Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd February 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

139: After Clause 68, insert the following new Clause—
“Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases
(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.(4) After subsection (8F) insert—“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause seeks to clarify the degree of force which is reasonable under the common law of self-defence where the defendant is a survivor of domestic abuse alleged to have used force against their abuser.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, like others, I want to express my gratitude to my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for his generosity in giving time to discuss my amendments with me and those supporting me in seeking reform in a place where it is needed. I am grateful that he heard me and listened. I do not know what the response will be, but I ask him to listen again very carefully, because this is a matter where justice really should say that there must be some sort of conformity in law available in what I would say are very comparable circumstances.

It is important to remember that domestic abuse can lead to death. We have just heard a very powerful debate about strangulation, which really emphasised the ways in which those who have experienced non-fatal strangulation described how they felt they were going to die—that they could not breathe and somehow were losing consciousness. Of course, that is what happens if the pressure is continued. We also heard the statistic that one in seven of the women killed after a history of abuse have experienced strangulation. Let me tell you that this one in seven statistic is based on the circumstances where women have already given accounts to others—to their doctors, family members and lawyers—about experiences of strangulation. There are many women who have not given those accounts because of the shame still associated with domestic violence. Some of us have acted in cases involving fatality; one can rely only on the fact that strangulation is a very common feature in the patterns of domestic violence that lead to death.

Today, I will speak about a different set of circumstances from those that have engaged the House up until now. One of the tragic outcomes of domestic violence and abuse can be that the person at the receiving end of it ends up being the person in the dock, having taken the life of their abuser in the end. This happens rarely, unlike the other way around, where two women a week are murdered in this country by a spouse or partner. The statistics show that the number of women killing abusers is very small.

I can draw from my experience—it may be that my noble friend Lady Mallalieu has the same experience—as a criminal lawyer and a Queen’s Counsel for 30 years this year: the women I represented in homicide cases have invariably had a background of abuse, and one of the patterns or things that they describe in the histories that they give is fearing for their life on occasions. The women who end up killing a partner who has abused them have almost invariably felt that they were going to die on many of the occasions when they were assaulted previously.

It is important to remember that, when an accused person ends up in the dock, they can be wrongly convicted because of the law’s inadequacy—remember Sally Challen, a case that we have spoken about before in this House. This was a case in point where gaps in the law had failed a woman because she was convicted initially of murdering her husband before coercive control, which she had suffered for years, was understood properly by the courts.

In a high percentage of the cases that I have dealt with where women have killed a partner, pleading self-defence should have been available to the accused—the woman—but she has ended up seeking recourse in the fact that, very often, because of long-term abuse, women end up suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder of some kind or another, or depressive illness. Those are the tolls that domestic abuse takes on victims. It is one of the great scandals of our system that we do not often think about the impact of things relating to women and domestic abuse until pretty late in the day.

A great deal of thought has gone into the amendment that I am presenting to the Committee today. It looks at self-defence and the objective test of reasonableness that is applied in self-defence, and I shall explain in a minute what that means.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for those various questions. On the issue of the person’s circumstances, I hope I set that position out in my reply. Perhaps it is the sort of point I could set out to her in writing in a couple of paragraphs, if she would not mind.

We are concerned when defences may be being misused; I made it clear that there are some concerns with the victims of slavery defence in that context. On the last point, which I think the noble Baroness accepted was somewhat rhetorical, she is certainly right that we always seek a balance. The point she makes that the law must keep up with the expectations of civil society is a profound one; it is, indeed, one of the big advantages of the common law. I am sure, therefore, that the issues raised by these amendments will continue to be discussed. The question before the Committee this evening is whether the legislature should provide for explicit statutory defences in these terms. For the reasons I have sought to set out, in my opinion, it should not.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I should tell the Committee that I turned a page too soon in my opening address on these amendments. I did not have the chance to really lay out the second of the statutory defences I am promoting, in Amendment 140.

I regret that I used the term “read-across,” because there are always lawyers who will use language literally. Of course, I did not mean it is an absolute read-across to talk about a householder as distinct from a victim of abuse, but the gravamen is the same. The core of it is about somebody put in fear in the place they want to feel safe: their home. I cannot think of any domestic homicide where I have represented a woman who has killed her partner or ex-partner that did not happen within a household—a place where she was hoping to feel safe but did not, and where experience had taught her to feel fear and terror.

I am afraid I have to say to the Minister that some time, I will take him by the hand into a women’s prison and have him sit down and listen to the accounts of women, by asking them to look him in the eye and tell him their stories. They are so often there because of childhood abuse, having been brought up in abusive households and with direct experience of partner abuse. We could almost empty our prisons without them having women who are there because of their mental health. They are not mentally ill for no reason; almost invariably, it is because of the kind of abuse we have heard about in the debates on this Bill.

I say this respectfully, but the Government are again falling into the trap of saying there are nice victims and bad victims, or of saying: “We will change the law for the good, conforming victims but not for the victims who somehow transgress”. These are the victims who, in the end, defend themselves because they are so in terror for their lives, who are so in fear of a partner that they commit a crime—carrying the drugs from A to B or hiding them in their sock drawer, for example. All I am saying is that there is a double standard in this debate: as soon as you move to that which involves crime and a woman, or anybody who is abused, is in the dock, then suddenly your compassion for the issue of domestic abuse somehow dissipates.

I am very concerned that there is not enough real consideration of the toll of abuse: we are moving into the field where somebody ends up transgressing the law but it is really because of what they are experiencing. If a psychiatrist were to speak to this Committee, they would tell noble Lords that when somebody has experienced fear for their life—we have heard about it in relation to strangulation—and thought “I am going to die at the hands of this person”, and then suddenly smells that level of fear again, in the air, in those circumstances they might take a knife and defend themselves, or take a heavy weapon and hit somebody fatally on the head. The test of “reasonableness” or whether the force was “disproportionate” has to be read in the context. That is why I am saying that it would have to be “grossly disproportionate” for it not to afford a defence of self-defence for somebody who has experienced long-term and serious abuse.

What we are seeing here are the very double standards that are so often experienced by victims of abuse and by women. It goes back to the nature of law and its patriarchal roots. It is about saying that, yes, women who are abused deserve all our compassion but if they overstep the mark, they do not.

Our prisons are full of women who have had these experiences—indeed, I have acted for women who have ended up killing a partner. They do not do it because they suddenly want to wreak vengeance; they do it in exactly the circumstances of the householder who feels in absolute terror for their life.

The failure to make those links and to understand this may be because one has not spent enough time sitting in a cell with people who are coming up for trial. I can tell the Committee that that is the circumstance, and if you can afford, because the Daily Mail demands it of you, to lower the standard of reasonableness and be more flexible for a householder—as indeed you should—then that kind of flexibility should be available to those who have been experiencing long-term abuse.

I ask that the noble Lord look again at the double standard that is operating here. It is partly, of course, because Governments always want to play the law-and-order card and do not want to be seen to be soft on people who commit crime. But very many of the women who end up in prison did what they did because they were under the coercion and control of somebody else, and were absolutely in fear of that person. I really regret the response I have received from my friend, the noble Lord. I ask him to take his great lawyer’s skills and go back to the drawing board again, because he is missing something very important here, which is about justice for women. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, with great regret, and I am really disappointed in the ministerial response.

Amendment 139 withdrawn.