Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in supporting Amendment 5, in my name, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

I agree with all those noble Lords who have spoken already and expressed reservations about Clause 1, but, if we are going to have to live with Clause 1, I want to suggest ways in which it could be improved by exempting certain classes of offences from it. My amendment would exempt from Clause 1 the removal of the right to trial by jury for those accused of speech offences that are currently triable either way.

The argument for doing this is that whether someone is guilty of one of these offences depends on where the line is drawn, and that question hinges on the meaning of words such as insulting, threatening, abusive, harassment, alarm, distress and grossly offensive, or whether something has a tendency to deprave and corrupt. There are often no hard and fast rules when it comes to understanding or interpreting the meaning of those words, and no unambiguous statutes or precedents that a judge can refer to. Instead, it comes down to a moral judgment about what is and is not socially acceptable. When it comes to making those kinds of decisions, that is properly a matter for a jury, not a judge.

That is not just my view. In Brutus v Cozens, a case heard before the House of Lords in 1973, the Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word such as “insulting” is not a question of law. It is a question about ordinary language and ordinary standards and where the line should be drawn, and such matters are best left to juries composed of ordinary people, not experts in law.

There is another reason for maintaining the “either way” status of the particular speech offences listed in my amendment. According to research carried out by the Free Speech Union, people charged with speech offences are twice as likely to be acquitted in the Crown Court as they are in the magistrates’ court. That is to say, juries are more tolerant when it comes to what speech is or is not socially acceptable.

I will give an example. In 2024, shortly after the Southport attack, an ex-Royal Marine called Jamie Michael, who was under the false impression that the attack had been carried out by an undocumented migrant, put out a video on Facebook urging his followers to protest outside the offices of elected politicians against illegal immigration. He did not use any racial epithets and he made a point of stressing that such protests should be peaceful. A complaint was made to the police by a member of staff of a Member of the Welsh Parliament, and he was charged with stirring up racial hatred, the maximum sentence for which is seven years in prison. The Free Speech Union found him a good solicitor and barrister, he pleaded not guilty and it took a jury a grand total of 17 minutes to acquit him. Would a magistrate have acquitted him in the same way? I doubt it.

When it comes to our fundamental right to freedom of speech, which is, after all, the most important right, because without it we would not be able to defend any of the others, I urge noble Lords to continue to entrust it to 12 ordinary Britons, who have proven to be a reliable guide to where to draw the line, as they did in the Lady Chatterley trial and have done so often since.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

One answer to the noble Lord is that even good cases sometimes make bad law.

I should apologise, like the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, that I could not be here for Second Reading. I was able to watch it. My explanation or personal reference does not follow theirs, because my legal practice is very different from both of theirs. I do not know what the collective noun is for a group of those who encompass nobility, learning and a thoughtful approach. If they know what it is, perhaps they can tell me, so I can use it at a later stage. It is really helpful to have their contribution, not just on this issue but later in the Bill. The notion of guidelines is something we must rightly explore.

I am not proprietorial about my Amendment 7. I simply felt that the issue of appeals to allocation must be explored. As the Law Society put it, speed should not be the only criterion where a person

“may be convicted and sentenced to a lengthy period of custody or suffer life-changing reputational damage”.

To me, the issue of reputation is hugely important. We tend to focus on the length of a sentence, but I think any sentence carries a reputational factor. Following a short summary trial, there is a serious risk that efficiency will be perceived to have come at the expense of fairness. Magistrates, as has been said, are very used to deciding whether to send up a case, but the context and their powers will change considerably. What I am suggesting should be addressed is a mechanism for appeal.

While I remember, I will follow a couple of the speakers opposite. I do not like to say “opposite”, particularly in the case of the two noble Lords who have made points. I find it difficult to distinguish between defendants on the basis of character. It is rather like human rights. Somebody can be a really unpleasant person whom you would rather not have to help. However, their human rights are the same as everybody else’s. The amendment seeks to provide for either side, the prosecutor or the accused, with the permission of the Crown Court, to appeal against the decision, a time limit for the appeal to have, in the court’s view, a reasonable prospect of success, and for there to be criminal procedure rules. I know that the issue of the permission of the Crown Court is contentious in some people’s eyes.

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[Lord John of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, while I have sympathy for Amendments 7 and 3, my concern is that this simply adds another layer of backlog or chaos to the Crown Court system, which we are trying to eliminate. Appeals going from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court are bound to take some time, delay the decision on where that case should sit and therefore delay justice again in that case. How does the noble Baroness propose that those additional delays are avoided?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am not seeking to instil chaos—at least, no more chaos than there may be at the moment. It is a question of the balance between speed and fairness, appropriateness—any of those nouns. I do not think that everything should be subsumed to speed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start from the position that we on these Benches support the right to jury trial in serious cases. I expect fully that we will support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in opposing this clause, should they put it to a vote, as I certainly expect them to on Report.

I agree with every word of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, and so many others in respect of jury trial. I agree with all those, in this Chamber and in the country at large, who believe that jury trial is one of the cornerstones of our liberty, and that the right to trial by one’s peers is trusted and relied on as a protection against arbitrary abuse of power. I entirely accept that the public trust juries. By and large, they believe that the secret deliberations of 12 jurors in the privacy of the jury room are more likely to produce a fair and unbiased result than the decision-making of one judge. Judges differ, to our knowledge and experience, in background, influences, prejudices and therefore conclusions, from other judges hearing the same evidence and determining the same case.

I also believe that the jury system democratises our justice by bringing the public into the process of making findings of guilt or innocence. My experience of how seriously jurors take their duty when sitting on juries—although it is a distant experience, because I have not practised criminal law for a long time—reinforces that belief in how seriously they take their duties, as does the experience of talking to members of the public who have served on juries.

I agree with all those who see it as a strange and unjustified position that we should take a step as radical as removing the right of election for an ephemeral reason, such as reducing the Crown Court backlog, when there are other ways of reducing the Crown Court backlog. I accept it is dreadfully serious but it is already being tackled in other ways, and quite successfully. In any event, the evidence that removing the right to elect will have the effect of reducing the backlog is painfully thin.

For there to be a right to jury trial, there has to be a right of election in cases that are serious enough to be indictable only or triable either way. But that is not to say that the classification of which offences should be triable either way or, indeed, indictable only cannot change. Of course it can. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, conceded that point, along with others; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas Cwmgiedd, made the point as well. However, I suggest that we would lose a democratic right of great value if we were to abolish the defendant’s right of election.

I turn to Amendment 1, on the importance of good character in the determination of the appropriate allocation for trial, which is in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who explained it fully and eloquently, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. I argued in the King’s Speech debate, at a stage when the likely length of sentence was going to be the determinant of a right to jury trial—now, thankfully, gone from the Bill—that defendants of good character were at risk only of a low sentence and therefore were much more likely to be denied a trial by jury than defendants with serious criminal records.

Of course I accept that justice needs to be equal for everyone and that everyone has the same human rights, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. Nevertheless, I am forced to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, on that point. No one is arguing that not all defendants deserve justice. However, the fact is that defendants of good character are at serious reputational risk from a conviction, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. They face not only the risk of the sentence but risks to their careers and to their relationships, to which one can add risks to their mental health and well-being. For defendants with many previous convictions, the likely sentence would be much higher. The effect, therefore, of taking into account only sentence and treating sentence as the determinant is that the defendants of bad character, or with previous convictions, are much more likely to get a jury trial.

It is idle to suggest that the chances of acquittal in the magistrates’ court are the same as the chances of acquittal in the Crown Court. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, explained the difference in connection with speech offences, but the experience of the public at large and of the legal profession is that defendants of good character, at least, have a better chance of acquittal before a jury than they do before magistrates. It is therefore of great importance that good character is taken into account at the allocation stage, otherwise we would not be treating all defendants equally. We would be according a jury trial to defendants with previous convictions but not to those of previously unblemished character. We ignore that at our peril. Those who say that it is an equal playing field between magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts are drawing the wool over their own eyes.

My understanding, though, is that it is intended in the Bill that magistrates will be guided by the seriousness of the alleged offence and will be expected to leave out of account considerations of character and history. I would be grateful if the Minister would elucidate that, and explain and justify—without reference necessarily to the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and others—the guidance that is expected to be given to magistrates on the criteria for allocation between Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts in contested cases.

I turn to the right of appeal against allocation by the magistrates’ court, which my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendment 7 would provide and which we support. Why should a decision of such fundamental importance be treated as no more than a case management decision for the magistrates alone? Magistrates do not, as a matter of course, have experience of jury trials. They do not know or need to know how jury trials work. The people most qualified to determine whether a case warrants a jury trial are the Crown Court judges who hear jury trials day in, day out. There should plainly be a right of appeal against the refusal of a jury trial. I argue that such an appeal should lie with the Crown Court, with the judge having the right to reverse the magistrate’s allocation decision simply if he or she took the view that it was the wrong decision.

I turn finally to the Clause 2 stand part notice in my name. I have notified the Government that that is not to be pursued. I ask the Minister to treat it as probing and ask him merely to explain how the mechanism in Clause 2 would work. By removing the right to object to the venue for a trial when the case comes before the magistrates, it is proposed that the decision on allocation is for the magistrate alone, but Clause 2 introduces a right to make representations.

I am not objecting to the right to make representations; it is a question of how that right is to be exercised and what the representations can cover. Is a representation to be only on the question of whether the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ court would be adequate to sentence the defendant for the offence? What would the criteria be? How far would they be confined to the nature and seriousness of the offence before the court? To come back to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would factors relating to character be considered? Would factors relating to the defendant’s circumstances—for example, family ties, housing, children, employment, mental health, addiction and treatment needs, the effect of delaying a trial on sentencing, and the effect of delaying sentence—be permissible subjects for such representations? Would there be a judgment, giving reasons as to why the magistrate’s sentencing powers would be adequate—or why not, as the case may be?

These are important issues as to how this new provision might work. All I seek on Clause 2 is clarity as to what the Government propose and how they envisage that the allocation might work.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Yes, I share that concern. Actually, it goes further. I do not believe that issues of dishonesty divide neatly into white-collar issues and other issues. Just as juries are told that dishonesty is a matter for them, that they know the ordinary meaning of dishonesty and they recognise it when they see it, I believe that is true of juries at any level. Ultimately, when questions of dishonesty are tried in relation to white-collar crimes that may be complex, ordinary citizens, and a jury of ordinary citizens, can nevertheless tell whether that individual defendant is being dishonest just as well as a judge can. That is certainly so when the wisdom of 12 is combined.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I support the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the distinction between the public interest and the interests of justice. The public interest is a matter of political judgment while the interests of justice are what we are here to serve. I thank both noble Lords—the noble Baroness being a noble Lord for this purpose—for raising this.

I also agree with the noble Viscount about the term “appropriate”. This term has seemed to me, over many years, to have been often used by social workers. I do not intend to disrespect them for this; it is often useful when they use it. I do not regard it so much as a weasel word but rather as one that is appropriate to certain contexts, but not this one.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I have lent my name to Amendment 10, but I recognise that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has provided what he describes as a raft of amendments which are intended together to establish a bulwark that will give a stronger safeguard against the removal of jury trial. In that sense, they are a secondary defence to the provisions in this Bill. We would rely on the primary defence, which is the retention of jury trial as it presently exists, but I acknowledge the reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendments—I just hope they will not be required because the Government will see sense with regard to the primary position.

We will come on to discuss related issues in the next three groups, and in particular whether we should see these fundamental changes to the justice system coupled with Henry VIII powers as reflected in Schedule 1 to the Bill. This is an ecosystem. All these elements are interconnected and if you interfere with one, you have an impact on the other.

Finally, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the important distinction between public interest and the interests of justice. I would add only that the interests of justice can be seen as being orientated towards the interests of the defendant in a way that the public interest will not necessarily be, and therefore that distinction is important.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

I rise to speak to Amendments 36 and 68 in my name, which seek to ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly prepared for the extension of their sentencing powers and that the impact of these reforms is reviewed within 12 months of the Bill coming into force, and annually thereafter. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me, together with his officials, and for the constructive discussion and helpful follow-up information.

The Government’s intention is to relieve pressure on the Crown Court. However, we need to be confident that the magistrates’ court will have sufficient capacity to absorb the additional work that noble Lords have discussed today. Amendment 68, which would extend the commencement period from two months to six months, seeks to probe whether the proposed timetable allows sufficient time to ensure that all necessary preparations are in place.

There are several areas I would like to explore with the Minister. First, on recruitment and retention, I welcome the fact that recruitment has almost doubled. In the year to March 2026 1,663 magistrates were appointed, compared with 898 the previous year. However, as mentioned at Second Reading, 988 magistrates also left during that period, which was a 20% increase on the previous year. In August the Magistrates’ Association highlighted that at this rate it would take a further 9.2 years to reach the Government’s target of 21,000 magistrates in post, which they aim to achieve by 2028-29. This really concerns me. Given the assessment, can the Minister give us the confidence and reassurance that the Government will be able to meet their targets?

We must also ensure that progress on diversity is maintained and strengthened along the way. The Government’s own figures show that 17% of new appointments in 2025-26 were from ethnic minority backgrounds, compared with 14% of serving magistrates. Can the Minister assure me that this is being closely monitored and that the Government remain focused on continuing to improve the diversity of the magistracy? Increasing numbers must go hand in hand with ensuring that the Bench reflects the community it serves, and does not get left behind.

One area I did not mention at Second Reading was my concern about whether there would be sufficient experienced magistrates to act as presiding judges. The Government’s own figures indicate that around a third of serving magistrates are currently presiding judges. Have the Government assessed whether this proportion will be sufficient to meet the additional demands arising from these reforms, in particular taking into account the expected departures and retirements? What steps are being taken to ensure that there are enough experienced presiding judges as the magistracy expands?

Secondly, the Lady Chief Justice raised concerns about the additional need for training, following the previous extension of magistrates’ sentencing powers, describing it as

“a huge amount of additional … need”.

As many noble Lords raised at Second Reading, the extension of these powers will create further demands. I understand that the Judicial College has already begun planning for the additional training requirements and that further funding has been made available. What assessment have the Government made of the Judicial College’s capacity to deliver this training alongside the ongoing training needs of the existing magistracy? Is there contingency funding available should demand exceed the college’s current estimates?

The Government have said that the extended sentencing powers will not come into force until sufficient magistrates, legal advisers and district judges have completed the necessary training. How will the Government determine whether this requirement has been met and what do they consider to be sufficient?

Thirdly, as we already know, legal advisers and court staff play a vital role in the effective running of magistrates’ courts. The Government have highlighted that they have appointed additional legal advisers and are recruiting further staff. However, how many additional legal advisers do the Government estimate they will need to support the increased case load, while trying to take into account the numbers that will leave?

I understand that HMCTS is still developing its package of pay, progression and career development reforms to address retention challenges. When do the Government expect this work to be completed and are they confident that these measures will be in place in time to support the additional demands?

Finally, I welcome the Government’s investment in additional sitting days, but these can be delivered only if there are sufficient magistrates, presiding judges, legal advisers and court staff. Taken together, these are significant practical challenges. While I recognise the steps the Government have outlined, I question whether two months will be sufficient to complete the necessary preparations. What assessment have the Government made of the preparations still required and what evidence supports their decision that a two-month commencement period is sufficient when there are so many variables and unknowns? I am not suggesting that six months is necessarily the only possible timetable, nor am I seeking to delay these reforms unnecessarily. The central issue is that these reforms must not come into force before the magistrates’ courts are ready to deliver them effectively, or we risk creating an even bigger problem.

Briefly, Amendment 36 would require the Government to publish a review within 12 months of the Bill coming into force and annually thereafter. Even with the necessary preparation, the practical realities of implementation may differ from the Government’s projections. Having this review and annually thereafter would allow us to assess how successfully magistrates’ courts are managing the additional case load, identify any challenges arising from the reforms and consider whether further support is needed.

Having served as a magistrate, I know that greater powers bring greater responsibility. We must ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly equipped to exercise these powers, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has raised so many variables and unknowns—a term that she used—and I am very glad she did so. She speaks from experience, which I cannot, but I have been very uneasy about almost everything she has mentioned and I have some amendments which we will come to next week on the same subject. So I am generally supportive of what she is saying.

My name is on Amendment 69. I will not say I added my name because it got added by the Public Bill Office disaggregating one of my amendments and adding my name to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. This is a bit of a stretch. I do not know whether you would call the noble Viscount, the noble and learned Lord and me an unholy alliance but, on the subject of collective nouns, I have had an email from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, saying that the term coined by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of an “exquisite quartet”—this is for future reference, your Lordships understand—is one that he can live with.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 5 provides powers to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months should future circumstances require it. These powers provide important flexibility to respond to changing pressures across the justice system and to ensure that court resources are deployed proportionately. Drawing on the experience of the past few years, responding to changing pressures across the justice system, including in the prison system, is a very high priority for the efficient management of justice which commands public confidence.

The Crown Court continues to face significant pressures, and many cases sent there for sentence can be dealt with fairly and effectively in the magistrates’ courts, as I have said in earlier groups. Extending magistrates’ court sentencing powers will allow more cases to be appropriately retained in the magistrates’ courts, freeing Crown Court capacity for the most serious and complex cases.

Reducing delay is not simply a matter of efficiency. Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness and justice, and freeing Crown Court capacity is critical if victims are to receive justice within a reasonable timeframe. The backlog is one question, and noble Lords have cited various statistics about the backlog in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court, but the backlog in the magistrates’ court is dealt with much more quickly than the backlog in the Crown Court, for all the reasons that are obvious. The waiting times in the magistrates’ court are less than half the waiting times for the Crown Court. That matters to victims in particular.

Amendments 69, 71 and 72 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 34 from my noble friend Lady Goudie seek to make these reforms subject to the affirmative procedure and prevent them taking effect unless a prescribed number of magistrates is maintained. The Government do not consider this additional procedure necessary. Parliament is already being asked by this Bill to take the substantive policy decisions, including approving the full range of magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers that may be exercised in future. Once Parliament has established that framework, it is proportionate and consistent with existing practice for changes within those limits to be made by regulations. I know that is not what many noble Lords wanted to hear, but it is our view. The negative procedure is the established approach and has been used previously, both to reduce and to increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers in response to the changing pressures across the justice system, which have been vividly recounted in recent months.

Nor do we believe that the implementation or continuation of these reforms should be made contingent on a single workforce metric. The Government fully recognise the importance of magistrates’ courts’ capacity, which is why we are increasing sitting days and undertaking a national recruitment campaign with the aim of increasing the size of the magistracy to around 21,000, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, noted, by 2028-29. However, operational readiness cannot be reduced to a single numerical threshold. It depends on court capacity, workforce deployment, case volumes and wider pressures across the criminal justice system. Amendment 72 would make commencement and continued operation dependent on a prescribed number of magistrates being maintained, regardless of the wider operational position of the justice system. The Government’s view is that such decisions should be guided by evidence and operational need rather than a single workforce measure.

Amendments 36 and 68 were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater—I thank her for meeting me in such a constructive spirit, and we have provided her with more information since. I take seriously all the points that she made about the things that needed to be true, if I can put it like that, for these reforms to succeed. I pay tribute to her experience and collaborative spirit. The Government have already committed in Clause 20 to post-implementation monitoring and review of the reforms, and therefore we do not consider that a further statutory review requirement is necessary. Amendment 68 would delay commencement beyond two months after Royal Assent. We do not consider that necessary either. The Bill does not increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers. Magistrates will continue to operate at their current sentencing limits unless and until a future decision is taken to exercise the power. Any future decision to increase sentencing powers will be informed by operational data and engagement with key partners across the criminal justice system, including HMCTS, prisons and probation, the CPS and the judiciary.

Since sentencing powers were increased to 12 months in November 2024, fewer cases are being committed to the Crown Court for sentence, and magistrates are retaining more cases to hear. I reject entirely the comment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that the Government have provided no evidence. We have published a magistrates’ capacity plan; I have commissioned a fact sheet that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has seen, and we have published our modelling. There is a good deal of data out there already. I have spent a good deal of time, including this morning, going over progress on magistrates’ courts’ capacity, recruitment and retention, so I am afraid I simply do not accept that characterisation.

We are going to increase sittings days to 131,000 in 2028-29. A national recruitment campaign is under way to increase the number of magistrates and recruit additional legal advisers and district judges. We are committed to rebuilding the magistracy. We have already made 1,500 new appointments across England and Wales since April. In 2025-26, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, noted, 17% of new appointments were from an ethnic minority and more than a third of new recruits were under 50. Women account for 55% of the new appointments.

I heard the concerns from the noble Baroness about the capacity and funding of the Judicial College. We will monitor those carefully but, as I told her when we met, we have significantly increased the funding to the Judicial College. That is an important aspect of making a success of these things—as is the need for new magistrates to have the mentoring and support of more experienced magistrates, as we have discussed. We have a detailed implementation plan. I would be very grateful if the noble Baroness, given her experience, would continue to work with us on making sure that is a reality. We all have the same ambitions here. I have a good deal of confidence in our efforts to expand the capacity of the magistracy. I am happy to share that with the noble Baronesses, Lady Sater and Lady Hamwee, and others.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The Minister referred to Clause 20, which talks about a review of equalities issues and, regarding the appointment of reviewers,

“any other matter specified in the appointment that relates to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions”.

It would be helpful to know what other matters the Government have in mind. We have been talking about some quite specific issues. I would be glad of a reassurance that that is what the Government intend to look at in a specific and detailed way to report to Parliament.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

The review that is promised is specifically on the question of disproportionality as it affects Black and minority-ethnic people. The provisions that we have made for the appointment and so on of the reviewer relate to that. That said, we also intend to review and publish progress on magistrates’ capacity, because we see that as central. It is not the same review, but both of those things are in play.

Of course, the readiness of the magistrates’ courts would be assessed before any decision to increase sentencing powers is taken. The decision would be informed by operational data and engagement. A fixed statutory delay would, therefore, reduce our flexibility without providing realistic additional assurance on operational readiness. It would also delay commencement of the statutory independent review of the structural reforms—just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—and provisions for when the Crown Court sits in the City of London, despite there being no equivalent operational rationale for doing so.

Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, together with Amendment 35, and consequential Amendments 58 and 70 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would either restrict the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts to the current possible limits of six or 12 months, variable by regulations, or remove altogether those existing powers to vary their sentencing powers by regulations. The Government do not believe that would be the right approach. Parliament is being asked through this Bill to decide whether magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers may in future be increased to 18 or 24 months. Clause 5 does not itself increase those powers. Parliament is taking the substantive policy decision about those limits through this piece of primary legislation and setting the limits within which any future regulations may operate. The purpose of Clause 5 is to continue to enable flexibility and any future decision to exercise the power would be informed by that evidence.

IPP Prisoners: Recall System

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

As I have said, we do need recall provisions: there must be some jeopardy if offenders break the conditions of their licence. On the specific point about the time it takes, we have addressed this, partly by what I said earlier, namely that decisions are now agreed by senior decision-makers. We introduced reforms in the Victims and Prisoners Act that reduced the number of IPPs on licence in the community by 936 and—this is the really important point—we are starting to use the risk-assessed recall review, and that has led to the re-release of 61 IPP prisoners many months before their parole hearing would have been scheduled.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, in the work that the Government are doing towards final arrangements, will they consult families of IPP prisoners? Many of us have heard so much from the families, who understand what prisoners have gone through and what they may, or may not, be capable of on release.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

Yes, we will. I can reassure the noble Baroness about that. Following the Lord Chancellor’s announcement on IPPs, victim liaison officers have started to issue notices to victims, with 375 notices already issued.

Criminal Justice Reform

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, wants to get up, but I want to respond quickly to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about implementation. It is obviously very early days. The Prime Minister has made a commitment to legislate in this Parliament. That is a major step forward and I absolutely undertake to keep the House, and noble Lords who are interested in this, up to date as our thinking develops. But I am sure he understands that I cannot explain precisely how we are going to do it now.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, also on IPPs, we have failed so many people. So many of those prisoners were not able to access the courses that they were supposed to undertake to qualify them to apply for parole and so on. They must have been damaged by what has happened and the length of time they have had to spend in prison which they should not have done. What are we going to do to support that cohort of people?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness. That is exactly what we are thinking about now. As we go forward with these plans on IPPs, we are actively considering how we support them, before release and afterwards. It is absolutely shocking that 80% of the unreleased IPP prisoners—I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, mentioned this statistic—have served more than 10 years over their tariff. Of course that has had an effect on them and we must make sure that we understand and mitigate that effect, not just from the point of view of public protection but for the welfare and dignity of those people. I still believe in the welfare and dignity of prisoners; I know that is old-fashioned.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am a stand-in for my noble friend Lord Marks, who is sorry he cannot be here today. These Benches support the Bill. My noble friends, including a Liverpool voice, and other noble Lords will speak from involvement with various issues or scandals. However, we have concerns. The Bill should extend as far as the public would expect, be fully and straightforwardly enforceable, and be not only reactive but proactive. We look forward to working with the Minister, whom I welcome to his new position. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, for all that she must have done in the preparation of the Bill.

Ethical conduct and candour should not need saying, but from the catalogue of disasters—not only what has lent the Bill its informal title—they clearly do. I echo the admiration expressed for the determination and sheer grit of the survivors of those disasters, their families and campaigners. I am glad to see the Nolan principles embedded; as we go through the Bill, we might test each provision against them. In a way, it is a pity it is not left at that. The more that is spelled out, the more significant is what is not. The Bill tells us what a public authority must do “in particular”. Lists are not exhaustive, but, leaving aside the technicalities of drafting, they will be the focus and so must be complete.

To fulfil the “purpose” in Clause 1, enabling whistleblowing in safety is essential. Otherwise, candour is muzzled and the duty incomplete. The Bill needs to prevent problems. A comprehensive whistleblowing policy, including a duty to investigate concerns, should not be optional.

So often, we hear from victims: “No one in future should have to experience this”. They and the campaigners working alongside them, over such long periods, are to be congratulated. What a powerful phrase is that of the right reverend James Jones:

“The patronising disposition of unaccountable power”—


so apt for the feeling of impotence that so many have had to battle.

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the involvement in the new regime—“landscape” might be a better term—of the Independent Public Advocate. GOV.UK prefaces the policy statement regarding the IPA with the explanation that it was

“published under the 2024 to 2026 Starmer Labour government”.

Is that some sort of disclaimer or distancing? I have seen it elsewhere. The IPA should be fully involved and adequately resourced to fulfil her role, which is complementary to what the Bill introduces.

The scope, in the non-technical sense, of the Bill must reflect the realities. Public authorities do not do everything themselves; they use subcontractors, who use sub-subcontractors, and so on. There are agency workers too. It is not just a chain; it is a web. The Government have said that it would not be proportionate to subject all such bodies to the duty to adopt a code of ethical conduct and that the appropriate national authority will target relevant sectors. We need to unpack that and perhaps rebuild it.

That responsibility must land appropriately has been highlighted by the recent report that the manufacturer of the cladding of Grenfell Tower has, in settling an action by its shareholders, paid them very considerably more than it paid to the families of those who died. That may not be directly relevant to the Bill but I wanted to say it, and that the whole state needs to play its part, whether or not it is a matter of candour. As we were reminded by headlines at the weekend, former postmasters and their families are still being frustrated in their efforts to overturn convictions and get proper compensation. Of course, we want to prevent the need for compensation.

What is directly relevant is what public authorities are required to do to maintain high standards of conduct. We want mandatory guidance on compliance with the code and mandatory regulation requiring compliance with standards. I was struck by the CQC’s experience: it refers to differences in the quality of the duty of candour in services rated outstanding and good compared with lower gradings. Ethical standards are integral to successful services.

National security will occupy some of our time. The Minister told the Commons that arrangements for some inquiries “remain available” and that existing practices, such as the use of security-vetted counsel, “can continue”. I have never felt entirely comfortable with arrangements for special advocates. Like their clients, they must rarely feel entirely satisfied with what they can achieve, given the constraints of closed material procedure. I am with Lord Bingham that their task is like taking blind shots at a hidden target, but I suppose there is no perfect solution.

With the end of the legislation in sight, the focus will be implementation. If that is not effective then the rest is in vain, so the House will not be surprised that we are concerned about legal aid—not only resources and rates but the capacity of the profession and the detail of the scheme, which does not recognise the complexity of, for instance, the work entailed in an inquest and the amount of work required outside the hearing itself.

Many of our points on the duty of candour are also relevant to the misconduct in public office provisions—inevitably, because this is also about ethics and accountability. Who is a “public” officeholder? What about private contractors and marrying up the duty with regulation? The “reasonable excuse” defence takes us into the territory of the reverse burden of proof, making the defence clearer and not setting an exceptionally high burden for the prosecution.

I am persuaded that the Bill should align with the Bribery Act, that someone who is not a public official but instigates misconduct should be covered, and that the offence should not be dependent on a benefit having been obtained. This should be about prevention.

Finally, to provide for parity at inquiries including inquests is a logical application of the underlying thinking. We must ensure that the reality achieves the objectives.

We all have an interest in a duty of candour. Its application is relevant to me for a particular reason—which is rather indulgent, I may say. I have a Private Member’s Bill—it has had its Second Reading, so I suppose it is now the property of the House—which deals with the conduct of undercover police and intelligence operatives. Listening to some of the women deceived into relationships by spy cops has given me some insight into institutional defensiveness, and the layers of issues and of the ranks of people who have not been governed by ethics. It is a reminder that when something goes wrong, prevaricating or denying it compounds the damage. And that damage can be so corrosive.

My noble friend Lord Marks has not signed off this speech. He will have plenty to say, and more cogently, in the next stages.

Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 17th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this may have been one of those occasions when noble Lords felt that they should have started their speeches with, “As I was saying”. I do not think I have spoken on this subject before, although I have listened to a number of debates. My noble friend has taken every opportunity over quite a long time to seek to have the law recognise how so many couples choose to live their lives—and still do, despite the introduction of civil partnerships. I agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am not an expert and I have done no polling, but I do not believe this will affect the numbers deciding to marry. I hope it will not. I take what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, said very seriously. His was an interesting perspective that we need to take into account.

I recall an occasion—the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred to some of this debate—when there was a determined effort to extend cohabitation rights to people sharing a household when one was acting as a carer for the other, or particularly when siblings were living together. I was never persuaded by that. Relationships can be very close indeed but are entirely different from cohabitation.

I heard a discussion on the radio a few days ago on the Government’s current consultation. One of the speakers, a woman—I say to my noble friend that I do not overlook the fact that either party may find himself or herself brutally discovering that cohabitation is not the same as marriage—described how, having supported her partner when she was the higher earner, she saw his career take off while she had children and, to care for them, reduced her working hours and lost chances for promotion. She had not realised that she could have kept up her national insurance contributions, nor what an effect this would have on her future financial situation, including her pension, in stark contrast to his.

The Bill deals not only with financial matters, including intestacy and the opportunity to arrange insurance cover on a partner’s life, but with the right to register the death of a partner. The block on that must be so hurtful. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred to Article 8. I am sure we will have opportunities in a different context to discuss Article 8 in the near future, so today is not the day to discuss how far it must extend.

Unsurprisingly, my noble friend has done a very thorough job on the Bill. I will be interested to see what comes out of the Government’s consultation and any negotiations my noble friend will be able to have based on his Bill. I hope we may end up with a system that is as simple as possible and does not need the involvement of lawyers. The people who can readily afford them are probably the people who are least in need of this Bill. My noble friend seeks to modernise the law and to provide rights that many people mistakenly think they have. So do the Government, I assume, because you should not consult on something you do not want to do. Anything else would be too cynical.

King’s Speech

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 18th May 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I wish we had extra time today in order to hear more from the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. It is so fitting that it is he who speaks of civility, tolerance and duty of care. We will miss him.

Following the tradition of bemoaning what is not in the legislative programme, I would have mentioned SLAPPs but instead I can welcome the PMB of the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell—this is not to ignore the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. There is also a tradition of calling for more cross-government working and, declaring an association with the charity Missing People, I note the number of people dying while missing, mostly by suicide. It is up 30% in six years. The current response, led by the police, just is not working. Their role is vital, but they are not alone responsible. All the agencies that deal with safeguarding, exploitation and care need to be mandated to work together. The Home Office should lead on this.

Modern slavery and human trafficking have grown, while our response has been weakened by a series of regressive reforms. As the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner notes in her recent report:

“It appears in shocking cases that briefly make headlines but then fade quickly from collective consciousness … Without widespread public awareness, even the strongest laws will struggle to deliver real-world impact”—


and they are not the strongest laws or the best practice. She is emphatic that people with lived experience see risks and problems long before institutions do, yet we fail to learn from them.

At the same time, government claims of widespread misuse and abuse of the national referral mechanism are not supported by the available evidence base, as the University of Nottingham Rights Lab points out. In an increasingly diverse and complex exploitation landscape, the statutory guidance was changed last week to put a higher burden on survivors to explain what they have gone through. The Home Office should not be using the term “trauma-informed” when it is so clearly lacking, as is any evidence of understanding retraumatisation.

Slavery is still conflated with immigration and immigration enforcement. We know that legislation in that area will herald measures that these Benches will not be able to welcome. The new independent appeals body is to be staffed by adjudicators, not judges. On stricter age assessments, the priority should be ensuring that fewer children are incorrectly treated as adults. The Government are requiring refugees to repay the cost of Home Office support without removing barriers to employment so that they can more easily contribute. The lifeline of family reunion is still paused. I am sure that my noble friend Lord German will say more about that.

The writer Horatio Clare puts it well:

“The story … misrepresents everyone. Brave and resourceful people crossing the Channel in hope and belief have been disfigured into faceless threats. The volunteers … aid workers and very many members of the public who help and support refugees, migrants and asylum seekers are slandered, denigrated or ignored. The populace of Britain, who are as overwhelmingly kind, sympathetic and generous as the people in the small boats believe us to be, are made to feel fearful, mean and foolish. All the good we and our institutions have done has been redacted”.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I was very happy to put my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Polak, not least because he and I, every Thursday morning in the post-legislative scrutiny committee for the Domestic Abuse Act, hear from the sector exactly what is going on and, perhaps more pertinently, what is not going on.

The Minister, like me, is a great fan of the “child house” approach to treating children who have had the most appalling direct physical and sexual abuse. It demonstrates what best practice looks like. Best practice really makes an enormous difference and is incredibly efficient, is very incisive and can work very quickly. That is partly why His Majesty’s Government have thankfully decided to roll this out throughout England to a large degree; that is a great step forward.

As we take evidence, we are hearing again and again that there are examples of really good practice. I recognise that it is unrealistic to imagine that His Majesty’s Government are suddenly going to find coffers bursting with money to enable the whole panoply of support services that one would wish victims to be able to access—that is not going to happen. However, I appeal to the Government and their officials to identify those examples of really good or best practice that are making a difference, rather than taking a blanket approach and saying we need to try to cover all support services. Clearly, some are dramatically more effective than others.

My appeal to the Government is to try to strategically identify those support services that are making a huge difference. For example, two areas that make an enormous difference are the independent domestic violence advocates and the independent stalking advocates. The proof of the pudding in both those areas is that when those individuals are involved and work with the victim from very early on, first, the victim’s experience is transformed for the better, but secondly, and more pertinently from the point of view of the Ministry of Justice, there is a much higher chance of the case coming to court and there being a successful prosecution. Not only does it help the victim but it helps the Government achieve their laudable aim to reduce violence against women and girls.

I do not expect the Government to say that there is a magic wand and that Rachel Reeves is the Minister’s new best friend, but I hope that an approach to identifying services similar to the Lighthouse, which really make a performative difference, could be identified more strategically and assisted more proactively and in a more focused way.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I will focus on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. We seem to have done a bit of mini-regrouping within the group, but I checked with my noble friend Lady Brinton and I think she will wind up the group while introducing her own amendments at the same time.

At the last stage the Minister resisted the proposal for more victim navigators on the basis that the service is already provided, but victim navigators are quite distinct in what they do from the Salvation Army and their subcontractors funded by the Home Office. As I said, I supported the amendment in Committee but I did express a reservation about the ambitious six-month period within which they could be rolled out. Victim navigators are collocated with police in the forces where they work—the term “embedded” with the police seems to be used quite often.

I was a member of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee, and the comments on victim navigators in our report were under the heading “Evidence gathering”. That describes quite a lot of what they do. I will try not to repeat what other noble Lords have said, but the link between support of the victims and the criminal justice system is their job, filling a very specific gap with access to details of cases but with the independence to build trust. They are of great value to the police—and we know how difficult it is to get convictions in this area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were members of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House, which was formed only in 2020. Our first inquiry and report were on the advent of new technologies in the justice system. During that work, I often asked myself—sometimes aloud—how you would feel if you were arrested, charged, convicted and imprisoned on the basis of evidence that not only did you not understand but could not be explained. We now know how people felt and feel.

That was in 2022, which was centuries ago in technical terms. I realise that the lexicon has expanded here and I hear terms that I have never heard before, but the basic issues remain. Our concerns then were about transparency and regulation, among other things, and that anyone could be affected. We were talking not just about insider trading and corporate fraud, as one witness powerfully put it, but

“high-volume data that is mostly about poor people”.

We found a lot of enthusiasm for the technology, but not a corresponding commitment to a thorough evaluation of it. These Benches support Amendment 21, which seems to have been a very constructive contribution to taking these issues forward.

At the last stage, I supported Amendment 22. I do so no less now. Sometimes we show that we are not as open as we should be to the way that society moves on or to the life experiences of people younger than almost all of us and how they wish to express them. I do not really feel qualified to say more than that.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a thoughtful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her supporters for their work on these issues.

On Amendment 21, I reiterate the sentiments expressed in Committee and by many noble Lords across the House from all parties. In light of the appalling Post Office scandal, keeping in mind the increasing use of artificial intelligence, the need to remove the presumption of reliability for computer evidence is now clear. The noble Baroness has responded to some of the concerns expressed in Committee in bringing forward this redrafted amendment. I commend her attention to this issue.

My concern is that the Government have had long enough to look at this. Their call for evidence closed on 15 April 2025, so I look forward to hearing from the Minister where we are now, given that the call for evidence is a year old. I am sure she will be anxious to update us on that.

I understand the basis for Amendment 22, but I have some reservations about its detail. There is an issue about the objectivity of the conditions listed in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. I would certainly be interested to hear more about how the court should consider who is suitably qualified to give evidence about

“linguistic and artistic conventions and the social and cultural context of the creative or artistic expression”.

It is an important area, but it is also a difficult one that will repay further consideration.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The noble Lord seems to be suggesting that the Victims’ Commissioner does not now engage with individual cases. My understanding is that she very much does, but to feed towards her statutory role. That is quite different from getting involved in the minutiae of an individual case, supporting a victim or witness and promoting that individual’s interests.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, there is clearly a balance to be struck. I think we should, as we go forward, because we all have the same interests at heart here, look carefully at whether there will be occasions when the commissioner should look at individual cases, not so much to interfere but to draw on the information that can be gleaned from them and use them in setting policy. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas has said. I shall add some observations. It is self-evident, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, says, that only those who are qualified and competent should be responsible for prosecutions, and no one would dispute that. However, it seems to me equally self-evident that not every criminal prosecution requires presentation by a barrister or a solicitor. There are many criminal prosecutions that others are perfectly competent to present. What matters is to ensure that whoever prosecutes in any particular case has the qualifications and experience that are necessary, and that will depend upon the nature of the case, whether it be a murder case at one extreme or a driving case at the other. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that those factors will be, and are being, taken into account in deciding, once this reform is introduced, who prosecutes in any particular case.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord has said what I wanted to say much more sensitively and tactfully, but I will say what I was going to say.

There is a danger that lawyers of my generation— I shall just apply it to my generation and not suggest which generation other Members of the House belong to—are prejudiced against lawyers who do not have standard qualifications, if you like, or the backgrounds that many of us come from. I understand from CILEX that there are 133 members working as associate prosecutors who cannot progress or get promotion. That is a real shame. It is a much wider issue than just prosecution.

I think the noble Lord answered his own point because he was talking about members of the Bar progressing. The Minister will tell us—I cannot believe it is not the case—that no one joins the CPS and prosecutes a murder the next day. Every profession has its hierarchy, and one progresses in the hierarchy dependent on both skill and experience. The current position is out of date, so, even if it were not to solve an immediate problem, what is proposed in the Bill is a good idea. I am afraid that we cannot support the opposition to the clause.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.

Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have

“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,

even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.

This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.

The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.

Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.

In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.

I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, the issue of costs in private prosecutions is an extraordinarily serious one. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has spoken of the position of charities, the RSPCA being one example. One can well understand the position of a charity conducting a prosecution through a small solicitor where costs are modest. On the other hand, one must recall that for good reasons of public interest, there are private prosecutions by large corporations to protect intellectual property. The consequence of the change in the market for solicitors and barristers has produced a problem, because what the CPS pays prosecutors to prosecute is completely out of line with what a large, industrial conglomerate that wants to enforce its intellectual property rights can pay. This is a problem that has to be grappled with.

One of the reasons why the CPS cannot prosecute more than it does is the Government’s constraint; both the last Government and this one are responsible for that. There is not enough money in the system to enable the CPS to prosecute where it should be doing so. More than 10 years ago, the change in the market and the constraint on the finances of the CPS, arising out of the 2008 financial crisis, began to manifest themselves in the contrast between what happened in private prosecutions by large conglomerates, or associations of those interested to protect their economic position, and in the CPS. The courts have tried to do something about it through a number of cases, but it is an extraordinarily difficult area.

For example, in a commercial case—many of these cases go to solicitors—there did not used to be the idea that you would have to get a tender before you prosecuted, but the courts now require it. The courts have made a number of very important changes to try to bring this cost under control, because, although it cannot be shown that if you pay a large sum—several hundred thousand pounds—to defer the costs of a private prosecution it will directly come out of any bit of the overall justice budget, anyone who has had to deal with the Treasury knows that that is the case. The Treasury looks at a pot for justice and, if you take large sums out of it by paying for private prosecutions, the other part of the justice system suffers.

This is a matter that has to be grappled with, and the right people to grapple with it are the Government. It is not a very good position for judges to be in to be making these very difficult decisions because of the gross inequality between what you pay private lawyers, which many may think is far too much but that is not for me to judge, and what you pay the Crown Prosecution Service, which may not be enough—again, that is not for me to judge. The problem of what I might call public penury and private affluence is absolutely illustrated by the problem of paying for private prosecutions. It is for the Government to grapple with, and setting rates is one of the ways to do it. I think it is probably the right way, but all I am saying is we that cannot run away from this problem that has arisen because of changes in the market and the constraints on public expenditure.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.

The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, in the view of the Government, Clause 12 provides a modest enabling power for the Lord Chancellor to set through regulations the rates at which private prosecutors may recover expenses from central funds where a court has ordered that such costs be paid. To be clear at the outset, this clause does not set any rates, and it does not affect the long-established right to bring a private prosecution, which remains protected under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

I should say at this stage that I have a great deal of experience in the area of private prosecutions, both as a state prosecutor working for the Crown Prosecution Service, where I oversaw all the private prosecutions that came to the CPS for consideration, and in private practice, where I brought a number of private prosecutions on behalf of clients and advised on many more.

The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report, Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. Taking an enabling power of this kind allows us to do precisely that in a careful and evidence-based way. The committee highlighted three key principles, which this Government agree should underpin reform: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 61. In doing a little background on this, I looked at the Law Society’s response to the MoJ call for evidence, which it produced last April. I wish to read two brief excerpts, because I think they are both particularly pertinent to what we are talking about. The first says:

“But given the increasing complexity of computational systems, computers should not be assumed to be operating correctly. Instead”—


this is important, because this is what other jurisdictions outside the UK systematically do—

“it should be evidenced and demonstrated through assurance, regular review, and disclosure of the technical standards applied by the system”.

That is what happens in Germany. That is what happens in France. That is what mostly happens in the United States.

Secondly, returning to the issue of artificial intelligence, the Law Society has been thinking about this and is clearly very worried about it. I quote again:

“Careful consideration needs to be given to emerging AI technologies that overlap with but go beyond the scope of this call for evidence. For AI, an additional layer of certification for meeting internationally recognised standards is important to ensure accountability and transparency, especially if they were designed and developed”—


which they mostly are—

“outside of the jurisdiction … Attention must be given to the ability for domestic regulation and requirements to be adhered to for computer systems and AI tools that are built outside of the jurisdiction”.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is six years since the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were among the members of a newly formed committee that looked at—I do not think I have got the title quite right—advanced technology in the justice system. We were concerned, among other things, about the need for a human in the loop and whether it was possible to have a human in the loop. We were given very firm assurances by two Home Secretaries, which I do not think convinced the committee at all.

We were also concerned about the attitude, “X must be right because the computer says so”. Have we actually moved on from that? I do not think so. On that basis —and was it my noble friend who added facial recognition into the mix?—we support the amendment.

I am deliberately going fairly fast because I do not need to add a whole lot to what has already been said. On Amendment 62, there have been a number of occasions when I have heard a rapper and realised how very clever the work was. I really admired what I heard. Then I thought back to the occasion decades ago when my father started criticising my musical taste and calling it Simon and Godawful. Tastes change; generations move on and develop. I cannot speak to the detailed content of all rap and drill, but I think we are in danger of dismissing the importance of this music to the generation that produces it.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is probing at this stage and I am with him in wanting to see procedures from the point of view of victims, but I simply do not know whether magistrates have the same powers as Crown Court judges. When we debated this issue before, we were told about the powers that judges have now, without the need for an extension.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, came quite close to my question. Magistrates come from a very different background. Do they currently have the same powers as the judges who will be covered by this legislation, quite apart from the powers that are given by the Bill, in dealing with recalcitrant—if that is the right word—defendants?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.

In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe

“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.

The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.

I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.

It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.

It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.

The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.

It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.

However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)]

My Lords, in general I support these amendments, particularly those put forward by my noble friend Lady Finlay. Having been in charge of some of these investigations over a long period of time, take it from me that they are very difficult, indeed nearly impossible, when the victim dies outside the jurisdiction. In a lot of cases, in the old days, talking to the DPP, some of us went out there personally to actually do the investigations. It was difficult in a way that is not necessary, and I think that what has been outlined by my noble friend is absolutely common sense. In the old days, if I might refer to them, things were a bit simpler: we dealt with the police, who were sometimes not quite up to our standards, and we tried to form some relationship. However, things have got more difficult in terms of the technical side of the law, so I make a kind of brief supplication, basically, as a practitioner over a long period of time: I really think that some of these amendments would have a massive effect on securing justice for victims, particularly in those places where we do not have any jurisdiction whatever.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has just used the phrase “common sense”, and I think that that is what is expected by people who are affected, who know that they could look to consular services for help if they have lost a passport, but not in such a difficult situation as this. I simply say—and this is not addressed to the noble Baroness but possibly to some of her colleagues—that over the period that we have discussed this issue, there has almost been a sense of, “That’s the Foreign Office, it’s not us”. If we could get this into the victims’ code, it might mean a duty on the FCDO to be prepared to be more effective, and actually to be more effective.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 36 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to add agreements entered into by the National Crime Agency, the NCA, to the list of agreements in new subsection (7) that are exempt from the measure. Non-disclosure agreements, or NDAs, should not be used to silence victims or cover up crime: I think we can all agree on that. New subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 6 provide that the provision will not apply to a narrow cohort of specified agreements, in the interests of national security.