(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
When I spoke in this House on 1 April, I set out the Government’s intention to introduce emergency legislation, because I believe that our justice system must be above all else fair, and that, standing before a judge, we are all equal, no matter the colour of our skin or the question of our faith. Given the existential nature of this matter for our justice system, I was clear that we would move at pace to change the law. The Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill was introduced that same day. With Second Reading taking place just three weeks later, we are forging ahead with plans to legislate as quickly as possible.
Before I set out the contents of the Bill, it bears repeating how we came to be in the current situation and why expedited legislation is necessary. In the last Parliament, the Sentencing Council put forward revised guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. I should note that during a statutory consultation they were welcomed by the last Conservative Government in no uncertain terms. The shadow Transport Secretary, the hon. Member for Orpington (Gareth Bacon), who was a Justice Minister at the time, should be able to furnish his colleagues with the details, but as he is absent today, I will do so.
Can the right hon. Lady clarify whether the guidelines proposed under the previous Government were the same as those with which she is dealing now, or did they differ—and if they differed, how did they differ?
They did not differ in any substantial way. All the guidelines, in so far as they concern issues relating to race, religion, culture or belief, are exactly the same as those to which the Justice Minister responded under the Conservative Administration. Hiding behind that, I am afraid, shows a failure to reckon with the Opposition’s own track record, which has become quite a hallmark of theirs in recent weeks and months.
These guidelines help judges, when sentencing an offender, to determine whether to impose a community order or a custodial sentence, providing guidance on the thresholds for disposals of this type. In the process of deciding which threshold has been met, judges are required by law to obtain a pre-sentence report, except in circumstances where they consider such a report to be unnecessary. The reports are used to give the courts more context of the offending behaviour in a given case, and set out any factors that should be considered as part of the sentencing process. As I said to the House on 1 April, generally speaking I am in favour of the use of pre-sentence reports, and in fact I have recently freed up capacity in the Probation Service precisely so that it has more time to produce reports of this type.
The chairman of the Sentencing Council has argued that the sentence should be tailored to the offender, but my constituents—and, I suspect, those of the Secretary of State—think that the sentence should be tailored to the offence and its effect on the victim. That is what counts, not the background, circumstances, history or origins of the offender.
The purpose of the pre-sentence reports, used properly, is to provide the court with the full context of the offending behaviour. That enables the court to ensure that when it imposes a custodial sentence it will be successful and capable of being delivered in respect of that offender, or else a community sentence should be imposed instead. It is a useful mechanism that judges have at their disposal. We would expect it to be used in all cases except when the courts consider it unnecessary because they have all the information. Because I consider pre-sentence reports to be so important in giving the courts all the information that they need to pass the right sentence for the offender who is before them, I have specifically freed up capacity in the Probation Service so that it can do more work of this type. However, the updated guidelines specifically encourage judges to request them for some offenders and not others, stipulating circumstances in which a pre-sentence report would “normally be considered necessary”. That is the bit that I am seeking to change.
The right hon. Lady has just said something very important: namely, that she would normally expect a pre-sentence report to be given in all, or at least almost all, cases. I hope that is her position, because what seems unfair to me is that a pre-sentence report, which presumably enables people to present arguments in mitigation, should be available to some people who have been convicted of a crime but not to others. Surely it should be available either to everyone or to no one, because everyone’s individual circumstances deserve the same degree of consideration.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. In fact, we fully support section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020—the sentencing code—which makes it clear that a court must obtain a pre-sentence report unless it considers it unnecessary to do so. That would be in cases where judges consider that they already have at their disposal the facts that will enable them to make a determination of the correct sentence for any particular offender. I think that the Sentencing Council got things right in the paragraph of the current guidelines that comes before the one that is the subject of the debate and the Bill, which states:
“PSRs are necessary in all cases that would benefit from an assessment of one or more of the following: the offender’s dangerousness and risk of harm, the nature and causes of the offender’s behaviour, the offender’s personal circumstances and any factors that may be helpful to the court in considering the offender’s suitability for different sentences or requirements.”
That covers all the areas in which we would normally consider PSRs to be necessary, and I would like them to be used more extensively. Indeed, I would like them to be the norm in all cases, because I think they offer important information to people who are passing sentence—unless, of course, it is unnecessary because judges have already been furnished with all the details, having heard the whole of the case that has been taking place before them.
The Lord Chancellor has just given us, very helpfully, the list of matters that might be relevantly considered in a pre-sentence report. As she has said, however, one of the items on that list is “personal circumstances”, and that is what the Bill will remove from the Sentencing Council’s discretion. May I ask her why she has not used in the Bill the language that is included in the explanatory notes? Paragraph 8 states that the Bill will
“prevent differential treatment… It does this by preventing the creation of a presumption regarding whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort”.
That strikes me as a much narrower exclusion, and perhaps one better targeted at the problem that the Lord Chancellor has, in my view, rightly identified.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right. That is why we have offered the additional context in the explanatory notes. Personal characteristics and personal circumstances have, over the years, been elided in different court judgments, and the different definitions of the two have sometimes slipped. I wanted to make it clear in the Bill that we are constraining the Sentencing Council’s ability to create guidance for PSRs in relation to personal characteristics. We refer in the Bill to race, religion, culture and belief, specifically to ensure that the Sentencing Council understands that we are targeting this part of the offending section of the imposition guideline. It will then have its own interpretation of how personal circumstances and personal characteristics should apply. I would expect this to be analogous to protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010, in terms of the way in which the courts are likely to approach the question of what a personal characteristic is for the purpose of the Bill.
However, I wanted to make the intention behind the Bill very clear to the Sentencing Council, and to everyone else. It is tightly focused on the offending section of the imposition guideline and leaves the wider question of personal circumstances untouched. As I will explain later in my speech, there is helpful Court of Appeal guidance on circumstances and on other occasions on which a PSR should normally be required, and nothing in the Bill will affect the Court of Appeal precedents that have already been set.
Is the Lord Chancellor aware that the Sentencing Council guidelines, and indeed the Bill, turn on issues that some of us have campaigned on for decades? I think that there would be concern if the Bill undermined the independence of the judiciary.
It certainly does not undermine the independence of the judiciary. There is a long tradition of campaigners, including my right hon. Friend, who have a lengthy track record of campaigning on issues relating to disparities within the criminal justice system and, indeed, across wider society. In so far as those disparities relate to the criminal justice system, my strong view is that they are matters of policy.
Parliament is the proper place for that policy to be debated, and Parliament is the proper place for us to agree on what is the best mechanism to deal with those problems. It is not within the purview of the Sentencing Council, because this is a matter of policy. Judges apply the laws that are passed by this House; that is their correct and proper function. I will always uphold their independence in that regard and will never interfere with it, but this turns on a matter of policy. It is right for the Government of the day to seek a policy response to this issue, and it is right for it to be debated and, ultimately, legislated for in the House.
I thank the Lord Chancellor for opening the debate, and for her answers to the questions so far. I think every one of us believes that the foundational principle that justice is blind must be adhered to in every way, but we live in an age of ever-changing political correctness, which, regardless of whether we like it or not, invades Parliament and our lives.
I am very much in favour of what the Lord Chancellor has said about race and faith. As a person of faith, I want to make sure that race and faith can never be mitigating or aggravating factors when it comes to justice. Given the lives that we live, the world that we live in, and all the things that impact on us daily and in this House as MPs, can the Lord Chancellor confirm that faith, justice and religion will always be preserved in the way that they should be?
For me, one of the most moving parts of the parliamentary day is when the day starts with prayers. Those are Christian prayers, and I am of the Muslim faith, but I always find it moving to be part of them and to hear them. They remind us that we all belong to a country with a long heritage, which is steeped in faith. The source code for much of the law of England and Wales is the Bible. The hon. Gentleman makes some broader points on the issue of faith and how important it is, and I suspect that he and I have a lot in common in that regard. There must never be differential treatment before the law of our land, and before any court, on the basis of faith.
I welcome the Lord Chancellor’s point about parliamentary sovereignty and that fact that policy must be determined by this place. I think many Members from across the House will have been quite shocked by the response of the Sentencing Council to her letter when she asked it to consider the guidelines again. Does she agree that if this place continues to butt heads with the Sentencing Council over guidelines like these, maybe the best thing to do is abolish the Sentencing Council?
I have had constructive conversations with the Sentencing Council, and I have made it very clear that I do not really do personal. I certainly would not do it in relation to the judiciary, whose independence I uphold and whose security I am ultimately responsible for. I take those responsibilities very seriously. I swore an oath on my holy book, and that means a huge amount to me. There is a clear difference here about where the line is drawn between matters of policy and matters that are correctly within the purview of the judiciary, which is how the law should be applied in the cases that they hear. I am simply making it very clear that this is policy and is for this place to determine, but as I will come to later in my speech, this situation has highlighted that there is potentially a democratic deficit here. That is why I am reviewing the wider roles and powers of the Sentencing Council, and will legislate in upcoming legislation if necessary. I will now make more progress with my speech and give way to other colleagues later if people wish to intervene again.
The updated guidelines specifically encouraged judges to request pre-sentence reports for some offenders and not for others, stipulating the circumstances in which a pre-sentence report would “normally be considered necessary”. This included cases involving offenders from ethnic, cultural or faith minorities. In other words, a pre-sentence report would normally be considered necessary for a black offender or a Muslim one, but not necessarily if an offender is Christian or white, and we must be clear about what that means. By singling out one group over another, all may be equal but some are more equal than others. We must also be honest about the impact that this could have. Equipped with more information about one offender than another, the court may be less likely to send that offender to prison. I therefore consider the guidance to be a clear example of differential treatment. As such, it risks undermining public confidence in a justice system that is built on the idea of equality before the law.
Given that the Sentencing Council refused the Lord Chancellor’s first invitation to rewrite its guidance, is she confident that the limited nature of this Bill is sufficient? Would she not be wiser to take a broader power to ensure that in future all sentencing guidance has an affirmative vote in this place?
It is right that, moving at pace, I have sought to have a targeted Bill that deals with this particular imposition guideline. I have made it very clear that I am conducting a wider review of the role and powers of the Sentencing Council. If we need to legislate further—maybe in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests, although other mechanisms are also potentially available—I will do so. I am not ruling out further legislation—in fact, it is very much on the table—but it is right that we are moving quickly in order to deal with the problems that could be caused by the guidelines coming into force, and that I have taken targeted action in this short but focused Bill.
As I told the House a few weeks ago, I had several discussions with the Sentencing Council in the time leading up to 1 April, when the updated guidelines were due to come into force. I reiterate my gratitude to the council’s chair, Lord Justice William Davis, for engaging with me on this issue and for ultimately making the right call by pausing the guidelines while Parliament has its say. I should say again that I have no doubt whatsoever about the noble intentions behind the proposed changes, because I understand the problem that the Sentencing Council was attempting to address. Racial inequalities exist in our justice system and are evident in the sentencing disparities between offenders from different backgrounds, but as the Sentencing Council acknowledges, the reasons for this are unclear. Addressing inequalities in the justice system is something that this Government take very seriously, and we are determined to increase confidence in its outcomes, which is why we are working with the judiciary to make the system more representative of the public it serves.
I have also commissioned a review of the data that my Department holds on disparities in the justice system in order to better understand the drivers of the problem, but although I agree with the Sentencing Council’s diagnosis, I believe it has prescribed the wrong cure. Going ahead with the new guidelines would have been an extraordinary step to take. It would have been extraordinary because of what it puts at risk: the very foundations of our justice system, which was built on equality before the law. The unintended consequences would have been considerable, because the idea that we improve things for people in this country who look like me by telling the public that we will be given favourable treatment is not just wrong, but dangerous. We are all safer in this country when everyone knows we are treated the same. If we sacrifice that, even in pursuit of a noble ideal such as equality, we risk bringing the whole edifice crashing to the ground.
I know there are disagreements in this House with regard to the correct policy to pursue, not least between the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, who opposes the guidelines, and the shadow Transport Secretary, whose support for them I have noted already—though I suppose that does assume that the shadow Secretary of State for Justice really is who he shows himself to be today. I must admit that I have begun to question whether his principles are set or really of no fixed abode. After all, he did pose as a Cameroon centrist for so many years, and only recently became his party’s populist flag bearer. It is enough to make me wonder whether he is, in fact, a Marxist—but one of the Groucho variety. “These are my principles,” he says, and if you do not like them, he has others.
Regardless of our positions on this question of policy, one thing is clear: this is a question of policy. How the state addresses an issue that is systemic, complex and of unclear origin is a question of what the law should be, not how the law should be applied. Let me be clear about that distinction: Parliament sets the laws and the judiciary determine how they are applied, and they must be defended as they do so. I will always defend judicial independence, and as I said earlier, I swore an oath to do so when I became the Lord Chancellor. Given the shadow Lord Chancellor’s recent diatribes, including just hours ago in this place, he may want to acquaint himself with that oath, if he intends ever succeeding me in this position, although I am assuming that it is my job he wants, not that of the Leader of the Opposition.
I think the Lord Chancellor just said that the approach to the guidelines taken by the Sentencing Council puts the foundation of the justice system at risk. Given that, how can she have confidence in a Sentencing Council that takes such an approach?
I have engaged constructively with the Sentencing Council and will continue to do so, and I am in the process of legislating to prevent this imposition guideline from ever coming into force. It has currently been paused, and I think that was the right step for the Sentencing Council to take. I am conducting a wider review of the roles and powers of the Sentencing Council, and it is right that I take a bit more time to think carefully about that, about what we may or may not want it to do, and about how we may right the democratic deficit that has been uncovered. I think my approach to the Sentencing Council is very clear from the action I am taking.
I do not think anyone is questioning the firm action the Lord Chancellor is taking. The point my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) made is: why should it be necessary for her to take that action? Surely, if the Sentencing Council cannot see the distinction she makes between its proper role and Parliament’s proper role, it is not fit to do the job.
The Sentencing Council might argue, rightly, that given the guideline was welcomed by the former Government, it probably thought it was on safer ground than I consider it to be. However, there is clearly a confusion, a change in practice, or a development in ways I disagree with about the proper line between what is practice or the application of the law and what is properly in the realm of policy. That is what I am absolutely not going to give any ground on and that I will be setting right.
The right hon. Lady is right about the moving process or trend that she has described, but the trouble is that it is part of a bigger problem, is it not? It is the problem of judicial activism, and it is not new. For some time, judicial activists have sought to do exactly what she has said, and it is they, not people in this House, who endanger the separation of powers.
However, it is always up to the people in this House, if they feel that a law is being applied in ways that were not intended, to put that law right. I am afraid the right hon. Member’s comment is a rather damning indictment of 14 years of Conservative Government, with 14 years of sitting back and allowing other people to do the policy work that Ministers in the previous Government perhaps did not have the time or inclination to do themselves.
I do not think that judges, in applying the law, are doing anything wrong; they are doing their job. They are public servants, and they do their job independently. It is right that we have an independent judiciary in this country. We are very lucky to have a judiciary that is world class and highly regarded. One of the reasons why so many businesses from all over the world want to do business in this country is that they know they can trust our courts system and the independence of our judges. I think it is incumbent on the whole of this House to defend the independence of the judiciary, because that independence was hard won. It is one of our absolute USPs as a rule of law jurisdiction in this country, and none of us must ever do anything that puts it at risk.
If there are issues about the way in which the law is applied—if Parliament or Ministers ever consider that it has strayed too far from the original intention—we can always legislate, and I am doing just that today. I hope this is an example that others, if they have issues in their areas, may consider taking as well. It is a question of policy, and that should be decided and debated here in this place, in this House, and the public must be able to hold us to account for the decisions we take, rewarding or punishing us at the ballot box as they see fit. This is the domain of government, politics and Parliament, and today we reassert our ability to determine this country’s policy on the issue of equality of treatment before the law.
The right hon. Lady is making a point about the wider justice system and the importance of equality before the law. What has she done to assure herself and the House that, in all aspects of her Department’s work, people are being treated equally under the law—whether in relation to parole, how they are treated in prison, bail conditions and so on?
I have ordered a wider review of all guidance across all the MOJ’s work in so far as it relates to equality before the law to make sure that the problems we have uncovered here are not replicated elsewhere. There is the issue of bail guidance, which was discussed in the House earlier. I have already ordered a review, and that guidance is being redrafted as we speak. That particular guidance has been something like 20 years in the making—it has been added to over many years—so the redraft has to be careful and we must make sure it does not have any unintended consequences. However, we are cracking on with that work at pace, and I will make sure that, by the time I am done, we can all be absolutely clear that this sweep towards allowing potential differential treatment is sorted out once and for all.
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will make more progress. I think I have been more than generous.
That brings me to the Bill before us today. While the updated Sentencing Council guidelines are currently paused, if we do not act they will come into force— [Interruption.] Well, there was a lot to say, gentlemen, about the previous Government’s track record and it needed to be said. And I do not think the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire (Mike Wood) should mind me taking interventions from people on his own side. That is a novel approach for the shadow Front Bench.
Let me turn to the specifics of the Bill. It is tightly focused, containing just two clauses. Clause 1 amends section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which brought the Sentencing Council into existence. It dictates that the guidelines the council produces may not include references to personal characteristics, including race, religion or belief, or cultural background. Clause 2 relates to how the Bill will be enacted: that it will apply only to England and Wales, and that its measures will come into force on the day after it passes.
It is also important to be clear about what the Bill does not do. It does not stop the Sentencing Council from issuing broader guidance concerning requests for pre-sentence reports in those cases where it is helpful for the court to understand more about an offender’s history and personal circumstances. The Bill does not interfere with the courts’ duties to obtain a pre-sentence report in appropriate cases, for example those involving primary carers and victims of domestic abuse. And, as detailed in the Bill’s explanatory notes, it does not change existing precedent where the courts have determined that pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable, in cases such as: Thompson, where the Court of Appeal recently emphasised their importance in sentencing pregnant women or women who have recently given birth; Meanley, in which the court referenced the value of pre-sentence reports for young defendants; or Kurmekaj, where the defendant had a traumatic upbringing, vulnerability, and was a victim of modern slavery. Instead, the Bill narrowly focuses on the issue at hand, putting beyond doubt a principle which finds its ancient origins in Magna Carta and has developed over the centuries to serve the interests of justice not just here but in jurisdictions around the world: that each of us, no matter who we are, where we come from or what we believe, stand equal before the law of the land.
Wider questions remain about the role and the powers of the Sentencing Council, as I have noted. The council does important work, bringing consistency to judicial decision making, but it is clear in this instance that it went beyond its original remit. It sought to set policy, which stood out of step with the Government of the day. Therefore, it raises the question: who should set sentencing policy? Today’s legislation only addresses this question in the narrowest terms, considering the guidance on pre-sentence reports. It does not give us a definitive resolution as to whether it is Government Ministers or members of the Sentencing Council who should decide policy in the future. As I noted, that leaves us with a democratic deficit.
As I told the House on 1 April, the question of the role and powers of the Sentencing Council must therefore be considered further. That work is already under way in my Department. Should a further change be required, the Government will include it in upcoming legislation. The Sentencing Council plays an important role in our justice system, and any changes to it must be made carefully and with the consideration it deserves. I am sure they will be discussed more in this House in the months ahead, and I welcome the opportunity to debate them.
The Bill we are debating today is small, but the issues it contains could not be of greater significance. I know the majority of right hon. and hon. Members in this House would agree that the Sentencing Council’s intentions on this issue were noble, but in trying to reach for equality of outcome, they sacrificed too much, undermining the sacred principle of equality before the law. It is right that we, as policymakers, stop the updated guidelines from coming into force. We must stand up for the idea that no matter our race or religion, no person should receive preferential treatment as they stand in the dock before a judge, so I beg to move that the Bill now be read a second time.
How did we get here? It takes a special kind of uselessness to engineer a crisis entirely of your own making and then to come to this House asking for applause as you legislate your way out of it. Let us remind ourselves what actually happened here. The Sentencing Council, an unelected unaccountable quango created by the Labour party, issued guidance that would have divided our criminal justice system by race, religion and identity; a two-tier system as offensive to common sense as it was to the most basic and important principle of equality before the law.
The Justice Secretary, asleep at the wheel, either did not know or did not care. Her officials signed off the guidance, her Ministry nodded it through, and the council published it; the guidance was due to come into force. Only then, after I raised this issue with her in this House, and in the face of fierce opposition from the Conservatives, the press and the public, did she rouse herself from her stupor—only then did she discover her principles.
Even at that point, however, the Justice Secretary did not act decisively. She did not use her powers to sack the architects of this shameful guidance, support my legislation or bring forward immediate legislation of her own to stop it. What did she do instead? She wrote a letter begging the council to reconsider. Such is the pace at which she moves—or, rather, crawls—that it took a further seven days to put her thoughts in writing after a meeting.
When the council did not move, the Justice Secretary threatened action—only to be humiliated by the chair of the council, who made clear that if she tried, he would take legal action and potentially challenge his own Justice Secretary. So incompetent was she that the Opposition had to take it upon ourselves to prepare a judicial review to do the Justice Secretary’s job for her, and such was the level of chaos over which she nominally presided that the Government’s own legal service was trooped out against us to defend the very sentencing guidelines that the Justice Secretary had denounced as two tier.
In November 2023, the Sentencing Council consulted on these guidelines, and said that a pre-sentence report may be “particularly important” if an offender belongs to an ethnic, cultural and/or faith minority community. Does the shadow Minister agree that it was particularly important? I do not. If he does not agree, why did he say nothing for two years?
I have to applaud the hon. Gentleman for reading out his Whips’ questions there. I have said it before and I will say it again, however: I do wish that he and those on the Labour Front Bench would stop perpetuating something that is obviously untrue. They know it is untrue. It has been said numerous times. The Sentencing Council itself—[Interruption.] Let me finish my point, because it is important.
Order. The shadow Lord Chancellor has just suggested that those on the Government Front Bench are perpetuating an untruth. He might like to think about whether he wishes to withdraw that comment.
It is, I hope, inadvertent, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Sentencing Council wrote to the Lord Chancellor correcting her on this very point, and made clear that the guidance that was put before the previous Conservative Government was materially different from the one—
Let me finish the point. If hon. Members do not like the answer, perhaps they should hear it in full.
The Sentencing Council made it clear that the guidance that was put before the previous Conservative Government was materially different from what was ultimately put before this Labour Government. The council said in the previous iteration that pre-sentencing reports would usually be required. There was a presumption that pre- sentencing reports would come forward, but importantly, it preserved full discretion. The guidance that was ultimately brought forward, which was given the nod by the Justice Secretary’s officials who were present at the final meeting of the Sentencing Council, made a significant distinction: it said that such reports “must” be requested. That removed the discretion available to judges, which was a very significant difference.
I have the pre-sentence report guidance in front of me. It says:
“When considering a community or custodial sentence, the court must request and consider a pre-sentence report (PSR) before forming an opinion of the sentence, unless it considers that it is unnecessary”.
It then goes on to describe various circumstances in which a pre-sentence report might be considered necessary and may “normally be considered necessary”. It does not remove judicial stipulations and interventions completely, and to suggest otherwise is not accurate.
The guidance does not use that phrase. It says a report would “usually” be required. That is an important point, because it removes discretion. Of course, there might be instances in which a judge would not request a report, but I think it would be extremely unlikely, in practice, that a judge would choose not to take forward a pre-sentence report, in the light of the new guidance. That is why we felt it so important to take action.
Let me make some progress.
Eventually the Sentencing Council did U-turn, but not before the guidance had briefly come into force. The council took until midday on 1 April, which was several hours after the guidance had come into force, to update magistrates and judges. Its email undermined the Lord Chancellor yet again. It stated that it still believed that the guidance was “necessary and appropriate”. The whole saga has been nothing short of farcical. It has been an embarrassment. It has damaged public confidence in the justice system, and the Justice Secretary’s Bill does not fix that trust deficit. It is half-baked. It is a half-job that stores up problems for another day—because, make no mistake, we will be back here again and again; it will be like Groundhog Day. The Justice Secretary has left in post at the Sentencing Council the very people who drafted these rules and declined her initial invitation to change them. She has left the system intact, and she has left the door wide open for this to happen again. That is not hypothetical. We know for a fact that more offensive two-tier sentencing guidelines are incoming.
The Sentencing Council is consulting on new immigration guidelines that water down sentences for people smugglers. If they come into force, hundreds of immigration offenders a year will not meet the 12-month threshold for automatic deportation, blowing a hole in border controls. If the Justice Secretary wanted to stop that—there are plenty of open-border activists who would oppose her—this Bill leaves her powerless to do so. She has chosen to be powerless. It is the definition of madness to repeat the same decisions and expect different results. History will keep repeating itself until Ministers take back control of sentencing frameworks. But still the Justice Secretary stands at the Dispatch Box and claims that there will be no two-tier justice under her leadership.
The Bill fixes one small element of the problem and leaves the rest of it entirely intact. It does nothing to stop the two-tier pre-sentence report guidance, which still instructs probation officers to take into account so-called intergenerational trauma—trauma suffered not by the defendant, but presumably by their ancestors. It does nothing to stop the bail guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice, which instructs officials to “prioritise” ethnic minority defendants for bail decisions—not on the facts of the offence, not on the basis of risk to the public, but because of their racial or cultural identity. It does nothing to stop the “Equal Treatment Bench Book”, the official handbook for judges, which is riddled with activist talking points, including the claim that migrants are mistreated by the press, and the adoption of a dangerously expansive definition of Islamophobia that could amount to a back-door blasphemy law.
Everywhere we look—more examples emerge every week—this ideology runs through the Ministry of Justice like rot through the rafters. The principle of equality before the law, one of the great inheritances of our country, is being systematically inverted, replaced by cultural relativism, by a hierarchy of victimhood. Some defendants are to be treated gently; others are to face the full force of the law—all depending on their background, race, religion or self-declared identity. That is not justice. It is injustice, wrapped in the language of compassion. But who is it compassionate to? The victims? Of course not; they do not get a look in.
My right hon. Friend deserves great credit for championing the cause of justice and obliging the Government to follow suit, albeit grudgingly. Leaving aside the fundamental injustice that he describes—the two-tier justice system—does he acknowledge that what the Sentencing Council proposes and continues to do undermines popular faith in the rule of law and justice and, as the Lord Chancellor herself says, tears the whole system apart?
That is the very real risk of what we see, not just in these aborted sentencing guidelines, but in the broader fabric of two-tier justice that we are revealing with every passing day. What we all want to see, and what I believe the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Brash) wants to see as well, is equality before the law. That means that in no instance should the law be applied differently depending on the colour of people’s skin or the faith that they abide by. We must all fight against that, because it is immensely corrosive to public trust and confidence in the criminal justice system.
The guidelines we are talking about came into force—or would have done—under this Labour Government. I will not return to everything I said earlier, but those of us who were in this Chamber on the day that I revealed this issue all know that neither the Justice Secretary nor any of her Ministers had the faintest idea that any of this was happening. I watched the Justice Secretary look to her Ministers; she was greeted by blank faces. They had no grip on what was happening in their Department.
The hon. Member for Hartlepool makes the good point that the issues that we are discussing predate this Labour Government. This is a broader issue facing our country. We all have to be defenders of equality under the law. I do not seek equality of outcome in our criminal justice system; I seek equality of treatment. That is the heart of a fair criminal justice system. That may be a point of difference between some of us in this House. All I seek is for every person in this country—man or woman, regardless of their religion or the colour of their skin—to be treated exactly the same by the law.
Everywhere we look in the Ministry of Justice, we see this ideology. The most worrying part is that I think the Justice Secretary knows this. She stood here and said that the appearance of differential treatment before the law is particularly corrosive, and I agree wholeheartedly with her.
I will make progress.
The guidance does not just create the appearance of two-tier justice; it is two-tier justice. The Secretary of State cannot wash her hands of that. The bail guidance comes from her own Ministry. The pre-sentence guidance is issued by officials she oversees. The bench book is sanctioned by the Judicial College, under the watch of the Lady Chief Justice. If the Justice Secretary truly believes in equality before the law, and if her words are more than empty slogans, why is any of this happening on her watch? The truth is simple. This Bill is not the solution. It is a fig leaf. It is damage control. It is political theatre to distract from the deeper rot that the Government have permitted to fester. Until this type of guidance is ripped out, root and branch, from sentencing, bail, judicial training and appointments, the principle of equality before the law remains under direct assault.
We will not vote against the Bill, because we will never support two-tier justice, but we will not let the Justice Secretary rewrite history, either. She did not stop these rules or fight against them. She did not even know about them until we pointed them out to her. She allowed them to happen, and then panicked when the backlash came. Now she is using this House’s time to clean up her mess. She wears the robes and she dons the wig, but she is not in control of the justice system. Despite the big talk today, there is still two-tier justice on her watch. If she continues to do so little about it, we can only conclude that, at heart, she truly supports it.
I can see that, when it comes to this legislation, I am in a minority—it is not the first time, and I suspect that it will not be the last. There has been a great deal of misinformation about the Sentencing Council’s original guidelines, both in the run-up to and during the debate, so I, with all humility, want to insert some facts into the debate.
First, it is important to recognise what the Sentencing Council actually is. Much of the debate today and in recent weeks has seemed to presume that it is a bunch of heedless young barristers and social workers. On the contrary, the Sentencing Council is largely composed of some of the most senior judges in the land. They include: Lord Justice William Davis, its chair, who was called to the Bar in 1976; His Honour Judge Simon Drew, a circuit judge sitting in the Court of Appeal; Lord Justice Tim Holroyde, lord justice of appeal and vice-president of the Court of Appeal; and the honourable Mr Justice Mark Wall, who was appointed a High Court judge in 2020. There are also some senior probation officers and magistrates. That is hardly a cohort of men and women who need the firm hand of an MP on their shoulder to explain to them what the rule of law is.
The right hon. Lady is making the important point that the Sentencing Council is comprised of senior and learned individuals. Given that, what circumstances does she think conspired to let it get the guidelines so very wrong? It is clearly felt on both sides of the House that they are wrong.
I can say with confidence that the Sentencing Council is talking about issues to do with race and criminal justice because of a history, going back decades, of problematic issues in relation to race and criminal justice. I will come to those later. The independence of the Sentencing Council is crucial, and the idea that anybody in the Chamber is standing up for law and order yet seeks to undermine its independence—and by implication, that of the judiciary as a whole—is quite remarkable.
Next, what do the guidelines actually say? Much of the debate implies that black and minority persons are singled out for pre-sentence reports under the guidelines. On the contrary, there is a whole list of people in the guidelines on whom, the Sentencing Council suggests, judges and magistrates might ask for a pre-sentence report. Those persons include those at risk of committing their first custodial sentence; young adults; women; ethnic minorities; yes, cultural minorities, of course; pregnant and post-natal women; and the sole or primary carer for dependent relatives. The Sentencing Council is clear that that is not an exclusive list; ideally, every defendant should have a pre-sentence report. The aim of the guidelines is to ensure that judges and magistrates get the most information possible. Who could object to garnering more information on any defendant? It is certainly not the intention of the guidelines to dictate the sentence in any given case.
Yet it is being argued that a pre-sentencing report will discourage a judge from sending an offender to jail. We are asked to believe that our judiciary is weak-minded and susceptible, and that it will not live up to its centuries-old standards, which, as we heard earlier, go all the way back to Magna Carta. However, the House was also told earlier that our judiciary is world-class and highly regarded. Both propositions cannot be true.
Yes, they can.
Well, either our judiciary is world-class and highly regarded, or it is so soft-minded that the very existence of a pre-sentencing report will make it rule in a way in which it would not otherwise have ruled.
Decisions by judges and magistrates on individual cases are not the same as policy. The Sentencing Council itself is very clear that it does not seek to dictate policy; it is simply trying to ensure that judges and magistrates have the maximum amount of information. Leading King’s Counsel Keir Monteith says that there has been a deliberate misreading of the rules in order to generate a row, and I believe that is correct.
Then we come to the talk, which I have heard on both sides of the House, about two-tier criminal justice. That can only mean that black defendants are treated more favourably than white defendants. Yet the facts tell us to the contrary. Ministers will be aware of the Lammy review, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—now the Foreign Secretary. It was a review of race in the criminal justice system, in which he found that
“Despite making up just 14% of the population,”
black and ethnic minority men and women
“make up 25% of prisoners, while over 40% of young people in custody are from BAME backgrounds.”
He added:
“If our prison population reflected the make-up of England and Wales, we would have over 9,000 fewer people in prison—the equivalent of 12 average-sized prisons.”
My right hon. Friend did not find a criminal justice system where black and brown people are treated more favourably than white people, and he did not find equality before the law. There is no reason to believe that things have changed since he drew up his review.
We need to appreciate that not only do we have a two-tier system, but it is a two-tier system in completely the opposite way to what the Lord Chancellor suggests, and it has been like that for decades. The population wants to see our two-tier criminal justice system taken seriously.
Members may remember the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence in the early 1990s. It took a Labour Government and a Labour Home Secretary to commission a judge-led inquiry into the Stephen Lawrence case. In 1999 the Macpherson inquiry reported. It spoke in an unequivocal way about institutional racism in the police service, and it spoke in a way that I had never heard it spoken about in this House or at the most senior levels in the state. Nobody since then has challenged the notion that there is institutional racism in the police.
Do we have to have our own Macpherson inquiry into the workings of the judicial system before people will accept that institutional racism is an issue in the courts as well? It is not enough to say, “Well, you know, the facts point in that direction but we are not quite sure why the figures are like that.” We know why the figures are like that, and we have known that for decades.
If we want to win the respect of the community as a whole, we must be seen to be working towards a fair criminal justice system, not just trying to score points off the opposition; and we must look at the long term, rather than the short term. We know that, in England and Wales, black people are much more likely to be arrested than white people. Specifically, black individuals are twice as likely to be arrested as white individuals. That disparity extends to imprisonment, with black individuals being more likely to be sentenced to prison and serving longer sentences than their white counterparts. Everybody knows that people are not treated the same, and it is misleading of Members on both sides of the House to imply that that is so.
Peter Herbert, chair of the Society of Black Lawyers, said:
“We have experienced racist two-tier policing for over 500 years. If we achieve equal treatment that is not two-tier as it is long overdue. We have never asked for special treatment only equal treatment.”
The Lord Chancellor should pay attention to the wish of so many members of the community, in her constituency in Birmingham and my constituency in east London, and the wishes of so many millions of people in the community to see a fair criminal justice system that treats people fairly, not unfairly as has happened in the past. Members will know that it took the Macpherson inquiry to get a measure of understanding about criminal justice in policing.
In closing, I will say this. It is interesting to hear the banter about this issue between those on the two Front Benches, but this is not an issue for banter. This is people’s lives; this is people’s liberty. I do not think that the debate is enhanced by some of the Trump-like narrative that we are getting from the Opposition. We do not need Donald Trump-type politics in Britain today. We need seriousness about the unfair discrimination in the criminal justice system, and a willingness not just to talk about it, but to do something about it.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Josh Babarinde.
Liberal Democrats believe in equality before the law, Liberal Democrats believe in the rule of law, and Liberal Democrats believe that no one is above the law, so it has been heartening to hear those words echoed across the Chamber today.
But actions speak louder than words, which is why I regret to say that few have acted more to erode those legal and democratic values than the two-tier Tory party that occupies the Benches next to me—two-tier Tories who unlawfully partied in No. 10, while the rest of us missed funerals for lost relatives; two-tier Tories who unlawfully suspended Parliament to get their way, while lecturing us about the rule of law; two-tier Tories who unlawfully approved developments for their donor mates, while purporting to talk tough on crime; and two-tier Tories whose unlawfulness, chaos and double standards landed them with the biggest election defeat in their history.
The Conservatives still have not learned, because that hypocrisy continues today in the context of the sentencing guidelines in question. They nodded through earlier editions of the guidelines when they were in government, yet they make a scene about them today now that it has become politically convenient for them to do so. According to the Sentencing Council, just one MP objected to the cohorting in the previous guidelines put out to consultation in 2023-24. I will give way to the then Home Office Minister, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), if he can confirm that it was he who made that objection. No—radio silence. [Interruption.]
Our country deserves better than the circumstances that have given rise to the Bill. Those circumstances are ultimately that the previous Government underfunded our probation and courts system so severely that pre-sentence reports have since been rationed and are not used universally, or indeed anywhere near it. In fact, the use of pre-sentence reports has declined by 44% over the last decade almost, according to Lord Timpson. That is despite the sentencing code having a presumption in favour of their use, regardless of any personal characteristic or circumstance.
The Liberal Democrats believe that that near-universal presumption is critical, because when the state is considering depriving someone of their liberty, judges and magistrates should be equipped with all the information possible to pass the sentence that is most likely to reduce reoffending and protect victims and survivors. Offenders need it and victims deserve it.
The Liberal Democrats believe that we should really be having a debate about how we can resource a criminal justice system that can fulfil pre-sentence reports for all offenders who need them, rather than a debate that feels grounded in rationing their use. We will therefore abstain on Second Reading, not because of indifference, but because of principled concerns that I will present constructively, to reciprocate the constructiveness with which the Secretary of State and her officials have engaged with me on this matter in recent weeks.
One concern is that this Bill simply is not necessary to achieve its stated aim. The Sentencing Council has, in response to the strength of feeling in Parliament, paused the implementation of its guidelines. It has not said how long that pause will last. My understanding is that the Department has not asked the council how long it would be willing to pause the guidelines. It seems to me that, in response to the most recent act of the Lord Chancellor, there is new-found space for an agreement to be reached, through dialogue with the Sentencing Council and the Lady Chief Justice, without a single minute of debate on primary legislation. Such legislation could then be devoted instead to patching up other injustices in our system.
Another concern is that this proposal is being rushed through without comprehensive consultation or co-ordination with wider work that is already under way. David Gauke is currently conducting an independent review of sentencing, which is due to report this spring. That review ought to have provided a clear opportunity to examine these issues in depth and to ensure that any reforms are evidence-based, balanced and considered in the broader context of sentencing policy. If the Government are convinced that primary legislation is required, why not wait for the Gauke review to report, take advantage of that independent insight, and then introduce coherent proposals in legislation later in this Session?
An additional concern is that although the Bill ostensibly gestures towards fairness, it fails to confront some of the most pressing injustices in our criminal justice system—to which the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), referred—including those identified by the Lammy review.
We know that there is disproportionality at most stages of the criminal justice process affecting various groups, from stop and search to charging decisions, early guilty pleas and sentencing outcomes. Ethnic minority individuals, women and those with mental health issues continue to be over-represented and underserved, yet this legislation makes no attempt to address that. While I welcome the review of data that the Justice Secretary described, it is unwelcome that the outcome of that does not feature in these proposals.
Finally, I am deeply troubled with the political context in which this Bill is being introduced. It may appear technical on the surface, but the legislation risks falling into a trap in which criminal justice is used by some in this House and beyond to stoke division, appeal to populist headlines and wage a cynical culture war. We must not allow our courts and sentencing practices to become pawns in that political game, nor part of a second stab at a Tory leadership campaign.
It is critical that in this debate and in any reform we make to sentencing policy, we lead with an evidence-based process and with a determination to tackle the injustices embedded in our criminal justice system, whether it is those disproportionately affecting women, ethnic minorities or white working-class boys—the list continues. We urge the Government to listen, reflect and return with proposals that work with the Sentencing Council, with the judiciary and with the findings of David Gauke’s independent sentencing review. Only then can we abolish the unjust two-tier system created under the two-tier Tories.
After the Chair of the Justice Committee, I propose to introduce a four-minute time limit. I am conscious that many Members will be disappointed this evening.
Let me begin by summarising how we got here. On 29 November 2023, the Sentencing Council launched a consultation on proposed changes to the imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline. On 19 February 2024, the then Minister for Sentencing, the hon. Member for Orpington (Gareth Bacon), wrote to the chair of the council and welcomed its work on the revised guideline, in particular the
“fuller guidance around the circumstances in which courts should request a pre-sentence report”.
On 28 March 2024, the then Chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Bob Neill KC, wrote to the chair of the Sentencing Council noting that the council had conducted a particularly effective consultation exercise.
On 5 March 2025, a year later, the Sentencing Council published the revised guideline, saying that it would come into effect on 1 April. The same day saw the first exchange in this Chamber between the Lord Chancellor and the shadow Lord Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), on the guideline. The accusation by the shadow Lord Chancellor that the guideline would
“make a custodial sentence less likely”
for those from an ethnic minority, cultural minority and/or faith minority community was not the view of the Sentencing Council, but the exchange led to extensive correspondence between the Lord Chancellor and the chair of the Sentencing Council for the rest of March.
I do not have time today to describe the contents of those letters, but the central point raised by the chair of the Sentencing Council was that the purpose of a pre-sentence report is to provide information, not to determine the sentence. He said:
“Frequently the information provided will not assist the offender’s prospect of avoiding a custodial sentence: rather the reverse.”
He added that the guideline does not make a custodial sentence less likely for someone simply by way of their membership of a cohort; that the guideline
“does not instruct or mandate judges and magistrates to request a pre-sentence report”
but is discretionary; that the list of cohorts is “non-exhaustive”; that a pre-sentence report “may be necessary” for those outside the list; and that,
“The section of the guideline relating to pre-sentence reports is directed to the issue of information about offenders, no more and no less.”
On 31 March 2025, following a meeting with the Sentencing Council, the Lord Chancellor said she was going to introduce legislation to render the section on cohorts unlawful. The guideline was due to come into force on 1 April. As a result, the council said that it would delay the date on which the guideline was due to come into force, pending such legislation taking effect.
On 1 April 2025, this Bill was given its First Reading. The Bill is designed to make it unlawful for a sentencing guideline issued by the Sentencing Council to include a presumption that a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on the offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort. The Bill has one operative clause, clause 1, which would amend section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The drafting of clause 1 indicates that the provision will apply to all sentencing guidelines that have been issued by the Sentencing Council and that are already in force when the provisions in this Bill take effect.
The Bill states that guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council cannot include provision framed by reference to “personal characteristics”. The Bill then specifies that
“‘personal characteristics’ include, in particular…race…religion or belief…cultural background.”
The list is non-exhaustive and therefore also covers other personal characteristics—for example, age, disability, sex and sexual orientation. Clause 1 would therefore render unlawful the following cohorts that were included in the imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline issued on 5 March:
“a young adult…female…from an ethnic minority, cultural minority, and/or faith minority community…pregnant or post-natal…has disclosed they are transgender…has or may have a serious chronic medical condition or physical disability, or mental ill health, learning disabilities…or brain injury/damage”.
The explanatory notes state that the Bill does not prevent the Sentencing Council “from issuing guidelines advising courts to consider the offender’s personal circumstances in deciding whether to request a PSR”.
The explanatory notes also state that the Bill does not affect Court of Appeal case law on the circumstances where a pre-sentence report is either necessary or desirable. It then cites three cases:
“Thompson…which says that where a woman who is pregnant or has recently given birth is to be sentenced, it is desirable for the court to obtain a pre-sentence report;…Meanley…where the court referred to the importance of PSRs in serious cases involving young defendants; and…Kurmekaj…where the court said that the defendant’s traumatic upbringing, vulnerability and the fact they had been a victim of modern slavery meant a PSR should have been requested”.
The Government have repeatedly emphasised that they object to the inclusion of ethnic, cultural and/or faith minority community in the guideline. The Government have not said that they object to the inclusion of the other cohorts in the guideline framed by personal characteristics. The fact that the explanatory notes make clear that the Government do not intend to prevent the Court of Appeal, or any other body, from issuing guidance relating to pre-sentence reports from being framed by personal characteristics, other than ethnic, cultural and/or faith minority community, would appear to indicate that they do not object in principle to such an approach. I am sure some of these matters can be explored more in Committee.
I will conclude by saying a few words about judicial independence. In his letter dated 10 March to the Lord Chancellor, the chair of the Sentencing Council said:
“There is general acceptance of the guidelines by the judiciary because they emanate from an independent body on which judicial members are in the majority. The Council preserves the critical constitutional position of the independent judiciary in relation to sentencing.”
The independence of the judiciary is recognised as a principle of fundamental importance to the United Kingdom’s constitution. The principle serves to protect the judiciary’s ability to exercise its functions in deciding cases in accordance with the law and free from external pressures. Deciding on an offender’s sentence is a clear example of that, but the principle of judicial independence also requires that the judiciary is treated with respect and with recognition of the constitutional boundaries between the judiciary, the Executive and Parliament.
Lord Hodge, the deputy president of the Supreme Court, said in 2018:
“Within Parliament it is a parliamentary custom, supported by rulings of the Speaker, that an attack on a judge’s character or motives, or charges of a personal nature or a call for his or her dismissal, should be made only on a substantive motion on which a vote will be taken, and also that arguments that a judge had got a decision wrong should be made in moderate language.”
There has been significant criticism of the Sentencing Council, and in particular its chair, in this Chamber. The shadow Lord Chancellor asked on 1 April in this House if the Lord Chancellor could
“honestly say at the Dispatch Box that she has confidence in the head of the Sentencing Council, Lord Justice Davis, given that he has brought it into total disrepute”—[Official Report, 1 April 2025; Vol. 765, c. 184.]
Criticising the judiciary for their decisions in their capacity as members of the Sentencing Council risks undermining their independence as serving judges.
It remains to be seen whether the measures in this Bill have ripples beyond the narrow prescription in clause 1. I look forward to the Government clarifying the detailed effects of the Bill in Committee, but it would be unfortunate if such a modest piece of legislation left in its wake collateral damage to the relationship between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary.
It is important in this debate to be clear what we are talking about and what we are not. The part of the guideline produced by the Sentencing Council that led to this legislation relates to the circumstances in which a pre-sentence report is produced, not to the passing of a sentence itself. It is also important not to overstate the problem. As we have heard, there is already law that says there should be a pre-sentence report in almost all cases, unless it is unnecessary, and most offenders being considered for either a community or custodial sentence—in the Crown court, at least—already have one.
The guidance that the Sentencing Council produces on the ordering of a pre-sentence report, though, does matter. That is because such a report is designed to give sentencers more information about the person they are sentencing. Without that information, it can be very hard to apply the full range of sentencing options. That might be about whether a rehabilitation activity requirement or a programme requirement might be appropriate, or to assess capacity for unpaid work. If a sentencer does not order a pre-sentence report for a particular offender, they may not be able to impose some of the more demanding community sentences and may find themselves more likely to impose a custodial sentence as the only available and realistic alternative. It does matter whether a sentencer is being encouraged to order such a report for an offender, and any guideline suggesting that this should be more appropriate for someone of one ethnicity, faith or culture, as opposed to another, cannot be right.
I accept that the Sentencing Council was trying to do good, but in reality we do not address inequality by replacing it with a different inequality. The Sentencing Council has misjudged this issue, and the Government are entitled to come to that view too. It would have been better if legislation was not needed to resolve this issue, but the Sentencing Council, independent as we know it is, has clearly concluded that it will not do as the Lord Chancellor has asked, and that means that legislation is the only realistic alternative. However, I have concerns about the way in which the Government are going about this, particularly in the breadth of the drafting of the Bill. I mentioned in an intervention on the Lord Chancellor one specific concern, which I will not go over again in view of the time, but which we might return to in the later stages of the Bill.
I think it is worth Ministers considering whether the use of the phrase “personal characteristics” is too broad. The Chair of the Justice Committee read out some of the other personal characteristics referred to in the draft guideline, which I do not think are anywhere near as controversial. We need to keep in mind that this is about a process in which a sentencer is given information about an offender in order to determine the appropriate sentence. I do not think that information about faith or ethnic origin would fall into the appropriate category, but information about health conditions or disabilities most certainly might.
There is a danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater: not all personal characteristics should be left out of account in sentencing. I therefore ask Ministers to consider whether they can tighten the wording of clause 1(2) and (3) in particular. If they do so, I think that will avoid some rather arcane discussions about what can be properly described as personal circumstances and personal characteristics. However, I also think there is a danger of losing sight of the good work that the Sentencing Council does.
I accept that this will not be a universally popular point of view, but I do think that the Sentencing Council adds something important to the sentencing process. It is important that we do not lose sight of that, or of the fact that the guideline that has been drafted is to replace substantially out-of-date guidance. I hope that point will also be noted by Ministers.
While I acknowledge that the updated Sentencing Council guidelines attempted to address inequalities in the criminal justice system, we must maintain the principle of equality before the law. As such, I support this Bill. I note, however, that the Bill does not prevent the Sentencing Council from issuing guidelines advising the courts to consider an offender’s personal circumstances when deciding whether to request a pre-sentence report, particularly when those circumstances are uniquely linked to their personal characteristics.
Pre-sentence reports are desirable when the defendant is a vulnerable woman who has committed a less serious crime—for instance, when they are pregnant or post-natal, the primary carer for dependent children, or a victim of domestic abuse or exploitation. Of course, those issues are often compounded when we consider intersectionalities, such as those experienced by black women. So many women in the criminal justice system are vulnerable: nearly two thirds are victims of domestic abuse, a similar percentage have children, and many have experienced adverse childhood experiences and trauma. Those vulnerability factors make it critical that personal circumstances affecting female offenders are given consideration in pre-sentence reporting.
Women in custody have complex health needs, which can increase the risks associated with pregnancy for mothers and their children. Babies born in prison are twice as likely to be born premature and seven times more likely to be stillborn. These are not just numbers; they affect real people, women who are already experiencing trauma and babies entering the world in incredibly difficult circumstances. Consideration of pregnancy and the associated risks to mothers, their unborn children and their newborn babies is therefore critical in determining appropriate sentencing. Custodial sentences can often do more harm than good, both to pregnant women and to their children. Women are far less likely on average to commit violent or sexual offences, and are far more likely to be charged with petty crime, non-violent crime and theft. In those cases, community sentences may be preferred, so long as the offender does not present a risk to wider society.
In April 2024, the Sentencing Council introduced a new mitigating factor—pregnancy, childbirth and post-natal care—in sentencing guidelines to consider the impact of custody on pregnant offenders and their dependants. This factor recognises that when the impact on offenders’ dependants would be disproportionate to the aims of custodial sentencing, imprisonment should not be imposed. Specifically, it relates to whether the risk posed to women and their dependants outweighs the risk associated with their crime, in order to determine a fair sentence for all—both for wider society, and for the offender and her children. It is critical that the justice system strikes the right balance when determining sentencing, and a pre-sentence report can inform this. As such, I am particularly glad that this Bill does not affect Court of Appeal case law on when pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable in cases concerning women who are pregnant, are victims of domestic abuse, or have recently given birth.
I believe that many of the issues raised today speak to a wider issue pertaining to women’s experiences in the justice and sentencing system more broadly. Ensuring access to pre-sentence reports helps courts to make informed, fair and just decisions, and for women in vulnerable circumstances, that can make all the difference.
This Bill is unfortunately necessary because of the unwise actions of the Sentencing Council. While the Lord Chancellor is right to bring the Bill forward, she did so only at the very last moment. It was on Monday 31 March, mere hours before the guidelines were due to come into force, that the Sentencing Council was forced to perform a U-turn. Those guidelines would have led to a two-tier justice system in England and Wales.
The Sentencing Council did not withdraw those guidelines out of wisdom or principle—it did so because it was caught out. Its backtrack was quietly communicated to judges and magistrates several hours after courts had already opened on Tuesday. To make matters worse, the Sentencing Council’s message said that it still believed the policy was necessary. There was nothing necessary about that policy.
Under the proposed guidelines, judges and magistrates were told that pre-sentence reports should normally be required when sentencing individuals from ethnic, faith or cultural minority groups. What about those who are white, male and not part of a specified minority? They would not have fallen within that description. The implication was clear: defendants will be treated differently, not based on their actions or the harm they have caused, but based on their identity, and that is wrong. It was only after the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), the shadow Justice Secretary, that the Lord Chancellor rightly took action. Race, culture and religion should never determine whether someone goes to prison. The Lord Chancellor said that she was willing to legislate to stop this travesty if the Sentencing Council refused to back down, and that is what we are now doing.
This is about the most fundamental principle in a free society: equality before the law. The question we must now ask ourselves is how the Sentencing Council got this so badly wrong and, judging by the comments of Lord Justice Davis, would continue to get wrong. The Sentencing Council’s guidelines would have had real consequences. In borderline cases where a judge is unsure whether to issue a custodial sentence, the presence or absence of a pre-sentence report can be decisive. The whole purpose of these reports is to influence the outcome. By tilting the system toward giving those reports preferentially to certain identity groups, the council would effectively be tipping the scales of justice, and the council knows it. Baroness Falkner, chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, has warned that the guidelines may violate the Equality Act 2010.
If we allow sentencing outcomes to be guided by race, faith or cultural identity, we abandon the core British principle that the law applies equally to all of us. I agree with the Lord Chancellor that we should pass this legislation to override this guidance, but how confident is she that we will not face a similar situation again? I would like her to go further and ensure that Parliament is given oversight of all future sentencing guidance. We must put into law the principle that no factor like race, religion or cultural minority status should ever influence sentencing procedures. Justice must remain blind, not selectively blinkered. If we lose equal justice, we lose the foundation of a free society.
I welcome this Bill and the swift action taken by the Lord Chancellor to correct a clear wrong. Had they been implemented, the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines would have introduced differential treatments before the law, which can never and should never be acceptable. The question is: how did we get to this point? Did these guidelines simply appear out of nowhere? Of course they did not. They were subject to extensive consultation under the previous Conservative Government, who welcomed them without reservation.
The consultation published in November 2023 and closed in February 2024 indicated clearly that a pre-sentence report “may be particularly important” if the offender belonged to ethnic, cultural or faith minority communities. The then Conservative sentencing Minister, the hon. Member for Orpington (Gareth Bacon) wrote to the Sentencing Council, thanking it and welcoming the expanded guidance on the circumstances in which courts should seek pre-sentence reports. Let us be crystal clear: it was the last Conservative Government who endorsed the idea that it was “particularly important” to request pre-sentence reports for individuals from ethnic, cultural or faith minority backgrounds and therefore, by extension of basic logic, less important for other groups. The Sentencing Council had their answer: the then Conservative Government supported its changes.
Given what we have heard today, there must surely have been a flurry of opposition in certain quarters. What did the now shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) say about it at the time? The answer is nothing. What did the Leader of the Opposition say? Nothing. Perhaps if they had bothered to stand up and do their job, as Labour has today, these guidelines would never have been issued in the first place.
For all the failings of the last Conservative Government, many Members were appalled by the outright refusal of the Sentencing Council to amend the guidelines when requested to do so by the Justice Secretary. That refusal is the reason we find ourselves here today. Far too much of the British state now appears to operate beyond the reach of those democratically elected to lead it. There are too many quangos, too many faceless bureaucracies, too many levers of power seemingly detached from those whom the people have chosen to govern them. The British public do not understand how a court can block the deportation of a convicted criminal whom the Government wish to remove from the country. They do not understand how a Chancellor is constrained in his or her decision-making by the actions of an unelected Office for Budget Responsibility, and they do not understand how a Justice Secretary cannot simply prevent unequal treatment before the law.
The Bill is the right response to this specific situation, but how long will it be before we find ourselves here again, in another stand-off with the Sentencing Council, over another issue on which unelected officials clash with democratically accountable politicians? I believe that in the fullness of time—and I welcome what the Lord Chancellor said today about her further review—we will have to go further; I believe that we should abolish the Sentencing Council altogether.
What the Sentencing Council ludicrously proposed was nothing short of two-tier justice: guidelines which would mean that young black, Asian or indeed other non-white offenders could receive more lenient sentences than their white counterparts in exactly the same circumstances. Let me be clear: justice must be equality before the law. As someone once said,
“justice should not only be done, but…be seen to be done”.
It should not depend on your race, the colour of your skin, your culture or your religion. It is high time we reminded the unelected, unaccountable, and quite frankly woke quangos that equality means treating everyone the same, and not creating one rule for some and one rule for others.
I am therefore glad that we have finally reached the Second Reading of a Bill that will stop the madness espoused by this out-of-touch, “liberal dinner party set” advisory body. For far too long, bodies such as the Sentencing Council have been allowed to rule the roost. Quangos of this kind—unserious and wasteful organisations —are costing the taxpayer more than £64 billion a year. Parliament must be sovereign, and should not continue to come up against a brick wall of regulatory and bureaucratic obstacles.
I cannot help having a sense of déjà vu. I was sitting in this very place well over a month ago when my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), the shadow Lord Chancellor, introduced legislation that would have prevented this slide into two-tier justice—and all the while, the Lord Chancellor allowed the chairman of the Sentencing Council to effectively run rings around her, the Government and the will of the House. Let us stop pretending: sadly, two-tier justice does exist, and the British people know it. Let us look at the facts. People are being thrown into jail for making stupid comments online, while grooming gangs were able to operate unchallenged because of a fear of cultural sensitivities. This is wrong, and the British people demand that it end now. However, it is not happening just in the courts. Police forces in the UK have been caught blocking white applicants from jobs, and that was based not on ability but purely on the colour of their skin.
How on earth did we get here? This is the country of the Magna Carta, the birthplace of common law and some of the greatest legal minds that the world has ever seen, yet we have enabled an unelected quango to propose guidelines that are openly discriminatory, and equality before the law has been replaced by ideology over fairness.
Equality before the law is at the heart of the rule of law. As the great Roman statesman Cicero said:
“For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights.”
The revised guidelines from the Sentencing Council fundamentally went against that important principle. To introduce a presumption that pre-sentence reports would be required not necessarily because of a particular vulnerability of offenders or circumstances related to their offences, but because of the colour of their skin, the region of their ancestors’ origin or the religious beliefs that they held is two-tier justice, no matter how laudable the intentions. This is not about Court of Appeal judgments such as Thompson, which the Lord Chancellor referred to, and it is not about factors that could fundamentally change the effect of a particular judicial sentences on an offender, or factors relating directly to the circumstances of the offence. This is purely about those characteristics.
My right hon. Friend the shadow Lord Chancellor did a huge service to not only this House but our country when he raised this matter from the Dispatch Box on 5 March, because it was clear that the Lord Chancellor was completely blindsided. Neither she nor her Ministers knew anything about the proposals. In fairness to the right hon. Lady, who is not in her seat at the moment, I am sure that she was as appalled as we were at the idea that people should be treated differently purely because of their ethnicity, culture or religion. But this is a lacklustre Bill, which does the minimum needed to clear up the immediate mess of this Government’s making. [Interruption.] As I said, it does the minimum necessary. It is better than nothing—it is a very small step in the right direction—but it does not go as far as the Government should to introduce the reforms that are needed.
The right hon. Lady had been Lord Chancellor for eight months, but she had so little grip of her Department that she not only did nothing to stop the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines, but was not even aware of them. Her representative had met the Sentencing Council just two days earlier. What were they doing at the Sentencing Council, if they were not there to stop such proposals? How is the right hon. Lady running her Department, if she was not even informed of the new guidelines?
The proposals had changed during the process. The Lord Chancellor, unlike me and the Business Secretary, has actually been a practising lawyer. She will understand that there is a substantial difference between saying that a pre-sentence report may be particularly important, and stating, as a requirement, that such a report will normally be considered necessary, given the effect that statement has, and the triggers for appeals against sentences. Those changes were made almost at the point when the right hon. Lady became Lord Chancellor, yet eight months later, she had done nothing to stop them and was not even aware of them.
This Bill stops only the narrowest and worst aspects of the guidelines from applying. If the Government were actually serious about taking action, they could have done so much more quickly. They did not even need to take action; an omission would have been sufficient. On 28 March, when my right hon. Friend the shadow Lord Chancellor brought forward his private Member’s Bill, all the Government Whips had to do was not shout “Object” in order for it to go forward. It would have restored proper ministerial oversight and, through the Minister, parliamentary oversight over sentencing guidelines. That would have allowed Parliament to take control of this fundamental matter.
My hon. Friend is right; the issue is not just these guidelines. In the last Parliament, we legislated to increase the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving to life imprisonment, after an offender killed three members of my constituent’s family and was given a sentence of only 10 and a half years. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need a broader power, so that where Parliament’s intent is not recognised by the Sentencing Council, we can act?
Clearly, Parliament needs to have oversight of revisions to sentencing guidelines, so that they reflect the will of Parliament.
The Government failed to act and have now brought forward this lacklustre measure. In the past few months, my hon. and right hon. Friends have uncovered multiple instances of two-tier principles being applied to bail, probation and other judicial matters. This is not a one-off, or a whistleblowing “fix it and move on” situation; it is systemic and endemic. We need much more radical reform than the Government are bringing forward today.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House for their valuable contributions. I think what I heard at the end from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire (Mike Wood), was support for this Bill, and I thank him for that. Today’s debate has been helpful; it has underscored the broad support for this legislation, and for the principle of equality before the law. Many Members—pretty much every Member who has spoken—underlined the importance of that principle. I am proud that my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor acted so swiftly to address this situation in a way that was courteous and respectful to all involved, and to get us to where we are today.
While we have had much agreement, the Mother of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), for whom I have the highest regard, announced herself as being in a minority of one. I am sure that is not the case, but she drew attention to her serious concerns about disproportionality in the criminal justice system. I can say to her that we share her concerns about disproportionality. That is why my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor has announced a proper review of all the data, so we will know what actions will properly address that disproportionality and bring about change in a way that addresses the seriousness of the unfairness in the system to which she rightly referred.
Equality before the law is a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system. It is the Government’s policy and belief that it should be protected. We know that more must be done to address inequalities in the justice system, and we are absolutely committed to tackling racial disparities across the criminal justice system. We are also taking steps such as increasing diversity in our staff and working with the judiciary to make sure that our appointments are reflective of the society we serve. That has included supporting under-represented groups in joining the judiciary and the magistrates, and has involved the Ministry of Justice and partners running widely supported outreach programmes to reduce barriers to individuals joining. However, we need to do much more. I commend my right hon. Friend the Mother of the House for keeping us on notice, and I promise her that we will deliver.
The hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde), who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, reminded us, as indeed did my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr Brash), that these guidelines were nodded through by the previous Conservative Government. The hon. Member for Eastbourne also reminded us of our inheritance of an underfunded probation and court system, which has led, in his words, to a rationing of pre-sentence reports. I agree with him that the debate should be about how we move to universality of pre-sentence reports, not about rationing. Of course, none of this debate alters the fact that independent judges can ask for pre-sentence reports whenever they feel they are necessary. Indeed, in her opening speech, the Lord Chancellor made it clear that capacity is being increased, quite properly, so that more pre-sentence reports can be done.
We had very helpful contributions from the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), and the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright). Both of them drew attention to the importance of pre-sentence reports in identifying the most appropriate and effective sentence for individual offenders. The Chair of the Select Committee gave us the full timeline of this affair to date, and a good analysis of where we are with the Bill. I agree with him that we will have more opportunity to look at matters in detail in Committee. Likewise, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam drew attention to his concerns about the breadth of the Bill. Again, we will have an opportunity to examine them further in Committee.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Dr Gardner) raised very serious concerns about issues relating to pregnant women, and was pleased that the Bill does not affect Court of Appeal case law in that respect. In fact, nothing in the Bill, as she helpfully reminded the House, prevents judges from requesting PSRs for pregnant women. Judges will continue to be able to request PSRs in cases where they ordinarily would, including appropriate cases involving pregnant women. We would expect that to continue.
I am happy to have heard so much support for the Bill. There will be a drop-in for MPs on Monday about the next stages of the Bill, at which Members can have any questions answered, and can feed into the process before Committee stage next week. This emergency legislation, while a small Bill, is of great significance. It will stop the Sentencing Council’s updated guidelines on pre-sentence reports from coming into force, and will safeguard against the risk of differential treatment arising from their use. The action taken by the Government on this issue underscores our commitment to equality before the law, which all hon. Members who have spoken today have underlined, and which is most important. It is the ancient principle on which our justice system was built. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill: Programme
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and on Third Reading
(2) Proceedings in Committee of the whole House shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after their commencement.
(3) Any proceedings on Consideration and proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion four hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee of the whole House.
(4) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to proceedings on Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(5) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Gerald Jones.)
Question agreed to.
(2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI remind Members that in Committee they should not address the Chair as Madam Deputy Speaker. Please use our names when addressing the Chair. Madam Chair, Chair and Madam Chairman are also acceptable.
Clause 1
Sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports
I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 6, leave out
“different personal characteristics of an offender”
and insert
“an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, page 1, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) After subsection (7) insert—
‘(7A) In the case of guidelines within subsection (4) about pre-sentence reports, the Council must, after making any amendments of the guidelines which it considers appropriate, obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing sentencing guidelines as definitive guidelines.
(7B) In any case to which subsection (7A) applies, the Secretary of State may—
(a) consent to the issuing of guideline as definitive guidelines,
(b) refuse consent for the issuing of guidelines as definitive guidelines, or
(c) direct the Council to issue the guidelines in an amended form as definitive guidelines.
(7C) Where the Secretary of State has consented to the issuing of guidelines under subsection (7B)(a) or has directed the Council to issue guidelines in an amended form under subsection (7B)(c), the Council must issue the guidelines as definitive guidelines in the appropriate form”.”
This amendment stops sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports coming into force unless approved by the Lord Chancellor.
Amendment 2, page 1, leave out line 10 and insert—
““a particular demographic cohort’ may include those related to—”.
Amendment 4, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(d) status as part of a group that may have experienced trauma from experiences of racism or discrimination—
(i) inter-generationally and relayed to the defendant, or
(ii) as a result of important historical events which may have had a greater impact on those from specific groups and cultures.”
This amendment would ensure that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports cannot include a defendant’s status as part of a group, particularly not if this involves considering events that may not have impacted the defendant personally.
Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.
New clause 1—Independent review—
“(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review to be carried out of—
(a) the effects of the changes made to section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 by section 1, and
(b) sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports.
(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Sentencing Council, appoint a person with professional experience relating to pre-sentence reports to conduct the review.
(3) The review must be completed within two years of the passing of this Act.
(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review, the person must—
(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and
(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.”
It is worthwhile at the outset of all debates on this Bill to restate that it is about pre-sentence reports that give information to sentencers that may be used in sentencing decisions, not about the passing of sentences themselves. Specifically, the Bill is about the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council to sentencers about the circumstances in which a pre-sentence report should normally be asked for, and about the sort of information about an offender which such a report may provide and which may be appropriate to consider and take into account before deciding on an appropriate sentence in that offender’s case.
There has been broad agreement—I see the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), in her place, so I will not say unanimity—that an offender’s ethnicity, race, culture or faith are on their own not that sort of information and that the Sentencing Council was wrong to suggest that pre-sentence reports should be awarded on that basis. I would argue that is because, even if there may be points to make about the treatment or experience of members of the ethnic, faith or cultural group to which the offender in question happens to belong, what is relevant to the sentencing of that offender can only be the treatment or experience to which the particular offender has themselves been subject, not whether they have arisen in the cases of other members of the same group who are not before the court. That is effectively the impact of amendment 4 in the name of the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan). That is why the Government are right to seek to exclude even from the process of asking for a pre-sentence report—let alone from passing sentence itself—the making of decisions based only on membership of such a group. That is after all what the Government have said this Bill is for.
These groups are described in the explanatory notes to the Bill as “particular demographic cohorts”. Paragraph 8 says,
“The Bill is intended to ensure that Sentencing Guidelines are drafted in such a way as to prevent differential treatment and maintain equality before the law. It does this by preventing the creation of a presumption regarding whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort, rather than the particular circumstances of that individual.”
Despite that explanation in the explanatory notes, the Bill goes further than that by prohibiting the Sentencing Council from including in a sentencing guideline any
“provision framed by reference to different personal characteristics of an offender.”
That is what clause 1(2) says in inserting language into the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. I think that language is significantly wider in impact than reference to membership of particular demographic cohorts—undesirably so, in my view. That is why I have tabled amendment 1, which would adopt the language used in the explanatory notes.
Let me explain why I think that would be preferable. My starting point is that I do not believe all personal characteristics are inappropriate to consider in a sentencing decision. There is, of course, much more to be considered in a sentencing decision than simply information about the offender, particularly the seriousness of the offence and its consequences, but relevant information about the offender is needed as part of the process. It surely cannot be right, then, to prohibit the Sentencing Council from encouraging sentencers to find out more about some of the personal characteristics that are relevant in reaching a more informed and therefore better sentencing decision—for example, a physical or learning difficulty, or a brain injury from which an offender will not recover.
The relevance of that information is not just in forming a fuller picture of the offender to be sentenced, but in assisting a sentencer to know whether that offender is capable of carrying out aspects of a community order, including work in the community, which the sentencer may want to consider as a potential sentencing option. It is worth underlining of course that the ordering of a pre-sentence report—whatever it says when it is produced—does not bind the hands of a sentencer to do as it recommends, but in reality, without one a sentencer’s options are often more limited. That is why guidance on when to ask for a pre-sentence report matters.
I defer to my right hon. and learned Friend’s experience, but is there not an argument for every case to have a pre-sentence report in order to truly understand what an individual has faced and whether there are any mitigating factors? I appreciate that that could create a backlog for these services, but is it not one possible solution to the problem that the Sentencing Council was worried about—namely, that different cohorts might have different sentencing outcomes?
My hon. Friend makes a fair point in relation to offenders who hover on the border between community sentences and custodial sentences, but he will know that, in the Crown court at least, the majority of such offenders already have a pre-sentence report. Of course, there are also offenders who come before the courts for sentencing and it is blindingly obvious either that a custodial sentence will follow, or that neither a community sentence nor a custodial sentence is realistically in prospect, so I do not think it right to say that we should have a pre-sentence report in every case, but there is already in law a presumption that pre-sentence reports should be ordered unless it is unnecessary to do so. What we are seeking to do here is respond to a very specific set of circumstances that have arisen as a result of a Sentencing Council decision. As he may have heard me say on Second Reading, I do not think that the Sentencing Council handled this well, and as a result we are having to do something that we would otherwise not have to do.
Sentencing offenders is, in all circumstances, a difficult business. The fact that different offenders receive different sentences, even for the same offence, is not necessarily evidence of a defect in sentencing practice as a result of guidelines or otherwise, but is more likely a reflection of the reality that every case and every offender is different. We should not, I suggest, try to stop judges reaching the appropriate conclusion, assisted by Sentencing Council guidelines, in each case before them.
Nobody is trying to stop judges sentencing in individual cases. All the Sentencing Council was seeking to do was ensure that judges and magistrates had the maximum amount of information before coming to a decision on the sentence.
Yes, I think the right hon. Lady is right that that is what the sentencing guidelines were aiming at, but I am afraid that the way in which they were phrased rather missed the mark, in my view. It is perfectly true to say that it is a good thing in most sentencing cases to get as much information as possible, but the sentencing guidelines have, as she will appreciate, particular influence on sentencers, who are obliged to follow them unless doing so is not in the interests of justice. The tone that is set by the Sentencing Council in the guidelines that it drafts gives a good indication to sentencers about the sorts of things that they ought to take into account in sentencing. As she heard me say—I think this is an important point to make—we are talking about the ordering of pre-sentence reports and not about sentencing itself.
It is a pleasure to take part in the Committee stage of this short Bill. On Second Reading, only a few days ago, I set out my views on the merits or otherwise of the Bill; how it affects the role of the Sentencing Council; the council’s consultation on this guideline; and the response to that consultation by the then Government, through their sentencing Minister, and by the Justice Committee, through my predecessor as Chair, Sir Bob Neill KC.
I also regretted the way that the Bill has been used to undermine judicial independence, and to allow ad hominem attacks on judges under the guise of belated objections to the guideline. I am not the only person to raise these concerns, and I agree entirely with the article on this matter by Sir Bob in The Times last Thursday. I do not propose repeating any of his arguments; nor do I need to spend a long time on the amendments tabled for debate. Those proposed by the official Opposition do no more than continue on another front the culture war that is the obsession of the shadow Lord Chancellor in his quest for higher office.
I am more sympathetic to the new clause in the name of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde), who is an important member of the Justice Committee. Given the fractured nature of the debate around the Bill, and the testy relationship between the Sentencing Council and the Ministry of Justice, it may be sensible to review the effect of the Bill, but I am not sure we need to put that into legislation. Indeed, the sentencing landscape is about to shift fundamentally with the imminent publication of the independent sentencing review, which is swiftly to be followed by a sentencing Bill. I suspect that issues raised by this Bill will get swallowed up in that process, and the Lord Chancellor has indicated that it may include a review of the role of the Sentencing Council.
I do not want to stir the pot further, but I observe that had the Sentencing Council been prepared, without the threat of legislation, to postpone implementation of the guideline, all these matters might have been dealt with in one Bill, and in the light of David Gauke’s recommendations. The parliamentary and ministerial time that has been spent debating a relatively narrow point could, in my view, have been better spent on other matters requiring urgent attention in our courts and prisons.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the reason why we are here today is an error of judgment by the Sentencing Council, on which it refused to back down until threatened with legislation? Does the amendment proposed by the shadow Justice Secretary not offer greater protection to the public from future errors of judgment by the Sentencing Council?
As I say, I do not want to repeat everything I said on Second Reading. I made a case then for why the Sentencing Council had behaved quite properly. It was complimented by many people—including the Justice Committee, on which the hon. Gentleman serves—for the way it conducted its consultation. I have a great deal of sympathy with the council and its chair, who were somewhat surprised by the reaction at that stage, the guideline having been approved by pretty much everyone who considered it at that time.
On the views of the hon. Gentleman and other members of the Justice Committee, whose opinions I have a great deal of time for, the Sentencing Council was a little stubborn when confronted with the Lord Chancellor’s view, as well as those of other Members of the House, and it could have acted to prevent us all needing to discuss this today; as I say, there are many other matters that need our attention.
On the amendments in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), as I would expect from a distinguished former Attorney General, his amendments go to the central issue in the Bill, which is whether it does what the Government intend it to do. I hope the Minister will address the issue of what a “personal characteristic” is, as opposed to a particular demographic cohort, and the question of what characteristics are caught by clause 1.
I will take a few minutes, if I may, to add some related questions on which I am seeking the Minister’s guidance. First, I turn to the effect of the Bill on the sentencing guidelines already in force. The effect of the Bill goes beyond the imposition of the community and custodial sentences guideline and future guidelines; it would also render unlawful the inclusion of provision framed by reference to different characteristics of an offender in all definitive sentencing guidelines by the Sentencing Council that have already been issued and are in force. The potential retrospective effect of the Bill on guidelines already in force could create legal uncertainty as to their lawfulness.
There are two main examples of overarching guidelines in force that could be caught by the Bill: the guideline on sentencing children and young people, and the guideline on sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders or neurological impairments.
In relation to offence-specific guidelines, a significant number contain mitigating factors framed by personal characteristics that have expanded explanations referring to the need to order a pre-sentence report—for example, an explanation for the mitigating factor of “age and/or lack of maturity” in the aggravated burglary guideline. By way of another example, the explanation of the mitigating factor of pregnancy, childbirth and post-natal care in the same guideline states:
“When considering a custodial or community sentence for a pregnant or postnatal offender…the Probation Service should be asked to address the issues below in a pre-sentence report. If a suitable pre-sentence report is not available, sentencing should normally be adjourned until one is available.”
I have already recorded my support for the principle of this Bill, which is unfortunately necessary to uphold the principle of equal justice. I speak in support of amendments 3 and 4, which would further strengthen this legislation.
Amendment 3 would give the Justice Secretary the power to prevent future errors of judgment by the Sentencing Council. It would require the council to secure ministerial consent before issuing any sentencing guidelines concerning pre-sentence reports. We should be clear that that is not a measure aimed at politicising justice. However, we must ensure democratic oversight of a body that has shown itself to be capable of committing a serious error of judgment, which led to the situation today. The reason why we are legislating is that the Sentencing Council’s guidance proposed treating offenders differently based on their ethnic, cultural or religious identities. That is wrong.
The Sentencing Council has at no point suggested treating defendants differently according to their ethnicity or religion. All it has tried to do is ensure that judges and magistrates have the maximum information.
The Sentencing Council says that if, for example, someone is a white, Christian male, they are less likely to benefit from a pre-sentence report than if they were a member of a religious or ethnic minority. I believe that that is wrong.
Does the hon. Member know that any defendant before the courts who has no previous convictions, despite the seriousness of the offence, is entitled to a pre-sentence report?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention. As a former solicitor, I am familiar with that provision, and I agree that any defendant who has not yet received a custodial sentence should have the benefit of a pre-sentence report. However, imagine two criminals who both have a criminal record, but one is a member of a religious or ethnic minority and one is not. The guidelines propose treating them differently, and that is not justice.
Is the fact not that the sentencing guidance said that a pre-sentence report would normally be considered necessary, and then went on to talk about race and religion? Making those distinctions immediately apparent in sentencing guidance, which could mean that a white Christian male would be treated differently if they committed the same offence as someone of a different ethnicity, is the fundamental problem.
Indeed. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point; the point I wish to make to the Committee is that all defendants should be treated equally. It should not be a matter of whether or not they are a member of an ethnic or religious minority.
The Sentencing Council did not withdraw the guidance on principle, and it did not acknowledge its error. It was forced to backtrack only after public and political pressure, largely from the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). Even then, the council continued to defend the policy’s rationale in private communications to the judiciary. That is not accountability—it is evasion. That is precisely why amendment 3 is so vital. We cannot allow this to happen again, and Parliament must have a say when guidance threatens the impartiality of our legal system.
Amendment 4, which addresses the content of sentencing guidance itself, is equally important. The amendment would make it illegal for sentencing decisions to consider a defendant’s group identity, particularly in reference to historical discrimination that has no bearing on their individual case. Current bail guidance from the Ministry of Justice already advises courts to consider the trauma suffered by individuals whose relatives experienced racism or cultural discrimination. It even refers to “important historical events” and their supposed differential impact on specific ethnic or cultural groups. That approach undermines the principle that people should be judged as individuals, not as members of a group. Amendment 4 would draw a clear legal line: mitigating factors in sentencing must relate directly to an individual’s actions and circumstances. Inherited identity or injustices not experienced by a particular convicted criminal should not be relevant to the sentence passed by the court.
Race, religion or cultural background should not determine whether someone is sent to prison, and it should not determine whether or not someone should benefit from a pre-sentence report. The Lord Chancellor has argued that the current Bill allows her to “move at pace” to reverse the worst aspects of the Sentencing Council’s proposals, but this is not just about moving fast; it is also about ensuring that we never face this situation again. Amendments 3 and 4 are essential if we are serious about protecting the most basic principle of a free society, which is equality before the law. Without them, the Bill addresses the symptoms, but not the cause. As such, I urge the Committee to support those amendments and reaffirm our commitment to equality before the law.
I entirely agree with Members who are making the case that we should all be equal before the law. The problem is that the figures show that that is not the case, and it has not been the case for decades. If we look at the statistics for the numbers of people in prison, black people make up 12% of the prison population, yet we only make up 4% of the general population. That tends to raise the concern that we are not equal before the law across the whole custodial and criminal justice system. I remember that years ago, before some Members were in the House, you could not say anything about institutional racism in the police force and how black people were treated by the police. It took Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson inquiry to get politicians and people who speak for the state to even acknowledge that there was such an issue as institutional racism in the police force.
I associate myself with every single thing that the Mother of the House has just said, because I could not possibly live up to it. I genuinely believe that this Bill will undermine efforts to ensure that equality before the law is a reality for everyone. It flies in the face of expertise and of the painstaking, authoritative work of the Sentencing Council —a rightly independent body run by, and for, the judiciary. This is a strange and populist Bill that is undermining and delaying good, well-evidenced independent guidelines for effective sentencing that would have made our justice system more fair, rather than less.
I will start my objections to clauses 1 and 2 standing part of the Bill—I am essentially opposing the Bill as a whole—by commenting on the process. We have before us a single-page Bill that in its specificity and intent cannot but bring to my mind how the current President of the United States is using executive orders to interfere intrusively and intricately in the rightly independent decision making of other bodies. This is a micro Bill that micromanages. I worry what else we might see from this Government if such an example is set today. On Second Reading, the shadow Justice Secretary was not shy of telling us about his next targets, which include the long-standing “Equal Treatment Bench Book”. The hon. Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter) has outlined other guidelines that might be immediately affected if we pass this Bill today.
My second objection is about the substance of the Bill, which is primarily contained in clause 1. I cannot believe that Ministers and shadow Ministers are unaware that achieving fair and equal outcomes does not mean treating everyone exactly the same. That principle is so fundamental that I think I learned it through the round window. I cannot believe they are unaware that systemic racism and unconscious bias are real things that still affect people at every stage of the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom in 2025. They must be aware that the good practice that we put together must mitigate those things, or else it will compound them.
I do not believe that the Government as a whole think that the findings of the independent Lammy review of 2017 are untrue, or that they and a wealth of other evidence did not demonstrate the need for guidelines of this sort to provide information to help mitigate the impact of systemic racism and prejudice. Yet here we are, being asked to vote for legislation that essentially bans this evidence and these principles from being part of independent judicial guidelines.
My concern and that of Opposition Members is that the guidance gave examples where pre-sentence reports would “normally be considered necessary” and picked out an identity of a religion or a minority, thereby entrenching racism back into the system. That is the very aim that the hon. Member purports to not want to see. That is the fundamental argument that the Government and the Opposition are putting forward. We do not want to see this situation made worse.
Just to respond to the point that the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) has just raised, the guidelines did not pick out race and ethnicity. In fact, they listed a number of circumstances in which a pre-sentence report might be considered appropriate, such as someone facing their first custodial sentence, someone who is under 25, someone who is a woman, pregnant, a primary carer or a dependent relative, someone who has said they are transgender or someone who may have addiction issues. Far from the Sentencing Council picking out race and ethnicity, that was only one in a long list of circumstances in which it suggested a pre-sentence report might be appropriate.
To return to the intervention from the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), it is difficult for some to realise that with these guidelines, the definition of “normal” has flipped away from the male, the white, the Christian and the majority to shine more of a light on people who are parts of minorities and might have experienced systemic problems leading up to the sentencing decision. That is the point of the guidelines. That is how we act in an anti-racist way. It is how we put together policy that mitigates the great problems that the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), has outlined and we know well.
In contrast to this rushed Bill, the process that led to the now suspended new Sentencing Council guidelines was excellent: the document was consulted on widely; the Justice Committee looked at it; and it was given the green light by a Conservative Government, of which the shadow Justice Secretary was a member. Before I am intervened on, I am aware that a small change was made, but in essence the same document has come forward and the same principles were enshrined in the document that was proposed and approved. There was basically consensus that more use of pre-sentence reports should be made for people suffering from systemic injustices, that particular groups might be in greater need of them, and that judges should be permitted and encouraged to ask for such reports for those groups in more circumstances.
I want to talk about another group who will suffer from the delay caused by the Bill suspending the guidelines. I do not know when we will get new guidelines, but there will be more harm to women, families and children, who were all given more specific focus in the new—now suspended—guidelines. I have worked for some years on the problems and injustices facing women in the criminal justice system. I am concerned about the serious consequences that will come from any delay to these long overdue changes to further widen the use of pre-sentence reports and to make those reports easier for these groups. There will be serious consequences not only for too many people with these characteristics or circumstances—however we define it—but for wider society too. Will Ministers tell us about the impact of this delay on women, families, pregnant people and other groups named? When will we get new guidelines that include them? How many people will be harmed in the meantime? This delay has already taken some weeks.
Some Members will be familiar with the seminal 2007 Corston report about women with particular vulnerabilities in the criminal justice system. Incidentally, that document reminds us in its introduction:
“Equality does not mean treating everyone the same.”
The Sentencing Council guidelines were about to help plug a gap that still remained in terms of addressing the recommendations and themes of the Corston report. Indeed, in its commentary, the Sentencing Council rightly points to deeply concerning evidence of this problem. I am aware of difficulties judges have had in justifying delays and adjournments to go and get pre-sentence reports. The old guidance pushed for often impossible same-day reporting back from the Probation Service and cautioned against adjournments. With this delay to the new guidelines, will it be 2027—20 years after Corston—before the old guidelines are fully removed? How many women might be harmed in the meantime?
As far as I can see, the shadow Justice Secretary has scored a major win today, seizing this issue to stage another culture war ambush against another minority. Instead of standing by judges and by important principles we have all known for a long time—instead of simply allowing these guidelines to be trialled while the concerns being raised were addressed calmly—this Government have essentially put an executive order-style Bill before us now for its remaining stages. There was not even time on Second Reading for opponents like me to point that out.
I am sorry, but I believe that this Bill represents nothing less than a rushed and extraordinary capitulation by this Government to hard-right propaganda. People will suffer injustice as a result. It is profoundly worrying to see the Government legislating in this manner, micromanaging justice in ways that are led by—let’s face it—dog whistles, rhyming slogans and disingenuous propaganda. I will support new clause 1, but I sincerely hope that other Members will join me in voting against this Trumpian Bill and showing our respect for the independence of judges and magistrates on these matters. It is vital that we do something today to stand up for evidence-led policy, judicial independence and genuine equality before the law.
Let me begin by drawing Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests; I am a member of the Bar.
I will align my comments with those of the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). The Bill, and the amendments, do not in reality tackle two-tier justice in this country; in fact, they risk entrenching it. Our justice system is founded on a principle that we all claim to uphold—fairness and equality before the law—but today we are being asked to support legislation that fundamentally undermines that principle.
Let me be absolutely clear. This is not a matter of opinion. Lord Justice William Davis, the chair of the Sentencing Council, has written candidly about the issue. He has said, for example, that defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds are statistically more likely to receive harsher sentences than their white counterparts for a similar offence. That is not the opinion of politicians or pressure groups, but a warning from within the senior judiciary itself. The Bill ignores that reality. Worse still, it undermines one of the very tools designed to correct it: the pre-sentence report.
From a medical perspective, there would be a genetic predisposition. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that people would, on a genetic basis, find themselves affected by the law purely because they were black? The comparison he has just made is exactly that, from a medical standpoint. I do not think he would really make such a suggestion, and I would certainly be against that position.
The hon. Gentleman has made his point, but as a criminal practitioner who has frequented courts over the last 20 years, I have seen disparities. I have seen sentencing which, in my view, was not fair. Lived experiences among certain communities are just as important as those of other minorities, whatever their backgrounds. Ultimately, who has decided that this is an important element that needs to be taken into account in the sentencing guidelines? This went through all the consultation under the last Government. People had seen it, and agreed to it. It did not raise a concern back then, so why should it now?
Addressing inequality is not the same as creating inequality. It is, in fact, the only way in which to ensure real equality—to ensure that justice is not just blind in theory, but fair in practice. I know some will argue that we need to understand the root causes of disparity, and they are right: that longer-term work is essential. However, while it is going on we must act in the present. We must allow the experts to do their jobs and support the guidance that they, not we, have developed through years of experience, research and consultation.
This Bill is not just misguided; it is regressive. I cannot and will not support legislation that sidelines expert insight, ignores data and compromises the principles of fairness that we all claim to defend in the name of political convenience. Justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, and right now the communities that face this disparity will no doubt be concerned about the Government’s approach.
First, I acknowledge that disparities in outcomes in our judicial system are a real issue and merit serious attention. I recognise the work of the Lammy review in 2017, as well as the conclusions of the Ministry of Justice’s 2020 report, “Tackling Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System”, which found disparities in how people from minority ethnic groups are treated in the judicial system. It is important that these issues continue to have the focus that they merit.
However, I am glad that the Bill has passed its Second Reading and that we are progressing through its remaining stages today. I am firmly of the view that it is not for the Sentencing Council to make policy decisions on this matter, for those are the domain of politicians and must remain so. The Government should be able to make political decisions and implement them, and the ballot box is the right place for us to be held to account.
What I find refreshing about the continued passage of this Bill is that we are showing that politicians do not have to be jelly-like in the face of blockages to their desire to make political decisions. At the same time, I support the unamended passage of the Bill, because it finds a way to thread the needle with a targeted intervention. Amendment 3, tabled by the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, goes too far and would undermine the independence of the Sentencing Council.
My hon. Friend refers to blockages. How can he describe Members of this House, and people in the community who are trying to stand up for a fair and just criminal justice system, as blockages?
I do not think that anyone in this House is a blockage—far from it. The point I am making is that I believe that this House should be the place where political decisions are made, and that politicians should make decisions about important things that matter to people in this country.
It is my view that the Sentencing Council is an important body. Crucially, however, it is not political, and I think that if the guidelines had gone through, it would have undermined the important principle of equality before the law. That is a political decision, and Members of this House hold different opinions, but it is for us to contest them in this place. I am glad the Government are making sure that we can make progress on the things that we believe need to be pushed forward for the British people, and I hope that the Bill will pass unamended today, because the precise changes that it proposes would prevent sentencing guidelines from being changed in ways that undermine equality before the law. I do not think that the amendments tabled by the Opposition are necessary, because they take things too far.
With this Bill and much else besides, it is time for us to show that moderate politics, which is the politics of this Government, does not have to be like soup—weak and watery, and impossible to hold on to—but can instead be the politics of action and delivery. I welcome the continued passage of this Bill and urge Members to vote for it today.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
I made the Liberal Democrat position on this very short Bill, and on this issue more widely, abundantly clear in the last debate that we had on this matter: we believe in equality before the law, we believe in the rule of law, and we believe that no one is above the law. That is why we believe that anyone facing the prospect of a custodial sentence should be the subject of a pre-sentence report. We believe that the state has that duty before dispensing its power to deprive someone of their liberty.
There is no world in which judges and magistrates having more information about an offender, whoever they are, and their circumstances is a bad thing. That is why it is an injustice that the use of pre-sentence reports had fallen from 160,000 in 2015 to just 90,000 by 2023, which is a cut of 42%. That has left judges and magistrates with fewer resources and insights than ever with which to go about their work. Less informed sentencing means less satisfactory sentencing outcomes. It means more reoffending, more victims and more turmoil, and that is unacceptable. That is not justice.
This is a product of the under-investment in our Probation Service—it compiles the reports—which was gutted under the Conservative Government. I therefore welcome the fact that the Minister, in his closing speech on Second Reading, agreed with me that
“the debate should be about how we move to universality of pre-sentence reports, not about rationing.”—[Official Report, 22 April 2025; Vol. 765, c. 1019.]
I will come to new clause 1 shortly.
The hon. Member will be aware that any sentencing magistrate or judge can request a pre-sentence report, so I would say that his use of the word “rationing” is inappropriate.
I do not know whether the hon. Member has read the Sentencing Council’s summary of the responses to the draft guidance that was in consultation under the Conservative Government, but it paraphrased magistrates and judges as saying that driving the universality of pre-sentence reports would be challenging in the light of the limited resource for the Probation Service and of the court backlogs. I would suggest that he consult that document to see the phrases used by those legal professionals.
How much would universality cost? Have the Lib Dems calculated how much it would cost?
If the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) was making the point that these reports should exist come what may, the cash should be ringfenced and earmarked for the use of judges and magistrates to request them, but he and the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) cannot have it both ways. We know that if we best tailor a sentence to whether it will result in somebody not reoffending—if we best match the sentence to an offender—we can spend to save. If we can reduce reoffending by ensuring that people get the appropriate sentence, we will keep people out of our crumbling prisons who do not need to be there because they will not reoffend in the first place. We can spend to save.
I regret that this issue has become a political football and one that is sowing the seeds of division. Plainly and simply, this is about the shadow Justice Secretary attempting to hijack our criminal justice system for his own political ends. So desperate is he to score political points that he uses his platform in this House to undermine judges by name, in the full knowledge that they cannot respond and that there is a formal process by which judicial complaints can be investigated and addressed. So desperate are the Conservatives to score political points that they paint judges as activist villains and are working to undermine public confidence in them just because the shadow Justice Secretary does not agree with their rulings.
I would expect the Liberal Democrat spokesperson to at least acknowledge that such references are to judges in their capacity as leaders of the Sentencing Council, not to judges sitting in individual cases. That is an important distinction to make when parliamentarians comment on their conduct.
I refer the hon. Member to the comments the shadow Justice Secretary made at the last Justice questions—I think the hon. Member was not in attendance for that—when he named a specific judge and made a critique of or complaint about them outside the formal processes.
Judges have been vilified, as have others sitting on the Sentencing Council, by Members of this House. Does the hon. Member agree that, if there is to be any vilification, it should be of the Conservative Members who formed the previous Government, who held the consultation and agreed to the guidance?
I do not agree that vilification is the right approach from any side of the argument. This debate should be conducted with respect and courtesy, and I feel that that was missing from some of the comments I just referred to. Absolutely, there must be accountability. Indeed, the previous Government were held accountable in huge respect at the general election, where they suffered the biggest defeat in their history. So desperate is the shadow Justice Secretary to rise to the top of our democracy that he is prepared, in the ways I have described, to undermine our democracy itself.
I hope the hon. Member was listening to my speech when I talked about the harm that might be caused by the delay in bringing in the really excellent parts of the new guidelines that might help women and families. Are the Liberal Democrats asking for a delay, or would they like to support bringing in the parts of the guidance that are agreed as soon as possible?
One problem with the proposals is that consultation has been minimal. They come from a rushed place. They come from a place of responding to a culture war. We are voting on people’s liberties and we need to consider the issues in great detail before responding, not in a knee-jerk way. What I can say, and what I have discussed with Members, including the Lord Chancellor, is that, for example, in the guidance on pre-sentence reports, the circumstances of victims of domestic violence, modern slavery and so on should be considered. As I said at the very beginning of my speech, on pre-sentence reports we should lean toward a presumption of universality rather than one of rationing, so that for all the groups and individuals that have just been mentioned, and more, judges can access a pre-sentence report.
We make the call I have just made not only because we have grave concerns about the impact of the proposed changes, but because we remain steadfastly committed to evidence-based policy making. Against the backdrop of cynical culture wars and leadership manoeuvres, it is more important than ever for the Government to assess the outcomes of this policy, with assessments based on statistics, data and evidence as opposed to dogma and ideology.
To conclude, we must not dance to the tune of the populists or the culture war fanatics, or undermine our legal institutions. As such, our position has not changed since last time and we will act accordingly. We will defend our judicial system and its independence, but we reject short-term reforms that fail to address the wider issues of disproportionality at play.
I rise to speak in support of amendments 3 and 4 in my name and in the name of the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and of Conservative colleagues.
As MPs from across the House have made clear, the draft guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council would have led to an unacceptable two-tier justice system in which defendants were treated differently on the basis not of their crimes, but of their racial, cultural or religious identity. In fact, the record will show that two-tier justice did exist for several hours, because this issue was managed so shambolically that the guidance came into effect ahead of its formal withdrawal. That is not justice—it is a betrayal of the fundamental principle of equality before the law. It would have happened under the watch of this Labour Government and this Lord Chancellor but for the intervention of the Opposition, and in particular the shadow Secretary of State for Justice.
This Bill is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Instead of acting decisively to restore public confidence, after the Labour Government have been dragged to this Chamber to act at all, they now bring forward a half measure—a meagre response that falls short of what it should be. That is why the Opposition have tabled two important amendments.
Amendment 3 would ensure that in future, sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports cannot simply be issued by the Sentencing Council without democratic oversight, and would instead require the consent of the Secretary of State before coming into force. Why is that now necessary? The Sentencing Council has proven itself not just in the initial measures it proposed, but in its attitude and response towards parliamentary and public scrutiny, to be unable to sustain public confidence in its work in this area. It is one thing for a public body to possess operational independence and to seek to exercise that independence on a day-to-day basis; it is quite something else for a public body to choose not to exercise good judgment and make use of that independence to act with restraint in the face of widespread Government, Opposition, parliamentary and public concern. While they do, of course, have their merits, the actions of the Sentencing Council have brought to life the potential pitfalls of unelected quangos that are deaf to the concerns of the people who pay their wages and the politicians who represent them.
While this whole affair has no doubt been humiliating for the Lord Chancellor and the Government, the damage to public confidence in the leadership of the Sentencing Council is just as great. Despite what the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) said in his remarks on Second Reading, the Sentencing Council did not agree to pause the implementation of the guidelines to allow for a period of reflection—it outright refused to do so. He has misunderstood the sequence of events. The council paused only because we would have otherwise entered into a constitutionally unsustainable situation where people were being sentenced in the courts, with guidelines being legislated against in Parliament through emergency legislation. It was that direct threat alone that caused the council to pause and demonstrated its lack of judgment.
I am afraid that we must therefore act more broadly to constrain the Sentencing Council in future, pending any wholesale changes that may be forthcoming. That is why the shadow Secretary of State put forward a Bill that would have taken the necessary steps to return accountability of the body through the Lord Chancellor while wholesale reform could be undertaken. Labour chose to oppose that Bill. Today, it is out of scope for the Opposition to seek to introduce a similarly wide amendment, and we are therefore restricted to seeking to at least restore accountability where we can in this field.
The amendment would require that guidelines on pre-sentence reports drafted by the council must be expressly approved by the Secretary of State before they come into force as definitive guidelines—a basic safeguard of democratic accountability, ensuring ministerial oversight on sensitive sentencing matters. Without our amendment, history may repeat itself: the same council will be free to bring forward ideological frameworks that Ministers will be powerless to stop before the damage is done. Had these guidelines gone unchallenged, we would have tilted sentencing based on identity politics, undermining public confidence in the entire system.
Our amendment would create a crucial safeguard, ensuring that no future set of guidelines in this field, at least, could bypass ministerial accountability. I encourage those on the Government Benches who have made clear that they wish to see accountability restored across the work of the Sentencing Council to vote in support of amendment 3; doing otherwise would make clear that they are unwilling to follow through on their concerns with action.
Amendment 4 would make clear that sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports must not include consideration of a defendant’s status as part of a group that has experienced historical or intergenerational trauma. Why is this necessary? It would be deeply wrong to allow collective historical grievances to influence the sentencing of an individual today. This area is the latest frontier of identity politics, with the public being told that what should be given disproportionate focus in all sorts of domains—that what matters more than what is happening today, with the whole variety of challenges facing people of all creeds and colours—is, in fact, the past. Sentencing must focus on the actions, culpability and direct personal circumstances of the defendant before the court, not on sweeping assumptions based on historical events.
We are not able in this Bill to legislate across all the workings of the criminal justice system as much as we might like to. The events of the past few months have shown that what has happened with these guidelines was not a one-off. There is a creeping, systemic attempt to inject identity politics into our judicial processes, bail decisions, probation, and even training materials. If we do not confront this now, it will embed itself deeper and deeper into the foundations of our system. It is fundamental to the rule of law that justice looks to the individual, not to the group. It is fundamental that we deal in evidence, not in ideology.
Taken together, our amendments are designed to strengthen this Bill, to ensure that it is not merely a reactive measure, but, in this narrow area at least, provides lasting protection of the principle that justice must be blind, and must be seen to be blind. The public expect justice to be equal, not preferential. Our amendments will go further in helping to secure that.
We are in this Chamber today because the Lord Chancellor was not paying attention, and was then humiliated by the recalcitrant leadership of an unelected body turning its face against parliamentary and public concern. The Government should have acted decisively and immediately and we provided them with an opportunity to do so, but they failed to take it. Even now, we are faced with a Bill that does not do the full job. Our amendments are closing the gap between what the Lord Chancellor is offering and what is necessary—decisiveness in place of timidity. I urge the whole House and the Government to support them.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins. I wish to thank hon and right hon. Members for the points that have been made and the amendments that have been discussed, which I shall respond to in turn. I shall speak briefly to each clause and then remind us of why we are here debating this Bill.
In the last Parliament, the Sentencing Council consulted on a revised imposition guideline, which was due to come into effect on 1 April. The revised guideline includes additional guidance on when courts should request pre-sentence reports. It notes that pre-sentence reports will “normally be considered necessary” for certain offenders, including those from an ethnic, cultural or faith minority. The “normally be considered necessary” is replaced with “may be particularly important”, which the previous Government very much welcomed.
This Government note that a pre-sentence report is necessary. They agree that disparities exist in the criminal justice system. The reasons for that are unclear, but this is a matter for the Government, accountable to Parliament and to the ballot box, to address.
In effect, the revised guideline could have led to judges deciding whether to request a pre-sentence report based on an offender’s faith or the colour of their skin. The Lord Chancellor has been clear that this would be unacceptable, as it risks differential treatment. Singling out one group over another undermines the idea that we all stand equal before the law—a principle that has been in the foundations of our justice system for centuries, and that is why she acted immediately and quickly. By preventing the Sentencing Council making guidance on pre-sentence reports with reference to personal characteristics, this Bill helps to ensure equality before the law.
Clause 1 amends section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. It provides that sentencing guidelines may not include provision framed by reference to different personal characteristics, including race, religion, belief or cultural background. Therefore, any existing guidelines that make reference to different personal characteristics will cease to have effect and the Sentencing Council is prevented from making such provisions in guidelines in the future.
The changes made by this clause prevent the Sentencing Council making policy about when pre-sentence reports should be obtained that risks differential treatment before the law, and which could undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system.
The sentencing code is clear that courts should obtain pre-sentence reports unless, in the circumstances of the case, it is unnecessary. The clause does not affect the independent judiciary’s ability to make decisions based on the personal circumstances of an individual offender, or determine where pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable. Nor does it stop the Sentencing Council from advising, in general terms, that pre-sentence reports are sought in cases where the court would benefit from an assessment of an offender’s personal circumstances.
Pre-sentence reports, as the Minister has set out, are important in considering punishments that can address offending behaviour and help reduce the likelihood of reoffending. But, very often, probation is stretched so thin that officers do not have time to complete them. What will the Minister do to ensure that, where a pre-sentence report is required, probation has the capacity to do that important work?
My hon. Friend echoes much of what the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) picked up on earlier. Probation is a significant part of the landscape. That is why we are onboarding 1,300 more probation officers over the next year.
The Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), raised issues about the impact of the guidelines on existing guidelines. We expect that other guidelines will be affected by the Bill, including offence-specific guidelines related to mitigating and aggravating factors, which set out guidance about pre-sentence reports for specific cohorts. We will continue working with the Sentencing Council on the implementation of the Bill. We have had constructive discussions and will continue to do so.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick referenced, the Bill’s explanatory notes point out, existing precedent is not changed where the courts have determined that pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable. Such cases include: Thompson, where the Court of Appeal recently emphasised the importance of reports in sentencing pregnant women or women who have recently given birth; Meanley, in which the court referenced the value of pre-sentence reports for young defendants; and Kurmekaj, where the defendant had a traumatic upbringing, a vulnerability and was a victim of modern slavery. The Bill narrowly focuses on the issue at hand, putting beyond doubt the principle that we all stand equal before the law of the land.
Clause 2 is concerned with details about how the Bill will be enacted. The Bill will apply to England and Wales only, and its measures will come into force on the day after it passes. The Bill may be cited as the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Act 2025 once enacted.
I thank the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) for tabling his amendments and for the very thoughtful and comprehensive way in which he dealt with them. Amendments 1 and 2 would replace the term “personal characteristics” with “demographic cohort” to describe the type of provision about pre-sentence reports in sentencing guidelines that the Bill will prohibit. The Government have considered the proposed change to the wording very carefully and would like to take the opportunity to briefly explain the Government’s approach.
The Government’s objective is to help ensure equality before the law so that offenders are treated according to their own particular circumstances and not by virtue of their membership of a particular group. To ensure that the Bill prevents sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports including provision framed by reference to any specific personal characteristics of an offender, we have used the term “personal characteristics”. The Bill sets out that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, or cultural background. However, this is not an exhaustive list. We accept that personal characteristics and personal circumstances have, over the years, been elided in different court judgments, and we are clear that it is intended to cover a wider range of characteristics including sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status.
The right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam has rightly noted that the term “demographic cohort” is used in the Bill’s explanatory notes. However, the use of the term was not intended to narrow the definition of personal characteristics, and I believe it does not, though I note that he believes that it might do. Rather, it is a different term used to describe individuals who share certain personal characteristics.
I accept that the Minister is trying to give us clarity, so for the purposes of clarity is it the Government’s view that all personal characteristics can also be described as personal circumstances?
No, that is not the Government’s view. “Personal characteristics” is a term that is understood and applied in other contexts, whereas “demographic cohort” is a term that, on balance, the Government feel is more imprecise and would ultimately need to be defined with reference to a group with shared personal characteristics. Therefore, I understand where the right hon. and learned Gentleman is coming from, but from the Government’s point of view, the amendments do not add anything to the drafting of the Bill and risk causing further confusion. As he pointed out in his helpful contribution, there is a danger of getting into detailed semantics, which probably does not help any of us.
I take on board the Minister’s warning, and I am not sure whether this will make it any better. I think he is saying that the term demographic cohort is a subset of personal characteristics, but personal characteristics are not the same as personal circumstances. Is that right?
If we had used the phrase demographic cohort, we would have to define what that means, whereas personal characteristics is a phrase that already has a level of definition and is therefore preferred by the Government.
I turn to the similar issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick. We carefully considered whether the Bill should be narrower than referring to personal characteristics—for example, an offender being from a cultural minority—but in the end we felt that was not helpful.
As such, while I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam for suggesting alternative wording, the Government remain of the view that, having considered it carefully, the term personal characteristics is the most appropriate way of capturing the issues raised by the guideline.
Will the Minister clarify the point in relation to pregnancy? He said—it is in the explanatory notes—that it would be right for a sentencer to follow Thompson and order a pre-sentence report where a woman is pregnant or has recently given birth, but that, following the passage of the Bill, it will be incorrect for the Sentencing Council to make recommendations along those lines for sentencers to follow. I do not quite see the difference.
The Court of Appeal has made it clear, and, as my hon. Friend said, it is right to follow Thompson in those circumstances.
While I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam for raising and rightly exploring this issue in Committee, I hope that he will not press the amendment to a vote.
Amendment 3, tabled by the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) on behalf of the official Opposition, would require the Sentencing Council to obtain the Secretary of State’s approval before issuing any sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. Again, I referenced the helpful words of the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam, who said we should tread carefully in this territory and that the separation of powers needs to be very much respected. Therefore, while carefully considering the case for mandating that the Sentencing Council obtain the Secretary of State’s approval, I am not persuaded that that is appropriate at this particular time.
As the Lord Chancellor has set out, this case has highlighted that a potential democratic deficit. That is why we are currently assessing the Sentencing Council’s wider role and powers for developing sentencing guidelines, with recent developments and imposition guidelines in mind.
I gently suggest to the Minister that if there is a risk of a democratic deficit, surely the thing to do is to act now in the short term and unpick it later if he feels he has overreached.
We certainly do not feel that we have overreached. We are acting in a timely and effective way. As the debate has demonstrated, there are issues of detail that need to be properly explored. The Lord Chancellor has done the right thing in announcing a review that will have a look at things in proper time; that will take place.
Given the special role of the Sentencing Council and the significant policy and constitutional issues involved, it is right that we take the time to consider whether more fundamental reform is needed, alongside considering wider recommendations that come out of the independent sentencing review. I am not convinced that it will be proper to deal with the issue now through this fast-tracked legislation, nor am I convinced that legislating in a piecemeal way would be helpful, noting that the amendment of the right hon. Member for Newark applies just to sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports when there may be other things that we need to look at. To be clear, we are keeping all options on the table and are willing to legislate further in a more comprehensive way if necessary. I therefore urge the Opposition not to press this amendment.
Amendment 4, also tabled in the right hon. Member’s name, would prevent the Sentencing Council from framing sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports with reference to groups that may have experienced trauma from historical racism or discrimination. While we have carefully considered the case for adding this restriction to the Bill, we are not persuaded that it is necessary. We have taken a general approach in the Bill to preventing sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports from being framed by reference to any personal characteristic of an offender. The Bill specifies that personal characteristics include race, religion or cultural background, but that is not an exhaustive list.
More widely, I appreciate that the right hon. Member for Newark has taken a keen interest in wider guidance across prisons and probation that touches on different experiences, including those specified in the amendment. The Government are absolutely clear on the need to ensure equality before the law. Wider work is going on to review relevant policy and guidance, and we will update practices where necessary. I therefore urge the Opposition not to press the amendment.
New clause 1 would require the Secretary of State to arrange an independent review into the restrictions the Bill places on the Sentencing Council’s ability regarding pre-sentence reports, which are framed by reference to offenders’ different personal characteristics. I thank the hon. Member for Eastbourne for tabling the new clause. Although we have carefully considered the case for such a review and I agree that it is important to carefully think through what the Bill’s effects, I am not persuaded that a review is necessary because the direct changes made by the Bill are very limited in nature.
To recap, the Bill helps protect equality before the law by ensuring no offender receives differential treatment regarding pre-sentence reports based on their personal characteristics. That reflects a fundamental principle that does not need to be reviewed. The Bill does that by restricting the powers of the Sentencing Council to issue sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. It will prevent guidelines from, for example, creating a presumption around whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s personal characteristics, rather than all the circumstances of the offender before the court.
For the avoidance of doubt, this Government support the use of pre-sentence reports and we have publicly committed to creating more capacity in the probation service to ensure it is able to do the valuable work that includes preparing pre-sentence reports. We are also happy to continue to work with the hon. Member for Eastbourne on disparities in the criminal justice system and the use of pre-sentence reports more generally.
We fully support the increased use of PSRs in our courts. PSRs include an assessment of the offender’s behaviour and the risk they pose, and the recommendations for sentencing options. It is a valuable tool, as many Members have said, in helping to ensure a sentence is tailored to an individual offender and their circumstances.
Equality before the law is a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system. It is the Government’s policy and belief that that should be protected. I again welcome the contribution from the Mother of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), supported by the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry) and for Birmingham Perry Barr (Ayoub Khan), to keep our feet to the fire on tackling disproportionality. I confirm again that this Government take very seriously tackling disproportionality in the criminal justice system. That is why the Lord Chancellor has commissioned a review of the data on disparities in the justice system to better understand the drivers of the problem. I know that my right hon. Friend does not need my encouragement to keep going on this one, so I look forward to her continuing to hold us to account as we move forward.
I will also be clear on what the Bill does not do, to underscore its limited changes. Nothing in the Bill restricts the court’s pre-existing ability to request pre-sentence reports, nor the Sentencing Council from advising in general terms that a pre-sentence report should be sought where a further assessment of the offender’s personal circumstances would be beneficial to the court. The Bill does not affect Court of Appeal case law about the types of cases where pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable, as we have covered previously. There is recent relevant case law covering vulnerable defendants, pregnant women and women who have recently given birth, and young defendants. Furthermore, the Bill will not prevent judges from requesting pre-sentence reports in cases where they ordinarily would, including in appropriate cases involving, for example, pregnant women, as well as those involving young people or domestic abuse. I welcome the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Dan Tomlinson) on those issues.
With such considerations in mind, the Government do not consider the proposed review to be necessary. However, as the Lord Chancellor has set out, she is carrying out a review into the wider role and powers of the Sentencing Council, so I can reassure the hon. Member for Eastbourne that there will be further opportunities to discuss issues surrounding the Sentencing Council in the House. I therefore hope that he will withdraw the new clause.
I call Sir Jeremy Wright to wind up.
I think—in gratitude to all those who have spoken—that we have got to a place where the Minister has told the House that there is some territory, which at the moment is being described as “personal characteristics”, into which the sentencing guidelines may not trespass. That is not the same as specifically referring to someone’s personal circumstances, and is a broader area than the question of whether they are a member of a particular demographic group.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Let me first take this opportunity to thank all Members of this House who have spoken in support of this important Bill. I am particularly grateful for the support expressed on Second Reading, as well as to all the hon. and right hon. Members who have contributed to this afternoon’s Committee proceedings. It is not yet a month since the Sentencing Council’s imposition guideline was due to come into effect. The Lord Chancellor followed up her concerns immediately with action. As Members from all parts of the House have acknowledged, had the Government not acted quickly to introduce this Bill, the guideline would have risked differential treatment before the law in this country.
I put on record my thanks to the Sentencing Council and in particular its chair, Lord Justice William Davis, for the constructive conversations on this issue and for pausing the guideline while Parliament had its say, as it is doing today. I also thank officials who have worked on this Bill, including Andrew Waldren, Stephen Toal, Jack Hickey, James Metter, Clare Taylor, as well as the Bill manager, Katherine Ridley, and my excellent private secretary, Emily Brougham. This Government strongly support the use of pre-sentence reports, which judges are required by law to obtain except in circumstances where they consider such a report unnecessary. We also acknowledge that there are disparities within the criminal justice system that must be addressed. However, those are matters of policy, and it is right for the Government to seek a policy response to these issues. That is why we brought this Bill forward, and I commend it to the House.
It is a pleasure to speak on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition on Third Reading, following on directly from the Committee of the whole House, where Government Members rejected our amendments to strengthen the Bill. We now know the strength of the appetite on the Labour Benches to tackle this challenge properly and comprehensively here and now: there is not one. In truth, we knew that already.
The Government had an opportunity weeks ago to restore democratic accountability to the Sentencing Council through the private Member’s Bill of the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). They rejected that opportunity, and earlier today they rejected even the more modest strengthening we proposed. That should not be a surprise. Labour has a Prime Minister who is first and foremost a lawyer, not a leader. He is a lawyer steeped in the philosophy of securing political change through legal activism. That is the very approach that the Lord Chancellor has been forced to bring in emergency legislation to curtail. That approach is why the appetite for proper action is so limited. The legislation before the House is a fig leaf to hide the truth that a Labour party led by Keir Starmer will always have to be dragged kicking and screaming to tackle the judicial activism that he has long championed—[Interruption.]
Order. The shadow Minister must be heard.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker; they do not want to hear it.
The root cause of the issue is that the Prime Minister appointed an Attorney General—the Government’s own Law Officer—who is steeped in judicial activism. The Prime Minister himself practised in a chambers that relished it and wholeheartedly supported its expansion case by case.
For anyone interested in a treatise on the risk of this approach—from someone much more qualified than me, as I am sure the House will agree—I encourage them to listen to Lord Sumption’s Reith lecture. His analysis on the divide between matters that should properly be the domain of politics and matters for law could not be more pertinent. He said:
“It is a vice of some lawyers that they talk about law as if it was a self-contained subject, something to be examined like a laboratory specimen in a test tube, but law does not occupy a world of its own. It is part of a larger system of public decision making. The rest is politics. The politics of ministers and legislators of political parties, of media and pressure groups, and of the wider electorate.”
Lord Sumption went on to say:
“The Courts have developed a broader concept of the…law which greatly enlarges their own constitutional role. They have claimed a wider supervisory authority over other organs of the State. They have inched their way towards a notion of fundamental law overriding the ordinary processes of political decision-making, and these things have inevitably carried them into the realms of legislative and ministerial policy. To adopt the famous dictum of the German military theorist Clausewitz about war, law is now the continuation of politics by other means.”
Be in no doubt: this whole sorry episode has been an exquisite further example of that mentality, this time from the Sentencing Council and its members as part of the wider judiciary establishment. The Lord Chancellor has failed to act decisively today. If she continues to refrain from taking decisive action, we will be here again and again, with the Opposition making sure, on each and every step of the way, that voters know where the sympathies of the Labour party and its leader lie: not with the ordinary, law-abiding citizen who expects equal treatment under the law and the democratically elected politicians of this country deciding on policy, but with activists and campaigning lawyers who want to wrestle control from them.
The Bill is barely adequate—barely. We will not oppose it, because it is better than nothing—and at least it tells the public everything that they need to know about those who sit on the Government Benches, and about the mentality of the man leading them.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Lords Chamber(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to extend my thanks to the many noble Lords who have already contributed to debates in this House on this matter, which have provided me and the Government with valuable food for thought. I am also grateful to the noble Lords with whom I have spoken about this Bill, who have shared their wise counsel and wealth of experience regarding the matters on which it touches.
I know that all noble Lords will be looking forward to my noble friend Lady Nichols’ maiden speech. I welcome her to this place, and I know we will all benefit from her vast experience in public service.
I will start by recapping how we got here, as I believe that it is important to understand the Government’s intention behind the Bill. The Sentencing Council’s imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline helps judges, when sentencing an offender, to determine whether to impose a community order or a custodial sentence. In deciding which threshold has been met, judges are required by law to obtain a pre-sentence report, except in circumstances where the court considers such a report to be unnecessary. Pre-sentence reports are used to give the courts more context for the offending behaviour in a given case to aid judges and magistrates in making informed sentencing decisions. The current imposition guideline makes it clear that pre-sentence reports offer valuable assistance to the court when it decides whether to impose a community or custodial sentence.
Under the last Government, the Sentencing Council consulted on a revised imposition guideline. This guideline was due to come into effect on 1 April this year and includes additional guidance on when courts should request pre-sentence reports. It noted that pre-sentence reports will “normally be considered necessary” for certain offenders, including those from an ethnic, cultural or faith minority. In effect, this could have led to offenders receiving differential treatment in terms of access to pre-sentence reports based on their faith or the colour of their skin. These changes were welcomed by the previous Administration.
By contrast, both the Lord Chancellor and I have been clear that that would be unacceptable—not least for the victims, who put their trust in the criminal justice system. Singling out one group over another undermines the idea that we all stand equal before the law, a principle that has been at the forefront of our justice system and our society for centuries. This is the position that the Lord Chancellor communicated in person and in writing to the Sentencing Council. The Lord Chancellor first used her existing power, meeting the Sentencing Council’s chair on 13 March to ask it to reconsider its approach. Unfortunately, the council declined to amend the guidelines significantly or re-consult on its approach. While the Sentencing Council remains of a different opinion from the Government, I am grateful to its chair, Lord Justice Davis, for the engagement he has had with the Lord Chancellor and for the cordial conversations that I know we will continue to have.
I am very thankful that, following its engagement, the Sentencing Council has paused implementation of the revised imposition guideline while Parliament has its say. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have shared their expertise in this area with me. It is clear that the intention behind the Sentencing Council’s changes to the guidelines was an honourable one: to address the inequalities in our justice system. The issue of disparities in the criminal justice system is a serious matter, and one which this Government are determined to address.
However, this is a question of policy, one which must be addressed by government, accountable to the public and Parliament, and via the ballot box. As noble Lords will be aware, this issue has prompted debate here, in the other place and publicly on the correct roles and responsibilities of the Sentencing Council, and the Lord Chancellor is carefully reviewing and considering all options. I am sure that that will be discussed more in your Lordships’ House in the months ahead.
However, I want to be clear that this is beyond the scope of the narrow Bill at hand today. The Sentencing Council, although only 15 years old, holds an important position within the justice system, and any changes to its function and powers must be considered carefully. I know that several noble and learned Lords have had roles on the Sentencing Council and its predecessor and will have valuable views to add as this is considered. It would not have been right to address this through this targeted and narrow legislation.
I am proud of our judiciary, and I know that they are the envy of the world: rightly respected for their independence, impartiality and fairness. I know that the Lord Chancellor takes her oath to defend the independence of the judiciary very seriously. I reassure noble Lords that nothing we are considering in terms of the future of the Sentencing Council will change the Government’s clear commitment to defend the rule of law.
I turn now to what the Bill does. Clause 1 amends Section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. It provides that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports may not include provision framed by reference to offenders’ different personal characteristics, including race, religion, belief or cultural background. This would mean that any existing guidelines on pre-sentence reports which are framed by singling out personal characteristics would cease to have effect.
The Sentencing Council will therefore not be able to make such provision in future guidelines. The changes made by this clause therefore prevent the Sentencing Council making policy about when pre-sentence reports should be obtained. That would risk differential treatment before the law and would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system.
In bringing forward the Bill, the Government’s objective is to help ensure equality before the law, so that offenders are treated according to their individual circumstances and not by virtue of their membership of a particular group. We have therefore used the term “personal characteristics” in the Bill to ensure that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports cannot include provision framed by reference to any specific personal characteristic of an offender, and we have accompanied this by listing some characteristics in the Bill, including race, religion or belief, or cultural background.
However, this is a non-exhaustive list, intended to give context to the term. The Government intend that the Bill will also apply to a wider range of characteristics including sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy. We have also used the term “demographic cohort” in the Bill’s Explanatory Notes, to help provide additional context to the meaning of “personal characteristics”.
I will now make clear what the Bill does not do. It does not interfere with the courts’ duties to obtain a pre-sentence report in appropriate cases—for example, those involving primary carers and victims of domestic abuse. The Bill does not interfere with the courts’ ability to request a pre-sentence report. The Sentencing Code is clear that courts must obtain pre-sentence reports unless they consider it to be unnecessary. The Bill does not affect this presumption. The independent judiciary will retain discretion to make decisions about where pre-sentence reports are necessary based on the facts of the case. The Bill does not stop the Sentencing Council advising, in general terms, that pre-sentence reports should be sought in cases where the court would benefit from an assessment of an offender’s personal circumstances.
Also, as detailed in the Explanatory Notes, the Bill does not change existing precedent where the courts have determined that pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable. Recently, in R v Thompson, the Court of Appeal emphasised their importance in sentencing pregnant women or women who have recently given birth. In R v Meanley, the court referenced the value of pre-sentence reports for young defendants. In R v Kurmekaj, the defendant had a traumatic upbringing and vulnerability, and was a victim of modern slavery. The court considered that these factors meant that a pre-sentence report should have been requested. Instead, the Bill narrowly focuses on the issue at hand.
I welcome the use of pre-sentence reports, which are a valuable tool for sentencers in appropriate cases. The number of pre-sentence reports declined by 44% between 2013 and 2023. The Probation Service is under a huge amount of pressure, which is indicative of wider capacity issues in the system. This Government have acted quickly to create capacity within the Probation Service to ensure that our hard-working probation officers have more time for vital work such as this. We have announced plans to recruit a further 1,000 probation officers in the coming year, on top of the 1,300 extra probation officers recruited in the last financial year. I am continuing to work with the Probation Service to ensure that it can deliver a high and consistent standard of service.
We are also working to better understand what drives disparities in the criminal justice system. The Sentencing Council has acknowledged that the causes of disparities in sentencing outcomes are “unclear”. Understanding the data is the key first step to deciding what we must do to address these disparities. The Lord Chancellor set out during the Bill’s Second Reading in the other place that she has commissioned a review of the data held by the Ministry of Justice on disparities in the justice system. On the timeline for the review, noble Lords can rest assured that we are working at pace on this and will update the House in due course. I assure your Lordships that this is an issue which the Government take incredibly seriously and are determined to address. However, this cannot be done at the expense of equality before the law.
In conclusion, by preventing the Sentencing Council making guidelines on pre-sentence reports with reference to personal characteristics, this Bill ensures that we all continue to stand equal before the law. I urge noble Lords to support the Bill and the principle that drives it—of equality before the law. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to this important debate. I welcome the Minister to his place and look forward very much to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. I broadly welcome this legislation while regretting its necessity and that we have reached such an unsatisfactory juncture. I am indebted to Policy Exchange for its excellent paper on this issue, Two-Tier Justice.
The impasse between the Lord Chancellor and the Sentencing Council was significant in its problematic challenge to parliamentary sovereignty, its undermining of the faith and trust that the public must have in the judicial system, and the concept of equal treatment under the law. It further undermined the long-established and quite proper constitutional convention of judicial independence and the separation of powers between the judiciary, legislature and the Executive.
The imbroglio arose from the consultation process on the sentencing guidelines, which was over two years in duration and culminated in January this year. The Sentencing Council’s wilful refusal, enunciated in its letter to the Lord Chancellor on 27 March, to amend its proposed guidelines demonstrated an obtuse disregard for democratic proprieties and quite legitimate criticisms of its actions in formalising two-tier sentencing and differential treatment by the courts based on membership of ethnic, faith and cultural minorities. This is at a time when the public are acutely aware and particularly mindful of fairness and appropriateness, or otherwise, in a number of high-profile criminal cases as reported in the media. This issue transcends party-political differences. It is about whether an elected Parliament and Government Ministers who are accountable to the electorate should be pre-eminent in setting policy in judicial and relevant related matters.
It is appropriate to make the point that pre-sentence reports are a vital tool for magistrates and judges, not least in securing a more comprehensive assessment of an offender and balancing the decision to impose a non-custodial sentence or a term of imprisonment. The previous 2017 imposition guidelines quite rightly made no reference to different cohorts that should receive a pre-sentence report. The new guidelines reference gender, ethnicity, pregnancy, transgender status, and addiction issues, as well as domestic abuse, modern slavery, grooming and other exploitation issues.
The automatic granting of a pre-sentence report to some groups but the availability of only discretionary powers to others was and is wrong. These proposals were divisive, racist and corrosive towards community cohesion. Essentially, if you are a white man who is not religious, you are, or were, under a material and substantive disadvantage in the proposed sentencing regime. The Lord Chancellor was right to highlight this in her letter to the chairman of the Sentencing Council, Lord Justice William Davis, on 6 March.
The fundamental question is: why were these new rules proposed, and on what evidential basis? The Sentencing Council’s 2023 Review of Trend Analysis of the Sentencing Council’s Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences Guideline found that
“for those groups with larger volumes of offenders sentenced, there is predominantly no clear evidence of differential impacts of the Imposition guideline”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, was surely right to state:
“The correct constitutional position would be ... that a judge already has tools at their disposal to seek pre-sentencing reports and that they … do so based on an individual case on a case-by-case basis, rather than categorising certain groups”.
Indeed, we have existing primary legislation in place to allow judges to discharge their duties quite properly, with appropriate evidential discretion, via the Sentencing Act 2020.
The Sentencing Council consultation was flawed and inappropriate, dominated as it was by liberal, self-serving and partisan groups that disregarded the wider societal need for a criminal justice system which is fair, impartial, open and transparent. For the avoidance of doubt, it is not for a judge, however eminent, to unilaterally determine sentencing policy, especially when the Lord Chancellor objects. Parliament has never legislated for it, and it is clear that it is for the judiciary to interpret and apply the law and not to formulate policy on an ad hoc basis. It is for Parliament to set overarching sentencing policy and criminal justice policy while remaining aloof from sentencing of individual offenders by trial judges and magistrates—that also goes for the appellate courts.
So Lord Justice Davis’s rationale in interpreting the role of the Sentencing Council was erroneous. In his letter to the Secretary of State for Justice, Lord Justice Davis referred to the consultation process, stating:
“It was decided that to remove the list would have been contrary to the majority view expressed by consultees”.
That “majority view” among the consultees, that there should be a specified list of groups that automatically receive a pre-sentence report, is unsurprising. The consultation process received 150 responses, 40 of which came from charity or non-governmental organisations. They have every right, and perhaps a duty—organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust, Clinks, the Centre for Women’s Justice and the Howard League for Penal Reform are perfectly entitled—to put forward their views but the Sentencing Council should perhaps have had a more balanced view rather than looking just at the majority of opinion in this particularly niche and narrow consultation.
I think the role of the Government, Ministers and Parliament was misunderstood by the eminent Lord Justice Davis. He questioned whether it was in the power of the Minister to amend Section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in respect of proposing to the Sentencing Council that a sentencing guideline be prepared or revised by the council, and whether it was appropriate in this case. Although the legal advice that Lord Justice Davis intends to obtain has not, as I understand, been published, it seems on an ordinary reading of the legislation, given that the words of the statute are plain and unequivocal, to be a novel approach if the Lord Chancellor is not permitted to propose a revision of the guideline.
Lord Justice Davis also claims that the inclusion of specific cohorts in the imposition guideline is not
“a policy decision of any significance”,
but that is not the case. Even someone as distinguished as Lord Justice Davis must understand that he cannot unilaterally determine, in opposition to the Lord Chancellor, a policy that the Government are obliged to follow. He also says in his letter, rather oddly:
“All judges and magistrates are required to apply any relevant guideline unless the interests of justice require otherwise. In practice, the guidelines form the backbone of every sentencing decision made throughout England and Wales. There is general acceptance of the guidelines by the judiciary because they emanate from an independent body on which”—
this is an important bit—
“judicial members are in the majority. The Council preserves the critical constitutional position of the independent judiciary in relation to sentencing”.
He goes on to say:
“In criminal proceedings where the offender is the subject of prosecution by the state, the state should not determine the sentence imposed on an individual offender. If sentencing guidelines of whatever kind were to be dictated in any way by Ministers of the Crown, this principle would be breached”.
I believe that Lord Justice Davis is mistaken for the following reasons. First, the critical constitutional position of the independent judiciary relates to the sentencing of individual offenders, not the overarching policy. Secondly, Lord Justice Davis implies that the judiciary accept, and presumably follow, sentencing guidelines only
“because they emanate from an independent body on which judicial members are in the majority”,
and I believe that is wrong. Thirdly, the letter from the Lord Chancellor that Lord Justice Davis was replying to does not state or even suggest that Ministers should play any role in the sentences imposed on individual offenders. To suggest otherwise, as Lord Justice Davis does, is disingenuous, I suggest. Fourthly, and lastly, the sense that courts are not part of the state is not only wrong by any ordinary understanding of what the state consists of but is explicitly contradicted by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary’s own website, which states:
“The justice system is one of the three branches of the state. The other two branches are the executive, or the government, and the legislature, which is the two Houses of Parliament”.
Presumably, when Lord Justice Davis refers to the state, he means the Executive.
It is right that the Government have taken swift action to legislate, but the Minister should also explain and look to the workings of his department, given that in the 12 months to January 2025, senior officials from the Ministry of Justice attended meetings of the Sentencing Council when these proposals were put forward, and yet they did not alert Ministers to the fact that the proposed guidelines would be completely unacceptable to both Conservative and Labour Government Ministers.
It is right that we open up and more closely examine the workings and membership of the Sentencing Council and that it is subject to proper scrutiny; for instance, with confirmation hearings in Parliament. We must make sure that something like this does not happen again. Guidelines for the future should be required to be confirmed by orders in Parliament before coming into effect. Finally, it is right that parliamentary sovereignty has been exerted in this case, while judicial independence remains protected. The Bill is a vital and timely intervention, and for that reason I am pleased on this occasion to support it.
My Lords, I start by saying how sorry I was to hear of the death of the noble and learned Lord—who I just think of as Terry—Lord Etherton. His words were always wise, measured and compassionate, and we will miss him. More positively, we look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols.
This one-clause Bill provokes such strong feelings, particularly when there is much we can agree on, but our approach from the Liberal Democrat Benches differs a good deal from that of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. This must be one of those situations where one really does not want to start from here, not only because I would like to rewind, but because we are expecting very soon the review of sentencing by David Gauke. That should be the basis for a debate about sentencing because the debate needs to be wider than this Bill.
We are very concerned about fast-tracking this legislation, which we do not see as necessary or desirable. That is a constitutional point. I am a member of the Constitution Committee. I think the only members who are able to talk today are my noble friend Lord Beith and I. That committee takes the view that fast-tracking is not necessary and says so in a report to the House that was agreed at about noon today and published at about the point that we started this debate. Obviously, the Minister is not going to be able to respond to it today, but I urge that the MoJ responds to the points made by the committee well before Committee stage so that it is properly before the House and considered.
Pre-sentence reports are important and ideally should be for everyone—unless, of course, the court considers that they are not necessary—but the Probation Service is very overstretched. The Lord Chancellor said she was clearing the way to free up capacity in the Probation Service, so we will be interested to know the details of at what cost that might be to the service’s other work. That in itself deserves debate.
The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House, in a report Cutting Crime: Better Community Sentences, spent a little time on pre-sentence reports. I was chairing the committee at the time. The Minister was very welcoming of the report when we debated it. I recall he said that he had read it three times. I suspect his workload is such that he does not manage that for many reports, but we appreciated that. We referred to pre-sentence reports and their purpose, which we described as
“providing an expert assessment of the nature and causes of the offender’s behaviour, the risk they pose and to whom”,
and so on.
Witnesses to our committee raised concerns about the quality of reports, in part because of the pressures on the service, meaning that sentencers—we took the view—do not have the confidence in them that they should have. If a report falls short, the sentencer might not be able to consider an offender as an individual. We heard of PSRs based on what was happening in offenders’ lives eight or nine months previously and not taking into account steps they had taken in that period. We were told in evidence of the view that they were a “tick-box exercise” and not being done in a “meaningful, person-centred way”.
Sentencers may include mental health treatment requirements and alcohol treatment requirements, both of which require the consent of the offender, and drug rehabilitation requirements, which require suitability conditions met by probation making a recommendation to the court. For a sentence to be rehabilitative—one of the objectives of sentencing—it is obvious that the PSR process needs time and the offender to be engaged. The committee said that PSRs
“are an essential part of the sentencing process. They allow courts to tailor sentences to individual circumstances and give sentencers confidence that specific requirements are suitable and available”—
that is another matter—“in their area”. The Government agreed. I stress “individual” because one has surely to consider the whole person, and how do you do that while excluding characteristics?
As well as agreeing on the importance of PSRs, I think most of us would agree on the importance of equality. But that does not mean starting from a point of equality. How can we ignore how people with some characteristics, in particular those picked out in Clause 1, are overrepresented in the criminal justice system? The Sentencing Council acknowledges this in correspondence, and so does the Lord Chancellor.
It is then argued that differential treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity offends the principle of fair treatment before the law. Is “fair” really a synonym for “equal”? I take the view that one has to recognise where there is inequality in order to address it, and addressing it does not always—and not in this context—mean treating everyone the same. As the Sentencing Council notes, there are inequalities in the sentencing regime, for instance around age, which the Bill does not spell out, although this of course comes within the non-exhaustive list that is not on the face of the Bill.
The council’s view is that
“providing a sentencer with as much information as possible about the offender is one means by which … disparity might be addressed”.
While the council agreed with the Government that
“any systemic issue relating to different ethnic groups will be a matter of policy”,
Lord Justice Davis, who has been referred to, said that sentencers must still
“do all that they can to avoid a difference in outcome based on ethnicity. The judge will be better equipped to do that if they have as much information as possible about the offender”.
The Constitution Committee is currently undertaking work on the rule of law, and I am assured by those who are far more expert than me that positive measures are not necessarily incompatible with the rule of law. To me, the term “personal characteristics”, without definition, is confusing. The division between characteristics and circumstances is very grey. What, for instance, is addiction? I think it is a characteristic. That would undermine treatment, to which I have referred.
The list is not exhaustive, as I have said, and that adds to the confusion. There is a risk of confusing characteristics under this Bill with protected characteristics defined for a different piece of legislation. The Constitution Committee is also critical of the Bill because of the uncertainty—I might say incoherence—in this area. I really look forward to the MoJ’s response to the points that we make in the report.
The committee also refers to retroactivity, which offends constitutionality. Can the Minister explain to the House what is to happen with pre-sentence reports that are currently—or will be at the point when the Bill becomes law, as I assume it will—in the pipeline, including reports that have been prepared but are not yet before the court? Are they to be reviewed or rewritten? It is really quite confusing to fast-track a Bill to such an extent that commencement is immediate; normally there is time for those affected by legislation to prepare.
I keep coming back in my mind to the question of how one can sentence without recognising the whole person. I also wonder how one can amend a one-clause Bill without being accused of wrecking it, but I know that my noble friend Lord Marks has been thinking about this very carefully, and I am hopeful that we will find a way to make it a Bill that is both coherent and accessible. I wish—not only for procedural reasons but because the focus should be on an effective, trusted system—that we were not starting from here, and I hope this is not the finishing point.
May I add very briefly to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the late Lord Etherton? He was a lawyer of the highest ability. He had great skill and was a man of real quality. I worked with him for many years at the Bar, and as a colleague on the Bench. All those qualities were shown in abundance in what he achieved in that period. But he also achieved a great deal in this House and took on number of causes that some might not have found popular. He was a great man and will be greatly missed.
I turn very briefly to make three points about the Bill. First, although we have been accorded a long time to speak, I do not intend to take advantage of that to repeat what I already said at length prior to the Easter Recess. I explained then why I thought the Bill was not necessary, and I regret that the Government feel it is. I very much hoped then—and still hope today—that this issue can be resolved without legislation, but I will not repeat what I have already said to that end.
Secondly, I agree with the Minister that this is a very narrow Bill. That is no excuse for not getting it right, but it is a narrow Bill. It is important to note that it is not the occasion for the kind of wide-ranging issues such as those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, to be raised. Therefore, I do not intend to answer them. If they are raised on a subsequent occasion, that will be the appropriate time, but this is a narrow Bill.
I say that because I think it is important that the Sentencing Council and its predecessor bodies, the Sentencing Guidelines Council and the Sentencing Advisory Panel, have worked well, although I ought to declare that I was a member of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, had a hand in setting up the Sentencing Council and was its president for four years until 2017. If we look at what it has done and analyse the constitutional position, I do not believe there is any basis for making any real change. It has been a great success as it brings together two arms of the state, the judiciary and the Executive, under the supervision of the third arm, Parliament, in producing a very sensible way of dealing with balancing the role of Parliament in setting policy and the role of the judiciary in sentencing individuals. That is a complex issue, and I would like to leave it for an occasion where it properly arises. It does not arise today.
Thirdly—this point does arise today—there is the definition of personal characteristics. This has already been touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I think it could, with advantage, be clarified. It would be helpful to understand why the definition is different to the definition of protected characteristics in Section 4 of the Equality Act. I note that the Minister has already referred to the remarks made by Sir Nicholas Dakin in the other place on 30 April, where he said
“we are clear that it is intended to cover a wider range of characteristics including sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/4/25; col. 388.]
There are a lot of other characteristics. Before trying to amend it, it would be helpful to have a clear explanation—I have given the Minister notice of this—of why the course chosen has been chosen.
That is more important in the light of paragraph 14 of the Explanatory Notes, as it uses the term “particular circumstances” of individuals in apparent contradiction to “personal characteristics”. I am not sure that I understand the difference. It would be helpful if the Minister could try to explain it. In any event, with that explanation, we can look forward to amending—I hope with considerable advantage—this part of the Bill without anyone being accused of wrecking it.
My Lords, I declare my interest as Anglican Bishop for prisons. I am grateful to be speaking in this Second Reading debate. I too greatly look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols. Having said that, I do not believe this is a debate we should be having at all. I do not believe this rather theatrical legislation is necessary.
In a world of sufficient resources, as has already been said, there would be comprehensive pre-sentence reports for everyone, to which careful attention would be paid in court. If we have to prioritise PSRs, then it makes sense to prioritise those we know are especially vulnerable, or where there is evidence of disproportionate outcomes from the justice system. Will the Minister comment on why he thinks there was such shock at this apparent two-tier justice with regard to ethnicity but not the other cohorts in the guidance, such as young adults and pregnant women? Do the Government believe the issues raised in the landmark report by the current Foreign Secretary almost eight years ago are now a thing of the past? Is there no role for judges in mitigating the issues raised in that report?
The use of the Sentencing Council guidelines apparently to feed a culture war is distressing. The allegation of two-tier sentencing based around race, religion, belief or cultural background is damaging to public understanding. This is already shaped heavily by media headlines and the shocking and extreme cases of violent crimes, which are not the norm. Public understanding of why and how criminal sentences are handed down is severely lacking, as evidenced by the Justice Select Committee in 2023 and a recent Prison Reform Trust report detailing a citizen jury exercise. My own experience of talking to teenagers in schools is that more information about sentencing results in more considered responses and a greater sense of engagement with what we are trying to achieve, which surely goes beyond mere punishment.
At the heart of the Christian gospel is a God who holds together both justice and mercy. We need a big long-term vision. Surely long-term vision must be about transforming lives and communities, and that includes victims as well as offenders, recognising that many offenders are also victims.
If we are committed to the transformation of society, we need to take account of the impact of sentencing on families and the wider community. I am not saying that people who commit crimes should not receive punishment, but I am saying that sentencing should be much more than this and give the best possible outcomes for society.
In a recent judicial critique focused on sentence inflation, four former Lords Chief Justice, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, highlighted that people in prison are individuals, not statistics, and that the
“consequences of imprisonment on people’s lives—in prison and upon return to the community—need to be considered in the whole”.
They go on to say:
“Evidence suggests that what happens during and after a sentence, including rehabilitative interventions and resettlement support, is more important than sentence length”.
If we are to treat people in the justice system as individuals, that surely includes taking into account people’s circumstances, such as whether a woman is pregnant, and their characteristics, such as neurodiversity. I echo what was said about characteristics. We cannot pretend that circumstances and characteristics do not matter. Wise sentencing is threatened by this am-dram politics, and the Bill risks taking us backwards, not forwards. I firmly believe that we need less political control over sentencing, not more.
I urge the noble Lord to revisit the House of Commons Justice Committee’s 2023 recommendation of the establishment of an independent advisory body on sentencing. I would propose an additional step: a commitment from the Treasury, set out to Parliament, where Ministers propose to expand or lengthen custodial sentences against recommendations from the advisory board, thus resetting the relationship between politics and justice, including the public purse.
There is more I could say—much more—but I will end by engaging with the Government’s own rationale for this legislation. The Justice Secretary says that inequality in society is a matter for policy and not for the judiciary. How, then, will the Government create an equal society over their term of office so that these guidelines become redundant?
My Lords, it is a profound honour to rise before noble Lords today and make my maiden speech in this esteemed Chamber. I am deeply grateful to my sponsors, my noble friends Lady Anderson and Lady Winterton, and to Black Rod and all the House staff, who have been so welcoming since my introduction—particularly the doorkeepers. I am grateful also to my noble friend the Leader, Lady Smith, and the Chief Whip, my noble friend Lord Kennedy, for their personal support since my peerage was announced. To be asked to join your Lordships’ House is a privilege I do not take lightly, and I intend to serve with the same dedication that has guided me throughout my life.
My journey to this moment has been shaped by my roots in Selby in North Yorkshire, a place that has defined who I am and the values I hold dear. It is a town built on industry, hard work and community, a place where people look out for one another and where solidarity is not just a word but a way of life. My connection to Selby runs deep. My father was born there, although his life was not always kind to him. His mother died from tuberculosis when he was six years old, and she was laid to rest in a pauper’s grave in Selby Cemetery —a stark reminder of the struggle so many families faced. My mother, one of 10 children from Spennymoor in County Durham, also knew hardship. Her father, a miner, lost his sight in a pit accident. Yet, even through adversity, my parents found strength, love and purpose. They met during the Second World War: my father was stationed at Burghfield Common and my mother was evacuated nearby. They married, settled in Selby and raised a family in a council house on one of the largest estates in the town. Their values, community resilience and public service shaped my path in life.
It was there that I attended Selby Abbey primary school, following in my family’s footsteps. I recently visited the year six group, who wanted to know about the House of Lords. My early years were filled with memories of the shipyard—yes, a shipyard—on the banks of the River Ouse, and the sight of workers leaving on bicycles as the buzzer sounded, a scene that spoke of industry and pride. But perhaps my most memorable early experience was the time when my mother, after a long walk into town, returned home only for my father to ask, “Where’s Wendy?” To her horror, she had left me outside Woolworths in my pram. Thankfully, I was still there, blissfully unaware that I had been momentarily misplaced.
My professional journey took me from catering college in Leeds and York. I became a school meals cook and then started work in the kitchens of a pit-top canteen at one of the five super-pits around Selby, and later moved into residential care for the elderly, following in my parents’ footsteps once more. It was at Carentan House, formerly a workhouse, where I truly found my calling. I saw at first hand the importance of dignity in care and the power of collective action to bring about change. It was there that I became active in the National Union of Public Employees, which later became UNISON. For over four decades, I have worked for North Yorkshire Council, during which I have fought for the rights of working people, serving as branch secretary in North Yorkshire and in 2015-16 serving as president of UNISON.
Public service has always been in my blood. Like my parents before me, I became a Labour councillor, though my route to office was far from conventional. In 1999, a miscounted vote led to an incorrect result being declared. It took a trip to the High Court and the oversight of a judge to correct the mistake. In a moment that I will never forget, he turned to me at the end and said, “I have always wanted to say these words: ‘I hereby declare Wendy Ruth Nichols duly elected’”. That experience taught me that democracy is precious, but it also requires vigilance.
Beyond local government, I had the privilege of serving on the national executive committee of the Labour Party for nearly 14 years, including some of our most challenging times in our party’s history. I am proud of that work, because I believe that politics should be about service, about building a fairer society and about ensuring that those who come after us inherit something better.
As I take my place in your Lordships’ House, I do so with immense gratitude but also a sense of personal loss. My husband Keith, a proud railwayman and a trade unionist, passed away in 2008. My parents, who shaped so much of who I am, died within a month of each other in 2009. I wish that they could be here to see this moment and share in this honour, but I know that they are with me in spirit, just as I know that my greatest legacy lies not in titles, robes or offices but in my children, Rachel and Shaun, my daughter-in-law Jenny and my six wonderful grandchildren: Brandan, Fiona, Libby, Ella, Michael and Aimee.
I now turn to the debate. This is, again, something of interest to me. Over the years, I have represented many of our members in the Probation Service and have seen the amount of work that they have to do. While PSRs themselves are not an indication of sentence, we know that there is evidence that they are an important element in sentencing. Receiving a PSR is more likely to discourage a judge from sending an offender to prison, and therefore will help to reduce pressure on prison numbers. We know that that there are inequalities and disparities in society and in our justice system, which must be addressed. But these guidelines amount to treating people differently before the law, according to their race or their religion, which breaks an ideal that our justice system is built on: equality for all before the law. One of our most closely held ideals is equality before the law and that we can never have two-tier justice because it completely undermines public confidence.
Clearly, the Sentencing Council is straying into matters of policy in trying to correct for racial disparities using differential treatment methods. Pre-sentence reports are very important to give the judge as much information about the offender as possible and can cut levels of reoffending when used properly. However, I hope that the Minister will agree with me that they should be available for all offenders and that access to a pre-sentence report should not be determined by an offender’s ethnicity, culture or faith.
Pre-sentence reports are important but, very often, probation is stretched so thin that officers do not have time to complete them. What will the Government do to ensure that, where a PSR is required and requested, the Probation Service will have the capacity to do that?
I note that the Bill removes the whole problematic section of the guidelines, but the Lord Chancellor has been clear that pregnant women or victims of domestic abuse would still very much be expected to have a pre-sentence report.
I look forward to working with all your Lordships in the months and years ahead. I bring with me the values of Selby: community, fairness and a belief that we all do better when we stand together. I thank noble Lords for their time and their welcome, and I look forward to playing my part in this great institution. The path from the pit-top canteen to the red Benches of this House has been eventful, and I have no doubt that the next chapter will be just as remarkable.
My Lords, it is an honour as well as a pleasure to be the first to congratulate my noble friend on her outstanding and, if I may say so, very moving maiden speech. She brings to this House deep experience and wisdom. She and her loving family have met challenges and setbacks that many in this House will not have experienced. She has faced adversity and knows as well as anyone what it is like to be brought up, to work and to live in a world where people do not always enjoy the good things that many of us in this House take, and have always taken, for granted.
It was clear in her speech that she understands deeply how people experience life. Her brilliant reputation, from her union work with NUPE and then with UNISON, shows that absolutely clearly. There will be many in Selby and beyond who owe a huge amount to her hard work and commitment. She told us in her speech that her values are community, resilience and public service. Whether in working for her constituents when she was a councillor, working for North Yorkshire Council for many years, her work for UNISON and her fellow workers, or performing her important and invaluable—I mean invaluable; many on this side will know exactly what I am saying—political work, she has truly lived up to her values. All of us who have had the honour of listening to her speech today look forward to hearing her many times in this House.
On the debate, I should declare some interests: first as chair of the Leicester Community Advice and Law Centre; secondly, as joint chair of the All-Party Group on Access to Justice; and, thirdly, as a member of this House’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee. Before making the few points that I intend to make, I want to stress—and I think it needs to be stressed—how the Ministry of Justice under this Government already has a record to be proud of. It is not only in the quality of its Ministers, particularly in this House, but in what, against crushing obstacles, it has already achieved, given the ridiculous, unsatisfactory budget it has to work with.
For me, the small but important increases in the legal aid area, and particularly the setting up of the Gauke and Leveson reviews, are among the MoJ’s most significant achievements. However, I cannot say that I am equally delighted to see the Bill before the House this afternoon, taking up precious parliamentary time that could be spent legislating, or at least debating, other more vital justice issues. Frankly, I find it hard to accept that we could not have resolved this impasse without the need for legislation, let alone fast-tracked legislation.
After all, there is an overwhelming consensus as to the value and necessity of pre-sentence reports. In addition, there is surely widespread agreement that the Gauke review, due out later this month, and the legislation that follows it, will be of much greater significance than the Bill as far as sentencing is concerned. It will also, of course, be relevant to the issues we are discussing this afternoon at Second Reading. The danger, it seems to me, is one of overlegislating. By not allowing something as broad as personal characteristics to be taken into account in sentencing, we may, almost by accident, be excluding other factors that are highly relevant to any sentencing decision.
This takes me to an amendment moved but not voted on in the other place. It was in the name of the right honourable Member, Jeremy Wright, a distinguished Attorney-General in the coalition and succeeding Tory Governments. He argued, cogently, that if anything that comes within the broad category of the term “personal characteristics” is forbidden from being considered by the Sentencing Council when setting out its guidelines, this could well cover other personal characteristics—he mentioned physical or learning difficulties, or severe injuries—which is surely not the intention of the Bill and could make the difficult task of the sentencer even more difficult. Jeremy Wright suggested a change in wording to “demographic cohort”, thus giving Ministers their point but not making the result confused or unintelligible. I am attracted by this approach and hope that the Government, following this Second Reading, will carefully consider Mr Wright’s proposition, if not using his actual words.
I want to make two final points. Both the current chair of the Commons Justice Committee, Andy Slaughter MP, and his predecessor, Sir Bob Neill, have expressed regret that the Bill, and particularly the events leading up to it, have been used by some to undermine judicial independence and to allow ad hominem attacks on judges under the guise of belated objections to these guidelines. I agree entirely with the two chairs of the Commons Justice Committee. Alas, today we see in other countries around the world, including, surprisingly, the United States of America, how easy it is for Governments, and Oppositions, to attack the judges. As a matter of course, we do not do that in this country, I hope, and I find it more than sad that—indeed, I am angry that—it has happened here.
Independence of the judiciary is of course a fundamental part of the rule of law. Attacking judges undermines that independence, and all of us should resist the temptation, however irresistible some politicians seem to find it. We should know better.
What unites us, and what makes this legislation quite hard to understand, is that all of us believe in the importance of pre-sentence reports, which play a vital part in sentencing. I practised criminal law for over 25 years, defending more than prosecuting. That was some time ago, of course, but in those days, it was inconceivable that a first-time offender—or any offender, really—who might face a first custodial sentence would be sentenced without a properly prepared pre-sentence report. By properly prepared, I do not mean a 10-minute interview in the cells and then back into court; I mean a well prepared and thorough report, with a probation officer being given the time and space to do their job.
We were all surely shocked to learn that the number of pre-sentence reports has fallen by 42% between 2015 and 2023, from 160,000 to 90,000. I am afraid that one has to ask the question: how many of these reports are having to be prepared much too quickly?
I hope we can all agree that pre-sentence reports are an essential part of our system and cannot be allowed to be compromised for financial reasons. That is why the future of the Probation Service is so vital to this debate, and why, in my view, it would have been better, if possible, to have waited until the Gauke review and the legislation that follows it.
My Lords, I too begin by paying tribute, briefly, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. He was a mentor and, for 25 years, along with his husband, Andrew, a close friend. I benefited from his counsel and friendship for many years, and I will miss him dearly, as I am sure many will in this House.
My spirits were, however, raised by the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. Her words were warm, moving, inspiring and thoughtful, so I am sure she will make a great contribution to this place.
Many of the points I wanted to make about the Bill have been made very eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and now by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. I should say that, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Bach, criminal law and criminal procedure is not within my field of academic expertise or practice at the Bar; the concerns I have about the Bill are of a more general nature.
I understand and respect the political considerations behind the Bill, but as with other brief and seemingly straightforward pieces of legislation, it lacks the necessary clarity. The main problem is, as we heard before, the concept of personal characteristics. The prohibition is by reference to this concept. The Bill does not contain a definition of personal characteristics but provides a non-exhaustive list. It leaves open the question of what other characteristics might count as personal characteristics under the Bill.
At paragraph 14 of the Explanatory Notes, the effect of the two key subsections of the Bill is described as follows:
“Sentencing Guidelines cannot be issued to state that it should generally be necessary to obtain a pre-sentence report based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort, rather than the particular circumstances of that individual”.
The Explanatory Notes thus suggest that the concept of personal characteristics is related to membership of demographic cohorts. The Sentencing Council’s draft guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences, which prompted the adoption of the Bill, said that a pre-sentence report would be necessary if the offender belonged to one or more cohorts. The guidelines did not describe the cohorts as demographic, because they included characteristics that would not generally be understood as being demographic.
It may be that the addition of the adjective “demographic” in the Explanatory Notes was designed to give more specificity, but, unfortunately, the categories of personal characteristics specified in Clause 1(3) seem only to add confusion. To begin with, we do not see the most obvious characteristic defining a demographic cohort—age. Moreover, the characteristics mentioned in the Bill, such as “belief” and “cultural background”, are not usually understood as characteristics defining membership of demographic cohorts. So I am not sure that the description in the Explanatory Notes of the cohorts as “demographic” really tells us very much about the meaning of personal characteristics.
Of the three personal characteristics that are expressly mentioned, two—“race” and “religion or belief”—are also protected characteristics under the Equality Act, while the third, “cultural background”, is not. By the way, cultural background is itself a rather vague notion. I was going to ask the Minister to provide some clarity on the relationship between personal characteristics in the Bill and protected characteristics under the Equality Act, but he addressed this issue in part in his introductory remarks. However, I am not sure that what he said makes the boundaries of the concept of “personal characteristics” any easier to identify. The Bill, as currently drafted, lends itself to both a broad and a narrow understanding of personal characteristics. Based on the Minister’s introductory remarks, it seems that the Government take the view that the broad interpretation is to be preferred. Can he tell us whether this means that personal characteristics include all protected characteristics under the Equality Act, as well as other unspecified characteristics? If so, how do we identify these other characteristics?
The Explanatory Notes also draw a distinction, on which others have commented, between “personal characteristics” and “personal circumstances”, but can the Minister help us understand the dividing line between them? What about, for example, education or socioeconomic status: is that a characteristic or a circumstance?
There are constructive avenues through which some of these issues can be addressed and the clarity of the Bill can be enhanced. It will be important for us to consider these thoroughly in Committee to ensure that the Sentencing Council receives a far clearer legislative instruction than the current draft of the Bill provides.
My Lords, what a pleasure it was to listen to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. I am so glad that she took such trouble to explain the complicated background that brought her to this House; it greatly adds to our understanding of the way in which she will approach the work that she will undertake here. It was an inspiring speech, and she also contributed to the merits of this debate, which was very valuable.
I was the last to work with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, on his final contribution to the work of the House. He sat as chairman of the Holocaust Memorial Bill Select Committee, which was a difficult task because many Members of this House were very concerned about its provisions. He presided over it with great care, great skill and considerable charm. If he was unwell—and he may well have been—he did not show it, so he conducted his duties as chairman with a great deal of courage. It was typical of his kindness that, as we were approaching Christmas and finishing our work, he did something unusual that I have never encountered before: he, as chairman, sent each member of the committee a Christmas card. That may seem like a rather light point to make, but it was very typical of a man who was very down to earth, very kind and very thoughtful. We shall miss him very much.
As others have said, it would be lovely if we could resolve the dispute that has given rise to this Bill without legislation. However, we have the draft legislation, so I will address what we have before us without speculating as to what might have happened.
As we heard, particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, there are two issues of principle that arise here: one is the independence of the judiciary and the need to respect that, and the second is the principle of equality before the law. As for the first, while the Sentencing Council includes the judiciary in its membership and is there to provide guidance to the judiciary, I do not see this as a reason why the Bill should not proceed. It does not compromise the independence of the judiciary in the exercise of its judicial function. It does not seek to deal with any decisions delivered in court by members of the judiciary. Its sole concern is with an issue of policy raised by the council’s revised guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. It does not address the passing of a sentence itself.
It is surely right, then, that the Government should ask Parliament to engage with issues of that kind if they find themselves in disagreement with what the council has proposed. Our statutes are full of examples of situations where policy decisions about the nature and length of sentences are made by Parliament. It was not always so: when I began my practice as a lawyer—earlier than the noble Lord, Lord Bach— 50 years ago, Parliament did not really say anything about sentencing. There were no sentencing councils; it was all a matter for the judiciary. We have discovered that there is a need for balance and consistency. That is where the Sentencing Council comes in, and one can understand its function.
The fact that the Bill disagrees with a policy decision by the council does not in any way undermine or offend against the principle of the independence of the judiciary. It is the application of the principle that everyone should be equal before the law that lies behind the Bill. I understand the Government’s concern that the revised guideline does not seem to respect that principle. To say that a PSR is normally to be considered necessary if the offender is from an ethnic, cultural or faith minority community inevitably raises the question: what about the others? What about the rest of those who are not from those particular backgrounds?
As everyone knows, due to years of hollowing out by successive Governments, the Probation Service is short of money. It is underresourced, and that has given rise to the tragic situation that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, described so well—the diminution in the number and possibly the quality of the reports that are being delivered. The problem we are addressing is that although everybody who faces a custodial or community service should have a pre-sentence report, that is not something that the Probation Service can deliver for everybody.
As I was not part of the discussions, I do not know why the council felt it necessary to issue the revised guideline, but it seems likely that it felt that priority should be given to some in a situation where a PSR cannot be got for everyone. I can understand that approach.
I agree with the Government that there is a risk that the revised guideline, although sensible and understandable for the reason I just discussed, will disadvantage those who are not from the particular cohorts that it has identified. They face the prospect of being sentenced without a pre-sentence report, and that is a result that, in most cases, no one would wish to see.
My principal concern, which others have touched on, is with the wording of the Bill. This was indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, told us, a point raised at Second Reading in the House of Commons by Sir Jeremy Wright, the former Attorney-General. He later tabled an amendment which addressed his point. As he said at Second Reading, we ought not to address one inequality by replacing it with another. He suggested, and I respectfully agree with him, that the phrase “personal characteristics” in proposed new Section 120(4) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is too broad. As worded, it seems to prevent the issue of guidelines to deal with cases where information about a particular personal characteristic—I rephrase that as “an individual’s circumstances”, because it might include individuals’ circumstances too in that broad language—is crucial to the just disposal of the case.
Take circumstances such as impaired physical or mental health, autism or some other condition or disability of that kind, pregnancy, or the fact that a person is a primary carer. These are examples of cases to which, on its present wording, the wide prohibition that the Bill seeks to impose would seem to apply. Sir Jeremy’s point was that there is a danger of throwing the baby out with the bath-water, and he wondered why the more precise language in the Explanatory Notes was not used.
I ask the same question. The Explanatory Notes say that the Bill will
“prevent differential treatment … It does this by preventing the creation of a presumption regarding whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort”.
Sir Jeremy had those particular words in mind. The use of the phrase
“membership of a particular demographic cohort”
would avoid extending the exclusion too far, while addressing more precisely the problem that the Government wish to address.
I have rather gathered from what the Minister said in introducing this debate that it is the Government’s intention that the prohibition should extend beyond the list which is given in the new subsection. That is troublesome. If the Government wish to stick to the language that they have chosen, they really should consider rewording the definition in new subsection (12). It says that, for the purposes of Section 120 of the 2009 Act,
“‘personal characteristics’ include, in particular”
listed items. The word “include”, if the Minister will forgive me for saying so, really is a weasel word. It stretches the point into the unknown, over which the House has no control or opportunity for scrutiny. When a prohibition is legislated for—a prohibition in particular—it should be precise. That would be achieved by replacing “include, in particular” with the simple word “means”, which would tie the prohibition down to the particular circumstances listed in the new subsection. That would give the prohibition a precise meaning, while meeting the very particular point in the revised guideline that the Government object to.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, and the Constitution Committee’s report drew attention to, there are reasons to be concerned about the fact that the Bill is being fast-tracked. But the fact is that it is being fast-tracked, and I suggest that with it that brings a reluctance to accept amendments in this House which would require the Bill’s return to the other place. If that will be the position of the Minister, I very much regret it, because I hope he will listen very carefully when we reach Committee to ways in which, without undermining or destroying the Bill, we can improve the wording to make clear exactly what the prohibition is intended to do.
The point is that words matter—words always matter. It is the function of this House to address that point, which is why I gave the Minister notice of it in advance and why I am addressing it now, along with others with whom I respectfully agree. I hope that, in order to save time, if that is what the Government want to do, they will look at the wording of these provisions themselves and come up with an amendment of their own which meets the objection that I am raising. I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, I start by congratulating my noble friend Lady Nichols on her absolutely brilliant and very moving maiden speech. It is great to be sitting here with her today.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his excellent work on this very difficult issue. I believe he was absolutely right to respond as he has. I think this is a question of how we preserve the public’s trust in our legal system. As we all know, unfortunately, we generally trust institutions much less nowadays, especially government and politics. That said, the British legal system enjoys a relatively high rating with the public, at 62%, versus the OECD average of 54%. This is something we must work hard to preserve and should feel very proud of.
There is, rightly, some concern that ethnic minorities are overrepresented in the prison system, as the Lammy review, for instance, found recently. However, the majority of the public does not see the sort of sentencing guidelines that are being discussed today—taking into account religious or ethnic background—as the solution. The polling on this is pretty clear: 72% of the public oppose these moves and 52% strongly oppose them. This clarity extends across the whole population. There are some differences between gender, age and so on, but, basically, that majority view—and particularly that strength of feeling—is held across all groups.
Essentially, it seems that the public believe that sentencing guidelines of this type risk being unfair and disregarding the complexity of causes that need to be taken into account. It might be that the public could, and perhaps should, know more about how sentences are set, but it certainly seems to me that simply saying that they are wrong is not the answer.
I therefore agree that introducing such sentencing guidelines is more likely to create resentment, and risks causing more problems than it solves and breaking that vital bond of trust between the public and the legal system that matters so much. I support the Bill very strongly.
My Lords, I do not regard the decision of the Government to try to resolve a difference of view about the contents of the guidelines in bringing legislation before this House as improper, or as an assault on the constitution or on the judiciary, but I think it is extremely ill-advised. It is ill-advised because of the fast-tracking, because of the impression it gives about pre-sentencing reports and because the Bill is so incoherent. I want to deal with each of those things.
It seems to me that the Government have encouraged a practice, to be deplored among Governments, of finding a political problem, getting out the legislative shotgun and firing the trigger immediately, before any serious thought has been given to how a problem can be dealt with properly and effectively.
The Bill is both unnecessary and undesirable. It is undesirable because it gives the impression that pre-sentence reports are in some way conferring a privilege, whereas they are in fact assisting the judge. If in some cases they lead to someone being given a non-custodial sentence, that may well be because a non-custodial sentence is more likely to reduce re-offending on the part of that person. They are to assist the judge to make important considerations in sentencing practice which need to be made—and increasingly need to be made in a situation where our prisons are desperately overcrowded and their record in reducing reoffending, as the Minister knows all too well, is very weak indeed.
I come to the contents of the Bill. The Bill says that guidelines about pre-sentence reports
“may not include provision framed by reference to different personal characteristics of an offender … in particular … race … religion”
or
“cultural background”.
The phrase “in particular” implies that other personal characteristics, unspecified, could fall within the prohibition. The Government’s Explanatory Notes on the Bill confirm at paragraph 15 that the list in the Bill is “non-exhaustive”. That has been further confirmed by various statements that Ministers have made.
How does the Sentencing Council know if a category or cohort of offenders, other than those named in the Bill, is covered by the prohibition? It is a very bad practice to impose on a body—in this case a single body, the Sentencing Council—a law whose extent it cannot know. There is no known method of deciding what the status in relation to this law is of a characteristic which is not specified in it and which does not fall within some generally described category.
We are all aware of numerous categories to which this applies. There are pregnant women, who are already covered, of course, by R v Thompson in 2024. It is not clear to me whether, if the sentencing guidelines included a phrase drawing attention to recent case law on the subject of pregnant women being given custodial sentences, the Sentencing Council would be acting illegally. What is to happen in those circumstances?
One can think of a number of other circumstances where there is already provision in statute and which the Government appear to be saying are unaffected by the Bill, but it is not clear whether the Sentencing Council can lawfully draw attention to those features, which fall within personal characteristics. The example that I took is not named in the Bill, but it applies to the named and the unnamed characteristics. There are many of them—victims of modern slavery; victims of domestic violence; offenders brought up in local authority care; victims of sexual abuse in childhood; residents of a notorious gang-ridden housing estate characterised by intimidation; children. Nearly all those categories do not fall within those specified in the Bill but obviously ought to be in a pre-sentence report. What happens if the Sentencing Council draws attention to any of those in any future version of the guidelines which emerges from this process? The Bill is a mess.
We have a crisis of re-offending, a crisis in our prisons and a sentencing review led by David Gauke. Those are the sorts of things that we need to be talking about. There is no crisis in the Sentencing Council; there is a disagreement about the form of words to be used to give guidance to courts on sentencing. However, that does not justify fast-tracking of Bills, which attenuates proper debate and discussion and could lead to the situation described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, of the Government being reluctant to accept an amendment because the fast-tracking would be upset by the Bill going back to the Commons. That is nonsense, because it would be done in a day. The noble and learned Lord’s guidance was very wise. I hope that we are not deterred from amending the Bill by the need for it to go back to the other House. That would make a nonsense of what we are here to do and the responsibilities that we have. In the Constitution Committee report, which is now technically published but not yet widely seen, it makes clear its objections to that fast-tracking process.
We have all these crises and problems in relation to our prison system and sentencing policy, yet here we have a Bill which does nothing to address any of them and is an ill-advised move in circumstances which could be resolved in a much better way.
My Lords, it was a pleasure to hear the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. I particularly liked her comment that politics is about service. I think that almost everybody in this House understands that extremely well and tries to commit to it. It is also a pleasure to be in a debate where the lawyers mostly agree. That is quite unusual. Quite often, one is debating this or that, but today it has been rather harmonious.
The Sentencing Council is an independent body that saw a problem and tried to do something about it. It has done what it was designed to do. Now, the Labour Government are running scared of these rather nasty right-wingers who are trying to interfere. I think it was Elon Musk, perhaps among others, who first said that Britain had a two-tier justice system. He was right. That is exactly what we have. Some groups are treated worse than others. We do not have equality under the law. We have known about women being less fairly treated for decades, with their being imprisoned for things that men would not be. The Sentencing Council came up with the mildest of changes to address that issue and has been slammed for it. The updated sentencing guidelines do not do anything dramatic. They just ensure that the courts have the most comprehensive information about offenders and offences. The revised guidelines put emphasis on pre-sentence reports in sentencing decisions and offer more clarity on the scope of requirements for community orders and suspended sentences.
The Government say that they want equality under the law, but everybody wants that; we all understand that it is absolutely desirable. However, the difference is that I accept the evidence that we currently have a two-tier system of justice where you can end up receiving worse treatment because you are a woman or because of the colour of your skin.
If the Government are going to reject the guidance from the Sentencing Council, what ideas are they putting forward? I am speaking only briefly because a lot has been said already that I agree with—and some with which I do not, obviously. I am puzzled by the fact that the Government do not have qualms—or perhaps they do; the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, might want to tell us—about the fact that the Greens, the Lib Dems, the Cross-Benchers and the Church are speaking against the Bill. They have the Conservatives and Policy Exchange supporting them—what is that about? Since when did the Labour Government want to be supported by this lot? I really do not understand where they are coming from.
Please can we remember that we are in a society now that is deeply misogynistic—more than, I think, at any time in my life? As a 1970s feminist, I thought that we had won that battle. I really thought that this was the future for women and that we would be equal in society. We clearly are not. The Government ought to address things such as that. I look forward to seeing some of the amendments from more learned people. I would almost certainly support them.
My Lords, I, too, add my heartfelt congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, on her wonderful maiden speech. I know her from back in North Yorkshire. She was always a wonderful woman—a wonderful lady. If you went to some of her meetings, she was very like a mother hen gathering her chicks around her. She was always looking out for somebody who was on the margin and excluded, and she tried to draw them in. What noble Lords have heard is what I experienced when she was a politician. She is still loved in Selby, and people still remember her. I remember the grand opening of the organ in that wonderful place. She was there helping with tea and coffee, serving and being involved. She did it from the heart. It was never a show. With her smile and her welcome, you always knew you had come home. I look forward to hearing what she is going to say. Her maiden speech was one of those things that reminded me of North Yorkshire.
Some of your Lordships may be surprised, but I welcome this Bill for the reasons clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes and the House of Lords Library briefing by Claire Brader. They give the reasons why this is happening: in the meeting with the Sentencing Council, it did not want to change things within its guidance, so the Government thought it was right to change it by legislation—and that is the only way you could change it; there is no other way, because the body is independent.
I agree with His Majesty’s Government that the Bill will ensure equality—I would rather use that word than “fairness”—for all in our courts. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said exactly the same. If we go for “equality” and not “fairness”, then everybody will be clearly included within it.
This law will prevent the Sentencing Council publishing guidelines that stipulate the use of a pre-sentence report —PSR—based on the offender’s personal characteristics. The Government have created this, and I think they should have been much wiser to pick out those characteristics that are prohibited to be used as a basis for exclusion from the Human Rights Act. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said the same thing: race, religion and belief are protected characteristics. Why not put in those protected characteristics or simply refer to Article 9 as set out in the Human Rights Act? That would be much clearer. Of course, they have done a bit about race, belief, and a thing I do not understand: “cultural background”? What does it mean? Does it mean that both of us grew up on the same estate and that, if you did not, you have no background? That is the bit in the Bill that I think is not worth retaining —the Government have to find something better.
I turn to that four-letter word, race. I was chair of the General Synod’s Committee for Minority Ethnic Anglican Concerns, which came out of the Faith in the City report. We carried out a survey of the ways of combating racism in the dioceses of the Church of England in 1991, and we called it Seeds of Hope. We said this about the nature of humanity: men and women, boys and girls, of every hue and ethnic group belong to the one race, the human race, all made in the image of God, and all are of unique worth in his sight.
The word “race” has had a troubled history. Racism is born out of ignorance. Sadly, ignorance is not in short supply, and that is why we get racism. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, believed that colour defined the race of a person. Laws were passed, from marriage to where you lived and where you were buried, because you belonged to a very different race from those who were governing at the time. Next door in Zimbabwe, the seizure of white farms led to the turning of a food basket for the whole region into a basket case. White farmers and their workers belong to the one human race and deserved to be treated thus. Humanity belongs to the one human race—even, I want to say, in Zimbabwe.
Margaret and I have three grandchildren. Two are from a white father and a black mother, while the third is from a white mother and a black father. All three, by the way, are not from mixed parentage or different races; they are blessed to be what we call “double ethnic”—that is, with a white parent and a black parent. It is not that they are “coloured” or this, that or the other stuff. I wish His Majesty’s Government had used a better word, which for me is “ethnicity”, not “race”. The word “race” has an unfortunate history. When most people talk about race they are talking about me, because I happen to be black and Ugandan; when you are talking about a white person, the word “race” does not appear. We all belong to an ethnic group, but equally we belong to the one human race.
I hope we will find a way of talking about this so that we bury the word “racism”, because it often does not describe what you want to describe. During the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, we talked to people in Birmingham who held the view that every white policeman in the Met was a racist simply because they happened to be white and they happened to be in the police. That was a difficult gathering. Then you get some black people to whom you may suggest that their views are racist but they deny that: “Me, a black person? Of course I can’t be racist”. But look at Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
I ask the Government to listen to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and table an amendment that is easier to understand and describes the very thing they want to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, thinks that is unnecessary. If tonight, by a miracle, the Sentencing Council could take out the words that have made the Government create this Bill, then of course there would be no need for it because they would not be in the guidance. But, while that is still the case, I support the Government in making sure that those sections in the guidance are prevented by law. However, I ask the Government to make the law clearer in what it is doing and to drop the question of cultural background. I do not know what it means, and I am not sure whether they know what it means, but it is in the Bill.
My Lords, what a lovely maiden speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. She did Selby and her family proud—and, what is better, she talked a lot of grounded sense on this issue, so I welcome her.
I also welcome this Bill. What we are discussing here—that pre-sentence reports will now not offer differential treatment based on race, religion or cultural background—is important, but, as we have heard, it was a close thing. As the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, outlined, it is important that we note that it is a serious democratic concern that an unelected quango set up by elected politicians sought to act against the wishes of those same elected politicians, and it has taken urgent, fast-tracked primary legislation to stop it. I know from the Minister’s letter that this broader debate is off limits today, but I emphasise that this tension cannot be sidestepped and needs to be taken head on.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, and others say that this Bill is unnecessary. Is the problem for us not that it became necessary because the independent Sentencing Council flouted democracy? That should matter. The Minister’s letter, which I referred to earlier, reassures us that this Bill will not affect pre-sentence reports in general. That is fine, although it has to be said that some attention needs to be given to PSRs. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation’s latest annual report said that 70% of PSRs inspected between February 2024 and February 2025 were deemed insufficient.
I also think that more clarity needs to be offered to the public about the role of pre-sentence reports in general, now that we are talking about them in relation to this Bill. While there may well be broad acceptance that, in making sentencing decisions, the specific individual circumstances of any defendant can be looked at and taken into account, I think reassurance may be needed for the public that the main focus of sentencing decisions should be appropriate punishment for particular criminal actions and individual perpetrators’ culpability.
More broadly, and going back to the specifics of this Bill, I commend the clarity of the Lord Chancellor, Shabana Mahmood, about why the original Sentencing Council’s revised guidelines offended the principle of fair treatment before the law and how they seriously risked eroding confidence in the justice system in general. There is indeed an ever-deepening trust deficit, and I am not entirely sure that this narrow Bill is sufficient to fix it. The reason is that differentiated treatment in criminal justice goes far beyond this sentencing issue. Ms Mahmood seemed to acknowledge that when she stated:
“As someone who is from an ethnic minority background myself, I do not stand for any differential treatment before the law, for anyone of any kind”.
To borrow a phrase from the Prime Minister, she gets it.
Interestingly, Ms Mahmood also used a key phrase in opposing this differentiated approach when she confronted a “two-tier sentencing approach”. That is a choice turn of phrase. Previously, the popular critique of criminal justice as two-tier really resonated, particularly in relation to the sentencing post last summer’s riots, which was sneeringly dismissed as a far-right conspiratorial myth by many Ministers and politicians. It was written off as some culture war trope, and we have heard similar slurs here today. Even as recently as April, the Home Affairs Committee’s inquiry into last year’s “civil disorder” described claims of two-tier policing as “unsubstantiated” and “disgraceful”. Does the Minister acknowledge why there is a widespread perception, reflected in polling and grounded in real-life experience and evidence, that often, even before sentencing occurs, some crimes can be handled differently depending on the race, religion or community membership of the perpetrator?
I have just written the foreword for a forthcoming report entitled The Many Tiers of British Justice: When Identity Politics Trumps Impartial Policing, by Hardeep Singh. I will send a copy to the Minister when it is published next month: it is a crucial read. It uses as an example, and explores in detail, the loss of confidence in the impartiality of police operational decisions, which seem increasingly to be influenced by the particular community being policed, or by broader political concerns, rather than by criminal justice ones.
The plight of the suspended and now sacked chair of the Met Police Federation, Rick Prior, indicates this tension. Mr Prior was removed from his job after a TV interview in which he discussed how his members’ fears of vexatious investigations meant that police officers hesitated before engaging with minority-ethnic Londoners. Referring to some Independent Office for Police Conduct investigations, Mr Prior reported that some police officers had stopped applying the law fairly to people of all backgrounds.
Some noble Lords have expressed concerns about speeches made today that have raised broad political concerns, suggesting that we should have stuck to the narrow tramlines of the Bill—a bit like “Get back in your lane”. But this is Second Reading, so we are allowed to stretch broadly. I will also raise my concerns, which rather mirror those, that criminal justice is being used in a proactive, political way, and that those involved should potentially stick to their lane. Indeed, one thing that the whole Sentencing Council controversy has revealed is the tendency to try to use criminal justice to compensate for perceived racial unfairness and alleged social injustices. The Sentencing Council in its original statement admitted this by saying the quiet bit out loud:
“The reasons for including groups for PSRs vary but include evidence of disparities in sentencing outcomes”.
That translates as, “The aim was to go easier on certain groups to address alleged inequalities”.
The Lord Chancellor, in the Minister’s letter, acknowledged the Sentencing Council’s good intentions in addressing disparities of sentencing outcomes, but I am not sure that we should flatter those intentions. Even if the Minister rightly emphasises that these discussions should be had by policymakers, with decisions accountable to the public, I have a nagging concern, and perhaps the Minister can reassure me as I finish off.
The Government seem to be accepting at face value the Supreme Court’s thesis that racial disparities or inequalities of outcome must mean inequality of treatment and racist discrimination. I fear that such conclusions are exactly what leads to inappropriate, proactive anti-racist correctives and cloud the ability to look dispassionately and objectively at the issue. At the very least, alternative explanations need to be considered. For example, ethnic minorities tend to plead not guilty at a higher rate, leading to less leniency at sentencing. One hypothesis to explain this is that there is more distrust of advice given by state-provided lawyers—distrust that might legitimately have its roots in the legacy of historic racism.
If criminal justice bodies and politicians push a narrative that the state is institutionally racist, will that not simply deepen and embed such distrust? What we need are not narrow Bills but broader discussions. However, in this instance I hope that the narrow Bill will clear the way for those broader discussions, which should be about the use of the law and the judiciary for political purposes—something I think is worrying.
My Lords, this rather sombre debate has been enhanced by the delightful and endearing maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby. I am so glad I was here to hear it.
I endorse the comments made in respect of the death of my learned friend and erstwhile colleague, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. His loss is a personal blow and a blow to this House.
I believe it particularly desirable that judges should have the assistance of a pre-sentence report when sentencing ethnic-minority offenders. The Lammy review identified that ethnic-minority and particularly black offenders were sentenced to prison more often and for longer than white offenders. The review considered pre-sentence reports and concluded that the role that they played was
“vital considering the … difference in backgrounds – both in social class and ethnicity – between the magistrates, judges and many of those offenders who come before them”.
The problem is that, ideally, provision of pre-sentence reports should be the norm in the case of almost all serious offenders. Singling out the ethnic-minority cohort in the guidelines is capable of appearing to some to be unfair discrimination. But currently, a struggling Probation Service appears to lack the resources to produce adequate pre-sentence reports, even in the diminishing number of cases where they are requested.
I do not believe that the guidelines introduce two-tier justice, nor do I believe that their introduction would severely damage confidence in our criminal justice system. I do not believe that we need this Bill, but we are where we are. Let us reluctantly accept the Bill, imposing drafting improvements if we may—and there is scope for those—and move on to addressing the much greater problems that currently beset the sentencing regime.
My Lords, I echo the eloquent tributes to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. He will be greatly missed not only by those in this House who have had the privilege of hearing him over recent years, but by the wider legal public and the public in general.
It is with great pleasure that I join others in praising the excellent maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, particularly, if I may say so, the very personal account she included in it. It was also a great pleasure to hear from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, the Yorkshire perspective on the noble Baroness’s contribution to public life.
Nothing I have heard today has persuaded me that this Bill is either necessary or sensible. We on these Benches regard it as an overreaction to a difference, little more than a misunderstanding at the outset, between the Lord Chancellor and the Sentencing Council. What is more, it is a misunderstanding that could and should have been sorted out informally, by discussion and compromise, without resort to emergency legislation, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said.
We believe that this Bill proceeds from a false premise—a fallacy, indeed—that that the Sentencing Council has produced guidelines that depart from the principle that everyone is equal before the law. We in this House all believe in equality before the law. The argument advanced for the Bill is that if PSRs are obtained more readily for particular cohorts of offenders, those offenders are less likely to go to prison, which, so the argument goes, amounts to two-tier justice. But as my noble friend Lord Beith pointed out, this Bill is about the provision of pre-sentence reports, not sentencing offenders differentially. PSRs are written to assist judges in making the right sentencing decisions.
I suggest that the two-tier justice argument misrepresents what equality before the law means. What it means is the courts treating everyone alike, with neither fear nor favour. That is the significance of the saying that justice is blind and of the iconic statue that tops the Old Bailey. It is about applying the law even-handedly.
It does not mean ignoring the evidence—still less skewing the evidence by depriving the court of the ability to do justice on the basis of all the available evidence and information, and so weakening the ability of the court to dispense justice. The underlying reality, which this Bill ignores, is the glaring inequality of outcomes in our criminal justice system, whereby offenders from ethnic minorities have historically been far more harshly treated by sentencing courts. They are far more likely to go to prison than their white counterparts, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, pointed out, for longer.
For the evidence of that, one has only to read the well-researched and well-argued 2017 final report of the Lammy Review, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Mattinson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was among many who reinforced this important point. The Bill does nothing to address that reality—far from it. It ignores three very real truths.
The first is that PSRs are the only reliable way that judges can obtain a full and true account of the individual circumstances of the offenders they are called upon to sentence. These reports are a vital source for judges of independently collated information about those individual circumstances, which they need to take into account when deciding between imprisonment or a community sentence. They cannot get such information from speeches in mitigation, however well-constructed and presented by defence counsel, because they are made on defendants’ instructions and cannot be verified.
The second truth is that, as the Minister reminded us, while PSRs ought to be before judges in every case before sentencing—certainly in every case where a prison sentence is possible but not inevitable—their availability in practice has substantially declined in recent years. The reason for that is uncontroversial. Resources for the Probation Service have been progressively reduced and mismanaged by government over the years. The Minister reminded us that the number of PSRs has reduced by 44% over 10 years.
The third truth is that the quality of the reports that have been produced has declined as the time allowed to probation officers to produce individual reports has been reduced, allegedly to save money. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, spoke in some detail of the present weaknesses of many reports. We thoroughly welcome the Government’s commitment to increasing resources for the Probation Service generally and for the provision of more detailed and thorough PSRs in individual cases in particular.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, that we should be making thorough pre-sentence reports available for all offenders where the options are custody or a community sentence, to enable the court to have the fullest material about individual circumstances of offenders when sentencing. Where I part company with the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, is that it neither logical nor defensible to say, “Well if we can’t afford reports for all those at risk of prison, we will forbid the judges to prioritise the most vulnerable groups in the interests of an artificial equality”. Yet that is what this Bill proposes. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that it is plain wrong to forbid prioritising pre-sentence reports in the face of a lack of resources.
That is not to uphold equality before the law in the face of a misguided guideline. It is to prevent the Sentencing Council performing its function in the most helpful way possible by addressing the inequality of outcomes that bedevils the system as it operates at present. It is all very well for the Minister to say that the causes of unequal outcomes are presently unknown, but there is a mass of evidence to the contrary.
Even the proposition that doing without PSRs saves money is deeply flawed. If, following the logic of the two-tier justice argument, more PSRs lead to fewer custodial sentences, then PSRs do not increase public costs; they save the public money. No one denies that prison is far more expensive than community sentences. That is true on all the evidence, even leaving out of account the knock-on effects of imprisonment on prisoners’ families, housing, employment and dependence on the state, and the effects of all that on the public finances.
Then there is the clear evidence that community sentences are far more effective than prison at reducing reoffending. Reoffending costs the public purse on the average estimate about £18 billion a year. If PSRs are more widely available, then that may contribute to a reduction in reoffending and so a saving of resources.
The Bill raises two constitutional issues. The Constitution Committee has considered this Bill and has prepared a report, which has technically been published today, but of course no one has had time to read or consider the report. That rush is relevant to the first constitutional issue, which is an issue on which the committee criticised this Bill—the use of fast-track emergency legislation once any emergency has passed.
As we know, the Sentencing Council paused implementation of the guidelines, specifically to give this Parliament time to take a view. This Bill has no place being treated as emergency legislation. It has been rushed at every stage. The rules about time lapse between stages are designed to allow time for reflection and consultation between stages, not just in Parliament but outside. This Bill has suffered from a lack of both.
The second constitutional issue is this: while I accept that Parliament has the power and right to legislate to alter the powers or functions of the Sentencing Council, the council is itself a creature of statute and that power ought to be exercised with great caution. The Sentencing Council was established by the Coroners and Justice Act as an independent body to give advice to judges. Its purpose is to assist the judges in the conduct of their sentencing decisions and to help them to achieve the appropriate level of consistency in sentencing approaches and outcomes. That is a judicial function. It is not sensible for the Executive to interfere. Parliament sets out maximum sentences and a set of rules. But it is dangerous for the Executive to interfere, through introducing an Act of Parliament, with the way the sentencing guidelines are then produced, and to set out what they should or should not contain. That runs some risk of an unwarranted and unhelpful interference by the Executive in the working of the judiciary.
In the House of Commons, Robert Jenrick, the Conservative justice spokesperson, proposed an amendment proposing what was in effect a veto over sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In this House, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, proposed much the same thing. That is inappropriate.
In addition, the Bill is incoherent in its drafting—what the Constitution Committee politely calls “legislative uncertainty”. I do not wish to go into detail because the points made throughout the House by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, and the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Verdirame, on personal characteristics are surely right. Are not pregnancy, being transgender and sexual orientation all personal characteristics? They are also circumstances that a sentencing court might want to take into account, as well as ethnicity, particularly where those characteristics give rise to persecution, abuse and psychological and mental health issues. Those are just the kind of factors that might be considered and explained in PSRs. Why should sentencing guidelines not indicate that some of these characteristics are important and make a PSR more valuable to judges?
For my part, I find any distinction between personal characteristics and personal circumstances ill-defined and unhelpful, and I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lord Beith that the wording of the prohibition is profoundly unhelpful. I shall not take up the invitation of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to foreshadow at Second Reading amendments that might later be considered. We have heard a number of suggestions for Committee. I would also consider the insertion of the words “without good cause” into the prohibition, to allow for some assessment of what may or may not be sensible. But that is for the next stage of these proceedings, so I shall leave it there.
My Lords, I hope the House will permit me to begin with a word about the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. He was, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, remarked, a very great man. Outside this House, he was a brilliant Chancery lawyer and a wise judge. In this House, he was a wonderful person to have on your side and, I remember as a Minister, an intimidating, if always courteous, opponent to have on the other side of a debate. I will miss him. May his memory be a blessing.
The Bill has been introduced to remedy a problem, and it does more or less remedy that problem. But it could, and we say should, do more, because the immediate problem that led to the Bill has shone a light on a deeper issue of constitutional significance in the criminal justice system. On that point, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, although we differ on the substance of the Bill and what has led to it.
Not surprisingly, given the number of former senior judges from whom we have heard this afternoon, we have heard many excellent speeches. More surprisingly, given the number of lawyers who have spoken, we have kept more or less to time. But I immediately single out a non-lawyer: the moving maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols of Selby, was a real privilege to listen to. I knew that you could get almost anything at Woolworths, but I did not appreciate that you could get future Baronesses as well. I look forward to hearing more from the noble Baroness during our work in this House in the coming months and years.
As we know, the Sentencing Council, an unelected body with eight members appointed by the Lord—now Lady—Chief Justice and six members appointed by the Lord Chancellor, proposed sentencing guidance that could have led to a divisive criminal justice system, one that risked dividing people by race, religion and identity. That point, it appears, is not now in dispute, at least between the two Front Benchers, given that first the shadow Lord Chancellor and then the Lord Chancellor herself publicly opposed the proposed guidelines.
Originally due to come into effect from 1 April this year, the proposed guidelines said that it will “normally be considered necessary” for judges and magistrates to request a pre-sentence report for certain cohorts of individuals. Those cohorts included the defendant belonging to
“an ethnic minority, cultural minority, and/or faith minority community”.
I should say at the outset that I too am not entirely sure what is meant in these terms by a “cultural minority”, if it is not already an ethnic minority or a faith minority. Are we talking about Morris dancers or devotees of Wagner’s “Ring” cycle? As the Bill uses the same term, this is not really a joke. If the Government want to put this phrase into legislation, they have to tell us what it means. I look forward to the Minister, to whom I have given notice of this and other points, giving a few examples, I hope, of a relevant cultural minority in this context.
What was the effect of these guidelines? It was quite simply that, if you were in one of these groups, a pre-sentence report would “normally be considered necessary”. What is the effect of that? It means that your chances of receiving a non-custodial sentence have increased. Pre-sentence reports, typically written by a probation officer, are key to judges and magistrates deciding whether to sentence an offender to prison or to a non-custodial community order, particularly in borderline cases. As a result, deciding which defendants are included in the cohorts where a pre-sentence report will “normally” be required, and which are not, can be key in deciding who goes to prison and who does not.
As a matter of statute, courts have to follow these guidelines from the Sentencing Council; they are not optional. Prior to 2009, courts in England and Wales were directed that, in sentencing, they must
“have regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case”.
That was from Section 172(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. During the passage of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the provisions concerning sentences attracted considerable debate, and the previous requirement for courts merely to “have regard” to any guidelines was replaced in Section 125 with courts being required to
“follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant … unless … contrary to the interests of justice”.
That was replicated in Section 59 of the Sentencing Act 2020.
I should therefore now deal with some of the points made on behalf of, and by, the Sentencing Council. For the avoidance of any doubt, although this ought not to be necessary to say, I firmly believe in the independence of the judiciary. Indeed, I believe that we have the finest judiciary in the world. But that does not mean that one cannot respectfully respond to points that have been made publicly on behalf of the Sentencing Council to the Lord Chancellor. So, when the chair of the council, Lord Justice Davis, wrote to the Lord Chancellor on 10 March this year, he made the point that it is still possible for a judge or magistrate to order a pre-sentence report if they are sentencing an individual not captured within one of these demographic groups. That is, of course, absolutely true. But, with respect to Lord Justice Davis, it rather misses the point. It is the almost automatic nature of the pre-sentence reports for certain groups, and their discretionary nature for other groups, that is the issue at heart.
Similarly, in his later letter dated 27 March, the learned Lord Justice said:
“The crucial point is that a pre-sentence report will provide information to the judge or magistrate. It will not determine the sentence”—
a point made a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. Again, that is true, but, again with respect to the learned Lord Justice, although a pre-sentence report does not mean that you will get a non-custodial sentence, it is certainly harder to get a non-custodial sentence without one.
To put it bluntly, if the Minister and I were each charged with the same offence, in the same court and with the same previous criminal record, these guidelines would have meant that I would almost certainly get a pre-sentence report, and he might or might not. That would mean that my chances of a non-custodial sentence were better than his, simply because I am a member of a minority faith community. That, I suggest, is entirely unjustifiable.
It is no answer to that point, I suggest, to say that there are disparities in sentencing in our criminal justice system for certain groups. There are those disparities, and we need to understand why they exist and work to eradicate them. But these guidelines are not and never were the answer to that problem, for three reasons. Like my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, I add that I am also indebted to Policy Exchange’s paper by David Spencer, and especially to the person who contributed research support for it.
First, the guidelines did not target only those groups where we see disparities. Black defendants, for example, do appear to receive longer sentences for the same offence than do white defendants. But, to take an example of a minority faith community, do Jewish defendants receive longer sentences? I have seen no evidence of that, and it does not appear that the Sentencing Council did either. These guidelines were therefore not properly targeted at what it said was the problem.
Secondly, as the Minister reminded us, the reason why black defendants receive longer sentences—to use the words of Lord Justice Davis’s own letter—“remains unclear”. What is clear is that the reasons are complex, as the noble Baroness, Lady Mattinson, reminded us, and do not—or certainly do not necessarily—involve bias on the part of sentencers.
I am sure that many noble Lords are, like me, devotees of the legal podcast “Double Jeopardy”, hosted by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who alas is not in his place. As I see that the noble and learned Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is also not in his place, I feel sufficiently charitable to say that his legal podcast, “Law and Disorder”, is also very good—and sufficiently brave to add that it is almost as good as that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald.
In his podcast recently—the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, touched on this—the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, pointed out that black defendants plead not guilty in a higher proportion than do white defendants, and of course sentences are higher if you are found guilty after a not guilty plea, because you lose the guilty plea discount. He pointed out that black defendants also elect for Crown Court trial proportionately more than do white defendants, and sentences are higher after conviction in the Crown Court than in the magistrates’ court. I am not suggesting those two points explain the entirety of the disparity; in fact, I am sure that they do not. There are likely to be a number of reasons for this disparity, which, I repeat, we should work to eradicate. On that point, I agree—and this is a sentence that I rarely utter—with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. But to get back in my normal furrow, where I disagree with her is this: you do not work to eradicate disparities by introducing additional and different discrimination into the system to somehow correct for those disparities, because there is one fundamental principle at the heart of our justice system, and it is this: equality before the law.
I am fond of the Minister, as he knows, so I do not propose to give him too hard a time in having to defend his boss, the Lord Chancellor. But the plain fact of the matter is that, despite having a representative on the council when the guidelines were discussed, the Lord Chancellor acted only once alerted to the problem by the shadow Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor has said that she was not personally aware of the guidelines until Mr Jenrick’s statements brought them to her attention, and of course I entirely accept that. However, given the seniority of some of the officials attending those meetings, the guidelines should have had warning bells ringing and lights flashing in Petty France. That they did not realise that these guidelines would not be acceptable to Ministers would indicate that there might be something of a problem of groupthink. To be fair to the Lord Chancellor, once she had been alerted to it, she got to grips with the issue, including, as I am sure that noble Lords have seen, by way of a polite but sometimes feisty correspondence with Lord Justice Davis, and this Bill is the result.
However, the real issue is the relationship between the Sentencing Council and the Government and between the Sentencing Council and this Parliament. I want to take a few minutes on this topic, because it is fundamentally important and often misunderstood. While I listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, as I always do, this is Second Reading and not Committee, so I want to take a moment to touch on this issue.
To say, as many do, that sentencing is a matter for judges and judges alone is too simplistic and, if meant literally, also wrong. Individual sentencing—that is, the sentence handed out in a particular case—is rightly a matter for, and only for, trial judges and magistrates. The Government must not be involved in that. But the setting of overarching sentencing policy is very clearly a matter for the Government and Parliament.
Here I must again disagree, and again with respect, with Lord Justice Davis, the chair of the Sentencing Council. In his 10 March letter to the Lord Chancellor, he said:
“There is general acceptance of the guidelines by the judiciary because they emanate from an independent body on which judicial members are in the majority. The Council preserves the critical constitutional position of the independent judiciary in relation to sentencing.
In criminal proceedings where the offender is the subject of prosecution by the state, the state should not determine the sentence imposed on an individual offender. If sentencing guidelines of whatever kind were to be dictated in any way by Ministers of the Crown, this principle would be breached”.
I respectfully disagree with Lord Justice Davis, for three reasons.
First, as I have said, we need to distinguish between the sentence imposed on an individual offender and the wholesale policy environment in which sentencing frameworks are set. The former is for the judiciary, and the judiciary alone; the latter is not. Parliament, and therefore Ministers and government, must have a critical role in setting overarching sentencing policy and frameworks. This Bill, for example, is entirely proper constitutionally. Indeed, for many decades we did not have a Sentencing Council at all; it is a creature of fairly recent statute.
Parliament obviously has an important role in setting sentencing policy. The upper limits for the sentencing of offenders are set by Parliament through statute—for example, in the Theft Act 1968. In addition to setting maximum limits, Parliament has sometimes set minimum limits for offences, although courts can often depart from that if exceptional circumstances exist. It is important that Parliament holds the pen because, ultimately, Parliament is accountable to the electorate. The public bear the impact of crime, and it is Government Ministers who are responsible for allocating public funds to the criminal justice system of courts, prisons, probation officers, police and lawyers. Those Ministers are ultimately accountable to Parliament and the electorate.
It was striking that Lord Justice Davis took the view in his letter—a point made in some of today’s contributions—that the inclusion of these specific cohorts in the proposed guidelines was not a
“policy decision of any significance”.
The fact that both the shadow Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chancellor immediately took a different view from that of the Sentencing Council, and that we now have this Bill before us, might indicate that it was in fact a policy decision of real significance and that government and Parliament are entitled to have a role in such policy decisions. I respectfully agree with much of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.
Secondly, Lord Justice Davis’s letter implied that the judiciary accepts and follows sentencing guidelines only because
“they emanate from an independent body on which judicial members are in the majority”.
With respect, that cannot be right. Judges follow the guidelines because they are part of a legally mandated framework, set out in statute, ultimately derived from Parliament. So long as any body is properly constituted under an Act of Parliament, of course our judiciary would follow it.
Thirdly, on a point made earlier, the distinction which Lord Justice Davis draws between courts and what he calls “the state” is, I suggest, somewhat elusive. Courts are part of the state, as the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary’s own website makes clear. I assume that, when Lord Justice Davis referred to “the state”, he actually meant the Executive or the Government. I agree with him, respectfully, that the Government should not be involved in sentencing individual offenders, but the Executive, and this Parliament, should be involved in the sentencing framework and in sentencing policy.
To that end, I invite the Minister to let us know whether as part of their thinking about the Sentencing Council the Government are again considering a proposal, not taken up by the majority of the working group which led to the establishment of the Sentencing Council, that sentencing guidelines from the Sentencing Council before they are implemented should be subject to approval by Parliament. Would he also tell us whether the Government are considering whether the House of Commons Justice Select Committee, which at the moment is a statutory consultee of proposed guidelines after they have been formulated, might itself have a representative on the council?
These are constitutional matters. I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, as to the answer to them, but we agree that these matters raise fundamental constitutional points. For those reasons, I look forward to working on this short but important Bill as it passes through this House. I am very grateful to the Minister for his engagement to date, and no doubt the House in all its quarters will debate in its usual way and seek to improve this Bill in its future stages.
I start my closing speech by paying tribute to the noble and learned Lord Etherton. Being relatively new to this place, I never got to know him, but it is clear how much he was deeply respected and admired. He has been described as a kind person, which is something that I hope one day would be my epitaph.
I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions over the course of today’s debate. The depth of knowledge and experience in this House has certainly been on full display. It has also been a pleasure to be in this place for the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady Nichols of Selby. I warmly welcome her to this place and look forward to working with her in the years to come, as she clearly has a lot to contribute.
I thank noble Lords who have raised perceptive questions over the course of today’s debate and those who have spoken to me privately. I hope they will feel that I have addressed their points in my closing remarks. If I do not cover them now, I will follow up in writing to address their points. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, words matter. I hope that my closing words matter and are helpful in answering noble Lords’ questions.
As I set out in my opening speech, the Sentencing Council’s revised imposition guideline risked differential treatment before the law. As we have discussed, this Bill is not about the wider role and powers of the Sentencing Council. It is not about restricting the use of pre-sentence reports. In fact, this Government are committed to increasing the use of pre-sentence reports. Rather, it is about the very specific issue of the Sentencing Council issuing guidelines on pre-sentence reports with reference to an offender’s personal characteristics, rather than all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, have asked why this Bill is necessary and whether it was possible to resolve the matter with the Sentencing Council without primary legislation. In response, I would explain that we first exhausted all other options prior to introducing this legislation. The imposition guideline was due to come into effect on 1 April this year. Ahead of this, the Lord Chancellor used her existing power to ask the Sentencing Council to reconsider. Unfortunately, the Sentencing Council declined to revise the draft guideline. It was right, at that point, to act quickly to introduce the legislation.
As a result, the Sentencing Council decided to put the guideline on pause while Parliament rightly has its say, and we are grateful to it for doing so. By acting quickly, we prevented a guideline coming into effect which risked differential treatment before the law. This legislation has been necessary to achieve that and to clarify this Government’s commitment to equality before the law.
Noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Beith, have questioned the scheduling of this Bill. I reassure noble Lords that the dates for Committee and Report have been agreed in the usual channels in the usual way.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and my noble friend Lady Mattinson have spoken about the importance of trust and consistency in the justice system. As the speed with which we introduced the Bill demonstrates, this Government are definitive in their stance with regard to equality before the law. The issues that have been raised with regard to disproportionality in our justice system are the domain of government, politics and Parliament. This Bill serves to reassert our ability to determine this country’s policy on the issue of equality of treatment before the law.
As my noble friend Lady Mattinson set out, we must work to preserve trust in our excellent legal system. I thank her for sharing her considered views on this. It is essential to victims that they are able to trust our legal system and know that everyone will be treated equally before the law. Implementing a sentencing guideline that could lead to differential treatment before the law puts trust in the legal system at risk, which is why we acted quickly to address this.
To address the question from the noble Lords, Lord Jackson and Lord Wolfson, about what this Bill means for the future of the Sentencing Council, I reiterate that the Sentencing Council has done valuable work, bringing consistency to judicial decision-making. However, developments on the imposition guideline have clearly revealed a potential issue, where the council is dictating policy that is not this Government’s and that does not express the will of Parliament. The Lord Chancellor is therefore reviewing the powers and function of the Sentencing Council. It would not be appropriate to deal with that wider issue through fast-track legislation, given the significant policy and constitutional issues involved. It is right to take the time to consider more fundamental reform like this. The Lord Chancellor will be considering all options and I know that many in your Lordships’ House will have valuable experience to contribute.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and other noble Lords asked how this Bill interacts with the review of sentencing being led by David Gauke and ably supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett. I reassure noble Lords that this Bill will not have any impact. This Bill is addressing the specific matter at hand regarding the Sentencing Council guidelines. The sentencing review is a wider review of sentencing, and we look forward to considering its recommendations in due course.
I turn now to the questions over the detail of the Bill, which were raised by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Hope, the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame, Lord Beith, Lord Bach and Lord Wolfson, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu. What is clear from this debate is the Government’s objective to help ensure equality before the law. We are clear that an offender should be judged by a court on an individual basis, according to the particular facts and circumstances of their case. It is not for the Sentencing Council to set out in guidance that judgments should be made on the basis of personal characteristics such as race or ethnicity.
The Government have used the broad term “personal characteristics” to make it clear that any reference to preferential treatment for particular cohorts is unacceptable. The Bill states that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, and cultural background, but these are examples and not a comprehensive list. “Personal characteristics” is intended to include a wide range of characteristics, such as sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status. This is broader than the concept of “protected characteristics” in the Equality Act, which is a closed list and not wide enough to address, for example, the reference in the guideline to being a member of a cultural minority.
After careful consideration, the Government have therefore concluded that the most appropriate and principled way to respond to the issues raised by the guideline is to use the broader concept of “personal characteristics” in the Bill. The term “demographic cohort” is used in the Bill’s Explanatory Notes. However, the use of “demographic cohort” was not intended to, and I believe does not, narrow the definition of “personal characteristics”. A demographic cohort is a way of describing people who share certain personal characteristics. It is used in the Explanatory Notes to provide additional context to the Bill, but it would not be an appropriate alternative to the current drafting and would, in my view, raise further difficult questions of definition regarding what amounts to a “demographic cohort”. The term “personal characteristics” is used and understood in other contexts, and the Government consider it is the best formulation to address the issues raised by the guideline.
The noble Lord, Lord Bach, raised concern over whether this Bill interferes with judicial independence. To be clear, this Bill does not in any way influence individual sentencing decisions. Individual sentencing decisions clearly remain a matter for the independent judiciary. However, as I have said previously, the issue of tackling disproportionate outcomes within the criminal justice system is a policy matter and should be addressed by Government Ministers. The narrow change introduced by the Bill targets aspects of the sentencing guidelines that relate to equality of inputs. We are therefore addressing a policy matter and are not encroaching on judicial independence.
It is regrettable that some of the recent debate has strayed into comments about individual judges and their decision-making. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will be reassured that this Government will always support judges to do their jobs independently. I know that the Lord Chancellor takes her duty to defend judicial independence very seriously. As a number of noble and noble and learned Lords have said today, we are very lucky to have a world-class and highly regarded judiciary.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Nichols of Selby, have rightly raised concerns about probation capacity, which is something that I think about in my role on a daily basis. One knock-on effect of this is the consistency and quality of pre-sentence reports. This Government support the wider use and improvement of pre-sentence reports within our courts. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that they can be valuable in all cases and for all defendants, regardless of their membership of a certain cohort, and should be obtained unless a judge believes that they are unnecessary. We are committed to ensuring that pre-sentence reports are available when needed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked what will happen to pre-sentence reports that are being prepared when the Bill comes into effect. I reassure her that there will be no impact on pre-sentence reports in the process of being prepared. This Bill is not about the ability of a court to request a pre-sentence report. The test remains that, under section 30 of the Sentencing Code, a PSR should be requested unless it is considered unnecessary. This is about council guidelines and the need to protect the principle of equal treatment before the law.
We have publicly outlined the steps we are taking to increase capacity in the Probation Service to enable it to undertake more valuable work such as this. Next year, we will bring 1,300 additional new trainee probation officers on board, but as noble Lords are well aware, and I have spoken to a number of noble Lords privately about this, it takes time to train and induct new staff to allow them to become the brilliant probation officers we so highly value. I have a lot to do to help our fantastic probation staff achieve what we know is possible in the service.
To support our probation staff, we are embracing technology, including AI. Work is ongoing that is improving the flow of information—so critical to an accurate assessment of an offender’s risk—and new tools are beginning to strip away a probation officer’s administrative burden. There is much more work still to do. However, given the challenges the Probation Service faces, new staff and better processes are not sufficient on their own. We need to think about how we use the Probation Service, which faces a case load of just over 250,000 offenders, more effectively.
The theme of the debate, highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has been tackling disproportionality across the criminal justice system. We know that more must be done to address inequalities and we are committed to tackling racial disparities, as I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will be pleased to hear. As the Lord Chancellor set out in the other place, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has questioned, she has commissioned a review into the data held by the Ministry of Justice on disparities, and we will carefully consider next steps. We are also taking action to increase diversity in our staff and working with the judiciary to make sure that our appointments are reflective of the society we serve. This has included supporting underrepresented groups to join the judiciary.
A particular concern was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about how the Bill may impact on women—in particular, pregnant women. As the chair of the Women’s Justice Board, I have paid particularly close attention to this matter and have also spoken with board members. To be clear, nothing in the Bill prevents judges requesting pre-sentence reports for pregnant women, nor will it affect Court of Appeal case law, which states that a pre-sentence report is desirable in the case of pregnant or postnatal women. Judges will therefore continue to be able to request pre-sentence reports in cases where they ordinarily would, including, for example, appropriate cases involving pregnant women, and we expect this to continue. We are committed to achieving equal outcomes for women.
In conclusion, this is a targeted and specific Bill which serves to protect the important principles of equality before the law. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and I look forward to engaging with them as the Bill progresses.
My Lords, before the Minister moves the Second Reading, he told the House, in justifying why the term “personal characteristics” is used here, that it is used in a number of contexts. I do not expect him to answer in detail now, but will he write to the House to explain what those contexts are so that we have them in our minds as well?
I will very happily write. As noble Lords are aware, I am not an expert on the finer details of the law, so that would actually help me as well. I beg to move.