Science, Innovation and Technology

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2026 Written Corrections

[Ann Davies (Caerfyrddin) (PC)]

I welcome the Minister’s announcement about blocking explicit images on children’s phones, but this should really have come much sooner. I totally agree with the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) that action needs to be taken now, not in three months’ time. What exactly will be measured at the end of that period, and what counts as failure? Are we really relying on the good will of tech companies, bearing in mind their inactivity so far?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for her question. Let me give a very clear sense of that outcome and how we will measure it. Currently, 91% of the images used in child sexual abuse interactions are self-generated. To me, that is the central focus for what this Government are doing. We have already made a significant difference, as I have said, in ensuring that our robust engagement delivered a pioneering change to a major operating system. If this change is not delivered within weeks, we will ensure that the full force of the law delivers such an outcome.

[Official Report, 8 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 42.]

Written correction submitted by the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Kanishka Narayan):

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for her question. Let me give a very clear sense of that outcome and how we will measure it. More than 90% of child sexual abuse webpages taken down from the internet now include self-generated images. To me, that is the central focus for what this Government are doing. We have already made a significant difference, as I have said, in ensuring that our robust engagement delivered a pioneering change to a major operating system. If this change is not delivered within weeks, we will ensure that the full force of the law delivers such an outcome.

Revised Telecommunications Security Code of Practice

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by my noble Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital Economy, Baroness Lloyd of Effra.

The Government have today issued the revised telecommunications security code of practice, under sections 105E and 105F of the Communications Act 2003.

The draft revised code of practice was laid before Parliament on 3 June 2026, and the statutory period required under section 105F of the Communications Act 2003 has now ended without either House having resolved not to approve it.

The UK telecoms supply chain review 2019 identified the need to establish an enhanced legislative framework for telecoms security. In response, the Government established a stronger telecoms security framework, which consists of:

The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021—primary legislation which established new duties on public telecoms providers to prevent security compromises within their networks and services.

The Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022—secondary legislation setting out specific cyber security requirements with which the public telecoms providers must comply.

The Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2022—technical guidance on how providers can comply with the requirements set out in the regulations.

The UK’s future prosperity rests on the public electronic communications networks and services—PECN and PECS—that provide our telecoms and internet connectivity. It is important therefore that the telecoms security framework keeps pace with the scale of the threat to UK telecoms networks and services, adapting to evolving threats to network security and new innovations in telecoms technology.

This revised code updates some areas of the technical guidance provided within the “Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2022” to:

Provide further clarity on specific security measures: in response to feedback from providers, the revised code includes updates intended to give clearer direction to support compliance with legal duties in the legislation. This includes clearer guidance on the use of privileged access workstations, approaches to security testing, and the encryption and protection of data.

Reflect evolving technology: since 2022, increased use of certain technologies warrants updated technical guidance to support safe adoption. The revised code includes new security guidance on the secure use of public cloud, automation, and application programming interfaces.

Reflect emerging security threats: recent hostile state linked attacks underline growing risks. Guidance to public telecoms providers must evolve to help ensure providers respond appropriately. The revised code includes updates to reflect the need for providers to take appropriate and proportionate steps to protect their networks against such threats.

The issuing of the revised code represents an important step in ensuring the UK’s telecoms security framework remains robust and effective in the face of rapidly evolving cyber threats and technological change. By providing clearer and more up-to-date technical guidance, the revised code helps telecoms providers to comply with their statutory duties, strengthen the security and resilience of the UK’s public electronic communications networks and services, and protect citizens, businesses, and critical services that rely on them.

[HCWS229]

Science, Innovation and Technology

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Written Corrections

[Kanishka Narayan]

… Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK.

[Official Report, 16 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 781.]

Written correction submitted by the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Kanishka Narayan):

[Kanishka Narayan]

… Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to set purposes, including matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK.

Role of Big Tech in Society

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is always a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy, but it is a particular pleasure when we are discussing questions of digital markets and regulation, because I know that you bring expertise in and experience of these issues.

I thank the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) for securing this debate. He has held me to account in the main Chamber, we have spoken in the corridors of Parliament, and I am delighted that he has now convened a much broader debate on the role of big tech in society. I am grateful to him and to all other hon. Members for their contributions to this important discussion.

This debate gets to the heart of what I consider the central question in our politics, our economy and our national security: how we ensure that the extraordinary power of modern technology serves our society, strengthens our economy, protects our citizens, and is grounded in British values.

Given the time we have, I will do the courtesy of responding to individual Members first before talking more substantively on the common issues. The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) raised the central question: are we on the side of British values or shareholder values for firms located abroad? It is pretty clear, whether on questions of online safety legislation, where we have the most robust regime anywhere in the world, or on questions of the most innovative set of sovereignty interventions anywhere in the world, that every single decision that this Government have made on technology has been on the side of British values, in the spirit of collaborating and never capitulating.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) raised the two magic words: open source. I made a speech a few months ago talking about my passion for open source, not least because aspects of its Welsh grounding—Raspberry Pi, developed by a Welsh founder, is now opening up opportunities for kids in living rooms across the world to develop bits of software.

There are three things we have therefore done on open source that make Britain the best place in the world for open-source talent: first, a particular focus on talent, not least a major hackathon we have partnered on to invite the world’s best talent to come and build open source here; secondly, a series of offers of compute, direct involvement in Government strategy on open source and, to the extent it is helpful, personal mentoring from me for winners of public service development on open source; and thirdly, just this morning, significant funding of £30 million for a serious national lab, led by University College London, focused in particular on open-source models. Britain is at the frontier of open-source AI, and this is the right thing to have done for our sovereignty aspirations.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport raised an important point about kids’ experiences on social media and the impact on educational attainment. That is exactly my personal motivation behind the significant action we are taking to ban social media for under-16s as well.

The hon. Member for Yeovil (Adam Dance) raised a series of questions, and I will address two of them in particular. He asked about compliance with social media bans. There are three things we have done to ensure we learn the lessons from elsewhere: more robust age checks; ensuring that enforcement is out of the gate on day one rather than delayed, so that companies feel the heat of enforcement early on; and to acknowledge that this will not be a 100% overnight compliance issue, but a long-term societal shift in culture, as previous regulations have created. That is the right thing to do.

The hon. Member for Yeovil asked about wider opportunities that the Government will support to offset some opportunities that young people might lose as a result of the ban. There are exemptions for both education services and music streaming. Really importantly, on the day that we announced the social media ban for under-16s, we announced 180 youth hubs across the country. That means more than £500 million spent on arts, music and culture opportunities for young people, right across England. There was a series of contributions from Members with that point in mind.

My hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised very important points about concentration. I will not speak overtly about an individual company, but I will flag that I understand from the relevant Department that a supplier contract for the NHS federated data platform will be reviewed in line with standard contract management processes this year, on the question of its extension. I am sure that her contributions will be regarded in that context.

I normally hold the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) fondly in my mind in our parliamentary debates, so I was sorry to hear her take a more political, point-scoring approach to questions of online safety. I was sad that she called putting the voices of Welsh kids and families at the heart our decisions “dilly-dallying”. Thousands of young people and families in Wales contributed to the decision on a social media ban. This is a historic decision for the people of Wales, whose voices fundamentally shaped it. That is not tiptoeing; it is running fast but together towards the solutions that matter.

On the hon. Lady’s particular questions, we are preparing legislative options alongside securing significant progress on blocking children from taking, receiving and sharing nude images. We have already secured more progress than any other country on this question. On her point on proactively dealing with national security concerns, the British Government are building capabilities, not least through the Security Institute and across our intelligence agencies, that are unparalleled in terms of ensuring that our national security is a priority on questions of technology.

On when this Government will face up to tech platforms, I gently suggest to the hon. Lady that again and again this Government have taken the side of people, not platforms—of British families, including Welsh families, not foreign tech billionaires. I would encourage her to join us in that mission.

My hon. Friend the Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) raised concerns about a particular data centre. I am not fully abreast of the plans on that particular site, but I am very conscious of the concerns he raised. I simply point out that, in theory, there are ways in which data centre investors ought to make sure that what they are doing supports our important clean energy and power goals. In particular, I reflect on the fact that in Lanarkshire there are significant sites that have pulled forward clean energy generation in solar and battery as a result of data centre investment, rather than instead of or in trade off with it. Again, we are focused on ensuring that both those aspirations are met, as they are in north Wales where our data centre investments are pulling forward the future of small modular reactor nuclear in this country.

The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean) and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), raised an important point about pension funds under allocation to British equities, in particular to British technology and AI equities. That has been a huge focus for the Government, not least through the Mansion House reforms and the increased deployment pace at the British Business Bank, which is now deploying more than £2 billion a year in this area, but also through the half-a-billion sovereign AI fund, which is focused on building deep British capability.

The point the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington raised about the balance of power is central. In response to the ask for a sovereignty strategy, we are not only talking about it—we are delivering it. We have defined the single most important question: where does Britain stand on the balance of power? Do we have strategic leverage to secure ongoing access to critical inputs? There are three tests we are focused on. The first is having enough critical inputs—NVIDIA graphic processing units, for example—to be able to play our way in the world. The second is having a diverse set of sources so that we have bargaining leverage in that context; one of the first things I did was meet SambaNova, Cerebras and Groq to diversify our engagement with chip companies. The third really important test is, where British strengths and economics allow, to build full-fat British capability. We have done that with our hardware plan—more than £1 billion supporting companies such as Fractile, OLIX, Salience Labs and others. That is the crux of our sovereignty strategy: a clear definition, a clear plan across every part of the stack on AI, and delivery alongside that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) brought a deep degree of expertise on technology to this debate and asked the central question: do we shape technology in the artificial intelligence revolution, or is it the other way around? His point about stronger competition, which was also raised by the shadow Minister, is important. The CMA has been acting in an area of collaboration between the previous Government’s aspirations on digital competition and this Government’s. I look forward to the enforcement of remedies across both mobile and business software when it comes to AI.

My hon. Friend also raised questions about online safety. I hope he feels that the significant actions that the Government have taken—banning social media for under 16s, being one of the first countries to bring AI chatbots into regulatory scope to make sure that they are not producing illegal content, and banning romantic chatbots—have been pioneering and show that we are always on the side of the British public.

My hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan) raised incredibly important points about how we ensure that the security of AI is central to the questions we ask in public policy. Across every aspect of Government, we are building a Labour vision for that. We are building state institutions that will last the test of time and ensure that we are kept safe from some of the risks of AI.

[Mark Pritchard]

I am conscious of time, so I want to give the Minister the opportunity to answer the questions I asked: who owns the data, who controls the data, and what does that mean for democracy and the balance of power?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and I am personally interested in how we rest more agency and control in the hands of the British public and the British state when it comes to data. There are clear rules and regulations about both privacy and individual data consents that apply, but I want to go further still by building infrastructure that equips individuals to have greater control over their data.

In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Poole’s points, through the AI Security Institute we have the best capability in the state to keep evaluating, understanding and mitigating risks. Through the AI Economics Institute, we have a deeper understanding of the impact of AI on jobs than pretty much any other country. We want to go further on that, including looking at a range of economic levers to mitigate some of the risks. Through sovereign AI we are investing in British capabilities, through the Alan Turing Institute we are investing in national security-relevant AI, and through labs that were funded just this morning we are making sure that British capability, rather than foreign capability alone, determines the future of AI.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (in the Chair)]

The debate must finish at 5.50 pm, so the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) has a minute to wind up his debate.

Online Safety Act 2023: Codes of Practice

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Thursday 18th June 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

The harms of viral harmful content do not end online. They can spill into our streets and destabilise communities. Recent incidents—including the disorder following the Southport attack in summer 2024, unrest in Leicester in 2022, and events following the tragic murder of Henry Nowak—demonstrate how online activity can intensify real-world harm at moments of vulnerability.

As set out in “Protecting What Matters”, the Government will go further where needed to protect communities, including by ensuring the Online Safety Act’s crisis response provisions are fit for purpose.

Today I am laying before Parliament draft amendments to Ofcom’s codes of practice on illegal content and the protection of children. These strengthen expectations on platforms to respond effectively where their services contribute to risks to public safety during crises.

The Online Safety Act places clear duties on user-to-user services to protect users, including through systems and processes to tackle illegal content and that which is harmful to children. Ofcom, as the independent regulator, sets out in its codes the steps providers should take to meet these duties.

Following parliamentary scrutiny, Ofcom’s initial codes came into force in March and July 2025. They established a proactive, systems-based approach to tackling illegal harms and protecting children.

These amendments go further. They set an expectation on relevant services to have effective crisis response arrangements, mitigate risks associated with content on their platforms, and work closely with law enforcement where public safety is at risk. This strengthens how platforms address harms such as violence, abuse, hate, extremism and foreign interference.

Ofcom has submitted the draft amendments, which I am laying before Parliament for scrutiny. Subject to the usual 40-day period, the updated measures will come into force 21 days after the codes are issued.

These amendments build on existing collaboration between Ofcom and platforms on crisis response. Following recent unrest in Belfast, Ofcom has written to online service providers to remind them of their duties under the Online Safety Act to assess and mitigate the risks of illegal content, including material that stirs up hatred or incites violence. As Ofcom said in its letter, platforms do not need to wait before they start implementing stronger measures.

These changes mark a further step in implementing the Online Safety Act and strengthening protections for communities. Ofcom will continue to keep the codes under review to address emerging harms. This Government are fully committed to using all available levers to protect the public from harms that originate and spread online.

[HCWS124]

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 16th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Spencer]

I do not want any part of the UK to be subject to the awful AI Act that has been passed by the European Union. Northern Ireland, and particularly Belfast, is a technological powerhouse of which we should be very proud. We need to ensure that it continues to go from strength to strength as part of our fantastic Union.

We on the Conservative Benches will not back new clause 13, because we understand how markets and global supply chains work. We believe in Britain.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I start by echoing the thoughts of many Members from across the House, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward). I did not know Jo Cox, but I admired her deeply. As we talk about our country’s resilience, her central message—that there is no deeper route to resilience than through the unity of our country and community—is top of our minds for all of us in this House.

It is a pleasure to bring this important Bill back to the House this afternoon. The Bill will increase our cyber-defences and resilience, making the UK an even safer place to live and do business. I thank Members on both sides of the Chamber for their valuable contributions to this debate and for the expertise that they have brought throughout the passage of the Bill. I particularly thank them for their recognition of my core belief: that the central question for our national security and resilience is the question of our technological and AI capabilities.

We tested the Bill’s measures carefully before introduction, but we have since listened to feedback. There are a small number of minor, technical drafting improvements, which I will briefly go through. Government amendments 16 and 17 ensure that regulators can ask for the information they need to fulfil their obligations under the NIS regulations. This does not give regulators any new powers; it simply confirms that the current reasons for requesting information under the NIS regulations will still apply under the updated regulations.

Government amendments 7 and 8 make changes to align with two information-gathering Government amendments made in Committee—amendments 16 and 17. Government amendment 11 makes consequential changes following an amendment made in Committee. That amendment enables information sharing between NIS regulators and other public authorities for cyber-matters outside the scope of the NIS regulations.

Government amendments 14 and 15 clarify the safeguards for information sharing gateways, and amendments 9, 10, 12 and 13 make the necessary changes to ensure that the rest of the clause is consistent with the change made by amendment 14. Government amendments 18 to 26, to clause 57, allow regulators and the Secretary of State to issue notices related to the powers of direction to nominated representatives of regulated entities. I have also tabled Government amendment 27, which corrects minor drafting errors to ensure the Bill works as intended.

Members raised a series of questions, and I will address them thematically. First, the question of scope was raised by new clauses 4, 20, 21, 5, 8 and 9. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, who brings consistent expertise and experience to these questions; the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western); and the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick), who tabled amendments on the services and scope of the Bill.

All organisations, from high street shops to manufacturing giants, should take steps to increase their cyber-security and resilience. The Government and the National Cyber Security Centre are making sure that the right tools are available for every part of the economy. I am sympathetic to their intent, and in particular with my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) when he talks about the impact of cyber-security incidents on local communities.

The Government have committed to reviewing whether new activities need to be brought into the scope of the NIS regulations, but it is essential that any such decision is based on a systematic and specific assessment of carefully considering whether the regulation in these particular parts of statute are the most appropriate response. The NIS regime has been put in place to protect the most essential parts of our economy, often those whose disruption would cause an imminent threat to life. It is focused on a specific set of tests where sectors have little or no alternative service provision in the event of disruption and relates the latest systematic evidence of the threats that each sector faces.

In that context, all Government Departments with sectoral responsibility work with their sectors on broader cyber-resilience. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs does so with food, and the Department for Business and Trade does so with retail, automotive and so on. The NCSC also has strong relationships across sectors, actively working with them to share best practice and incident insights, and to strengthen overall resilience, such as by engaging with the British Retail Consortium following incidents affecting the sector last year.

The food sector is unique among other critical sectors because of its high levels of diversity. In the analysis underpinning the judgments made in the Bill, there are approximately 20,000 SME food manufacturers in the UK alone, and many more farms, distribution centres, retailers and other types of businesses that form the UK’s food supply chain. Given the lack of a single point of failure, we think there are more proportionate levers to pull, rather than bringing food in scope of the NIS regime. We have made similar judgments about other sectors on the basis of that systematic analysis, as I have shared in Committee and at other stages of the Bill’s consideration.

[Matt Western]

I accept the point about the plethora of businesses in the food supply sector, but my amendment simply seeks commonality with what the European Union has pushed for. Why can it not be the right thing for the UK Government to do as well?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I am happy to the write to the Chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is that we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of the Bill should apply in a systematic, proportionate and coherent way to sectors. The analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I mentioned—primarily diversity of supply—but I would be delighted to engage with him on the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based our decision on our analysis here.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly.

The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber-resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber-capability in central Government.

The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co-ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber-risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political-party representatives as well.

The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill. I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber-threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State.

New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course.

New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Let me take the Minister back to the question of bringing the retail sector into the provisions of the Bill. He seems to be saying that cyber-security and resilience require Government intervention only when there is an immediate threat to life. Will he clarify whether that is what he is saying? My understanding is that we need to keep our economy and citizens secure in all circumstances. On the question of proportionality, my new clause 20 seeks to bring in only very large businesses, so that the requirements of cyber-security on them are proportionate. We know that such businesses are not taking the measures to keep cyber-secure, as we have seen recently with Marks & Spencer, Jaguar Land Rover and others.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

It is rare for me to have a point of divergence with the Chair of the Select Committee, given her experience and expertise. However, on that question I am absolutely not saying that Government support is limited only to the certain number of sectors covered by the Bill. There are a range of other ways in which the Government act to support sectors outside of the scope of the Bill. That is the right thing to do.

The scope of this Bill—the only Bill horizontally applicable to large parts of the economy—is systematically and specifically set to sectors that are significant as essential services, sectors where there is the risk of significant disruption and threat to life, and sectors where alternative supply is limited. For those reasons, we have excluded retail. Consideration of the scale of the business is not currently in that rubric, because there are also businesses that are small in scale but very material in life-threatening impact. I hope that is a satisfactory answer.

I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West for their amendments relating to the risks posed by communications modules made or controlled from outside the UK. Although I am sympathetic to their concerns, the Bill’s approach is intentionally technology and incident-agnostic. Instead of reacting to individual components in isolation, we focus on structural checkpoints and systematic dependencies in this context.

There are a range of other levers—investment screening through the National Security and Investment Act 2021; telecoms and cyber data security requirements to protect data and networks; supply chain measures, such as those in the Procurement Act 2023; diversification requirements to reduce dependency and build resilience—all of which are important to respond to the deeply significant concerns raised.

[Graeme Downie]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will make some further progress.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendment relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concerns, as well as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly, and Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants the Secretary of State the power to direct regulated entities if the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it, gives rise to a national security risk. This could, for instance, require an entity to cease using and isolate an AI model.

These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber-security regime, enabling Government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats. They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability among regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. While I share my hon. Friends’ concerns, I encourage them to work with the Government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate the risks they have rightly highlighted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley in the first instance and then to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar.

[Alex Sobel]

There is obviously a level of complexity here in relation to the data centre, AI development and the network in the UK and more broadly. Will the Minister therefore commit to a meeting with me and my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward) to discuss this matter further?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I would be delighted to.

[Graeme Downie]

I would be more than happy to work with the Government on something that will provide specific protections against cellular internet-of-things modules. What assessment has he made of the specific threat of internet-of-things modules, and what protections are there against that in the legislation?

[Kanishka Narayan]

Given the specificity of his question, I will suggest that I come back to my hon. Friend. The broad thrust is that through our investment control legislation and procurement legislation, there are a series of responsibilities on Departments to look at it. [Interruption.] Given your encouragement, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall move on.

Finally, I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who raised a very important point. The most important thing to say is that I share his diagnosis, although for reasons mostly of technical drafting, I disagree with his prescription—I hope he will take that in the spirit in which it is intended. His amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas where we do not have an explicit requirement. While I share his diagnosis and his objective, I hope that we can work together to consider how best to give it effect, including through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing.

I thank all hon. Members for their consideration.

[Jim Allister]

I want to draw the Minister back to a point I raised with him at an earlier stage of the Bill, when he gave me what I would call a holding reply. When this legislation goes through, will the whole United Kingdom be subject to it, or will my part of the United Kingdom—Northern Ireland—be subject to the EU’s AI laws as they affect the digital sector? Businesses in that industry in my constituency want to know whether they will be governed by this Bill or by the EU’s AI Act. In other words, will the EU’s AI Act and Cyber Resilience Act be added to annex 2 to the Windsor framework, which would give them superiority and direct application in Northern Ireland? Can we have an answer—are they going to be added or not?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware from a response I recently gave him that both the complexity of the EU’s AI Act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration at the moment. The EU has made a proposal and we are working with it on that. I will be happy to engage with him on that particular question in due course.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am not quite certain that I understand the Minister’s reasons for why he cannot accept my amendment, tweak it or work with it in the other place. The reality is that with this Bill, we are opening the door in a way that we would not have otherwise done to the use of information that may predicate a failure for some British citizen sitting in a country where the rule of law does not protect them in the courts. The Government are taking a risk of making it worse, not better. While the Minister agrees to some degree with the principle of what I am saying, surely this is the time to put it right in the Bill.

[Kanishka Narayan]

As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK. Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information-sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023. In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for generously giving way again. I have no desire to test the House by pushing my amendments to a vote, and I will be happy if I can receive his assurance. I take his points on not having technology-specific regulation where possible, but can I have an assurance that the Minister will work with me, my Committee and other hon. Members to look at the need to safeguard where there are technology-specific risks?

[Kanishka Narayan]

As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one.

I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.

[Alex Sobel]

On the amendment from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), I think we have made some progress with the Minister, but it is clear that trying to isolate the issues around fair trial from other matters is complex. Repeating my earlier call, will the Minister meet me, the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and others who signed his amendment to explore the complexities of this after the debate?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

I can confirm that the Government will be very happy to engage on this question further with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I commend the Bill to the House.

[Victoria Collins]

Before I withdraw new clause 2, I want to draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in reference to my earlier speech. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13

Digital Sovereignty Strategy on risks posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy (“a Digital Sovereignty Strategy”) which sets out the Government's approach to maintaining the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems by—

(a) assessing, managing and mitigating risks—

(i) associated with foreign interference,

(ii) arising from reliance on foreign-supplied technologies, and

(b) preventing over-reliance on foreign providers by building domestic capacity.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant network and information system” is a network and information system belonging to—

(a) an operator of an essential service,

(b) a relevant digital service provider,

(c) a relevant managed service provider, or

(d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.

(3) A Digital Sovereignty Strategy published under this section must—

(a) include risks associated with—

(i) hardware,

(ii) software,

(iii) supply chains, and

(iv) procurement processes;

(b) include a specific focus on security and resilience in government digital procurement processes, detailing how the Government intends to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign-owned service providers to mitigate the risk of systemic disruption;

(c) include a commitment to prioritise the use of technologies developed in the UK by UK organisations in relevant network and information systems to reduce reliance on foreign technologies, and

(d) where risks are identified under subsection (1)(a)(i), state how the Government intends to address these risks by supporting the use of domestic technologies or systems for the purpose of ensuring the security of those systems.”—(Victoria Collins.)

This new clause would require the Government to publish a Digital Sovereignty Strategy setting out how it intends to address risks to relevant network and information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

It has been a privilege to take this vital piece of legislation through the House. I thank everyone who has played a role in getting the Bill to this stage, including the noble Baroness Lloyd of Effra, who has been instrumental in driving the policy in this Bill and leading its passage in the other place. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology; the officials who have worked tirelessly since the Bill’s inception; the Bill team, led by Shona Lester; the policy teams, led by Nick Dodd and Liam Harkin; the legal team, led by Alicia Swannell; and my private secretary, Ben Holloway. I also thank parliamentary counsel, the Clerks and the Chairs of the Public Bill Committee, and every Member of the House who served on the Committee, as well as Members who have provided important input today and during all previous stages.

This country is subject to daily and unrelenting cyber-attacks. This is no longer the stuff of science fiction, but a daily reality that threatens public services, businesses and even our ways of life. As Dr Richard Horne, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, has said:

“The real-world impacts of cyber attacks have never been more evident than in recent months”.

The Bill delivers on the Government’s commitment to drive secure growth and make the UK more resilient to the threats we face. It recognises how things have moved on since 2018, with data centres playing an increasingly important role in our digital lives and supply chains continuing to diversify. It also recognises that things will continue to change, with a deliberate, technology-agnostic approach and proportionate powers to enable the Government to close regulatory gaps and respond to imminent national security threats.

Since the introduction of the Bill, I have tabled a small number of amendments to refine its drafting and ensure that it achieves its intended purposes. They include designating Ofcom as the sole regulator for data centres, to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen accountability in this key sector. They also include enabling the network and information systems regulators to share vital information with other regulators and public bodies overseeing sectors and vice versa, enabling more co-ordinated and strategic oversight without unnecessary business burdens. They also updated the definition of cloud computing to respond to important feedback from the sector and made several minor and technical corrections to ensure that the Bill can be practically implemented.

The version of the Bill before us is an ambitious, practical and proportionate piece of legislation. It is the result of engagement with industry, important regulator feedback, international dialogue and tireless work from officials. I wish Baroness Lloyd the best in moving the Bill forward in the other place, and I commend it to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

Digital and Technologies Sector Plan

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by my noble Friend, the Minister of State for Science, Innovation, Research and Nuclear, Lord Vallance of Balham.

I am pleased to update the House on the publication of the “Digital and Technologies Sector Plan: Year One Update”. In June 2025, we published the sector plan—the UK’s first long-term plan to back the sectors and technologies of the future—as part of the Government’s modern industrial strategy. We set out a clear, ambitious, 10-year vision: to make the UK one of the top three places in the world to create, invest in and scale up a fast-growing technology business by 2035. We are working to secure the UK’s first trillion-dollar technology company.

The implementation update we are publishing today sets out our progress in delivering on the commitments set out in our sector plan, and where we have expanded our ambition, across the following areas:

Unlocking economy-wide measures to boost digital and technologies growth. The Government are providing end-to-end support for our sector’s innovative, high growth companies across the UK to underpin the UK’s growth, security and sovereignty. We have announced record public investment in R&D to back frontier technologies at the earliest stage, including committing nearly £4 billion of funding until 2029-30 through UK Research and Innovation. We have launched TechFirst, which has already reached over 100,000 young people, to grow our domestic skills pipeline for our six frontier technologies. We have expanded the British Business Bank’s mandate, with a new activist focus on scale-ups to back British deep tech champions, such as its recent £100 million investment in the UK based spinout, Oxford Quantum Circuits. We have introduced tax reforms to encourage frontier technology companies to start, scale and stay in the UK. And we are delivering world-class infrastructure, including the telecoms infrastructure that is fundamental to our digital economy.

Supporting our frontier technologies. The Government are taking an active and strategic approach to grow the UK’s technological capabilities. Earlier this year, we expanded and extended the engineering biology mission awards with £20 million of funding and delivered our third engineering biology accelerator programme in collaboration with Science Creates. We have launched Sovereign AI, a new sovereign venture fund which will invest £500 million to scale AI companies in the UK. This week we published the AI hardware plan to back British companies developing the chips and semiconductor technologies behind AI and invest in the scientists, engineers and technicians needed to turn new ideas into products and good jobs in the UK. We have published the cyber growth action plan to boost the UK cyber-security industry and we are scaling the national security strategic investment fund to invest in strategic dual-use science and technology companies. Expanding on our sector plan commitments, we announced up to £2 billion to establish the UK as a world-leader in quantum, including skills and talent, research, and a world-first commitment to procure large scale quantum computers in the early 2030s.

Growing the Digital and Technologies sector across the UK. The Government are committed to maximising the benefits of innovative technologies for communities across the country. We are backing places across the UK to build on their strengths, with support ranging from the local innovation partnership and global talent funds to the five digital and technology technical excellence colleges.

One year into delivery, we can already see this work is paying off. The UK alone has captured 48% of all European venture capital funding so far in 2026. Last year, digital and technologies companies received £8.3 billion of equity investment and strategic companies are choosing to anchor and scale in the UK.

We have made strong progress in the first year of delivery of the sector plan, but our ambitions do not stop here. Our update publication also outlines our next steps and where we will go further as we move into year two of our decade-long commitment to the sector. I look forward to further updating the House on our future delivery.

[HCWS104]

Digital Safety: Children

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology if she will make a statement on the Government’s new policy announcements regarding children’s online safety.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

The Prime Minister has announced that this Government will take decisive action to strengthen children’s online safety, including new expectations on technology companies to introduce crucial safety measures on children’s phones. The Government are clear that children are facing unacceptable levels of sexual harm online, including grooming, sextortion and coercion into sharing intimate images. A single image can trap a child in a cycle of abuse—something I have personally heard about from young people, families and civil society. I hold them in my mind and heart as we take action to stop this harm at source.

To address this issue, we have set out expectations that technology companies introduce device-level protections for children. The protections will prevent children from taking, sharing or viewing nude imagery across all core device functionalities, including camera, messaging apps, search functions and file sharing. The protections are built directly into the operating system.

We recognise that companies have already developed and implemented nudity detection on devices, and we want to work collaboratively with industry to build solutions and call on companies to take action within three months. We have been clear that if industry does not meet our high expectations, we will not hesitate to legislate. Furthermore, the Government’s “Growing up in the online world” consultation closed on 26 May. The Government are reviewing the responses and will provide an update in the coming weeks.

[Munira Wilson]

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his response. Today and over the weekend, we have seen a Prime Minister who has spent months completely disengaged from the digital threats facing our young people suddenly experiencing an eleventh-hour damascene conversion. This sudden rush seems to be driven entirely by a looming ballot in Makerfield and a full-scale rebellion on his Back Benches.

We Liberal Democrats will not criticise someone for reaching the correct position, even if it has taken them some time, but unfortunately this Government’s approach remains profoundly weak. It is shameful that the Prime Minister has to beg big tech to stop the proliferation of child sexual abuse imagery. He could and should make these changes anyway, so I appeal to the Minister and, if he is watching, the Prime Minister: just bring forward the legislation. Why is the Prime Minister still asking big tech to co-operate with him when it has constantly shown a total disregard for our children and young people?

Broader proposals regarding a ban on harmful social media for teenagers were briefed to the newspapers over the weekend. The Liberal Democrats welcome these reports, and again urge Ministers to move quickly and decisively. Only through a smart film-style age-rating system can we protect children from harmful online content and algorithms. I am delighted that, in pursuit of a legacy, the Prime Minister seems to be borrowing more Liberal Democrat ideas wholesale—tiered age-rated access, ending infinite scrolling and tackling online gaming, not just social media—despite ordering his MPs and peers to vote repeatedly against many of those proposals during the passage of Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026.

However, today is not about who voted which way. I ask the Minister and, through him, the Prime Minister to remember the children who have lost their lives because of the harms they have encountered online, and those whose mental and physical health and education have been harmed by what they have been exposed to online. It is for those children that we must work together to bring about change. The Prime Minister must stop begging tech companies to protect our children and start acting himself—now.

[Kanishka Narayan]

It is astonishing to hear the Liberal Democrats mention a lack of action. On Grok, this Government stood up to the richest man in the world, stood him down and as a result secured protections for people in this country. We have acted on cyber-flashing and strangulation in pornography, banning nudification tools and criminalising nudification, and putting personal criminal liability on tech bosses if they do not act. I understand that the Liberal Democrats are seeking relevance by doing a strategy review, but their complaint is still too much.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Bromborough) (Lab)]

I welcome this announcement, but is it not shocking that these companies have to be told what is unacceptable—that children should not be able to send and receive naked images? I ask the Minister: is this a tech problem or an issue of a lack of understanding and decency at the heart of these companies?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank my hon. Friend for a point well made. We have been consistently robust with tech companies on this question. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) for her leadership on this question. It is, to me, not a technology problem; we have the technology to act on this, and we will now deliver that in the real world.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I welcome the shadow Minister to the Dispatch Box, but he is supposed to have two minutes. He has now spoken for nearly three minutes, so I am sure that the Minister will have grasped what he had to say.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I first point out that in government, the Conservatives took seven years to pass a Bill and then found that law to be inadequate. That is why they are proposing all the things they are trying to do. This Government are listening to the people of Britain. I have been around listening to thousands of young people and families, and they say that they have a Government who are listening with humility and getting the action right on this central question. They say, on age assurance for adult content, that this Government have listened and acted robustly. They said so on Grok when the Opposition were missing in action. On the shadow Minister’s point about existing devices, I point out to him that a major provider has already applied age assurance at the device level for existing devices as well. We will learn the lessons and ensure that we are acting robustly in protecting young people.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Education Committee.

[Helen Hayes (Dulwich and West Norwood) (Lab)]

I welcome the announcement today. The Education Committee recently took evidence from social media and gaming companies, which left every member of the Committee profoundly concerned. They downplayed the issues, denied the scale of harm and overplayed the magnitude and effectiveness of their own responses, so we have very little confidence that big tech knows what is required and has any motivation to do it. If, as seems likely, legislation is required after three months, can the Minister provide an assurance that the drafting of that legislation is already under way so that we do not lose any more time before our children are safe online?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that time is of the essence, and I can confirm that we are working closely with the Home Secretary and the Home Office to make sure that we are ready to go if the companies do not act in the way they need to.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) this urgent question. I am very disappointed that the Minister brought petty party politics into his response, because we have consistently proposed legislation that could have been implemented months ago. I speak on behalf of parents, teachers, carers and the children themselves in asking why the Prime Minister is pleading with tech companies about this. He is the Prime Minister; he should be leading the charge on blocking child sexual abuse material on smartphones. It is absolutely baffling that we have only reached this point now. We saw earlier this year the horrifying effects of Grok and other chatbots that are able to generate and share explicit content containing women and children at the request of online users. Children deserve far more than this dither and delay. The tech companies do not even deserve this three-month ultimatum. The Prime Minister should not be begging; he should be telling the big tech companies, “No to the proliferation of child sexual abuse imagery, and no to putting profit over the safety of children.”

[Kanishka Narayan]

Perhaps the hon. Member did not listen to the questioning about politics from his own party, but let me say two things. First, when I go around the country and speak to parents and young people, they say to me that the fact that 116,000 people have engaged with our consultation shows that this is a question on which the British public have strong views, but also that they have a British Government who are now putting those strong views directly into public policy action. On the question of pace, I simply point out to the hon. Member that we are moving at pace on this issue, and in particular that the Prime Minister has secured changes. When I went to Australia two weeks ago, they said to me, “Why was the UK the first place to secure changes on nudity blurring on operating systems for a major provider?” That is the result of the robust engagement we have had. The House is rightly questioning the pace of legislation. I am interested in the pace of outcome, and that is what we are delivering.

[Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)]

Social media companies have been conducting a social experiment on our children for too long and parents have been left trying to bear the burden. I thank the Minister very much for many meetings over many months. Can he tell us the criteria for deciding which platforms are going to be deemed safe or unsafe when determining what young people should have access to and at what age? In particular, can he reassure the House that this will not be left to parents, as YouTube, for example, is still pushing for?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank my hon. Friend, who has been a remarkable champion for young people and families on this question, and I have deeply valued her input and expertise. On her question about definition, I will not pre-empt the decisions that will result from the consultation, but her representations on harmful functionalities are very much top of mind for me. I assure her that it will not be parents who will bear the burden of enforcement; we will ensure that it is very much the platforms who are responsible for enforcement and for acting.

[Mr Speaker]

I call Father of the House.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Rather than trading party political points, can we all agree that these huge companies are rotting our children’s minds with addictive algorithms? While we know that banning things seldom works because people circumvent it and it leads to criminality, will the Minister and the Prime Minister go to these companies and say that they are in the last chance saloon—either they take decisive action, which we know they can do, or we will ban children from going on social media?

[Kanishka Narayan]

In characteristic fashion, the Father of the House has given wise counsel, and I will very much take it to heart in the way that the Government act.

[Clive Efford (Eltham and Chislehurst) (Lab)]

It is clear that the sociopaths that run these platforms have no concern whatever for the welfare of anyone, but particularly our children, and that they will listen only if legislation is put before this House that makes them act and sends a clear message to them, so when are we going to do that?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I absolutely feel the weight of the point my hon. Friend makes about the inadequacy of what the tech companies have done so far. We are acting to make sure that young people in this country are secured from the harms they are experiencing. We have done that already by engaging robustly with the companies. As I said, we are already world-leading in that a major operating system has been reformed only in the United Kingdom to secure our children from harm. If that does not happen, we are working in parallel to make sure that the force of the law is felt as well.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

It is a pity that the Minister has chosen attack as the best form of defence when so many Members across the Chamber have repeatedly raised their concerns about the issue over many years. Nevertheless, I will set aside his bombast in the hope that the implementation of these welcome changes is more thoughtful.

Will part of the planned guidance for parents about screen usage, particularly by very young children, address parents’ screen usage in the presence of their young children? There is growing evidence that what is now called technoference is having a strong impact on the attachments that parents form with their children in the early months and years of life, and that that is being felt, certainly in Andover and elsewhere in my constituency, in primary schools when those children arrive. It would be helpful for parents to understand the impact that screen usage is having on them and on their attachment to their children.

[Kanishka Narayan]

The right hon. Member makes an incredibly thoughtful point about something that I have heard in anecdote when engaging with young families. I am conscious that we are running a large-scale media literacy campaign to support parents in their understanding of social media and its impact on them and their relationships with their kids. I will take his comments and ensure that they are fed into the guidance that is prepared.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) mentioned delay on this issue; perhaps she did not enjoy the same level of consultation that I and many of my Labour colleagues enjoyed with our constituents, which would be a shame. When I was in Ysgol Maes Garmon recently consulting with groups of parents, young people and students, I was surprised by how much commonality there was in what they asked for from this consultation, and it was my privilege to present what they said to the Minister last week. Does he agree with me, and indeed them, that it is the Government’s responsibility to call the tech companies to the table, so that there is an opportunity for parents, young people, Government and tech companies to all work together to protect our young people?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank my hon. Friend for her depth of engagement with young people and families in her constituency, which she has shown in her representations to me. I have heard consistently from young people, both here and abroad, that in the way that we have engaged on this question, we have made sure that we are doing politics differently: we are listening to the voices of young people and families and putting them at the heart of our decisions. She has done that in her community and we will do that across the country.

[Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)]

It is funny how the thought of the Prime Minister’s legacy has suddenly spurred him on to take action to protect our children, when he has resisted for so long. That being said, it is welcome that the Government are listening to the Liberal Democrats’ proposal for a harms-based approach and are considering restricting different social media sites at different ages, rather than imposing a blanket ban that will have unintended consequences and be unworkable. Will the Minister confirm that the Government will include addictiveness as a factor when determining age restrictions for different sites, platforms, games and features?

[Kanishka Narayan]

In the spirit that has been recommended by the House, I will ignore the political attack in the first part of the hon. Member’s question. Her point about addiction being an important vector of harm is very much on our minds as we think about the appropriate action.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

Parents and teachers across North Warwickshire and Bedworth are worried sick that tech companies are wilfully allowing young people to share and access explicit content on their platforms and devices, and they are crying out for help. Does the Minister agree that it is high time the tech giants were held to account and forced into action to keep young people safe, and will the Government legislate without delay?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend, who has been another remarkable champion: she has engaged with people in her community and represented those voices to me. We will ensure that those voices result in quick as well as deeply robust action.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The Minister is aware of my concern about the interaction between whatever the Government choose to ban and the workings of the Online Safety Act 2023 that we already have. I know the Minister recognises that that is an important interaction. Will he reassure me that the Government are fully aware that whether they ban access to social media entirely for children, or ban specific functionalities, we will need to ensure we do not undermine the duty of care that the OSA requires of social media platforms and others?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The right hon. and learned Member, with all his expertise and experience on this theme, makes an incredibly thoughtful point. He has made that point to me before, and I assure him it is on my mind to ensure that whatever we do, there is no levelling down of the force of the child safety duties under the Online Safety Act on the platforms—if anything, there is a levelling up.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

To test Instagram’s claim that its teen accounts provide age-appropriate content, I set up a teen account as a 17-year-old boy called David. Without searching for anything, it took just 11 minutes of scrolling for David to be shown antisemitic conspiracy theories. Does the Minister agree that that is a disgrace? That is just one example of why it is time to stop asking social media companies to make their products safe and instead start requiring them to do so through regulation.

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important contribution. I brought together Jewish leaders to ensure that they got time with the companies to tell them about the depth of prejudice they experience online, and I was horrified when I heard a very similar set of anecdotes. I agree with her, and the Government will continue to ensure that we bring the full weight of regulation and policy to bear against the tech companies.

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

While we all welcome the fact that the Government are finally acting, I will point out to the Minister that not a single parent of the very many parents in Edinburgh West who have been in contact with me has requested that the Government ask the tech companies to behave differently. Every single one of them is concerned about their child—a child who is not the problem, but the victim of the tech companies. Is it not time to recognise that we made this mistake with the press? We left them to self-regulate over decades, and we ended up with Leveson and all sorts of problems, so why are we doing the same thing with the tech companies? We want change, so we should demand change and legislate for it, not let the people who created the problem decide when and how they will fix it.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I was visiting young people and families in Leith in Scotland just a few weeks ago. The thing I heard about more than anything else was the scale of harm that young people in those families were experiencing and a desire that we focus on doing the thing that stops that harm. That is why we will act robustly on the consultation we have done. In this instance, as I have mentioned before, we have already secured major changes; we will continue to do so and, in parallel, we will prepare legislation. I am interested in ensuring that young people in Edinburgh and across the country are protected from the horrific harms.

[Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)]

I welcome today’s decisive action. There have been the most appalling tragedies across the country, including in my constituency, where parents have lost children due to online harms. I know the Minister and the Prime Minister are working closely with parents, but may I urge the Minister to continue to do that, to carry out the type of engagement he has been carrying out, and to listen to the example from Australia? We look forward to hearing about more decisive action in the near future.

[Kanishka Narayan]

One of the big lessons of the Australian experience and beyond is that policy in this context is about not just short-term impact, but long-term norms. We will achieve that impact only if we bring parents and families with us. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend, who has been a remarkable champion, particularly for bereaved families in his constituency who have experienced the utmost tragedy and, through it, have shown the most remarkable resilience.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

While I welcome the Government’s belated intention to act in this area, does the Minister agree that there would be no need to wait for legislation if the social media companies actually started to enforce their existing age requirements for participating online? Many children under the age of 13 are able to create accounts and interact, despite the fact that that is completely against the terms of the platforms.

[Kanishka Narayan]

The right hon. Gentleman is totally right. Social media companies are already required to enforce the age assurance thresholds that they face under existing legislation. Where that is not happening, we continue to back Ofcom to ensure that it acts robustly and uses every single power it has. We will continue to review whether more is needed to ensure that that is robust action.

[Ms Julie Minns (Carlisle) (Lab)]

It has been more than 20 years since I was one of half a dozen people who co-wrote the world’s first code of practice to protect minors from age-inappropriate content. One of the biggest challenges we faced then was age verification. Will the Minister assure us that the technology and the devices are now there and in place so that under-18s can verify their age?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kanishka Narayan]

I have been very conscious of my hon. Friend’s expertise in this domain, but I am glad to hear of her pioneering experience on the question of age verification, too. We have taken this action because, through our engagement, we have made sure that the technology is now in a good place to robustly verify the age threshold of 18. That is why we want to see it extended, to make sure young people are secure online.

[Suella Braverman (Fareham and Waterlooville) (Reform)]

I have met victims of online sexual exploitation—it is an absolutely devastating crime that needs to be stopped. However, I fear that the Government’s plans are going to make things worse for everyone while taking little action to protect children online. The Australian model has not worked, and I fear that these Government plans will effectively open the door to state-mandated surveillance and digital ID for the entire population. We all want children to be safe online. Brilliant technology exists, such as parental control software and other excellent mechanisms; can we not use that technology more, rather than imposing an authoritarian ID database on the entire population?

[Kanishka Narayan]

That is a remarkable mischaracterisation of what the Government are looking to do, and I think the bulk of the House will feel the weight of what the right hon. and learned Member has just said. There is a straight choice here between backing parents and their families in a context where they are experiencing remarkable difficulties in keeping up with modern technology, and backing platforms. I am astonished that she has said that the Reform party is backing tech billionaires and platforms, not parents.

[Naushabah Khan (Gillingham and Rainham) (Lab)]

Unfortunately, I do not believe that the tech giants will do as they say and act in the right way on this issue. What consideration is the Minister giving to legislation, particularly to ensure that all platforms can meet the same standards, but also so that we can future-proof against new platforms?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I share my hon. Friend’s scepticism, so let me say two things. The first is that actions matter more than words, and we have already demonstrated that we can move in a pioneering way through the world-first action that we were able to take regarding a major operating system earlier this year—a move that has been praised by international partners. Turning to my hon. Friend’s point about law, as I mentioned at the outset, the Home Secretary, the Home Office and I are working closely together to prepare law in parallel, to ensure no stone is left unturned when it comes to securing our young people’s future.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I welcome the Government’s belated move on social media, but can the Minister clarify whether the technology prevents photos from being taken in the first place, or whether it scans people’s devices to prevent them sending photos? There are understandable privacy concerns. The Minister’s Department has also briefed the media that YouTube Kids will be excluded from any such action by the Government. Can he explain why?

[Kanishka Narayan]

On the hon. Member’s first question, while we will continue to look at the most effective ways of making this happen, the existing technology largely uses classifiers that ensure that, even at the point of taking the images, camera rendering can prevent those photos from being taken. On her second point, she will be aware that as a matter of course, I will not comment on briefings.

[Laura Kyrke-Smith (Aylesbury) (Lab)]

I have spoken to many young people in Aylesbury and the villages about this issue. One boy told me about the content he had seen, from terrorist beheadings to sexual abuse. He said to me, “Please don’t stop us communicating with our friends—we want to do that—but please stop us seeing this illegal and traumatising material, and please help us manage our addiction to these social media platforms.” Does the Minister agree that the tech companies cannot be trusted with our children’s safety or their futures, and that the Government have to step in now?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend—she has also been a persistent campaigner on this question, and I have valued her input and the conversations I have had with her. Clearly, the experiment that we have allowed our young people to be a part of has not worked; we must bring it to an end, and we will do so robustly and imminently.

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

I welcome the proposals announced today, but I am concerned that they appear to be limited to nudity. Children who have been subjected to self-harm content or who have been encouraged to take their own lives, and those who have seen extreme violence, do not appear to be covered. My son George told me that without any attempt to find them, he was fed the images of Charlie Kirk’s murder pretty much as soon as it had happened, and I do not see anything in this change to prevent something like that from happening again. Can the Minister confirm that it will include measures on extreme violence, as well as on those awful sites that are causing children to hurt themselves?

[Kanishka Narayan]

It is valuable that the hon. Member has raised those particular harms. I assure her that extreme violence and self-harm content of the sort she has described are already significant and priority offences under the Online Safety Act. Platforms have liability for making sure that that sort of content is proactively rooted out, and where that is not happening, the regulator has the powers it needs to act against it and will continue to do so. The particular change we are considering is about a very specific classifier of nudity—it is much harder to build classifiers for particular types of violence. However, I will of course continue to work with the hon. Member, and any other Members who are interested, on what more we can do.

[Tom Collins (Worcester) (Lab)]

I welcome the Government’s position on this issue. We know that the technology is capable and present. I have spoken to those in the UK developing it, but it is being realised against headwinds, because there is no pull. For every other product area or technology, consumers rightly expect safety, and that is built into our product safety laws, but that is not the case with digital. There is no pull for this technology from the big tech companies. Does the Minister agree that we should move in a direction that creates this pull for innovation, for safety as a value and for technology that delivers safety? Such innovation could be enriching our economy as much as the technology at the moment is threatening people’s health.

[Kanishka Narayan]

Safety by design is an incredibly important principle. I valued its mention in the online safety legislation and in our engagement with companies. It is an attractive and tractable way of driving change, too. My hon. Friend has done extensive work on this issue, and I look forward to engaging with him in depth to make sure that his ideas feed into our decisions.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As long as children are given access to social media I very much doubt that it will be possible to prevent them from seeing harmful content. Given the strong assurances from the Minister that he will certainly be taking action to prevent them from seeing extreme content, can he explain to the House what sanctions will be available effectively to punish those social media companies that defy the legislation?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The existing legislation provides for significant fines. More than 100 investigations have been conducted, and millions of pounds of fines have been levied on companies for inaction, too. Under any prospective new regime, I will make sure that the enforcement levers are as robust as they can be. The clear lesson from elsewhere is that compliance is critical to reshaping norms, and I want the companies and the bosses to feel the weight of that.

[Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)]

I thank the parents, teachers and young people in Dartford who came together with me at the end of last month to discuss how to take action against what social media companies are engaged in, which has been described as the great rewiring of our childhood. I was pleased to be able to provide a report to the Minister’s Department after that engagement. There was near consensus that we want to see age restriction on social media access, a digital age of consent on data access and more guidance for parents and families from trusted sources. Does the Minister agree that it is vital that we take steps in all those areas, as well as the welcome announcement today on smartphones?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank my hon. Friend for the engagement he has done and for sharing the lessons from it across the three areas that he talks about: age restrictions, the ability to wield appropriate consent, and guidance for parents. The central theme is that parents and young people feel a loss of agency, and that is exactly the fundamental focus that this Government have: to restore the agency of people over platforms.

[Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)]

There remain serious concerns about the ability of children to use livestreaming on social media and the risks and harms that may arise. That issue has been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) in the past. In addition, Members will be well aware of the risks posed to children by strangers, who are in some cases adults with malevolent and illegal intent. Will the Minister confirm that livestreaming and the protection of children from these predators will fall under the scope of the forthcoming Government response?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. Member raises important points about livestreaming and what is called stranger pairing, which is the ability for strangers to engage with young people online on a series of platforms. Livestreaming and stranger pairing together seem to me to be an important way in which international criminal networks have undertaken child sexual abuse. It is at the top of our minds as we think about regulating functionalities and features that are some of the most challenging aspects of what drives harm for young people.

[Lola McEvoy (Darlington) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for answering this urgent question today, and urgent it is. While the tech companies are spending millions of pounds congratulating themselves on how they are going above and beyond, children in Darlington tell me that the parental controls are really easy to work around. Can the Minister outline how these new settings on devices will be safeguarded to make sure that children cannot toggle them on and off to regain access to functionality?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend has been extremely thoughtful before in relation to these issues, and I agree with what she has said. In my experience with young people and families, parental controls have not been easy to engage with, and nor have they been completely effective in driving down the harm in question. As for the effectiveness of what we have announced today, there is clear evidence that age assurance at device level has already been effective in some instances. The technology also appears to be pretty effective in understanding nudity and therefore blocking it. We are looking at that precisely, because we think it is radically more effective than age assurance just at the level of the application. I will continue to bear my hon. Friend’s lessons in mind.

[Sir Gavin Williamson (Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge) (Con)]

In my constituency, this issue is of real concern to parents as well as children. Some of the big tech companies seem to resemble the big tobacco companies of the 1960s. We have had a great deal of briefing from the Government, and we have had an announcement that was not made in the House. Will the Minister commit himself to coming to the House when the guidance is ready, to set out exactly and clearly the steps that the Government will continue to take to give real reassurance to the parents in my constituency who are so concerned about this matter?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The Government are already committed to a conversation as well as a vote in the House on the substantive question of the consultation. I will ensure that there is even fuller scope for engagement in the Chamber on the full set of questions that the right hon. Member has raised.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

Many Members will have read “Careless People”, a book by Sarah Wynn-Williams. It is a whistleblowing account of her time working inside Facebook, now Meta. She was silenced by Meta, using lawfare, when she sounded the alarm. These companies do not care about the people who use the platforms. They care only about keeping people on their platforms, especially our children. What does the Minister know that we do not? Does he believe that asking them nicely, rather than legislating against them, will achieve the intended results,?

[Kanishka Narayan]

One of the things that I value most in this role is the ability to engage directly with whistleblowers from a range of companies, and to hear about their understanding of what is happening internally but, more than that, the strength of their prescription. I am not relying on any internal, privileged understanding; I am relying on action, not words. The fact that we have already been able to secure a world-leading change in respect of age assurance at device level, protecting millions of young people in this country, is the action on which I am relying, not false promises or privileged information.

[Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)]

The tech companies are big, they are rich, they are clever, and they are playing a very long game. I do not doubt that in the next three months we shall see some degree of compliance or movement towards what the Government are asking for from those tech companies, but I fear that there will then be constant backsliding—that we shall see them endlessly rowing back on, or not quite meeting, what they have agreed to. How can we prevent that from happening by means of any steps short of legislation? Could legislation please be enforced by means of class actions for children who are damaged by this content? I think that that is the only thing that the tech companies might pay attention to.

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend is right to say that the issue of concern is not whether there are some incremental changes but whether our children are safe online, and that is at the forefront of my mind. We are looking at the quickest way of achieving such an outcome. We are preparing legislative options alongside the engagement that we are already carrying out, and if we are not able to secure substantive change to deliver that outcome, we will not hesitate to legislate.

[Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)]

A little while ago I ran a consultation in my constituency with 60 young people and teachers, which the Minister kindly attended. While they would welcome the action taken today, they wanted to see significant regulation of tech companies, because a ban is easily avoided. What further steps are the Government considering to protect young people through regulation?

[Kanishka Narayan]

One of the firm lessons that I learned from my hon. Friend’s engagement—and such depth of engagement—with young people in Staffordshire was the need to ensure that the changes we make online also reflect better opportunities offline. I know that she provides extensive opportunities for young people in her constituency. We will make sure that when we are acting on this issue, we are looking at the full range of their experiences.

[Greg Smith (Mid Buckinghamshire) (Con)]

I am genuinely pleased that the Government have at least come to the table on preventing harms to children from social media and online content, but it strikes me that it is rather piecemeal. Listening to voices on the Conservative Benches, other parties in opposition and the Government’s own Back Benchers, it seems everything is pointing in the same direction: we need an outright ban on social media for under-16s. This House has proven in the past that when we want to act quickly, we can. Before any more children are harmed, will the Minister bring forward legislation?

[Kanishka Narayan]

With respect to the hon. Member, there are a range of questions, not least about how we make sure that we do not allow harms on gaming and messaging platforms. We need to look at the precise way in which age assurance can be robust enough, so that we do not get young people escaping any changes. There are a range of implementation questions. We want to get this right for our young people and families, not give in to political back and forth.

[Sonia Kumar (Dudley) (Lab)]

Health misinformation and disinformation on social media is not harmless; it is a growing and serious threat to public health. We have already seen cases in which harmful online trends have led to severe injury and, tragically, even to the deaths of children. What steps are the Government taking to hold technology companies to account, and to prevent online influencers from being able to spread harmful and misleading health content on their platforms, given the clear risks that they pose to young people?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point. One of the things that we have been clear about is that regulated health advice should be provided only by regulated individuals in appropriate ways. The platforms need to ensure that they comply with that, and we will work with the regulator to ensure that any such responsibilities are carried out.

[Adrian Ramsay (Waveney Valley) (Green)]

At a recent roundtable that I held at a high school in Waveney Valley, one young person said:

“Social media is dangerous for young people and the government needs to take more control over social media companies because of the harmful content”.

A senior teacher said:

“The majority of what we are dealing with as safeguarding leads is via social media.”

How will the Minister ensure that the out-of-control corporate tech giants are regulated effectively, so that only age-appropriate content can be accessed?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The central message that the hon. Member should take away is that this Government will make sure that we restore control to the hands of families, rather than tech bosses. That is the outcome that we will deliver imminently.

[Jonathan Davies (Mid Derbyshire) (Lab)]

Parents, teachers and young people in Mid Derbyshire have spoken to me extensively about the harm that young people are receiving from social media and smartphones, but it is worth noting that many young people get their legitimate news content online. They also have a lot of access to educational material on places such as YouTube, and we have to be careful not to push young people towards more harmful places on the internet through legislation. What steps will the Minister take to ensure that young people can still get their legitimate news online? They are not engaging with traditional broadcasters or buying newspapers, and they need to access their educational content. We do not want there to be any unintended consequences.

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. On all my travels across the country, I have tried to be active on social media, but the only content that young people report having seen is on “Newsround”. Public broadcasts of appropriate, high-quality news and educational experiences can be delivered in innovative ways in schools, as well as online. This Government will make sure that young people are kept informed and are in receipt of educational experiences.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

This country is in danger of losing a generation of young people to the bad and malign influences of big tech. Big tech can be a force for good, but are this Government not completely embedded with big tech, as the last Government were? Big tech is often more powerful and has bigger budgets than many Governments, and some of the big tech owners do not believe in democracy; they believe that democracy is bust and want to undo it. There is an inherent conflict of interests between the Government’s position and big tech’s influence and embeddedness in all Government Departments. It is incumbent on all of us to take action, because parents feel powerless. They look to us as their Members of Parliament to reflect their views, and today I am reflecting my constituents’ views. As we have heard from Members across the House, guidance is not good enough. It has to be about legislation, class actions and big bucks—that is what these companies listen to.

[Kanishka Narayan]

The right hon. Member makes an incredibly important point. First, of course we will act, including in law, to make sure that we are focused on outcomes for young people and families. Secondly, and critically, the conversations I have had across the country reflect a deep understanding that we need robust action in the short term, but in the long term Britain will shape technology, rather than being shaped by it, if we build British capability. That is what we are focused on. In fact, just this morning we announced a £1 billion hardware plan to make sure that the next generation of fundamental technologies—AI chips in particular—are built here. We are reindustrialising ourselves but, at the heart of it, making sure that we have the discretion to engage with international firms in the way that we want.

[Johanna Baxter (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for his response to the urgent question. I am very grateful that the Government are taking action on this vital issue, but we all know that the pace of change in technology is terrifying. Will he set out how the discussions with technology companies and online safety experts have focused on ensuring that device-level controls are not only effective and easy for families to use, but adaptable to emerging online risks?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend makes the incredibly important point that the speed of technology needs to be reflected in the speed of democracy. That is why we have moved so fast in engaging the country, getting a set of actions ready and acting imminently. On device-level changes, although we were one of the first countries in the world to secure major changes to an operating system earlier this year, she is totally right that we must look not just at where the technology is now but at where the harms may go, and I will continue to bear that in mind.

[Ann Davies (Caerfyrddin) (PC)]

I welcome the Minister’s announcement about blocking explicit images on children’s phones, but this should really have come much sooner. I totally agree with the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) that action needs to be taken now, not in three months’ time. What exactly will be measured at the end of that period, and what counts as failure? Are we really relying on the good will of tech companies, bearing in mind their inactivity so far?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Member for her question. Let me give a very clear sense of that outcome and how we will measure it. Currently, 91% of the images used in child sexual abuse interactions are self-generated. To me, that is the central focus for what this Government are doing. We have already made a significant difference, as I have said, in ensuring that our robust engagement delivered a pioneering change to a major operating system. If this change is not delivered within weeks, we will ensure that the full force of the law delivers such an outcome.

[Chris Webb (Blackpool South) (Lab)]

There is growing evidence of a link between smartphone overuse and symptoms of depression and anxiety and reduced student performance, and areas such as Blackpool are seeing double the national average of young people self-harming. What steps will my hon. Friend take to ensure that device-level controls are effective and easy to use for parents who may not be tech savvy?

[Kanishka Narayan]

A fundamental principle behind both the changes announced today and those we are considering as a result of the consultation is simplicity. Parents across the country tell me that they are working incredibly hard to try to keep up with the technology, but the technology continues to make it more difficult rather than easier for them to exercise control. That principle will motivate our actions, and we will ensure that this is easy and effective, and that the burden of liability falls on platforms, not parents.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Why is the Minister answering an urgent question rather than bringing forward a Government statement?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I understand that Home Office Ministers made a statement at oral questions. I am happy to answer any further questions from Members of the House.

[Josh Dean (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)]

The vast majority of Members in this place had the benefit of growing up in a world without social media, and with social media, but today’s young people have not had that benefit. They have grown up with their lives intimately intertwined with the digital world, and in lockdown they were pushed even deeper online without being given a say. Whatever we do next, we must bring young people with us. Beyond the consultation, what will the Department do to meaningfully engage with young people in this area of policy, so that we can build a digital world that is safe for young people with young people?

[Kanishka Narayan]

My hon. Friend has been one of the most vocal Members on this question, particularly on engaging with young people. There are two things on my mind. First, there is the trust that I have felt in engaging with young people in every nation and region of our country on these questions. Whether over basketball, cricket, football or netball—and, indeed, toasting marshmallows with the Cumbria scouts—my trust has only been affirmed. Secondly, he is right to raise an important point about finding a community online, particularly for young people from LGBTQ groups and rural groups. We must bear that in mind and ensure that they have appropriate resources to feel supported in forming such communities.

[Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)]

At the G7 Digital Ministers meeting, it was reported that the US and the UK watered down stronger protections for children presented by France. My constituents, as evidenced by more than 2,000 emails I have received on online harms, want stronger protections. Will the Minister assure us that on online safety he and the Prime Minister have the interests of children in my constituency at heart, rather than the interests of the US and big tech? If so, why did the UK resist mandatory protection frameworks?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will not be commenting on leaked briefings, but I will say two things. First, in my engagement, even in Australia, civil society has said that the United Kingdom has been the first country in the world to pioneer the changes to operating systems that are securing young people’s future. On children’s safety, the only thing that matters to this Government is ensuring that British children are kept safe. We will continue to make that the defining principle for all our actions.

[Sureena Brackenridge (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)]

Tech giants have had the digital level controls capability to stop children taking, sharing or viewing naked images on their devices, but have failed to do so. I have very little confidence that they will suddenly have an epiphany and do the right thing without the necessary pressure, enforcement and consequences. How will the Minister ensure they comply, and if, or when, they fail, legislate with urgency?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I share my hon. Friend’s starting position of scepticism. Robust action will be achieved by ensuring that the outcome is a significant reduction in child sexual abuse material propagated through the mechanisms described. In the absence of that happening within weeks, we are preparing law in parallel to ensure that such action is not deferred.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

Regardless of what has provoked this change of heart, we can all welcome the Government now recognising the harms caused to children and families by social media. The evidence is very clear. I believe that most children will support the legislation. On Friday, I chaired a debate— a lively debate—at Roddensvale special school. All the points about disruption, distraction, bullying, peer pressure and so on were brought up. One thing I would ask of the Minister is that we need action now. He should not be put off by further promises from the big tech companies about self-regulation. If we are to have action, it should be enforceable and there should not be unintended consequences for free speech.

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point. When I visited young people in Glengormley in Northern Ireland, they told me that it was the first time they had been engaged on this question so systematically; and yes, they wanted robust action, but action that worked in the real world—they use different apps as well as virtual private networks. On the broader question of social media, the Government are not just listening but acting robustly and in a way that is distinctive. On the specific question of device-level interventions, the fundamental focus will be what delivers the most robust action the quickest. If that is the law, we will pursue the law. If it is engagement and the way that we have already delivered significant changes, we will do that. The future of young people is the critical driver here.

[Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement. It really does feel like change is coming and I know that parents in Edinburgh South West will welcome that. On the proposals to restrict social media access for young people, the Minister has rightly been listening to parents, but what work is he doing with campaigning charities such as the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, whose knowledge and expertise is extremely important in this domain? This also cannot be about a Government-led ban: we must engage our young people, schools, parents and charities in communicating the changes we plan. It would be good to hear more on that from the Minister. Lastly, if the industry does not proceed with a voluntary ban, how long does the Minister think it would take to implement a full ban on the ground?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I thank my hon. Friend for his incredibly important point. One reason we have ensured that we engage young people and families alongside civil society is that there is a depth of experience across the country. If we are to achieve change not just on devices but more broadly on social media norms, those who engage in places that matter with young people and families must be right at the heart of that. I will ensure that civil society charities across the country engage with us not just on the decision but on its communication.

[Shockat Adam (Leicester South) (Ind)]

I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a practising optometrist. Myopia—shortsightedness—is nearing epidemic levels for UK children. It is a crisis that was sharply increased by covid, when screentime surged and outdoor activity collapsed. Research shows that nearly one in three of our UK children will now be short sighted, and the rate is still rising. Shortsightedness after a certain dioptre level can lead to retinal conditions and sight loss. When developing any digital policies, can consideration be given to the devastating impact of screentime on our children’s eye health?

[Kanishka Narayan]

The hon. Member raises an important point, and I will ensure that it is fully considered in the evidence that we include when making decisions on that question.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Minister for his response to the urgent question; I have always been a big fan of his style. I echo the points made by the Father of the House on the importance of holding social media companies to account. The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I have done extensive consultation with parents, teachers and young people in my constituency of Harlow about the issue. I also echo the comments made by the Chair of the Education Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Helen Hayes); I do not think that social media companies are taking their responsibilities seriously. Does the Minister agree that some sort of social media ban—which would be a good idea—will only be effective if we ensure that the technology does not allow people to circumvent the age-verification tools? That is very important.

[Kanishka Narayan]

Not even my mother has complimented me on my style, so I can confirm to my hon. Friend that a visit to Harlow is imminent. He is totally right, and one reason that we have taken time to ensure that we are engaging with families and young people is to understand exactly how age-verification technology works, as that is crucial to whether we look at a platform ban or features and functionalities limitations. We want to get it right and robust so that young people in this country are kept safe.

[Lincoln Jopp]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. A few moments ago, I asked the Minister why he came to the Floor of the House to answer an urgent question rather than bringing forward a Government statement. I believe his answer was that he thought Home Office Ministers had made a statement earlier today. The Minister and I are both new to this House, but given that statements tend to follow oral questions— I sat through Home Office questions—and there has not been one, the Minister may have inadvertently misled the House. What opportunities are there for the record to be corrected?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. The Minister will know that in the first instance statements should be made to the House. Today we have had an urgent question to address the issue. If there has been any inadvertent misleading of the House from the Minister’s use of language, I am sure that those on the Front Bench have heard that and will want to clarify the matter.

[Kanishka Narayan]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I heard the Home Secretary deliver a statement at the start of topicals. It may not have been the fullest format, but it was a clear statement of the policy. I am of course happy to keep answering questions for as long as the House likes.

Revised Telecommunications Security Code of Practice

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd June 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

I am repeating the following written ministerial statement made today in the other place by my noble Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital Economy, Baroness Lloyd of Effra.

The UK telecoms supply chain review 2019 identified the need to establish an enhanced legislative framework for telecoms security. In response, the Government established a stronger telecoms security framework, which consists of:

The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021—primary legislation that established new duties on public telecoms providers to prevent security compromises within their networks and services.

The Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022—secondary legislation setting out specific cyber-security requirements with which the public telecoms providers must comply.

The Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2022—technical guidance on how providers can comply with the requirements set out in the regulations.

The UK’s future prosperity rests on the public electronic communications networks and services—PECN and PECS—that provide our telecoms and internet connectivity. It is important therefore that the telecoms security framework keeps pace with the scale of the threat to UK telecoms networks and services, adapting to evolving threats to network security and new innovations in telecoms technology.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre’s annual review 2025 highlights how state actors continue to pose a persistent and escalating cyber-threat to UK critical national infrastructure, including telecoms, leveraging sophisticated cyber-capabilities and working closely with a growing commercial intrusion market. This threat is becoming increasingly diffuse and dangerous, with cyber-attacks a key tool in geopolitical competition. The volume of nationally significant incidents managed by the NCSC continues to grow, and we are seeing high-profile campaigns like Salt Typhoon, targeting over 80 countries worldwide.

At the same time, innovations in technology are redefining both the cyber-security threat and the tools available for cyber-security and resilience. The growing use of AI, for example, delivers significant operational benefits for telecoms, but it also introduces new risks. Adversaries can exploit AI to automate the discovery of network vulnerabilities, and more rapidly identify high-value targets within networks. Maintaining a proactive, adaptive security posture is essential to safeguard the UK’s telecoms networks and services against these evolving and increasingly sophisticated threats.

Within the code of practice, to account for this changing threat landscape, the Government stated their intent to

“review and update the Code of Practice periodically as new threats emerge and technologies evolve.”

Following discussions with the NCSC and Ofcom, and regular feedback from industry, last year the Government consulted on proposals to update some areas of the technical guidance within the code of practice in order to:

Provide some further clarity on specific security measures in the code of practice—some providers suggested the code lacked specific guidance in some areas. The proposed updates intend to give clearer direction to support compliance with legal duties in the legislation. This includes clearer guidance on the use of privileged access workstations, approaches to security testing, and the encryption and protection of data.

Reflect evolving technology—since the code of practice was published, increased use of certain technologies warrants updated technical guidance to support safe adoption. The proposed updates include new security guidance on the secure use of public cloud, automation, and application programming interfaces.

Reflect emerging security threats—recent hostile state-linked attacks underline growing risks. The code of practice must evolve to help ensure providers respond appropriately. The proposed updates ensure the code of practice reflects the need for providers to take appropriate and proportionate steps to protect their networks against such threats.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has considered in detail the feedback received in response to the consultation and has made amendments based on this feedback to the draft revised code of practice where appropriate.

Following the conclusion of this work, the Department is today laying the draft revised telecommunications security code of practice—the revised code of practice—in Parliament for scrutiny under the negative procedure. A copy of the Government response to the consultation on proposals to update the telecommunications security code of practice 2022, which details the changes made in response to feedback, is published on gov.uk.

The revised code of practice represents an important step in ensuring that the UK’s telecoms security framework remains robust and effective in the face of rapidly evolving cyber-threats and technological change. By providing clearer and more up-to-date technical guidance, the revised code of practice will help telecoms providers to comply with their statutory duties, strengthen the security and resilience of the UK’s public electronic communications networks and services, and protect citizens, businesses, and critical services that rely on the networks and services.

[HCWS83]

Online Safety Act 2023 Codes of Practice on Illegal Content

Kanishka Narayan Excerpts

Monday 1st June 2026 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

Non-consensual intimate image abuse can have devastating and long-lasting impacts on victims and disproportionately affects women and girls. Delivering stronger protections against this harm is a key Government priority. The Prime Minister committed earlier this year to strengthen protections for victims and ensure platforms take a more proactive role tackling this horrendous abuse.

Today marks a further important step in strengthening protections online, as I lay before Parliament an amendment to Ofcom’s codes of practice for the illegal content duties, bringing in hash matching to strengthen protections against non-consensual intimate image abuse.

The Online Safety Act 2023 puts a range of duties on social media companies and search services, making them responsible for their users’ safety on their platforms. These include duties to put in place systems and processes for tackling illegal content and activity. Ofcom, as the independent regulator for this regime, is required to set out steps in codes of practice that providers should take to ensure they fulfil these duties.

Ofcom issued its first codes of practice for the illegal content duties following parliamentary scrutiny. Those codes came into force in March 2025. They introduced a framework of measures, and required services to take a proactive, systems-based approach to tackling illegal harms.

This amendment introduces a targeted additional measure to strengthen protections against non-consensual intimate image abuse. It sets a clear legal expectation that relevant services will use perceptual hash-matching technologies, or demonstrably equivalent tools, to identify and prevent the re-uploading and circulation of known non-consensual intimate images, including intimate image deepfakes. In practice, this will require services at risk of hosting such content to deploy proactive detection systems, capable of preventing repeat uploads at scale, rather than relying on case-by-case takedown, following user reports. This approach meaningfully supports victims, and ensures that once content is identified, it is effectively prevented from reappearing.

Ofcom has now submitted an amendment to its codes of practice for the illegal content duties. I am laying this before Parliament for scrutiny. If neither House objects to the amendment, Ofcom must issue the amended codes, and the updated measures will apply from 21 calendar days after they are issued.

Once in force, these updated measures will further strengthen the existing framework, ensuring that service providers put in place effective systems and processes to prevent the spread of illegal intimate image abuse content, including through the use of proactive technologies.

The amendment represents a further step in implementing the Online Safety Act and strengthening protections for users, particularly in tackling some of the most harmful forms of online abuse against women and girls. Ofcom will continue to build on this framework and keep its codes under review to address emerging harms.

[HCWS70]