managed under MAPPA category 3.
Guidance makes it clear that MAPPA should be actively considered in every case of domestic abuse. The guidance specifies that offenders should be considered for category 3 where they demonstrate a pattern of offending behaviour indicating serious harm, such as domestic abuse, that was not reflected in the charge on which the offender was actually convicted, are convicted of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, or are serial domestic abuse perpetrators. My instinct is that instead of amending the current legislation, there is probably more value in making better use of the existing MAPPA framework and related police systems and we recognise the need to strengthen the use of these. Listening to noble Lords, I do not think that they would inherently disagree with that point. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, pointed out what she saw as some of the deficiencies undermining it.
It is also true that not all victims of domestic abuse call the police and not all victims wish to pursue a criminal justice outcome against their abuser. There are many other statutory agencies involved in families’ lives, not just the police, which is why effective multi-agency working is so vital to ensuring that the risks faced by victims of domestic abuse and their children are properly identified and assessed. I do not think noble Lords would disagree with that either. That is why the package of non-legislative action that underpins the Bill covers the full range of front-line professionals with a role to play in protecting and supporting victims of domestic abuse, including schools, children’s social care, job centres, the NHS and local authorities.
My noble friend Lady Newlove and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned Clare’s law, otherwise known as the domestic violence disclosure scheme. It already provides a system for the police to inform partners and ex-partners of a person convicted of domestic abuse-related offences about that person’s offending history. Importantly, that is from both a right-to-know and a right-to-ask point of view. Clause 70 places the guidance for the police on the DVDS on a statutory footing. This will help to improve awareness and consistent operation of the scheme across police forces.
Work has already begun on improving existing police information systems. I am pleased to say that we have already completed the first phase of work, looking into the current functionality of ViSOR. The College of Policing has issued a set of principles for police forces on the identification, assessment and management of serial or potentially dangerous domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators. More generally, as part of the £10 million funding announced by the Chancellor in last year’s spring Budget, we have now allocated £7.2 million—the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, referred to it—in 28 funding awards to police and crime commissioners for the introduction of perpetrator programmes for domestic abuse, including stalking, such as the Drive Project that noble Lords have been referring to so positively.
There are also existing provisions in the Bill that will help to improve the management of the risk posed by domestic abuse perpetrators. The new domestic abuse protection orders—DAPOs—will provide an additional tool for managing the risk posed by perpetrators by enabling courts to impose a range of conditions, including electronic monitoring, or tagging, and positive requirements. DAPOs will also require perpetrators subject to an order to notify the police of their name and address and any change in this information, and that will help the police to monitor perpetrators’ whereabouts and the risk that they pose to victims.
Regarding stalking specifically, in January of last year we introduced new civil stalking protection orders, which can also impose positive requirement conditions on perpetrators. These orders, which were welcomed by most stalking charities, enable early police intervention pre conviction to address stalking behaviours before they become deep-rooted or escalate. Therefore, while we agree with the spirit of the noble Baroness’s amendments, we do not feel that it is necessary to accept them at this stage.
I am similarly supportive of the intention behind Amendments 167 and 177B, which call on the Government to prepare a domestic abuse perpetrator strategy. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has been more generous in his time than my noble friend Lady Bertin, and that has been spotted and pointed out already, but the substance of the two amendments is the same. The Government are clear that we must hold perpetrators to account for their actions, and we are ambitious in our aim to prevent these destructive crimes happening in the first place. My noble friends Lord Polak and Lord Farmer spoke very eloquently about that.
I am also sympathetic to the aims outlined in the calls to action for a perpetrator strategy, which are reflected in the amendments. We recognise that more work is needed to improve the response to perpetrators, and in particular to increase the provision of effective perpetrator interventions. I assure the Committee that we already have a programme of work under way to address the issues raised by the amendments and by the calls to action.
What we are not persuaded of is the need for an inflexible legislative requirement for a perpetrator strategy, but the Government of course endorse the need for such a strategy. Indeed, I can inform the Committee that, later this year, the Government will bring forward a new, ambitious strategy to tackle the abhorrent crime of domestic abuse. This strategy will be holistic in its approach to tackling domestic abuse and will outline our ambitions not only to prevent offending but to protect victims and ensure that they have the support they need. It is right that we have a strategy that takes a holistic approach to tackling domestic abuse.
In the meantime, we are building our evidence base to inform this work. As part of his spring Budget last year, the Chancellor allocated £10 million to fund innovative approaches to tackling perpetrators and preventing domestic abuse. As I have said, more than £7 million of this has been allocated in 28 funding awards to PCCs from all areas of England and Wales to support the adoption of a range of domestic abuse perpetrator-focused programmes in their area. To strengthen the evidence base of what works in preventing reoffending, as part of this funding, PCCs will be required to conduct an evaluation of their project to measure outcomes for perpetrators, victims and survivors of domestic abuse.
We value the importance of research in helping to improve our understanding of perpetrators of domestic abuse. That is why we will also be funding a range of research projects that focus on topics including drivers and aggravating factors, and what works in preventing offending, identifying perpetrators and improving understanding of underrepresented groups to further aid our understanding of perpetrators of domestic abuse. I will provide the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, with more details on this, but I know that the contracts have gone out today. I think she will agree that the findings from this research will play a key role in helping to shape the domestic abuse strategy.
In addition, the designate domestic abuse commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, has already begun mapping the range of interventions currently available for non-convicted perpetrators who are showing signs of abusive behaviour, which will allow us to better assess where there is unmet need for this cohort.
My Lords, acknowledging that rehabilitation programmes are an essential part of tackling these abhorrent abusive attitudes and actions, can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House who will take the lead in any co-ordinated approach, bringing together such a multiagency strategy so we can ensure that any programme will not be cosmetic but meaningful and productive?
Clearly, the Home Office will take the lead, but I acknowledge the challenges in trying to work across government to try to bring it all together. Of course, the Department for Education will take the lead for schools.
I may have misheard the Minister, but did not she say that one of her reasons for not accepting any of the amendments was that it would be restrictive to place these things in the Bill? You can perhaps argue that Amendment 164 is a bit more prescriptive, but the other two amendments, other than setting a time limit for a report, set no restrictions at all. They would just steer the Government to get on with the matter in good time. Beyond that, I do not see that they are restrictive at all.
The point I was trying to make—and I hope the noble Lord will accept it—is that we do not need to put it in the Bill, because you are always restricted by primary legislation. But I voiced my intention that the Government want to do this.
I call the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, to speak on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall.
Amendment 165, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, would require that where a local authority employee
“suspects in the course of carrying out a financial assessment for adult social care that a person is the victim of domestic abuse, the employee reports the suspected abuse to a relevant social worker or the police.”
Amendment 166 would allow “A magistrates court” to
“make an order permitting a registered social worker to enter premises specified … by force for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims of domestic abuse”.
I will be interested to hear the government response on the specifics of these amendments. We definitely support the general aim of making sure that older victims are focused on and protected and, like so many noble Lords, we recognise the truly immense contribution that the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, has made in drawing attention to and highlighting older victims of abuse. After all, the Bill will achieve its aim only if it works for all victims. Older victims are too often invisible—metaphorically speaking—can suffer different forms of abuse, and are at increased risk of adult family abuse. Amendment 165 raises the importance of staff being taught to recognise the signs of abuse and who to raise their concerns with when they see it. The amendment refers to an employee possibly reporting suspected domestic abuse direct to the police, an issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I am not sure whether that would be only with the victim’s consent. The amendment also raises the importance of joined-up working so that, where abuse is suspected, it gets acted on and victims are offered support.
The Local Government Association has raised the need for clarity on information sharing between agencies. In its consultation response on the Bill, it said:
“There is still not a clear and consistent understanding about what information professionals can share within agencies and across agencies … Given the changes introduced through the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), the LGA thinks it is crucial for the Government to issue guidance on how”
those changes affect
“safeguarding and information sharing arrangements, particularly the impact on domestic abuse victims.”
Like other noble Lords, I await with interest the Minister’s response to both amendments on behalf of the Government.
My Lords, I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, will not get a big head when I again pay tribute to her for highlighting the plight of elderly victims of domestic abuse. She has such experience in this area. These very well-intentioned amendments seek to tackle the scourge of elder abuse. My noble friend Lady Hodgson of Abinger said that the way we treat our elderly reflects us as a society; I agree.
Local authorities are well equipped to identify, investigate and address suspicions or cases of domestic abuse where the individual has existing care and support needs or is known through other means. There are mechanisms and clear professional responsibilities in place to ensure the safety of suspected or known victims. I am not convinced that these amendments will add value to existing rules and processes or improve outcomes for elderly people experiencing domestic abuse, and I will explain why.
On Amendment 165, local authority employees are expected to undertake safeguarding training to ensure that they are able to identify and act on any concerns about exploitation or abuse in any circumstances, including when carrying out financial assessments for adult social care. Existing mechanisms will be in place to ensure that training is effective and that employees are able to escalate any issues. Escalation may include making a report to the police or making a referral under Section 42 of the Care Act 2014, which places a duty on local authorities to make inquiries, or to ask others to make inquiries, where they reasonably suspect that an adult in their area is at risk of neglect or abuse, including financial abuse.
Turning to Amendment 166, the police have existing powers of entry which ensure the protection of victims of domestic abuse and other instances of exploitation and harm where appropriate. We do not think that social workers require powers of entry separate from those of the police, who already effectively carry out this function. It is appropriate for the police to lead on any steps which may require gaining entry to a home where there is a serious threat from a perpetrator of domestic abuse. Extending this power to social workers risks placing them in dangerous situations which they are not equipped to deal with.
In addition, introducing a power of entry applicable to instances of domestic abuse risks creating a hierarchy of the different categories of exploitation, harm and abuse that are set out in the Care Act 2014. To take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the police, and health and social care professionals, will have local arrangements in place to enable joint working with one another and other partners to investigate all instances where an adult or child must be safeguarded, including instances which may require police to enter a home. It also plays to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made about data protection when information sharing. I think that joint working, certainly in the case of the troubled families programme, gets round those data protection issues.
Where there are concerns that an individual with a mental disorder is being ill-treated or neglected, including through domestic abuse, approved mental health professionals have special powers of entry set out in Section 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983. This allows for the approved mental health professional to present evidence at a magistrates’ court to obtain a warrant authorising the police, an approved mental health professional and a registered medical practitioner to gain entry to the premises, for an assessment to take place there and then or for the person to be removed to a place of safety.
Local authorities have the power to investigate under Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 if they have cause to suspect that a child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm. These inquiries will determine whether they should take action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. Furthermore, social workers may make an application under Section 44 of the Children Act 1989 for an emergency protection order. Where an emergency protection order is in place, the court can authorise a police officer to accompany the social worker if they are refused entry to the premises. Where the police have cause to believe that a child is likely to suffer significant harm, under Section 46 of the Children Act the child can be removed to suitable accommodation.
I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness that there are practices and procedures in place to identify and tackle domestic abuse where financial assessments are being undertaken for the purposes of adult social care, and that there are existing powers of entry, exercisable by the police and others, that can be used where necessary. Having initiated this important debate, I hope that the noble Baroness is happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, whom I now call.
My Lords, I declare my interest, as set out in the register, as chair of the National Commission on Forced Marriage. I ask the Minister that any guidance on training that is given to local authorities has added to it that some women may be victims of forced marriage and may therefore need some specialist support.
I can certainly look into that for the noble and learned Baroness and ask that it be included.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I am most grateful. The understanding and special knowledge that many of them shared was very helpful and gave me a lot of hope for the future. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, because, as I have known for many years, he is aware of all the problems involved, physical, financial, et cetera.
The noble Lord, Lord Randall, pointed out that there is less impetus in reporting these issues than those of younger people, and we must ask why. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, identified the complexity of these issues and how existing relationships sometimes determine what is happening and what is reported. I was aware of her reluctance to involve the police, but my experience with the Met in London is that it is often the police who uncover aspects of bad care, no care or, worse, abuse that other people do not know about, so we disagree on that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had some reservations relating to a lack of awareness about these issues. I agree with her. As she pointed out, cultural change is needed. The noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, emphasised how training is essential because many older people unfortunately face issues, as we have heard about in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, highlighted that the family is not always as loving and supportive as in the ideal situation that we are talking about and would like to see, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, emphasised how professional input is needed, whoever reports these issues. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, pointed out that we need to give attention to this problem, which we must tackle. It has been tackled better in Scotland and in Wales, which is quite unacceptable. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said that we must not leave older people out, which I am afraid has happened so often until now. I am not sure that without some measures we will do enough to protect the people to whom these two amendments apply.
The Minister emphasised how local authorities are well equipped and should deal with this problem, and how the police have the right of entry when necessary. But I have to say to her that, in spite of the fact that they have the right of entry and that local authorities are well equipped, there are problems, and I hope that I have highlighted them in a way that means that your Lordships will understand that they need highlighting.
As many people have said, I have worked on these issues for many years, and I feel that what we have in place is just not sufficient to make the system work well and ensure that older people have the rights to the protection of society and to the bringing to justice of perpetrators of abuse that they should have. Whatever our age, we are adults and are part of this country’s population, and we must not leave this huge number of people with fewer rights to help and care than other, younger people have. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but hope that this matter will be taken further.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for raising this. Amendment 171 seeks to repeal the so-called carers’ defence in coercive and controlling relationships. I am grateful to Stay Safe East for its excellent briefing. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, highlighted the frequency of disabled people being abused compared to non-disabled. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, was shocked by these figures and so was I.
As we have heard, the so-called carers’ defence clause reposes in the 2015 Serious Crime Act. This defence can be employed by the carer if she can prove that she believed that she was acting in the victim’s “best interests” and that
“the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable”.
Stay Safe East maintains that this Act discriminates both directly and indirectly against disabled victims. It says:
“The purpose of legislation on domestic abuse is to protect survivors, rather than to defend the rights of abusers or alleged abusers.”
It is already hard enough to get a case involving a disabled victim to court, as so many difficulties and barriers stand in the way. To abuse a disabled person in the cause of their own “interests” surely must be one of the most patronising and demeaning excuses for perpetrating coercive control of the victim. It piles insult on injury, can prolong the abuse and ultimately denies justice to the victim. I do not need to add to the cogent and clear description, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, of what this form of coercive control looks like and how it makes the disabled victim feel. Let us shut that loophole and give disabled victims justice and their dignity back.
A carer can already claim the “best interests” defence without our having to enshrine it in law. I listened carefully to the remarks of the Minister on Monday and she seems to have prejudged the amendment without listening to the arguments, which is most unusual for her. In response, I say that the arguments that she uses can be used in favour of the amendment. She said:
“As is the case with all legal defences, it is for the courts and juries to decide merit on a case by case basis”.—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 123.]
Why not take this patronising defence out of English law and let the courts decide, as she suggests?
My Lords, I start by commending the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, because she spotted something that nobody else noticed on Monday evening, which is that I spoke in response to this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, had not moved it at all. That might be why I sounded as if I had prejudged a bit. I will reiterate some points on this occasion, but I apologise for being a bit previous with my comments.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, Amendment 171 addresses the so-called carers’ defence within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. Subsections (8) to (10) of Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 allow for this limited “best interests” defence, where the accused can demonstrate that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. The defence is not available in situations where the victim fears that violence will be used against them. I must be clear on that. For this defence to apply, the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that their behaviour was reasonable in all the circumstances.
The defence was designed to cover cases where the accused is genuinely acting in the best interests of the victim. The first example that comes to my mind is a situation where the accused is looking after an elderly partner or parent with Alzheimer’s disease and must ensure that that person does not leave the house for their own safety. In these circumstances, it is entirely possible that the accused’s behaviour, while it might be considered controlling in a different context, is reasonable given the nature of their caring responsibilities.
As we have heard today, proponents of this amendment fear that it may enable the abuse of disabled people. However, there is a real risk that, without such a defence—and bearing in mind the example that I have just given—a person may be wrongfully prosecuted for and convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour, when in fact they were acting in a person’s best interests.
Ultimately—and I am repeating my words from the other night—it is for courts and juries to decide merit on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the threshold for the defence has been met. It should also be noted that similar or equivalent offences in Scotland, such as Section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, and the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, in Clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, which has recently completed its passage through the Northern Ireland Assembly, also contain a similar defence.
I hope that, in the light of my explanation—for the second time—of the necessity of this defence, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, which has been a short but important one.
The central point I took from the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is that the Carers Trust wants better support and wants the support of carers to be a more suitable focus rather than this potential loophole for wrongly accusing carers of some form of abuse.
The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, was much more robust in her language than I have been. She called it a patronising defence and said that the courts should decide. Essentially, that is what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said; the courts can decide because the charges can be brought with other legislation, as she acknowledged in her intervention.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, argued that the neatness and ease of reference may be a deciding factor in keeping this defence in this legislation and that putting it in other Acts would create difficulty for practitioners. That is the point that I think both the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt and Lady Grey-Thompson, would not have agreed with, because this Bill is about domestic abuse; it is not about giving potential defences to abusers that are already covered in other legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, opened her comments by saying that nobody noticed. I am sorry to disappoint her, but we did notice—but there was no easy way of informing the authorities that she had given an answer to these points on Monday evening. Nevertheless, this is a probing amendment and we will consider our position. I think that it shows that people with disabilities want to be fully represented in this landmark legislation. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 173 in the name of my noble friend Lady Gale, who has done so much to support and defend the rights of women during her career in Wales and in the wider United Kingdom. She made many powerful points in her speech, urging an holistic and joined-up approach to this issue, and she remains steadfast in her support for the adoption of the Istanbul convention. I also closely associate myself with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I, too, was a feminist from my early childhood years, having been raised single-handedly by a resourceful and formidable Welsh man.
Wales has already adopted a gender definition in relation to domestic abuse. The Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 includes all forms of violence and abuse against women and girls, including domestic abuse, rape and sexual violence, stalking, forced marriage, so-called honour-based violence, FGM, trafficking and sexual exploitation, including through the sex industry, and sexual harassment in work and public life.
At a global, European and national level, violence against women, including domestic abuse and sexual violence, operates as a means of social control that maintains unequal power relations between women and men, and reinforces women’s subordinate status. It is explicitly linked to systematic discrimination against women and girls. Failing to make the connections between the different violence that women and girls experience and how it is explicitly linked to their unequal position in society can hinder the effectiveness of interventions and prevention work. It is also important to recognise that different groups of women experience multiple inequalities, which lead to further marginalisation.
There are significant differences in the frequency and nature of abuse experienced by men and the abuse experienced by women, notwithstanding the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I take on board many of the points that he raised. However, the gender of both victim and perpetrator influences the behaviour, risk and severity of harm caused. Abuse perpetrated by men against women is a quantitively and qualitatively distinct phenomenon. Women and girls experience violence and abuse in their everyday lives at higher rates.
As we have heard, though it is worth repeating, more than 1.7 million women in the UK have experienced domestic sexual assault and rape. That is more than 12 times the number of men who have experienced this trauma. In 2019, five times more women than men were killed by their partner or ex-partner. Over the past few years, over 96% of women killed in domestic homicides—almost all—were killed by men. Of the men who were killed in domestic homicides, more than half were killed by other men. We know that domestic abuse impacts everyone: men, women and children. But we also know that it is women and girls who suffer the most frequent and severe abuse. It is important to acknowledge that to enable practice and support to be tailored to the specific needs of the person experiencing abuse, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach.
I also speak in support of Amendment 185 in the name of my noble friend Lady Lister, which requires the statutory guidance to take account of the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, alongside the existing requirement that the guidance takes account of the fact that the majority of domestic abuse victims and survivors are female. As she said so expertly and with much learned experience in this field, it is clear that the Government intend their revised VAWG strategy, currently going through consultation, to be separate from their domestic abuse strategy. Many supporters feel that a 10-year cross-party consensus on the need for an integrated approach to tackling domestic abuse and other forms of VAWG is now broken. Amendment 185 would allow that position to be reversed. I urge the Government to listen to my learned noble friend Lady Lister and adopt her amendment, along with the amendment of my noble friend Lady Gale, who has done so much to enshrine the rights of women becoming the law of our lands.
My Lords, I pay tribute to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate because between them they have achieved the impossible of getting the balance right. It is very difficult to recognise that most victims are female while getting the legislation and guidance right.
I mention in particular the words of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who is my friend. As the only man speaking on this group, he recognised that the Bill would not be here if it were not for women. His personal accounts are always really moving and it takes tremendous bravery to recount them. Many people are still too traumatised to even speak about abuse and many accounts will remain unheard. We are very lucky to hear his account.
We know that victims’ needs must be at the centre of our approach to domestic abuse. They are individuals with individual needs. That includes an understanding and appreciation of their gender and, of course, sexuality. The latest Office for National Statistics report showed 4% of men aged 16 to 59 experienced domestic abuse. Of course that figure, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, will be much higher as domestic abuse is so often a hidden harm, and it is too often underreported.
For a multitude of factors, including often misplaced cultural norms of masculinity, and how that is perpetuated, male victims sadly feel they cannot report their experiences, whether to specialist support services or the police. There are also some very specific issues that are unique to the experiences of LGBT victims, which include but of course are not limited to the threat of disclosure of sexual orientation or gender identity to family.
This is one of the reasons we have a gender-neutral definition. This approach is absolutely critical to ensuring that all victims and all types of domestic abuse are sufficiently captured, and that nobody—absolutely nobody—is inadvertently excluded from protection, support or accessing the help that they need. As an aside, the Istanbul convention definition itself is gender neutral. That is why, in the statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73, we detail the unique considerations among other issues, including expanding on the range of abuse and the forms that it can take, and on specific communities and groups, such as male victims and those in same-sex relationships, as well as, of course, minority ethnic and migrant groups.
It might be an opportunity to read out Clause 73, which gives powers to the Secretary of State
“to issue guidance about domestic abuse, etc … The Secretary of State may issue guidance about … the effect of any provision made by or under”
certain sections of the Bill, as well as,
“other matters relating to domestic abuse in England and Wales.”
Clause 73(3) states:
“Any guidance issued under this section must … take account of the fact that the majority of victims … (excluding children treated as victims by virtue of section 3) are female.”
I would like to reassure noble Lords that there has been extensive engagement on the statutory guidance. This is exactly why we published it in draft in July. A series of thematic working groups has been undertaken, where the focus has been on the unique needs of male victims, and separately on LGBT victims. This engagement and consultation on the guidance will continue following Royal Assent. I would like to thank all noble Lords for providing feedback and for their thoughts on the guidance to date. Let me be clear; this approach in ensuring that we are taking into account all victims is one we will consider beyond the Bill in the forthcoming domestic abuse strategy.
Amendment 185, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, seeks to build on the provisions in Clause 73 by seeking to ensure that any guidance issued under this clause takes into consideration any strategy to end violence against women and girls adopted by a Minister of the Crown.
Noble Lords will know that in 2016 the Government published the violence against women and girls strategy, which ran until 2020. The Government intend to publish a new violence against women and girls strategy, followed by a complementary domestic abuse strategy. We launched a call for evidence to inform a new VAWG—as we call it—strategy on 10 December and we very much welcome contributions from noble Lords.
The main argument raised by proponents of the amendment centres around the gendered nature of domestic abuse and the Government’s decision not to produce a single, integrated violence against women and girls strategy to include domestic abuse, in recognition of the gendered nature of domestic abuse. Proponents argue that this approach ignores the reality of women’s experiences and threatens to undermine specialist service provision, which takes an integrated approach to domestic violence and other forms of violence against women and girls. Concerns have also been raised that the domestic abuse definition is not gender specific.
I fully recognise that point. I also recognise that conversion therapy might take place, not just in certain cultures but in this country as well, to try to convert gay men. A lot goes on, including, as the noble and learned Baroness said, families forcing people down a route against their wishes.
I have received another request to speak. I will call the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, first, and then the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
My Lords, I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that he is not alone. I support the powerful speeches made by my noble friends Lady Gale and Lady Wilcox, without detracting in any way from what the noble Lord had to say.
I want to raise with the Minister the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made about the Government’s desire for this to be a gender-neutral Bill. The Minister spoke on this very carefully and said within the forthcoming strategy there would be gender-specific elements. The question I want to put back to her is: if it is okay to have gender-specific elements in a strategy, why on earth can that not be covered in the legislation?
This is prompted by the publication of the Ministerial and other Maternity Allowances Bill that is being debated in the Commons tomorrow. That Bill excludes the words “women” or “mothers”, instead referring to a “person” who is pregnant and a “person” who
“has given birth to a child.”
My question to the Minister is about whether the Government have decided not to use the term “woman” in future legislation. Does she share my concern that there is a risk of delegitimising specific concerns about women, and that women’s hard-won rights over the past six decades are in danger of dissipation as a result?
My Lords, I think what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has just said could be the subject of a Question for Short Debate or even quite a long debate in your Lordships’ House, so complex is what he has just said so simply. By making reference to gender in the guidance but also having a gender-neutral definition, we recognise two things: first, that domestic abuse is mainly perpetrated against women, but taking into account that men, such the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who outlined his story so eloquently, can also be victims of domestic abuse. I said at the beginning of my speech that our aim is to protect and support all victims of domestic abuse, so I hope that what the Government have done, notwithstanding the legislation in the Commons, has struck that balance right.
My Lords, I very much appreciate the Minister’s sensitive response to the amendment, but I asked her two questions and I do not think she really answered them. First, when all the stakeholders—all the people working in this area—think that it is a retrograde step to separate, even if they are complementary, domestic abuse and VAWG strategies, why do the Government think that they are right and everyone else is wrong?
My other question was why the Government think that separate strategies will be more effective than an integrated strategy, which could have separate strands within it? The Minister said that my amendment—or our amendment, because it is supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, to whom I am very grateful—is not necessary, but she has not said anything that convinces me that there is an argument against including it in the draft guidance. It is not about just gender neutrality; it is about integration, coherence and a holistic strategy.
I do not know how much she can say now, but it suggests that we may have to come back with this in order to get a more plausible answer about why this should not go into the guidance alongside what has already been put in it by the Government on gender.
I understand what the noble Baroness says. She made a point about VAWG versus DA. Of course, domestic abuse is a type of violence against women and girls, although violence against women and girls goes far wider than domestic abuse. We are going to be bringing forward a domestic abuse strategy later this year. I can see the noble Baroness shaking her head, and I do not think I am going to convince her at this stage.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I also thank Refuge for their briefings and support. As the Minister said, I think we have got the right balance in our debate today. I totally agree with my noble friend Lady Lister, the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester speaking in support of Amendment 185. They were criticising the Bill for being a non-gendered one, or gender neutral, when most people have spoken in support and said we should recognise that.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, first for being the only male voice—although my noble friend Lord Hunt was able to put his views in, and I thank him for that. I agree with a lot of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. He said that it is not anybody’s intention to say that men do not suffer from domestic abuse and are not victims, because they are, and we know that women can be perpetrators. I do not want to undermine that in any shape or form. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, was raising this issue very strongly and was absolutely right: we should recognise all victims of domestic abuse.
The purpose of the amendments today was to illustrate that it is a gendered crime. Women are the majority of victims and men are the perpetrators, but that does not exclude recognising that there are male victims and female perpetrators. We have had a very good debate today. I am pleased with everyone who has taken part and put their views forward. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, explained, Amendment 177A requires the Government to undertake an investigation into
“the impact of access to online pornography by children on domestic abuse”
and to review the commencement of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017, which all noble Lords spoke about.
We share the concerns raised in both Houses by parents and those advocating on behalf of children’s safety online that a large amount of pornography is available on the internet, often for free, with little or no protection to ensure that those accessing it are old enough to do so. In turn, this is changing the way that young people understand healthy relationships, sex and consent.
In October 2019, the Government announced that they will not commence Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017. We propose to repeal those provisions and instead deliver more comprehensive protections for children through our proposals for a wider online harms regulatory framework. Protecting children is at the heart of our plans to transform the online experience for people in the UK, and the strongest protections in our forthcoming online harms framework will be for children.
The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Home Office have now published the full government response to the online harms White Paper consultation, which sets out the new expectations on companies to keep users safe online. These new laws will mean that companies must tackle illegal content on their platforms and protect children from harmful content and activity online. Major platforms will need to be clear about what content is acceptable on their services and enforce the rules consistently.
I am pleased that Britain is setting the global standards for safety online, with the most comprehensive approach yet to online regulation. Ofcom will be named in legislation as the regulator, with the power to fine companies failing in their duty of care up to £18 million or 10% of annual global turnover. It will also have the power to block non-compliant services from being accessed in the UK.
The noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, asked whether the provisions in the online harms framework will be as robust as those in the Digital Economy Act. Through the online harms framework, we will be able to go further than the Digital Economy Act’s focus on online pornography on commercial adult sites. We will be able to protect children from a broader range of harmful content and activity across a wider range of services. The online safety duty of care will not just be for sites with user-generated content; it will also be for sites that facilitate online user interaction, including video and image sharing, commenting and live-streaming.
The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Ponsonby, the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, and my noble friend Lord McColl all asked why, given that the online harms regime is years away, the Government cannot commence the Digital Economy Act as an interim measure. It is important that we take the time to deliver the most comprehensive approach for protecting children online, which will ensure that robust protections are in place for generations of young people to come. Through the online harms framework, we will be able to go further than the Digital Economy Act’s focus on online pornography on commercial adult sites, as I said. We will be able to protect children from a broader range of harmful content.
One of the criticisms of the Digital Economy Act was that its scope did not cover social media companies, where a considerable quantity of pornographic material is accessible to children. The Government’s new approach will include social media companies and sites where user-generated content can be widely shared, including the most visited commercial pornography sites. Taken together, we expect this to bring into scope more online pornography that children can currently access than the narrower scope of the Digital Economy Act. We will set out, in secondary legislation, priority categories of legal but harmful content and activity posing the greatest risk to children, which will include online pornography.
The Government expect that the regulator will take a robust approach to sites that pose the highest risk of harm to children. That may include recommending the use of age assurance or verification technologies where the risk is highest, including for sites hosting online pornography. Companies would need to put in place these technologies or demonstrate that the approach they are taking delivers the same level of protection for children. We are working closely with stakeholders across the industry to establish the right conditions for the market to deliver age assurance and age verification technical solutions ahead of the legislative requirements coming into force. The online safety Bill will be ready this year; in the meantime, we are already working closely with Ofcom to ensure that the implementation period that will be necessary following passage of the legislation will be as short as possible.
On the point about the Government sitting on the research, we were not seeking to suppress its results. Given the number of comments from noble Lords about the letter, I had better write again on the points there were clearly not satisfactory to them. My ministerial colleagues in the DDCMS will continue to engage with parliamentarians as we prepare for the vital legislation. I hope I have provided reassurance that Amendment 177A is not necessary and that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister and, accordingly, I call the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin.
My Lords, I can be brief with the government amendments in this group. Clause 73 enables the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the effect of certain provisions in the Bill, but also about
“other matters relating to domestic abuse in England and Wales”.
It is the UK Government’s view that, with the exception of Clause 73, the provisions in the Bill relate to reserved matters in Wales. We acknowledge that the power to issue statutory guidance about any matter relating to domestic abuse encroaches on devolved matters in Wales. It is for that reason that Clause 73 requires the Secretary of State to consult the Welsh Ministers in so far as any guidance relates to a devolved Welsh authority.
Following discussions with the Welsh Government, these amendments narrow the power to issue guidance under Clause 73(1)(b) so that any such guidance does not relate to Welsh devolved matters. Guidance relating to Welsh devolved matters is properly a matter for the Welsh Ministers and not the Secretary of State. As I indicated, these amendments have been discussed and agreed with the Welsh Government. I will respond to the other amendments in this group when winding up but, for now, I beg to move.
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 180. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for adding their names to it. Most of all, I thank the Ministers for their extraordinary forbearance on this very long day.
A key aim of this amendment is to prevent domestic abuse in the future. How should we do it? First, we should ensure—perhaps surprisingly, you might say—that primary school children who exhibit symptoms of severe psychological disturbance receive the professional psychological help that they urgently need if their mental health is to be restored and if long-term problems, for them, society, their own children and future spouses, are to be avoided. The amendment makes it clear that, wherever possible, parents should be involved in that therapy. Much quicker and more sustained improvements for the child can generally then be achieved. Having been involved in family therapy work many years ago, I know just how powerful and beneficial it can be for all members of the family.
The second part of the amendment would ensure that effective preparation for adult relationships—sex, marriage and, most particularly, awareness of domestic abuse and its consequences—was provided across the country for all senior schoolchildren in the last years of their schooling. I will return to this briefly at the end of my remarks; I want to focus mainly on primary school children.
This amendment is probably not the polished article. If we proceed to Report on these important matters, relevant lawyers and, I hope, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, might help to get it into shape. But why is the amendment so important? It is because domestic abuse is rooted in childhood and is such a big problem. The Children’s Commissioner suggests that 831,000 children in England are living in households that report domestic abuse. The mental health of all those children will be adversely affected, in some cases very seriously. Many will go on to become domestic abuse perpetrators, as we have said before. Action for Children tells us that 692 assessments are carried out every day that highlight domestic abuse as a feature of a child’s or young person’s life.
The problem is very serious, for the children as well as for their future spouses and children. The consequences of domestic abuse on children range from negatively affecting brain development and impacting cognitive and sensory growth to developing personality and behavioural problems, depression and suicidal tendencies. Analysis of data from the Millennium Cohort Study found that children whose parents experienced domestic violence when their children were aged three reported 30% higher than average anti-social behaviours aged 14, for example committing physical assault. Sensible, preventive interventions with children will save taxpayers’ money on police, courts and prisons, quite apart from saving the lives of the individuals involved from the miseries of criminality and becoming perpetrators of domestic abuse, with all that those things involve.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, I will be brief, bearing in mind the time and the fact that much of what I would have said has already been said. I note what the Minister said on government Amendments 178 and 188, which would ensure that guidance issued by the Secretary of State about matters relating to domestic abuse in Wales does not relate to matters that are devolved in relation to Wales.
Amendment 184—which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, and to which my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen added her name—would place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish
“separate statutory guidance on … teenage relationship abuse”.
This would not just cover victims of teenage domestic abuse but extend to those who perpetrate abuse within their own teenage relationships.
We support the aims of Amendment 184, and in particular the emphasis on both providing support for victims of abuse in teenage relationships and looking at perpetrator behaviour in young relationships. Ideally, the aim must be not to criminalise very young people but to catch abusive behaviour early, challenge it and prevent it from continuing. The importance of good sex and relationships education, including empowering young people to recognise abusive behaviour, surely cannot be overstated.
I look forward to the Government’s response to Amendment 184 and to the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, in their amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for explaining their amendments, which I will deal with in turn.
However, first, I will address the curious point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, about Lord Curzon and women’s suffrage. I remind the Committee—this will not be lost on noble Lords—that Conservative Governments introduced this Bill, introduced marriage for same-sex couples, were part of the partial decriminalisation of homosexuality and ensured that women such as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, are able to sit in your Lordships’ House.
That aside, Amendment 180 from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seeks further guidance in relation to “aggressive or manipulative” pupils and “relationship and sex education”. I agree with her that good behaviour in school is absolutely crucial if children are to learn and reach their full potential. As well as delivering excellent teaching, schools should be safe, calm and disciplined environments, free from the disruption that prevents children from learning.
However, I hope to persuade the noble Baroness that Amendment 180 is unnecessary, because there is already a framework of support in place for schools to identify and address the causes of misbehaviour in schools. Where a pupil’s difficulties are such that they require individual or specialist support, the process for this is already established through the special educational needs and disabilities statutory processes, in which the importance of the child or young person, and the child’s parents, participating as fully as possible in decisions is an underpinning principle.
All schools are required by law to have a behaviour policy outlining measures to encourage good behaviour and the sanctions that will be imposed for misbehaviour. Department for Education guidance on behaviour and discipline says that schools should consider whether this is as a result of a special educational or other need, where a multiagency referral might be necessary. Where a pupil’s difficulties are such that they require individual or specialist support, schools should refer to the special educational needs and disability code of practice, and set out the provision and support that they will put in place, including drawing on specialist support to meet the child’s needs. All schools are required by the Children and Families Act 2014 to have regard to the views, wishes and feelings of the child and their parents when making decisions about special educational provision and support.
Persistent disruptive behaviours do not necessarily mean that a child or young person has special educational needs. Where there are concerns, there should be an assessment to determine whether there are any causal factors, such as undiagnosed learning difficulties. If it is thought that housing, family or other domestic circumstances may be contributing to the child’s behaviour, a multiagency approach, supported by the use of approaches such as early help assessment, might be appropriate. In all cases, early identification and intervention can significantly reduce the use of more costly interventions at a later stage.
Amendment 180 also seeks to ensure that pupils have access to relationships, sex education and preparation for marriage classes. We want to support all young people to be happy, healthy and safe, and to equip them for adult life and to make a positive contribution to society. That is why we have made relationships education compulsory for all primary school pupils, relationships and sex education compulsory for all secondary school pupils, and health education compulsory for pupils in all state-funded schools.
To support schools in implementing these subjects, the Department for Education has published non-statutory implementation guidance, entitled Plan your Relationships, Sex and Health Curriculum, alongside teacher training materials. There is a specific training module on “families and people who care for me”, which has a section dedicated to marriage, cohabitation and civil partnerships. The training materials are all freely available on GOV.UK.
I turn to my noble friend’s Amendment 183, which is concerned with the drivers for different types of abuse. I commend my noble friend’s incredible work through his Family Hubs Network. As he rightly says, there is no simple or single cause of domestic abuse. It is multifaceted, complex and a very sensitive issue. It warrants a response that is equally sensitive and, as he pointed out at Second Reading, one that is nuanced.
Drivers of domestic abuse include the exercise of power, but it can also occur through the breakdown of a relationship. In addition, where an individual has particular vulnerabilities, such as those arising from substance misuse, which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, highlighted earlier in Committee and my noble friend talked about tonight, this can potentially make domestic abuse more likely. That is why we make specific reference to the characteristics and types of domestic abuse in the draft statutory guidance that we have published alongside the Bill. It will be regularly updated to allow for emerging trends and behaviours to be recognised. In preparing it last July, we engaged extensively with the domestic abuse sector and practitioners, and that engagement is continuing as we refine it ahead of the formal consultation process following Royal Assent.
The forthcoming domestic abuse strategy will afford a further opportunity to address the drivers and multiple causes of domestic abuse, highlighted by my noble friend, with a specific focus on prevention and early intervention. In short, I assure him that the issues he has highlighted will be addressed in both the statutory guidance and our forthcoming domestic abuse strategy.
Finally, Amendment 184 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, is concerned with the important topic of teenage relationship abuse. We know that it can be just as severe as abuse in adult relationships. We are clear that the impact of domestic abuse on young people, including those in abusive relationships, needs to be properly recognised, and we need to ensure that agencies are equipped to identify and respond appropriately. I therefore have no doubt about the intentions of the amendment.
However, under Clause 73, the Secretary of State must already publish guidance that concerns the effect of particular types of behaviour that amount to domestic abuse. This would include abusive teenage relationships, where the parties are at least 16 years old, and the impacts that these relationships have on victims. I therefore agree that the appropriate place to address this is the statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73, but I do not think we need to make express provision for this in the Bill.
In preparing this draft guidance, we have worked with the children’s sector to include the impacts of abuse in teenage relationships in the guidance. We will continue to work with the children’s sector to ensure that the guidance is as effective, thorough and accessible as it can be, before it is formally issued ahead of the provisions in Part 1 coming into force.
In addition, Clause 7 of the Bill expressly recognises the impact of domestic abuse on children and young people in the statutory functions of the domestic abuse commissioner. Moreover, the duty in Part 4 of the Bill on tier 1 local authorities to provide support to victims of domestic abuse in safe accommodation expressly extends to victims and their children, so the need for statutory agencies to respond and recognise the impact of domestic abuse on children and young people, including in the context of relationship abuse among those aged 16 to 19, is already embedded in the Bill. I have already outlined that relationships, sex and health education is now a statutory part of the curriculum.
Clause 73 already affords the flexibility for the Secretary of State to issue guidance not only about specified provisions of the Bill but about other matters relating to domestic abuse in England and Wales. Such guidance should, however, complement rather than duplicate existing statutory guidance issued by the DfE and others.
I hope that noble Lords agree that, while they have raised important issues, these amendments are not strictly necessary.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
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My Lords, Labour is happy to support this group of amendments but recognises the realities of abuse that different communities face. We must ensure that what is in the Bill works in practice for victims of all backgrounds in the UK.
The technical aspects of the amendments have been described powerfully and in detail by other noble Lords. When I came to review them in preparation for today, I was struck by the complexity of the situation surrounding victims caught in these particular circumstances due to religious faith, and the clarity with which these amendments have been written in order to ameliorate the effects and consequences of that faith while unlocking the rights of the woman in that situation and disallowing perpetrators from using the get negotiations as an abusive bargaining chip.
I pay tribute to the noble Lords who have brought forward these amendments for the experienced and knowledgeable way in which they have highlighted this problem, and I am glad of the support across all areas of the House for the amendments, on the grounds of domestic abuse by way of controlling and coercive behaviour. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke of in her detailed opening speech, this is a defined form of abuse where the victim is treated as chattel. I was interested to hear my noble friend Lord Winston’s insights into the uniqueness of Judaism in not having one central authority, as well as my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn’s powerful and cogent arguments about what must be done, and the insight that he showed in his comment about not knowing what is actually going on with people who you think you know.
Inclusion in the Bill provides the opportunity to ensure that its provisions and protections are applicable to all. It specifically recognises the plight of these women by removing the shadow of abuse and control, restoring their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith. The recognition would also offer these women other protections under the Act, once it is passed, if they are specifically included. It is in line with a key objective of the Bill: to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. Key is the ability of women to bring a case where they retain control of the process as the victims, rather than as a witness in a prosecution, having criminal sanctions as a civil party. It also clarifies that unreasonably preventing the obtaining of a get can include the imposition of unfair conditions, calibrated by reference to being substantially less favourable terms than the civil courts have ordered.
In conclusion, on International Women’s Day, this group highlights what so many noble Lords have said. The Bill needs to work for all victims and to do that it needs to grapple with the reality of how domestic abuse is experienced, in all the different ways that it is, by all of our communities across the UK—whatever their faith or ethnicity—by those living with it and trying to escape it.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Altmann for tabling these amendments. As a number of speakers have said, it is particularly apt that we are debating this on International Women’s Day. The quality of speeches in this debate is a testament to the strength of feeling across the House. Indeed, the standard of speeches has set a very high bar for the rest of Report.
I hope the House will forgive me if I depart from my prepared text to pick up two comments by my noble friend Lord Cormack. He first said that all were equal under the law. I respectfully agree entirely. Towards the end of his short but powerful contribution, he also said, if I took it down correctly, “The rule of law is what makes this a civilised country.” Again, I respectfully agree, and those two propositions guide not only the work of my department but my approach to this matter.
Amendments 1 and 3 would add a sixth limb to the list of behaviours in Clause 1(3) which count as abusive; namely, the unreasonable refusal to agree to the granting of a religious bill of divorce, or get, which is necessary to dissolve a Jewish religious marriage. The threat of such a refusal would also be caught by the amendment. It is undeniable that women who are refused a get by their husbands suffer long-lasting and significant consequences. A woman who has not received a get is regarded in the eyes of Jewish religious law as still married. She is therefore unable to remarry, but that is not the only disability which she suffers. Perhaps more importantly, if she does not remarry but has further children with another Jewish partner, those children will be severely restricted as a matter of Jewish law as to whom they are later able to marry.
The term applied in Jewish law to a woman whose husband refuses to give her a get, being an “agunah” or “chained”, is thus apt and tragic. I know that Jewish religious authorities are concerned about the problem but have not, so far, found a solution to it within Jewish religious law. That is a source of regret to many, but not something which English law alone can solve. While I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, put it, that this issue goes back to medieval times and may go back further—it is certainly of long standing—it is a matter which ultimately, so far as Jewish law is concerned, the Jewish religious authorities themselves have to deal with. If the undoubted abilities of the mother of the noble Lord, Lord Winston, were insufficient to resolve this problem—I pass on congratulations from the Front Bench to him on his wedding anniversary—and she did not succeed with all her talents, one wonders where the solution will come from.
While English law cannot solve this problem, there is something which English law can and should deal with. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, reminded the House, this is not the first time English law has engaged itself in this area. He reminded the House of the significant work done by the late Chief Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits, of blessed memory, which led up to the legislation at the start of this century. English law can recognise that the refusal to grant a religious dissolution is all too often about the exertion of control by one spouse over the other—almost invariably, in the context of a get, by the husband over the wife—and, as such, may be considered a form of domestic abuse in certain circumstances
However, as my noble friend Lady Williams outlined in her response in Committee, we consider that this would sit better in the statutory guidance on domestic abuse provided for in Clause 73, rather than in the Bill. Again, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, identified, that is because the list of abusive behaviours included in the definition is purposefully drafted to be high level. That definition is therefore to be applied by the courts and other agencies on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. Including specific circumstances in the Bill, such as a refusal to grant a get, may lead to calls for inclusion of other examples which would have two adverse consequences. First, as a matter of drafting, it would make the definition unwieldy. Secondly, we do not want to give the impression by including specific examples that there is a hierarchy of abuse. We are concerned to capture and prevent all forms of domestic abuse.
Before I provide further reassurance on the matter of statutory guidance, which a number of noble Lords have referred to, it would make sense to respond to Amendment 79 first. That amendment seeks to ensure that both the guidance I have just referred to and the statutory guidance issued under Section 77 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 include the unreasonable refusal to grant a get within their discussion of controlling or coercive behaviour. While we would not want to prescribe in statute what statutory guidance must contain, the House will have heard my own and my noble friend Lady Williams’ previous commitments during Committee and subsequent discussions to address this issue in the statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73.
I am pleased to have met with my noble friend Lady Altmann, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Palmer, recently to discuss this matter and share our progress on including the issue within the statutory guidance. Home Office officials have been working closely with my noble friend Lady Altmann, with Jewish Women’s Aid and others to shape the reference to this issue in the statutory guidance. I was particularly pleased to hear my noble friend refer to the work done by my department’s officials in this regard as well.
I am pleased that we have now included specific reference to refusal to grant a get within the draft guidance. We have also included a specific case study on get refusal, provided by Jewish Women’s Aid—to whom I pay tribute, as my noble friend Lord Polak did—to bring the issue to life for those reading that guidance. Let me say this clearly and unambiguously: there are, and no doubt will be, cases in which the refusal to give a get may be considered a form of domestic abuse. As my noble friend Lady Deech reminded the House, that is especially the case if refusal to grant a get is used as a method to undermine a financial settlement imposed by the civil court. As the noble Lord, Lord Mann, reminded the House, the issue here is that that power affects all the negotiations which surround the issue of separation.
Turning back to the statutory guidance, we have also added a new section on spiritual abuse, a particular form of abuse where perpetrators use the victim’s faith or other belief system to control them. We have worked closely in this regard with the Faith and Violence Against Women and Girls Coalition, drawing on its expertise. The new section is now comprehensive and takes up a few pages within the guidance.
I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, that this applies to all faiths. Spiritual abuse is not faith specific, and I assure the noble Lord, Lord Mann, that the Government’s approach is to be absolutely inclusive of all communities within our country. We will continue to work closely with the experts as we develop the guidance, and we will be publishing an updated version of the draft guidance shortly after Royal Assent for a formal consultation, where there will be a further opportunity for interested parties to contribute. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, because what we are dealing with here are ultimately issues of power and control, I hope that that will enhance the nature and quality of the consultation.
My Lords, I remind the House that I sit as a family magistrate in central London and regularly deal with these types of cases. I have to say that this has been a better debate than the one we had in Committee. The reason is that many of the speakers showed a greater appreciation of the complexity of these types of cases, which we hear in court. A number of speakers, including those who put their names to this amendment, stated that if the Minister were to make it crystal clear that the term “parental alienation” will be dealt with fully outside of the Bill, then they would think that a good solution to the issue in the amendment. We have also had a number of very eminent lawyers—the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay and Lord Morris, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—clearly say their view is that the amendment is not necessary, as long as the issue itself is addressed elsewhere.
We have had a lot of contributions and I will not go through all the speeches. However, I want to pick up a couple of points noble Lords have made, in particular a contribution by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth. He spoke about the distressing and polarising effects of the issue being debated in Committee; I think we have all received a huge amount of lobbying material since then. He also said that he had no doubt that parental alienation exists and that professional organisations such as Cafcass, through its child impact assessment, and the court system try to address the whole range of domestic abuse, including parental alienation.
I want to make one point, which has not been made by any other speaker, and stems from that made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. She summarised it, in a typically succinct way, by saying that the effects on the child are twofold: first, the witnessing, either directly or indirectly, of domestic abuse, which is clearly extremely bad for the child; and secondly, the malicious attempt by a parent to turn the child against the other parent. She has characterised that issue accurately, but I have been sitting as a family magistrate for about eight years now and have seen many cases where a parent has admitted, perhaps through a conviction, that their behaviour means they have committed such abuse. I have seen that many times but never seen a parent admit trying maliciously to alienate the child from the other parent. I have simply never seen a parent acknowledge that they have indulged in such a course of action. The court is of course in a very difficult position, so we move on to the possible use of experts, training for the judiciary and the life experience of magistrates and judges who are dealing with these cases.
I come back to where I opened: there has been a greater acknowledgement by the contributors to today’s debate of the difficulty in making these decisions. Of course, I am in favour of more training—magistrates, lawyers and judges are trained in any event, but more training would be welcome. I hope that the Minister will manage to convince the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, that it is not necessary to press her amendment. I personally believe that the issues she has raised and the intensity of the speeches she has given can be properly met through regulations under the Bill.
My Lords, on this International Women’s Day, I pay tribute to the courage of and thank my noble friend Lady Meyer, and other noble Lords, for their continued engagement on this issue. As pointed out by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, parental alienation clearly proved to be one of the most polarising issues in Committee. He challenged us to focus on the areas of agreement and I will try to do that. It was apposite that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to the comments of the noble and right reverend Lord and said that we had a better debate today than we did in Committee. I agree. We are beginning to develop a shared understanding on where we are trying to get to on this, and to understand what points the amendment is driving at.
My noble friend Lady Meyer has lived experience of this very difficult, deeply distressing and personal issue, and 19 years of campaigning experience to boot in the area of alienating behaviours. I pay tribute to her; in no way do I seek to deny or to minimise the devastating impact that alienating behaviours can have on family life. But we must carefully consider the suggestion that legislation in the form of my noble friend’s amendment is the appropriate response here, and I hope that I can give her comfort on that. I will now outline the aspect of things that I think go to the heart of the Bill and the nub of the point that she is trying to make.
Our approach in Clause 1 is to define domestic abuse by reference to types of abusive behaviours, as pointed out by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and by the noble Lord, Lord Curry of Kirkharle—although he agrees with the amendment—and not by reference to the form in which those behaviours may be manifested. We are fearful of creating a hierarchy of behaviours by appearing to give more weight to one manifestation than another, and do not—as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay said—wish to inadvertently narrow the Clause 1 definition by giving specific examples such as that proposed by my noble friend in her amendment to Clause 1(5), as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out. The behaviours to which my noble friend Lady Altmann referred would be in scope; whether the examples she cites would be covered would clearly be a matter for the courts to decide.
As I indicated in Committee, I accept that there are circumstances where alienating behaviours indicate a wider pattern of emotional or psychological abuse. However, where this is the case the definition of domestic abuse in Clause 1—subsections (3)(e) and (5) are particularly relevant, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Brinton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said—already applies and, as such, does not need to be further expanded.
To answer the question about statutory guidance asked by my noble friend Lady Meyer, and almost all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, the draft statutory guidance covers alienating behaviours. I am very grateful to noble Lords who have already shared their views on the guidance and we welcome further feedback and suggestions for improvement. There will then be a further opportunity to comment on the guidance when we formally consult following Royal Assent.
One of the strengths of the Bill is that it recognises the impact of domestic abuse on children, considering them as victims in their own right. From the perspective of risk of harm to the child, the relevant legal framework is provided for in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, together with the definition of harm in that Act. My noble friend Lady Meyer and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, referenced the Cafcass definition of parental alienation. Although that definition supports our shared understanding of the impact of alienating behaviours on the child, it is an important point of clarification that the Cafcass definition is not one of domestic abuse—we need to be clear about that. Cafcass is clear that there are a number of reasons why a child might resist time with, or be hostile towards, one parent following separation or other breakdown of a parental relationship.
My Lords, I speak in support of this group of amendments. It is humbling to add my name and be among such a campaigning and dynamic group of Peers. The clause as amended would bring the relationship between a disabled person and their carer within the definition of “personally connected” in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, in line with the amendments to the definition in Clause 2 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton—who has so powerfully lobbied for this amendment—so that controlling or coercive behaviour by carers is covered by the Section 76 offence.
On the definition of “personally connected”, at Report we continue to believe that the Bill should reflect the realities of all domestic abuse victims who need to be able to access services, justice and support and that no victim should be left behind. These amendments would ensure that “personally connected” also covered a person’s relationship with their carer, whether paid or unpaid.
I spoke of this in Committee and, despite frank and helpful discussions with the Minister and her officials, I remain convinced that these are necessary amendments. They reflect the lived experiences of disabled victims of domestic abuse, where a significant personal relationship in their life is with a person who provides care.
This is a Bill for all victims, and we believe that these amendments would help to ensure that disabled victims are represented in the legislation. We have heard the Government say that the abuse of disabled people by their carers is already covered by existing legislation—Section 42 of the Care Act 2014 places such a duty on local authorities. However, the Bill is flagship legislation—we hear the term time and again—and it should not be the case that disabled victims have to be provided for elsewhere. The unamended clause does not recognise disabled victims of domestic abuse, who are among the most vulnerable.
This type of abuse often goes unnoticed. Disabled victims are more likely to experience domestic abuse for a longer period of time, and the Bill should make it easier for such victims to be recognised. There has to be an understanding and an acceptance of the reality of disabled lives. Significant relationships can be different from those of a non-disabled person with an unpaid carer. This close relationship has the ability to become a difficult relationship that is the same as family or partner violence. Trusting someone enough to let them provide either personal care or support with day-to-day tasks or communication is in itself an emotionally intimate act that creates a close bond but also runs the risk of abuse. It is not infrequent for abusers to target the disabled person and befriend them, and persuade them that this is done from an altruistic motivation, while at the same time exploiting and abusing the disabled person. Unfortunately, the news racks are full of such stories. The victim will experience the same ambiguity about power and control versus emotional attachment as any other victim of domestic abuse.
My noble friend Lord Hunt mentioned the organisation Stay Safe East in his authoritative speech. Ruth Bashall, chief executive of that organisation, said of this Bill:
“If this landmark piece of legislation is to protect disabled victims as well as non-disabled victims, we must ensure that abusers are not provided with a cause to claim ‘best interests’ as justification for abusing us … Every year, disabled people are victims of abuse by paid and unpaid carers or personal assistants with whom they have a close relationship but are not family members, and there is very little legislation to protect us.”
I welcome the important issues raised by noble Lords in this group of amendments. I urge the Government to listen to the lived testimony expressed throughout this debate. I support the amendments for inclusion in the Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Campbell of Surbiton and Lady Grey-Thompson, for introducing these amendments that seek to expand the definition of “personally connected” in Clause 2. I am very grateful to have had the opportunity to meet them ahead of Report to discuss their amendments.
To answer the question that a number of noble Lords have asked: 3,200 responses were received to the consultation on the Bill and 85% of those responses agreed to our definition in the Bill. We consulted a wide variety of focus groups, which included disability groups; I do not have the list today, but I can try to get it.
These amendments seek to bring all carers under the definition of “personally connected” in the Domestic Abuse Bill. This would include carers who are unpaid, such as neighbours and friends, as well as paid carers and people in a position of trust who care for disabled people.
Let me be absolutely clear: the Government fully recognise that abuse can be perpetrated by carers on the people they care for and that these victims can be especially vulnerable. However, extending the definition of “personally connected” in the context of domestic abuse would have detrimental effects on the overall understanding of domestic abuse and the complexities of the familial and intimate partner relationships that domestic abuse is understood to encompass, where the affectionate emotional bond between the victim and the perpetrator plays a very important role in the power dynamics. By extending the definition to include carers, we would be broadening the definition of “personally connected” to include a much wider range of connections within health and social care settings, which are covered by other legislation, and would confuse the meaning of domestic abuse.
Noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and other proponents of these amendments argue that the relationship between the carer and the person being cared for is an intimate relationship because of the often intimate nature of caring. However, it is important to recognise that different degrees of care are required by different individuals and that not all care relationships can be classed as intimate. Additionally, many care relationships are affected by different power dynamics due to the paid nature of the work that many regulated carers undertake. This would make it inappropriate to class these relationships as domestic abuse, where the emotional interdependency and sometimes financial dependence make it very difficult for a victim to leave a domestic abuse situation.
This would be detrimental to one of the Bill’s overarching aims, namely to raise awareness and understanding of the devastating impact of domestic abuse on victims and their families. This is a domestic abuse Bill and should not be confused with a Bill on abuse in general, or abuse that takes place in a domestic setting. The explanatory report to the Istanbul convention makes clear what is intended by domestic violence or abuse. In its commentary on the term “domestic violence” it says:
“Domestic violence includes mainly two types of violence: intimate-partner violence between current or former spouses or partners and inter-generational violence which typically occurs between parents and children.”
What is proposed by these amendments—however worthy their intent—would mark a fundamental shift away from the objectives of this Bill, necessarily diluting and stretching the focus of the domestic abuse commissioner. We would also have to reset and reassess much of the work we are doing to prepare for implementing the Bill and developing a new domestic abuse strategy. By fundamentally expanding the concept of domestic abuse as used in the Bill we risk a significant delay in its implementation, and I am sure that is not what the House would want.
The Government recognise abuse of disabled and elderly people by their carers. This type of abuse should be called out and tackled, and existing legislation covers it. The Health Survey for England 2019—Providing Care for Family and Friends, which has been mentioned, shows that most unpaid carers were caring for family members. As such, a wide portion of informal care is already covered by the Bill and by Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, where the abuse amounts to domestic abuse.
The Care Act 2014 placed adult safeguarding on a statutory footing for the first time. Under Section 42, local authorities have a duty to carry out safeguarding inquiries if they have reason to suspect that an adult in their area with care and support needs is at risk of abuse or neglect. Importantly, this is the case irrespective of whether that individual’s needs are being met by the local authority.
The care and statutory support guidance defines the different types and patterns of abuse and neglect and the different circumstances in which they might take place. The list provided is not exhaustive but is an illustrative guide to the sort of behaviour that could give rise to a safeguarding concern, such as physical abuse, including domestic violence, sexual abuse, psychological abuse, financial or material abuse, modern slavery and discriminatory abuse.
In the almost six years since the Care Act was introduced, we have seen a steady increase in the number of concerns raised, as well as the number of inquiries made under Section 42. This demonstrates that the legislation is having an impact. Data from 2019-20 covering concluded Section 42 inquiries where a risk was identified showed that, in nearly 90% of cases, the outcome was reported to have either removed or reduced the risk to the individual.
Additionally, the Government have made clear in the accompanying statutory guidance that, under the Care Act regarding the duty on local authorities, they must ensure that the services they commission are safe, effective and of high quality. All relevant professions are subject to employer checks and controls, and employers in the health and care sector must satisfy themselves regarding the skills and competence of their staff. Furthermore, the Care Quality Commission plays a key role, ensuring that care providers have effective systems to keep adults safe and ensure that they are free from abuse and neglect. They have a duty to act promptly whenever safeguarding issues are discovered during inspections, raising them with the provider and, if necessary, referring safeguarding issues to the local authority and the police. Lastly, safeguarding adults boards provide assurance that local safeguarding arrangements and partners, including police, councils and the NHS, are acting to help and protect adults who may be at risk of abuse or neglect.
My Lords, when, initiated by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, these issues were debated in Committee, the Government argued that the need for statutory agencies to recognise and respond to the impact of domestic abuse on children of all ages is already embedded in the Bill and the associated statutory guidance. The Government said that they recognised that pregnancy can be a trigger for domestic abuse and that existing abuse may get worse during pregnancy or after giving birth.
The Government went on to say in Committee that the statutory guidance made clear that local authorities, with their partners, had a responsibility to develop clear local protocols for assessment, and that these protocols should reflect where assessments require particular care and include unborn children where there are concerns. Further, the Government said that if there are concerns relating to an unborn child, consideration should be given to whether to hold a child protection conference prior to that child’s birth, with decisions regarding the child’s future safety, health and development made at that conference.
The Government concluded their response in Committee by saying they were committed to protecting all children, including the very youngest, from the heinous crime of domestic abuse. There have since been further discussions. We agree that pregnant women, unborn children and young children need access to support and protection. I look forward to the Government, in their response, giving further meaningful assurances that this will be the case.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Stroud for affording us the further opportunity to debate the impact of domestic abuse on very young children and unborn babies. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made an important point about alcohol as a trigger for domestic abuse and the effect of alcohol on an unborn child, which is part and parcel of this. The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, made a point about preventive measures being so important in our aim of protecting victims or potential victims of domestic abuse.
Amendment 7 to Clause 3 seeks to recognise unborn babies exposed to domestic abuse in utero as victims of domestic abuse. Amendments 8 and 9 to Clause 7 seek to explicitly provide for the domestic abuse commissioner to encourage good practice and provide protection and support to children under the age of two, including unborn babies, affected by domestic abuse. Amendment 78 seeks to make provision for publicly funded therapeutic services for expectant parents and parents of children under the age of two who are victims of domestic abuse. Finally, Amendment 90 seeks to make explicit reference to unborn babies and children under two in the statutory guidance to be issued under Clause 73.
Under Clause 3, children of all ages, from birth to the day that they turn 18, are considered victims of domestic abuse in their own right if they see, hear or experience the effects of domestic abuse and are related either to the targeted victim of the abuse or to the perpetrator. As such, all children will benefit from the provisions in the Bill. For example, Part 2 expressly recognises the impact of domestic abuse on children in the statutory functions of the domestic abuse commissioner. Part 4 of the Bill places a new duty on tier 1 local authorities to provide support to victims of domestic abuse and their children within safe accommodation. This would include the kind of support referred to in Amendment 78. In addition, Clause 73(2) provides that the Secretary of State must issue guidance on the
“kinds of behaviour that amount to domestic abuse”
and on the effect of domestic abuse on all children.
Separate to the provisions in the Bill, there are important existing measures in the Children Act 1989 to protect children at risk of harm. These include Section 8 of that Act, which makes provisions for child arrangement orders regulating arrangements relating to when a child is to live, spend time with or otherwise have contact with any other person, and whom. Section 17 sets out the provision of services for children in need, their families and others. Part V sets out measures for the protection of children, including in Section 43 on child assessment orders; Section 44 on orders for the emergency protection of children; and Section 47, which sets out the local authority’s duty to investigate when it suspects that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Lister for her superb introduction and to all noble Lords who have spoken.
Amendment 10 relates to single payments of universal credit. The case has been made overwhelmingly clearly that the system of single payments facilitates financial abuse by allowing perpetrators to control the entire household income. Ministers only seem to have three arguments against acting on this: first, that claimants can ask for split payments, although, as my noble friend pointed out, that just puts survivors at risk; secondly, that most couples keep and manage their finances together, although, as Refuge points out, the finances of those experiencing economic abuse are not managed jointly but controlled by their abuser; and thirdly, that it would undermine the nature of universal credit and be a bit difficult. These are pretty weak arguments. All this amendment does is say that the commissioner will look into the matter further and report to Parliament. If the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, and the Government do not want the commissioner to look into it, can I suggest that they simply sort it out themselves? That would save our having to do so.
Amendment 69 would exempt domestic abuse survivors from repaying benefit advances made to mitigate the five-week wait. There is a real risk that survivors wanting to flee will be deterred because they know it is five weeks until they get paid—many are already in debt and do not want to take on more—and if they take an advance on, their monthly income falls below survival level, yet they have other debts to service. Does the Minister accept that this is a genuine barrier? I would be really interested to know the answer.
Amendment 72 would disapply the benefit cap for 12 months for survivors who fled and claimed universal credit. I am not going to repeat the devastating critique made by the noble Lord, Lord Best, but I do think Ministers owe it to this House and to survivors to engage with those arguments properly. Normally, Ministers argue that people can escape the cap by moving to cheaper housing or by getting a job, but those are not practical for someone fleeing abuse. There are already exemptions for those in refuges, so why not for those in any accommodation? There is already an exemption from the work requirement of universal credit for someone who has fled abuse in the previous six months, but what use is that exemption if survivors cannot afford to take advantage of it because they would still be hit by the benefit cap and so could not afford to pay their rent?
These issues are all examples of social security policy or practice which have a differential impact on survivors of domestic abuse. If Amendment 68 were accepted, government departments would have to assess the impact of any social security reforms on victims or potential victims of domestic abuse before making changes, rather than afterwards. It would stop us being here over and over again, trying to point out the problems of systems already changed, by trying to address them beforehand. Had that been done before creating universal credit or imposing the benefit cap or the bedroom tax, these problems could have been designed out at an earlier stage.
The survivor quoted by my noble friend Lady Lister was right: you need money to escape. Our social security system should enable survivors to flee abuse, but it does not. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, this is a failure of joined-up government. The sad reality is that problems do join up, and at the level of the individual survivor, but the Government response fails to address that. There is no point in the Government legislating to support survivors of domestic abuse while steadfastly ignoring problems in their own systems, which risks exacerbating or even enabling abuse and making it hard or sometimes impossible for survivors to flee and rebuild their lives. I say to the Minister, whom I know cares about these issues, a lot of work has gone into researching, evidencing, and debating the issues, and the fact that the noble Baroness is a Home Office Minister is not a reason not to engage with them. The House, the country and survivors deserve to have these arguments taken seriously. I look forward to her reply.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Best, for explaining their amendments, which relate to the operation of the welfare system, including universal credit and the benefit cap, and their impact on victims of domestic abuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, is absolutely right: just because I am a Home Officer Minister does not mean that I should not and do not engage on these matters.
Amendment 10 seeks to place a duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to investigate universal credit single household payments and lay a report before Parliament within a year of Royal Assent. As I indicated in Committee, and as my noble friend Lady Sanderson said, as an independent officeholder, it should be for the commissioner to set her own priorities as set out in her strategy plan, as provided for in Clause 13. I understand that the commissioner has no current plans to examine this issue in the next year. If this amendment were to be made it would necessarily mean that other issues which she might have regarded as more pressing would fall by the wayside. Moreover, the way the amendment is drafted arguably prejudices the conclusions of the commissioner’s report and makes it difficult or impossible for her to comply with the duty if those conclusions do not then come to pass. If the aim of this amendment is to secure a particular preordained outcome, I see no benefit in asking the independent commissioner to investigate the matter. She has already embarked on the mapping exercise in relation to community-based services, so there is no contradiction between government Amendment 17 and the concerns we have about Amendment 10.
DWP is committed to doing all it can to support victims of domestic and economic abuse, including giving split payments when requested, easements to benefit conditionality and referrals to local specialist support. However, by default, a core principle of universal credit is that it is a single household payment. Where a claimant is part of a couple and living in the same household, they will need to make a joint claim for universal credit. Many legacy benefits, including housing benefit, child benefit and child tax credit, already make payment to one member of the household, so the way universal credit is paid is not a new concept. Instead, we believe that this reflects the way that most couples can and want to manage their finances—jointly and without state intervention. We have therefore taken a proportionate response, ensuring that universal credit meets both the needs of the many and the most disadvantaged, including victims of domestic abuse.
Recognising that there are circumstances in which split payments are appropriate, we have made them available on request to anyone at risk of domestic abuse. As part of that, it is important that we allow the individual who is experiencing domestic abuse to decide whether they think that split payments will help their individual circumstances. Once that choice is made, the request for such payment can be made in whatever way works best for the claimant, including during a face-to-face meeting or a phone call. Once paid, the larger percentage of a split payment will be allocated to the person with primary caring responsibilities, such as childcare. This is to ensure the health and well-being of the majority of the household. We can also arrange for any rent to be paid directly to the landlord to protect the family tenancy. No information relating to why a split payment has been requested or granted will be notified to the claimant’s partner. In addition to the right to split payment on request, we have also taken measures to encourage payment to the main carer in the family. Evidence suggests that 60% of universal credit payments are made to women, who are usually the main carer. Given this, we have changed the claimant messaging on the service to encourage claimants in joint claims to nominate the bank account of the main carer to receive their universal credit payment.
I hope that noble Lords will see that, although universal credit’s single household payment mirrors the model of the legacy benefits it replaces, much has been done to offer alternative payment arrangements to victims of domestic abuse. However, universal credit cannot solve all the problems of domestic abuse and split payment is not a panacea. It is crucial to acknowledge that abusive partners may still take money from their victims, whether that is payment of universal credit or any other source of income, including through intimidation, coercion and physical force. Payment to the victim’s individual bank account is no guarantee, with such people capable of learning passwords and taking control of bank cards.
The Government therefore view calls for split payments to all couples claiming universal credit as disproportionate. This would be a fundamental change to the payment structure of universal credit, from a single household payment made to one individual of the benefit unit to payments split between joint claimants by default, rather than made available to those who need this method of payment. It would add very significant cost and complexity. For example, split payments are currently a manual process. To introduce them by default they would have to be automated, at considerable cost and disruption. This would also deflect limited resource from the improvements already prioritised for the universal credit system. Such fundamental change from a single to a multiple-payment model for all, regardless of need, may also put the stability of the system at risk for all 6 million current universal credit claimants, and at a time when numbers have grown significantly in response to the pandemic.
Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, advocated split payment by default, pointing to the Scottish Government’s wish to adopt this method of payment. For the reasons I have set out, that is not the Government’s position. It is also noticeable that the Scottish Government are yet to come forward with firm proposals. I say this not to criticise, but merely to illustrate to the House that this is a complex area in which to design a workable policy. Nevertheless, we will continue to work closely with the Scottish Government to establish the practicalities of delivering split payments in Scotland. Should they come up with a policy capable of being implemented, we will observe their implementation to further understand the impacts, any potential advantages and disadvantages. We would ask advocates of split payment by default to do the same, in a “test and learn” approach, so that future debate on this may be based on practical evidence.
Amendment 68 would require the DWP to assess the impact of welfare reform on victims, and potential victims, of domestic abuse. The DWP already does this, in accordance with the public sector equality duty. An equality impact assessment to support the introduction of universal credit was published in November 2011, and an impact assessment was published in December 2012. Equality impacts have been further considered in developing subsequent plans surrounding the implementation of universal credit. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s intention in proposing the amendment, but I do not think that the additional duty is required.
Finally, Amendment 69 seeks to make victims of domestic abuse exempt from repaying universal credit advances. It is important to note that there can be no such thing as an advance that is never intended to be recovered. Advances are simply an advance of a claimant’s benefit, paid early, resulting in the same amount of universal credit being spread across more payments. It is, therefore, more appropriate to say that this amendment would effectively create grants or additional entitlement to universal credit solely for victims of domestic abuse. While the Bill demonstrates the Government’s commitment to supporting victims of domestic abuse by introducing additional benefit entitlement, we would effectively be unfairly discriminating against all other vulnerable cohort groups who may be facing substantial challenges.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response to this group of amendments, in particular to Amendments 72 and 102, to which I have added my name. I also thank her for her reassurance that local authorities will be given clear encouragement to prioritise the needs of domestic abuse victims, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, requested. Can she ensure that national statistics on the number of such cases accepted and rejected in each year will be counted and made public? Visible success for the Government’s preferred approach may serve as encouragement to those facing the unenviable decision of whether they can afford to flee their abuser’s home.
Yes, I can certainly request that on behalf of the right reverend Prelate.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and also the Minister. Noble Lords have enriched the arguments but, given the time, I will not go over what they said. I will not try to come back on the Minister’s arguments because it feels a bit like Groundhog Day. I am disappointed, however, that the noble Baroness did not acknowledge the point that I and my noble friend Lord Rooker underlined, as did others: there is a real tension between social security policy and domestic abuse policy. The policies that she is so committed to in this Bill will be undermined by DWP policies. I hope that at the very least she will take back to the DWP the concerns that have been raised today.
I thank the Minister for saying she will try to arrange for Women’s Aid to meet the DWP Minister to talk about training. As for panic rooms, will the noble Baroness have words with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions about what has happened and why no action has been taken in response to that judgment? Time is ticking past—we really should have action by now.
My noble friend Lady Sherlock asked a couple of very specific questions about the Minister’s position, and I wonder whether she could write in response. I think I will leave it at that.
I take the point of my noble friend Lord Rooker that it would have been good to have been able to vote on this issue. However, there are so many amendments that noble colleagues want to vote on that I realise it was not possible. That should not mean that Ministers think we do not attach great importance to the arguments that have been made today. I just hope that the Minister will take those arguments to the DWP and see, behind the scenes, if something can be done. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have added my name to and speak in support of Amendment 12, which would extend the list of public authorities with a duty to co-operate with the domestic abuse commissioner. Amendment 14 would place a new duty on public authorities that carry out reviews and investigations into deaths in which domestic abuse has been identified as a contributory factor to notify the Secretary of State for the Home Office and the office of the domestic abuse commissioner upon completion and to provide them with a copy of their findings.
This oversight by the domestic abuse commissioner is intended to ensure a more systematic collection of investigations into suicides and homicides in which domestic abuse is identified as a contributory factor, together with a robust accountability framework to ensure that individual recommendations are acted upon and key themes across investigations are identified to help target the key policy changes needed to prevent future deaths.
The pandemic has created so many problems for our society, notwithstanding the area of domestic abuse. Coronavirus may exacerbate triggers and lockdown may restrict access to support or escape; it may even curtail measures some people take to keep their own violence under control.
In 2011 domestic homicide reviews were established on a statutory basis under Section 9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act. It was one of the most difficult and disturbing aspects of my role as a councillor when I had to take part in such a review following the death of one of my constituents. It was a devastating time for the community and left long-running consequences as we searched our souls to see what more anyone could have done to prevent such a tragedy. In hard terms, what can be done by agreeing these amendments is to establish a clear oversight and accountability mechanism, led by the independent domestic abuse commissioner, which would help to drive effective implementation and share lessons nationally in the long as well as the short term.
My Lords, we return now to the debate we had in Committee about the role of the domestic abuse commissioner in helping all relevant agencies to learn the lessons from domestic abuse-related homicides and suicides so that we can avoid such deaths in future.
In Committee I undertook to consider further amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt. We agree that the commissioner has an important oversight role to play in this area, and government Amendment 14 will support it by placing a duty on those responsible for carrying out a domestic homicide review under Section 9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to send a copy of the report of the review to the commissioner.
As I indicated in Committee, we are not persuaded that it is necessary to extend this requirement to the other homicide reviews listed in Amendment 16. Given that the bodies involved are required to engage and feed into domestic homicide reviews, we think the lessons will be captured through this process. Where necessary, the commissioner can also use her powers under Clause 15 to request relevant information from the public authorities subject to the duty to co-operate.
Amendment 12 seeks to add to the list of public authorities subject to the duty to co-operate. We agree in principle that the IOPC, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, should be added to the list. Clause 15(4) includes a power to add to the list of specified public authorities by regulations, and we propose to exercise this power in relation to the IOPC. The IOPC has come late to the party, as it were, so we consider it preferable to use the regulation-making route to allow time for the IOPC and the commissioner’s office to work through the implications for the IOPC of adding it to the list of specified public authorities.
As for the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, I must point out that it is not a statutory agency, and therefore there are difficulties with referring to it in statute. On a more practical level, the ombudsman routinely publishes its fatal incident investigation reports, so they are accessible to the commissioner and others. That said, there is scope for discussions between the commissioner and the ombudsman about how the flow of relevant information might be improved.
As I indicated at the start of my remarks, we consider tackling domestic homicides a top priority and we intend to work closely with the commissioner on this issue. The changes being made through Amendment 14 and our commitment to add the IOPC to the list of relevant public authorities by regulations are only part of the wider programme of work taking place to tackle domestic homicides. I hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, would agree that these are important advances and that accordingly she would be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove and Lady Wilcox, for their very knowledgeable contributions, particularly the poignant case of Anne-Marie Nield, provided by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, which just illustrates how important it is that we learn the lessons.
I am very grateful to the Minister—she is clearly a Minister who listens and works out what is logically possible and what is not. It perhaps would not have been realistic for her to say, “Oh yes, we’ll do all of that, that’s no problem at all”, but what she has said is extremely encouraging, particularly regarding the IOPC. I am very grateful to her particularly for the way that she has gone more than half way, and her actions, I am sure, will make a very big difference to the ability of the domestic abuse commissioner to do her job—and, indeed, to the Secretary of State. I have great hopes for what the commissioner is going to achieve with all of this. We have certainly loaded on her enough information, so I hope that it is not going to overwhelm her, but I really feel heartened that she is going to have the tools to do the job, and I am very grateful. I respectfully wish to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am conscious of the time, so the House does not need 15 minutes from me on why we should support these amendments. I will make a few quick points to enable the Minister to respond fully to the debate.
I support both amendments. We have heard some excellent speeches this evening. I hope the Minister can give a detailed response to my noble friend Lady Armstrong. She has amended her amendment to take on board the comments made by the Minister in Committee.
I hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, may divide the House on Amendment 44 when we reach it. I can offer the support of these Benches if she decides to do so. This may focus the minds of some noble Lords in this debate. I shall leave it there and look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for the parting shot. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and my noble friend Lady Helic for raising the issue of training for front-line professionals in relation to domestic abuse. Quality training is important to equip practitioners with the knowledge and skills they need to protect and support victims of domestic abuse, including children, in an appropriate manner.
We can also agree on another aspect of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt articulated, professionals need to have the skills and confidence to ask the right questions about domestic abuse, and then take the right course of action. If the pandemic has taught us anything, it has served to further highlight the importance of professionals across a wide range of disciplines recognising the signs of domestic abuse and responding accordingly.
The noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, talked about relationship and sex education in schools. Healthy relationships in this area are more important than ever.
In January, we launched “Ask for ANI”, the code word scheme that is now in operation across thousands of pharmacies. The scheme provides a clear process to follow. Working closely with the sector, we have developed bespoke training and guidance to support it to deliver this additional assistance. We have ensured that victims have a means to access potentially life-changing support, and have seen more than 45 uses of the scheme already. This is excellent news.
Those working in vaccination centres are also being provided with bespoke training to ensure that they pick up any signs of domestic abuse and can respond to disclosures should they be made in such safe spaces. I am sure we can all agree that the response and approach to identifying domestic abuse in a pharmacy and in a vaccination centre is very different from how one might respond in a school or a job centre. That is why reporting protocols and training are best developed and delivered by the appropriate responsible agency in each sector. Therein lies the expertise, so we should not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. The training needs to be tailored to the circumstances of each professional group and will, therefore, take many different forms.
While the domestic abuse commissioner and her office may support organisations in the development of their training, and may deliver some training itself—as Clause 7(2)(d) envisages—it is not appropriate, or indeed realistic, to expect the commissioner to be specifying training or reporting standards for the diverse range of public authorities specified in Clause 15.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, this group of amendments brings us back to the provision of community-based support for victims of domestic abuse and their children. I share the ambition of my noble friend Lord Polak, the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Rosser, and all noble Lords to ensure that domestic abuse victims receive the support that they need, regardless of where they reside. The provisions in Part 4 of the Bill, which relate to the provision of support within safe accommodation, are a major step towards meeting that goal.
The issue before us is whether we can and should now be legislating for a parallel duty in respect of community-based support, whether by extending the provisions in Part 4, as Amendment 31 seeks to do, or by making freestanding provision, as in Amendment 85. The Government remain firmly of the view that the necessary groundwork for such legislation has yet to be undertaken and, accordingly, that it would be premature to legislate in this Bill by either method.
I can see the attraction of Amendment 31, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It seemingly accepts the government argument that we do not yet know how we should frame the duty in respect of community-based support, so a regulation-making power affords a mechanism to come back to this once the domestic abuse commissioner has completed her mapping work and the Government have consulted.
Let me make a couple of observations about Amendment 31. First, your Lordships’ House and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee are regularly critical of the Government for coming forward with skeletal delegated powers such as in the amendment. The framework for the provision of safe accommodation support is on the face of the Bill and it is right that any parallel duty in respect of community-based support should also be set out in primary legislation. Secondly, even if the route of delegated legislation was, in principle, an acceptable way forward, until we have developed and consulted on a scheme for that provision of community-based support, we simply do not know how properly to frame a regulation-making power to ensure that we have the necessary vires to give effect to a set of proposals post-consultation. The landscape for the provision of community-based support is more complex than that in respect of safe accommodation- based support, as Amendment 85 recognises, so a power simply to extend the provisions of Part 4 is not, in our view, the right approach.
Amendment 85, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and in Committee by my noble friend, seeks to navigate the complexities of the current provision of community-based support by placing a new duty on local authorities in England, local policing bodies in England and Wales and clinical commissioning groups in England. This may or may not be the right approach, but I do not think that we are in a position to make that judgement yet. If the duty is to be split three ways, we need to know how the discharge of the duty is to be co-ordinated between the three agencies to ensure that there is not overlapping provision or that support for some victims does not slip through the cracks. In applying the duty across three agencies, Amendment 85 risks creating an environment in which accountability is unclear, presenting challenges for all bodies in ensuring that the necessary services are provided to those who need them.
It is the Government’s clear view that there are no ready-made solutions such that we would be in a position to legislate here and now. We need to better understand the existing landscape and the gap in provision, which is why the domestic abuse commissioner’s mapping work is so vital. We need to draw on the evidence provided by that work and other sources, consult widely and then come forward with proposals that command widespread support and, most importantly, deliver the necessary support in the most effective and efficient way possible.
As part of this work, we need properly to understand the resource implications of any new duty. The £125 million of new money that we have provided to fund the duty in Part 4 shows both the level of our commitment and the significant cost of any parallel new duty in relation to community-based support. Women’s Aid has suggested that some £220 million is needed. I make no comment on that or the accuracy of that estimate, but it at least demonstrates that Amendments 31 or 85, were either to be passed, would have significant financial implications, which this House should be alive to.
Recognising that the House is reluctant to let this Bill pass without it containing some provision that recognises the problem and provides a pathway to the solution, the Government have brought forward Amendments 17, 20, 22, 24 to 29 and 99. Amendment 17 places a duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to prepare and publish a report under Clause 8 of the Bill on the need for community-based domestic abuse services in England and the provision of such services. As with the provisions in Part 4 of the Bill, we have limited this duty to the provision of community-based services in England in recognition of the fact that we are generally dealing here with devolved matters in Wales. The commissioner will be required to deliver a Clause 8 report on this issue within 12 months of commencement and then, by virtue of the provisions in Clause 16, Ministers will be required to respond to any recommendations directed at them within 56 days. This amendment will therefore set out a clear roadmap for the Government to set out definitive proposals for addressing the gap in the provision of community-based support.
Amendments 20, 22 and 24 to 29 address the concerns raised in Committee that the new duty in Part 4 of the Bill may have unintended consequences regarding community-based support that is currently provided or funded by local authorities. I know that my noble friend Lord Polak was particularly concerned about this. As a result of the £125 million funding that we are providing to tier-1 local authorities to support the delivery of Part 4, we think that such concerns are unfounded. However, we recognise that there would be merit in making provision in Part 4 to monitor any unintended impact. These amendments do just that.
The amendments will also ensure that the domestic abuse local partnership boards, provided for in Clause 56, play an active part in such monitoring and that the results are recorded in tier-1 local authorities’ annual reports under Clause 57. These annual reports will feed into the work of the ministerially led national expert steering group, of which the domestic abuse commissioner will be a member, so that the impact, if there is any, of the Part 4 duty on the provision of domestic abuse support to people in the community by local authorities can also be monitored.
The Government are ready to take one further step. I can say that the Government are now committed to consulting on the provision of community-based domestic abuse services in the upcoming victims law consultation. I recognise the concerns about missing the legislative bus and the suspicion—it is unfounded—that the Government will kick this into the long grass. The government amendments that I have outlined will ensure that that does not happen, as will our commitment to consult on a victims law later this summer.
As to the concerns that this is all too far off and victims need support now, there is already significant provision. Since 2014, Ministry of Justice funding has helped police and crime commissioners to support victims of crime within their local areas, addressing the specific local needs identified within their communities. This core grant will be around £69 million in 2021-22, which includes an uplift for child sexual abuse services. Additionally, the Government have committed a further £40 million, which includes £9.7 million for domestic abuse community-based services commissioned by PCCs for the coming year, as well as £8 million for independent domestic violence advisers, the support of which will be felt mostly in the community. This does not take account of support provided by local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and others. It may not be enough, but these sums demonstrate the significant levels of community-based support that are already available for domestic abuse victims and their children, and for other victims of crime.
I am very much looking forward to hearing the other contributions to the debate on these amendments. I reiterate my thanks to my noble friends Lord Polak and Lady Sanderson, who are in the Chamber now, and to other noble Lords who have engaged so constructively on this. I hope that what I have said today is evidence of our intent and that the House will support this approach. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, is absolutely right to say that peace has broken out, but I do not think that your Lordships were ever at war. We have all been seeking the same ends. This has been a good and succinct debate—long may that last—and from what several noble Lords have said I know that they will keep a close eye on developments over the next few months.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Primarolo, made specific points about perpetrators being brought to book and that victims should be able to stay in their own home. The importance of community-based services for the victims of domestic abuse and their children is unquestionable. We share noble Lords’ ambitions to see all the victims of this terrible crime being supported.
It might assist the House if I briefly recap the Government’s reasoning on why now is not the appropriate time to legislate on this issue. I shall return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The current landscape is complex. Unlike accommodation-based services, those in the community are funded and commissioned not only by PCCs but by local authorities and clinical commissioning groups. Further, as another noble Lord said, the third sector is prominently involved in this. Introducing an undeveloped statutory duty in the Bill would run the risk of cementing in legislation a complex landscape that we are working hard to simplify. Equally, placing the duty on only one of these public bodies would be to risk legislating for responsibility in the wrong place. This is far too important an issue on which to legislate in a rush.
Several noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Russell, the noble Baronesses, Lady Primarolo and Lady Burt of Solihull, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh talked about the funding behind this, which is crucial. In fact, it has gone to the heart of the position taken by the Government. We must understand fully the cost of such a duty before we can implement it. The MHCLG duty has been funded at a cost of £125 million, so any action around community-based services must be funded appropriately. As I have said, significant government funding is already provided for these services, with an additional £17.7 million for them having been announced only last month. The results of this funding will be a further crucial piece of information to help us understand further need. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others that funding for the commissioner also has to be in place.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about the position in Wales and Amendment 17 placing a duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to prepare and publish a report under Clause 8 on the provision of domestic abuse services in England. As with the provision made in Part 4, we have limited the duty to the provision of these community-based services in England in recognition that generally we are dealing here with devolved matters in Wales. However, the noble Baroness is absolutely right to ask the question. We recognise the concerns raised by noble Lords, which is why we have tabled amendments to demonstrate our commitments in this space.
The statutory duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to publish and lay before Parliament the Clause 8 report on the provision of and need for community-based support services, and the statutory duty on tier 1 local authorities to monitor and report on the safe accommodation duty on the provision of community-based support in their area, will together ensure that the Government have all the information they need to protect and support safe accommodation and services in the community. In addition, I have committed today to consulting this summer on a statutory duty around community-based services in the upcoming victims’ law consultation. This is a commitment to explore precisely the issues that noble Lords have highlighted in this debate. It will give us the time to do them justice. To rush legislation now would, as I have said, risk solidifying into statute the wrong framework and accountability mechanisms, as well as the wrong arrangements for ensuring that responsible public authorities collaborate to ensure that victims receive the services that they need.
We also cannot take a shortcut with a regulation-making power, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. As I said in my opening speech, your Lordships’ House does not like the kind of skeletal powers that would be provided for in Amendment 31. Any new duties in respect of community-based support should be set out in primary legislation, as we have done for accommodation-based support in Part 4. This issue must be given thorough and thoughtful consideration. We will use the consultation to interrogate fully the current landscape of community-based services and to develop effective proposals on how we might ensure that it remains robust and effective in order to give all victims access to these vital services.
My noble friend Lord Polak pointed to the fact that Amendment 85 also seeks to make provision for perpetrator programmes. I agree entirely that more is needed here. The noble Baronesses, Lady Primarolo and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, also talked about the issue. I will set out our plans in this area when we come to debate other amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. The needs of victims and perpetrators are clearly of a different order, but we recognise that both issues need to be addressed. However, we are not persuaded that they should be conflated in a single provision such as that provided for in Amendment 85.
I turn finally to Amendment 30. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that for the reasons I have explained, we would not expect local authorities to give priority to accommodation-based support services over community- based services, so the circumstances addressed in the amendment should not arise. In response to his question, once the new duty under Part 4 becomes law the public sector equality duty will apply to local authorities in delivering their functions under it.
In assessing needs, local authorities will consider the differing requirements of all victims. This goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, because that will include those with relevant protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, as well as victims who might come in from outside the specific local authority area. As set out in the draft statutory guidance, tier 1 local authorities should make it clear in their strategies how they plan to make support services available that will meet the needs of all victims. The strategy should set out the support needs that have been identified as part of the local needs assessment, along with a clear breakdown of the differing needs of victims’ groups such as, but not limited to, those from BAME backgrounds or who identify as LGBT, and how they will address the barriers faced by victims with relevant protected characteristics and/or multiple or complex needs. I hope that that will answer the point put by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
We want the same outcomes here. I think and hope that the road map that I have set out, underpinned by our amendments, has reassured noble Lords that the Government are committed to taking this issue forward at pace. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, not to move his amendment. I thank all noble Lords for taking part in what has been an incredibly constructive debate and I hope that these government amendments will be universally supported.
I have received a request to ask the Minister a short question from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
My Lords, I want to ask the Minister a couple of quick questions. The first relates to the additional money she mentioned today and in Committee that is going to local authorities to help to implement the legislation. Given what the NAO has said this morning, is she confident that local authorities will actually spend the money in the areas in which the Government wish them to? Secondly, on the question put by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about the jeopardy that women-only spaces in refuges are coming under because of local authority commissioning policies, will the Minister remind those authorities of the need to implement fully the Equality Act 2010 and not try to reinterpret it?
My Lords, I will answer the last question first. The Equality Act 2010 is of the utmost importance here. Whether or not I actually remind every local authority of its obligations under that Act, they have statutory duties, and under- pinning the work of every single local state body is the Equality Act.
Will local authorities necessarily spend the additional money on what they have been tasked with spending it on? It is being given to them in conjunction with a duty. I know, because of what she has said, that both the domestic abuse commissioner and the local boards will be scrutinising the spending and commissioning of those services locally.
My Lords, as I indicated in Committee, I agree with the general aim of the amendment, which is to ensure that criminal liability and punishment for a breach of a DAPO should occur only if the breach is proved to the criminal standard of proof. I heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and a number of other contributors to this short debate that the essential purpose of the amendment is for me to repeat from the Dispatch Box what I set out in a letter. I will aim to do just that.
I therefore make two main points. First, a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence. As with all criminal offences, this will require the police to investigate the case and refer it to prosecutors, who will decide whether to pursue a prosecution. Secondly, the fact that a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence means that, as with all criminal offences, the criminal standard of proof will apply automatically when the court is dealing with the case. A criminal conviction cannot be entered, or criminal sanctions imposed, unless and until the criminal standard of proof has been met.
The criminal standard of proof applies, therefore, when we are dealing with a breach of a DAPO. It does not apply when we are dealing with the making a DAPO. When we look at whether a DAPO should be made, the civil standard of proof applies—that is, the balance of probabilities. But in order to impose criminal sanctions for its breach, the criminal standard of proof will apply—that is, beyond reasonable doubt. I hope that has set out the position clearly and unambiguously.
Picking up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, “beyond reasonable doubt” is the standard of proof; “without reasonable excuse” is an element of the offence, which would have to be proved to that standard. That is the difference between the two phrases.
We have taken this approach to the DAPO because we want to send a clear message to perpetrators that breach of an order is a serious matter and will be acted on. As I stated in Committee and during my engagement with the noble Baroness and others since, this approach is similar to other civil protective orders that carry criminal liability for breach, such as the non-molestation order, stalking protection order and knife crime prevention order. The approach is therefore consistent with our existing legal framework.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked why some victims may not want to go for criminal sanctions. That might not be their preference for a number of reasons. First, they may be concerned about the possible consequences for their partner or ex-partner and would not want them criminalised for a breach or, indeed, if the point of the question was, “Why isn’t the original order criminal?”
Fundamentally, the proposed orders are intended to be preventive and not punitive. They will enable courts to impose positive requirements which can help to achieve long-term sustainable behaviour change and challenge perpetrators to address their abusive behaviour. For example, the perpetrator might be required to attend a behaviour change programme or an alcohol or substance misuse programme, or undergo a mental health assessment. That may help those victims who wish to maintain a relationship with their partner or family member but want the abuse to stop. It is a strength of the DAPO that it is such a flexible remedy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised contempt of court. If a victim wanted a breach of an order other than one made in a magistrates’ court to be dealt with as a civil contempt of court, they could make a committal application to the court, including for an arrest warrant, if necessary. In those circumstances, the court has the power to remand the perpetrator on bail or in custody. We would expect that victims’ views would be considered, together with other questions of public interest, when deciding which sanction for breach is appropriate.
On her point about the guidance, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will recall that in Clause 48 there is a provision for guidance to the police, and in Clause 73 there is provision for guidance to others, including victims.
This is one of the strengths of the DAPO when compared to other existing orders used in these cases, such as the domestic violence protection order. The responses to our consultation highlighted that the absence of a criminal sanction following breach of the DVPO limits the effectiveness of that order. We have therefore ensured that non-compliance with a DAPO is met with the appropriate consequences. In that regard, I reiterate a point I made in Committee: in its report, the Joint Committee did not raise issues with using the civil standard of proof for making a DAPO when examining the draft Bill.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, noted, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised on a number of occasions that we are making a move from civil standard to criminal standard when breached. With respect, I have set out the Government’s position in response to that on a number of occasions. We are satisfied that the system we have in the Bill is appropriate. There is nothing in the point, I would respectfully say, that there is something wrong with criminal sanctions on breach for an order made on the balance of probabilities. They are two conceptually distinct questions First, what is the standard for the order to be made? Secondly, what do you have to prove for criminal sanctions when there is a breach of that order?
As for the question on going to the magistrates’ court, one of the strengths of this order is that it can be issued quickly in response to a crisis incident, as with the existing domestic violence protection order. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said, ultimately, we are dealing with the question of protection for victims.
I hope that my explanations on the standard of proof in this short debate, alongside the explanations I provided in Committee and my subsequent discussions with noble Lords, have been helpful. I hope that what I have said today has been clear and unambiguous. I therefore respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Paddick’s question about the underlying architecture, if that is the right phrase, still stands, but I will not pursue it now. I am grateful to the Minister for all he said about the application of the provisions. I did not make myself as clear as I should have done about what he explained as someone not wanting to go for criminal prosecution. That was not quite my point, which was about inability and due process, which is a term we would do well to keep in mind—due process for both parties.
The Minister has been very clear in his explanation of the standard. I am conscious of how much business the House has to get through today, so I will not prolong this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, first, I congratulate my noble friend Lady Newlove on bringing forward these amendments, which, as she said, will create a new criminal offence of strangulation and suffocation. A number of tributes have been paid to my noble friend; they are all well deserved and I associate myself and the Government with them. If I may pick up one phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, she has made a real difference and, moreover, in a really important area. I assure him and the House that we listen. I will listen to noble Peers on this and on other matters. We will not always agree but I will always listen.
There have been a number of powerful and brief contributions. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was kind enough to thank the Government, which is very welcome. I will seek to make it a more regular occurrence but it is warmly accepted. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, mentioned, and as my noble friend Lady Newlove identified, a number of organisations have worked hard in this area. Their names are on the record and they deserve the credit as well.
I am also personally grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for the discussions which he and I have had on this matter, together with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. They have been extremely useful to me. Perhaps I may also pick out some good discussions I have had with somebody who did not contribute to this debate but has worked hard in this area: the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. She certainly improved my knowledge of and focus on this matter.
My noble friend Lady Newlove has highlighted to the Government why this new offence was necessary. She has engaged with me and my officials, to whom I should also pay tribute for working at significant speed, together with Professor David Ormerod—I think I can now say Professor David Ormerod CBE. This is not the first time, and will not be the last, that he has contributed significantly to the criminal law of this country. I will take a few moments to explain the architecture of the offence, because it is a new offence.
The key amendment in the group is Amendment 49, which provides for the substantive new offence. Strangulation and suffocation are always dangerous and, subject to the issue of consent, which was raised by a number of noble Lords and which I will come back to, they are wholly unacceptable. Strangulation can not only injure but be used by perpetrators to cause fear or exert control over their victim, as part of an abusive relationship.
Amendment 49, as I have stated, seeks to create a new offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation in England and Wales. It applies to behaviour which is currently criminal, so the aim is to improve the ability to prosecute such offences effectively—a point made by a number of noble Lords. The offence is designed to deal with assaults on any person where this affects their ability to breathe, whether by application of force to the neck—that is, strangulation—or by any other act; for example, by suffocation or constriction. The offence applies to all cases where strangulation or suffocation takes place, including those that occur in a domestic abuse situation. To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, this offence is not restricted to domestic abuse situations but it is quite right that it is in this Bill, because it is often found in those situations.
Although such criminal behaviour can currently be captured under the offence of battery or, where more serious harm is caused, via the offence of causing actual bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, the Government have been persuaded of the need to distinguish such crimes through a stand-alone offence. Serious offences against the person currently require actual bodily harm, which can make cases of strangulation or suffocation potentially difficult to prosecute. That is because the victim may have no, or limited, signs of injury. The problem can be compounded by the fact that the existing charge of battery, which carries a penalty of six months’ imprisonment, does not enable the seriousness of the offence as experienced by the victim—the terror caused during the assault or the often long-lasting psychological effect of it—to be suitably punished.
Unlike the summary-only offence of battery, the new offence of strangulation or suffocation will not be time-limited if a prosecution does not commence within six months of the offence. But perhaps of greater importance here, as my noble friend Lady Newlove identified, the new offence will expose the defendant to a more serious sentence than the current six months’ imprisonment for battery. That is because the nature of the harm required to qualify for the maximum five-year penalty has been reduced.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the Minister has been generous with his time and has spoken with the group twice. The purpose of this amendment is well understood by the contributors to this short debate and by the Minister. The purpose is simple: it is to close a loophole, to make sure that all child contact centres reach the necessary standard, that there is some form of overview and accreditation and that there are consequences if that standard is not reached.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, succinctly put it, we know that, as far as the courts are concerned, only accredited child contact centres should ever be used. However, what about other referrals to child contact centres? What about private referrals or referrals by local councils or other organisations such as Barnardo’s?
In the discussions that we have had with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, he has asked for proof that there is a problem. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, said, it is difficult to provide proof, because you are looking for organisations and child contact centres that do not necessarily advertise their services. If they run into problems, they can easily withdraw the advertising and re-emerge in another form, but with the same people running them. At the moment, there are no consequences for people playing fast and loose with the system, if I may put it like that. There needs to be some consistency across the range of services and regulated services that children use. This anomaly needs to be addressed and I can see no better place to do it than in this Bill with this amendment right now. I and my party will support the amendment if it is moved to a vote.
My Lords, as I indicated in Committee, I fully recognise that the provision of child contact centres is extremely important to supporting families and enabling parents to have contact with their children, while at the same time providing a safe environment that protects children and adults from potential harm. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, put it, there is no agenda here, in the sense that we all have the same aim. The question is the best means of achieving it.
It is essential that all children experience the same high level of care and safeguarding where circumstances have necessitated their involvement with the family justice system and child contact centres or services. I thank noble Lords and the National Association of Child Contact Centres for their engagement with me and my officials since Committee. I have met, on a number of occasions, several noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment. I have found those discussions extremely helpful and I am grateful to them for the time that they gave to discussing the issue with me in more detail.
This amendment differs from the amendment debated in Committee, because it provides that the child contact centres should be accredited in accordance with national standards to be specified in regulations laid by the Secretary of State. The amendment in Committee did not specify who would set the accreditation standards. I continue to question whether the statutory accreditation proposed in this amendment is required or would provide a more effective form of regulation than that which currently exists through the NACCC accreditation framework and the statutory regulations governing local authorities.
I extend my sincere thanks to the NACCC for the useful overview of the current landscape of unaccredited child contact centres and services in England and Wales that it produced following Committee. That review was conducted at some pace and has been used to inform further discussions on this matter. While I accept and take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that it is hard to identify evidence in this area, it is fair to say that the work that was done was at a somewhat high level.
My Lords, may I address head on two points that the Minister has raised? First, the case has been made of how difficult it is to access the evidence and whether it is in the public interest to put this in the public domain. This is an extremely sensitive area and we have done our best to provide the evidence on the two occasions when my noble friend has requested it. Secondly, there is a legislative loophole. The Government undertook to come forward with regulations to establish the regulatory framework to set the standards in place and they have failed to do so. For what reason have the Government not brought forward these regulations and why are they not prepared to bring them forward at this time? I am at a loss to understand why that is the case.
I will be brief. On the first point that my noble friend raised about evidence, I accept that people have done their best in the short time available. However, with respect, the points that I made about the high-level nature of that evidence stand. At the moment, we are not persuaded that there is a need to legislate in this area. On the second point about the loophole, I would be repeating what I said earlier. For the reasons that I set out, the position at the moment is that the use of unaccredited child services is rare. In circumstances where they are used by local authorities, that would be covered by their statutory duty under the Children Act. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the amendment is required or would even necessarily be effective.
I am most grateful to the Minister for his fulsome reply and for trying to get to grips with this issue, but I point out that it has been 14 years since the need for standards was originally raised. I did not mention some cases in my speech today because I have not been able to check them out in detail—we could not track down the details of the services—but I have names of services that I would be prepared to share in confidence with the Minister. I believe that there is evidence that this area is unregulated, that there is a gap and that children are at risk now, today. If we are dealing with domestic abuse, we must not leave children vulnerable. Therefore, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, it is important to recognise that domestic abuse does not happen in a neat silo. It is inherently bound up with the wider issues of mental health and substance abuse.
We cannot ignore the impact of devastating cuts to our public services through a decade of austerity. The Royal College of Psychiatrists called for the Government to reverse the cuts and enable local authorities to invest at least £374 million in adult services to cope with the increased need. Indeed, report after report highlights the poor preparedness of our public realm to cope with this dreadful pandemic. It is as a consequence of the austerity decade that council funding has been cut to the bone.
Mental health services have been particularly impacted by austerity, leading to a lack of services and long waiting times. Victims and survivors with mental health problems also face barriers in accessing many other vital services due to strict eligibility criteria and not being able to engage in the way that the services require. Such barriers often lead to people being bounced between different services and having to constantly retell their story. There is awareness of the complex and interrelated needs of those with mental ill-health, but many services are unequipped to support them and few services exist that can care for people with both mental health and substance misuse issues.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, spoke expertly and knowledgably about the close link between domestic abuse and alcohol, with a perpetrator drinking heavily. Of course, there are instances where the victim’s drinking leads to uninhibited behaviours that can trigger abuse. Similarly, the victim may use alcohol and drugs to self-medicate. We know that the level of alcohol consumption has increased during the pandemic, thus exacerbating an already known problem.
This should be part of the Government’s work on community services. They have made a commitment to consult on the provision of community services for victims and perpetrators. Will the Minister give a commitment that the consultation will explicitly include the provision of alcohol and substance misuse services? All this work will be effective only if we look at tackling domestic violence in the round.
In conclusion, the importance of multiagency and holistic working in this area cannot be overemphasised. It is important to recognise that mental health and addiction problems can create additional vulnerabilities which people perpetrating abuse may seek to exploit. If the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, decides to test the opinion of the House, the Opposition Benches will strongly support her.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, for tabling this amendment. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss the issue with them at length. As the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox of Newport, observed, domestic abuse does not happen in a neat silo. That is a very good way of putting it in the context of this amendment.
In Committee we debated the complex relationship and obvious correlation between domestic abuse, mental health problems and the misuse of drugs and alcohol. Some of us have witnessed the way in which someone who abuses a substance such as alcohol seems to have a switch flicked within their brain and suddenly becomes potentially very aggressive. That is not an excuse for domestic abuse. It is important that both victims and perpetrators have the opportunity to address these issues, and that they get the support they need. To this end, the statutory guidance issued under Clause 73 will reflect the importance of joining up domestic abuse, mental health and substance misuse services.
As I informed the Committee, local authority spending through the public health grant will be maintained in the next financial year. This means that local authorities can continue to invest in prevention and essential front-line health services, including drug and alcohol treatment and recovery services. We want to ensure that people who need support for alcohol and substance misuse issues can access the right services commissioned by local authorities. The Government are working on increasing access, and we have appointed Professor Dame Carol Black to undertake an independent review of drugs to inform the Government’s work on what more can be done.
The overarching aim will be to ensure that vulnerable people with substance misuse problems get the support they need. The review will consider how treatment services can enable people with a drug dependency to achieve and sustain their recovery. These will span a wide range of services with which they might interact across mental health, housing, employment and the criminal justice system. The review is currently focusing on treatment, recovery and prevention. The Government look forward to receiving Dame Carol’s recommendations shortly.
I reassure noble Lords that we intend to reflect the importance of joining up domestic abuse, mental health and substance misuse services. The joint strategic needs assessment produced by local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and other partners should include consideration of the needs of victims and survivors. This assessment informs the commissioning process for the local area. In addition, joint working through local health and well-being boards helps support people who may have co-occurring substance misuse, mental health and domestic abuse issues with more effectively commissioned services in order to improve outcomes and the use of local resources. We want to ensure that, no matter where someone turns, there is no wrong door for individuals with co-occurring conditions, and that compassionate and non-judgmental care centred on the person’s needs is offered and accessible from every access point; for example, people can access via a referral from their GP, or by self-referral. I hope this reassures noble Lords that assessing and meeting the needs of the local population are already integral to the commissioning and provision of healthcare services.
In addition, the Government have announced a total of £25 million in funding for domestic abuse perpetrator programmes. This more than doubles the £10 million funding for such programmes last year. Through them, we funded a number of interventions that sought to address issues such as substance misuse and mental health problems as part of a wider programme of intervention.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, is pleased that the Bill introduces domestic abuse prevention orders—DAPOs—which enable positive requirements such as attendance at a drug or alcohol programme or a behavioural change programme. The courts will also be able to require the subject of such an order to wear a sobriety tag.
The Government recognise the harm that alcohol can cause and have already committed to rolling out sobriety tags as part of a wider programme to tackle alcohol-fuelled crime. Following two pilots and a successful judicial engagement programme, the alcohol abstinence monitoring requirement was launched in Wales on 21 October last year. This has proved a popular option for sentencers in Wales and we will be rolling out the new requirement in England later in the spring.
We are also committed to our ambitions in the NHS long-term plan for expanding and transforming mental health services in England, and to investing an additional £2.3 billion a year in mental health services by 2023-24. This includes a comprehensive expansion of mental health services, ensuring that an additional 380,000 adults can access psychological therapies by 2023-24.
I would add that the domestic abuse commissioner’s role requires her to adopt a specific focus on the needs of victims from groups with particular needs. She also has the power to make recommendations where she sees gaps in provision. I believe her role will offer independent oversight and the assurance that all issues relating to domestic abuse will be monitored closely.
Finally, it is worth briefly touching on the drafting of the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox of Newport, referred to this. It seeks to add to the definition of domestic abuse support in Clause 55. This relates to a new duty on tier 1 local authorities to provide support to victims of domestic abuse and their children within safe accommodation. As such, the amendment does not touch on the issue of support for perpetrators to help them address problems with alcohol misuse; nor does it deal with the provision of alcohol and mental health community-based support. This is the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, was making.
That said, I can assure the noble Baroness that, as part of the new duty in Part 4, tier 1 local authorities will be expected to assess the accommodation- based support needs of all domestic abuse victims and their children. Within the statutory guidance that will accompany Part 4, we describe the support within “relevant” safe accommodation as including support designed specifically for victims with unique and/or complex needs, such as mental health advice and support, and drug and alcohol advice and support.
Again, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Burt, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, and other noble Lords for drawing attention to this important issue, and I thank all noble Lords who have raised it during this debate. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness in relation to the existing provisions and our ongoing ambitions to address the links between substance misuse, mental health and domestic abuse. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I apologise for the short intermission while we changed places. The government amendments in this group relate to special measures and the ban on cross-examination in person as they operate in civil proceedings. The Government have taken careful note of the debate in Committee on Clauses 62 and 64, particularly the argument that there should be equivalent protections for the victims of domestic abuse in the civil courts as in family courts. I am personally grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for our discussions about these issues. As I explained in Committee, while we want to ensure that there is parity between each of the jurisdictions, we also need to build in allowances for the differences. That is why the provisions in respect of cross-examination and special measures in civil proceedings differ from those in family proceedings.
I shall speak first to Amendment 32 in respect of Clause 62. It is worth noting that the original provision in the Bill was based on recommendations made by the Civil Justice Council in its report published last year entitled Vulnerable Witnesses and Parties within Civil Proceedings. However, having reflected on the representations we have received and the cogent arguments put forward in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Amendment 32 would extend eligibility for special measures to those at risk of domestic abuse in addition to the existing provisions which provide eligibility for special measures for the victims of specified offences. We see the force of the argument to include this measure so that there will be an equivalent level of protection for domestic abuse victims across the jurisdictions. The Civil Procedure Rules will lay out how this is to work in practice, but the instruction in the Bill is a clear indication that those victims who have not reported their perpetrator to the police will have an opportunity to let the court know where they are at risk of domestic abuse.
As the existing clause provides, judges will still need to consider whether the quality of a person’s evidence or the person’s participation in proceedings is likely to be diminished by reason of vulnerability and, if so, whether it is necessary to make one or more special measures directions. However, we believe that including provision for those at risk of domestic abuse will mean that these victims will be covered and given the ability to avail themselves of special measures.
I shall say a further word on that, which I mentioned in Committee as well. By their nature, civil cases have the potential to cover a much broader range of circumstances where there is no prior connection between the parties; for example, where a victim is suing an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse, an action against an employer where abuse is alleged, or in a boundary dispute. This amendment is therefore an appropriate step. The breadth of cases in the civil courts means that it may not be appropriate in all cases to grant special measures, although our amendment makes it likely that they will be granted where there is a genuine need.
I turn now to Amendments 33 to 40 to Clause 64. These introduce an automatic ban on cross-examination in person by a litigant in person if the party to proceedings has been convicted or cautioned in relation to a specified offence against a party to the proceedings or where there is a protective injunction between the parties. The witness may also introduce additional evidence to prove that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and this too can give rise to an automatic ban. The evidence would be based on legal aid evidentiary standards and may include a letter from a GP or an employer. This is provided for in family courts through Clause 63. These amendments would therefore move the position in civil courts substantially closer to the provision in family courts on a ban on cross-examination. However, as with the point I made in regard to Clause 62, we have to be mindful of the differences between the two jurisdictions.
The clause, in so far as it relates to banning the cross-examination of vulnerable parties or witnesses, again stems from the report by the Civil Justice Council. The council recommended that the prohibition of cross-examination by a self-represented party should be extended to cover civil proceedings, thereby ensuring some parity with the criminal and family jurisdictions. The council did caution, however, that the ban or prohibition should not be automatic and absolute, bearing in mind the broad range of cases that come before the civil courts.
As I have said previously in our debates on the Bill, we have concerns in relation to the civil jurisdiction that there should be an automatic ban on cross-examination where the position is only that someone is charged with an offence against an individual; that is, where the facts of the case have yet to be proven. In the circumstances where someone is charged with an offence, we believe that it should be left to the discretion of the court to determine whether a ban is appropriate on the facts of a particular case. That is because, as I have said, civil and family jurisdictions are different in type of case they deal with, the civil jurisdiction having a much wider range.
I believe that these amendments will give better protection to victims of domestic abuse and bring closer parity between the civil and family jurisdictions. I beg to move.
My Lords, I explained in Committee the reasons for my amendments, which were directed at ensuring that special measures and the prohibition of direct cross-examination should be applied in civil cases on the same or a very similar basis as they are to be in family cases. Our debates highlighted the difficulties, fear and trauma for parties and witnesses in giving evidence and taking part in proceedings where they were victims or at risk of being victims of domestic abuse at the hands of other parties or witnesses. We spoke of the effect of reliving the trauma of abuse in subsequent court proceedings and the fear of the consequences of giving or challenging evidence given by or in the presence of perpetrators.
I argued that in many civil proceedings the risks and effects were the same. I mentioned disputes over property and goods, landlord and tenant disputes, employment disputes, inheritance disputes and business disputes—particularly when partners break up and the separation of their joint business interests gives rise to litigation. It is a truism for litigation lawyers that the disputes giving rise to the most bitterness and unpleasantness are precisely those where the litigants have a close personal connection. However, of course I take the Minister’s point that the range of disputes in civil cases is very much broader than it is in family cases.
The Government have listened to those concerns. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for the time that he and officials in his department made available to consider these issues and for the very useful discussions we had, which have led us to the position that special measures are now to be extended to persons who are or who are at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse, where the original unamended clause required that the person had to be the victim of a specified offence for which the perpetrator would have had to have been convicted, cautioned or charged.
I am delighted that the Government have agreed, no doubt because so many cases of domestic abuse never reach that stage—largely because so much abuse goes unreported or is never the subject of criminal investigation—that victims and those at risk of being victims should be protected in civil proceedings, as they are to be in family proceedings.
Although the amendments on direct cross-examination are complex, as the Minister has explained, they effectively offer broadly equivalent protection to victims of abuse in civil proceedings to that offered in family proceedings, which was the aim of my amendments. In addition to the discretionary protection which the court is to be able to give as a result of new Section 85F of the Courts Act 2003, to be introduced by Clause 64, there is now to be a clear bar on direct cross-examination in cases where the victim is a victim of an offence or protected by an injunction or where there is evidence of domestic abuse against the victim by a party or witness. The nature of the evidence to be required to trigger the mandatory bar will be specified in regulations. It is to be hoped that no undue formality will be required, but I am confident that will be the case.
These amendments achieve what I set out to achieve: to protect witnesses and parties in civil proceedings who have been subject to domestic abuse. I am therefore very pleased to have been able to add my name to the amendments and say—it is not the first time it has been said today—that this process has shown the House at its best. It has been a model of co-operation between some of us on the Opposition Benches and the Government of the day.
My Lords, I hope the House will forgive me if I am brief, because I am conscious there is a lot of business still to get through. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—my co-sponsor of these amendments—for his kind words and engagement. As he said, we have reached the position where there are broadly equivalent provisions in place across the jurisdictions.
I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. The point he raised about remote working and the courts having to work in real time in dealing with the pandemic and its effects is very important. To say any more at this stage would take me both outside the confines of this Bill and well off my brief. However, I have no doubt we will discuss it in this and other contexts in future.
My Lords, Amendments 41 and 104 relate to Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. Last year we committed to exploring whether an amendment to the Bill was needed to clarify that Section. As noble Lords will be aware, it deals with barring orders, as they are often called, which allow courts to bar individuals from making further applications without permission of the court. Importantly, therefore, the order does not prevent access to the court; it prevents making an application without first obtaining the permission of the court to do so.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Newlove asked for an update on the progress of the work. On responding to an amendment on barring orders put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, I said that I would consider the issue of Section 91(14) carefully ahead of this next stage. I can assure noble Lords that I have done precisely that.
The sad fact is that perpetrators sometimes use the family court as a way to continue their abuse, often bringing their victims back to court repeatedly, which can in itself be a traumatising process. It is an abuse of the victims and also, therefore, an inappropriate use of the court process.
As it is currently formulated, Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 does not include any detail as to the circumstances in which such barring orders should be used. Courts have therefore elaborated the principles for when such barring orders may, and should, be made. Last year we heard compelling evidence from the expert panel in its report Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases that, while they can be an effective measure, Section 91(14) barring orders are not being used sufficiently to prevent perpetrators continuing their abuse through the use of court applications under the Children Act 1989.
Before I go further, I want to pay respectful tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who delivered the seminal re P judgment in this area of law back in 1999. For over two decades the guidelines included in that leading judgment have been regarded as the main reference point for judges when they are making the often difficult decision on the use of Section 91(14). It is fair to acknowledge that it is clear from those guidelines that specific cases and types of harm, including harm from domestic abuse, are not excluded from consideration for a barring order. None the less, now is the right time for us to act on the evidence presented by the harm panel about how Section 91(14) is being understood and applied, particularly in domestic abuse circumstances.
As is evident from the many debates we have had on the Bill, we now know far more about the prevalence of domestic abuse and the different forms that it can take than we did in 1999. It is therefore right that as the Bill approaches the end of its parliamentary journey, we use the opportunity to clarify the ambit and application of Section 91(14) to ensure that we are providing greater protection to victims, survivors and their children.
The Government are clear that barring orders are available to protect parents and children where further proceedings would risk causing them harm, and particularly where proceedings could be a form of continuing domestic abuse. To that end, Amendment 41 introduces a new provision into the Children Act 1989: new Section 91A. The new section clarifies that the circumstances in which a court may make a barring order include where the court is satisfied that a further application made by the named person would put the child or another individual—for example, the parent victim—at risk of harm. It is a non-exhaustive example; the discretion is preserved, but an additional statutory indication is provided. As I have mentioned, this amendment responds to recommendations made by the harm panel.
The aim of Amendment 41 is therefore to make it clearer to courts and practitioners that Section 91(14) barring orders are indeed available where a further application would pose a risk of harm to a child or a parent victim, and in particular where that application could constitute further domestic abuse. In that context, I should highlight to noble Lords that while this amendment does not expressly mention domestic abuse, it refers to the concept of “harm” that is already found in the Children Act 1989. This is because the definition in Section 31(9) of the Children Act is already very broad. It already includes coercive control and other forms of domestic abuse, along with many other forms of harm.
We touched on that point in the government response to the Joint Committee’s recommendation to amend the definition of harm. As we said there, we believe that singling out a specific form of harm in any part of the 1989 Act could have unintended negative consequences and risk appearing to give greater weight to one form of harm than another. We do not want to create a hierarchy of harm. We have therefore opted for the wider concept of harm, consistent with the approach in the Children Act.
We have also responded to the harm panel’s report in a further way. The new Section 91A makes it clear that in determining whether to grant permission to make an application to a person who is subject to a barring order under Section 91(14), the court must consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the barring order was made. Our intention is to require that courts consider carefully whether the circumstances that gave rise to the barring order have materially changed, such that permission to apply should be granted. The amendment does not draw a red line such that permission can be granted only if there has been a material change of circumstances, but we believe that the inclusion of this provision, which requires the court to consider this question, will offer further protection to domestic abuse victims.
The amendment also makes it clear that courts can make these orders on their own initiative—of their own motion, as it used to be said—for example, without an application being made by the victim for an order to be made. This, too, is a response to the harm panel’s recommendations. We want to put beyond doubt that there need not be an application for a barring order in order for the court to consider making one. Of course, the court will still need to give due consideration to the making of such an order, but the amendment clarifies that the court can make an order on its own initiative.
The Government are therefore confident that the amendment will mean that barring orders are used more often by courts to protect victims of domestic abuse where further applications put them at risk of harm. It will also make sure that permission to apply will be granted only where the court has considered whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made, and also clarify that courts can make these orders on their own initiative. For those reasons, I beg to move.
My Lords, we support this government amendment and the amendment of the Title of the Bill that goes with it. As the Minister has explained, Section 91 of the Children Act permits the court to make a barring order—that is, an order forbidding someone, usually an applicant who has failed to persuade a court to make an order in his or her favour, from making an application for an order of a particular kind; this is usually but not always a repeat application—with respect to a child, importantly, without the leave of the court.
An order under this section still permits a further application for an order to be made if the court decides to permit it, which the court may in its discretion decide to do. This amendment, as the Minister has explained, extends the discretion to make a barring order if a further application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm. That is the real purpose and merit of this amendment: it is for the protection from repeated litigation of those who might be victims of domestic abuse, when that repeated litigation often amounts to a particularly unpleasant form of harassment by legal proceedings.
The jurisdiction is similar to the court’s jurisdiction to make civil restraint orders and civil proceedings orders against vexatious and unmeritorious repeat litigants in civil cases. Under this government amendment, a person subject to a barring order may of course seek permission to apply further to the court. That application for permission will be considered, but the court considering whether permission should be given to make a fresh application must consider whether there has been a change of circumstances since the making of the original order. That, I suggest, seems entirely sensible. The amendment therefore strikes a careful and judicious balance between protecting potential applicants and providing a safeguard against people being harassed by unmeritorious repeat litigation.
My Lords, again, I hope that the House and the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, will forgive me for being brief. I am conscious of the amount of the work that we have to get through. I am grateful for their comments and support for the purpose and effect of these amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, put it, we are striking a careful and judicious balance here between access to courts and preventing the court process being used as a vehicle for abuse. As we were reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, it is not only in cases of domestic abuse that Section 91(14) is available, although that is the purpose of the amendments before the House.
Again, with apologies for being brief, because there appears to be broad agreement, I beg to move Amendment 41.
My Lords, the proposed new clause in this amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would disapply the presumption that parental involvement furthers a child’s welfare in cases where there has been domestic abuse. It would also prohibit unsupervised contact for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for domestic abuse offences where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse or where the parent has a criminal offence for domestic abuse. I moved a similar amendment in Committee which did not receive the backing of a number of speakers in the debate or of the Minister.
In his response in Committee, the Minister said:
“I have a great deal of sympathy for the aims of these amendments, and I agree that more needs to be done to ensure that the courts take proper account of the impact that domestic abuse can have on children’s well-being and safety.”
He went on to say that
“following the recommendations from the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, the Government launched a review on the presumption of parental involvement”
which
“will focus on the presumption … and the impact on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of these provisions.”
He argued that it would
“be premature to amend the legislation relating to the presumption … before gaining the in-depth evidence from the review.”—[Official Report, 3/2/21; col. 2222.]
However, we should not forget that Women’s Aid’s Nineteen Child Homicides documents the cases of 19 children in 12 families who were killed in circumstances relating to child contact by a father who was the perpetrator of domestic abuse. The Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts said that it had
“received sufficient evidence to conclude that in the cohort of cases described in submissions the presumption further reinforces the procontact culture and detracts from the court’s focus on the child’s individual welfare and safety.”
The report also states:
“The panel is clear, however, that the presumption should not remain in its present form.”
There is thus some clear and, indeed, tragic evidence that the present arrangements relating to the presumption of parental involvement as opposed to solely what is in the best interests of the child, including its welfare and safety, are just not delivering the protections they should. However, in the light of the concerns expressed by some noble Lords in Committee, which have been repeated today, and the current review of the presumption of parental involvement, we did not put down the amendment for Report. Instead, we will continue to pursue this issue outside the discussions and debates on the Bill.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has explained, Amendment 42 seeks to disapply the presumption found in the Children Act—that parental involvement furthers the child’s welfare—when there has been domestic abuse that has affected the child or the other parent.
The amendment also seeks to prohibit unsupervised contact by a parent in a number of different circumstances: when they are on bail awaiting trial; when there are ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic abuse offence; when a fact-finding hearing concerning domestic abuse allegations is pending; and when domestic abuse is proven in such a fact-finding hearing or as a result of a criminal conviction for a domestic abuse offence.
In Committee, many noble Lords spoke passionately about the presumption of parental involvement and gave a number of examples of unsupervised contact leading to tragic results in cases which involved domestic abuse. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reminded us of some of them this evening. As I said in Committee, I have significant sympathy for the aims of this amendment and agree that more needs to be done to ensure that the courts are taking proper account of the impact domestic abuse can have on children’s well-being and safety. That is why this Government, in November 2020, following the recommendations from the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, launched a review of the presumption of parental involvement. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, referred to the harm panel’s report, but it is important to acknowledge that the panel did not call for immediate legislative change, despite hearing evidence from more than 1,200 parties. Instead, the panel recommended that a full review be undertaken by the Government, and that is precisely what we are doing.
In my respectful view, the panel was right to do so because, as the debate in Committee demonstrated, this is a complex and nuanced issue, with a significant real-world impact for the thousands of families who go through the family courts every year. That review will focus on the application of the provision and its exceptions, and the impact on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of those provisions. Through the review, we will develop a strong evidence base and ensure that any changes brought about as a result of it are rooted in a solid understanding of the effect of the presumption and the associated evidence on child welfare. I remain of the view that it would be premature to amend the Children Act in the way proposed by the amendment before gaining the in-depth evidence and response from the review.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, powerfully moved this amendment and went into the detail of the problems that arise when refuge addresses are revealed. I fail to understand why judges, in her words, are turning a blind eye to the requirement to keep the secrecy of a refuge; I fail to imagine why that might be the case. Nevertheless, either mistakes happen or some judges—very few—have an alternative view. What I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is that she wants the Minister to put on record that guidance will be updated and to make it absolutely clear that this should not happen again. I do not know whether she is going to move her amendment or what will happen, but I would have thought that, at the very least, the Minister should be able to do that and say that guidance will be updated.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Uddin, both have experience of working in refuges and they know the importance of keeping these addresses secret. I hope we will hear from the Minister something that sufficiently reassures his noble friend Lady Bertin that this issue can be properly addressed once and for all.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Bertin for her continued engagement on the issue of the confidentiality of refuge addresses. I take this opportunity to thank refuge providers and others in the sector who took time out of their very busy diaries to meet me on this issue: we had a very useful discussion.
As with many issues with the Bill, it seems to me that we all agree on the issues of principle. Refuges are places of safety. They play a vital role in effectively responding to domestic abuse, and in supporting victims and their children. Therefore, I am in complete agreement with the principle underlying my noble friend’s amendment, that those in refuges must be protected. As such, it is right that the Government and those involved in family proceedings carefully consider both whether existing measures offer enough protection and whether there are further steps that could be taken better to protect domestic abuse victims living in refuge accommodation.
In Committee, I outlined that those engaged in family proceedings are not required to disclose their address, or that of their children, unless specifically directed to do so by the court. Where such a disclosure direction is made, addresses are disclosed to the court only, and it is for the court to determine whether information it holds should be disclosed further. Where there are known allegations of domestic abuse, the court should hold this information as confidential. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the formulation I used in Committee was certainly intended to indicate agreement.
Turning to the service of orders at refuge addresses, I again thank those from the refuge sector with whom I discussed this issue and their experience of it. They gave some valuable evidence, and we heard some more this evening from the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin. As I indicated in Committee, existing measures, particularly Part 6 of the Family Procedure Rules, enable the court to direct bespoke service arrangements, and orders can be served at alternative addresses, such as the refuge office address. This approach should be taken wherever possible.
I noted the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put it: service on a refuge should be avoided. However, as I said on the last group, the real question is the welfare of the child, which is of paramount consideration in family proceedings. I remain of the view that there can be limited circumstances where the court may need to serve an order on a party at the refuge they are staying in because not doing so would pose risks to the safety of children involved in family proceedings.
One can envisage such cases, and I would not wish to limit the court’s ability to act quickly in those circumstances to safeguard a child, which might occur were we to place a blanket or inflexible restriction on addresses at which an order can be served. However, I would expect family proceedings where an order needs to be served at a residential refuge address to be very few and far between. Although the question must ultimately be a matter for the judiciary and not for the Government Front Bench, one would expect that a refuge address would be used only when there is no other viable alternative in the circumstances.
I have indicated that existing measures enable protection for victims in refuges. However, I am persuaded that there is a legitimate question of whether those measures could be strengthened to ensure that victims are better protected, that addresses are not disclosed to perpetrators, and that service of orders at refuge addresses is directed only when absolutely necessary. While I am clear that primary legislation, and therefore this amendment, is not the appropriate response here, there are other routes to explore, as I have discussed with my noble friend since Committee.
This issue has been discussed between Ministers and the President of the Family Division in recent bilateral meetings. I assure my noble friend that the judiciary is taking seriously the concerns raised. I appreciate, in this context, that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, wanted some reassurance from the Government; I hope I am giving it to him. The Whips may not agree, but one of the benefits of making slightly slower progress on Monday than we intended is that I can now say that this matter was discussed at the meeting of the Family Procedure Rule Committee on Monday, which was a couple of days ago. The committee agreed to work on this issue and will be giving it detailed consideration in the coming weeks and months.
The Government are committed to protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse from further harm by their abuser. I am confident that this issue is being properly and carefully considered by members of the senior judiciary and by the Family Procedure Rule Committee. I have full sympathy with the motivation behind this amendment. I understand why my noble friend has maintained this, and why the noble Lord, Lord Marks, had considerable sympathy with it on the confidentiality point, although I note that he did not engage with the lack of any exception to the proposition set out in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause—that is, service on a refuge address.
I have used my response to set out what the Government are doing and the steps being taken. I hope that, having provided that assurance to my noble friend, she will now be content to withdraw her amendment.
I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this short but very important debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her support and for putting her name to the amendment, and likewise to the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, for her kind words. It was powerful to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with all his deep knowledge of the law on these issues, and the noble Lord Ponsonby, agreed with the amendment. I felt it was important to hear them say that, and I thank them for it.
I am of course disappointed that my noble friend the Minister does not see that there is a need to put this into the Bill. I will never accept that there is justification for revealing the location of a refuge, but I have really appreciated the time that he has given to this issue. I can tell that he cares; he obviously has a concern about this issue and is committed to trying to deal with it. I absolutely accept that his response has gone further than that in Committee, so I will bank that progress and am grateful for it. We have indeed spoken at length about other routes to explore, and I will certainly be keeping in touch with him on this. I also want to pursue greater transparency.
I was very reassured—as my noble friend said, the timing has been fortunate—that the issue has already been discussed with the President of the Family Division on the back of the amendment. I do not doubt the judiciary’s willingness to tackle this and to take these accounts seriously. We will certainly keep a close eye on this and the progress that it makes. With that in mind, I will withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as noble Lords have pointed out, Amendment 45 removes the cohabitation requirement contained within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. This would extend the reach of the offence, meaning that it may apply to post-separation abuse, or to any family member regardless of whether they lived with the victim.
As noble Lords will be aware, the current offence applies only to those who are “personally connected” as defined in Section 76 of the 2015 Act. This definition applies to those in an intimate personal relationship—whether or not they live together—or to those who live together and have either been in an intimate relationship or are members of the same family. The definition in the 2015 Act is therefore out of sync with the definition in Clause 2 of this Bill.
The Government have listened carefully to the debate in Committee, where the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and many others argued for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence to be extended to cover post-separation abuse between intimate partners and interfamilial abuse regardless of whether the family members were living together. In Committee, I asked noble Lords to await the outcome of the review into the controlling or coercive behaviour offence—I really meant it—and I am pleased to say that this review has now been published.
The review found that police-recorded controlling or coercive behaviour offences, as well as prosecutions, have increased year on year since the introduction of the offence. However, the review also found there is still room for improvement in responding to this abhorrent crime. The review considered views from a number of stakeholders, who expressed concern that the cohabitation requirement in the offence is preventing some victims of this abuse from seeking justice, and that it poses challenges for police and prosecutors in evidencing and charging abusive behaviours under other applicable legislation.
Calls from domestic abuse services echo concerns around the cohabitation requirement of the offence, given that we know that victims who leave their perpetrators are often subjected to sustained or increased coercive or controlling behaviour after separation, and are statistically at the highest risk of homicide within the period immediately after they have left.
Controlling or coercive behaviour is an insidious form of domestic abuse and this Government are committed to ensuring that all victims are protected. We have heard the experts and considered the evidence on this issue and I am very pleased to support the amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. She has campaigned on it. She owns it. I am very happy that she is the sponsor. I commend the resolute campaigning on this issue by Surviving Economic Abuse and other organisations. I acknowledge the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, and I will draw her comments to the attention of my colleagues in the MoJ.
Amendment 45 will bring the definition of “personally connected” as used in the controlling or coercive behaviour offence into line with that in Clause 2 of the Bill and send a clear message to both victims and perpetrators that controlling or coercive behaviours, irrespective of the living arrangements, are forms of domestic abuse.
This Government are committed to doing all we can support victims and to tackle offenders. I am delighted that, in removing the cohabitation requirement in the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, we can take another step towards ensuring that every victim has access to the protection they need.
Amendments 46 and 47 seek to expand the definition of “personally connected” within the revised offence of controlling or coercive behaviour to include both paid and unpaid carers. I made it very clear during the debate on Monday on earlier amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, that the Government absolutely recognise that abuse can be perpetrated by carers. The other point that I made on Monday was that many carers will be captured by the “personally connected” definition, being family members or partners. However, I reiterate that extending that definition in the context of what is a domestic abuse offence would have detrimental effects on the overall understanding of domestic abuse and the complexities of the familial and intimate partner relationships that domestic abuse is understood to encompass, where the affectionate emotional bond between the victim and the perpetrator plays an important role in the power dynamics. By extending the definition to include carers we would be broadening the definition of “personally connected” to include a much wider range of connections within health and social care settings, which are of course covered by other legislation, and would confuse the meaning of “domestic abuse”.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Burt, talked about the important issue of ongoing training. I acknowledge that there is more to do to ensure that the offence is understood, and we will update the statutory guidance, in consultation with police and others.
In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, about what next, we will be strengthening the legislation around controlling or coercive behaviour to ensure that all victims of domestic abuse are able to receive protection, regardless of their living arrangements with their abusers. This summer we will be publishing a domestic abuse strategy, which will build on the work to date to help to transform the response to domestic abuse and to tackle perpetrators. We will consider the wider policy and data recommendations made in the review throughout the development and implementation of the strategy, and we will of course continue to engage with domestic abuse organisations throughout the process.
The noble Baroness mentioned monitoring. At the moment, all legislation is subject to ongoing review and monitoring, and we have the very important benefit of the domestic abuse commissioner, who I know will be keeping a very careful eye on how the legislation is working in practice.
I will not repeat the other points that I made on Monday, but I hope that, in the light of the debate then and my response today, the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, will be content not to move her amendment. To be clear, the Government’s position on Amendment 45, should Amendments 46 and 47 be moved, is that we will not support Amendments 46 and 47. There is cross-party support for Amendment 45 as currently drafted, and I urge the House not to detract from that should it come to a vote on Amendment 46. The House must of course first reach a decision on that amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have supported my amendments. I am grateful for the very kind words about my own personal commitment to these issues and that of my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson, who has wheeled with me through this amendment rollercoaster today. Disabled people, who face so many barriers in their fight for equal dignity and safety from those who may abuse their vulnerability, need this support; it gives them all strength to carry on.
I am of course deeply saddened by the Minister’s response. As I said earlier, I am not able now to divide the House; my hands are tied. I have no alternative than, very sadly, to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I must begin by applauding the frankness and honesty of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his speech. It is truly humbling to hear him speak so bravely about his own former coercive partner.
In bringing this much-needed amendment to the House, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, has recognised the changes that have occurred in society since the widespread introduction of mobile phone technologies and social media coverage. It has changed irreversibly the way in which we communicate, and the inherent dangers of the misuse of that communication have become increasingly prevalent. I warmly support her tenacity in getting the amendment through the process. Clearly, her colleagues and former colleagues in Government have listened and acted on her arguments. It will make a difference.
As a former teacher of media studies, I had no idea, just five years ago, when I was last in the classroom, how exploitative or dangerous the medium would become. The threat to share intimate or sexual images and films is an increasingly common tool of coercive control, which can have enormous negative impacts on survivors of abuse. While the sharing of intimate and sexual images without consent is a crime, threats to share are not, leaving survivors of this form of abuse without the protection of the criminal law.
During my reading for this topic, I was powerfully moved by a key report, Shattering Lives and Myths, written by Professor Clare McGlynn and others at Durham Law School, which was launched in 2019 at the Supreme Court. It sets out the appalling consequences for victims of intimate images being posted on the internet without consent.
Threats to share these images play on fear and shame and can be particularly dangerous where there may be multiple perpetrators or where so-called honour-based abuse is a factor. The advent of new technologies enables perpetrators to make these threats even where such images do not exist. But there is no clear criminal sanction for this behaviour. Lack of support leaves victims and survivors isolated, often attempting to navigate alone an unfamiliar, complex and shifting terrain of legal provisions and online regulation. The Domestic Abuse Bill is the most appropriate vehicle to make this change. Victims and survivors would benefit almost immediately and it would help them prevent further abuse and get away from their perpetrator. This amendment will close that gap in the law.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Morgan is to be congratulated on bringing forward these amendments. As she has explained, the amendments seek to extend the scope of the offence at Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, commonly known as the revenge porn offence, additionally to criminalise threats to disclose such images. Importantly, in any prosecution there is no need to prove the images exist at the time of the threat.
I reiterate that the Government consider that the revenge porn offence has worked well to date. There have been over 900 convictions for the offence since its commencement in April 2015. I am pleased to see that the creation of this offence has offered victims protection under the criminal law from the deeply distressing behaviour of sharing private intimate images.
I am very grateful for the discussions that I have had with the sponsors of the amendment in addition to my friend Lady Morgan: my noble friend Lady Hodgson of Abinger and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I have been happy to add my name on behalf of the Government to the amendment.
However, we cannot rest on our laurels. We must be alert, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, to changes in technology, including the misuse of social media and the opportunities to abuse and distress others that such developments can bring. While we have a range of criminal offences that in many instances can deal with those who threaten to share intimate material with others, it is vital that we ensure that the criminal law remains fully equipped to deal with any new problems in this constantly developing area.
It was with this in mind that the Government asked the Law Commission to review the law in this area. That review has considered the existing offences relating to the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images to identify whether there are any gaps in the scope of protection already offered to victims. Noble Lords will be pleased to note that on 27 February the Law Commission published the consultation paper on the review. The consultation ends on 27 May and I encourage noble Lords to consider contributing to that public engagement, as my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes said.
The consultation paper puts forward a number of proposals for public discussion, including the need to address those who threaten to disclose intimate images. I look forward to the Law Commission’s full proposals in this area once its final recommendations are published later this year. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, that the law must keep pace with technological developments. I would not say that we are behind the curve but I think that it is fair to say that the curve itself is constantly moving. While it would be wrong of me to pre-empt the consultation and the Law Commission’s eventual findings, I think the fact that the commission has acknowledged that threats to disclose intimate images should be further considered adds strength to the calls to extend the revenge porn offence, as provided for in Amendment 48.
We have listened to the passionate calls for change from victims. They have bravely shared their distressing, and sometimes life-changing, experiences of suffering at the hands of those who would manipulate and torment them with threats to share their most personal and intimate images. That point was made during this short debate by the noble Baronesses, Lady Crawley and Lady Uddin, and in particularly moving terms by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Since I have just mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, I remind her that sex and relationship education is part of the national curriculum.
We have also taken note of the views of campaigners and fellow parliamentarians. I remember the strength of feeling in this House in Committee, when my noble friend and others proposed a similar amendment to the one now before us. We have reflected on those calls and that debate and we are happy to support these amendments, which will extend the parameters of the Section 33 offence to capture the threat of disclosure.
As was noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, Amendment 48 stays as close as possible to the provisions and drafting of the existing Section 33 offence, rather than making any broader changes to the law in this area. I suggest that that is the right approach given the Law Commission’s ongoing work. I assure the noble and learned Lord and the noble and learned Baroness that the Law Commission is specifically considering the intent issue as part of its work. I am grateful that the amendment also has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Wilcox of Newport.
I should say something in response to the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. This is nothing to do with criminalising speech and we are not dealing with just domestic abuse here. This is a broad offence that applies throughout criminal law; it does not apply just in the context of domestic abuse. While I agree that other criminal law offences, such as blackmail and harassment, can be applicable in this area—a point I made in Committee—the Government have been persuaded that it is right and appropriate to have this specific offence in this area of the law.
For those reasons, I believe that this reform will create a clear and consistent enforcement regime for both threats and actual disclosures, thereby providing greater protection to those who may have had to endure such intrusive and distressing behaviour. It has been a pleasure to be able to add my name to these amendments, and I join my noble friend in commending them to the House.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in the debate on these amendments. As we heard the noble Lord, Lord Russell, put so eloquently, victims are suffering. I am pleased that the Government have decided that they do not have to wait until the conclusion of the Law Commission process.
Like other noble Lords, I pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for being so brave and clear about his own personal experiences of these issues, which will be outlawed by my amendment. I thank him for sharing his experiences with the House.
Like the Minister, I took careful note of what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. They pointed out that this is not the end of the matter, of course, and that the use of “intent” will be looked at during the course of the Law Commission consultation.
For those who remain in any doubt, I want to share just one of the stories that I heard about. It relates to Rachel, a lady who was physically abused by her partner. After her partner had been arrested and released by the police because of the physical abuse, he threatened to disclose the many images he held on his phone to Rachel’s family and friends unless she went back to the police to change her evidence about the level of physical abuse that she had suffered. She did so and he thought that he had gotten away with it until, sadly, the abuse continued to escalate; at that point, Rachel decided that she had to get out of the family home with her children. I am pleased to say that she is now in a much more positive and better place, but the fact that victims are changing their behaviour and evidence, allowing perpetrators access to their families and returning to them, shows, in addition to the mental suffering, the very real toll that the threat of showing these images has on their lives. It just shows the very real effect that these victims suffer.
I thank the Minister for adding his name to my amendment and I thank his officials in the Bill team, who worked so hard on drafting this amendment and the consequential ones. I am grateful to them and to him for allowing me to move this amendment, and I take great pleasure in moving Amendment 48.
My Lords, Amendment 50 is proposed by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, along with Amendments 51 and 66. These amendments were debated in Committee and when my noble friend tests the opinion of the House at the end of this debate, the Labour Benches will support her. Today and during Committee my noble friend, and other noble Lords who have spoken, have highlighted how domestic abuse can lead to death. We all know of the terrible figures about women who die at the hands of a partner or former partner.
My noble friend’s amendment draws attention to the tragic situation where some women—the victims of the abuse—find themselves in the dock when they have in the end killed their abuser, often after years of horrific abuse and in situations where they feared they were going to be killed. The Sally Challen case is an example of where coercive control had not been fully understood by the courts; further, pleading self-defence has not been working for women. My noble friend, who has many years of experience in the criminal justice system, has told the House of truly tragic situations where women have not been treated fairly, or where the horror of the situation that they and their children found themselves in has not been properly appreciated.
These amendments seek to correct this imbalance and would, in my opinion, put the law in the right place by protecting those victims who have had to defend themselves in situations where they have feared for their life. The law should provide them with the ability to mount a defence, along with an understanding by the court of the horrors of domestic abuse and the need, when your life is in danger from an abusive partner or ex-partner, to take actions which are not grossly disproportionate to defend oneself.
As my noble friend said, a situation often plays out where a woman is taken along a route where she has to plead guilty to manslaughter and is convicted. On release from prison, such women have problems for the rest of their lives, for example with employment; they may also find that they have lost their home, or their children may be taken into care.
My noble friend also carefully explained the intent behind Amendment 51; the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, drew attention to his support for it. It mirrors the coercive control provisions of the Modern Slavery Act.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked a powerful question: why is it that victims of domestic abuse are meant to retreat while someone under attack from intruders in their home has greater protection? That cannot be right.
This has been a very good debate and I look forward to the Minister’s response. As I said, we on these Benches will certainly support the noble Baroness when she divides the House.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for providing a full and detailed explanation of the reasons she believes that these amendments should be included in this Bill. In addition to the noble Lords who have spoken today, I am aware of the support that these proposals received last Thursday evening at the parliamentary event hosted by the noble Baroness and Jess Phillips MP on this subject. So that noble Lords do not think that only Kennedys can support other Kennedys, I join the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, in acknowledging and paying tribute to the noble Baroness’s work in, and experience of, this area.
The noble Baroness has put two amendments before the House; they are conceptually distinct, so I will address them in turn. Amendment 50 deals with the defence of the reasonable use of force by victims of domestic abuse who, in self-defence, react to violence from an abusive partner. Amendment 51 would create a new statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit a criminal offence. The third amendment, Amendment 66, is intimately linked to and logically consequent on Amendment 51.
I turn first to the reasonable use of force and Amendment 50. Although the Government are wholly sympathetic to the plight of victims of domestic abuse, we are unpersuaded that there is a gap in the law here that needs to be filled. Nor do we feel that the circumstances of a victim of domestic abuse, who has often experienced that abuse over a prolonged period, are necessarily comparable to that of a householder who suddenly finds an intruder in their home and acts instinctively.
Let me expand on that point. Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 covers a specific circumstance. Its focus is on those occasions where an intruder, who is unlikely to be known to the householder, puts the householder in a position where they react instinctively as a result of intense stress. By comparison, in domestic abuse cases, the response may not be a sudden instinctual one but may follow years of physical and/or emotional abuse.
Furthermore—and this is an important point—the current law on self-defence and loss of control allows that any previous and extended history of domestic abuse be taken into account. I respectfully disagree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the law on self-defence is, to use her word, outdated. It is not. As a result, it does not seem necessary to extend Section 76 of the 2008 Act to a wider set of circumstances as proposed by this amendment, given the defences that already exist in law.
I note too that no mention has been given in this new clause to a defendant’s option to retreat from the abuse, and I make that point with due care. I acknowledge, and am well aware, that an abused woman or man may not have that option. However, although Section 76 of the 2008 Act makes clear that there is no duty to retreat, the option to retreat remains a factor, and, where that is established on the facts of the particular case, it is a matter that will always be taken into account.
Therefore, although I warmly reciprocate the kind words that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said about me, and while I respect and acknowledge his personal history and experience, about which he has spoken extremely movingly on a number of occasions, I know that he will not like what I am going to say. I stand by the points that I have just made about the comparison or lack thereof between the householder situation and the situation of a victim of domestic abuse. I think at one point he came close to an implied charge of misogyny. I respectfully say that that does not easily sit with my approach to many amendments to the Bill or indeed the way in which I have dealt with the Bill itself. The issue between us is one of principle.
I am aware too that the noble Baroness who proposed the amendments has stated that there are difficulties with establishing the common-law defence of self-defence in cases of reactive violence by a survivor of domestic abuse against their abusive partner or former partner. As I stated in Committee, the ethos of the Bill is to improve and provide better support for victims of domestic abuse and to recognise and indeed highlight the wide-ranging impacts and implications of such behaviour. In raising the profile of domestic abuse, the Government hope to strengthen not only statutory agency support for victims and survivors but to improve the effectiveness of the justice system in better protecting those who suffer such abuse while bringing perpetrators to justice.
To that extent, I share the aims of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I assure her that this is not a question of finance; it is a question of the proper approach that the law should take in this area. That is because it is important for the Government to ensure that there is fair and equal access to justice for all. The law has to balance both the recognition of the abuse that has been suffered and the impact that it has had on a victim against the need to ensure that people, wherever possible, do not revert to criminal behaviour. I was pleased to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, agreed with me, at least on the latter proposition. The Government believe that that balance is currently reflected in the law—a law that continues to evolve but nevertheless strikes the right balance between those factors.
In making that last point, I referred in Committee to the fact that courts can often be quicker, more nuanced and more flexible in developing the common law than can Parliament in introducing a statutory provision that can be too rigid and narrowly drawn and may become more problematic than useful. I expressed myself as a fan of the common law, and I confirm again this evening that my enthusiasm for it is undimmed. Of course I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that sometimes Parliament can lead the way—but not here.
Before I conclude my remarks on this amendment, I shall reply to one other point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She said that the Government have moved on several parts of the Bill, so why not this one? The reason is that, for the reasons I have set out, there is a principled argument that we make and which we stand by. I suggest that that argument is rooted properly in the way that the law is now applied and in the distinction between the domestic abuse case and the householder case. Towards the end of her remarks, the noble Baroness asked me a couple of quickfire questions. I am not sure that I have picked them all up, so if, on reading the Official Report, I find that they are relevant to this amendment, I will respond to them.
Although the Government are sympathetic to the aim behind Amendment 50, we remain entirely unpersuaded that it is needed, given the current defences that exist in law and the increased help, support and advice that will be available to victims of domestic abuse throughout the rest of the Bill.
My Lords, these amendments fulfil an undertaking I gave in Committee in response to amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Bertin that sought to ensure that UK citizens who commit marital rape in countries where such behaviour is not criminal may none the less be prosecuted in the UK.
I said then that we would consider this matter ahead of Report and, bearing in mind that the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions are UK-wide, that we would also consult the devolved Administrations to ensure a consistent approach across the UK. We have done both —we have considered and we have consulted. I am pleased to say that, with the agreement of Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland, government Amendments 53 to 55, 58 to 61 and 63 to 65 achieve what my noble friend intended, and will apply to relevant legislation throughout the UK. I shall remind the House briefly, given the hour, of the provisions.
Schedule 2 to the Bill contains amendments to various enactments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This will ensure that, as required by the Istanbul convention, the UK will be able to prosecute these offences when they are committed outside the UK by one of our nationals or habitual residents. The scheme is this: part 1 of the schedule covers England and Wales, part 2 covers Scotland, and part 3 covers Northern Ireland.
In keeping with the normal principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the terms of the convention, there is a requirement that a prosecution for one of the relevant sexual offences—these include rape where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over—may be brought in the UK only when the offending behaviour is also an offence in the country where it happens. This is known as dual criminality.
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses marital rape, whereby rape could be committed by a UK citizen in a country that does not consider it a crime and, presently, no prosecution could be brought. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, brought the matter to the attention of the House in Committee and has been successful in persuading the Government of the merits of her case and the importance of closing this loophole.
I offer her my sincere congratulations on her success. Her actions will protect women and girls from the horrific crime of rape and ensure that no rapist or perpetrator of these vile crimes can evade justice through making use of this loophole in the law and hide behind the fact that marital rape is not a crime in a small number of countries. This is a good example of the House of Lords doing its job well. An important issue was raised, well argued and supported across the House; the Government considered it carefully and responded positively, bringing forward their own amendments to address the issue.
My Lords, I hope the House will forgive me again if my reply is very brief, not because the issue is not important but because there is obvious agreement across the House. I again thank my noble friend Lady Bertin for bringing this matter to the Government’s attention and for the discussions we have had. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his kind words on this matter this evening, which I appreciate. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark; I am very pleased to have his and his Benches’ support on this matter. I will not say any more given the time, but I commend this amendment to the House.
My Lords, I am pleased to offer my full support for Amendment 66A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. I would have happily signed the noble Lord’s amendment and apologise for not doing so. The noble Lord set out his case well—namely, that victims of domestic abuse must often endure lifelong risks from the perpetrator. The risk does not end when the relationship comes to an end and, as the noble Lord, Lord Randall, told us, it is often when the relationship has ended that the risk significantly increases.
I can see, therefore, as I am sure other noble Lords can, that some victims will want to get as far away as possible from the perpetrator. However, the action of some local authorities in introducing a local connection rule, whether for access to refuge places or for the provision of housing, puts victims at risk. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to ensure that, in England, victims can seek the protection of moving away to another place when seeking new housing, and that no local rules can be brought to bear that frustrate that protection or that desire if that is what the victims wish to do. With this and the other amendments that we are debating about enabling victims to make a choice that affords them the protection that they feel comfortable living with—that is what this is about—the noble Lord is looking for a positive response from the Minister on how we can move this forward. I am confident that we shall get that.
I should declare my relevant interest as vice-president of the Local Government Association, as this is a housing matter. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I hope I can provide that assurance. My noble friend Lord Randall explained that Amendment 66A seeks to amend the Housing Act 1996. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, just explained, that Act deems victims of domestic abuse to have a local connection to the relevant local authority in England when seeking homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Act.
I indicated in Committee, and will say again, that the existing legislation and guidance on this matter are clear. A victim of domestic abuse, or indeed anyone who is homeless or at risk of homelessness, can approach any local authority in England for assistance without a local connection. Once a local authority has accepted an application, it will then make inquiries around local connection, among other criteria. Ordinarily, if someone does not have a local connection in the area, but has a local connection elsewhere, the local authority may then refer that person to the other local authority. However, the legislation is clear that a housing authority cannot refer an applicant to another housing authority where they have a local connection if they, or anyone who might reasonably be expected to reside with them, would be at risk of domestic abuse.
The homelessness code of guidance makes clear that a housing authority is under a positive duty to inquire whether the applicant would be at risk of actual or threatened domestic abuse and stipulates that authorities should not impose a high standard of proof of actual violence in the past when making its decision. If an applicant is at risk, they can present at another local authority. As such, protections are already in place for victims of domestic abuse which ensure that they are not housed in a local authority area where there is a risk of violence or abuse and ensure that local connection is not a barrier to accessing that homelessness assistance. The local connection test seeks to keep a degree of fairness, ensuring that those who live locally are prioritised and no one authority gets oversubscribed, which is an important point.
The statutory guidance already ensures that victims of domestic abuse should not be hindered by local connection criteria when accessing support services. As I indicated, the Government are committed to proactively engaging with local authorities to ensure that there is a thorough and proper understanding of the new duty and wider domestic abuse policy, including in relation to local connection.
I acknowledge that it is clear from engagement with the sector and points raised by noble Lords today that there is perhaps a misunderstanding that Amendment 66A would impact on social housing allocations. Social housing falls under a different part of the Housing Act 1996 so, regrettably, the amendment before us would not meet my noble friend’s aim.
With regard to social housing legislation, since 2012 local authorities have had the power to decide who qualifies for social housing in their area, including through the use of a local connection test. However, statutory guidance published in 2013 advises local authorities to consider making appropriate exceptions, including for people moving into an area to escape violence. Guidance issued in 2018 goes further and strongly encourages all local authorities not to apply a local connection test to victims of domestic abuse in refuges or other safe temporary accommodation. With those words, I hope I have been able to satisfy my noble friend and, consequently, that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and my noble friend. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, did not have her connection—obviously it was not a local one. I will have to be satisfied; I think we are nearly there. I noticed that my noble friend changed some of the words—to “abuse” rather than “violence”; I think that is right.
She has been slightly saved by the bell. It had been pointed out to me that the amendment was not quite fit for purpose in what I had aimed to do. I tabled another amendment late and, if we had not got as far as we have today, I would have been able to speak to it next time, but that will not happen. I shall leave it there and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, when we debated the amendment tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, which intended to prohibit GPs from charging domestic abuse victims for legal aid evidence letters, I made clear my intention to try to reach a satisfactory conclusion on this matter. I was also clear that the Government wholeheartedly agree that vulnerable patients should not be charged for evidence to support them in accessing legal aid. That remains the Government’s position.
In Committee, I gave an undertaking to give this matter detailed consideration before Report, while, I hope helpfully, pointing out some technical defects with the amendment tabled but ultimately withdrawn by the noble Lord. The current position is that GPs can provide services in addition to NHS contracted services. These are classified as private services for which GPs have discretion to charge the patient for their completion in lieu of their professional time. The provision of letters of evidence to enable access to legal aid is one such private service.
A GP is one of many professionals to whom a vulnerable person can turn for a letter to provide evidence of domestic abuse for access to legal aid. It is up to the discretion of an individual GP practice as to how much any charge for private services should be and, indeed, whether a charge should be levied at all.
As part of the 2020-21 contract agreement, the British Medical Association recommended to all GPs that a charge should not be levied for letters providing this evidence. That was a welcome and important step forward, and a recognition by the BMA that vulnerable patients with limited means should not be expected to pay for such letters. We recognise and commend the vast majority of GPs who are following this guidance, but we recognise that this is a non-binding recommendation from the BMA, so we now move with this amendment to remedy this gap, having considered the matter carefully since Committee.
Amendment 66C achieves our aim. It will provide that no person may charge for the preparation or provision of evidence demonstrating that a person is, or is at risk of being, a victim of domestic abuse for the purpose of obtaining legal aid. The “relevant health professionals” listed in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause are those providing services pursuant to any of the general medical services, personal medical services, or alternative provider medical services contracts. A “relevant health professional” who has assessed the patient in the course of providing services under any of those three contracts will be prevented from charging for such a letter.
Importantly, the same amendment also prohibits charging for this letter through any vehicle, the health professional themselves or the practice, be it a company or a partnership. Nobody who seeks evidence from such health professionals demonstrating that they are a victim of domestic abuse, or are at risk thereof, for the purposes of obtaining access to legal aid, may be charged under the government amendment. With the agreement of the Welsh Government, this amendment will extend to England and Wales, subject to a legislative consent Motion which is being debated in the Senedd tomorrow.
In these respects, Amendment 66C will go further than Amendment 71 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. As I observed on a previous occasion, that amendment relies solely on the definition of a general medical services contract in Section 84 of the National Health Service Act 2006, therefore covering only one of those three types of GP contracts, and would not apply to almost 30% of practices. Obviously that was not his intention, but it is an important drafting point.
We have also taken the opportunity to future-proof this prohibition through the two regulation-making powers in proposed new subsections (3)(b) and (6). Proposed new subsection (3)(b) enables the Secretary of State to extend the scope of the prohibition beyond legal aid, should a health professional’s evidence of domestic abuse ever be relevant in other contexts, while proposed new subsection (6) enables the Secretary of State, or the relevant Welsh Ministers, to alter the lists of professionals and contracts caught by the prohibition. Should a change in the delivery of health service necessitate a change in the scope, we can do that with the appropriate regulations.
The remaining government amendments are largely consequential on Amendment 66C. Amendment 89A amends Clause 73 to provide that the Secretary of State can issue guidance about the prohibition. Amendment 103A provides for commencement on the first common commencement date following Royal Assent. Government amendments 95A to 95C, 98A to 98C and 99A to 99C make consequential amendments to Clauses 74, 75 and 76 respectively.
I remember well that in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, read out an impressive list of occasions when he had raised this matter. He went so far as to list the names of my illustrious predecessors with whom he had engaged, and I know that they worked hard to resolve this matter. On that occasion, I said that I hoped to escape the horrid fate of being added to his list, and I hope that I have achieved that very modest ambition. However, delighted as I am to be the Minister standing today at the Dispatch Box, moving these amendments to bring this very long-running problem to a close—I hope—I am conscious that many other Ministers, present and previous, have worked on this matter, and without their efforts we would not have got to where we are today.
We have listened carefully to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and other noble Lords, on this important matter. I am pleased that this Government have been able to table these amendments. I look forward to the contributions of other noble Lords, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I am delighted with the amendments tabled by the Minister. I thank him very much; the amendments have my full support. I will at the appropriate time not move my amendments on the Marshalled List.
This campaign has been a long one. I will spend a few minutes setting out how it started, thanking those people who have got us to this day, and paying tribute to those whom I cannot mention. The campaign was started by a domestic abuse survivor in the Wythenshawe area of Manchester, on discovering that their local GP was charging victims of domestic abuse for letters that they needed when applying for legal aid. They thought that this was wrong and decided to change the law. I thank Katy—I am not allowed to give her surname—who first raised the issue with my friend Tom Watson, when he visited Safespots Wythenshawe. He raised the matter in Parliament.
I thank Mike Kane, the local MP who supported the campaign for many years; Laura Hitchen, the local solicitor in Manchester who highlighted how widespread the problem was; Councillor Sarah Judge, who works at Safespots; all the Safespots women who are victims of abuse and who stood up and decided to change the law; Manchester City Council and the other local authorities that gave their support to the campaign; all the police and crime commissioners who gave their support, including my noble friend Lord Bach; Sue Macmillan, my good friend for many years, who got the Mumsnet campaigners on the case; Charles Hymas, the home affairs editor of the Daily Telegraph, for shining a light on the issue at the right time; my good friends Stephanie Peacock MP, for kindly raising the issue in the other place, and Stella Creasy MP, for her valuable advice and support; the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, who supported me in Committee, along with the noble Baronesses, Lady Bull and Lady Burt of Solihull, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, who has always been supportive and who encouraged me to carry on; and noble Lords of all parties and on the Cross Benches who have supported me in my numerous questions to a variety of Ministers, whom I thank for their responses to all the amendments to government Bills that I have moved over the years. I have involved officials from at least four government departments.
I also thank Victoria Atkins MP, a Home Office Minister who listened and was a great help in getting out of this position. I am also grateful to our Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar—who on 8 February, when I raised the issue in the House, listened, bringing these amendments back to the House today. My final thanks go to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. I have tremendous respect for her, and she is also my friend. She listened and understood the points being made and played a key role in us getting to where we are today. I am tremendously grateful to her.
I have always said that this is a good Bill, and it is undoubtedly a better Bill because of the work that we have done in this House. With these amendments being agreed today, we are ending the postcode lottery in which a victim of domestic abuse could be charged by their GP for a letter that they need to gain access to legal aid. With these amendments, that position ends. This is wonderful. I am delighted to have played a small part in achieving this.
My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on resolving the injustice of NHS providers charging for evidence of domestic abuse. It is an object lesson in persistence. I hope that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who I was hoping to follow, will meet the same eventual success with her plans on forced marriage. I am also grateful to the Minister for his amendments to ensure that this is properly and legally installed in law.
In my view, it is a scandal that it ever had to come to this. What hard-hearted group of medical practitioners ever made the decision to charge money for evidence that a woman has been subjected to violence as a qualifying condition for legal aid? I suppose that is what happens when you try to marketise the NHS.
The Minister spoke about the role played by the BMA, but according to the BMA this amendment should never have been necessary. It says:
“We believe that legal aid agencies should trust the word of victims without needing to consult with a medical professional, who themselves”
will rely on what the victim tells them and
“may not be best placed to confirm whether domestic abuse has taken place.”
It recommends that the MoJ should remove altogether the unfair requirement for medical forms in the domestic abuse legal process. It seems to me that this requirement is just placing one more obstacle in front of the victim, perhaps to test to destruction her determination to get justice. Will the Minister say why legal aid agencies are requiring these medical certificates in the first place? Should we not be legislating to remove this requirement, full stop?
My Lords, I begin by taking up the comment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who said that this is a loophole that needed to be filled. I respectfully agree, and that is why the Government have tabled the amendments that have the effect that I set out earlier.
It was gratifying to hear the congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, from my noble friend Lord Naseby, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Carlisle and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull. I shall not rise to the challenge in her phrase about marketising the NHS, but I should respond briefly to her point about why any evidence is needed at all. The short answer is that there is limited legal aid spend. We must target it at those who need it most, and we believe that the evidence requirements ensure that the legal aid scheme strikes the best balance between ensuring that victims of domestic abuse can evidence their abuse and access legal aid and ensuring that the risk of fraudulent or unmeritorious claims is as low as possible. To that end, we have significantly extended the accepted forms of evidence. We have removed all time limits and the government amendments seek a clear resolution of the issue of victims being charged to obtain that evidence.
Other than that, it is fair to say that the debate we have just had was something of a tribute band to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, but on this occasion, tribute is entirely well merited. He has been indefatigable and resolute, and he was very generous, although I associate myself with it, in mentioning my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who has also worked very hard to resolve this matter.
I shall not take up any more of the time of your Lordships’ House. For the reasons I have set out, the Government believe that these amendments will sort out this long-running problem, and I therefore commend them to the House.
My Lords, I seek to be relatively brief. Amendment 70, moved so compellingly by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, would extend the destitution domestic violence concession to all migrant victims of abuse, providing them with
“temporary leave to remain and access to public funds, for a period of no less than six months … while they flee abuse and apply to resolve their immigration status.”
Amendment 87, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, spoke so powerfully, would ensure that
“all victims of domestic abuse are protected, regardless of their status, in line with Article 4(3) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.”
Amendment 70 addresses a major gap in the Bill—namely, the lack of provision for migrant women in particular. They are probably one of the most vulnerable groups suffering domestic abuse. Despite that, they do not get the same level of support as other domestic abuse survivors, with the suspicion being that migrant women in this position are all too often regarded as immigration cases rather than victims of domestic abuse—making it even more likely that abuse of migrant women will take place and simply continue.
This is because the reality is that migrant women who do not have established immigration status find it difficult, if not impossible, to access refuges and other essential support services to escape abuse. Also, their abusers know that they do not have funds of their own—their abusers make sure of that—and have no recourse to the public funds necessary to access that support because of their lack of status. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, reminded us, less than 6% of refuge beds are available to women without recourse to public funds because refuges cannot carry out their vital work without income.
I await the Government’s response, particularly to see whether it still seeks to put off making any meaningful specific commitment to address the plight of migrant women suffering domestic abuse, and whether the response also suggests that, at heart, the Government still regard migrant women without established immigration status who suffer domestic abuse as primarily an immigration issue rather than a domestic one.
In Committee, the Government spoke about a pilot exercise. Again, the right reverend Prelate highlighted the inadequacy of that exercise and the fact that it does not actually commit the Government to doing anything.
The domestic abuse commissioner-designate supports this amendment, and the evidence in support of it is already there in the public domain. The terms of this Domestic Abuse Bill have been debated and discussed for a number of years, going back to when Theresa May was Home Secretary. No doubt as a result of that discussion and consideration, the Bill marks real progress in a number of areas.
However, the fact that the Government still say that they do not know enough about the plight of migrant women faced with domestic abuse to agree to this amendment says a great deal about their attitude to, and the priority they give to, this particular highly vulnerable group. The time to act is now. Action should not be delayed or kicked into the long grass any longer.
We support Amendment 70. We will also support Amendment 87, which seeks to ensure that
“all victims of domestic abuse are protected, regardless of their status”,
if it is taken to a vote.
My Lords, I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lady Helic for their continued commitment to providing support for migrant victims of domestic abuse. I want to take this opportunity also to thank the International Agreements Committee, which is represented so well this afternoon.
As I highlighted in Committee, I know that we all share the view that anyone who has suffered domestic abuse, regardless of their immigration status, should be treated first and foremost as a victim. Although the Government appreciate the sentiment behind these amendments, we still do not think that they are an appropriate way forward.
Amendment 70 seeks to provide at least six months’ leave and access to public funds to all migrant victims of domestic abuse, as well as providing them with a route to apply for leave to remain. Amendment 87 seeks equally effective protection and support for all victims of domestic abuse, irrespective of their status, while also referring to Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention.
I thank the Minister for her very full reply. She said, rightly, that I had pressed her and that there was no intention to park the issue, but what I really pressed her on was an assurance that there is no intention to enter a reservation to the Istanbul convention on the question of migrant women.
My Lords, I can state quite honestly from my point of view that I know of no intention to enter a reservation.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. Again, I thank the Minister for her very full response and for her real passion about providing support for all victims and survivors of domestic abuse.
I do not want to repeat everything I said in my opening speech, because I think we are at risk of going round in circles. But the Minister herself said that this is not a homogenous group and that it was about treating each person as an individual. That is why we are asking for this temporary leave to remain and access to public funds, so that each person can be treated as an individual and the right action can be taken.
My Lords, I join others in sending our thoughts and prayers to the family of Sarah Everard. We do not know the history of her murderer, but we do know that she is just another murdered woman. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, there have been 30 such women since Second Reading. I heard the story of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as a horror story; it is something you would never wish on anybody. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, paid tribute to Jane Clough and her wonderful parents. I have met Jane Clough’s father, and I pay tribute to her parents, who have campaigned so tirelessly so that what happened to their daughter will not happen to somebody else. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned some of the horrendous things parliamentarians have to put up with. I am so sorry for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for the abuse she has suffered in the last week or so, and I am sure I speak on behalf of every other noble Lord in the House. And the story of my noble friend Lady Bertin was awfully sad and horrific.
To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, this set of amendments is not about political digs. I totally agree with him. We all seek the same end, so it might seem odd that the words I am going to say disagree with noble Lords’ amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and I have campaigned and worked together for years, trying to fix the gaps that we find in the provision.
Amendment 73 seeks to amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003, so that individuals assessed as high risk and high harm, as well as those convicted of more than one domestic abuse or stalking offence, should automatically be subject to management under Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, commonly referred to as MAPPA. Management under MAPPA may result in these individuals being recorded on VISOR, which is the dangerous persons database. The amendment would also place a duty on the Government to review these changes to the Criminal Justice Act and issue a report 12 months after Royal Assent. It specifies that the report would need to include a comprehensive prevention and perpetrator strategy for domestic abusers and stalkers. This links to Amendment 81, which also calls on the Secretary of State to issue a perpetrator strategy.
Noble Lords have spoken passionately about this issue and it is impossible not to be moved. I am simply horrified by some of the stories raised, not only today but in Committee. I indicated then and say again that I totally agree with the intention behind these amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, said, so much works, so why are there gaps? We want to make sure that there are no gaps and that we have the right systems in place to enable the police and partner agencies to accurately identify the risks posed by high-harm, repeat and serial perpetrators, and to act accordingly to protect victims.
We recognise that there is more that can be done to fill the gaps and ensure that the system works as intended, but we do not think that Amendment 73 addresses or resolves the underlying issue of improving risk assessment and case management. We fear, therefore, that it will not achieve the outcomes that it is intended to achieve.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said—I will paraphrase—that serial and high-harm domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators can be managed under the current MAPPA legislation, but that it is not always happening in practice. My noble friend Lady Bertin echoed this and we agree, which is why, instead of amending the current legislation to add an additional category, we think there is more value in making better use of the existing MAPPA framework and related police systems.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering talked about upskilling. There is a range of things, of which upskilling is one, which will drive an improvement in the system, including a better focus on the outcomes that we seek. We have already taken steps to improve MAPPA and related systems. Last spring, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service published the Domestic Abuse Policy Framework, which sets out arrangements for working with people whose convictions or behaviours include domestic abuse. The framework mandates an adherence to the referral pathways for domestic abuse perpetrators and ensures that the required actions for these cases are fully laid out. It focuses on the need for an investigative approach, sets clear expectations about information exchange and the use of MAPPA, and draws together expected practice into a clear framework. This will significantly strengthen the consistency of our approach. It is right that we put our focus on embedding this framework, which will have a real operational impact to ensure that it is working to better safeguard victims and those at risk.
We are also introducing measures in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on 9 March. These measures will clarify the information-sharing powers of those agencies subject to the duty to co-operate under MAPPA. It will also explicitly extend these information-sharing powers to those agencies or individuals who can contribute to the assessment and management of risk—for example, GPs.
As my noble friend Lady Bertin says, we know that there is still more we can do to address the areas of concern that this amendment intends to resolve. I would like to outline the programme of activity that we will undertake to best achieve this. First, the Ministry of Justice will revisit and refresh all relevant chapters of MAPPA statutory guidance to include the sections on domestic abuse. This will ensure that all agencies involved take steps to identify offenders who are domestic abuse perpetrators whose risk requires active multi-agency management.
Secondly, we will introduce a thresholding document for local MAPPA strategic management boards to improve the consistency of assessments of MAPPA levels to ensure that those requiring greater oversight are correctly identified. We will ensure that there is a reference to domestic abuse perpetrators to assist relevant agencies in making decisions on the level of MAPPA management needed for individual cases.
Thirdly, HMPPS will issue a policy framework setting out clear expectations of the management of all cases at MAPPA level 1 by the National Probation Service, including domestic abuse perpetrators. This will further help to improve the quality of information sharing, the consistency and regularity of reviews, and the identification of cases where additional risk management activity is required.
Finally, we will improve the MAPPA sharing database —known as ViSOR—used to manage offenders, including through exploring alternative digital offender management systems, building on the success of the existing system in bringing agencies together to share information, and strengthening risk assessment, management and mitigation. To answer the point of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, as I said before, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill makes provision for that better data sharing under MAPPA.
There are provisions in the Bill which will also help to improve the management of risk posed by domestic abuse perpetrators. The new domestic abuse protection orders—or DAPOs—will provide an additional tool for managing the risk posed by perpetrators by enabling courts to impose a range of conditions and positive requirements. DAPOs will also require perpetrators subject to an order to notify the police of their name and address and any changes to this information. This will help the police to monitor the perpetrator’s whereabouts and the risk that they pose to the victim.
Stalking protection orders, which were introduced last year—I am glad that my noble friend is in the Chamber—can also impose positive requirement conditions on perpetrators. These orders enable early police intervention, pre-conviction, to address stalking behaviours before they become deep-rooted or escalate.
Ultimately, adding an additional MAPPA category into legislation specifically for domestic abuse offenders will not improve the practical issues it is truly seeking to resolve—and if it did, I would be fighting for it to happen. In fact, if we were to use the definition of domestic abuse offender as outlined in the amendment, we would make a large group of offenders not defined by specific offences automatically eligible for MAPPA. This would risk creating a level of complexity not reflected in the current legislation that will distract resources and could overwhelm the current system.
My Lords, what an extraordinary debate—powerful, passionate, distressing and harrowing in many ways. I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have participated, especially the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Bertin and Lady Grey-Thompson. It is extremely painful to relive the sort of experiences that they have relived today, but I hope their courage in putting their experiences on the record will help others.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell, was right when he said we need to fix the system for victims and their families, and for us to live at ease with ourselves as a society. Today, having named so many victims and cited the cases, we must remember the families of those victims and the great pain that such debates must cause them. Equally, I hope the fact that we are debating ways of improving systems will ensure that other young women, older women or girls will not be subjected to the same abuse, the same stalking and the same murders as their loved ones had to experience.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for her comments, and she is right: we all seek the same end. But we have always had a slight difference in how to get to that end. If she does not mind, I would like to ask her something before she sits down, as it were, although I know she has sat down. I quoted some words from the Sunday Times suggesting that the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary were thinking of a register for stalkers and perpetrators of domestic abuse. I wonder whether she can give us any further information about the comments made to the Sunday Times.
Like the noble Baroness, I saw that article. I have not had a chance to corroborate with the Home Secretary and my right honourable friend Robert Buckland the contents of that article. I can get some more information for the noble Baroness, because it would be useful to have their thinking on it.
My Lords, apparently in answer to a question from my right honourable friend Yvette Cooper, the Home Secretary said, “I will be very candid: I will look at all measures”. That was in response to a question about this very amendment.
The noble Baroness mentioned the fact that more guidance is coming and that there are more policy frameworks and strategies. All that is very good, but unless people have to do what we need them to, and unless they can be accountable to the law in some way, these things will not happen. We know that, for the last 20 or 30 years, there has been a plethora of guidance et cetera, but, still, people are falling through the cracks. This is why it is extremely important to have something in the Bill to put these things in statute. As my noble friend Lord Hunt said, police forces are awash with guidance—people do not need guidance; they need to know exactly what they have to do, and we have to hold them to account and ensure that they do it.
As the noble Baroness pointed out, my amendment might not be perfect—I have no doubt that it is not. However, I would like to test the opinion of the House, so that I can perhaps enter into some discussions with the Government, especially as they are now—from what we know from the newspapers and what the Home Secretary said in the House of Commons today—looking at a register. I suggest that perhaps the amendment before us provides the basis of such a register and of the way in which the Government might move forward.
Therefore, I would like to test the opinion of the House, so that we can, I hope, enter some negotiations. It will be up to our colleagues on all sides of the House of Commons to take this forward. I am very grateful to noble Lords who have supported this amendment in the Chamber today, and I have had messages from many other Peers, on all sides of the House, who are very supportive of what we are doing.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that I think his amendment is excellent. I do not know if he will test the opinion of the House, but I am delighted to have been able to participate in the debate on his amendment. With that, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an incredibly thoughtful debate, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, for her rather timely retabling of this amendment, which in Committee was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. The noble Baroness has highlighted how the collection of data could add to our understanding of the nature of hate crimes against women and thereby find ways of tackling it, and I agree on that. Perhaps I may make it absolutely clear to the noble Baroness that we are more than willing to engage on the issue of data collection. Not only is it crucial to our understanding of the issue, it will enable us to find solutions to some of the problems we face.
I have read the article about Sue Fish’s appearance on “Woman’s Hour”. I was rather taken aback that the woman who had instigated the collection of data in Nottingham said that she would be reluctant to come forward about something that happened to her personally because of some of the prejudice that she felt she might face. That should give us all pause for thought about the issue at hand.
I join with other noble Lords in being appalled and shocked at the killing of Sarah Everard, and again our thoughts and prayers are with her family and friends. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has pointed out, criminal proceedings are under way, but this brings into sharp focus the need to protect women and girls from violence. The Government are of course deeply committed to tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, and this Bill is a testament to that. We have also brought forward a number of measures in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which just last week was introduced in the House of Commons, to strengthen the management of sex offenders and those who pose a risk.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, who said that we should not react in a knee-jerk way. I do not think that we have done that in this Bill, but I have given this issue much thought. We need to do more to keep women and girls safe from harassment, abuse, sexual and other violence, That is why in December we launched a call for evidence to inform our forthcoming Ending Violence Against Women and Girls strategy. When it closed last month, it had already received more than 19,000 responses, and in recognition of the renewed debate on women’s safety in recent days, we have now reopened it for a further two weeks to 26 March. We have already received over 120,000 responses and I would encourage the public to share their views. We will use the responses to develop a strategy to better target perpetrators and to support victims and survivors. Our aim is to publish the new strategy by the summer.
I cannot but agree wholeheartedly that all hate crimes are abhorrent and should be dealt with using the full force of the law, regardless of gender or any other characteristic. I made the position of the Government quite plain in Committee that all crimes motivated by hatred are totally unacceptable and have no place in our society. I also set out that this was the reason why, in 2018, as part of the Government’s updating of our hate crime action plan, we asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of the current hate crime legislation. This includes a review of whether other protected characteristics such as sex, gender and age should be included.
During the course of the review in 2019 and last year, the Law Commission organised events across England and Wales, speaking to as many people as possible who have an interest in this area of the law. We asked the commission to look at the current range of offences and aggravating factors in sentencing, and to make recommendations on the most appropriate models to ensure that the criminal law provides consistent and effective protection from conduct motivated by hatred towards protected groups or characteristics. In addition, the review took account of the existing range of protected characteristics to identify potential gaps in the legislation so that the review could make recommendations to ensure consistency of approach. As noble Lords will know, the consultation of the Law Commission to support the review closed in December. In that consultation, it focused on the issue of whether sex or gender should be added to hate crime law, noting that adding misogyny by itself might introduce inconsistencies to hate crime laws.
The Law Commission has pointed out that this is complex. Its consultation has highlighted a number of issues that need further consideration to ensure that adding sex or gender to the hate crime framework brings greater rather than less effectiveness to the law. This includes ensuring that linking domestic abuse and sex-based hostility does not create a hierarchy of harm in those cases of abuse where a sex-based hostility is more difficult to demonstrate and is seen as being less important. The Law Commission also talked about the need to ensure that the law itself is coherent, which is why it has been discussing the possibility of carve-outs to ensure that domestic abuse legislation does not conflict with how hate crime laws operate. These are just two examples of the complexity of this issue that the Law Commission is still working through.
I shall go back to the point made by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. Before we make long-term decisions on changes to police recording practices in this area, I still think that we should wait for the outcome of the Law Commission’s review, which is an in-depth and wide-ranging one into the complex area of hate crime. Moreover, I do not think that further legislation is required. Section 44 of the Police Act 1996 already allows the Secretary of State to require chief officers of police to provide information relating to policing in their area. This might include statistical or other information related to policing, crime and disorder. It provides the statutory basis for the annual data requirement from police forces in England and Wales, which includes recorded hate crime.
While the amendment is not needed, as the necessary powers are already in place to require forces to provide information of this kind, we agree that data can be helpful and we know that some police forces like Nottingham are already collecting it. I advise the House that, on an experimental basis, we will ask police forces to identify and record any crimes of violence against the person, including stalking and harassment, as well as sexual offences where the victim perceives it to have been motivated by a hostility based on their sex. As I have said, this can then inform longer-term decisions once we have considered the recommendations made by the Law Commission. We will shortly begin the consultation with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and forces on this with a view to commencing the experimental collection of data from this autumn.
In response to the question put by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Paddick, the detail of the consultation is still to be worked through. That is not to exclude gender, but just to say that the detail remains to be worked out. In giving this undertaking and in the knowledge that the necessary legislation is already in place, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
I have received two requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Russell of Liverpool. I will call them in that order.
My Lords, I warmly thank my noble friend Lady Kennedy and the Minister for her response. Can the Minister confirm that the Nottinghamshire Police official definition is the following:
“Incidents against women that are motivated by an attitude of a man towards a woman and includes behaviour targeted towards a woman by men simply because they are a woman”?
I take it that there is no question of introducing the sex or gender terminology used in this amendment, which is different from the amendment moved in Committee, and has certainly not been endorsed by the Law Commission.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, is absolutely correct about what Nottinghamshire Police records. I cannot confirm what the conclusion will ultimately be, but I have said that I will consult.
I thank the Minister very much for that helpful response. I would like clarification on how we are going to proceed. Does she agree that the police forces currently recording crimes such as misogyny are doing so slightly differently in each case, because each police force has decided to interpret it in its own way? What the Minister’s department is about do to with the National Police Chiefs’ Council is to look at the different ways different police forces currently collect this data. I imagine she will also work with the Law Commission to take into account its evidence taken on sex and gender and its interim recommendations. Therefore, she will come out with a clarification of the guidance to be given to all police forces in England and Wales.
I can confirm that to the noble Lord. I think a bit of consistency here would be very helpful to give us the information we seek.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Young of Cookham, who championed this amendment in Committee and again in this debate. I also pay tribute to the many campaigners and women who have taken time to contact noble Lords, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. I also pay tribute to my colleagues in the other place, namely the Member of Parliament for Walthamstow, Stella Creasy, and the Member of Parliament for Birmingham Yardley, Jess Phillips, for all their determined work in fighting for action to end violence against women and girls.
I particularly agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. This data would add to the Law Commission’s consultation and broaden the evidence base to allow us to move forward. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who gave us a poignant reminder of the shocking figure of the number of women who have lost their lives since we started the debate. I agree with his assessment that this amendment would help us deal with the culture of misogyny and sexism in our country.
Regarding the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I respect his knowledge and experience as a former serving police officer. His insight is invaluable, and I hope he will support the offer from the Minister today and agree that this is a first step to record data. If data is not recorded, it is hidden. Data shines a light on an issue and allows it to be addressed. I will be with him, by his side, in future legislation to ensure that misogyny becomes a hate crime, which I believe the majority of the House wishes to see.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for reminding us to think of the victims of the Atlanta shooting—our thoughts are with them—and for her clear explanation of her support and of why and how the work of Nottinghamshire Police has been important. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey- Thompson: women are tired—tired of changing our behaviour to keep ourselves safe.
Therefore, I thank the Minister for her response and her confirmation that, starting this autumn, the Government will require police forces to record and flag any crimes of violence against the person, including stalking, harassment and sexual offences, where the victim perceives it as motivated by sex and gender-based hostility. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for seeking that clarification. This commitment is extremely welcome.
In the police forces already doing this, not only has it helped with detecting crime, it has helped with confidence in the police and changing the culture within the police about how to deal with violence against women. I thank the noble Baroness for confirming that the Government will move forward in this way and thank her for the way she has, as always, sought to engage positively with Members of this House to reach a consensus.
My noble friend Lady Lister said at Second Reading that
“the Bill should state explicitly that the statutory guidance must take account of the VAWG strategy. Failure to do so ignores the reality of women’s experiences”.—[Official Report, 5/1/21; col. 40.]
On that day in January, we could not have predicted that the violent reality of women’s experiences would be brought into such sharp relief by the terrible tragedy of the abduction and murder of Sarah Everard last week and the subsequent scenes of protest by women across the United Kingdom.
Many decades ago, I taught at Priory Park School in Clapham. I lived in Helix Road in Brixton and walked those same streets as a young woman. They are some of the capital’s most populated, brightly lit and well-walked paths. Women across the country took to social media to discuss their experiences of walking the streets and the lengths that they went to in feeling safe. Many testimonies exposed stories of being followed, harassed, catcalled, assaulted and exposed to by men. In the year to last March, 207 women were killed in Great Britain and 57% of female victims were killed by someone they knew—most commonly a partner or ex-partner.
The Prime Minister said about the Sarah Everard tragedy that her death
“must unite us in determination to drive out violence against women and girls and make every part of the criminal justice system work to protect and defend them.”
I respectfully suggest to Mr Johnson that he begins by looking at some of the legislation already passed by the Welsh Government in this area. Their Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 required local authorities and health boards to prepare a strategy to tackle violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence.
As the leader of Newport, my cabinet approved the Gwent VAWDASV strategy in May 2018. It contained six regional priorities that are today being delivered locally. It is a tangible and practical application of lawmaking, which is helping to change perceptions and promote recognition of such suffering in our society. In this House and from this shadow Front Bench, I am determined to keep making those differences to people’s lives in the wider context of the UK Government’s ability to make laws that will help to prevent domestic abuse and support the survivors of such abuse. I strongly support the inclusion of Amendment 91 in the Bill.
My Lords, I start by acknowledging the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on what Helena Edwards said—that is something upon which we should all reflect.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, Amendment 91 relates to the linkages between domestic abuse and wider violence against women and girls. The Government are working on two new strategies, due to be published later this year, the first of which is a violence against women and girls strategy, replacing the old one, which expired in March 2020, followed by a complementary domestic abuse strategy. The amendment seeks to ensure that any guidance issued under Clause 73 of the Bill takes into account
“any strategy to end violence against women and girls adopted by a Minister of the Crown.”
The main concerns raised by proponents of the amendment centre around the Government’s decision not to produce a single, integrated violence against women and girls strategy that includes domestic abuse. This has wrongly been interpreted as an attempt to downplay the gendered nature of domestic abuse.
It is irrefutable that, while anyone can be a victim of domestic abuse, it is a crime of which the majority of victims are women. We recognise the gendered nature of domestic abuse, and the Bill acknowledges this in Clause 73(3), which provides:
“Any guidance issued under this section must ... take account of the fact that the majority of victims of domestic abuse ... are female.”
The draft guidance we have published does just that. We have been clear that the two strategies will complement each other and that the Government fully recognise that domestic abuse is a subset of violence against women and girls.
The Bill is focused on domestic abuse, and for good reason. Domestic abuse is one of the most common crime types, with 2.3 million victims a year, and the cause of tackling it and providing better support and protection for victims is deserving and indeed requires its own Bill, commissioner and strategy. We are producing a separate but complementary domestic abuse strategy in order to continue working on the excellent provisions created by the Bill because, as I have said, domestic abuse deserves this unique consideration.
I reiterate that, in producing a discrete domestic abuse strategy, the intention is to create space to focus on this high-harm and high-prevalence form of VAWG, while allowing space for other VAWG crimes to be considered as part of the VAWG strategy. The two strategies will work together to drive down VAWG crimes and their impact on society, and both strategies will continue to recognise the gendered nature of these crimes. As I have said, the strategies will complement each other and share much of the same framework and evidence.
We recently concluded the call for evidence for the violence against women and girls strategy, through which we also welcomed evidence on domestic abuse. However, as I said in the previous debate—I now have an updated figure—we have reopened the call for evidence for two weeks to allow a further opportunity for everyone’s voice to be heard. As of last night, the call for evidence had received just shy of an incredible 137,000 responses, and I hope that we will now receive many more.
As such, we fully acknowledge the direct link between domestic abuse and violence against women and girls, but the Government do not think that this amendment is necessary or appropriate for a domestic abuse Bill. The Bill already recognises the gendered nature of domestic abuse, and we do not think that a reference to a separate VAWG strategy is directly relevant to the Bill. If it were to refer to any strategy, it should be the planned domestic abuse strategy, but, for the avoidance of doubt, I am not advocating an amendment to this effect.
I do not think that I have persuaded the noble Baroness; I hope that I have and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
I thank noble Lords and all who spoke in support of this amendment. I was puzzled by the intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, because most of it did not seem to be relevant to this amendment at all. I am even more puzzled and disappointed by the Minister’s response—I think she knew very well how I would respond. As far as I can see, the arguments have not moved on since Committee, whereas our argument has.
I call the Minister to respond. Are you there?
My host muted me and I could not unmute—I apologise for that temporary blip that delayed my response.
On the question about whether it will be explicitly referenced, I say that the two are so closely interlinked. The noble Baroness asked that question in all good faith, so I will write to her, telling her and giving detail on how one will reference the other.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I am grateful for your Lordships’ patience in enabling me to table and move this short amendment, whose purpose is to correct a minor defect in my original drafting, for which I apologise. I am grateful to the clerks for their advice.
I understand from the Sunday Telegraph that the Government are going to create a super-database, which would include domestic abusers and stalkers, as well as sex offenders. If this were the case, I would naturally be delighted. This would enable police, prison and probation services to track offenders guilty of violence against women and would be a huge step forward in our efforts to tackle gender-based violence and misogyny.
I pay tribute to all those who have campaigned over many years to make this a reality, especially my formidable friend Laura Richards, as well as survivors and the families and friends of victims. I emphasise that we have never been asking for a separate register for stalkers and perpetrators of domestic violence but rather that they should be included on ViSOR—the violent offender and sex offender register. I am sure that we will receive more details when the amendment agreed last week is considered by the Commons after Easter, but I hope that the intention, if not the details, will be on the face of the Bill. Likewise, I have outlined details of the perpetrator strategy which must be an integral part of the policy relating to the database. There must be a statutory requirement for police, prison and probation services to risk assess and manage perpetrators, in partnership with domestic abuse and stalking services. Unless this is mandatory, the key professionals will not always come to the table, and their participation is vital.
I thank the noble Lord the Minister for his work on these issues and, specifically, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for all that she has done and for her letter received this morning. Sadly, the letter was not as explicit as some of the media briefings, but I am grateful to her for recognising that there is a consensus that more needs to be done. I suggest that there is a consensus on the actions needed. As the noble Baroness has said in the past, we have already agreed on the ends; I think and hope that, as a consequence of the debate and vote on my amendment on Report, we are now close to agreeing on the means that will bring about a cultural change, focusing on the perpetrators and saving lives. I look forward to hearing the results of the discussions between her officials and experts in developing the database and the perpetrator strategy. I beg to move.
My Lords, I first apologise on behalf of my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who is unable to be present today. The Home Secretary has asked my noble friend to deputise for her at today’s meeting of the G6, which the UK is hosting. The G6 meeting of Interior Ministers is one of the most important long-term, multilateral forums in which to discuss priority home affairs issues with some of our closest security partners. I hope that noble Lords will therefore understand the importance of my noble friend attending that meeting, but she is, none the less, disappointed that this means that she cannot be here today.
I turn briefly to the amendment which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, has explained, is purely a drafting amendment and, as such, the Government will not oppose it. My noble friend made clear on Report what the Government’s substantive view now is of Clause 85 of the Bill. I hope that the House will forgive me if I do not repeat that position today. It is now for the other place to consider this and other amendments agreed by your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for expressing the Government’s position on this amendment. I am sure we are all very proud of the fact that his noble friend Lady Williams, the Minister, is representing the Government at the meeting of the G6.
My Lords, I hope noble Lords will permit me to say a few words to mark the completion of the passage of the Bill through this House. I say, with some hesitation, that this is one of those Bills which has shown your Lordships’ House as its best. My hesitation does not arise from the proceedings on the Bill. Those were marked by speeches of high calibre and engaged debate and, undoubtedly, led to an improved Bill. My hesitation is due to the fact that this was the first Bill on which I worked in my time in this House. When I began work on it, I had nothing to compare it to, but I was fortunate to have the support and wise counsel of my noble friends Lady Williams of Trafford and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. They were right about everything else they told me so, as they have assured me that this Bill shows the House at its best, I am relying on them to be right about that as well.
Having mentioned my noble friends, I must pay tribute to them and give my thanks to those who have supported them and me in this endeavour. We have had the benefit of expert support from officials and lawyers across no fewer than eight government departments: the Home Office; my department, the MoJ; the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government; the Department for Education; the Department of Health and Social Care; the Department for Work and Pensions; the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; not to mention the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which have also had a hand in this Bill. I also thank the Bill managers, Charles, Pommy, Oliver and Georgina, and the private secretaries, Rebecca and Patrick; their work has been exceptional. If nothing else, the range of government departments and people I have just mentioned shows that tackling domestic abuse is everyone’s business. We are very grateful to all those involved across government.
In addition, we are grateful to Members from across the House. I thank those on the Front Benches opposite for the constructive way in which they have dealt with the Bill, and the very courteous and constructive way in which they have engaged with me. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy—I am particularly pleased that this Bill is the culmination of his four-year campaign on the issue of GP fees. Last, but certainly not least, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for bravely sharing his own experiences of domestic abuse, and to his colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Burt of Solihull, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
I will also take a moment to thank other Members of this House who have worked very hard. I thank my noble friend Lady Newlove, as well as the organisations which aided her, on their work on non-fatal strangulation —something that is now part of the Bill as a Government-drafted amendment. I thank my noble friend Lady Morgan for her work on threats to release intimate images. Again, this is now part of the Bill as a Government-drafted amendment. In that context, I must give my personal thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who discussed with me some of the legal issues raised by that amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friends Lady Bertin and Lady Sanderson—if I may respectfully group them together—for their campaigning on coercive and controlling behaviour, which also is now part of a Government-drafted amendment. I thank my noble friend Lord Polak, who campaigned tirelessly on community-based services. This is something we have now taken on board. We may not have agreed on all points, but I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Campbell and Lady Grey-Thompson, for raising the important issue of carers in the Bill, which will be explored further in another place. Finally, I thank my noble friend Lady Altmann and the other sponsors of the amendments dealing with get. It is a somewhat recondite point, but one which causes real distress and suffering.
Whether we have agreed or disagreed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, mentioned a moment ago, in scrutinising this Bill, we have all been striving for the same outcome: ensuring that victims of domestic abuse and their children have better protection and support, and that perpetrators are brought to justice. As she said, the differences have invariably been about the means of achieving this, not the ends involved.
We will of course reflect carefully on the nine amendments agreed by your Lordships’ House against the advice of the Government. We will set out our position when the Bill returns from the other place in due course. We will inevitably debate this Bill at a future date, but I know that all noble Lords will join me in hoping that it will soon be on the statute book, making a real, tangible and positive difference to the 2.3 million victims of domestic abuse each year. I therefore beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
My Lords, I see the time and I hope the House will not think me discourteous if I respond very briefly. I am very grateful for the kind words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He was quite right to remind us that the Bill had cross-party support. He was also right to remind me to thank—I fear that I did not, but I do now—the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who brought his experience as a magistrate in family matters to the attention of the House, which was very helpful in number of issues, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, with whom I debated some of the legal matters. I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, for stealing her lines. I would put it this way: she reassured me that I was, in fact, correct when I said what I did.
The House benefited, as it always does, from the considerable experience and wise counsel of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am sure we are all grateful to her. As for my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, I hope she will allow me to disagree with her when she said that she played a small part. She did not; she played an important part and, with that very important correction, I very much endorse what she said.
Last but certainly not least, if I may put it in those terms, to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, praise the Government is a wonderful thing. It shows that miracles do happen. I can assure her that the Government always listen, we just cannot always say yes. I hope noble Lords will forgive me for being brief, but I do see the time and I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
My Lords, I have received a request to ask a short question of elucidation from the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin.
My Lords, I thank the House for its leniency. I welcome the super register that has been proposed. I convey my thanks and respect to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It has been my long-standing hope to participate in a small way in this debate, and an honour to have done so. I extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson and Lord Parkinson, for their contributions and dedication to this cause. It has been much noted that the sisterhood across the House was incredibly powerful, and I wanted to state that. We have a common purpose in making real changes to the lives of survivors, so will there be a public information campaign to empower women with a message that our society has marked this day to say that we utterly reject violence against women? It is everyone’s business, as has been said, to begin the process of eliminating violence and abuse. It will send a very powerful message to all, around the world, that we intend to stand against violence and abuse in every form.
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of the noble Baroness. Of course, this Government oppose violence in all forms, especially violence against women. As to the publicity campaign she mentions, she will be aware that there are a number of areas where the Government already have publicity in this area. I am very happy to speak to her to understand particularly what she has in mind, and I will arrange to have that conversation in due course.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Lords amendment 2, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 3, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 4 to 8.
Lords amendment 9, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 10 to 32.
Lords amendment 33, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 34 to 36.
Lords amendment 37, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 38, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 39.
Lords amendment 40, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 41, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 42, and Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu.
Lords amendment 43, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 44 to 82.
Lords amendment 83, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 84 to 86.
Before I start my speech, may I beg your indulgence, Mr Deputy Speaker, and place on the record not only my condolences to Her Majesty the Queen but my and my constituents’ heartfelt thanks to His Royal Highness Prince Philip? He was the personification of public service, dedicating his life to Her Majesty and to serving our country for more than 70 years, and he did so with great style and often a twinkle in his eye.
May I also pay tribute to my friend, the right hon. Dame Cheryl Gillan, who passed away very recently? She would have loved to take part in today’s debate. She was a huge advocate for the vulnerable, including those who live with autism. She was a wonderful, wonderful friend and colleague to us all, and she will be very, very sorely missed.
I thank my hon. Friend for all that she has done with regard to recognising the problems around threats to publish intimate images. Will she join me in saying that we need to make sure that the law is all-encompassing in this area? It is important to improve the law on revenge pornography as it stands now, introduced by this Government, but it is even more important that we have a wholesale review of this area, such as that which is part of the Law Commission’s review.
I agree completely with my right hon. Friend. I thank her for the work she has done over many years to address this and other issues particularly affecting women and girls. We very much take that point. We have worked on the amendment with Baroness Morgan to have an immediate impact, but in addition we look forward to receiving the Law Commission’s report and recommendations later this year—it is looking at the whole of the law on the use of intimate images and other types of malicious communications on the internet. If the law needs to be changed to reflect recommendations, we can address those in subsequent legislation. These clauses apply to all relationships and all encounters of a sexual nature, from a Tinder hook-up to a marriage of many decades. Those protections will be enshrined in this Bill.
I turn to another amendment that I know has been welcomed warmly by survivors and campaigners: the extension of the coercive and controlling behaviour offence to include post-separation abuse. We listened very carefully to debates in this place, as well as to charities such as Surviving Economic Abuse and, of course, to survivors themselves. We reviewed the offence to see how it is working after five years of being in force and we published that review in March.
We acknowledge that coercive and controlling behaviour continues and indeed may escalate following separation, so amendment 34 will extend the offence to cover post-separation abuse between former intimate partners and interfamilial abuse, regardless of whether the family members are living together or not. The amendment will send a strong message to perpetrators that controlling or coercive behaviours, irrespective of the living arrangements, are forms of domestic abuse and that the criminal law is there to protect victims.
The Bill also revolutionises the help that is available to victims who need to flee relationships to refuge or other safe accommodation. It is revolutionary in that it helps to ensure that they are helped to recover from their experiences. Part 4 introduces a duty on tier 1 local authorities to provide specialist services to such victims and we have announced £125 million of funding to support that provision in the Bill.
There is a cross-party desire to see those measures matched by equivalent provision in respect of community-based support. This Government are alive to such calls. Police and crime commissioners, and others, already provide significant community-based support to victims of crime, but we need better evidence of the gaps in current provision and how they might best be addressed. That is why the Government have now committed to consult on the provision of community-based support as part of this summer’s consultation on the new victims’ law. That commitment to consult is backed up by Lords amendments 5, 8 and 10 to 16. Lords amendment 5 will place a duty on the domestic abuse commissioner to publish a report, under her new powers in the Bill, on the provision of and need for community-based services. Lords amendments 8 and 10 to 16 will place a duty on tier 1 local authorities, with the support of their domestic abuse local partnership boards, to monitor and report on the impact of the safe accommodation duty on the provision of community-based support in their area. Taken together with the responses to our victims’ law consultation, those amendments will ensure that the Government have all the information they need to build on the strong foundations of existing community-based services.
Some of the most upsetting and torturous experiences that victims can experience happen after a relationship has ended, in the family and civil courts. Lords amendments 17 and 24 to 31 relate to special measures and the ban on cross-examination in person in civil proceedings. In short, those amendments more closely align the position in the civil courts to that in the family courts, so that victims of domestic abuse have the benefit of automatic eligibility for special measures to enable them to give their best evidence and to ensure that they are protected from being cross-examined in person by their abuser. Our justice system should not be used as another form of abuse. This Bill will help to protect victims and secure justice.
In the case of the family courts, perpetrators can continue abuse through repeated unmeritorious proceedings. Lords amendment 33 amends the Children Act 1989 to prevent such vexatious claims. The amendment makes it clear that a court may make a barring order in circumstances where it is satisfied that a further application made by the named person would put the child or another, for example the parent victim, at risk of harm. For all the victims and survivors I have met, and whose stories we have heard in the Chamber: these measures are to help you all to secure justice, as you deserve.
Lords amendment 39 would ensure that a health professional working in a general practice that holds an NHS contract cannot charge for evidence to show that a patient has been the victim of domestic abuse for the purpose of obtaining legal aid. We recognise that it is already the case that most GPs do not charge for such evidence, but the amendment will ensure that no victim faces that barrier to obtaining legal aid.
The Bill also reaches beyond these shores. Lords amendments 70 to 82 amend the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions in the Bill to remove the dual criminality requirement for relevant sexual offences, including rape, committed outside the UK by UK nationals. That will enable UK nationals who commit marital rape in countries where such behaviour is not criminal to be prosecuted in UK courts. This is also a significant step forward towards ratifying the Istanbul convention, as it addresses one of the three outstanding matters set out in the statement to the House in October last year.
I turn to the 12 sets of Lords amendments to which we have tabled motions to disagree. I emphasise that, in line with our approach throughout the Bill, where we do not agree with the amendments, and where possible, we have sought to address the concerns raised through practical measures instead. The first set of amendments relates to the definition of domestic abuse. Lords amendments 1 to 3 would bring abuse by all carers of disabled persons, paid and unpaid, within the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill. I hope it is clear—it perhaps does not need saying—that the Government abhor all abuse, and we have every sympathy for the spirit of these amendments. Abuse of disabled people by their carers must be called out and acted upon. The issue before us today is whether this is the right Bill to strengthen the protection for disabled people.
The focus of this Bill is on domestic abuse as it is commonly understood—that is, abuse by a current or former intimate partner, or by a family member. That is the approach taken in the Istanbul convention, which I know many hon. Members are keen for the UK to ratify. Where a disabled person is abused by a partner or family member, the abuse will be covered by the definition as already agreed by this House. However, Lords amendments 1 to 3 would bring in a much wider range of relationships, outside a domestic abuse setting. We should steer away from diluting the purpose of the Bill.
As I have said, however, in inviting the House to disagree with these Lords amendments, we do not wish to downplay or deny for one moment the experience of disabled people who are abused by their paid or volunteer carers. There are protections in place, including the offences in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 relating to ill treatment and wilful neglect. However, we have listened carefully to the experiences and concerns raised in this House and the other place. We want to find practical ways in which to address those concerns. That is why the Government intend to carry out a review of the protections for people at risk of carer abuse. We will engage with the noble Baroness Campbell of Surbiton and the disabled sector on the scope of the review, but it would broadly seek to examine the protections offered against carer abuse and the support available to victims. We have listened and we will act.
Like the Minister, I wish to place on record my own and my party’s sadness on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen. I suppose all your life you get used to the existence of the royal family as if they are always going to be there. In the passing of Prince Philip, we realised how lucky we are as a nation to have a sort of backbone that is always there—a family who are not always perfect, like anyone’s family, but who we can look to. I and we all feel very keenly in light of the pandemic the loss to the royal family specifically and to us as a nation.
We also share in the Minister’s sadness at the loss of Dame Cheryl Gillan. Regardless of political party, she was a friend especially to every woman in this House. To every woman from every party who came, she offered words of advice and words of exasperation in the lady Members’ rooms. She was one of a kind, and she will be missed genuinely and keenly across the House. She would definitely have been here today, without question. She spoke in almost every single one of these debates. We will miss her further, and no doubt we will all seek to take on her work.
Following the death of Sarah Everard, heartbreak, fear and anger ripped through the country—a response to the endemic violence that women and girls suffer. People felt it in their bones. Responding to such an outpouring of grief is our job. It is our duty and a privilege as parliamentarians to take that emotion, that fear, that rage, that passion and that injustice and to turn it into policy and law. It is our job to do something meaningful.
The question for the House today, as we consider the amendments inserted into the Bill by the other place in the heat of those moments, is: who do we decide to save? I will briefly talk through which amendments we are supporting and why, as the Minister has done.
I welcome very much, as I have throughout its passage, the immense changes to the Bill. It is unrecognisable from the day it started, which I do not know if anyone can remember; it seems so long ago. The spirit in which the Bill has been forged—that is how it feels—has always been to seek amendments and to work to improve it, and my comments will continue in that exact same spirit as we seek to continue to amend it.
Amendments 40, 41 and 43—I am sure nobody will be surprised to hear my views on migrant victims of domestic abuse—would allow migrant victims to access support and protection just like everybody else and just like I could. Without the amendments, victims will be left trapped in abusive households. It is as simple as that. The Government will seek to tell us that they have proposed a pilot project, which we have heard about today. I am pleased to hear that the pilot has gone to Southall Black Sisters, I believe in partnership with Birmingham and Solihull Women’s Aid—a place very close to my heart—but the specialist organisations and independent commissioners have all been very clear that the pilot is inadequate, as the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) alluded to.
Analysis by the domestic abuse sector suggests that thousands of victims could be left unprotected and unsupported under the pilot scheme. Students here studying, for example, might be raped, battered and abused by their partners. Thousands of students have this week talked on the Everyone’s Invited site about sexual assaults on campus. Foreign students would not be able to seek refuge in the same way that I can under the current rules in this country if they needed to escape.
This pilot is not good enough. It will only provide minimal, short-term support for 300 to 500 women. There is no money, for instance, for counselling, therapeutic intervention, interpretation costs, children’s costs and medical or travel costs. What happens, then, when the 501st victim visits? I can tell you what happens to the 501st victim, because it is what happens now. It is happening to Farah, who was routinely tormented and assaulted with a belt by her father and trapped in that abuse without access to public funds or support and protection. She said:
“I made many calls to the council and even the national domestic violence helpline and many other organisations for people who suffer domestic violence. They all said the same thing: I had no recourse to public funds, so they couldn’t and wouldn’t help me. Some of them even said it was the law not to help me. I guess that no recourse to public funds means that it’s okay for me to be violated physically and mentally abused by my father. I guess the Government approves of that.”
Lords amendment 40 establishes safe reporting mechanisms which ensure that all victims of domestic abuse feel able to come forward to the police. Perpetrators know at the moment that they can use immigration status as a weapon against vulnerable, frightened victims—“If you tell the police, you’ll get deported and you’ll never see the kids again. If you go to the police, they’ll lock you up in a detention centre.” I have seen this thousands of times.
At the end of last year, three police oversight bodies said that the data sharing with immigration enforcement was causing “significant harm” to the public interest. If victims cannot report, those perpetrators remain out there. We are leaving violent rapists and dangerous, violent men in our community, able to hurt people again and again. I listened to the Minister’s comments on this, and obviously I welcome the idea of a review. In terms of the idea that it is premature to ask for the law to be amended to protect these victims, I have stood in the House asking for this for at least four years. It does not feel premature for my constituents who had threats to kill and ended up in detention. It does not feel premature when I had to go to Yarl’s Wood to collect them.
I have to disagree with what the Minister said. These amendments do not ensure indefinite leave to remain for all victims of domestic abuse or allow some mythical path to dodge immigration processes. They are about getting victims out of an abusive and dangerous situation, on an equal footing to what any one of us in this House would expect for ourselves and our daughters. I also expect it for all my constituents.
Moving on to other serial offenders whom we currently leave on the streets and those victims who are at the highest risk of harm, Lords amendment 42 requires serial domestic abuse or stalking perpetrators to be registered on a database and accompanied by a comprehensive perpetrator strategy. The Labour party supports this amendment. Zoe Dronfield almost died when her ex-partner attacked her with a meat cleaver. Zoe spent weeks in hospital recovering from bleeding to the brain, a stab wound to her neck and a broken right arm inflicted during an eight-hour ordeal at the hands of Jason Smith. Zoe discovered after reporting her case to the police that Smith had abused 13 previous victims. There is a desperate need in this country to do something to identify, manage and monitor these high-harm perpetrators of stalking and domestic abuse. They would not have been met by current MAPPA. [Interruption.] The Minister claims that that is not true, but they were not in these instances.
I just want to clarify this, because it is an important detail. Category 3 of MAPPA is defined as “other dangerous offenders”. It does not matter whether that offender has committed section 18 grievous bodily harm or criminal damage, which, as the hon. Lady will know, is a much lower offence. It is the risk assessment of that defendant in the circumstances of the offence that matters and puts them in category 3. That is the point—it already exists.
If it already exists, why was Jason Smith allowed to go on and abuse 13 other people? It is not just Jason Smith, of course—it is the person who killed Hollie Gazzard, the person who killed Jane Clough and the person who killed Helen. The reality is that this is not working, and the victims in these instances, like Zoe Dronfield, have spoken very clearly, and the agencies have spoken clearly. They have asked us to look again and help to protect them.
Just to assist the House, as I hope I made clear in my speech, we know there have been horrific instances where, in the system itself, those risk assessments and the management have not been done properly. I think we are having a disagreement about whether putting in a new category will change that. We want to look, and we are doing so through the statutory guidance, at how these assessments are made on the ground. That is what will make a difference, not a statutory framework.
I can sympathise with what the Minister is saying, but I would ask the House and the Minister to sympathise with somebody on the frontline who has been watched again and again, through one multi-agency risk assessment conference after another, or a serious case review or a domestic homicide review. Again and again, the same thing is said—agencies do not speak to each other. The idea of amending the statutory guidance but not putting in place some legislative framework so that this has to occur is just more, “Oh, let’s see if we can get agencies speaking to each other again.” It just is not enough. It is not just me who thinks it is not enough. When I spoke to Zoe Dronfield herself this morning, she told me that she was devastated. In the heat of the Sarah Everard killing, she felt that the Government were listening, and today victims like her feel as though they have been let down.
The Government amendment in lieu is not enough. It is perfectly fine in its own right and the Labour party called for a perpetrator strategy in Committee, but it is not the same as what is proposed in Lords amendment 42. It is not even nearly answering the same question. Dangerous criminals are on our streets and in our homes, and repeating the same acts of violence and abuse over and over again, moving from victim to victim. Nothing in what the Government have proposed, I am afraid, has anywhere near enough teeth or will account for, identify and offer safety to the victims now dead at the hands of the most serial perpetrators. The amendments from the other place are strong, and I very much imagine that it will successfully push back. The Labour party stands ready to support it as it does so, and stands to support the victims.
Disabled victims are currently left out of the Bill. Lords amendments 1 to 3 change the definition of “personally connected” to reflect the lived experience of disabled victims of domestic abuse. Disabled people can be victims of domestic abuse by paid and unpaid carers, with whom they have close, intimate relationships. For victims, this abuse of trust and power is experienced in exactly the same way as that perpetrated by a mother, a father or a partner, so it should be recognised as such in the Bill. The expansion of the definition of “personally connected” will not dilute it, as has been suggested by the Government, but fortify it to protect those who right now are being domestically abused because they are dependent on another person in their lives. This is what disabled people have asked for, and I am sure we will see after today if the review proposed by the Government is satisfactory to those voices, who are the ones we must listen to in this.
Moving on to training of the judiciary and the accreditation of child contact centres, I want Members in this House to know that today they will be voting against making it mandatory for family court judges to be trained on domestic abuse. The Government are claiming that Lords amendment 33 threatens the independence of the judiciary. They have yet to elaborate, and the Minister did not elaborate on this point earlier. However, I shall assume—she can of course correct me if I am wrong—that she and those who sit behind her, both metaphorically and actually, are using the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which gave the Lord Chief Justice responsibility for training. I am assured that those who tabled this amendment in the other place took legal advice on this exact thing, and they do not agree that it is unconstitutional, but think it fits very well with that Act.
The amendment was drafted by a peer who is a QC, and was accepted by the parliamentary Clerks. On Report, a number of significant legal minds voted in favour of the amendment, including QCs and the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court. I would very much welcome a copy of the Government’s legal advice. There is absolutely no desire on our parts to do anything that is unconstitutional. We are not even saying what the frame of the training has to be, just that it has to happen. The idea that the Lord Chief Justice would push back, saying it did not have to happen and was against the independence of the judiciary, is something, frankly, that we would want to push against.
The Government’s own harm review found that comments made by judges in the family court included, for example, that a woman could not be a victim of domestic abuse because she wore make-up to court. Judges also found that women were emotional and temperamental when they cried about their abuse in the court room. Who knew that we did not need the police, the courts or welfare for victims of domestic abuse? We should have just told women to pop on a bit of make-up, and that would have protected them from domestic abuse. That is essentially what is being said in our family courts: if a woman wears make-up, how can she be a victim of domestic abuse? That was not said by me but by a judge in our family courts, and that kind of attitude is not just insulting but dangerous, because terrible practice in our family courts leaves children alone with violent perpetrators. I am not offended by the sexism; I am frightened for people’s lives.
Home should be a place of love and safety, but for 2.3 million adult victims of domestic abuse, and for their children, it is not. We all want this abuse to stop, and we want victims to live peaceful, safe and happy lives, and as I have said many times at this Dispatch Box, that is why this Government are bringing forward the Domestic Abuse Bill. The continued passage of the Bill marks an important milestone in our shared endeavour across the House to provide better support and protection for the victims of domestic abuse and their children. It is the culmination of over three years of work, although I rather liked the slip of the tongue by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) when she said it felt like two generations. I pay tribute in particular to my right hon. Friend, who as chair of the Joint Committee, set in train much of the work that has happened in this place and the other place when the Bill was in draft form. I thank her sincerely.
I also thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for championing the Bill, both as Home Secretary and as Prime Minister, and now—eminently, if I may say so—from the Back Benches. I also thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed today. The Bill has been improved during the course of debate in both Houses. It was scrutinised properly and thoroughly by their lordships, whom I thank for their vital contributions. I do not know whether many other Bills have had a mere 86 amendments to them when they came back to this place. This is a sign of their lordships’ commitment. The Bill includes real measures to help victims of domestic abuse and, as we have heard, even beyond those relationships. It expressly recognises the harm and distress caused to victims by so-called revenge porn and threats to disclose such images.
The Bill also creates a new offence of non-fatal strangulation. My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris) did much in this place when the Bill was before us for scrutiny, along with the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), to campaign on the issues of rough sex and non-fatal strangulation. My hon. Friend asked me about consent in the amendment, and I want to try to clarify that in order to reassure people who may be watching. A valid defence of consent is available under the new offence only where the offence does not involve causing serious harm or where the perpetrator can show that they had not intended to cause serious harm or had not been reckless as to the serious harm caused. This provision reflects the current law as set out in R v. Brown and, indeed, in the rough sex clause that was passed earlier in the Bill’s progress. We have had to be, and tried to be, consistent with both of those provisions, and I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend.
I have listened carefully to colleagues who have raised the issue of the management of perpetrators. This is absolutely critical. I have talked in the past about the evolution of our understanding of domestic abuse. We look back on the days of the 1970s when brave campaigners for Refuge and other organisations started setting up refuges and talking about domestic violence. Our understanding and our efforts to deal with this have obviously moved absolute milestones in the decades since then, but one of the challenges that we will certainly be looking to address in the domestic abuse strategy is the management of perpetrators. I am delighted that we are now investing unprecedented amounts in perpetrator programmes, as announced in the Budget, because we have to prevent perpetrators from committing harm in the first place. Again, let me emphasise that the reason we find ourselves unable to accept that Lords amendment is that creating a separate category as envisaged in the Lords amendment does not get away from the need for the MAPPA authorities to make a judgment in individual cases as to whether a particular offender should be managed under the framework. I want to be clear that three categories exist in MAPPA. Category 1 covers registered sexual offenders. Category 2 covers any violent offender or other sexual offenders convicted of offences under schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and sentenced to more than 12 months’ imprisonment. Category 3 covers any other dangerous offender. So on the sorts of horrific examples we have been hearing about, if there are convictions in the background of those offenders, these categories would cover some of the convictions that have been described. I say that, but I hope again that colleagues have appreciated that I have been very clear that there must be improvements in how the system works on the ground. That is why we have announced—we went into a little more detail in the “Dear colleague” letter—that we are going to revisit and refresh all relevant chapters of the MAPPA statutory guidance so as to include sections on domestic abuse, to ensure that agencies are taking steps to identify perpetrators whose risk requires active multi-agency management. We are ensuring that cases of domestic abuse perpetrators captured under categories 1 and 2 are included in the threshold guidance that is being developed. We will issue an HM Prison and Probation Service policy framework setting out clear expectations of the management of all cases at MAPPA level 1. This work on this new system, the multi-agency public protection system, will have a much greater functionality than existing systems, including ViSOR, enabling criminal justice agencies to share information efficiently and to improve risk assessment and management of MAPPA nominals. That is what will address the very understandable concerns that colleagues have raised in this debate.
I come to the final point I wish to touch upon, and I hope colleagues will understand why I am going to be quick. Hon. Members have raised questions and concerns about the issue of judicial training. My right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) set out the problems with the way in which Lords amendment 33 seeks to achieve that laudable aim, which we all agree with, of ensuring that the judiciary and magistrates must be trained well and, importantly, trained regularly. Referring back to the comments I was making earlier about the progress that has been made in the past few decades, let me say that, by definition, our understanding has grown, even, as some have said, during the passage of this Bill. Of course, that knowledge must continue to be deployed and trained. Domestic abuse is covered in all family law courses run by the Judicial College, and the debates held in the other place and in this place will I know—I have faith—have been watched and listened to very carefully by the President of the family court and others.
I admire the hon. Lady’s faith, but I would like something more than faith. The triumph of hope over experience will, I fear, leave us in the exact same position with the exact same problems. Faith is well and good—I have it in spades—but I would like to know about a monitoring process that will be done to review how well people are trained and how well this is working.
I am happy to help the hon. Lady. As I said in my opening remarks, the President of the Family Division has indicated that he will consider making recommendations regarding training, taking into account this Bill, the harm panel report, which, as she knows, is critical to the Ministry of Justice’s concerns in this area and the four recent Court of Appeal judgments in domestic abuse cases. I would argue that there is a real understanding among our independent judiciary of the need to make sure that they are equipped to ensure that justice is delivered—and delivered well—in the courtrooms over which they preside.
In summing up, let me reflect on the course of the Bill. Progress on the Bill has been characterised by a determination on both sides of the House to work constructively and collegiately. At every stage, we have endeavoured to focus on what can be done to help victims of domestic abuse and to ensure that the abuse can stop. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke put it, these are not our issues—these are not party political issues—but the issues of our constituents who are victims and of their children, and I know that each and every one of us has had that very much in mind in all our deliberations on the Bill.
I therefore commend the Bill and the amendments that the Government support to the House. I very much hope that we will be able to make real and meaningful progress and pass the Bill, so that we can get on with the job of helping the victims we all feel so strongly about.
Before I put the Question, just a reminder that, should there be more than one Division, the doors will be locked after eight minutes in the first Division and, after that, after five minutes.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 9B.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu.
Lords amendments 40B and 40C, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (g) in lieu.
Lords amendment 41B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 42D, 42E and 42F, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (d) to (f) in lieu.
I thank right hon. and hon. Members of this House and noble Lords who have worked tirelessly to make this a truly transformational Bill. It will make a significant difference to the lives of many women, men and children by better protecting them from their abusers and providing them with the support they so very much need. However, before the Bill can have any impact, we need to pass it, and we are fast running out of road to get us to that point. In the course of our deliberations, we should all be clear, therefore, about the risk of the Bill being timed out this week. None of us wants that—I hope I can take that as read. In the collegiate spirit of many of the debates on the Bill, we reflected carefully on the debates that took place in the Lords last Wednesday and we have tabled further amendments in the hope, and indeed expectation, that both Houses can now agree to submit this landmark Bill to Her Majesty for Royal Assent.
On child contact centres, there is no dispute that they need to be subject to appropriate regulation. It remains our contention that, on the evidence currently available, that is already achieved through accreditation by the National Association of Child Contact Centres, the agreements in place between the NACCC, the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service and the judiciary, and the comprehensive statutory provisions already in place that determine how local authorities should discharge their duties in public law family cases.
We listened carefully to the debate last week and recognise that there is an issue that needs to be examined further, but we cannot legislate on the basis of anecdotal—albeit pertinent—evidence. That is why the Government tabled Amendments 9C and 9D, which will require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a report about the extent to which individuals, when they are using contact centres in England, are protected from the risk of domestic abuse or, in the case of children, other harm. The report will need to be laid before Parliament within two years of Royal Assent. We will engage closely with the NACCC and others in carrying out the work, which will provide a firm evidence base on which to introduce further regulation, including in the area of vetting, should that be necessary.
I turn to Lords amendments 40B and 40C. We remain concerned that the revised Lords amendments regarding data firewalls still pre-empt the outcome of the review recommended by the independent policing inspectorate in response to the super-complaint. We need to undertake that review without any preconceptions as to its outcome. To provide further reassurance on that point, Government amendments 40D to 40J introduce two new clauses. The first new clause will put the review of the current data-sharing arrangements on to a statutory footing and enshrine in law our commitment to report on the outcome of the review by the end of June. The second new clause will provide for a statutory code of practice relating to the processing of domestic abuse data for immigration purposes. Persons to whom the code is issued—notably the police and Home Office immigration staff—will be under a duty to have regard to the code, which will also be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Although the clause is framed in terms of a permissive power to issue a code, I assure the House that we fully intend to exercise that power.
On Lords amendment 41B, I welcome the fact that this revised amendment attempts to separate the issue of leave to remain from the provision of support for migrant victims of domestic abuse. As I previously indicated, we need to focus on ensuring that victims with insecure immigration status can access the support they need. That is the priority. Unfortunately, despite the best intentions, the amendment would not achieve the outcome it seeks. The question of leave to remain is inextricably linked to the conditions attached to that leave, so it is impossible to waive the “no recourse to public funds” condition in isolation from consideration being given to a person’s immigration status.
As I announced last week, we have now appointed Southall Black Sisters to oversee the support for migrant victims scheme. The scheme will provide access to safe accommodation and the associated support to migrant victims of domestic abuse who are not eligible for the destitute domestic violence concession or other existing support mechanisms. The scheme will be independently evaluated, and will provide us with the necessary evidence of the gap in current support arrangements, so that we can put in place sustainable long-term provision. That is the direction of travel we are on. Since the scheme will provide support to victims, Lords amendment 41B is not necessary, and waiving the no recourse to public funds condition for a full year will again have significant new resource implications. The support for migrant victims scheme will be up and running shortly. We should see it through to its proper conclusion and settle on a sustainable programme of support.
Will the Minister clarify what she just said? At the moment, repeat domestic abuse cases and stalkers will often not be included in categories 1 or 2 because the offences are not treated as serious enough in the way those categories are listed. Category 3 currently involves a tiny number of people. Will the Minister include all repeat domestic abusers and high-harm stalkers—all of them—under MAPPA in future?
As the right hon. Lady will know, category 1 perpetrators have to have committed a specified sexual offence under the legislation, and for category 2 they have to have been convicted of a violent offence and received a sentence of imprisonment for at least 12 months. If they are domestic abuse perpetrators, they will be included in the threshold guidance. This is very much about drawing out in the guidance the factors that local agencies should be concentrating on.
Although domestic abuse is already mentioned in section 6 of the guidance, we have listened to concerns that at local level the preponderance and patterns of behaviour are not necessarily being picked up in offenders in categories 1 and 2, as well as category 3. That is why, in discussions with Baroness Royall, we have been clear that we want to better capture those people under the existing framework. We will consult MAPPA responsible authorities on the draft revised guidance by the summer recess, and we will inform Parliament when the updated guidance is promulgated. Today, Baroness Williams of Trafford has written to Baroness Royall to confirm that past patterns of behaviours will be explicitly referred to in the guidance.
There are countless serious repeat domestic abuse cases that are not sexual offences. There are also countless very serious repeat domestic abuse offences that do not pass the 12-month threshold. All the Minister is saying is that she is going to try to include little bits of lines about domestic abuse in categories 1 and 2, which we know will not include huge numbers of repeat domestic cases, so she has actually gone backwards on some of the things that Baroness Williams was saying.
I do not accept that. The point is that category 3, as we have always said, is the flexible category. It is meant precisely to fit those cases that the hon. Lady has described. These offenders do not fit in category 1 or 2, but because they are considered to be dangerous offenders—they may, for example, have received a sentence of imprisonment of less than 12 months—they are in category 3. We want to join up that understanding in the guidance across all three categories.
We will consult with MAPPA authorities and will also invite views from across the House, but we have been working closely with Baroness Royall to try to address some of the issues that were rightly raised in the other place about past patterns of behaviour and so on. We give that undertaking today: we will look at that phrasing within the statutory guidance that is being drafted to help address some of the concerns in both Houses.
I am very grateful to the Minister, who is being very generous with her time. May I specifically ask about category 3? There are only around 300 offenders in that category, compared with the thousands or nearly tens of thousands of people that we are talking about. Will she undertake to include all convicted serial domestic abusers in category 3?
The flexibility of category 3 means that that is already possible, if there has been a conviction. I gave the example on 15 April of criminal damage, such as if somebody kicks down a door. On the face of it, a criminal damage offence would not fit into category 1 or category 2. That is where the professional curiosity of professionals on the ground—police, probation and prison officers and so on—comes in. If someone has been convicted of that offence, he or she may not be in category 1 or category 2, but if those professionals believe that it is part of a pattern of past behaviour, on which Baroness Royall has rightly focused, that is how they will be put on to the system under MAPPA. We very much want the concerns that have been raised to be reflected in the guidance as well as the national framework.
I have already announced that we need to be sure that action is taken when there are indicators of escalating harm for those who are managed under the least intensive level of MAPPA—so, level 1. To that end, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service will issue a new policy framework setting out clear expectations for the management of all cases at MAPPA level 1 by the National Probation Service. This includes domestic abuse perpetrators. That will further help improve the quality of information sharing, the consistency and regularity of reviews, and the identification of cases where risk is increasing and additional risk management activity is required.
Thirdly, as I announced on 15 April, we are bringing in the new multi-agency public protection system, or MAPPS, which will be piloted from next year. All category 3 offenders will be on MAPPS, which will have much greater functionality than the violent offender and sex offender register, or ViSOR, which is the existing database. That will enable criminal justice agencies to share information in real time and improve their risk assessments and the management of MAPPA nominals, including domestic abuse perpetrators.
Fourthly, we are legislating in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill to clarify the information sharing powers under MAPPA. For example, GPs and domestic abuse charities can very much be part of that data sharing. That is the intention of the clauses in the Bill, and I hope we will be able to persuade Opposition Members to support us on that.
Fifthly, we are committed to bringing forward a new statutory domestic abuse perpetrator strategy as part of our holistic domestic abuse strategy to be published later this year. Our revised amendment makes it clear that the strategy will address the risks associated with stalking. We will also include a perpetrator strand in our complementary violence against women and girls strategy, which will cover stalking that does not take place in a domestic abuse context.
Sixthly, we are investing new resources, with an additional £25 million committed this year, to tackle perpetrators’ behaviour and to stop the cycle of abuse. Finally, more broadly, I can assure right hon. and hon. Members that this Government are committed to supporting vulnerable victims. Having published a new victims code to guarantee victims’ rights and the level of support they can expect, we will consult over the summer on the victims’ law, which will enshrine those rights in law.
The other place has asked the Government to consider again these four issues. We will do so in the next hour. We have listened carefully to their lordships’ concerns and responded with a substantial new package of commitments, both to strengthen this groundbreaking Bill and to further our wider programme to protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children and bring perpetrators to justice. It is time for the Bill to be enacted and implemented, for the sake of the 2.3 million adults and their children who are victims of domestic abuse each year. Let us agree to the Government amendments in lieu, let us pass this Bill, and let us help victims.
I call the shadow Minister, Jess Phillips.
I thank hon. and right hon. Members across the House for the constructive tone they have maintained not just tonight but throughout. I am particularly moved by the comments the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) has just made. He speaks of the constituents he meets in his office. He knows they are sitting next to their perpetrators and he tries to distract them. I am sure many of us can understand and sympathise with that. It is precisely those people we are trying to help with the Bill.
I will try to deal with some of the issues raised but I am very conscious of time, so forgive me if I am not able to. My noble Friend in the other place will have more time tomorrow and will try to deal with some of the points that will no doubt be raised then.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) asked questions about the code in respect of the firewall review. We are very much in listening mode. We have not yet drafted the code and will consider the consequences she raised. I draw her attention to the fact that in the new clause we have said we will consult the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and the Information Commissioner’s Office. I very much hope that the fact that we have thought about the point she makes about accountability and so on, and included it in the new clause, gives her some comfort.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) for raising Clare’s law. We have not talked about it in the context of recent debates. The right to ask and the right to know is an incredibly important tool for victims and the police. We can spread the message across our constituencies that if someone is worried about a new relationship they can ask the police whether there is something they should know about their new relationship, or if the police are worried about a serial perpetrator and want to warn the new partner, then this facility exists. Again, this is why it is so important that the Bill is passed.
The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) rightly and understandably raised questions about our approach to the point on MAPPA. I know this is an issue to which she has given a great deal of attention and consideration during the passage of the Bill and previously. If I may, I just want to clarify something. I do not know whether there has been a misunderstanding in translation, but I am aware of my duties at the Dispatch Box. I think she said that I had said that category 3 will include all serial perpetrators in future. I hope I have not misquoted her. To clarify, categories 1 and 2 will include domestic abuse perpetrators by definition of the qualifying offences under categories 1 and 2.
We very much hope and expect that the updated guidance we are issuing as a result of the discussions on the Bill and the improvements we will make to data sharing, not just in terms of guidance and framework but also, importantly, through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, will see an increase in category 3 offenders. We want local agencies to be applying the system in the improved way we all want. Of course, domestic abuse protection orders will also include notification requirements. I just wanted to clarify that. Perhaps there has been a misunderstanding in translation, as it were, or in debate.
I think the confusion is that I was asking whether it would be possible to include all repeat domestic abusers and high-harm stalkers in category 3. That is what we were trying to achieve. Can the Minister include all of them through the change to guidance to include them on category 3?
I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Lady for clarifying that. This is the nub of it: through the framework that already exists—improved guidance, the national framework that I described, and the wording in guidance and so on that has been discussed recently—we want those offenders whom local agencies judge to pose a risk to be assessed as such. They will either already have been automatically included in category 1 or 2, or assessed under category 3. That is the point of this—it is the professional curiosity that I talked about. We want this framework to work better, in addition to the work in MAPPS, which is being piloted next year.
I know that this is incredibly technical. I have spent the past three years trying to de-jargon—if that is a word—some of this very technical language so that we may all communicate with the victims whom we are desperately trying to help in our constituencies. This is one of those instances that is very technical. I have tried to de-jargon it as much as I can, but it is incredibly technical. We have to look to local agencies and professionals using their best endeavours to protect our constituents across the country.
The hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth) asked the question—which I might have just answered—how we reassure women in her constituency that we are, first, acting with the best of intentions and, secondly, being held to account. I make this point, not just to us but to Members of another place: this is not the end of the road for our work on domestic abuse. We have been very clear that the Bill is a landmark one, but it is setting up a whole programme of work, locally through things such as our specialist services for people in safe accommodation, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and all the measures we have put into local family courts.
This programme of work will, I hope, outlast many of us and our time in this place. By virtue of that, I point the hon. Lady to things such as our announcement that we want to publish a VAWG—violence against women and girls—strategy later this summer, looking at some of the behaviours that we have discussed during the passage of the Bill. Later this year, we will publish a domestic abuse dedicated specialist national strategy to tackle abuse. The momentum that the Bill has created will be continued through both those strategies. This is very much the start of the journey as far as I and this Government are concerned. We very much look forward to listening to ideas and suggestions from across the House as we take through those strategies and other pieces of legislation.
To return to the people to whom the hon. Member for Strangford referred, those constituents whom he faces in his office to help—as we all do—I have talked before about my commitment to helping victims of domestic abuse. This is not just about those victims whom we are trying to help today, or in the future; for me, this is about the women, the victims, I could not help when I was working in the criminal courts at the very beginning of my career. In that day and age, it was all too inevitable that the victim would hand in her withdrawal statement, because the abuser had got to her before she had been able to give her evidence and to put her case forward. It is for those victims, as well as victims now and in the future, that this Bill is so critical. I very much hope that the Lords will help us to pass this piece of legislation as quickly as possible this week, so that we can start to help those victims as soon as possible.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 9B.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 41B to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 41C.
My Lords, to recap, Amendment 41B seeks to lift the no recourse to public funds condition for migrant victims of domestic abuse until the conclusion of the support for migrant victims scheme. The amendment also provides that, within two months of the scheme’s conclusion, the Secretary of State must consult the domestic abuse commissioner and specialist sector, and publish a strategy for the long-term provision for victims who do not have leave, or have leave subject to the no recourse to public funds condition. I am conscious that after two full debates, in Committee and on Report, along with our consideration last week of the Commons reasons, we are all likely to be well versed in the points that I have highlighted and will highlight now, and those which proponents of Amendment 41B will outline. For that reason, I will try to make my points relatively short.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester knows how much I respect her, and I share her commitment to providing protection and support for migrant victims of domestic abuse. But I still do not believe that Amendment 41B represents the appropriate course of action. The other place likewise disagreed with this amendment, again on the basis of financial privilege. Waiving the no recourse to public funds condition for 12 months—double the six months provided for in the earlier Amendment 41, which sought an extension to the DDVC—would clearly involve a significant charge on the public purse.
My Lords, I too pay tribute to the right reverend Prelate for championing this issue.
Again, I will boil this down to its essence. The refusal of the Government to offer equal protection to all victims of domestic abuse, whatever their status, which is the effect of their rejection of the Lords amendment, is a clear breach of the Istanbul convention. As I said when we considered these matters last time, this Government cannot claim that this is a landmark Bill when they continue to treat those with irregular immigration status less favourably. These are some of the most vulnerable victims of domestic abuse.
We are unable to take this matter further today, but the Government cannot avoid ratifying the Istanbul convention much longer without serious reputational damage.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and pay tribute to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester for her work on this Bill. I hope I have made it clear throughout the passage of the Bill, including in my introductory remarks today, that people—women mostly—who are victims of domestic abuse should get the support that they need when they need it.
On the Istanbul convention, as set out in our latest annual report on our progress towards ratification of it, published last October, the position on whether or not we are compliant with Article 43 of the convention, to the extent that it relates to non-discrimination on the grounds of migrant or refugee status, and with Article 59 relating to resident status, is under review, pending the findings of the evaluation of the support for migrant victims scheme. We will consider compliance with Article 59 in parallel with Article 43. As such, it also depends on the outcome of the support for migrant victims scheme. Far from not being compliant, we are working towards that compliance. I hope that noble Lords are content with what I have set out today and in previous stages of the Bill.
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 42D, 42E and 42F, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 42G, 42H and 42J in lieu.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for the very constructive discussions that we had on this matter at the end of last week and this morning, to make some final adjustments to what I think we all agree is a very good Bill.
Amendment 42D, put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, seeks to amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to provide for a new category of offender to be managed under multiagency public protection arrangements, known as MAPPA. The intention is then that such offenders are recorded on ViSOR—the dangerous persons database—although this is not set out in the amendment. The new category would cover perpetrators who have either been convicted—and “convicted” is the operative word—on two or more occasions of a relevant domestic abuse-related or stalking offence, or have been convicted of a single such offence and have been assessed as presenting a high risk of serious harm.
The elected House has now disagreed with noble Lords’ amendments on this issue for a second time, and again by a substantial margin. That said, we agree that more needs to be done, but we do not think that this amendment is the right way forward. Many have asked why the Government will not support the amendment, and the simple and honest answer is that we do not think it will be effective in securing the changes that we all want to happen. As I have said before, if we did, we would have no hesitation in supporting it. When the Bill was last in this House, I set out in detail our concerns surrounding the amendment and I will not go through them again. In essence, I do not think it adds anything substantial to the current legislative landscape around MAPPA.
Much has been said during the course of our debates and in the media about what this amendment will achieve. An example of this is that it will create a register; it does not. In fact, the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and others have said that that is not what they wish to achieve. Equally, it does not address the issue of perpetrators not being charged and convicted of the offences they have committed. We should not lose sight of the fact that MAPPA is a framework for the management of convicted offenders, and a good number of the cases cited of failures to intervene relate to perpetrators who had not been convicted of an offence. I want to take a moment to place both these points on the record, because any miscommunication on this highly important issue feels deeply unfair to victims. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, would not want any such misunderstandings to take root.
This is a very sensitive and difficult issue and there is no easy solution to it. However, I want to stop focusing on—and noble Lords will know I have done this the whole way through the Bill—where we do not agree and instead put our focus on the many areas where we do agree. Everything I have heard during the passage of this Bill continues to lead me to the firm belief that the issue we need to address is not the legislative framework but how offenders are brought to justice and, once convicted, how MAPPA operates on the ground to ensure that agencies actively identify those offenders who pose the highest risk and then manage them effectively.
I reassure the House that we are undertaking a substantial programme of work to tackle this issue from multiple angles to make a real difference to the outcomes for victims. I will take the opportunity briefly to go over these again and to provide some further updates on developments. We will refresh and strengthen the MAPPA statutory guidance to make it clear that convicted offenders who demonstrate a pattern of offending behaviour that indicates either serious harm or an escalation in the risk of serious harm, related to domestic abuse or stalking, which is not reflected in the charge for which they were actually convicted, should be considered for category 3 management. The guidance will set out the importance of being mindful of the totality of an offender’s behaviour in domestic abuse and stalking cases. I know that this is an important point for the noble Baroness.
The strengthened guidance will ensure that all agencies involved take steps to identify offenders who are domestic abuse perpetrators whose risk requires active multiagency management and take action based on that risk, no matter what the category. The guidance is statutory, which means that agencies must have due regard to it. It is in no sense voluntary. I should add that the updated guidance will be dynamic. We will keep it under regular review to ensure that it reflects developing good practice.
My Lords, to take the words that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has just spoken, I would expect the House to be back if the measures that we have put into the Bill and the accompanying guidance and practice around them were not working. He asked what it was about this Bill that would change things. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, has said that this last bit is the hard yards, because it asks the question: where in practice will what is in the Bill change things? That is absolutely the right thing.
In no particular order, I shall go through the various questions that noble Lords have asked. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, asked about domestic abuse and stalking in category 1. The revised guidance will address the management of domestic abuse perpetrators at level 1 for category 1 sexual offences. In addition to guidance, and to ensure that there is maximum accessibility and clarity, we will, as I have said, publish a succinct thresholding document to guide practitioners in deciding on the most appropriate level of management. The different levels of management under MAPPA are set to ensure that resources are directed to, and properly targeted at, those offenders who pose the highest risk and are the most complex to manage. However, we need to ensure that action is taken where there are indicators of escalating harm, as a number of noble Lords have mentioned, for those managed at the least intensive level. HMP Prison and Probation Service will therefore issue a policy framework for its staff setting out clear requirements for their management of all cases at MAPPA level 1.
On the question about a person not being sentenced for something, and therefore where the information is, the guidance will make very clear that convicted offenders who demonstrate a pattern of offending behaviour that indicates either serious harm or an escalation in the risk of serious harm relating to domestic abuse or stalking but which is not reflected in the charge for which they were actually convicted—I think this is what the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, was referring to—should be considered for category 3 management. The guidance will set out the importance of being mindful of the totality of an offender’s behaviour in domestic abuse and stalking cases. The noble Baroness reiterated her points, and I know this is an important issue for her. She wanted me to say it again, and I hope she is happy with that.
On MAPPA category 3, there is no minimum sentence for those who can be managed under that category. On commissioners monitoring the impact of the actions that I have outlined, they are independent but I am certain that they will be monitoring the impact of those actions, because one of the first things that will be on the commissioner’s desk when she is formerly in post is the Domestic Abuse Act and the implications and practices arising out of it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, talked about the very important issue of the sharing of information. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill specifically clarifies that information can be shared with non-duty-to-co-operate agencies—for example, specialist domestic abuse organisations—if they can contribute to the risk management plan.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, talked about the job description for the head of MAPPA. He said that whoever does it will need a breadth of knowledge and a broadness of mind. Perhaps they might refer to Hansard for inspiration from the passage of this Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether stalking was covered within and outwith domestic abuse. The answer to that is yes.
The last thing that I must talk about is funding. Funding was set out in the Budget but MAPPA is clearly a set of arrangements for managing high-harm offenders and, as such, is resourced from within the existing budgets of responsible authorities. However, the Government are committed to an additional 20,000 police officers, of which 6,600 have already been recruited. As I have already said, we are investing £25 million in additional funding to tackle perpetrators in 2021-22. We will continue to work with specialist domestic abuse organisations and the domestic abuse commissioner to ensure that that funding is spent effectively. We will continue to push to maintain that investment in perpetrator programmes as part of the next spending review.
As a House of Lords, we have come a long way with this Bill. We have revised it for the better. The Government have acquiesced to virtually all that noble Lords have asked in order to make this the excellent Bill that it now is. I hope that noble Lords will not divide on this matter and that they wish to see this Bill pass. The test will be the difference it makes to the lives of so many women and children.