European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

That is a not a verdict with which I agree. Some of the criticisms of the Bill have been exaggerated up to and beyond the point of hyperbole, and I will seek to explain why.

In concluding my comments about why the Bill is needed, I want to stress that the time available to us under the terms of article 50 is limited. We must assume that in March 2019 this country will leave the European Union. That will be the deadline, and therefore by that date we need not only to have primary legislation enacted, but to have established the new regulatory bodies. We will need to have given effect to the secondary legislation that is proposed under the defined powers laid out in the Bill.

Several right hon. and hon. Members have said, “Yes, certain rights may be being preserved, but what about the general underlying principles of EU law?” As I said earlier, when we leave, the treaties will cease to apply to this country, but under the Bill, the general principles of European law, as recognised by the Court of Justice before exit day, or as embodied in extant European legislation, will be retained in United Kingdom law for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law. Existing sources of rights and domestic rights of action will continue to operate in United Kingdom law undisturbed by the Bill. That includes rights such as the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination. Similarly, notwithstanding our exit from the EU, individuals will continue to be able to challenge secondary legislation and administrative action under our domestic law by way of well-established grounds of judicial review.

To take two important issues that have been raised, all the rights and remedies available under the working time directive or the Equality Act 2010 will remain in force, but they will be enforced through the United Kingdom courts—ultimately, our Supreme Court—rather than through the European courts.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I wonder whether what my right hon. Friend says can actually be correct. The feature of the Bill is that it removes the right of challenge for breach of the general principles of EU law. As a consequence, rights that currently exist and are exercised—indeed, were exercised by our right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union—will in future not be available. That is an important point that the Government will have to consider during the passage of the Bill.

[Mr Lidington]

For the most part, those rights are used when they are given effect through specific items of European Union legislation, rather than in the abstract. My right hon. and learned Friend makes an important point, and it is true that after exit it will not be possible for an individual to bring a free-standing claim, or for the courts to quash an administrative action or disapply legislation on the grounds that it breaks one or more of the general principles of European law, except as those principles have been preserved by the Bill—which will be the case if those principles have been given effect through a specific piece of legislation. That position flows logically from the decision by the electorate to leave the European Union, because that does involve separating the United Kingdom’s legal order from the European Union’s legal order.

The issue of devolution has been the subject of much debate among Scottish Members of Parliament—

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[Mr Lidington]

It strikes me that there have been constructive comments and suggestions from a range of Members, including my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for Rushcliffe and for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) and the hon. Members for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) and for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer). Between Second Reading and Committee, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and his team intend to discuss those suggestions further with colleagues on both sides of the House.

We accept that we need to get the balance right—for example, between negative and affirmative procedure and between debates in Committee and debates on the Floor of the House—and, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has already pledged, we wish to discuss further the issue first raised by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) about linking the timing of SIs under clause 9 to the date of debates on the withdrawal agreement, although we will have to bear in mind the possibility that that agreement might be concluded only very shortly before the date of exit.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend is discussing matters that will have to be considered in detail in Committee. A sensible programme motion has been tabled, but can the Government assure the House that, if more time is needed because, in truth, we have difficulty getting through the programme within the period specified, they will properly consider making more time available to the House?

[Mr Lidington]

We think that the 64 hours that have been guaranteed are reasonable, and they compare with the 39 hours and 17 minutes that the Blair Government granted on the Bill to ratify the Lisbon treaty. We have shown today that, where there is good reason to extend debate further, we are willing to consider it very seriously and carefully indeed. I hope my right hon. and learned Friend will take that assurance in the spirit in which it is intended.

I hope that the House will recognise that it is in the national interest that we put this Bill on the statute book and that we deliver the democratic verdict of the British people in a way that allows businesses and individuals to plan for their future, confident in what the law will be on and after exit day. I hope that the House will therefore give a clear vote for the Bill on Second Reading.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baker]

I will give way just once more, to one of the Members behind me, and then I will make progress. I give way to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my beloved neighbour.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Does he recognise that there are two different issues relating to exit day? Some of the amendments were tabled to express the fear that there might be multiple exit dates. That is very different from fixing a day. Obviously, under article 50 there is an expiry date, but, as my hon. Friend knows, article 50 itself contains provision for a possible extension of the period if that is what is needed to conclude an agreement. That is why I find the Government’s amendment so strange. It seems to me to fetter the Government, to add nothing to the strength of their negotiating position, and, in fact, potentially to create a very great problem that could be visited on us at a later stage.

[Mr Baker]

My right hon. and learned Friend has made his point with considerable clarity. Of course I accept that the article 50 process involves certain provisions, but I should say to him that a number of learned voices in private expressed concern about the existence of a degree of elasticity in the sunsetting of the powers in the Bill, and, for that reason, were anxious for us to fix the exit date. I should also say to him that, while he made his point with his usual clarity, other Members expressed the view that we should put beyond doubt the time and the date when we leave the European Union, and that is what our amendment does.

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[Mr Baker]

I will get on with my speech now.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that very point?

[Mr Baker]

No. I did say to my right hon. and learned Friend, and the Committee, that I was going to get on with it. If I give way to him, I will not make the progress that I need to make.

We said on Second Reading that we would listen to the concerns of the House, and our amendment delivers on that promise. Ultimately, the Government want the Bill to provide as much certainty as possible, and we are happy to consider amendments that share that goal. I hope that in the light of this the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) will be willing to withdraw his new clause, and hon. and right hon. Members with related amendments will withdraw them, too.

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[Paul Blomfield]

I agree with the hon. and learned Lady. In fact, the Brexit Secretary talked about the Court in those terms yesterday.

[Mr Grieve]

I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. Is not part of the difficulty that there is a sense of people being disingenuous about the reality of the process of Brexit? Of course it is possible that, at the end of this, despite how we pass this legislation, the Government will come back with a withdrawal agreement Bill—the statute they have promised us—that does the very thing they will not admit at the moment: keep us within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union during a transitional period. Would it not be better, and would it not help us in our debates on this Bill, if we had a bit of honesty and clarity from all sides about the implications of withdrawal, about how we have to go about it and about the options—sometimes the lack of options—that may be open to us?

[Paul Blomfield]

I very much agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Otherwise, we will face the nonsense of the Government introducing new legislation effectively repealing the repeal Bill, or a key part of it.

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[Sir William Cash]

I had actually spotted that, Dame Rosie, and I am most grateful to you for confirming that I am in order.

Let me now touch on some of the issues that arise from this continuous emphasis on the virtues of the European Court of Justice. There is the constitutional principle, which I have already explained, and there is the case law, which I have also already explained. But it goes further than that. The very great Lord Justice Bingham, in chapter 12 of his book “The Rule of Law”, describes the relationship between the courts and Parliament. He comes down unequivocally in favour of Parliament. He makes it clear that when Parliament passes a Bill such as the one that we are to enact, it will override all the laws in the European system that have shackled us so far, and also all the Court judgments, save only that we have agreed, by virtue of the retained law, to transpose some aspects of the process to which we have become used, and which we can decide what to do with at a future date.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir William Cash]

I certainly will; I should be only too delighted. I have been waiting to hear from my right hon. and learned Friend, whom I happen to know very well, and for whom I have great respect. I shall listen to him with interest.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think my hon. Friend can have it both ways. A moment ago, he was talking about direct effect. There is no doubt that if we leave the European Union, direct effect will cease on the day we go; but, as I am sure he knows, we are signed up to about 800 treaties with arbitral mechanisms that can lead to judgments affecting the United Kingdom, which we then undertake to implement, sometimes by changing our own laws. I do not quite understand why my hon. Friend has such an obsession with the Court of Justice of the European Union if its direct effect will be removed, although we will have to be subject to it during the transitional period as we are leaving.

[Sir William Cash]

I do not think that matter has been entirely settled, by any means. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) earlier referred to a lunch she was at, where it appears that she was told we were going to be subject to the European Court of Justice, and my right hon. and learned Friend has made exactly the same point.

I have to say that there are serious questions about the nature of the European Court. The problem is that the European Court is essentially not an impartial court at all. It has never discharged the function impartially, and from the early 1960s it developed a range of principles, such as those of the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law, that it then expanded of its own volition into the general principles of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law over national law. These judge-made principles had no basis in the EU treaties until the Lisbon treaty, which my right hon. and learned Friend, who was then Attorney General, opposed. The fact is that until Lisbon—

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[Yvette Cooper]

Clearly, we need more transparency.

I want to draw my remarks to a close. My amendment gives Parliament the opportunity to indeed take back control. The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) said he wants us to debate in this House how we are governed. Well, then he should vote for my amendment, rather than concentrate power in the hands of Ministers. At a time when we have seen democratic values and democratic institutions undermined and under threat right across the world, we have an even greater responsibility to ensure that there is a proper democratic process and that we follow our obligations that come with the parliamentary Oath we took. So much of the debate we had during the referendum was about parliamentary sovereignty. What my amendment does is make that real.

[Mr Grieve]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in this debate, particularly as the matters on which I wish to touch very much concern her amendment and some of the others we have had.

I hope that the House will forgive me if I start by dealing briefly with the opening remarks of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). I am sorry he is not in his place, but I hope that he will forgive me if I say that the words he articulated were ones that I could fully understand and appreciate—heaven knows I have heard them often enough from constituents and from right-thinking people who want the best for our country—but that contained simplicities. Those simplicities simply do not match the problems this House faces in disentangling us from our relationship with the European Union. This issue has bedevilled the entire debate on Brexit and remain, and it is one reason why we find ourselves where we are today.

I happen to believe that what we did last year was a great and historic error. I cannot help it, and nothing that has happened since is going to alter my view. I recognise my responsibility as a Member of Parliament to try to give effect to what the public asked for in their response to that referendum. But in doing so, I am certainly not willing to suspend my own judgment, particularly when I have to witness what I see as an extraordinarily painful process of national self-mutilation, which I am required to facilitate. I cannot escape that; that is what I feel, and I am not going to abandon it because I am ordered to do so by anybody else.

With that in mind, I have to say what the right hon. Gentleman is asking for is the desire perhaps of many people in this country, which is to go to bed at night and wake up to find that the whole thing is over and done with. Unfortunately, it is not going to be over and done with for a very long time. The problem we have in this Bill, and on which we have to focus, is how we try to take this risky, dangerous—for our economy, our national security and our national wellbeing—and difficult process to a reasonable outcome. That is the challenge we have got. In doing that, Parliament cannot simply abdicate its responsibility to the Executive. Of course the Executive have to get on with the business of the complex negotiations, but Parliament is entitled to take a check on this at every conceivable stage.

I have to say to my colleagues on the Treasury Bench that the problem is that as the difficulties have piled up—in my view, they were inevitable, predictable and predicted—the tendency has been for everybody to get more and more brittle, more and more unwilling to listen, and more and more persuaded that every suggestion that is being made is in some way a form of treason. I have to say, with the deepest regret, that this culminated last Friday with a mad amendment, which I shall come back to in a moment. It was tabled, I believe, without any collective decision making in government at all and it was accompanied by bloodcurdling threats that anybody who might stand in its way was in some way betraying the country’s destiny and mission. I am afraid that I am just not prepared to go along with that.

[Paul Farrelly]

I welcome the amendment tabled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman that would remove the Alice “Through the Looking-Glass” absurdity of there being different exit days for different purposes. I was an early signatory to all his amendments because they are eminently sensible. The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) described entertainingly the reasons for the remarkable metamorphosis of the Bill, from one that allowed Ministers to name an exit day or different days by regulations into one that names a day and a specific time. It was a sop to the denizens of what he called the fourth row below the Gangway. Has the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield reflected on what such a fundamental change signals to our partners in the European Union about how serious we are and how carefully we have thought through this crucial process?

[Mr Grieve]

There is no doubt that some of the problems we have are not going to be helpful in our negotiation. Equally, it is right to say that the more we can have mature, considered and sensible debate in this House, the more we improve our ability to negotiate with our EU partners.

I have tabled a number of amendments. As with all amendments, some are multiple choice—we have to do this in this House, because it is how we go about looking at and examining legislation—and some are probing amendments. Some are, in my view, more important than others. I tabled the one that hon. Gentleman highlights because the Government did not really explain that they wanted multiple exit dates. I wanted to tease out why and to suggest that one exit date might be better because of the consequences for the use of Henry VIII powers thereafter, but there might actually be a justification for what the Government are doing. All that needs to be worked through in the legislation, and that is what I have sought to do.

I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that over past weeks we have had some really sensible, constructive discussions on some of the areas covered by the amendments that I have tabled. I hope very much indeed that we can achieve some degree of consensus, in which case some of the amendments, whether on triage or the way we treat retained EU law, might not be required. I do not wish to get diverted into all that; I shall come back to it in later debates. The trouble is—I repeat this—that it all gets marred by events such as those last Friday, when extraordinary amendments are suddenly magicked out of the blue that simply do not make any sense at all.

When I read the amendments and those consequential on them, which I must say I saw only this morning, I saw another problem: as has already been highlighted, one of the consequentials seemed to me to totally undermine the purpose of the main amendment, to the point where the conspiracy theorist in me made me think it was a sort of double deceit or double bluff—that it was intended in some way to give the impression to some of my right hon. and hon. Friends who really worry about this that they were being offered this tablet of stone on our departure, but it was in fact teasingly capable of being shifted. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General sent me a text earlier that said that I was mistaken and that that was not the intention—that it was the very reverse.

I am not a parliamentary draftsman, and I know that there are always different ways in which an amendment to a statute can be read. I remain of the view, though, that the wording is very peculiar indeed if the intention is to exclude the possibility of playing around with the exit date, which is being offered as a talisman. I must say to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that I did naughtily begin to wonder whether in fact the parliamentary draftsman was so appalled at the folly of what the Government were doing that he had sneakily altered amendment 383 to try to offer them a lifeline in case they came to regret what they had done. I am sure that that is being very unfair to the parliamentary draftsman, whom I know always does what is requested of him or her.

[Chris Bryant]

The tendency of any Government, especially when they have such a major project on their hands, is always to try to manage the project and to manage Parliament. Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman discovered over recent weeks that the sad truth of the matter is that there is a consensus in the House that embraces all those on the Opposition Benches and a significant number of Government Back Benchers? It actually embraces half the Government—I can see at least three, possibly four, Ministers sitting on the Front Bench who would sign up to his amendment. Would not it be far more rational for the Government simply to calm down about this process and try to establish a consensus that can carry the country forward?

[Mr Grieve]

I endorse what the hon. Gentleman says. That is precisely what I wanted to start suggesting to Ministers. There are a number of key areas in this debate this afternoon. The first is the recognition, belated but nevertheless I am grateful for it, that leaving the EU requires statutory authority from this House to make it part of the rule of the law of our land. It is a very important principle. Indeed, I detect that the Government also recognise that if, at some point in the future, we get beyond transition we will probably need another statute to alter the law of our land for any final agreement that we have with our EU partners. We will have to take it in a measured way, and the Government will have to accept that Parliament, being sovereign, must, at the end of the day, have the ability to support or reject this. There is no way around that.

Of course there are the hypothetical questions, such as “Well, there might be nothing to reject because we might be falling out of the European Union with no agreement.” Indeed, yes, but we will discover that when the time comes. In the meantime, the Government must get on with their negotiation, and we can carry on scrutinising them on that. At the end, we want a statute. That statute—I think that this has been acknowledged by the Secretary of State—has got to come before we leave.

That then brings us to a critical issue in this debate. The best point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State yesterday was that, whereas moving into transition is a qualified majority decision, getting an extension to article 50 requires unanimity. Therefore, the Government may be living with legitimate anxiety that there could be circumstances in which, running up to the wire, there could be difficulty implementing the whole thing by statute. I personally think that that seems inherently improbable, because, on the face of it, if our partners agree a deal with us, why would they then decide to pull the rug from under our feet in such an extraordinary fashion—I know that they talk about “perfidious Albion”, and we probably think that they are all garlic eaters—to tell us that we cannot have an extension to article 50 for the necessary two or three months to take through our statutory processes while they have to take their processes through the EU Parliament?

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

Was the right hon. and learned Gentleman alarmed, as I was yesterday, when, after mentioning to the Secretary of State that the Prime Minister had asked in September for a two-year extension—six months after she had triggered article 50 —he did not seem to have a clue when the EU 27 might possibly agree to it? Some of the media think that that extension will automatically happen, but, as we speak, there is absolutely no guarantee that we will get it. Is he alarmed that the UK might indeed find itself out because of its own actions in March?

[Mr Grieve]

There are massive uncertainties in all this, and I do not want to pile the gloom on the Treasury Bench. All I will say is that there are great risks. I do understand that the Government have an important point on this, but if that is the case, the proper dialogue that should be taking place between those on the Treasury Bench and the House is how we craft and alter this legislation both to emphasise the statutory process to be followed and to make sure that the only circumstances in which it is not followed—clause 9 has to be used as an example—is where it would be impossible to get an article 50 extension to enable the statutory process to take place before we go. If we do that, we will start talking sense in this House, rather than the polemical nonsense that we have been talking over the past few days.

[John Redwood]

When Czechoslovakia decided to form two countries with two Governments—a very complicated task—it took six months planning and was implemented over a weekend. Why does my right hon. and learned Friend think that the 16 months remaining is not enough time in which to reach an agreement or to reach the sad conclusion that an agreement is not possible in the mutual interests of both sides, and to do all that in an orderly way? Surely 16 months is more than enough time to sort this out.

[Mr Grieve]

I cannot help it that the reality is that we entered into a partnership that now includes 27 other member states. We cannot just magic that away; they all have their interests, and they will all have to be taken into consideration at the end. As we have seen with trade agreements that are reached with the EU and other states, they take time. Indeed, my right hon. Friend and some of my other hon. Friends are, frankly, delusional in their belief of the speed with which these wonderful new trade agreements with third countries will be concluded once we leave the EU. My main anxiety on that topic is that there are 759 external treaties that come through our membership of the EU and that we are in danger of losing with amendment 381, tabled by the Government, in respect of putting a writ-in-stone date on when we have to leave. That should worry us just as much as any other aspect of leaving the EU.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

Is not the real ludicrousness of amendment 381 that it is unenforceable and there is no punishment if that law is broken? As a former Attorney General, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us the point of having a law for which—if the date is extended and the law broken—there is absolutely no consequence? The Minister will not be sent to prison for breaking it. It is a worthless political gesture.

[Mr Grieve]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I do not entirely agree with him. If the measure stays on the statute book, the consequence would be that at 11 pm on 29 March 2019—even if the agreements, transitional arrangements and everything else have not been worked out—we will drop out of the EU, potentially into the void that so much of this legislation is apparently designed to prevent. All the possible benefits of continuing in transition would not be available, so this actually matters very much indeed. That brings me—although I do not want to take up the Committee’s time—to the infamous amendment 381.

Amendment 381 was sprung on the House, sprung on the Conservative party and certainly sprung on me—after weeks of talking gently to my ministerial colleagues and trying to find a sensible way through, which I continue to want to do—and suddenly landed on us as a diktat. It is quite simply unacceptable because it fetters the Government’s ability to carry out this negotiation, which makes me seriously question their competence, and it disenfranchises the House from properly exercising its scrutiny role, with the potential that, in fact, is almost an invitation to running into the buffers. Although I do not happen to believe that this is what the Government want to do, it certainly appears to play into the hands of those who seem to be so eager that we should leave the EU with absolutely no agreement whatever.

I seriously worry that I go to audiences of the kind that seem to extol the virtues of some of my colleagues on this side of the House, and I am told that only a departure from the EU without any agreement at all can detoxify us of the taint of our participation. Those were the very words used to me at the Conservative party conference. All I can say is that the individuals who are saying these things are utterly misguided, do not understand how a parliamentary democracy works and do not understand how an international community operates. But, whatever their grievances may be, they are the people to whom we have to sensibly articulate an alternative approach.

I am really pleased that amendment 381 cannot be put to the vote this afternoon, because I have to say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that I will vote against it. There are absolutely no ifs, no buts and no maybes about this—no arm-twisting and nothing that can be done to me in the intervening period. It is unacceptable and I will not vote for it. I will not vote for it if I am the only person to go through the Lobby to vote against it. The sensible thing for Ministers to do is to go away, have several cups of tea, think again, continue talking to me about all the other sensible things we have been talking about and on which we are likely to reach agreement, and just focus for a moment on where there is unanimity in this House about how we should proceed.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I will make my point and then give way.

The point is that we cannot go into the negotiations saying, “We have signed up to article 50, but we do not accept that we might have to leave after two years. We might come to you begging for a bit more time.” That will not put us in a very strong negotiating position.

[Mr Grieve]

I should preface my question to my hon. Friend by saying that, in my view, there is no evidence at the moment that public opinion on this issue has shifted at all since the referendum. But let us just suppose, as a hypothesis, that by the end of next year it becomes clear from opinion polls that 90% of the population believe that a mistake was made in the triggering of article 50. Does my hon. Friend seriously believe that we as a House should entirely ignore that evidence, if it were presented to us repeatedly?

[Mr Jenkin]

My right hon. and learned Friend is a very able barrister, and he presents his case extremely well, but we really are into hypotheticals now. [Interruption.] It was my right hon. and learned Friend who used the word “hypothesis”.

The fact is that article 50 was passed by an Act of Parliament, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, by 498 votes to 114 on Second Reading of the Bill that became that Act. All that these three amendments do is align this Bill with what the House voted for so overwhelmingly.

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[Mr Leslie]

My proposed new clause seeks to elicit from the Government information on how they are going to deal with the issue. The Prime Minister has said that she accepts that the European Court of Justice would need to continue to have jurisdiction during a transition. However, there are problems in the Bill.

I invite hon. Members to turn to page 3 and read clause 5(1), which states:

“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”

Therefore, under the Bill as framed, the ECJ arrangements will not apply beyond exit day. Further down on page 3, clause 6(1) and (2) similarly state that no regard will be made to the European Court after exit day.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The way in which this Bill is framed takes no account whatsoever of the possibility of a transitional arrangement.

[Mr Jenkin]

It’s not meant to!

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend says that it is not meant to, but I cannot criticise the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) for raising the issue, because we are hearing more and more about transitional arrangements. Of course, that highlights—does it not?—the fact that this Bill can do only part of the task that we have to do altogether. I think that it is right that we seek in vain to amend this Bill, because we will not able to make it do something that deals with transitional arrangements that we currently know nothing about.

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[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend raises a very important issue, and it is not just a transitional issue; it is a rule of law issue, and is about legal certainty. My right hon. Friend is absolutely to raise it, and she may agree with me that the Government are going to have to deal with this, because ultimately it is a fundamental principle of law that people should be able to have that certainty when they commence actions.

[Mrs Gillan]

My right hon. and learned Friend, who is also my constituency neighbour in Buckinghamshire, knows that I have been preoccupied with this for some time. Of course, there is also that principle of UK law called legitimate expectation, which is based on the principles of natural justice and fairness, and seeks to prevent authorities from abusing power, and I think that that is most important.

Essentially, this principle ensures that the rules cannot be changed halfway through the game if an individual had a reasonable expectation that they would continue. Changes to UK law can only happen prospectively—in other words, they can only apply from a point in the future onwards—and cannot be applied to the past. This means that anyone lodging court proceedings can do so knowing that the rules that applied at the time they lodged those proceedings will apply to their case. If that was not so, the law could be retrospectively changed in favour of the state.

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[Mrs Gillan]

The hon. and learned Lady makes a valid point. I am trying to give the Government an opportunity to examine this, as I think it is very serious. I also think that no British Government would want the sort of unfairness thrown up by the anomaly that has arisen from the way the Bill is drafted.

In fact, the repeal Bill already states in paragraph 27(3) of schedule 8 that actions begun prior to Brexit, including Francovich, can continue and can rely on EU legal principles. However, I think there is an error in the Bill, in that it does not allow anyone who has commenced an action prior to the day of exit the right of a reference to the European Court, which they could have reasonably expected when lodging their claim in the court prior to Brexit.

[Mr Grieve]

That must be wrong as well. In the past, when we have had references to the Privy Council, for example, and a country has terminated those references, the references have continued after the date of termination until all the cases going through the system are completed. It must follow that references to the ECJ—or CJEU, perhaps, to give it its full title—must be able to continue after the date of exit.

[Mrs Gillan]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes the same point that I am trying to make. Likewise, the Bill does not allow anyone who has suffered harm because of an act of the state in the period prior to the day of exit the right to lodge a claim under the rules as they stood at the time they were harmed.

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[Mr Grieve]

Is not part of the problem that this is an area of law that has quite a political—with a small “p” —aspect? In reality, this law has been entrenched when it comes from the EU, and it represents a number of areas that have been treated by some as fundamental rights.

The difficulty for the judiciary is that they will be asked to continue interpreting this law—this is the nub of it—without real political guidance as to what emphasis they should attribute to it in future in light of the emphasis it has been given in the past. It is not just any old law but something rather more complex and, for that reason, it is more sensitive to the judiciary’s interpretation.

[Paul Blomfield]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right, and that is what we seek to address with amendment 306.

I will briefly address some of the other amendments in the group. We support new clause 14, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), as it sensibly calls for a report to be laid before Parliament on the interpretation of EU law during a transitional period.

We also support amendment 137, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and others, as it seeks to have UK courts pay due regard to any relevant decision of the ECJ when interpreting the new category of retained EU law.

Amendments 202 and 384, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), would allow matters pending on exit day to be referred to the ECJ, which is clearly common sense, and we are pleased to support the amendments. We also support amendments 203, 353 and 354, in the right hon. Gentleman’s name, on the definitions of EU retained law. Amendment 357, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), raises important issues, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification. We support amendment 358, which would help with the interpretation of EU retained law.

I end on the same note on which I began by urging the Government to accept amendment 278 and its consequential amendments and, in doing so, to put aside their obsession with the ECJ so that we can secure the effective transitional deal with the EU that they, we, business and trade unions want to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

First, let me thank my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, for her intervention and for highlighting this important issue constructively. I have looked carefully at the report of her Committee and had discussions with the Equalities Ministers on the points she has made, so today I can give her the reassurance, and tell the House, that we have commissioned work to be done on an amendment that the Government will table before Report. It will require Ministers to make a statement before the House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act 2010. I hope that gives her the reassurance she needs that the Government are serious about addressing the legitimate point she has raised.

The point I was making before my right hon. Friend’s intervention was that once the UK leaves the EU, the domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the ECJ. Clause 6 also provides that domestic courts and tribunals will not be bound by or required to have regard to ECJ decisions made after Brexit.

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

May I just finish this point, because I am at risk of answering the question before my right hon. and learned Friend puts it? As I say, UK courts will instead be able to take those post-exit judgments into account when making their decisions, if they consider it appropriate to do so, as they can, of course, with judgments of courts from other jurisdictions—common law, around the Commonwealth and elsewhere.

[Mr Grieve]

A number of different points feature in all this, but there is one point about the legal certainty, which was raised earlier. It is one thing to be able to take a case to the Supreme Court, but under a previously set up regime people could take it as a reference to the ECJ. Have the Government considered the propriety issues on removing that right for a case that is current? There is an issue to address there. The Government may be able to provide precedent and justification for what they are doing, but the issue troubles me. This strikes me as an odd way of going about things simply for the sake of trying to get rid of the ECJ in one fell swoop, which I think will be rather difficult in any case for other reasons.

[Dominic Raab]

I hope that I can give my right hon. and learned Friend some reassurance as the Committee makes progress. Some of what he says relates to clause 5 as much as to clause 6, but let me have a go at addressing it today. We may well return to it next week.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I am not quite sure that I understand my right hon. Friend’s forensic point. It is a feature of the common law that UK courts already take into account and consider principles and precedents from other jurisdictions, but they do so with full autonomy as to how they might apply it, where they have discretion under the normal canons of interpretation. We are effectively seeking to apply the same basic principles, through this Bill, to retained EU law and the interpretation of it.

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

I am going to make some progress, as I have given way once. I want to turn to some other amendments; otherwise, I will not give them the attention that they rightly deserve. I turn to amendment 357 in the name of the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.

[Mr Grieve]

Can I not tempt my hon. Friend to give way?

[Dominic Raab]

My right hon. and learned Friend is very tempting, but not at this moment.

I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I have given way to hon. Gentleman before. I am going to make some progress.

That priority means getting a close economic partnership, but out of the single market, out of the customs union and without the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. We want to get to that endgame in a smooth and orderly way, with the minimum of disruption.

That is why we want early agreement on the implementation period—on that much, we are agreed. That may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some of the rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we shall do so. These amendments do not allow for that. They prejudge and pre-empt the outcome of negotiations, and they introduce legislative inflexibility by saying that we must keep rules in domestic law that would bind us to the jurisdiction of the European Court after we leave, for the full duration of any implementation period, without our knowing for a second how long that might be. The Government are making the case for legal certainty. The Labour party is proposing legal limbo. We cannot accept that.

[Mr Grieve]

I actually agree—I should make this clear to my hon. Friend—about the issue of transition. I find it difficult to see how we can approach transition in the course of this Bill. However, there is an important underlying issue here, because, ultimately, our future relations with the EU will have a very powerful bearing, whether it is in transition or even after transition, on what we want EU law to do and how we want it to be interpreted, depending on transition, or indeed when we have completely gone, and on the extent to which we wish to be in comity with EU law. This is the elephant in the room, and it will have to be debated at some point as the Bill goes through, because some of it does not have to do with transition but has really to do with an entire future relationship, and it marries with great difficulty with the constant reiteration that the ECJ is somehow going to disappear out of the window.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

The point is that we take a snapshot of EU law, including case law, at the point of exit, but after that the normal rules of precedent will apply both to the Supreme Court and in Scotland. That will allow a departure from any precedents that apply, which again comes back to the question of how we achieve a smooth and orderly transition from retained EU law while making sure that, when push comes to shove as such case law evolves, the UK Supreme Court will have the last word. That is balance struck in the Bill.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand that issue, but there is another one. Let us assume for the moment that there is no transition or relationship with the EU at all. Is the Court supposed to apply EU law as currently applied—purposively—or is it supposed to ignore the underlying purpose by which it has constantly been applied heretofore, and in that case, which rules is it supposed to apply? The judiciary have expressed a real concern about what they are supposed to do, because it is quite unclear what Parliament intends. If we forget about a transition or a future relationship, what are they supposed to do? They have rules for interpreting this law at the moment. Are they supposed to stick to those rules when they no longer have an underlying purpose?

[Dominic Raab]

I have to be careful about not pre-judging or prejudicing what the courts decide to do, particularly given that the thrust of the Bill is to make sure that judges have autonomy and discretion. The reality is that the issue is dealt with in the Bill. It is possible for the UK courts, in relation to retained case law, to look at the underlying purpose or intention of any piece of legislation or any principles that have been articulated. Moving forward, they are free, of their own volition, to depart from any precedence in the usual way. That already applies in relation to wider common law jurisdictions. The question I would put back to my right hon. and learned Friend is: why on earth, when we are leaving the EU and given that we are an open and outward-looking country that does filter, take interest in and take account of different principles from different jurisdictions, would we put on an further elevated status the case law of the ECJ?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point, but I wish to emphasise that my own concern is not about retaining EU law in some way, but about getting some clarity, which is certainly not in the Bill. My right hon. Friend may agree that from listening to the Government it does not appear that they are particularly concerned about this matter—yet the judiciary plainly is, and the House cannot ignore that.

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. It is important that during this and future debates—we will have the opportunity to return to this issue in the debate on clause 5—my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Government take due regard of this issue. The courts have already said that they are unclear and want clarity. It is not always usual for courts to come back and say that they want us to decide, but on this matter they really do. That is important, because there has to be a future point at which they understand that they do not have to have regard to any change in the European Court principles.

I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Government to make that point very clear in the course of this process, and I look forward to their response. I think the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, said that he would return to this issue in the discussions on clause 5, and I would certainly appreciate that.

I know that other Members wish to speak, so I shall conclude. I applaud and support the Government on this part of the Bill. For me, and I think for most of our colleagues, it is the most important element. We can debate money and all these other issues, but who ultimately decides on our laws is the most important element of the vote to leave. I made this point earlier, and I conclude by making it again: the single issue on which the British public voted most was to take back control of their laws. I want that to happen as we leave the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

If the Solicitor General is trying to argue that he is aiming for equality between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, that poses an insoluble problem for the lower court. One has to trump the other, but if the Bill is trying to make out that one trumps the other, it does not do it. It is really quite important for a human being who speaks English and reads the Bill to be able to see which trumps which.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand exactly where my right hon. Friend is coming from. I have to say that my reading of this was that once the Supreme Court had departed from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in a particular case, thereafter the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence would be the one that the lower court would have to follow. However, that does not get us past the problem that the Supreme Court is provided with no guidance whatever about the purposive nature of EU law and how it should approach it.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Let me deal with my right hon. and learned Friend’s helpful intervention in two steps. If what he said in the first step about the supremacy of the Supreme Court’s rulings is to apply—which is not inequality, but puts the Supreme Court above the ECJ in the interpretation of these matters for retained law—that is a perfectly clear position, and one that I, as a matter of fact, would welcome; but then the Bill should bloody well say so. However, he is right, in that even if we presume that the Bill will be adjusted—as I am sure it will be, in the House of Lords—to make it clear that that is the case, we face the next problem, which is what it is that the poor old Supreme Court is meant to be doing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Wes Streeting]

I wholeheartedly agree. We hear this fallacy that those of us who warn about a no-deal Brexit are somehow willing to sign up to any kind of bad deal—as if there is a bad deal that could possibly be worse than no deal.

I would like to hear an intervention from anyone on the Government or Opposition Benches who can explain how crashing out of the European Union over a cliff edge with no deal—meaning an immediate end to all existing contractual and legal obligations and to all the frameworks and protections, a hard border in Ireland, and the end of our trading agreements not only with the European Union, but through the European Union to countries across the world—could be worse than any kind of transitional deal. No deal would be the very worst deal, and it is astonishing that there are Government Members who not only entertain the possibility of no deal, but are enthusiastically encouraging it with the views that they put forward.

There have been many problems with the Prime Minister’s approach to Brexit, but in the Florence speech she tried to set out a practical and flexible framework through which we could now give certainty to business about the transition period and, crucially, through which there would be only one set of changes from our membership of the European Union to our future relationship with it once we leave.

This evening, the Government Front-Bench team have driven a coach and horses through the Florence speech. They cannot provide business with the clarity it needs on how the European Court of Justice will operate during transition. They ought to support our position, which is to remain in the single market and the customs union for the time-limited period of transition, because that would give business the certainty it desperately needs.

For Conservative Members to put their ideological vanity against the best interests of the British economy is selfish, reckless and irresponsible, and people should have no truck with it.

[Mr Grieve]

I will pick up two or three points that have been made in this important debate. There have some magnificent contributions, particularly from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I will start with what he had to say because it is central to the debate.

I appreciate what the Government have been trying to do with clauses 5 and 6 on the way in which retained EU law should be interpreted. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the wording is opaque, although I think that I understand the Government’s intention on the role and supremacy of the Supreme Court in developing law, but that still does not get us away from the fundamental problem that EU law is different from our law. Its rules of interpretation are different and its purpose is different.

We will come back to that problem right through this Bill, whether on the charter of fundamental rights or the general principles of EU law. We cannot just take EU law and drop it into our law without leaving guidance on what the Government expect that law to be used for. I worry that the lack of explanation is most peculiar. It is not a question of wanting to keep EU law—I assume that it will all ultimately go away, anyway—but in the meantime there is a lack of clarity, and I can well understand why the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary, are troubled by the lack of guidance. It is almost as though the Government have found it too embarrassing to want to grapple with it. They want to maintain continuity, but they do not want to maintain the implication of continuity because that is a difficult message to sell to some Conservative Members.

We will really have to look at this as we go through the Bill, and I am quite prepared to try to help the Government to find a way through. It is not that I want to keep its aura, and there are many Conservative Members who do not like it at all, but the simple fact is that we need to look at it.

The other issues that have been raised are absolutely right, but they are not relevant to this debate. We do not have the slightest clue what the transitional arrangements will be. We will have to have a completely separate piece of legislation to sort that out, and I suspect it will take a long time to go through this House. Ultimately, if we have a long-term agreement, there will be an interesting issue about whether we will be instructing our courts to mirror EU law so as to maintain comity with the Court of Justice of the European Union or risk constantly having to readjust our legal frameworks for the sake of that deep and special relationship.

I do not want to disappoint some of my right hon. and hon. Friends too much, but the harsh reality is that our geographical location and our desire to have a close trading relationship with the European Union will inevitably mean that decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union continue to have a major influence on our law here—I am afraid that was rather disregarded in last year’s referendum. I think that it is called globalisation, and we will have to return to that as we go along.

[Dominic Raab]

We have listened carefully to all hon. Members in the various contributions and concerns that have been raised, and taken account of the amendments in this group. There are issues we will take away for further consideration. I refer in particular to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) said about the Equality Act 2010, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) raised her issue powerfully and constructively. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) also raised a number of points, and I think that we can address those. I think that they are covered by clause 6, but I will take them away and we will work further to make sure we provide the clarity that is required.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman may have missed my point. I completely accept the fact that these rights will be brought into UK law, that they will not be underpinned by EU provisions and that many of them were there first and have been added to over the decades of our membership. What we are talking about here is ensuring that retained EU law cannot be chipped away at by secondary legislation—that it has an enhanced status and must be amended only by primary legislation debated in full in this Chamber.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is right. It is the curiosity of this legislation that laws that the public, if we were to raise these issues with them, would regard for the most part as being of very considerable importance are being brought to the lowest possible status on their return here, and without there really being an opportunity, for obvious reasons, to revisit this issue domestically in a way that might lead us to enact fresh legislation.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I could not have put it better myself. That is precisely the problem, and that is precisely what new clause 58 seeks to address.

The uncertainty that surrounds the status and interpretation of retained EU law is a real weakness, but irrespective of what happens, retained EU law, as defined in the Bill, is vulnerable to secondary legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament, which will have been drafted in a very different context—in the context of a country whose long-term future appeared to reside unambiguously in the European Union.

Perhaps the most potent example is the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. Part 1 provides for Ministers to introduce statutory instruments to remove burdens resulting from legislation, including primary legislation. A burden, for the purpose of that part of the Act, includes a financial cost or

“an obstacle to efficiency, productivity or profitability”.

That Act is a potent piece of legislation as it is, but it will be far more so as a result of this Bill if it can be used to alter a raft of EU rights and protections that are currently underpinned by EU provisions.

This is not just about the powers in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. Other examples come to mind, such as section 5 of the Localism Act 2011 and section 11 of the Public Bodies Act 2011. All contain wide powers to alter regulations, and all were passed in the constitutional context of our rights and protections being underpinned by our EU membership. All will become more powerful after exit today.

Retained EU law would also be vulnerable to recently proposed legislation and legislation currently making its way through this place. For example, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, which is currently in Committee in this House, contains proposed new clause 76A(6) to the Energy Act 2013, which provides that the delegated power in section 113(7) of the Energy Act can be used to make changes to retained EU law. Similarly, clause 2(6) of the recently published Trade Bill provides for regulations that can be used to modify primary legislation, including retained EU law. The same, we can only assume, is likely to be the case for the immigration, agriculture and other Bills we expect in the coming months as part of the process of legislating for Brexit.

New clause 58 would ensure that regulations of the kind provided for by those Bills could not be used to amend or repeal retained EU law in the five areas I have set out, thereby according them a level of enhanced protection. That is important because any future Government could easily use secondary legislation contained in a variety of past and future Acts of Parliament to chip away at rights, entitlements, protections and standards that the public enjoy and wish to retain.

In the interests of brevity, let me illustrate the risks posed if we do not pass new clause 58 or a similar new clause, by focusing on employment entitlement, rights and protection. As hon. Members will know, a substantial part of UK employment rights is derived from EU law, and an even larger body is guaranteed by EU law. As such, key workers’ rights enjoy a form of enhanced protection. Those include protections against discrimination owing to sex, pregnancy, race, disability, religion and belief, age, and sexual orientation; equal pay between men and women for work of equal value; health and safety protection for pregnant women, and their rights to maternity leave; a degree of equal treatment, in broad terms, for the growing number of fixed-term, part-time and agency workers; rights to protected terms and conditions, and rights not to be dismissed on the transfer of an undertaking; and almost all the law on working time, including paid annual leave and limits on daily and weekly working time.

Whether it is the working time regulations guaranteeing rights to holiday pay and protections from excessive working hours, which will be preserved via clause 2 of this Bill, or the right to equal pay contained in article 157 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, which will presumably be preserved via clause 4, these rights will not enjoy enhanced protection after exit day and will be at risk of amendment from regulations set out in other Acts of Parliament if this new clause or a similar one is not passed.

Now, it is true the Government have promised to ensure that workers’ rights are fully protected and maintained after the UK’s departure from the EU, but in the absence of stronger legal safeguards, there are good reasons to be sceptical about that commitment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means]

Obviously I would not comment on the order of selection on the Floor of the House, but the Leader of the House is here and I am sure that she will have heard the hon. Lady’s comments.

[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure again to be able to participate in this debate.

The new clause in the name of the Leader of the Opposition raises a really important issue about the way in which the Government have approached the whole question of retained EU law. To be clear at the outset, and it is worth repeating, the Government’s aim—to bring EU law into our own law, retain it there to ensure continuity and then, over time, to take such steps as this Parliament wishes to take to replace it or change it—makes absolute sense. But as we discussed yesterday, the difficulty that arises is that the origins of EU law mean that it has come into the law of this country in ways that are totally different from our usual process of primary and secondary legislation. [Interruption.] Does my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) wish me to give way? I thought that he said something from a sedentary position.

[Sir William Cash]

Not yet.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I said, “That’s why we are leaving”, in response to my right hon. and learned Friend’s comments.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand that that is why my hon. Friend thinks we should go. As he knows, I personally think that in the globalised world in which we operate, as we mentioned yesterday, the notion that the only source of law is likely to be the domestic Parliament of one’s country is rather fanciful, given that we are currently subordinate or have signed up cheerfully to all sorts of areas of international law without any difficulty at all. I accept, without wishing to go over old ground, that the way in which EU law operates in this country through its direct effect does pose some issues that have particularly exercised my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. Nevertheless, the idea that all sources of law in this country come from this House is wrong, full stop.

The question is how we make sure that in bringing this law into our own law, we preserve its essence—because that is what the Government say they want to do—until such time as we as a domestic Parliament decide that we want to do something about it. The problem that has arisen is that, as currently drafted, the importation of EU law means that standards in areas such as equalities and the environment will no longer enjoy the legal protection that EU membership gives them—indeed, they will, for the most part, be repealable by statutory instrument.

On the whole in this House, we would not think it appropriate to do that with our own primary legislation, and this legislation is undoubtedly important enough to have primary status. That is because clauses 2 to 4 on retaining most EU-derived law are worded in such a way as to turn it principally into secondary legislation in United Kingdom law.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

There seems to be an inconsistency in what my right hon. and learned Friend is saying. He has been happy for law to come into this country and become our senior law having been approved by a qualified majority vote in which the British Government may have voted against, but he would object to its being repealed through a statutory instrument subject to a parliamentary process in this House and the other place.

[Mr Grieve]

I fully appreciate that my hon. Friend has a great distaste for the way in which this law has been imported into our country during the course of our membership of the EU. However, two wrongs do not make a right. He could profitably look at the prolonged period of time it is going to take to replace all this law—five years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years? I would be prepared to have a small wager with him that some of this is still going to be around in three or four decades to come.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend concedes that two wrongs do not make a right. May I point out to him that the introduction of qualified majority voting was an achievement of the Thatcher Government? We persuaded the European Union to adopt the single market because we did not want small countries to be subjected to little pressure groups holding up very important standards that we needed to achieve in the new market we were creating. Mrs Thatcher sent as her commissioner Arthur Cockfield, who presided over several thousand of those being introduced so that the single market could get under way.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. and learned Friend is entirely correct. If I may explain, I was simply attempting—although I sometimes find it quite difficult—to put myself into the position of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), who had explained his distaste. Having done so, I was trying to explain why he should still be concerned. I could not agree more with my right hon. and learned Friend. I am not troubled by the way in which this law has come into our country. We have kept our sovereignty. We made a choice to do this, and we did so because of an awareness of how, as international relations develop, it was in our national interest. That may represent a philosophical difference, but as I pointed out, there is all sorts of international law out there that binds us that did not originate in this Chamber.

We should be concerned about the fact that these laws matter. I do not know whether they matter to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone or other hon. Members, but if we go out into the street and ask people whether equality law—

[Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)]

I accept that my right hon. and learned Friend has considerably greater knowledge of these matters than I do, so I wish to ask him about a more general point. I take on board his detailed points about how law is made in this place. However, does he accept that we have very good laws that were made outside the EU—for example, the health and safety legislation that was made domestically in our Parliament? With regard to Labour Members saying that we are not concerned with workers’ rights—

[Rachel Maclean]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree with me on that point?

[Mr Grieve]

I do. I entirely accept that it is within the wit and ability of this House in future to replicate, if we so desire, many areas of law that currently come from the EU, but at the moment we do not have time to do that. We are taking in law that really matters to people out in the street. I suspect that the vast majority will have no idea where this law originates from; they will just say, “Actually, my employment rights are rather important.”

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I will carry on for the moment and then give way.

People will value that law, and yet we are bringing it in and giving it a status that I regard as very unsatisfactory. There are a number of ways in which that could be addressed, including new clause 2, which has been tabled by the Opposition. I have tabled new clause 55, which I will briefly explain. It looks at the nature of retained EU law, establishes a general presumption that retained EU law may be amended only by primary legislation or subordinate legislation made under the Bill that we are enacting, and provides a framework for the Government to stipulate specific provisions of retained EU law that are merely technical, and therefore appropriate to be amended by subordinate legislation. I do not have any objection to that happening, but the rest would have to be dealt with by primary legislation. The new clause would provide much greater legal certainty about powers for future amendment of retained EU laws, and it would give the Government flexibility to amend technical provisions quite freely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr William Wragg (Hazel Grove) (Con)]

Given the concerns in the House, will my right hon. and learned Friend tell us which party introduced such legislation in the 19th century?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, indeed: the Conservative party did precisely that. There is a proud record in the Conservative party—as, indeed, there is in the Opposition—of contribution to that process. I make it quite clear that I do not put the smallest imputation that those on the Treasury Bench, or on any of my colleagues in government, want to reduce those protections one bit.

[Sir William Cash]

I want to put on the record that I have a lot of sympathy with the idea of an enhanced sifting scrutiny process, as my right hon. and learned Friend knows. I am glad to note that he puts an emphasis, which I am sure we all agree with, on primary legislation. The only question that I want to raise with him about his earlier remarks concerns his enthusiasm for the manner in which the legislation was made in the first place. I make the point yet again that it was done, to an extraordinary extent, behind closed doors and by a process of consensus that cannot possibly be justified.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand where my hon. Friend comes from, in view of his long-held concerns about these issues. But I ask him to consider the fact that one consequence of our EU membership—I have to accept this—is that in some areas in which law might have developed domestically, it has not done so in the 45 years of our membership, because we did it in common with our European partners. That is just an historical fact. Because it is an historical fact, we have to grapple with how we make sure that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

[Frank Field (Birkenhead) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman feel, as I do, that from the Back Benches on both sides of the Committee is emerging an agreement, to which we wish the Government to respond? New clauses 50 and 51, tabled in my name and those of hon. Friends, are designed to make us look, first of all, not at laws from all over the world—we are, after all, debating the EU (Withdrawal) Bill—but at law from the EU. The new clauses would ensure that we put all EU law and regulations on to our statute book and allowed the House of Commons—we are not talking about a Henry VIII clause—to decide how we should review it.

My only slight worry with the new clause that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has tabled is that it will tie the hands of a future Government, as he accused me of doing yesterday. It might be that, on reflection, there are better ways of reviewing EU law than involving the whole House in primary legislation.

[Mr Grieve]

I read the right hon. Gentleman’s new clauses, and I can understand where he is coming from. If one looks at the totality of the amendments and new clauses in today’s debate, one sees that they are all trying to do, roughly speaking, much the same thing. The question is not the exact route that is adopted, but how the Government respond to that challenge. I do not want to take up more of the House’s time, but—

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

In case my right hon. and learned Friend is coming to a conclusion, I want to ask him this question. I think we all hope that the Government will propose some mechanism for sifting, but does he intend to make a binary distinction between delegated legislation, which could mean exclusively negative resolution, and primary legislation? Alternatively, is he willing to accept, as I think I would be, the possibility of a sift that involves allocating some tasks to the affirmative resolution procedure, and only some others to primary legislation?

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point, but I wonder whether we are in danger of straying into another topic. There is an issue about the operation of the mechanism for implementing the changes and taking us out of the EU. I keep confidently hoping that the Government will be able to respond positively to that by having an adequate sifting mechanism for Parliament. Even when that has taken place, the changes envisaged for EU law are, as far as I can see, of a semi-permanent or permanent character. They are about the nature and quality of the law that we have decided to bring in, rather than the manner in which we have decided to do so. New clause 55 is very similar to new clause 25, tabled by the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), and they seek to look at the matter in slightly different ways. The question is how the Government will respond.

That raises, perhaps, a more fundamental issue about the process of debate in this House, on which I hope the Government will be able to provide some reassurance this afternoon. I do not know how other hon. Members found it, but I found yesterday hugely instructive, not because it led to some votes—it did so, but let us leave the votes out of it—but precisely because it gave us the opportunity to have a cogent and sensible debate about problems on which, as we proceeded, we began to perceive that there might indeed be a degree of consensus. The problem is that we always run up against the sense that if the Government come to the Dispatch Box and say, “This is very interesting, and we will think about it,” but we do not do something about it then and there, we may lose our opportunity ever to do something about it. We will, of course, have the opportunity of Report stage, should the Bill have one.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

I want to pick up my right hon. and learned Friend’s point about consensus. As I understand it, new clause 55 is designed to send a clear message that the Government do not intend to lower standards for the environment, financial services or consumers without an open and transparent process. I have heard Ministers say from the Front Bench again and again that they do not intend to lower those important standards. Does he agree that that is an important message to give to our future trading partners in Europe?

[Mr Grieve]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. If we are to have a deep and special relationship, it is inconceivable that we could dilute the rights that have been created.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

I will give way, but then I want to bring my remarks to an end.

[Geraint Davies]

On that point, can the right hon. and learned Gentleman envisage a point in the future—it could be a very short time away—when tariffs are imposed and economic circumstances are such that businesses demand reductions in cost? Businesses will turn to the four weeks’ paid holiday, the 48 hours directive or anything else that will cut their costs, and the Government will be tempted to abolish those rights.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think I am quite as apocalyptic as the hon. Gentleman, because I happen to think that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said in his speech yesterday, the idea that the UK suddenly wishes to translate itself into a country of no regulation and no protection at all is fanciful. I have never seen the smallest sign of that from any section of the public. Indeed, one of the things that brings us together as a nation is agreeing that quality of life matters while, at the same time, wishing to develop a cohesive society.

[Frank Field]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

I give way for the last time, because I really want to bring my remarks to an end.

[Frank Field]

Is it not true that the clearer the message we send out from the debate on this Bill that we are adopting the whole corpus of laws and regulations, the easier it will be to do a trade deal because we will be competing on the same terms?

[Mr Grieve]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important and interesting point, to which I have no doubt the Government will respond. As I have said, however, I do not wish to be prescriptive. I want an assurance from the Government that this matter is being looked at, and that it cannot really be divorced from some of the things we will look at next week, or whenever the Committee sits again.

My desire is that we should have such debates. I do not wish to force the Government’s hand, even though that may appear superficially attractive. I do not actually wish to put new clause 55 to the vote; it has problems of its own. However, I put the Government on notice that we are going to have to draw together the issues we are debating today, and I am convinced that we will debate similar issues next week.

All those issues derive from the same problem about the way in which the Government have approached and have at the moment drafted the legislation, and that problem must be remedied. It can be remedied, and I am happy to work with the Government to try to ensure that it is remedied. If necessary, we can come back to this on Report—on the assurance that we will have a real opportunity to do so on Report—and then pull the strands together and produce a package that will command some consensus across the House. I very much hope to hear that from the Government this afternoon, if I am not to be tempted to put my new clause to the vote.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

I rise to speak to amendments 200 to 201 in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and to new clause 45, which will be decided on at a later date. I also want to support amendment 217, tabled by our colleagues in Plaid Cymru.

Last week, with several members of the Brexit Select Committee, some of whom have already spoken about this, I went on a very informative visit to Brussels and Paris. It was very informative partly because the people we spoke to were so well informed and so forthcoming. They appeared to be a lot better informed and more forthcoming about what Brexit is really going to mean than a great many Conservative Members and, indeed, than some Conservative Front Benchers.

In about 20 hours of meetings, the shortest and most perceptive comment we heard—this sums up where we now are with Brexit—came from a member of the European Affairs Committee of the French Senate. He quite simply said, “Quelle pagaille!”—“What a mess!” I replied that if he thought it looked like a mess from the French side of the channel, he should try looking at it from the United Kingdom’s point of view.

We have a Government who rushed into a referendum too soon, at a time when the UK population was the least well-informed in the whole of Europe of what Europe is actually about. Article 50 was triggered in indecent haste—far sooner than it needed to be—simply to pacify some of the more rabid Brexiteers on the Government Benches.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[The Solicitor General]

May I make progress? I would be grateful, as I need to make progress on the amendments. I think I have been more than generous in giving way. I will move on to try to ensure that I deal with all the points that have been raised.

May I deal first with health and safety legislation? There has been a lot of proper debate about that. The way existing powers are used—the way the UK meets its obligations to implement EU law—is most typically through regulations that are made under the 1972 Act, but regulations are also made under a range of other Acts for these purposes, sometimes in conjunction with the 1972 Act powers and sometimes not. For example, some health and safety regulations are made using the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the 1972 Act where the 1974 Act alone cannot provide the vires, or powers, for those regulations.

One example is the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015. They are made for the purposes of health and safety and of environmental protection, the latter being outside the vires of the 1974 Act. Those regulations prevent and mitigate the effects of major accidents involving dangerous substances, which can cause serious damage and harm to the public and to the environment. The parts of the regulations made under the 1974 Act can continue to be updated after exit under existing powers conferred by that legislation.

As I have set out, clause 2 rightly takes a maximalist approach to preserving direct legislation. It sets it out that any domestic legislation that implements EU obligations or is otherwise related to the EU or the EEA will continue to have effect after our exit. The effect is that those regulations will therefore become retained EU law within the meaning given in the Bill. So it is absolutely right that after we have left the European Union, domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts can operate on what will become retained EU law, and as such will be our domestic law. This is so that appropriate changes can be made in future, in line with any domestic policy, where they are within the scope of those powers and the will of this place.

In contrast, the amendments would fetter powers across the statute book that Parliament has already delegated. Relying only on powers set out in this Bill to amend retained EU law would be insufficient and would defeat the purpose of what Parliament has previously set up in the 1974 Act, for example, and other Acts. As I have set out, these powers are in many cases very important and help to deliver functioning regimes. Each of them also contains its own limitations. Those limitations were agreed by Parliament when it agreed to create the powers in question.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The right hon. Gentleman is old enough and wise enough to know that, while this exercise of freezing the law in time on exit day has to be done, the law is a constantly evolving creature. None of us can stand here and bind the hands of our successors. What we can do, as men and women of good will seeking to achieve as sensible and smooth a Brexit as possible, is provide legal certainty. That is why I am here. That is why I have undertaken to try to deal with this task. That is why this Government are doing everything they can, within the time they have, to get this right.

[Mr Grieve]

I have been listening carefully to what my hon. and learned Friend has been saying. Again, there seems to be an overlap. There are issues about how Parliament conducts scrutiny, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) has mentioned. That is also covered in proposed new subsection (3) of my new clause 55. There is also the question about modifications to some areas of retained EU law taking place in any way other than by primary legislation, in the longer term. Keeping those two points in mind, may I invite him to go away and see, as the discussion continues, what the Government can come up with by way of a package involving those two elements that might commend itself to the House, bearing in mind the undertaking that he has given to look at this afresh on Report and for the Government to respond positively on Report to what has been said?

[The Solicitor General]

Yes, I am happy to do that. That is very much in the spirit what I have already said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

Has the hon. Gentleman given any consideration to what the words

“enforced, allowed, and followed accordingly”

are supposed to mean? I confess that, on reading clause 4 1(b), I found it very difficult to understand what the Government intended.

[Matthew Pennycook]

That point is very well made. I expect that other hon. Members will touch on that in more detail when they speak to amendments 93 to 95.

We support amendments 148 to 150 and new clause 34—the efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston to remedy deficiencies in the Bill with respect to the rights of children. Her amendments are designed to preserve in domestic law any rights or obligations arising from the UN convention on the rights of the child, to ensure that Ministers act in such a way as to comply with that convention, and to protect from the delegated powers in the Bill the rights and obligations that flow from the convention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I am going to make a little progress; I am mindful of your strictures, Mr Streeter. I will take interventions on the amendments, but let me just explain the relevance of clause 4.

I will give just a flavour of the kinds of rights or obligations captured, which would include the EU-derived rights to equal pay and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. In the context of something like competition law, it would include the prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position. The explanatory memorandum gives further illustrations. Ultimately, given that the criteria for directly effective rights are determined judicially, the scope of such rights must be for UK courts to determine. That is why it would not be right for us to draft our own definition or definitive list.

Clause 4 only converts rights as they exist and are recognised immediately before the date of exit. It serves as a snapshot of EU law on the date of exit, and guarantees a smooth legal transition out of the EU—in respect of everything of value, importance and significance—for businesses and citizens up and down the country.

[Mr Grieve]

That brings me neatly to the question as to what it means that a right should be “allowed” immediately before exit day. It seems that that word particularly, of those three, “enforced, allowed and followed”, is astonishingly opaque.

[Dominic Raab]

I will come to the precise application shortly, but I am happy to take another intervention if my right hon. and learned Friend does not think I have answered his question sufficiently by the end.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I am going to make a little progress, again mindful of the guidance that I have received.

Leaving the EU will not diminish our commitment to environmental principles. Indeed, it is an opportunity to reinforce them. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who was here earlier and I am sure is coming back, announced only last week our intention to publish a new comprehensive national policy statement setting out the environmental principles driving UK policy, drawing on the EU’s current principles and underpinning future policy making. The point about its relative significance, value and status was very well made by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I ally myself with his remarks. We will consult on it early next year. This is not just blue-sky thinking—it is coming imminently.

Critically—this touches on the point made by the Chair of the Select Committee—the Secretary of State has also set out plans to consult on a new independent statutory body to hold the Government to account for upholding environmental standards. I hope that that addresses concerns that some hon. Members may have not just about the substantive law but about the institutional checks and oversight that we definitely need to make sure we continue when Britain leaves the EU. I hope that addresses the point that hon. Lady made, which was also mentioned by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion.

Turning to amendments 60, 67 and 28, I certainly understand their intention, but they are unnecessary because of the snapshot of all EU environmental principles that we are already taking at exit day under this Bill. Furthermore, the amendments would alter existing EU principles, at least to some extent—for example, in the way that they apply to public authorities. Given that the Bill’s purpose is to bring into effect the law we have currently, the amendments risk generating a measure of uncertainty and a degree of confusion about the legal position. I hope that I have addressed some of the concerns on the environment, and I urge hon. Members to not to press the relevant amendments.

I turn to amendment 93 in the name of the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy). Many hon. Members have been eloquent in outlining the need to ensure that treaty rights and other provisions falling outside clauses 2 and 3 are still retained in UK domestic law. Clause 4, as I have said, is a broad sweeper provision. It will ensure that as a starting point, all existing rights available in domestic law immediately before exit day as a result of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 will continue after exit to be recognised and available in our domestic law to the extent that they were before exit day. Clause 4(1) deliberately mirrors the language in the European Communities Act, which for our period of membership of the EU has been used to determine what and how EU law is accurately reflected in UK law. Clause 4 goes no further than section 2(1) of the ECA currently does. It is not intended to capture a narrower set of rights or obligations, or somehow to trim back. It does not make any changes as to how those rights or obligations are enforced in our courts. Deleting clause 4(1)(b) would mean that clause 4 no longer mirrors the ECA.

I understand why the hon. Lady has tabled the amendment, but it would be a rather curious, if not perverse, outcome if what counted as EU law after we depart the Union was expanded to be wider than when we were a member—yet that would be the direct result of her amendment. Perhaps even more importantly, for individuals, businesses, courts and practitioners up and down the country, by changing and inflating the test for what counts as EU law just as we are leaving, the amendment would in practice lead to significant legal confusion after exit with regard to the scope of rights retained. I know that that was not the intention of her amendment, and I hope that she can be persuaded not to press it.

[Mr Grieve]

It may well be that this comes from the European Communities Act, but I still find the word “allowed” very difficult to understand in this context, in view of the plain meaning of subsection (1)(a). As one of the questions that we have perpetually raised is that our own domestic courts will have to sort this tangle out, I am concerned about any form of drafting that appears to have an ambiguity in it. It is very hard to understand what paragraph (b) adds, and my hon. Friend has not actually explained that.

[Dominic Raab]

I have endeavoured to explain that the aim—and, I believe, the fact—of the Bill and the clause is to reflect and replicate the device used in the ECA. I always listen to what my right hon. and learned Friend says, but if that device has worked reasonably tolerably until now, I question why it cannot continue to serve the same purpose on exit. As ever, if he has a better formulation, I am very happy to look at that with him between now and Report to see whether there is a better way of doing this.

Let us be clear about the intention of clause 4. It is a sweeper provision to make sure that we have an accurate snapshot of EU law reflected in UK law on the date of exit.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie). If I may say so, I do not take the view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) in her description of new clause 16. It seems to me that in tabling it for consideration by the Committee the hon. Gentleman has accurately sought to stimulate an extremely important debate on the consequences of getting rid of the charter.

I sometimes feel that there is perhaps a failure of some Members to look at what has been happening in our society and country over a 40-year period. On the whole, western democracies have tended in that time to develop the idea of rights. I know that for some Members that appears to be anathema—it makes them choke over the cornflakes—but it is a development that I have always welcomed and that, it seems to me, has delivered substantial benefits for all members of our society, particularly the most vulnerable.

In this country we have had a long debate about how we reconcile rights with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, in 1997 the Labour Government sought to craft—extremely ingeniously, I thought, which is why I was very supportive of it at the time—the legislation that would become the Human Rights Act in an effort to achieve that reconciliation. I think most people in this House would argue that that Act has worked very well by preserving parliamentary sovereignty for primary legislation, enabling secondary legislation to be struck down if incompatible and with the mechanism of a declaration of incompatibility when required.

The truth is that because of our membership of the European Union there are some things that many of us would regard as rights but which fall outside the scope of the Human Rights Act and the European convention, and those things have developed over the same period I mentioned as a result of our European Union membership. I appreciate that that leads to double choking over the cornflakes, because not only have those rights come from what some people might regard as a tainted source—although I am blowed if I can think why: it is just another international treaty—but on top of that is the fact that once in place the charter has no regard for our parliamentary sovereignty. It has the capacity to trump our domestic laws if there is an incompatibility between our domestically enacted laws and the principles of, or anything that has come from, the charter. That is part of the supremacy of EU law to which we have all been subject.

All that should not make us ignore the benefits that the charter of fundamental rights has conferred. Whatever we may think as we talk about parliamentary sovereignty, I venture the suggestion that if one goes out into the street and asks people whether they think that equality law, which is largely EU-derived, has been of value to this country, most people would give a resounding note of approval. I am sure they would do the same with respect to the recent Benkharbouche case in relation to the disapplication of the State Immunity Act 1978 for the purposes of enabling an employment case to be brought against an embassy that had mistreated one of its employees. Of course, as has been cited, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has availed himself of the provisions of the charter and the rights that the EU has conferred in relation to questions of data privacy and the way data is handled.

[Mr Lammy]

Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman also aware of the simple rights that many of us will have used on behalf of a parent, such as the right to wheelchair accessibility at our airports? There are also rights that came up in the course of the youth justice review I did for the Government, to do with making courts child-friendly so that, for example, they do not intimidate a young woman having to relay a terrible case of sexual assault. Such rights did not exist in British law but now exist as a result of the charter. For that reason, we ought to give due respect to our European friends for giving us the charter.

[Mr Grieve]

I place great respect on the fact that, for all the faults I can sometimes identify, when the European Union was established its founding fathers wished it to be based on principles not only of the rule of law, but of a vision of human society of which I have no difficulty approving.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

I will just make a little progress.

I do not have any problem with that vision at all. It worries me that, in the course of this debate on Brexit and our departure from the European Union, in this massive upheaval of venom about the EU that I have experienced personally in the past week, which seems to have no relation to reality at all and troubles me very much, we seem to be at risk of losing sight of these aspects of real progress within our society as a result of our EU membership. They are overlooked.

[Sir William Cash]

I have listened to my right hon. and learned Friend with great care and interest. Will he explain why the matters to which he and the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) have just referred could not be enacted? In fact, they often are enacted; I referred to the Protection of Children Act 1978, the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 and so forth. Does he not understand that it is terribly important to remember that implicit in the charter—as a distinguished lawyer, he knows this—is the power of the European Court to disapply Supreme Court enactments? The Factortame case was a good example of that in respect of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988.

[Mr Grieve]

I thought Factortame would come along at some point in this debate. My hon. Friend is of course right about that. I know that he has spent most of his career in this House agonising over the issue of the loss or diminution of parliamentary sovereignty. That is not a matter to be neglected, and if he will wait just a moment I shall come to that point.

As I said, by raising the points he has through tabling new clause 16, the hon. Member for Nottingham East has done the right thing, because we need to focus on what is going to happen after we have left the EU. Of course my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is correct: the laws that we have enacted, as at the date of exit, as a consequence of our EU membership and the requirement for us to adhere to the charter, will remain in place, but it is interesting that they will thereafter be wholly unprotected. For example, they will not even enjoy the special protection that we crafted in the Human Rights Act for other areas deemed to be of importance.

One solution may be that, in due course, we ought to think carefully about whether there are other categories of rights additional to the European convention on human rights—heaven knows we have been here before—that ought to enjoy the sort of protection that the Human Rights Act affords other rights. That might well be the way forward. I agree with my hon. Friend that it is slightly strange that, in leaving the EU for national sovereignty reasons, we should then say that we will continue to entrench certain categories of rights protected in the charter and give them a status even higher than, for example, prohibiting torture under the ECHR. That might strike people as rather odd. On that basis, I am forced to conclude that, if we are leaving the EU, as we intend to do, the sort of entrenchment that has previously existed is not sustainable. We will have to come back to this House to consider how we move forward, but, in saying that, I think that this is a very big issue indeed.

It worries me that, when we leave in March 2019, there will be a hiatus. There will be a gap where areas of law that matter to people are not protected in any way at all. It is no surprise, therefore, that non-governmental organisations have been bombarding MPs with their anxiety. I think that that anxiety is misplaced, because I cannot believe that any Member on the Treasury Front Bench intends to diminish existing rights. However, we are in danger from two things. One is sclerosis—that the rights development will cease. Secondly, because those rights do not enjoy any form of special status—many, not necessarily all, should certainly do so—there will be occasions when we nibble away at them and then discover that they have been lost. For that reason, it is a really urgent issue for consideration by this House, preferably before or shortly after we leave.

[Victoria Prentis]

My right hon. and learned Friend and former pupil master is making a speech with his characteristic intellectual honesty. Nothing passes him by. In that spirit, does he agree that the charter is not really the solution to incorporating the rights that so many of us want to see incorporated, such as the new views of sexuality and children’s rights? Possibly the way forward is not to vote for this new clause, but to continue to put pressure on those on the Treasury Bench to ensure that those rights are protected in a modern and suitable way for the current world.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. As has been pointed out, this new clause just asks for a report, which means it is trying to concentrate minds on an issue. In our debate last week, one point that I made on my new clause 55, which is still hanging over the Treasury Bench like the sword of Damocles, is that there may be some ways in which we can provide—even now as we leave, as a temporary measure before we can return to the issue—some greater reassurance on the protection of key rights in the fields of equality. I strongly recommend that my hon and right hon. Friends pay some attention to that, because the issue will not go away. If we do not seek to act on it, the idea of a modern Conservative party starts to fray at the edges, and I do not wish my party to gain a reputation for ignoring these key issues.

[Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)]

Might I use as an example very cash-strapped services, which might not naturally wish to be extending the rights and the costs of services? For example, in the aged care sector, a couple who traditionally had to be split up due to the needs of one or other of them can, under European rights, remain as a couple. We can imagine that, in a time of cash-strapped services, that sort of right might not necessarily fall into the lap of service users.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Lady makes a valid point, but it is worth bearing in mind that that is covered by the Human Rights Act and the ECHR, so let us not get too worried. We must also face up to the fact that some socio-economic rights that require levels of cost and economic policy decisions are legitimate areas in which Parliament and Government can say that, however ideal they might be, a balance must be struck. That is why I am always careful—this probably marks me out as a Conservative—about the infinite extension of rights, because thereby we dilute their importance. That is very important to bear in mind.

[Mr Harper]

My right hon. and learned Friend raised the issue of the extension of rights. Is not one of the problems with the charter and its interpretation by the courts that, because it is a very general set of rights, it can be extended by courts? Unlike with the ECHR and the Human Rights Act, it is not just about declaring incompatibility, but about striking down Acts of this Parliament too. This does not get the balance right, which he accepts is very important.

[Mr Grieve]

That of course was one of the great anxieties when the charter was enacted. Indeed, it is the reason for the UK’s so-called opt-out, but it is not an opt-out because, in so far as the charter reflects general principles of EU law, we are bound by it. One example, which my right hon. Friend will remember, was the case of Chester and McGeoch and prisoner voting rights. There was an attempt to invoke EU law as a tool in order to force the UK Government to bring in prisoner voting, at least in relation to European elections. I think that it is fair to say that it caused much disquiet in government as to the possibility that that might be the outcome of the court case. Indeed, I went to argue the court case as Attorney General on the Government’s behalf in our Supreme Court. Invoking EU law was used as a tool, but it did not lead to that outcome.

Looking back over the history of the charter, I do not think that some of the fears that were expressed—that it would be used for an expansionist purpose by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg—have been proved to be correct. In any event, we are leaving the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, unless we have to stay in it for transitional purposes. When we are gone it will be our own Supreme Court, in which I have enormous confidence, that will carry out that interpretation. I do not want to labour this point much further. I simply want to say that there is a really important issue for us to debate. It is about what happens to the sorts of rights that have come to us through the charter and through the EU. The matter cannot be ignored. In the short term—the sword of Damocles moment again—the Government must think about it before the Bill has finished going through this House.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

I just want to make sure that I understand what my right hon. and learned Friend is suggesting. Are there some items in the charter which are not going to be retained through the retention principles of the Bill, but which should be retained in the form effectively of becoming an amendment to the HRA, so that they are subject to the HRA’s protections?

[Mr Grieve]

That could be a solution, but even if we do not have time to move to that and to have the necessary debate—as we highlighted in the question about the statutory instrument powers that the Government are taking to change law—some comfort and reassurance might be provided with the fact that there are some categories of EU-derived law that could do with at least the assurance that they would require primary legislation to change them. That might go some way to providing reassurance to some of the perfectly worthy organisations that have been writing to us that there is no malevolent intent towards this important area in which rights have developed.

[Mary Creagh]

The general principles of European law do not cover the principles of environmental law. That was made clear to us in terms from the Dispatch Box last week. The charter does guarantee those environmental rights. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that environmental principles are one area in which this Bill is deficient and in which our rights will be lost?

[Mr Grieve]

I agree that environmental law is an area that could do with the scrutiny that I have just outlined.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I just want to follow what my right hon. and learned Friend was saying a moment ago, because it seemed to be a very useful suggestion. Is he saying that, as part of what he and I sometimes call the triage process, certain items that are classed as rights could be subject to primary legislation in full for amendment, whereas others, which are important but not rights, might be subject to the affirmative procedure and others, which are technical, will be left over for the negative procedure?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, absolutely, and that was what new clause 55 sought to achieve, although it did provide the opportunity of looking at purely technical amendments—those would be really technical, and I do not wish to burden the Committee with complete trivia.

[Charlie Elphicke]

My right hon. and learned Friend is making a typically thoughtful and deeply considered speech. On a point of clarification, would it be right to say that there are, effectively, three different categories in the charter of fundamental rights? There are those rights that, as I indicated earlier, do not make a lot of sense in transposition, such as the right to petition the European Parliament. There are those rights that are already covered by the Human Rights Act, such as the right to life and the right to property. However, there is a third category of rights, such as that in article 41, that are not covered by our own jurisprudence and legal system, and they might usefully be so in due course.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. He has correctly analysed what the issues are and the categories of rights on which we probably ought to focus.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Some of these rights are going to be incorporated in different statutes. For example, there is going to be an environment Act, which will create a new regulator and, we hope, protect those rights. Is the present proposal not a very broad brush, which is ill fitted to dealing with these rather detailed matters? Can my right and learned hon. Friend give us some reassurance that Supreme Court judges will not be left dealing with more legal uncertainty, rather than less, because they will have to adjudicate between two different rights regimes—one that is directly applicable from our own statute, and the other where they may have to declare an incompatibility with European convention rights? How will that diminish legal uncertainty, which is what Supreme Court judges are looking for?

[Mr Grieve]

If I understand my hon. Friend’s question, it goes to the point I made a moment ago, which was that it ought to be possible to consider whether some of these rights should be incorporated in a Bill of Rights that provides equivalent protection to that currently provided in the Human Rights Act. I think it is possible to distinguish between what matters and what does not. I am not suggesting that all environmental law would have to enjoy that protection, but I think it is possible, and an exercise that this House and the Government will have to carry out—the pressure will build for this—to give this issue some consideration. Equally, the House may decide that it is not concerned about some categories of rights and that it just wants to stick to things such as equality, data privacy and children’s rights. We will need to debate that.

[Mr Jenkin]

But it will create uncertainty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

No, I do not think it will create uncertainty, any more than the Human Rights Act has created uncertainty. I have to say to my hon. Friend that I do not think that that is an issue. However, as I say, I do accept that it will take time to draft and debate these things, and it is not in this current forum that we will be able to achieve that.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

On the point my right hon. and learned Friend is making, I think I am in complete agreement with him. It is right for this place to consider, debate and legislate on these issues, because this is the right forum for doing that, rather than by implementing a whole slew of rights, which would then be entirely in the hands of the courts.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, and there we are in agreement. It is inevitable and regrettable that we face this situation, but that is why simply to convert the charter, which, in any case, has lots in it that is unconvertible, and to say that it should maintain entrenched rights, seems to me, in the light of what we are debating in the context of Brexit, to be an impossibility. That is not something that commends itself to me.

Let me now move to a slightly narrower issue. We have to accept that, in the course of what we are doing, we are going through a complex period of transition. Forget about the transitional arrangements we may be negotiating with our EU partners—the truth is that we are creating a whole category of transitional law. By the concept of retained EU law, we are doing some very strange things indeed with our ordinary legal principles.

Clause 5(2) allows EU law to have priority over domestic law in certain circumstances. In fact, it allows for the possibility of UK law enacted prior to exit day being quashed for incompatibility with EU law that is retained on exit day. I simply make the point that, leaving aside our EU membership, which of course will have ceased, this is an utterly unique development in our legal system—it has never happened before. We are about to create a species of domestic or semi-domestic law—I would not quite describe it as feral law—which will have the unique quality of being able to override our own laws. Clause 6(3) will also allow CJEU judgments given before exit day to be binding, but not on our Supreme Court—a matter that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and I have been worrying about quite a lot in the course of the passage of this legislation.

So although the CJEU will rightly lose jurisdiction, it and EU law will keep a special status. However, that is intended to be only temporary, although how temporary is speculative, and I of course note clause 5(3), which says that this law can be modified and still retain this special status, as long as the modification, I assume, is not so dramatic or drastic that it is made explicit that it should lose it. That is different from replacement. That, I suspect, is because the Government know very well that this situation may continue for decades to come.

Yet, in the middle of that, the charter is removed. Leaving aside the other issues concerning the charter, which I have touched on, and which I do not want to go back over, that creates an unusual circumstance. EU law was always intended to be purposive, and one of the purposes is to give effect to the fundamental principles under which the EU is supposed to operate. Yet we are removing the benchmark under which this law is supposed to operate, because the charter will no longer be there, although, interestingly—I think this is an acknowledgment by the Government of the problem they have—they have then, in the next clauses, essentially allowed the charter and general principles of EU law to continue to be used for the purposes of interpretation.

It is very unclear how all this, in practice, is going to work out. That is why I tabled my two principal amendments. Amendment 8 would allow the retention of the charter. It provides an easy route to ensuring that this legal framework is retained, but for the reasons we have just been debating, there are serious issues surrounding it, which is why I think it is probably wrong to pursue it.

However, there is then the question in schedule 1 of what we do with general principles of EU law. What they are is totally undefined, but I assume—I have to assume—that if the Government are content to articulate the existence of general principles, they have done enough research to establish to their own satisfaction that general principles do exist—they are the result of court judgments interpreting the law and, indeed, the fundamental principles in the charter, but not the ones that are going to disappear on the day we leave.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Is not the important point about clause 5 that any future Act of this Parliament takes supremacy, so if there is a muddle or a problem, this Parliament can sort it out definitively? I should have thought that that would deal with the interests of all parties concerned.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend almost makes my case for me. He is absolutely right that, in so far as we want to depart from anything, this House, once we have left the EU, can do what it likes, and as regards anything we enact thereafter, the supremacy of EU law is entirely removed. We can do exactly what we please, except, I am afraid, in so far as we may find ourselves still locked into trying to maintain comity with the EU when the penny drops about the economic consequences of not having it. However, I will refrain from straying too far into that area.

So the question is: is there some merit in keeping the right to bring a challenge using general principles of EU law? I would have thought that there is. I tried to work through in my mind the importance of this. First, we may have retained EU law that is deficient, defective or does not operate properly, or a court might be forced to conclude that it operates in a capricious or even unfair manner, or is disproportionate. At the moment, the only remedy for the court, unless it can bring in the Human Rights Act, will be to apply the law and somebody points out to a Minister that that law is working very badly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right and we are completely of one mind on this. I am talking about retained principles—the principles that were seen to exist at the date of exit.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am delighted, though not surprised, that my right hon. and learned Friend and I are thinking alike on this, as we have thought alike on many of these issues. Does he think, in that case, that his amendment 10 ought to be recast when, as I hope, it appears as a Government amendment on Report, so as not to remove paragraph 3 but to say, instead of “general principles”, “retained general principles”, with similar consequential adjustments?

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. As I have said on many previous occasions, whatever merits I may have as a lawyer, I am not a parliamentary draftsman. On top of that, I gently point out that, in an effort to get my amendments in early, they were, in the usual way, drafted with a wet towel around my head at about 30 minutes past midnight on the night before Second Reading. I am therefore quite sure that they are all capable of substantial improvement. Indeed, in my experience, it is very unusual for an amendment ever to be accepted just like that, apart from when it adds a comma, particularly in Committee.

Yes, of course there are different ways in which this can be approached. Indeed, my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, with whom I have had an opportunity for a bit of a chat—I shall look forward to talking to him further about this—has made it clear that he thinks I have been a bit too draconian in deleting paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. On the other hand, there are some other things in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 that I find rather concerning. However, I shall confine myself to paragraph 3 for the moment.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

On whether the drafting is entirely right, so far, as far as I am aware, the Government have had absolutely no answer to the extremely clear case that my right hon. and learned Friend has made about the proper way to protect these cases in future. The obvious thing is for the Government to accept these amendments today, because they can come back on Report and start correcting and redrafting amendments to which I am sure that he will be wholly receptive. What I would not welcome is some vague assurances from Front Benchers that they will think about it and then might come back with something on Report. The drafting can be corrected later; the points that he is making need to be confirmed today.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very good point. He highlights the difficulty faced by all Back Benchers, particularly Government Back Benchers, in presenting amendments—namely, the extent to which they should accept assurances from Front Benchers. That largely depends on how detailed the assurance is—whether it is woolly and vague or has some specificity to it. My judgment on whether I might press amendment 10 to the vote will depend on how specific Front Benchers can be in providing an assurance that they recognise that, even if there may be areas that remain to be debated, there is a core issue that must be addressed about the ability to bring a right of action in domestic law based on a failure to comply with a general principle of EU law when it concerns the operation of retained EU law.

Furthermore, because retained EU law has supremacy over domestic law, it must be possible that there might be instances in which our domestic law would have to be altered. The Government cannot then argue that that is an extraordinary thing to do, because they have themselves drafted this Bill in a way that allows for the possibility of UK domestic law being quashed. That will, I hope, be for a temporary period. Nevertheless, I am unable to understand how, during that temporary period, we can end up with a situation where the Government are perfectly happy to allow for the supremacy of EU law but remove the very principles that moderate it, ensure that it cannot be abused, and, in those areas that were within EU competence, provide a framework under which the Government are undertaking to operate unless or until they repeal the bits of retained EU legislation that they are bringing into our law.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

Before my hon. Friend intervenes, let me say this to him. The big argument against EU law is that it was either created by “this foreign body” or it was inflicted on us and we had to enact it in order to comply with our international legal obligations. In those circumstances, it is a bit odd if we start arguing that, in view of where it comes from, the possibility of, for example, knocking it on the head because it does not comply with its own general principles should be entirely abandoned.

[Sir William Cash]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not go down the rabbit hole suggested by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), which is that we should accept this incongruous proposal when in fact it involves a fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) understands that. He is identifying a number of questions, and I entirely encourage him to continue to do so. I suggest, however, that it would be very unwise indeed to follow the advice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe as regards the Government accepting these amendments for the time being.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point. However, the purpose of this Bill, as I understand it, is to put together a package that enables a smooth transition from our presence within the European Union to our presence outside of it. That, of necessity, requires adjustments to the purity of his thinking about parliamentary sovereignty, which the Government have been required to acknowledge in the way that they have drafted this Bill. In those circumstances, it does not seem to be pushing the boundaries very much further, nor should it be seen as some treasonable article, for us to consider whether the general principles of EU law ought not to be capable of being invoked when they are probably the very thing that has, over the years, prevented the EU from turning into an even worse tyranny, as my hon. Friend would see it. [Interruption.] Well, I have to say, having listened to him, that that is usually the impression that has come across. He sees it as tyrannical because it is not moderated by the doctrine of our parliamentary sovereignty. I simply make that point; I do not wish to labour it.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Is there not an important change once we have left the European Union in that the European Court of Justice would not accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights because it would not accept that a higher court could intervene in any of its rulings? It therefore needed protections within its own system that within our system are provided by the European Court of Human Rights and the application of that in domestic law.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. I slightly question the extent to which we have had clear evidence of that, although I know that there has been a reluctance on the part of the European Court of Justice to accept any higher authority, despite the intention of the parties that it should become subordinate, ultimately, to the ECHR. He is right that one reason why the charter came into being was to secure compliance. I think it is rather more of a hypothetical than an actual state of affairs, although such a problem might exist in future. In any event, I do not think we are dealing here just with matters covered by the ECHR, for the very reasons that were discussed earlier in relation to new clause 16, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East. I simply say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that the issue has to be addressed.

As I said earlier, I recognise that my amendment is not as good as it might be, and could be improved on. If the Government can give me an assurance that is adequate and goes beyond vagueness, I will be content not to press amendment 10 a vote. The issue is not going to go away, however, and when one is in this sort of dialogue with the Government, one does not want to be soft-soaped off. If that happens, there will be a road crash when we come to Report, in which I will be unable to support the Government on a whole series of matters. I hope that those things can be resolved by consensus.

I have spoken for quite long enough, but I have explained why I think that, on the important issue that we are debating today, the best solution in the interim is to use something along the lines of amendment 10 to ensure that general principles of EU law can continue to be invoked. Of course, as the transition goes on, I assume that so much EU law may disappear, but I venture the suggestion that it will continue to be relevant for some time to come.

May I, finally, touch briefly on the three other amendments —297, 298 and 299—that I have tabled? They are very simple, and they concern the use in clause 5 of the words

“any enactment or rule of law”.

I simply say that nobody I have spoken to understands why the words “rule of law” appear in the Bill. Ultimately, a rule of law is a rule of the common law; and in so far as a rule of the common law is displaced by statute, that rule will be displaced, of itself, by the courts. It does not require to be spelled out in legislation. I draw some comfort, on that, from the fact that a very distinguished lawyer who previously worked in this building shares my view that the inclusion of those words is incomprehensible. I do not think that that is a matter that I would necessarily put to the vote, if I was required to do so, but I hope that the Government might be able to provide a positive response on it. I am grateful to the Committee for listening.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

It is a genuine pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who made his case extremely well and very convincingly—it is supported by many hon. Members on both sides of Committee.

I rise to speak to amendment 46, which is designed to ensure that we keep the charter of fundamental rights in EU retained law; amendment 335, which would maintain the principles of the Francovich ruling after exit day for pre-Brexit cases; amendments 285, 286 and 287, which make provision for existing arrangements to continue during a transitional period; and, finally, amendment 336, which makes provision for retaining existing principles of EU law within domestic law until the end of the transitional arrangements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

If the Prime Minister’s words are to be taken at face value—we continue to operate during the transition practically as if we were still part of the membership—new principles would apply during the transitional period, although not after it had ended.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman has touched on an important point. If we are going into a transitional period retaining the architecture of EU law, or the vast majority of it for that period, to try to leave at the end of the transition and go back to the status of retained EU law on the date on which we moved into transition would be utterly unrealistic. It would have to be from the date on which we moved from transition to final departure.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who has made the point much more effectively than I did. That is absolutely right.

Briefly, Francovich raises some important issues of accountability. Surely there is oversight by Government, because I would expect them to accept that the right to damages should be available in cases where the breach of Community law took place before exit day, and indeed before the end of a transitional period, but discovery only took place afterwards. I am therefore seeking clarification from Ministers on that point, and I hope that they accept what hon. Members are seeking to do in amendments on Francovich.

We are pleased to support new clauses 16, 78 and 79, as well as amendments 297, 298, 299, 8,10,101,105 and 62 and the consequential amendments 126 ,127,129,140, 141, 302 and 9—just for clarity. In conclusion, I return to amendment 46, because we need some honesty from the Government. The House has not authorised the Government to use Brexit as a vehicle to deplete human rights in this country. If the Government want to reduce rights and protections, they should say so and we can debate it. What is not acceptable is to pretend that the Bill provides for the transfer of rights and protections when it clearly does not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I will give way shortly to the hon. and learned Lady, because I know she supports some of the amendments.

I turn now to amendments 297, 298 and 299, tabled my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and to amendments 285 and 286, tabled by the leader of the Labour party, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield wishes to remove any reference to “any rule of law”, which is a reference in the Bill to common law rules in relation to provisions addressing supremacy of EU law. In effect, his amendments—at least as I have understood them, and I stand to be corrected—would allow EU law to continue to trump the common law after the date of exit. However, this would undermine both of the key strategic objectives of the Bill. It would mean in relation to common law rules articulated after exit day that retained EU law trumps them, undermining the UK’s basic constitutional hierarchy that we are seeking to restore and affirm.

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

Allow me to make the point and then I will give way, because there are two sides to my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment.

Paradoxically, with respect to the relationship between retained EU law and common law rules made up until exit day, my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment would skew the clear and certain snapshot the Bill will take, because retained EU law would no longer supersede common law rules. By removing the common law from the operation of the Bill, I am afraid the amendments would—at least on the Government’s analysis—create considerable uncertainty for business and individuals alike.

[Mr Grieve]

No, I want these words removed because they are completely unnecessary. To use that wonderful word that lawyers like to apply, they are otiose—they add absolutely nothing to the Bill. The common law will be adjusted according to the statutory framework in which it operates, so I say with some regret—because someone clearly came up with the idea—that it seems rather poor drafting. Others, whom I consulted because I was puzzled by this, and who have spent their lives drafting precisely this sort of legislation, seem to agree with me. I was trying to help my hon. Friend, not create some devilish plot to scupper Brexit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I am going to make some progress, because I have been speaking for over half an hour and the Solicitor General will want to speak again to address schedule 1.

The substantive rights that individuals already benefit from in the UK when their data is processed will be retained under this Bill. As I have pointed out, the charter is not the source of rights contained within it; it was intended only to catalogue those that existed in EU law at that moment in time.

Finally, I want to address the late new clauses tabled: new clause 78, tabled by the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), and new clause 79. On the impact our departure from the EU might have on equalities legislation, I again reaffirm the commitment I made on day one in Committee to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, when we discussed this issue at some length. I understand the intention behind this amendment and can reassure the right hon. Gentleman that there will be no reduction in the substantive equalities protections when we leave the EU. Equally, the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment presents some very real practical difficulties, not least his attempt effectively to copy and paste the procedural model used in the Human Rights Act and then put it into this Bill for the equalities purposes.

The Human Rights Act assesses compatibility according to an international instrument, the ECHR, which is not the same. There is not an equivalent that applies to the Equality Act, but I am more than happy to reaffirm the commitment I made to my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee that the Government will bring forward an amendment before Report stage that will require Ministers to make a statement before this House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act. I hope that reassures the right hon. Gentleman that the Government are serious about addressing the issue he has rightly raised.

New clause 79 suggests a procedural device for incorporating certain EEA-related rules into UK law. This is entirely unnecessary given the wider snapshot of EU law this Bill will take at the point of exit.

I hope I have tackled, or at least have endeavoured to tackle—

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

I give way to my right hon. and learned Friend.

[Mr Grieve]

Is my hon. Friend about to move on to schedule 1, or is another Minister going to deal with it, and at what stage of this afternoon’s debate? I thought the Government would wrap this all up in one, seeing as it is a single debate.

[Dominic Raab]

As I said at the opening of my remarks, given the intention to address clause 5 in some detail and all the underlying amendments, we have split this up and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 and all my right hon. and learned Friend’s concerns around Francovich and general principles in due course.

I hope I have tackled hon. Members’ concerns, at least in relation to clause 5 and the charter, and I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments to a vote. This Government and the ministerial team have listened, and we will continue to reflect carefully on all the arguments made today. Equally, the Government believe the exceptions to retained EU law contained in clause 5 are right as we carefully seek to separate our legal system from that of the EU, restore democratic control to this House, and do so in a way that leaves more, not less, legal certainty. I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments and to pass clause 5 unamended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s general proposition, to which I would add that it is up to us to make our own laws. We can listen to the arguments, we can make the amendments and we can recognise human rights, as well as all the other things, as I did with the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014. I entirely agree with his sentiment for that reason.

Lord Bingham went on to say:

“We live in a society dedicated to the rule of law”—

I note the reference to that by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield—

“in which Parliament has power, subject to limited, self-imposed restraints, to legislate as it wishes; in which Parliament may therefore legislate in a way which infringes the rule of law; and in which the judges, consistently with their constitutional duty to administer justice according to the laws and usages of the realm, cannot fail to give effect to such legislation if it is clearly and unambiguously expressed.”

I ought to add that, in fact, Lady Hale revisited that territory, before she was made President of the Supreme Court, in a speech in Kuala Lumpur on 9 November 2016.

The Conservative party opposed Lisbon, which conferred treaty status on the charter. I say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield with all respect, because we get on pretty well and we have had several chats over the past few days, but I trust he will recall his opposition to the Lisbon treaty and, therefore, to the charter when he was shadow Attorney General—he followed me in that post. More specifically, I hope he will recall the evidence he gave to the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, which was cited in its report published on 9 May 2016—

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

I know my right hon. and learned friend knows what I am about to say, but may I finish the quotation? He said that

“the European Court of Human Rights is a very benign institution, whereas I happen to think that the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices”.

I would suggest that those are in respect of the question of disapplication of Acts of Parliament.

[Mr Grieve]

May I gently say to my hon. Friend that although this is fascinating, we are actually talking about retained EU law which will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union? I do have criticisms of the CJEU and the way it has operated at times, and I have had the pleasure, or misfortune, of appearing before it. Its teleological principles and its purposive interpretation of law have often been challenging in our national setting, although it is not a pariah court and by international standards it is a pretty good tribunal. So I stand by the points I made on that occasion, but they in no way diminish or undermine anything that I have said here this afternoon.

[Sir William Cash]

I simply add that I understand this with reference to the European Court in its existing situation, because not until we leave the EU are we able to avoid the jurisdiction of the European Court, so that applies at least for the next two years and probably for the two after that. God knows what they will do in the meantime. My European Scrutiny Committee has been holding meetings already on the European laws that have been proposed since the general election, but the problem is—

--- Later in debate ---

For all those reasons, I strongly urge my right hon. and hon. Friends—I say this with all sincerity—not to pursue these amendments. If those amendments are pressed, I call on the Committee to reject them. I say that because, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield has already conceded, they are technically defective and would not make sense.

[Mr Grieve]

As I said, the drafting of amendments is quite a complex matter, and I am the first to accept that an amendment may not meet the exact needs of the Government, even if the Government were to seek to accept it. None the less, the position is very simple and I can only repeat it: amendment 10 will be put to the vote unless the Government give some satisfactory assurances that they will respond to it.

[Sir William Cash]

Let me conclude. I do hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not do what he has just suggested. I say that because those measures are defective not only in the way that he has described, but in respect of paragraph 5 of schedule 1. Amendment 10 refers to paragraphs 1 to 3, but there are also difficulties in relation to paragraph 5, which I will not go into now because I have made all my remarks.

I sincerely urge my right hon. and learned Friend to listen to the arguments and to accept the fact that, for very good reasons, it would not be appropriate to press these amendments to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Neill]

There have been a number of powerful speeches from Members on both sides of the Committee on this important issue. I shall be as brief as I can, but I want to begin by picking up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). This is what we are supposed to be doing in this House. This is about proper parliamentary scrutiny. I do not care about the views of writers of newspaper headlines. If any one of us stands up and seeks to scrutinise the Bill to improve it, we are doing our duty by our constituents. Anyone who thinks that doing so is somehow opposing either the Bill or the wishes of the electorate has precious little knowledge of—or, even worse, no respect for—our parliamentary processes.

In an endeavour to seek to improve the Bill and assist the Government, I supported a number of amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others, and I stand by that. I hope—I get the impression from the spirit of what has been said—that the Government recognise those issues and will find a means to take them forward constructively. That is in everyone’s good interests, but I want to reinforce as swiftly as possible the significance of that. The Government’s position in relation to the protection of human rights has been grossly mischaracterised by some Opposition Members. That does the debate no good. I do not believe for a second that it is the Government’s intention to diminish rights protection. Equally, it is important that we get right the way in which that is protected. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General will reflect on that.

I particularly want to refer to Francovich litigation, because this is a classic case of making sure that we do not inadvertently do injustice to people as we take necessary measures in the Bill to incorporate existing European law into our own. No one has a problem with that, but it is not right to deny people the ability to seek effective remedy for a course of action that arises under retained law. The whole point of having sensible limitation Acts is to prevent people from being denied a remedy with the passage of time when they have done nothing to deserve that. We need a bit more clarity—for example, if there is a pre-existing right to a course of action that is available until the moment we leave the European Union, it ought to be possible for someone, once they have become aware of that course of action, to pursue it through our courts.

[Mr Grieve]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. While the Government have made an argument that there is a problem because of the international law aspect in such a piece of litigation going all the way to the European Court of Justice, there can be no argument that the same rules that applied when we were in the EU should apply to any such piece of litigation, even if the end-stop is our own Supreme Court. It is perfectly easy to do, and the Bill has to be altered to allow that to happen.

[Robert Neill]

The case that my right hon. and learned Friend makes is completely unarguable. There is no answer to that thus far from the Government, and the only answer is to change and improve the Bill. To fail to tie up that clear, apparent and recognised loose end in the Bill could have the effect, almost by negligence or a measure of inadvertence, of denying UK citizens rights they might otherwise have. That would seem to me to be almost verging on the disreputable. I do not believe that the Ministers on the Treasury Bench wish to do that for one second and I know they will want to put it right. I hope that they will make it clear that it is the Government’s intention to make sure that that lacuna is resolved.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

If I may, I will move on to amendment 10, which would remove paragraphs 1 to 3 from schedule 1. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) earlier drew the attention of the Committee to these important matters, and I am grateful to him for the constructive way in which he has sought to approach this issue. First, we cannot agree to the removal of paragraph 1 because the effect would be to create huge uncertainty. How would our domestic courts approach the task of assessing challenges to the validity of converted law? That is a job that they have never had before. Who would defend those challenges? What remedies would be available to the courts? How could converted law that was found to be invalid be replaced? The amendment does not deal with any of those vital questions.

Similarly, we cannot accept that paragraph 2 should be removed from the schedule. There is no single definitive list of the general principles. They are discovered and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Paragraph 2 in its current form maximises certainty by specifying a clear cut-off point and stating that a general principle needs to have been recognised by the Court before we exit. Without that, it would be completely unclear which general principles could be used as the basis for a challenge. It is not even clear whether post-exit CJEU jurisprudence could be taken into account, and so whether new principles couldbe discovered after exit. That would be completely inappropriate.

[Mr Grieve]

I would like gently to point out that I did not propose deleting the interpretation provision 5(2). Admittedly, it does not interpret anything because the rest is gone, but it nevertheless made it pretty clear that we were talking about retained EU law and that such law was created prior to the date of our exit.

[The Solicitor General]

I think that my right hon. and learned Friend has answered his own point. Without sub-paragraph (2), paragraph 5(2) becomes rather difficult to apply. I want to get to the nub of his concern, however, which is paragraph 3 of the schedule. We recognise the strength of the views that he and other Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed on this issue, many of whom have spoken this afternoon. We are listening, and we are prepared to look again at this issue to ensure that we are taking an approach that can command the support of the Committee.

Simply removing paragraph 3 in its entirety, however, is not something that we could agree to. It would result in an open-ended right of challenge based on the general principles of EU law, however they are defined, after exit. It would mean that domestic legislation, both secondary and primary, rules of law and executive action could be disapplied or quashed if found to be incompatible with those actions. Currently, the general principles apply when a member state is

“acting within the scope of EU law”,

so after exit the circumstances in which the general principles could be relied upon would not be clear.

Allowing courts to overturn Acts of Parliament, outside the context of EU law, on the basis of incompatibility with these principles would be alien to our legal system and would offend against parliamentary sovereignty.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend raised the question of scope and when this would apply, but it seems to me that he was answering his own question, because it comes when there is a clash between the law that has been retained and has supremacy and any domestic legislation. It is precisely because the supremacy of the retained EU law is kept that it is necessary also to have the potential for the general principles to have that supremacy as well, because they are essential to the purpose of interpretation of that law.

[The Solicitor General]

I wanted to deal with the issue in this way, because it seems to me that the nub of the issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is concerned about is with regard to the rights of challenge relating to pre-exit causes of action. It would be possible to retain those, and in relation to executive action even after exit in areas covered by retained EU law. We can agree that there should be appropriate mechanisms for challenging the actions of the Executive. I am happy to discuss further with him what might be needed. I am also willing to discuss whether there needs to be some further route of challenge on secondary legislation.

The rights landscape is indeed complex, and we are seeking with this Bill to maximise and not remove any substantive rights that UK citizens currently enjoy. In view of my commitment to look at this again, I invite my right hon. and learned Friend not to press amendment 10 and to agree to work with us in this shared endeavour. The Government will bring forward our own amendments on Report for the purposes of clarifying paragraph 3 of schedule 1.

[The Solicitor General]

Let me turn to paragraph 3(1) of schedule 1 to be absolutely clear. I am interested in looking at all aspects of that provision: sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who has made a really important concession at the Dispatch Box, which I much appreciate. It clearly reflects the disquiet that has been shown across the House. I can tell him now that, in the light of that, I will not be pressing my amendment to a vote. However, it is clear from what he has said that although some of the issues that I have raised have been met, I ought to put it on record that it is also clear that the issue about whether this could be used to disapply primary legislation appears to remain an area of potential disagreement between us, which I hope we may be able to iron out. I have to say that it is a strange area of disagreement, given that elsewhere we have precisely the possibility of that happening, by virtue of keeping the supremacy of retained EU law.

[The Solicitor General]

As I have said, I want to ensure that the dialogue that has been opened continues. My right hon. and learned Friend knows that at all times the spirit with which he and other hon. Members have tabled amendments has been entirely understood and respected by those on the Treasury Bench. We have never sought to pillory Members for doing the job of scrutinising legislation. I have been there myself many times and can remember tabling dozens of amendments in order to probe the Government’s intentions in a Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I make it clear that, in the words of both the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, today and, previously, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, we are seeking to publish such details. If there are any further concerns, we can have a continuing dialogue to ensure that the information is in a comprehensive form that seeks to address the issues raised today and elsewhere. The publication on 5 December will therefore be a meaningful event that assists everybody in greater understanding and assists greater progress on getting this process right.

On the question of general principles, I emphasise that there are good reasons to say why it would not be appropriate to incorporate the constitutional and administrative principles of the EU as free-standing principles in our law by inserting a specific right of action, or to incorporate the remedy of striking down domestic legislation based on incompatibility with EU law principles, when we are no longer a member of that institution. First, some of these principles will, indeed, cease to make sense when we have left, except for the purpose of interpreting retained EU law, whereas other principles are already, and will continue to be, reflected elsewhere in our domestic law anyway.

[Mr Grieve]

Has not the Solicitor General, again, just answered his own question? I appreciate that some of the general principles will evaporate because they cease to be relevant, but those that are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law must still be relevant because they will be used as a tool and aid to interpretation. In those circumstances, why should an individual or a business be deprived of raising them as arguments for saying that, in fact, this law is supposed to be supreme, and therefore able to overcome our own domestic legislation, and ask why the general principles cannot be used to have that bit of offending domestic legislation set aside? I just do not understand the rationale.

[The Solicitor General]

The rationale is quite straightforward in the sense that, in seeking to achieve maximum certainty, there is danger in allowing the system to create a situation in which the law might rapidly degrade in a way that does not achieve such stability and certainty. I accept it is almost reverse logic, but there is logic in trying to make sure that we have an identifiable and pretty understandable body of retained EU law.

I give the example of the EU principle of good administration, which will not have any relevance to our UK law after exit because, of course, the bodies vested in EU agencies will be returned here and all the normal domestic rules about the exercise of such powers by public bodies will apply. Another example is the principle of subsidiarity, which does not make sense outside the concept of EU membership.

Secondly, the Bill will, of course, take a snapshot of the law as it stands at the moment we leave. Retaining a right of action based on general principles of EU law, which will of course change in the future, would lead to uncertainty for businesses and individuals about their rights and obligations if we end up in a situation where pre-exit legislation could be struck down, or where administrative decisions could be challenged, on the basis of those principles.

In other words, that is an echo of what I was just saying to my right hon. and learned Friend. This is particularly the case given the uncertainty about the way in which principles could develop or about the circumstances in which they would apply after exit. It would make no sense to bind ourselves to such an imprecise, open-ended and uncertain set of principles—it does not mitigate legal uncertainty, but increases it. It makes no sense, once we are no longer an EU member state, to bind ourselves to a set of principles that are the EU’s judge-made constitutional principles, when we have our own constitutional and common-law principles. Such an approach risks duplication and confusion.

Perhaps more fundamentally, outside the context of EU law, the ability for courts to disapply primary legislation is just inconsistent with the way our constitution works and the balance of powers that has to exist between the legislative and judicial branches.

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In many of those cases, Francovich damages have been sought by businesses, not individuals. That includes large companies seeking to pursue commercial interests.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[The Solicitor General]

No, I will not give way, as I need to develop my point.

For example, in 2015, in their legal challenges to the domestic legislation standardising the packaging of tobacco products, the tobacco companies reserved their right to claim Francovich damages should they succeed on the substance of their claims against the Government. I make this point because any suggestion that removing the Francovich procedure reduces access to justice for the average citizen is not reflected in the UK experience.

[Mr Grieve]

I am very grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. I understand everything that he is saying. He knows what I have said about Francovich damages and their disappearance being inevitable, but the point about the transition is key. I have to say to him that it is not a comfortable argument for a Law Officer of the Crown to make to suggest that just one person, or one business, being deprived of a legal right is an acceptable circumstance, because it plainly is not.

[The Solicitor General]

I did not say that. If that was the impression that was created, I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend is mistaken. What I am talking about is trying to balance out and put into context the use of this particular procedure, which needs to be done because we have not heard the other side of the argument. That is what I am seeking to do.

By contrast, all existing domestic law routes of challenge and remedies for breaches of retained EU law will remain undisturbed. For example, this provision does not affect any specific statutory rights to claim damages in respect of breaches of retained EU law—such as under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015—or the case law which applies to the interpretation of any such provisions. Nor does it affect the right to challenge the decisions of public bodies by way of judicial review. Claimants will also still be able to seek remedies through the law of tort, by establishing negligence or by a breach of statutory duty, and they will also still be able to make a claim for restitution for unlawfully levied tax or charges.

The existing right to Francovich damages is linked to EU membership and the obligations that we have as a member state to the EU at an international level. There is clearly a difference between substantive EU law, which is being kept by the Bill to prevent legal uncertainty, and the supranational procedural rules, principles and frameworks that will no longer be appropriate once we have left the EU.

Let me turn briefly to amendments 139 and 302, which take a slightly different approach. They would maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law, but only in relation to pre-exit causes of action. Amendment 335 would similarly maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law for causes of action occurring during any transitional period. The Bill sets out elsewhere—at paragraph 27 of schedule 8—that the exclusion of the right to Francovich damages would apply only in relation to claims that are brought after exit day.

I would like to assure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan), and indeed all Members, that we will consider further whether any additional specific and more detailed transitional arrangements should be set out in regulations.

[Mr Grieve]

I am delighted to hear the Solicitor General say that. As he will appreciate, the point is a very simple one: it must be the case that the damages are available if the action takes place before exit day. It is a very basic principle of law and quite easy to correct.

[The Solicitor General]

Perhaps I can forgive my right hon. and learned Friend his eagerness to hear the remarks that I was going to make. I am sure that when this debate finishes he and I will continue the dialogue that we have had for some time about these matters.

It would not be right to maintain, in general, such an open-ended right to this form of damages after exit for any and all potential pre-exit causes of action. I am concerned that we would end up with an almost indefinite trail of cases. That is not good for certainty, and it is not good for the transition we want to make.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Monday 4th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Jenny Chapman]

I sincerely hope that that will not be the outcome, but I have to admire the hon. and learned Lady’s ability to spot an opportunity and take it.

The Government have never argued that these powers need to be in London or that they intend to hold on to them permanently. Rather, it seems that they feel that tackling the undoubted complexities of considering how to make new arrangements with the devolved Administrations post Brexit belongs in the “too difficult” pile—something to be put off until there is more time and there are fewer distractions. However, there are no time limits on when the Government will cease to hoard the powers. While the hard-line Brexiteers on the Back Benches are promised a time and date—to the very nanosecond—for when they will see powers returned from Brussels, the nations of our Union are told to wait indefinitely. The people of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland deserve better from the Government.

The Government agree with Labour and the devolved Administrations that frameworks are needed—I think—and new clause 64 assists them by outlining how that can be achieved. The presumption should be that powers remain devolved as is the case now, and that UK frameworks are created to co-ordinate policy in some areas through negotiation with the devolved Administrations. To do anything else would turn back the clock on devolution—impossible—and cause untold damage to important relationships between Parliaments.

As well as having the motivation and attention to address this issue, the Government need to trust the devolved Administrations. That is why our proposal makes explicit the obligations on each Government and the nature of the frameworks needed. So far, the Government have not exactly shone in their endeavour to develop a UK-wide approach to Brexit, so new clause 65 helps by putting the Joint Ministerial Committee on a statutory footing.

It is important to reflect on the absence of representation from Northern Ireland on the JMC. The suspension of the Executive is deeply regrettable, and permits the neglect of the needs, concerns, ambitions and hopes of the people of Northern Ireland. Their voices must not go unheard at this most critical of moments, but need to be amplified, as it is they who have the most to lose from a chaotic departure from the EU.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I am following the hon. Lady’s speech carefully. I am also looking very carefully at her new clause, but I do not see how it would resolve the question of what would happen if we set up joint structures and there was disagreement about how they will work. It can, of course, be argued that the Parliament of the United Kingdom is ultimately sovereign, so I think that it is a matter of law that if there is a disagreement, the logjam would ultimately be resolved by this Parliament and the Government in Whitehall having primacy. The question the hon. Lady has to answer is whether the structure she is putting forward would be workable in practice, or if it would just lead to conflict.

[Jenny Chapman]

The new clause is not intended to cause conflict—we already have a certain degree of conflict between the Administrations—but, rather, to remove that conflict, and to provide a mechanism by which issues can be resolved. Hearteningly, the JMC seems to have started to function rather better than it did when we last went around this particular issue. It has issued statements that explain how it wants these frameworks to be established, so it does not seem to be too much of a leap to write that into the Bill.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman will probably remember our attempt to put the JMC on a statutory footing when we considered the article 50 Bill, but this time the Brexit negotiations are upon us. The Government have lost their majority since our last attempt, so I encourage Ministers to take a more conciliatory approach this time. New clauses 64 and 65 would force the Government to respect both the devolution of decisions, and those who are responsible for taking the decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Blackford]

I am surprised at that intervention from the hon. Gentleman. I expressed right at the outset of my speech that we recognise that progress was made, but that progress has not been sufficient to justify the SNP supporting this Bill tonight. The whole point about our position is that we want to see frameworks in place, but we can move forward on that only when the UK Government are prepared to negotiate. Why was there a six-month period when the Joint Ministerial Committee did not meet? If there is any blame in this matter, it lies with those on the Government Benches.

I can tell the hon. Gentleman that there is not a fag paper between the position of the SNP on these Benches and that of our colleagues up the road in Holyrood. We are united, which is more than can be said of the Conservative party, because Ruth Davidson is delivering a very different message from the one that is being delivered by the Conservatives down here. Ruth Davidson recognises the threat to Scotland of being out of the single market and the customs union. The Scottish Conservatives would serve the interests of the people of Scotland if they recognised that there is an economic threat from being outwith the single market and the customs union.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say so, I have sympathy with the point that is being put across—that the way in which the Bill is drafted seems to be excessively stark and to fail to take account of the sensitivities of the devolution settlements. However, I am afraid I cannot join the right hon. Gentleman on the rhetoric, because, ultimately, as a United Kingdom, which is what we are, there has to be flexibility in reaching a sensible way forward in the light of a change in circumstance. If I may gently say so to him, because I participated actively in the debates on the devolution legislation of 1997, it was always acknowledged then that devolution was not just a one-way street; for it to work, we required that flexibility of dialogue between Cardiff, Edinburgh, Belfast and London to reach solutions and not just to get anchored on principles. While I am respectful of the point he is trying to make, I suggest to him that that might be a sensible way forward.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Lady Hermon]

I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman—or the hon. Gentleman; I just promoted him. That is not what I understood, so there is no point in putting up a straw man for me to knock down. I understood that the proposal that the Prime Minister took with her to Brussels was always to have been that the entirety of the UK should have the same alignment. The Prime Minister is no one’s fool. She has made it quite clear that she will protect the integrity of the whole United Kingdom. She had already ruled out having a border down the Irish sea. I therefore believe and trust that when she went to Brussels, she had always planned that there would be convergence throughout the United Kingdom, and that Northern Ireland would not be treated differently from the rest of the United Kingdom. That is the confidence that I have.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Lady may share with me a certain amount of bemusement. There can be no question for me, as a Unionist, of a separate regulatory arrangement for Northern Ireland, permitting it to have regulatory equivalence or convergence with the Republic. Convergence either applies to all of us, or cannot apply at all. I have to say that all of us having regulatory convergence with the Republic, and indeed the rest of the EU, strikes me as a very good idea.

[Lady Hermon]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. Even though he sits on the other side of the Chamber, I have always regarded him as a friend. He has just summed up how I feel. I will not stand here and criticise our Prime Minister—she is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and I believed that her stance when she went to Brussels on Monday was that the convergence would apply to all of the United Kingdom. I did not believe for one moment that she would cast Northern Ireland off somehow to a regulatory framework and convergence on the island of Ireland, and not with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Of course, I do not want Northern Ireland to be treated any differently from the rest of the United Kingdom. We are all coming out of the EU—sadly—on 29 March 2019. The referendum result in Northern Ireland was in favour of remaining, but the UK-wide result will be honoured. The Prime Minister has said that repeatedly. As we move towards that, I urge and encourage the Government to adopt, in some form of words, new clause 70, because the principles of the Good Friday agreement, which I and the other Members who have put their names to the new clause are proud to support, must be protected in black and white on the face of that Bill. That is the assurance I need from the Government this afternoon, otherwise I will test the House’s commitment to the Good Friday agreement.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not intend to speak at length. I listened carefully to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) and I completely agree with all the sentiments she expressed about the benefits that the Good Friday agreement has conferred on our country generally and on our international relations with the Irish Republic. It has been a step change in improving the quality of life for all citizens in this country, particularly those in Northern Ireland, about which the hon. Lady spoke so eloquently.

It is clear that the Brexit process is challenging in the context of maintaining those benefits. I regret that, during the referendum campaign last year, those of us who highlighted the consequences that could flow did not get as much register as we would have liked. In the cost-benefit analysis between staying in and leaving the EU, the Good Friday agreement was a factor that should have been taken into account properly, but I regret to say that some of the enthusiasts for our leaving the EU seem to have systematically ignored it.

However, we are where we are. It is clear that we will have to try to manage the Brexit process in a way that does not adversely impact on the Good Friday agreement. I listened carefully to DUP Members, and I can well understand that any suggestion that leaving the EU involves uncoupling Northern Ireland and putting it into a separate regulatory regime for the benefit of maintaining the Good Friday agreement, or regulatory equivalence with the Republic of Ireland, is a complete non-starter. It is totally unacceptable to me, and I did not understand the Prime Minister’s words and the agreement she reached as being indicative of her intending to do any such thing. If she was, all I can say is that she will not long survive her party’s views, which are unanimous on this matter, irrespective of whether Members most enthusiastically embraced Brexit or most vigorously sought to prevent it. We therefore need to park that on one side.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I have great sympathy with the approach of the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) in her anxiety about seeing the Good Friday agreement respected. That said, it is right that it is an international agreement and I have some difficulty seeing how that can easily be incorporated in a statute relating to another matter. It is either declaratory or it has some effect—one or the other. I simply say to my hon. Friend the Minister that this is an area where the Government may seek and need to provide reassurance, but whether the hon. Lady is right that it needs to be specific on the face of the legislation is, I think, more complex, because it raises as many problems as it may provide answers.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

It is touching that the right hon. Gentleman takes those assurances from Ministers at face value, but the Ministers may not be here for very much longer. Who knows? If we are going to make policy changes, that should be done in a Bill that comes before Parliament, or in a statutory instrument subject to affirmative resolution.

I now invite Members to pick up their copies of the Bill, because I want to deal with a couple of provisions in clause 7 which I think contradict the understanding of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) of the scope of the order-making powers that are being taken. It is, in fact, fairly wide. Clause 7(4) states:

“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament.”

In other words, a provision in a statutory instrument could have the same effect as one in primary legislation.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

When statutes are being considered and Bills are being drafted, there does on occasion come a point at which we must accept that assurances given, for example, at the Dispatch Box will have to complement the inevitable small grey areas. However, that should not prevent us as a Parliament from scrutinising legislation and insisting that, so far as possible, it is drafted in conformity with the purpose for which the Government say that they intend to use it.

[Mr Leslie]

That is why Members often say in the House, “Let us place it on the face of the Bill”, which means “Let us put in writing, in black and white, something that can then be held up in a court of law”, rather than a mere verbal promise from a Minister who, as I have said, could be here today and gone tomorrow. These things matter, and if we are to do our job properly we need to get our statute right.

It is not an exaggeration that clause 7(4) represents a massive potential transfer of legislative competence from Parliament to Government. It is a sweeping power that would make Henry VIII blush if he were to see it today. My amendment 57 would delete the sweeping nature of clause 7(4), because Ministers have not ensured that their powers are as limited as possible; on the contrary, they have ensured that they are as exceptionally wide as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that those who draft legislation go off to Government Departments, show the draft and ask whether that covers all the things that need to be covered, and are then inevitably told that the Department is worried that something has not been covered? Perhaps this should be an encouragement to those on the Treasury Bench to go away and think again about whether the list they have produced is not in reality exhaustive. If it is not, perhaps they would like to identify during today’s debate where they think there might be these extra powers that take them beyond the limits they have listed.

[Mr Leslie]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman and any other Member who has had the privilege of serving as a Minister will know exactly what civil servants will advise, which is, “Well, you don’t know the exact circumstances, so seek as wide a power as you can possibly get away with through Parliament, if it will turn a blind eye to it. We can deal with the consequences thereafter.”

Unfortunately for them, Ministers will not be able to get away with that on this occasion, because we have spotted this land grab attempt. It is not appropriate; if they feel that there should be exceptions or that certain circumstances should be accounted for, those must be set out in the Bill, not just left in these current loose terms.

Current Ministers might feel that they are responsible stewards of Government, but I invite hon. Members to imagine circumstances in which we end up with a malign Government of some sort, shape or variety, such as some sort of extreme Administration—who knows what might happen in years to come? These Henry VIII powers are extremely sweeping. They will be available to Ministers in years to come and could leave the door open to some quite arbitrary near-autocratic actions of a future Government.

For example, if a future Government sought to lift the 48-hour working week provisions that EU law currently gives to employees in this country, Ministers would by order potentially have the scope to do that under the powers in clauses 7 and 9. If Ministers wanted to require the banking sector to have more capital requirements under these provisions, they would be able to simply make those orders. If Ministers wanted some sort of aggressive or inappropriate state intervention to distort competition, favouring one producer over others, they would be able to do that through the provisions on these order-making powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Redwood]

I am glad we agree about that. I am trying to make a helpful suggestion for the future on this issue and a wider issue to which we need to return at some point. We need a system that establishes parliamentary control—as I have explained, all the methods we are discussing today are parliamentary control of one form or another—but we may need to think about how we improve processes for the future when that control is a statutory instrument.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend is making some important points. If I may say, I have signed up to the amendments tabled by the Procedure Committee because they are a reasonable compromise, but they are most deficient in the absence of a revision mechanism to ask a Minister to reconsider. My right hon. Friend may agree that, even at this stage, those on the Treasury Bench could go away, reconsider the issue and bring a further amendment forward on Report to deal with it.

[John Redwood]

That may be hanging a bit too much on this piece of legislation. I think this is a wider issue, which Parliament may need to consider, so I was not going that far in my recommendation. However, Ministers would be well advised, if by any chance they did make a mistake in a draft instrument, not to do what the previous Government did and just drive it through, but to accept that they needed to withdraw it and to come back with a corrected version, which would make for better order.

The Bill as drafted, with the amendments to provide a process to make the task of parliamentary scrutiny manageable, is a perfectly sensible package, and I look forward to hearing sensible promises from Ministers on the Front Bench, who I am sure will want to exercise these powers diligently and democratically.

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, this is simply about Parliament standing up for itself and ensuring that it does its job: scrutinising the Executive and ensuring that when we give them powers—of course, we do need to do so in the proper circumstances—we ensure that we put the right safeguards in place, the right checks and balances, as we have an historic obligation to do. It simply means that we do not believe that this should be done through a concentration of powers, and we think that these powers should be used only when they are needed.

[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I draw the Committee’s attention to my new clause 82 and amendments 15, 1, 388, 5, 2, 389, 16, 13, 3, 4 and 12. I apologise to the Committee for so burdening the amendment paper this afternoon, but that simply reflects the importance of clause 7 and the fact that, while there are many important aspects to the Bill, clause 7 and the powers that the Government intend to take in order to deal with deficiencies arising from the UK’s withdrawal are so controversial.

I remember a long time ago, when I was newly elected to this place, listening to a debate in which an Opposition Back Bencher, also newly elected, asked why we have Second Reading debates at all, because, in view of the size of the Government majority, they were bound to be a foregone conclusion. She suggested, as I recollect, that in the circumstances Second Reading should be merely formal and that we should move straight on to the Committee stage. The issue before us today touches directly on what was said then, because it is not only a question of parliamentary sovereignty that is at stake, and the extent to which we want to hand over power to the Executive; it is also a question of whether we want to maintain the rule of law by good governance. This House, not without good reason, has over time evolved processes and procedures that present the Government with hurdles when it comes to the enactment of primary legislation. We take Bills through Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading precisely because we, and our forebears in this place, have come to understand that that is the way, by a process of debate through which we moderate each other’s ideas, we are likely to achieve the most sensible outcome. Indeed, we have been doing that consistently. I praise the Government for the time they have given us to do precisely that on the Bill.

However, that is the very reason why we should be so cautious when the Government ask us to change the rulebook, for what are undoubtedly primary legislative changes, to give them the power to bring about all those changes by statutory instrument. It may be that statutory instruments can be debated—although in many cases, as we know, they are not—but the fact remains that the process of debate, particularly if it touches on matters of importance, is likely to be incomplete and unsatisfactory. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) so tellingly made the point about the deficiencies of our statutory instrument system in relation to not being able to ask Ministers to go away to consider the deficiencies—if I may hijack that word—in their own proposals.

That is why I have found clause 7 particularly difficult in the context of being able to support the Government. There are two ways in which the challenges of clause 7 can be met. The first is to improve the scrutiny process by which the House goes about its business. The second, as has been suggested by the numerous amendments I shall come back to in a moment, is to try to restrict the scope of the powers the Government have taken, or at the very least to get the Government during the course of the passage of the Bill to justify each and every one of them.

On the scrutiny process, the Government have moved. I tabled amendment 3, which appears on the selection list for debate this afternoon, because I went to the Hansard Society, as I am sure other hon. Members did, and got its assistance in looking at ways in which our scrutiny processes might be improved. Amendment 3 and the consequential amendments derived from it came from that exercise. I have to say to the Minister—I again endorse my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham; I am sorry he is not in his place to hear my eulogy of him—that we very badly need a total reform of our statutory instrument system. It is deficient in a whole range of matters. The Bill provides a possible opportunity on how we might make a significant change: providing a proper triage mechanism, giving the House a degree of control over the process, allowing for a dialogue between the House and the Minister, and still enabling statutory instruments to be enacted.

The Government, who I appreciate are under a lot of pressure over a whole range of matters, in particular the word “time”—which I think Monsieur Barnier keeps on repeating, but it is a matter with which we all in this House have to concern ourselves—have been reluctant to do that. In has stepped my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) to tell us that he has a different way of approaching this. Looking at the Procedure Committee’s proposals, I am impressed by what his Committee has achieved. I continue to have some reservations about some aspects, in particular the point highlighted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham on the inability to engage in preliminary dialogue and to ask for revision, but for the purpose of dealing with the avalanche of statutory instruments about to come in our direction the amendment that has been tabled will enable the House to do its job properly.

Much is going to depend—I hesitate to say this, because in this House we are all equal—on the Government’s common sense on how those who are to be appointed to the Committee are chosen. There are plenty of Members on all sides who have a keen understanding of what a statutory instrument is, a keen understanding of how it should work and an ability to sniff out when it is being misused. It is those individuals, if I may say so to my hon. Friends and to the Whips on the Government Front Bench, who ought to be appointed. Without that, a committee will have no credibility at all. I appreciate that we will have to move on to consider Standing Orders. If we do this properly and with good will on all sides, my assessment is that the Government will be helped.

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[Mr Jenkin]

May I take it therefore that my right hon. and learned Friend is offering his services on this committee?

[Mr Grieve]

I am already the Chairman of another Committee of Parliament, and I think it might be undesirable to burden me with extra work. Indeed, there are plenty of other people in this House who are capable of doing this work. Obviously, if somebody wanted to ask me, I would give it consideration, but I am always conscious of being rather too thinly spread as it is, so I do not put myself forward.

[Tom Brake]

Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman set out how he thinks the process of scrutiny will be improved for outside organisations? Many of them feel that they are excluded from this process.

[Mr Grieve]

Such organisations can be summoned before the new Select Committee. They can come along and provide input to the committee on anything that has been tabled; that has been my understanding of how it would work and, indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, sitting to my right, has just confirmed that. There is a mechanism here. Obviously, to come back to the point I made earlier, this depends on the quality of the committee and shows why it will be so important. It also comes back to the Procedure Committee and how it works. For all those reasons, I think that this is a workable arrangement.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

On the quality of the committee and the scrutiny process, the committee will be scrutinising changes to detailed pieces of European legislation. In my experience, in other countries’ Parliaments, an expert committee often does the scrutiny. So financial experts would consider a piece of finance legislation; environmental legislation would be considered by environment experts; and a judicial piece of legislation might be considered by those involved with their justice committee. Does he agree that it would be sensible to include Members with expertise in the underlying legislation, as well as in British legal practice, on the committee?

[Mr Grieve]

That would be a very sensible course of action. As I say, the burden is on the Government to show some common sense and inventiveness in how they approach this. My understanding is also that, as was mentioned earlier, the committee will not have a Government majority—

[Mary Creagh]

Eight and eight.

[Mr Grieve]

Indeed. To that extent, it will, as I understand it, have sufficient flexibility and will, I hope, also be able to command enough confidence. These are difficult issues, but, as I say, I am mindful of the fact that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, having been asked to consider this, have gone and done it in a conciliatory and sensible spirit. For that reason—we were talking earlier about trust—this is one matter on which I have trust in the way that they have responded and that this will be sufficient for the work we have to do.

In the longer term, this issue will not go away, and I feel strongly that this House ought to be thinking about how it can assert itself again to take a better system of scrutiny than that which we have at the moment. Heaven knows, I have sat through enough of these Committees to know their deficiencies. It is also noteworthy that, although some jurisdictions have specialist committees linked to each of their select committees to consider legislation, we do not—something I have always found mystifying. I also served for four years on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. It was a very interesting Committee, but, again, it did not really have the necessary bite to correct what were sometimes egregious howlers, of the kind that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham pointed out.

I turn now to the other way this matter can be looked at: by trying to constrain the powers the Government are taking. Of course, the vast majority of the amendments I have tabled along with my right hon. and hon. Friends concern constraining those powers. For example, amendment 2, which has been mentioned, would use a process first introduced in 2006 in seeking to constrain the powers set out by applying the concept of reasonableness and proportionality. Another example is my amendment 1, which would leave out the words

“(but are not limited to)”,

and so limit the deficiencies to the list of powers and functions set out in clause 7(2).

The Government have here an enormous menu of options by which the powers in clause 7, and indeed elsewhere in the Bill, can be constrained. I do not want to repeat some of the things we have said in earlier sittings of this Committee. The question for me is: how will the Government respond? There is a legitimate argument from the Government, which I have heard and listened to, that they ought to go away and consider the variety of amendments—mine are not the only ones; a great range of amendments have been tabled from across the House, and each, in my judgment, is valid. The Government have to come up with a response on how they can constrain the powers set out. At the moment, my opinion is that these powers are far too stark, far too great and not necessary. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), to whom I also always listen very carefully on these matters, approaches this matter from a slightly different angle, so I was interested to hear him say that he thought the powers were excessive and unnecessary—I hope that I do not paraphrase him wrongly.

In those circumstances, the Government have to think again. I do not want to be particularly prescriptive, because it seems to me that there are a range of ways in which this could be done. I want to hear from Ministers this afternoon broadly how they will respond to the amendments and give some thought to coming back on Report with a constraint on the powers set out. There are probably two ways this can be done—indeed, we could do both. The first is to accept some of the amendments. On my amendment 1, for example, I continue to be bemused that, in view of the extensive nature of subsection (2)(a) to (g), it is in fact necessary to provide a further power. I think that there are excessive jitters within Departments. Somebody ought to have the courage to say, “Find me some examples that fall outside the scope,” and if they can, they should add those to the list and take out the unlimited nature of the powers at the top of the clause.

I accept, picking up something that was said earlier in Committee, that the word “deficiency” provides some constraint. I take the view that if an attempt were made to extend the use of the powers outside of correcting a deficiency, it could be challenged in court, but we do not want to end up with court challenges. I say to Ministers that that would be the worst possible place to end up in January 2019—the clock ticking and people claiming the Government have used excessive powers. That would contribute to chaos rather than certainty, so the issue needs to be addressed.

The second issue, which has been highlighted by some of the other Members who have spoken, is whether the Government can sensibly identify areas of particular concern to the House, such as children’s rights, environmental law or equality rights, that can be safely cordoned off—or, in the case of children’s rights, specifically inserted—to reassure the House that these powers will not be used for a purpose other than that which was intended. That seems to me to be the challenge.

For those reasons, I am going to listen very carefully. I want to avoid putting any of my numerous amendments to the vote, but that will depend first on the answer that I receive from the Dispatch Box this afternoon and secondly on whether the answer is sufficiently clear and shows a willingness by the Government overall—we have debated this on previous days—to go away and consider the matter properly, and then come back with a sensible proposal on Report. I should be happy to wait until then, because that is exactly what the process of legislation is about—waiting to see what the Government come up with—but I put them on notice that if what they come up with is inadequate, the debate on Report will allow us to re-table amendments, or table them in a slightly different form. If necessary, we will vote on them, and I will vote to ensure that the powers are not as they currently appear. That is the challenge to the Government, and I expect a response. Provided that I receive that response, I will sit on my numerous amendments this afternoon.

Let me say one more thing, about a matter that has not been much touched on. My new clause 82 deals with tertiary powers. This is a little bit technical, but I do not like tertiary powers. I do not like them one little bit. They are, of course, powers that ultimately do not come to this place at all. I want to find out this afternoon what tertiary powers are actually for, and I want the Government to give some examples to justify their appearance in the Bill. I confess that I found it slightly difficult to see why they had crept in. One or two people have suggested some possible reasons, but I should like to hear rather more this afternoon; otherwise, again, I put the Government on notice that I shall return to this matter on Report. I do not think that the world would come to an end if they were to disappear from the Bill, although my hon. Friend the Minister may persuade me otherwise. As a result of the Government’s approach, we have already made great progress on triage. I am grateful to them for that, because it is exactly how the Bill should be dealt with. However, I want to see some progress on constraining the powers and making them less extensive, because I think that they are unnecessarily broad.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

As ever, I am considering what my right hon. and learned Friend is saying with enormous care. Much of it has enormous force and makes a great deal of sense. However, if his objective in amendment 2, which inserts proportionality and reasonable tests, is to avoid resort to the courts, I should point out that the insertion of a clause of that kind is more likely to encourage resort to the courts than to deter it.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend is right. Of course it is true that, although such measures have a history of being introduced into legislation, amendment 2 raises the risk of legal challenge, because ultimately these issues can usually only be resolved in courts.

[Mr Cox]

More often.

[Mr Grieve]

Such measures may act as a constraint, but once Ministers have taken the plunge, there will not be much that we can do. That is precisely why there is a menu of options. I personally would prefer Ministers to do a proper exercise of asking themselves whether they really need individual powers in their current extensive form. That would be the easier course, and it would provide much greater certainty and avoid the lawyers, although it might do my hon. and learned Friend out of a brief fee or two, but lawyers on the whole ought not to benefit from defective legislation in so far as possible. I am grateful to the House for listening, and I look forward to hearing the response of my hon. Friend the Minister.

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[Mr Baker]

I will come back to that later, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman for a start that the translation functions of the European Union and various institutions will no longer be required.

I come now to amendment 1, from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It has support from all sides of the Committee including, I do not mind telling him, from me, in spirit. The Secretary of State has asked me to put on record that he, too, is sympathetic to the idea of narrowing the Ministers’ discretion. My right hon. and learned Friend seeks to restrict the power of Ministers to make regulations to amend retained EU law to cases where the EU law is deficient only in the way set out in the Bill.

We have listened carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and others, and the specific proposal in amendment 1 and amendment 56, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, is to convert the illustrative list of potential deficiencies in the law in clause 7(2) to an exhaustive list. As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we do not think that it is possible to do that at this stage.

We know that there will be thousands of deficiencies across our statute book and it is impossible at this stage definitively to list all the different kinds of deficiencies that might arise on exit day. To attempt to do so risks requiring significant volumes of further primary legislation on issues that will not warrant taking up parliamentary time. The specifics of the deficiencies will inevitably vary between cases and it will therefore not be possible to provide a definition that accompanies them all, as amendments 264 and 265, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), also seek to do. An exhaustive list would risk omitting important deficiencies, so rendering the powers in clause 7 unable to rectify the statute book. To require primary legislation in such circumstances would undermine the purpose of the Bill and the usual justifications for secondary legislation, such as technical detail, readability and, crucially, the management of time.

We cannot risk undermining the laws on which businesses and individuals rely every day. Our goals are to exit the EU with certainty, continuity and control. However, I listened extremely carefully to the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, my constituency neighbour, and to his appeal for us properly to consider this issue. I hope that he will not mind my saying that I think that we have already properly considered the issue, but we are perfectly willing to work with him and others to continue to reflect on this point with an eye on Report. We heard a very informative intervention on this point from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox). My right hon. and learned Friend will know that we are wrestling with the susceptibility of what we do to judicial review, which might undermine the certainty that we are trying to deliver.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand that, and I realise that I am setting a bit of a challenge. Of course, amendment 1 is only one way to deal with this. Interestingly, amendment 1 is the least justiciable route because of its clarity. Other amendments, such as amendment 2, do raise the issue of justiciability. One way or the other—I put this challenge to my hon. Friend—the Government will have to come back with something that tempers the starkness of these powers. I leave it to my hon. Friend’s discretion, which is precisely why I have not tried to fetter him over this.

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for that intervention.

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[Mr Baker]

I will be very straightforward with my hon. Friend: we are keen to move on this issue, but, as several hon. and learned Friends have acknowledged, it is a tricky issue, so we will need to reflect further on how a movement might take place. The Attorney General, who is in his place, and the other Law Officers are well aware of this issue, but we are conscious of the imperative of being able to deal with deficiencies in the statute book, as well as of the advice of hon. and learned Friends.

[Mr Grieve]

I am sure that the Minister will deal with this on some of the other amendments, but the other limb of this is whether certain categories of retained EU law need special protection. All that, I suggest, needs to be looked at as a whole. I am convinced that if the Government do that, they will probably be able to come up with the right solution, and one that commands the confidence of the House.

[Mr Baker]

I will come to that a little later, but I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will allow me to move forward.

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[Mr Baker]

I think that my hon. Friend has made a strong case for her membership of the sifting committee. I hope that, if the Whips Office has heard her appeal, she will become a member in due course and will enjoy it very much indeed.

Let me now deal with amendment 2. Conditions similar to those in the amendment, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, are proposed by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in amendment 48. Again, we have significant sympathy with the intention behind the amendments. However, they would introduce new terms into the law and invite substantial litigation, with consequent uncertainty about the meaning of the law as we exit the EU.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Baker]

May I just finish making my case? I must point out to my right hon. and learned Friend that I can speak for two or three hours if I take all the interventions, or I can press on.

I hope to give the Committee some reassurance. Any provision made under clause 7 must be an appropriate means of correcting a deficiency in retained EU law arising from withdrawal. It is a strong test, and it represents a significant limit on the provisions made under clause 7. The limit can ultimately be guarded by the courts, although I note what my right hon. and learned Friend said about that. However, the right place in which to determine which changes in the law are appropriate is Parliament, which is why I hope Members will accept that their concerns have been addressed by the provisions that we have made for greater scrutiny and transparency in the case of each statutory instrument.

[Mr Grieve]

I have noted my hon. Friend’s comments, and I appreciate them, but may I take him back for a moment? All these issues are linked. I acknowledge the contribution from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), but let me return to the discussion of amendment 1. One possibility might be that the list could only be added to by a statutory instrument. After all, given the extensive powers in the Bill, it would present a double lock. If the Government wanted a new power, or area of power, they could secure it through an SI anyway, because of the extent of the power that we are giving to them. The Minister might like to consider that point.

[Mr Baker]

I shall return to the clause 7 versus clause 9 argument a little later.

Amendments 3 and 4 were also tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend. The Government agree with his goal of ensuring that instruments under the Bill are accompanied by all the information that the House, the public and, indeed, the sifting committee need in order to understand what they can do and why. We also agree that more can be done to ensure that the House has the proper opportunities to scrutinise the instruments. As I have said, the Government have therefore accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, and we will also table amendments to address long-standing concerns about information. The Government believe that the proposed committee represents an option that balances our concerns about the ability to plan and the limited time available before exit day with some Members’ well-stated and long-standing concerns about the efficacy of the scrutiny of negative SIs in this House. Those amendments will address the unique challenge posed by the secondary legislation under this Bill, ensuring that the Government’s reasoning on procedure is transparent to the House and that the House can recommend that any negative instrument should instead be an affirmative one.

Beyond all that, the Government have tabled amendment 391 which will require that explanatory memorandums are alongside each SI and include a number of specific statements aimed at ensuring the transparency of SIs that are to come, and act as an aid to this House, providing more effective scrutiny. These statements will explain, for instruments made under the main powers in this Bill, what any relevant EU law did before exit day, what is being changed, and why the Minister considers that this is no more than is appropriate. They will also contain information regarding the impact of the instrument on equalities legislation. The wording of our amendment and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne differs from that proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, but, as he has said, he has put his name to it and I am pleased that we are therefore able to move forward.

I turn now to the issue of what is necessary and amendments 49, 65, 205 to 208, 216 and new clause 24. Amendments 49 and 65 bring us to the important debate about whether the power in clause 7 should allow necessary corrections or appropriate corrections. “Necessary” is a very strict test, which we would expect to be interpreted by a court as logically essential. Where two or more choices as to how to correct EU law are available to Ministers, arguably neither would be logically essential because there would be an alternative. Ministers therefore need to choose the most appropriate course. If two UK agencies, such as the Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority, could arguably carry out a particular function, the Government must propose which would be the more appropriate choice. Also, if the UK and the EU do not agree to retain an existing reciprocal arrangement and the EU therefore ceases to fulfil its side of the obligations, the UK could decide it is not appropriate for the UK to provide one-sided entitlements to the EU27; it might not be legally necessary for the UK to stop upholding one side of the obligation, but it might not be appropriate for us to continue if the EU is not doing so.

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Amending the power so that regulations made under it could not, for example, make provisions of constitutional significance or remove any necessary protection, would be vague and opaque. It would also generate considerable uncertainty and, potentially, unnecessary litigation, given the lack of definition and clarity as to what these terms mean in practice. Again, clause 9 needs to be both clear and flexible to enable us to implement the withdrawal agreement or those elements of it needed prior to exit day which it would not be possible to include in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill by virtue of the time available. I therefore urge my right hon. and learned Friend not to press his amendments to a vote.

[Mr Grieve]

I can understand the Minister’s point on timing, but the reality is that the terms of amendment 13 are ones with which the Government must be very familiar, as they appear in lots of other legislation. So I find this slightly difficult to follow.

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for putting me right on that point, but I shall now have to press on rather than explore it. [Interruption.] I am not in a position to answer it, but I will see whether my memory can be jogged.

I turn to the issue of children’s rights, where I am grateful that I have the opportunity to discuss amendment 332 and new clause 53, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton). I congratulate him on the powerful speech he made, reminding the House of its obligations. His new clause has received broad support across the House, including from my right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan), the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), among others. This new clause and amendment 332, tabled by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), give me the opportunity to clarify our position on child refugee family reunion and asylum seekers.

The Government’s commitment to children’s rights and the United Nations convention on the rights of the child is and will remain unwavering. Our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Domestically, the rights and best interests of a child are already protected through the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002, in addition to other legislative measures across the UK. Existing laws and commitments already safeguard children’s rights.

The Government support the principle of family unity and we have in place a comprehensive framework so that families can be reunited safely. The Dublin regulation itself is not and has not been a family reunification route. It confers no right to remain in the UK on family grounds and there is no provision for children to apply for family reunification under it. Crucially, the Dublin regulation creates a two-way process that requires the co-operation of 31 other countries. We cannot declare that we are going to preserve its terms when we need the co-operation of other countries to make it work.

We understand our moral responsibility to those in need of international protection, and that will not change as we leave the European Union. We value co-operation with our European partners on asylum and we want that co-operation to continue, but the way to ensure that is through the negotiations, not by making changes to the Bill before we have been able to make progress on this matter. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and those who support his new clause but, as he said, changes are required in immigration rules. I am grateful to him for his stating the probing nature of the new clause. I ask him to work with Ministers, whom I think he said he has now met, to deliver the right changes to the immigration rules.

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[Mr Baker]

I will not give way, because I need to make progress and to keep my remarks to some form of limit.

Amendments 15 and 16, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, seek to narrow the categories of deficiencies arising from our withdrawal from the EU. The removal of clause 7(8), as amendment 16 proposes, would restrict our ability to keep the law functioning as it does now. Subsection (8) is about deficiencies arising not only from withdrawal, but from how the Bill works. For example, the Bill does not preserve directives themselves, as we have already debated, but instead preserves the UK law, which implements them. In some instances, there are provisions in directives, giving powers or placing restrictions on Government or on EU institutions or agencies, which it would not have made sense to transpose in UK law, but which then need to be incorporated in order for the law to continue to function as it did before exit. For example, the Commission currently holds a power to restrict the disclosure of confidential information in the financial services sector, which is referenced by UK implementation of the capital requirements directive 2013, but which will need to be transferred to the UK. We might also want to transfer powers that the Commission currently has to define what counts as hazardous waste, which is currently in the waste framework directive.

Subsection (8) allows the clause 7 power to correct deficiencies that arise from that withdrawal together with the operation of the Bill. For example, it might be appropriate to lift a relevant part of a directive and insert it into UK law in order to keep the law functioning as close as possible to how it does presently.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say to the Minister, he has actually provided a totally coherent and helpful answer, which dealt with a probing amendment that I tabled. I am most grateful to him for it.

[Mr Baker]

Well, I am extremely grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, who I am very happy to see does remain my friend, as well as my constituency neighbour. I cannot tell him how happy I am to discover that that is the case.

Earlier, my right hon. and learned Friend asked me why Government could not accept additional protections requirements in amendment 13, given that that appears in other legislation. A similar test does appear in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, but the powers in that Act are rarely used, in part because of its complicated requirements. Moreover, the detail of that Act and its powers justify such a test as it is about deregulation. We consider that the existing restrictions in clause 9 are the right ones.

I move forward to amendments 131, 269 to 271, and 359 on restriction of the powers relating to EU citizens’ rights. Since those amendments were tabled, we have secured much-needed agreement on citizens’ rights through our negotiations. I hope Members will be glad that we have now made sufficient progress, subject to the European Council meeting, and that we will be able to move forwards.

The final agreement with the European Union on citizens’ rights is still subject to our negotiations with the EU. However, of course, we expect to give effect to those in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. The House will therefore have both a meaningful vote on the agreement and on its debates on the primary legislation necessary to implement it. I therefore invite hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

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Conferring powers on public authorities to allow them to make provisions of a legislative character or other legislation can be an appropriate course of action, particularly where there is a need for specialised, technical rules to be developed, introduced and maintained by a body that has the necessary dedicated resource and expertise. There are good examples of where Parliament has already provided for this approach in the UK. Our financial regulators, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority, have been given the responsibility by Parliament of developing and making the detailed rules needed to ensure that financial services firms are stable and well managed and meet the needs of consumers. Of course, those regulators can exercise their rule-making powers only according to the policy set by Parliament.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend touches on an important issue. Might it not be the case that any such power done by regulation ought to be done by affirmative resolution? I just suggest that that might be the solution to dealing with tertiary powers, because of their unusual nature. In view of the list he has given us, it seems to me that, in all likelihood, these things would be done by affirmative resolution, but that is something the Government might like to consider between now and Report.

[Mr Baker]

I just draw my right hon. and learned Friend’s attention to paragraph 1(2)(c) of part 1 of schedule 7, which would require that the affirmative procedure be used if a provision

“provides for any function of an EU entity or public authority in a member State of making an instrument of a legislative character to be exercisable instead by a public authority in the United Kingdom”.

So instruments of a legislative character coming across would trigger the affirmative.

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[Mr Grieve]

I take it, therefore, that that covers all the points my hon. Friend has just raised at the Dispatch Box.

[Mr Baker]

There are also some matters in relation to fees and charges, which we discussed earlier in the debate. What I would say to my right hon. and learned Friend is that, where he has doubts, we have agreed to the sifting committee, and if he is concerned, I hope he will consider membership of that committee so that he can play his part in seeing through this set of measures.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

Secondly, the Government say that we cannot have a legislative process around an internationally negotiated deal, but of course we can. This is what parliamentary sovereignty is all about, and this is about us being mature. Thirdly, they have said that this would somehow stop Brexit. Again, that is rubbish. This is about how we should do this and how we can get the legislation right. Fourthly, I know that some Conservative Members have been told that if they vote for amendment 7 and do not stick with the Government’s line, it will somehow undermine the Prime Minister’s position and be a disloyal thing to do. All I would say to them is that the Prime Minister has proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of things that are considerably worse than losing one vote on one amendment in this place. Much as I would like it to be different, the fact that she is still standing at the Dispatch Box despite the result of the election and the result of a series of other things means that she really will not be knocked over by this one amendment.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady might agree with me that what causes more consternation overseas among those observing what is going on are the signs that we as a Parliament and as a Government seem from time to time to completely lose our marbles and get involved in polemical arguments that are far removed from the actual matters that we are supposed to be discussing.

[Yvette Cooper]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is exactly right, and I will defer to him to set out his amendment and describe its impact. The idea that we should make a confidence issue out of every single adjustment to the Brexit process or to the withdrawal Bill is just nonsense.

If we have a Bill before Parliament, it has to be possible for Members of Parliament to table amendments to it and to vote on them. In a hung Parliament, that is even more the case. The Prime Minister asked for a mandate to do all this her own way, but she did not get it. She got a hung Parliament. That puts even more responsibility on us all to work together to find something that will build consensus across Parliament and across the country. In a hung Parliament, the Government sometimes lose votes because Parliament has to do its job to build the right kind of consensus and to get the right kind of outcome.

In the end, this is all about Parliament and democracy. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to our constituents not to hand over, share or give up our authority and our sovereignty, but to exercise our responsibility to get the very best deal. For centuries, Members of Parliament have fought tooth and nail to defend democracy and the powers of Parliament against Executive power. We cannot be the generation that just rips that up and hands over all the power to the Executive. We have a responsibility—now more than ever, given the gravity of the decisions before us—to use that power responsibly and to try to build consensus. To be honest, if the Government cannot build a broader consensus in Parliament, there is no chance of their building a broader consensus in the country, and if they cannot do that, we will end up with everybody rowing over the Brexit deal for a generation to come. For the sake of all of us who want to get back to discussing our schools, our hospitals and all the other issues that face our Parliament, I urge Ministers to accept either amendment 7 or new clause 3, and to start trying to build a consensus that can get us a sustainable Brexit deal.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

I will make some progress, I am afraid, because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) will do so.

New clause 66 would ensure that there is a vote on a motion, not just in the event of a withdrawal agreement being concluded, but, crucially, when no such deal has been concluded, should that be the case. That outcome appears less likely following the agreement the Government reached last week and the clarification that the default position in the event of no deal will be regulatory alignment, but it remains a possibility, and Parliament must have a say.

As I have said, there are many, many ways of ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful vote. Amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is very well drafted. I do not think that it is deficient. We would definitely support it and we would not press new clause 66 if he pressed it to a vote.

[Mr Grieve]

May I say now that that amendment either has to be accepted by my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, or it will be put to the vote?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am very, very pleased to hear that. We will support the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the amendment in that eventuality.

I will conclude by saying that, subject to the kind of constraint that would be put in place if amendment 7 were incorporated into the Bill, we remain of the view that the power to appoint an exit day for the purposes of the Bill should be placed in the hands of Parliament, not Ministers, and also that the flexibility inherent in clause 14 with regard to exit day should be retained, because it is essential to finalising in some scenarios a withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements that need to be agreed to. We need only look at the mess last week to justify the need for such flexibility. As such, we believe that amendments 381 and 382 tabled by the Government with the aim of putting a specified exit date, and indeed time, in the Bill are an ill-conceived and unnecessary gimmick and on that basis we intend to oppose them if they are pushed to a vote.

This whole debate is about whether right hon. and hon. Members are content for Parliament to be a spectator, a passive observer, of one of the most important decisions that has faced our country in generations. Parliament must have a grip on the process, which is why we have tabled our amendments and new clauses.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to have the opportunity to participate in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook). I agreed with virtually every word that he said.

In speaking to amendment 7, in the name of my hon. Friends, myself and other hon. Members, I am conscious that it has taken on a life of its own. When the Committee stage of the Bill started, it was my intention—and I hope one that I have observed and honoured throughout—to try to approach the amendments that I tabled in the spirit in which they are intended, which is to try to improve difficult legislation while entirely recognising the many challenges that the Government face. Brexit is full of risk and full of complexity—legal and otherwise—and the Government are entitled to my support, wherever possible, to carry Brexit out as smoothly as they can and with the least impact on the well-being of the citizens of our country. That has been my aim throughout.

I very much regret that—as often tends to happen in these matters—while some sessions in Committee have led to sensible amendment and the Government considering matters, or going away to look again and making some helpful suggestions, in the case of amendment 7 we seem to have run out of road. What happens in those circumstances, I regret to say, is that all rational discourse starts to evaporate. The purpose of the amendment, the nature of it, is entirely lost in a confrontation in which it is suggested that the underlying purpose is the sabotage of the will of the people, which it most manifestly is not. That is then followed by a hurling of public abuse; large numbers of people telling one that one is a traitor; and, I regret to say, some of one’s hon. and right hon. Friends saying slightly startling things. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), for example, said that I am grandstanding, when I do not remember ever having suggested such a thing to him about the way that he has expressed his views on Europe at any time in his career—including, I might add, when I tried to be a loyal member of his team when he was leader of my own party.

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. and learned Friend will know that I have never participated in any of that sort of language. May I gently put it to him that amendment 7 leaves open at least the possibility that, given that the EU does not want any member to leave and that there is therefore no incentive for it to negotiate a good deal that would be acceptable to this Parliament, we could find ourselves in a permanent state of limbo, deadlocked in unproductive negotiations?

[Mr Grieve]

I note what my hon. Friend has said and I am very grateful to him for the way in which he put it, but I happen to disagree with him. If he listens to me he will understand why I think that I am right on that point.

The consequence is that we completely lose sight of what the key issues are, and if I may say so before I move on, that matters a lot, because in the course of this, we also lose sight of the fact that we are the Parliament of a deeply divided country on this issue. When I go and lecture to sixth-formers occasionally and talk to them, I point out that the parliamentary process is not just about the imposition of the will of the majority on the minority; it is the process by which we obtain consent for what the majority chooses to do.

The difficulty with this referendum is that, having invoked the public will, which, I regret to say, is not entirely tempered in its expressions of view by some of the courtesies that we extend to each other here, we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that 48% of the electorate did not wish for the policy that we are currently pursuing and have deep concerns about, not trying to reverse it, but the extent to which it will have an adverse impact on their well-being, and request us as a Parliament to pay as much attention to what they are saying as we undoubtedly have to do to those who voted in the referendum and said that they wanted to leave. The most worrying aspect of the debate, as it has progressed, is how we become polarised and so fixated on ends that we fail completely to look at means. We look at the top of the mountain, but not at where we are going to put our foot next. As a consequence, we run serious risks of badly letting them down—all of them, collectively—by enacting bad legislation and taking very foolish decisions.

Of course, when this confrontation comes along, the negotiations immediately stop, the conversation ceases, the Government’s steamroller is invoked, and the atmosphere can suddenly get really quite unpleasant; and I regret it. As a consequence—I will come back to this in a moment—I have to tell my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that I think they have lost a series of opportunities in the dialogue we have had on this to come to a sensible outcome. With that, I turn to the issue that is, in truth, under debate.

[Paul Farrelly]

Is not the advantage of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s very helpful amendment that it would give certainty? It would nail down, in black and white, what we have agreed and would place a legal responsibility on the Government. We would then avoid a situation whereby what people think has been agreed simply becomes a statement of intent within a matter of hours and days.

[Mr Grieve]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I hope that I will be able to develop some of those points in a moment.

As was rightly said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Government had a notion when this debate started that it was possible to pull out of the European Union by use of the royal prerogative. Fortunately, time, common sense, debate and a small amount of judicial intervention has pointed out that that is not possible. As a consequence, my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench have correctly begun to understand that in fact there has to be a proper process. I appreciate the points that have been made about a meaningful vote and how we can actually get that in the context of Brexit; it is a real, live issue. Nevertheless, I greatly welcome the written ministerial statement, which sets out what appears to be a constitutionally tenable process for Parliament approving or considering the deal by motion, and then moving on to implement the deal by primary legislation.

Of course, the Government know that they must proceed by primary legislation because, in view of the comments during the Miller case, it is blindingly apparent that there must be a serious risk of legal uncertainty if anything other than a statute were to be used to take us out of the EU at the end. That is the last thing that my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench should want, because that will cause even more trouble and difficulty than they already have in the challenges they have to face.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me if I appear pedantic, but does not this Bill and the enactment of article 50 take us out of the European Union at the end, whereas the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill legislate for the consequences?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes. If, indeed, we were leaving with nothing further to do, that might be a good point. But it seems to be a pretty universal view, even on the Government Benches—although this perhaps does not apply to my hon. Friend—that simply leaving to jump off the top of the tower block is not the best thing to do. Therefore, there will need to be primary legislation to implement the undoubted new constitutional order that we will have after 29 March 2019.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

May I just make a tiny bit more progress?

As the Government’s position has shifted, they have come up with a written ministerial statement, which seems accurately to reflect the right direction of travel. But the difficulty is that clause 9 is entirely incompatible with what the Government have set out.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I happen to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that it would be undesirable for us to leave without an agreement. Indeed, I think that the Government agree with that. But I will go back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) a moment ago. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that, in the event that it were not possible to reach a further agreement, it would then be the case that the actions of Parliament already taken—including in triggering article 50—would constitute a proper answer to the Supreme Court’s point that Parliament, and Parliament alone, can remove us from the EU?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, I think I agree with my right hon. Friend that the action of Parliament in triggering article 50 would do that. But it is not, I think, the intention of the Government to do any such thing, and never has been. Indeed, if it is the intention of the Government to do such a thing, I hope very much that they will tell me as soon as possible, because I think I might be withdrawing my support from them.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Is not the point that, everything else being equal, even if nothing else happens, article 50 has been triggered so we are leaving the European Union on a set date, unless 27 other countries decide to extend the date? Therefore, this argument is about the UK’s internal process. It is not a question of the EU or anyone else holding things up.

[Mr Grieve]

There are a series of processes. I do not wish to get too diverted from my main point. We are intending, and will require, a further statute in order to achieve what the Government have set out. I hope very much that we do not leave with a no deal on anything, because we would not be able to fly off to Rome on the day after, we would have no security co-operation and we would, indeed, be mired in complete and utter chaos.

The reality is that clause 9 is incompatible with the programme that the Government have set out. At the time that clause 9 was inserted, I think that the Government had not yet fully worked out the implications of how withdrawal had to take place.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment. I do not wish to take up too much of the Committee’s time.

My point brings me to the specifics of clause 9, which is an extraordinary and wide power to remove us from the EU by statutory instrument, and moreover—this is the most telling point—to ask the House to give the Government effectively a blank cheque to draft statutory instruments to achieve something when at the moment we do not know what that is.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening very carefully, but clause 9 is not about implementing our leaving the European Union; it is about implementing a withdrawal agreement. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) did not vote for article 50, but my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) did. That is when he voted to leave the European Union and that is decided, so he is incorrect to say that clause 9 is deciding when or how we leave the European Union.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say so, I think my hon. Friend has misunderstood what I said. The fact is that clause 9 provides a power, exercisable once this Bill comes into force before exit day, to implement something when we do not at present know what that is. Therefore, it is a very strange thing to ask Parliament to sign off.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

Is not the supreme irony the fact that clause 9 is actually the child of article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, which the Government are now supporting? This provision is the Lisbon treaty timetable. It is not in any way trying to give power or control back to this House to amend that in any way or to ensure that the UK leaves the European Union at the time that is fortuitous. The UK is just accepting what is in the Lisbon treaty and the Government have welded themselves to that very idea.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point.

Ultimately, the centre of this point is that we are being asked to give the Government a power that can be exercised on something, but we do not know what that something is. Logically, the moment to make the statutory instruments to enact our withdrawal would come when we have this further statute—whatever it happens to be called—and have debated it in this House. We will then have structured the powers conferred by statutory instrument to achieve what Parliament wants and thinks is necessary to carry out withdrawal. That is the point, and pre-empting matters in this fashion is odd. Indeed, it is so odd that I heard one Minister—I will not reveal who—informally saying that they questioned whether the clause 9 power was in fact still needed, in view of how the Government were progressing this matter.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment.

On my key issue and what I was trying to tease out in tabling amendment 7, I could, I suppose, have simply said that I will not support clause 9. Indeed, if my amendment is not accepted, I am afraid I shall be voting against clause 9 this evening—I have no option—but rather than do that, the purpose of my amendment is to try to explore what it is that the Government want clause 9 to do that, in fact, we should not be doing when we enact the legislation at the end.

It is for the Government, in those circumstances, to explain themselves; it is not for Parliament simply to roll over and accept something because the Government say that that is what we should do. Indeed, if we all get told that we must support the Government out of loyalty because to do otherwise would undermine the Prime Minister—I think that is cuckoo, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—we need to know why.

Last week, I engaged in a whole series of dialogues with the Government, trying to understand what was bothering them. At one point, I thought we might be getting to the point where we would reach an agreement that some power might be needed in the Bill before we came to the final Bill, although I will come back to that in a moment. It started to dawn on me that one possibility was that this power might be exercisable, but only provided it could not be used to bring anything into force—we might lay some statutory instruments, but they could not be brought into force in any way until the end statute had been passed.

That is where I thought we might be—and then everything closed down, and I am none the wiser why the Government need this power, except that I note that a journalist who seemed to have been speaking to a briefing was told it might be required to effect the registration of EU citizens. I thought to myself, “I thought we were going to have an immigration Act to do that.” So I am still at this moment—this afternoon—absolutely at sea about why this power is needed. If the Government cannot make a case for this power, it should not be here.

Even at this stage, I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, if they accept this amendment, which is absolutely central and necessary to ensuring that a power of this scope cannot be abused in a way that the House should not tolerate, and if they want to come back on Report and tidy it up because there is some adjustment or some caveat they want to put in, I will of course listen to what they want to say—my job is not to make their lives more difficult—but I am not prepared to sign away such an extensive power, when it appears to be contrary to the Government’s stated policy on how Brexit will be carried out and, in fact, surrenders without any good reason the control of this House over how the Government conduct Brexit.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

If my right hon. and learned Friend’s version of what our vote would be were to prevail, rather than the Government’s version, what would happen if, close to our leaving date, Parliament voted against any agreement there might have been and against no deal?

[Mr Grieve]

Ultimately, as my right hon. Friend knows, this Parliament is sovereign, although its sovereignty does not extend to concluding agreements with other parties in international relations that the Government do not wish to adhere to or sign up to. I have no idea what the circumstances are going to be in 12 months’ time. I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich: we are dealing with a whole series of hypothetical questions. I get a bit fed up when I keep on being asked, “What is it? Surely, it is a choice between the deal on offer and no deal.” I do not know. There is no way that any of us can know, and that is why the process matters so much. If we get the process right, we will answer correctly each question as and when it arises. Far from that hurting or damaging the Government, it will enhance their power. To come back to the point I made in an intervention, it will convey an impression of purpose and method to our EU partners in negotiation, whereas, at the moment, the major thing that has been undermining our negotiations is the impression of chaos in our procedure and our aims.

[Sir William Cash]

I am extremely intrigued by the line that my right hon. and learned Friend has taken, with which I largely agree in relation not to the substance, but to the deficiencies he now seems to have accepted could, in some shape or other, be tidied up, as he put it, on Report if we were to get to that unfortunate situation. I simply ask him: is he able to elucidate how his amendment would actually work in practice?

[Mr Grieve]

I have been pleading with the Government throughout the past four weeks, pointing out to them that this is a really important amendment, and asking them please to respond to it. I have asked them what alternative they might have that could persuade me that they had a working proposal that should command the approval of the House and my own approval. I have been doing that repeatedly, and I was striving to achieve those things last week, but the blunt reality is—I am sorry to have to say this to the Committee—that I have been left in the lurch as a Back Bencher trying to improve this legislation, because silence has fallen. There has simply not been a credible explanation. The last explanation was, “Here is your written ministerial statement. That ought to be enough for you. In loyalty, you should now support the Government.” However, that does not answer the question.

[Anna Soubry]

Has my right hon. and learned Friend also looked at this issue: does he think that, should the Government decide that the best deal is the European Free Trade Association—we would effectively be Norway—some right hon. and hon. Government Members have worked out that, without his amendment or the new clause moved by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), this country would become like Norway and go straight into EFTA, without this Parliament having a say on whether that is what leave meant?

[Mr Grieve]

It would indeed be a remarkable outcome. Certainly, I think that Parliament ought to have a say. Those reasons highlight the difficulty of clause 9. There are other difficulties with the Bill, but clause 9 really has it.

I want to bring my remarks to an end, and I simply say that I do want the Government to listen. The opportunity is here for them to accept the amendment and then to come back on Report and explain themselves further or to tidy the amendment up, and I will listen and try constructively to help them if, indeed, any of this power is needed, but I am not prepared to sign off clause 9 in its present form.

The one merit of amendment 7—I tailored it very carefully and I tried quite deliberately to avoid the no-deal scenario, which is a very legitimate issue, but it is not what I went for—is that I wanted to make sure that these powers could not be used to pre-empt a statute that we should probably be considering this time next year. It is plainly wrong, and if it is to be departed from, the Government have to provide a credible reason for it.

[Alex Chalk]

May I ask my right hon. and learned Friend about a point I am struggling with and that others may be struggling with, too? On the one hand, given that the Government have conceded that there will need to be a statute to implement any agreement, it is difficult, for me at any rate, to see what the point is of clause 9, and Parliament should not legislate in vain. That is point one. On the other hand is the key point not that we will get a vote on that statute, so does this really matter? That is the part I am struggling with, and I would very much welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s views.

[Mr Grieve]

I think that this does matter. If I understand the reason why the Government want this power, it is that, at the time when we may be considering the next statute, they will also be pushing through this House statutory instruments setting up structures for our departure from the EU that may be, or that we might consider to be, at variance with what we need in the fresh statute that we are considering. I think that that is a form of constitutional chaos, actually. I cannot see how it produces any clarity at all. For that reason—a reason of good process—this is a mistaken course of action, particularly because it is not necessary.

We have heard the argument, “We’re going to run out of time in leaving the EU.” I simply repeat what I have said previously. I realise that this is hugely objected to by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends because they are so fixated on getting us out. The article 50 mechanism provides for a sensible structure to enable us to leave smoothly, yet for reasons that I do not understand, the aim of some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seems to be to mess it up as much as possible. There is the famous amendment 381, for example, which we are going to come back to next week and which I have already indicated I will not support under any circumstances whatsoever. If we actually stick to a sensible process, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), then we will get the right answers. As I say, if the Government are to justify keeping clause 9, they have to provide us with chapter and verse—and they simply have not done so. I have asked, and I have not had it.

In those circumstances, the only proper course of action—I say this with the greatest reluctance—is that I am going to have to vote for my amendment, and, if necessary, if it is not passed, I will vote against clause 9, because without my amendment, clause 9 becomes a really very worrying tool of Executive power that does not appear to have any reasonable presence in this legislation. Apart from on HS2, I do not think that I have ever rebelled against the Government in my 20 and a half years in this House. I do find it quite entertaining that some who criticise me for speaking my mind on this matter are individuals who appear to have exercised the luxury of rebellion on many, many occasions. But that said, there is a time for everybody to stand up and be counted. As Churchill said, “He is good party man—he puts the party before himself and the country before his party.” And that is what I intend to do.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I think that is a very possible eventuality, which takes us back to our earlier discussion. I certainly agree that if, upon a resolution, the House refused to accept the withdrawal agreement suggested by the Government and agreed by the EU, it is very likely that the Government would go back and try to renegotiate it, and it is very possible that they would succeed in doing so. I do not deny any of that. My point is that amendment 7 would not force that result, because all it would do is, under certain circumstances, stop certain kinds of orders being issued under this Bill.

[Mr Grieve]

I picked this amendment with some care, precisely because I wanted to avoid the suggestion that by tabling it I was trying to sabotage Brexit. I was trying to prevent the potentially abusive use of a power in clause 9 when the Government were saying that they were going to do something different. That was the purpose behind the amendment. It was also, if I might say so, to prod the Government into responding, which I very much regret they have failed to do.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am delighted by my right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention, because I agree that he has succeeded in doing that. He has not created the so-called meaningful vote that the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and the Opposition want. He has instead pointed out an issue with the use of the order-making power in this Bill. The question is: is it a good amendment in those terms? We have accepted that it is not a question of creating or not creating a meaningful vote, to use the term used by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central, but just a question of trying to get the Bill into good order—a pursuit in which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I have joined on many occasions during Committee proceedings. However, I think that on this particular occasion, this particular amendment is not a particularly good way of doing that. I will explain why I think that is the case, and I hope that the Government will instead come forward with another way of achieving the same effect.

It is a very odd situation indeed to have an amendment to what will become a section of an Act that refers to another piece of primary legislation as the basis for an order-making power in the first piece of legislation. In fact I think it is virtually unprecedented.

[Mr Grieve]

The Bill is unprecedented, because it is asking us, in the light of what the Government themselves say they are going to do, to sanction a power that undermines a further statute that the Government intend to pass, which should be the source of power for removing us from the EU.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Now I am beginning rather to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. Therefore, my suggestion is that if that is the purpose of his amendment, it would be far better that it come back as a Government amendment on Report that achieves that effect in a different way and directly, without the gross inelegance of referring to another piece of legislation. It should mainly limit the power in clause 9 to things that are urgent and immediate, and perhaps even specify what sorts of things they might be.

As a matter of fact, I rather share my right hon. and learned Friend’s inclination to believe that clause 9 in its present form came forward before the Government were clear about the need for the implementation and withdrawal Bill, and that Ministers and officials have so far been quite hard pressed to identify exactly which powers are required in clause 9 under the new dispensation of that forthcoming Bill. The Government therefore have a good opportunity to promise from the Dispatch Box today that they will come back on Report with an amendment that is correctly phrased in such a way as to limit the order-making power in clause 9. That would avoid the possibility—this is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend and other hon. Friends—of suggesting that we are in any way creating a launch pad for the efforts of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and Opposition Front Benchers to create what they call a meaningful vote, which is in fact an ability to trigger us not leaving.

[Mr Grieve]

There will undoubtedly be an opportunity at the end of this process, if this House were so minded, to reject a deal. I have to say—my right hon. Friend may agree with me—that ultimately the House could bring this Government down, if it had to or wanted to do so. That is our constitutional ability.

My right hon. Friend’s main point does not find favour with me, because the only way we will get something sensible on Report is by getting amendment 7 on the statute book and on the face of the Bill. I asked repeatedly for an engagement along precisely the lines that my right hon. Friend has identified, and it was consistently rejected. That is why I will vote for amendment 7, and if I may say so, I would encourage him to do likewise.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am surprised by that, because my right hon. and learned Friend has a long and distinguished record of voting for good law. I do not think that this is good law, for the reasons I have identified. I think it really would be better if we had a correct amendment at a later stage of proceedings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way again. In a sense, he unmasks my strategy. I have spent the whole time trying to be sotto voce about this, trying to get some common sense into the Government, which I have been unable to do. It is for that reason that, I very much regret, there really is no alternative to amendment 7. It may be inelegant—although I do not think it is—but it does the business. It would stop the Government doing something that they should not be doing. I could not agree with him more that clause 9 could be removed entirely. It would very sensible if the Government were to do that, but if I had suggested that they would have been upset with me, and it would have made the relationship and the negotiation even harder. In the spirit of conciliation I avoided that brutality and came up with something different.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Speaking personally, I do not think there would be anything very brutal about the Government deciding on Report that it would be sensible to not have clause 9 in the Bill, given that there will now be a separate piece of legislation to achieve the same effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Vaizey]

I bow to my right hon. and learned Friend’s wisdom and experience on that point. I am a consensus merchant and simply thought there might be a way forward, but I totally understand that votes might have to be exercised tonight in order to stiffen the Government’s backbone to provide a solution. But nevertheless it has always been the case proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that the Government will have an opportunity on Report potentially to alter his amendment.

[Mr Grieve]

If they can justify it.

[Mr Vaizey]

If they can justify it, of course.

The second part of my remarks, which will be as brief as possible because so much time has been taken up, is about amendment 300, standing in my name, which has the largest number of signatories of any amendment to this Bill. I am astonished that only four of them are Conservatives, but I think that reflects the standing in which I am held in my own party; I could not even persuade the leader of the rebel alliance, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, to sign my Euratom amendment, and I really do not want my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset to talk about bad law when he comes to look at it.

The point of the amendment is simply to put the issue of Euratom under parliamentary scrutiny, and I note the comments made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) in her excellent speech about the importance of Euratom in our medical life, and her own real experience at the chalkface in her extraordinary work. So Euratom is not an esoteric issue; it affects us all. It has been debated in the House before and I shall not spend a lot of time talking about how extraordinarily successful our nuclear industry is. My own personal interest comes from the fact that although Culham is not in my constituency, many of my constituents work there, and it depends on Euratom. I thank the Government for last week’s announcement of £86 million of investment in Culham for two new centres of excellence for the testing of components and for fuel storage; that is a real vote of confidence in Culham.

The point, of course, about Euratom is that nobody voted to leave it. Euratom was not in the European Union Referendum Act 2015, and was not on the ballot; it falls under a separate treaty. So the British people did not have a chance to have a referendum on our membership of Euratom.

The reason we are leaving Euratom is technical. Legal advice, which we have not seen, deems Euratom to be inextricably linked to the European Union and therefore an article 50 notice would be defective if it did not include Euratom. However, the mood of the Government and, I think, the House is that we are leaving Euratom on a technicality, not because we object to being governed by Euratom. There is no mood among the general population to leave Euratom as far as I am aware, and I think that only one hon. Member has managed to stand up and say that there is a plausible reason to leave it.

[Mr Grieve]

I am entirely supportive of the intention behind this amendment, but being too much of a lawyer, I probably did not sign it because I realised the potential implications—

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

indicated assent.

[Mr Grieve]

I see the Solicitor General nodding. However, the fact that it might have legal implications does not mean that it is not a very desirable objective.

[Mr Vaizey]

The implications of leaving Euratom, some of which have already been identified by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, also extend to our nuclear industry, which provides 20% of this country’s energy. At the moment, we simply cannot move nuclear material around unless we are members of Euratom. So when we leave Euratom, we will have to have, in effect, a Euratom-style arrangement to allow us to move goods around. “Goods” can mean a variety of things. We imagine highly radioactive canisters being moved in special trains at the dead of night, but the movement of goods also involves mundane things such as heat pumps, motors, spares and other components, all of which, because they are part of the civil nuclear ecosystem, have to be moved under the terms of these treaties.

Euratom covers not only objects but the freedom of movement of people. We depend on our membership of Euratom for a nuclear power industry, for our medical industry—isotopes have been mentioned—and for the Joint European Torus at Culham, where Britain has done extraordinarily well. Huge advantages have been made in robotics and other sciences, and there are £500 million-worth of contracts already in ITER, the successor to Culham, thanks to the expertise we have built up here.

Let me make it clear that, throughout this process of our technical move to leave Euratom, Ministers have been absolutely brilliant in engaging with me and other hon. Members who share my concerns and have similar interests. They have bent over backwards to do what they can to accommodate our concerns. Looking forward, we need Ministers to give us clarity on a number of issues. We need nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries—the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and possibly the European Union as well—and they need to be in place by March 2019. These agreements can be complex, and they can depend on the legislation in other legislatures. For example, the US Congress would have to pass a new nuclear co-operation agreement with us. We will also need a new safeguards regime, and this will come in through the Nuclear Safeguards Bill as a contingency, although I understand that the Government might want Euratom to continue to cover the safeguarding role.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend for the constructive way she makes her point. Of course, until we have the withdrawal agreement, we will not know precisely the nature of the technical—

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

May I at least give the answer before my right hon. and learned Friend jumps in?

That is why the agility that clause 9 gives us is important. I do not mean to correct my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) in a lawyerly way, but it is not quite right to say that clause 9 can legislate for anything in the context of departing the EU. It relates only to the withdrawal agreement, and I think she said it related to withdrawing from the EU.

Another illustration of what clause 9 could be used for is the spelling out of the technical detail of how ongoing UK cases at the European Court of Justice should be handled, and how the UK courts should treat resulting judgments. Some of that might be done under this Bill, and some under the withdrawal agreement, but we will need to clarify things such as the types of cases that would be in scope and the precise procedural points in terms of whether a case could be considered to be pending, among others. Without that clarification, how such cases should be treated might not be clear. We would run the risk of legal uncertainty, as well as uncertainty for the individuals involved in those cases.

I do not want to make too much of that before my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield jumps in. He is quite right—he has made this point before, and he may want to hear me out before I take his intervention—that, in 2016, there were 23 preliminary references from UK courts and just one infraction case against the UK. So we do not expect this issue to affect large numbers. None the less, for those affected, it is still important to get this right.

[Mr Grieve]

I want to understand this, because it is rather important. We are going to enact a withdrawal agreement Bill—I think that is what it is called. I would expect that to have statutory instrument powers—the very statutory instrument powers we can consider in relation to the scope of the withdrawal agreement when deciding what we then enact by secondary legislation to take us out. I begin to wonder whether, in fact, it is the Government’s intention not to have any statutory instruments made under that agreement at all, but to seek to make them entirely through the mechanism of clause 9 before we have had the opportunity of considering what we actually want. That is why clause 9 is, I have to say to my hon. Friend, so mischievous. While I would be prepared to listen to some great exception, abandoning the normal legislative process in this way seems to be utterly undesirable, so I would press my hon. Friend on what is going to happen with this withdrawal agreement Bill. Are we going to have secondary legislation under it?

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

From my experience, I must say that I think that is a rather rose-tinted perspective on EU negotiations. I should also say that the same arguments were made about my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister going into the phase 1 negotiations, yet we are on the cusp of formal ratification of the joint report dealing with the first phase issues. The Prime Minister has made some difficult compromises and shown flexibility precisely to get the deal that I think my right hon. and learned Friend welcomes—I also welcome it—even though we were on different sides during the referendum campaign.

I turn to new clauses 3 and 75, which attempt to remove clause 9 wholesale from the Bill. They would undermine one of the important strategic objectives of the Bill, which is to provide the legal means to implement the withdrawal agreement thoroughly in domestic law. I hope I have explained the important, albeit residual, role that clause 9 stands to play in light of the separate primary legislation covering the withdrawal agreement. To remove clause 9 would increase the legal uncertainty, and I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed.

I want to spend a little bit of time focusing on amendments 7, 47 and 355 and new clause 68, but particularly on amendment 7 in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. May I say at the outset that I do not think he has any ulterior motive in tabling the amendment? I have had a number of constructive conversations with him, and I look forward to more in the future. By dint of that, I hope he accepts that I have followed through on every assurance I have given him, and that I have not failed to live up to the undertakings I have given him. It is in that spirit that we on both sides of the debate need to proceed as the Bill goes through the House.

Amendments 7 and 355 call for a separate statute to be enacted approving the withdrawal agreement before the powers in clause 9 can be used. There are a number of problems with doing so. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) mentioned the constitutional issue, and I agree with him about that. From a practical point of view, however, the crucial problem is the effect that amendment 7 would have in significantly curtailing the timely advantage that we will gain from clause 9. One of the key benefits of the clause is the ability to start to use it reasonably swiftly after the withdrawal agreement has been reached.

To add an unnecessary Bill to the parliamentary agenda—in addition to Parliament’s meaningful vote, as set out in today’s written ministerial statement, and on top of the new withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—would be restrictive enough. However, to make the first use of the powers in clause 9 wait until the additional legislation has fully passed through Parliament would unduly compress the time we will have to prepare the legislative groundwork, and would risk greater uncertainty. With the greatest respect in the world, I am afraid that is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is defective.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dominic Raab]

If I may, I will finish my comments on this amendment, and I will then let my right hon. and learned Friend critique them in the round. I suspect such a critique is coming.

In rare and exceptional cases, we may need to exercise the powers in clause 9 to pass statutory instruments before the final enactment of the primary legislation, which will be on the date of exit. Let me give an illustration of why it may be necessary for operational changes to be in put in place before that point. An example is where specific statutory authority is needed for a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on citizens’ rights, if that cannot be done in advance under other primary legislation. Such a body would need to be set up beforehand so that it was ready to operate on day one, but we may not know its precise content and contours until relatively late on in the negotiations.

Yes, the potential scope for reliance on clause 9 has been reduced by the Government’s commitment to primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period, but it is still important to retain it. The fetter imposed by amendment 7 would risk materially damaging responsible preparations for exit, including in sensitive areas such as citizens’ rights. I know that that is not the intention of my right hon. and learned Friend, to whom I am very happy to give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I am again most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. He will know—I touched on this in my comments—that when this issue was first raised, I suggested that one possibility might be to allow statutory instruments to be laid and voted on by this House prior to the enactment of the further statute, but not allow them to be brought into force until that further statute had been enacted. That would allow the House to stop the statutory process if it was not happy with it. As I understand it, the further statute has to be enacted before the date we leave, because without it we do not have the powers to pull out. In those circumstances, I find it impossible to understand why my suggestion might not solve his problem. I think he will agree that that is where our dialogue stopped. If he actually wants to do something even before that, I have to say to him that, as a matter of principle, I object.

[Dominic Raab]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right about almost everything; the only point he is not right about is that I think he will find that my suggestion to him was the appropriate way to deal with that. I will come on to give him precisely the assurance he is asking for, although we have not had a chance to get it on to the face of the Bill. I would argue that a political assurance, which I will give him on top of the others that have been given, ought adequately to address his concerns.

With the genuine and material risk of my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment in mind, I hope I can go further, bridge the gap and reassure hon. Members, and assuage any residual concerns they may have about the operation of clause 9 in practice. I want to provide three very clear assurances to the House.

First, secondary legislation passed under clause 9 will either be affirmative or considered by the Committee established under the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. Secondly, the Government are committed to publishing such statutory instruments in draft as far as possible, as early as possible, to facilitate maximum scrutiny, which is another point we have discussed.

Thirdly, we expect that the vast majority of statutory instruments enacted under clause 9 will not come into force until exit day, when the withdrawal agreement comes into force. But I can give my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and the Committee, the concrete assurance that, following the timeframe set out in today’s written ministerial statement, none of the SIs introduced under clause 9 will come into effect until Parliament has voted on the final deal. I hope that that provides important reassurance and is sufficient for hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

That approach has two advantages. First, it retains our ability to use clause 9 in time to fully implement the withdrawal agreement. It also squarely addresses the concern, fairly and honestly reflected in amendment 7, that there should be a meaningful vote—the critical point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—and that we should not bring new law implementing the withdrawal agreement into effect if Parliament votes that agreement down.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

The right hon. Lady knows as well as I do that the intention is to try to conclude an agreement by October 2018, but, again, there is no guarantee of that fact, in which case the resolution will be tabled soon after 2018. May I just point out that amendment 7, proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, is trying to create a meaningful vote by turning this resolution of both Houses into a statute?

[Mr Grieve]

Well, we have been promised a statute.

[Mr Jenkin]

Yes, a statute has been promised, but not as a means of second-guessing the negotiations. At what stage in the passage of the statute does my right hon. and learned Friend expect the Government to use that moment and say, “Oh, well, they haven’t agreed with this bit of the agreement; we’ll have to go back.” Is it during the passage of the statute that the negotiations would have to continue? Making this decision a statute does not alter the discussion about a meaningful vote.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I think that he may misunderstand the position. The House will have an opportunity, at the time that it is asked to move a motion approving the deal, to express its view, but it will also have an opportunity to express its view during the passage of the statute. Both those are necessary pre-conditions constitutionally for our leaving the European Union. I cannot help that; that is just how it is. Let me reiterate: the purpose of my amendment is to prevent the powers in clause 9 being used until this key statute has been enacted. That is the purpose.

[Mr Jenkin]

Actually, that option is not available, because article 50 has a deadline, and when that deadline runs out, we leave. There is no requirement for a withdrawal agreement or a statute for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I rise to support the—

[Mr Grieve]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, of course.

[Mr Grieve]

While I was briefly out of the Chamber, an announcement was made of a Government concession, but I have to say, it is too late. I am sorry, but you cannot treat the House in this fashion. My hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) may agree with me that the best way of getting progress in this area is by moving amendment 7 and thereafter we can co-operate with the Government in trying to achieve its aim.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I rise to support amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I have listened with great interest to all the excellent speeches and interventions by right hon. and hon. Members this afternoon and, for me, three key themes have emerged. First, there is real disagreement about the meaning of “meaningful”. Secondly, there is confusion about the terms of article 50. Thirdly, there is an issue of trust.

On the first point, it is crystal clear that this vote cannot be meaningful if it is binary. It has to be taken on the basis of us having an opportunity to instruct the Government to extend article 50 if necessary. On the second point, article 50 clearly gives the Government the opportunity to seek an extension of the period, and there is no reason whatever why the EU27 would reject that request. It is enshrined in the treaties, and for that to have meaning, they would clearly have to listen to our request. Why on earth would they not accept that request if it was in our mutual interest to do so?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

I have been vexed and exercised for quite a long part of the past 40 years, but that is my problem. The hon. Gentleman should know that as we go forward we are creating a new type of legislation. It is true that many of the European directives and regulations have been adopted over the years in different ways, but we are now importing this great body of EU retained law. It is going to affect him and his constituents, as well as my constituents. The first point to make is: can we understand what it is? That provides a useful opportunity in this exercise—

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman may agree with me that if there are deficiencies in the way EU law has been imported into our law, the last thing we want to do is to perpetuate them by keeping the uncertainties after we have gone. Yet schedule 5 raises a number of uncertainties, which this House would do well to address.

[Mr Leslie]

We are doing our duty by at least trying to comb over these issues now.

I wish to commend the Labour Front-Bench team on their amendment 348, which seeks to ensure that impact assessments are made properly and thoroughly before we take many of the decisions in this whole Brexit process. We already know enough about what has happened with the Brexit Secretary promising impact assessments and their turning out to be sectoral analyses. Many of us will have gone to the reading room and looked at the hastily written 50-odd documents, which would be good if someone was writing a master’s degree dissertation on the aviation sector—they are full of facts and information—but do not really provide much more analysis than people can already get off Google.

Where we did get an insight, although it may have been a slip of the tongue, was when the Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared before the Treasury Committee on 6 December and said that he has

“modelled and analysed a wide range of potential alternative structures between the European Union and the United Kingdom”

and that

“it informs…our negotiating position”.

So obviously there does exist within government some level of impact assessment and analysis that has not yet been placed in the public domain. It might be that the Brexit Committee wishes to explore that further or that the Treasury Committee wishes to do so, but it is important that we know whether this is simply a reference to the pre-referendum work that was done under the former Chancellor George Osborne or whether further assessments have taken place, independently undertaken by the Treasury. We need to know what analysis the different Departments have undertaken and what sort of modelling on the different sectors of our economy has been done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Leslie]

That is the level of analysis and assessment that deserves to be shared and that was not available to the public prior to the referendum. It should not be dismissed but made more widely available. Members, and beyond them voters, can weigh up the different opinions. Some Members might rubbish representatives of the steel sector and say, “What do they know? I know better,” but we can weigh these things up and bring them into balance. We have the opportunity to debate transparency. Let us allow sunlight to flood over this issue and make sure that we are better informed going forward than we were before the referendum.

[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure to participate in the Committee’s consideration of schedule 5 and clause 13, although the reality is that the clause says very little and the schedule says a great deal.

As we have just heard, part 1 of schedule 5 provides for the publication of retained direct EU legislation by the Queen’s printer, which should be completely uncontroversial because its purpose is to promote transparency and access so that people in the United Kingdom can know what the law is. That is not some slight matter. One of the points that has been gently canvassed in the debate so far is the extent to which EU law may have created, in the way it has been brought into UK law, a degree of uncertainty as to what it is, in which case that is the last thing we should retain when we carry out this retention of the law. One of the central principles of the rule of law is that the law must be

“accessible…intelligible, clear and predictable”.

That is one of Lord Bingham’s principles of the rule of law, and it should matter to the House very much with respect to how it legislates. People need to be able to understand what activity is prohibited and therefore discouraged, and what their rights are so that they are able to claim whatever rights they have.

The interesting thing about part 1 of schedule 5 is that paragraph 2 empowers Ministers to make exceptions to the duty to publish retained direct EU legislation by

“giving a direction to the Queen’s printer specifying the instrument or category of instruments that are excepted.”

There appear to be no limitations on that power and no guidance on when such instruction might or might not be appropriate. My first question to my colleagues on the Treasury Bench, and particularly my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, is: what is the Government’s intention in respect of that exception? Why is it there—we need to understand why it has been included in the Bill—and how will it be used in practice? It seems to me that it is desirable that the entirety of retained direct EU legislation should be made available through the Queen’s printer, so what is the intention as to the circumstances in which a Minister might remove himself from the duty and give a different direction? There is, perhaps slightly to my regret, no amendment to address that question—had I focused on it slightly better at an earlier stage and not been diverted by other matters, I might have tried to tease it out by tabling an amendment—but as we are also debating whether the clause and schedule should stand part of the Bill, it is important that we give the matter some consideration. Indeed, it ties in exactly with what the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said in introducing new clause 21, which is on exactly the same principle or philosophical issue of providing certainty.

My second question is about part 2 of schedule 5, which provides for Ministers by regulations to enable or require judicial notice to be taken of retained EU law or EU law. There are no limitations whatsoever on this delegated legislative power to enable or require judicial notice to be taken and, as far as I can see, nor are there any provisions to require that a Minister can make such regulations only under certain circumstances—for example, regulatory harmonisation might be a legitimate reason for making such regulations. This is a classic Henry VIII power, as paragraph 4(3) provides total Henry VIII powers, and is only limited, under paragraph 4(4), to primary legislation made or passed before the end of the Session in which this Bill is passed.

All that takes me back to an interesting debate the Committee had on a previous day—which one has rather faded out of my memory—in which my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and I raised our continuing concerns about the judiciary having a lack of clarity about how they were supposed to interpret and apply retained EU law. Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale have expressed concern that the Bill is insufficiently clear about how retained EU law should be interpreted by the courts post exit. Lord Neuberger in particular was concerned by the prospect of the courts having to determine questions of regulatory harmonisation against divergence between UK and EU law—an essentially political topic, with possible economic consequences to the interpretation. As it happens, regulations made under part 2 of schedule 5 might address the judiciary’s anxiety about the need for better guidance on retained EU law, but what troubles me is that this provision again subtly sidelines Parliament from any role in providing guidance, as it is a matter of Executive discretion.

I must say to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, and to my other colleagues on the Treasury Bench, that I do understand the Government’s difficulties. The whole Bill is about an accretion of power to a Government who do not really know how they are going to have to use that power and are fearful that something will come up that will require them to act swiftly, and who therefore think that they have to maximise the tools at their disposal.

Forgive my repeating this—I think that the Bill has been quite well improved as it has gone through the House and, indeed, some of the assurances that have been given will lead to further improvements, I have no doubt, on Report—but it was this sort of thing that made me describe the Bill as a monstrosity on Second Reading. It is so contrary to the normal way in which one would expect to legislate for Parliament both to grant the powers that a Government need, including, where necessary, powers of secondary legislation, and at the same time to make sure that these cannot run out of control. On the plain face of the Bill, this is really one of the immense Henry VIII powers. The Government have decided to resolve this issue by taking a very big sledgehammer to the normal structures.

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

During last Wednesday’s debate, I specifically asked whether the Bill was first drafted before the June general election. My view—I do not know whether my right hon. and learned Friend shares it—is that this Bill was all about delivering a quick and hard Brexit, and the reason for these extraordinary powers is that they were needed by Ministers to execute that process in quite a short period of time. Does he think that there is any merit in that?

[Mr Grieve]

I think I might be a little kinder to my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, because it seems to me that at the time the Bill came into being, the Government still thought that it was all that was required to take us out of the EU. I think that that is where its genesis and origin lie. In actual fact, one of the supreme ironies is that for all the heat that has been generated—we have carried out some proper scrutiny as well, but certainly, last Wednesday, there was a lot of heat—much of what we are doing here might well turn out in practice to be completely academic. In fairness to the Government, once they were landed with this immense problem, I am not sure that they were wrong to proceed in this way, but it just so happens that that is where we are going to end up. However, that is not a reason why we should not pay attention to the powers that the Government are seeking to take—we do have to pay attention to them.

[John Redwood]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

I will give way to my right hon. Friend in just a second, because I do not wish to speak for very much longer.

For that reason, I do hope that a bit of focus can placed on schedule 5. I do not have any amendments tabled. I am not about to create difficulties for the Government or to divide the House on schedule 5, but I will, if I may, just ask a question as we approach Report, because I cannot believe that this will not be looked at in the House of Lords. It would be quite nice for the Christmas period to be used for quiet reflection on just how wide these powers are and whether, yet again, the Government might, on reflection, be able to circumscribe them a little bit, so that they appear to be slightly less stark in terms of the power grab that they imply. That is quite apart from the fact, to come back to my first point, that the exception in paragraph 2 giving Ministers the power not to print strikes me as very, very odd.

[John Redwood]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the Henry VIII powers, as he calls them, in the Bill are much more modest than the Henry VIII powers in the European Communities Act 1972 that it replaces? This is about only transferring existing law into UK law. Where and when we wish to amend, improve or repeal, that will require a full parliamentary process, which it did not need when it came from Europe.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point. Of course, I am mindful of it—it has been raised on numerous occasions during the passage of the Bill—but the system that we had to follow as a result of our EU membership implied that that law, having been agreed by the Council of Ministers and translated into directives, had direct effect in this country and was then applied, not usually through primary legislation but by means of secondary legislation, or indeed directly sometimes. I understand all that, but it does not provide a justification for taking unnecessary powers in trying to effect our departure.

As I said, there is something a bit odd about schedule 5. There must be legal certainty, so why are the Government taking for themselves a power to create legal uncertainty if they so wish? Let us be clear about this: if guidance is a matter of Executive discretion, it is a very unusual state of affairs indeed. There is guidance and guidance. There may be general guidance that Parliament might give as to how it intends retained EU law to be treated. I do not have difficulty with that. Indeed, I think that it may be something that we will have to do. As we have discussed—my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset and I were in agreement about this—we think that Parliament might want to explain how it wishes this matter to be approached generally. That, if I may say, is a rather different thing from saying that Ministers can suddenly wake up one morning and decide, “I want the law to be interpreted in a different way on some specific matter, and I am going to lay a statutory instrument before Parliament that will enable me to do that.” It is a very unusual thing to do, and the Government must be in a position to justify it. It slightly troubles me that the law can be tinkered around with in this form. Obviously, Parliament can decide what it likes about changing law. Occasionally, we change laws by statutory instrument, through regulatory change, but it is not something that we should do lightly.

[Mr Jenkin]

Clause 13 is confined to the publication and rules of evidence. The schedule itself is about publishing what is retained direct EU legislation. Can my right hon. and learned Friend describe to me what latitude the Government would have that could do so much damage, or be so capricious, within the powers of the Bill, and can he give an example of what would be so damaging and outrageous?

[Mr Grieve]

As I have explained, this is a Henry VIII power, so within the period in which this power is operational—this is on my reading, but perhaps my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench will correct me—a Minister of the Crown may, by regulation, essentially change the way in which retained EU law is handled by requiring

“judicial notice to be taken of a relevant matter, or…provide for the admissibility in any legal proceedings of specified evidence of…a relevant matter”.

That is a very extensive power. Effectively, it gives a power to rewrite how legislation should be interpreted.

[Mr Jenkin]

Give us an example.

[Mr Grieve]

The examples could be endless—[Interruption.] Well, if there is an established rule by which, for example, EU law is currently being applied, a Minister could say that, in future, that should be disapplied because notice should not be taken of its previous application.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it is not correct to compare the direct application of EU law with Henry VIII powers? When EU law is made, we all sit around the table. EU law is not other people’s law but our law. We sit at the table when EU law is being made, so it is an incorrect comparison.

[Mr Grieve]

I do actually agree with the hon. Lady and, I am afraid, disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin). Of course, membership of the EU implies a pooling of sovereignty, but the decision-making process by which law has been created in the EU is one that is done not by faceless bureaucrats, but by the Council of Ministers. There is absolutely no doubt about that at all—

[Mr Jenkin]

In secret.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not wish to be dragged off into some new polemical argument. My hon. Friend says in secret, but, if I may say, we are signed up to hundreds of treaties other than that with the EU in which we pool our sovereignty to come to common positions with our fellow treaty makers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Duncan Smith]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

I think that I am about to take up much more time than I wanted to. I give way to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon).

[Lady Hermon]

I am extremely grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for allowing me to intervene. I agree entirely with his eloquent points about the power that schedule 5 transfers to Ministers of the Crown. Will he spend a moment reflecting on the definition of a Minister of the Crown that is set out in clause 14? The definition comprises not just Ministers, but

“also includes the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs”.

The power in schedule 5 is being given to a very broad range of individuals.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Lady is right. [Interruption.] Next to me, from a sedentary position, my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex is saying, “It’ll only be used for technical matters.” Indeed—let us be clear about this—I strongly suspect that that is the intention, but this is a very extensive power and, as it is worded, it goes way beyond technical amendments. As we are in Committee, it seems perfectly proper for me, as a Back-Bench Member of Parliament—it does not matter which side of the Chamber I am sitting on—to ask my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench to explain to the Committee how the power will be used. I gently say to my hon. Friends that the problem with this debate is that the heat that starts to come off very quickly goes into issues of principle about what has been going on over the past 50 years. Could we just gently come back to focus on the issue at hand?

[Mr Duncan Smith]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

As much as I would like to give way to my right hon. Friend, I am actually now going to sit down.

[Mr Duncan Smith]

Just for a second.

[Mr Grieve]

All right, I will give way.

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I want to take up my right hon. and learned Friend on one small point. After agreeing with the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) and justifying the past 40 years by saying that decisions were agreed by Ministers sitting together to make law, he knocked down his own argument as to why he cannot support what Ministers are doing because, of course, they would use this power as Ministers who have been elected to implement change and make law. My right hon. and learned Friend cannot have it both ways. Either he thinks that the last 40 years were wrong, which is why one defends the idea of change, as he did originally; or he thinks that the last 40 years were fine, in which case there is no attack on this particular aspect of the Bill.

[Mr Grieve]

I am afraid that I disagree totally with my right hon. Friend. In the last 40 years, we decided to pool sovereignty as a matter of national interest and necessity. This is a totally different issue; it is about our domestic law. When it comes to matters of domestic law, this House does not have the necessary constraint, which is the very reason why I have asked these questions. I am quite confident that my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench will be able to provide some cogent answers to the points I have raised.

[Mike Gapes]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

All right, but this is the last one.

[Mike Gapes]

Is there not also another difference, which is that decisions within the European Union are not just taken by meetings of the Council of Ministers, as there is a co-decision process that involves elected Members of the European Parliament representing all 28 member states?

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I do not want to get dragged into revisiting the way in which the European Union works. The European Union has many flaws, and there are many issues on which I have seen fit to criticise it during my years in the House—including, sometimes, the way it goes about its business. Having said that, this constant conflation of the two issues when we are carrying out scrutiny of what will be domestic legislation is, in my view, not helpful. We need to focus on what we are doing. If we do, we will come up with the right answers.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

It is a real pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who made a characteristically thoughtful and reasonable contribution. It is always remarkable to see how such thoughtfulness and reasonableness can be so provocative to some Government Members.

I wish to speak to amendments 348 and 349 in my name and the names of my hon. and right hon. Friends. I hope, in doing so, to build on the agreement across the Committee that was evident last Wednesday, when we made the decision that Parliament should have a meaningful vote on the final Brexit deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend puts the point beautifully. That is actually the historical and traditional job of Back-Bench Members of Parliament. We should be here to protect the interests of our constituents and the interests of the constitution, and to hold the Government—of whichever party—to account.

That is why I am in such agreement with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield about the undesirability of Henry VIII powers. However, I said I would diverge from him at some point. The point on which I diverge from him is the perhaps slightly academic one about where we have started from. I think it is inconsistent to say that Henry VIII powers exercised by the British Government, subject to the normal parliamentary procedures of this House and another place, are worrying, but that the Henry VIII powers used under the European Communities Act 1972 were not.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend makes a perfectly reasonable point, and there is an argument that this House should not concede Henry VIII powers without very good reason indeed. I suggest that the difference is that the 1972 Act carried the clear implication that this was a necessity in order to meet our international obligations. The question I have asked this afternoon is whether these powers are required to meet some domestic necessity. My hon. Friends on the Front Bench may be able to reassure me that they are, but as the powers are so extensive, it is right that we should question them.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

It is always right that we should question such powers. That issue was about meeting our international obligations, but we volunteered to take on those international obligations by treaty without allowing the House to have the final say on the regulations that would come in. A political decision was made for the convenience of the then Government to do this in such a way to get that treaty agreed, but that was just as much a power grab from this House as what is currently proposed. Indeed, to my mind, it was a very much greater power grab because of the way in which laws in the European Union are introduced. The key is not co-decision making, which we have heard about—that is marginal, and came in at a later stage—but the fact that the right to present a new law rests with the Commission, which is the least democratic part of the European Union.

One of the glories of this House is that any right hon. or hon. Member may at any point, after the first few weeks of a new Session, go up to the Public Bill Office and seek to bring in a new Bill. The right of initiation of legislation lies with all of us, not just people who win the lottery or have ten-minute rule Bills. It lies not just with the Government; any right hon. or hon. Member has that right. It is such an important part of our ability to represent our constituents and to seek redress of grievance. The highest form of redress of grievance is an Act of Parliament; interestingly, Acts of Parliament emerged at the beginning of the 14th century from the presentation of petitions to this House that Members then turned into Acts. This is at the heart of our democratic system, but it was immediately denied by the basis on which laws are introduced within the European Commission.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I recognise it, because in my former career I appeared regularly in the Supreme Court of the UK and the supreme courts of Scotland. The hon. Gentleman may not recognise my concerns, but if he shares my professional background, he should recognise the concerns of senior members of the serving judiciary and the retired judiciary. These are very real concerns. They are telling us that clause 6(2), as currently drafted, on how they will be directed to interpret retained EU law after exit day, does not give them the clarity they desire and would leave in their provenance issues that are political and economic, and factors that, to use Lord Neuberger’s words, are rather unusual for a judge to have to take into account. This is complicated.

[Mr Grieve]

indicated assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I was about to say to the hon. and learned Lady that, tempted though I am to embark on a long debate with her about why it is important that those who criticise clause 6(2) come up with some sensible alternatives, I am conscious that the Mace is under the Table and that this is a debate in Committee on clause 13 and schedule 5. I do, however, commend to her the evidence I gave to the Lords Constitution Committee last week, at which the very questions she raises were asked of me by Lord Judge and Lord Pannick. In discussion with them, I made the point that, for example, a check list of dos and don’ts for judges would not be an appropriate way forward. There was a measure of agreement with that assertion, but inevitably these issues will be considered in the other place. Having said that, I think that she is right to make no apology for airing these matters in this House, because it is vital, on a Bill as important as this, that we, as elected Members, inform the other place that we have not given it cursory examination, but considered it very carefully indeed. To that extent, I am extremely grateful to her.

There have been many interesting and important contributions to the debate, and I urge the Committee to agree to clause 13 and schedule 5. It is good to see the hon. Member for Nottingham East back in the Chamber. I took the spirit with which he moved his new clause to heart, and I hope that I can respond in kind to him, but there is one word that perhaps sums up the debate, and indeed my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), who used it himself: sesquipedalian. It is a synonym for polysyllabic, and I am afraid that it is inevitable in such a debate that we will use words of more than two, three or, dare I say, four syllables. I will, however, try to curb my natural inclination to enjoy such diversions and to meet the hon. Gentleman’s argument that we speak in plain English.

On schedule 5, which is the meat of this debate, it is worth reminding ourselves—I say this particularly in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—that we are talking about means of publication and the rules of evidence to be applied. It is important that I gently remind hon. Members of that, lest we start to soar again into the stratosphere of constitutional debate and get unduly worried about the Government seeking to accrue massive power, when really we are talking about, first, how all this information can be presented to the public and, secondly, how the courts should be enjoined to take notice of it.

I will go through the points raised by my right hon. and learned Friend, particularly with regard, first, to paragraph 2 in part 1 on exceptions from the duty to publish. It is important to note that the direction power under paragraph 2(2) does not allow a Minister to make something retained EU law; it is there merely to enable the Government to ensure that legislation that is obviously not retained EU law does not have to be published. We are trying to minimise the potential for confusion, but we have to be realistic. It will not be possible to ensure without exception that only retained EU legislation is published. We do not think—quite properly, in my opinion—that it is the place of the Queen’s printer to make the determination of what such legislation is. That is why the Bill, quite reasonably, gives powers to Ministers to do this instead.

The powers in part 2 are not quite as alarming as might have appeared at first blush. They are clear and limited. The purpose of the creation of new rules of evidence is to allow them to sit alongside existing rules, including those in primary legislation. Importantly, these powers are subject to the affirmative procedure, which ensures a vote in this House. I will give my right hon. and learned Friend two examples of where the power to make a direction under paragraph 2 may be used in respect of all or part of an instrument. The first would concern an EU decision addressed only to a member state other than the UK. For example, the small hive beetle is a particular issue in Italy, and Commission implementing decision 2014/909 concerns certain protective measures with regard to confirmed occurrences of that insect. It is addressed only to Italy and quite clearly should not be published as part of EU retained law.

[Mr Grieve]

I rather assumed that, given the other extensive powers the Government are taking, we would have that deleted before it became retained EU law in the first place.

[The Solicitor General]

As I have said, this is a power of publication. It is important not only that we formally delete it, as my right hon. and learned Friend says, but that we provide that it does not end up in the wrong place and thereby mislead the reader or those who want to find an authoritative source for retained EU law. Another example would be EU regulations that have entered into force but are only partially applicable here immediately before exit day. One example is regulation 2016/2031 on protective measures against pests of plants, which has entered into force. One provision applies now, but the rest will apply in the EU only after exit day. To answer him directly, that is why the power exists.

I shall move on to paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraph 3, as the keenest Members will have observed, is based on section 3(1) of the 1972 Act, which provides that

“any question as to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any EU instrument, shall be treated as a question of law”,

and, of course, when something is a question of law, a court can determine the meaning of that law for its own purposes. Foreign law is normally a question of fact to be pleaded and then proved, often by recourse to expert evidence. Quite rightly, however, we want to allow a question of EU law to continue to be treated as a question of law after exit day, for certain purposes, such as when it is necessary to decide the question of EU law for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law in legal proceedings here.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

To be fair to our judges, they already have the task of interpreting and applying EU regulations and all EU legislation that has direct effect. With respect to the hon. Lady, it will not be a new task for them, and I trust Her Majesty’s judges to get it right. As I said in response to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, it is tempting for the House to try to set out a list of judicial dos and don’ts, but I do not think that that is an appropriate approach. I trust and respect the judiciary to get this right, as they almost invariably do. They answer the question that is put to them, and deal with it in a robust and independent way. As one of the Law Officers responsible for upholding the rule of law, I am happy to reiterate on the Floor of the House that I have the utmost confidence in our domestic judiciary to get it right.

Paragraph 4 is based on subsections (2) to (5) of section 3 of the 1972 Act. Those subsections distinguish between EU-related matters which are to be judicially noticed—such as EU treaties, judgments of the Court and the Official Journal of the European Union—and other matters which, in theory, fall to be proved to the Court, such as EU instruments. For the latter category, rules are provided about how such matters are to be admissible to our courts. It is worth noting that the power in paragraph 4 to make evidential rules is again subject to the affirmative procedure, as it will be used to replace rules commonly found in primary legislation. I think it is important for all Members to note the context in which these powers are to be used.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend is giving a very helpful explanation of the powers in paragraph 4. He may agree that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) should listen to it with care. There he was, expressing his great concern about the way in which legislation and EU law was handled in this country—and is still being handled before we leave the EU—but here the Government are replicating the process for when we have left. I am not allowed to speak in French in the Chamber, but plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

[The Solicitor General]

My right hon. and learned Friend is not just a lawyer but an historian. He will know that a previous Solicitor General, the late Lord Howe, steered the Bill that became the 1972 Act through the House of Commons. I nod to his memory. He knew what he was about, and he helped to produce an extremely important and effective piece of legislation. I make no apology for replicating aspects of it in this Bill.

Let me reassure the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that the fact that the provision is in a schedule is not significant. It is on the face of the Bill—in primary legislation—and it receives the same high level of scrutiny that it would if it were one of the clauses. I think it only right that clause 13 is drafted in a general way and there is particularity in the schedule. That is good, modern drafting practice, as I am sure the hon. and learned Lady will acknowledge, given her extensive study of other Bills on which we have worked together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am delighted by that. It is important to people on both sides of the arguments that it be something that Parliament can do, not that Ministers may simply do on their own. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), my south-western neighbour at the end of the Bench, very much agrees with that proposition, as does my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield in the middle.

[Mr Grieve]

I just want to thank my right hon. Friend for having intervened in this matter and found a way to resolve the issue. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) just pointed out, the oddity of the original amendment 381 was that it would have imposed a rather serious obstacle if, for any reason, there had been an agreement for the article 50 period to end earlier.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

That is right. My right hon. and learned Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset have always actually maintained the same point, which is that we need to keep the two sets of law in sync with one another. That is the overriding purpose of the whole Bill: to ensure that UK law matches what is happening in the international law arena and that we then import the whole of EU law into UK law for the starting point of our future.

--- Later in debate ---

As we come to the final stages of these debates in Committee, we have an opportunity to reassert that this House will not be sidelined in the most important negotiations facing this country in our lifetime, not because of some obscure constitutional argument but because we are a representative democracy and it is our job in this place to defend the rights and interests of our constituents. This Parliament will not allow those who want to crash out of the EU at any cost to have their way. We will put people’s jobs and livelihoods first. We will ensure that the values and rights that we have forged in 43 years of EU membership are not discarded as we leave, and we should ensure that we remain close to our friends and partners on the continent that we will continue to share.

[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure to participate in this debate, and it was also a pleasure to listen to the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) opening it. He will not be surprised to hear that I entirely share many of his views about the merits of staying in the customs union, and the lack of advantage of leaving it. However, there is a time and place for everything. The customs union and the merits or otherwise of the single market are all matters that the House will have to debate in due course. In the meantime, we will have to see what the Government come up with in the negotiations, and what they return to the House with at the end of them, but I do not intend to get bogged down in that this afternoon.

[Tom Brake]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

I will give way in a moment.

I made it quite clear on Second Reading that the purpose of the Bill relates to process, not outcome, and I have tried really rigorously to confine my remarks to the process issue, although the extent to which people have kept interpreting my concerns about process as an intention to sabotage our leaving the EU altogether, which I have never at any stage sought to do, is remarkable. I will now give way to the right hon. Gentleman, but I must tell him that I want to get on to the meat of this subject, rather than talking about those other matters.

[Tom Brake]

I understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about focusing on process rather than outcome, but does he agree that given that Cabinet Ministers are now sitting down to discuss the outcome, it would be helpful for Parliament also to use the opportunities available to us to express our views about what the outcome should be?

[Mr Grieve]

Parliament should certainly be debating these matters. Individual Members will decide whether they want to use the opportunity of this Committee stage for that purpose, but I want to confine myself strictly to the issues in front of us.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

My right hon. and learned Friend has been consistent all the way through our consideration of this Bill in agreeing with me on only the subjects of process, rather than substance, but I quite respect his view and always have the highest respect for his legal and political skills. Does he agree that if amendments actually went beyond the Bill, they would have been ruled to be beyond the scope of the Bill? It is entirely a voluntary decision on his part that he refuses to be drawn into the substance of Government policy, or the stance that the Government are taking on the eve of their starting the first serious negotiations on our future after we withdraw. It is a pity that he has made this self-sacrificing concession.

[Mr Grieve]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. Yes, it is a self-denying ordinance, but it was taken for what I think is a good reason, and partly because I did not wish to inflame the debate into something more general. However, despite my best endeavours and making speeches of what I thought was studied moderation, I seem to have been singularly unsuccessful, but that is merely a reflection of the fevered atmosphere in which this Committee meets.

I have to accept that I did raise the temperature a bit on amendment 381, because when it was first presented to the Committee, I expressed myself in respect of it in very strong terms indeed. I did so not because I was making some statement that I refused to contemplate the day of exit as being 29 March 2019 at 11 pm, but because I considered that to introduce that date into the Bill as a tablet of stone made absolutely no sense at all for the very reason that I sought to highlight in my intervention on my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). In actual fact, that amendment would make it harder to move the date forward if we had wish to do so at the conclusion of the negotiations, because that would require a statute. I know that statutes can be implemented quite quickly in this House, but that process would nevertheless take significantly longer than the alternative. I could not see why we were losing the sensible flexibility provided by the way in which the Bill was originally drafted.

Underlying all this, there appears to be a sort of neurosis abroad that the magical date might somehow not be reached or, if it were to be reached, might be moved back. I am afraid that I cannot fully understand that neurosis of my right hon. and hon. Friends, but it is there nevertheless. It may give them some comfort to have in the Bill this statement of the obvious. However, it is worth bearing in mind that we are leaving on 29 March 2019 as a result of the article 50 process, unless the time is extended under that process, and we are doing so as a matter of international law even if the European Communities Act 1972 were to survive for some mistaken reason, which would cause legal chaos and put us in a very bad place.

In order to try to reassure my right hon. and hon. Friends and to give out the message that this is a process Bill, I am prepared to go along with things now that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) have so sensibly and creatively come up with a solution that appears to provide what my hon. Friends want and, at the same time, removes what I consider, perhaps in my lawyerly way, to be an undesirable incoherence in the legislation.

[George Freeman (Mid Norfolk) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for making so eloquently the point about the importance of process as the best defence of our liberties. Will he join me in welcoming the work that assiduous junior Ministers have done for their Secretary of State with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in agreeing a package of amendments that I am happy to put my name to and vote for tonight, along with amendment 381? As he mentioned tidings of comfort, it seems at this Christmas moment that not since the soldiers met on no man’s land to sing “Silent Night” has peace broken out at such an opportune moment.

[Mr Grieve]

I am filled with my hon. Friend’s Christmas spirit, and very much wish that it may be carried through to the new year, and for many years to come. For that reason, I am prepared to support the Government on amendment 381, on the obvious condition that we have the other amendment, and with the assurance from the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend and neighbour the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), that we will get the necessary further change on Report to make the matter subject to the affirmative procedure. I fully understand why we cannot have that today—it is too late. We should have acted earlier if we wanted to get that into the Bill during Committee.

I want to put on record an argument that was made to me against this course of action: what we are doing has an impact on clause 9, as amended by my amendment 7. The intention behind amendment 7, which the House voted for, was always that the powers in the Bill for removal should not be used until after the final statute had been approved. That included the power to fix exit date. As a consequence of the amendments before us, those powers are removed from the ambit of clause 9, and therefore have a stand-alone quality that could mean that they could be invoked by making the date earlier than 29 March—so early that we would not have considered and implemented the statute approving exit. Some have expressed concern to me about that.

I have given the matter careful thought, and while I understand those concerns, they appear unrealistic. It would be extraordinary if we were in such a state of chaos that a Government—I am not sure which Government, or who would be the Ministers in government—decided to take that course of action in breach of our international obligations to our EU partners, because that is what that would involve. In truth, that would still involve getting an affirmative resolution of the House, hence the assurance that we needed from my hon. Friend the Minister, and this House would be most unlikely to give permission for such a chaotic outcome. I wanted to respond to what others, including individuals outside the House, had represented to me, but we should not lose sleep over that aspect of the matter. In truth, my amendment 7 was never aimed at exit day. It was aimed at the other powers that the Government might wish to start using before a withdrawal agreement had been approved.

I had an amendment 6, which was about multiple exit days, but that issue has been resolved, so the amendment can be safely forgotten about. I also had amendment 11, which dealt with whether retained EU law was to be treated as primary or secondary for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. My hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench know very well that that is part and parcel of a wider issue that we have debated on many occasions. I have chucked the ball—delicately, I hope—into their court to see how they respond to some of the many anxieties expressed by Members on both sides of the House about how fundamental rights that are derived from EU law that I think most people now take for granted can be safeguarded properly. I look forward very much to hearing a little more about that on Report.

I want to bring my remarks to a close. I am personally delighted that the problem that I could see coming down the track has been so neatly averted by the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon.

[Stephen Gethins]

I would like to speak to new clauses 44 and 56, in my colleagues’ names. New clause 56 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) is on an issue raised with the Prime Minister today. Gibraltar voted by 96% to remain in the European Union—an even higher figure than for those who voted remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That vote clearly reflected the people of Gibraltar’s concern to protect the rights that they have acquired since joining the EU with the UK in 1973.

Gibraltarians need their border to be kept fluid, so that commerce can thrive and so that residents, workers and tourists can continue to pass through a border that should have only proportionate controls and reasonable checks. It is fair to say that they are not asking for anything from the UK that they have not had to date, and it is right that they should be given a firm, formally enshrined legal guarantee to add confidence for industries and commerce. The right of a person from or established in Gibraltar to provide services into the UK, where that right existed immediately before exit day as a result of the UK and Gibraltar’s common membership of the EU, should continue. There is strong cross-party support and, building on the Prime Minister’s comments earlier, I hope the Minister will touch on it in his summing up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I rise on this eighth day of eight to propose that clauses 14 and 15, 18 and 19 and schedules 6, 8 and 9 stand part of the Bill.

Over the course of the eight days of debate, we have had almost 500 amendments tabled and more than 30 separate Divisions. I am very happy that, in this section of the debate today, the amendments under consideration run to just 39 pages.

[Mr Grieve]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Baker]

I did want to make a serious point.

[Mr Grieve]

This is a serious point.

[Mr Baker]

May I make my serious point first, and then give way?

It is sometimes said of this House that it does not scrutinise legislation well and that we send Bills to the other place in a mess. On this occasion, on this historic Bill, I think that the House of Commons has shown itself equal to the task of scrutinising important constitutional legislation. With that, I will very gladly give way.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. What I wanted to say was that, at the start, there was some disquiet over the timetable motion, and, actually, the Government responded positively on that. The evidence suggests to me that, in fact, the timetable has matched the scope of the amendments that we have had to consider, and that is greatly to the credit of the Government that that has happened, and I am very grateful to him for it.

[Mr Baker]

I am very grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. For all the fire and smoke that we have had over the course of this debate, there has been quite a lot of consensus.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

What I would say to the hon. Gentleman, and I try to say this as gently as possible and in the spirit of Christmas, is that when I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield talking about certain colleagues of a Eurosceptic persuasion, I hope he will not mind me reminding the House that he gave an articulation of—I think he used the word neurosis.

[Mr Grieve]

indicated assent.

[Mr Baker]

He says that he did. I think we need to recognise that as a Government we are trying to make this Bill work, and we have throughout the Bill’s passage worked closely with the House, listened closely to the concerns—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I am really not going to any more on this point.

Amendments 11 and 380 relate to the treatment of direct EU law for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this point, which, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, is related to his other concerns. The amendments concern the status of retained EU law, in this case specifically the status of retained direct EU legislation under clause 3 for the purpose of challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Let me be clear from the outset that all legislation brought across will of course be susceptible to challenge under the HRA. Hon. Members will, however, understand that the remedies available under the Act differ for primary and subordinate legislation. It is therefore important that the Bill is absolutely clear on this point. Paragraph 19 of schedule 8 is clear. It sets out that this converted EU law is to be treated as primary legislation for the purposes of the 1998 Act, with the result that it will be open to the courts, if that legislation is challenged, to consider whether the legislation is compatible with rights under the European convention on human rights, and, if they conclude otherwise, to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA.

The amendments, by contrast, would assign the status of subordinate legislation for the purposes of HRA challenges, meaning that a successful challenge could, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield knows, result in a strike-down of the legislation. The Government considered this point very carefully before we introduced the Bill. We recognised the potential arguments that, for example, detailed and technical EU tertiary legislation is more akin to our domestic secondary legislation. We are also, of course, alive to the concerns that this law must be properly challengeable. We concluded on balance, however, that assigning primary status to converted law for these purposes was the better course for three principal reasons.

First, this law comes into our domestic statute book in a unique way, but fundamentally Parliament will have chosen to bring each and all of these pieces of legislation into our law by primary legislation, albeit indirectly through the Bill. Contrary to the position for subordinate legislation, there will have been no exercise of discretion by an individual Minister. In that sense, converted EU law is more akin to primary legislation.

Secondly, if the law could be struck down by the courts, we would risk undermining the certainty the Bill is seeking to provide. None of this legislation can be challenged in UK courts now and some of it has been on the statute book for decades. Opening it up to being struck down is an invitation to challenge law which has long been settled, and to refight the battles of the past in the hope that a different court will return a different verdict.

[Mr Grieve]

Of the three points the Minister has made, the latter is without doubt the one that has the greatest force. It is worth bearing in mind that it highlights the fact of the supremacy of EU law, which is being preserved for the purposes of retained EU law. That, if I may say so, is a good reason why he should listen carefully to what I said about people being able to invoke general principles of EU law in order to challenge its operation. All these matters are interconnected.

[Mr Baker]

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. I know he is going to take this matter up further with my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General. I did actually just make two points, but perhaps I structured them ambiguously.

The third point is that in the event of a strike-down there would be no existing power under which fresh regulations could be brought forward, so it would be necessary to bring forward a fresh Act of Parliament or to rely on the remedial order-making power within the HRA itself. I should say that the remedial order-making power within the HRA was not designed to be the default means by which incompatible legislation is remedied or to deal with the policy changes that could be required.

The remedial order-making power may only be used if there are compelling reasons for doing so and it is targeted at removing the identified incompatibility. If wider policy change were needed following a finding of incompatibility, a fresh Act of Parliament would be the only means of doing that and we could be left with damaging holes in the statute book unless and until such an Act was passed. That is why the Government concluded that converted EU law should have the status of primary legislation in relation to the HRA, and that is why the Government will not be able to accept the two amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I am not going to let the hon. Gentleman come in on this point, which we have dealt with.

I emphasise again that our approach does not immunise converted law from HRA challenges. If an incompatibility were to be found, it places the matter in the hands of Parliament to resolve, without creating a legal vacuum in the interim. This approach strikes the right balance and recognises that supremacy of Parliament. I know that my right hon. and learned Friend has wider concerns regarding the rights of challenge after exit, including, in particular, where these are based on the general principles of EU law. I am happy to repeat the commitment made by my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General earlier that we are willing to look again at the technical detail of how certain legal challenges based on the general principles of EU law might work after exit. We will bring forward amendments on Report to address this, and we are happy to continue to discuss these concerns with him.

[Mr Grieve]

That is a very sensible approach on these matters, and I am very grateful to the Minister and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General for taking it forward. As for the other matter that has floated into our discussion, and which I have studiously avoided getting drawn into, I would simply recommend that, on the whole, kicking hornets’ nests is not a very good idea.

[Mr Baker]

It is ironic that my right hon. and learned Friend and I should be constituency neighbours, and, if I may say so—and as we put on the record on a previous day—friends. It is also ironic that our other Buckinghamshire neighbours have swapped one rebel commander for another. But I think I should move on: I have kicked enough hornets’ nests myself for one day.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Report stage: First Day: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Kerry McCarthy]

Amendment 57, which would leave out clause 4, is linked to new clauses 19 and 21. Many of the amendments I tabled in Committee have been proposed by Greener UK, a coalition of many environmental organisations that are concerned about the possible impact of Brexit on environmental protections. They see it as one of the biggest threats: I know other people see it as an opportunity, especially when it comes to rejigging how we subsidise agriculture once we leave the common agricultural policy. The concern is what protections would remain, given the importance of our membership of the EU for everything from cleaning up water pollution and protecting biodiversity to improving recycling and reducing waste. It is hard to believe that we used to allow untreated sewage to flow into our seas before the EU’s bathing water directive forced the UK Government to make our bathing waters fit for swimming and to test for bacteria such as E. coli. In 1990, only 27% of our bathing waters met minimum mandatory standards; by 2014, 99% complied.

When the then Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs gave evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee’s inquiry on the natural environment after the EU referendum, she told the Committee that approximately a third of the more than 800 pieces of EU environmental legislation will be difficult to transpose into UK law. The Committee also identified a considerable governance gap, which the Government have acknowledged, and I support new clause 18, which would enshrine what the Government have said they want in relation to carrying over environmental principles and establishing a new environmental regulatory body.

My amendment addresses the substantial flaws, gaps and democratic deficit in the Bill that were not addressed in Committee, in particular to fully transpose current EU environmental legislation in all areas effectively into UK law to avoid any weakening or loss of existing environmental protection during Brexit. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has been encouraging in saying that:

“We must not only maintain but enhance environmental standards as we leave the EU. And that means making sure we secure the environmental gains we have made while in the EU even as we use our new independence to aim even higher”.

Opposition Members share the same aspirations and visions, but we cannot just take his word for it. We need those promises written into the Bill and concrete measures to deliver on those aspirations. This has to last longer than he is in post.

Amendment 57 would leave out clause 4, with a view to replacing it with new clause 19 which would preserve—more comprehensively than clause 4—rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from EU law. The new clause seeks only to properly realise the Government’s stated ambition for the Bill—they have repeatedly assured us of this during the process—that the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU as before.

In their White Paper, the Government sought to reassure us that this Bill will mean that

“the whole body of existing EU environmental law continues to have effect in UK law”.

The Prime Minister has promised:

“The same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before”,

but that is simply not the case. As drafted, the Bill will not properly capture and convert all EU environmental law into stand-alone domestic law.

Clause 4 appears to deal with full transposition. In Committee, the then Minister of State for Courts and Justice described it as a sweeper provision that

“picks up the other obligations, rights and remedies that would currently have the force of UK law under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972.”—[Official Report, 15 November 2017; Vol. 631, c. 498.]

But it fails to do its sweeping properly, because some inexplicable and unnecessary restrictions in clause 4(l)(b) and (2)(b) mean that important aspects of environmental law will be lost. Those exceptions include rights that have not been recognised by a court before exit day. Effectively, the basic rights that everyone accepts but that have not been litigated on are at risk. Those rights have been hardwired into EU law and do not need enforcing, but once we no longer have the safety net of the EU, they could fall.

The Government’s defence of the limitations in these subsections in Committee was far from convincing. The Minister essentially argued that they were necessary because directives do not produce directly effective rights until they have been recognised as such by courts. However, if a provision in legislation creates directly effective law, it does not need a court to confirm that that is the case. If a piece of legislation creates a legal position, it does not need a judge to verify that that is the case. In fact, the Government have often not transposed certain provisions of directives on the basis that they function adequately directly from the directives without any need to transpose them into national law. That clearly demonstrates that there are parts of directives that currently form part of UK law that will be removed by subsection (2)(b).

Clause 4 does not adequately engage with failures to properly transpose EU law. An obligation should be placed on the Government to remedy incorrect and incomplete transposition. The powers to do so are contained in clause 7(2)(f), but there is a significant difference between a power to do something and a duty to use that power.

To summarise, amendment 57, in getting rid of clause 4 and replacing the linked new clause 19, seeks to rectify those errors. New clause 19 is simpler and more comprehensive than the existing clause 4. It would ensure that rights arising under EU directives are preserved and that a mechanism is in place after exit day to deal with problems arising from the incomplete or incorrect transposition of EU law before exit day.

If clause 4 is not amended, we could lose vital EU law provisions, including requirements to review and report on the adequacy and implementation of laws that are crucial to ensure the law is complied with and up to date. That includes the requirements contained in article 20 of the marine strategy framework directive, article 17 of the habitats directive and article 32 of the air quality directive. Without reported data under the latter, ClientEarth would not have been able to hold the Government to account through the courts on air pollution.

We will also lose obligations on the Government to report and send information to the European Commission, which is then able to aggregate it and use it for considering the appropriateness of laws and their implementation. On day 6 in Committee, I gave an example of how losing reporting requirements under article 10 of the birds directive could, for example, present a barrier to future investment in, and the roll-out of, marine renewable energy and other developments. The Government still have not said whether they intend these reporting requirements to disappear.

Without amendment, we will also see a loss of environmental standards and conditions. Some obligations on member states have not been transposed into UK law, such as article 9 of the water framework directive, which requires water pricing policies to provide adequate incentives for users to use water efficiently, or article 5 of the energy efficiency directive on energy performance requirements for publicly owned buildings. We have been promised a green Brexit, and we are told that leaving the EU will not threaten the health of people or nature, so why is there opposition to amending the Bill to make those promises legally binding?

Let me turn briefly to the other new clause tabled in my name. New clause 21 would ensure oversight of the transfer of functions from EU institutions to domestic institutions. It would do that by requiring the Government to establish a publicly accessible register of environmental governance functions and powers exercised by EU institutions and to make regulations that ensure that all relevant environmental powers and functions are continued. The register would allow the public to monitor and hold the Government to account on their plans for robust arrangements to be in place on exit day to deliver their ambition for a world-leading environmental justice system. The new clause also reflects strong public concern that the environmental governance gap that would arise on leaving the EU is filled as quickly as possible.

To conclude, I am simply saying that if the Government want the Bill to match their stated intentions, they need to accept these provisions.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) in respect of her provisions and to have the opportunity this afternoon to talk about the schedule of amendments in front of us, which we have to consider as a block between now and 4 pm.

The hon. Lady’s concern is about the fate of environmental law, as provided to us by the EU, once we leave, and about what provision we will make to provide it with adequate protection. However, the whole list of amendments, including those tabled by the official Opposition, goes to the issue of what happens to areas of entrenched law that have developed during our EU membership after we have gone. My right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench keep on repeating insistently that it is not the intention, as a result of our removal from the EU, that any of these protections should be diminished in any way at all.

It is true that one or two of my right hon. and hon. Friends have made hinting noises at various times that there are areas that they might like to alter in future, in a way that suggests a possible diminution, but in fairness to the Government, that has never been the Government’s position. Indeed, as we have spent time looking at issues such as equality law or children’s rights, the message has come back over and again that the disappearance of the charter of fundamental rights or environmental law issues, for example, will not be used as an excuse for diminishing the existing legal framework.

The difficulty—it is the one that exercised me in Committee—is that it is all very well Ministers coming to the House and making very pleasant statements that that is what they intend to do, but it must be the responsibility of this House to ask the Government how, in practice, that is to be done, when such a powerful mechanism as our EU membership is about to be removed.

That raises a second and more fundamental problem, where I have considerable sympathy with the Government. I understand why, for many in this House—I think that I count myself as one of them, as a good Conservative—the idea of entrenched rights that override the sovereign power of Parliament is something with which we are not comfortable. Indeed, the official Opposition, when in government post-1997 and when seeking to enact the Human Rights Act 1998, recognised that, in that they did not seek to provide entrenched laws; they sought to provide a mechanism through the Human Rights Act whereby rights under the European convention on human rights might be protected in a special way through declarations of incompatibility. That was not sufficient to override primary legislation of this House, but, of course, it did provide a mechanism by which it could be overridden and struck down in the case of secondary legislation. That has always been a way of doing things that has commended itself to me.

I have always accepted that one of the consequences and problems of EU membership is that it has provided entrenched laws that ultimately override by virtue of our international obligations and the direct effect of the European Court of Justice. So I can understand that there should be reluctance on the Government side of the House, as we leave the EU, to simply take this category of laws and say that we are going to give it a special status that overrides the ordinary way in which this House does its business.

If we do that, however, it raises the question of what the Government propose to do to provide, for example, at least as much protection for these categories of rights as is currently enjoyed under the Human Rights Act. One possibility—we canvassed it in Committee—was that the Government might wish to enact primary legislation to add clauses to the Human Rights Act to provide such a mechanism. Indeed, if the Government were to come up with such a proposal, I would be enthusiastic about it, and it is a matter to which we have to give careful consideration.

I am also aware that some of the rights provided in the charter, for example, clearly pertain to EU citizenship, so they are irrelevant to this country once we leave. I also accept that some of the rights may be said to have a socioeconomic aspect, which makes it debatable whether they should be categorised as rights at all. However, that still leaves a very big area indeed of matters that, as I understand it from listening to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, Ministers acknowledge are of such importance that they are now seen as being equivalent to rights, yet they do not enjoy the protection of the convention.

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[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the best guarantee of the fundamental rights of the British people is the will of the British people as expressed through the Parliaments they elect? That is the system I thought we all believed in. I know of no threats to these important rights coming from this Parliament. There are not people proposing that they are watered down, and there would be no majority to do so. The guarantee to the British people is that their Parliament will look after their rights.

[Mr Grieve]

May I gently say to my right hon. Friend that if his analysis were accurate, no statute would ever have been enacted by Parliament, at any stage in its history, providing additional protections to people’s rights over and above the common law? That must be the end point, because the whole point about the Human Rights Act was that it added to protections enjoyed under the common law and did so in a way that was compatible with this House’s sovereignty. All I am saying to Ministers is that given that, for 40 years-plus, we have been involved in an international organisation that in practice has entrenched certain rights, it must now be for Ministers to come forward with a sensible proposal as to how those rights, in so far as the Government consider that they are in fact rights, will be protected in the future.

I am afraid that I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). Nice as it is to rely upon the Executive’s good will, 21 years in this House—heaven knows, my right hon. Friend has been here far longer—persuades me that that good will is not something that we should always rely on. I am afraid that I have seen a number of instances—particularly when I was in opposition, I might add—where it did not seem very wise to do so.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) that in the end, because we are a sovereign Parliament, we are the only guarantor of our people’s rights. However, I am interested in what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) is saying about this matter, because the other danger that is lurking here is the fact that our courts may well decide that they have an obligation to maintain EU law even in the face of an Act of Parliament, and might strike down an Act of Parliament because, from reading the Bill, they see it as their obligation to retain certain principles of EU law. I like the declaration of incompatibility that my right hon. and learned Friend is suggesting as a very suitable compromise that enshrines what we have.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. This, if I may say so to the hon. Gentleman, is a mini-speech, with more emphasis on the speech than on the mini.

[Mr Grieve]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

My hon. Friend makes a perfectly good point, which reinforces my impression that it is inadequate simply to say, “Because we are leaving we shall leave this to a later date.” I will return to that later.

We did actually, Mr Speaker, talk about this at some length in Committee. In Committee, as hon. Members may recall, I emphasised that one way out of this difficulty might be to move away from the charter and look at the general principles of EU law. We could allow them to continue to be invoked, in respect of retained EU law, which would include issues such as the laws which we have under the charter, until they were replaced. That seemed to me to be a stopgap. I emphasise that I put it forward as a stopgap—not as a long-term solution, but as a way of getting the Government off the hook of having to accept any part of the charter, because I know that one or two of my hon. Friends choke when they even mention that word. I have never shared that view—I think they should actually go and read the charter, because then they would realise it is rather a reasonable document. My suggestion provided a way forward, and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General very kindly said that he would go away and give the matter some thought, the consequence of which was Government amendments 37 and 38.

I am sorry to start this Report stage with a bit of carping, because later I shall say some very nice things about the response of my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench to some of the representations that I made to them in Committee. Some very good things indeed have been done, for which I am grateful—I will talk about those when we come to the right point—but I think that the response on this matter is, frankly, rather paltry. They have provided a mechanism by which for three months—the period in which it is possible to carry out judicial review—after the exit date it will be possible to invoke these rights, but not in a way that challenges any primary legislation. It is a minuscule change, but minuscule though it may be, it is actually a little wedge in the door, because it represents quite a major surrender or change of principle on the part of the Government towards this issue, and to that extent I am delighted to welcome it. Nevertheless, as I think the Solicitor General knows very well, the proposal is not what I was asking for. The problem is that although it starts to remedy the situation, it does not go anything like far enough, particularly when it is not linked to a wider statement from the Government about how they want to go ahead and deal with this.

I had to make a decision about whether to table a further amendment to put to the House on Report. Having rebelled—there is no other way to describe it— against the Government, because that was what I undoubtedly did on clause 9, and indeed incited some of my colleagues to join me in doing so, because I thought that clause 9 was so deficient, it is not my desire to cause further stir, in the harmonious atmosphere of early January, by doing that again if I can possibly avoid it. It crossed my mind that two things appeared to me to militate against doing it. The first is this.

I have to say to the Solicitor General that I do not think that the Bill will pass through the upper House without this issue being considered. It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether Brexit takes place; it has to do with the state of certainty of law in this country, which is a matter to which plenty in the other place are capable of applying their minds. I very much hope that when the Bill goes to the Lords, they will look at the amendment that the Government have tabled and understand its spirit—it is well-intentioned, so I must welcome it—but perhaps decide that it might be capable of a little bit of development. Or, indeed, they may apply their legal minds to this matter and come up with an alternative that does respect—I want to emphasise this—some of the reasons, which I understand, why the Government do not wish to entrench these laws after we have gone.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a point that gets to the heart of the purpose of the Bill, as stated by the Government: this is a technical transfer exercise—it is technically transferring the acquis communautaire into British law to facilitate Brexit. Does not the decision not to transpose the charter of fundamental rights make a mockery of that claim? Although the right hon. and learned Gentleman is making very valid points about some of the technical alternatives, do we not need to keep returning the Government to their stated fundamental purpose in the Bill?

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman makes a totally legitimate point, especially as the Government themselves have emphasised how important these issues are to them. We are not turning the clock back to the 1950s—at least, I do not think we are—since when this country has moved on in respect of rights. The challenge to Ministers is that they have to come up with some solution to the problem. As I said, I do not want to put spanners in the works of how they do it.

Another factor influenced my decision not to table another amendment and divide the House on this matter. Realistically, although I realise that some may not like this, in leaving the European Union, we are about to embark on a lengthy period of transitional arrangements during which, in my view—I might be wrong—every jot and tittle of EU law will continue to apply to this country in every conceivable respect, except that we will no longer share in its making in the institutions of the European Union. I am afraid that I think that is where we are going; the alternative, of course, is that we are jumping off the cliff.

If that is where we are going, I accept that there is a little more time for the Government to start to reflect on how they will deal with issues of entrenched law before anybody’s remedy disappears. That is something else that influences me in not wishing to divide my own party or the House. I am always aware that quiet persuasion may be better than speeches from the Back Benches, and for those reasons, a bit more quiet persuasion might get us to where we need to be on this issue, but it will not go away.

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend says that he does not wish to divide the House. However, if he had tabled an amendment and divided the House, and then that vote had been lost, it would have sent a powerful message to their lordships not to mess with the Bill and that the will of the House had been firmly expressed. There would have been an advantage in his position, if he had maintained it.

[Mr Grieve]

There might have been, but as a loyal member of the Conservative party over many years, I have always been of the opinion that the best way to try to influence one’s party’s policy is in the quietest way possible. As this issue has the merit of being able to succeed in that way, I shall stick to my strategy. Of course, if and when I think it necessary for me to do something else, I could, very reluctantly, be forced to do so. On this matter, however, I prefer to leave it.

I turn to a related matter about which I did table an amendment, which I do not wish to press to a vote. It goes to the other issues about the certainty of retained EU law. There is an inevitable internal incoherence about how retained EU law is being handled in the Bill. In reality, retained EU law has a primary quality, because in all likelihood most of it is supreme over our own laws. Oddly enough, that situation is going, at least in part, to be retained, but the Government have dealt with that by allowing it all to be altered through statutory instruments.

In Committee, we tried to find a way out—I tried quite hard. That is why I have tabled new clause 13, which provides a way of identifying what EU legislation is in reality primary and what is secondary. I thought that the House might be interested—if it is not, the other place might be—in how one might go about making that separation, which would then provide a sensible measure of greater certainty. At the moment, the Government’s proposal, as I understand it, is that each measure will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. That seems a rather extraordinary way in which to proceed.

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[Mr Grieve]

I am certainly not going to make a mini-speech; I said what I felt was sufficient. I offer the new clause not as a perfect solution, but as an alternative to what I consider to be the rather incoherent approach that the Government have adopted. The new clause seemed to me to have some merit, especially because it includes a provision allowing the status of retained EU law to be altered by statutory instrument, so the House could be done with the process quite quickly. I thought that it was a way of trying to resolve what I saw as a practical problem. Let me emphasise that it was not intended to be a weapon with which to beat Ministers on the head. I saw it merely as a sensible way of trying to take things forward, and I present it to the Committee in that spirit. It is not perfect, but represents another way in which we might approach the issue.

[Mr Leslie]

This may seem a dry and technical question, but from time to time Parliament does reflect on the nature of legislation that has been passed. We all assume that it has been accrued through Acts of Parliament or through secondary legislation, but we are now importing a third category, that of retained EU law, into our legal context, and we need to know how to treat it in the future. I do not think that the Government have addressed that question adequately, which is why I think that new clause 13 is of particular interest.

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Lord Neuberger, the former President of the UK Supreme Court, has raised this issue on a number of occasions, including in interviews with the BBC and in evidence to Committees of the other place.

[Mr Grieve]

I agree entirely with what the hon. and learned Lady is saying, but it is my understanding, and I hope the Minister will say it again—he said it in Committee—that this will be dealt with in the other place. I am sorry that it could not be dealt with here, because that would have been rather better, but if the Government need more time, I expect them to address this issue.

[Joanna Cherry]

That is what I have heard, too. What I would like to hear from the Government today—this is why I tabled this probing amendment—is some indication that they recognise the gravity of the issue. This is not a political football, and it is not about stopping Brexit; it is about addressing issues of legal certainty.

As a courtesy to this House, I would like to hear some indication of how the Government propose to address the issues of legal certainty, particularly so that Members of my party, which is not represented in the other place, can have some input and give our view. Of course Scotland has a separate legal system. Clause 6(2) will apply to the High Court of Justiciary, and we need to be reassured not just on behalf of judges in the UK Supreme Court but on behalf of judges in the Supreme Courts of Scotland. I very much hope amendments 42 and 43 will draw from the Solicitor General some colourable reassurance that the Government are taking these concerns seriously and that they have them in hand, as well as some indication of the route the Government intend to go down in the other place to address these concerns.

Finally, on the charter of fundamental rights, I will wait to see what the official Opposition do, as we each have an amendment down. Given the spirit in which we have worked together on other aspects of this Bill, I am sure we can come to an agreement on that. The Scottish National party will be happy to support new clause 7, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). Many of our constituents feel strongly about the issue it raises, as do those of other MPs, and we are grateful to her for persevering with it.

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[The Solicitor General]

I will not; I am developing my argument. It was a point that was made clear, not only in the charter itself but in protocol 30, which was signed by Poland and the UK at the time of the Lisbon treaty. In addition—this is important, and this, it seems to me, having listened carefully to the debate, is not understood—the charter does not apply to member states in everything they do. Although it applies to the EU and its institutions in all areas, it binds member states only in so far as they are acting within the scope of EU law. Therefore talking about the charter in a domestic context misunderstands its purpose and point: it was not drafted in that context. I am afraid that there has, I think, been a regrettable misunderstanding about that in this debate.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think I have been under any misunderstanding at all. That is why I have kept pressing the Government to leave the charter to one side but look at the general principles of EU law necessary to bring challenges to retained EU law, brought into our own domestic law, that was not enacted by this Parliament—and without which, frankly, the coherence of EU law starts to disintegrate. That is the issue. Linked to that, of course, is the other issue of protecting some of those fundamental rights, perhaps in a different way, that matter to so many on both sides of the House.

[The Solicitor General]

My right hon. and learned Friend and I agree about general principles, which is why the general principles that underpin the recently drafted charter remain and, of course, do apply in respect of retained EU law. His second point about the means by which individuals challenge that is, of course, a matter of ongoing debate. I shall come back to the points raised in not only his amendment, but mine as well.

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[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Lady seems to be very focused on future referendums and the desire to rerun arguments that were held some time ago. I want to do justice to her amendments as much as to anybody else’s, and I will say this about the amendments posited by her and the Labour party: they offer different visions of how challenge might be mounted by using the charter. Amendment 4, which stands in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, deals with a situation akin to that under the Human Rights Act, whereby a declaration of incompatibility can be given, but that does not guarantee full redress for individuals seeking it under the charter. I accept that the amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Lady goes further and would retain a power in effect to strike down legislation if it is incompatible with the charter. I simply say to both of them, with the greatest of respect, that their approaches work against the core aims of the Bill. We are leaving the EU, and there has to be certainty about the process; and certainty in the law lies at the heart of everything else we have to do. That is the simple reason why we cannot accept those amendments.

I was interested in the arguments of the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) about clause 4, when she moved her amendment 57 and spoke to her new clause 19. My argument about clause 4 is simply this: indeed, as the sweeper clause—the description she adopted—it has the important function of curing any loopholes that might exist in European law when we leave the EU and deals with the question of uncertainty that I know she is extremely concerned with. I will try to reassure her. She will remember that the explanatory notes contain a helpful and non-exhaustive list of the type of directly effective rights, such as equal pay—a very important right—that are designed to be covered by this important provision in clause 4. As I have said in evidence in another place, we are simply seeking to ensure the important principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of fundamental rights such as those of equality, which she referred to, and those pertaining to the environment, for which I know she also has a great passion.

In conjunction, I can deal with the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous), who succinctly and clearly made his argument on new clause 16, which deals fairly and squarely with equalities. We have already made our commitment clear that all the protections in and under the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 and the equivalent Northern Ireland legislation will continue to apply once we have left the EU. In Committee, we tabled an amendment which would secure transparency in that regard by requiring ministerial statements to be made about any amendments made to the Equality Act through secondary legislative powers under the Bill.

What concerns me about new clause 16 is that it would go further by creating new free-standing rights, perhaps even more than have been proposed in amendments relating to the charter. That is not the purpose of the Bill. The Bill is about maintaining the same levels of protection on the day after exit as on the day before. It is not a vehicle for substantive legislative changes such as those that have been proposed, and for that reason we cannot accept the new clause.

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) for his qualified welcome for the Government amendments. The reason for a three-month time limit analogous to that which exists in domestic judicial review is the important policy consideration that there must be a degree of certainty when it comes to ongoing litigation and dispute about EU law as we enter the post-exit era. I think there must be some resolution of that by way of a limitation period. Retaining an open-ended right of action would create more uncertainty for businesses and individuals about rights and obligations.

After we cease to be a member of the European Union, it would not be right to allow “general principles” challenges to Acts of Parliament to continue, because that is not in line with the purposes of Brexit. To put it simply, outside the context of EU law, the ability of courts to disapply Acts of Parliament on “general principles” grounds is not consistent with the way in which our domestic legal system functions. That must be at the heart of our policy considerations.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend’s argument would make more sense if the Government had not decided to retain the principle of the supremacy of EU law in the Bill. Once they have done that, removing the mechanism of a challenge on the basis of general principles creates something that I think is rather odd. I would not have pressed the issue if the Government had adopted an alternative approach, but that was their own decision. This has, I think, highlighted some of the oddities of the way in which the matter has been approached. It may well be that they can be sorted out in the other place, but I think my hon. and learned Friend must acknowledge that they are odd.

[The Solicitor General]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend is allowing me to intervene on his intervention. Let us not forget that we are dealing with the pre-exit situation. The EU acquis is being frozen, in the sense that its full effect in a pre-exit sense must be maintained so that we can maintain certainty. I agree that it is a strange and rather unusual concept, but I think it preserves that all-important certainty.

Time is short, and I want to ensure that I deal with further amendments.

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[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin). I want to raise two points, and the first of them goes to the issue around devolution and clause 11 and the lack of Government amendments. I do not share the hon. Lady’s somewhat apocalyptic view on this issue, but I certainly acknowledge that it is not desirable, because it is clearly not the Government’s intention for the process of Brexit to result in a diminution of devolved authority either in Scotland or Wales, or for that matter, in so far as Northern Ireland is going to get a viable Administration, in Northern Ireland. My view has always been, on looking at and reading the way the Bill was drafted, that we can do better than what appears in it at present. My understanding is that that is also acknowledged by the Government, although I do slightly regret that the Bill was introduced in its current form, because it seems to me that it was, to an extent, unnecessarily provocative.

However, it is worth bearing it in mind that ultimately the devolution system—I participated in the debates that set it up—had behind it the implication that the adjustments were not just a one-way ratchet, and I want to emphasise that point: the implication was that devolution might at times require adjustments that gave powers back to Westminster, just as they conferred more powers over time to both Cardiff and Edinburgh. That was clear in the course of those debates when Parliament set the original system up, and it has been repeated on a number of occasions since.

[Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree with his colleague in the Scottish Conservative party Adam Tomkins MSP, the constitution spokesman, who said:

“Brexit must be delivered in a way that respects devolution…Looking at the substance of the 111 powers, many can safely be devolved without further ado; why aviation noise, for example, would need to come under a UK-wide framework I do not know”?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, 110%; I agree entirely with those sentiments, and the remark I made earlier about it not being a one-way street in the way it is supposed to operate does not in any way detract from what Adam Tomkins had to say, and for that reason I continue to look to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench to sort this out, and I share the regret that what should have been done in this House is clearly going to come back for consideration in this House at ping-pong. That is not very satisfactory, and I gently make the point at this stage, as I am confident that there will be the necessary amendments in the Lords, that when the Bill comes back from the Lords there must be sufficient time for us to consider it in detail, because ping-pong often has remarkably little time for detailed consideration of measures. I hope very much that we can get an assurance that, in view of the important constitutional nature of this legislation, we should get that.

I said earlier that I had been rather disappointed by the Government response to a matter I raised in Committee and that we debated earlier this afternoon, but that having been said, we debated the extraordinarily broad nature of the powers conferred on the Executive in respect of clause 7 and I am pleased at the way the Government have responded to the representations I made and the amendments I tabled. In amendment 14, it is rather nice to see the Government echoing the very words that I drafted when this matter was in Committee. I have no doubt that, as drafted, the Government amendments produce a significant safeguard on the way in which the powers can be used. They do that in two ways: first, by introducing an ejusdem generis clause, which refers to something of the same nature. In referring to the deficiencies listed, they state that if there are any others, they must be of the same nature as those in the list. The second protection that is now being provided is that, if the Government wish to add to the list of deficiencies, they are going to have to do it by an affirmative resolution of this House.

I entirely accept that this does not go as far as what I was seeking to achieve when I tabled my original amendments, which was to tie the Government down rather more. However, the Government certainly made a perfectly reasonable case in the discussions that I had with them. I think that that might exhibit a certain amount of neurosis on their part—neurosis is very common, as I know from my time in government—that they might have missed something that they ought to have put into the list. The fact that they are willing to come to the House and get an affirmative order to do this provides me with considerable reassurance that this power will now be used in the manner in which it was intended.

Having said all those good things, it is worth pointing out that this and many of the other power grabs in the Bill are quite startling in their scope. It is, however, to the Government’s credit that they have been willing to listen on this. Their amendments amount to a considerable improvement, particularly when associated with the other safeguards that we have been offered in respect of triage and scrutiny. I should therefore like to express my gratitude to the Secretary of State and to the Bill team, who have suffered my presence on probably more occasions than they might have wished in discussing how this might be taken forward. This is exactly what I came into this House to do, and it is always rather nice to be able to achieve something—and, furthermore, to achieve it without having to divide the House, as that is always the weapon of last resort for the Government Back Bencher.

With that, I come back to the point at which I started. The test of this legislation will be whether, after enactment, it is seen to be working fairly when it comes into operation. I have no idea when it will come into operation. I suspect that that is still a very long time off, but that is a product of the folly of the course of action on which we are embarked. All that we can do is to try to moderate it as much as possible.

[Stephen Doughty]

I should like to speak to amendment 5, a cross-party amendment tabled in my name and those of other hon. Members. I should also like to indicate my strong support for the Opposition Front-Bench amendment 3. In principle, I also support many of the other amendments in this group, although not, I am sorry to say, the Government amendments, which do not go far enough towards addressing the concerns that have legitimately been raised by the devolved Administrations in particular. It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who has made some excellent points, as has my colleague and friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin), who shares many of my deep concerns about this part of the legislation, which have not been addressed.

I hesitate to raise this point, but it is odd that we are discussing devolution and Brexit in this, the most important piece of legislation to face the United Kingdom and the devolved nations since the second world war, without the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland being present in the Chamber with us. I cannot see any of their junior Ministers here either. Perhaps they all have other important business to undertake. That seems rather remiss of them, given that we are considering such serious matters. I raised a point of order with you about this the other day, Mr Speaker, as did other Members. Much of the concern about this part of the Bill relates to promises and assurances that were given by the Secretary of State for Scotland, yet he is not here to account for himself. I have a great deal of respect for him, but these are serious issues that have been raised in good faith, and Ministers should be here to hear our concerns, and those of the devolved Administrations, if we are truly supposed to be bringing the United Kingdom closer together—as the Prime Minister claims to want to do—rather than pushing it apart.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: Second Day: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me down an avenue that has nothing to do with the point I am making, which is that it remains unclear why the Government tabled three exit day amendments to their own Bill which have sown further confusion. We do not know why they did that—whether it was driven by Tory party management considerations or some other reason. The effect of those Government amendments would have been to end the jurisdiction of the ECJ on 29 March 2019, thereby preventing agreement on a transitional period on current terms.

The Government clearly soon realised their mistake and to save face enlisted the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who is not in his place, to table amendments to loosen the legislative straitjacket they themselves had created. But his amendments, which the Government have accepted, only provide a limited form of flexibility. Ministers may now amend the definition of exit day in clause 14 for the purposes of the Bill if the date when the treaties cease to apply to the UK is different from 29 March 2019. However, there is good reason to argue that that power might not be sufficient to facilitate transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now. If it is not—this might end up being the most bizarre aspect of the Bill’s curious parliamentary process—the Government will find themselves in the ludicrous position of having to amend this Bill when they bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill later this year.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I think that is a virtual certainty in any event. On the basis of the Bill that the Government have promised the House for the end of this year, it seems to me that it will be a substitute for the arrangements under the existing European Communities Act, so I think that must be what is going to happen.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree, but what I would say—and why I would urge Members to support this amendment—is that it need not require the amendment of this Bill to allow the facilitation of transitional arrangements on the same terms in addition to the provisions that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right to say will be needed in that further Act of Parliament.

We still believe that it should be Parliament, not Ministers, that decides exit day for the various purposes in the Bill. Our amendment 1 helpfully bolsters the position set out by the Prime Minister in the Florence speech by ensuring that this Bill can facilitate transitional arrangements on the same terms as now.

Given that this is, of course, Government policy, it is a wonder that the Government did not bring forward such an amendment themselves. They did not do so because they cannot agree on what the transition means. There can be no clearer evidence for that than the recent appointment of the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) to the Department for Exiting the European Union team, given her past form in seeking to actively undermine the policy position set out in the Florence speech by encouraging her colleagues to sign a European Research Group letter to the Prime Minister objecting to crucial aspects of it. It is ironic that those Tory MPs who voted for amendment 7 back in December are viewed by many as having betrayed the Government, while those who actively undermine stated Government policy appear to get promoted in quick succession.

Amendment 1 is simply an attempt to restore some common sense to the question of exit day for the purposes of this Bill. It would ensure that this Bill can facilitate any transitional arrangements agreed as part of the article 50 negotiations and that we avoid the ludicrous situation of potentially having to come back to amend this Bill in order to do so. It is in line with stated Government policy, and we therefore look forward to the Government not only accepting it, but welcoming it.

The Opposition have made it clear from the outset that a Bill of this kind is necessary to disentangle ourselves from the European Union’s legal structures and to ensure that we have a functioning statute book on the day we leave. But as we argued on Second Reading in September last year, this Bill is a fundamentally flawed piece of legislation. Sadly, despite the small number of welcome concessions, and the implications for the legislation of the defeat the Government suffered at the hands of amendment 7 and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on 12 December, it remains a fundamentally flawed Bill. Those flaws still need to be addressed either by this House today or in the other place, and on that basis I urge all hon. Members to support new clause 1 and amendments 2 and 1.

--- Later in debate ---

I have put into new clause 2 the sort of basic headings that we would expect to see in a pretty basic trade agreement. If the withdrawal agreement is to be acceptable to me, those things need to be spelled out, because I could not recommend an agreement to my constituents unless we had buttoned down some degree of certainty with our EU counterparts so that we knew what we were to be getting.

[Mr Grieve]

The issue of the withdrawal agreement was supposed to be resolved last December, as part of phase 1 of the negotiations. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is abundantly clear that there are massive potential pitfalls, particularly in respect of the relationship with the Irish Republic, in the translation of what appears on the face of it to have been a mutually convenient fudge into what will in fact be a binding treaty obligation?

[Mr Leslie]

That is absolutely right, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman neatly and helpfully moves me on to my new clause 3, which deals with the question of the Irish hard border. I think that many people read the phase 1 agreement in an optimistic light. In many ways, those words were all things to all people. The can was kicked down the road, but there will have to be a translation into some sort of legal text by the time we get to the withdrawal agreement. Heaven help us when the two sides to the negotiations have to start talking in specific terms.

The Prime Minister had a slightly different view from the Republic of Ireland of what the phase 1 agreement meant. She reported back to the House that it was simply to be restricted to the issues listed in the Belfast agreement, which does not, of course, include trade in goods, to mention just one small policy area. There are massive questions about the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. People in that area share reciprocal healthcare, as well as environmental factors such as rivers, streams and lakes. They have a shared energy market and shared fisheries, food and plant arrangements. All those are shared because of the very geography of what are two distinct countries, so trying to fudge the issue just will not work, particularly if the UK is a third party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

Order. On my reckoning, about 12 people want to speak. I advise the House that it is reasonable for the Minister to have at least 20 minutes to reply to the various points that have been made—[Interruption.] Someone chunters from a sedentary position, “No more.” The Minister should certainly be allowed 20 minutes, and Members can do the arithmetic for themselves. I am encouraged, as I call possibly the most courteous Member of the House of Commons, Mr Dominic Grieve.

[Mr Grieve]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I shall endeavour to practise courtesy by act rather than by anything else, in being brief.

It is a pleasure again to participate in this afternoon’s debate, which is wide-ranging and has moved away from the rather narrow focus of some of the perfectly sensible amendments that have been tabled and that are designed to explore the undoubted deficiencies in the legislation; for example, the Opposition have put forward sensible proposals in new clause 1. Those are matters that we have looked at for a considerable number of days.

I wanted to focus on an issue that has arisen this afternoon and is a particular concern to me. In doing so I do not want to repeat what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said. I agree with every word he said, and there is no point in my saying it again. There is a separate angle, however, on which we might pause and reflect. New clause 17 raises the issue of whether we should have continued participation in the single market and customs union.

If we look at the Bill as drafted and at its original intention, particularly now that the pernicious effects of clause 9 have been removed, we can see that it is about the legal order of the United Kingdom after we have left with no deal at all. So an argument can be made that this legislation is perhaps not the most satisfactory place to try to bring in the single market and customs union. However, that raises an entirely legitimate issue. Ultimately, as we trundle on with the legislation it becomes more and more apparent how different it is from the Government’s intention regarding the end product that they want the country to enjoy.

The Prime Minister set out her vision in the Lancaster House and Florence speeches. As I have said before, but it is worth repeating, if she succeeded in achieving everything that she set out, there might well be broad consensus in the House, because we would lose those aspects of EU membership that we do not like and at the same time we would retain all the benefits of EU membership that we—or at least many of us, the vast majority of hon. Members—consider desirable.

The truth is that most of us—again, I suspect—in the House know that that is unlikely to be achieved. We are asking our EU partners to engage in the bending of the rules of the legal order, which is not something that can be readily obtained. We started out on this negotiation with a major fallacy: the EU can somehow be twisted around from matters of self-interest into entirely changing its nature. In fact, it is an international treaty organisation underpinned by law: that is what it is. Having visited Brussels on Monday, it was brought home to me—I already knew it—very clearly that that is indeed the nature of the entity with which we are dealing. Unless we are realistic about that we cannot hope to secure a reasonable outcome to our negotiations.

What troubles me particularly is the timing of all this. The reality is that the EU, for very good reasons, wants order. It is a legal order, and it wishes order to exist, even when countries are leaving it. The point was made to us that ultimately it would negotiate according to our red lines and, if we decide to put red lines down that make it impossible to reach the sort of agreement that the Prime Minister wants, we will not secure that agreement—it is very simple. On top of that—I would like to add this point to the one made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—all of this is likely to come to a head at a very late stage indeed for rational judgments by the House about what is in the national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

In his discussions with Mr Barnier, did my right hon. and learned Friend gain any impression that the European Commission, and indeed Mr Barnier himself, had taken on board the fact that in relation to the legal order to which my right hon. and learned Friend refers—the European Union and its institutions—article 50 actually represented a radical change by giving people the right to withdraw if they wished? That changed the nature of the European Union from the day on which article 50 was passed as part of the Lisbon treaty.

[Mr Grieve]

I am not sure I entirely agree. I do not think that Mr Barnier has ever suggested that the United Kingdom cannot withdraw under article 50—we plainly can. Indeed, new clause 6 deals with the question of whether article 50 is revocable. I think that it almost certainly is, so it is a pertinent question for the House to ask, although it is not an easy one for the Government to answer, in fairness, as ultimately it could probably be determined only by the European Court of Justice.

I do not think that the fact that we can revoke article 50, or that article 50 has kicked in, alters the EU legal order. The EU intends to continue with the United Kingdom outside. On the question of our future relations with the European Union, we will be outsiders, and some things that we are asking for, including a special and deep relationship, are currently—and, I fear, for ever—incompatible with the nature of that legal order. We either have to be in or we will get something that is very much less than what we have set out as our request. I therefore say to my hon. Friends that these amendments are perfectly pertinent, because they raise questions that will be asked over and over again, and with greater urgency, as each week passes in the course of this dramatic year.

I will end by saying this to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). I listened very carefully to what he had to say. He is an individual of complete and clear integrity when it comes to his own views about how the United Kingdom’s constitution should work, which is one of the reasons why he has been so dramatically opposed to our EU membership—a matter on which we differ—but here he was, highlighting that in the process of taking ourselves out of the European Union, we are smashing up our domestic constitution big time—“O Brexit! What crimes are committed in your name?” It is imperative that we in this House manage the process so that we prevent the sort of mischief that he has identified, but I am afraid that, in part, it is inherent in the nature of the venture that we have taken on.

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that this constitutional danger is heightened by the fact that Conservative Members from Scotland are not listening to growing concerns about our lack of membership of the single market and the customs union, and the implications for our economic future, but simply following the Government through the Lobby?

[Mr Grieve]

I am afraid that I disagree entirely—far from noticing any such thing, I have noticed the very reverse. My Scottish colleagues are very much alive to the constitutional implications of Brexit and have been working assiduously to address them, while not falling into the trap, as I am afraid the hon. Lady and some members of her party have, of constantly characterising what is a national constitutional debate—indeed, a crisis—in binary terms, with Scotland always appearing either as a victim or as having a halo over its head, neither of which, in the scheme of human existence, is justified.

[Christine Jardine]

I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman might have misunderstood what I meant, which is that the binary nature of what the Scottish Conservatives are doing is heightening the binary argument in Scotland, and indeed playing into the hands of those who seek nationalism.

[Mr Grieve]

I am afraid that I disagree. My Scottish colleagues have been behaving with extraordinary good sense, particularly their leader, Ruth Davidson, and my colleagues here at Westminster. Perhaps I have misunderstood some aspect of the hon. Lady’s question. Far from seeing them as supporters of crazy ideas in the context of Brexit, I think that they have consistently shown a moderate common sense in trying to understand the wider United Kingdom position and Scotland’s distinctive position, and trying to take this forward. If I may say so, they are exactly the sorts of allies I want in the course of the work that I will continue doing in this House.

I have spoken quite enough and I thank the House for its indulgence.

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to amendment 10, which stands in my name and those of colleagues across the House. I think this follows logically from the wise words that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has just delivered to the House. Like him, I support new clause 17, and I also want briefly to mention new clause 1 and amendment 44.

From the start of the Bill’s passage through the House, my concern has been about how it concentrates power in the hands of a small group of Ministers. Be we liberals, communitarians, socialists or conservatives, in this House we are democrats all. It goes against all our British political traditions to concentrate power in the way the Bill still does—even after the amendments have been made—over decisions that could affect our children and grandchildren for generations to come. The referendum decided that we will leave the EU, but it did not decide how, and those decisions should not be so concentrated in the hands of a small group of Ministers, especially in a hung Parliament.

In Committee, we often went one step forward and then two back with regard to the interests of parliamentary democracy. That is why further amendments are needed today. Ministers did agree to the amendments put forward by the Procedure Committee, which will give Parliament a bit more of a say over whether the affirmative or negative procedure is used for secondary legislation, but Parliament will not be able to insist on which procedure is followed or that changes should be made in primary rather than secondary legislation. That is why new clause 1 is so important.

The Bill would still allow a small group of Ministers to take away workers’ rights and equality rights, which have been hard fought for over generations and hard won through this place, and they would be able to do so with hardly any say from Parliament. Therefore, those of us who have been part of the fight for greater equality and for workers’ rights for many years cannot just stand by while those rights are diminished. Nor should any of us, whatever our view, be part of agreeing to the wide scope of ministerial powers still embedded in clauses 7 and 9, allowing Ministers to do simply “as they consider appropriate”. Amendments 44 and 2 are important attempts to limit those powers to what is necessary, and Parliament has a responsibility to do so. I hope that those in the other place, whose job is to scrutinise the Executive and stand up for Parliament, will consider these matters very seriously when the Bill reaches them.

Parliament has agreed that there should be more democratic say over the withdrawal agreement itself. The previous amendment 7, which was agreed to in Committee against the wishes of Ministers, made it clear that we must have a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement. It said that that vote should apply not to a motion, but to a statute, and that we should be able to take a decision before the treaty is ratified, not after, and before implementation starts. I know that Ministers have considered rowing back on that, and I strongly warn them not to do so. They should respect the spirit of our debates and the views of this House.

Several Government amendments relating to the date on which we will leave have undermined that meaningful vote. My amendment 10 seeks to deal with the conflict between the previous amendment 7, which was passed, and the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and the Government. Those amendments on the date would bind Parliament’s hands and concentrate powers with Ministers when it comes to considering the final withdrawal agreement and as we come to the supposedly meaningful vote.

In Committee, we debated the fact that it was unwise at this stage in the negotiations to include the date in the Bill, because that could make it difficult to handle late problems in the process or to renegotiate any aspects of the agreement if we get a bad deal. It also restricts Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and call for changes, if necessary, once we see what the Government propose as the final deal. Suppose, for example, the transitional arrangements miss out something that is extremely important for our security, or for a sector of our economy. Parliament should at least have the chance to debate that and decide whether it wants to call on the Government to go back and try to negotiate a further change, or propose adjusting the timings—even for a few months—while the issues are sorted out. The Bill, as it stands, prevents us from doing so, and it could mean that Parliament is simply timed out. It would force us back to the very situation that Parliament rejected when it passed the previous amendment 7. In other words, Parliament would basically have to choose between the Executive’s deal and no deal at all. That is not a meaningful vote.

The amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for West Dorset do not help, because they allow the date to be changed, but only by Ministers—not by Parliament, even if Parliament takes a different view from the Executive. In addition, they allow the date to be changed only if an alternative date is included in the withdrawal agreement, so if Ministers agree an alternative date with the EU, they can use secondary legislation to change the date in our legislation, too. That is not on, because it will effectively give the EU Parliament more of a say than this Parliament over whether the date should be changed. That is hardly taking back control.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chuka Umunna]

I will be as brief as I can. I rise to speak in support of new clause 6 on the legal standing of article 50. I voted in the last Parliament to invoke article 50 because I believed it was the duty of the House to seek to deliver Brexit in the form in which it was sold to the British people, but it was conditional on it being in that form. I said that if it turned out to be materially different at the end of the process, the people would be entitled to keep an open mind on what should then happen. By that I meant they were entitled to halt the process and revoke the article 50 notification given by the Prime Minister to the President of the European Council, if that was what the people decided to do.

The core purpose of new clause 6 is to clear up this matter. On the issue of revocability—halting the process or extending article 50—Ministers have sought deliberately to pull the wool over the eyes not just of this House but of the people. They have given the misleading impression that legally we are not free to keep an open mind and that we cannot revoke article 50 if we so wish. For example, on 9 October 2017, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) asked the Prime Minister if it was possible to halt the article 50 process, she implied that it was not and said:

“The position was made clear in a case that went through the Supreme Court in relation to article 50.”—[Official Report, 9 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 51.]

But it was not. The case she was referring to was brought by Gina Miller to stop this Government seeking to take back control for Ministers instead of for Parliament, as was intended.

The Prime Minster was pressed again on the same day by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) and each time gave a similar response. This gave a completely false impression of the reality, because what she said was not factually correct. The Supreme Court did not and has not opined on this issue in the Miller or any other case before it, though the author of article 50, the noble Lord Kerr, has made it clear that it may be revoked.

[Mr Grieve]

It is abundantly clear that the matter has not been determined by the Supreme Court. The Government chose in the Miller case—for understandable reasons—to put forward the proposition that it could not be revoked, and both sides asked the Court to proceed on that assumption. It did not opine on the matter.

[Chuka Umunna]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right.

The Brexit Minister in the House of Lords, Lord Callanan, repeated this false claim when asked by a Conservative colleague whether he could confirm that the judgement in the Miller case had in ruled in “precise terms” on the revocability of article 50. He replied, “I can confirm that” and went on to say that the European Commission had said that once invoked, article 50 was irrevocable. He was forced 10 days later to return to the other place to come clean on the reality of the legal position, which was of course that the Supreme Court had said no such thing. Indeed, the European Commission is clear that article 50 can legally be revoked, and politically no member state has indicated that it would object to this.

Last week, the Government received legal advice from three Queen’s counsels, Jessica Simor, Marie Demetriou and Tim Ward, all of whom are on the Attorney General’s A panel of counsel and represent the United Kingdom. They have provided the Government with a published legal opinion confirming that article 50 is revocable. On the political side, the President and vice-president of the European Commission and the President of the European Council have made it clear that if this country wishes to change its mind at the end of the process, it will be free to do so. The British people deserve to know that; our constituents deserve to know it. The Government should publish that legal opinion, which is why new clause 6 must be passed.

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[Mr Baker]

The situation is set out in detail in the written ministerial statement that we laid. Both Houses will have meaningful votes on whether to accept the agreement. It is my expectation that we would not ratify before that primary legislation has gone through.

New clause 1 was tabled by the Labour Front-Bench team. It seeks to place limitations on the use of existing and future powers to amend and modify retained EU law. It is absolutely right and necessary for existing domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts and any future delegated powers created after exit day to be able to operate effectively and without inappropriate fetter within UK domestic law after our departure from the EU. This includes parts of our existing domestic law which will become retained EU law after exit day, as well as retained direct EU legislation which will be converted into our domestic statute book.

The Bill’s current approach to existing and future delegated powers aims to ensure the successful operation of retained EU law within our domestic statute book beyond the time limits for the Bill’s more limited specific powers. Adopting the new clause, on the other hand, would undermine the position of certainty and have several detrimental effects that would risk creating significant confusion in the UK statute book. First, limiting the modification of retained EU law by existing and future delegated powers only to when this is necessary

“to maintain or enhance rights and protections”

could have uncertain consequences. A test of necessity would impose a high burden that may prevent powers from being used in the most appropriate and relevant way if the regulations they create are not deemed truly necessary for the protection of rights. That could mean that existing and future delegated powers would be unable to amend or modify irrelevant or unsuitable parts of the statute book, leading to ossification of parts of retained EU law within UK domestic law and creating confusion and uncertainty.

Secondly, a restriction of that nature inevitably will increase the possibility of legal challenge against any use of these delegated powers. That would create needless uncertainty for businesses and individuals and risk holes emerging within the domestic statute book. Finally, the measure would also impose significant consultation requirements on the exercise of the delegated powers, the use of which is running against the clock. I understand and support the intention to ensure that all relevant stakeholders, as well as the general public, are aware of the situation and can engage as new legislation is developed. However, the blanket approach suggested under the new clause would be excessively and needlessly onerous. It would risk delays to the implementation of important changes.

In using both existing delegated powers and those created in the future, the Government will, of course, remain bound by the rules and procedures laid out in the parent Act, as well as the accepted statutory instrument processes. I will take this moment to say that I am proud of what we have done to clause 7 to make sure that we have contained the list of deficiencies while making sure that it is amendable through the affirmative procedure.

Turning to new clause 22, I think that I satisfied my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) earlier in the debate, but he is not in the Chamber so, if the House will allow me, I will move on to new clauses 14 and 15—

[Mr Grieve]

May I take the Minister back to clause 7 and thank him very much for the approach that he took in the negotiations?

[Mr Baker]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, and pay tribute to him. Although I have occasionally disagreed with him, he has, of course, made a historic contribution to the passage of the Bill. I am very grateful for the way in which he has helped us to improve the legislation.

Labour’s amendment 2 would restrict the scope of the clause 7 power. Labour appears to accept the principle that the power is essential if the UK is to exit the EU with certainty, continuity, control and a working statute book, but restricting the power in the way proposed in amendment 2 would risk compromising our ability to ensure that that statute book continues to function, thereby leaving gaps in our law, and creating uncertainty and confusion for businesses and individuals.

As we have explained previously, making the list of deficiencies in clause 7(2) exhaustive and immutable would risk omitting important deficiencies, preventing us from fully correcting the statute book. To require primary legislation in such circumstances would undermine the purpose of the Bill and the usual justifications for secondary legislation: technical detail, readability, incompleteness and, crucially, the management of time. We cannot risk undermining laws on which businesses and individuals—often unknowingly—rely every day.

As my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster set out yesterday, the word “appropriate” was chosen carefully to ensure that the Government have the discretion called for by this unique situation. The constraints that a test of necessity would impose would prevent the Government and the devolved Administrations from making the best corrections to ensure that the statute book continues to function properly. A provision of necessity would risk limiting the Government and the devolved Administrations to only the most minimal changes, regardless of whether that would leave the law deficient, create absurd outcomes, or change the outcomes that the legislation was intended to deliver. I cannot believe that any Member would want to risk leaving the statute book in such a state. I am very conscious that we are now in a position whereby either these instruments will be brought forward under the affirmative procedure or, if they are brought forward under the negative procedure, the sifting committee will have the opportunity to push us towards that affirmative procedure.

Amendment 2 and new clause 15 seek to prevent regression in the protection of rights and equalities as we leave the EU, and new clause 14 seeks to do similarly by maintaining equivalence with the EU. The UK already has strong protections for equalities and human rights as part of our domestic provisions, independent of our membership of the EU. Some of those predate or go beyond EU requirements. The Government are committed to protecting our equalities legislation as we leave the EU. As we set out in the paper that we published on equalities legislation, limited technical amendments will be needed to ensure that all relevant legislation continues to operate as intended by Parliament after exit.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

It is unthinkable that any Prime Minister would seek to force through a course of action that would have significant consequences for many years which the majority in this House did not approve of. That is unthinkable, and the idea that that is how we would achieve an orderly Brexit is for the birds. The amendment would provide order where there would otherwise be utter chaos and, for those reasons, I urge hon. and right hon. Members on both sides of the House to support the amendment tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, to preserve Lords amendment 19P.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I beg to move manuscript amendment (b), to leave out from first “19P” to end.

I am grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for having enabled this amendment to be considered this afternoon by accepting my manuscript. It is a very odd and, I have to say, unsatisfactory aspect of the way in which our Parliament does its business that we frequently end up on ping-pong debating amendments that are irrelevant to what the House is really troubled about. I have to tell the House that, in order to get to this point, it has been necessary also to twist the rules of procedure in the other place, and I am immensely grateful to those peers who facilitated the manuscript amendment that was tabled there and that has enabled us to consider for the first time this afternoon the issue of the meaningful vote in relation to the Government’s view of what it should be and to the suggestion that has come from their lordships’ House. I should like to say here and now how deeply I object to the way in which their lordships are vilified for doing the job that we have asked them to do, which is to act as a revising Chamber and to send back to this House proposals for our consideration.

The issue, which has been highlighted by earlier speakers, is about the form that a meaningful vote should take. There are two options in front of the House. The House will recall that, when this matter first arose last week, the amendment that had come from the Lords included a mandatory element. That is constitutionally rather unusual. Indeed, I do not think that it has happened since the civil war in the 17th century, and I do not think that that ended very well. I seem to recall that it ended with Oliver Cromwell saying:

“Take away that fool’s bauble, the mace.”

Because of this, I considered it to be excessive. I apologise to the House that, in trying to produce something else very late at night last week, I probably did not draft it quite as well as I might have done. However, it led to a sensible discussion, prompted by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who had a number of us in her room and said she would do her best to meet the concerns we were expressing on there not being a meaningful vote on no deal.

Last Thursday, it looked as though we were going to reach an agreement based on exactly the terms of the Lords amendment that has come back to us, but at a very late stage, it was indicated to me that the Government did not feel able to proceed with that. I should like to emphasise that I make absolutely no criticism of those with whom I negotiated, who have behaved impeccably in this matter. Indeed, at the end of the day I have to accept that negotiations may sometimes founder at the last minute. However, this was unfortunate, from my point of view, and I will come back to that point in a moment.

Be that as it may, the Government’s tabled amendment was the one that we are being asked to accept today—the one that simply asks us to note and does not give us the opportunity of amending. Two arguments were put to me to justify that change when it occurred and in the negotiations that followed. The first was that there was concern about the justiciability of the amendment. The Standing Orders of the House cannot be impugned in any court outside of this high court of Parliament, but it is right to say that if one puts a reference to the Standing Orders into a statute, that can raise some interesting, if somewhat arcane, legal issues about the extent to which a challenge can be brought. My view is that I do not believe that the amendment, which is currently the Lords amendment that has come to us, is credibly open to challenge. For that matter, I happen to think that the Government amendment is also not credibly open to challenge either, although it is worth pointing out that it is as likely to be challenged or capable of being challenged as the other. I do not accept a differentiation between them.

The second argument was of a very different kind. It was said to me—this was picked up by the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman—that the Government had real concerns that this issue, which is one of detail, had acquired such a status with those with whom we were negotiating that it could undermine the Government’s negotiating position in trying to get the United Kingdom the best possible deal for leaving the EU. Now, I must say that I found that difficult to accept based on my own range of contacts and on how I thought that the EU is likely to work. However, it is not an issue that I, as a supporter of the Government, can entirely ignore.

I am very troubled about Brexit. It is well known in this House that I believe that we have made an historic mistake in voting to leave, but I am open minded as to what the best course of action should be and respectful of the decision of the electorate in the referendum result. I dislike very much the extent to which we can be fettered or pushed into frameworks of what we have or have not to accept in that negotiation but that is, if I may so, a reason why I should also give as much latitude to the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister as she indicates to me that she might have.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I wish to conclude.

In those circumstances, there is an issue that I cannot ignore. As the House will have noticed this afternoon, a statement was sent by the Secretary of State that will become a written ministerial statement tomorrow. The first part of it deals with the position of the Speaker and, if I may put it like this, the piquancy of this is that having on the one hand said that an unamendable motion to note is an unamendable motion to note in a statute, the fact is that it really has absolutely no force at all. The reality is that it is part of the Standing Orders of this House, and it is not open to any interpretation in any court and, ultimately, it will be entirely your responsibility, Mr Speaker, to decide what can or should not be treated as a neutral terms motion. Actually, the statement highlights the fact that, although this debate has been about trying to provide assurance—not just in this House, but to many members of the public outside who are worried about the end of this process and what might happen—the truth is that the assurance does not lie in the words of the statute, except in so far as the statute is the word of the Government. The assurance lies in the hands of this House and, in the first part of the statement, in the power of the Speaker.

I then insisted that a second piece be put into the statement, which I will read out. If I may say so, this ought to be blindingly obvious, but it says:

“The Government recognises that it is open for Ministers and members of the House of Commons to table motions on and debate matters of concern and that, as is the convention, parliamentary time will be provided for this.”

If this House chooses to debate matters, including matters on which it may wish to have multiple motions, the reality is that if we wish to exert our power to do that, we can. In the circumstances that might follow a “no deal”, which would undoubtedly be one of the biggest political crises in modern British history, if the House wishes to speak with one voice, or indeed with multiple voices, the House has the power to do so.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The bit I do not understand is that many motions have been carried by this House in the past few years—motions tabled by the Backbench Business Committee, by the Opposition and by ordinary Members—but the Government have just let them go through and then completely ignored them. The only thing that has legislative effect is legislation. That is why we must have a meaningful vote, not a pretend one.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right, but if the Government were to concede to the amendment, as drafted in the Lords, for an amendable motion, the House must understand that the Government could ignore it. I can assure the House that it would not be enforceable in any court of law—[Interruption.] No, that really must be understood. It could not be enforceable in any court of law, because that would entirely undermine the rights and privileges of this place. It would be for us to enforce it. Of course, the ultimate sanction that this House has is a motion of no confidence but, short of that, there are other means by which the House can in fact bring its clear view to bear on the Government.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I will not.

In view of that acknowledgement, I must say that I weigh that and the clear words of this statement against what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has told me about her anxieties. My judgment—it is purely personal—is that if that is the issue, having finally obtained, with a little more difficulty than I would have wished, the obvious acknowledgement of the sovereignty of this place over the Executive in black and white language, I am prepared to accept the Government’s difficulty, support them and, in the circumstances, to accept the form of amendment that they want. I shall formally move my amendment at the end, because I do not want to deprive the House of the right to vote if it wishes. Members have the absolute right to disagree, but it seems to me that, with the acknowledgement having been properly made, I am content to go down that route.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I want to end.

We are facing some real difficulties at the moment. It is rightly said that those whom the gods want to destroy, they first render mad. There is enough madness around at the moment to make one start to question whether collective sanity in this country has disappeared. Every time someone tries to present a sensible reasoned argument in this House vilification and abuse follow, including death threats to right hon. and hon. Friends. There is a hysteria that completely loses sight of the issues that we really have to consider. There is an atmosphere of bullying that has the directly opposite consequence in that people are put into a position where they feel unable to compromise, because by doing so they will be immediately described as having “lost”—as if these were arguments to be lost or won. The issue must be that we get things right.

Right at the other end of the spectrum, we get some other ridiculous things. I have had Daily Mail journalists crawling over the garden of my house in France. I do not quite know, but I think they were looking for silos from which missiles might be aimed at the mansion of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg). The area where I have a holiday home has a history of monsters and witches chucking megaliths backwards and forwards across the channel. Such is the state of our discourse, and that is the very thing we must avoid. We are going to have differences and, if there is no deal, those differences may extend to my taking a different view, as a Member of Parliament, from what the Government might wish. This House has a right to act if there is no deal in order to protect the interests of the British people, and the responsibility in those circumstances lies as much with us as it does with the Government.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Philip Davies]

My right hon. and learned Friend did not give way, and I am not going to give way either because time is limited. Parliament cannot vote to reverse the decision of the referendum. People outside this House need to know very clearly today that—

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn]

It is not for me to advise you, Mr Speaker, but please do not cross any roads between now and the end of this process.

It seems to me that the Government’s intention throughout has been to seek to neuter this House when we come to the end of the process. We are talking about the possibility of facing no deal at all. In his speech from our Front Bench, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) set the position out very clearly: first, not only would we be facing economic difficulty of the most serious kind—with impacts on trade, on our services industry and on broadcasting—but there would be impacts on the security of our nation, because with no deal in place, how would the exchange of information continue? These are not minor matters; they go to the heart of the Government’s responsibility to make sure that we are safe, that industry works, that taxes are raised and that public services are paid for. That is why people are getting exercised about this. It is not just some amendment to one Bill; it is the most important decision that the country has faced for generations.

As my right hon. and learned Friend pointed out, we are not ready to cope with the consequences. Members should contemplate this, for a moment: if, because the House cannot do anything about it, we fall off the edge of the cliff, and future generations look at us and say, “What did you do at that moment? What did you do? Didn’t you say anything?”, are we, as the House of Commons, really going to allow our hands to be bound and say, “Well, at least I took note of what was happening”? Our responsibility is not to take note; it is to take charge, to take responsibility and to do our job.

[Mr Grieve]

I assure the right hon. Gentleman that, if he looks at the Standing Orders, he will see that, if the House wants to take charge at that point, it will be able to do so. If necessary, I will join with him in doing just that.

[Hilary Benn]

I absolutely bow to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s expertise, but I am afraid that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras pointed out earlier, under this Government, we have sat on these Benches on too many occasions, time and time and time again, on which the House has used the Standing Orders to debate a matter and pass a motion but the Government have sat there and said, “We’re not taking any notice of you whatsoever.” That is why the opportunity to ensure that we have the right to amend a motion is, in the next few minutes, in the hands of this House. There will be no further opportunity to take back control, so I hope the House will do so by voting in favour of the amendment of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield.