Domestic Abuse Bill (Sixth sitting)

Victoria Atkins Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 10th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I was just discussing the issue of a notice being breached on behalf of the victim. I had started to say that in the case of Caroline Flack, who sadly took her own life, there was a notice between her and her partner that they had not breached. In that instance, the partner would be considered the victim in the context we are discussing. That case has highlighted in the public’s mind the fact that when a victim is told not to contact somebody, there will always be pressures, for lots of different reasons, and certainly if the victim shares children with the perpetrator.

In a case where somebody is struggling with their mental health or wishes to reach out, I just want some assurance about how it might play out in court if a breach of these notices occurred on the side of the victim—that is, if a victim breached a notice for pressure reasons, or even for humanitarian reasons. I have seen lots of cases in the family courts, for example, where the fact that orders have not been kept to has been used against victims. I wondered what we might think about breaches of these particular notices from the victim’s point of view.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

The hon. Lady’s question relates to clause 23, but my answer will be given on the basis that we are debating clause 21. Before I answer, I want to clarify that when I said the perpetrator could not make representations, I was thinking of court representations. I suspect that the officer can take representations into account if they arrive at the scene and the perpetrator says something to that officer, or whatever.

In relation to breaches, again, we need to be careful about the language we use. The notice will be between the police, who issue it, and the perpetrator; it does not place any restrictions on the victim. However, with other types of orders, there are of course circumstances in which non-contact orders have been made and the person being protected by that non-contact order contacts the person on whom it is placed.

That must be a matter for the court. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has set out, the person being protected may well have had perfectly reasonable grounds for making contact, but that must fall into the arena of the court. I do not think we could interfere with that, because the judge will have to engage in that balancing exercise when considering the orders, as opposed to the notices we are debating at the moment. I am sorry that I cannot provide the hon. Lady with more information than that, but in those circumstances I recommend to the Committee that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Breach of notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

I will address this clause briefly, because the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has raised a query about it. Clause 23 relates to a perpetrator who is alleged to have breached the grounds of their notice. If a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in breach of a notice, they can be arrested without warrant, held in custody and brought before a magistrates court within 24 hours, or in time to attend the scheduled hearing of the application for a domestic abuse protection order—whichever is sooner. It is fair to say that these are very strong powers, which I hope shows the seriousness with which we believe the alleged perpetrator should be viewed, but also the seriousness with which the police and the courts view these notices.

The Bill also provides the police with a power of entry when they are arresting someone for breach of notice, and that is stronger than the current domestic violence protection notice provisions, which do not go quite that far. This additional power of entry will improve the police’s ability to safeguard victims and to gather vital evidence at the scene of an incident.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

One of the most striking features of the clause is set out in subsection (2), which states:

“A person arrested by virtue of subsection (1) must be held in custody”.

These are indeed strong powers, but they send a very clear signal that the law and law enforcement are on the side of the alleged victim at such times. It is a very welcome move and will give confidence and respite to any alleged victims in future, so we thank the Government for delivering it.

[Victoria Atkins]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I am pleased that he sees what we are trying to achieve with this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Meaning of “domestic abuse protection order”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Minister Chalk—or Minister Atkins? One of you.

[Victoria Atkins]

Sorry. Just to explain, I am obviously very keen that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, plays his part, but this shows that there is real interaction between both our Departments on the Bill, so we have had to do a certain amount of carving-up between us.

It is my pleasure to introduce clause 24. We are moving now from the provisions in the Bill about notices to those about domestic abuse protection orders. Clause 24 defines a DAPO for the purposes of part 3 of the Bill and signposts the subsequent provisions in this chapter relating to the making of an order.

The definition in subsection (1) provides that a DAPO is

“an order which…places prohibitions or restrictions or both on the subject of the order, namely, the perpetrator for the purpose of protecting another person, namely, the victim from abuse and in accordance with Clause one, the victim must be aged 16 or over”

and “personally connected” to the perpetrator.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Domestic abuse protection orders on application

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

One key advantage of the DAPO over other existing orders is that it can be obtained via a range of different application routes. Unlike the current domestic violence protection order, which can only be applied for by police to a magistrates court, or the non-molestation order, which can only be applied for by victims to the family courts, the DAPO provisions allow far greater flexibility in who can apply for an order, and to which court the application may be made.

Clause 25 sets out who can apply for a DAPO: namely, the victim, the police, a relevant third party specified in regulations, or any other person with the leave of the court. The provision for relevant third parties, which is to be set out in the regulations, ensures that such parties would be able to apply for an order directly without first obtaining the leave of the court. We will use the pilot of the orders to assess whether the current provisions for anyone to apply with the leave of the court are sufficient, or whether it would be beneficial to enable local authorities, for example, to make an application without first having to seek leave of the court. If there is a case for expanding the list of persons who can apply for a DAPO as of right, we can provide for that in regulations at a later stage.

Subsections (3) and (4) set out which police force, including the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police, should lead on an application for an order in different circumstances. Where a notice has already been given, the application must be made by the police force that gave the notice. Where the police wish to apply for a stand-alone order without a notice having been given, the application should be made by the force for the police area in which the perpetrator resides currently or intends to come into. The purpose of the provision is to make it absolutely clear which police force has responsibility for applying for a DAPO in order to avoid any confusion, duplication of effort or delay in putting protective measures around the victim.

The clause also sets out to which courts applications can be made. Police applications are to be made to a magistrates court, as is the case for domestic violence protection orders, and other applications are to be made to the family court. To ensure that DAPOs are widely accessible in other circumstances where they may be needed, the clause also allows for applications to be made by a victim during the course of certain proceedings in the family and civil courts, as specified at clause 28.

[Jess Phillips]

The clause is very robust and replaces an incredibly confusing picture of which orders one can get where. As somebody who has filled in the paperwork for pretty much all of these orders, I do not think I could explain it right now. It is very complicated, but we have a clear listing of exactly who can do what. What the Minister has said about regulations being laid around relative third parties is an important point. I know that the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill and also anyone who works in this building will have potential concerns about the misuse of third parties applying for DAPOs. I cannot imagine many circumstances in which they could be misused, but unfortunately perpetrators are particularly manipulative and can sometimes find ways to do that, so I will be interested to see the regulations on third parties when they are laid and how much that will be in consultation with the victim and, in fact, the perpetrator. We are infringing on people’s rights. Although I want to see those rights inhibited in lots of cases, they are none the less rights that we are here to fight for.

The Minister has outlined the police force area in which the DAPO is filed. This is always a complicated thing, but does she foresee any problems with resource in the police force area? I raise this because of personal experience in having orders in my own cases. I am not very popular in Manchester for some reason. I feel desperately sorry for Greater Manchester police. When coming to take statements from me to look at options around protections for me personally, it takes a whole day out of a police officer’s time to come all the way to Birmingham and sit in my house, sometimes for nine hours.

Is there a plan that could be put in guidance around police force partnerships where there is a big geographical spread? In these cases, most likely people will be close by, but when women go into refuge they can move across the country, often from Birmingham to Wales, for some reason—I do not know why, but it is close and we like the water. I have concerns about victims feeling, “Oh, that’s really far away,” or, “Gosh, I’m bothering the police.” I have certainly felt myself that I am bothering Greater Manchester police and that I might just give up on this because it is such an effort for them to drive there.

Those are not reasonable things, and we cannot mitigate people’s feelings in the law. As the Minister said, we do not try to put people’s feelings into the law, because we would never be able to represent them properly, but I think this has to be considered. The clause is well written and substantive in its detail.

[Victoria Atkins]

On the potential for conflict between the different areas for the victim and perpetrator police forces, we absolutely understand that. We very much expect those sorts of issues to be drawn out through the pilot. Interestingly, any police force can issue a notice to the perpetrator in response to a crisis incident, whether or not it is the police force where the perpetrator resides. That prevents any delay in protecting the victim and means that the forces do not have to reach a decision in each case on who should issue the notice. Clause 25(3) provides that whichever police force issues the notice to the perpetrator must then apply for the order against them.

We are very alert to the issue of distances. That is why in subsection (8)(b) we have ensured that a victim cannot be compelled to attend the hearing or answer questions unless they have given oral or written evidence at the hearing. That means that the police and other third-party applicants can make evidence-led applications that do not rely on the victim’s testimony. Of course, where the application is supported by evidence provided by the victim, the court should have the opportunity to hear from the victim in person. We will ensure that there are guidance materials for victims to make it clear what they can expect from the DAPO process and to address any concerns they may have about the DAPO application hearing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Applications where domestic abuse protection notice has been given

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 26 covers the steps that the police must take to apply for a DAPO following the issuing of a domestic abuse protection notice. Subsections (2) and (3) set out that the application for a DAPO must be heard in a magistrates court within 48 hours of the notice being given. That 48-hour period gives the police time to make the application for the order while giving the victims breathing space from the perpetrator until more comprehensive and longer-term protective measures can be put in place through the DAPO.

Clause 22 requires the police giving the notice to ask the perpetrator to provide an address at which they may be given notice of the hearing of the application for the order. Clause 26 provides that if the notice of the hearing is left at this address or, in cases where no address is given, reasonable efforts have been made by the police to give the perpetrator the notice, the court may hear the application without notice to the perpetrator. That is to ensure that the sorts of manipulative individuals that we have heard about cannot try to frustrate this process by simply not turning up.

To ensure that the victim remains protected if the hearing of the DAPO application is adjourned by the court, subsections (7) and (8) ensure that the notice continues to have effect until the application for the DAPO has been determined or withdrawn. The perpetrator can be remanded if they have been brought before the court after breaching the notice. Again, these are very powerful measures, and I hope that assures the Committee about the strength that we want to give to the police, the courts and those who are trying to stop perpetrators and protect victims, and about our determination to support them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Remand under section 26(8) of person arrested for breach of notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

I call Minister Chalk.

--- Later in debate ---

I am aware that, in some places, police have not been able to use domestic violence protection orders to protect women, for fear that, in removing the perpetrator from the home, they would make him homeless, which effectively leaves the woman at risk. Other police areas have found routes round that. During the coronavirus crisis, I looked over the accounts of the Manchester courts, and they were handing out those orders. It is a real opportunity for us to learn in this area because, for the first time, with the “Everyone In” scheme run by the MHCLG, accommodation has been offered for perpetrators. That is not the standard that we are used to, but during the coronavirus crisis, that has certainly been the case.

[Victoria Atkins]

On coronavirus, we have been in constant contact with charities and the police locally to understand how DVPOs are working. Where there have been problems, as in the hon. Lady’s point about homelessness, we have sent out guidance repeatedly to local authorities to say that they must include perpetrators in their rehousing programmes, precisely so that DVPOs can be enforced.

[Jess Phillips]

It will be a very thin silver lining to what has been an enormous cloud over our country. The Minister is absolutely right: we have been learning some things in this period. Because of the availability of resource in our police forces as a result of the reduction in other areas of crime, this will in some regards be a high point—a gold standard—in terms of how we act in domestic violence cases. If there was certainty in a police force area, built in partnership with a local authority, that there would absolutely be a place for a perpetrator to stay, I can almost guarantee that the police would be much more active in the DVPO area, because that is what we have seen during the coronavirus crisis.

There should be five elements of a perpetrator strategy. We need criminal justice systems and other public and voluntary services, such as housing, health and education. We need training, and clever and tough working, to hold perpetrators to account. We need proven interventions and behaviour change programmes for all perpetrators available everywhere, and we need education to prevent and raise awareness of abusive behaviours. We need regulation to end poorly run programmes, some of which are actually dangerous. And we need ongoing research to ensure that we know what stops abuse, particularly within groups that are currently under-served by these kinds of preventive interventions, such as LGBT groups.

Essentially, money is needed. A sustainable and predictable source of funding would save millions in policing, justice and health costs—perhaps even billions, given the Home Office costings on the cost of domestic abuse. Leadership is ultimately needed to make it happen. It is pleasing to see that the domestic abuse commissioner is taking a proactive stance on this. She will need backing from Ministers in all Departments to look beyond their important response to victims to the other side of the coin: the people causing the harm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 37 relates to arrest for breach of order and it makes provision for breach of a domestic abuse protection order to be dealt with as a civil matter— that is, as a contempt of court. A breach of an order is a criminal offence under clause 36, which we did not debate, whereby a police officer can make an arrest without a warrant under powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

However, we understand that some victims may be concerned about their partner or ex-partner being convicted of a criminal offence for breaching the order. Where an order is made by the High Court, the family court or the county court, clause 37 makes provision for the victim—the original applicant for the order—or any other person with leave of the judge to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest to be issued. That means that the court can then deal with the breach as a civil matter as a contempt of court. We consider that this allows effective action to be taken by the court following breach of an order, while still providing an option for victims who do not wish to criminalise their partner or ex-partner.

Schedule 1 makes further provision regarding remand under clause 37, where breach of a DAPO is being dealt with by the court as a civil matter. It sets out the procedure whereby the court may remand the person who has been arrested for breach. The process set out is consistent with existing law and replicates the approach the court already takes in regard to remand in such cases. It is sometimes necessary for the court to adjourn the hearing in order to allow for evidence to be prepared. In such cases, the court may decide to remand the person in custody or on bail.

Remand would usually only be used in cases where the court considers that the person arrested for breach is at a high risk of either committing further breaches or evading the return hearing. That may include, for example, if the court considers that person a flight risk.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 38

Notification requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 38 provides that all DAPOs will impose notification requirements on the perpetrator, requiring them to notify the police of certain personal details within three days, beginning with the day on which the order is made. The perpetrator will have to provide details of their name, together with any aliases that they use, their home address and any changes to those details. This will help to ensure the police have the right information at the right time in order to monitor the perpetrator’s whereabouts and the risk posed to the victim.

These provisions have been drafted to capture a number of different scenarios, including if the perpetrator has no one fixed address, leaves and then returns to the UK or becomes homeless, helping to ensure their compliance with the notification requirements. There is also a power for the Home Secretary to specify by regulations further notification requirements, which a court may attach to a DAPO on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate. For example, details of the perpetrator’s work place, whether they hold a firearms licence and details of new applications for a spousal visa.

We will use the pilot of the orders to assess whether the current provisions are sufficient or whether it is necessary for the police to be notified of additional information by the perpetrator in order to protect victims. If so, this can be set out in regulations at a later stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Offences relating to notification

Amendment made: 34, in clause 40, page 26, line 22, leave out “section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” and insert “paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020”.—(Alex Chalk.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 40 simply provides that breach of the notification requirements without reasonable excuse is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. Again, this sends a very strong message to perpetrators that the Government, as well as the courts, the agencies, the police and so on, take any breaches of these orders very seriously indeed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Variation and discharge of orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 41 is about the variation and discharge of orders. Another example of the DAPO’s flexibility is that the requirements imposed by the order can be varied so that the courts can respond to changes over time in the perpetrator’s abusive behaviour. That is important for the complainant, so to speak, as well as for the person who is subject to the perpetrator order. It is important that he—it will usually be a he—can come back to the court to seek to vary it if appropriate. That is why the clause is drafted as it is.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Nature of certain proceedings under this Part

Amendment made: 35, in clause 45, page 31, leave out line 15 and insert

“sections 79, 80 and 82 of the Sentencing Code”—(Alex Chalk.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Special measures for witnesses

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 47— Review of domestic abuse protection orders and notices—

“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of this Act being passed conduct a review into the operation and use of domestic abuse protection orders and notices.

(2) The review must take account of—

(a) the extent to which domestic abuse protection orders and notices have been used;

(b) data on the effectiveness of domestic abuse protection orders and notices in tackling and preventing domestic abuse;

(c) the views of those for whose protection orders and notices have been made.

(3) In designing and conducting the review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner,

(b) the Welsh Ministers,

(c) organisations providing support to victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse,

(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Upon completion of the review, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report setting out—

(a) the findings of the review, and

(b) the action the Secretary of State proposes to take in response to the review.”

This new clause would ensure that both DAPOs and DAPNs are reviewed to ensure that they are operating effectively and serving the purpose that they were intended for.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 47 requires the Government to issue statutory guidance on the new notices and orders to the police, and to any third parties specified in regulations who may make a standalone application for an order. The recipients of that guidance must have regard to it when exercising their functions. The Government are also required to consult the commissioner before issuing or revising any guidance under the clause. This provision is crucial to help to ensure that frontline practitioners have the knowledge, understanding and confidence to use DAPOs effectively and consistently, in order to help victims and their children.

Topics to be covered by the guidance include how the different application pathways for a DAPO operate, when to consider applying for a DAPO and how to prepare robust application conditions, which may be included in a DAPO, and how to work with victims effectively, highlighting the importance of robust safety planning and referral to appropriate victim support services. We will develop the guidance in collaboration with the police and sector experts, ensuring that it is of high quality and relevant to the frontline practitioners using it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Powers to make other orders in proceedings under this Part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

The clause relates to powers to make other orders in proceedings under this part. I will speak briefly on this, because it is important. Clause 49 makes provision for DAPO proceedings to be included in the definition of family proceedings in the Children Act 1989 and the Family Law Act 1996, if they are taking place in the family court or the family division of the high court. In practical terms, that will ensure that family judges have access to their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in the course of DAPO proceedings.

For example, if a family judge is hearing an application to make or vary a DAPO, and concerns around child contact arrangements are raised, the judge will be able to make an order under the Children Act without a separate application having to be issued. We consider that that will provide clarity and flexibility to the court, as judges will be able to use their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in any DAPO proceedings to best protect victims of domestic abuse and their children.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 50 to 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)