(3 years, 10 months ago)
Written StatementsSection 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of her TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force—as of 30 November 2020 3 Number of new TPIM notices served—during this period 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens—as of 30 November 2020 3 TPIM notices extended—during the reporting period 1 TPIM notices revoked—during the reporting period 1 TPIM notices revived—during the reporting period 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices—during the reporting period 3 Applications made to measures specified in TPIM notices refused—during the reporting period 0 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation—during this the reporting period 3
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
Two individuals have been charged with breaching their TPIM notices in this period.
The TPIM Review Group (TRG) keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. Fourth quarter TRG meetings were held on 14 and 15 December 2020.
[HCWS698]
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe safety and security of our citizens remains our priority. We are working closely with operational partners to ensure we are ready for a range of scenarios at the end of the transition period. We will continue to co-operate with European and international partners to tackle shared security threats.
The deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan police has pointed out that losing access to EU databases such as the Schengen information system will move the average time for securing a criminal conviction from six days to 60 days, describing this as a “capability gap” and as having a “massive impact”. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, what emergency contingency plans does the Department have in place until—possibly—replacements for the existing cross-border arrangements are agreed?
National security remains our absolute priority. This country is a safe country and will remain so after the end of the transition period. The hon. Lady asks what alternative arrangements are in place. Obviously, we continue the negotiations and await their outcome, but we are prepared for a range of scenarios. In the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement, the UK has well developed and well rehearsed plans in place. They involve transitioning co-operation with EU member states to alternative, non-EU arrangements by the end of the transition period. These are tried and tested mechanisms, which the UK already uses with so many other countries.
The Minister recently wrote to me that, in the event of no deal on policing and security co-operation, the UK would fall back on non-EU arrangements. Does he agree with the former National Security Adviser’s comments this weekend that these fallbacks are all “slower and more clunky” and that they would leave us all less safe? Moreover, when the current head of UK Counter Terrorism Policing said that we need an agreement that retains or improves levels of co-operation, can the Minister promise the police, the Security Service and, most importantly, the British public that this Government will deliver precisely that?
I have already said that this country will remain one of the safest places in the world. It is worth underlining to the hon. Gentleman that the UK will continue to be a global leader on national security; we are now and we will remain so in the future. I hope that, equally, he will note the level of preparedness and the hard work by our police and all our other agencies to ensure that we are well prepared for the end of the transition period to give that assurance to the public over their safety and security and welfare and wellbeing, which absolutely remain a priority for this Government.
I welcome the Windrush announcement; we look forward to seeing the detail. Last week, the National Audit Office report said that the Home Office plans to remove all SIS II—second generation Schengen information system—data from the Warnings Index, Semaphore and Border Crossing systems on 31 December. Can the Home Secretary confirm that that means the Government will be removing or deleting from our border systems the details of more than 40,000 criminals and suspects wanted abroad?
The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee highlights the issue of the ability to share data with our international partners. Obviously, our Interpol relationship predates our SIS II access, and that will provide us with the means to communicate with all our international partners quickly and securely. All incoming Interpol circulations—notices and diffusions, as they are called—are uploaded to UK border and policing systems to ensure our security.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart) on securing the debate, and on the very powerful and poignant speech she delivered to the House this evening. Her comments on the brutal murder of William Heenan will have struck a chord with all who have heard the debate tonight. The loss and impact on his son Sammy Heenan, and on the rest of the family, is lifelong. I am sure that all in this House would wish to convey our deepest and sincerest condolences for his and their loss, and for all the pain that they continue to suffer.
Certainly, as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, I have met too many who continue to suffer that pain and that loss. We still collectively need to do much more to be able to look to Northern Ireland’s future with a positive sense of the amazing place that it is and the incredible people there who make it such a special place, while equally knowing that the legacy of the troubles and of the past still runs very deep and knowing the pain that it continues to cause. Therefore I understand and hear that sense of the need for us to be able to look to a future beyond all of those troubling issues.
I speak as the Security Minister, and therefore look to these issues of national security across all parts of our United Kingdom. I was struck by the emphasis that the hon. Lady gave to issues relating to this House, which brought to mind the response that she received from the Leader of the House recently during business questions when she highlighted this point. The Leader of the House underlined that very clear message, saying:
“We should remember and commemorate those who were killed”,—[Official Report, 26 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 993.]
drawing to mind the shields within this House to remember Airey Neave and Ian Gow, and stating that commemorating those who committed murder is absolutely not what we as a House should do. I understand that it is in that sense that the hon. Member for Upper Bann approaches all of this.
I want to look at the work that we do as a Government across the United Kingdom, and I am sure that the hon. Lady would join me in recognising the work that happens here and now. What do I mean by that? I mean the work of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, MI5 and others, who work tirelessly to keep people safe and have our full support for the immense contribution they make on a daily basis. I commend all those who, sometimes quietly, sometimes out of sight, help to deliver safety and security for the public in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. That ongoing work by the police and MI5 means that most people in Northern Ireland, mercifully, are not directly affected by the severe terrorist threat that endures.
It remains unacceptable that, decades on from the Good Friday agreement, there are still groups who are using and hiding bombs and bullets in residential areas, putting their own agendas above the rights of the community who want to live and thrive in peace. Where terrorism, paramilitary-style attacks and attacks on the community endure, so, too, will our efforts to tackle them. We will always do everything in our power to ensure they do not succeed.
I take this opportunity to commend the recent successes of Operation Arbacia, an ongoing Police Service of Northern Ireland-led operation into the activities of the New IRA, which has involved collaboration with partners such as MI5, Police Scotland, An Garda Síochána and the Metropolitan Police Service. In August, the Police Service of Northern Ireland arrested 10 people, all of whom have now been charged with a range of terrorism offences under the Terrorism Act 2006. Violent dissident republicans cause substantial harm to communities and the fabric of society. These arrests, I believe, are a welcome step in maintaining peace in Northern Ireland and keeping people safe from criminality and violence.
We have robust UK-wide legislation to counter the threat of terrorism and protect the public. The legislative framework was established in the Terrorism Act 2000; it was updated and strengthened in the post-9/11 era, again more recently to respond to the threat connected with the Syrian conflict and individuals travelling from this country to join terrorist groups, and then again following the attacks in the UK in 2017. Our framework provides a coherent approach, including an ideology-neutral definition of terrorism, which determines the scope of other terrorism powers and offences.
On the particular issue raised in this debate today, the Government are clear that statements that encourage or glorify terrorism are unacceptable and that individuals who make such statements should be liable for prosecution. It is an offence under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 for an individual to intentionally encourage members of the public to engage in terrorism or be reckless as to whether their statements will encourage it. That applies whether or not any person is in fact encouraged or induced to engage in terrorism as a result of the individual’s statements.
The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 updated the section 1 encouragement offence in three ways: closing a gap that existed whereby the offence would not necessarily be committed in a case where someone radicalised or sought to encourage a child or vulnerable adult to carry out an act of terrorism; ensuring extra-territorial jurisdiction applies fully to the encouragement of any act of terrorism, meaning that a person may be prosecuted in the UK for conduct that took place outside the UK that would have been unlawful had it taken place here; and increasing the maximum penalty available following a conviction from seven to 15 years’ imprisonment to reflect the seriousness of the offence. That is an appropriately broad offence of encouragement, which also covers the glorification of terrorism and ensures that perpetrators can be prosecuted appropriately.
In addition, our counter-terrorism legislative framework includes the separate offence under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 of inviting support for a proscribed organisation. The 2019 Act extended the offence by making it clear that it is illegal to make statements in support of a terrorist organisation or to be reckless as to whether others will be encouraged to support the organisation.
I am always mindful of the Minister’s exceptional contribution when he was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and I thank him for that. The council that represents my area is Ards and North Down Borough Council. It wanted to name a leisure grounds and playground after Blair Mayne, who is a hero of the second world war. It was called in because of the legal process in Northern Ireland, yet Newry, Mourne and Down District Council was able to name its play park, where children play, after a convicted terrorist who died by his own hand in the Maze. Is that right? Is that council not accountable under what the Minister has said, and can it not be made to change that name and remove it?
I appreciate and respect the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. He will understand that I am not familiar with all the circumstances or indeed whether it would be appropriate for me as a Minister to try to determine what a particular community would do, but obviously he makes an important point on how we reflect on the issue of building strong communities and looking beyond division and that sense of difference. Indeed, we should not be looking backward to the issues of the past, but looking forward to what I believe can be a positive, outward-looking, exciting future for Northern Ireland and all the young people who have not been touched directly by those issues of the past that sadly still, through family and through the impact of things such as paramilitarism and separation, touch Northern Ireland in this way.
I can see the hon. Lady wishes to intervene, and I will give way to her.
I genuinely thank the Minister for his efforts in Northern Ireland; he did a sterling job when he was Secretary of State. The crux of this, in my mind, is the victims of South Down, where I believe this House has a responsibility, while councils sit within the Northern Ireland remit. This House needs to take action against a Member of this House who has an office named after two convicted IRA terrorists. I know that the Minister is bringing his remarks to a close, but could he clarify how we can have this investigated and, ultimately, overturned?
A number of the issues of which the hon. Lady speaks are, in essence, matters for the House and equally for some of the external bodies that maintain standards in relation to the House. I do not have direct oversight or responsibility for those particular organisations. I think I am correct in saying that the Leader of the House has that relationship on issues of policy. I will certainly draw her comments to the attention of the Leader of the House, which is probably the most appropriate way that I can approach this.
I hope the hon. Lady will have heard from me the emphasis that we give to confronting terrorism in all its forms and its glorification. Our approach to terrorism makes it illegal to make statements in support of a terrorist organisation, or to be reckless as to whether others will be encouraged to support such an organisation. It is rightly for the police and relevant prosecution services to decide whether any offence has been committed and whether it would be appropriate to bring charges in the circumstances. That is rightly a matter for the independent law enforcement agencies, not this House.
In conclusion, I would like again to sincerely thank the hon. Lady for raising these issues and all those who are working to tackle the threat of terrorism across the United Kingdom—all of the United Kingdom. Whatever their ideology or motivation, terrorists seek to undermine our way of life, but our message is clear: we will never compromise on the values that they hate. We will not allow them to encourage or glorify terrorism and push their warped view of the world on others, and we will maintain our relentless determination to tackle terrorism in all its forms.
For clarification, I will ensure that this matter, in so far as it relates to a person who has been elected to this House and is therefore perhaps a matter for Mr Speaker, is drawn to Mr Speaker’s attention.
Question put and agreed to.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Written StatementsI intend to lay legislation in 2021 which will commence the Criminal Finances Act 2017 in Northern Ireland. As part of this, I will issue updated codes of practice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 contains a comprehensive package of measures designed to make the recovery of unlawfully held assets more effective. The operation of certain powers within POCA are subject to guidance in various codes of practice issued by the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice and Scottish Ministers.
The existing codes of practice need to be updated to reflect my intention to commence the Criminal Finances Act in Northern Ireland, following consent from the Justice Minister, Naomi Long. The changes to the codes will not come in to force until the Criminal Finances Act has come in to force in Northern Ireland.
The Proceeds of Crime Act provides that before a revised code of practice is issued, I must consider any representations made and modify the codes as appropriate, and subsequently lay the codes before Parliament for approval. As such, I will launch a consultation today, 1 December, for eight weeks.
I intend to consult on changes to the following codes of practice:
The investigation code of practice issued under section 377 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides guidance for investigators in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The search, seizure and detention of property code of practice issued under section 195S of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides guidance in relation to certain reserved functions in Northern Ireland.
The recovery of cash: search powers codes of practice issued under section 292 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides guidance for investigators in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The recovery of listed assets: search powers codes of practice issued under section 303G of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides guidance for investigators in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The Attorney General will also consult on changes to the investigation code of practice issued under section 377A of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides guidance for prosecutors in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
I will arrange for a copy of the consultation documents to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
[HCWS613]
(3 years, 12 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Law Enforcement and Security (Separation Issues etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and good morning to other members of the Committee.
The Committee will be aware that the Government have been preparing for the end of the transition period on 31 December. This statutory instrument forms one of the legislative changes we are making as part of those preparations to ensure that the law is clear and accessible on cross-border law enforcement and criminal justice matters. I have no doubt members of the Committee will have studied the statutory instrument carefully and read the accompanying impact assessment and explanatory memorandum. I hope it is clear from those not just what the regulations do, but what they do not do.
The regulations we are debating today are required under any European Union exit scenario. They will not enact an outcome of any negotiations. To that end, they are scenario agnostic. Instead, they will provide legal and operational clarity regarding the handling of live law enforcement and criminal justice related cases and procedures at the end of the transition period, and will ensure that the United Kingdom has a fully functioning statute book.
The regulations will do that by performing three main functions. First, they will make the changes needed in UK law to give full effect to the separation provisions contained in the withdrawal and separation agreements. These provisions concern ongoing cases and procedures at the end of the transition period, and place reciprocal obligations on the UK and European economic area-European Free Trade Association states regarding their handling.
Secondly, and in a similar vein, they will make the necessary amendments in UK law to give full effect to the related data provisions contained within those agreements. These provisions concern data accrued before the end of the transition period or under the separation provisions, and will provide clarity for operational partners regarding the handling of such data.
Thirdly, the regulations will address a number of deficiencies that would otherwise arise at the end of the transition period, for example where new EU law has come into force during the period since the Law Enforcement and Security (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 were passed. Addressing those remaining deficiencies will ensure that the UK has a fully functioning and relevant domestic statute book at the end of the transition period.
Overall, the scope of this statutory instrument is narrow. It will give full effect to the separation provisions in the withdrawal and separation agreements by making the necessary technical changes in UK law. Making these changes will provide legal and operational clarity on the handling of live law enforcement and criminal justice cases at the end of the transition period, and will therefore enable the UK to meet its obligations under these agreements.
The regulations are required regardless of the outcome of any negotiations, and form part of a package of legislative changes we are making to ensure that the UK is ready for the end of the transition period. The safety and security of our citizens is the Government’s top priority and this statutory instrument helps to support that.
I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Although I appreciate the Opposition’s support for the statutory instrument, unsurprisingly, I do not accept the shadow Minister’s contentions about the Government’s approach and posture. I say to him that the UK is, and will continue to be, a global leader on security and one of the safest countries in the world. The Government take their responsibilities for the safety and security of the people of this country incredibly seriously.
As I have highlighted, the regulations will provide legal and operational clarity regarding the handling of live cases and procedures at the end of the transition period, and they will ensure the UK has a fully functioning statute book. As I have explained, they are required under any scenario, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. Talks obviously continue in Brussels. There has been a constructive atmosphere, and progress has been made on putting legal texts together, but there are still significant differences on the familiar difficult issues—the so-called level playing field, and obviously in relation to fishing. Time is short, and we are focused on reaching an agreement with the EU. In the space of criminal justice, there is a good degree of convergence in what the UK and EU are seeking to negotiate on operational capabilities. In any negotiation, however, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We obviously look to continue those negotiations and to find a solution that fully respects the UK’s sovereignty.
I shall respond to some of the points made by the shadow Minister in relation to a non-negotiated outcome, which I think was the main thrust of his remarks. In the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement, the UK has well-developed and well-rehearsed plans in place. He speaks about the incredibly important role of the National Police Chiefs’ Council as well as the National Crime Agency, and I pay tribute to them for all their efforts and their work in seeking to ensure that we are well prepared under any scenario. If the shadow Minister looks at those letters, he will see that they underline those organisations’ preparedness. I pay tribute again to them for the work that they have put in.
Does the Minister agree with Martin Hewitt that the loss of tools will mean that, even with the contingencies in place, systems will be slower, provide less visibility and make joined-up working more cumbersome? That is not my contention; that is what the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council said.
I will come to the hon. Member’s broader point. We can obviously discuss the specific issue of the second-generation Schengen information system, SIS II, and what that does and does not do. Notably, it was introduced in this country only in 2015. We had been reliant on various other measures, such as Interpol, to be able to facilitate exchanges.
This country will remain a safe place, and I reject any contention that there is any lack of emphasis on national security or on ensuring that we do not continue to be a global leader in the way that this country has been.
Perhaps I can help the hon. Member by saying that the plans for transitioning will clearly involve co-operation with EU member states in order to reach alternative non-EU arrangements by the end of the transition period where available. Broadly speaking, that would mean making more use of Interpol, Council of Europe conventions and bilateral channels, which are tried and tested mechanisms that the UK already uses for co-operation with many non-EU countries.
I have asked the Minister a very specific question: does he agree with the assessment of Martin Hewitt, the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council? In a letter to the Home Affairs Committee, he expressed in stark terms his concerns about these specific matters. Does the Minister agree with him or not?
I think the shadow Minister’s points are specifically about the second-generation Schengen information system. We have always said—I have said it myself before—that there will be some mutual loss of capability in the event that the UK no longer has access to SIS II. That is why we offered to reach an agreement with the EU that delivers a similar capability. The Commission maintains that it is not possible legally for the UK to continue to co-operate through SIS II after the transition period, but we have maintained our offer. Obviously, we know that there is clear benefit on all sides to working together, which is why we are positive about a continuing relationship with our European partners. That allows us to benefit through our collective and shared security. In the absence of SIS II, we will use Interpol channels, which predate our SIS II access and provide the capability to exchange data and communicate with all our international partners quickly and securely. I underline that the UK has an excellent relationship with Interpol in that regard.
Work continues on the issues and on preparations for all outcomes. The hon. Member for St Helens North highlights national security and counter-terrorism. National security has always been the responsibility of member states. Co-operation with European partners on national security largely takes place outside EU structures and so is not dependent on our membership of the EU. Our bilateral and multilateral co-operation will continue regardless of the outcome of any negotiations. It is important to highlight the work of organisations such as the Counter Terrorism Group, which facilitates counter-terrorism co-operation across 30 European intelligence and security services.
It is important to stress the steps that have been taken, such as the establishment and funding of the International Crime Coordination Centre to help police forces adapt to new processes after transition. Alongside extensive domestic preparations, we are also engaging with member states who have expressed their willingness to continue to share critical law enforcement data with the UK using Interpol channels. Although I recognise that today’s statutory instrument is narrow, dealing with the effective continuation of various operational data sharing post transition that may have commenced before the end of the transition period, no one in this Committee should take anything I say today, as the shadow Minister has tried to play it, as anything other than an indication of our determination to ensure that the UK remains a leader in security. Steps have been taken by police, the NCA and other partners to see that we are ready and we have given them support. Clearly, we would like an agreement with our European partners. That is where the Government’s emphasis continues to be, and we remain positive that even though gaps remain and even though time is short, that can still be achieved in the time available. That is where the Government’s focus remains.
Question put and agreed to.
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. May I just say to Members that it is unfair to those the call list if I cannot get through it? We were slow on the last set of questions, and topical questions are meant to be short and punchy. Please let us work together. It is not fair on those who are missing out.
As the right hon. Lady has highlighted, in the absence of SIS II we will use Interpol channels to exchange information with EU member states on persons of interest. All incoming Interpol circulations, notices and diffusions are uploaded to UK border and policing systems. Our use of Interpol predates our SIS II access, and provides the capability to exchange data and communicate with all our international partners quickly and securely.
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a statement regarding the UK terrorism threat level. The UK faces a serious and enduring threat from terrorism. Recent events in France and Vienna have provided a stark and brutal reminder of the risks that we face and the continuing need to be resolute in the face of those who would wish to sow division and hatred. This Government are committed to tacking terrorism in all its forms and to supporting our friends, partners and allies against those who would do us harm. We stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of France and Austria at this time of hurt and pain. Our thoughts are with the bereaved and all those who mourn the loss of loved ones. We have made formal offers of support to their Governments and underlined our shared resolve to stand together in solidarity against the extremists who despise our liberal values and our very way of life.
Since March 2017, UK police and security services have foiled 27 plots, including eight motivated by right-wing ideologies. The threat level system is designed to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. It is a tool used by security practitioners working across different sectors and used by the police to determine the level of their overall protective security activity. It is also an important way of keeping the public informed about the threat from terrorism and to provide the context to understand why security measures are in place.
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, JTAC, is responsible for setting the threat level to the UK from terrorism. JTAC operates independently of Ministers and keeps the threat level under constant review. It is based on the latest intelligence from our world-leading intelligence agencies and from our allies around the globe and considers factors including capability, intent and timescale. JTAC took the decision on Tuesday to change the UK threat level from international terrorism from “substantial”, meaning an attack is likely, to “severe”, meaning an attack is highly likely. JTAC keeps the threat level under review based on the very latest intelligence and taking into account international events. The recent terrorist attacks in France and Monday night’s attack in Vienna suggest that the temperature of the threat in Europe is rising.
I should stress that this change in the threat level is a precautionary measure and is not based on any specific threat. However, there is a risk that the recent attacks in France and Austria could have a galvanising effect in other parts of Europe, including the UK, and the change of threat level is therefore seen as prudent. We know that these incidents can be exploited by those who want to further their own cause, especially on online platforms. I am pleased to note that communities from across the UK stand together in uniformly condemning the attacks in Vienna and France. In particular, they stress that places of worship should never be targets for violence, and that religion should not be used to justify murder.
The national terrorism threat level takes account of the threat from all forms of terrorism, including—but not only—Islamist and right-wing terrorism and Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Great Britain. A separate threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Northern Ireland is set by the Security Service, MI5, and remains at “severe”. When JTAC’s assessment of the threat changes, it is important that it is communicated as quickly as possible to ensure that those who rely on it to inform their decision making and planning can do so.
Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu has confirmed that the police have activated their established planning mechanisms following the change in threat level, and the public will see additional police officers deployed to certain places over the coming days. Our counter-terrorism strategy, Contest, sets out how the Government will confront all forms of terrorism. It aims to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism, so that our people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. Already, the Government have taken steps to ensure that counter-terrorism policing and the Security Service have the necessary tools and powers to keep us all safe from the threat from terrorism.
In response to the horrific Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks, the Government acted swiftly by passing emergency legislation, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, to end the automatic release of terrorist and terrorism-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill is currently being debated by Parliament. It will improve protections for the public by strengthening every stage in the process of dealing with terrorist offenders. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the police, security and emergency services, who show such resilience, courage and professionalism when responding to terrorist incidents, both in the immediate aftermath and in the investigations that follow. They put themselves in harm’s way to protect us, and we should never forget their service in keeping us all safe. Their skill and dedication is why we constantly invest in our security and intelligence agencies, to help ensure that they have the resources they need to deal with the threats we face.
We also continue to challenge ourselves as to what more we should do. The public inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack is currently taking evidence. I know that this is a difficult and painful time for many people. The inquiry is rightly examining the events of that terrible night so that those who survived and those who lost loved ones can get the answers they need, and so that we learn and apply the lessons, whatever they may be.
Finally, at this time, I urge the public to remain vigilant. We should be alert but not alarmed, and any suspicious or concerning behaviour should be reported to the police. Those responsible for these attacks want to change our very way of life. Our clear message to them is that our values, our freedoms and our principles are what make us strong, and that they will never succeed. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support and that of the Opposition. As he highlighted, the Home Secretary spoke to the Leader of the Opposition. Indeed, I also spoke to leaders in the devolved Administrations to ensure that there was good communication and co-ordination across the whole United Kingdom, recognising that this threat level speaks to all the UK.
The hon. Gentleman asks about the role of JTAC. I can say to him that JTAC keeps the threat level under constant review, so it is a question always of assessing not only the intelligence and information that is available, but the context, which is why, as I indicated, the international perspective is also so important when analysing this.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the public communication. I underline that the counter-terrorism policing network effectively sent a communication around the entirety of the network so that policing in all parts of the UK had consistent messaging. There are established processes and procedures that apply to ensure that we step up visibility in public places, thinking about how to provide support to places that may have areas of vulnerability, crowded places and all those sorts of themes. Therefore, this is part and parcel of the standard approach that is reflected in the resources we provide to our intelligence and counter-terrorism policing.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the Prevent strategy. We are in the final stages of the recruitment of the independent reviewer, and there is a real opportunity to examine those elements of our work and see what further steps we need to take. As I have indicated to the House already this afternoon, we will continue to challenge ourselves on what additional measures may be appropriate.
In terms of Northern Ireland, we judge that a separate assessment is appropriate. It is a separate process that operates, and the Security Service is involved in that step, looking at the threat, sadly, from dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland. That threat very much endures. We remain vigilant and robust in meeting the challenges there, in co-ordination with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, as well as other agencies.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. We stand united against those who would seek to divide us. National security and the safety of our citizens remain the utmost priority for this Government.
I welcome the fact that the Government have chosen to make this statement. The attack plans of lone terrorists are obviously the hardest to anticipate, yet their behaviour often sends signals to those in their immediate circle. What advice does my right hon. Friend have for people who see worrying signs that someone they know is developing an extremist outlook?
My right hon. Friend makes a really important point about the nature of the threat that we face from self-motivated individuals, but they are not isolated and they are not alone; they sit within communities and within families. They have connections with different agencies. That is why we introduced the Prevent duty on statutory agencies, but if people have concerns, they should report them in confidence to the police. The counter-terrorism hotline is 0800 789 321. There are additional resources online at gov.uk and also the Action Counters Terrorism—or ACT—app. That can be downloaded and provides further information and ways to report.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. This is a prudent move, and the United Kingdom Government have the full support of the Scottish National party and the Scottish Government in the fight to keep all our communities safe from terrorism. I take this opportunity to express condolences on behalf of my party to those bereaved or injured in the recent terrorist atrocities in Vienna and across France and to express our solidarity with the people of Austria and France. I pay tribute to those who risk their lives to keep us safe. The funeral of Sergeant Matt Ratana yesterday was a sad reminder of the high price they pay for our safety. I salute his courage and his service and extend the sincerest condolences of my party to his family and friends.
Will the Minister tell us what work is being carried out with local communities and faith groups to ensure a co-ordinated response as the threat level is increased? What support and assistance are being offered to minority groups in need of additional reassurance? He will be aware that in Scotland, the delivery of the Prevent strategy is devolved and has worked well to foster strong relations between communities and the police. Will he consider looking at the success of Scotland’s approach and seeing what lessons can be learned for the rest of the United Kingdom?
Finally, it is the remit of the Home Office to ensure that all our communities are kept safe and secure. In mid-September, counter-terrorism police warned the Home Secretary that it was suspected that a far-right extremist had attempted to carry out a terrorist attack at a solicitors firm in London, yet in early October she and the Prime Minister went on to intensify their anti-lawyer rhetoric. Will the Minister acknowledge that there is a responsibility on politicians and other public figures to avoid saying anything that could inflame tensions or put people at risk?
I welcome the support that the hon. and learned Lady gives to the steps that JTAC has taken, and I underline to her the contact that I had shortly afterwards with the Cabinet Secretary for Justice to again emphasise that co-ordinated approach across the United Kingdom. The hon. and learned Lady rightly highlights those who put their very lives on the line for us, and the funeral of Matt Ratana, as she highlights, underlines that so clearly. I know the thoughts of the whole House will be with his friends, his loved ones and his colleagues today.
The hon. and learned Lady highlights the issue of communities. The counter-terrorism network clearly works across the UK to provide support, contact and advice to faith communities and other places of vulnerability in order to ensure that appropriate measures can be put in place. The places of worship scheme, which was established by the Home Office, has awarded 183 grants in England and Wales. I also highlight the broader work that we co-ordinate with the Scottish Government to ensure that we can work and learn together, recognising, as Neil Basu said, that it is communities standing together that defeats terrorism.
In relation to the hon. and learned Lady’s last point, let me say very gently that this case is pre-trial and it would not be appropriate to provide any further comment that may have an impact on legal proceedings.
I thank my right hon. Friend for making it clear that Islamist terrorists are a threat not just to our physical security, but to all that we stand for. They are of separatist tendency, intolerant, violent and against our very way of life. Does he agree that all of us, in this House and beyond, have a duty to constantly re-emphasise our belief in democracy, a secular rule of law, freedom of the individual, religious tolerance, and equality between men and women? Do we not have a further duty to make it very clear that what we believe in is not just different from the Islamists—that what we believe in is better?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for expressing that view. It is our liberal democracy, values and principles—who we are—that these terrorists want to attack and change. We will not allow them to do so, because it is the very essence of our country, our values and our democracy that makes us strong; by being vigilant and robust in our defence of those values, we will ensure that these people never, ever succeed.
I thank the Minister for his statement. I also thank the police, and security and intelligence agencies, for the work that they continue to do to defend our values and keep us safe. I join the Minister in thinking of those who have been affected by the terrible attacks in France and Austria. We stand firm with our friends and neighbours against these violent extremists and terrorists.
Given how important it is for us to be able to work closely with our neighbours against terrorism and extremism, will the Minister update the House on the progress with establishing a new security agreement for the end of the transition process? In particular, can he confirm that the Government expect to have strong arrangements in place on information sharing, access to crucial databases, work with Europol and arrest warrants in time for 1 January, and that not to do so would make it much harder for the police and security agencies, who work so hard to keep us safe?
As the right hon. Lady will appreciate, the negotiations with our EU partners are at a sensitive point. We continue to focus firmly on security issues, but I remain positive that we will find a way through, recognising the important message that we are stronger by working together and that it is that co-ordination and co-operation that assists us all. As we look to a future beyond the end of the transition period, the focus on national security—ensuring that we are a safe nation and a safe place to be—will remain. As the negotiations continue in these crucial days, I hope that we will achieve a positive outcome that reflects the interests of us all in defending our values and our citizens.
May I put on record my gratitude, and the gratitude of my constituents and the Community Security Trust, for the decision by the Metropolitan police to provide additional patrols in the Hendon constituency following the Vienna attack? Is the Minister aware that some parts of the media erroneously reported that the attack in Vienna was at a synagogue, and that this produced an increase in the amount of online incitement from jihadists and far-right extremists? If the threat level has been changed as a result of a heightened threat to the Jewish community, can the Minister provide reassurances that sufficient police resources will be provided to meet that threat?
My hon. Friend is clearly aware of the reassurance approach that counter-terrorism policing has taken. That has led to increased patrols and discussion with the counter-terrorism policing network and the Community Security Trust, to provide that reassurance, and ensure that action is well co-ordinated. As my hon. Friend will know, the Jewish community protective security grant has been provided for protective security measures at community sites, including a number of synagogues. We keep this issue under review, recognising that important essence of support so that all communities can practise their faith, and those are precisely values that we as a country seek to uphold.
I, too, wish to extend my thoughts and prayers to the families, and to all those who have been bereaved or injured by these horrendous, horrible and evil attacks. The Vienna authorities have indicated that they failed to act on some of the advice they were given, and I hope that such a criticism could never be made of our British authorities and the good work they do. The jihadist and Islamist terror threat, and the Irish terror threat, are well known and well voiced, and this adds weight to calls to have the Muslim Brotherhood proscribed in this country. Will the Minister take this opportunity to commend the work of the National Crime Agency? It has a magnificent approach to its work across all the United Kingdom, and it works closely with our authorities in Northern Ireland. Is there any effort to extend that organisation’s footprint in Northern Ireland?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for highlighting the excellent work done by the National Crime Agency. Earlier this year I was able to travel to Northern Ireland and see the actions of the NCA, and meet some of the officers who are doing sterling work in Belfast and across the whole of Northern Ireland. It is important to continue to support that, and I underline the connections between the National Crime Agency and counter-terrorism policing. If any links or intelligence straddle organised crime and terrorism, those should be picked up, and we must ensure that that strong co-ordination has the effect on our security and safety that we all wish to see.
All of us owe a daily debt to the security services, the Foreign Office and the police for all that they do to keep us safe, and my heart goes out to all those who have lost friends and loved ones in the recent devastating attacks. I appreciate the supportive tone of those on the Opposition Front Bench, but will my right hon. Friend confirm that just a few weeks ago, when the House was asked to give our security services the support they need in the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, those on the Opposition Front Bench sat on their hands and refused to stand by our security services?
Parties across the House need to reflect on the messages they give, and Conservative Members stand full square behind our police and security agencies. That is why we judge that the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill is important to safeguard capabilities and ensure that terrorist plots can be disrupted, and our security services can certainly rely on our support, and on continued support in the future.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of this statement. He is well regarded across the House because he takes his duties seriously, and he generally goes about his business in a thoughtful and non-partisan way that prioritises keeping us all safe. I think we should place that on the record, whatever other disagreements we may occasionally have. With that in mind, is he aware of the comments of former EU security commissioner, Julian King, who said that a Brexit deal would still provide useful access to intelligence and security co-operation across the European Union, but that a no-deal Brexit would mean cutting ourselves off from that? Given his approach in other areas, what is the Minister doing to ensure that we have the best possible access to security and intelligence sharing post 31 December?
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments, and yes, I do take these issues incredibly seriously, as he well knows from the discussions on these topics that we have had over many years. Clearly, negotiations are going on with our EU partners, but if they do not conclude successfully, we will move back to pre-existing tools and powers. I would say to him that the emphasis on security and protecting our citizens is the utmost element of all that we do and therefore so is ensuring that, whatever the outcome, we keep our citizens and our country safe.
The current floundering Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, has threatened to cut the Metropolitan police budget by £110 million. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that would be grossly irresponsible and leave us at greater threat of terrorism?
I am concerned by what my hon. Friend has said. In January, the Home Secretary announced a £90 million increase in funding for counter-terrorism policing, taking the total for this year to £906 million, the highest ever. Clearly, that sits within the footprint of other policing activity, and I would say to those in authority to think carefully about the decisions they take and how they then relate to the security that we all feel.
The UK Government fund community groups to work against extremism. Were the budgets for those groups cut this year? If so, is the Minister concerned that any reduced funding at a time of increased threat could hinder efforts to help communities fight the battle against extremism?
I would say to the hon. Gentleman that clearly we have supported communities. We have supported funding for places of worship and those who may be effective. We have our Prevent strategy, which absolutely is about engaging and ensuring that communities can come forward, and that we do all work together. That remains part of our strategy, keeping us all safe.
Colleagues across the House have talked rightly about defending our liberal values, but it is first and foremost our people we must defend—the first duty of any Government. Can my right hon. Friend elaborate to the House what powers and tools he is giving to our police forces, including my own force, Thames Valley police, to keep us safe from this emerging and evolving terrorist threat?
As I have indicated, the Government will do all that is necessary to ensure that the counter-terrorism, policing and security services have the necessary tools. We have acted swiftly in seeing the end of automatic release for terror-connected offenders, and the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill will strengthen things further, ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorism offenders will spend longer in custody and strengthening the regime on terrorism prevention and investigation measures. We stand reflective, and the Home Secretary and I have asked officials to review with partners existing and proposed powers in the light of the horrific attacks in France and Austria to consider what more, if anything, might be needed.
The likes of me were saddened and sickened by the horrific terrorist atrocities perpetrated recently in Paris, Nice and Vienna. While expressing condolences, I would like to convey my solidarity with the good people of France and Austria in the battle against extremist ideology. While our brave counter-terrorism police and security services have already thwarted several terrorist plots here in the UK, and I thank and commend them for helping to keep us all safe, the Security Minister will appreciate that our constituents will be extremely concerned by the heightened terror threat right here in the UK. Will he outline what lessons have been learned for the counter-terrorist strategy in our country from what has happened on the continent?
Clearly, there is a broader network of information sharing, intelligence sharing and working with partners—our Five Eyes group, as well as our European partners. Therefore those exchanges, that work and that sharing of good practice and ideas are very firmly in place, and our Contest counter-terrorism strategy has informed the thinking of others. We remain vigilant. We remain reflective and open-minded in terms of how we can strengthen our tools and powers and strengthen our approach, and it is by that co-ordination and co-operation that we can do so.
I very much welcome the Minister’s statement. He has outlined the number of incidents that have been foiled by our excellent intelligence and police services. Can he clarify the number of people currently considered potentially to be violent Daesh or far right-inspired extremists in the United Kingdom, and has that number gone down or up over the past 12 months?
I commend the work of my hon. Friend in challenging so much of these issues around extremism, and indeed the work that he has done on the issue of faith in such a positive way. He will understand that I will not get drawn into matters of intelligence, but the head of MI5 has said that there are several thousand subjects of interest that are monitored and assessed. We are very vigilant against the threats and challenges that are there. Therefore, through our approach on the threat level and our approaches through the Contest counter-terrorism strategy, we challenge ourselves to do all that we possibly can. Equally, this Government will support our counter-terrorism policing and the Security Service in that endeavour in keeping us safe.
Those detained under terrorism legislation are entitled to legal representation. Many, after all, are released without charge, or indeed even stain on their character. Northern Ireland has previously seen attacks on lawyers doing such work, as the deaths of Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson testify to. Will the Minister ensure that legal representatives are not besmirched or undermined, and that their necessary and appropriate role in due process and the rule of law is respected?
This Government stand behind the rule of law. It is part of the essence of who we are as a country. That obviously does necessitate, require and oblige fair representation. I say to the hon. Gentleman in very strong terms that I condemn and take strong issue with those terrorists who would seek to undermine our very values. That is why I made the comments in the statement about seeing that as a Government, as a House and as a country we stand up for our values and stand against those who would wish to destroy them.
Having devised, implemented and managed effective and successful Prevent programmes at home and overseas, I know that the best way to prevent terrorist atrocities from taking place is stopping people being drawn into terrorism in the first place. Will my right hon. Friend update the House on the progress of the Prevent review, and does he agree that we must make this programme more effective?
I commend my hon. Friend for the work that he has done and the powerful and important point that he makes—that we need to do all we can to prevent people from becoming engaged in terrorism and moving down a pathway that takes them further and further into it. We launched a full and open competition to appoint the next independent reviewer of Prevent, and the successful candidate will be announced as soon as possible. I want to get on with this. There is some very good practice within Prevent, but equally we need to challenge ourselves as to how we can improve that—what more we can do—and that is what I am committed to doing.
Coming from Manchester, I can say that we stand in absolute solidarity with the people of Paris, Nice and Vienna. National security and protecting the population is one of the most important duties of Government. Indeed, it is something that this House should always take seriously. I thank and support the police, security and intelligence services in the difficult job that they do to keep us safe from vile acts of terrorism. Given the upcoming comprehensive spending review, can the Minister tell the House what level of resources our counter-terror policing has requested and whether that funding will be forthcoming?
I understand why the hon. Gentleman takes me down that route, but the spending review is obviously ongoing. We do take these issues of national security incredibly seriously, and announcements in relation to the spending review and allocations to Departments will be made in due course.
South Kensington in my constituency is the heart of the French community in the UK. Given the recent terrorist atrocities in France, can my right hon. Friend assure me that we are doing everything to protect French sites in the capital?
I can give that assurance to my hon. Friend. It is a point of discussion that I have had with counter-terrorism policing, and I know how seriously it takes this in looking at sites and providing support to the community. It is the richness of our community that I think makes our capital city and our country so special, and why we give that sense of reassurance to everyone here and stand against those who despise that and would wish to destroy it.
I know that the Muslim community in Swansea will be appalled by and condemn the awful terrorist attacks in France and Austria and stand in solidarity with the victims. Islam, after all, is the Arabic word for peace. Does the Minister agree that we need to ensure all our communities stand together side by side to identify and to root out terrorism, whether it is based in a perversion of mainstream religion or in right-wing violence, and that all our communities deserve the protection the state must apply in that process?
I do. The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point about the peaceful religion of Islam, and the twisted perversion that terrorists seek to take to it to advance their twisted cause. I think it is important to underline that message of standing together shoulder to shoulder with all of our communities against those who would wish to create division, hatred and extremism. That is not what our country is all about, and it is why, as a community and as people, we stand against those who would use those sorts of terrorist tactics, which are in complete opposition to who we are.
The UK’s terrorism threat level has just been raised to severe, and from today the Government are once again telling people to stay at home because of the risk caused by the virus, with Remembrance Sunday services cancelled up and down the country, yet tonight thousands of people will be protesting in London, which is a complete slap in the face to my constituents in Redcar and Cleveland. Can the Minister confirm that, in the light of these things, today’s protest should not be going ahead, and will he encourage the police to enforce the law, protect the public and disperse the protest?
In response to my hon. Friend, I think I would make the point that the right to peaceful protest is one of the cornerstones of our democracy, but in these unprecedented times any gathering risks spreading the disease leading to more deaths, so it is vital that we all play our part in controlling the virus. People must follow the rules on meeting others, which apply to all gatherings and therefore to protests, too. As they have done throughout the pandemic, the police and local authorities will engage, explain and encourage people to follow the rules before moving on to enforcing the law.
Having recently joined the Intelligence and Security Committee and as a member of the Home Affairs Committee, I have huge respect for the vital work of our police and security services in keeping our citizens safe and protecting our values. However, it is strongly suspected that covid lockdowns have increased the conditions in which largely unknown lone individuals are radicalised online by terror groups, including those of the far right. Can the Minister say what he is doing to review the adequacy of the powers to monitor and take action on potentially dangerous individuals?
The hon. Lady sits on the ISC, and I commend the Committee and the comments of its Chair earlier in relation to these really important issues. The hon. Lady is right to highlight how the increased use of the internet as a result of covid-19 has brought into focus the need for us to remain vigilant of terrorists seeking to exploit the situation. We are working closely with tech companies to ensure that preventing terrorists’ use of their platforms continues to be a priority and that companies are responding quickly to any emerging threats. We need to focus on the issue of end-to-end encryption, which intentionally blinds tech companies’ access to content and would have a disastrous impact on public safety. That is why we ask them to find solutions that put the public’s safety first, and they must not turn a blind eye to this problem.
I thank the Minister for what he has said. Last weekend, the papers in Northern Ireland reported that dissident republicans had a very large bomb, and intelligence agencies indicated that they were trying to find it. For our police to effectively prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, they need to have all the funding and resources required. Can he confirm that the £90 million funding boost that this Government delivered for our counter-terrorism police this year ensures that our regional forces have the capabilities to mount a swift and effective response to any terrorist attack and that additional funding is making its way to Northern Ireland as we deal with our additional threats of the home-grown variety—dissident republicans?
It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know of my focus on issues of Northern Ireland’s security, given the incredible and positive time that I had experiencing the wonderful people of Northern Ireland. We remain very conscious and vigilant of the threat. As he will understand, I will not comment on issues of intelligence, but I can assure him that we take a co-ordinated and resolute approach, which plays into the consideration of funding, to ensure that all parts of our United Kingdom are safe and secure.
The terrorist threat to this country does not only come from isolated individuals but from some hostile states as well. Can my right hon. Friend outline the powers that this Government have given our police forces and security services to ensure that they are able to combat those threats as well?
I appreciate the powerful point that my hon. Friend makes about the threats to this country. We stand resolute and vigilant against the threat from hostile states. We are actively considering further measures in this space. There is a commitment in the Queen’s Speech on further legislation to counter hostile state activity, and I will update the House further in due course in that regard.
The Minister will be all too aware that many individuals start their path to extremism and radicalisation on the internet. With our lives moving online even more this year due to the pandemic, does he agree that it is even more crucial to move forward with legislation such as the much delayed online harms Bill and that there can be no excuses for further stalling?
I have already outlined the emphasis that we give to the online space, which we will not allow to be in any way a place where those who wish to foment terrorism or extremism are able to thrive. That is why we are working with online companies and have established the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which does takedown work. The response to the online harms White Paper will be published shortly, with legislation to follow thereafter.
The recent terrorist attacks across Europe are deeply concerning, and I want to thank the emergency services and multiple agencies in Carshalton and Wallington for their joined-up approach to preparations for major incidents. Can the Minister assure me that this multi-agency approach is being taken across the United Kingdom and that all these services have the powers and resources they need to deal with developing threats?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his words of support to our emergency services for the incredible job that they do. As I have indicated, we have strengthened the powers, we keep this under review, and we have provided additional resources. But I underline that national security and keeping our citizens safe is the priority of this Government, and we will do all we can to see that that continues.
My thoughts are with those who recently lost their lives and were injured in the horrific attacks in France and Austria. We must not let recent events and the increased terror threat level correspond with increases in racism and hate crimes against our Muslim communities by the far right. Will the Minister outline the conversations that he may have had with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government about the actions that the Government intend to take to stop that happening?
The hon. Lady makes a powerful and important point about supporting all communities. The issue of right-wing terrorism is firmly on my mind. We have taken action on proscribing various groups. We keep that under careful and steady review.
As I indicated, since March 2017, the police have disrupted eight right-wing terrorist plots. It is concerning to see the ages of some of those involved, but we work closely with our colleagues across Government to take action and to provide assurance to all communities that hatred and division are firmly responded to and that we act together as a collective community.
The attacks in Paris, Nice and Vienna are attacks on all of us that cut to the heart of our values. We all stand in solidarity with the people of France and Austria. To tackle the constantly evolving threat, it is vital that we give our security services the tools that they need and that we learn the lessons of past attacks. With that in mind, will the Minister urgently introduce legislation when the Manchester bombing inquiry reports on its findings?
As I have already indicated, we will continue to challenge ourselves as to what more we need to do. As we speak, the Manchester inquiry is rightly asking searching questions and taking evidence clearly. As I said, I know that this is a very difficult and painful time for many people. We want to see that inquiry conclude and to reflect on its recommendations. It is important to state that we have already taken a number of steps, but if there is more learning that we need to take or apply, we will do so.
The Minister knows that, despite our political differences, I have a great deal of respect for him, so I am sure it was only an oversight that he did not reply to part of the question of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). She reminded us that we all have a responsibility to remember that if we allow the language of hatred and intolerance to become acceptable in our lives, actions of hatred and intolerance will follow.
Last night, for example, election observers from the internationally respected Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe went as far as to accuse the man who claims to be the leader of the free world of deliberate attempts to weaken confidence in the election process. I give the Minister another chance to follow the example of his colleague the Justice Secretary earlier this week in committing to being mindful of the language that he uses and urging all his Cabinet colleagues to do the same.
As the hon. Gentleman said, we have had a number of discussions on many different fronts over the years. I stand for the rule of law and for our upholding it to ensure that we reflect on seeing it as a core part of our values as a country. Therefore, we stand shoulder to shoulder against those who would seek to create terrorism, whether against lawyers or parts of our community. Terrorism and hatred have no place in our society and the Government will always stand against them.
My right hon. Friend will be well aware that many of the attacks across Europe have been religiously motivated. Sadly, our places of worship across England and across the UK are currently closed for collective worship, but available for private worship. In particular, Hindu new year is in two weeks’ time. Can he confirm what arrangements have been made to make sure that people who attend places of religious worship for private prayer can do so safely and securely and that places of worship will be thoroughly protected during the lockdown?
If it is helpful to my hon. Friend, I can reassure him that Counter Terrorism Policing has asked all forces to review all events over the next 14 days to ensure that appropriate advice and security arrangements are put in place. As we have a heightened threat level, it is important that we reflect on forthcoming events and where communities may be celebrating or marking particular events in the religious calendar. I underline that and recognise that, yes, of course, at this time when communal acts of worship are not permitted, notwithstanding that there will be individual acts of worship, places themselves may be potential challenges, which is why the police are taking that co-ordinated approach in offering reassurance and advice for the good reasons that he highlights.
I thank both the Minister for his statement and the security services for the work that they do, day in, day out, to keep us safe. We know that many perpetrators of terrorism are isolated and vulnerable individuals and so taking a safeguarding approach is really important. May I ask him what terms of reference will be in the Prevent review to ensure that a safeguarding approach is taken?
When I was last in this role a number of years ago, that element of safeguarding was how I very firmly articulated our work in relation to Prevent, to deal with some vulnerable individuals who may be isolated and who may face a whole host of different factors. For many of them, it is about ensuring that we have the right preventive measures and the right support measures in place, which is why so many different agencies are involved.
We are in the final stages of appointing the independent reviewer, and the terms of reference will be discussed with that individual. That will enable the review to move forward and, I hope, ensure that we have the right learning and the right lessons that we can apply so that we take action not only to prevent, but to safeguard.
As my right hon. Friend will know, the threat that we face from terrorism is ever evolving. Will he tell the House what technology and data tools have been made available to our security services so that they can stop these attacks before they occur? What monitoring and disruption weapons are in the armoury that he can give to our very, very important security services?
I recognise the leadership and the interest that my hon. Friend has shown in science and technology over so many years and I commend him for everything that he does. I hope that he will understand that I will not be drawn down a route of opening up techniques and tactics and the way in which our intelligence and security agencies operate, but I can say that we keep these issues under very careful review. We are blessed with world-leading intelligence agencies which invest very firmly in ensuring that they have the right capabilities to meet the challenges of an ever more data-driven age, and they will continue to do so.
The last question from Steven Bonnar is, I believe, audio only. [Interruption.] Unfortunately, we are unable to get through to the hon. Member.
Virtual participation in proceeding concluded (Order, 4 June).
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberI do not know whether this will be helpful to the right hon. Gentleman, but I just draw his attention to paragraph 3.10 of the supported guidance, which underlines that the person granting the authorisation should hold a “reasonable belief” that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate. The important point he makes is addressed through the guidance.
The Minister does help me and I am grateful for his assistance, because if that reasonable belief is in the guidance, there is absolutely no reason why it should not be in the Bill. As I said to the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), guidance can be changed without any meaningful oversight from this House. The Minister makes the point for me very well, so perhaps amendment 14, which I had thought modest, is more significant than I realised. I look forward to hearing his acceptance of it—if we could do that without a Division, it would be all the better. [Interruption.] God loves a trier.
Amendment 15 deals with the issue of economic grounds. As things stand, the Bill allows crimes to be authorised if they are necessary
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”
That conjures up all sorts of delicious prospects. If it is decided that we need a different Governor of the Bank of England, can we authorise a CHIS to wipe him out? Could we use this if we decided that a no-deal Brexit was not in the UK’s economic interests? There are at least two or three good Netflix series in this; the possibilities are almost endless. What crimes might be authorised in order to entice a foreign investor to bring their money to the UK or a car manufacturer to keep its UK plant open? There is nothing here to prevent corruption or bribery from being used in these circumstances. Amendment 15 would restrict these grounds to cases that are relevant not only in an economic sense, but to national security. There is precedent for this approach, because amendment 15 matches exactly the amendments the Government themselves made to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill last year, after my noble Friend Lord Paddick raised similar concerns about detaining people in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. If it was good enough for that Bill, there is no reason why it should not be good enough for this one.
Amendments 18 and 19 involve oversight by prosecutors and would require criminal conduct authorisations to be shared with prosecutors before they take effect, to allow for proper independent oversight of these decisions. The amendments cover the same sort of grounds as many others have in their amendments, most notably the Mother of the House, and I believe the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) will cover this in her contributions. They all come to the same point that there has to be independent oversight where matters are as serious as this.
Amendments 16 and 17 deal with the number of different bodies that can be authorised under the Bill as it currently stands. At present, it extends well beyond the obvious candidates and includes: MI5, the police, the security services, the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling Commission, and the Department of Health and Social Care. With these amendments, we seek to reduce the list to the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services.
Mr Evans, you and I have visited an abattoir in the past and we know that there is plenty of blood in an abattoir already without actually adding to it by empowering meat inspectors to be authorised to spill even more of it. We all know, as we complete our tax returns every year, that taxation can be a tortuous business, but I do not think that we should be giving the taxman the power to apply the thumbscrews.
The need for these extra bodies to be given authorisation under these provisions has never been properly explained from the Treasury Bench. Their inclusion demeans the seriousness of those acts, especially by the security services, the police and the Serious Fraud Office that could well be required to use them in very difficult circumstances. It looks to me, almost certainly, as if these provisions have been put in the Bill with a view to giving up the fight when the Bill gets to the other place, which, I suggest, demonstrates a lack of respect not just for them, but for this House as well.
Finally, I wish to touch on other amendments that have been moved by other right hon. Members. I have added my name to the one from the Mother of the House covering the approval of the judicial commissioner and the one removing economic interest grounds and I support their inclusion in the Bill. Amendment 13 in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), which removes murder, torture and others, would be one of the most obvious amendments that could be made to this Bill to render it genuinely fit for purpose. It is the purpose of this Bill that commands unity; it is the detail of it that requires still so much improvement.
It is an honour to follow the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), and I agree with much of what he has said. I think there is agreement in this Chamber that we need this legislation, because the hallmark of a grown-up democracy is that it does not shy away from taking the necessary actions to keep a country safe, and nor does it say, “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” This legislation puts on a statutory footing those practices that are part and parcel of security in this country. The question for all of us is whether it also provides the necessary accountability and oversight to ensure that they are just. I recognise that covid and the speed with which this legislation has been brought through militate against our doing our job properly on this, because we are doing it so quickly, but today I want to flag up one particular issue of concern. I suspect that it will be in the other place that we will see progress on these issues.
We know that this is a narrow Bill with a specific role around criminal conduct. I also recognise and understand the concerns that my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised—I am sorry that she is no longer in her place—about the ongoing inquiries and the timing of this legislation. I hope the Minister will address those points in his comments and tell us what the Government would do, should those inquiries come back with further requirements for support. I also want to put on record my support for amendment 13 and for the Front-Bench amendments from my own party.
We recognise that there are genuine concerns about the Human Rights Act. In other debates in this place, people have talked about rewriting the Act, and I hope the Minister will deal with that issue. Also, it is a circular argument to suggest that the practices set out in amendment 13 and the amendments from my own Front Bench are already covered, if the Government will not accept amendments to ensure that they are part of how this legislation is dealt with.
I also hope that the Minister will talk about the equalities impact of the legislation. I represent a community that has, at best, a tangled relationship with many of the agencies that will have these powers. We are in a position of privilege in this House, so it is right and proper that we have oversight of those who do not share those same benefits.
I rise to speak in particular to new clause 8—especially the issue at the heart of this legislation, which for me is about the people who can consent to be a covert human intelligence source. It is worth looking at the definition:
“Someone who maintains a relationship for the covert purpose of providing information to another person”—
that is, not just someone who has a one-off conversation with our security services or police about something, but someone who is asked to maintain what is potentially a position of harm to support an investigation.
The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden talked about the James Bond code. In most of our discussions about CHIS, we have envisaged those James Bond figures—the people from our security services or police conducting covert investigations. But I want to talk about those who are not the James Bonds: the children and vulnerable people who become covert human intelligence sources and who need us to make sure in this legislation that they are properly protected.
For the last year, there has been a legal challenge to the Government about how children have been used as covert human intelligence sources. It was settled last week in the High Court, when the Government agreed to update their guidance and code of practice on how children could be involved in this legislation. It is worth taking a step back at this point to reflect on that: we are talking about young people—children being asked to do what we previously envisaged James Bond doing. I hope that I am pushing at an open door with the Minister with the new clause because that code of practice and the recognition at the High Court that there was a case to answer reflect the fact that we need to get this right.
Our first instinct may be that no child should ever be involved in intelligence work in this way, and I sympathise with that. But when we look into the cases where it has happened, we see that there may be exceptional circumstances in which a child may become an informant. It is right, therefore, that we should have incredibly strict guidelines that have the interests of that child at heart when that happens. I am open to the idea that understanding what constitutes those exceptional circumstances is very difficult, but the new clause comes from the belief that the child’s primary interests should be, as a matter of fact, at the heart of any engagement with state services.
Let us talk for a minute about the children we are discussing. For many of us who represent communities where issues such as county lines are a real problem, they are the children in the gangs and those who have been part of child sexual exploitation, who may know valuable information and have relationships with those exploiting them. For the police and the security services, they become incredibly valuable sources of information.
Those are important investigations—nobody is suggesting otherwise. But the new clause recognises that there may be a conflict of interest between the investigation and the best interests of an incredibly vulnerable person. A young child drawn into county lines who knows the people organising things and has been given a gun—I can think of such cases—is still a child. We have a duty to that child to ensure that they are not exploited, even if people feel that the investigation is merited.
The Minister will say that that happens very rarely. The Government’s own figures show that 17 children in 11 jurisdictions were used in this way in the past couple of years. One of them was just 15—a 15-year-old child being asked to continue a relationship that puts them at harm because that helps an investigation. What troubled me was that one of the other Ministers told the court that we should actually make more use of children in such circumstances—that they could be valuable because they were getting involved in criminal activity themselves.
Again, take a step back and think that through. In other parts of our legislation, we recognise that when children engage in harmful practices it is our duty to stop that. Yet in that court case and this process with CHIS, Ministers are saying, “Actually, we might want to maintain that because it will help with an investigation”—the children would have “unique access” as “juvenile undercover agents”. They are children, Minister, and it is absolutely right that we act to protect them and see them as children first. That is what new clause 8 seeks to do.
I will respond to the hon. Lady formally in my winding-up speech, but I would like to stress that all public authorities that task juvenile CHIS must have regard to their safety, welfare and wellbeing, as required under sections 10 and 11 of the Children Act 2004 and the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. It is important that I state that. The hon. Lady is making some important points, which I am listening to intently, but I think it is right that I put that on the record.
I always take seriously the advice of a senior and distinguished Member of the House. I am confident that, given the amendments that we have tabled today, as the Bill makes further progress through the House, our colleagues in the other place will be cognisant and take note of that. That is why we are asking the Government to listen carefully to what we propose in our amendments.
In that vein, I give my strong support to new clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy). It seeks to ensure that a CCA cannot be applied to a trade union and, specifically, to blacklisted workers. Of course, it was the previous Labour Government who made blacklisting illegal in 2010.
On the issue of oversight and accountability, I wish briefly to mention new clause 3, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. With the additional scrutiny, oversight and accountability that are at the heart of the right hon. Gentleman’s sensible proposal, the Secretary of State would be compelled, at the end of each relevant 12-month period, to make a report to the ISC that contains key information on both the number of CCAs authorised and the categories of the conduct authorised. That seems to me to be an eminently reasonable and sensible proposal.
On new clause 2, given the nature of some of the networks that the Bill looks to disrupt, there are clear concerns about its impact on communities and vulnerable individuals throughout our country. One important example is the gendered impact of actions taken by covert human intelligence sources. The Minister must commit, today, that the Government will seek to uphold the highest possible standards on gender impact.
New clause 8 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). I have some experience of campaigning with her and know how formidable she can be on these issues. Her new clause raises another crucial point, which is the need to safeguard the welfare of children, vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery and trafficking. It would achieve that by ensuring that a CCA is authorised for a child or vulnerable adult only in certain exceptional circumstances, and by ensuring that an appropriate adult is present at meetings between the source and those representing the investigating authority.
As outlined in new clause 2, we propose to compel the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual equality impact assessment on the use of criminal conduct authorisations in covert operations involving women, children and black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A motion should then be put to the House within three months of the assessment being published.
In conclusion, the Opposition are committed to working in the national interest to keep people, their families, our communities and the country safe. I entirely understand that some colleagues on both sides of the Chamber have an interpretation of what the Bill does that is different from mine and have arrived at a different view. I think they are wrong, but that does not mean that I do not respect the arguments they put forward. That is particularly the case in relation to my hon. Friend—and my actual friend—the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Dan Carden). He will know that I once resigned on a point of principle. I hold him and his family in high esteem. The decision he took today to make the points he made was a difficult one. He has my respect, continuing friendship and affection.
This is uncomfortable territory for the whole House. Many of the issues raised by the Bill are felt deeply personally. All I would say, gently, is that those who oppose the Bill in its entirety do not have the monopoly on principles, nor are they the sole moral arbiters when it comes to forming a view on the measures in the Bill. The position reached by the Leader of the Opposition—who literally wrote the book on human rights—and me is a principled one and comes after careful consideration and detailed discussion of the Bill.
It is also our view that we have a duty, as legislators, to meet our responsibility and acknowledge that it is not just the Government who have to make difficult decisions. We want to be in government so we have to take difficult decisions, too. When we are in government, we will return to the Bill based on the principles that I have outlined. That is why we have taken the approach that we have taken: to acknowledge the importance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing; to robustly and responsibly scrutinise the way in which that is done; and to place national security, human rights and support for victims at the centre of our attempts to improve the safeguards in the Bill. We will continue to do that as it progresses through Parliament and are confident that the other place will assist us in that task if our amendments are not made today.
This has been a very informed, considered and thoughtful debate on the various amendments to the Bill that have been tabled for consideration. As right hon. and hon. Members will know, covert human intelligence sources play a crucial part in preventing, and safeguarding the public from, many very serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. In performing that role, it is essential that they can build credibility and gain the trust of those under investigation. At times, that may mean they have to commit criminality in order to maintain that cover.
I hear very clearly the points that have been made about needing to see those powers put on an express legal basis. Indeed, that is the essence of what this Bill is all about. It puts that on a clear statutory footing, putting beyond doubt Parliament’s intentions on the matter. From the contributions we have heard on all sides of the House, I think that that point is recognised—the seriousness of that and its implications for our own security in ensuring that the capability is maintained in order to keep us safe in the future, as it has done in the past, but also recognising the need for confidence in and assurance about how those agencies that act to protect us do so in an appropriate way.
Let me deal with the various amendments, because I do want to make as much progress on that as possible, and where I can I will give way to right hon. and hon. Members in doing so. First, in that context, there is the issue of oversight. The Government’s priority is to provide these public authorities with the powers they need to keep the public safe, while also ensuring that there are appropriate safeguards. This is the balance that the Bill seeks to provide. We do not believe that prior judicial approval, as proposed in amendment 7 and new clause 7, strikes that balance, as it risks the effective operation of the capability. This is a point we discussed at length on Second Reading. There are ways in which we can provide that safeguard and assurance, and prior judicial approval is not the only way to provide effective oversight of investigatory powers.
Members may find it helpful if I set out in more detail why this capability is different from other powers, such as interception or equipment interference. Put simply, human beings are more complex. Any decision on how to use a CHIS has immediate real-world consequences for that covert human intelligence source and the people around them. This requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal strengths and weaknesses of the individual, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. These are not decisions that have the luxury of being remade. It is even more critical than for other powers that these decisions are right and are made at the right time.
Is not the plain truth of the matter that if we define the role and method of those whose mission is to keep us safe who are covertly operating on our behalf, we will, among those they have infiltrated, make known what they are doing and possibly who they are, putting their lives at risk? Is not the principal power and the pivotal power of Government to protect their people? Indeed, it is the defining power of the state.
My right hon. Friend makes a very powerful and important point about the issues at stake here. That is why we judge that there is, of course, a need for robust oversight to give confidence and to ensure that the powers available here are done in the right way, and we judge that the proposals in the amendments do not achieve that and actually have an impact on the operational effectiveness of what is needed.
The Minister will know that many of us are concerned about new section 29B(5)(b) and (c) in clause 1(5). He has rightly stressed the importance of clarity, but it seems to many of us that the clarity around the words “preventing disorder” and around what constitutes “the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”, such that a criminal conduct authorisation can be given, is very vague indeed. He rightly insists on clarity, so could we have it here, please?
The language that is used in what would become new subsection 5 of section 29B is reflective of existing provisions within the Investigatory Powers Act. I will go into more detail on the hon. Gentleman’s point about disorder and economic wellbeing.
The point made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) was dealt with very ably earlier in the debate by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) under reference to the letter from the previous DPP, when he said that this was a bit of a Sopranos argument. Our Five Eyes partners manage to delineate the crimes that a CHIS can commit without having these worries, so isn’t this really a false worry?
I know that the hon. and learned Lady was unable to partake in the Second Reading debate, but I will repeat what I said there. We are not suggesting that there is routine testing of suspected CHIS in all criminal gangs, but there is evidence that it does occur more than infrequently, so this is not a fanciful argument. This is a matter that we take very seriously and one that I think is relevant. I would just pick up on the constructive discussions that we have had with the Scottish Government and I can say to her that it still remains my firm intention that we should reach a position where a legislative consent motion can be achieved. I can certainly assure her and her colleagues in the Scottish Government that we will continue with our discussions in order to reach that conclusion.
I know that the Minister has a lot of faith in the security services, but some of us know too much about them to have any faith in them. If this Government have so much faith in the behaviour of the security services, why will they not announce a full public inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane?
I appreciate the seriousness of the point that the hon. Gentleman has made, and he will know more than anyone in this Chamber about the huge issues involved and, equally, about the statements that have been made by the Government in relation to that appalling murder. I am sure there will be other opportunities to debate that matter further, but I hear the point that he makes. Obviously, this has been considered at length before, but that does not in any way cut across the statements that the Government have made in condemning, underlining and apologising for what happened.
The use of the CHIS—the covert human intelligence source—does, as I say, underline the need for this oversight to be provided by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, but it is about more than that. It is about the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who already has wide-ranging powers to support him to carry out his oversight functions, and about the real role that he has. This is why we judge that deep and retrospective oversight is the most appropriate way to provide oversight of this power. This includes regular and thorough inspections of all public authorities that use the power, to ensure that they are complying with the law and following good practice. The frequency of these inspections is decided by the commissioner, and inspectors must have unfettered access to documents and information to support those functions.
Amendment 12 from the Opposition would require a judicial commissioner to be notified of an authorisation within seven days of its being granted. I have underlined the role of the commissioner, which means that we will not support the amendment today. We also believe that amendment 7 and new clause 6 would impact on the operability of the regime. However, I can say to all hon. and right hon. Members that I am giving careful consideration to how this retrospective oversight could be strengthened further, and to how this might be addressed in the Bill’s passage in the other place.
Amendments 18 and 19 relate to oversight by prosecutors. A correctly granted authorisation will render conduct lawful for all purposes, so no crime will have been committed. There is therefore no need to introduce a requirement for prosecuting authorities to play a role in the authorisation process. However, the IPC, supported by judicial commissioners and inspectors, ensures public authorities’ compliance with the law through inspections and investigations. That could lead to information being passed to prosecutors if they felt that that was necessary. I would also highlight that where a CHIS commits criminality outside the tight parameters granted by the authorisation, prosecutors can consider a prosecution in the normal way.
Will the Minister be addressing the point that I put to him about operations overseas and the application of the Human Rights Act? That is important.
The UK will comply with obligations under the Human Rights Act, including when they arise extraterritorially. The UK is also bound by obligations under international human rights law.
I wanted to speak to the new clause tabled by the Intelligence and Security Committee and I thank its members for their support for the Bill. I think that underlines the role for the ISC in the scrutiny that they apply. Indeed, as the Minister who took the Justice and Security Act 2013 through Parliament, I recognised, in the creation of that Committee, its role in providing that rightful scrutiny and confidence in relation to this matter. I welcome the spirit with which new clause 3 has been tabled to emphasise the important role of the Committee, which I respect and appreciate.
I have written to the Committee Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), to underline ways in which I believe we can provide the information that has been sought by the Committee, and I will place the letter in the Library to provide that certainty and clarity. I would say to my right hon. Friend that operational agencies will consider requests and specifics in the usual way, and I can commit to them considering that through the 2013 Act. The fact that it may relate to a live operation should not preclude that information’s being shared. I hope that that will be helpful to him in underlining the importance of the information’s being forthcoming.
I accept that assurance in good heart. In the letter, the Minister said, “Such information as is requested in order for the ISC to provide effective oversight of these policies relating to these authorisations shall be provided to the Committee,” so I take it he is saying that we will not get refused those statistics when we want them.
I take in equally good faith the way in which my right hon. Friend and the Committee have approached this, and it is firmly my intent that information will be provided. He knows the debate and discussion over live operations and being bounded in that way, but I would want to ensure that information is given to his Committee, so that they can fulfil their oversight function and also, I think, give confidence to the House. He and his Committee have raised an important point, and I recognise the contribution that they make.
I turn to the issues of redress in relation to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), in amendment 2, the Leader of the Opposition, in new clause 1, and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland in amendments 20 and 21. Let me be clear: there is no barrier under the Bill for affected persons seeking a judicial review of a decision made by a public authority. Similarly, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal already has jurisdiction in relation to conduct to which part 2 of RIPA applies, which will include the amendments made by the Bill. I am, though, listening to concerns expressed by Members about the Bill’s potential impact on routes of redress, and I am happy to consider whether anything further is needed.
I shall now discuss the amendments that seek to place further limits on what can be authorised. The limits that other countries have chosen to place on the face of their legislation have featured prominently in this debate, as they did at Second Reading. Further to the Second Reading debate we have continued, for example, to engage with our Canadian friends with regard to their limits on the conduct of their covert human intelligence sources. The Solicitor General and I agree that it is correct to say that limits are found on the face of their legislation, but it is not straightforward to make comparisons between what we are proposing here and what might exist for other countries. We have our own legal systems; our operational partners each have their own practices and functions; and—perhaps most importantly—we have a very different threat picture.
For example, our friends and partners, such as Canada and the US, are not signatories to the European convention on human rights. We are the only members of Five Eyes that are bound by the convention and the obligations that it comes with. Again, I reference clause 1(7)—it has been focused on quite a lot during today’s debate—which makes specific reference to the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 being taken into consideration. Placing explicit limits on the face of the Bill risks creating a specific list of prohibited activity that would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist, as I have explained and as I think my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) set out so clearly in his contribution. Therefore we cannot accept amendments 8, 13 or 22.
I will give way to the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown, just to be fair.
Is the Minister saying that criminals will not be able to read the Human Rights Act 1998 to realise that these crimes are not permitted to be authorised, or is he saying that actually those serious crimes will be permitted to be authorised? I am confused about this contradiction that he presents us with.
I reiterate again that a covert human intelligence source is not able to commit any and all criminality. I made that point on Second Reading. There are limits to the activity that can be authorised under the Bill and they are contained within the Human Rights Act 1998. The covert human intelligence sources code of practice also sits under this legislation and provides additional guidance and safeguards that apply to the authorisation of such activity.
I have two minutes left and I still have a few more amendments I would like to discuss.
On the issue of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, it is an established statutory purpose for investigatory powers. It recognises that threats to the economic wellbeing of the UK could be immensely damaging. It might include the possibility of a hostile cyber-attack against our critical infrastructure, our financial institutions or the Government. Similarly, preventing disorder is an important and legitimate law enforcement function found in all investigatory powers legislation. Where illegal activity takes place, public authorities listed on the Bill have responsibility to take action that is necessary and proportionate.
Turning to new clause 8, I do not underestimate the concerns expressed about the use of juvenile or vulnerable individuals as covert human intelligence sources. There are provisions contained within the code and the guidance, as the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) knows, and I have sought to discuss those issues with her outside of this place. The provisions also highlight the role of an appropriate adult, but I will continue discussions, because I recognise that there are concerns across the House. In good faith I would be pleased to continue those discussions to see whether there are other issues there.
On the issue of undercover officers and the authorisation of sexual relations, I will reiterate what police leaders have already said publicly: it is never acceptable for an undercover operative to form an intimate sexual relationship with those they are employed to infiltrate and target or may encounter during their deployment. That conduct will never be authorised, nor must it ever be used as a tactic of deployment.
Equally, we discussed trade unions on Second Reading, and I re-emphasise that the Bill does not prevent legitimate and lawful activity, which is precisely what trade unionism is all about. That is why the code of practice is explicit on that. Indeed, section 20 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 in another context also highlights that.
We must not forget the human element of this capability. We are not talking about machines and equipment, which is why the Bill is framed in this way. They are real people who are making significant personal sacrifices, and they must be able to continue living their lives safely and securely. That is what this Bill is about. Through the information they provide, lives are saved, which is why the measures in this Bill matter so much.
The House has had a debate this afternoon that has been both good and frustrating at the same time: good because of the quality of speeches and the thoughtfulness of those who have made them; frustrating because it needed so much more time. As the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee said, this is really no way to go about this sort of business. The difficulty for the Minister is that it is counterproductive, because all he has done in railroading our proceedings today is give a green light to those at the other end of the building, who lack our democratic mandate, to crawl all over this and fillet his Bill, which they most assuredly will do. I will seek to divide the Committee and test its opinion on amendment 16, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This legislation is being introduced to keep our country safe and to ensure that our operational agencies and public authorities have access to the tools and intelligence that they need to keep us safe—safe from terrorists, safe from serious organised crime groups, and safe from others who wish to cause harm to our country and our citizens. Specifically, the Bill deals with participation in criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources—so-called CHIS. These are agents, or undercover officers, who help to secure prosecutions and disruptions by infiltrating criminal and terrorist groups.
Throughout history, those entrusted to uphold the law or safeguard national security have used covert human intelligence to support and progress their activity. From Sir Francis Walsingham’s use of informers to defend the reign of Elizabeth I from internal and external threats, to the deployments by the newly formed detective units of the Metropolitan police in the latter half of the 19th century, to the double-cross system in the second world war, covert human intelligence has always been a vital part of our national security and law enforcement framework.
More recently, though, CHIS have been critical in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, drugs and firearms offences, child sexual exploitation and abuse, and other serious organised crime. Since March 2017, MI5 and counter-terrorism police have together thwarted some 27 terror attacks. As the director general of MI5 said when the Bill was introduced:
“Without the contribution of human agents, be in no doubt…these attacks would not have been prevented.”
I have been advised that between November 2018 and 2019 CHIS operations within the Metropolitan police area alone led to 3,500 arrests, the recovery of more than 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, the seizure of more than 400 kg of class A drugs, and the recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash. Similarly, CHIS operations in 2019 alone enabled the National Crime Agency to safeguard several hundred victims of crime, including from child sexual exploitation and abuse. This is an important and unique tactic; by working their way into the heart of criminal groups, CHIS are able to access intelligence that other investigatory powers may simply never detect.
The Minister knows how seriously I take these matters and the equipping of our security services to do the job that they need to do, often in horrendous circumstances that affect the integrity of our country and its individuals, but he will also appreciate that safeguards have to be in place. What does he have to say to those who have raised serious concerns that the Bill, as it stands, does not have the safeguards in place to prevent assault, murder and torture, about which there is an absolute prohibition? He knows that we are a signatory to the convention on human rights, so what does he have to say on those matters?
I hope I will be able to respond to the hon. Gentleman during my speech, underlining some of the safeguards—the importance of oversight, which we attach equally to this Bill, and the operation of a criminal conduct authorisation, as contemplated by the Bill. I hope he will also have noted the specific reference to the Human Rights Act in the Bill, in order to underline some of the important points he makes about convention rights.
The Minister has reeled off an impressive number of statistics, which justify the use of CHIS operations. How many or what proportion of the operations were undertaken by the Food Standards Agency, which will also come under the ambit of this Bill?
The right hon. Gentleman is drawing me on to talk about some of those wider bodies. I will address that later in my speech, but I point out that the FSA is required to deal with issues associated with misrepresented food—food that may be harmful for human consumption. Therefore the issues of proportionality and necessity are bound within the frame of the Bill, and limit the activities that would be reasonable for such agencies to act upon. Perhaps I can come back to that a little later in my contribution.
We have had discussions on the points of concern to me, and my right hon. Friend has given answers to three written questions today, which were helpful indeed. He will understand the importance of the point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty): that these are significant powers for us to grant in a democratic society. I believe my right hon. Friend has made the point in the past, but will he confirm today that the Human Rights Act trumps the provisions in this Bill which the hon. Gentleman and I are most concerned about?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. Again, I intend to draw out this point during my contribution in the House this evening. He rightly highlights the import and implication of the Human Rights Act and what that then imports in terms of the convention rights, which we are clear provide restrictions and inhibitions on how agencies are able to operate.
I will give way twice more and then get into some of the important details that I know right hon. and hon. Members would like me to address.
The point surely is that as well as proportionality and necessity, the Bill is particular about specificity, so that those matters that lie outside the specific permission can be challenged in court and can indeed lead to prosecutions. That specificity is at the heart of this measure.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that point. The issue of specifici—I cannot even say it; I shall settle for saying the specific authorisations that are granted. They are tightly bound and that is important. That is why we published the guidance that sits alongside the operationalisation of the Bill at the same time as the Bill—to give that sense of confirmation and clarity on how it will operate.
I hear what my right hon. Friend says about the Human Rights Act, but the defence that the Government put up in the legal case that was brought against them said in terms that the state is “not the instigator” of such activity and
“cannot be treated as somehow responsible for it”.
The memorandum to the Bill states that
“it is to be expected that there would not be State responsibility”.
How is that using the Human Rights Act to underpin the rights of our citizens?
I know that my right hon. Friend, rightly, takes these issues incredibly seriously. The issues we are talking about go to the kernel of our national security, and equally, our confidence in our criminal justice system and the way in which our operatives, who are there to protect us, act. I do place weight on what he has said.
Will the Minister give way before he moves on?
I would quite like to answer the previous intervention before I give way again, and I need to make some progress.
I can say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) that the way in which agencies are required to act under the Bill means that they cannot act in a way that is inconsistent with the convention rights, hence the importation by the specific reference to the Human Rights Act on the face of the Bill to underline that. It is important to state that and be clear as to how the Bill operates and the protections. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) has tempted me, so I will give way one final time, and then I will make some progress, because I know that others want to speak.
On the point that the Minister just made in relation to the Human Rights Act, proposed new section 29B(7) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in clause 1 and proposed new section 7A(6) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 in schedule 1, say, for example, that subsection X is
“without prejudice to the need to take into account other matters so far as they are relevant (for example, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998).”
Why is it not more explicit that there is an obligation to obey the Human Rights Act rather than simply referring to it as an example?
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. Some may argue that the inclusion of those words was not of itself necessary, because those agencies are already bound by that requirement. We take the judgment, because of the very relevant points that have been made during the course of the debate, that being clear on the face of the Bill in that regard is helpful. It is reassuring. It creates the context as to how this regime is intended to operate, and that is why it is included in the way that it is.
If the hon. Lady will allow me, I will make some further progress, but I will allow her to intervene on me later.
In order to build the credibility and trust of those under investigations, there are occasions where, in carefully managed circumstances and subject to robust independent safeguards, CHIS may need to participate in criminality themselves. This is an inescapable and essential feature of CHIS use and has always been fundamental to this work. Although I am unable to go into the detail about the specific criminality that a CHIS may participate in, for reasons I will come to, limited examples have been discussed in the public domain. For example, a CHIS may be required to join the organisation that they are seeking to disrupt. This membership alone will sometimes be criminal but will be deemed necessary and proportionate to prevent more serious criminality from taking place. Again, without going into the specifics, the use of that tactic enabled the police and MI5 to disrupt a planned terrorist attack on No. 10 and the then Prime Minister in 2017. The necessity of CHIS participation in criminal conduct has been accepted in the UK and around the world for many years. In December 2019, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that MI5 has a lawful basis for this activity and recognised that CHIS participation formed an essential part of MI5’s core activities. I want to reassure the House that this Bill does not confer the power to carry out a new activity, but enables CHIS to continue to deploy the methods that they already use. Notwithstanding those powers, this Bill puts that existing practice onto a clearer statutory footing, putting the matter beyond doubt as to Parliament’s intentions. The Bill provides certainty for CHIS and their handlers and will augment our ability to recruit and retain in the future in this regard. It is important to stress that the Bill does not change the position of CHIS who have previously been properly authorised to participate in criminal activity. It has no retrospective effect.
Can the Minister explain one difference between the situation that has applied in the past and the situation that will apply in the future if the Bill goes through as it is? We are now legislating to make properly authorised criminal conduct lawful, rather than continuing with the current position whereby MI5 or another authorising authority is able to argue that it would not be in the public interest for prosecuting authorities to prosecute properly authorised criminal conduct, but there is no guarantee of immunity. What we are now saying is that they are not breaking the law, rather than, as in the past, that they were breaking the law, but that it was against the public interest to prosecute. Why the reason for that change?
The right hon. Gentleman, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, makes an important point when he draws that distinction. I say to him that, under the current regime, the Crown Prosecution Service will consider the prosecution of a properly authorised CHIS as perverse. So in essence, the Bill will offer no practical difference in the application of the power, because obviously the conduct will have to be properly authorised, as it does now. If something has not been properly authorised, then clearly the authorisation will not have effect. Where CHIS conduct is outside that authorisation, there will be no impact on the ability to prosecute. Public authorities tightly limit the scope of CHIS criminal conduct, so this will not provide a licence to commit crime outside those stringent limits. In reality, the practical difference between providing a defence and making conduct lawful is limited. Indeed, we say that the provisions actually reflect broader provisions within the current legislative regime, governing all other aspects as well. There is a distinction, which the right hon. Gentleman makes, but in practice, we do not see that there is the fundamentals difference that perhaps some might wish to paint into it.
One of the problems that the Government have today is that, for those of us who like the red meat of law enforcement and law and order, the Minister has forced us to look inside the abattoir, and of course we do not like what we see. On this point about stringent limits, will he explain why there is not more in the Bill to put those limits in place? I cannot imagine Ministers will be authorising killing or torture, so why are those things not in the Bill, so that the public can have very clear confidence that they will not be authorised?
I will come on to that issue—this is why, although I wanted to give way to many Members, I wanted at the same time to make progress with my speech. I will not go into the limits of what can and cannot be done because of this issue of what is known as CHIS testing—providing a list against which sources can be tested, which has practical implications to it. What I can say to my hon. Friend is that I will come on to the import of the Human Rights Act in just a second, if he will be patient.
The Minister has talked about practices that are already permitted, but does he appreciate that there are many, many questions about those practices? That is why there has been the Pitchford inquiry, which has now dragged on for so long that it is about to be called something else. Are the Government not the slightest bit concerned about laying down such a piece of legislation before the inquiry has reported, given the history of agents provocateurs undermining progressive movements such as our trade unions and deceiving women in intimate relationships? All of these things have been carried out before, and people have major concerns about that. Will the Government explain why they have no concerns whatsoever about laying down a piece of legislation without having looked at what that inquiry finds?
The hon. Lady makes a serious point. First, there is no retrospective effect—it is quite important for me to state that explicitly. Therefore, actions that have occurred in the past and are subject to further inquiry, and potentially further criminal investigation, are untouched by the Bill. On the position moving forward, I have explained the different safeguards. She refers to trade union activity. Trade union activity is lawful. I recognise some of the concerns expressed, and it is important that I state that in order to provide assurance. This is tightly bound—it is about providing the oversight, the governance and the proportionality and setting out the necessity of this for criminal justice, security and other issues that I have already alluded to. I am grateful to her for intervening to allow me, I hope, to be more specific on that point.
On the previous intervention, there are real concerns about women who are seeking legal redress for sexual assaults at the hands of police officers in the spy cops inquiry. Can the Minister guarantee that if those situations were to occur again, survivors of sexual assault could seek legal redress?
I can certainly say that there are clearly ongoing inquiries in relation to this important and sensitive issue. I have highlighted the lack of any retrospection, and I point the hon. Gentleman to what has happened since then and what the police themselves have underlined in this regard. There is an enhanced regime of what are known as relevant sources—in other words, undercover police officers—and the criminal conduct authorisation is in addition to the regime to authorise and approve a CHIS covert source in the first place.
It has never been acceptable, as the police have said, for an undercover operative to form an intimate sexual relationship with those they are employed to infiltrate and target, or who they may encounter during their deployment. This conduct will never be authorised, nor must it ever be used as a tactic in deployment. That is made clear through the code of ethics for the police as well as the updated law enforcement agency undercover operative authorised professional practice.
I hope that I have explained what the Bill does and what it does not do, and therefore how it is quite specific. On the point about what is on the face of the Bill, it is about locking in the existing regime and other safeguards on the authorisation of a source in the first place. That has to happen first, and then, if it is warranted, justified and fits within the boundaries of the Bill, there is the criminal conduct authorisation that sits alongside it, which has to be subject to the earlier authorisation.
Does the Minister agree that sexual assault and rape are clearly prohibited by article 3 of the Human Rights Act? Does he recognise that the importance of the Human Rights Act in providing a safeguard to this Bill means that it would be helpful to hear wider support for the purposes of the Act from across his Government, not just from him on the Front Bench?
Obviously there is the specific reference on the face of the Bill that I have alluded to, and therefore there is that requirement. As the right hon. Lady will know what the convention rights say, for operational and other reasons I will not go beyond what the convention says. There are very clear issues that I will now, I hope, come on to in that regard that will help to draw this out.
I thank the Minister; he is being very generous. He has been clear that sexual assaults on women such as the ones that have been referred to are entirely prohibited and not allowed, but they have obviously happened. In the past, those cases have been brought forward for proper review. How will they be brought forward in future under this Bill?
I have drawn out the separate regime that operates in relation to the authorisation of, for example, undercover officers, as well as the tight remit, the ambit and some of the additional oversight that is provided in respect of that regime. Again, that is all subject to the supervisory nature of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and can, therefore, as with the provisions proposed through the Bill, be drawn out through that route. However, I will hopefully make some more progress and be able to get into how the Bill works and some of the further assurances. I may not be quite as generous with interventions, so that I can hopefully make progress and let other right hon. and hon. Members in.
The Bill amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by inserting a new section to provide a power for public authorities to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. Equivalent amendments are also proposed to the equivalent legislation in Scotland, subject to ongoing constructive engagement with the Scottish Government.
A CCA may be granted only where it is necessary for one of three statutory purposes: national security, the prevention or detection of crime, or in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK. It must also be proportionate to what it is seeking to achieve, and consideration must be given to whether the objective could be achieved by conduct that is not criminal. These authorisations will be tightly bound and granted by a highly trained and experienced authorising officer. They must also be compliant with our obligations under the Human Rights Act, including the right to life and the prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Again, I will expand a little further shortly.
A CCA can also apply only where the deployment or engagement of the CHIS has already been authorised under the existing section 29 of RIPA, and is subject to the limits that that section provides. As such, there is a two-stage process: first, the authorisation of the use of a CHIS and, secondly, the separate authorisation of that source to carry out criminal conduct in the tightly prescribed circumstances proposed by the Bill.
It is worth highlighting that, alongside the Bill, we have published draft provisions of the CHIS code of practice, which provides further detail as to how the authorisation process will work and the factors an authorising officer must consider before granting an authorisation. To be clear, all authorisations are precise and explicit. A CHIS will never be given unlimited authority to commit any or all crimes. The effect of an authorisation is to render the authorised conduct lawful. This model is consistent with the approach we have taken for other investigatory powers. Of course, where a CHIS commits any criminality outside the tight parameters of the authorisation, the prosecuting authorities can consider this in the normal way.
Members will understand that, because of the clandestine nature of their work, there are limits to what I can say publicly about the role that CHIS play in saving lives and property, without exposing sensitive information about their methods and techniques. I know that there are concerns about the Bill somehow providing a licence to kill or to commit torture. Let me be clear that there are upper limits to the activity that can be authorised under the Bill, and those are contained in the Human Rights Act. That includes the right to life and the prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is unlawful for any public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the European convention on human rights, and the legislation makes clear that nothing in the Bill detracts from a public authority’s obligations under the Human Rights Act. Therefore, an act that would be incompatible with the ECHR could not lawfully be granted under this Bill.
We do not believe, however, that it is appropriate to draw up a list of specific crimes that may be authorised or prohibited. To do so would place in the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of identifying our agents and sources, creating a potential checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. That would threaten the future of the CHIS capability and result in an increased threat to the public. Protecting CHIS from prosecution will have achieved little if we cannot also protect them from being identified by the terrorist and criminal groups they inform against, placing them at personal risk.
I am listening very carefully to what the Minister is saying, but will he be clear? This is all predicated on our continued membership of the European convention on human rights and on the Human Rights Act staying as it is, and at the moment we have an Attorney General who has made very clear her intentions towards both those instruments. Can he make it clear that we will stay in the ECHR and that the Human Rights Act will stay as the bedrock of the guarantees on this, but also that other international conventions we are signatories to, including the convention against torture, would also apply in restricting actions that could be authorised under this Bill?
I have been pretty clear about the way this Bill operates and the manner in which agencies and the different bodies that can be authorised are able to act. Clearly, I cannot bind this House for the future, but I am very clear that we stand by our ECHR commitments, which is why this has been expressed in the way that it has in the Bill. I hope that is helpful to him.
What my right hon. Friend has described is, in effect, a wish not to provide a terrorist checklist, as it were, to test a member of such an organisation. Did he read the article in The Times this morning by probably one of the best Directors of Public Prosecutions of modern times, who would probably know more about this than all of us in this House? It was scathing about that analysis and said it simply did not stand up?
I am happy to respond to that point specifically. We are not suggesting that there is routine testing of suspected CHIS in all criminal groups, but there is evidence that this does occur more than infrequently, and I say that in clear terms. We are asking CHIS to put themselves in difficult positions to help the state investigate these criminal groups, and it is our judgment that we need to make sure that we can best protect them, and that means avoiding the provision of a checklist of crimes that can be tested against. I note that this risk is not just to CHIS, but to people who are not CHIS but may be suspected of being so.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the independent commissioner, established under the 2016 Act by this House, has, in the 2018 report of the analysis on MI5 and other agencies, written very positively about the processes, the applications for CHIS and the rigour that these organisations go through? It is important that the House realises that these processes are rigorous, detailed and already in place.
Yes, and I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for making that point. With his experience as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, he knows the importance of these national security issues in the context of Northern Ireland. He is right, and this point about safeguards and oversight is precisely what I was about to come on to. It is about the rigorous and careful way in which the agencies operate and the focus that they attach to this, as shown in the response the commissioner provided in his 2018 report and equally by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal when it reflected on this.
I will give way, but this is probably the last time as I am conscious of time and of getting others in.
In the 2018 report by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, one of the issues that raised concern was the sheer prevalence of human error. We are rolling this out to further Departments. Surely, we are also rolling out the potential for further human error.
The right hon. Lady makes an important point about training and about ensuring that the high standards necessary here are applied. I would say to her that, equally, such focus needs to be applied to those who operate this regime in order to get this right because of the potential criminality that sits alongside it. There are obligations to report errors to the commissioner, and equally the commissioner will report on those too. Rigorous standards are necessary to ensure that criminal conduct authorisations are made appropriately and well, and the way in which that operates now and will operate for all agencies—whether the Security Service, policing or some of the other agencies—is subject to that clear oversight, and the Bill draws that out and makes it explicit.
As I have said, it is important to state that, in view of the restrictions on what can be disclosed publicly, the Government also recognise the importance of robust independent oversight. The authorisation of CHIS participation in criminal conduct is and will continue to be subject to this robust oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The IPC—
I am very conscious that I am now eating into the time of others who may wish to speak, so I will perhaps make some more progress, and we will see where we get to.
The Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and his judicial commissioners, have all held high judicial office. The current IPC, Sir Brian Leveson, was most recently president of the Queen’s bench division and is entirely independent of Government. The commissioners are supported by expert inspectors and others, such as technical experts, qualified to assist the commissioners in their work.
The IPC conducts wide-ranging inspections of public authorities and publishes an annual report on the findings from those inspections. The IPC himself sets the frequency of those inspections, and public authorities are required to provide unfettered access to documents and information. The Bill strengthens the IPC’s role by providing that the IPC must explicitly keep CCAs under review and include information on the use of them in his annual report. The most recent report from the IPC found that in all instances MI5’s authorisations of CHIS participation in criminal conduct were proportionate to the anticipated operational benefits and met a high necessity threshold.
Further, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has statutory responsibility to oversee the UK intelligence community. Hon. and right hon. Friends on the Committee have a vital role in scrutinising the work of the intelligence agencies, and I am grateful to the Committee for its support for the legislation and welcome its expertise as the House considers the Bill in detail. I also note that Select Committees will equally play an important role in scrutinising the work of law enforcement and wider public authorities.
On that note, I give way to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.
I am very grateful to the Minister, who has been very generous with his time. Clearly he makes the case that we need to continue with covert intelligence, particularly on extremist groups that may be proscribed. Associating with them in any way is currently a crime, so clearly he makes a strong case for legislation to ensure that such intelligence can continue in the interests of national security. I know that he recognises, though, that having safeguards is also in the interests of national security and of the intelligence agencies and the police.
The safeguards in place on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the Bill are still very vague. It is very broad and very much retrospective, as opposed to concurrent assessments. Will the Minister look again at the potential for amendments on authorisation and very timely oversight, and on strengthening the measures on Investigatory Powers Commissioners, so that it is possible to get the details of the legislation right?
Obviously, we will have continued debate during the passage of the Bill. I believe that it provides strong oversight and governance, but I will continue to reflect. Judicial approval is an important safeguard for the operation of some of our investigatory powers; however, it is not the only way to provide a robust oversight of a power. It is important to recognise the context of this: we are talking about human beings. Some challenging issues operate around this space, which is why we judge that robust retrospective oversight is the right approach, but I will keep the timeliness of that, and how it operates, under reflection so that perhaps further reassurance can be provided, specifically on the point of how soon oversight can occur after an authorisation has been made.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who is being generous. At what level will the original authorisation take place in the various organisations? From reading the Bill, it seems to me that the level in the police is a relatively junior police officer. In view of the seriousness that such authorisation leads to, should it not be given at chief constable level, and why can it not be given through a warrant overseen by a judge?
I have responded to the latter point on the judgment that we have made in relation to this regime and how we believe that deep retrospective oversight is the right approach. This is distinct from phones or cameras. The use of CHIS requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal qualities of that CHIS, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. There are different elements to how this operates, and the experience and highly trained nature of the authorising officer in some ways informs the relevant authorising level that is specified within the guidance. Robust retrospective oversight is provided equally by the commissioner himself, to give further assurance.
If I may, I shall turn to a separate point about specific public authorities’ ability to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. The RIPA already lists a range of public authorities that use CHIS for general investigative purposes. Far fewer public authorities will be able to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. Only those public authorities that have demonstrated a clear operational need for the tactic are able to use the power. These are the intelligence agencies, the police, the National Crime Agency, the armed forces, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and 10 other public authorities. Pausing momentarily on this list, I want to highlight the role that these wider public authorities also have in investigating and preventing serious criminal activity. The Environment Agency, for example, investigates the illegal dumping of toxic waste that can permanently harm our environment. The Serious Fraud Office investigates complex fraud cases that risk costing the public millions of pounds. The Food Standards Agency investigates deliberate mislabelling and the sale of unsafe food to the public. HMRC tackles the money laundering and trafficking of illicit goods that would risk significant damage to the economy.
We expect the wider public authorities to have only limited use of this power, because a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted only where it is necessary and proportionate to the criminality it is seeking to frustrate. There will, however, be occasions where CHIS will be critical in providing the intelligence to prevent, detect and prosecute serious crimes. This is increasingly important as organised crime groups expand into areas overseen by these public authorities.
This is an important and necessary Bill—
I am extremely grateful. He mentioned the armed forces very briskly there. Could he clarify why the armed forces might need to engage in criminal conduct? I suspect it is because they each operate their own military police, and that those police might need to have covert operations, but I would be grateful if he clarified that, because there will be suspicious souls out there worrying that there is some other motive for the armed forces being authorised to break the law.
My hon. Friend highlights one particular aspect of the role of the Ministry of Defence. It is difficult to go into detail, but one further example I would give is that it might be necessary to access a proscribed organisation. As I say, the reporting regime is quite specific. Indeed, the oversight that is envisaged—and the oversight in the existing legislation—draws this out quite carefully and clearly for the issues that I have highlighted, on proportionality and necessity, as well as those specific aspects in the Bill, stating that it can relate only to national security, criminality and economic wellbeing. It has to anchor to those three elements, as well as to the Human Rights Act application that we have debated at length this evening.
This is an important and necessary Bill. It is not about providing agents with an unfettered ability to break the law and commit any crime. There are strict requirements that must be satisfied, and robust and independent oversight will be in place. The Bill is really looking to achieve just one thing, which is to ensure that our intelligence agencies and law enforcement bodies with important intelligence functions are able to continue to utilise a tactic that has been, and will continue to be, critical to keeping us all safe. Accordingly, I commend the Bill to the House.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith), both of whom made important and powerful speeches. I agree with what both of them said, and the two are not irreconcilable.
It seems to me that the Government, having brought forward a necessary and appropriate measure—it is right to put these matters on a statutory footing—need to bear in mind the need to tighten up the language in a number of places. I support the basic thrust of the Bill, but there is nothing more profound than to authorise the agents of the state to break the criminal law. That can be done only in the most exceptional circumstances, and those circumstances are not things that can be trailed in public, so obviously we need a degree of discretion about how we do it. I will deal swiftly with just a few matters.
First, given that principle, I am concerned about how we deal with the pre or post-authorisation arrangements. Having put the matter on a statutory footing and having previously established the independent commissioner and then the tribunal, I would be worried about the exclusion of pre-authorisation save in the most exceptional circumstances. I am not saying that every type of criminal offence should be excluded at this stage, but when we come to Committee, we should examine whether we should in any circumstance contemplate setting on the face of an Act of Parliament provision for someone committing the offence of murder, for example, or something equally extreme, other than when they would probably be entitled to run the defence of self-defence anyway.
Given the ability of any High Court jurisdiction to deal immediately and swiftly with interlocutory matters, there is no reason to think that the same arrangements cannot be made in relation to the commissioner. The quality of the commissioners— Sir Adrian Fulford and now Sir Brian Leveson—is of such an extent that I would have thought that their early authorisation would be a great support to our security services in doing what they have to do. We must think about where the balance lies.
The second point I wish to deal with is the list of organisations. The obvious ones are there, and of course they must be supported. Like others, however, I question the need to list bodies such as the Food Standards Agency and, up to a point, the Financial Conduct Authority. Is this really a Bill about counteracting terrorism and life-or-death threats, or is it actually just about enabling the National Crime Agency—a worthy body in itself—to deal with economic crime? That may be a legitimate concern, but I do not think it should be put in this type of legislation, unless it is spelled out a bit more carefully.
The Minister of State and I have personal and shared casework experience relating to constituents of overreach and mission creep on the part of Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise, which frankly behaved appallingly. Ultimately, it was overridden by the courts, but I am worried that it might be thought that the imprecise definition of serious crime could be stretched to cover some of the cases we have dealt with. The Minister looks as though he thinks that is impossible, but serious crime is not defined in statute; it is a matter of fact and degree. It requires either a definition or, more likely, a more robust pre-application process.
I appreciate the contribution that my hon. Friend, the Chair of the Justice Committee, is making and perhaps we can continue this conversation. I point him to the issues of proportionality and necessity, the requirement to consider matters that are not criminal to the end itself and the safeguards that the Human Rights Act provides, which I set out earlier. Therefore, there is a strong framework, as well as the subsequent oversight, but I will listen carefully to what he says. I am reflective on some of the timeliness of oversight, as I indicated, and I appreciate his points.
I understand the spirit in which my right hon. Friend makes that point. I suspect that many of those fears could be set at nought if we can do this sensibly. The point is that without either having an obligation to comply with the ECHR on the face of the Bill and certain most grave offences being excluded in the Bill, or, on the other hand, greater clarity on the timeliness and the way in which that will work, there are still issues that we need to deal with.
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Commons ChamberAs a Government, we are committed to vigorously countering extremist ideology by making sure that every part of government is taking action. That includes ongoing conversations between the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Home Office on the implementation of the online harms framework to tackle hateful content. We will continue to work across government to challenge extremism in all its forms.
At a Home Affairs Committee session last week, the national lead for counter-terrorism, Neil Basu, warned of growing numbers of young people being drawn towards right-wing terrorism. During this pandemic, social media have done much to amplify hateful extremism. What steps will the Minister take to prevent young people from being drawn into extremism?
The hon. Gentleman highlights an important point about the exploitation of the online world to attract the unwary and what that can lead to, which is why we are working with the companies concerned to see that content is removed. I highlight the online harms work, which will lead to a new regime to put new responsibilities on those companies to provide support in respect of the challenge of extremism and content that might not be illegal but profoundly is harmful.
A recent Home Affairs Committee session heard that Facebook had deleted 9.6 million posts about hate speech in the first quarter of this year. The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Sub-Committee on which I serve has considered online disinformation during covid. What assessment has the Minister made of the links between hate speech and disinformation? Is there discussion between his Department and the DCMS?
As I indicated in response to the previous question, we are in discussion with the DCMS about these issues. It troubles me that sometimes this disinformation and these conspiracy theories can be used to galvanise more extremist behaviour. We are very alive to that in terms of working with our colleagues at the DCMS and in terms of our broader work in the Prevent space where this issue can move into terrorism. The issue of the extreme right-wing and far-right extremists seeking to exploit the online world and trap some quite young people is something we are very focused on and conscious of.
For two weeks running, we have seen anti-lockdown conspiracy theorists clashing with police throughout the country, with four people having been arrested in Newcastle over the weekend. This behaviour is being fuelled online by far-right opportunists and some high-profile individuals, such as Ian Brown of the Stone Roses. Will the Minister outline what his Department is doing to build trust in Government information and in respect of scepticism and concern about vaccination?
I highlight to the hon. Lady the work that is being led by the DCMS, with which we are working on the cross-Whitehall counter-disinformation unit, which has been stood up during this time of acute disinformation to challenge some of the conspiracy theories and false information. I assure her that there is extensive work across government to analyse and then work with the companies to take false or misleading information down. Clearly, it is an ongoing challenge, but we are determined to take firm action where false narratives are being perpetrated.
The scale and accessibility of hateful extremist content online is deeply worrying and causing serious damage to society, and it needs to be identified speedily and dealt with. Last week, in her evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, the commissioner for countering extremism called for a more rigorous classification system for assessing hateful extremist material in the online harms Bill to get to grips with the vast spread of extremism online. Does the Minister support this call, and does he agree with the commission’s report last year that the Government’s counter-extremism strategy, drawn up in 2015, is insufficient, too broad and out of date?
The 2015 strategy was the first of its kind in the world in having a unit dedicated to countering extremism. I pay tribute to the work of the commissioner, and I read very carefully her words to the Select Committee last week. We will work with the commissioner—indeed, the Home Secretary met her last week—and we are working with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and Ofcom to consider the appropriate design for the regulatory framework. We will continue to develop this as we prepare to introduce the legislation, and we will consider the commissioner’s proposals as part of that work.