European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Chris Leslie Portrait Mr Leslie
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I agree. I find it odd that Ministers are saying that, somehow, the charter does not matter but are then saying that we must delete the charter in the Bill. They would almost die in a ditch to defend clause 5(4), which simply says:

“The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day.”

If the charter is so benign and so irrelevant, why not have the report? It may be tedious to some, but the report is necessary to explain whether those rights do or do not offer protections. If the charter is so ineffectual, and if this is supposed to be a copy-and-paste exercise to transpose EU law, I do not see the argument for deleting the charter.

Jacob Rees-Mogg Portrait Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
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Has the hon. Gentleman paid attention to protocol 30? Article 1(2) states:

“In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”

The whole point of the charter of fundamental rights, subject to the protocol, is that it does not apply in our national law.

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Dominic Grieve Portrait Mr Grieve
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No, I do not think it will create uncertainty, any more than the Human Rights Act has created uncertainty. I have to say to my hon. Friend that I do not think that that is an issue. However, as I say, I do accept that it will take time to draft and debate these things, and it is not in this current forum that we will be able to achieve that.

Jacob Rees-Mogg Portrait Mr Rees-Mogg
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On the point my right hon. and learned Friend is making, I think I am in complete agreement with him. It is right for this place to consider, debate and legislate on these issues, because this is the right forum for doing that, rather than by implementing a whole slew of rights, which would then be entirely in the hands of the courts.

Dominic Grieve Portrait Mr Grieve
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Yes, and there we are in agreement. It is inevitable and regrettable that we face this situation, but that is why simply to convert the charter, which, in any case, has lots in it that is unconvertible, and to say that it should maintain entrenched rights, seems to me, in the light of what we are debating in the context of Brexit, to be an impossibility. That is not something that commends itself to me.

Let me now move to a slightly narrower issue. We have to accept that, in the course of what we are doing, we are going through a complex period of transition. Forget about the transitional arrangements we may be negotiating with our EU partners—the truth is that we are creating a whole category of transitional law. By the concept of retained EU law, we are doing some very strange things indeed with our ordinary legal principles.

Clause 5(2) allows EU law to have priority over domestic law in certain circumstances. In fact, it allows for the possibility of UK law enacted prior to exit day being quashed for incompatibility with EU law that is retained on exit day. I simply make the point that, leaving aside our EU membership, which of course will have ceased, this is an utterly unique development in our legal system—it has never happened before. We are about to create a species of domestic or semi-domestic law—I would not quite describe it as feral law—which will have the unique quality of being able to override our own laws. Clause 6(3) will also allow CJEU judgments given before exit day to be binding, but not on our Supreme Court—a matter that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and I have been worrying about quite a lot in the course of the passage of this legislation.

So although the CJEU will rightly lose jurisdiction, it and EU law will keep a special status. However, that is intended to be only temporary, although how temporary is speculative, and I of course note clause 5(3), which says that this law can be modified and still retain this special status, as long as the modification, I assume, is not so dramatic or drastic that it is made explicit that it should lose it. That is different from replacement. That, I suspect, is because the Government know very well that this situation may continue for decades to come.

Yet, in the middle of that, the charter is removed. Leaving aside the other issues concerning the charter, which I have touched on, and which I do not want to go back over, that creates an unusual circumstance. EU law was always intended to be purposive, and one of the purposes is to give effect to the fundamental principles under which the EU is supposed to operate. Yet we are removing the benchmark under which this law is supposed to operate, because the charter will no longer be there, although, interestingly—I think this is an acknowledgment by the Government of the problem they have—they have then, in the next clauses, essentially allowed the charter and general principles of EU law to continue to be used for the purposes of interpretation.

It is very unclear how all this, in practice, is going to work out. That is why I tabled my two principal amendments. Amendment 8 would allow the retention of the charter. It provides an easy route to ensuring that this legal framework is retained, but for the reasons we have just been debating, there are serious issues surrounding it, which is why I think it is probably wrong to pursue it.

However, there is then the question in schedule 1 of what we do with general principles of EU law. What they are is totally undefined, but I assume—I have to assume—that if the Government are content to articulate the existence of general principles, they have done enough research to establish to their own satisfaction that general principles do exist—they are the result of court judgments interpreting the law and, indeed, the fundamental principles in the charter, but not the ones that are going to disappear on the day we leave.

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Dominic Grieve Portrait Mr Grieve
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I understand my hon. Friend’s point. However, the purpose of this Bill, as I understand it, is to put together a package that enables a smooth transition from our presence within the European Union to our presence outside of it. That, of necessity, requires adjustments to the purity of his thinking about parliamentary sovereignty, which the Government have been required to acknowledge in the way that they have drafted this Bill. In those circumstances, it does not seem to be pushing the boundaries very much further, nor should it be seen as some treasonable article, for us to consider whether the general principles of EU law ought not to be capable of being invoked when they are probably the very thing that has, over the years, prevented the EU from turning into an even worse tyranny, as my hon. Friend would see it. [Interruption.] Well, I have to say, having listened to him, that that is usually the impression that has come across. He sees it as tyrannical because it is not moderated by the doctrine of our parliamentary sovereignty. I simply make that point; I do not wish to labour it.

Jacob Rees-Mogg Portrait Mr Rees-Mogg
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Is there not an important change once we have left the European Union in that the European Court of Justice would not accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights because it would not accept that a higher court could intervene in any of its rulings? It therefore needed protections within its own system that within our system are provided by the European Court of Human Rights and the application of that in domestic law.

Dominic Grieve Portrait Mr Grieve
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My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. I slightly question the extent to which we have had clear evidence of that, although I know that there has been a reluctance on the part of the European Court of Justice to accept any higher authority, despite the intention of the parties that it should become subordinate, ultimately, to the ECHR. He is right that one reason why the charter came into being was to secure compliance. I think it is rather more of a hypothetical than an actual state of affairs, although such a problem might exist in future. In any event, I do not think we are dealing here just with matters covered by the ECHR, for the very reasons that were discussed earlier in relation to new clause 16, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East. I simply say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that the issue has to be addressed.

As I said earlier, I recognise that my amendment is not as good as it might be, and could be improved on. If the Government can give me an assurance that is adequate and goes beyond vagueness, I will be content not to press amendment 10 a vote. The issue is not going to go away, however, and when one is in this sort of dialogue with the Government, one does not want to be soft-soaped off. If that happens, there will be a road crash when we come to Report, in which I will be unable to support the Government on a whole series of matters. I hope that those things can be resolved by consensus.

I have spoken for quite long enough, but I have explained why I think that, on the important issue that we are debating today, the best solution in the interim is to use something along the lines of amendment 10 to ensure that general principles of EU law can continue to be invoked. Of course, as the transition goes on, I assume that so much EU law may disappear, but I venture the suggestion that it will continue to be relevant for some time to come.

May I, finally, touch briefly on the three other amendments —297, 298 and 299—that I have tabled? They are very simple, and they concern the use in clause 5 of the words

“any enactment or rule of law”.

I simply say that nobody I have spoken to understands why the words “rule of law” appear in the Bill. Ultimately, a rule of law is a rule of the common law; and in so far as a rule of the common law is displaced by statute, that rule will be displaced, of itself, by the courts. It does not require to be spelled out in legislation. I draw some comfort, on that, from the fact that a very distinguished lawyer who previously worked in this building shares my view that the inclusion of those words is incomprehensible. I do not think that that is a matter that I would necessarily put to the vote, if I was required to do so, but I hope that the Government might be able to provide a positive response on it. I am grateful to the Committee for listening.