Victims and Prisoners Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Any legislation that might improve the position of victims is to be welcomed. As someone who has practised at the English Bar for five decades now, I can say that I have seen huge changes taking place—I see jaws are dropping at the idea of my having practised for so long, but it is true; I was very young when I qualified. When I started, the idea of us considering the position of victims did not exist at all. We have seen incrementally changes being made, but unfortunately the Bill will need some amendment to make it do what we all hope for, which is a serious updating on the rights of victims.

I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is a wonderful committee, combining Members of both Houses of this Parliament. We have made notes on a number of issues that still concern us after this matter has gone through the Commons. We are delighted at the introduction of the role of the independent public advocate—something that we really endorse. Bishop Jones of Liverpool and others gave evidence in front of us in relation to the Hillsborough disaster, and they convinced us all of the need for an independent advocate to support victims of major incidents. However, we want that person to be fully independent of government. I emphasise the need for independence and for immediate action in the aftermath of major incidents.

We were concerned also about the Parole Board process and giving the Secretary of State the power to direct the referral of decisions to the Parole Board to himself, and to be retaken. This is again an issue of independence—how will you secure the services of independent-minded people if they feel that their carefully considered opinions are going to be abandoned at the whims of a populist Home Secretary?

The fact that there are 3,000 prisoners still serving sentences of imprisonment for public protection is a matter that has concerned the Joint Committee for quite a long time. Despite our having raised serious concerns about all that, we feel that Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right not to be subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, and Article 5, the right in respect of arbitrary detention, and even the right to life, are all interfered with by imprisonment for public protection. We are urging that the amendment that Sir Robert Neill put forward to the Commons might be considered by this House.

We are also concerned about the disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act in respect of the full legislative framework in England and Wales relating to the release, licences, supervision and recall of indeterminate and determinate sentenced offenders. It is a shocking business that a section of vulnerable people—because they are out of sight and therefore often out of mind—will not have the protections of the Human Rights Act. Again, I urge this House not to listen to the siren voices of those who have never liked the Human Rights Act and to recognise it as a wonderful addition to our legislative framework. I am a big believer in the common-law tradition, but it has been enriched by the Human Rights Act.

In keeping with previous recommendations, we would also like better data collection. A particular matter of concern to all of us, and something I have written about over the years, is the publication of the number of people in prison who have responsibility for the care of a child. Do we take enough care about that? I am not sure that we do, and I would like to have better data collection of the information.

I want to mention Sarah Everard, because my friend the Minister mentioned that that was a pivotal moment. It gave us a sense of something I have written about extensively: the lack of confidence that women and girls have in the justice system around sexual matters, meaning that so many would never turn to the law and feel that they are not listened to and cannot be confident of positive outcomes. To recover—though I do not know whether we ever had it—or secure the confidence of women and girls in our society, we must have reform. I urge that we take positive steps around the whole issue of rape and sexual assault, and perhaps look at the New South Wales model, or the Canadian model that was mentioned by one of the noble Lords on the Government Benches. We should be looking at better ways of supporting those who are victims.

There should also be the protection of survivors’ counselling and therapy records. I have seen it myself: there was a time when women were encouraged not to take counselling or see a therapist after they had been sexually violated because it would in some way call into question the credibility of what they were telling a court because they had talked about it too much and might have had ideas introduced into their heads. Now they are allowed to see counsellors, but misuse is often made of the records. Where women have said that they feel a sense of shame, that is used to question why they would feel shame if they were the victim. This has got to stop. I urge that we provide proper protections of women around the misuse of their records and that they have legal advice, funded by the state, around what is going to be involved in a trial.

When the then Domestic Abuse Bill came before this House, I made the argument for there being changes to the law in relation to the current defences that exist in certain areas of crime. Many of the women who are in prison—and they are a tiny part of the prison population—almost invariably are themselves people who have been victimised. Something like 78% of women in prison have themselves been abused, either as children or as adults, at the hands of partners and husbands. Many of the offences that women are in prison for have been committed at the behest of men—they have been coerced by men to commit them. What I am calling for—I will again raise the issues that I raised and had support for during the passage of the Domestic Abuse Bill in this House—is that there should be statutory defences for women who commit crimes, such as handling stolen goods or carrying drugs, for their coercive partner because they know that not to do it will bring down serious punishment and they have become so coerced and controlled that the ability to say no or go to the authorities is out of their reach. There has to be something better in the way of defences for women who are forced into crime and end up imprisoned for those reasons. For women who end up killing their abusers after years of abuse, there has to be a proper way of considering defences that might be available. Many of those currently available are failing women because of the way they are constructed.

I have always argued, and have written books on the subject, that law was historically created by men, and it has been only in the process of women being involved in our parliamentary processes and on our senior judiciary that law has been changed. We have to change the law so that it delivers for women too. I will be putting amendments to this Bill that I hope this House will accept and return to the Commons to improve it for women and girls who continue to be abused.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere on his excellent maiden speech. I shall treat it as a template for how to make a speech from now on. It was also an honour to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and I congratulate her on her reappointment as Victims’ Commissioner.

This is a welcome Bill and I agree that it is overdue, but, as I was reading it, something was nagging at me. It was not until I went to the Children’s Commissioner’s very useful briefing that I realised what it was: children are hardly mentioned at all, and nor as the victims of crime, as the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Gohir and Lady Benjamin, so aptly described. At this point, as ever, I declare my interest as a state secondary school teacher in Hackney. It is true that Clause 16 is entirely about the relationship between a parent and a child, but even that relationship is seen from an adult standpoint. As far as I can see, the issues of children then cease to be considered in the rest of the Bill, as several noble Lords have noted.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, said most powerfully, the children’s coalition suggests introducing a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in Clause 1 so that a victim can be described as a victim of child criminal exploitation and the crime itself is defined. This seems an opportunity to protect children and ensure that children who have been forced into committing crimes are recognised as victims, not perpetrators. I, among others, would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that.

As my noble friend Lord Meston said, when a child is the victim of a crime they should be treated very differently from an adult. Clause 15 talks about independent domestic violence advisers and independent sexual violence advisers, but again, there is no mention of a child victim adviser. We all know that it can be extraordinarily bewildering and challenging for a child to go through the justice system, whether as a victim or witness. According to data from Safelives, already cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, only 1% of clients accessing independent domestic violence adviser services were under the age of 18, despite the high prevalence of domestic abuse in this age group.

The solution is that we need a specialist for every child victim. The noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, quoted the Children’s Commissioner as saying:

“The Victims and Prisoners Bill should mandate that every child victim of the most serious crimes be offered a specialist advocate … This advocate must have the training and qualifications needed to work with vulnerable children. As well as specialism in the specific harm children have experienced, these advocates should also have the skillset of a Registered Intermediary, to ensure language and communication is appropriate to the child’s development level”,


as my noble friend Lady Coussins admirably described. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Gohir, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have all quoted, Claire Waxman, the London Victims’ Commissioner, agrees:

“Clause 15 provides guidance about ISVAs and IDVAs, but does not recognise other victim advocates—including Stalking Advocates and Child Domestic Violence Advocates—who operate in the justice system and are crucial to victims. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, for example, has shown that victims NOT supported by an Independent Stalking Advocate had a one-in-1,000 chance of their perpetrator being convicted, compared with one in four if they HAD this advocate”.


Surely this alone would make the idea worth while and repay any further investment tenfold. It would also fulfil the Government’s wish to avoid silos. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on this.

Another issue that has been flagged is that the Bill treats all under-18s as children. There is obviously a risk of adultifying them, but as the Children’s Commissioner also states, we need to deal with young people on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the criminal justice process is not disempowering for them.

We have to increase the profile of children and young people in this Bill. I will leave your Lordships with a quote from a 15 year-old rape victim: “I think if I could do it again, I wouldn’t report it, because I’d get over it much faster”.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is a question of judgment. The Government’s judgment is that this legislation will go a long way towards reducing the terrible risks that people and unaccompanied children are facing in crossing the channel in difficult circumstances, and will destabilise the business model of the people smugglers. Those are surely legitimate objects for any Government to pursue.

The noble Baroness’s analysis is essentially correct: if I am a national of a particular state and I make an asylum claim or human rights claim then I cannot be sent back to that country; I could be sent back to a country with which—she puts it somewhat colloquially, and I would not quite use these words—we have a deal. The country with which we have a migration partnership at the moment is Rwanda, so that is still a possibility, subject to the individual in that case being able to make an application for either a factual suspensive application or an application based on imminent and foreseeable and serious harm. That is how it works, and that is how the Government see it.

While I am on my feet, I will address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about whether the threat of deterrents supersedes individual human rights. For the reasons I have given, our answer is that there is no question of superseding individual human rights due to the protections I have just explained. Refoulement is covered by the existing agreement with Rwanda, and I am sure it will be covered in future agreements.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder if an answer could be given to the question from the Minister’s colleague on the Benches behind him, who asked about Commonwealth countries. Would the Minister agree that many of the Commonwealth countries have laws which criminalise homosexuality? Indeed, Uganda has just passed legislation which says that the death penalty can be used in relation to homosexuality, and in India there are currently a lot of issues and questions about the treatment of Muslims there. There might be very real issues even when it comes to Commonwealth countries.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness says, there might indeed be issues. Their legislation is a matter for them. The fact that they are members of the Commonwealth which upholds, or seeks to uphold, barest basic standards is a relevant background consideration, as the noble Lord pointed out.

For the reasons I have given, as best I can, the protections in the Bill are adequate to deal with the problems that have been raised. I respectfully say that Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill.

European Court of Human Rights: Rule 39

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Wolfson, particularly where the interim measures order, in the circumstances that he relates, overrides three reasoned judgments by the domestic court at first instance, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. None the less, the Prime Minister is fully engaged and discussed this very question in Reykjavík recently with the president of the Strasbourg court.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I have asked the Minister about the difficulty that we lose credibility if we do not engage with the use of this particular interim measure order. It has been so useful, for example in relation to Russia, because interim measures have already got in under the wire and now, of course, Russia has been expelled from the Council of Europe. Does the Minister agree that, eventually, when people are brought before the International Criminal Court, the fact that Russia has failed to abide by those interim measures will be evidence of their culpability in war crimes?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I have already agreed on Russia. I emphasise that the Government’s approach to this is to engage very closely, respectfully and constructively with the Strasbourg authorities and the court’s working party, which is considering this very question.

Jurors: Mental Health Impact

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Tuesday 28th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as I say, the Government are exploring options. Sometimes a judge will warn jurors in advance that it is distressing and ask whether any of them wish to be discharged. There is a post-trial leaflet and an interesting video, which I watched yesterday, for jurors after the trial, which suggests what they should do if they feel stressed. Some courts of their own volition make references to local charities, and we are providing further guidance to courts on what to do in those circumstances.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I will come to the assistance of the Minister because he has been a practitioner in the courts, as I have. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not someone who practises in front of juries—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

—but it is commonplace now for judges to say to a jury that a case is of a sexual nature or involves homicide or murder where the facts are particularly troubling and gruesome, and to ask: “If any of you have any reason why you feel could not sit on such a case, then please come forward and tell me”. You can have a juror say, “I have had an experience in my past which will make this particularly difficult”. Judges will take the opportunity to say that the juror does not have to sit. That is commonplace in serious cases now. I ask the Minister: should it not be an obligation on the Crown to inform a court and the judge who is sitting that a case may be very disturbing for jurors, so that they can step forward and withdraw from sitting as a juror on that particular case?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I am entirely in agreement with the noble Baroness that in most cases of this kind judges will warn jurors in advance. That should generally be done, and I think it is for the judge to decide.

Domestic Abuse: Defence for Victims who Commit an Offence

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I do not wish to pre-empt the contents of the Wade report or the Government’s response. The broad position is that the Government are not yet persuaded that a change in the law is needed in relation to homicide or other offences, but are very much open to further consideration of these very difficult issues.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, it is right to say that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, made the commitment that has been referred to as a result of amendments which I had put forward, with the assistance of the right reverend Prelate and others in this House. The concern is that there has been evidence that women are disproportionately convicted of murder, because the way in which defences to homicide have been designed has not taken account of their experiences. Provocation and diminished responsibility are measured in ways that do not take account of that experience. We want to hear urgency from the Front Bench: will it be done with speed?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, these are difficult issues and I completely understand the concern of the noble Baroness and others who have raised them. Taking the law into one’s own hands is a very big step and there should be a very high bar to taking life, whatever the circumstances. The question of whether one should change the law on the defence of homicide is complicated and the Government will continue to consider it.

Human Rights Act 1998

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with a warning. This Government do not want scrutiny. It will not matter who becomes the new leader of the Conservative Party and, on the vote of only 160,000 people, our new Prime Minister—the Government do not want scrutiny. That is why they want to repeal the Human Rights Act, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, for introducing this debate and for her humanity over the years in promoting human rights.

I remind everyone—I see here the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Carlile, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, people who have been involved in these issues over a long period—that it used to take us six years to get a case to the European Court of Human Rights. When we took a case about the cruel and inhumane treatment being used in interrogation practices in Northern Ireland, it took six years to get the case to the European court. The business of bringing rights home in 1998 was to say, “Look, this is ridiculous; we ought to be able to make some of these decisions in our own courts”. What is being said now is that we want to constrain these terrible foreign judges, but let us be very clear that this is about constraining our judges even more. Do not be taken in by the rhetoric.

Human rights, as we know, are about respect for the humanity of another, irrespective of whether that person is male or female, whether they are a person of colour, whether they have one religion or another or no religion, whether they are gay or straight or trans, whether they are an asylum seeker or an economic migrant, whether they are a prisoner who has forfeited their liberty because of bad things they have done: they are still human beings who deserve to have their humanity respected. A person’s status should not reduce their humanity in our eyes; their human rights should not be contingent on their conduct or have to be earned. Those things, we have to hold on to.

I reinforce what has just been said by my noble friend Lord Parekh: decision-making by public bodies that undermine human rights should not be above challenge. Unfortunately, this business of repealing the Human Rights Act is precisely as he said. This is about a grab of power to the Executive, so we should be very clear about what is underpinning this. It really is about saying that members of the public will not be able to say, “These decisions being made by public bodies or by government policy are going to take away some of my human rights”. They do not want that, and that is what will mean significant inroads into the powers, not just of an international court but of domestic courts, to review the legality of what the Government do.

It must be remembered that the law develops by bringing test cases. To reinforce something said by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, at the heart of this assault on rights is the division between lawyers who believe in the “living instrument” doctrine—the idea that law has to live and breathe through generous interpretation of rights because society changes and becomes different, so we want our judges to do likewise—and lawyers who want to cling to the original meaning of a text. They insist that common law is the great tradition and does not need any additional elements from outside, or the outside eyes that can often help us look at our system and see where it might need bettering. This idea of the original text comes from the US Justice Scalia school of lawyering, which insists on what the drafters of law had in mind and takes no account of changing norms or culture. It maroons society in a romance with the past, which is one of the things that we have to guard conservatives against, instead of moving into contemporary times and respecting the humanity of all.

We should be very clear about what the Government have in mind. This is why they are so dismissive of consultation or bringing in experts, as we had with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on judicial review and my noble friend Lord Murphy’s friend reviewing the Human Rights Act. They were dismissed by the Government because they do not want external reviews; basically, they just want to stick to an ideological position—to attack human rights. The objective of this Bill is not to restore parliamentary sovereignty or bolster rights, but the very opposite: to reduce rights, consolidate executive power and resist scrutiny.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I came into the debate late on the day we voted. I was really quite shocked to find what was being debated, and I listened very carefully to the contributions. Because I had not heard the Minister speak from the Dispatch Box, I did not take part in the debate; I felt that I would be criticised for coming in without having heard the full discussion. But I have practised in the criminal courts for 50 years—I was called to the Bar 50 years ago—so I can tell noble Lords that I was very alarmed at the content, and I echo what has just been said by one of our distinguished judges.

I really was concerned at the absence of discretion here. You could have such a range with this kind of manslaughter charge, and it is a shocking idea that a mandatory life sentence might be passed on someone very youthful in circumstances such as were described—you can never completely cover every possibility—by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, where the consequence of a tragedy could also lead to the double tragedy of somebody spending their life in prison because the sentence is mandatory. So I really do think we have to think twice here. Of course, we have to protect our public servants, but it is vital that we keep true to the idea that different cases require different responses, and that there have to be some exceptions.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, relatively new as I am to this House, I try to follow procedure and often fail to do so, and I am rightly reprimanded by fellow Peers when that happens and when mistakes are made. I am also very conscious of the democratic deficit of this House as unelected legislators. But, in relation to this issue, I was shocked by what I saw as an abuse of procedure by the introduction of this very important Harper’s law at such a late stage. I felt that that was bending the stick, to say the least, in terms of taking this House and its procedures seriously.

So, from my point of view, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has explained very well that this is a modest amendment that does not try to overturn the spirit of what was passed earlier on but is trying to deal with what I think are unintended consequences that the Government themselves do not want to see—that is not their intention. But Harper’s law is not a minor matter. Since that bit of a mess by which it was passed last time, I have had some sleepless nights imagining that I might in any way be responsible for the unintended consequences that I really do not think the Minister wants to happen, but which could happen unless the Bill is unamended—which is why I support this amendment in these unusual circumstances.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Fullbrook. As a woman of Glasgow heritage, that alone should undoubtedly make her a great asset to this House.

It is hard to select which pieces of the Government’s legislative programme are the most dispiriting, but let me start with the Lord Chancellor’s plan to ratchet up sentences of imprisonment. This is mere populist posturing. It has already been mentioned—I mention it again because it is about wider Europe—that we have the highest prison population in Europe, surpassed only by Russia and Turkey. We are not talking just about western Europe but about the wider Europe of members of the Council of Europe. We are up there at the top of the league table, and it should be no source of pride to us.

I was rather saddened by the Minister’s woeful slogan, “Tough on crime, tough on the perpetrators of crime”. I know that he seemed proud of it. However, while it may be a little jibe at the Labour aphorism, “Tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime”, the difference between a slogan and an aphorism, which is why I choose the word “aphorism”, is that there is a nugget of truth in an aphorism. The truth in that aphorism about having to deal with and look to the causes of crime is because there one has a real sophisticated project on trying to drive down crime.

At the moment, our prisons are crammed full, with there being virtually no skills training, rehabilitation or education. Yet the level of illiteracy is high among our prison population. It means, therefore, that their ability to survive in society is harder. There are no anger management courses. It is truly abysmal that there is such an absence of courses to address drug addiction, alcohol addiction and misogyny, which is the backdrop to so much crime against women. We also have a depleted probation service, as was described by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. Probation officers are so hard-pressed that they have no capacity to carry out the risk assessments that are key to the prevention of reoffending.

My great friend, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, spoke of women in the criminal justice system, about which I, too, am concerned. In 2018, 62% of women in prison were serving sentences of less than six months. Since then, it is believed that that figure has increased. We have the extraordinary business of women being in prison, the vast majority of whom are serving sentences of under six months. Think about the consequences of that. A woman’s children are taken away from her and put into care; she loses her accommodation because the contract is terminated and she is evicted; and of course in prison, as I have mentioned, she is not able to avail herself of much in the way of support. Women in prison have usually been the victims of domestic violence, child abuse and all those things that we know often lead to people committing offences at the behest of controlling men.

It saddened me that, when the Attorney-General was asked on “Woman’s Hour” why we were creating 500 new places for women when the majority of women do not commit violent or serious offences, the response was that 50,000 new police officers were being created so that there would be many more arrests and therefore there was a need for many more prison places. That does not seem like a very imaginative way of dealing with criminal justice or preventing crime.

I turn to the other Bill that is an absolute travesty, the asylum reforms, which my noble friend Lord Blunkett made the arguments about very clearly. It is a shameful rejection of our obligations in international law. It should be remembered by everyone in this House—we are the last generation that really remembers this stuff; I remember my father, having coming back from the Second World War, telling us stories of the horrors—that the reason why the 1951 refugee convention was created was the problems that many had in getting out of Nazi Germany and away from persecution. The drafters of the convention made it very clear—

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I remind the noble Baroness of the time.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Sorry. They made it clear that we have to treat a person as a refugee, not simply according to the way in which they made their way to another country.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Smith: we cannot delay the business of dealing with the persecution and misery faced by homosexual people in conversion therapy. That is a promise that was made, and I hope the Government stick to it. This is not about a failure to protect religion; it is about preventing people from being treated horribly—exorcised and so on—in ways that are inhumane and do not recognise their essential sexuality and humanity. Please proceed with that Bill.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Wednesday 21st April 2021 Lords Chamber

We also recognise that there are some women offenders who have been subject to domestic abuse and have been compelled to commit crime as a result of their involvement in an abusive relationship. The Government have, therefore, given a commitment—and this is, I hope, an important point—to a review of sentencing in domestic homicide cases. The parameters and details of that review are currently being refined, but we intend to explore the use of sentencing legislation and guidelines in relation to use of a weapon, how aggravating and mitigating circumstances are taken into account, particularly those relevant to domestic abuse and, to the extent possible, the way in which defences to charges of murder or manslaughter affect sentencing, in both cases with a prior history of domestic abuse and those without. By undertaking that review, we will gain a greater understanding of how sentencing in domestic homicide cases works in practice, while avoiding a rush to make changes that could have unintended consequences. With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, we feel that this is a more appropriate response, both to the original Lords Amendments 37, 38 and 83 and also, if I may say, to her latest Amendment 37B. For those reasons, I believe the principles and ethos behind this Bill will improve and provide better support for victims of domestic abuse and highlight the impact of offensive behaviour. We have raised the profile of domestic abuse. We will, obviously, continue to work in this area but, for the reasons I have set out, the Government are unable to support Amendment 37B, and I therefore beg to move Motion D.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

As tabled, this new amendment, is in lieu of my earlier amendments which sought to create statutory defences for survivors who offend due to their experience of domestic abuse. One of the devasting impacts of domestic abuse is the unjust criminalisation of the victim. This is a landmark Bill, and I pay tribute to all who have been perfecting it and adding to it. I think it will be a hugely important piece of legislation, but I am afraid it does not prevent this criminalisation of victims.

I am not resisting the Motion, but my new amendment would commit the Government to establishing an independent review of the effectiveness of self-defence. It is my view, as a barrister in the courts who has done homicide cases involving domestic violence where the victim has killed her abuser, that there is need for legislative reform. A great deal of research has now been done. A study recently conducted by the Centre for Women’s Justice has produced a very persuasive report concerning the limitations of the defences available to women and, particularly, how self-defence fails women because often, in circumstance where their abuser is not using a weapon, they reach for a weapon. This is then deemed to be disproportionate to the threat, but in the circumstances, and the fear created in her is so great, and she is so unmatched physically with abuser, that she will often reach for a weapon where others might not. The report produced by the Centre for Women’s Justice calls into question the ability of self-defence to cover many of the women, and it provides serious evidence of that.

Equally, the Prison Reform Trust has done a great deal of research into women in custody, serving sentences in our prison estate, many of whom have been forced to commit crimes by their abusers.

We hope that this review might be added to the review that has just been mentioned by the Minister. The fact that sentencing is being looked at is welcome, but that does not deal with the fact that women unable to avail themselves of self-defence are often being left with a conviction. This has serious consequences for people’s lives, even if they are dealt with more compassionately by a court because of their history of abuse that the court has heard.

I ask that this review be undertaken in conjunction with the review on sentencing in homicide cases. I remind the House that the Lord Chancellor is contemplating such a review on homicide cases because, having spoken to the Victims’ Commissioner and the domestic violence commissioner, who explained to him the ways in which women might seem to take disproportionate action because of their physical disadvantage, he felt compelled to. I would not have thought that it was particularly complicated to add to the review the issue of whether the matter of self-defence and duress works for women and men experiencing domestic violence.

My amendment seeks a formal response from the Minister to my suggestion. I will not be pushing the amendment to a vote. My earlier amendments would have provided effective defences for survivors of domestic abuse who, as a result of the appalling experience, are driven to use force in self-defence or are coerced by their abuser into offending. The amendments were based on legal precedents already in place to protect other groups. Since we already make this special concession for householders facing an intruder, I cannot understand why the same kind of concession in seeking proper justice cannot be made available to victims of domestic abuse.

One might also look at how victims of trafficking who are compelled to offend are dealt with, as suggested by the statutory defence in the second of the two propositions that I put before the House. They would have provided equivalent protection to survivors who, far from receiving protection and support, as this Bill seeks to ensure, find themselves in the dock for offences that they had no realistic alternative but to commit.

When the Minister and I met last week to discuss these proposals with members of the Centre for Women’s Justice, we were joined by a survivor who spoke powerfully of her experience of terrible abuse, including how she was coerced by her terrifying abuser into handling stolen goods. I feel sure that the Minister would agree that there is no material difference between the circumstances that led her to offend and the way in which victims of trafficking are coerced into offending. Yet, had she been caught, it is highly likely that she would have received a caution or conviction, given the impossibly high threshold required for the defence of duress, and that she would have gone to prison.

This is far from being an isolated case. Many other examples, including cases in which self-defence has failed, have been collated and presented to the Government. The misery and injustice faced by victims in these cases will simply go on and on until reforms are implemented. Other common-law jurisdictions have dealt with these challenges through legislation, and I have never been more convinced than now that we need legislation in this jurisdiction to ensure that these cases are dealt with justly. I know that the Minister disagrees, but I also know that he sympathises with our aims. I hope therefore that he will take action today by confirming that the Government will hold an independent review of this matter, and do so in conjunction with the review of sentencing, as he has already outlined.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in favour of Amendment 37B, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, having supported her in earlier amendments on Report.

I always think that it is a danger for a non-lawyer to get involved in some of these discussions. I remember that very often people asked why we had so many lawyers in the House of Commons, and when I got there I realised that it was because we make laws. This of course is a good example of why we need the great legal brains that this Chamber has in plenty. So I feel a little in awe not only of the noble Baroness but of my noble friend the Minister.

I declare an interest as the deputy chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. There is a similarity with the Modern Slavery Act, which covers people who commit crimes under duress because they have been trafficked or are enslaved, although my noble friend the Minister does not think so. I find it difficult not to see it, and it is a shame. The last thing we need is to fill up our prisons with people who should not be there and who committed a crime only because they were forced to. I heard what the Minister said, and what the noble Baroness said. It would be very useful if he could move a little more and extend that review to look at the issues that the noble Baroness mentioned. I heard what the noble Baroness said about the meeting that she had with my noble friend and the fact that there was a survivor there. I have always believed that listening to survivors, whether of domestic abuse or modern slavery, normally for me swings the balance in favour of the victims. Those poor, innocent people who have had to endure so much should not have to face criminal proceedings as a result of their abuse.

I look forward to hearing what my noble friend the Minister says in winding up this debate. I fear that I may be disappointed, but I hope that perhaps at the last minute there will be a glimmer of hope.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As I explained, the review’s terms of reference are being set out. The date will depend on how broad the review is, which will obviously affect the date by which it reports. Certainly, as soon as there is a date fixed or anticipated, I can perhaps write to the noble Baroness to inform her of it.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am of course disappointed that there has not been any movement—because the suggestion of there being a review in relation to the defences was posited last week, and I had hoped that, in the interim, we might have heard that some movement had taken place behind the scenes. Given that the terms of reference have not been finalised, I will write to the Lord Chancellor and seek to persuade him that the terms of reference might extend to a look at the defences as well as the sentencing in homicide cases where there is a background of domestic violence or abuse.

As I indicated, I will not press this Motion. I beg leave to withdraw it, but I ask that the good offices of the Lord Chancellor’s Department might be open to some reconsideration.

Motion D1 withdrawn.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

50: After Clause 68, insert the following new Clause—
“Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases
(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.(4) After subsection (8F) insert—“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b). (8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause seeks to clarify the degree of force which is reasonable under the common law of self-defence where the defendant is a survivor of domestic abuse alleged to have used force against their abuser.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

It is a great privilege to take part in this debate and to hear the voices of so many people with expertise in this field —sometimes direct experience—speaking with wisdom and compassion about why the law had to change.

I remind noble Lords that not so very long ago there used to be a way of referring to domestic abuse as “a domestic”, as though it were lesser than ordinary crime. It has been a long and hard struggle to have the law shift and change, for the agenda and context to change and for our political and legal classes to understand the full import of domestic violence and the toll it takes on our lives and the whole of society. That is why it has been so uplifting to listen to this debate over the last few weeks. I will move for two new statutory defences to be included in the Bill and give notice that I intend to divide the House.

In 2017, the Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said there needed to be a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system when they themselves are victims of abuse. Unfortunately, criminal law still fails to protect those whose experience of abuse drives them to offend. I strongly urge this House that there cannot be two classes of victim: those who somehow win our compassion and for whom we are desirous of a much fairer system and those who somehow fall outside that kind of protection.

We know that the law has failed women in many different areas for many years, and that one of the reasons why has been the absence of women in lawmaking—in the senior judiciary and in Parliaments. Happily, we have seen that changing in our society over recent decades, but there is still work to be done. I am attempting in these amendments, supported by colleagues around the House, to fill a really important gap—for those who perhaps have least voice because they end up in prison.

These amendments are supported by virtually every organisation involved—I do not know any organisation involved in domestic abuse that is not supporting this change. Once you really know about abuse and its ultimate potential consequences, which can often be the death of a woman or a victim of abuse, you know that sometimes the person on the receiving end can take no more and, out of despair and desperation, inflicts violence. We have to understand the context, and what has often been missing in the courts was a full understanding of domestic violence and the context. I know that, even in this House, we learn from each other and from each other’s experience, directly and indirectly, about what is involved and what the long-term impact of domestic abuse can be. It has been in only recent times, for example, that forms of abuse other than violence have been shown to have long-term consequences that can be so damaging to someone’s mental health. That learning has, in turn, to be fed into the law.

The organisations supporting these amendments include Women’s Aid, Rights of Women, Refuge, the Criminal Bar Association and the Centre for Women’s Justice, which has been a very important part of the research-gathering for these amendments. One of the pieces of work has come out of a report recently published by the Centre for Women’s Justice, Women Who Kill: How the State Criminalises Women We Might Otherwise Be Burying. The Victims’ Commissioner supports these changes. The domestic abuse commissioner- designate supports these amendments. Unfortunately, at the moment, the Government do not. Is this about not wanting to be seen in any way to support persons who might be accused of crime, rather than seeing that you are really supporting victims?

The first of the amendments, Amendment 50, has a new statutory defence relating to self-defence and the reasonableness test that applies to it. This amendment would afford justice to women who, after long-term abuse, are unable to avail themselves of self-defence when they are accused of harming their abuser, using force against their abuser or, indeed, killing their abuser. Why does self-defence not work in these circumstances? The reason is that the force used in self-defence must be reasonable, but because of their experience of relentless abuse and their physical disadvantage, women often reach for a weapon. As a result, their action is often deemed disproportionate because, in examining whether something is reasonable, which is an objective test, the question is asked, “Is it proportionate to what was happening to her at the time?”

Of course, it might not seem proportionate if a woman runs to the kitchen drawer, or reaches to the kitchen counter, and picks up a knife, or, as Sally Challen did, reaches for a hammer and causes a fatal blow to her controlling, abusive husband. I even represented a woman who took a rolling pin and hit her husband, causing an injury to his skull that ended in his loss of life. But he had abused her over years and years, and she could not take any more. So, we have to look at the ways in which we can contextualise this form of abuse, and look at why self-defence does not work for women. The research conducted in the report by the Centre for Women’s Justice really lays it out very clearly.

I just raise the comparison that I put before the House originally, when I spoke at Second Reading and then in Committee. I pointed out that there had already been a departure from the normal rules when dealing with a householder. The Government’s response then was to distinguish a householder’s fear if someone trespassed on to their property—an Englishman’s home is his castle—as, not knowing who they may be, they may take a weapon from a drawer and use it fatally, from the position of a victim of domestic violence taking a weapon in her hand.

I suggest that the point was ill made, because no one is suggesting a parallel. A departure has been made from the normal rules, which were made with a different perception in mind, by men of law who had not imagined the circumstances of domestic violence, the long-term abuse, the toll that it takes and the psychological impact it has on someone—the rising fear, the reading of a situation, the complexity referred to by the Minister and the dynamic that is created in these relationships. The point that I was making was that a departure has been made for the circumstances of the householder. If we are prepared to make it there, why are we so reluctant to make it here, particularly when it is going to be made use of by women—rare as these cases are—defending themselves against someone?

We heard today of the Government’s change of heart in their concession that non-fatal strangulation should become a crime, properly recognised by the courts at the right level. I have not worked on a single homicide where such a strangulation has not put people in fear that, one day, it will extinguish their life. That has been part of the histories that they have given to the court about the way in which they have been treated over the years.

The concern here is that self-defence is not working in these cases. The amendment seeks to introduce the test that was introduced for the householder, which is that, instead of being reasonable and proportionate, it would have to be grossly disproportionate to lose the right to draw down self-defence as a rationale or defence for conduct and for seeking an acquittal. For most of these women, because they face a conviction of murder if they fail, those acting for them persuade them to plead guilty of manslaughter. They are driven down another road that will lead to a conviction, but that is not the justice of the situation. They plead guilty to manslaughter, are convicted and end up in prison. That conviction will have consequences for their lives—employment and so much else—when they have been at the receiving end of abuse. That is quite wrong. It is in the hands of the Government to make a difference and I call upon them to reconsider their position.

I turn now to an interesting piece of academic work that was written under the names of Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie in 2012. It is about defences against homicide from battered women, as a comparative analysis of laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This House can be persuaded by research from elsewhere, if changes have been made in other common law jurisdictions. It would be good for us to take a lead. When Theresa May introduced this legislation, she spoke of the United Kingdom leading the world in making changes to law that would bring proper justice to anybody facing domestic abuse, particularly women. Seeing whether others have made those changes first is not necessary, but it is helpful to look at research.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness. I appreciate that she has three amendments to introduce—

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

The third one does not count.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

She has taken 20 minutes to do so already and the House is keen to debate the amendments she is putting forward. If she could do so briefly, it will give noble Lords the opportunity to do just that.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

I feel that that was unnecessary, but I was coming to my conclusion anyway. There must be a causal link between the threat and the decision of the defendant to break the law, and that is a high bar. I strongly urge the House to support this new statutory defence for women who are compelled to commit crimes so that they can put it before the court where it can be tested and measured evidentially. If it passes the test, she can be acquitted.

Amendment 66 is a list of the offences to which this would not apply because of their gravity. I hope that the Crown does not think that there are two kinds of victims: those who are somehow deserving and those who are undeserving. The end of the road is when women are forced to do things that take them into the criminal ambit because of a history of abuse. I beg to move.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con) [V]]

My Lords, we have heard a passionate and erudite speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I have attached my name to her Amendment 51 principally because I was struck by the similarity, which is mentioned in the explanatory statement, to what is set out in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where someone cannot be found guilty of committing a criminal act if they have been subjected to the coercion of modern slavery. I can see the same parallel between that and the domestic abuse situation which has been put so well by the noble Baroness. I therefore say, in the interests of brevity, that the noble Baroness has said it all and I shall support her, certainly on Amendment 51, if she puts it to a vote.

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[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

I have received no requests to speak after the Minister; accordingly, I call the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am of course disappointed but not surprised by the response, as it was indicated that I would not receive the response that some other amendments have. It is regrettable, because all the evidence points towards problems in both these areas. There are women being convicted of crimes where they have clearly been coerced and their abusive partners are forcing them to commit crime. In relation to homicide and, indeed, lesser crimes, self-defence is not available to women because of the “disproportionate” issue. The measure should be just the same as in the intruder case. The distinction that the noble Lord seeks to make between that and the householder is really without merit and not convincing. I am sure he is having to read from a brief and he will know himself.

Anyone who really knows about domestic abuse knows that this is instinctive: when someone snaps, in the end, it is because they cannot take any more. That is why they reach for a weapon; they know that they cannot take on the sort of force that they have experienced in the past. This is a failure of understanding. It is being unable to stand in the shoes of someone in these circumstances.

I do not blame the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in any way. It is just that there is a process of learning here, which we have all been on. It may be easier to understand someone nearly being strangled, but harder to understand the moment when, instinctively and in terror, a person who has been abused over a long period suddenly reaches for a weapon in their defence. Not to understand that is regrettable, so I will move both these amendments and test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

51: After Clause 68, insert the following new Clause—
“Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of this Act, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship), or(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.(5) For the purposes of this section “relevant characteristics” means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule (Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply).(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply).(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule (Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply) and any amendment to Schedule (Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would provide a statutory defence for survivors of domestic abuse, in some circumstances, who commit an offence. It is closely modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

66: After Schedule 2, insert the following new Schedule—
“OFFENCES TO WHICH THE DEFENCE FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE WHO COMMIT AN OFFENCE DOES NOT APPLYCommon law offences
1 False imprisonment.2 Kidnapping.3 Manslaughter.4 Murder.5 Perverting the course of justice.6 Piracy.Offences against the Person Act 1861
7 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—(a) section 4 (soliciting murder);(b) section 16 (threats to kill);(c) section 18 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm);(d) section 20 (malicious wounding);(e) section 21 (attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle in order to commit or assist in committing an indictable offence);(f) section 22 (using drugs etc to commit or assist in the committing of an indictable offence);(g) section 23 (maliciously administering poison etc so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm);(h) section 27 (abandoning children);(i) section 28 (causing bodily injury by explosives);(j) section 29 (using explosives with intent to do grievous bodily harm);(k) section 30 (placing explosives with intent to do bodily injury);(l) section 31 (setting spring guns etc with intent to do grievous bodily harm);(m) section 32 (endangering safety of railway passengers);(n) section 35 (injuring persons by furious driving);(o) section 37 (assaulting officer preserving wreck);(p) section 38 (assault with intent to resist arrest).Explosive Substances Act 1883
8 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Explosive Substances Act 1883—(a) section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property);(b) section 3 (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property);(c) section 4 (making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances).Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929
9 An offence under section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (child destruction).Children and Young Persons Act 1933
10 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to children).Public Order Act 1936
11 An offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (control etc of quasi-military organisation).Infanticide Act 1938
12 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide). Firearms Act 1968
13 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—(a) section 5 (possession of prohibited firearms);(b) section 16 (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life);(c) section 16A (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence);(d) section 17(1) (use of firearm to resist arrest);(e) section 17(2) (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for specified offence);(f) section 18 (carrying firearm with criminal intent).Theft Act 1968
14 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—(a) section 8 (robbery or assault with intent to rob);(b) section 9 (burglary), where the offence is committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, or to do unlawful damage to a building or anything in it;(c) section 10 (aggravated burglary);(d) section 12A (aggravated vehicle-taking), where the offence involves an accident which causes the death of any person;(e) section 21 (blackmail).Criminal Damage Act 1971
15 The following offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971—(a) an offence of arson under section 1;(b) an offence under section 1(2) (destroying or damaging property) other than an offence of arson.Immigration Act 1971
16 An offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state).Customs and Excise Management Act 1979
17 An offence under section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (indecent or obscene articles).Taking of Hostages Act 1982
18 An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking).Aviation Security Act 1982
19 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation Security Act 1982—(a) section 1 (hijacking);(b) section 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft);(c) section 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft);(d) section 4 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).Mental Health Act 1983
20 An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).Child Abduction Act 1984
21 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—(a) section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc);(b) section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).Public Order Act 1986
22 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986— (a) section 1 (riot);(b) section 2 (violent disorder).Criminal Justice Act 1988
23 An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).Road Traffic Act 1988
24 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988—(a) section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);(b) section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs).Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990
25 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990—(a) section 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes);(b) section 9 (hijacking of ships);(c) section 10 (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms);(d) section 11 (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety);(e) section 12 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation);(f) section 13 (offences involving threats).Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570)
26 An offence under Part 2 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (SI 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system).Protection from Harassment Act 1997
27 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—(a) section 4 (putting people in fear of violence);(b) section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).Crime and Disorder Act 1998
28 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 —(a) section 29 (racially or religiously aggravated assaults);(b) section 31(1)(a) or (b) (racially or religiously aggravated offences under section 4 or 4A of the Public Order Act 1986).Terrorism Act 2000
29 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000—(a) section 54 (weapons training);(b) section 56 (directing terrorist organisation);(c) section 57 (possession of article for terrorist purposes);(d) section 59 (inciting terrorism overseas).International Criminal Court Act 2001
30 An offence under any of the following provisions of the International Criminal Court Act 2001—(a) section 51 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes);(b) section 52 (ancillary conduct).Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
31 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001—(a) section 47 (use of nuclear weapons);(b) section 50 (assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas);(c) section 113 (use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate). Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003
32 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(a) section 1 (female genital mutilation);(b) section 2 (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia);(c) section 3 (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia).Sexual Offences Act 2003
33 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—(a) section 1 (rape);(b) section 2 (assault by penetration);(c) section 3 (sexual assault);(d) section 4 (causing person to engage in sexual activity without consent);(e) section 5 (rape of child under 13);(f) section 6 (assault of child under 13 by penetration);(g) section 7 (sexual assault of child under 13);(h) section 8 (causing or inciting child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);(i) section 9 (sexual activity with a child);(j) section 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(k) section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);(l) section 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence);(m) section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming);(n) section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child);(o) section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(p) section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child);(q) section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act);(r) section 25 (sexual activity with a child family member);(s) section 26 (inciting a child family member to engage in sexual activity);(t) section 30 (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice);(u) section 31 (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity);(v) section 32 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice);(w) section 33 (causing a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to watch a sexual act);(x) section 34 (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder);(y) section 35 (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception);(z) section 36 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a mental disorder);(aa) section 37 (causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception); (ab) section 38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder);(ac) section 39 (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity);(ad) section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder);(ae) section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act);(af) section 47 (paying for sexual services of a child);(ag) section 48 (causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography);(ah) section 49 (controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography);(ai) section 50 (arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography);(aj) section 61 (administering a substance with intent);(ak) section 62 (committing offence with intent to commit sexual offence);(al) section 63 (trespass with intent to commit sexual offence);(am) section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration);(an) section 65 (sex with an adult relative: consenting to penetration);(ao) section 66 (exposure);(ap) section 67 (voyeurism);(aq) section 70 (sexual penetration of a corpse).Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004
34 An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm).Terrorism Act 2006
35 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—(a) section 5 (preparation of terrorist acts);(b) section 6 (training for terrorism);(c) section 9 (making or possession of radioactive device or material);(d) section 10 (use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes);(e) section 11 (terrorist threats relating to radioactive devices etc).Modern Slavery Act 2015
36 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015—(a) section 1 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);(b) section 2 (human trafficking).Ancillary offences
37_(1) An offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed in this Schedule.(2) An offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence listed in this Schedule.(3) An offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence listed in this Schedule.”