Domestic Abuse Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Moved by
18: Clause 37, page 23, line 28, leave out “without reasonable excuse the person fails” and insert “the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has without reasonable excuse failed”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment applies the criminal standard of proof to a breach of a domestic abuse protection order.
Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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My Lords, this amendment raises the relationship between the civil order and the criminal conviction that can result from a breach of it. I hope that this debate is as constructive as the last one, because my intention is not to divide the House but to get on record the explanation of how a DAPO—a domestic abuse protection order—and the breach of it will work.

The order may be made if the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, which is the civil standard of proof, that an individual has been abusive to someone with whom he or she has a personal connection— I find it difficult to use “they” of the singular. It is also a condition that the order is

“necessary and proportionate to protect that person from domestic abuse, or the risk of domestic abuse”.

The civil court can impose requirements and the Bill gives examples, such as non-contact, not going to specified premises and electronic monitoring. If the subject of the order fails to comply with a requirement, without reasonable excuse, it is an offence of which he or she may be convicted. If found guilty, he or she is liable to a fine or imprisonment up to five years.

We debated protection notices and orders in Committee. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in a long and helpful reply, said that he agreed with the aims of our amendments and he summarised them correctly as:

“to ensure procedural fairness so that criminal liability and punishment for breach of a DAPO will occur only where the breach is proved to the criminal standard of proof”.

He also said:

“One of the strongest elements of a DAPO is that it is a civil order, made on the civil standard of proof. That means that if a victim is not able to, or chooses not to, seek remedy through the criminal justice system, they can still access protection from the court.”—[Official Report, 1/2/21; cols. 1950-51.]


I wonder whether the Minister can unpack that “not able”—why not? And “chooses not to”—why would we not require that course to be pursued? I understand, as much as someone who has not been in this situation can, the difficulties facing someone going through everything in a court, which is an issue that we will come to later. It is important to enable a victim to pursue both justice and protection, but it is also important to have regard to the rights of an alleged perpetrator, which is about the standard of proof to be attained.

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, as I indicated in Committee, I agree with the general aim of the amendment, which is to ensure that criminal liability and punishment for a breach of a DAPO should occur only if the breach is proved to the criminal standard of proof. I heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and a number of other contributors to this short debate that the essential purpose of the amendment is for me to repeat from the Dispatch Box what I set out in a letter. I will aim to do just that.

I therefore make two main points. First, a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence. As with all criminal offences, this will require the police to investigate the case and refer it to prosecutors, who will decide whether to pursue a prosecution. Secondly, the fact that a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence means that, as with all criminal offences, the criminal standard of proof will apply automatically when the court is dealing with the case. A criminal conviction cannot be entered, or criminal sanctions imposed, unless and until the criminal standard of proof has been met.

The criminal standard of proof applies, therefore, when we are dealing with a breach of a DAPO. It does not apply when we are dealing with the making a DAPO. When we look at whether a DAPO should be made, the civil standard of proof applies—that is, the balance of probabilities. But in order to impose criminal sanctions for its breach, the criminal standard of proof will apply—that is, beyond reasonable doubt. I hope that has set out the position clearly and unambiguously.

Picking up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, “beyond reasonable doubt” is the standard of proof; “without reasonable excuse” is an element of the offence, which would have to be proved to that standard. That is the difference between the two phrases.

We have taken this approach to the DAPO because we want to send a clear message to perpetrators that breach of an order is a serious matter and will be acted on. As I stated in Committee and during my engagement with the noble Baroness and others since, this approach is similar to other civil protective orders that carry criminal liability for breach, such as the non-molestation order, stalking protection order and knife crime prevention order. The approach is therefore consistent with our existing legal framework.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked why some victims may not want to go for criminal sanctions. That might not be their preference for a number of reasons. First, they may be concerned about the possible consequences for their partner or ex-partner and would not want them criminalised for a breach or, indeed, if the point of the question was, “Why isn’t the original order criminal?”

Fundamentally, the proposed orders are intended to be preventive and not punitive. They will enable courts to impose positive requirements which can help to achieve long-term sustainable behaviour change and challenge perpetrators to address their abusive behaviour. For example, the perpetrator might be required to attend a behaviour change programme or an alcohol or substance misuse programme, or undergo a mental health assessment. That may help those victims who wish to maintain a relationship with their partner or family member but want the abuse to stop. It is a strength of the DAPO that it is such a flexible remedy.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised contempt of court. If a victim wanted a breach of an order other than one made in a magistrates’ court to be dealt with as a civil contempt of court, they could make a committal application to the court, including for an arrest warrant, if necessary. In those circumstances, the court has the power to remand the perpetrator on bail or in custody. We would expect that victims’ views would be considered, together with other questions of public interest, when deciding which sanction for breach is appropriate.

On her point about the guidance, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will recall that in Clause 48 there is a provision for guidance to the police, and in Clause 73 there is provision for guidance to others, including victims.

This is one of the strengths of the DAPO when compared to other existing orders used in these cases, such as the domestic violence protection order. The responses to our consultation highlighted that the absence of a criminal sanction following breach of the DVPO limits the effectiveness of that order. We have therefore ensured that non-compliance with a DAPO is met with the appropriate consequences. In that regard, I reiterate a point I made in Committee: in its report, the Joint Committee did not raise issues with using the civil standard of proof for making a DAPO when examining the draft Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, noted, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised on a number of occasions that we are making a move from civil standard to criminal standard when breached. With respect, I have set out the Government’s position in response to that on a number of occasions. We are satisfied that the system we have in the Bill is appropriate. There is nothing in the point, I would respectfully say, that there is something wrong with criminal sanctions on breach for an order made on the balance of probabilities. They are two conceptually distinct questions First, what is the standard for the order to be made? Secondly, what do you have to prove for criminal sanctions when there is a breach of that order?

As for the question on going to the magistrates’ court, one of the strengths of this order is that it can be issued quickly in response to a crisis incident, as with the existing domestic violence protection order. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said, ultimately, we are dealing with the question of protection for victims.

I hope that my explanations on the standard of proof in this short debate, alongside the explanations I provided in Committee and my subsequent discussions with noble Lords, have been helpful. I hope that what I have said today has been clear and unambiguous. I therefore respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Paddick’s question about the underlying architecture, if that is the right phrase, still stands, but I will not pursue it now. I am grateful to the Minister for all he said about the application of the provisions. I did not make myself as clear as I should have done about what he explained as someone not wanting to go for criminal prosecution. That was not quite my point, which was about inability and due process, which is a term we would do well to keep in mind—due process for both parties.

The Minister has been very clear in his explanation of the standard. I am conscious of how much business the House has to get through today, so I will not prolong this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.
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Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for bringing this amendment back. She has explained the position very clearly. I have added my name, because the disclosure of a refuge address is something that should be avoided, can be avoided and usually is avoided—because it can be—but, if not avoided, can have very serious consequences. We spent some time on that at the previous stage of the Bill.

In Committee, the Minister said that he did “not dissent” from confidentiality being described as “of critical importance” and “essential”. If I may say so, that is very much counsel’s phraseology, and I am not sure where on the scale of strength of agreement as expressed by a member of the Bar all this comes, but it certainly means agreement. He also took on board my point about the safety of other occupants of the refuge if a determined abuser tracks down the address—a problem I have come up against.

Sometimes it is enough to say that such and such hardly ever happens and there are ways to ensure that it does not and, anyway, there are rules to cover the point. I do not put this issue in that category with any sense of ease or confidence. I join the noble Baroness in acknowledging that there are relevant rules but asking that their importance is emphasised in guidance, if the Bill is not amended.

Baroness Uddin Portrait Baroness Uddin (Non-Afl) [V]
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My Lords, I support this amendment, eloquently and powerfully detailed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Hamwee. I agree that confidentiality must be inherent in safe- guarding women survivors, many of whom may have endured prolonged periods of violence prior to reaching the safety of a refuge.

I have worked with refuges and inside a refuge. I know how hard it is to ensure the safety of not just one individual but of a number of women and their families. There may be instances where refuge addresses are revealed by residents being followed by a perpetrator, or, in fact, survivors may reveal the address if they return to perpetrators for the countless, complex reason debated on many occasions in this Chamber. Regardless, our statutory institutions, including the courts, must uphold the essential principle of safeguarding, not just for the sake of one survivor but for all those who reside in refuges and for the staff responsible for protecting all survivors in such refuges.

It is critical that we acknowledge this, and I look forward to the Minister being persuaded, much more eloquently than I could ever do, by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I thank the noble Baroness for moving this amendment and I wholeheartedly support her.

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Lord Randall of Uxbridge Portrait Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con) [V]
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My Lords, we have heard a passionate and erudite speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I have attached my name to her Amendment 51 principally because I was struck by the similarity, which is mentioned in the explanatory statement, to what is set out in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where someone cannot be found guilty of committing a criminal act if they have been subjected to the coercion of modern slavery. I can see the same parallel between that and the domestic abuse situation which has been put so well by the noble Baroness. I therefore say, in the interests of brevity, that the noble Baroness has said it all and I shall support her, certainly on Amendment 51, if she puts it to a vote.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness is intent on pursuing these two amendments, to which I have added my name. She mentioned a report published recently by the Centre for Women’s Justice. The report mentioned that a defendant must be prepared, which I think means in both senses of the term, to disclose in court in the presence of the deceased’s family, how he—it is usually he—had treated her; it is usually her. I would add to that the further difficulty of disclosing the behaviour in the relationship in front of one’s own family. Shame is another component of what we have been discussing, however misplaced it is.

I mention this because I want to use this opportunity to ask the Minister about the MoJ’s review of the issues raised in this debate. I heard the Secretary of State for Justice being interviewed yesterday about the sentencing Bill which has just been introduced in the Commons. He talked about the views of a victim’s family. He referred to the victims’ commissioner, having talked to her about the disproportionately high sentences imposed because the weaker partner, as has been referred to, had to arm herself because she could not defend herself with her bare hands against a stronger person. Can the Minister tell us more? There is clearly a relationship between this and what we are discussing in the context of these amendments. Amendment 50 is not about sentencing but about culpability, and if there should be a review, we should not delay.

During the Bill’s passage, I have been struck by how fast our understanding of domestic abuse has been developing. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, referred to this. In Committee, the right reverend Prelate said that she is a passionate defender of trauma-informed interventions. I am with her there. Would we have heard that 10 years ago? Perhaps 10 years ago, because that was post Corston, but it would have been quite rare in the sort of debate that we are having now, not in specialised circles and among professionals, but in this sort of debate.

Reading the report that I have just referred to, I was struck by the observation that often abuse is disclosed very late, sometimes after conviction, especially when abuse has taken the form of coercive control. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, explained in Committee that this was the form of abuse in all the cases that she had been involved in. So much of our debate has touched on, if not centred on, training. I refer to this here because it is a shorthand way of referring to a thorough understanding of the subject, or as thorough as it can be, while understanding of the whole issue continues to develop.

In Committee, the Minister, when arguing for the status quo, said that it is important to ensure that wherever possible, people do not resort to criminal behaviour—well, indeed. The amendment proposed is quite limited. To quote from the 2008 Act as amended for the householder cases,

“the degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances.”

He also argued, as, he said, an “enthusiastic” fan of the common law, that

“the courts are quicker, more nuanced and more flexible in developing the common law”.—[Official Report, 3/2/21; col. 2285.]

They are not quick, nuanced, and flexible enough, or we would not be having this debate. I do not know the genesis of the 2008 Act but clearly it was thought then that it was necessary to produce legislation on reasonable force for the purposes of self-defence, and then of course we had the householder defence. I hope that as an equally enthusiastic parliamentarian—the enthusiasms are not mutually exclusive—the Minister takes the view that there are occasions when Parliament should lead the way.