(1 day, 4 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the set of amendments in my name. I am sure that, throughout the course of this Committee, many noble Lords will debate and question precisely which offenders they think should be excluded from the numerous provisions for suspended sentences included in the Bill. The Government have made the underlying principle behind their approach quite clear: that only those who pose a serious risk of harm to a particular individual should be denied the privilege of a suspended sentence. On these Benches, we believe that the exemptions to Clause 1 should be much wider. We have tabled many amendments to that effect, and I will speak to them at several points throughout this Committee. I am sure that noble Lords will disagree with some of our suggestions, and I welcome the debate that will ensure that we scrutinise the Bill with care. The Bill received just one day of Committee in the other place. It is therefore imperative to carry out our duty to provide the Bill with the scrutiny that it requires.
These amendments do not directly relate to the specific offender types who we believe should spend their sentences in custody. Rather, this group of amendments seeks to clarify important practical and operational points of the Bill, which either the Government did not account for or appear to be in favour of. I have tabled these amendments to highlight the harmful effects that the Bill will have on communities and individuals, if it becomes law in its present form.
Amendments 1 and 12 may seem relatively minor in the grand scheme of the Bill, but, without their inclusion, a significant number of dangerous criminals will be free to roam the streets. There are many crimes for which a 12-month sentence is imposed, and these amendments seek to ensure that such offenders are past the cut-off point for suspended sentences to apply.
Just last month, a sex offender, Hadush Kebatu, was released from prison by accident. The Foreign Secretary said repeatedly that he was “livid” that such a man had been let loose and was free to roam the streets. Further, the Home Secretary called the same man a “vile sex offender”. Countless Government Ministers expressed their thoughts and sympathies for the victim and her family, and we on these Benches could not agree more with that assessment of Mr Kebatu.
Mr Kebatu was serving a 12-month sentence. He was convicted for trying to sexually assault a 14 year-old girl. A 41 year-old man convicted of a child sexual offence was allowed to roam the streets and the Government purported outrage, yet under the provisions of their own Sentencing Bill offenders such as Mr Kebatu would be at large not simply for a handful of days but for the entirety of their sentence. When questioned about this, the Minister simply explained that there were separate provisions for foreign-national offenders, but this misses the point. It does not detract from the fact that there are thousands of offenders convicted of charges similar to those of Mr Kebatu, all of whom would be let out on to the streets after their conviction for child sexual assault. Will the Minister finally accept this as being the Government’s stance with respect to these proposals?
In an ideal world, I would rather see all such offenders behind bars for the entire duration of their sentence, and I have tabled further amendments to that effect. However, Amendments 1 and 12 seek at least to close this obvious gap in justice to some degree by ensuring that only offences with sentences of less than 12 months are eligible for suspension. That way the one-year sentences imposed on men such as Mr Kebatu and other sexual offenders would be served in custody and not on our streets.
Amendments 2 and 13 similarly seek to plug apparent drafting oversights in the Bill. At present, it is not yet clear whether the presumption of a suspended sentence would apply to that sentence before or after a guilty plea is submitted. Given that in all published materials of the Government they have indicated that only short- term sentences of up to one year should be suspended, I can only guess that they intended for Clause 1 to take effect before guilty pleas were submitted. I have therefore tabled Amendments 2 and 13 to ensure that the presumption of suspended sentences should apply before any credit is given for a guilty plea.
If this is an amendment which the Government wish to oppose then I suggest they must make clear to all noble Lords, and indeed to the public, that they in fact wish to suspend sentences for all crimes up to 18 months, rather than 12 months. That is because any offender charged with a crime of 18 months has the ability to reduce it by a third by submission of an early guilty plea, which will subsequently make them eligible, apparently, for an automatic suspended sentence. I suggest that this will simply open a Pandora’s box for a whole new subset of crimes that will fall into the eligibility criteria of Clause 1.
The exclusion of an express clause negating credit for a guilty plea in this context will have unintended and dangerous implications for our justice system. It risks fundamentally undermining public confidence in justice if offenders come to recognise that by pleading guilty they can simply avoid prison altogether and serve their sentence in the community. That distorts incentives in a manner that no responsible Government should welcome. It may even encourage individuals charged with serious crimes, regardless of whether or not they committed them, to plead guilty, purely to escape a custodial sentence. That cannot be a principle on which our system of justice is based. I hope that the Minister will take this point seriously, and I look forward to hearing his response.
Amendments 3 and 14 address a further operational incoherence in Clause 1: the length of time for which a suspended sentence would be imposed. Under the Bill as drafted, there is no clarity as to whether suspended sentences imposed automatically under this presumption would be suspended for the maximum period. In many cases, an offender could therefore benefit from a dramatically reduced suspension period, serving little to no meaningful time under supervision. My amendments seek to ensure in statute that this is simply not the case. If the intention is truly to uphold the integrity of sentencing, any suspended sentence imposed as a substitute for immediate custody must be suspended for the maximum allowable period. Anything less would undermine the very concept of accountability that the public rightly expect from our justice system.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is unavoidably unable to be here. I apologise for taking his place from the second Bench; I am sure noble Lords will understand that I need propping up.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for explaining the Conservative amendments in such clear detail. They read to me as if he and his party are going along with the Bill with such reluctance that they would really like to oppose it completely, and have proposed so many amendments so as to come just short of wrecking it. I know that the noble and learned Lord will say that he is giving shape to the presumption, and I accept that some of the amendments will help to clarify the position. He calls them “practical and operational”; I do not necessarily read them that way. But I do think is a pity. He quotes a very few cases, and few cases make bad law; and using language such as “roaming our streets” does not help a sensible and calm debate on a Bill which is thoughtful and addresses not only the matter of prison capacity but what will be best for particular offenders to assist them, as I read it, not to reoffend. From these Benches, we wholeheartedly support that.
I have to say, too, that, if we were to accept these amendments, we would be in danger of constraining magistrates so much that they would read what they are given as prescription instead of leaving them scope to produce the best sentence in the particular circumstances of the offender.
On the first amendment in this group, can the Minister say how often a sentence of just short of 12 months is given? I hear 12 months as being quite a usual order, so that, if one changed the terminology, one would be nullifying or at any rate reducing the effect of the central part of this Bill. On Amendment 4, concerning danger not just to an individual but to the public, when I read it, I thought, “If there is a real danger to the general public, we probably wouldn’t be looking at a sentence of less than 12 months”.
My Lords, there is a curious diffidence over so important a part of the Bill as Clause 1. I shall not say much about it, except that, although the amendments are worth studying to see whether they do improve how Clause 1 can operate, they seem to stem from a general hostility to the Bill disguised as a sort of benevolence. It is a strange position that the Conservative Front Bench has taken.
We would be in a happier situation if we were discussing this Bill because we had worked out a coherent alternative criminal justice policy and the sole reason for carrying it forward would be that it would be better at protecting the public, recognising, as it should, that many people who are in prison are not being improved in their propensity not to reoffend by being in prison, and some of the people in the community are not getting the support and structure they need to make their lives responsible—or reduce the danger to the public in general.
However, we are considering this Bill because our prisons are full and will remain full and get fuller unless we do something about it. That does not preclude having a sensible criminal justice policy in support of provisions such as Clause 1, but it does necessitate it. The good thing about this Bill is that significant parts of it are addressed to better provision in and out of prison and in the transition from prison to being out of prison—a matter on which the Minister has plenty of specialised knowledge from his own experience. It may be that we can tidy up Clauses 1 and 2 a little, but we should be quite clear in our minds that they are necessary clauses to deal with a crisis. We will rely on other parts of the Bill to ensure that we are dealing with that from the point of view of criminal justice reform, and not merely trying to empty prisons.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a great honour to have the opportunity to speak for the Government in Committee on the Sentencing Bill. As noble Lords know, I have devoted much of my life and career to criminal justice reform, in particular the question of how to reduce reoffending. Therefore, I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the amendments on short sentences, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. While I am grateful to noble Lords for their constructive and thoughtful input on this Bill, inside and outside the Chamber, I remain convinced that the position of the Bill is the right one. I appreciate the words from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, along those lines.
Let me be clear at the outset: we are not abolishing short sentences. Judges will still have discretion to send offenders to prison where there is a significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual, where they have breached a court order or in exceptional circumstances. However, the evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. That is a key driver behind the presumption to suspend short sentences and why it must continue to apply to sentences of 12 months or less.
We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities, and we are also following the lead of the previous Conservative Government who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament, without the additional amendments we are debating today.
Given the clear evidence on short sentences, the Government do not agree with introducing further exemptions. To do so could increase reoffending and so create more victims. I came into this job to build a criminal justice system that leads to fewer victims, not more.
I will now turn to the specific points that noble Lords have raised in this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have both raised important points on early guilty pleas through Amendments 2 and 13. I can assure noble Lords that I have reflected on these amendments and considered them at length and with great care, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly, and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. Moreover, it can save victims and witnesses from the concern about having to give evidence. This is particularly important in traumatic cases.
Furthermore, the amendments proposed would create inconsistencies. The presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea mitigation brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, whereas it could still apply where the court applied any other mitigation that had the same effect. For these reasons, the Government do not support these amendments.
Through Amendments 3 and 14, noble Lords have also proposed requiring courts to impose suspended sentence orders with a maximum operational period of two years. This would not be appropriate for every suspended sentence order without consideration of the particular facts of the case, and would place additional burden on the Probation Service. The evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities.
It is absolutely clear that the last Government left our Probation Service under immense pressure. Fourteen years of austerity came alongside a botched privatisation. The scars are still there, and we are fixing it. Sentencing must always be proportionate to the offence committed, taking into account all the circumstances of each case. It is right for the judiciary to retain discretion to consider this and make the sentencing decision. This amendment would remove that discretion.
I thank the noble Lords again for their amendments and the opportunity to debate them. I hope I have sufficiently explained why our approach of following the evidence is the right one to take. With that in mind, I ask them not to press their amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this part of the Committee debate, and I thank the Minister for explaining the position of the Government with regard to these proposed amendments.
On early guilty pleas, it appears to me, respectfully, that if the Government are going to maintain the position that has been set out, they should be explicit in the Bill that they are not dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of 12 months; they are dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of up to and including 18 months. That is far from clear in the Bill. Whether or not the Government accept our amendment, it is a point that has to be made clear so that public confidence can be maintained in the nature of the sentencing system that is going to be introduced.
With regard to the matter of suspension and the maximum suspension period of two years, we maintain that if these moves are going to be taken, it is only appropriate that the suspension should be for a period long enough to enable some form of rehabilitation to take place, because otherwise it is simply pointless. Again, I ask the Government to reconsider their position, but at this stage I will withdraw this amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, these amendments touch on similar issues to those we have already addressed. They highlight what we say is a fundamental flaw in Clause 1—the blanket presumption of suspended short custodial sentences even for offenders who pose a serious and ongoing risk to the public.
Under the Bill as it is framed, there is the real possibility that individuals convicted of crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, burglary and offences involving knives or other bladed weapons could serve the entirety of their sentences in the community. As we have just noted, that may be far less than a suspension of two years if the Government proceed as they intend. From the point of view of public safety and public confidence in the justice system, that appears to be unacceptable.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 7 to 11. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, particularly Amendments 6 and 18 to 29.
I fully understand the need to address the issue of prison capacity and overcrowding. We are now in a position where we have 97.3% capacity and 86,800 prisoners, as at 3 November this year. I think we are all committed to tackling recidivism and to improving prisoner education and rehabilitation; I know the Minister has a personal commitment and an enviable record in that respect. I support the wider aim of delivering 14,000 additional prison places by 2031, given that, at present, we will be 9,500 places short by 2028. I am one of the few people who has actually read the Independent Sentencing Review by my erstwhile friend and former colleague David Gauke, which is an excellent piece of work.
I notice that the Government are no longer propagating the disingenuous statistic and canard that the previous Government, who struggled with Covid, Ukraine and other contingent financial problems, created only 500 places. For the record, they created 8,500 places and opened three new prisons: HMP Five Wells, HMP Fosse Way and HMP Millsike. Unfortunately, due to the decrepit physical condition of the prison estate, presided over by both parties, the previous Government, cheered on by His Majesty’s Opposition at the time and prisoner advocacy charities, were compelled to take many prison places out of use. Some 4,151 cells have been closed due to dilapidation since 2010, according to the PAC report on prison capacity published in March this year.
I have two major concerns regarding the proposals in Clause 1 that give rise to my amendments, which in practice would de facto abolish prison terms under 12 months. They send out a regrettable message to criminals and the wider public that, because of government incompetence, a failure to plan and a failure of imagination, committing crime is cost free. Shoplifters, burglars, thieves, fences, thugs and drug dealers will be spared jail and instead will receive a community sentence. Even someone given an 18-month sentence for a serious crime, with a credit of a guilty plea taken into account and a reduction to 12 months, will receive no custodial jail time at all.
I shall focus on Amendment 7, concerning these rather wrongheaded proposals. The Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 was introduced by a Labour MP and supported by the Labour Front Bench and the GMB union, whose national officer said at the time:
“It’s welcome to see arrests taking place but we also want to see an increase in prosecutions and tougher sentences handed down for these unacceptable assaults”.
The Bill was supported by many senior Labour MPs, including, for instance, Louise Haigh, then a Front-Bencher, who said that the attitude
“sadly exists across the criminal justice system, that being punched and kicked is somehow to be expected and accepted … we will never accept that people should be assaulted while they are doing their job and we will do everything in our power to protect them”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/17; col. 1150.]
Under these proposals we have a situation where around 3,000 thugs—who assaulted police officers, NHS workers, firefighters and ambulance staff, among others—will receive a golden ticket: a free pass. What message does that send to the public and to those public servants who do these very tough jobs? The criminal justice system is distrusted by many taxpayers already. Will that improve as a result of this legislation?
My Lords, I made some remarks in the previous group about my concern that magistrates in particular would be constrained by being proscribed as to the detail of what they can do. In listing the offences of the offender, if some offences are not on the list, is that list conclusive? I am not sure that this is as helpful as the Opposition would suggest.
I wonder how many of these amendments are appropriate for primary legislation, and how many would or could go into sentencing guidelines. There are noble Lords here who know far more about the workings of both the courts and the guidelines than I do or could.
I am a bit confused about the suggestion that 12-month sentences are being abolished. I do not read them as being abolished. Would some of what is listed attract sentences of less than 12 months? I also wonder what is meant by “associated offences”, which crops up in a number of these amendments. Additionally, what are offences with “a connection to terrorism”? If an offender commits a terrorist act, is he looking at 12 months or less?
Many of the people who are listed in Amendment 6 and its companion amendment strike me as people who would benefit not from being in custody but rather from receiving support and rehabilitative services. I do not, of course, take issue with the comments made about the capacity of the Probation Service. We are all concerned about that, and we would all be with Baroness Newlove on that comment.
We were also told that there is no bar to reoffending. Is the suspension of a sentence not itself a bar to reoffending, given that, if the suspension is lifted, the custody applies? That strikes me as something of a bar.
I will try not to say this again today but I will repeat the point I made about the language that we use. I commented on the use of language such as offenders being free to “roam the streets”; “career criminals” seems to be a similarly unhelpful phrase.
My Lords, if I might, I will make a brief comment. I have a lot of sympathy with what the noble Baroness has just said. I share many of the reservations expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, but I wonder whether trying to identify a whole range of offences that fall outside the suspended sentence regime is helpful. It raises the question of what has not been included. My own feeling is that if we could get some generic language which encapsulates the thinking expressed by my noble and learned friend, we would be doing well, rather than to have a list of offences, which runs the risk of omitting others and perhaps including some that we should not.
I understand why we have all got a problem with the size of the prison population. Generally, we could be safer if there were fewer people in prison. Many of them have probably been there too long and not had an awful lot done to help them. But as I have tried to understand the Government’s proposals and public spending generally, I have a growing concern about how they might be improved.
The proposals rely on the fact that, as people are released early or do not go to prison, they are tagged. I generally agree with tagging and think that we could do far more with it. At the moment, we do not do much with geofencing, with which we can stop a person going where a victim of domestic violence might be. There is sobriety tagging—where alcohol is the cause of somebody’s offending, you can check whether they are abiding by a court order not to drink or not to take drugs. These are positive developments. I am told that about 30% of the people leaving prison who should be tagged are not getting tagged because of administrative issues. That is a significant number of those who are leaving prison who should have some form of restraint or monitoring. If that is not happening, it needs to be sorted before we start allowing people out at a quicker rate.
The other opportunity with tagging which we are not currently taking—Ministers have been kind enough to find some time to talk with me about this—is how we might proactively use it better in the future. The data that comes from the tags goes to the commercial operators of the tagging system. I am not sure whether it is G4S, but it is a commercial operator. I have no problem with that. The problem is that the data goes into its control room and the police do not see it. It tells us where the offenders are; we might be able to check, for example, whether there is a rapist nearby to a rape or a burglar nearby to a burglary—real-time data sharing. At the moment, that is not happening, but it is an opportunity that could be taken with this new experiment. It would not take an awful lot of investment or time to get this running.
Further, as one or two people have said already, we could probably have fewer short sentences on the whole but I am not sure that they should be removed, as it appears the assumption is here, from the armoury of the judge. The particular group I would consider are those repeat offenders who commit low-level offending, but if you live next door to them it is not very good. Such cases are perceived as minor cases, but they often impact on their neighbours and the community where they live—they do not impact on people who live 20 miles away. The opportunity for a judge to intervene in those cases ought to remain. I worry that, with the assumption based on the Government’s proposal, that group, for example, would not get caught.
I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that the list offered by the Opposition is entirely the right one. It would force the Government to address what should be on the list, or, if not a list, what should be the principle to guide such action by a judge. I worry that, at the moment, judges may feel constrained not to give short sentences in circumstances where they are the only method. It is no good giving a fine to somebody who has repeatedly been given fines and does not pay them, as an example. I think we need to retain that in the armoury.
Is not the corollary of the noble Lord’s argument that, as it stands, if the Government were to reject these amendments, in cases of serious and egregious crime the judge may be fully cognisant of the fact that they cannot give a custodial sentence to someone who is deserving of one, and therefore will give a higher sentence than 12 months, with the result that prison overcrowding will be made worse? That is a risk if these amendments are not supported.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is quite right. In fact, that is one thing I would mention to the Minister about the risk, because judges will try to do what is best. They are not trying to subvert the law, but they will try to do what is best in the case before them.
The noble Lord recalled what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about having a list of crimes to which this will apply, but the moment you do that you have fettered the discretion of a judge. It must be left open for the judge to determine. If it is not, and you list the crimes to which this applies, when he or she listens to the evidence, it will be absolutely clear that the person must be sent to prison. But you have fettered the judge’s authority and power. I would not go for a list. Certainly, I support the noble Lord’s suggestions around tagging and the last question he raised, but I am not so sure that the Government can say to the judge, “You’ve got discretion but, by the way, over this you don’t”.
That is probably for the Minister. I say only that I fundamentally agree with the noble and right reverend Lord, but discretion for judges has of course been limited in some ways. For example, there are minimum sentences: of five years if you carry a firearm and of six months on second conviction if you carry a knife after the age of 18. There are occasions when their discretion is fettered, and the Sentencing Council does that anyway with a list of a type.
I am with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. The Government offer one broad principle, but I do not think it is sufficient to deal with some of my concerns. It may be improved. It may be that there should be a list—I would not argue that—but, personally, I am not reassured by the Government’s approach to what I take to be the broad assumption that people will not go to prison for a 12-month sentence. There could be some horrible cases and somebody might get hurt. That is what worries me.
My Lords, I will briefly challenge some of what has been said. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, rather implied that it was his belief that the Bill intends to remove all short sentences. From the Minister’s opening remarks and those of others, that is clearly not the case. There is, however, very good reason for reducing the number.
The Minister pointed out that there is a significant reduction in the level of reoffending. He has not given the figures, so I will share them with the Committee, as a result of the work of your Lordships’ Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I chair, in a report that was done during the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. It showed the figures then—they have been replicated by more recent research—that, of offenders who are put in prison for short sentences and are released, 60% reoffend, whereas the average reoffending rate for those on custodial sentences is only 24%. As that report said, and as we will discuss in future amendments, there are very good ways in which we can improve non-custodial sentences to reduce the rate of reoffending even more.
I am going to disagree during our deliberations over the three sessions that we will have on the Bill—maybe more—with a lot of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, says, but I entirely agree with him, and it has been reflected by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend, that none of these measures we are talking about will succeed unless we have the resources to do the job. Again, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others that there are amendments coming later where we can address the need for more probation officers and more people in our prisons. There is not currently, as far as I am aware, an amendment on police numbers, but there would be time to put one down.
The only other thing I want to say is how much I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about getting rid of the list argument, which has also been picked up. I hope the Government will listen to his proposal about finding language that can be used about those people we know we would not want to put on short sentences, but not necessarily have the sentence inflation that has, sadly, caused a problem for us and is one reason we have so many prisoners in our prisons today.
My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, said, save that I think that the Bill already deals with the problem identified by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe. It is important to look at the text of the Bill: this is a “presumption” against short sentences; it is not a bar to them. Of course, there is a philosophy behind the presumption: the authors of the Bill and the Government have taken the view, which is not a revolutionary view in relation to the evidence that has been collected over many years, that, generally, short sentences are not a great idea. They do not lead to rehabilitation; they do not help with reoffending.
If you disagree with that and think that a short, sharp shock is a jolly good thing, you are obviously going to disagree with the Bill and these provisions. Having lists of various offences is a good wheeze, but it is not consistent with the philosophy of the Bill, which is that, in general, short sentences do not work—they do not keep the public safe because they do not rehabilitate anyone and, in fact, some people go to the university of crime for a short course of less than 12 months and come out with drug problems, relationship breakdown and other issues that they did not have before. But this is only a presumption; it is not a bar. To respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with whom I so often agree, I do not think that anything else is required as an alternative to the list approach of exceptions, because there is the residual discretion provided in the Bill for exceptional circumstances.
Is this not a case for the Sentencing Council to express some guidance on these matters rather than go down the route of the list system in a statutory form?
I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.
The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.
My Lords, I hesitate to intervene on this matter, but I wonder what thought has been given by the Ministry of Justice to simplification. The Sentencing Code is now a very lengthy document. The way in which the title of the clause has been put is very sensible: it says that there is a presumption for a suspended sentence. However, one goes on to read the entirety of this text, with the words “the court must … unless”, and then there is a whole series of exceptions to that order. Why do we have to have complexity?
There are two strong reasons against it. First, there will not be parliamentary time to alter this if we get it wrong. Secondly, it is much better to leave this to the guidance of the Sentencing Council. If the Bill could say “the Sentencing Council will provide guidelines to bring about that there should be a presumption against short sentences”, would that not achieve what we want without language? I heavily criticise the parliamentary draftsmen for this unnecessary complexity. Can we go not go back to the Victorian age and do things simply? I know these words are likely to fall on deaf ears, but it would be so much better if we had simple sentencing legislation and left it to the Sentencing Council, which can adjust it as we see whether it works, because one thing experience shows is that we try one type of sentence and, a few years later, we want to tinker with it.
My Lords, as a judge who did not sit very often in crime but had to do it from time to time, I have been listening with increasing dismay to what has been discussed in these increasingly elaborate proposals. I hope that the Minister will listen to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, because that was the first bit of absolute good sense, whether we need to call it Victorian or just remind ourselves that the Victorians did a lot of things extremely well. At the end of this discussion and throughout this Bill, could we not do three things: simplify, trust the judges, and trust the Sentencing Council to do a lot of what is going to be, at the moment, in primary legislation?
My Lords, I want to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Foster, that I was not a co-author of this Bill; it is entirely the responsibility of the Government. I was merely saying I had a similar view: that prison numbers could come down and we could be safer. That was the discussion I had with the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, after the Bill was announced. If it had been my Bill, there would have been something in it about a 10% or 20% reduction in the Sentencing Council guideline targets for maximum or minimum sentences. In my view, there have been two causes of prison numbers going up: the lack of the ability to get parole, which has been addressed by the Bill, and the grade inflation in sentences, which has had nothing done to it. Unless someone would like to correct me, no political party has gone into any election promising lower sentences. Has anybody ever said that?
Without wishing to delay our deliberations, I point out to the noble Lord that if he feels passionately about it, there is still time for him to draft and put down amendments on the issues he raises. He may well find support from these Benches.
My Lords, let us remember that we passed a Bill here about the Sentencing Council, when there was a disagreement between the Ministry of Justice and the Sentencing Council, and we know how we resolved that, so we cannot put too much faith without that legislation, which went through here not long ago.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Jackson, for the further amendments they have tabled to Clause 1, which has allowed for another engaging debate on the presumption to suspend short sentences. I begin by reiterating that we are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities. We are implementing the Gauke review, for which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. Texas, which the noble Lord referred to, saw crime fall by 30% and 16 prisons were closed. I would also like to reiterate how much missed Lady Newlove is.
Perhaps I might ask the Minister about the way he ran his business. One of the important roles of a legislature is to get things technically right. There is no disagreement, as I can see, on the view that that the policy is right, but can we not do things more simply? Throughout the Bill, I have asked the Minister: can we look at producing a piece of workable, simple legislation that can be adapted if what is set out is not right? I believe that this is something a legislature ought to address, where policy is not at issue.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The principle that the noble and learned Lord raises is the right one. I do not believe that we can change things in this Bill now, but the message that I can relay will be very helpful. There is another point around complexity: how this is then communicated to the hard-working staff on the front line, who will need to interpret and put into action what we are proposing here.
I will respond to the Minister. First, it is always our duty to put legislation right, otherwise we might as well all go home. Secondly, the Sentencing Council is there to give practical guidance; it is not our job as a legislature to tinker with the detail. I urge the Minister to go back and see whether we can produce, instead of the complexities inherent in this clause, something that just expresses the presumption and leaves the Sentencing Council to do its job. It will do it far more competently, I am sure, than the Ministry of Justice.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
We will come back to that later in Committee, when we talk about the Sentencing Council. But I reassure the noble and learned Lord that I will take back to colleagues his point about clarity and simplicity.
I do not think that simple legislation will ever catch on, because it would put a lot of lawyers out of business—I say rather irreverently. The Minister in his remarks did not specifically address my Amendment 7. The piece of legislation put forward by his honourable friend Sir Chris Bryant, the emergency workers offences Act, had significant support across both the other place and here. Given the impact of these proposals, I wonder whether the Minister would revisit the specific ramifications for emergency service workers, because there is significant concern about that. I take the point that we should not specify in too much detail in primary legislation, but that Act did receive significant support.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for raising the point about emergency workers: they deserve all our attention and we are very proud of what they do in often very difficult circumstances. I will take away his challenge on that.
I have met a number of people—especially women—in prison who are there for assaulting an emergency worker. While those assaults should not happen at all, often those people were in a very traumatic situation and, when the emergency services came to their aid, they reacted in the wrong way. That is something we need to bear in mind as well.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions from across the Committee and for the response from the Minister. Everybody appreciates that Clause 1 is not prohibiting anything. Nevertheless, a number of noble Lords, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked eloquently and correctly about the discretion of our judges and the trust that we should place in our judges. But that is not what Clause 1 is doing. Clause 1 is saying they must apply a presumption. They are not being trusted with it; they are being told they must apply it. That is one of the issues that we need to address.
A number of specific exceptions were tabled in the amendments, but I take on board the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about it being far more straightforward to produce some generic description in this regard. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out, it may even be something that should be left to the Sentencing Council at the end of the day. But that is another issue. I read this quotation:
“Even when criminals are found guilty, the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.
That is from the Labour manifesto. My fear is that Clause 1 is simply going to reinforce that perception, and that is one of the concerns that we have with it.
I appreciate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about the potential for a suspended sentence to lead to support and rehabilitation. The problem is that those facilities are simply not available at the present time and, in any event, we do not know what period of suspension might or might not be imposed by the courts. It may well be one or two years, but, as the Bill is framed, it may be much less and leave no sensible opportunity for either support or rehabilitation.
There is also the matter of statistics. The noble Lord, Lord Foster, alluded to some well-known statistics about the fact that those who are in custody for short sentences are much more likely to repeat offences when they come out of prison than those who have been given a suspended sentence. But one must bear in mind that those who have been given a suspended sentence have generally committed a far less serious offence than those who have been given a custodial sentence, and that those who are given custodial sentences for relatively minor offences are given those custodial sentences because they are repeat offenders. One must bear in mind Disraeli’s observation that there are lies, there are damned lies and there are statistics and, therefore, we have to approach them with a degree of care. I understand and appreciate that there is more generic evidence to suggest that suspended sentences, when properly applied, controlled and maintained, can have beneficial effects—nobody doubts that for a moment—but there is a very real need here to address, among other things, the whole scourge of repeat offenders.
This arises particularly in the context of Amendment 8 from my noble friend Lord Jackson, which highlights burglary as a particular offence. Burglary is an intensely intrusive crime that leaves victims traumatised, and it is inclined to attract repeat offenders. Its social damage is considerable. There are particular crimes of that nature, given their impact on society as a whole, that should attract something more than a suspended sentence, given the fear is that somebody will simply repeat them. Similar observations can be made on knife crime as well.
I fully understand that there is a need to revisit Clause 1 and its implications. We have sought to do so by identifying particular or specific exceptions to it. There is, as I indicated, and as outlined by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, potentially a better route to that conclusion. Indeed, to echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, there is hopefully a simpler route to that conclusion. For present purposes, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, before I get on to the detail of this amendment, may I say how much I agree with the comments that have been made about the increasing complexity of the Sentencing Code, the guidelines and so on? I started to look at them in connection with another amendment and found that I was very quickly bogged down. However, we need to sort out Clauses 18 and 19 first, I would say to the noble and learned Lord; otherwise, we could find ourselves in worse trouble.
I am grateful to the Prison Reform Trust for raising a reminder of community sentences and their place; my amendment provides specifically for community sentences. It should not, of course, be necessary, but it seems that it might be important to remind magistrates in particular. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has another amendment directed to the same end, which is probably more straightforwardly drafted—though I did not draft this one; I will come to that. The briefing that I have received from the Prison Reform Trust is very much based on the risk of increasing the imprisonment of women. The point might apply not only to women, but the position of women has just been trailed by the Minister.
We welcome the presumption that we have just been talking about against custodial sentences of 12 months or less, but there are implications of a custodial sentence that is suspended that do not apply to community orders. I tripped over the issue when I was looking online for the views of women’s organisations on the Bill, and I found an article by Vera Baird for the Centre for Women’s Justice. She wrote:
“There is abundant evidence to show that women are disproportionately given short custodial sentences, mainly for non-violent, low-level offences such as shoplifting—”
I am sorry to use that term in the presence of my noble friend, but I am quoting—
“or breaches of court orders. Nearly 70% of women in prison are victims of domestic abuse”—
that is an MoJ figure, I think, and I should perhaps declare an interest as having been chair of the charity Refuge for a number of years—
“many have complex needs and whilst, for male prisoners, relationships can be a protective factor, families rarely stay together if the mother goes to prison”.
On that issue of complex needs, the article also makes the point:
“Women with multiple needs may breach suspended sentences due to the complexity of their lives, the challenges they face in complying with court-ordered requirements, mental health disorders, caretaking responsibilities, unstable housing and lower employment prospects. Conflicts with conditions, missed appointments or failure to meet financial obligations linked to their sentences, can result in technical violations which will breach the suspended sentence and lead to women being returned to court for imprisonment. Women may also breach community orders, but the consequences are not likely to be as severe. Women on suspended sentences live under the threat of prison from day one of the sentence, long before the benefits of treatment and support, which may be offered alongside a suspended sentence order, have any chance of working”.
In case anyone thinks that I am advocating letting women off, community sentences are punishment. Vera Baird wrote that this amendment—I think it is this one; I have since seen a longer alternative—was drafted by members of the Women’s Justice Board. I mention that because I know that the Women’s Justice Board is very much supported by the Minister, and I have an amendment about it later, but it is significant that it is backing this. Vera Baird said that it was tabled in the Commons; it took me a while to track it down, but as far as I can see there was no comment from the Minister in the Commons in response to this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 29A. It is not often that I feel daunted in speaking out on legislation in this Chamber, but I feel a slight nervousness when a lot of senior police officers, former judges and KCs start—
Yes, luckily they have, so I do not really need to be nervous at all.
Often, in putting my or the Green Party’s views—which obviously overlap quite a lot—I feel that I am speaking from the street. I talk to a lot of people who probably do not know much about this sort of thing, and they probably agree with me on some of it.
On simpler legislation, I know for a fact that the Met Police would like simpler legislation around protests. It is absolutely sick of the confusion and it is time for us to revisit it. However, that is not for today.
Amendment 29A would make a simple but important change: it would require courts to consider the use of a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. This would strengthen the Government’s own intention to reduce the overuse of short prison sentences—an aim that I and, I am sure, many across the Chamber, including the Minister, warmly welcome. However, unless we make it clear that community orders must be properly considered first, we risk creating what justice organisations call a net-widening effect. In other words, people who should have received a community order may instead receive a suspended sentence order simply because it appears to be a tougher alternative to custody.
A suspended sentence order is still a custodial sentence. It carries the weight and the lifelong consequences of a criminal record, and it places people at far greater risk of imprisonment if they breach its terms. By contrast, a community order is a genuinely non-custodial disposal. It is designed, when properly resourced, to address the underlying causes of offending, whether those are mental health needs, alcohol or drug dependency, or others. Community orders enable people to keep their jobs, maintain their homes, stay connected to their families and communities, and continue caring responsibilities—all factors that are well established as reducing the risk of reoffending.
If the Bill’s aim is to reduce the crisis in prison capacity, we must avoid funnelling people into suspended sentences where a community order would be more effective and safely promote rehabilitation. Otherwise, we simply increase the pipeline into custody through breach, defeating the very purpose of the Government’s reforms. We also risk the danger that this disproportionately affects women as it currently stands, which we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
This amendment is supported by Justice and aligned with the recommendations of the Independent Sentencing Review, which suggested
“introducing ‘crime reduction’ as an overarching principle”
to guide sentencing. Community sentences can play a crucial role in achieving that. They provide a real opportunity for rehabilitation and practical programmes that help people rebuild their lives without the barrier of a custodial sentence on their record. Crucially, community orders can command public confidence when victims are properly informed about what they involve and understand how these sentences can reduce future harm.
Amendment 29A would simply ensure that the most proportionate, most effective and least harmful sentence is considered first. It would strengthen the Bill’s stated ambition of reducing pressure on prisons while supporting better outcomes for individuals and communities. I hope that the Minister sees this as a constructive amendment that aligns with the Government’s own agenda. I urge the Committee to give it serious consideration.
My Lords, I support what is behind the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, for two reasons. First, we still send far too many women to prison; we need to reduce that number. Secondly, a community sentence probably should be in priority to a suspended sentence.
However, it is not that simple. I will not come back to this point again, but the amendments show precisely why this should be left to the Sentencing Council, which can weigh up the detail of the terms and conditions that it is appropriate to attach to a suspended sentence, as you can make them almost as tough as a community order. The judgment of how the public perceive suspended sentences and community orders can also be left to the council. Unless we satisfy the public’s perception that we are punishing people, the result will be that the judges will think, “Okay, we’ve got to go above 12 months”. That would be a disaster, particularly in the case of women.
I support the excellent ideas behind the amendments. However—and I promise not to say any more about the Sentencing Council today—they are a very strong argument for changing this Bill and making it sensible.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to these amendments, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to insert an explicit reference to Section 77 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make it plain that courts may mitigate a sentence to a community order where appropriate. This amendment is not necessary. The Bill does not alter the courts’ ability to consider the full range of mitigating factors, nor does it disturb their discretion to impose a community sentence where that is the just and proportionate outcome. What it does is imposes an obligation to suspend a prison sentence where otherwise a prison sentence might be imposed. Those powers remain firmly in place. To single out Section 77 of the Sentencing Act for restatement in the Bill might imply that the legislation would otherwise curtail judicial discretion to impose a community sentence. That is not the case. For this reason, we do not consider the amendment to be needed or helpful.
Amendment 29A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would place a statutory duty on courts to consider a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. Although we understand and appreciate the intention behind the proposal, we do not support it. The courts are already required to work upwards through a full hierarchy of sentencing options, including setting community sentences, before custody is reached. That is the well-established principle in law and practice. Sentencing judges are highly experienced in applying those principles.
To introduce a further procedural step will not add substance but create additional bureaucracy in an already very complex framework. It risks increasing administrative burdens on the probation services and court staff, and generating uncertainty about what additional assessments or reports might be required to satisfy the new duty. We should not legislate for processes that the system is not resourced or structured to deliver. Above all, a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, by definition, imposed only when the custody threshold has already been crossed. To require courts to revisit considerations that are already inherent in the sentencing exercise risks weakening clarity and undermining judicial confidence in the tools at their disposal.
For all these reasons, although we respect the intentions behind both amendments, we do not believe that they would strengthen the sentencing framework. We cannot support them.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these amendments. I was pleased to hear mention of two organisations: one which I used to chair, the Prison Reform Trust, and one which I now chair, the Women’s Justice Board. I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position on this issue. In doing so, I hope I will address the noble Baronesses’ questions, and reflections raised by other noble Lords at Second Reading.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that there are too many women in prison, and that is why we set up the Women’s Justice Board to come up with a plan to fix that.
I agree that my amendment is not necessary, but perhaps that is in a technical sense; it is the practical situation that the Prison Reform Trust, particularly, and the Women’s Justice Board were pointing to.
Of course I will withdraw the amendment; but before I do so, I just throw back into the arena the hope that there can be some way of reminding magistrates that community sentences are still available and should be used. To my mind, they are the first thing that should be considered.
I hesitate to mention sentencing guidelines, particularly as the noble and learned Lord has imposed a self-denying ordinance on mentioning them again. I would not suggest what the mechanism should be, but there should be some mechanism. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the group of amendments in my name raise important points concerning Clause 2. Our concerns here stem from the same concerns that gave effect to our proposed amendments in respect of Clause 1. Of course, we have sympathy for the current pressures on our prison system, but we must also recognise that, in essence, an undiscriminating provision to let offenders remain in the community without custodial punishment is by no means the solution. Indeed, in many ways, the present provisions create greater challenges than Clause 1 in respect of the ability for the suspension of sentences for offenders who have been sentenced for up to three years’ imprisonment.
These are not petty criminals. This provision would apply to those going to prison for crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, organised drug dealing and possession of an offensive weapon. Amendments 30 and 32 provide a list of offences where we believe it would be unacceptable to allow such offenders to serve suspended sentences. I accept that, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham observed when we debated Clause 1, there may be scope for a generic provision here rather than a long list of specific offences, and certainly we will give consideration to that. However, we do not consider that someone convicted of, for example, sexual offences related to a child or grooming should avoid custody entirely.
Without any effective form of custodial sentence, we risk two important consequences. First, the deterrent effects that are inherent to custodial sentences cease to operate. Secondly, serious offenders will have the opportunity to reoffend, having received no effective rehabilitation, and will have continued access to their victims.
Amendments 30 and 32 similarly make provisions for offences of assault and wounding with intent involving weapons such as knives. We believe it is important that offenders convicted of these serious crimes serve their sentences in custody rather than at large in the community. Those convicted of such violent offences should have to spend some time in custody. This is not only to ensure the continued safety of the wider public, but to ensure that the public’s perception is that serious crime of this nature is punished. I again repeat that, although we recognise that prisons are under considerable strain, we cannot allow that to be the chief or principal consideration when it comes to the imposition of sentences.
Finally, Amendments 30 and 32 seek to exclude offenders who have engaged in stalking or harassment, and also those who have been guilty of domestic abuse
“where the victim is a current or former partner or family member”.
I suggest that it is self-evident why such offenders should serve their sentences in prison and not have access to their victims. I note that even in Clause 1, there is an exception in respect of “significant risk of … harm” to “a particular individual”, where the presumption will not apply. Why is there no similar provision in respect of Clause 2 when we are dealing with far more serious offences than those addressed by virtue of a sentence of 12 months?
Amendments 31 and 33 seek to highlight further operational issues with respect to the Bill, and Clause 2 specifically. The clause, in essence, leaves the door open to a multitude of issues that would never arise if a custodial sentence was going to be present. It is entirely possible that someone convicted of assault on several occasions could be handed down a sentence of less than three years under the current sentencing guidelines. This provision would operate to provide that person with the possibility of serving a suspended sentence. Without meaningful accountability, law breaking and crime will continue to proliferate.
I draw particular attention to the proposed new subsection (2B)(g) in Amendment 31, which provides that suspended sentence orders should not be imposed on those who have
“a history of poor compliance with court orders”.
I respectfully suggest that this is an obvious point to make. Those who clearly have a history of not following community orders should not be placed immediately back into society after committing a crime. Yet that is a very real possibility under the provisions of Clause 3.
It would appear that Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is perhaps underpinned by the same concerns that are rooted in our amendments, namely the real possibility of dangerous offenders on the streets, thereby putting the public at risk. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to exempt specified offences of terrorism, violence and sexual offences from suspended sentences. We support the intention behind that amendment and certainly hope that the Government will take it seriously.
I have sought simply to illustrate a few of those instances where it should not be appropriate for a suspended sentence to be available. That is not only so that the crime is met with a proportionate punishment but is also required to ensure that the public can maintain confidence in the criminal justice system. I hope that the Government will take these amendments seriously, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated, the motivation behind Amendment 34 is broadly similar to what he has just described in his own amendments. Indeed, later in the Bill, at some point next week, there is a series of amendments that I have laid, working with Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, specifically to try to make sure that when we are looking at early release provisions, a particularly hard and clear focus is placed on domestic abuse perpetrators, who have very high levels of recidivism and can be particularly dangerous.
The motivation behind this amendment came partly from an interaction with an organisation in Northern Ireland called the Marie Collins Foundation, which is particularly concerned about yet another acronym I have learned—TACSA—which sounds like an injury to your ankle. It actually means technically assisted child sexual abuse, an activity that is prevalent and growing extremely quickly, assisted by technology. There was a particularly egregious example of a father of several daughters, resident in one of our larger cities outside London, who was found to have drilled a series of holes around his home, particularly into the bathrooms and lavatories, to be able to watch his daughters as they were going about what one does in bathrooms and lavatories. I am afraid this is, believe it or not, not that unusual.
I completely follow the logic that has been put forward by several noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord by my side, which is that we should not and must not be too specific in the Bill. But some clear guidance is required, whether that comes from the Sentencing Council or some other bodies. While I am not a professional politician, professional politicians in office know all too well the opprobrium and publicity that come their way when—not “if”—somebody is released from prison who should not have been, and does something dreadful yet again, or when somebody who should go to prison does not, for reasons to do with trying to alleviate the pressure on the prison population, and then does something really awful. Everybody will say: “Why didn’t we pick that up at the time?”.
We need to think about this very carefully. I understand fully the reasons behind why we are trying to alleviate the pressure on prisons and His Majesty’s occasionally loyal Opposition have quite a lot to answer for, given the state we are currently in. But we need to be very careful about this; that is really all I have to say.
My Lords, I do not want to say more about lists other than to note that these amendments contain a lot of lists. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell, will not think this is in any way an aggressive point, but I think I picked up that he would expect to see some fleshing out of the term “serious”, as well as the detail of “specified offences”, through a mechanism that follows today’s debate. If he is looking for encouragement for further work subject to some of the comments that were made earlier, then he has it.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Sandhurst, for sharing their views and tabling these amendments, which aim to prevent sentences for certain categories of offences from being suspended. I would be interested to hear more about the Marie Collins Foundation; I have never heard of that organisation before. If it would be helpful, I would be interested in having a meeting with the noble Lord and the foundation to learn more and see what I can gain from that.
I must be clear that it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence, taking into account all the circumstances of the offence and following the appropriate guidance set by the Sentencing Council. For example, sentencing guidelines are clear: it may not be appropriate to suspend a sentence if the offender presents a risk to any person or if appropriate punishment can be achieved only by immediate custody. If the offender breaches the order by failing to comply with any of the requirements or committing a new offence, they can be returned to court. If the breach is proven, the courts are required to activate the custodial sentence unless it would be unjust to do so. Of course, criminals serving suspended sentences also face the prospect of being sent to prison if they fail to comply with the terms of these orders. So, under this Bill, someone could receive a two-and-a-half-year sentence, suspended for three years, and with an electronically monitored curfew lasting for two years. In this scenario, if they breach their curfew or commit a further offence, they face the prospect of being sent to prison.
I would like to reassure noble Lords that there is already provision within this Bill to prohibit the use of suspended sentence orders under any circumstances in relation to sentences for offenders of particular concern and extended determinate sentences. These sentences can be imposed in relation to the specific offences listed in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, where the court is of the opinion that the offender is dangerous. Currently, if an extended determinate sentence is imposed for two years or less, it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence, and both can be suspended. However, the Bill will change that position so that where an extended sentence is imposed, it cannot be suspended under any circumstances, including when it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence.
I turn to terrorism sentences. Where a life sentence is not imposed, unless there are exceptional circumstances, a serious terrorism sentence is required if a court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public and the offence was likely to cause multiple deaths. The minimum sentence of imprisonment will then be 14 years and therefore a suspended sentence order would not be available. The noble Lords have also proposed to exempt offences with mandatory minimum sentences and those eligible for referral under the unduly lenient scheme. If the offence being sentenced has a mandatory minimum sentence and is capable of being suspended, judges still retain the discretion to impose an immediate custodial sentence when there is the appropriate outcome.
To be clear, we are not abolishing short sentences. Offences falling under the unduly lenient sentence scheme are rightly treated very seriously. I reassure noble Lords that Clause 2 does not interfere with existing mechanisms that allow for the review of sentences in these cases. We believe that these safeguards protect the public while preserving judicial discretion. Sentencing in individual cases is rightly a matter for the courts, considering the full circumstances of the case.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which would prevent the court from suspending a sentence where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and to exempt offenders convicted of multiple previous offences from being suspended. I can reassure noble Lords that the sentencing guidelines are clear. Where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and the court thinks that they are unlikely to comply in the future, that may be a reason not to suspend the sentence.
Additionally, when an offender is in custody—for example, when they have breached their licence conditions by committing a further offence and have been recalled into custody as a result—the court will not suspend the sentence. Sentences are generally served concurrently when the offences arise out of the same incident, or where there is a series of offences of the same or a similar kind, especially when committed against the same person. The key point is that the court should ensure that the overall sentence imposed on the offender is just and proportionate. Noble Lords will know that this Government take prolific offending extremely seriously, and previous offending is already a statutory aggravating factor.
I must also be clear that a suspended sentence is not a soft option. The courts can impose a range of requirements on an offender, ranging from curfews to exclusion zones. This Bill includes tough new restriction zones, which will restrict offenders to a specific geographic area. These will be electronically monitored in most cases and are intended to serve as not just a punishment but an important tool to protect and reassure victims.
Reoffending is unacceptably high for victims and the public, and we must drive it down. That is why we are ramping up intensive supervision courts, targeting the prolific offenders whose criminal behaviour is often driven by addiction or other needs. The international evidence is clear: these courts cut crime, with a 33% decrease in the rate of arrest compared to offenders who receive standard sentences. That is just one way in which this Government are putting the necessary structures in place to build a sustainable justice system going forward.
Suspended sentence orders in appropriate cases give offenders a chance to stay in work, keep stable housing and access support in the community. All of this goes towards reducing repeat offending and supporting rehabilitation, and it is right that that remains the case. By targeting the causes of offending in the community, we can lower reoffending rates and in turn reduce the number of victims. I hope noble Lords are now assured of the Government’s position on this, and I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I thank the Minister and other noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments are designed to ensure that dangerous or repeat offenders cannot avoid custody due to a general presumption of suspension.
I hear what the Minister said about the discretion of the independent judiciary, but it seems to me that he is attempting to go in two different directions at the same time—we have only just looked at Clause 1, where he is imposing upon the discretion of the independent judiciary a presumption that has to apply. There is no discretion there; they must abide by the presumption. So, in a sense, we go from one extreme to the other with regard to the justification for these provisions in the Bill, and it is very difficult to understand any underlying logic or principle that is being applied here. I do hope that the Government will give further consideration to Clause 2 and the proposed amendments to it, but, for present purposes, I will withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, His Majesty’s Opposition have made no secret of our profound reservations about the sweeping presumption in favour of suspended sentences. We fear that it risks sending entirely the wrong signal about the seriousness of offending and will undermine public confidence and place additional strain on already overstretched probation services. Yet, if the Government are to insist on pressing ahead with this presumption, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that public protection, good order and the prospects for genuine rehabilitation are at least properly safeguarded. That is the purpose of the amendment.
Amendment 35 would require that, where a court imposed a suspended sentence order, at least one meaningful rehabilitative or support-based requirement should be attached, whether that be engagement with NHS mental health services, substance misuse treatment, accredited offending behaviour programmes or structured education, training or employment support. The intention is clear: a suspended sentence must be more than a paper exercise; it must be a tool to reduce reoffending.
The Committee will have noticed that the list of activities is rather broad. The intention here is to permit the court to use its discretion as to which activity the offender is required to undertake. The activity or service would depend upon the particulars of the case before the court and the offender’s personal circumstances. If the offender had a history of alcoholism and their offending was related to that behaviour, the judge could require attendance at a substance misuse service. In other circumstances, the court could require an offender to undertake an apprenticeship for the purposes of rehabilitating them and helping them to become a contributing member of society.
If we are now to envisage a significant expansion in the use of suspended sentences, it is only right that Parliament builds in minimum expectations. Rehabilitation does not happen just because you want it, or by osmosis. If an offender has underlying mental health needs or substance addiction, or lacks stable employment, simply to suspend a sentence without addressing those elements that are the real drivers of crime is neither just nor sensible. It helps no one, least of all other members of the public.
Importantly, the amendment would not interfere with the sentencing powers of the independent judiciary. Rather, it would simply ensure that the court had power to enforce rehabilitative activity, for otherwise any failure to comply with this order would be considered a breach of the suspended sentence order.
I know the Minister has a long history of involvement in rehabilitation of prisoners, and I praise him for that. Hopefully, he will see that this amendment would complement that work. I beg to move.
My Lords, I entirely agree with the sense behind the amendment, but I notice that it would be a mandatory requirement—the judge must do it. My own preference, as is so often the case, is to leave it to the discretion of the judiciary. As I understand the position, they already have the power to do what is suggested and I would leave it to them—there may be exceptional cases where it is inappropriate to do so.
My Lords, I said earlier that there would be few occasions when I was likely to agree with the noble and learned Lord—I am sorry, I have forgotten his name—Lord Keen. In fairness, I should have added at the same time the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, because he has just moved an amendment that, in view of what I have said, he might have expected me to disagree with, but actually I very much agree with the broad thrust of what it proposes, although I accept the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord— I am trying to remember his name too; I apologise, my mind is going tonight—Hailsham.
I referred earlier to a report from the Justice and Home Affairs Select Committee when it was chaired by my noble friend Lady Hamwee—whose name I have been able to remember. That report was called Cutting Crime: Better Community Sentences. I referred to the fact that statistics show that current community sentences reduce the level of reoffending in comparison to those on short-term prison sentences, though I accept the caution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, when it comes to how we interpret those statistics. Still, we know that they are already better.
Baroness Porter of Fulwood (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 35, as outlined by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. As I said at Second Reading, good intentions go only so far. The Bill transfers a large part of the responsibility for rehabilitation into the community, a change that, as has been pointed out by many, the evidence supports. Not only does it have benefits for those who would previously have served a short custodial sentence but, in theory, by reducing the number of those in prison over time, it should provide the capacity that is needed to ensure that those in the prison estate are better able to access the education and support services they need to give them a second chance on release.
The challenge, though, is that this Bill places more people out in the community but does not go far enough in answering the question of what support they will be receiving to help address some of the underlying factors driving their offending. Unless this happens, it could make a difficult situation worse. This amendment specifically deals with those on a suspended sentence, obliging them to undertake at least one form of support, such as an apprenticeship.
The proportion of people with a rehabilitation activity requirement attached to their suspended sentence is relatively high at the moment. The challenge is that adequate resourcing for them is often not available and access can be patchy. A Ministry of Justice assessment from earlier this year found that the rehabilitation activity requirement
“tended to be seen by probation staff as the ‘right idea in theory’ but more resource is needed to deliver it appropriately”.
When asked about the biggest barriers that affect how the rehabilitation activity requirement is delivered, responses tended to centre on limited funding and resource. All practitioner participants reported that resource constraints—for example, staffing shortages and time pressures—and practical constraints, such as a lack of meeting rooms, were barriers to the effective delivery of rehabilitation activity requirements.
This matters because, as the Magistrates’ Association pointed out in its submission to the Sentencing review:
“The impact of delays on offender outcomes is clear. One magistrate told us that an offender was given a Mental Health Treatment Requirement … as part of a suspended sentence, yet their first appointment didn’t occur until nearly six months after it was imposed. The offender was not able to access treatment in time and subsequently reoffended. This may not have happened had he been given support earlier”.
If this is happening at the moment, my worry is what will happen when the system is placed under much greater strain through many more people being managed in the community. Although the Government have committed to some additional funding for probation, they have published no detailed breakdown of how this funding will be deployed. They have also not addressed the central role that the many community and voluntary organisations in this sector play as a critical part of the delivery model for this type of activity.
If I may, I would like to help the noble Baroness with the very powerful argument that she is making, with a set of statistics that I hope noble Lords will find worrying. If we look at the 91,000 people on average who are currently engaged in probation, community sentences and so on, we find that, in 2023, only 1,302 of them even started treatment—that is 1.8%. The shortage of support services is deeply worrying.
Baroness Porter of Fulwood (Con)
I thank the noble Lord. To build on that, more needs to be done for the community and voluntary organisations that, sitting alongside this Bill, will help build the capacity to deliver, so that the rates he outlined will be increased. Policy examples include multi-year, unrestricted grant funding and regional commissioning.
I return to the amendment. By being more explicit in the Bill about the central role that rehabilitative activity plays, my hope is that the Government would be forced to resource this area sufficiently and signal that they view these services and programmes as essential, rather than discretionary.
My Lords, I support the amendment in the names of my noble friends on the Front Bench. Some 14 years ago, I travelled to San Miguel prison in Santiago, Chile, which was one of the worst prisons in South America. I had the dubious distinction of travelling often with the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, who is a noted prison campaigner. When I travelled with her, she invariably asked me to accompany her to a prison. She would regale me with the greatest hits of the worst prisons in the world. Her choice was Kingston prison, in Jamaica. At San Miguel, in Santiago, we saw the results of a system that was overly concentrating on punitive actions and did nothing on education, training and rehabilitation. In fact, a few weeks before, 81 prisoners had died in a fire following a riot in that prison. Over the course of a few years, I visited the toughest prisons in Honduras and El Salvador. I can tell the Committee that they were not Pontins holiday camp in any respect.
The serious point, our earlier debates notwithstanding, is that if we accept the importance of suspended sentences and the fact that, according to Ministry of Justice figures, incarcerating a person in the prison estate costs £53,801 a year, then the state has an obligation to provide those individuals in the criminal justice system with endemic, underlying problems—drink and drug misuse, poor family background and poor education, skills and training—with an alternative way out of recidivism.
I have a great deal of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, particularly the work he has done on problem betting and gambling. I look forward to our debates on that issue in this Bill. He has been rather shy in neglecting to mention the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 that arose from the coalition Government. The Minister and others will know that, prior to the Act—which was groundbreaking legislation —prisoners were turfed out of prison on Friday evening with £46 and within a few hours were in the company of ne’er-do-wells, drug-dealers and others who were leading them back to a life of crime. That was the beginning of rehabilitation being taken seriously for offenders who were not at the top end of seriousness in their offences: there was drug testing and a need to attend appointments; specific, targeted help for young people; the beginning of rehabilitation activity requirement as a policy; and bespoke treatment for female offenders, which is something I know the Minister cares deeply about.
I welcome this amendment and the imperative of the wording. While it is important to respect the discretion of the judiciary, to put in the Bill a requirement that we use that time in as efficacious a way as possible, to ensure that those who have the most acute problems and who will cause the most acute problems, as my noble friend Lady Porter put it—
It is not so much that I dissent from what my noble friend is saying, but a mandatory requirement on the judge implies the capacity to fulfil that requirement. I can imagine circumstances in which the Probation Service would not be able to fulfil a particular requirement. In that event, the trial judge might feel that he or she could not impose a suspended sentence because they could not impose the required obligation to fulfil the condition.
My noble friend makes a fair point. However, it could be put the other way, like the chicken and the egg. Putting this as an imperative in the Bill would oblige the Probation Service and other organisations, such as the NHS and community trusts, to raise their game to provide those services.
That may be so, but that takes you back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, was making: the fact that there is not capacity in many of the required services.
I understand the point that my noble friend is making—
Perhaps I can help the noble Lord a little in his answer to his noble friend. I am sure he has seen that later on the agenda there are a number of amendments in my name and those of others in the Committee proposing that the Bill not be allowed to go ahead until we have evidence of sufficient numbers of prison officers and in the Probation Service. That might be the way out of his dilemma.
I do not often get in-flight refuelling from the Liberal Democrat Benches, but I am grateful that it has happened on this occasion. If I had my way, I would encourage the Government to develop education and training plans, in primary legislation, for each individual prisoner in the prison estate.
As the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, has said, this is a wide area for debate. This amendment begins that debate by trying to encourage the Government to put processes in place in the Probation Service and other key stakeholders to assist prisoners. If someone is in a position where they have already been given a suspended sentence, it seems very sensible, in terms of opportunity cost and saving the taxpayer significant amounts of money in the long term, to have a position where education, training, drug treatment and other areas of work are not just encouraged but mandatory. On that basis, I surely support my noble friend’s excellent amendment.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. We cannot ask for mandatory work or process unless we are sure that we have the facilities and people on the ground. If we do not, from the word go, we are setting up a scheme that is going to fail.
As noble Lords all know, in 1966 an organisation called Nacro, the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, was established. I was a member of it, and we tried our best, with the Howard League. Our success at rehabilitating criminals in our prisons was very small, and the evidence about short sentences, which we have been talking about, is another great failure.
It therefore seems that history and experience tell us that we as a nation have failed to rehabilitate the people we put behind bars. We take away their freedom in the hope that they will be rehabilitated and come out as good citizens. Some do, but there is still great failure. If that is so with people in our prisons, how much more will it be for those who have suspended sentences, for whom we make engagement with rehabilitation services mandatory? The noble Lord has not identified where these centres are going to be; nor has he found who is going to carry out these services—schooling and education. I worked as a chaplain in a young offender institution. Some of the classes were no good and did not help, but there was a lot of success in some.
Our history of incarcerating people does not work. A previous Minister talked about payment by results, but even that did not do it. I want us to do a health check on ourselves, because these are suspended sentences that we would be creating a mandatory process for, through which people might go. If a judge is going to impose the proposed orders, he will want to know who will deliver these services and how certain we are that they will be delivered, because if an offender does not turn up, that may be a way of revoking this.
This mixes up two things that should not be mixed. A suspended sentence is a suspended sentence. If people do not fulfil what that suspended sentence is about, they know that the sentence in prison will begin from the day they break the order. However, with this proposal for mandatory rehabilitation and attendance at drug centres, we are saying that the suspended sentence is not a suspended sentence because somebody is going to watch over you. If it is very clear that they are going to be tagged, things offenders cannot do would be abandoned by this rehabilitation.
I have been with Nacro for so many years. I want to say that we did our best, but we never cared much or rehabilitated many people. We talked about it, and we provided money, books and all sorts of things, and these people were in our prisons. What about those who are roaming our streets—we think this is going to work? I am a realist, and I do not think that we would like this part of the Bill, particularly the way it is crafted. I am with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for raising the very important issue of offender rehabilitation. As noble Lords know, this is an issue that is extremely close to my heart. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his generous words about my work rehabilitating offenders.
I clarify that Clause 2 does not create a presumption to suspend sentences; it simply gives judges the power to suspend sentences of up to three years. This amendment would require a court, when passing a suspended sentence, to oblige an offender to engage in at least one of the following: a treatment programme, education, training and employment support, or an approved behaviour change programme.
As noble Lords are aware, sentencing in individual cases is a matter for the independent judiciary. It must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the purposes of sentencing. The courts already have a range of requirements that can be included as part of a suspended sentence to rehabilitate offenders. These include treatment requirements, which require offenders to take part in accredited programmes, as well as unpaid work, which can include education, training and employment. As noble Lords identify, interventions such as these can be incredibly valuable in supporting rehabilitation, and it is right that they are available and used in those cases where they are needed.
The noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Porter, all raise the important issue of probation and the future of probation. Whether it is pre-sentence reports, rehabilitative activity requirements or all the various support options that probation has, they need to be funded; we need strong leadership, we need to train and retain our staff and we need to have the technology available to support them to do their jobs. We have pledged a 45% increase in funding for probation—that is £700 million. In the coming weeks, I would be delighted to do a presentation for noble Lords on my plan for probation and how funding for that links to that plan being landed successfully.
I am also very keen to hear more from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, about the Santiago prison system, which I have never heard of before. I have been to a number of prisons abroad, but that is one I have never been to. If we ever have time to hear the noble Lord’s wider reflections on rehabilitation, that would be appreciated.
However, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, clearly explained, the decision on which requirements to include in an order is a matter for the judge sentencing the case. This is to ensure that the most appropriate requirements are included in a sentence and that the Probation Service is not overburdened with requirements that may not be necessary in the circumstances of the individual offender.
Additionally, evidence has shown that, for low-risk individuals, the effects of accredited programme participation are usually found to be either negligible or, in some cases, even negative. There will be cases where an offender does not have any of the needs listed by the noble Lord and the court determines that it needs simply to impose a punishment. This amendment would fetter that discretion. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, and many of them have supported the sentiment underlying this amendment. It has clearly shown our shared recognition that, if suspended sentences are to become more prevalent, as the Government intend, they must be made fit for that purpose. We on these Benches continue to oppose the presumption that custodial terms of 12 months or under should routinely be suspended. The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, helpfully has supported the thrust of this amendment, while also highlighting the issues with resources facing the Probation Service.
Our duty today is also a practical one. The Government are introducing a major shift in sentencing practice. If they are to do so, they must build into the legislation the safeguards necessary to preserve public confidence and deliver genuine rehabilitation. My noble friend Lady Porter of Fulwood, in a powerful speech, has explained the difficulties in delivering support for offenders in the community and has explained why support is necessary for offenders. So too, my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, after his excursion to Chile, made an important point: if we propose to go down this line, we must give practical help to recidivists, or they will simply come back and reoffend.
That leads me to say this: if we do not deal with this, and if offenders who have been given a suspended sentence—even if it is only suspended for 12 months—reoffend within that period, they will have to be brought back to court. This is an important point. It is not simply that they may end up in prison, but having been brought back to court, they will occupy court time. That will not help the backlog in the courts. I speak with the experience of someone who, until some 10 or 12 years ago, sat as a recorder for 20-odd years in the courts, so I have some practical experience of this.
People breach suspended sentences. That is why judges in the past have often been cautious about imposing suspended sentences, particularly on people who offend time and time again. If there are too many of them, this will be impractical. What will happen is that, in about two years’ time, we will have the courts overwhelmed with people coming back for resentencing and then having to be put into prison because, otherwise, as the courts will say, it will show that a suspended sentence is not a suspended sentence in any meaningful sense. I put that before the Government in a spirit of constructive criticism, not to try to make difficulties. That is what lies down the road if we are not very careful indeed.
If suspended sentences are to be used more widely, they cannot be hollow or simply be deferrals of punishment; they must require offenders to confront the issues that led them to offend in the first place, and they must offer the public some hope that these offenders will cease offending. I hope the Minister and those behind him, so to speak, will carefully consider this proposal, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I speak to Amendment 36, and will also speak to Amendment 39.
Amendment 79 in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is in this group. As rapid consultation during the course of this afternoon’s proceedings has revealed that none of us is entirely clear what we wanted to say, I hope that it is not too late to de-group it. There will be the opportunity to come to it on one of the days next week. I am sorry if that causes a problem to any colleagues. Otherwise, I will just let the Minister reply as if it had been introduced.
Amendment 36 and 39 deal with income reduction orders. They are complex and not very practical, I would suggest. These orders were not, I understand, recommended in the independent sentencing review. They are not easy to achieve; they can impose additional and unpractical burdens on the court system, which as we know is overstretched, and on HMRC and benefits administration. A lot of fines are imposed by the court; they are the most common criminal sanction, but payment is persistently low. In 2023, 49% of fines remained unpaid after 12 months, despite the requirement that they are set at an amount which can be paid within a year. If that rather simpler system cannot reliably recover half of what is imposed within a year, the more complex income reduction order is not likely to be more successful.
The IRO penalises a person for finding employment by making deductions from their earnings each month. This poses the risk of discouraging individuals from engaging in employment or, at any rate, formal employment. They may move into low-visibility work or decide they are better off not working at all. The impact of court fines is disproportionately severe for low-income households. People with court debts are very likely to live in social housing and very likely to be unemployed, strong indicators of economic precarity. The fines system, particularly additional court charges, rigid payment plans and deductions from insufficient benefits, often escalate the total owed beyond what is affordable for people on low means. I do not need to spell out the path that some people may follow.
I have some questions for the Minister. First, what is the projected collection rate for IROs, and how does it compare with the current 50% unpaid at 12 months for court fines? How will the system track fluctuating incomes, PAYE changes, zero hours and self-employment, and resolve disputes without adding to the burden on the court? What employment impact assessment has been conducted—I am going to come back to employment in a moment—given the Minister’s well-known support for hiring people with convictions to cut reoffending? How will IROs avoid pushing low-income households further into poverty?
I said that I would come back to employment. Our Amendment 39 raises the dangers, as we see it, of income reduction orders hindering the good things that we want to see—offenders taking up employment and training and achieving housing. If the net income with which an offender is left is too low for these various activities, the net benefit would be a disbenefit as we see it. I beg to move Amendment 36.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
I did not quite follow what the noble Baroness proposed about degrouping, but I draw attention to what it says in the Companion, which is that
“de-grouping is discouraged once each day’s groupings have been published”.
But I may have misunderstood.
No, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, is quite right. I had only realised it shortly before we came to this group. “Discouraged” means no in House of Lords language, I think. So I wonder whether the Minister can regard me as having spoken to what is set out in quite a long amendment, because I am sure he will have words to answer what my noble friend would have said, had he been here.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Clause 3 is of course a novel sentencing tool, and it is entirely correct that the Committee should probe its design with some care. Many of the amendments before us seek reassurance that the scheme will be fair and proportionate, and indeed that it will be workable in practice. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with her amendment, draws attention to the basic question of impact. An income reduction order must not be set at a level that undermines an offender’s ability to work, train or maintain stable housing. If these orders are to be effective, they must support rehabilitation, not jeopardise the very stability on which it depends. The noble Baroness’s amendments highlight that there is a risk here that requires very clear scrutiny.
The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst raise a series of questions about the architecture of the scheme. As drafted, the Bill establishes broad powers to reduce an offender’s income, yet it leaves almost all the crucial detail to regulations that we have not yet seen and that may in due course prove insufficiently robust.
Amendments 37 to 44 ask the Government to place in the Bill the essential elements that will govern how these orders operate in the real world. They begin by posing the most basic question of all: what do the Government mean by “monthly income”? Are we assessing gross or net income? How are fluctuating earnings to be treated? What of the self-employed or those on irregular or zero-hours contracts? It is very difficult to see how a fair and consistent system can be construed without clear statutory guidance on these points. If Parliament is to authorise a mechanism allowing the state to deduct a portion of a person’s income month after month, it is surely right that we also understand with precision how that income is to be defined, what thresholds will apply, how caps are to be set and which factors the court must take into account before imposing an order.
Amendment 44 goes to the heart of our concern that the Bill as currently drafted lacks the necessary clarity about the conditions under which an income reduction order may be imposed. Leaving this almost entirely to secondary legislation again risks undermining both transparency and fairness—surely qualities that are fundamental to the integrity of such a system.
These amendments illuminate the substantial gaps in the present drafting and ensure that Parliament does not sign off on a broad new power without understanding how it will work in practice and what safeguards will accompany it. I look to the Minister to provide the clarity that has so far been somewhat lacking. For our part, we do not oppose the principle of creating a more flexible and enforceable means-based penalty. But, before we take such a significant step, we must be satisfied that the framework is sound, that the protections are clear and that the consequences, particularly for those on the margins, have been fully thought through. I hope the Minister will address these concerns.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, one of the three guiding principles of the David Gauke Independent Sentencing Review was to expand and make greater use of punishment outside prison. We are determined to make sure that crime does not pay, which is why we introduced Clause 3, giving courts the power to impose income reduction orders on offenders who receive suspended sentence orders. From the debate we have just had and from my prior conversations, I know that noble Lords have a keen interest in how these will work in practice, and I am grateful for the opportunity to debate this at greater length today. I have been employing prisoners for over 20 years. Many are on day release and, in some cases, a proportion of their earnings goes back to victims. Income reduction orders are inspired by that principle: offenders must pay back to society for the harm they have caused.
I first turn to Amendments 37, 41, 42 and 44, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. They seek to specify what must be contained in the regulations detailing this scheme. I assure noble Lords that we are working cross-government to develop a process for delivering income reduction orders in a way that works cohesively with the rest of the powers that sentencers have at their disposal. We have intentionally kept the legislation flexible to ensure that we can deliver this measure in that way. For example, we do not agree that it would be appropriate for income reduction orders to be mandatory in certain circumstances. This would unnecessarily curtail judicial discretion to decide whether an order should be imposed based on the full facts of an individual case.
The Sentencing Council is actively considering what updates to its guidelines are needed to account for the Bill’s reforms, including these orders. My officials are working closely with the council. I reassure noble Lords that regulations will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, so noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate and discuss these details prior to implementation.
I turn to Amendments 38 and 40 and am happy to explain the rationale behind the drafting of this Bill. Let me be clear: this measure is a penalty for high-income individuals. It will ensure that criminals who break the law, and who benefit from keeping their jobs and continue to earn a significant salary, pay back to society. I doubt that anyone in the Committee would disagree with that. The intention is to set an income threshold that would apply at an appropriately high level. But the Bill sets a baseline that the threshold for an income reduction order can never be below. The aim is to ensure that those with incomes in line with the minimum wage cannot ever receive this penalty. The minimum wage is set at an hourly rate, and 170 times that is a reasonable approximation of the hours likely to be worked over a month.
Noble Lords have also questioned why there is an upper limit. A core tenet of our criminal justice system is fairness and proportionality. So, setting a maximum percentage of an offender’s excess monthly income that can be collected protects individuals from receiving an excessively harsh penalty. We need to ensure that the punishment fits the crime. If the court determines that a higher penalty is appropriate and the offence is serious enough to carry an unlimited fine, the court will still be able to impose that, either instead of or as well as an income reduction order.
But income reduction orders must not be a disincentive to employment or amplify existing hardship. As someone who has championed the employment of ex-offenders for years, this is the last thing I would want to happen. Therefore, they will be applicable only to offenders who earn or are deemed likely to earn a significant income. We will set the minimum income threshold through secondary legislation at an appropriate level. This will ensure that low-income households are not in the scope of this measure.
As with any other financial penalty, judges will consider an offender’s means and circumstances when choosing whether to apply an income reduction order at sentencing. This can include, but is not restricted to, income, housing costs and child maintenance. Additionally, the provisions in the Bill allow the Secretary of State to set out in regulations the deductions that must be made when calculating an offender’s monthly income for the purposes of assessing whether an income reduction order can be applied.
Amendment 79, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes to create a power for a sentencing court to require an offender to make periodic payments or other contributions towards the maintenance and welfare of their dependants. I must inform the noble Lord that there are existing mechanisms to deal with payments to dependants. For example, the family courts are able to make spousal maintenance payments on divorce.
This proposed new clause would require the court to inquire whether an offender has responsibility for children or other dependants. Although this is well intentioned, it risks creating practical difficulties. Inquiring whether a person holds parental responsibility, has dependent children or other dependants—and subsequently inquiring about the circumstances and reasonable needs of those dependants—may require interpretation of family court orders, birth records or informal care-giving arrangements for the purposes of verification. Imposing such a duty risks delaying sentencing.
This Government have committed to identifying and providing support for children affected by parental imprisonment. As such, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education are working to determine the best way to do this to ensure that children get the support they need. This builds on a range of services offered by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to help families and significant others, where appropriate, to build positive relationships with people in the criminal justice system. This includes social visits, letter writing, video calls, family days and prison voicemail. I hope this addresses the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I ask the noble Lords not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I got my calculator out because I was reminding myself, so far as I could, what the amount might be, in cash terms, that an offender could be left with. I am not sure that I believe what I am finding, multiplying the national minimum wage by 170 and so on. I realise that we are talking about the future, but is the Minister able to share now what the cash amount would be?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My intention is that this concerns people who are earning significant amounts of money and might otherwise have a custodial sentence. Let me give the example of long-distance lorry drivers. They regularly earn over £70,000 a year. These are the people who I believe this income reduction order is appropriate for, not people who do not have means beyond that which they need just to look after their children and so on. It is very much, as I reiterated in my comments, for high-income earners. That level is the minimum wage level, and that is where we see the minimum. We obviously need to have further conversations internally on this, but my intention is that this covers people who earn significantly more than that.
That is helpful, because what is a high income to one person is not necessarily a high income in the eyes of another. I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the amendments and for dealing with them in that way. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 36.