Public Bill Committees Debates in the Commons on 2nd November 2021

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Mark Hendrick, Andrew Rosindell

† Barker, Paula (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)

† Cartlidge, James (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Crawley, Angela (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)

† Cunningham, Alex (Stockton North) (Lab)

† Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)

† Fletcher, Nick (Don Valley) (Con)

† Hayes, Sir John (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

† Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)

† Hunt, Tom (Ipswich) (Con)

† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

† Longhi, Marco (Dudley North) (Con)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† Mann, Scott (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)

† Marson, Julie (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)

† Moore, Damien (Southport) (Con)

† Slaughter, Andy (Hammersmith) (Lab)

† Twist, Liz (Blaydon) (Lab)

Huw Yardley, Seb Newman, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Witnesses

Sir Stephen Laws KCB, QC, First Parliamentary Counsel 2006 to 2012, Senior Fellow, Policy Exchange 2018 to present

Professor Richard Ekins, Head, Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project

Professor Jason Varuhas, Professor of Law, University of Melbourne

Professor David Feldman, Professor of English Law, University of Cambridge

Dr Jonathan Morgan, Reader in English Law, Cambridge University

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Sir Mark Hendrick in the Chair]

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

The Chair

Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Similarly, officials in the Gallery should communicate electronically with Ministers. Please switch any electronic devices to silent. As many of you will be aware, tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings, but water is provided at most desks.

Today we will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before we commence the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters formally.

Ordered,

That—

1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 2 November) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 2 November;

(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 November;

(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 16 November;

(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 18 November;

(f) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 November;

2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

DateTimeWitnessTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 10.25 amSir Stephen Laws, KCB, QC; Professor Jason Varuhas, University of Melbourne; Professor Richard Ekins, University of OxfordTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 11.25 amProfessor David Feldman, University of Cambridge; Dr Jonathan Morgan, University of CambridgeTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 2.45 pmRichard Leiper QC; André Rebello OBE, Senior Coroner for Liverpool and the Wirral and Hon Secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and WalesTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 3.30 pmPublic Law Project; Law Society; LibertyTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 4.30 pmInquest; Justice; AmnestyTuesday 2 NovemberUntil no later than 5.00 pmDr Joe Tomlinson, University of York; The Law Society of Scotland; Aidan O’Neill QC

Date

Time

Witness

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 10.25 am

Sir Stephen Laws, KCB, QC; Professor Jason Varuhas, University of Melbourne; Professor Richard Ekins, University of Oxford

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 11.25 am

Professor David Feldman, University of Cambridge; Dr Jonathan Morgan, University of Cambridge

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 2.45 pm

Richard Leiper QC; André Rebello OBE, Senior Coroner for Liverpool and the Wirral and Hon Secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 3.30 pm

Public Law Project; Law Society; Liberty

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 4.30 pm

Inquest; Justice; Amnesty

Tuesday 2 November

Until no later than 5.00 pm

Dr Joe Tomlinson, University of York; The Law Society of Scotland; Aidan O’Neill QC

4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 23 November.—(James Cartlidge.)

Resolved,

That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(James Cartlidge.)

The Chair

Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and will be circulated to Members by email.

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(James Cartlidge.)

The Committee deliberated in private.

Examination of Witnesses

Sir Stephen Laws, Professor Richard Ekins and Professor Jason Varuhas gave evidence.

The Chair

Before we hear from the witnesses, please may I have any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill?

Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

I am a non-practising barrister.

The Chair

Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters in the scope of the Bill. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. We have until 10.25 am for this session, which gives us just under an hour. Could the witnesses please introduce themselves?

Sir Stephen Laws: My name is Sir Stephen Laws. I spent my career in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, starting in 1976. From 2006 until 2012 I was the First Parliamentary Counsel, head of the office and responsible for the offices of the Government business managers. Since retirement, I have been a senior research fellow at the judicial power project at the Policy Exchange.

Professor Varuhas: Good morning, I am Jason Varuhas. I am a professor of law at the University of Melbourne, where I am also the director for the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies in the law school. My interests lie in public law, private law and the law of remedies.

Professor Ekins: I am from the University of Oxford. I have led Policy Exchange’s judicial power project for the last few years and have written a fair bit about cases involving judicial review that warrant criticism or are problematic. I have made submissions, as have my colleagues, to the independent review of administrative law and in response to the Government consultation, and most recently another paper for Policy Exchange outlining possible amendments that might be made to the Bill.

The Chair

Thank you. Could I invite the first question? John?

Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

- - Excerpts

Professor Ekins: I will go first, since you directed that at me. It is true that the independent review of administrative law noted a worrying trend in relation to cases in which fairly abstract constitutional principles were used to develop the law in surprising ways. It is true that the review held short of recommending legislation in response, but it attended to this as a problem, and I think it is quite rightly within your field of vision as something that should be attended to. The review noted in particular the perfect legitimacy of Parliament legislating in response to particular cases that it thinks break new ground in problematic ways, which might include the Prorogation judgment or Unison, Evans and other cases. That would also include the Adams case, which the review briefly referred to. It is very true that that case made a significant change that is problematic for our law and government. Sir Stephen and I wrote a paper last year for Policy Exchange noting the shortcomings of the judgment—that it really undermines the Carltona doctrine, which is central to the way in which Parliament confers power on Ministers and how civil servants exercise that power. I think it will be a very good contribution to the rule of law to restore and vindicate that principle.

Sir Stephen Laws: If I can come in, I endorse everything that Professor Ekins said. The Adams case is very disturbing and undoes the assumption on which, for almost three quarters of a century, government has carried on. It needs to be urgently reversed.

On the question of parliamentary sovereignty, one of the great defects of the law as currently applied in proceedings for judicial review is that it does not adequately distinguish between the different sorts of decision making to which it is applied. It assumes that the same or very similar principles, processes and remedies are appropriate for a challenge to what you can call casework decisions by public officials in individual cases as should be applied to challenges to legislative decisions.

It seems to me that courts are deciding what the rules should be in future, hypothetical cases, or what the rules should have been in past cases that are not before them. They need to apply very different principles from those that they apply when they have one case before them and the public official has been doing something very similar—[Interruption.]

The Chair

Your sound has gone, Sir Stephen.

Professor Varuhas: May I come in while Sir Stephen fixes his audio?

The Chair

Yes, you can come in while Sir Stephen gets his sound back.

Professor Varuhas: I also agree that there are some concerns that attend the Supreme Court’s increasing attraction to articulating very broad constitutional values and rights. That was something that the independent review of administrative law drew attention to, and particularly the court’s articulation of these norms not revealing any particular principle. The right of access to courts has perhaps unsurprisingly been classed as of fundamental constitutional value, but not the right to life, for example. Moreover, these values have been used at times, it seems, to subvert parliamentary intention in the interpretation of legislation. I think there is a more general need for a reassertion of legislative or parliamentary intention as the touchstone of statutory interpretation, which would help to counter some of these problematic trends.

On the provision for suspended quashing orders in the Bill before the Committee, part of the rationale for suspended relief is that, in cases where controversial constitutional values are invoked or there are controversial interpretations of statute where Parliament’s intention is in question, relief can be suspended as a prompt for Parliament to enter the fray and inject its voice on behalf of the polity into the delineation of constitutional values and norms, and to make clear, where there is any doubt as to its intention, what its intention was in a particular statutory context. The suspended orders in the Bill are in part a response to that jurisprudence, although, as I mentioned, more reforms could of course be introduced to clarify parliamentary intention as the touchstone of statutory interpretation.

The Chair

Sir Stephen, do you want to come back in, because you were cut short by the sound? [Interruption.] We are still having sound issues, so we will try to come back to you later. I do not know whether it is a technical issue at your end or this end. Sorry about that, Sir Stephen. In the meantime, I will take a question from Andy Slaughter.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

“overall, the way that judicial review worked was satisfactory”

and that

“any decision to do something about it radically would…be wrong and potentially contrary to the rule of law.”

From some of the answers you have already given, it sounds as though you may not entirely agree with that. Where do you differ from Lord Faulks, if at all? On the contrary view, how do you think judicial review can help to improve decision making by public bodies?

The Chair

Can I ask who that is directed to first, Andy?

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Any of the witnesses.

The Chair

Who wants to take that question?

Professor Ekins: I will go first, and then my colleagues can take a turn. I am always happiest when agreeing with Lord Faulks, and I am certainly not willing to propose a radical overhaul of judicial review. It is a central institution of our constitution and there would be dangers in trying to put it entirely on a statutory basis—a course of action that has been thought through but that I think would be fraught with difficulty.

The question is whether it has gone too far in some domains and in some directions, and that conclusion is entirely compatible with the idea that you do not want to overhaul it at large and that no radical reform is necessary. A correction could be made in certain cases, where judicial review is extended into the heart of the political constitution, as you saw in the Prorogation case, which I know Lord Faulks was much exercised about and was highly critical of, and in other cases, where the techniques involved—we have talked about some of them already—are difficult to square with parliamentary sovereignty and the primacy of Government decision making in relation to the public interest, and where, rather than a supervisory jurisdiction being in play, one has intrusion into the merits.

One can make some significant corrections on the margins—if you call it the margins—without undermining the central value of judicial review. In relation to its value, Ministers should clearly be subject to the law; they should not exceed the scope of their statutory powers, or go beyond the scope of prerogative powers for that matter. The courts have a vital role to play in vindicating those legal limits and in correcting deficiencies in process, where decision making might have flouted the requirements of natural justice or an extremist has simply made an irrational decision, although one would expect that to be less common. So there is undoubtedly a very valuable role for judicial review to play, but that is consistent with noting—as so some senior and retired judges—that what has gone on in some significant, major, politically salient cases is unjustifiable and warrants a legislative response.

Andy Slaughter

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“the Bill’s measures are a carefully considered, limited response to two important Supreme Court judgments.”

Some of the things that the Lord Chancellor has said in the context of human rights have implied the same thing—that, effectively, there will be a second-guessing or a corrective effect on judgments of the superior courts. Is that how you see this working?

Professor Ekins: In part. With respect, I would not say tit for tat, but judgments that put the law in doubt in significant ways, or break new ground in ways that are constitutionally problematic, deserve a response to correct the law. It is not a response to dress down the judges; it is to restore or make the law to that which Parliament wishes it to be. I think that much good can be done by a systematic response to cases where the law has been changed in difficult ways. That would be the central mode of action.

There is a sense sometimes, though, that one should respond to grounds of action. For example, a legislative response to the Adams case—I have drafted a possible response—would not necessarily, and does not, mention that case by name, but it restates the Carltona principle. It makes it clear that the Carltona principle has a central place in our law and constitution—so, partly just a general change but motivated by cases where this has been put in doubt.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Professor Ekins: With respect, I do not think that it is a radical departure. I think that legislative responses to judgments that put the law in a different place were, maybe not routine, but they are certainly unimpeachable constitutionally. In a sense, this is an opportunity, and it was built to look back across several decades of legal development, or at the least the last decade or two, and make some changes that are worth making in this context. Whether power should be used by statutory instrument, I would be much less comfortable with, in so far as some of the changes we are talking about involve the meaning and application of a judgment.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Professor Ekins: I would not ever mention that it needs to be emergency legislation. Sometimes it will have to be, as was the case after the Adams case, where legislation was moved from within a matter of weeks to a number of days, but much more often, we simply need to pay attention and be willing to bring forward legislation in response. Obviously, legislative time is scarce, so that will always be difficult to prioritise, but noting when the law of judicial review has been developed in startling ways that really are not justified in responding is a significant exercise of Parliament’s responsibility.

The Chair

Does any other panel member want to come in to respond to Andy Slaughter’s question? Sir Stephen, have we got you back yet?

Sir Stephen Laws: I think so; I apologise. I think I detected a problem at this end. There are some systematic approaches that need to be adopted. I think it is right that Parliament should retain its ability to react to individual cases, but that is difficult because time is short and, quite often, by the time the courts have set the framework, they have intervened, in a way, in the political argument.

I would like to come back to the point I was trying to make when I was muted. There are distinctions between intervention by judicial review in casework and intervention by judicial review in legislative actions, because the remedies and principles that are applied to legislative actions are themselves legislative. If the courts are deciding judicial review decisions that set the rules for future hypothetical cases, they are usurping the legislative function. The systematic approach needs to distinguish more clearly between judicial review of legislative actions and system management issues, and judicial review of casework.

Professor Varuhas: Obviously, there are many cases in the judicial review casework of the courts that raise no problems whatsoever, but the IRAL report identified some problematic areas where there were patterns where courts were potentially exceeding the institutional and constitutional limits of their role. It was acknowledged in the conclusion to the IRAL report that there were some instances where the Supreme Court had exceeded the supervisory conception of review. It is also important to note that IRAL acknowledged very clearly that it was legitimate for Parliament to legislate in the field of judicial review, including the response to particular judgments. I note that the modern machinery of judicial review was established by legislative instruments and statute, particularly the Senior Courts Act 1981. The entire modern machinery of review is owed to legislation.

A number of problematic areas have already been mentioned by my colleagues. One is that the courts have turned from scrutinising individual decisions to scrutinising and evaluating entire administrative systems and invalidating them, without an acknowledgement that the courts lack expertise and experience in the field of design of large administrative systems.

Another area is in proportionality—where the courts strike a balance between competing considerations. That tends to supplant the role of the statutory decision maker, whose role is to weigh up all those considerations. Then there are the areas we have already mentioned, where the court has taken upon itself to speak for the polity in articulating constitutional values. One would expect that is a role for Parliament first and foremost. Also, there is where the courts have used those values to interpret legislation in the light of the concerns they consider normative appealing, rather than necessarily to give effect to the legislative intention that sits behind legislation.

What the IRAL process showed is that it can be very difficult to legislate as to the substance of judicial review at an abstract level, but what can be done is that responses can be made to particular judgments. There are plenty of examples through history where Parliament has done so. Also, the rules governing the procedure and remedies of review have always been housed in the Senior Courts Act—they are the product of Parliament; Parliament has updated and amended those procedures and remedies over time. This latest batch of reforms, particularly the remedial reforms, can be seen as a further incremental development of the remedial system.

Remedies can be important, because they can provide an outlet for wider concerns, such as the public interest or interest in good administration, and they can provide a way to modulate the boundaries of review, to ensure that it does not stray beyond ordinary practicalities and infringe upon fundamental principles. Again, I think that is entirely legitimate and there are many examples of Parliament legislating as to remedies.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Professor Varuhas: These remedies will not prevent anyone from getting in the court door, because they are remedies, which apply after a finding of unlawfulness has been found by a court. I think these remedies are welcome, because they provide for a greater remedial flexibility for courts—for courts to tailor remedies in their discretion, to the exigencies of the particular facts of the case. It is important to bear in mind that these remedies will be discretionary and the courts will take into account a range of relevant considerations in exercising that discretion. Courts are well versed in exercising remedial discretion—courts can be expected to respond to the justice of the particular case. What the Bill does is to give the courts more options.

The most common consequence of a finding of unlawfulness is that the impugned administrative measure is a nullity, which means it never existed. That will suffice in many cases, but in some cases it will be an overly blunt measure that can have very drastic effects. For example, a large infrastructure project may be started and there might be a slight technical or procedural error at the outset.

If the project proceeds and is then nullified as if it never existed, that will have very negative effects on the people who had contracted with the Government and, by being critically disruptive, on the national economic interest, and could lead to significant economic waste. In that sort of case, a suspended order allowing the Government time to respond to the finding of unlawfulness and make relevant provisions to accommodate that finding, or a prospective order that holds that what has gone before remains good and that the nullification takes effect only prospectively, can play an important role in protecting very important public interests, interests of good administration and the interests of third parties who might interact with Government.

Indeed, if something like a large infrastructure project were invalidated, it could undermine the confidence of market players in contracting or working with Government, because the rug could be pulled out from the project at some later point once a lot of money and time has been sunk into it. I think these are very moderate reforms seeking to give the courts greater remedial flexibility to tailor remedial responses to the particular context of the case, in the light of the range of interests implicated.

Sir Stephen Laws: I am sympathetic to people who have a view about what remedies should be granted to litigants in the case in question, but I am not sympathetic to the idea that judicial review should be an extra step in the political debate about whether a piece of legislation should exist or continue to exist. The Unison case provides a startling example of the sort of absurd consequence that you would get from the nullity remedy.

In that case, the courts overturned fees to be charged to people who wanted to take their employment cases to hearing. The result of nullifying the regulations involved a very large amount of money being paid not to the people who were deterred from bringing their cases to employment tribunals, but either to the people who did bring them and lost, or to employers in those litigations who lost and had to pay the fees of the people who had been successful. That was a ridiculous remedy for a mischief that harmed people other than those who got their money back.

Professor Ekins: I agree with my colleagues that clause 1 increases remedial discretion and focuses it to some extent, although one can argue about how it does that. Much of the response to these two clauses has been overstated.

We have not yet spoken about clause 2 and the limitation of review of the relevant decisions of the upper tribunal. Again, that has been a bit misunderstood or framed and received by some groups as though it were an abolition of judicial review at large in some way, but I think it is a restatement of the law that Parliament tried to create in 2007 in the relevant legislation. The Supreme Court sort of glossed that in 2011, and many senior judges have been unhappy with the way that it was decided then and the way it was worked out subsequently.

In limiting review in the way that clause 2 does—with plenty of safeguards, I should add—one is not barring the door to the courtroom, but bringing an end to an otherwise never-ending series of procedural steps. Looking into it, one can always find a benefit from further procedural steps, but it is a perfectly reasonable and proportionate response to limit judicial review in that context, where the decision maker in question is another court. It is not a Minister detaining someone, or something like that; it is the upper tribunal, and as a court, it warrants an immunity from judicial review in that context. People should be much more relaxed than some have been about those two measures.

Andy Slaughter

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“it is expected that the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”

That appears to signal an intent on the Government’s part to use the ouster more commonly in future. Is that how you read it? Do you think that that is a good or bad way of going about things?

The Chair

Who wants to take that one first?

Professor Ekins: I will, since I was talking about Cart just now.

It is true that they have signalled that. I think that this will be an effective ouster clause because it is a perfectly constitutionally irreproachable response to the Supreme Court’s judgment. It restates Parliament’s intention and is protecting a court’s jurisdiction—not an ordinary court’s, but a specialist court’s, albeit one with pretty wide jurisdiction.

I think that it will work as an ouster clause. I do not think that the courts will view it with disdain or try to undercut it as they have done with some other ouster clauses. To that extent, it will provide a framework, partly because it is limited: it is designed to limit judicial review without ousting it altogether. It is a safeguard in relation to true procedural failure, bad faith and so on, which is fine and proper.

I think that it could be used as a framework for other cases. In the Policy Exchange paper that I published last week, I suggested one such context: the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, another specialist court, which was subject to the protection of an ouster clause enacted in 2000, as David Davis mentioned in his Guardian article last week. That ouster clause was undercut by the Supreme Court in 2019, using some of the problematic techniques that we have talked about—openly departing from legislative intent and distorting the meaning of the statute.

I think that Parliament should enact an ouster clause, modelled on clause 2, that protects the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. There will be pretty sharp limits on how often you want to use the clauses, of course—this one is controversial, and they will all be controversial. Whenever there is a suggestion that there is not a proper context for ouster, the controversy will be higher.

We have talked before about intrusions that judicial review has made on some relationships at the heart of the political constitution. There is a case to be made for ouster, or for limitation of review, in that context. You will be aware of the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, which is making its way through Parliament now. Clause 3 of that Bill is a partial response to the Prorogation judgment, and quite rightly so; it protects the prerogative of Dissolution, when it is restored, from judicial review. I think that that is justified and that you may have to act similarly in relation to Prorogation law on other aspects of the political constitution.

I would not expect the approach to be widely used, but I think that there are contexts in which it is reasonable and justified.

Sir Stephen Laws: I agree with all of that. As a drafter of legislation, whenever I was asked to draft an ouster clause, as I was from time to time, my response was always: “There’s no hope of it ever succeeding, unless you’re presenting a politically and legally justifiable alternative route for people who would otherwise be going to the court.” That, of course, is what the Cart judgment does, for the reasons that Professor Ekins has given: the upper tribunal is a proper court; the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is a proper remedy; and, in the case of the Prorogation judgment, the remedy is political because that is how the constitution is set up. In relation to the major matters of the relationship between Parliament and Government, it is Parliament that has the remedy, ultimately, in being able to pass a vote of no confidence in the Government and require their resignation or a general election.

Professor Varuhas: On clause 2, the first thing that I would say is that it derives from a clear recommendation from the expert independent review of administrative law and has subsequently been subject to a full Government consultation. Former Law Lords have also come out in support of the policy, including Lord Hope, who is the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court, and Lord Carnwath, who—importantly—was the inaugural Senior President of Tribunals and was subsequently a Law Lord on the Supreme Court. He said that the ouster would restore what was always intended: that the upper tribunal should have equal status with the High Court. That was the intention behind its designation as a superior court of record. As colleagues have stressed, that is a really important point: the upper tribunal has equivalent status to the High Court.

There is a further point to be made, which relates to how many bites of the cherry one person might have. It is worth reminding ourselves what a Cart judicial review is. It will have been a claim in the first-tier tribunal that will have been unsuccessful. The claimant will then seek permission to appeal to the upper tribunal. The first-tier tribunal will decline permission, and then the claimant will appeal to the upper tribunal against the declination of permission to appeal to the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal will have declined permission to appeal. It is not clear, given the upper tribunal’s status as a superior court of record, that one then needs a further bite of the cherry by going to the High Court via judicial review, and potentially all the way up the judicial hierarchy.

Whatever the case is more generally, in this instance the clause is justified, and it is a targeted response to a particular problem. Also it is not a pure ouster, because in clause 2(4) the path remains open for claimants to bring a judicial review in the High Court in serious instances of illegality, such as where the upper tribunal acts in bad faith or in fundamental breach of principles of natural justice. That is an important point to bear in mind: there is still a route to the High Court in cases of serious unlawfulness.

The Chair

A few Members have indicated they wish to ask questions, so I will take them in order.

Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)

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Q There has been lots of debate about whether these reforms are necessary or good for parliamentary democracy. It is important to reflect on the fact that of course it was in the Government’s manifesto that they would propose significant reform to the way in which judicial review works. To what extent do the witnesses see the mandate of an election as important to the functioning of our democracy?

The Chair

Who wants to take that one? Is it a googly?

Professor Ekins: I will start. Clearly the mandate on which the Government campaign and secure a majority is significant. It is true that page 48 of the Conservative party manifesto makes a commitment to look again at the constitution and to take measures to ensure that judicial review does not become “politics by another means”—a phrase Lord Sumption used in his Reith lectures and also used by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in judgments in 2019. It is also true that the commitment does not spell out what it will involve, and that is partly what the Committee is considering and the Government have been thinking through—as has the independent review of administrative law.

There should be no constitutional question about the entitlement of Parliament to legislate on judicial review. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Burnett, has made that crystal clear in various public statements. The question, of course, is the merits of the proposals—the devil may be in the detail. It would be wrong, as we have discussed, to overhaul judicial review. It would be a mistake—not improper, but a mistake—to try to put it on a statutory footing at large, but changes can be made where problems have arisen.

The political salience of judicial review has clearly risen in the last five years—indeed in the last decade or two. If one can identify the problematic trends and respond to them in a targeted and careful way, one would be acting properly and in accordance with the manifesto, even if I would be cautious myself in connecting any particular proposal to the manifesto because it was not quite that specific.

Sir Stephen Laws: I have nothing particular to add to that, as it all seems right. In my submission to the independent review of administrative law I drew attention to what I thought were the beginnings of a breakdown in trust between the political world and the judiciary, and the political salience of the issues around judicial review is evidence of that. Plainly, there can be no question about Parliament’s right to legislate, and the need to do so has been demonstrated.

Professor Varuhas: I would add that the concerns reflected in the manifesto around the judicial review and whether the courts had in certain contexts overreached were vindicated in the IRAL report, which did pinpoint at multiple times areas of concern. This set of reforms, regarding remedies and the Cart ouster, have been through an incredibly thorough process. An expert independent panel was constituted, the Independent Review of Administrative Law, with five distinguished academic lawyers and others drawn from the profession, chaired by Lord Faulks. The reforms in the Bill derive from that panel’s recommendations.

The panel stressed the need for reforms to emphasise remedial flexibility and it recommended the ouster of Cart judicial reviews. Those recommendations were then put out to general consultation—a Government consultation. At each stage there were a lot of consultation responses, so the reforms we see before us are the product of an incredibly thorough, expert-led process. To my mind it is not a surprise that the reforms are well justified in the end.

The Chair

Thank you. Are you happy with that, Tom?

Tom Hunt

- - Excerpts

indicated assent.

The Chair

Sir John Hayes.

Sir John Hayes

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Q I am listening closely to what you have all said. You have described a sort of creeping judicial activism. The case you have made is that the Bill effectively reaffirms the proper role of judicial review against a drift into a whole range of political areas where judicial review is used as a means of perpetuating political debates. I have particular concern with the perpetual use of the idea of rule of law to legitimise that judicial activism. I would be interested in your view on that. A very good example is the Privacy International case, where the extraordinary judgment by Lord Carnwath talked about the essential counterpoints to the power of Parliament to make law. It describes the courts as such. This is an extraordinary and outrageous thing for a judge to say. It is time, to put it bluntly, that we put some of these people back in their box. Is it not?

The Chair

Who wants to take that question? Anybody?

Professor Ekins: I will go first. I have been highly critical of the Privacy International judgment, and I share the view that the majority judgment, or Lord Carnwath’s judgment, with which Lady Hale and Lord Kerr agreed, was outrageous. Those three judges are no longer on the Supreme Court, but that judgment is part of the common law and it does warrant a response. There were many other things going on in May 2019, so maybe it is not a surprise that it did not get much public attention, but that judgment did constitute a very serious attack on some fundamentals of the constitution.

Parliamentary sovereignty was openly questioned and the rule of law was set in apparent tension with parliamentary sovereignty, which is deeply wrong, I think. The rule of law requires respect for the law, which includes parliamentary sovereignty and the stability of statute, and the primacy of legislative intent in interpreting statute is one of the fundamental ways in which the rule of law is secured. It is true that the rule of law is often bandied about as though it warrants adventurous judicial action that cannot be squared with the existing constitutional law or with the terms of statute, because we are going to make it better and we are going to impose further controls on the Government or public bodies.

As Lord Hughes, who was on the Supreme Court at the time, said, that is to confuse the rule of law with the rule of courts. You do not see that just with the Privacy International case, we see it in the Evans case, involving the Freedom of Information Act 2000, where a clear statutory power was undone. Three judges interpreted it so that it does not exist any more, and another two judges, also during the majority, attacked its exercise in a different way. This is a worrying trend, and the independent review noted the Evans case.

If Parliament can notice and respond to those judgments, it will both correct the law that has been undone and make clear that the technique is seen and is not tolerated as legitimate. In cases where judicial review breaks new ground and is being carried out in a way that is inconsistent with statute and long-standing principle and rules—the Prorogation judgment is very large here—the litigation is an extension of political argument and a way of getting the courts to weigh in on your side in a controversy. That is destructive of the courts’ reputation and of the political constitution that should be framing those arguments, and it is not vindicating the rule of law but undoing it and undoing the political foundation for our parliamentary democracy.

Sir Stephen Laws: I would agree with that. It seems to me that the fundamental principle that should be upheld as part of the rule of law is the need for legal certainty and predictability. Judicial law making undermines that because it produces new law that nobody was able to expect, and because of the myth that the common law has always existed, it also creates the further injustice of retrospective effect.

If ordinary citizens cannot predict with certainty before they act what conduct will escape censure, that is a serious injustice. If public officials cannot be sure that what the law allows them to do, adherence to the law for them ceases to be a matter of principled compliance and becomes instead a straightforward commercial exercise in risk management, and that is a very bad thing for the management of public affairs generally.

The Chair

There seems to be consensus on that. I am conscious of time; Jason, would you like to come in on that quickly?

Professor Varuhas: I think the rule of law is an important value, but all too often, it is used to denote what someone thinks is good. It is often invoked without elaboration and as a trump card. The rule of law is an important value, particularly the principle of government and the law, but other values and aspects of the rule of law can be important.

As Sir Stephen alluded to, you can see that with the proposal for prospective orders, for example. You might have a decision-making procedure created by regulation, with many decisions made under that in regard to particular people. If you invalidate that ad initio, the consequence will be that all those decisions in regard to all those individuals would be thrown into doubt. They would have planned their lives on the basis of the decisions that had been rendered in regard to them.

On the one hand, you might say that voiding ad initio and rendering a decision a nullity upholds the rule of law, but it can undermine other aspects of the rule of law, such as certainty, predictability and people’s ability to plan their lives in the light of decisions that have been made in regard to them. The beauty of prospective orders is that they can be calibrated to save those past decisions and provide certainty, finality and confidence in the administration of justice for those individuals, while ensuring that the system complies with legal requirements going forward.

The Chair

I am conscious of time. As I said earlier, we have to move on to the second panel soon, so this will be the final question. I call Dr Caroline Johnson.

Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

- - Excerpts

Professor Varuhas: One of the motivations for the provisions is to provide the courts with flexibility to adapt remedies to the particular needs of the given case. That is a response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that have held, contrary to long-standing authority, that a funding of unlawfulness automatically voids administrative measures as if they never existed. That has never been the position, because there has always been remedial discretion to modulate the effects of unlawfulness.

The Bill reasserts that remedial flexibility so that remedies can be tailored to the particular needs of relative interests and values implicated in the facts of the case. In proposed new section 29A(8) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, you have a list of factors that will guide courts in exercising their discretion, and those factors are drawn from the common law, so dovetail with pre-existing doctrine. Importantly, they give litigants and the Government fair warning of the factors that will bear on remedial decisions. Subsection (8) requires that

“the court must have regard to”

those factors, which has the benefit that the court will apply the same framework in every case. That provides consistency of principle and ensures transparency, because the court will have to work through those particular factors to reach a conclusion regarding what type of order ought to be given on the facts of the case.

In my view, one problem with subsection (9) is that it erects a presumption. It is a particularly weak presumption, and therefore one might question what the justification for it is, but more generally I am not necessarily in favour of a presumptive approach one way or the other, because that can undermine the court’s capacity to adapt to the particular facts of the case and respond to the particular factors that arise—the public interest in good administration, the interests of third parties and so on. Necessary flexibility is built into the scheme, but there is also fair warning of the factors that will be taken into account pursuant to subsection (8), which is a particularly important provision in that regard.

The Chair

Professor Ekins: Briefly, I agree with everything that Jason said. One could add a little more detail perhaps to the factors in subsection (8), tying in with Sir Stephen’s point about the significance of whether something is a legislative act. That seems like something that should be at the forefront of the court’s mind. It is a weak presumption in subsection (9). One could either remove it or tailor it, narrowing it so that the presumption arises only where the decision making in question is legislative in character or on a general policy decision, rather than casework, to use Sir Stephen’s term. At the moment, it is a very broad presumption, and a very weak one, and it might be more useful if it were narrowed and applied in a more focused way.

The Chair

Quickly, Sir Stephen.

Sir Stephen Laws: I am a legislative drafter. I am used to people asking me to guarantee when a discretion is conferred that it will be exercised in the way that they wish. I think I agree with Professor Ekins that more detail would be desirable.

The Chair

Thank you. To ask the final question, I call the Minister.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)

- - Excerpts

Q Thank you, Sir Mark; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank our three very distinguished guests for their excellent contributions and some very interesting points. I will finish with one point on Cart JR. I think Professor Varuhas made the point about the upper tribunal effectively being a superior court. On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), who has acted on Cart JR cases as a barrister, made this point about consistency: in very few other areas of law do we have what we call three bites of the cherry. Very briefly, does it not seem strange that no one arguing to maintain Cart JR seems to be arguing that all the other areas where there are only two bites of the cherry should now have three? Would that not be the logical conclusion of that position?

The Chair

I think we have time for only one response, so who should take it?

James Cartlidge

- - Excerpts

It probably has to be Professor Varuhas.

Professor Varuhas: I reiterate what I said before in response to your question. The phrase on the number of bites of the cherry comes from a speech given by Lord Carnwath, who raised this point and considered that it was disproportionate that an applicant in this context should have so many bites of the cherry, given that the upper tribunal has the status of the High Court. It is a judicial body, independent of Government, that is staffed by senior members of the judiciary with specialist expertise. Given the credentials of the institution, it seems disproportionate to allow a further three or four bites of the cherry after an application has proceeded through those stages and been found not to have merit. I think the point is well made.

I will abuse my position to add one further point on the remedies provision. Professor Ekins reminded me that I meant to say that one discretionary factor that should be added under subsection (8) is the public interest, which is a curious omission because the public interest can be seriously prejudiced by decisions on remedies in the interests of the economy, national security and so on. That should be factored into the remedies.

Although I went slightly off topic at the end, I certainly agree—

The Chair

Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of our time. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence today.

Examination of Witnesses

Professor David Feldman and Dr Jonathan Morgan gave evidence.

The Chair

Q We now move on to panel 2. We have one witness present, Dr Jonathan Morgan, and a virtual witness, Professor David Feldman.

We will hear oral evidence from Professor David Feldman and Dr Jonathan Morgan, both of the University of Cambridge, for just under an hour. Without any further ado, I ask them to make their introductory addresses.

Professor Feldman: Thank you, Chair. I am David Feldman, the emeritus Rouse Ball professor of English law at the University of Cambridge and emeritus fellow of Downing College, Cambridge.

I have been working in this field for some 40 years, and I take a great interest in what is going on. In relation to the proposed new provisions set out in clauses 1 and 2, I suggest that one should approach them on the basis of the constitutional background and the importance of judicial review and access to courts.

On the constitutional importance of keeping public officials within the limit of the powers set by Parliament, parliamentary sovereignty requires that there should be independent interpreters and adjudicators to keep the people to whom statute delegates power within the limits set by Parliament. That is complicated by the requirement of the rule of law that requires obedience to law by Government and scrutiny by an independent judiciary on the lawfulness of behaviour.

The combination of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, together with article 6 of the European convention on human rights, where applicable, requires access to independent and impartial courts and tribunals and it requires the availability of effective remedies for violations of law, where those are found to have taken place.

The Chair

Professor Feldman: The conclusion is that the provisions in clauses 1 and 2 affect access to courts and the effectiveness of remedies and, therefore, should be examined with very great care to make sure they are justified.

The Chair

Q Thank you. Dr Jonathan Morgan, do you want to say a bit about yourself and your view on the topic? Then we will open up for questions.

Dr Morgan: My name is Jonathan Morgan. I am a reader in English law at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Like any academic, I would be delighted to address you on the sexy subject of constitutional theory, but having heard what my learned friend has experienced, I will not do that now. I will just say a couple of things about the Bill before us.

It seems to me that clause 1 is highly welcome, but it needs two significant amendments to make it perfect. Clause 2, which is on the Cart review, is compatible with the rule of law, but there are some very real costs to doing this, and Parliament needs to confront them. One of the costs is that the very few people who succeed in Cart reviews will not have that avenue in future. I am happy to substantiate those in questions, but I will not enlarge on that now.

Dr Johnson

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: I think you have put your finger on it, lawyer or not, because Cart deals with a fairly unusual situation, exactly as you have said. This is to do with the level of appeals within the judiciary. Critics of clause 2, who say that this is doing violence to the rule of law and is setting a bad precedent by immunising the Government from being judicially reviewed, are therefore somewhat missing the point. Clause 2 has its cost, but I do not think it immunises Government decisions from judicial review. It simply says how many reviews or appeals there should be within the judiciary. I was here for the previous panel of witnesses, and in terms of whether you have permission to review within the court system, the number of “bites of the cherry” is a good way to put it.

One overall criticism of the Supreme Court might be that it failed to give proper respect to the tribunal system as a branch of the judiciary. It had a slightly legacy, old-fashioned view of the tribunal system as something that needed to be under the supervision of the High Court, and so on. That is why Lord Carnwath, who, as we have heard, is a former Senior President of Tribunals, has been a critic of the Cart decision. It is important to see clause 2 as to do with arrangements within the judiciary. Yes, there is an ouster clause in clause 2, but it does not immunise administrative or Government decisions. It immunises decisions of what is, in effect, a court by another name—the upper tribunal.

The Chair

Dr Feldman, do you want to come in on that? I noticed that your volume was quite low. If possible, could you raise your voice a little bit?

Professor Feldman: I beg your pardon; I did not hear that.

The Chair

Q Would you like to respond to the question? If you do, could you please raise the volume a little? You were very quiet in your opening remarks.

Professor Feldman: Thank you. The only thing I would add to what Dr Morgan has said is that judicial review is seen as a general safety net. One of its functions is certainly to scrutinise Government decision making and action, but it is there as a backstop to deal with unlawful action by any public body. One starts with the presumption that judicial review is available unless there is some specific reason for excluding it. It is clear that the justification for interfering with access to judicial review may be stronger where a body is a judicial body, and where a litigant has already had the chance to have his or her case heard by an impartial and independent tribunal, rather than simply by an administrative body.

Dr Johnson

- - Excerpts

Professor Feldman: The answer is that the courts held in Cart that being a superior court of record does not immunise a body from being subject to judicial review. For practical purposes, the High Court is immune to judicial review, because it is the High Court that carries out judicial review. It extends, as they used to say, to all inferior courts and tribunals—that is, below the level of the High Court—as well as public officials. It is a matter of basic principle that the upper tribunal was to be subject to this, even if, as Lord Justice Laws said in Cart, the upper tribunal would be seen as the avatar of the High Court.

Dr Morgan: In my view, this is what went wrong in 2007, so apologies to any Members who were in Parliament then. In 2007, Parliament thought that by designating the upper tribunal as a superior court of record, it would immunise it from judicial review. That is what the Government argued in Cart, but they failed to convince the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

To ingratiate myself with Members, I will say that the fault was not only that of Parliament but that of the Leggatt report on tribunals, which said that there should not be judicial review of the upper tribunal and that by designating it a superior court of record, Parliament would immunise it from judicial review. I am afraid that Sir Andrew Leggatt turned out to be wrong on that when it got to the courts. It is true that Leggatt had said that there should be an express ouster clause, which Parliament did not put in. If Parliament in 2007 had gone for the belt-and-braces approach and not relied only on the status of the upper tribunal as a superior court of record, Cart would never have happened and we would not be here today discussing it. In a way, this problem has been 20 years in the making.

Dr Johnson

- - Excerpts

Q Just to be clear, it is the equivalent of the High Court but it is not treated as such.

Dr Morgan: More or less. I think Lord Justice Laws called it the alter ego of the High Court, but that is not quite the same thing.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: I wrote an article about that in 2019 before IRAL was even thought of. It is not like me to be ahead of the trend. In it, I analysed in particular the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed and others v. HM Treasury—the freezing orders case. Ahmed causes enough doubt on the question that legislating to put it beyond question is a worthwhile use of Parliament’s time. There are some precedents the other way—in a case called Liberty, the divisional court suspended a declaration—but on quashing orders, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ahmed (No. 2) suggests that it is just not possible to suspend a quashing order. In my view, that is unfortunate, because judicial review remedies are in every other respect discretionary, so why not here? In the debate on IRAL in the House of Lords, Lord Hope said that he was dismayed to be in a “minority of one” when he dissented in Ahmed on postponing it. He certainly approves of clause 1. It is at least a doubtful point, and sufficiently doubtful that the legislation is worth it.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Q You are saying there are two separate issues: whether it is a sensible proviso, and whether there is certainty at the moment.

Dr Morgan: Yes. My position is that it is a sensible remedy, and at the moment, it is certainly not clear whether the courts can do it. Clause 1 will, beneficially, clarify that.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

But a court might attempt to impose—

Dr Morgan: For a court below the Supreme Court, the obvious precedent that the applicant would cite would be Ahmed, and it would be very hard for a lower court to get round that, I think.

The Chair

Q I see Professor Feldman nodding his head. Do you want to comment on that point?

Professor Feldman: I think that is completely right. There is a big distinction between quashing orders and declarations for this purpose. What Ahmed (No. 2) did was to eliminate the difference—a quashing order quashes, whereas a declaration can only declare that a body has a duty or has breached a duty or has not breached a duty, and that is something that is not limited as to time. I also agree with Dr Morgan as to the effect of Ahmed (No. 2) on lower courts. However, I think there is a big distinction to be drawn between the suspending of a quashing order where, as the Bill says, the retrospective impact remains when the quashing order eventually takes effect, and a prospective-only order, which seems to me to raise significantly more problems of principle and of practice.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Professor Feldman: One of the difficulties of having a prospective-only remedy is that it is only prospective, and by definition a remedy of this kind would take effect only if the court had already decided that the claimant had been treated unlawfully. To say to a claimant, “This is going to be prospective only” strongly implies it is not going to protect the claimant himself or herself. Some way would have to be found of protecting the claimant, and other people in the position of the claimant, if one did not want to be stuck in the position of saying, “These people were treated unlawfully, but they are not going to have a remedy.”

In clause 1, there is nothing that makes it explicitly clear that a court could say, “I am going to give you a prospective-only remedy, except that it would be retrospective for the purpose of protecting you.” The court might be able to do that, but then you also have the problem of other people in the same position as the claimant—all those people would have been treated unlawfully. It seems strange to me that they should have to suffer unlawfully because the remedy is only prospective.

The language of clause 1, under which proposed new section 29A(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 would state,

“if the impugned act is…upheld”

is very odd. Subsection (5) says,

“it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

That makes it quite difficult to see why one should give a remedy to people who are deemed in that case not to have suffered a legal wrong.

I think it is quite a problem, unless the clause is amended to expressly allow a judge to give a remedy to someone who has obtained a prospective-only order, despite the fact that the law and treatment were to be treated as entirely lawful.

The Chair

Have you finished, Professor Feldman?

Professor Feldman: Yes, thank you.

The Chair

Dr Morgan.

Dr Morgan: I agree with what David Feldman said, but perhaps I could suggest a solution. This is an amendment that should be made to clause 1. Proposed new section 29A(2) to the Senior Courts Act 1981 says that the order

“may be made subject to conditions.”

I think the court should have the power to set as a condition of making a prospective-only order or suspending the order that compensation should be paid to the particular applicant. In my view, that would be a way of squaring the circle of postponing the effect of quashing an entire piece of legislation—saying that is not going to happen today, but is going to happen in six months’ time to give the Government time to prepare.

Of course, that would work great injustice on a successful particular applicant who has paid to take their case to court, has won and then does not get any redress at all. However, if the court were empowered to grant compensation, that could be a way of achieving both those things. I am a public lawyer, but I also teach contract and property law. If you get an injunction in a tort case, the court might suspend the injunction for a period of time and, if it does so, it will give compensation during the period of suspension. It is on that sort of model that I think this could work.

You could argue that while proposed new section 29A(2) says orders

“may be made subject to conditions”,

the explanatory notes say that those could be any conditions the court likes. However, given that the courts cannot award compensation for public law wrongs, it is very doubtful whether that implicitly contains a power to award compensation. I think that proposed new section 29A(2) should be amended to say that orders may be “made subject to conditions including, if the court sees fit, compensation.” That might be a way of reconciling those competing objectives.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Q Do I take that to mean that the way the proposed new section is drafted could dissuade individuals from initiating judicial review proceedings, because they may not obtain a remedy?

Dr Morgan: Yes. That point was made by many Members on Second Reading. It could be a real problem, in particular if it became the norm and the court ordinarily postponed orders. In my view, the court should not ordinarily do that; it should be in exceptional cases only. That takes us on to the presumption in subsection (9) —but perhaps we will come back to that at a separate point. There are two problems with it: first, the presumption; secondly, the absence of a compensation power.

Professor Feldman: May I add two things to what Dr Morgan has said? I agree with what he says in principle.

First, the compensation remedy may not be useful to all claimants. If one is about to be deported as a result of having one’s unlawful decision treated as lawful, for example, compensation is unlikely to be an effective and adequate remedy. There are lots of other types of administrative wrong that lead to people suffering loss or injury that cannot readily be financially compensated.

Secondly, if one is going to compensate, one has to consider all the other people who have been treated unlawfully, who are in a similar position to the claimant, but who are not before the court, so the court cannot order compensation for them. Perhaps one needs to consider whether a court should be empowered to require the provision of a compensation scheme for all those in a similar position to the claimant. That could be a lawful step.

It is also true, as Dr Morgan said, that the administrative law of the English system does not treat financial compensation as a readily available remedy. Therefore, some express permission would have to be made to allow the courts to do it.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: I would take the presumption out altogether. I think what this clause is doing—certainly what it should be doing—is enlarging the power of the courts to tailor relief in a way that they see fit, and removing the obstacle that the Supreme Court laid in their path in Ahmed v. HM Treasury (No. 2). Thus, I just do not see why it is there. The Government say that it is to encourage the courts to use this remedy, but I do not see why we should try and push the courts in a particular direction.

I also think, if subsection (9) is taken out, subsection (8) could be taken out as well. At the moment there is a need to try and direct the court what to take into account; the drafting is already getting very complicated. I think that probably everyone who has written you a paper has suggested more paragraphs that could be put in subsection (8); I think it is going to end up very long indeed. We are talking here about High Court judges; it is very senior judges who will be making these decisions, and in my view, they can simply be trusted to make the appropriate decision based on the facts. That is my first point—I would take it out.

If we are going to keep it in, it is virtually doing nothing at all. I think the courts will be very reluctant to find that there is an adequate redress, because they will say, “The claimant is not going to get anything, so that is not adequate redress.” I think if the court does find that it is satisfied, they will say, “There is a good reason to make the quashing order immediate and retrospective, because that is what we ordinarily do. It is important to do that to keep the Government within the limits of its powers.” I think that subsection (9) is not going to do anything other than generate needless litigation about this; it will become a question that has to be considered in every case, whether it is really relevant to the facts or not. Therefore, I suggest that subsection (9) should go.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Professor Feldman, do you agree with that?

Professor Feldman: I do. Subsections (8) and (9) have twin disadvantages. First, they try to create a presumption that something will happen regularly, when we know that it will not, for the reasons that Dr Morgan has given. Secondly, they are unnecessary because the courts are quite capable of making judgements for themselves. Look at subsection (8)(f):

“any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”

This opens up the field very nicely; I do not see anything there that is necessary.

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

Q Finally, I will ask the same question that I asked the previous panel about ouster, and the Government’s comment in a press release that the

“text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”

Do you think that is a sensible way to go about legislating?

Professor Feldman: Is that for me?

Andy Slaughter

- - Excerpts

For either, or both.

Professor Feldman: I will start then, if I may. I think there is a real difficulty about a provision of this kind being used as a template, because there are two questions that arise. First, is this a situation in which it is justifiable to exclude the High Court supervisory jurisdiction? Secondly, have we drafted a provision that will work and have that effect?

In relation to the first, I think it is important to note that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law generally require that people should have access to courts to determine the lawfulness of action. There is a functional inconsistency between Parliament’s saying that there are limits to the powers of a body or person and, on the other hand, saying that that person or body can decide for themselves, effectively, what those limits are. That is quite apart from the importance of access to courts for the rule of law.

I approach this by asking whether this sort of exclusion of review is justifiable. On balance, I think it is, for a combination of reasons. First, because it excludes review of judicial bodies, not of administrative or executive agencies. Secondly, because the number of people who will suffer, although we can never be quite sure, looks as if it will be relatively small compared with the number of people who would suffer generally if we cut off all judicial review. Somewhere around 3.4% of these cases end up being successful, the Government estimate, compared with 30% to 50% in most other judicial review situations. Bearing in mind the need to use judicial time as efficiently as possible, it may be that this is not a proportionate use of judicial time, in which case one might say—although I say this with great disquiet—that the ouster is justified.

Does it work? Yes, I think it does, for roughly those reasons. Courts will not kick against it, given that the claimant will have had two bites at the cherry already before a judicial tribunal. Is it a template? I am not sure that it will be either necessary or perhaps effective to use this sort of thing in situations in which someone is getting review of other types of decision by other types of agency in different circumstances. For example, I note that in another Bill before the House, the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, there is an attempt to exclude judicial review of decisions concerned with Dissolution of Parliament and purported decisions. Clause 3 of that Bill does not go into any such elaborate provision as are provided here. Presumably, the drafter of that considers that it will work, because of the nature of the decision that is being considered.

Dr Morgan: My position—

The Chair

Very quickly, because four more people want to ask questions. We are running on time.

Dr Morgan: Very briefly, I broadly agree. I think this will work for Cart. I think the Government are mistaken to see it as any kind of template, and that they can put exactly the same words into another Bill about some other different matter and that it will work, because it is not only about the words that Parliament uses but the entire context. Sir Stephen Laws, himself a parliamentary draftsman, made just that point—that it is not only the literal meaning of the words but the whole context. That is why it will work in Cart, but it may not work in another statute, even if precisely the same words were used. I would not see it as a template or model.

Sir John Hayes

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: There was a debate earlier about whether this should be described as tit for tat, which I do not like either, but doing it on a case-by-case basis. If you are not a lawyer and you read through the Cart judgments, you will see that it is all highly technical stuff about the number of appeals you should have within a particular structure. I have never heard anyone suggest that the judges in Cart were guilty of judicial activism. I think it is a relatively technical problem that has created a lot of expense and lots of hopeless judicial reviews, and the Government are taking action to address that.

I will not keep saying “sexier subjects”, but the more egregious examples of muscular judicial review have been mentioned earlier: Privacy International, the Prorogation case, and Evans v. Unison. There is a case for Parliament to reverse them. In my view, it has a constitutional right to do so if it wishes, but they should probably be taken one by one. Maybe we need a different Bill to do that, and the Government can tell us whether that is their intention, but the two clauses here deal with some real problems in a fairly unflashy way. Ouster clauses might be needed if we are to reverse the other cases, but I think that has to be debated separately. It is not really within the scope of the Bill at all.

Sir John Hayes

- - Excerpts

On the issue of judicial activism, is this the right Bill to explore that, or are you suggesting, as you implied just a moment ago, that perhaps another piece of legislation will be introduced to deal with that in the light of the Evans case, the Miller case and the other cases that we have seen prevailing over a number of years? There is a challenge for democratic Government that needs to be addressed.

Dr Morgan: In my view, it would be a shame if the valuable things that are in the current Bill were lost because other things were put in that were frankly much more controversial. I am not the manager of parliamentary time; I do not know how easy it is to get another Bill going through. There is always a temptation—the Minister laughs—to tag things on, so maybe this is an opportunity not to be missed. I have read Richard Ekins’s list of desirable amendments, which would keep Parliament going for about five years, and with heated rows, if all those were put in.

Sir John Hayes

- - Excerpts

I will take that as an invitation to table some desirable amendments and probe the Government on exactly that matter. I am grateful.

The Chair

Professor Feldman, do you want to come in on that?

Professor Feldman: Only to say that I would not want to be thought to agree with the suggestion that there has been a sudden rush of judicial activism. Judicial activism is extremely difficult to define, and people who say there is a lot more judicial activism than there used to be tend to pick on a very small number of fairly high-profile cases over the last few years. It may be that there are more of those than one might have expected in the length of time passing. Having been involved in this subject for over 40 years, as I said before, it seems to me that there has been a process of gradual—it has been gradual—development of principles of administrative law and their application since the 1950s, so we are talking about getting on for 70 years.

Nothing has happened suddenly and things have not all gone in one direction; there has been progress in one direction and then a pushback. I suspect we may be going through a pushback at the moment, within the judiciary itself. Judicial activism is a term that I do not really understand and I would not want it to be the basis of legislation.

Sir John Hayes

- - Excerpts

Q I simply recommend that you read the Attorney General’s speech on this, delivered in Cambridge about a week ago, which sets out exactly why this matters and defines judicial activism pretty well. I make no more comment, but refer you to that.

Professor Feldman: Thank you. I shall read it with interest.

Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: I think I just want to repeat what I said earlier, which is that it certainly could. To adopt Professor Feldman’s example, if the court suspends the effect of its order in an immigration case, you might have been deported by the time the order comes into force. Certainly it could cause serious problems for applicants in particular cases, but there are countervailing advantages, particularly where we are dealing with the general legislative scheme, which the court would otherwise immediately quash with retrospective effect. That could cause enormous difficulties in a very important area.

The Ahmed case was about quashing these freezing orders, made by requirement of the United Nations Security Council on suspected international terrorists. The court said that the whole legislative scheme had to be immediately quashed, as many Members will remember. It required emergency legislation to deal with it. In cases like that it could be beneficial, but it could cause a problem for a particular applicant. My earlier answer suggested how we might try and address it; Professor Feldman was right to say that damages and compensation are not always the answer, but they might be sometimes.

The Chair

Q Professor Feldman, do you want to comment on that?

Professor Feldman: I will just say that lying behind this there is a difficulty that faces people drafting legislation like this. The onus is to be general and to apply to all kinds of decisions and rules, whereas, in fact, quashing a rule has rather different implications from quashing an individual decision, so the approach to it has to be similarly different.

The Chair

Are you happy with that, Janet?

Janet Daby

- - Excerpts

Yes, that is fine.

Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: The context was slightly different. You could say the ouster clause before us in clause 2 is less extreme, because it allows for JR on certain very narrow grounds. That is one reason why the courts would be more likely to accept what is now proposed than the Labour proposals back then. Of course, they were never even enacted, let alone reached the courts, so it will be a nice hypothetical question about whether it would have survived scrutiny or not. All it shows is that this particular question of having a huge volume of challenges, very few of which succeed, is not a new problem. It has been there for at least 20 years. Successive Governments have wrestled with it.

Cart was a very noble attempt to hold a balance, but even some of the judges who decided the case—Lord Brown and Lord Hope—have now accepted that their solution has not worked and perhaps a more drastic solution, as in clause 2, is justified. I think if the judges themselves are accepting that they went too far, that is something Parliament should take careful note of.

Marco Longhi

- - Excerpts

Thank you. I am glad that you referred to the words “less extreme” in your commentary.

Professor Feldman: I agree with what Dr Morgan said.

James Cartlidge

- - Excerpts

Professor Feldman: That is a perfectly fair point. Success rates in judicial review are extremely difficult to assess. There have been some very good studies. The consensus that has emerged seems to be of between 30% and 50% success rates, which takes account not only of the favourable decisions from judges, but also of the favourable, or more or less favourable, out-of-court settlements of the claims, which allow litigants to withdraw their claims before they get to a full hearing. If it is 3.4% or so, that is, I would say, a significant but not huge figure.

The question for Parliament is: what amount of injustice should be contemplated as acceptable in the face of the shortages of judicial time? As the Supreme Court said in Cart, if you overload judges with a certain type of decision, less time is available for them to deal with other types of claims, which might be equally or more deserving. It is a really difficult question, but I think it is a fair one.

Dr Morgan: This is a deeply political question, because what it requires is a trade-off between expense, court time and the rational use of limited court time against the achievement of justice. We must not forget that sometimes Cart reviews do succeed. That means that there is either a point of law of public importance that the High Court has corrected, or that something has gone very seriously wrong with the facts of a particular case. Again, the High Court has given justice to the particular individual. The kind of cases we are talking about involve very vulnerable individuals. It was put rather well by Andy Slaughter on Second Reading:

“Cart reviews are a last-gasp defence for some of the most vulnerable people in the most desperate situations.”—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 230.]

In order to save money and economise on judicial resources, that is the cost that Parliament faces. In the end, that is why this is probably a question for Parliament, rather than the courts, because Parliament has the public purse, which the courts do not. It is very hard for the courts to make decisions which inevitably influence resource allocation.

That is not a criticism of the Supreme Court and Cart. Lord Dyson in Cart said something very interesting. He suggested that Parliament in 2007 should have addressed this question and failed to do it, and it now fell to the courts to do it instead. That was the suggestion in Cart itself; the courts felt they had been left to deal with some unfinished business in the 2007 Act. Well, the courts gave their answer and, in my view, Parliament is fully entitled to take a different view, but with the costs of it to certain individuals squarely in mind.

James Cartlidge

- - Excerpts

I had the great privilege of attending the Lord Chancellor’s swearing in. One of the things he swears is that he will ensure that resources are provided to the judiciary. This is not just about public money per se; it is about time, which is incredibly precious. Arguably, there is a context which goes back some years which seems to recognise on both sides that this is disproportionate in resource terms.

Dr Morgan: I agree. This does not seem to be a partisan point. It is about how best to deploy the resources of the judiciary. I hope the judges have been consulted on this reform, but retired judges who speak on it in the House of Lords seem to be sympathetic to the objectives.

Dr Johnson

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: The answer might be to a slightly different question. I refer the Committee back to some things that were said in Cart itself. Both Baroness Hale and Lord Phillips, two Presidents of the Supreme Court at different times, said the reason why there are so many immigration and asylum challenges is because people are desperate. Lady Hale said:

“There is every incentive to make the road as long as possible, to take every possible point, and make every possible application.”

She went on to say she did not blame people, because people are desperate, and we can hardly blame them for doing this, but she said that that was why there was such a problem. It does create a resource problem for the courts, because in the immigration and asylum system there is bound to be a huge number of applications, even if most of them are doomed to fail. In fact, Lord Phillips seemed to recognise that Cart was sowing the seeds of a great problem. He said:

“The stringency of the criteria that must be demonstrated will not discourage a host of applications in the field”.

He was the judge who came closest to saying we should not have had Cart judicial reviews, as they are now known, at all.

That is one reason why this creates such a problem: people will try every avenue to challenge a decision, even in a fairly hopeless case, for reasons that we can all appreciate. That is why I think an even more stringent approach than Cart is perhaps needed to close down the avenue, if that is what you want to do.

Dr Johnson

- - Excerpts

Dr Morgan: The statistics that the Government presented in their response to the consultation used a criterion of success that I think answers your question. A successful Cart judicial review did not just mean that the High Court sent it back to the upper tribunal; you then had to win in the upper tribunal, so you actually had a good case on the facts. The Government came up with a figure of 3.5% success in that sense, so I do not think that they could be written off as legal technicality cases, although some people do successfully get a Cart JR and then fail when it goes back to a substantive hearing, and it could fairly be said that some of those are legal technicalities.

Members in the Second Reading debate referred to various case studies of actual live cases where something had clearly gone badly wrong and it was only a Cart JR that rescued it. I cannot remember whether it was 50 cases per annum or 50 cases in total—it is not a huge number—but in each case, it really matters to someone’s life.

The Chair

Are there any final questions? We are running short of time, but I will take one more if anybody wants to come in.

There are no further questions from Members, so I thank both witnesses for coming in to give evidence in person. It has been very useful indeed.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

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Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Roger Gale, Siobhain McDonagh

† Anderson, Stuart (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)

† Baker, Duncan (North Norfolk) (Con)

† Blomfield, Paul (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

† Goodwill, Mr Robert (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

† Gullis, Jonathan (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

† Holmes, Paul (Eastleigh) (Con)

† Howell, Paul (Sedgefield) (Con)

† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Coventry North West) (Lab)

Pursglove, Tom (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Richards, Nicola (West Bromwich East) (Con)

† Whittaker, Craig (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury)

† Wood, Mike (Dudley South) (Con)

Rob Page, Sarah Thatcher, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Sir Roger Gale in the Chair]

Nationality and Borders Bill

Clause 48

Identification of potential victims of slavery or human trafficking

The Chair

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Electronic devices switched off, please, and masks on, if possible, as a courtesy to colleagues. No food and drink in the room, and all that sort of stuff. You will have noticed that there is a change of Minister this morning. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Welcome, Mr Whittaker. We crack on.

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert

“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”

This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.

Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.

At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that

“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,

the reasons for which include that there is

“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.

The report also pointed to

“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”

and times at which

“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.

The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

- - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.

Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.

At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.

Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.

As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.

Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

- - Excerpts

Does the Minister agree that decision making in such circumstances is made very difficult by the fact that many people who are victims of modern slavery will not declare that because it is part of the deal with the people traffickers, and many people who claim to be victims of modern slavery are not victims but are using it as a way of getting their asylum claim accepted?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He is right that one of the key points in the process is that decision makers have the ability and the training to know what they are looking for to identify whether people are victims of modern slavery.

Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is stepping in as Minister, but he just said that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby was right in his assertion that many of those who claim to be asylum seekers are not. Could he remind us of the Home Office statistics on that issue?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 48, page 43, line 17, leave out subsection (7).

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 57, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 57, page 51, leave out lines 42 and 43.

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 48, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.

Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.

The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?

We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his answer. I have made the point I need to make, which is that it is not appropriate to leave it to regulations to define these two fundamental concepts. I am sure this is something that will be pursued in the House of Lords. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Identified potential victims of slavery or human trafficking: recovery period

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 49, page 43, line 33, leave out “30” and insert “45”.

This amendment would increase the recovery period for victims of slavery or human trafficking from a minimum of 30 days to a minimum of 45 days.

This amendment would ensure that victims of modern slavery continue to receive a recovery period of at least 45 days, bringing this provision in line with current statutory guidance. We strongly welcome the inclusion in domestic law of a recovery period with support for victims, and we support this decision. However, the reduction of the minimum recovery period during which victims in England and Wales receive support from the current 45 days to 30 days is a worry.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner said in her written correspondence with the Home Secretary that the average length of time it takes for a conclusive grounds decision to be made in 2020 was 465 days. It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government are seeking to reduce the timescale from a target they are already significantly failing to meet. Their focus should be on increasing the efficiency of decision making, rather than reducing the already short recovery time to which victims are entitled.

In its written evidence to the Committee, Hope for Justice highlights that the explanatory report on the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings clearly states that the purpose of the recovery and reflection period is to allow victims to recover and escape the influence of traffickers. A reduction of this period therefore represents a step backwards in our ability to offer effective protection to victims of trafficking.

The assistance and support that should be provided during this recovery period is essential and wide-ranging, and it may include mental health support and counselling, legal advice, secure housing and access to social services. It also allows the police time to gather evidence during their investigation and to establish a working relationship with victims, strengthening their ability to secure a prosecution. It is estimated that there are between 6,000 and 8,000 modern slavery offenders in the UK, yet there were only 91 prosecutions and 13 convictions in England and Wales last year for specific modern slavery offences as a principal offence, and only 267 prosecutions for all related crimes.

Both sides of the Committee can agree on our desire to see more perpetrators of human trafficking and slavery brought to justice. This clause is a disappointing backward step away from the appropriate period necessary to break the bonds of slavery and to allow victims to establish a relationship with the relevant agencies in order to support their recovery and secure a prosecution.

Justice and Care has highlighted that many victims already decline to enter the national referral mechanism. As we have heard, Care UK says that 2,178 adults referred by first responders declined entry into the NRM last year. We have discussed the barriers that some might experience, including not recognising that they are, in fact, a victim, but it can also be because it is not immediately obvious what support the NRM provides for victims. This reduction in the recovery period certainly is not going to help.

I anticipate that the hon. Member for Calder Valley is about to tell me that under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, the current threshold is set at 30 days. However, the minimum of 45 days in the UK, which was established in 2009, was a clear distinction that we could be proud of, and it is unclear why the Government are seeking such a change. Victims in Northern Ireland and Scotland are entitled to longer periods of support—the recovery period in Scotland is actually 90 days. I ask the Minister to outline how the change will have a positive impact for victims in any way. Amendment 1 would ensure that victims are protected and that we do not undermine the progress that has been made so far by reducing the recovery period further.

I will speak to clause 49 more broadly. I draw the Minister’s attention to subsection (2), which states:

“A conclusive grounds decision may not be made in relation to the identified potential victim before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the positive reasonable grounds decision was made.”

I welcome the sentiment, but I wonder whether he could address the concerns raised by Dame Sara Thornton, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, that there are pilot schemes under way to test approaches to devolving national referral mechanism decisions for children to local safeguarding partners. As part of the pilots, conclusive grounds decisions are being taken at the same time as reasonable grounds decisions, where the evidence is strong enough to do so. I hope that the Minister will join me in welcoming that approach, and although I am worried about the clause’s intended consequences, I also hope that he will recognise that this could be an unintended negative consequence, which we can hopefully all agree would be wholly regrettable. The clause is relatively simple and we do not support it standing part of the Bill.

The Chair

In the light of the hon. Lady’s comments, we will also consider clause 49 stand part.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

What is the Home Office driving at here? What signal does it send by making this change? As the shadow Minister pointed out, it is completely artificial, given where we are with average decision times. In one sense, this is just about sending signals. What a signal it sends—that we want to reduce the support given to folk who are suspected of being victims and survivors of trafficking. I support the amendment and endorse everything that the shadow Minister said.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until

“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”

In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.

With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.

On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his response. We have seen this approach at previous stages of the Bill. The Minister cites the realities of processing times, but the fact that it is 45 days in the statutory guidance shows why the Bill is an absolute nonsense and does not make the first bit of sense. We should ignore it and trust the guidance. There is a commitment to driving down the processing times anyway. I hope that the Minister can therefore see why the amendment was tabled. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

No entitlement to additional recovery period etc

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 180, in clause 50, page 44, line 4, at end insert—

“(aa) the person was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the first RG decision;”.

This amendment seeks to preclude those exploited as children from being denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked.

The Chair

In line with what appears to be custom and practice, with this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK has warned that clause 50

“may severely impact child trafficking survivors”

who are at high risk of going missing and being re-trafficked, particularly when

“they transition to adulthood and require access to support and protection through the NRM.”

To make that point, I want to share a real-world case study provided by ECPAT UK that demonstrates why our amendment is necessary.

Huang was referred to the local authority children's services at age 17, following a police operation in a nail bar. He was also referred as a potential victim of trafficking into the NRM and received a positive reasonable grounds decision. He was accommodated by the local authority. He told his support worker that he had been scared because his family back home were receiving threats to pay back his debt. Shortly after, he went missing. He was found by the police just after his 18th birthday and went on to develop trust with his lawyer, where he disclosed for the first time a significant period of exploitation in Vietnam, across Europe and in the UK, prior to being found in the nail bar. He remains in fear, and while the dangers facing his family back home persist, sadly, there is still a high likelihood that he will go missing again.

Without amendment 180, Huang may be unable to be referred to the NRM again, given the new disclosure of previously unknown periods of exploitation. As he is now 18, he would not be looked after by children’s services. Clause 50, as it stands, will place him at great risk of subsequent re-trafficking in the absence of access to safe accommodation and support through the NRM during his reflection and recovery period.

The increase in the number of British children in the NRM in relation to child criminal exploitation gives us further cause for concern. I recently met officers from the Metropolitan Police Service who are leading the response on trafficking, slavery and exploitation. They told me that it is becoming standard practice that when a child or young person is sent on their first county lines journey, their exploiter will arrange for them to be robbed of the drugs they have been instructed to sell. When they then have to come back and explain what has happened, they are immediately told they have to work off the value of the drugs. That traps them in debt bondage, even though the real criminal will have recovered the drugs, having arranged what can sometimes be a particularly violent mugging in the first place, so in reality there is no debt.

It would not be unusual for children in such vulnerable and exploited positions to be identified by the authorities but then go missing from the NRM because of the risks that persist. They must be treated as a safeguarding concern and not by way of immigration compliance, not least because so many of those children are British nationals. So I ask the Minister again: why are children subject to clause 50, given their particular vulnerabilities? Amendment 180 seeks to right that wrong. I am sure all colleagues will agree that a child rights-centred approach, which ensures children’s safety and their protection, must be a priority. I therefore hope the Minister will reflect on the points we have made and accept Amendment 180.

More broadly, clause 50 has the potential to exclude trafficked children and adults from being identified following re-trafficking, thereby leaving them unable to access the support they should be entitled to. I worry that with this clause the Government are suggesting that making repeat claims of having been trafficked undermines someone’s credibility. However, we also know that traffickers are increasingly coaching those they are exploiting on what to say should they be identified by authorities. An expectation is placed on the victim that they will return to their exploiters due to their perceived debt bondage, in order to avoid consequences for them or often their families.

Re-trafficking has increasingly become a part of a trafficker’s operating model, so why are we not responding to that? The changes negatively affect the victim and not the perpetrator of such crimes. It also appears to contradict the identified need for individual assessment and support, as required under ECAT. The Government have described the clause as necessary

“to prevent the recovery period being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK and to remove unnecessary support and barriers to removal where these are not needed”.

Will the Minister present the evidence to support that claim? That explanation fails, not least, to recognise that the most common nationality of all referrals to the NRM for victims of modern slavery in 2020 was that of UK nationals, primarily referred for criminal exploitation. We know that children make up the lion’s share of those referrals. Does that not make the Government stop and think about what is in the clause?

There is a fear that the NRM is being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK. Without amendment 180, the clause means that we are sending children, both migrant and British, back into the arms of their exploiters. We plead with the Minister to think again about the clause. We cannot see it stand part of the Bill.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.

The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.

Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.

Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I put to the hon. Gentleman the suggestion I made towards the end of my contribution: that he reverses the situation so that the presumption is that somebody does need an additional recovery period unless there are specific circumstances that mean it is not appropriate. Is that something he could pass on to his ministerial colleague, for when he takes the Bill forward?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for that contribution. I have been consistently concerned by the lack of provision for children and young people within the clauses before us. With that in mind, I will not be withdrawing amendment 180.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 164, in clause 51, page 44, line 31, at end insert—

“was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the positive reasonable grounds decision and—”

This amendment would exclude children from the disqualification from protection measures outlined in clause 51.

The Chair

I will take the stand part debate with this, and would like to explain why. Where there are relatively short clauses with only one amendment to them, experience tells me that it is sometimes better to take the stand part debate with the amendment, because discussions that might be out of order in debate on the amendment can be in order if clause stand part is taken with the amendment. In other words, it allows for a greater freedom of discussion.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

Thank you for that advice, Sir Roger.

Like a number of our other amendments, amendment 164 seeks to ensure that no child victim of trafficking or modern slavery is denied protection. Clause 51 introduces the following reasons why someone would be disqualified from protection: they are a threat to public order, or they have claimed to be a victim of modern slavery in bad faith. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, says in her letter to the Home Secretary on the Bill:

“I have grave concerns about this clause because it casts a wide net, with the potential to prevent a considerable number of potential victims of modern slavery from being able to access the recovery and reflection period granted through the NRM. Without such support prosecution witnesses will be unable to provide witness evidence and this will severely limit our ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised crime groups.”

She says these changes will make it harder to convict perpetrators and go after organised crime groups. I doubt any of us came into politics to pass laws that work to the advantage of criminals, so why is the clause included in the Bill?

The Children’s Society has emphasised concerns regarding the impact on children who are victims of child criminal exploitation. In 2020, of the 47% of referrals to the NRM that were for children, 51% were for criminal exploitation. According to the National Crime Agency, referrals to the NRM for British children have grown due to an increase in child criminal exploitation, particularly by groups using the county lines model. The average custodial sentence length given to children has increased by more than seven months over the last 10 years, from 11.3 to 18.6 months in 2020.

A case study supplied by the Children’s Society following a serious case review by Waltham Forest Safeguarding Children Board is one of the most depressing of the many case studies we have been sent during our preparations for this Committee. Child C was a vulnerable child who lived in Nottingham. He was regularly excluded from school and was eventually home-schooled. His family noted that he regularly ran away from home. In January 2018, his mother said he was threatened by an older youth, who said that Child C had money for them. The incident was reported to Nottinghamshire police, but the police have no record of it. Also in January, Child C was arrested by police in possession of an air gun, a knife and cannabis. He later informed the youth offending team that an older boy had given him these. The youth offending team worked with Child C on a programme designed to highlight the dangers of carrying weapons. The incident was reported to the multi-agency safeguarding hub, but no further action was taken because of the youth offending team’s involvement.

Child C moved to Waltham Forest in April 2018. In October 2018, he was arrested in Bournemouth in what is known as a cuckoo flat—a person’s home that criminals take over and use to facilitate exploitation. There was significant evidence of drug use and sales in the flat. Child C was found to be in personal possession of 39 wraps of crack cocaine, and was arrested for possession of class A with intent to supply. That was a pivotal moment in providing support to the child. For the first time, the authorities in Waltham Forest had been presented with completely unequivocal evidence that Child C was being criminally exploited. From that point, he had multi-agency involvement and a further conviction for carrying an offensive weapon. The case study ends with Child C being murdered in January 2019.

That is the operating model for county lines gangs. We know that criminally exploited children are driving up referrals to the NRM, meaning that children will be coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation. That is explicit in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. It is unclear what, if any, assessment the Government have made of how children will be affected by changes in clause 51 and the risk to them of remaining in exploitative situations. Disqualifying child victims from protection is incompatible with the duties on local authorities and other public bodies under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. I urge the Minister to adopt amendment 164 and stand with child victims of modern slavery; it will allow him to go after the criminal gangs who will welcome this clause.

Clause 51 is incompatible with the duties on local authorities and the Home Office to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. It fails to take into account that children are at greater risk of exploitation owing to their developing capacity and, under the UN convention on the rights of the child, should never be denied protection. The fact that the Government have decided to ignore those fundamental principles to protect the most vulnerable children is simply shocking. The Government’s equality impact assessment promises to mitigate the adverse impact on vulnerable people but fails to identify any exemptions or specialist support for children in part 4 of the Bill.

Other shocking findings include the more than twelvefold increase in the number of children waiting longer than a year for an initial decision; the number has gone from 563 children in 2010 to 6,887 in 2020. Additionally, more than 250 people have been waiting for five years or more for an initial decision on their case, of whom 55 are children. We believe that clause 51 is incompatible with the protections in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act. The exclusion of victims of all nationalities and ages with convictions for offences listed in schedule 4 of the 2015 Act is too broad, considering that exclusion from support is different from protection from criminal convictions under section 45, for which the list in schedule 4 was created.

Subsection (3) of clause 51 stipulates that an individual is considered a threat to public order if

“the person has been convicted of any other offence listed in Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015”

or a corresponding offence under the law of any other country. That incorporates criminality not just committed in the UK but potentially older and minor offences committed in the person’s country of origin. As the Human Trafficking Foundation has highlighted, many victims from eastern Europe are targeted precisely because they have had minor convictions; prison leavers are sought out precisely for that reason.

Operation Fort, which involved dismantling the UK’s biggest modern slavery network, demonstrated that traffickers

“targeted the most desperate from their homeland, including the homeless, ex-prisoners and alcoholics. ”

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has explained that she has “grave concerns” about clause 51 because it

“casts a wide net, with the potential to prevent a considerable number of potential victims of modern slavery from being able to access the recovery and reflection period granted through the NRM. Without such support prosecution witnesses will be unable to provide witness evidence and this will severely limit our ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised groups.”

She also includes a second case study—Operation Elibera:

“In 2018 a Romanian trafficker was convicted of offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, having trafficked at least 15 people from Romania and forcing them to work in the construction industry without pay whilst being threatened with violence. He received a seven year sentence, and was also given a Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Order. Each victim received compensation of approximately £1,000. Of the 15 potential victims identified, two provided statements to support the police investigation. One of those witnesses, whose evidence was significant in securing the conviction, had three previous convictions in Romania all of which attracted sentences in excess of 12 months.”

Dame Sarah goes on to say:

“We know that traffickers already have a modus operandi of recruiting individuals with offending history, including those who have recently left prison, who are less likely to engage with authorities and seek support. Should this cohort be prevented from accessing support through the NRM, they are likely to be increasingly targeted by traffickers.”

The Government repeatedly talk about breaking the business model of people smugglers, but the clause will undermine our ability to do just that. For example, Hope for Justice says that 29% of individuals in its current case load have committed offences that would meet the criteria for exemption under public order grounds. There are many other examples that demonstrate that; the most recent is the judgment of VCL and AN in February this year, in which the European Court of Human Rights found that the United Kingdom had violated articles of the European convention on human rights. That case involved two victims, both Vietnamese minors, who were found by police working in a cannabis farm. On the advice of their legal representatives, they pleaded guilty and were charged with drug-related offences, despite having been trafficked to the UK as children. That case shows that identification is key to protecting victims from exploitation, particularly children who have diminished capacity and are therefore at greater risk.

Of course we agree that the public should be protected from serious criminals who pose a threat to our society, but there is simply no data to support the Government’s claims in relation to clause 51. Research undertaken by the National Crime Agency suggests that, as we have discussed, there are between 6,000 and 8,000 modern slavery offenders in the UK. However, in the England and Wales last year, there were only 91 prosecutions and 13 convictions where modern slavery offences were the principal offence.

The clause will drive more people underground and make it significantly harder for the police and the authorities to investigate the perpetrators of human trafficking. It also sends a clear message to those perpetrators that they are free to exploit someone with a criminal record, knowing that they will be exempt from protection. We agree with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner that securing prosecutions against those who commit those heinous crimes will become harder if the clause stands part, which we do not believe it should.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.

The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.

We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.

After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.

In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.

Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

That wording is absolutely right. It is possible for the recovery period to be withheld, but the convention absolutely does not allow for a decision to be made on public order grounds. It is absolutely contrary to article 10 of the convention. Does the Minister have anything that can help him with that point?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

As I have already explained, such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of whether they are children or vulnerable people, it is important that all aspects of the individual’s case are taken into account, such as whether they have been exploited and to what extent.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I do not want to make life difficult for the Minister, because I know he is in a very difficult situation, but the point is that it will not happen on a case-by-case basis, because decisions will not be made at all. As a result of the clause, people will just be excluded altogether from having a decision made about them. The point is that there is no case-by-case basis. It is an absolute blanket, and huge swathes of people will just not have a decision made about them, with no assessment made of whether they might be a victim of trafficking.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

In light of the fact that the Minister is asking for the amendment to be withdrawn and given his understanding that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, can the Minister tell us if the guidance that goes with the legislation will set out the exemptions and the process by which cases will be decided on an individual basis, and if there will not be the blanket exemption that is the Opposition’s understanding?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I look forward to hearing more detail about the Children’s Society projects that the Government are funding and the Look Closer campaign, which I very much welcome, but, as things currently stand, this is much more of a blanket exemption than the Minister has tried to suggest. The very broad public order definitions in the Bill go beyond the intention that he has tried to explain, so once again I am concerned that children will be particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of clause 51 if unamended, so I am minded to press amendment 164 to a division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Identified potential victims in England and Wales: assistance and support

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 52, page 46, line 9, after “50A” insert—

“Meaning of assistance and support

‘(1) For the purposes of guidance issued under section 49(1)(b) and regulations made under section 50, “assistance and support” includes but is not limited to the provision of—

(a) appropriate and safe accommodation;

(b) material assistance, including financial assistance;

(d) counselling;

(e) a support worker;

(f) appropriate information on any matter of relevance or potential relevance to the particular circumstances of the person;

(g) translation and interpretation services;

(h) assistance in obtaining specialist legal advice or representation (including with regard to access to compensation);

(i) assistance with repatriation, including a full risk assessment.

(2) Assistance and support provided to a person under this section—

(a) must not be conditional on the person’s acting as a witness in any criminal proceedings;

(b) may be provided only with the consent of that person;

(c) must be provided in a manner which takes due account of the needs of that person as regards safety and protection from harm;

(d) must be provided to meet the needs of that person having particular regard to any special needs or vulnerabilities of that person caused by gender, pregnancy, physical or mental illness, disability or being the victim of violence or abuse;

(e) must be provided in accordance with an assistance and support plan which specifies that person’s needs for support and how those needs will be met for the full duration of the period to which that person is entitled to support under this Act.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.

50B”

This amendment would define the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery in England and Wales in line with Article 12 of the European Convention on Actions Against Trafficking in Human Beings; and conditions associated with its provision.

The Chair

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 2, in clause 52, page 46, line 16, leave out from “receiving” to the end of line 19 and insert

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This amendment would define the objective of assistance and support in line with Article 12 of the European Convention Against Human Trafficking 2005.

Amendment 3, in clause 52, page 46, line 16, at end insert—

‘(6A) When a person who is receiving assistance and support under this section receives a positive conclusive grounds decision, the Secretary of State must secure assistance and support for at least 12 months beginning on the day the recovery period ends.”

This amendment would give modern slavery victims in England and Wales with a positive conclusive grounds decision the right to receive support and assistance for at least 12 months.

Clause stand part.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to

“make matters worse for victims”.

Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”

and replace it with the requirement to assist a person

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”

Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support

“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.

The British Red Cross has highlighted that

“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.

The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that

“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—

in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.

Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.

Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.

Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.

Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:

“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.

This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that

“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”

Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.

To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.

On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only

“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”

for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.

In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are

“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”

This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will

“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.

It adds that the clause will also

“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”

To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s

“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.

After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.

As I have outlined, the details of the types of assistance and support that can be provided already exist in the modern slavery statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Bringing this detail into primary legislation, as amendment 4 seeks, is not appropriate and would create a fixed, blanket approach to support, making it harder to adjust our approach in the future and tailor to victims’ individual needs as our understanding of trauma develops. Amendment would also necessitate that assistance and support may be provided only with the consent of that person. As children are not necessarily able to offer their consent in an informed way, the amendment may—unintentionally, I am sure—exclude children from the provision.

Finally, amendment 3 seeks to stipulate the minimum length of time support is provided after a positive conclusive grounds decision. In contrast, our approach is to provide tailored support to victims following a recovery needs assessment through a tailored transition plan. The plan can be put in place for up to six months at a time, with no overall limit. This will enable us to deliver the most appropriate and effective needs-based support to victims.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister said earlier that the tailored plan would support someone until they move back into the community. Can he confirm that that support will be provided whatever setting the person is living in, not only to those who happen to be in a detention centre or accommodation centre, for example?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

For future reference, I understand that abstentions are supposed to be recorded by saying, “No vote”, although I am happy to be corrected. I am not always right.

Clause 53

Leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 53, page 47, line 12, after “Kingdom” insert

“for a minimum 12 months”.

This amendment would give modern slavery victims in England and Wales with a positive conclusive grounds decision leave to remain for a minimum of 12 months.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 53, page 47, line 14, leave out from “recovery” to the end of line 16 and insert “personal situation,”.

This amendment would define the criteria of providing leave to remain in line with Article 14 of the European Convention Against Human Trafficking 2005.

Amendment 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.

Amendment 6, in clause 53, page 47, line 22, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

This amendment would remove the criteria of not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

“The personal situation requirement takes in a range of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.”

Amendment 6 would remove the criterion for not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country. It is not clear why the Government introduced that criterion, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in his response how he could possibly envisage that working in practice.

Amendment 7 provides a clear minimum timeframe for granting leave to remain, thereby creating more certainty for victims. Under the Home Office’s current guidance on assessing discretionary leave for survivors of modern slavery, leave to remain is granted for a mixture of different time periods—sometimes as little as six months. Those timeframes are short, and the inconsistency can set back recovery.

In 2017, the UK Government issued figures on grants of leave to confirmed modern slavery victims. Some 21% of confirmed victims who were neither UK nor EU nationals were granted asylum in 2015. A group of more than 13 frontline charities that are expert practitioners in providing support to victims of slavery highlighted the problem, stating that:

“The support currently provided to survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery is not meeting recovery needs. Government funded support ends abruptly and too early and there is little information or data as to what happens to survivors in the longer term. The current situation leaves survivors with little realistic opportunity to rebuild their lives, with some ending up destitute, vulnerable to further harm or even being re-exploited.”

The Government may argue that they are already providing support for confirmed victims in England and Wales through the recovery needs assessment. However, under the RNA, victims are not guaranteed long-term support. Victims will receive a minimum of 45 days of move-on support, with the RNA determining how much—if any—extra support is required under the modern slavery victim care contract; that extra support will be for a maximum of six months at time, and may be only a few days or weeks.

Furthermore, Labour believes that victims’ needs are not fully addressed in the RNA. In the 2020 annual report on modern slavery, the support recommended by victim support workers was agreed to in full by the Home Office in only 53% of cases, which raises questions as to whether the process genuinely responds to victims’ needs or is, instead, focused on moving victims out of the service. In summary, amendments 7, 5 and 6 are necessary to address the fundamental challenge facing victims and provide them with far greater certainty.

Amendment 189 is necessary because all child victims must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance. The amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims as per article 14 of ECAT into primary legislation. It will specify that if the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the national referral mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests, giving due consideration to a victim’s need for support and care and a sustainable arrangement.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has echoed concerns on the lack of clarity around what the clause would mean in practice for children, with this having been acknowledged in the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation. Dame Sara Thornton states

“it is disappointing that this detail was not included as part of the Bill”,

and we share that frustration. There is no consistent public data available on the outcomes for potential child victims of trafficking, but evidence shows that our current policies are not being implemented adequately.

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking requested data through the Freedom of Information Act on the immigration outcomes for those exploited as children, the response to which showed alarming results in the data. It found that only about 5% of child-related considerations resulted in a positive decision for discretionary leave. The data indicates that discretionary leave is not being granted to children as victims of trafficking, and that in the small number of cases where it is, the average length of grant is short, suggesting that decisions are not being taken with their best interests as a primary consideration, providing minimal stability.

How many child victims of trafficking were subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain under the policy is unknown but, based on those figures, we can estimate that they are few. That is despite the explicit current policy that states the need to consider the length of leave, including a grant of indefinite leave to remain in line with the child’s best interests. That requirement is set out to fulfil the Secretary of State’s statutory obligation under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the wellbeing of children. All child victims of trafficking must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as only standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.

The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.

Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Shall I try it the other way round?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

You can try it whichever way you like.

The Chair

Order. I have been trying not to interrupt the Minister, but “you” is me.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Sorry, Sir Roger.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.

The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.

Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as

“the person’s wishes and feelings”,

which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.

We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.

I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.

I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.

For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,

“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”

Sadly, cases such as these are representative of many of the systemic issues that currently exist that leave victims in limbo and vulnerable to further exploitation. I ask the Minister, have the Government considered a different course of action in light of that ruling, and might clauses 52 and 53 be revised at a later stage?

Another area of concern is subsection (3) of the clause, that states that there is no obligation to provide leave to remain on the grounds of a victim’s need for support in their recovery if the victim could receive support in their own country, or a third country, although there is no requirement for there to be evidence that the victim will receive that support—I very much hope there is good news in the note being passed along the Front Bench to the Minister. Therefore, the clause risks imposing a blanket rule for inadmissibility. I ask the Minister to set out how the UK will know what support can be provided in another country and how the impact on the victim of going to potentially a third country could possibly be assessed.

We have already discussed at length the importance of adopting a trauma-led approach, and the same must be applied here. It must be recognised that victims will very rarely be able to work with law enforcement agencies, even those that will be investigating their cases, if they have the fear of removal hanging over them. The Government acknowledged that in their new plan for immigration, which states that certainty over their immigration status is for many victims a

“crucial enabler to their recovery and assisting the police in prosecuting their exploiters”.

I ask the Minster, where is certainty provided in the clause?

As mentioned in my previous remarks, this is an area where there is considerable cross-party support. I am sure the Minister will be aware of concerns raised by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who has stated:

“The ability of a victim to remain in the UK is unchanged by the Bill, and one would therefore expect that the proportion of confirmed victims in receipt of leave to remain would remain low…this Bill would perpetuate rather than address the current arrangements in which the vast majority of confirmed victims are denied leave to remain in the UK to help their recovery.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 746.]

I do hope the Minister reflects carefully on these remarks and applies the same enthusiasm that his colleague the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Corby, expressed last week in working with the sector to simply start again in light of the High Court judgment made since the Bill was first published.

Clause 53, as it stands, shows that the Government are only cherry-picking at parts of ECAT to satisfy their agenda, rather than adopting article 14 in its entirety. On that basis we cannot support the clause.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

The Opposition have indicated that when we return this afternoon they wish to make brief remarks on clause 54 and 55 taken together and then discuss clause 56 separately. We will then take clause 57 without debate. I hope that is clear.

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No.88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

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Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, † Siobhain McDonagh

† Anderson, Stuart (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)

† Baker, Duncan (North Norfolk) (Con)

† Blomfield, Paul (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

† Goodwill, Mr Robert (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

† Gullis, Jonathan (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

† Holmes, Paul (Eastleigh) (Con)

† Howell, Paul (Sedgefield) (Con)

† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Coventry North West) (Lab)

Pursglove, Tom (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Richards, Nicola (West Bromwich East) (Con)

† Whittaker, Craig (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury)

† Wood, Mike (Dudley South) (Con)

Rob Page, Sarah Thatcher, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Afternoon)

[Siobhain McDonagh in the Chair]

Nationality and Borders Bill

The Chair

Clause 54

Civil legal aid under section 9 of LASPO: add-on services in relation to the national referral mechanism

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 55 stand part, as announced by Sir Roger at the end of the morning sitting.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

- - Excerpts

The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.

The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.

It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:

“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”

We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.

It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.

Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.

In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:

“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”

The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.

The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,

“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”

There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.

The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.

I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to

“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,

which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”

that were saved cease to apply,

“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”

Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.

The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:

“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”

The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.

Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.

Holly Lynch

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In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Age assessments

Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

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I beg to move amendment 150, in clause 58, page 52, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the ethical committees of the relevant medical, dental and scientific professional bodies and publish a report on the consultation.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with ethical committees of medical, dental and scientific professions before making regulations in their area, and publish a report on the consultation.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 168.

Government new clause 29—Interpretation of Part etc.

Government new clause 30—Persons subject to immigration control: referral or assessment by local authority etc.

Government new clause 31—Persons subject to immigration control: assessment for immigration purposes.

Government new clause 32—Use of scientific methods in age assessments.

Government new clause 33—Regulations about age assessments.

Government new clause 34—Appeals relating to age assessments.

Government new clause 35—Appeals relating to age assessments: supplementary.

Government new clause 36—New information following age assessment or appeal.

Government new clause 37—Legal aid for appeals.

Paul Blomfield

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I understand that the Government seek to delete clause 58 and replace it with new clauses 29 to 37, which provide more detail. However, the detail does not offer any reassurance; quite the contrary.

Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

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Does the hon. Gentleman accept that new clause 32 makes amendment 150 superfluous, as it talks about the scientific input into age determination?

Paul Blomfield

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I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but he is completely wrong and I will explain why shortly.

In existing clause 58 and the new Government clauses, the Government want to introduce new regulations and a standard of proof for age assessments, to compel local authorities to assess age, to allow the use of “scientific methods” to assess age, despite widespread concerns from professional bodies about the validity or accuracy of any such methods, and to penalise children for not consenting to these potentially harmful interventions.

Children who come to the UK on their own, from countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Eritrea, face a unique problem when asked to prove their date of birth. The registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world, and many are genuinely unable to show official identity documents, such as passports or birth certificates, because they have never had them in the first place, they have had them taken away from them, they have lost them in the chaos of fleeing, or sometimes they have had to destroy them en route.

Disputes over age can also arise from a lack of understanding of the way in which dates are calculated in other countries and cultures, and associated confusion over what is being said by a child about his or her age. So, one might reasonably ask, why are the Government making so much of this issue?

Mr Goodwill

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Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that there are incentives for adults to pass themselves off as children? If the age assessment is done incorrectly, the result could be adults being placed in schools or local authority care, putting children at risk.

The Chair

I call Robert Goodwill—sorry, I meant Paul Blomfield.

Paul Blomfield

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He can have another go if he wants.

I hear what the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby is saying. I remember watching a BBC programme recently—I think it was on the BBC—on the Kindertransport. The same debate was had about Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany after Kristallnacht. Some were slightly older than the age restriction of the time. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that this legislation would have been appropriate at that time. We could have turned them around and sent them back to the Nazis.

Paragraph 24 of the explanatory notes states:

“Since 2015, the UK has received, on average, more than 3,000 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children per year. Where age was disputed and resolved from 2016-2020, 54% were found to be adults”.

Clearly, 54% is a big number, but the data in the notes is more than a little selective.

According to Home Office statistics, for the most recent normal year unaffected by the pandemic, which was 2019, there were 4,005 unaccompanied children applications. Of those, 748 had their age disputed and 304 were found to be adults. That is just over 7% of child applicants. The problem is that that is in no way as prolific as purported by the explanatory notes. The actual number is likely to be lower, because the Home Office stats do not include decisions later overturned following advocacy or reviews by judges.

Again, the Government have a problem finding evidence to justify a proposal in the Bill. This is clearly not the first time this has happened. I see that the Home Secretary got herself into trouble with the Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee today by being unable to come up with the facts to justify one of her wilder allegations about those crossing the channel. Nevertheless, the Government are ploughing ahead with their plans to use scientific methods to assess age.

I now turn specifically to new clause 32, which does not offer any of the clarity that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby suggested. Proposed new subsection (2) mentions the

“types of scientific method that may be specified”,

and that the two specified might be included. However, proposed new subsection (9) goes out of its way to state:

“This section does not prevent the use of a scientific method that is not a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment under”

the previous proposed new section,

“if the decision-maker considers it appropriate to do so”.

New clause 32 is therefore saying: “Any scientific method that we can come up with at any time in the future will be legitimate.”

Mr Goodwill

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I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but I am worried that he is saying, “Well, we’ll give a lot of people the benefit of the doubt”, which could result in large numbers of adults being placed in settings that are appropriate for children. Surely he is aware that since the 2003 case, age assessments have been Merton compliant. Any actions that the Government take to follow through on the Bill becoming law will obviously be tested in the courts in the same way as the early years situation.

Paul Blomfield

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What do the experts think? The British Dental Association called dental X-rays for age assessments “inaccurate and unethical”, which is a theme that relates to the rest of the Bill—it will not do what it says it will do. The Government apparently told some journalists that they do not plan to use dental X-rays anyway, but the Bill leaves that option open, so forgive us if we do not take casual briefings to journalists on the side as a way to determine the Government’s future conduct on this issue.

The Government are apparently planning to use wrist X-rays, which the British Medical Association tells us it has “serious concerns” about because

“they would involve direct harms without any medical benefit to the individual”,

as radiation exposure over a lifetime should be kept as minimal as possible. The BDA agrees:

“The process of radiography is a medical procedure that should be carried out only for medical purposes, and where the patient stands to benefit. Exposing children to radiation when there is no medical benefit is simply wrong.”

The BMA also warns that

“the evidence supporting the accuracy of the process is extremely weak”.

We are back to the same old theme: there is no real evidence to support what the Government are doing. The BMA goes on to say that the process is particularly weak where,

“as in the case of most asylum seekers, there is a shortage of appropriate age and cultural comparators.”

Yet again, Ministers are introducing ineffective proposals without any evidence, making those seeking asylum—in this case, children—part of the narrative of “Let’s assume bad faith, and let’s assume that everybody is trying to play the system.” It will not work, but it is designed to grab headlines and to make it seem as though the Government are talking tough, rather than dealing with the genuine issues on which we agree, such as stopping those who are forced out of desperation to make journeys across the channel. I urge the Minister to accept our amendment or, better still, to just withdraw the clause.

The Chair

The Public Gallery is becoming a little crowded. I encourage everyone sitting there to spread out as much as possible, to ensure social distancing.

Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

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First and foremost, we should continue to think about age assessments as a function of the child protection and safeguarding system, not of the immigration system. The responsibility should remain with social workers, whose expertise and experience make them by far the best people to undertake such assessments where support is required. We should preserve the current position, which does not place an evidential burden on a child or young adult but leaves the decision makers to weigh up all the evidence to a reasonable degree of likelihood. The Home Office has quite simply offered no sound reasons for undermining that arrangement and for imposing a higher standard of proof.

New clause 29 and other new clauses almost certainly mean that age assessments will be routine. The Secretary of State is basically helping herself to powers to demand tests whenever she wishes, even where social workers think they are entirely inappropriate. The idea of a national age assessment board could be helpful. As we have seen from both oral and written evidence to the Committee, sharing resources and best practice could bring benefits, but what is proposed by the Government in the new clauses goes way beyond that. We need to know who is going to be on the board, how it will work and how its independence will be secured, particularly given the vast, wide-ranging regulation-making powers that the Secretary of State is helping herself to. The role of any such board should be to support local authorities, not to supplant and overrule them. Unfortunately, the Government’s provisions go far too far, and they need their wings well and truly clipped if we are to support them.

New clause 29 seems incredibly lazily drafted in how it refers to relevant children’s legislation. In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland we have to work out whether a piece of statute corresponds to part III, IV or V of the Children Act 1989. It is pretty sloppy drafting. It also serves notice that this is a devolved area. Important questions for the Minister are: what consultation has there been with devolved Governments, and is a legislative consent motion to be sought on these issues?

There has to be recognition that, for many reasons, the process of age assessment can be, and will remain, a very difficult task. We know that children develop into adults at different speeds. The experience of an asylum-seeking child can affect their appearance and demeanour. As the hon. Member for Sheffield Central eloquently put it, the demeanour of a young person who has travelled across continents and survived in some incredibly difficult circumstances may no longer be that of a child, despite them being a child. Completely different physical and nutritional regimes in the country of origin will also cause differences. That is why raising the standard of proof is not appropriate.

These difficulties are not going to be overcome by the use of so-called scientific methods of assessment—methods which are absolutely no more scientific than assessment by expert social workers. Indeed, many would suggest that these methods are a lot less helpful. Much evidence has been submitted to the Committee about the lack of effect of these new methods and their unethical nature, as the hon. Member for Sheffield Central referred to. The British Dental Association is clear that dental tests cannot produce accurate assessments and that taking radiographs is inappropriate where there are no health benefits for the individual undergoing the test. The BDA has submitted detailed evidence on that.

Mr Goodwill

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I have just had a look at the NHS website and it says that having an X-ray is equivalent to one or two days of background radiation. If someone takes a short-haul flight, the amount of radiation they are likely to be exposed to is probably more than an X-ray, particularly if it is on a limb and not on the main body.

Stuart C. McDonald

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In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.

Mr Goodwill

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The hon. Member is very generous in giving way. Is he saying, in effect, that in every case we should take the person’s word for how old they are and treat them as children, even if there is scientific evidence that they may be many years older than 18?

Stuart C. McDonald

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The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.

I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.

What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.

Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

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I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?

Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

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We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.

For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.

New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.

This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.

It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.

K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.

K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.

K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.

In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?

In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments

“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.

The Government’s proposals will give the Home Office powers to compel local authorities to assess the age of a child, as they must provide the Home Office with evidence for why they believe that the child is the age they claim to be. That will put pressure on local authorities, which have already expressed frustration over having to conduct age assessments when Home Office caseworkers challenge their view that they see no reason to doubt a young person’s age. Introducing those changes in new clause 30 will likely undermine the specialist knowledge and experience of those who work in the asylum system, while putting increased pressure from the Home Office on the already stretched resources of local authorities.

New clauses 30 and 31 outline the powers and procedures of the national age assessment board. There are concerns from the sector, in particular the British Association of Social Workers, about the lack of a multi-agency, holistic approach. Indeed, the NAAB as introduced by the Bill will have significant powers, with minimal accountability or transparency. In practice, it will be able to override professional judgment developed over years of experience, including a local authority age assessment, as the NAAB will be able to carry out an assessment if required to by the Secretary of State or a designated person on their behalf.

It is appropriate that age assessments draw on, and consult, a wide range of practitioners in health, care, education and the community, especially as we turn to new clause 32, which controversially provides for the use of scientific methods for age assessment. It includes methods such as examining or measuring parts of a person’s body by using imaging technology and analysis of saliva, cell or other samples from a person’s body. It is a deeply worrying provision. I note that the new clause is not exhaustive. Could the Minister provide more details on age assessments under it?

It is worth re-emphasising, as many organisations in the sector have, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, that medical age assessment methods are highly contested and subject to a high margin of error. The evidential value of scientific age assessment methods is uncertain. Scientific methods, for example, remain contested by UK courts and by medical professionals and associations. The evidence supporting the accuracy of the processes is extremely weak, particularly where, as in the case of most asylum seekers, there is a shortage of appropriate age and cultural comparisons. Indeed, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health has stated that the use of radiological assessment is extremely imprecise and can give only an estimate of within two years in either direction.

While potentially being inaccurate, scientific methods such as those listed in the Government’s proposals are also harmful to the individuals who are assessed. It is telling, and very concerning, that the British Dental Association notes at the very end of its written evidence that

“dentists could find themselves performing an act that is not just inappropriate and unethical, but even constitutes criminal battery.”

The British Medical Association, too, has serious ethical concerns about the proposed use of imaging technology. The use of radiation for that purpose is harmful for the individual, without any medical benefit. Invasive procedures will likely be traumatic for the individual, and will almost certainly adversely affect vulnerable children and young people, causing anxiety, confusion and frustration. That will actively harm the most vulnerable of asylum seekers and potentially retraumatise them. For those reasons, the Home Office ruled out using dental X-rays, as the BDA found that they would be “inaccurate, inappropriate and unethical” if implemented in asylum cases.

Furthermore, the fine print of new clause 32 includes subsection (9), which appears to create another category of potential scientific methods that can be used—methods that have not been specified in regulations and have not been approved by relevant professional bodies. The subsection states:

“This section does not prevent the use of a scientific method that is not a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment…if the decision-maker considers it appropriate to do so and, where necessary, the appropriate consent is given.”

That has potentially very worrying implications, and the Government should clarify why the subsection has been included and whether the methods, which are not specified in regulations, include those that the Government were advised against when seeking scientific advice. It is critical that any method used to make age assessments has a strong scientific and evidentiary base.

Another worrying aspect of the new clause is around consent and damage to credibility. Subsection (7) states that decision makers must take it

“as damaging the age disputed person’s credibility”

if they do not consent to the use of the specified scientific method. A child could object to the use of an invasive method that is not a specified scientific method, which is deeply troubling. That is also included in new clause 33, which allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about age assessments, including damage to a person’s credibility, due to lack of co-operation. Refusing to be subjected to an invasive measure, including those that the BMA says are potentially harmful to individuals, should not have a bearing on a person’s credibility.

As referred to throughout Bill Committee proceedings, people who come to the UK have often endured significant challenges in their journeys, including trauma and physical, mental and sexual abuse. Further subjecting these vulnerable people, such as unaccompanied people and young people, to invasive measures is deeply concerning, especially when the outcomes will remain inaccurate. By legislating to ensure that decision makers take it as damaging a person’s credibility if they refuse to consent to these methods, the Government will penalise children for not consenting to potentially harmful “scientific methods”. In practice, this measure will force children and young people to undergo assessments that may be harmful to them.

The Government’s proposals fail to take into consideration issues of consent and the competency of children in decision making. For example, children affected by trauma may have had their capacity to make decisions undermined. More widely, it is crucial that we do not view the use of scientific methods as a silver bullet for age assessments, especially given the widespread concern about their accuracy and the harm they will potentially inflict on vulnerable children and young people.

New clauses 34 to 37 provide additional measures around the right of appeal, situations when new information comes to light after an age assessment or appeal, and access to legal aid. We of course welcome measures to provide access to justice provisions. In the interests of time, I will focus on the more controversial aspects of the Government’s new clauses on age assessments. I think we all agree that wrongly treating a young asylum seeker as an adult puts an already vulnerable person at immense risk, effectively depriving them of all the support, supervision, awareness and monitoring that ought to be provided. The Government’s proposals on age assessments are therefore concerning as they will increase the number of children and young people who enter the adult asylum system in incredibly vulnerable circumstances, with fewer rights and entitlements than they deserve.

The Government’s new clauses appear to suggest that there is a simple process to determine age accurately. This is worrying. We must avoid viewing age assessments in asylum cases in this way. We need to get age assessments right. That will involve taking a broader approach than the Government have laid out in new clauses 29 to 37. The new clauses on age assessments risk vulnerable children and young people being denied rights they deserve, protection they need and support we must offer. We oppose the measures set out in the new clauses, and we oppose clause 58 standing part of the Bill.

Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

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As a former teacher, I understand the importance of this. As a former head of year who had responsibility for safeguarding, covering welfare, attendance and the behaviour of young people, it makes no sense to me why anyone would oppose a measure to make sure that people who claim to be young people are indeed young people. An individual who has nothing to hide should have nothing to fear in this regard. It is absolutely essential that age assessments take place to make sure that people claiming to be of school age are indeed of that ilk, because ultimately other young people could be put in a very vulnerable situation.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

We want age assessments to be as accurate as they can be at the moment, not just through the work of social work groups but with input from outside. Does the hon. Gentleman have any concerns about the impact on children who end up being wrongly placed in adult facilities?

Jonathan Gullis

- - Excerpts

There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.

Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.

We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

Holly Lynch

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The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.

One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.

First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.

Existing regulatory frameworks already govern the safe and ethical application of various technologies and they could be employed to assess age. The use of ionising radiation, for instance, is highly regulated by the Justification of Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004, which require a demonstration that the individual or societal benefits of their use outweigh any health detriments. I can assure hon. Members that the Government will comply with all relevant regulatory frameworks in relation to the scientific methods chosen.

An important point to reflect on is that the use of scientific methods for age assessment is not new. They are already widely in use in most countries throughout Europe, including Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The UK, therefore, should draw on the latest technological advances to improve the process for determining age, as that is a positive step towards ensuring that we are doing all that we can to safeguard those vulnerable children.

Reflecting on the safeguards in the Bill and the pre-existing processes to ensure safe and ethical applications for the various technologies—before I finish, I will give way.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

The Minister is outlining what he sees as safeguards. I am unconvinced. New clause 32(9) seems to say that nothing prevents the use of a scientific method, even if it is not specified in regulations and so on, if the decision maker considers it appropriate and, where necessary, consent is given. Given that there are implications if consent is not provided, that surely rides roughshod over all the other protections that the Minister just outlined.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.

Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

What are the experts comparing with? My question is, will they be comparing the bone density or whatever with that of children of the same age in the UK, knowing that the development of children from other parts of the world is very different, or will they have a database of comparable images of the skeletal system—whichever part they are using—from each of the other countries? Is that something that is happening at the moment, or will they just be compared with UK-based children?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.

Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.

The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.

New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.

I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.

New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked about the devolved Administrations. As part of the consultation earlier this year, we engaged with the devolved Administrations and have had conversations about some of the detail of the new clauses, and we intend to continue to do so in the coming weeks. I hope that helps to answer his question.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East mentioned the skeletal development of people from different ethnic backgrounds. We are conscious that ethnic and environmental factors may have an impact on physical characteristics that may be analysed as part of a scientific age assessment. We will endeavour to ensure that the scientific method used will consider the characteristics of people of different ethnicities and the environmental factors within a person’s country of origin.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

The Minister may be about to pre-empt me, but I do not think he has answered the questions raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the national age assessment board, so will he at least undertake to write to us on that issue?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

No, I have not finished yet. I am not quite ready to sit down, but I will answer that question. Basically, the board will predominantly consist of qualified social workers who, through being dedicated to the task of conducting age assessments and through training and the sharing of expertise, will achieve a more consistent and accurate approach to the task of age assessment. As Members have probably seen, such professionals are referred to as a “designated person” in the new clauses, and the board will have responsibility for conducting age assessments on age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority, as I said. Local authorities will retain the ability to conduct age assessments if they prefer to do so. If they believe that a person is actually the age they claim to be, they must inform the Home Office accordingly.

The hon. Member for Sheffield Central asked whether binding local authorities’ hands is just a power grab from central Government. The answer to that question is no. If local authorities wish to carry out their own assessments, they will be able to do so—without question, that will be the case. On that basis, I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s observations. To be fair, he made a good fist of defending the indefensible, but he failed to answer the concerns expressed by me and the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the way that subsection (9) of new clause 32 drives a coach and horses through all the reassurances that we have been given. His criticism of the amendment as being a bit broad and involving quite a lot of work fails to acknowledge how narrow it is. It would simply require the Secretary of State to take advice before making regulations, and I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 58 disagreed to.

Clause 59

Processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 151, in clause 59, page 52, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State must publish impact assessments on the effect of the provisions in this section on—

(a) nationals from countries falling within subsection (3), and

(b) the United Kingdom’s economy and trade.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish impact assessments with regard to the effect this clause might have on both nationals from countries in subsection (3) and the UK economy and trade.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 80.

Government new clause 9—Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries.

Government new clause 10—Visa penalties: review and revocation.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

The amendment would require the Home Secretary to publish impact assessments on the effect of clause 59 both on nationals from the countries in subsection (3) and on the UK’s economy and trade.

The Government plan to replace clause 59 with Government new clauses 9 and 10. This is a slightly more developed version of the proposal to punish the nationals of countries if the Government consider their Governments to have been unco-operative on returns. The explanatory notes for clause 59 do not explain its purpose—because it was a placeholder clause, there was no detail—so I assume it is to act as an incentive for countries to co-operate with returns, but I hope that the Minister will seek to provide some evidence of that.

The explanatory notes do state that

“a very small number of countries do not cooperate”

with returns, suggesting that penalties would apply only to a limited number of states. However, a report in The Daily Telegraph on 15 October—presumably briefed by the Government, which is the way we seem to get information these days—said that

“Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea and Philippines”

are countries understood not to co-operate with returns. We know that the majority of those on that list have conditions that mean returns are unlikely anyway, as there are strong asylum cases from them, so we know that the deterrents will not work. So, I would like to press the Minister a little bit more on what the Government expect to achieve with these revisions.

Mr Goodwill

- - Excerpts

Surely what the hon. Gentleman says defies logic. If we are going to give visas to nationals of a particular country and we know there is a risk they may overstay, surely we can be more generous and more engaged with that country if we know that those overstayers can be removed. In the case of visas, we will have biometric data, so that there is no doubt about a person’s identity.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

I want to press the Minister on what the Government expect to achieve by this. For example, it is not in our interests to sanction doctors, nurses or engineers who have been recruited to the UK from one country with longer visa processing times or higher charges, and that would be deeply damaging for our diaspora communities. Again, it feels as if we have proposals picked from headlines, which are not in the country’s interests.

Mr Goodwill

- - Excerpts

It might help some of these countries if we did not plunder their health professionals, who have trained at the expense of that country, and actually trained our own instead.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

Amendment 151 will try to ensure that the Government are clear-eyed about the impact of their policy and the trade-offs they are prepared to make, as well as the impact on UK public services, communities and businesses. The amendment would allow the public to examine that trade-off, too. It would ensure that the Government track the impact of their policy, and are transparent with business and trade over the impact any visa penalties might have, either through reduced travel or through deteriorating relationships with those countries.

The Government talk a lot about global Britain, but through our examination of the Bill we have seen many threats to that and a lot of ways in which they plan on sowing discord with other nations around the world, damaging our reputation in the international community. I know that the Minister will not vote for clause 59 stand part, but I would welcome his thoughts on the wider impact of the replacement clauses, along the lines of my amendment. I would appreciate it if he could tell us whether any such impact assessments are being considered.

I have an important point to make about new clauses 9 and 10, to which I hope the Minister can respond. There is significant concern that these clauses will prevent people from joining refugees in the UK through the family reunion route. Let us consider the countries cited in The Daily Telegraph again: Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea and the Philippines. Since the start of 2019, 8,480 people from Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Eritrea have been granted refugee family reunion visas to join loved ones in the UK. That equates to just over half—53%—of all family visas granted over that period. Some 3,584 of those visas were for children and 5,771 for women or girls. The new clause, as drafted, would potentially apply to visas for refugees coming to the UK under one of the Home Office’s resettlement schemes, including the relocation scheme for Afghan nationals who have previously worked with the UK Government or applicants from Hong Kong for British national overseas visas.

So, if the Government are determined to proceed with these new clauses, at the very least new clause 9 needs to be amended to include an exemption for refugee family reunion and other protection routes. I should be grateful if the Minister would indicate whether the Government are willing to do that.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

The Government say this clause will incentivise other countries to co-operate with the UK Government to remove those who have no right to be in the country, but they have presented no evidence that this will be the case. Saying it is one thing, but if they are so confident of it they should do some work and, as the hon. Member for Sheffield Central asks in his amendment, publish a report examining the impact on our relations with other countries.

The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants says that this clause will affect, among others, workers, including key workers. Have not the Brexit restrictions on key workers coming into the country taught us anything? There are also tourists and their massive contribution to our economies; performers; students—who pay thousands of pounds to study at our universities, many of which would struggle to survive without them—and academics, among others, including the family members of British citizens. Again, we are punishing the wrong people.

Specifically, I want to express the concerns of Elizabeth Ruddick of the UNHCR about the impact on family reunion. The UNHCR’s concern is that although the clause gives the Home Secretary flexibility on the type of penalties to impose, nothing explicitly prevents the imposition of penalties on applications for refugee family reunion. Elizabeth Ruddick says that delaying refugee family reunion on that basis is likely to violate their human rights, particularly under article 8 of the ECHR. Will the Minister do that thing that his colleague has done a lot in Committee, which is to reassure us that that will not happen? For the record, I am not reassured, but reassurances have been offered throughout the Committee and it would be good to hear his thoughts at least.

Will the Minister consider a scenario that could arise from the clause and reassure me about it? I might be taking this too far, but let us take the case of two asylum seekers who arrive irregularly by boat. Perhaps the Home Secretary is feeling generous and decides that, rather than offshoring them or jailing them—both options that the Bill allows to be considered—she will simply return them to their countries of origin, from which they fled. Country No. 1 has not signed an agreement and does not agree to take the person back, perhaps because—I will be generous—its Government recognise that they cannot protect that person, for whatever reason.

Country No. 2, however, is Afghanistan. We have talked a lot about Afghanistan in considering the Bill, and we are not currently returning people to Afghanistan, but that will not always be the case, so bear with me. The second asylum seeker is to be returned to Afghanistan and the Taliban men in charge are ready to welcome refugees back with open arms, primarily because they have been hunting them down anyway. For obvious reasons, Afghanistan complies, signs the agreement and accepts its citizens back. Does that mean that country No. 1 could have restrictions placed on its students, key workers and tourists who wish to visit the UK, while by comparison the Taliban could have free rein? I am not asking whether that is likely to happen; I am just asking whether the clause means that it could happen.

We welcome the reviews included under new clause 10, but they are not sufficient, and the powers under new clause 9 are too wide. Again, they give far too much power to the Secretary of State. It seems that nothing is off limits. The new clause encompasses three themes recurring in the Bill: first, too much power to the Secretary of State; secondly, not enough regard to international relations; and thirdly, closing down one of the few safe and legal routes, unless the Minister can reassure me that refugee family reunion is not affected by the provision—I hope he can.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Both the United States and the EU have similar powers to those we are seeking. Recently, the Council of the EU decided to suspend temporarily the application of certain provisions in the visa code to nationals of The Gambia, owing to the country’s lack of co-operation on readmission of third-country nationals illegally staying in the EU. The new powers in the Bill will bring the UK into line with our international partners and ensure that we are no longer lagging behind other countries.

I assure hon. Members that, given talk of penalties and exemption, family reunion will be an exemption to the penalties, as discussed.

Turning to amendment 151, I can assure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the power to impose visa penalties will be exercised only after consideration of the potential economic impact on the UK, and with full agreement across Government. Contrary to the hon. Member’s assertion that there is another Government leak, there is no current list: this will be done on a case-by-case basis, based on the impact across areas such as the economy, but also taking each Department into account. I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to new clauses 9 and 10, which—as we have already touched on—set out those visa provisions in more detail. I feel that this is a fairly straightforward part of the Bill, with no need for the hon. Member’s amendment.

Turning to new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80, a key function of the Home Office is the removal of individuals who have no legal right to be here, either by deportation or administrative removal, usually to the country of which they are nationals. We expect our international partners to work with us, as they expect us to work with them, to remove such individuals, as the UK does where our own nationals in other countries should not be in those countries. This is a critical component of a functioning migration relationship, and the vast majority of countries co-operate with us in this area. However, a small number do not.

As has been said, new clause 9 is designed to give the Government the power to impose visa penalties. Countries should no longer expect to benefit from a normal UK visa service if they are unwilling to co-operate with us on the matter of returning nationals. We will be able to slow down or suspend visa services for that country, and require applicants to pay a surcharge of £190 when they apply for a UK visa. Specifically, new clause 9 sets out when a country may be specified as unco-operative and the factors that will be taken into account when imposing visa penalties. Additionally, the new clause provides detail on the types of penalties that may be applied. It is a critical step in taking back control of our borders.

Briefly turning to new clause 10, visa penalties are intended to be a matter of last resort, and must not be in place longer than necessary. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the application of visa penalties every two months and revoke those penalties if the relevant country is no longer unco-operative. This provision is a safeguard to ensure that any visa penalties applied do not remain in place by default. Government amendment 80 is consequential on new clauses 9 and 10, providing that they will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

I commend new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80 to the Committee, and by your leave, Ms McDonagh, I request that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central withdraw his amendments.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 59 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 60 disagreed to.

Clause 61

Special Immigration Appeals Commission

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider Government new clause 11—Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

The sector has long expressed concerns about the powers and procedures of SIAC, but the Government are seeking to extend the powers even further. It follows that the wider escalation of the Home Office power in the Bill, which will have a devastating consequence for vulnerable people, will also provide the lead for others to promote and encourage similar draconian measures in their immigration and asylum systems. We are opposed to new clause 11, because it will significantly expand the powers of SIAC and put British citizens—and other people who have or seek an entitlement to enter, reside or remain in the UK—at risk of being excluded from the UK or of being treated as having no right to be here.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Let me address a couple of points. Basically, the hon. Gentleman is asking whether SIAC involves a further erosion of civil liberties. The direct answer to that is no—if anything, it is quite the opposite. New clause 11 allows the specialist court the ability to consider all evidence relied on to ensure that cases may be both brought and properly defended. In addition, the special advocate system, the disclosure procedure used in such hearings and other safeguards are designed to provide individuals with substantial measures of procedural justice in their difficult circumstances when, in the public interest, material cannot be disclosed to them directly.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.

Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.

Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:

“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—

(a) disallow, or

(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,

the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.

Wasted costs are defined as

“any costs incurred by a party—

(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or

(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”

That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made

“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”

In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.

In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant

“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and

(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.

The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include

“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,

(b) any employee of such a person, or

(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.

(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”

However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.

Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:

“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”

No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.

Clause 63 provides that:

“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—

(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”

a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.

According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,

“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”

“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,

but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.

The Chair

This debate will now include consideration of clause 63.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.

The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.

Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.

As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.

Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.

Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Tribunal procedure rules to be made in respect of costs orders etc.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Good Faith Requirement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 81.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

The Chair

I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 65

Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Extent

Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—

(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);

(5) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 186, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Scotland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Scottish Parliament, bringing it into force in Scotland.

(5) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Northern Ireland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly, bringing it into force in Northern Ireland.”

Under this amendment, Part 4 of the Bill would not enter into force in Scotland or Northern Ireland until the relevant devolved legislatures had given their consent.

I am sorry to have to take the Committee back to part 4 and modern slavery and trafficking. The amendment relates to a similar issue that I raised in connection with age assessments, because I tend to believe that certain provisions in part 4 encroach on devolved competences in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the way that the part 4 is drafted, the Government have recognised that modern slavery and trafficking is a matter that is devolved to both those jurisdictions. That is why certain clauses do not impact on them. However, in this amendment, we are suggesting simply that the Government should go further. For example, in my view, the recovery period is clearly within the competency of the Scottish Government and I think, also, the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, clause 49 interferes with the start and end points of that period. Clauses 46 and 47 trample all over the idea that identification of victims of slavery and trafficking are devolved matters. So too does clause 51. For those reasons, I am prompting the Minister on what engagement there has been and is ongoing and whether a legislative consent motion should be requested from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly before the Bill is passed.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister says “almost all” the provisions. Can he outline which are not?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for his assurances that engagement has been taking place and is ongoing. I accept that the amendment is not practicable, because it impinges on reserved matters. The other side of the coin is also true and this was about provoking a discussion about which parts of the Bill the Home Office has identified as relating to devolved matters. The Minister has listed some, which is helpful, but I do not think he has completely listed all that would apply and should be described as devolved. For example, age assessments quite clearly relate in some circumstances to devolved functions regarding children. More relevant to this amendment debate is modern slavery, as I said—for example, the length of the recovery and reflection period and various other matters in relation to identification of victims are, absolutely and definitely, devolved. That is why we have separate modern slavery and trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

I have done what I needed to do, which is to suggest that the Home Office has a look at whether a legislative consent memorandum is required, but I will leave it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Commencement

Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 70, page 58, line 30, leave out “and (4)” and insert “to (5)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 109.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 70, page 58, line 42, leave out paragraphs (d) and (e).

This amendment is consequential on an Amendment 109.

Amendment 109, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

“(5) Sections 27 to 35 may not be commenced before—

(a) the Secretary of State has consulted with such parties as the Secretary of State considers appropriate on—

(i) the compatibility of each section with the Refugee Convention; and

(ii) the domestic and international implications of the UK adopting each section;

(b) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of that consultation stating which parties were consulted, and stating in respect of each section—

(i) the views of the parties consulted on its compatibility and implications;

(ii) the differences between the interpretation of the Convention provided by the section and any interpretations provided by the higher courts before the passing of this Act;

(iii) the reasons why the Secretary of State concludes that the section should be commenced; and

(c) both Houses of Parliament have considered that report and approved the commencement of each of the sections that is to be commenced.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)—

“interpretation provided by the higher courts” means an interpretation provided by any judgement of the High Court or Court of Appeal in England and Wales, of the Court of Session in Scotland, of the High Court or Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or of the United Kingdom Supreme Court that has not been superseded.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to hold consultations on the compatibility of Clauses 27 to 35 with the Refugee Convention, and to report to Parliament on such consultations, before the relevant Clauses enter into force.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.

On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.

In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.

There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.

The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.

In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I have not succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to move beyond assertion that there is compliance with the refugee convention and to hear a little more about why the Government think that that is the case. I accept the point that different countries have slightly different interpretations of certain provisions; that is legitimate. But there are clear arguments that what the Government are doing in relation to the evidential threshold, their definition of “particular social group” and, in particular, their total rewriting of article 31 on immunity from penalties is inexcusable and way beyond any margin of appreciation that Governments enjoy. I tried. I failed. I will accept that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 77, 123, 191, 78 and 167.

Clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Amendment 191 removes the commencement provision regarding clause 42, as the clause is intended to be replaced entirely by new clause 20. Amendment 167 removes the commencement provisions regarding marker clauses 58 to 61—about age assessments, processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries, electronic travel authorisations and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—as these clauses have been removed and replaced by substantive clauses.

Clause 70 sets out the commencement of the clauses in the Bill. As currently drafted, the majority of the provisions in the Bill will be brought into force by regulations on a day appointed by the Secretary of State, with the exception of those in part 6, which commence on Royal Assent, as is usual, and those that come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment 76 agreed to.

Amendment made: 77, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(a) section 57 (interpretation of Part 4), for the purposes of making regulations under that section;” —(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment brings the power to make regulations defining “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” into force on the day on which the Act receives Royal Assent.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I beg to move Government amendment 121, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(b) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(1) and (5) to (7) (effect of failure to give notice of pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”

This amendment brings subsections (1) and (5) to (7) of NC19 (concerning the effect of a failure to give notice of a pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 122.

Government new clause 19—Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship—

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

New clause 19 allows the Secretary of State to amend section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 to permit that in certain limited circumstances a notice of deprivation does not have to be given to the person concerned, either where there is no way of communicating with them or where to make contact would disclose sensitive intelligence sources. To deprive someone of British citizenship is very serious and is rightly reserved for those whose conduct involves very high harm or who obtained their citizenship by fraudulent means. However, it cannot be right that the proper functioning of the immigration and nationality system grinds to a halt because an individual has removed themselves from contact with the Home Office, there is otherwise no other method of communication, or because our knowledge of a person’s whereabouts comes from sensitive intelligence sources which we do not wish to disclose.

New clause 19 is therefore necessary to avoid the situation where we could never deprive a person of British citizenship just because it is not practicable, or not possible, to communicate with them. Preserving the ability to make decisions in this way is vital to preserve the integrity of the UK immigration system and protect the security of the UK from those who would wish to do us harm. However, we do not wish to deny a person their statutory right of appeal where we have made a decision to deprive, so the amendment also preserves that right. In cases where we have already made a decision to deprive but for one reason or another have not notified the person, the clause also ensures that such decisions, as well as the subsequent deprivation order, are still lawful.

It is important that deprivation orders made before this Bill comes into force remain valid, otherwise individuals who the Home Secretary has already decided should be deprived of their British citizenship because it is conducive to the public good would have their citizenship effectively reinstated and could therefore freely travel in and out of the UK. This could have detrimental consequences for national security. We need amendment 121 so that the relevant provisions of the new clause are enacted at the earliest opportunity.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.

Amendment 121 agreed to.

Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—

“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.

This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.

This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).

This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.

Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—

“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.

This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 12.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.

New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.

Amendment 79 agreed to.

Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)

This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.

Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);

(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);

(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”

This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.

Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”

This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“

This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 38—Time limit on immigration detention—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) who is liable to detention under a relevant detention power.

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 28 days from the relevant time.

(3) If P remains detained under a relevant detention power at the expiry of the period of 28 days then—

(a) P shall be released forthwith; and

(b) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power thereafter, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that there has been a material change of circumstances since P’s release and that the criteria in section [Initial detention: criteria and duration](1) are met.

(4) In this section, “relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—

(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);

(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);

(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal); or

(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).

(5) In this section, “relevant time” means the time at which P is first detained under a relevant detention power.

(6) This section does not apply to a person in respect of whom the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain is or was taken in the interests of national security.”

This new clause would prevent people who are liable to detention under a relevant power from being detained for longer than 28 days.

New clause 39—Initial detention: criteria and duration—

“(1) A person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power other than for the purposes of examination, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that—

(a) P can be shortly removed from the United Kingdom;

(b) detention is strictly necessary to effect P’s deportation or removal from the United Kingdom; and

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 96 hours from the relevant time, unless—

(a) P has been refused bail at an initial bail hearing in accordance with subsection (5)(b) of section [Bail hearings]; or

(b) the Secretary of State has arranged a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P in accordance with subsection (2)(c) of section [Bail hearings] and that hearing has not yet taken place.

(3) Nothing in subsections (1) or (2) authorises the Secretary of State to detain P under a relevant detention power if such detention would, apart from this section, be unlawful.

(4) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(5) In this section, “relevant detention power” and “relevant time” have the meanings given in section [Time limit on immigration detention].”

This new clause sets out the circumstances in which a person to whom NC38 applies may be held in initial detention, and the maximum duration of such detention.

New clause 40—Bail hearings—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies and who is detained under a relevant detention power.

(2) Before the expiry of a period of 96 hours from the relevant time, the Secretary of State must—

(a) release P;

(b) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(3) Subject to subsection (4), when the Secretary of State arranges a reference to the Tribunal under subsection (2)(c), the Tribunal must hold an oral hearing (“an initial bail hearing”) which must commence within 24 hours of the time at which the reference is made.

(4) If the period of 24 hours in subsection (3) ends on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank holiday, the Tribunal must hold an initial bail hearing on the next working day.

(5) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal must—

(a) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(b) refuse to grant immigration bail to P.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Tribunal must grant immigration bail to P at a bail hearing unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] are met and that, in addition—

(a) directions have been given for P’s removal from the United Kingdom and such removal is to take place within 14 days;

(b) a travel document is available for the purposes of P’s removal or deportation; and

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] above are met and that there are very exceptional circumstances which justify maintaining detention.

(8) In subsection (6), “a bail hearing” includes—

(a) an initial bail hearing under subsection (2); and

(b) the hearing of an application for immigration bail under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016.

(9) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(10) The Secretary of State shall provide to P or to P’s legal representative, not more than 24 hours after the relevant time, copies of all documents in the Secretary of State’s possession which are relevant to the decision to detain.

(11) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal shall not consider any documents relied upon by the Secretary of State which were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10), unless—

(a) P consents to the documents being considered; or

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal there is a good reason why the documents were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10).

(12) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows—

(a) After paragraph 12(4) of schedule 10 insert—

“(4A) Sub-paragraph (2) above does not apply if the refusal of bail by the First tier Tribunal took place at an initial bail hearing within the meaning of section [Bail hearings] of the Sovereign Borders Act 2021.”.”

In respect of people to whom NC38 applies, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to either release them, grant immigration bail or arrange a reference to the Tribunal within 96 hours.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

We are talking here about the deprivation of liberty not because people have committed a crime but, essentially, for the convenience of the Home Office. The new clauses contain measures to end what is indefinite detention in the UK, whatever the Home Office says to the contrary, and to implement a workable system that ensures detention is used only as a last resort to effect lawful removals from the UK. That is what the situation should be. The existing power to detain without prior judicial authority would be retained but there would be important safeguards: a 28-day time limit, judicial oversight by way of bail hearings after 96 hours with clear criteria for continued detention and re-detention only when there is a material change in status or circumstances.

Immigration detention has declined over the last several years, which is very welcome. Nevertheless, there is no release date for immigration detainees, which is incredibly severe, particularly in terms of mental ill health. Although numbers have been falling, the length of time that people are detained has not fallen. The fact of falling numbers does not reduce the need for a time limit. We are talking about several thousand individuals leaving detention every year who have been detained for longer than 28 days and hundreds who have been detained for more than six months. In a minority of cases, detention lasts for years rather than months.

Why 28 days? It is not a number that has been pulled from thin air. It is already in Home Office guidance, which requires caseworkers to consider whether removal is imminent and goes on to define imminence in the following terms:

“Removal could be said to be imminent where a travel document exists, removal directions are set there are no outstanding legal barriers and removal is likely to take place in the next four weeks.”

This is a recommendation that has been made by many organisations with expertise in the area, including the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Affairs Committee, the Bar Council and the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migration.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

As vice-chair of the inquiry to which the hon. Gentleman referred, may I ask whether he will add the House of Commons to the list of those bodies that have endorsed this? When our recommendation was considered on a votable motion in a Backbench Business debate, it was approved by the House.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.

If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I want to be clear from the outset that this Government’s position is that a time limit on detention simply will not work and will not be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be here in the UK leave.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

One of the issues highlighted by the report referred to by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, which had genuine cross-party engagement, was that the UK is an outlier in having no limits on detention. Every other country in Europe has a limit. Why does the Minister think it will not work here?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Those who have no right to be in the UK should leave voluntarily, but where the opportunities to do so are not taken, we have to operate a system to enable us to enforce removal and deport foreign national offenders who would otherwise remain in the UK.

I also want to be clear that we do not and cannot detain people indefinitely. It is not lawfully possible to do so.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

I think what the hon. Member has asked me to do is put a time limit on this, and I have already said clearly that just does not work. We have a duty to those in the immigration system, but we have a duty to protect the public too. The introduction of a 28-day detention time limit would severely limit our ability to remove those who refuse to leave voluntarily, and would encourage and reward abuse, to answer the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, in some cases from individuals who present a genuine threat to the public, which is not the effect I consider the hon. Members intend with new clause 38.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

Does the Minister not think that if someone represents a threat to the public, they would be in jail? If they are not in jail, there is no evidence that they represent a threat to the public.

Craig Whittaker

- - Excerpts

New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.

New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.

The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)

Adjourned till Thursday 4 November at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

NBB44 Hope for Justice

NBB45 ATLEU (Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit)

NBB46 CARE (Christian Action Research and Education)

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Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Second sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Mark Hendrick, Andrew Rosindell

† Barker, Paula (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)

† Cartlidge, James (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Crawley, Angela (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)

† Cunningham, Alex (Stockton North) (Lab)

† Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)

† Fletcher, Nick (Don Valley) (Con)

† Hayes, Sir John (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

† Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)

† Hunt, Tom (Ipswich) (Con)

† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

† Longhi, Marco (Dudley North) (Con)

McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† Mann, Scott (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)

† Marson, Julie (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)

† Moore, Damien (Southport) (Con)

† Slaughter, Andy (Hammersmith) (Lab)

† Twist, Liz (Blaydon) (Lab)

Huw Yardley, Seb Newman, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Witnesses

Richard Leiper QC

André Rebello OBE, Senior Coroner, Liverpool and Wirral area

Sara Lomri, Deputy Legal Director, Public Law Project

Ellie Cumbo, Head of Public Law, The Law Society

Louise Whitfield, Head of Legal Casework, Liberty

Louise Finer, Head of Policy, Inquest

Stephanie Needleman, Acting Legal Director, Justice

Steve Valdez-Symonds, Programme Director for Refugee and Migrant Rights, Amnesty International UK

Dr Joe Tomlinson, Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of York

Aidan O’Neill QC

Michael Clancy OBE, Director of Law Reform, The Law Society of Scotland

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Afternoon)

[Sir Mark Hendrick in the Chair]

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

14:00

The Committee deliberated in private.

Examination of Witnesses

André Rebello OBE and Richard Leiper QC, gave evidence.

10:14

The Chair

- Hansard -

Q35 I remind Members that this session is being broadcast. We will now hear oral evidence from André Rebello OBE, senior coroner for Liverpool and Wirral and honorary secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales, and from Richard Leiper QC. We have until 2.45 pm for this session. I welcome the witnesses. Would they like to introduce themselves, starting with Richard?

Richard Leiper: My name is Richard Leiper QC. I am a specialist in employment law and related civil matters. I am also chair of the advisory council of the litigant in person support strategy. In that capacity, I was part of a shadow online rules committee that was chaired by Mr Justice Langstaff.

André Rebello: I am André Rebello. I am the senior coroner in Liverpool and the Wirral and the honorary secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales, the judicial association for coroners. I have been a coroner for over 28 years, and I welcome, with some caveats, all the provisions relating to coroners in the Bill.

Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I have one or two quick questions on coroners. Some people have commented that the provisions in the Bill are fairly modest, particularly in light of the recent Justice Committee report, which was debated last week and which suggested that progress could have been made in quite a number of other areas. Probably the suggestion that received most attention concerned legal aid, specifically in relation to bereaved families at inquests where state parties are represented. Those are seen to involve an inequality of arms. Is that something that you have experienced, and do you think that there is merit in that suggestion?

André Rebello: A coroner’s jurisdiction is inquisitorial. It is an inquiry; it is not litigation. In the vast majority of inquests in which the state is represented—apart from some very high-profile inquests—those representing the state are actually representing, in effect, a body corporate, to provide a voice to an organisation. They often facilitate the proceedings, assist the court and, more often than not, assist bereaved families to understand the issues before the court.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q May I press you on that? It sounds to me that your answer is that legal aid for bereaved families in such inquests may not be necessary, even if it was desirable. However, these are often complex matters and, although I am sure that legal counsel will do its best to assist the coroner’s court, they also have their clients’ interests to look after. Whose job is it—is it your job as a coroner?—to help those who have no legal experience and who are in difficult and perhaps emotional situations, as relatives of the deceased, to understand proceedings and to represent their best interests?

André Rebello: As you will recall from the Justice Committee hearings with the chief coroner, the deputy chief coroner and myself, more than 95% of inquests are heard by coroners sitting alone. The coroner has an enabling role, and it is the coroner who carries out an inquiry. Only the coroner can call evidence, and you will also recall that the coroner’s court is the only court where no one actually brings a case to prove. We are led by the evidence, and the coroner’s role is to level the playing field.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Except that in some cases there will be pro bono representation, or there may be privately paid representation. Is this a level playing field? I am talking about the minority of cases where there is representation.

André Rebello: Where there is representation, you should recall that from section 41, where the properly interested persons are identified, they have rights with regard to disclosure of advance information, but thereafter their duty is to assist the court in finding the true facts as to who the deceased was, when and where they died, and by what means and in what circumstances they came by death in certain cases. That is all done without determining criminal liability by a named person or any question of civil liability. This is an inquest, not litigation.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Are there any other recommendations of the Select Committee which are not in the Bill at present which you would like to see in the Bill? There were quite a number to do with appeals, oversight, the national service, the inspectorate and complaints—matters of that kind. Was there anything in there that caught your eye?

André Rebello: Lots of things caught my eye, however, I am a judge and not the Executive. It must be for the Executive to make policy. However, I will reiterate the issue of the national shortage of pathologists desperately needs addressing. The fees have not been increased for over 20 years and that is something which must affect the number of pathologists available to facilitate coronial investigation.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q And you will have seen the Government’s response to that?

André Rebello: I have seen the Government’s response to that. However, being at the coalface and knowing the lack of pathologists across the country, something needs to be done.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Richard, do you wish to respond to this question?

Richard Leiper: No thank you.

Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Mr Leiper, these questions are probably for you. One of the things that the Bill does is introduce an online procedure rule committee. I believe you sat on a shadow version of such a committee. Can you give us your insight into what kind of efficiencies this might bring and where you think the early focus of that committee should be in its first couple of months after inception?

Richard Leiper: One of the things that people need to appreciate about the conception here is how broadly it could be applied. It is intended or, at least, it empowers there to be rules which cross employment tribunals, first-tier tribunals, all civil proceedings and all family proceedings, and it would need to be dealt with on a very narrow incremental basis.

I see two particular issues. First, there is not an existing infrastructure for an online process. Essentially, this rule committee would be laying rules which could be seen to tread on the toes of the existing rule committees for civil procedure, for family law, for employment tribunals and it would set down rules which somehow put in place the process which, for example, would tread on the toes of an employment tribunal—so, how a claim was initiated.

The online rule committee would be setting a rule which provided a wholly new way of a process being initiated. That would need the buy-in and support of the tribunal process, because there is not, as yet, the underlying infrastructure. That is in contrast, for example, to the civil procedure rule committee, where the entire infrastructure of the civil court process is there, and the judges know where they fit in and what they are supposed to be doing. Here, this has judges being told that there is a new process which has an online procedure, and they will not have a clue how that is supposed to operate.

If you start broadening it, it becomes cross-jurisdictional. For example, someone who wants to bring a claim against their employer that involves a breach of contract claim and an unfair dismissal claim, but one of which would normally go to a civil court and one to an employment tribunal. How can that be pulled together? Who would be the judge that dealt with it, and how would the procedure move forward? These are enormously difficult questions, which brings me to a second point.

The current composition of the committee is a total of 6 people. That is in contrast to the civil procedure rule committee, which has 18 members. The family procedure rule committee has 18 members. To me, given the potential breadth of the rule that could be set by this committee, having one senior judge, a couple of other judges, one practitioner, one layperson and one computer person is simply not enough. That is partly because the scope for the procedures would be trespassing on areas which it is likely that no member of the committee would have any knowledge of.

For example, I have no knowledge at all about family court proceedings—how they begin, how they proceed, or what the interests of the various parties would be. Yet, if there is just one practitioner, who could be a barrister, a solicitor or a legal executive—each of whom have different perspectives on how the system operates, how it impacts on clients, other parties and so forth—there will not be the wealth of knowledge, even with consultation with people who do know, to enable effective online rules. The composition of the committee is my single greatest concern.

Antony Higginbotham

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Can I just follow up? I understand what you are saying about treading on toes, but it is not also the case that we must ensure our ways of working evolve as technology evolves. To your point, that is why it is important, as the committee establishes itself, that it does so in a careful and considered way—not to step on toes, but to take the best of new ways of working and carry the profession with it.

Richard Leiper: I could not agree with that more. I think it is exactly the right concept to have. It will help litigants. There is provision so that those who do not have the means of doing things online would have the alternative of doing so through more traditional mechanisms, but I completely agree with the process because it should simplify the system to enable people to access justice more freely.

I could not agree more with the underlying concept. It is more a matter of ensuring that the infrastructure is in place to carry that through, so that it can become effective. That has two parts. First, it means having a properly composed committee with the expertise that can be brought to it and, secondly, having the infrastructure behind it so that it is not just a rule committee setting what needs to happen on high, but it gets the buy-in of everyone who will implement it and of how it will operate.

Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Mr Leiper, you talked about the size of the committee being inadequate at six members. What is your opinion about how we build that particular committee? Are you suggesting 16 members like other committees or do you think there is a middle ground? Who should the committee comprise?

Richard Leiper: I am not one for large committees, which can be counterproductive, but we are talking about an enormous amount of work that will need to be undertaken across a wide range of practice areas. I suggest that the composition was akin to that of the civil procedure rule committee and of family law, so having more judges and more practitioners. The committee has only one person who can bring the knowledge of the lay-advice sector, whereas I think both the civil procedure rule committee and the family procedure rule committee each have two lay members. It needs a wider composition akin to those of the existing rule committees—which seem to operate perfectly successfully—where people are able to bring together the knowledge and direction of what they want to achieve through the online rule committee, but also bring particular practice or individual knowledge to the development of those rules.

Alex Cunningham

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q You said that a tremendous amount of work needs to be done, but that you accept that this is a good idea generally. What safeguards do you think we will need to put in place in the short term to ensure that justice is not adversely impacted as this is developed?

Richard Leiper: I guess that the biggest risk is of technological failure of some kind, because this is wholly dependent on having the underlying technology operating successfully. If there is a failure, then it could lead to disaster. It is about ensuring that there is the funding and knowledge behind it to be able to support a process that would need to be implemented in a small area at first—I would think—ensuring that it was successful, and then gradually broadening it so that one could have confidence in its effectiveness. It is about having the comfort that there is going to be the technological and financial support behind it to ensure that it works.

Alex Cunningham

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Thank you. I have one final question. What do you think about the powers provided to the Lord Chancellor by the OPR provisions in the Bill, in clauses 19 to 26? Do they cause a democratic deficit?

Richard Leiper: I suppose there are two answers to that. One is yes. The other, which is my personal view, is that it seems to reflect the processes that are already in place into the existing procedure rule committee. This appears to have been the accepted approach since about 2005, and it seems to be replicating that. It does seem to give a substantial power to the Lord Chancellor in this regard, which I personally find surprising. However, it seems to be the way that things have operated for some time.

Alex Cunningham

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is very helpful, thank you.

Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I wanted to ask a question about online procedures, particularly the coronial inquest where you have said that 95% are carried out by a coroner sitting alone. For the 5% that require witnesses, how does being able to hold inquests online make the system more efficient?

André Rebello: Perhaps I misspoke. When a coroner sits alone, the coroner still hears evidence, and witnesses still come to court. It is just that there is no representation for any of the interested persons; the coroner hears evidence and makes finding and determinations. There is a real issue, though, with remote hearings in that, although many people have found advantages with them, the coronavirus easements did not apply to coroners’ courts. Coroners’ courts have only been able to work through remote hearings by using rule 17 to receive video evidence.

The provisions in this Bill are to bring coroners’ courts in line with other courts. However, there is a real issue in regard to the Equality Act 2010; not everyone can participate in the rule of law and in open justice through remote hearings. Any judge presiding has to be very careful to make sure that everyone can participate. I suspect there are more disadvantages in remote hearings than in having everyone in court, where you can fully appreciate how people are following the proceedings. In the 95% of cases where there is no representation, the coroner still hears evidence. It is not as if the coroner is just reading statements; evidence is still heard.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Do you think there are enough safeguards to be sure that people are able to participate, and alternatives if they are not?

André Rebello: With regard to remote hearings or with regard to—

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q You said that some people cannot participate in remote hearings.

André Rebello: No. Basically, with remote hearings, there are all kinds of AV infrastructure challenges with regard to recording what has been said, and people with hearing difficulties being able to follow Zoom or Microsoft Teams. Technically it is quite difficult. It is also difficult for a coroner to evaluate evidence, because they do not have the people in front of them to judge.

Further, there is a danger with remote hearings that we will lose courts. If people can have all hearings remotely, there is a danger that we may not have a court infrastructure in future, for when justice needs to be seen to be done. The correct procedure in my view is that most things should be dealt with in court, and remote hearings should be used where necessary, but that should not become the norm.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Can you give an example of where it might have been necessary? I have given evidence to coroners’ courts, in my capacity as a doctor. I remember one specific case where the doctor who had been involved with the child at the time of death was overseas and refused to return for the court. As someone cannot be extradited for the purpose of a coroner’s court, their evidence was not heard. Would allowing online processes enable that individual’s evidence to be heard? Does it apply to evidence being given virtually from overseas?

André Rebello: Under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the coroner can receive evidence by video, under rule 17 of the inquest rules. I have certainly received evidence from Australia and, I think, South Africa, with doctor witnesses who had moved overseas and then given evidence. I see no reason why coroners should not receive evidence from overseas. However, if people can attend, it is important, because it is a lot easier to give an explanation about the means someone comes by the cause of death, if everyone is in the courtroom, and everyone can follow the proceedings.

If Parliament brings in remote hearings for coroners and brings them in line with the Courts and Tribunals Service courts, the Chief Coroner will have to issue some very firm guidance on how and when it is used, because I do not believe it should become the norm.

Angela Crawley (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Much has been said about the importance of having people present when looking into such an important matter, which I understand, but there is an accessibility issue. One thing we have learned throughout the pandemic is that many people have had the advantage of accessibility and the ability to attend. Would it not be a real advantage, in some instances, to have a hybrid performance, so you could retain the formal court setting, with people both present and remote, if required?

André Rebello: Absolutely; if someone needs to attend court and they cannot attend other than remotely, that is fine. At the moment, the legislation relating to coroners allows witness evidence to be given remotely only under rule 17 of the coroner’s inquest rules. The easements that would be provided by the Judicial Review and Courts Bill would enable coroners’ courts to be far more flexible, with people appearing remotely, and also broadcasting. At the moment, under section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, it is unlawful for a coroner’s court—or any court—to broadcast. The purpose of remote hearings is for participation.

Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I have a question for Mr Rebello. What is your view on coroners having the power to hold inquests without a hearing, particularly in non-contentious cases?

André Rebello: I have no problem with that proposal, that being another tool in the bag, as and where it is necessary, that is needed. My own preference is to go into court and record the hearing that I would have had, so that people can apply for a copy of what has been received and they can actually hear what has occurred. Certainly, it takes a lot longer to write down a considered decision than to go into court, go through the evidence orally and speak to it. Something that could take me five to 10 minutes in court, could take me an hour and a half to write down the issues, the law being applied, the rulings, the findings, determinations and conclusion, and then all the reasons which you would need for a considered judgment. That would be far, far more time consuming and may well take up far more coroners’ time. I appreciate not all coroners have access to courts all the time, and they cannot just go into court, so this is a very useful proposal, which I am sure will be used as and when needed.

Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q We understand that the Chief Coroner will be providing guidance to coroners on the proposed five measures in the Bill. Do you think that that will ensure consistency of practice across coroner areas, given that coroners are independent judicial office holders and that judicial decisions are for them to make?

André Rebello: Absolutely. We should bear in mind that coroners are judges like any other judge, and every judge is an independent judicial office holder. No other judge, other than a properly constituted appellate court, can tell another judge how to decide something or do something. However, it is important to have guidance to ensure consistency not only between coroners, but internally for each coroner. What you have to bear in mind is that every coroner determines the facts of the case on the very facts that are before the coroner. No two cases are actually the same. If the Chief Coroner is minded to issue guidance, that can only help to make these things work.

When you look at the provisions, the ability to merge coroner areas is something that has been long needed, because at the moment you can only merge unitary authorities, not parts of those authorities and that has delayed the coroner reform project. It is sensible that the disapplication of reportable deaths under covid continues because we are not out of the pandemic. On remote hearings, we should be brought in line with the Courts and Tribunals Service, with some guidance to ensure consistency, so that that facility is used where necessary, but not overused, because the rule of law and open justice is very important and people should be able to attend to see justice being done.

As we have just discussed, written inquests, without going into court, will have their need when coroners are struggling to get a court. The ability to discontinue cases when we have not ordered a post-mortem is long over needed. Occasionally, we will have a GP abroad who knows the cause of death and there is no one else qualified to give a cause of death. The only way the coroner could open up the facility to discontinue that case would be to order an unnecessary post-mortem. The proposal will enable coroners to open an investigation and when the GP returns, to discontinue and have the death registered.

That does raise another issue that the Bill does not cover, and I am sure that Members will be aware that the sunset clause in the Coronavirus Act 2020 expires in March next year. The law used to be that a doctor had to treat a patient in his or her last illness and, relying on regulation 41 of the births and deaths regulations, had to have seen the patient within 14 days of death, or seen the body after death. The Coronavirus Act gave an easement, enabling 28 days to be used, whereby any doctor had seen the patient and any other doctor could see the body after the death. It looks as if that part of the Coronavirus Act will expire before Parliament has a chance to bring into force the medical examiner and death registration provisions. There will be a big lacuna in the work coroners are carrying out. If doctors are not seeing patients face to face and cannot issue death certificates, far more cases will be unnecessarily reported to the coroner. If there is any way to continue that coronavirus easement on death certification, it would be greatly appreciated, particularly by the bereaved.

Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)

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Q According to Transform Justice:

“Online pleas compromise open justice principles by removing the opportunity for the plea hearing to be witnessed/observed.”

It sounds like you may agree, Mr Rebello. To what extent do you think online pleas are compatible with the principles of open justice?

André Rebello: I am not sure that is a matter for a coroner, because I deal with inquisitorial proceedings in which there are no pleas.

Richard Leiper: This might relate to the Crown court part of the Bill, which I do not think either of us deals with. Online pleas would be an aspect of the criminal process.

Janet Daby

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Okay, I will leave that for session 6.

The Chair

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Three questioners wish to be called a second time. I will call them in the order in which they indicated.

Alex Cunningham

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Q I suspect Mr Leiper might not be able to help me on criminal procedure reforms, but will he indicate that is the case?

Richard Leiper: I should not. I sit as a recorder in the Crown court, but I would not hold myself up as having the necessary expertise.

Alex Cunningham

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Q That is fine. I have a general question. Clause 4 extends the pleading by post scheme to children—in other words, defendants who have attained the age of 16, rather than the usual 18. Do you think that is appropriate?

Richard Leiper: Again, that is an issue for the Crown court section of your discussion, rather than the civil side of things.

Alex Cunningham

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Okay.

Dr Johnson

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Q On death certificates, you spoke about treating the last illness or seeing a patient in the last 14 days or after death. I appreciate that at the moment you can see them in the last 28 days or after death, and you seem to be implying that makes a large difference. With increasing face-to-face appointments and the opportunity to see the person after death, why do you believe the change will make a material difference to the number of cases referred to the coroner? I appreciate that the coroner gets involved if you cannot issue a death certificate, but how many cases are there in which the doctor is unable to see the patient after death or in which the 14-day window—between 14 and 28 days before death—is crucial? It seems to me that there would not be many such cases.

André Rebello: Actually, there are many. With the easements in the Coronavirus Act, we are just about keeping our heads above water in the coroner service. Under the Coronavirus Act, any doctor could have treated the patient—it does not have to be the doctor who certifies the death, provided that the other doctor sees the body after death—and we have been able to get medical examiners and other doctors to issue death certificates. These are all deaths from natural causes, which should not ordinarily be reported to the coroner. Hopefully, the statutory medical examiner service will alleviate quite a lot of the deaths that come the coroner’s way, which cause a lot of concern for bereaved families. Unfortunately, a lot of deaths are reported to the coroner unnecessarily. At the moment—gosh—probably 20% or 30% of deaths being reported now do not need to be reported. Doctors could issue, but for whatever reason, the deaths are being reported—I suspect that doctors are busy trying to get back to normal and see patients.

I have concerns about the coronavirus easements lapsing before we bring in the new death certification and medical examiner provisions. I raise this on the record to flag that I can see a storm brewing in, probably, April of next year.

Andy Slaughter

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Mr Leiper, am I okay to ask you about employment tribunals?

Richard Leiper: You can.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Our notes say that I can, so I will have a try. Do you welcome the provisions in clauses 32 to 36? Do you see any problems with them, or are they mainly administrative?

Richard Leiper: I do not see any particular issues with them, but they do seem primarily administrative in that they are reflecting changes. There are issues about the composition of the tribunal, which I suspect some people may have concerns about. There has been quite a substantial shift in tribunals being presided over by a judge alone rather than being supported by members, for example, but in my experience, that has not been unsuccessful. The provisions seek to further that, as I understand them.

Andy Slaughter

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Q It looks like it moves responsibility from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to the Ministry of Justice, making adjustments to the procedural rules so that they are equal between the different types of tribunals, and changes the membership, like you say. Is that your reading of it?

Richard Leiper: Yes. On where it fits, I do not know why, historically, it has not fallen within the Ministry of Justice; it has always been slightly out on a limb in that it has not.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I guess it is because they were industrial tribunals to begin with, so they were in the industry Department. We have discussed coroners, but could we take this opportunity to put in the Bill anything relating to employment tribunals? I am thinking in particular of the backlog at the moment, which is pretty heavy. Could any measures be introduced to address that?

Richard Leiper: As I understand it, they are desperately trying to recruit more judges, which is an underlying problem. Another problem that I do not think the Bill would address is the financial support and infrastructure for employment tribunals. Individual employment tribunal centres are essentially fractured in the IT that they have, as I understand it, and that has caused significant problems, particularly at the beginning of the pandemic, when remote hearings were almost impossible because the tribunal just lacked the software and infrastructure to be able to do them. There has been a chronic underfunding of the tribunals system for a very long time, and if the backlog is going to be dealt with, the system desperately needs that support.

Andy Slaughter

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Q There was a reduction in resources because of the Unison case, which has now been reversed. Is that also causing problems?

Richard Leiper: Yes—well, not problems, but it has meant that more people have been able to bring their claims. I do not see that as a problem, but it has created more cases that need to be dealt with, yes.

The Chair

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I thank both our witnesses for being present today and giving evidence, which I am sure the Committee has found very useful indeed. We will now move on to the next panel of witnesses.

Examination of Witnesses

Sara Lomri, Ellie Cumbo and Louise Whitfield gave evidence.

14:45

The Chair

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We are now going to hear evidence from Sara Lomri, deputy legal director at the Public Law Project; from Ellie Cumbo, who is head of public law at the Law Society; and from Louise Whitfield, who is head of casework at Liberty. We have until 3.30 pm for this panel, and we will try to make sure that the questions are fairly sharp. If the answers can be equally sharp, we will get more questions in and I am sure it will be much more fruitful. I can see two of the three witnesses on screen, and the third witness is present in person. First of all, can each of you briefly introduce yourself, and then we will open it up to questions?

Sara Lomri: Hello, I am Sara Lomri. I am the deputy legal director at the Public Law Project.

Ellie Cumbo: Good afternoon, my name is Ellie Cumbo, and I am the Law Society’s head of public law.

Louise Whitfield: I am head of legal casework at Liberty. I will be talking on behalf of Liberty, but I have been a judicial review specialist for 20 years, so I may refer to my experience in practice previously.

Andy Slaughter

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Q This question is to any of the witnesses. Do you think the changes to judicial review that are included in the Bill are justified?

Sara Lomri: I am happy to go first, and thanks for the question. Ultimately, the short answer is no, they are not justified. IRAL, which you were talking about this morning—Lord Faulks’s review—asked for lots of evidence. They were asked to review administrative law in a really short timeframe, and they were not able to go into the kind of level of research detail that we would have liked them to, but they nevertheless did a valiant job. They gathered evidence from right across the public law world. Although some of their recommendations are slightly mirrored in the Bill, the Bill in fact goes so much further, and we really cannot see the evidence base for the proposals put forward in the Bill. The Government say that the proposals will, for example, give judges more flexibility, save time and money and promote the rule of law. We think exactly the opposite. I am happy to go into that in more detail now, or to let my colleagues answer and come back in.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I am happy either way. Rather than assertions, however, I think we are looking for some factual basis for why you say this is wrong. We heard some evidence this morning that perhaps suggests there is a political motivation, or at least that judges are being drawn into politics in this way. Is that how you read it, and do you see these provisions addressing that problem?

Sara Lomri: Absolutely not; in fact, quite the contrary. We think that clause 1 will draw judges further into potentially political ground where they will be asked to look at the impact of implementation of the order, and they may be drawn into further satellite litigation around what order is available.

I think it is fair to say, and I do not think this came out in any of the evidence given this morning, that JR is a remedy of last resort. As a solicitor, I represent individuals who bring judicial review. The cases are about hospitals and care homes closing, policies discriminating against service personnel and disabled children being denied proper care. It absolutely is a last resort. It is really hard to access legal aid for judicial review, which is heavily restricted.

It is a very low-volume jurisdiction. Around 4,000 applications are issued a year and, of those that get permission, only a third or so proceed to trial: that is fewer than 1,000 cases a year. Of course, a few of those cases will feel very political to the Government, but that really is the absolute minority of judicial review cases—which, in any event, is a low-volume jurisdiction. I will leave that point there.

Ellie Cumbo: It is not for the Law Society to speculate on the motives—we are interested in the effect. I want to draw particular attention to the proposal to create prospective-only quashing orders, which appears in clause 1. It is important to understand that that is a drastic new suggestion that did not arise in the report by the independent review of administrative law. Its effect would be to remove a remedy from a person who successfully challenges a decision and proves that it is unlawful. Is it not the most basic requirement of a justice system that, if someone brings and wins a case, they are entitled to an effective remedy? The proposal really is very difficult to justify, and is a radical departure from the expectations that I suggest all of us—including all of your constituents—have of an effective justice system.

The point that we are most concerned about, which also appears in clause 1, relates to the statutory presumption. It is less drastic, in the sense that presumptions do, of course, exist in the law. However, it is difficult to understand the justification for creating a new set of remedies and then creating a presumption that those are the default remedies, in the absence—because there can be none—of any evidence as to their effect as a remedy. We are concerned that there is simply no justification for the Government’s own rationale for those particular provisions in clause 1.

Louise Whitfield: I would like to add that I think there is no justification, because there is no evidence the proposals will improve public-body decision making. One of the main benefits of judicial review is that it holds public bodies accountable—not just central Government, but all sorts of public bodies that make decisions affecting people’s day-to-day lives. If it improves public body decision making, we would expect to see reforms that were going to help that.

In actual fact, Liberty thinks that the reforms will hinder the ability of public bodies to make good decisions because they will be tempted to gamble more. The proposals create a risk of incentivising the public bodies because they will not have to put right the wrongs that are found by the court. It will buy them a couple of years while the case is fought out, and they will know that there is a good chance of getting a prospective-only remedy or some suspended quashing order, even if it is found that the policy or decision was unlawful. That is the other piece of the jigsaw: it lacks any justification for saying that the proposals will improve the quality of public body decision making.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Thank you very much. Turning to clause 2 for a minute, I would like to clear up one point with Sara from PLP. We have heard about the success rate of Cart reviews, which was corrected from 0.22% to, I think, about 3%. Public Law Project puts it higher than that—perhaps as high as 6%. Could you shed any more light on what the difference is?

Sara Lomri: That is right. We say that the best evidence puts it at around 5.7%. We are particularly concerned that, in response to IRAL, the Government agreed that there should be judicial supervision of the decisions of the upper tribunal, particularly in relation to refusals of permission to appeal, citing the significant cost as a reason to abolish Cart JRs.

In actual fact, the total cost save is around £364,000 to £400,000 a year. The data relied on by IRAL was incorrect—it has agreed that it was incorrect—and, in fact, it looks more like 5.7% to 6% of Cart JRs are successful. In fact, there is not a significant cost. It is £364,000 per year which, given the constitutional principle at stake, is not a significant cost.

Andy Slaughter

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Q More generally—this is for any of the witnesses—in relation to Cart, you have seen the reference from the Government’s statement that it is expected the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation. We discussed that part this morning; This might form the basis of oustering other cases. What is your response to that?

Ellie Cumbo: I would just say again this is a really drastic suggestion. Remember, it is for Parliament, not Government, to decide when to oust the jurisdiction of the courts and remember that the effect of it is to prevent a remedy when a decision has been found to be unlawful. The importance of that should not be underestimated. Parliament is supreme and has that right, but it must be considered on a case-by-case basis, as long as the circumstances are appropriate. We would welcome an indication from Government as to when they would consider it appropriate to ask Parliament to pass future ouster clauses.

Sara Lomri: I would tie it back to an article by David Davis on 25 October, in which he talks about the Government’s plans to restrict the use of judicial review in this Bill as an obvious attempt to avoid accountability. He refers to previous attempts by previous Governments, so obviously it is not just this Government, but David Cameron’s Government and before that Tony Blair’s Government attempting the same thing in a different guise. PLP would say that consideration of ouster clauses is constitutionally really problematic. We understand that it comes up from time to time, but it is not in this Government’s best interest to do that. It will really impact the way in which decisions by this Government and future Governments can be held to account.

Louise Whitfield: I echo those points. Liberty’s concern is that this is the death of judicial review by a thousand cuts. It would chip away at the fundamental right of citizens to challenge Government and other public-body decision making. If we start down the road of ouster clauses, the question is when will it stop and what else will be subject to ouster clauses until we are left with virtually no judicial review at all?

Andy Slaughter

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Q Thank you. I have one more question—I do not want to monopolise the time. You have already said something about prospective-only quashing orders. If you want to saying anything more about how that might prevent somebody from obtaining an effective remedy, please do. I would specifically like your comments on suspended quashing orders and whether you see any merit or demerit in introducing them as proposed in the Bill.

Ellie Cumbo: I am happy to say on behalf of the Law Society that we support the creation of suspended quashing orders. That enhances remedial flexibility and how can that be anything but a good thing? As I have already indicated, our concern is with the presumption that those then become the default remedy, when they do not already exist and there is no evidence base as to the extent to which they are an effective remedy.

Andy Slaughter

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Q What do the other witnesses think about that?

Sara Lomri: PLP would add that the judges already have those powers. There are cases where suspended orders have been made, but the judges have used them very sparingly. I heard earlier today your witnesses talking about increasing discretion and flexibility for judges. Absolutely, clause 1 does not do that. As the Lord Chancellor said in The Daily Telegraph on 17 October, it is about trying to mandate judges and that is really problematic for the reasons that we have already set out.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Just to be clear for Liberty and PLP, are you welcoming the provisions in the Bill on suspended quashing orders, or do you think they are not necessary or could they be dealt with by the judiciary itself evolving those powers?

Sara Lomri: We think that they are dealt with by the judiciary itself. It does have that power, and it is not needed in the Bill.

Louise Whitfield: Liberty’s position is the same: the judiciary has the power. We do not see that there is a difficulty in legislating to clarify that it does have the power, but it is the presumption that becomes problematic.

One of the points that is missing from this debate and discussion is that this will actually add a very considerable layer of further complexity and cost and take up more court time, in a way that will make judicial review less accessible and less clear. There are already hearings just about remedies. If you add on top of that a whole layer of arguments about six different factors as to whether you should get an immediate quashing order or a suspended quashing order, I think, based on my experience, you are going to have a lot of very lengthy legal submissions in writing and further hearings; you will have to list the hearing before the same judges who heard the original trial. It is going to increase costs, and it is going to make the litigation more risky for claimants. It is going to be off-putting because of the difficulty in advising people about their chances of getting the order to which we say that they should be entitled if it has been held that something is unlawful.

Andy Slaughter

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Thank you very much.

Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

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Q I do not know whether any of the witnesses are familiar with the recent comments of the Attorney General on these matters, which seem to contradict some of their evidence. She said that, in the last decade or so, there has been

“an increased appetite for political litigation, and, more worryingly, an appetite for putting judges in an invidious position, by asking them to decide essentially political matters on applications for judicial review.”

That also reflects the view of Lord Sumption who, the witnesses will be aware, has commented:

“Allowing judges to circumvent parliamentary legislation, or review the merits of policy decisions for which Ministers are answerable to Parliament … confers vast discretionary powers on a body of people who are not constitutionally accountable for what they do.”

He added that

“if we keep asking judges to answer inherently political questions, we are ignoring the single most important decision maker in our system: the British people.”

There is clearly a problem. We have heard that from other witnesses this morning. The problem needs to be solved. I have some sympathy with the view that the Bill does not go far enough and that we could do more. However, the idea that we should do nothing seems to me to ignore the facts.

Ellie Cumbo: If I may say so, I have not heard facts. I have heard assertion; I have heard the opinions of two people, neither of whom have been recent practitioners. On behalf of the Law Society, I do not think that we would agree that we have seen evidence that there has been an increased politicisation of the courts. In any case, it is not up to the judges to decide what cases come before them. This question is largely about the remedies available in judicial review; that is what the Bill seeks to focus on. Our view is that judicial discretion is what enables a proportionate remedy that correctly responds to the facts of the individual case to be made.

Sir John Hayes

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Q But you do accept that judicial review should not be a means for perpetuating political debate, that it should be entirely separate from any consideration of policy, where Ministers are held accountable for that policy and it has been made in a proper way.

Ellie Cumbo: Certainly, but, as I say, I have seen no evidence to suggest that that is what is happening.

Sir John Hayes

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I will give you some evidence in a second, but others may want to comment first.

Ellie Cumbo: I was actually going to make a slightly different point that actually enhances the ability of the Bill to protect judges from any assertion that they are in fact dabbling in matters of policy, which is that the provision we were just talking about earlier—to create suspended quashing orders—is not entirely clear on the face of the Bill. What it actually says it may do is allow for conditionality in suspended quashing orders: in other words, you would introduce a quashing order that would take effect only in the event that certain conditions laid down by the courts are or are not met. That is, arguably, inviting judges to pass a view on what an acceptable policy solution in those circumstances would be. We would welcome some clarification on that point of the Bill in order to ensure that it is very clear that judges are not being invited to pass policy.

Sir John Hayes

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Q Forgive me for saying so, but I am asking questions, not commenting. I agree that there is an argument both for increasing the scope of the Bill and for dealing with some of the issues of process identified in the independent review of administrative law. I agree that the Bill could be tightened and improved, but that is true of all legislation.

To give an example, I understand that a character called Jolyon Maugham—I am inclined to say, wearing my inverted snobbery on my sleeve, that there were not many Jolyons on the council estate that I grew up in—is going to take to judicial review the appointment of the new chair of the Charity Commission, at least according to reports. That is despite the fact that in parliamentary answers it has been made clear that that appointment has been an open and fair competition in line with the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments, as regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Even where the process has been entirely fair and reasonable, the judicial review is being used as a way of asserting—one might go as far as to say campaigning—for political ends.

Ellie Cumbo: I do not want to continue to speak if my colleagues would like to join in. I will just say that I am not familiar with the merits of that case and cannot comment on it. I would return to the point that the Bill is primarily looking at the remedies that should be available in the event that a decision in that case was found to be unlawful. Our view, as stated already, is that remedies should be effective whatever the impugned decision is.

The Chair

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Sara or Louise, do you want to join in?

Sara Lomri: Yes, I would love to. The assertion around the increased number of political cases and litigation remains just that; Lord Faulks and the IRAL looked at this and there was no such finding. At PLP, we advocate for and promote evidence-based approaches to policy. We know that there are around 4,000 applications for judicial review every year and around 1,000 get to trial. We know that in the majority of cases defendants win, not claimants.

In terms of the cases that you, Mr Hayes, and the Attorney General are talking about, there are probably a handful over a couple of years. It is understandable why those cases may take up a lot of oxygen, and of course we cannot talk for Jolyon Maugham and what that case is about.

I am a solicitor and I represent individual, marginalised, disadvantaged people who have no option but to use judicial review to hold the state to account. By passing this Bill you are going to make it harder for those people: the vast majority of users of judicial review on a day to day basis. You are going to make it hugely more difficult for them to get access to justice.

The Chair

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Louise, do you want to add anything?

Louise Whitfield: I have nothing to add to what my colleagues have already said.

Angela Crawley

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Q Thank you for that, Sara. We have heard much this morning about how most of the judicial review cases are subject to immigration decisions, and that those are particularly privileged in terms of judicial oversight compared with other matters of jurisdiction. Do you think that that is a fair assessment? Can you indicate for the benefit of everyone here the other instances where judicial review is used as a remedy of last resort? I will start with the Public Law Project.

Sara Lomri: I do not have the stats in front of me to compare the number of JRs in the immigration jurisdiction and at the upper tribunal as opposed to the High Court, but I can quickly try and find those.

The judicial reviews that we are involved with are around how decisions of the state impact poor and marginalised individuals. There are issues around welfare benefits, special educational needs, discrimination against all kinds of individuals, and particularly disability discrimination and difficulties around getting access to public services. That is the mainstay of our work. I am not sure that anybody who uses the immigration justice system feels that they are getting any kind of special treatment.

We say that Cart JR—if that is what was behind the question—remains a really important procedural safeguard for the most vulnerable, marginalised and disadvantaged individuals, to make sure that unlawful and erroneous decisions do not go unchecked.

Angela Crawley

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Q Thank you for that, Sara. I am conscious that Louise and Ellie might want to come in on that, but I will just ask a supplementary question specifically on the responsibility of Governments. Successive Governments have all had differences of opinion on policy, but it is not the responsibility of any Executive to ensure that their Government is held to account for their decisions. The Bill may limit future Governments and bind them by the same principle. Do you feel that is a fair point?

Sara Lomri: I would just say yes, I absolutely agree with that.

Louise Whitfield: I have not practised immigration law either—like Sara, I cannot comment on the figures—but a lot of the judicial reviews that I have been involved in over the last 20 to 25 years have been the kind of low-level day-to-day decisions that affect people. A lot of the debate has focused on the high-profile cases.

People hear about judicial reviews that go to trial over completely random issues, such as where Richard III should be buried and that kind of thing. In actual fact, judicial review is really important, if not essential, for day-to-day stuff such as whether you are entitled to a blue badge and whether rail replacement buses should be wheelchair accessible, and for loads of issues such as whether you should be supported to live independently in your home when you are old and disabled and struggling on your own, or whether you should have access to particular drugs or healthcare.

The reason why those cases do not get much publicity, but are really important, is that they settle pre-issue. They settle pre-issue because we have the opportunity, within an effective pre-action protocol, to say to a public body, “We think this decision is wrong; please put it right.”

If you go down the road of these reforms and make remedies harder to get, and there is more opportunity for public bodies to put off the day of giving in—or to know that even if what they have done is found to be unlawful, they will not have to address the wrongs that people have suffered previously—that will just make it harder for individuals to use judicial review effectively. That can only be a bad thing.

Ellie Cumbo: I understood the question to be about Cart and this idea that immigration cases are privileged—I think that is what you said. It is important, in the interests of strict accuracy, to say that Cart judicial reviews are available outside of immigration. Mr Cart himself was challenging a decision of the child support and social security tribunal. He was seeking to vary his child support. While I am on this, it is also worth saying that he ultimately lost; he was unsuccessful in securing a judicial review of his own. He merely won the principle that judicial review should be available in certain circumstances.

Angela Crawley

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Thank you.

Tom Hunt

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Q This is to Sara. In principle, do you agree that the Government have a duty to ensure that precious and limited judicial resources are directed as effectively and efficiently as possible?

Sara Lomri: Yes, of course.

Tom Hunt

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Q But with such scarce resources and pressure, and such a low success rate in the cases that do get JR, how could that be seen as an efficient and effective use of precious resources?

Sara Lomri: In relation to Cart JRs, we are talking about a constitutional principle. Public Law Project and others are saying that that price tag of £350,000 to £400,000 is worth it and a good use of resources.

When we talk about Cart JRs, we talk about the case of G, who had been seriously mistreated in Nigeria and trafficked to the UK. The Government agreed at the first-tier tribunal that she was a victim of trafficking, but the tribunal came to a bunch of erroneous decisions, including that the evidence that supported her being a victim of trafficking was not substantiated, and came to the wrong decision. She brought a Cart JR, which was successful. As a result, she and her child were not returned to Nigeria, where they invariably would have been killed. That is the price tag.

We say that that is such an important procedural constitutional principle that the tribunal’s decisions should be reviewed from time to time by the High Court—by a judge who is more senior, has more time to consider the evidence, and who is sometimes better placed to make those decisions. Yes, we think that is an efficient, much better use of scarce resources.

Tom Hunt

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Q But you accept that the vast bulk—well over 90%—of that £350,000 of scarce resources is spent on cases that are going to be unsuccessful.

Sara Lomri: It is the same amount that DCMS spent on its art collection in 2019-20. When we are talking about constitutional principles, I do not think we can say that is too much money.

Tom Hunt

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Thank you.

Ellie Cumbo: Could I come in briefly on that point? We entirely agree that judicial resource is precious. As one of your earlier witnesses said, more of it would make an enormous difference to the issues we are dealing with, such as the backlog in courts at the moment. However, there are other interests that it must be balanced against, including that once again, in these cases, we would be talking about an unlawful decision by the upper tribunal. I think it is a reasonable expectation that unlawful decisions should be able to be challenged.

I would make a second point about resource. If we take the Public Law Project’s figure of around 5.7%—so around the 6%—that is not incomparable to the number of rape reports that lead to a conviction: nobody would argue that that is a waste of resource.

Tom Hunt

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Q My understanding is that the 5.7% figure is heavily contested. In fact, I have seen figures of under 1%.

Ellie Cumbo: I believe Sara can speak to the extent to which that is a contested figure. It seems clear on paper, at least to me.

The Chair

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Is that the end of the answers?

Ellie Cumbo: Yes, from me.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I would just like to clarify some points that came up this morning about this issue. It has been said several times that with Cart reviews, there is an extra bite of the cherry—an additional step to challenge, which is not there in other types of case. Is that right in your view, and is it justified? It is also said that, because the upper tribunal has equivalent status to the High Court, it is inappropriate perhaps for the High Court to review those decisions. What is your view of those points?

Sara Lomri: Just in response to Tom Hunt’s point, originally, yes, IRAL made a claim that Cart cases had a very low success rate. In order to answer that question, we have to get into the weeds of how cases are brought and how they are reported. IRAL said that there were 12 cases that had been successful, which points to a success rate of 0.22%.

In fact, there is significant difficulty because Cart cases are not reported. Also, because of the way they are brought—through a different stream, and they do not go to hearing—it is hard to get to the data. Through the work that we did with practitioners and people we know who have been involved in Cart JRs, we came up with a figure of more like 5.7%.

The Government’s revised figure—following our successful challenge to that, which went via the Office for National Statistics, and they agreed with us—is something in the range of 3%. Other researchers have had a look at it, and they have said between 5% and 10%. Our own data indicates 5.7%, which is why we give that figure—and we think it is hugely more reliable than the Government’s 3%.

The Chair

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I am conscious of the time, and we have three more questions to come. Paula Barker.

Paula Barker (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)

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Q Thank you, Chair. I want to concentrate on clauses 18 to 31, which deal with the online procedure rules committee, and I will put this question to Sara first, if I may. I would be interested to understand which types of proceedings you believe should be subject to online procedure rules.

Sara Lomri: Ellie, I am not trying to drop you in it, but could you answer that first? I feel like you have more to say about online than we have.

Ellie Cumbo: The Law Society would probably not get into the detail of deciding which cases it would be appropriate for. What we do have is quite a comprehensive set of views on the types of proceedings in which online proceedings are appropriate—rather than the types of cases, if you see what I mean. It is going to depend not just on what the case involves, but on the nature of the parties. If it is helpful, I would be very happy to provide that to you after today. I am probably not in a position to itemise it right now.

The only thing I would say that I think would serve as a general Law Society position on this part of the Bill is that we have a particular concern about unrepresented litigants or, in criminal proceedings, defendants taking part in online proceedings. There is a real danger of the formality not being clear to them in the absence of expert advice, and these can be life-changing decisions, so we would have real concerns about the fact that, as drafted, the Bill does not seem to make any distinction between represented and unrepresented parties.

Paula Barker

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Q Thank you. That is really helpful. Louise, did you wish to add anything?

Louise Whitfield: No. Liberty is not doing any work on part 2 of the Bill, so I will leave it to colleagues to answer this.

Paula Barker

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Q Thank you. I believe this next question is actually for Sara. What impact will the measures in clauses 18 to 31 have on practical access to justice?

Sara Lomri: Public Law Project, like others, remain very concerned about digital exclusion and the blurring between digital assistance and independent legal advice, which we say remains extremely important. Further than that, I know that you will hear from other witnesses later on, including Justice, and we would support what they say on online courts. Later on today, you also have Dr Joe Tomlinson, our ex-research director, who will also be able to flag some headlines in terms of PLP’s response to the online issue.

Paula Barker

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Q I will be putting the same questions to Justice in the next session. Do you think there are any potential safeguards that the Government could introduce to ensure that access to justice is not adversely impacted?

Sara Lomri: In terms of the headline answer to that question, we would say preserving and promoting legal aid, and ensuring that independent legal advice remains a viable option for those using online justice systems.

Paula Barker

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Q What about the powers provided to the Lord Chancellor by the OPR provisions in the Bill, specifically looking at clauses 19 to 26? Do you believe that they cause a democratic deficit?

Sara Lomri: I am sorry, but I am not able to answer that question.

The Chair

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Paula, I am conscious of the time.

Paula Barker

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That is fine. Thank you, Chair.

The Chair

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I think the Minister wants to come in briefly now. I will then move to Liz Twist, and then to Caroline.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)

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Q Going back to Cart JR, and this point on privilege; I would not personally use the word privilege, but we can surely accept that there are many areas of law in this country that do not have what we are calling three bites at the cherry. Therefore, seeing as the panel have given very passionate arguments, particularly the Public Law Project, as to why we should retain Cart JR, is it your view that in those areas of law that do not have three bites of the cherry in the same way, that they should also get that? Or do you think this should be an exception in these cases, which are primarily—95% of them—immigration cases?

The Chair

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Could Members please indicate who they want to direct the question to.

James Cartlidge

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I said the Public Law Project.

Sara Lomri: We do not accept that it is about bites of the cherry. It is about fair systems. For example, in the case of G, the Government accepted that she was a victim of trafficking and the first-tier tribunal came to an erroneous decision. The High Court then corrected that erroneous decision. If the Cart JR had not been available to G, a victim of trafficking from Nigeria who was on the verge of being returned with her child back to her traffickers, that erroneous, unlawful decision would have held. It is not about bites of the cherry; it is about correcting unlawful decisions, and erroneous errors of law.

James Cartlidge

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Q The Public Law Project is not just about immigration, as I understand it. Correct me if I am wrong, but that was the impression I got when I met your representatives at the legal aid meeting. Whether you like the phrase three bites of the cherry or not—I think it sums it up very well—my question is whether that right should apply in other areas of the law in this country that do not have it.

Sara Lomri: Why it does not summarise it very well is because it is trying to paint a picture of our client group, who are the most marginalised and disadvantaged people in society, as having some kind of privilege that most people do not have. This is just not the case. This is about correcting unlawful decisions; most people do not have to go through this. Most people—thankfully, because we live in a good and democratic society—do not have to hold Governments to account,. However, when they do, we hope that those systems are fair and work properly.

Liz Twist (Blaydon) (Lab)

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Q I have a question for Ms Cumbo and the Law Society, about the abolition of local justice areas. I wonder what impact you think the abolition will have on the criminal justice system in England and Wales?

Ellie Cumbo: We do have a concern about that provision, in clause 42, I believe. We believe that the abolition of local justice areas obviously risks forcing parties to a case to travel much greater distances, at great cost to themselves and to the courts in the event of delays and cases having to be taken off as a result. There is also a point of principle around justice being seen to be done at that local level where it feels like it relates to the community from which all parties are drawn. What we would ask is for a consultation with local stakeholders before those provisions go ahead.

Liz Twist

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Q Talking of local stakeholders, do you think that the proposals might have an adverse impact on the independence of the magistracy?

Ellie Cumbo: I do not think we have considered that question in detail. Possibly the Magistrates Association would be best placed to comment, and we would usually defer to them. If you would like us to provide an answer at a later date, I am very happy to do that.

Dr Johnson

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Q I want to clarify with Sara; you have talked about the importance of Government accountability, and the importance of judicial review to children with special educational needs and people who may be discriminated against because of a disability. I do not think there is anyone in the Committee who would disagree with you on the importance of those things. However, in practice, the decisions that are governed by the Cart reviews are not decisions of Government; they are decisions of an upper-tribunal court.

Sara Lomri: Absolutely. When I was talking about—

Dr Johnson

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The legislation that I am talking about would not actually affect whether or not a child with special educational needs, or a disabled person, was able to bring a judicial review of the Government’s decisions on their behalf. It does not really apply to this Bill—or have I misunderstood?

Sara Lomri: I think you have. I was painting a picture of the kinds of clients that I represent when using judicial review. Clause 1—

Dr Johnson

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But does it affect the abolition of the Cart reviews?

Sara Lomri: Clause 1 is about the presumption of prospective-only orders, which absolutely would impact on that client group.

The Chair

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Order. I am afraid that we have come to the end of the time allotted for this panel. I thank the three witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of Witnesses

Louise Finer, Stephanie Needleman and Steve Valdez-Symonds gave evidence.

15:31

The Chair

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Welcome to the new witnesses. It is good to see all three of you physically present. We will have none of the technical difficulties that we had earlier, although it is important that people attend, whether virtually or in person. Could you please introduce yourselves before we begin the questions?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: My name is Steve Valdez-Symonds, I am the refugee and migrant rights programme director at Amnesty International UK. For the purposes of these proceedings, it is probably relevant that I have experience of practice in the immigration field, including many years of representation before the immigration tribunals of various iterations, and training and supporting practitioners in understanding the law and procedures, and many years’ experience of parliamentary advocacy, including representing those practitioners in that.

Stephanie Needleman: I am Stephanie Needleman, I am the acting legal director at Justice. Justice is an all-party law reform and human rights organisation that works to strengthen the justice system in the UK. Our vision is for fair, accessible and efficient legal processes that protect individuals’ rights and uphold the rule of law.

Louise Finer: My name is Louise Finer, I am head of policy at Inquest.

The Chair

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Your sound is very low indeed. Could you move a bit closer to the microphone?

Louise Finer: I was trying to socially distance, but it is more important that you can hear me. We are an organisation that supports families through the inquest system. I bring that experience to this Committee.

The Chair

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Thank you.

Alex Cunningham

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Q I have a question for Stephanie. Does the Bill contain sufficient safeguards to ensure that online pleas are entered only if the defendant has legal advice. If not, what safeguards do you think might be put in place?

Stephanie Needleman: There are two provisions in the Bill that we are concerned about in terms of safeguards. There is the new allocation procedure for online pleas, for adults in clause 6 and for children in clause 8. While the Government have said that this will be accessible only through the common platform, which as I understand can currently only be used by legal professionals, there is nothing in the Bill that would guarantee that a defendant would only be able to enter an indicator plea or trial venue with access to legal advice. We would like to see something in the Bill that guarantees that.

We oppose the use of the procedure by children. We do not think that even with a safeguard of access to legal advice that it is an appropriate procedure for use by children. The criminal justice system considers children to be inherently vulnerable, and there is a whole process in place in the youth criminal justice system that recognises their rights and works to guarantee them, and this system would allow that whole system to be bypassed.

Alex Cunningham

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Q Do those concerns you have about children extend to clause 4, where we talk about the defendant who

“has attained the age of 16”

rather than the usual age of 18? Could that be covered?

Stephanie Needleman: Clause 4 is not something that we have looked at in particular detail. As I understand it, the automatic online conviction process in the Bill is only available to 18-year-olds. The single justice procedure that it builds on is also only available to 18-year-olds, and the section 12 procedure in clause 4 is available to 16-year-olds, and that does appear to be an inconsistency that is unjustifiable.

Alex Cunningham

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Q Apart from the inconsistency, what is your concern?

Stephanie Needleman: The same concerns as we have with using the new online allocation procedure for children. There is a whole system set up to protect vulnerable children within the criminal justice system, and those safeguards are being bypassed.

Alex Cunningham

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Q That is helpful; thank you. Do you have any concerns about clause 9, which gives the court powers to proceed if the accused is absent from an allocation hearing?

Stephanie Needleman: That is not a clause we have looked at in particular detail, unfortunately.

Alex Cunningham

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Q Can I ask you about something else, then? Do you anticipate that the automatic online conviction as the standard statutory penalty will have an impact on disproportionality in the criminal justice system?

Stephanie Needleman: Yes, we are very concerned about the disproportionate impact of the AOCSSP—a catchy acronym. That builds on the single justice procedure, and there are clear issues with that that have not been addressed by the Government. There has been some research by Appeal, which shows that the vast majority of those being prosecuted under the single justice procedure are women for non-payment of television licences.

We are concerned about the impact on ethnic minorities. Racial disparities permeate the criminal justice system, and we are concerned that a disproportionate number of ethnic minority individuals will also be unduly criminalised through the automatic online conviction process, as well as those with mental health conditions or neurodivergent conditions who may have particular difficulties understanding the process or the implications of going through the process, pleading guilty and receiving a conviction.

As it stands, there is nothing within the process that would screen for any vulnerabilities, and there has also been no assessment by the Government, as far as we can see, of the equalities impact of the Bill. Back in 2017, these measures were originally floated in the Prisons and Courts Bill, and there was an equalities statement which recognised the potential adverse impact on people with protected characteristics. There has not been an update to that equalities statement as far as I have seen. As it stands and given the issues with the single justice procedure that it builds on, we think that the procedure should not be in the Bill. However, it definitely should not proceed without a review of the current evidence available in terms of what impacts it might have on those groups with protected characteristics and vulnerabilities.

Alex Cunningham

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Q That is helpful as well. Some people in the sector have expressed concern that there are insufficient safeguards built into the Bill for all manner of things, but an awful lot around how people understand what their options are. For example, if you look at the expansion of the written procedure for allocation proceedings in clause 6(4), do you think it provides sufficient information for the accused to understand what is happening and how to effectively engage in that process?

Stephanie Needleman: Absolutely. That is also a concern of ours in terms of people understanding what the process involves and, importantly, what the outcome of that process is going to be. Obviously, with the automatic online conviction, that outcome is a criminal conviction. We are worried that the process encourages people to go through it and plead guilty without properly understanding what impacts that can have later in life. I know it is currently only for summary and non-imprisonable offences, but those can still have serious implications—a criminal record, increased insurance costs, loss of employment and educational opportunities. This is not just for trivial offences that will not have an impact on people’s lives. Similarly, with the online plea, understanding the implications of where a case is heard—and the seriousness of going to the Crown Court and having the greater sentencing powers available there—is incredibly important. There should be provisions built in to ensure that defendants understand those. Having legal representation in the context of the allocation procedure goes some way to dealing with that.

Alex Cunningham

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You have anticipated the rest of my questions. I do not know if either of your colleagues wish to comment. No.

Sir John Hayes

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Q I want to turn to the issue of proportionality. Witnesses may be aware of the recent judgment that says that

“challenges to legislation on the grounds of discrimination are becoming increasingly common in the UK, usually brought by campaigning organisations which lobbied unsuccessfully against the measure when it was being considered in Parliament, and then act as solicitors for persons affected by the legislation, or otherwise support legal challenges brought in their names, as a means of continuing their campaign.”

They are assisted in that, are they not, by the principle of proportionality, which confers on courts a broad discretionary power that risks undue interference of the courts in the sphere of political choices. That is very bad, is it not, both for a democratic society and for the role and reputation of courts, because the separation of powers—well, I do not need to lecture witnesses on the separation of powers. They know what it means. We have a problem that needs to be solved by legislative means. The Bill is a welcome start in that respect, is it not?

The Chair

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Who is the question directed at?

Sir John Hayes

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I am happy for any or all to take it.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I am happy to respond to that on behalf of Amnesty. With respect, I think that is to misunderstand the role of the courts. The courts manage—indeed, you make a reference to the Supreme Court giving clear direction about its view to all the other courts below it as to how to manage the matters that are brought before it, including matters that raise the issue of proportionality. Proportionality, where it applies, is a question of law on which courts need to rule. That is why we have a judicial system, not for Parliament to try to predetermine how courts should exercise that role and perform their judicial function, in ensuring that administrative bodies act proportionately, according to the law and according to its interpretation as clearly set down now by the Supreme Court.

Sir John Hayes

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Q To be clear, I was reading out a recent judgment from a court.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: The Supreme Court.

Sir John Hayes

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I was reading out a court judgment, so there are a number of distinguished judges who share the view I articulated, as you know, that proportionality has become a problem and the Supreme Court has interfered in matters of high politics. That is the argument that has been made by the Attorney General, Lord Sumption and others. That is not my view; it is the view of those who want to see the courts doing what they traditionally did. It is a long-established and time-honoured principle that courts do not become involved in matters of high politics and the argument I am making—or reflecting—is that that is now a problem. We saw it in the Miller case and there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would not act as it did in the Miller case again. We need to do more to clarify and make certain the respective roles of those who are chosen by the people and who are accountable to them, and those who are not.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: If I may, I will make two responses to that. First, with respect, you started reading from the Supreme Court’s judgment on the question that you were concerned about, I understood from you, in support of what the Supreme Court had ruled and the direction it has given therefore to all the courts below it as to how judicial proceedings on the matter in question should be performed in future. It seems to me that the matter is addressed by the Supreme Court in black and white in front of you.

As for the wider question, the issue is clear that the Government set out—commissioned—a review of judicial review. It had eminent evidence from many public bodies, including many Government Departments, about whether there were concerns. Its overriding finding on judicial review generally was that there was no problem. Again, for reasons that have also been given earlier, I do not see that there is any need for this interference, frankly, with the way in which courts perform their constitutional function.

Sir John Hayes

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Q Since we are having this helpful exchange, the change has been the Supreme Court entertaining the idea of proportionality as a general ground for judicial review. That has altered over time. You could argue, as you seem to do, that that is perfectly acceptable and agreeable, but my case is that it is not what judicial review has been about or is supposed to be about.

A good argument for a process of judicial review is that the grounds on which it is exercised have altered. As you know, the Attorney General has made clear her concerns about this, as have a number of senior lawyers, former Supreme Court judges and others. The argument I am making is by no means an unusual or untested one. You will have heard it many times before. I am simply saying are not the Government right at least to address those concerns?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: With respect, all I can do is refer to the previous answers and say that I think the Government are not right. Of course, there were many voices, including judicial voices, that have considered that the situation is satisfactory as it is, including the review that the Government commissioned.

Sir John Hayes

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Q And that is the end of the matter from your point of view? You think it is perfectly reasonable to continue down this road, even though it is very different from the time-honoured principles that I have briefly articulated.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not accept what you have articulated, but you started by reading from a very recent Supreme Court judgment, which I understood you to agree with. I do not really see what you see as the problem. The Supreme Court has ruled on the matter. It is the highest authority for all the courts that will have to deal with the matter in the future and there is no ruling.

Sir John Hayes

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Q Because the Supreme Court is taking a more permissive view around proportionality of the grounds for judicial review.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: But it did not in the very matter that you have just read from in its very recent judgment.

Sir John Hayes

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Q As a generality, the Supreme Court is doing that.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not accept that.

Sir John Hayes

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Q We will have to agree to differ on that subject. You presumably would agree that there is an argument that the scope of the Bill might be widened. We heard earlier evidence that suggests that there is a case for a more widely drawn review of judicial review, for all kinds of reasons that I will not tire you with, because you can check the evidence we received earlier. If we are going to have a change in judicial review, presumably this is an opportunity to do so comprehensively.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not think I can add any more. I am sure the Government’s review spent considerable time with considerable amounts of evidence—more time than this Committee will have to consider these things, unfortunately—came to a clear conclusion that there was no need essentially to revise the way in which judicial review works. It was working perfectly well—we agree with that.

The Chair

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Sir John, my interpretation of what you are saying is that you want to widen the scope of the Bill. The scope of the Bill is already set, so with the indulgence of the Committee, I move to the next questioner, Andy Slaughter.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I have a couple of questions for Louise Finer, first on the clauses on coroners. What is your view of those, particularly clauses 37 to 39, on discontinuance of investigation, on non-contentious inquests in writing, and on increased use of remote procedures for coroners’ courts? Do you see any advantages or disadvantages in those?

Louise Finer: Thank you for the question. On clauses 37 and 38, we feel that, although they might be appropriate in some circumstances, they introduce some very real risks into the coroner service. Reflecting on the recent report by the Select Committee on Justice, and the extent to which it identified the continuing problem of inconsistencies and, essentially, a postcode lottery, depending on the coroner who hears the case, we are really concerned that there need to be some strong safeguards on clauses 37 and 38, to ensure that, in the kinds of cases that Inquest supports, day in day out, no new risks are introduced through the Bill.

What concerns us about these two clauses is very significant decisions being taken that could lead to the proper interrogation of evidence being curtailed at an early stage, when families would often not have legal representation to be able to argue the case to continue an inquest, or for an inquest to be heard. The kinds of cases that we have seen, were these clauses to be in place, include some where initially evidence suggested a death by natural cause, but where, as the inquest progresses, further evidence comes to light that suggests that the situation was anything but.

To refer briefly to one case, Laura Booth died in hospital after a routine eye procedure. She became unwell and developed malnutrition, due to inadequate management of her needs. In that case, the coroner was not initially going to hold an inquest, because it was considered a natural-cause death, but the family pushed for an inquest. The inquest reached such critical findings that it would have been quite shocking for that not to have occurred, had the inquest been discontinued. It was found that her death was contributed to by neglect, and that there had been a gross failure of care. We are suggesting that safeguards need to be built in, to ensure that cases such as that, which really need to be heard, in the context of a coronial system, where there is already a significant amount of discretion, should not be discontinued, and are in fact heard as appropriate.

On clause 39, on remote hearings and juries, we are really worried and broadly agree with the evidence of André Rebello. His conclusions were quite damning, to be frank, of the risks of remote hearings. Again, there may be some circumstances in which a remote hearing is appropriate. We see them as potentially very advantageous for pre-inquest hearings. A remote process can be very efficient. We do know some families who are happy to go ahead with a remote hearing but, of the families we support, that is a very small minority. Overwhelmingly, the families we have supported recently have very negative views and impressions of remote hearings.

We take issue with the Government’s justification for that aspect of the Bill, which we think is weak and unevidenced. It claims that remote attendance will reduce distress. We are not sure what evidential basis there is for making that claim. It certainly does not match up with our experience of the many families we are supporting at the moment. Although there may be some benefits to opening up the ability to join remotely, we do not see those as being introduced as an add-on and an advantage, but more as a taking away.

The argument about bringing coroners’ courts into line with other courts in terms of remote attendance glosses over the fact that the inquest process is quite a different process from that in other courts. We think there needs to be much more exploration, consultation and development and evidence to justify the proposal.

An inquest process can be a very traumatising experience for a family already traumatised. Imagine yourself having to sit through the inquest process and hear evidence about how a member of your family died. They may have been a long way from you in a prison or in a secure setting when they died. You may have no knowledge of how they died. The inquest process may be your first opportunity to find that out. Imagine doing that in your front room, without the support services that you would have in person at a hearing. We think that there are very, very real risks that families could be retraumatised and put through more distress rather than, as the Government claim, their distress being reduced.

We are concerned about remote juries. We have had recent experience of juries sitting in adjacent rooms to the coroner, and the coroner is then unable to see the jury as they would were they in the same room. We have seen some very concerning things, including jury members falling asleep, eating packets of crisps and so on and so forth. All such things would be much harder to safeguard against the more remote the setting. We think the Government need to provide more evidence to support their claims about remote hearings, to evidence much more clearly how they would work in the context of the inquest and how they would ensure that families were not put through more distress or their ability to participate effectively undermined.

Andy Slaughter

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Q One other question. It appears that you heard Mr Rebello’s evidence, and you will know that I asked about some of the other recommendations of the Justice Committee, in particular about non-means-tested legal aid for bereaved families in cases where there are state actors represented. To paraphrase his reply, given the inquisitorial nature of coronial proceedings and given that the state parties would often act in the interests of the court, and perhaps even to assist the bereaved persons, as well as their own clients, I do not think he necessarily thought it was inappropriate, but that he certainly did not seem to warm to it. What is your view of that?

Louise Finer: Our view is that this Bill presents a crucial opportunity to address the inequality of arms that is at the heart of the inquest process. There have been many calls from authoritative reviews and inquiries to address this and it is a disappointment to us that there is nothing in the Bill to address that inequality of arms. The Justice Committee report—so recent—was absolutely clear on this point. It makes no sense that on the one hand Members are concluding that and on the other a Bill is introduced that does nothing to address that. There are many other issues in the Justice Committee report that remain unaddressed in the Bill.

The inequality of arms is acute. One example came last week in the Westminster Hall debate on the Justice Committee report. Tim Loughton MP referred to the Shoreham air disaster. He said that he supported the case for public funding for inquests because of his experience of the Shoreham inquest. Very early on it was unclear whether the families would get funding for legal representation, but it was immediately clear that all of the 18 public bodies represented at the inquest would have automatic access to funding to represent themselves. Yet there was a big question mark over whether the families of the victims would receive funding for inquests. We acknowledge that the Government are bringing forward some measures to address the means test for exceptional case funding, and we welcome those, but we do not think that they go far enough. We very much hope that the Bill will seize the opportunity to do something about that.

Chair

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Andy, can I say that we have several more questioners, so I ask for shorter questions and, with respect to the panel, shorter answers.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I will ask one more very quick question. Is there anything else in the Justice Committee report that you would like to see incorporated in the Bill? Perhaps list it rather than explain it.

Louise Finer: I will be as brief as I can. There are many issues in the Justice Committee report and many recommendations for an appeals process, a coroner service inspectorate, and a national coroner service, which would help to eliminate the inconsistency in the system. We support all those recommendations and would welcome any of them being incorporated in the Bill. Most importantly, the Justice Committee called for families to be put at the heart of the inquest process. What we are concerned about is that clauses in the Bill could actually go the opposite way. Instead of putting families at the heart, it could make it even harder for families to participate effectively.

Andy Slaughter

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Chair, I was going to ask about judicial review, but I understand I will have time at the end.

The Chair

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If we have time at the end. We have got three more questions that one or more of the panel may wish to answer. I call Tom Hunt.

Tom Hunt

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q This is for Steve. I have a certain understanding of the word “tyranny” and what it means. I can think of many regimes in the world that are tyrannies, sadly. There are too many where great harm is done to people’s lives. In this country we have by and large a sound legal system that works effectively. I understand there is a debate here about whether a lower and upper tribunal is enough and whether it is appropriate for Cart JR to have a third bite of the cherry. The debate is ongoing. Do you regret that on 26 October you used the word “tyranny” and said the Government were promoting it in this Bill? Is it unhelpful or does it help the debate?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not regret the use of the word. I was drawing attention to the fact that there was considerable interference in the functioning of a judicial function in the tribunal system and the way in which the Government were legislating not just in this Bill—this is an important factor, which is not before this Committee—but in the Nationality and Borders Bill at the same time. If it is passed in its current form, it will impose direction on judicial figures in the tribunal system as to how they may perform their judicial function, and how they must or must not weigh and assess evidence and appellants in front of them, pre-empting what will be in front of them by statute.

It is a grave concern that at the same time as withdrawing in this Bill the oversight of our constitutional courts to ensure that the tribunal system works properly according to law, the Government are seeking to legislate to incapacitate those tribunal systems to manage independently and fully their own judicial functions. That is the effect of provisions in the Nationality and Borders Bill. You can look at them in clauses 16, 20 and 23. Provisions like that, although not going anywhere near as far—dating back to 2004, the time of the ouster that this Committee has discussed that was put forward by the Labour Government—have caused much confusion already.

The Chair

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Steve, I really should have pushed Tom on this because it falls outside the scope of the Bill.

Tom Hunt

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The comment made was in relation to this Bill, so I do not know where the Nationality and Borders Bill has come from.

The Chair

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I think the witness tried to justify it in an explanation relating to a different piece of legislation.

Tom Hunt

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It was a comment made by the panellist in relation to the Bill we are discussing today.

The Chair

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Okay, we will continue.

Tom Hunt

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Of course, the definition of tyranny is cruel and oppressive government—

The Chair

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Sorry, Steve, you were answering.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: The point I have made is that you cannot properly look at these two Bills in isolation, because clause 2 of this Bill affects whether there is any constitutional court scrutiny of whether the tribunal system performs the functions that Parliament has set it up to perform. At the same time, you have legislation to impede that tribunal’s functions about whether it can perform those duties. You have legislation from the very Department whose decisions it will be responsible for regulating—the Home Office. I think it perfectly appropriate to raise the concern that if that sort of interference were going on in the courts of other countries, we would, as I said, describe it as tyranny. [Interruption.]

The Chair

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Sorry; we are not taking questions unless they have been indicated. Tom has indicated that he has finished his questions. I call Paula Barker.

Paula Barker

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Q My question is for Ms Needleman. You may have heard Ms Lomri suggest that you would be best placed to answer this question on clauses 19 to 26—[Interruption.]

The Chair

- Hansard -

Order. We are not having a separate meeting on the side.

Paula Barker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you, Chair. Ms Needleman, what are your views on the powers provided to the Lord Chancellor by the OPR provisions, and do you believe that they cause a democratic deficit?

Stephanie Needleman: The provisions relating to the online procedure rules give significant power to the Lord Chancellor. The Government have themselves recognised that the broad powers provided to the Lord Chancellor could have a significant impact on access to justice and that some of those powers should therefore be subject to a requirement to obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. However, there is a slight lacuna in the Bill, in that two powers are not subject to the same concurrence requirement.

Those are the power to require the online procedure rule committee to make rules, and a broad Henry VIII power to make consequential amendments, the latter power being subject only to a consultation requirement and the former to no requirements at all. That undermines the point of having a concurrence requirement in the first place. As Lord Judge pointed out on Report of the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill—the previous iteration of these rules—taken together, those powers overrule the very rules that the Government themselves made subject to the concurrence requirement because of the wide-ranging impact the provisions can have on access to justice.

Liz Twist

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Q Ms Needleman, do you have any concerns about the type of online convictions that might be used in future?

Stephanie Needleman: Absolutely. As I said before, we do not think this procedure, as it stands, should be introduced at all, because of the lack of evidence and the concerns around protections in relation to the identification of vulnerabilities and inequalities. However, if it is introduced, we at Justice are calling for it to be restricted to non-recordable offences only.

Currently, the Bill would allow the procedure to be used for a range of offences that would cause people to have a criminal record. That could impact parents when it comes to failing to provide for the safety of children at entertainments, for example, or it could impact pub-goers and pub owners in relation to the offences of being drunk in a public place or selling alcohol to a person who is drunk. If the procedure is to be introduced, we would call for it to be for non-recordable offences only, because the implications of being convicted of those are smaller.

Liz Twist

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You have answered my follow-up as well. Thank you.

The Chair

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Andy, we have a bit of time left. Would you like to come back to your earlier point?

Andy Slaughter

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Q Yes, Chair, just for completeness. This panel probably expected to deal primarily with part 1 of the Bill, so this question is for any of the witnesses, but I am guessing that it will be for Steve or Stephanie in particular. Do you think that any of the changes to judicial review in the Bill are justified? If not, can you say why you think that they are leading us into in error, or are unnecessary?

Stephanie Needleman: I will take clause 1. Justice supports the introduction of suspended-only quashing orders. We think that, after Ahmed, the law could do with clarification, and that putting statutory suspended quashing orders on a statutory footing makes sense. We envisage that the orders would be used in exceptional circumstances such as those that existed in Ahmed, where there had to be retrospective legislation to deal with the issues it caused.

Crucially, suspended-only quashing orders come into effect and have retrospective effect, even if it is slightly delayed. However, prospective-only quashing orders do not have retrospective effect, and we oppose those measures. You have heard a lot of arguments about why they undermine the rule of law; in particular, they do not afford a remedy to the individual claimant in front of the court, and more generally to other people in the same situation as claimants. For example, if someone paid tax under a regulation that was later found to be unlawful, they would not be able to reclaim the excess tax they had paid, because the Bill as currently drafted requires the regulation to be treated as lawful up until the point of that judgment. In relation to benefits, if ineligibility criteria were later found to be unlawful, under the Bill people would not be able to reclaim benefits that they would have been entitled to, because the unlawful ineligibility requirements would be deemed to have been lawful at the time they claimed their benefits.

We are particularly concerned about the presumption. We have heard from various people in Government that the provisions increase judicial flexibility, but the fact that there is a presumption is entirely opposed to the idea of increasing judicial discretion and flexibility. The presumption constrains judicial flexibility and remedial discretion by requiring the prospective-only quashing order to be used in certain circumstances. We are concerned that the prospective-only quashing order will have a chilling effect on judicial review. Even if a prospective-only quashing order would not in any one case be given, the fact that the presumption for it exists in the first place creates a chilling effect, as it is an additional factor for a claimant in deciding whether to bring a judicial review in the first place. It may also make it harder to obtain legal aid, because the merits criteria require there to be sufficient benefit to the litigant if successful. Those are our main concerns about clause 2. I will let Steve talk about clause 2.

The Chair

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The Minister has indicated that he would like to ask a quick question. Steve, could you answer quickly so I can try to squeeze him in?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I will do my best, and I will be led by you. I will say nothing about clause 1; we agree with the concerns raised. I ask the Committee to think back to the evidence of Professor Feldman. He is someone who supports clause 2, but he does so having expressed great disquiet about it in principle, and we agree with that. The principle of the matter is that statutory bodies, including statutory tribunals, which have limits on their powers set by Parliament, are required to be ordinarily subject to review by our constitutional courts to ensure that their powers are exercised properly and within the powers that are set, rather than, as he put it, being permitted to determine for themselves where the limits of their powers are. That is what clause 2 is removing.

There is nothing exceptional about Cart judicial review for immigration matters or the other tribunal matters that it relates to, except for the fact that it is a highly restrictive form of judicial review because of the particular practice direction by which the High Court has operated ever since the Supreme Court decisions in Cart and Eba, which curtail both the process, to make sure that it is less truncated, and the much higher test that has to be passed for the judicial review to succeed.

Professor Feldman then goes on to reach conclusions for suggesting why he none the less, despite his great disquiet, thinks it is appropriate to interfere in this way. There are several reasons why I think he is wrong about that, and why I think he misunderstands some of the things that have happened—including since Cart and Eba, and including those that are happening by legislation now—which more closely curtail the prospect of justice in this tribunal system. Perhaps in view of the direction from the Chair, I will write to the Committee immediately afterwards and spell out what those things are, so that the evidence is in front of you.

The Chair

- Hansard -

I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of this panel. I thank the panel for making the time and effort to appear before us physically, which was much appreciated. Apologies to the Minister on the final question.

Examination of Witnesses

Dr Joe Tomlinson, Aidan O’Neill QC and Michael Clancy OBE gave evidence.

16:15

The Chair

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We have a fully virtual panel of three members this time. May I ask each panel member, starting with Dr Joe Tomlinson, followed by Aidan O’Neill and Michael P Clancy, to introduce themselves?

Dr Tomlinson: Thank you. I am Joe Tomlinson, senior lecturer in public law at the University of York. I study all aspects of the public law system, and I have a particular interest in judicial review. Of particular interest to discussions today, I suspect, is that I have a particular interest in empirical studies of judicial review and immigration judicial review.

Aidan O'Neill: I am Aidan O’Neill. I am a QC at the Scottish Bar and also the English Bar. I suppose that I practise primarily in the fields of public law and constitutional law. I have been involved in a number of recent cases that involved constitutional issues, among them Miller (No. 1) and the Cherry-Miller case, which referred to the prorogation of Parliament, and the Wightman case about article 50 and whether it could be unilaterally revoked. My area of practice is within judicial review on both sides of the border.

Michael Clancy: Good afternoon, Chair and Committee members. I am Michael Clancy. I am the director of law reform at the Law Society of Scotland. I have a particular interest in constitutional law and some aspects of immigration law, and I am delighted to be here and to answer, or attempt to answer, your questions.

The Chair

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Thanks very much for attending today’s meeting. I will start with Dr Caroline Johnson.

Dr Johnson

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Q I want to ask a question about judicial reviews, and in particular the numbers of cases. In earlier evidence, we were told that there were a 1,000 cases of judicial reviews per year. I wonder how many of those would be the Cart review that we are talking about in relation to the Bill. Do you have any figures on that?

Dr Tomlinson: I do not have the exact full set of statistics to hand, but I would happily supply those to the Committee. The general picture of judicial review is that ordinary judicial review, by which I mean non-immigration cases, is around a few thousand cases issued every year. Numbers have been declining in recent years. On the immigration side, for a good period of time—a couple of decades—there have been more immigration judicial review cases. They are obviously mostly heard in the upper tribunal now. The numbers fluctuate for a variety of complicated reasons, but my understanding is that they have been coming down in recent years. Cart is a small subset of judicial reviews. I can provide the full statistics to the Committee, but that is the overall picture.

Dr Johnson

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Q The other thing that we have been advised on is the success rate of the Cart review in immigration cases. We have been given figures of between 0.22% and 5.7%. Regardless of where in that range you feel that the real figure lies, it is substantially lower than the figure for a standard judicial review. What is the discrepancy, and why do you think it is present?

Dr Tomlinson: If you do not mind, I would like to comment on the figure, which is an important starting point. The original figure provided by the independent review of administrative law was 0.22%, which is an incredibly low success rate, but that figure was arrived at through the IRAL’s expert panel simply looking at published judgments. The Cart procedure is such that it is very unlikely to produce public judgments, so the panel looked only at a very narrow sample of the overall case load. The 0.22% figure is basically flawed. It is not correct, and the Ministry of Justice has since accepted that and provided a new figure of 3.4%, as I understand it. In various ways, I think that is also a deflated figure. Importantly, success is measured in the narrowest way possible. With a wider definition of success, you can get to a higher success figure.

It is difficult to say with any precision what the figure is, but I can say it is certainly not 0.22%. It is 3.4% with a very narrow definition of success, and it is higher than that if you have a different definition of success. The best figure, although it is not a precise figure, is that about one in 20 cases are successful. Of course, one in 20 is a relatively high success rate. You are challenging judicial decisions, so you would hopefully expect them to be of better quality, and so on. In my view, the success rate is not as low as the initial figure that was put out suggests.

Dr Johnson

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Q Sorry, but the question was: what is the figure for a standard non-immigration-related judicial review, and where do you think the disparity comes from, if there is one?

Dr Tomlinson: Again, I am not trying to dodge the question. It is very difficult to define in a precise way what success in a judicial review looks like. To take one example, most strong cases settle relatively early in the procedure. Settlement is a really important part of the judicial review system, but the way they show up in the statistics is that they look like withdrawn cases. The various statistics that we have vary, but I think we can accurately say that the Cart success figures are lower than the average judicial review success figures. By how much would be very difficult to say precisely, but one in 20 is still a reasonable success rate.

Dr Johnson

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Q Professor Feldman, who is professor of English law at the University of Cambridge, gave evidence earlier in which he said the success rate for a non-immigration-related judicial review was over 50%. Why do you think that they are 10 times more likely than immigration-related judicial reviews to be successful?

Dr Tomlinson: I think the figure that Professor Feldman is relying on in making that claim is the success rate after a hearing. As I have just explained, many judicial reviews—the majority of them—do not reach a full hearing. When you get to that point, the success and failure rate is roughly 50:50. It obviously goes up and down in various directions ever year, but it is roughly 50:50. Overall, the success rate is potentially a bit lower, depending on how you define success. Again, I would say that potentially the best explanation for why success rates are lower in Cart judicial reviews is that you are talking about judicial decisions, rather than administrative decisions, being challenged by judicial review, so you can potentially expect a better quality of decision that is likely to withstand judicial review a little more robustly.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Just to be clear, what you are saying is that in a standard non-immigration judicial review a good case is more likely to settle before court. Although 50% are successful in court, the likelihood is that even more cases taken forward will be successful, because the better cases will have been filleted out beforehand.

Dr Tomlinson: Would you remind repeating that point? My connection dipped for a moment.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q What you are saying is that 50% of the cases that ultimately reach court for a non-immigration judicial review are successful, but the likelihood of cases being successful is probably higher than that because the better cases will have been settled out of court. You also made the point that the Cart judicial review is the review of a judge’s decision, and not a review of the Government’s decision. In effect, it is not the same as other judicial reviews, because it is the court asking the High Court to judge the opinion of a court of the same level, rather than a judicial review, whose purpose is to hold Government and Government decisions to account. Is that correct?

The Chair

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Sorry, there were two questions there. Before the witness had the chance to answer the one about the percentage of cases, you came up with another one. Were you clear on the first question, Joe?

Dr Tomlinson: I think so, yes. The headline point is that the statistics we have on judicial review—as a wider point, what the Government collect on judicial review could be much better—only give you a limited insight on success rates overall at different stages.

On the second question, if I have understood correctly, yes, obviously, Cart judicial reviews are of a slightly different nature, in that they challenge decisions of the tribunal. However, there are good reasons potentially, still, to provide judicial review of those decisions. Ultimately, what is at the base of those cases are the rights of individuals. While I can see there is a distinction to be drawn there, which was extensively dealt with in the initial Cart decision by the Supreme Court, the distinction in some ways is immaterial to the rights of the people who bring these cases.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q That being the case, if you are in support of maintaining the Cart review of judicial decisions in the upper tribunal, do you therefore believe that a review of all decisions at courts at that level should be available by judicial review? Do you think everyone should get the third chance? Would anyone else on the panel like to comment on that?

Aidan O'Neill: The first issue, of course, if one takes the 5% figure by way of success—I agree with Joe Tomlinson that it is a high figure—is that one always goes back to the idea: is it better to let one innocent person be convicted of a matter or to let nine guilty go free? In a situation where you have one in 20 Cart or Eba judicial reviews being successful after a hearing, that shows that there has been an error in law in relation to the specific individual case, which has potentially incredibly serious consequences when one is dealing with asylum and immigration cases. In principle, I do not think it is a question of playing with numbers and saying, “Well, only 5% are successful, so it does not matter—we can get rid of the whole position in terms of allowing errors of law to be identified and reviewed at second instance and by way of judicial reviews in other cases.”

I also agree with what Joe Tomlinson has said, which is that in the Cart and Eba situation, one is dealing with the fact that judges, both at first instance and in the upper tribunal, have looked at the matter and therefore are legally trained already, but they are not infallible. That is the whole point about judicial review; matters are not infallible. One would hope that there would therefore be a much lower percentage of areas in which they have been shown to err in law than is the case for simple administrative bodies, which are not necessarily particularly legally qualified and are certainly not judicial bodies.

I would be wary of the attempt to compare matters that are not alike by saying that there is a 50% success rate on non-immigration judicial reviews. I must say I would be very surprised at the basis of that statistic, but if it is the case, then—[Inaudible.] The point is that you are stopping those 5% of cases ever being rectified, and that is not a situation that I think Parliament should properly be allowing.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Last point, Caroline, because there are other questions. Actually, Michael just wants to come in on your previous question, before you make your final point.

Michael Clancy: I agree with what Aidan O’Neill has said. Of course, in Scotland it is a different question in some respects, because as far as I recollect from the IRAL report, there were no statistics about the situation of judicial review in Scotland. The scale of things like that in Scotland is quite different, and one might expect only 100 judicial reviews to get to the Court of Session in any one year. The proportionality arguments about the use of judicial time and the expense are of a different order and would need to be separately vouched, I would say, before the same kind of decision taken in relation to Cart would be taken in relation to Eba-type cases.

Let us remind ourselves exactly why we have judicial review, which perhaps creates a tension between what one might describe as ministerial legality or quango legality judicial reviews and other types. Lady Hale said in Cart that

“the scope of judicial review is an artefact of the common law whose object is to maintain the rule of law—that is to ensure that, within the bounds of practical possibility, decisions are taken in accordance with the law, and in particular the law which Parliament has enacted, and not otherwise.”

I think that that grounds us on the basis for having a law of judicial review, and it is something that we should not depart from without very serious consideration indeed.

The Chair

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Unless you have a really pressing question, Caroline, I would like to move on to the next speaker, because you have taken quite a bit of time.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have just one quick question.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Right, one quick question and one quick answer.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I do understand what you are saying about the importance where the decision has been taken by Ministers or Government, but I am still not clear why it is important to review the opinion of another judge. How do you ensure that the number of erroneous judgments falls? Although I can see that having the Cart review has picked up some cases where judgments were unlawful or wrong, how, on an ongoing basis, do the judiciary make sure that those numbers fall?

The Chair

- Hansard -

Who wants to take that?

Aidan O'Neill: I do not understand the question. How does the judiciary make sure that—

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Some people say that 0.2% of the judgments are incorrect, and some people say 5%.

Aidan O'Neill: Nobody is saying 0.2% reputably. I do not think one can take that on board. The IRAL report even accepts that its figure was wrong, so do not even start on that. You start with the claims made subsequently when this Bill was introduced, which were that the figure was at least 3%. That massive change was made in response to work done by academics such as Joe Tomlinson. Let us not start from 0.2%; let us use the better evidence we have heard so far, which is at least, or around, 5%. Ask me the question on that basis.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Okay, so on the presumption of—

The Chair

- Hansard -

Order. Janet Daby.

Janet Daby

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I will direct my question to Mr Clancy. In its briefing, Transform Justice says:

“Online pleas compromise open justice principles by removing the opportunity for the plea hearing to be witnessed/observed.”

What is your view on that?

Michael Clancy: I am not entirely sure that I can comment competently on what is happening in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. It is certainly the case that there have been trials in Scotland of not only online pleas, but online trials with juries distanced from the courtroom. I do not know whether Aidan O’Neill would have more practical experience. The situations in the two jurisdictions are quite different, and my latest information is that we have almost reached pre-covid levels of conduct of trials in Scotland, which may have an element of online activity.

Of course, there are distance issues with some courts in Scotland. I remember one solicitor describing the fact that being able to conduct trials or provide pleas to court from Inverness in three courts in rural areas over the online system was actually quite a boon. I do not know whether that goes so far as to answer your question, but it is an observation that I can make from the Scottish jurisdiction.

Janet Daby

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Would anybody else like to respond?

Aidan O’Neill: Echoing what Michael Clancy has said, I would just say that, at least anecdotally in terms of the situation in Scotland, full criminal trials, rather than simply online pleas, seem to have been working quite well. In fact, in terms of satisfaction levels, jurors seem to quite like the idea of turning up at a cinema, rather than at a court, and being more comfortably seated and better looked after while still being able to see and, apparently, participate in the criminal trial that is taking place elsewhere.

That is not answering the detail of your question, which I think was more directed towards the idea of things going online meaning less public participation. I would have thought that that was really a matter depending on the software or program used to allow for greater observation by the public online. On some levels, it is easier for the public to participate when cases and trials are online, precisely because they do not have to go all the way into court—the physical location—to watch it. I am unsure whether that addresses what it was you were asking.

Janet Daby

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Would you like to respond, Dr Tomlinson?

Dr Tomlinson: I have spent quite a lot of time looking at the online proceedings question in England and Wales, and there are lots of interconnecting challenges around the move to online hearings. I have not spent much time looking at the criminal context, but rather at the use of online proceedings in tribunals. The challenge there with open justice is that online proceedings can potentially enhance open justice in various ways, but also diminish it. There is a real need for clarification of strategy in terms of key things like open justice, but also other areas, such as digital exclusion, in the reforms that we are seeing.

Angela Crawley

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q My question is to Michael Clancy. In its report, the Law Society of Scotland outlined questioned the Government’s conclusion that a legislative consent convention does not apply to the abolition of Cart judicial reviews in respect of reserved tribunals in Scotland, and that judicial review is a devolved matter under the Scotland Act in section 126(4). Why does the Law Society of Scotland consider that a legislative consent motion is required? Will one be required for clause 2 of the Bill?

Michael Clancy: We do take the view that the provisions of clause 2 engage legislative consent, otherwise known as the Sewel convention, which would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament. The reason for that is a piece of law that is a bit complicated and a bit tricky. Nevertheless, you began by identifying that judicial review of administrative action is part of the definition of Scottish private law, which is contained, as you say, in section 126(4) of the Scotland Act 1998. That is a significant element in terms of recognising that it is a devolved matter exclusively; it is not split between the reserved areas of law and the devolved ones.

I freely recognise that the Government have taken steps in terms of new clause 11A(5) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which states:

“Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply so far as provision giving the First-tier Tribunal jurisdiction to make the first-instance decision could…be made by…an Act of the Scottish Parliament, or…an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly passed without the consent of the Secretary of State.”

However, while the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to modify the law relating to reserved matters, paragraph 2 of schedule 4 to the Scotland Act makes provision that applies only to the rules of judicial review insofar as

“the rule in question is special to a reserved matter”.

Special to a reserved matter would of course be a rule that would relate to something like an immigration tribunal, employment tribunal or employment appeal tribunal. Those are the kind of tribunals that one would think about.

In the 2010 Supreme Court case of Martin v. Most, there was a decision that a general rule that applies to both a reserved and devolved matter is not special to a reserved matter. Therefore, our conclusion is that if we follow the rule in Martin v. Most we get to the position where the decision in Eba—in fact, all judicial review matters under Scots private law—engage the Sewel convention and would therefore require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be complied with, because of course it is declared in section 28 of the Scotland Act that

“the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.”

Of course, section 28 provides that the UK Parliament can always legislate for Scotland. That is not in dispute. It is whether the Sewel convention is engaged. I hope that that answers your question.

Angela Crawley

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It did, thank you very much.

Aidan O'Neill: Can I just add to that very briefly?

The Chair

- Hansard -

Very quickly, as we are running short of time and we have a number of questions to come.

Aidan O'Neill: Absolutely. I think the Sewel convention is engaged because, apart from anything else, the reform proposed in the Bill would also require an amendment of section 27B(3) of the Court of Session Act 1988, because that embodies the Cart/Eba test, and that is a statute falling within devolved competence. At the moment, I do not see that the Bill attempts to amend that Act, and I think it needs to do so if it is to apply properly in Scotland. That makes it plain that it is a Sewel convention issue.

Sir John Hayes

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I want to deal with the issue of the courts being used to either resist or counter the Crown and Parliament—both the Executive and the legislature. In the evidence to the independent review of administrative law, which has been raised a number of times today, Sir Stephen Laws wrote:

“Ultimately, law cannot guarantee individual liberties or good governance unless it is supported by a culture of responsible politics”.

He went on to say:

“The risk of too much intervention by the law in politics is that it can undermine the culture on which law itself depends for its effectiveness in relation to other matters…Responsible politics requires incentives to listen to other points of view and to conduct civilised debate to convince others. None of that is necessary if the authority of the law can be enlisted to force the views of one side on the other.”

Inasmuch as this Bill goes some way to redress the balance between that authority and the democratic will of Parliament, is it a helpful and useful step? In what ways might it go further in redressing that imbalance?

Aidan O'Neill: I am happy to speak briefly on that. There is not an imbalance. We are all subject to the rule of law—Parliament as much as the Executive and the courts—and it does involve a mutuality of respect. There is absolutely no doubt about that, but the Parliament has to respect the basic fundamental rights and the procedures by which those have been maintained over centuries in this country without a revolution. It is all a matter of that maintenance of a mutuality of respect, and I have seen absolutely no evidence to suggest in any way that there has been any breach by the courts of those basic fundamental principles in which all three organs of government—courts, Parliament and the legislatures generally, and the Executives of the Union—seek to respect the rule of law and fundamental rights, and the procedures that allow those to be vindicated.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Just one follow-up, John, because I am trying to get everybody in.

Sir John Hayes

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q But you would accept that that view is not universally held. It is certainly not the view of the Attorney General. It is not the view of some senior judges or some of those who have contributed to this debate so far. There has been a change in the character of the usage of judicial review. I mentioned in an earlier session the application of proportionality increasingly as a means of effecting that change. Your view is particular and well informed, but by no means the general view.

Aidan O'Neill: I am not sure whether it is the general view. I am certainly speaking from my own experience, having been involved in a number of cases of some import over the past 30 years of my practice. But I am also echoing the views set out in the formal response to the IRAL consultation by the Faculty of Advocates, which generally said that one thing that one ought to avoid in any discussions of the constitution is the notion of absolutism and of the zero-sum game—that if courts say something, that means that somehow the rest of us are—[Inaudible.]

We all benefit from the dialogue that goes on and the maintenance of a balance of powers. Frankly, I would not accept any suggestion that the courts have in any sense in recent years or earlier overstepped the boundaries of their stating what the law is, and the obligations that fall upon all of us to respect it, whichever position we are in. “Be ye never so high, the law is above you”, and that applies of course to lawyers and the courts as well, but it does involve this mutuality of respect, so I am sorry, I am afraid that when one looks at the evidence, there is absolutely no basis for declaring that the courts in recent years or earlier are overstepping any mark.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Given the time, I will ask one broad question in two parts, if I may. First, we have heard some very strong opinions, on both sides, on the provisions for suspended orders and prospective-only orders, on the presumption on Cart per se, and on the use of the ouster. Do you have any particularly strong views either way on those issues?

Secondly, we have heard—particularly this afternoon—about the effect on individual litigants, and that some of the provisions may be a discouragement, whether in mounting a case in the first place or in obtaining a remedy. What is your view on that?

Dr Tomlinson: I have concerns about both provisions. I will summarise my view in headline form.

In relation to clause 1, I would first like to clarify that I do not think it reflects what IRAL proposed; it goes further that what IRAL proposed. The risk with the changes to remedies is that they will leave some individuals without a remedy in their particular case—for instance, where a remedy is prospective only. There will also be a potential chilling effect on claimants. Why would you bring a case if there were a chance that your remedy is not going to apply to you? Why would you take the various risks involved? It is okay, in an academic sense, to separate out the issues of remedies and say, “They come at the end of the case,” but the practical reality is that claimants consider what will potentially come out of a case at the end, so remedies are relevant to that initial analysis on whether to bring a case in the first place.

Clause 1 also potentially puts judges in a position of having more power, in terms of remedies, than they have currently. Given the points that have been made today and in discussion with this panel, I am not quite sure that the way that will operate in practice is what is intended. I think clause 1 will leave some significant uncertainty that might also generate further litigation.

I have already spoken about clause 2, but very briefly, there are two really important points. One is the point of principle: does Parliament want to enact an ouster clause and is that a thing that Parliament should be doing? The second key point is the use of judicial resources: is Cart judicial review a proportionate use of judicial resources? The really basic calculation, to my mind, is that you have a roughly one-in-20 success rate. The cost of those cases is around £364,000 a year according to the MOJ’s figures—not a great deal of money. As I said earlier, the success rate is potentially higher than that.

The financial figures produced by the Ministry of Justice are, I think, a little bit too high in various respects—they include, for instance, the cost of cases won by claimants. Overall, I think there is a question there: is that cost worth it, given the kinds of errors that this Cart system protects against? There can be reasonable disagreements about that. My view would be that the cost of the jurisdiction is worth it because of the errors that it protects against—you have heard case studies of the impacts of those errors today. Those are my concerns in relation to clauses 1 and 2.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Michael, do you want to come in? I know you tried to get on the previous question—I do apologise. If you can, please keep it very short. We only have seven or eight minutes left, and two Government Members want to come in.

Michael Clancy: Thank you, Chair. On clause 1, we were delighted that the Government decided to adopt a remedy that was in section 102 of the Scotland Act, allowing for the suspension of an order to give the parties time to fix the problem.

On clause 2, I made reference to the case of CM (Petitioner) in my written evidence to the Committee. It comes to the conclusion that the first tier, upper tier and the Lord Ordinary in the Court of Session may have misunderstood the claimant’s evidence in CM, and that a remedy for that is an extraordinarily well-placed provision for access to justice.

Turning to the last question prior to this one, I align myself with much of what Aidan O’Neill said. His quotation of Lord Denning—that no matter how mighty you are, the law is above you—is very apposite. I am not a politician and I am not going to get involved in a political debate, but it may be the case that the transformation of our legal system from one of a distribution of powers between Parliament, the judiciary and the executive into one where there is much more separation has given voice to some of the concerns. However, we are still in the early days of having that more strict separation of powers, and at some point in the future, when there is a change of Government, I think views might be quite different.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Marco Longhi, followed by the Minister. You have five minutes, so a very quick question from yourself, Marco.

Marco Longhi

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Mine is a question of consistency. There are no other aspects of the law, whether it be the public or private realm or whether it be employment law, family law or local government, in which applicants have more than two bites of the cherry, but it is immigration, and immigration alone, that seems to fall into a special category in which they have a third bite of the cherry. How can this be justified in a point of consistency?

The Chair

- Hansard -

Just one of the panellists. Who wants to take it? They do not look willing. Are you directing it at anybody in particular?

Marco Longhi

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Dr Tomlinson.

Dr Tomlinson: I would point out that Cart judicial reviews are not just immigration cases. While the caseload is made up mostly of immigration matters, they are not necessarily all immigration cases. My view would be that there are lots of different appeal routes and mechanisms across the justice system and in different areas of the justice system. As I said earlier, there can be reason for disagreement about that, but in my view the Supreme Court in Cart got the question right, and I think its reasoning was correct that the procedure that is potentially open to review in a Cart judicial review is one where there needed to be a limited—I stress limited because the Supreme Court made it limited—scope for review, and that has proven to be a relatively successful and cheap way of picking up important errors that affect people’s lives.

James Cartlidge

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Going back to the question from the hon. Member for Lewisham East, about the England and Wales measures in terms of magistrates courts and so on, on the point of the principle of access to justice and technology, which is important for this Bill, there was an emphasis in some of the evidence that we heard earlier that having online procedures is negative for access to justice in many ways. However, from what Aidan O’Neill said earlier and the experience of the pandemic, particularly in England and Wales, technology is important for keeping access to justice. Would you agree that the expedited development of technology that was necessary because of the pandemic has improved access to justice, while we do need to have safeguards in place?

The Chair

- Hansard -

You have a minute and a half to answer.

Aidan O'Neill: My experience—paradoxically much to my surprise—has been remarkably positive: that remote courts have worked. In the area that I am primarily involved in, which is public law but also employment cases involving witnesses and the like, there has been greater efficiency, so long as there is the proper ability for people to watch as part of access to justice. From a user perspective and from my experience, there are certainly positive benefits to it, but as Joe Tomlinson said, one must be aware of the potential negativity involved in terms of digital access and the like. However, open justice is an absolutely central point, and now that we have courts that are available online, just as the Supreme Court has been, I see that as a positive development.

The Chair

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Thank you very much; that is spot on. I thank the witnesses for attending today’s meeting. We have greatly appreciated your contributions and I thank you on behalf of the Committee as a whole.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)

17:00

Adjourned till Thursday 4 November at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

JRCB01 Law Society of Scotland

JRCB02 Fish Legal

JRCB03 INQUEST (Briefing for Committee Stage: Part 2, Chapter 4, Clauses 37, 38 and 39)

JRCB04 INQUEST (Briefing on funding for the bereaved at inquests)

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Subsidy Control Bill (Fifth sitting)

Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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Divisions during this debate:
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Caroline Nokes, † Mr Virendra Sharma

† Baynes, Simon (Clwyd South) (Con)

† Benton, Scott (Blackpool South) (Con)

† Blackman, Kirsty (Aberdeen North) (SNP)

† Bowie, Andrew (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)

† Buchan, Felicity (Kensington) (Con)

† Esterson, Bill (Sefton Central) (Lab)

† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)

† Flynn, Stephen (Aberdeen South) (SNP)

Hollinrake, Kevin (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Aberavon) (Lab)

† Malhotra, Seema (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)

† Millar, Robin (Aberconwy) (Con)

† Mortimer, Jill (Hartlepool) (Con)

† Scully, Paul (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy)

† Stafford, Alexander (Rother Valley) (Con)

† Tomlinson, Michael (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)

† Whitley, Mick (Birkenhead) (Lab)

Kevin Maddison, Bradley Albrow, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Mr Virendra Sharma in the Chair]

Subsidy Control Bill

09:25

The Chair

- Hansard -

We now continue the line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue.

Clause 32

Subsidy database

Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 34 in clause 32, page 17, line 10, at end insert—

“(c) the subsidy database is subject to routine audit to verify the accuracy and completeness of entries.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to ensure that the database is subject to routine audit.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to take amendment 39 in clause 33, page 17, line 27, at end insert—

“(3A) A public authority must ensure that all entries made under this section are accurate and complete”.

This amendment would require public authorities to ensure that all entries on the subsidy database are accurate and complete.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Sharma, and to debate amendments 34 and 39.

The clause provides that the

“the Secretary of State must make arrangements for the provision of a database of subsidies and subsidy schemes for the purposes”

of transparency as required by the trade and co-operation agreement—the TCA. The database must be accessible to the public free of charge, and public authorities who are obliged to upload details of subsidies or schemes should be enabled to do so. The Secretary of State may direct the Competition and Markets Authority to take on responsibilities for maintaining the database in the future.

Clause 32 mandates the Secretary of State to arrange for the database to be set up, and we support the creation of the database. We recognise that it is vital for there to be transparency over subsidies in the new regime. However, we are again concerned that key details are missing from the Bill. In order for it to function effectively, the legislation should require public authorities to make sure that their entries on to the database are accurate and complete. This is particularly important given that interested parties will use information on the database to assess whether subsidies meet the subsidy control principles and, if not, whether they should be challenged before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Surprisingly, the Bill does not contain any obligations on local authorities or public authorities to make accurate and complete declarations. I hope the Minister will agree that that is a gap in the legislation and is one that we need to see addressed.

To resolve the problem, Labour has proposed amendment 39, which would establish an explicit duty on public authorities to ensure that their entries on the database are accurate and complete. That is the least we should expect, but I am afraid that the evidence suggests that not all entries entered even over the past 11 months have been accurate or complete. In many cases, they have not been either.

Secondly, the Bill does not place the database under any order or control mechanism. Whose responsibility is it to verify that the information on the database is accurate and complete? Again, given that the information entered on the database is crucial for effective transparency of the regime, does the Minister not agree that this is a significant gap? If the database does not have any regular audit function and if inaccurate or incomplete information entered on to it is not checked, this poor information may lead to misguided legal challenges or, indeed, to harmful subsidies failing to be addressed. The other consequence is that it reduces overall confidence in the database and the information in it. Over time, that would undermine the regime.

In the evidence given on Tuesday 26 October, Alexander Rose of DWF said that since 11 pm on 31 December 2020 only 501 subsidies had been entered on the database. He highlighted that

“of those 501, some 257 are recorded as having a zero or nil value. —[Official Report, Subsidy Control Bill Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 52, Q73.]

He gave some frankly shocking examples of schemes that had not been accurately reported. He also questioned the database’s completeness and said that there was no way that only 501 subsidies had been awarded since the entries began.

The Minister may also remember the example of the Tees Valley Capital Grant Scheme. It was listed as having been posted on the website on 1 April 2020, but the website did not even exist on 1 April 2020. Given how vital subsidy entries will be to ensuring that subsidies meet the principles, it is clear that such complacency cannot be allowed to govern the new database under this regime. We need to get it right from the start. Expectations therefore need to be clear and they need to be defined in law. Let us remind ourselves that this is public money. Faith in the system requires good-quality information that is accurately reported, and we need to ensure that there will be a value for money check on the subsidies being proposed.

As the current database is clearly not working for those purposes, it is vital to address that point. Part of this may be about the design of the website for data entry itself, but the expectations of Parliament need to be clear on public authorities. It should be understood that there will then be real consequences if the database contains inaccurate information. We cannot control that if it is deliberate, but we need to put the safeguards in place so that the subsidies are used as intended.

Amendment 34 would ensure that the database was subject to routine auditing. We are open to discussions with the Government and stakeholders on which body is best placed to conduct such an audit. However, we believe that ultimately the responsibility lies with the Secretary of State to ensure that the database contains accurate information and is fit for purpose. I hope that the Government recognise the importance of both amendments in ensuring that the new regime is effective and transparent.

Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is nice to be here again, Mr Sharma. Thank you for chairing the Committee.

This is an important part of the Bill. It is vital that the database is as full as possible and that people can find the information that they need. The points that were made in the evidence sessions about searching through the database were also incredibly important. There need to be search terms that people can use so that they can look through the database to find the information that they need. The regime will work only if people can find subsidies that are relevant. Improvements to the search function need to be among the other improvements.

I got the Library to put together some figures. As of 26 October, there were 501 subsidies on the database, but 245 of them—nearly half—did not have an amount specified. I know that this is a precursor system and it is not yet fit, but that shows how important it is that we have a framework and the details in place so that public authorities know what information they need to provide and that anyone wanting to challenge the information is able to find that information on the site. So 245 entries did not specify an amount, but about £1.6 billion is currently registered on the database. In addition, 138 entries did not specify where they are from—whether that is England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland—but given the way challenges are likely to work, and given principle F in schedule 1 about competition within the United Kingdom, it is incredibly important that the entries make it clear where they are from and where the subsidy has been given. The principles include a requirement that a subsidy does not affect competition between the regions. It is therefore important that that is one of the criteria that the Secretary of State specifies.

The links on the database are an absolute nightmare. If we go to any of the subsidies, it says, “Click here for more information”. Some of the links take us just to gov.uk, but other links take us to a local authority landing page. That is not right. It does not give us the details of the scheme. It would be more helpful if people were required to upload the details on to the website for the database rather than having the freedom to upload the details on to their own website. They could put them on their website and then take them down the next day. Even if there were a checking process when the information first went up, they could immediately remove it. Having the backroom systems in place so that there is enough space and server capacity on the website to store all the information would be incredibly helpful and probably provide better transparency.

I just want to pull out a couple of further things from the statistics that the Library provided. Of the subsidies recorded on the database that specify the region they are from, 30% are from England. I refuse to believe that only 30% of the subsidies that have been given in the UK since the system was started were in England. Some 21% were from Scotland, and I also refuse to believe that 21% of the subsidies that were given in the UK were given in Scotland. That just cannot be possible.

I completely agree with the amendments that have been proposed. I am not looking to argue with the Minister about the requirements set out and the strength of the database; I am just looking to ensure that the guidance that authorities have to abide by is very strong. I would rather there be too much information on the website than not enough to enable people to mount their challenges. We will come to this later, but there will be very little time for people to make a challenge. They should therefore not have to spend quite a while rummaging around trying to find the details that would enable them to make an informed challenge. I would be keen to hear the Minister make it clear that he intends a significant amount of information that is as accessible as possible to be on the website. People should be able to search the website and, if possible, a system should be in place to ensure that authorities that do not upload full information face a slap on the wrist. They should face some sort of sanction or negative consequence for failing to do their duty.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma.

Clause 32 sets out the obligation for the Secretary of State to provide a database for subsidies and subsidy schemes, so that public authorities can adhere to the transparency requirements set out in the Bill, including those in clause 33. We have discussed the operational subsidy database. That was put in place to ensure the UK would be able to meet its international subsidy reporting obligations from 1 January 2021. It will continue to be adapted over the coming months to ensure it is fit for purpose for the future subsidy control regime.

The Government are committed to digital best practice in the monitoring and development of this database and all the databases that we oversee. The database uses the service standard specified by the Government Digital Service. The contract we have with our supplier is flexible—both to implement this Bill and to ensure that we can make improvements as we monitor and evaluate how it is being used.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the Minister clarify his comments on digital standards? There are two key issues here. One is the content and the functional design of the database. The other is the technical design and the ease of use of its search facilities and so on. Will he comment on the quality of what can be searched for and on the duty to include accurate information on the database? Will he say a little more about how he sees them being delivered?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

: I will try in my remarks to develop some of the issues with public authorities and their statutory duties.

We have made minor improvements since the database came online in March and we will make changes in the coming months. We will reflect on what has been said in the Committee and throughout the Bill’s passage and by stakeholders and public authorities.

Amendment 39, tabled by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, and amendment 34, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, focus on ensuring the accuracy of the information that is available on the database.

Amendment 39 would require public authorities to ensure that their database entries are accurate and complete. Amendment 34 would create a new obligation on the Secretary of State to subject the database to routine audit to ensure that entries on the database were accurate and complete. Although I agree wholeheartedly that it is important that the information on the database is correct and complete, the amendments are unnecessary for several reasons.

First, the obligations on public authorities set out in clause 33 are clear. If an authority uploaded data that was inaccurate or incomplete, its statutory obligations simply would not have been discharged properly. Amendment 39 is therefore superfluous.

The incentives faced by public authorities also mean that there is no need for amendment 34. If the public authority does not properly fulfil its obligation to upload the required information, the clock for the end of the limitation period does not start, so the subsidy or scheme could be challenged indefinitely. This gives public authorities an in-built incentive to ensure that the information that they upload is timely, complete and accurate.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Who decides whether the information is complete and that the clock has started, or does that happen only in the event of a challenge? How does somebody who is challenging know that, even though they are outside a month, it does not matter because the clock has not started?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Effectively, it is for the challenge. It is a loose framework. It is not like the state aid regime, where permission has to be sought and waited for before going ahead with a subsidy. It looks back at the subsidies and schemes that have been made. I shall return to the database and the issues raised about its integrity and accuracy, which I hope will illustrate some of the points.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister has stated, in effect, that public authorities that do not protect information might not be in line with their statutory responsibilities. I am not clear where, in the Bill as drafted, there is a requirement on public authorities to ensure that all entries that they place on the database are accurate and complete. It is fine to say that a public authority must ensure that an entry that it makes must be maintained on the subsidy database for six years, beginning on the date the entry is made, but where is the requirement for the information to be accurate and complete?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is as with every statutory duty placed on a public authority. The Bill contains a statutory obligation on public authorities to upload subsidies on the transparency database—in most cases, within six months. With any breach of statutory duty—whether it is on the face of the Bill or otherwise—a public authority can be challenged in judicial review in the courts. That is why I say that the amendment is superfluous: the net effect is exactly the same.

Members referred to the Teesside scheme. The reason the database was not live on 1 April 2020 was that that was the date when the scheme was set up rather than when the subsidy was paid. Subsidies that are not part of the scheme are dealt with differently.

09:57

On the database being full of gaps and of poor quality, in the evidence sessions Professor Rickard described it as “excellent”. It is worth noting that the database is still a relatively new tool. It continues to be developed to ensure that it is fit for the purposes of the new subsidy control regime. We are open to suggestions on how it can be improved and we expect to make further improvements in the coming months before the new domestic regime comes into force next autumn.

We have heard examples about the number of zeros. At the moment, the database is unable to show subsidy schemes and awards that follow. The ones with a zero are part of the scheme and are dealt with differently. An enhancement to the database is planned for the coming months that will show scheme-only entries, which will get around the issues that arose previously.

On the other issues—geography or some of the information that the hon. Lady was talking about earlier that may want to be challenged—any person who wants to challenge a scheme or subsidy or to find out more about data that is not on the database can put in a pre-action information request. Again, that stops the clock. The six-month period is not affected by that, because someone can make such a request, get that information and judicially review it later.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am finding the logic of what the Minister is proposing quite difficult to follow. With the requirement for completeness and accuracy, we could prevent a lot of wasted time and money, possibly on the part of public authorities or enterprises that may consider a challenge on the basis that information was incomplete, where a public authority may decide not to put information on the database completely. It is important, given the functions in the Bill and the powers to be exercised, that we have as accurate and complete information as possible. There is no point in saying that judicial review or a pre-action protocol may be used later to correct information that was not provided earlier. That strikes me as building huge inefficiency into a system that could be more efficient and more accurate and could better achieve the Government’s intended outcomes. The Minister has not answered where the duty is on a public authority to ensure that its entries are accurate and complete. It is not here in writing.

I want to clarify a point that the Minister made about the Tees Valley Capital Grant Scheme. The scheme might have started on a particular date, but if the date listed on the database is eight months prior to the database existing, that is not accurate. It can be listed, but it should also be possible to say when a scheme might have started. There are different parts to the information, so ensuring its accuracy is important. Other parts of the Bill hinge on the date when something is listed, so that cannot be inaccurate—it would have a knock-on effect on the actions that can be taken and the powers that people have.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The scheme that we are referring to was created under the state aid rules—under an entirely different regime when we were still a member of the framework. It is additional information rather than subsidy control—specifically, UK subsidy control. Payments are still being awarded, despite the fact that it was an EU state aid scheme in the first place.

On the public authority duty, we are looking at similar aims. I used the word “superfluous” because public authorities clearly have a statutory duty and a requirement to carry out statutory duties. If we put something on the face of the Bill, the net result will be the same. How do you challenge someone who does not want to adhere to their statutory duties? You judicially review them.

That is why the Bill does not provide for any sanction for the failure to upload a subsidy. There is a strong incentive to do so, because the sooner the subsidy scheme or stand-alone subsidy is uploaded, the sooner the limitation period for digital review under the cap will expire. The Bill sets out the statutory obligation on public authorities to upload subsidies on to the transparency database, in most cases within six months.

Any breach of a public authority’s statutory duty can be challenged by judicial review, which is why the amendments are, although worthy in their aims, superfluous to the requirements of the Bill. I therefore ask that amendment 34 be withdrawn.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have listened to the Minister. Our difficulty is that the amendments seem to be fundamental to the integrity of the whole regime.

The Minister alluded to obligations on local authorities. I cannot see any in writing. I shall not press amendment 39, as I would like further to explore whether there are, by proxy, obligations on which we can look to draw. If not, I would like to bring this back at a later stage.

The requirement for a routine audit to verify the accuracy and completeness—a duty of the Secretary of State under clause 32—is fundamental. That gap is not filled elsewhere and we should like to press the issue today.

Question put, That the amendment be made:

Division 6

Ayes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause requires the provision of the subsidy database to ensure that the subsidy control regime is transparent and facilitates compliance with our international commitments. It must be available to the public free of charge. Public authorities will be able to upload certain subsidies to the database to meet their obligations under clause 33. The Secretary of State is clearly responsible for providing the subsidy database, and if appropriate the Secretary of State may direct the Competition and Markets Authority to carry out this function on his or her behalf.

I should clarify that the five-year reporting cycle that we discussed earlier was chosen to correspond roughly with a standard parliamentary term and, for consistency, with the monitoring reports of other bodies, such as the Office for the Internal Market. There might be circumstances when reporting within a shorter time period is desirable, such as in the early stages of the new regime, enabling the Secretary of State to assess how well it is bedding in.

The database is a key part of the new subsidy control regime, enabling the public and interested parties to see which subsidies have been awarded and to whom.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his remarks. I have made a number of comments on clause 32. He will appreciate why we feel that there are areas to address, but fundamentally we think that the clause is important.

The principle of the database being accessible to the public free of charge is important, but I reiterate the points made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about searchability. Useability is an additional consideration alongside accessibility, and it should be referred to in further regulations or guidance.

I understand that when the Secretary of State directs the CMA to perform duties on his or her behalf, the powers go to the CMA as a whole. It might be assumed, however, that the subsidy advice unit in the CMA will take on those duties, so will the Minister clarify whether he expects that to be done by the unit or another team in the CMA?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Lady. We agree on useability. We will look at making the changes to the database, not least because of the Committee’s reflections and those in further parliamentary stages, but also because of the real-time conversations with people using the database—not only people putting data on, but people wanting to read it.

The subsidy advice unit in the CMA will be responsible for the use of the database and delegation. Expertise may be brought in, but it will be for the subsidy advice unit to work on the database on behalf of the Secretary of State.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Duty to include information in the subsidy database

10:00

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 35, page 17, line 18, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment requires all subsidies to be entered onto the subsidy database.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 32, page 17, line 21, leave out “£500,000” and insert “£100,000”.

This amendment reduces the threshold for subsidies granted under subsidy schemes to be registered in the database.

Amendment 33, page 19, line 17, after “requirements” insert “with the exception of duties under section 33,”.

This amendment requires that Minimum financial assistance under £315,000 is subject to the subsidy database requirements in clause 33, despite being exempt from the other control requirements in Part 2.

Seema Malhotra

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The clause details the specific obligations of a public authority in uploading subsidies and subsidy schemes on to the subsidy database, as it stands in the Bill. It is right that a public authority must ensure that an entry is made in respect of any subsidy scheme unless any agreed relevant exemption applies. The clause also states that a subsidy or scheme must be uploaded within six months of the confirmation of the decision to grant or make a subsidy or scheme, except for tax measures which must be uploaded within one year. Subsection (2) exempts a subsidy from the requirement to be uploaded when the individual award is less than £500,000.

As I said on Second Reading, Labour welcomes the subsidy regime, which will enable subsidies to be granted more speedily while requiring stronger checks to be in place. The Bill presents us with an opportunity to create a more responsive subsidy regime but, as we move away from the EU system of pre-notification, it is vital to ensure that the new regime, which grants subsidies first and then allows them to be challenged after, has appropriate mechanisms for oversight and transparency.

Clause 33, which outlines the obligations that public authorities have in respect of the subsidy database, demonstrates how the Bill seems to fail to provide the checks that we need for subsidies under the new regime. As the Bill stands, subsidies made under a scheme that are worth less than £500,000 do not have to be entered on to the database. I would like to understand the Minister’s justification for that and how the figure of £500,000 was decided on. Amendment 35 would leave out subsection (2) so that there is a requirement to be transparent.

The provision in the Bill is staggering. The sum of £500,000 is significant and could be given multiple times under a scheme without that being transparent. How are we then able to challenge what is being done and, as an interested party, make the possible case against? Does the Minister not agree with Professor Rickard, who said in our evidence sitting last week:

“Through transparency, we can get better compliance and better value for money”?––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 23, Q25.]

I am sure the Minister will agree that we always want to see value for money and that we can help to ensure that the subsidies that are being granted meet the goals that we are setting out to achieve.

I am sure the Minister will also agree that subsidies worth £500,000 or less can have a significant effect on the market. They can distort competition. As such, public authorities should be obliged to enter them on to the database to ensure that their aims and the subsidies can be fairly scrutinised. That is why Labour is proposing amendment 35, which would stipulate that all subsidies should be entered on to the database. We have not suggested setting a minimum threshold for publication; there are proposals on that from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.

In the system of appeal rather than pre-notification, comprehensive transparency is vital. With the right system, entering subsidies on to the database need not be cumbersome or complicated for public authorities. It can be a straightforward task that is well worth completing for the transparency it provides in the context of every subsidy. We can search the database for the amounts that we might want to scrutinise, but every subsidy should be on the database. That is our starting point.

Amendment 35 would mandate that subsidies given under a scheme are individually also quoted under the scheme’s entry. There will be an amount associated with that subsidy under the scheme; there is no reason why that amount should not be able to be entered and should not be required to be entered.

The amendment would ensure full transparency of all subsidies under the regime and that interested parties had the relevant information needed to scrutinise any subsidy, whether given alone or under a scheme.

Kirsty Blackman

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I will speak to not only amendment 35, but amendments 32 and 33. I want to address the logic behind the amendments. It is impossible to overstate the importance of the transparency database. It is the key place—the only place—where organisations and local authorities will be able to find information about the subsidies being granted. I imagine that a lot of organisations will be poring over the information on a fairly regular basis to work out whether the subsidies made meet the principles put forward by the Government. It is absolutely, desperately important that we get this right, and I am keen for us to do that from the beginning as far as possible, rather than having to make changes to the legislation afterwards.

I am concerned by what the Minister said earlier about the timing of pre-action information requests; it feels to me that organisations will just make those requests all over the place, no matter when the subsidy was actually registered. If there is no requirement to have full information on the subsidy database and there is no sanction for public authorities that do not do that, people may as well try their hand with the pre-action information request. This encourages the action process to happen, rather than providing people with the information in the first place so that they know that they do not need to make the request.

The logic behind amendment 32 is that subsidy schemes should be easier to implement than subsidies. It should be easier for public authorities to give them out: presumably, the schemes will have been agreed. They will be set up in a certain way, so the process of giving awards under them should be easier—that is literally the point of having subsidy schemes.

I turn to the logic of changing the figure from £500,000 to £100,000 and keeping a floor. If something under £100,000 has been approved as part of a scheme, it is probably going to be not that bad—it will probably be fine. But £500,000 is far too high, which is why we suggest £100,000. As was said in the evidence sessions, the figures are arbitrary—the figures are always arbitrary no matter which one is chosen. However, that was the logic behind having a differential system in place between subsidy schemes and subsidies on the subsidy database.

I like Labour’s amendment 35 and get where they are coming from, but I am more comfortable than them with the more streamlined process of the subsidy scheme.

I move on to our amendment 33, on minimal financial assistance. It would actually amend a future clause—clause 36 —but it makes sense to debate it at this point, as it is specifically on the amount that needs to be provided on the database. My suggestion is that all subsidies not made under a scheme should be part of the database. I am not suggesting that they should have to meet the other minimal financial assistance requirements, but I am suggesting that—this was pretty clear from our evidence sessions on Tuesday—all the subsidies not made under schemes should be registered on that database. They would not necessarily have to jump through the other hoops, but all the public authorities that we are dealing with will have done a huge amount of due diligence before giving a subsidy of any sort. They will have the information and it would not cost them much in the way of time to ensure that it is uploaded. That would increase drastically the amount of transparency and our oversight. As drafted, we will not know whether the system is working, because we will not have access to transparency data on any subsidies under £315,000 or any made in a scheme under £500,000. That is not good enough.

A new system is being set up and the Government have been clear that it is a free-market and permissive system, but neither I nor anyone else will know whether it works if we are not able to see the data and whether public authorities are making far fewer—or far more—subsidies than expected under the scheme. We will be unable to assess the adequacy of the system unless the Minister is willing to make changes to the thresholds for schemes and for general subsidies. Once again, I am not suggesting that we put other duties in place for minimal financial assistance or a requirement that other hoops have to be jumped through; I am suggesting that details are uploaded to the database so that we may scrutinise the data.

Paul Scully

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There has been a great deal of interest in the thresholds at which the transparency obligations apply, so I will explain some of the detail and logic of those thresholds. Transparency is an important part of the subsidy control regime and key to the enforcement provisions.

As we have heard, interested parties must be able to see subsidies in order to determine whether they may be affected and whether they wish to challenge the subsidy award or subsidy scheme. Any challenge will be made in the Competition Appeal Tribunal through that judicial review. The database is a vital tool in that. To serve its purpose, the aim of the database should always be to enable interested parties to see the subsidies that they may wish to challenge. It is not designed to be a general database of public authority spending; other tools are already available elsewhere for greater financial transparency in that regard and are not limited to subsidies. The transparency requirements in the Bill have therefore been designed to focus solely on those subsidies and schemes that can be challenged on subsidy control grounds.

The Bill provides for various reasons why a subsidy or scheme cannot be challenged on subsidy control grounds, such as a subsidy award given under a published scheme not being able to be judicially reviewed in the CAT on subsidy control grounds. That is because the scheme itself is assessed against the subsidy control principles and is challengeable, rather than the award under the scheme. Another example is minimal financial assistance subsidies, which are considered too small to cause undue distortions. They therefore do not have to adhere to the subsidy control principles and other requirements. Those subsidies do not need to be on the subsidy control database.

The transparency of subsidy awards has costs as well as benefits. Providing the data would create an administrative burden for public authorities, including small local authorities, in addition to the imposed costs for those using the database if excessive, irrelevant or potentially poor-quality data is provided that interested parties have to sift through. Another thing about the impact on public authorities is the cumulative impact. We find that transparency requirements in general tend to fall on a small number of people in local authorities and other public bodies. That is why there is a relatively high bar or threshold—because of that cumulative burden on a few people in local authorities.

Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)

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Does the Minister not agree that, with public trust in politics and Government at an all-time low, the more transparency that we can have in the system, the better it will be to build trust in the new subsidy control regime? Does he not recognise the serious risk of cronyism and that sunlight is the best disinfectant? Therefore, let us have the maximum transparency, and let us drop this clause from the Bill, as requested by my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston in her amendment.

10:15

Paul Scully

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I do believe in transparency, that sunlight is the best disinfectant, and in the importance of this database being as accessible as possible. As I will come on to say, the starting point of many of the thresholds and the amounts that we have been adhering to for many years lie in EU state aid rules. They also reflect the consultation responses that we have received from all parties, which I will come back to. We need to ensure that the benefits of any approach to our database and transparency outweigh the costs, and I believe that the Bill strikes the right balance.

Seema Malhotra

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Could the Minister define what he means by the costs of information on the database? Surely, if all the information is available to a public authority that has gone through the process of making a decision about an award, uploading entries and so on should not be an onerous process. What does he see as the cost?

Paul Scully

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As I say, it is the cumulative costs that, in many ways, were the starting point. As a matter of principle, we should not seek to add duplicative red tape for public authorities—particularly local authorities and other small authorities—without good cause. I will expand on that as I continue.

Seema Malhotra

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Perhaps this is an opportunity for the Minister to design a database and an extremely straightforward way of entering information. It does not seem to me that this should be onerous at all. Of course we agree that we should not add red tape, but in the interests of the integrity of the system, of public money and of preventing cronyism and people getting around controls, surely this ought to be part of a public authority’s obligation to the public. Perhaps the Minister could come back on those specific points.

Paul Scully

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First, on cronyism, the starting point for the thresholds—as I will come to in a minute—were based on EU state aid, which we have had for the best part of 40 years.

Seema Malhotra

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I am sorry to make this point again to the Minister: the EU state aid regime was based on information being available to the public. The whole system was different. There was pre-notification, so by the time a subsidy was awarded, a transparent process had taken place. The proposed regime will not do that. The shift in the system means that safeguards are needed for public money and so that any future scandal does not cause a crisis in the regime. Does not the Minister realise that shifting the regime to a different position from that in the EU will have consequences?

Paul Scully

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First, moving the subsidy control scheme from pre-notification and pre-approval will mean that the subsidies can actually get to those businesses and interests at the right time, rather than when it is too late or when they would have less of an effect. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North mentioned the pre-action information requests and transparency requirements. We have based this on the consultation responses from people who will be at the cutting edge of the system, and it is also in line with other international examples. We have looked at other examples around the world, which is why I probed our witnesses on what happens in other parts of the world. We have been looking at that with this scheme.

This system, as drafted in the Bill, does strike the right balance in ensuring that people can drill down into this scheme. On the pre-action information request process, if the database is not keeping up with the ever-changing world of subsidies, businesses, environmental impact and other areas relating to subsidies, there are safeguards to ensure that it is as transparent as possible.

Let me briefly deal with some of the thresholds and give a little more information. Public authorities must upload information about all stand-alone subsidies that exceed the minimal financial assistance threshold of £315,000 cumulated over three years, unless they are subject to a specific exemption. They must also upload information about all subsidy schemes.

The Bill provides for transparency of large awards given under schemes—those over £500,000. That was worked out roughly, allowing for currency differences, according to the EU amounts. Although these large awards cannot themselves be challenged in the CAT using the subsidy control requirements, they do provide important information about how the scheme is being used by the public authority, and their size means that the benefits outweigh the costs.

Seema Malhotra

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Will the Minister clarify the maximum number of subsidies of, say, £450,000 that may be given under a subsidy scheme? How would anyone know about them?

Paul Scully

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I shall come back to that, if I may. Let me deal first with consultation.

The Government’s proposed approach to transparency was set out in the consultation on subsidy control, including the proposal to exempt minimal financial assistance and subsidies given under schemes of less than £500,000. We asked whether respondents agreed with the proposed rules on transparency, and 81% agreed. We also asked specifically whether respondents agreed that minimal financial assistance subsidies should be exempt from transparency requirements, and 65% agreed that they should be exempt. Respondents pointed to the administrative burden as a reason for not lowering the thresholds. It is clear, therefore, that the approach taken in the Bill reflects the views of those who responded to the consultation.

There is no theoretical limit to the number of subsidies of any value that may be given under the specific scheme. None the less, it will be the scheme itself that will have to be applied under the principles of the subsidy control framework.

Amendment 32 would require all subsidy awards, given under published schemes, of £100,000 or more to be uploaded to the database, lowering the threshold from £500,000. Amendment 35 would remove this threshold altogether so that a subsidy of £1 given under a scheme would need to be uploaded on to the database.

The database will already include information about the scheme under which these subsidies are given. This information will be sufficient for others to understand whether their interests will be affected by any subsidy given under that scheme and whether they should seek to challenge the scheme itself. As such, and as I have said, the Bill does not provide for the possibility to challenge subsidies given under schemes.

Further, the Bill provides for an exemption from the transparency requirements for small subsidies given as minimal financial assistance, which is found in clause 36. Amendment 33 would remove this exemption. It would require information about all subsidies of any size to be uploaded to the database, except for those given under a scheme or subject to another exemption.

I believe that the costs entailed in all three amendments clearly outweigh the benefits.

Kirsty Blackman

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Does the Minister feel that his rejection of amendment 33 renders the cumulative provisions of clause 36 unworkable? How will anyone know that somebody has received cumulative subsidies if there is no requirement for those subsidies to be registered anywhere? What is the point of those provisions if we are not going to be able to police them?

Paul Scully

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The challenge will be to the scheme itself, not to the subsidies within it.

Kirsty Blackman

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I was talking specifically about minimal financial assistance and the cumulative impact. An organisation cannot have more than £315,000 over a three-year period before it has to be registered, but if there is no requirement to register the 20 subsidies received —or 200,000—how is anyone ever going to know?

Paul Scully

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A public authority awarding something that it believes will be a subsidy below that will have to publish a letter demonstrating that it is adhering to minimal financial assistance. That is therefore for businesses or the recipients of the subsidy to double-check. Although it is the public authorities that will be awarding the subsidies and they will be analysed by people checking the database, if I ran a business that was reliant on a subsidy, I would, to be frank, make sure of it. I would not want to leave it to the awarding authority to do all the paperwork. I would want to make sure that my business interests were looked after. So there is that risk of task duplication.

Kirsty Blackman

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One more point: the duty is on the public authority to ensure that it is complying with the regime. It is the public authority’s duty to do that. The Minister made it clear earlier that the public authority has a statutory duty. However, the public authority is then having to rely on that organisation telling them that it has had a subsidy. The public authority will know that that will push the organisation over the £315,000, that it will not be eligible for minimal financial assistance and that it will have to be registered on the scheme. A duty has been placed on the public authority for something over which it has no control and because the Government refuse to put that on the subsidy database it will not be able to find out whether the law is being broken.

Paul Scully

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All I will say is that if the public authority is issuing something that it believes to be a subsidy, albeit under MFA, it will publish a letter to explain to the recipient why that MFA exemption appears.

Kirsty Blackman

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Who is going to get the letter? Just the business? Where does it say in the Bill that the public authority has to publish a letter when providing a subsidy? Let us say Aberdeen City Council gives a subsidy to somebody and Aberdeenshire Council gives a subsidy to that same business. How are they going to know that the other authority has done it when the only paper trail is a letter that Aberdeen City Council has given to the business?

Paul Scully

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It is not published as such, but is sent to the recipient. That is in clause 37. I hope hon. Members agree that we have taken a proportionate, sensible and balanced approach here, first, to make sure that we can exempt small subsidies from the requirement to apply the principles of subsidy control, and secondly, to enable public authorities to assess the subsidy schemes against their principles, rather than duplicating the analysis for every individual subsidy awarded within those schemes. Publishing additional information about small subsidies would have limited value for those concerned about potentially distortive subsidies and would detract from the core purpose of the database. The requirements would lead to additional red tape for public authorities, well beyond the requirements they had to fulfil under the EU state aid regime. In a great many cases, the information would simply duplicate what those authorities already publish in appropriate formats elsewhere.

I do not doubt that, overall, both local and national Government need to make databases interoperable so they can talk to each other, data can be scraped from them and they can be read more easily alongside each other. However, I do not believe that that is for the Bill to address. The exemption from minimal financial assistance subsidies and the £500,000 threshold for subsidies given under schemes finds the right balance between the administrative burden of uploading subsidies and the transparency that the regime needs.

10:28

Seema Malhotra

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I thank the Minister for his comments, but I must say that I do not feel that they have so far moved us forward in tackling the very serious issues that the debate has started to uncover. I also want to refer to his consultation as an illustration of how complex this is and how it requires further considered discussion, also in the light of the risks of things going wrong. A system works well when we plan for things to go wrong. When we do that, things will largely go better, because we have managed the risks and taken them seriously. As an example, page 45 of the consultation states:

“The consultation also asked for views on whether there should be a minimum threshold of £50,000 below which no subsidies have to be reported. 14% of respondents answered this question. Of those that responded, 64% agreed there should be a minimum threshold of £50,000.”

It goes on with differing views across differing areas. That comes back not just to how the regime will be used by those who use it in good faith but to where things can go wrong. We must ensure that there are measures, boundaries and transparency in place to prevent things going wrong and to protect the public purse. Value for money surely must be a consideration—more than it seems to be for the Government from the comments that we have heard so far. This requires a much more considered debate. We need to consider some of the evidence and the risks again.

Robin Millar (Aberconwy) (Con)

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I think that it is important that we pay attention to those matters, so I am grateful for the discussion, which I am following with interest. However, I have some familiarity with grant schemes in local authorities. One of the first questions that we, as a subsidy-awarding body, were asked was, “Has anybody else given you money?” It seems sensible for any subsidy-awarding body to ask a potential recipient of a subsidy whether they have applied for or received a subsidy elsewhere. If they fail to declare it, that is a case of fraud.

Seema Malhotra

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I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comment. If he thinks that there should be such a requirement or that that should be in the guidance, perhaps he might raise it with his own Front Bench. It is important to have some of those checks in place. However, where fraud might be taking place, or there is an impact of—perhaps genuine—cumulative subsidies, whose responsibility is it? If an enterprise has been in receipt of multiple subsidies and does not declare them, where are they declared? If feedback to the local authority or the public authority is incomplete, how do we find out, unless subsidies are on the database and it is then much easier to search and identify them?

There is a lot more to be taken away from this discussion in terms of inefficiency and higher risk of fraud—or, if not fraud, perhaps some forms of maladministration or error. A transparent and full database would reduce the risk of many of those issues arising, and would then reduce the cost of seeking pre-action information or judicial review. Why must we clog up our tribunals with matters that could have been avoided had we had better control systems in the first place? A transparent and full database would ensure the value for money not just of the subsidy but of what the system demands and who pays for checks and balances later in the process.

The complexity of some of those issues requires us to think them through in more detail. I will not be pushing amendment 35 today, but we certainly plan to return to it in later stages of the Bill.

Kirsty Blackman

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On a point of order, Mr Sharma, if I wanted to push amendment 33 to a Division, would it happen now or during the debate on clause 36?

The Chair

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Later.

Kirsty Blackman

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I would like not to move amendment 32 and to push amendment 33 to a Division.

The Chair

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Ms Malhotra, would you like to withdraw amendment 35 or to press it to a Division?

Seema Malhotra

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I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Kirsty Blackman

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I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 33, page 17, line 24, leave out “one year” and insert “three months”.

This amendment would reduce the length of time public authorities have to enter a subsidy in the database from one year to three months, with respect only to tax measure subsidies.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 37, in clause 33, page 17, line 24, leave out from “measure,” to “or” in line 25 and insert

“as soon as practicable, or within one month, beginning with the date of the tax declaration, whichever is sooner”.

This amendment would require the public authority to make an entry into the subsidy database in respect of a subsidy or scheme given in the form of a tax measure as soon as practicable and at the latest within one month.

Amendment 18, in clause 33, page 17, line 26, leave out “six months” and insert “one month”.

This amendment would reduce the length of time public authorities have to enter a subsidy in the database from six months to one month.

Amendment 38, in clause 33, page 17, line 26, leave out from “form,” to “scheme.” and insert

“as soon as practicable, or within one month, whichever is sooner.”

This amendment would require the public authority to make an entry into the subsidy database in respect of a subsidy or scheme in any other form as soon as practicable and at the latest within one month.

Amendment 27, in clause 33, page 17, line 27, at end insert—

“(3A) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must make regulations defining the term “tax declaration” in subsection (3)(b).”

This amendment requires that Government to define the term “tax declaration” before this section comes into force.

Kirsty Blackman

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This is one of the most important parts of the Bill that the Government have got wrong, and I am massively concerned. A number of witnesses raised concerns about the length of time. Some of those time lengths might have come from the trade and co-operation agreement, but my understanding is that those are minimum thresholds. It is entirely proper for us to put in stricter thresholds, should we desire to do so. It is important that those times be changed, for the sake of transparency and to protect organisations that might be harmed by subsidies being given to somebody else.

Amendment 26 would

“leave out ‘one year’ and insert ‘three months’”.

That is specifically about tax measures. The logic behind having a three-month period, rather than the one-month period I have suggested for normal measures, is that tax measures may be more complex, and it may take authorities longer to make that registration on the database. That should give them enough slack to be able to put that information on the database.

My big concern about tax subsidies is followed up in amendment 27 on the meaning of “tax declaration”. That meaning is not clear to me and, when I asked a tax professional, they did not know what “tax declaration” means in this case. It is important that the Government make clear what that means because, if “tax declaration” is the tax return, that return is made after the financial year in which that happens. It could possibly take up to two years for a requirement for that to be registered on the database. By that time, a competing organisation might have gone under. It was made clear to us in the evidence sessions that six months was a fairly long time; nearly two years is a very long time. It is completely unacceptable for the Government to choose to do that.

If the Minister says that “tax declaration” means the tax return, that would be helpful in making clear the meaning of “tax declaration”. My understanding, from the evidence given by Daniel Greenberg, is that that would be enough for everybody to understand the implementation of the legislation. The length of time is a massive concern for me. That is why I am proposing on tax measures that the length of time be changed from one year to three months, which is reasonable.

Where measures do not relate to tax, I am proposing that six months be changed to one month. That is again to protect businesses where the subsidy has distorted competition to the extent that they are in serious difficulties. I understand what the Minister said about time being paused if a subsidy has not been uploaded properly on the database, or if a pre-action request is made, but my concern is that people will make pre-action requests left, right and centre, no matter the date put in. It is also far too long a period of time.

The public authority that is granting money to an organisation has to go through a number of hoops in order to do so. It is completely reasonable to ask it to upload that as close to that point in time as possible, rather than let it potter about for six months, because it is already doing lots of paperwork. It is already jumping through hoops in relation to that subsidy, so it makes sense for us to reduce the time. It builds much more protection into the system, which is important. Surely that is the point of having a system. If we did not have international agreements and did not have to have any system in place, it would be different, but we do have to have a system. Therefore, the system that we have should make sense and should work.

I will just speak briefly about the Opposition amendments that have been put forward. They are along a similar line and try to do very similar things. Should the Opposition decide to push the amendments to a vote, I would be quite happy to back them, because it is really important to get this right.

Seema Malhotra

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It is a pleasure to speak to our amendments 37 and 38, and to the other amendments in this group. I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for the persuasive arguments that she has outlined. She has mentioned that our amendments are on similar lines. Ours perhaps go slightly further, and I will lay out our arguments as to why we have tabled the amendments in this way.

Amendments 37 and 38 would change the period that public authorities have to enter their subsidies on the database to one month, including for subsidies given in the form of a tax measure. Schedule 1 highlights the intention for subsidies to be proportionate, fair and targeted. However, the extensive time period described in clause 33 allows public authorities to have six months to publish on the database, or one year if the subsidy is given in the form of a tax measure. That is notwithstanding the important comment made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, which I think also came up in some of the evidence sessions, about what is intended by “tax declaration” within the context of the Bill and what time could elapse between the equivalent of the subsidy being made and that being public. An understanding of that would be very helpful for the purposes of scrutinising that aspect of the Bill and whether there needs to be a change.

Having one year to enter tax measures into the database means that subsidies that do not meet the regulations can still be granted and be spent over that significant amount of time. As subsidy details are not entered into the database, interested parties do not have the necessary information to scrutinise or challenge the subsidies. That means there could be a six-month period in which a highly damaging subsidy can be granted without any challenge. Does the Minister recognise the damage that extensive publication periods could have on the fairness and transparency of the regime, and the extra cost to the public purse of ceasing to recoup some of the subsidies that may be subject to a successful challenge but may already be spent by then? What are the Government’s reasons for making the publication period so long? In last Tuesday’s evidence session, Jonathan Branton, partner at DWF Group, said:

“I have yet to hear a really persuasive case for why you need that long to publish the fact that you have made a award. Why do you need six months to get yourself together to publish that something has been done?”––[Official Report, Subsidy Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 58, Q79.]

That was a powerful point. Can the Minister enlighten us? We in Parliament have a responsibility to the public to try to ensure value for money and transparency in public expenditure. That question is at the heart of how we ensure that the proposed regime commands the confidence, credibility and trust of all four nations of the UK and our constituents.

10:45

If the process for entering subsidies on to the database is designed to be easy and straightforward, there is even less reason why the time period for publication should be any longer than one month. We know how busy our public authorities can be, so does the Minister agree that leaving things for longer does not necessarily make them easier, but harder? That can lead to greater errors. What if an official moves on? People change their jobs, and that means someone else needs to find the paperwork. Errors can be built in when decisions and information are not updated at the time of a transaction. That is why I am concerned that the longer the publication period, the harder it can become for public authorities to ensure that they make accurate and complete entries. If the risk of error becomes greater, surely it is not in the public interest to have such a long publication period.

We are also not clear about the justification for providing a different time period for tax and non-tax measures. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified the Government’s thinking on that. Our amendment would still provide ample time for public authorities to enter their subsidies on to the database, while ensuring that potentially damaging subsidies are not given the opportunity to go unchallenged for half a year.

Paul Scully

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Let me start by explaining the intention behind the process of uploading the subsidies to the database. As with other aspects of the transparency requirement, we have sought to balance the objectives of minimising unnecessary bureaucratic requirements on public authorities while ensuring transparency for those interested in subsidy awards, and most importantly for those that may be subject to challenge under the Bill’s provisions. As such, we have set the deadline for uploading subsidies on to the database at six months—the deadline for most subsidies—which is the time limit that existed under the EU’s state aid system.

Special provision is made for tax subsidies, as calculating their exact value is more complex and cannot be done until tax declarations have been received and finalised. I will come back to the time limit and the definition of tax declarations.

We expect public authorities to upload subsidies promptly because they have a strong incentive to do so. Generally, the date of uploading a subsidy on the database will determine the end of the limitation period to challenge it. The sooner a subsidy is uploaded to the database, the sooner the clock for the limitation period will start running, and therefore the sooner the public authority will gain certainty that the subsidy will not be subject to a challenge. Public authorities will therefore seek to upload subsidies as soon as possible.

Amendments 18 and 38 would shorten the upload deadline for subsidy awards and subsidy schemes not given in the form of tax measures. Amendment 18 would shorten the deadline to one month and amendment 38 would oblige public authorities to upload the subsidy award or scheme as soon as possible, and within one month at the latest.

As I said, we expect public authorities to upload as soon as the relevant data are available, and to use the whole period of six months only if there is good reason. An upload deadline as short as one month would likely result in more public authorities needing to amend their entries at a later date. Although they can do so as a permitted notification within the meaning of clause 81, that creates an unnecessary administrative burden for those authorities. It also means that the information on the database is more likely to contain minor inaccuracies.

I am sure that hon. Members will agree, as their earlier amendments suggested, that accuracy is really important, so a longer deadline for uploading is not only justified but sensible. I again emphasise that the approach taken in the Bill reflects the views of those who responded to the public consultation on the approach to subsidy control earlier in the year. The consultation set out the details of the proposed approach that we are now discussing, including the six-month deadline for uploading general subsidies. Of those who responded to the question, 74% agreed with the Government’s proposed approach.

Amendments 26 and 37 seek to shorten the deadline for uploading subsidies in tax measures on to the database. Subsidies in the form of tax measures can be an effective tool for achieving policy objectives, but they are generally a more complex way of giving subsidies. They are more likely to have performance-related conditions, which means that it can take longer to determine the exact amount of the subsidy. Of course, a public authority will have an estimated value for the subsidy when it is granted for the purpose of assessing compliance with the principles, as well as for costing the measure for the purpose of managing public money. However, a final amount may not be known until the tax declaration has been completed. Even once that declaration has been submitted, further discussion between the beneficiaries of the subsidy and the public authority might be necessary, to confirm that the calculations in the tax declaration are correct.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Points were made earlier on the specific length of time. Why is the final amount required to be on there at the beginning, because they could presumably just put in how much they expect it to be? That would be much better for those organisations that may be looking to challenge it.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

They will clearly have that estimated calculation, but the database will function most effectively if the public authority uploads a subsidy when it can be confident of its accurate value. That will enable an interested party to determine whether to challenge the subsidy through a judicial review. It is important that public authorities are not then coming back and correcting those figures. It is a balance between ensuring that we get the entries in a timely fashion and in an accurate fashion. That is admittedly a difficult balance to strike, but the majority of people in the consultation agreed with our approach, which is set similarly to the EU state aid scheme.

The result of what we have set out is that a public authority will require sufficient time between the date of the tax declaration and the obligation to upload that subsidy to the database. We have determined that 12 months from the date of the tax declaration is sufficient time for public authorities and beneficiaries to calculate the exact subsidy amount. Amendment 26 would reduce that period from 12 months to just three months, and amendment 37 would reduce it to one month. That would mean a significant reduction in the time available for a public authority to make those final calculations and upload the subsidy.

As with non-tax subsidies, an upload deadline of one or three months will increase the likelihood of error. Again, I am sure that is something we want to avoid. We expect public authorities to upload subsidies in the form of tax measures as soon as they can and, as I mentioned, they will have a strong incentive to do so. That is why 12 months is an appropriate deadline to reduce the risk of inaccurate information being uploaded. Shortening the deadline would not improve subsidy transparency in our view, nor help interested persons who may wish to challenge a subsidy in the form of a tax measure.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If I had an enterprise that was being harmed by either a tax subsidy or any other kind of subsidy, I would rather know that the subsidy had been given and not know the exact amount than have no information at all until my business had gone under.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I come back to our earlier discussions about the onus that is put on public authorities, and the impact that it will have on them, not only to put the amount on the various databases but possibly to go back and correct them. I appreciate that it is a difficult balance to strike, but none the less the balance is based on the EU state aid rules. It has gone through the public consultation and the majority agreed with it.

Amendment 27 would add a requirement to define a tax declaration in regulations before the subsidy control regime came into force. I can reassure hon. Members that, in the vast majority of cases, I would expect that the relevant tax declaration would indeed be a tax return. There are other examples: duty and certain other types of taxation treatment. That is why it is called a tax declaration rather than a tax return. But most of the time it would indeed be a tax return. The precise details would vary, depending on the specific tax and the mechanics of the measure in question.

As I have said, the Government will provide thorough guidance—I come back to the guidance that we have spoken about on a number of occasions—to ensure that public authorities are aware of their subsidy control obligations, including how to report subsidies in the form of tax measures. If it would be helpful to public authorities, subsidy beneficiaries and interested parties, that guidance will provide further explanation as to what should be considered a tax declaration. As that does not affect the substance of the law, I do not think it would be appropriate for secondary legislation. I therefore request that hon. Members withdraw or not press these amendments.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his comments. There has been quite an important discussion and debate today. I want to highlight why this matter is complex and why more is needed on it. The Government quote from their consultation response, but on the specific point about the public authorities consultation question—should it be within six months?—I think it was actually quite a loaded question: “Do you agree that the obligation should be to upload information within six months of the commitment to award a subsidy?” That is hard to disagree with, even if people think that it should be one month or less. As with many of the questions, we had 15% of respondents answering this, and a majority did agree with the proposal. I do not think people would necessarily disagree with it. But even those who then did think a bit further and disagreed commented that six months was too generous and could be shorter, and apparently suggested a range of alternatives.

What is important is to get this right. The Minister made a couple of points in relation to where there may be some information that is not fully available—I do not know what specifically that would be—that would result in edits to correct some information, which could be after a month or two. I would like the Committee to have an opportunity to reflect on that and perhaps to talk to local government and other public authorities about what difficulties they might perceive if the period was to be greater than one month, or whether they did think that one month could be workable in the context of an easy-to-enter database. I think that, rather than pushing this matter to a vote today, we should see some further work done on these issues, in order to have confidence about the deadline, and come back to this on Report, with some of that information and further research being clear.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 33, page 18, line 7, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.

This amendment makes the regulations set out in Clause 33(8) subject to the affirmative procedure.

This amendment would ensure that any future changes made to the minimum threshold for publication were decided through the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. We have said throughout the passage of the Bill that too many aspects of it are set to be decided at a later date by the Secretary of State. Decisions that could and will have a significant impact on the new subsidy regime, such as those that would change authorities’ database obligations, should be afforded appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The decision to change the minimum threshold for publication on the database is one example that would alter the transparency and clarity of the new regime. It is not right for it to be nodded through Parliament or go under the radar. It should be given parliamentary scrutiny and the vote that it demands.

11:00

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have a wee comment to make on this. The Government increasing the minimum threshold required on the subsidy database is a very contentious issue that we have discussed at length, including with witnesses. A significant number of respondents to the consultation answered on the basis of the numbers put before them. It is important enough that lots of people responded to the consultation. It is important enough that we have had a length of time debating the numbers. The negative procedure does not make sense, given the Bill’s possible impact. Unless the Bill is amended, the Government could, at a stroke, change the threshold to £2 million under the negative procedure. In terms of transparency, accountability and ensuring that this makes sense and works for everybody, it would be sensible for the amendment to be accepted.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 33 sets out that the Secretary of State may change the threshold above which subsidies given under schemes are required to be uploaded to the transparency database. Amendment 36 seeks to change the procedure for these regulations from negative to affirmative.

The regulations can be used to change the thresholds for all subsidies given under schemes, or for those matching a specific description, such as those given to a specific sector. The regulations cannot be used to make changes beyond this—for example, to change the requirement to upload all subsidy schemes to the database—and nor do they change the substantive subsidy control requirements, which are assessed at scheme level, rather than for each individual subsidy given under a scheme. As such, these regulations should be considered technical.

The Bill proposes the right parliamentary procedure for different types of secondary legislation. For example, the powers to amend the exemption thresholds in clause 42(1) are subject to the affirmative procedure because they affect the substantive subsidy control requirements rather than simply the threshold for uploading information to the database.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the Minister agree that if the Government were to change the threshold from £500,000 to £20 million, that would require some scrutiny?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I have set out, the figure of £500,000 strikes the right balance between transparency and minimising undue and unnecessary administrative requirements. We currently have no intention of changing the overall threshold. The Secretary of State has power to change the threshold if necessary—for example, because of changing market conditions or international obligations.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I appreciate that the Minister has stated the Government’s position on the £500,000 threshold but he has not made the case for it, neither on the operation of the regime nor on value for money or transparency. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North powerfully made the point that the Government have the power to change the £500,000 threshold under the negative procedure. Has the Minister held discussions—with the Secretary of State or others in government—about whether there should be a maximum that the Secretary of State may propose? The consequence is much less transparency over greater amounts of public funds. That surely cannot be the right direction of travel for any Government, and certainly not for a scheme that we want to stand the test of time and enjoy the confidence of the public.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In this instance, we are looking at adjusting the thresholds for specific sectors, such as agriculture, that are characterised by smaller businesses where a relatively small subsidy can have a distortive effect. It might be more appropriate to have a specific threshold in the future, but the focus in the transparency measures in this Bill is on enabling interested parties to see the subsidies that they may wish to challenge. We are not setting out to provide a general database of public authority spending, but the schemes are transparent because the details of a scheme itself must be uploaded on to the database. That is where the challenges may come. Transparency is set within this framework and that is why it is appropriate to use the negative procedure. I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his comments. In the light of the complexity of many of the issues that we have debated, I will not push the amendment to a vote. However, the issue must be looked at in the round to ensure that clause 33 is as robust as it can be and will stand the test of time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause sets out the duty on public authorities to upload certain information on to the database about their subsidies and subsidy schemes. It provides public authorities with clear rules on whether a subsidy award should be uploaded to the database or not. It sets out the three rules for public authorities granting stand-alone subsidies and subsidy schemes.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This is an important clause, but it requires significant improvement. We will not vote against clause stand part, but I hope that the Minister will engage positively on the issues. This is not a party political matter. It is genuinely in people’s interests to have a robust regime, and we have outlined the cornerstones of that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Information to be included in the subsidy database

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 34, page 18, line 9, remove “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment makes the regulations listed in subsection (2) mandatory for entries on the subsidy database.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to take amendment 19 in clause 34, page 18, line 12, leave out “may, in particular,” and insert “must”.

This amendment seeks to ensure the Secretary of State will include all these measures in the regulations.

Amendment 41, in clause 34, page 18, line 12, leave out from “The” to “particular,” and insert

“Regulations made under subsection (1) must”.

This amendment makes it a requirement for subsidies entered into the database to include the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (i) of subsection (2).

Amendment 20, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) any other matter which the Secretary of State deems necessary”.

This amendment is linked to amendment 19.

Amendment 21, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the purpose of the subsidy”.

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to include a requirement in regulations that a public authority’s entry in the database details the purpose of the subsidy.

Amendment 43, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the date the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database.”

This amendment requires the date on which the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database, to be included in entries on the database.

Amendment 42, in clause 34, page 18, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about further information that must be included in a public authority’s entry in the subsidy database in relation to a subsidy or subsidy scheme.”

This amendment allows the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out further information required to be published on the subsidy database.

Amendment 44, in clause 34, page 18, line 34, at end insert—

“(d) the date the public authority confirms the decision to give each subsidy under the scheme;

(e) the duration of each subsidy under the scheme;

(f) any time limits or other conditions attached to the use of each subsidy under the scheme;

(g) the amount of each subsidy or the amount budgeted for each subsidy under the scheme;

(h) the date each subsidy under the scheme was published.”

This amendment requires that the information required to be entered into the subsidy database for subsidy schemes includes much of the same information required for subsidies.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to move our amendments to clause 34, which is about the information to be included on the subsidy database. The clause outlines that the Secretary of State can make regulations about what public authorities must include in their entries on the database and it lists certain regulations that the Secretary of State may make provision for. As well as ensuring that subsidies are published on the database and with accurate information, it is important that public authorities are obliged to include all the necessary information in their entries. It is therefore strange that the Bill does not contain minimum requirements that must be included in the subsidy entries. An explanation of why that is the case would be welcome from the Minister, particularly following Jonathan Branton’s assertion that,

“a national transparency register has been established, but when you look at that register and at the relevant rules around it, you do not see that it is functioning well.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 51, Q72.]

The Government must surely recognise that the information included on the database will be crucial for the effectiveness of the regime, and that there should be a common standard—one that is an obligation—for public authorities to enter that information, rather than yet again leaving it to the Secretary of State, a very busy person, to decide later what should be included in subsidy entries. The Bill should mandate those requirements now. I am sure the Secretary of State would appreciate the Minister making changes in Committee that could make his life, or her life in future, easier. That is in the public interest.

The requirements should also be put to the whole House rather than nodded through Parliament through a process with less scrutiny. They should be included more firmly in the primary legislation to allow public authorities and interested parties a strong, clear message from Parliament about what information as a minimum should be prepared and uploaded on the database. That is why we propose amendments 40 and 41 to make the regulations listed in subsection (2) mandatory, rather than obligations that the Secretary of State may or may not include in future regulations. It is also why, if they decide to put it to a vote, we will support amendment 19 tabled by the hon. Members for Aberdeen North and for Aberdeen South, which achieve similar outcomes. The amendments would ensure that entries onto the database include the information necessary for transparency and for interested parties to make informed decisions about whether subsidies obey the control principles. As Jonathan Branton summarised:

“If you cannot see what is going on, you do not know what to challenge, or even if to challenge.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 51, Q72.]

Amendment 43 would include the date that the subsidy or scheme was entered on to the database as part of the mandatory information that public authorities must include. Given that the legislation states that interested parties have just one month from the date of publication on the database to challenge subsidies, it seems odd that the information required by the amendment is not already included in the Bill. It is a critical piece of information. As Alexander Rose stated,

“the key piece of information on that website”—

—the database—

“is the date the entry is made, and the reason that is so important is that the challenger has as little as a month to challenge once that information is placed on the website.”—[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 52, Q73.]

Will the Minister explain why the Government do not think the database needs explicitly to include and mandate publication dates, even though the dates are so crucial to the challenge process?

I hope the Committee can see how necessary amendment 43 is, as it includes the publication date on the database. Without it, I fail to see how the interested parties will be able to exercise their power in the ways intended in the Bill to bring challenges within the timeframe to damaging subsidies or those they consider of concern.

Amendment 44, on similar lines, sets out mandatory requirements that public authorities need to meet when entering information. We recognise that subsidy schemes will provide public authorities with a surer framework under which to grant subsidies. However, that does not mean that subsidies granted under them should escape scrutiny and transparency. The amendment seeks to ensure that the date each subsidy under a scheme is granted is published on the database, as well as the duration of each subsidy under a scheme, any time limits as might relate to the conditions and each subsidy’s amount. I cannot see any reason in the public interest that that should not be so.

The amendment would ensure that not only the schemes, but each individual subsidy under them, was subject to appropriate transparency. It would enable the Secretary of State, the CMA and interested parties to check that subsidies given under the schemes, as well as the schemes themselves, are consistent with the principles laid out in schedules 1 and 2. To quote Jonathan Branton:

“It is really difficult to argue against transparency and say, ‘Why wouldn’t you have transparency about the dispensation of public money in this way?’”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 55, Q76.]

Finally, to change the substance of the Bill, Labour also proposes amendment 42, which would allow the Secretary of State still to make the regulations on the content of the database. I hope that the Government can therefore see that the amendments, taken together, do not seek to make the provisions stated in subsection (2) static and would rather ensure that the database is necessarily informative, to ensure that the regime can run effectively and that subsidies can obey the control principles.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Michael Tomlinson.)

11:16

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

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Health and Care Bill (Twenty Second sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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Divisions during this debate:
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Mr Peter Bone, Julie Elliott, † Steve McCabe, Mrs Sheryll Murray

† Argar, Edward (Minister for Health)

† Crosbie, Virginia (Ynys Môn) (Con)

† Davies, Gareth (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)

† Davies, Dr James (Vale of Clwyd) (Con)

† Double, Steve (St Austell and Newquay) (Con)

† Foy, Mary Kelly (City of Durham) (Lab)

† Gideon, Jo (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Con)

Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)

† Madders, Justin (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)

† Norris, Alex (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)

† Owen, Sarah (Luton North) (Lab)

† Robinson, Mary (Cheadle) (Con)

† Skidmore, Chris (Kingswood) (Con)

† Smyth, Karin (Bristol South) (Lab)

† Timpson, Edward (Eddisbury) (Con)

† Whitford, Dr Philippa (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)

Williams, Hywel (Arfon) (PC)

Huw Yardley, Sarah Ioannou, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Steve McCabe in the Chair]

Health and Care Bill

09:27

The Chair

- Hansard -

As Members have possibly worked out, I am a last-minute stand-in for Peter Bone, which has always been my ambition in life. [Laughter.] Seriously, Peter has been caught up in some kind of road traffic incident. I think he is fine; he has just been delayed, so that is the reason for the delay in proceedings.

I remind Members of all the usual things: please switch electronic devices to silent, and remember that no food or drinks are permitted. I encourage Members to wear masks, as per the House of Commons Commission rules, and to give their notes to Hansard or to send them to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.

New Clause 58

Duty on NHS England to promote evidence-based public health programmes

“(1) NHS England must promote to integrated care boards the value of evidence-based public health programmes.

(2) NHS England must publish a report each year on the state of evidence-based public health programmes within England and their impact.”—(Alex Norris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I have heard about the fastest gun in the west; I think you might be the fastest-moving Chair in the west midlands, Mr McCabe. Turning to the substance of the new clause, covid-19 has shown the value of public health programmes in building this country’s resilience and improving public health outcomes, yet there is no duty in the Bill on NHS England to promote such public health programmes to integrated care boards or to evaluate their impact. New clause 58 seeks to change that.

During proceedings over the past couple of months, I have highlighted on multiple occasions the damage caused by the short-sighted health cuts we have seen over the previous 11 years, so colleagues will be relieved to hear that I am not going to repeat those points. However, we should be looking to do better now and to use this Bill as a watershed moment. As the Association of Directors of Public Health noted when the White Paper was published, there is a limited focus in the Bill on the health inequalities that have been exposed and exacerbated by covid-19 and, again, this new clause seeks to improve that situation. With the changes to Public Health England and the announcement of the new Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, it is vital that the Government make a belated recommitment to public health and prevention.

There are a number of ways in which that commitment could be manifested. Public health programmes are particularly crucial to the prevention agenda, and it is right that NHS England promotes the value of those programmes, looks at them, assesses them and reports on their impact. To draw on one example that is linked to an item we will be discussing later—dental services—community dental services and oral health public health programmes have shown that significant savings and significant improvements in individuals’ lives can be generated through effective, evidence-based public health programmes. Social enterprises such as those can bring a number of additional benefits. They exist not to make a profit but to deliver on a social mission and to reinvest any surplus in improving local services.

That is what the public health grant traditionally funded. When I first had responsibility for the public health grant in 2014, 85% of that money went into commissioned services. That funding will have been diluted by the cuts in recent years, but largely that money went to community-based, not-for-profit, evidence-based schemes. Public health programmes really improved our communities, but we have lost them, and that is a sadness. We need to recommit to them and have a real focus on getting integrated care systems to commit to them, demonstrating what works in one part of the country and promoting it across the rest of the country. That is what this new clause seeks to achieve.

The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Mr McCabe, it is a particular pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, allowing us to get going.

I very much welcome the opportunity to debate and put on record again the Government’s commitment to improving and protecting the public’s health and to supporting evidence-based interventions. Like the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, I can think of no better example than the remarkable speed of this country’s roll-out of covid vaccinations and the response to the pandemic, saving lives and supporting our economic recovery. That, of course, is testament to the hard work and dedication of our NHS and public health professionals in rising to the greatest infectious disease challenge of modern times.

Our commitment to evidence-based public health is also writ large in many of the Bill’s provisions, our wider programme of public health reform and the proposals set out in the Government’s recently published plan for health and care, “Build Back Better”. We made it clear in that document that although the Government’s immediate priorities for the NHS must be dealing with covid and recovering from the elective backlog, the long-term priority is to shift the NHS towards prevention. Prevention must be a central principle in delivering a sustainable NHS and levelling up. That means fixing the underlying causes of ill health, which is at the heart of the mission of the new Office for Health Improvement and Disparities and the new UK Health Security Agency.

As new clause 58 hints at, a focus on prevention, coupled with a strategic approach to population health more generally, will also be at the heart of integrated care systems. The new triple aim will bind NHS bodies to consider wider effects on health and wellbeing, alongside a duty to reduce inequalities in access and outcomes. Integrated care boards will be required to seek advice from persons with a broad range of professional expertise on public health and prevention, complementing the role, already set out in regulations, of local government and directors of public health to provide advice. Moreover, each integrated care partnership’s strategy will be clearly rooted in, and draw extensively on, local place-based joint strategic needs assessments so that real needs and priorities can be addressed at local level. The ICB’s plans must have regard to that strategy.

I entirely concur with the shadow Minister that evidence-based public health practice is always desirable, and a learning culture essential, but the Government do not see the need for a specific legal duty on NHS England to promote that to ICBs—as envisaged by the new clause—although it undoubtedly will have a role in exhorting and supporting them to their best efforts. The Office for Health Improvement and Disparities and the UK Health Security Agency will also have an important role in this regard, and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence will continue to issue evidence-based guidance on public health topics referred to it.

There is already a broad obligation on NHS England and NHS Improvement to promote continuous improvement in the quality of services provided across the NHS and, in doing so, to have regard to evidence-based public health quality standards. That includes having regard to quality standards prepared by NICE.

It follows from the rejection of the first limb of the new clause that the Government cannot support the second. However, as set out in “Build Back Better” the Government will bring forward separately from the Bill a new requirement for NHS England

“to introduce a yearly prevention spend, outcome and trajectory reporting criteria, including an assessment of the 10-year spend and outcome trajectories…of the major preventable diseases such as diabetes.”

It may not, but I hope that that goes some way towards meeting the intent behind the shadow Minister’s new clause.

There is a somewhat different matter where public health programmes are commissioned directly by the NHS itself, in exercise of the Secretary of State’s public health functions. That is the case with, for example, national screening or immunisation programmes. These programmes are currently commissioned by NHS England but are rooted in expert advice from the UK National Screening Committee and the Joint Committee on Vaccinations and Immunisations respectively. NHS England is already prepared to report to the Secretary of State on its performance against these functions.

Were any of these functions to be delegated to ICBs to deliver in future, we would expect NHS England to clearly convey the requisite standards and performance expectations for those evidence-based programmes, and overall information about performance and effectiveness will be provided to the public.

In summary, there is a good deal of unity of aim and objective, but I fear there is a difference as regards methods. On that basis, I encourage the shadow Minister not to press the new clause to a Division.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I share with the Minister the desire for a shift to prevention. My anxiety, from the Government action we have seen over the last decade, is that that is a rhetorical shift rather than a substantial shift in policy, and definitely not a substantial shift in resourcing. Nevertheless, the Minister’s answer on the documentation that NHS England will be asked to publish is a suitable substitute for a provision being on the face of the Bill. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 63

Young carers’ needs assessments following hospitalisation

“In the Children Act 1989, after section 17ZC, insert—

‘17ZCA Young carers’ needs assessments following hospitalisation

(1) An NHS trust or NHS foundation trust must ascertain during hospitalisation whether a patient when discharged will be cared for primarily by a young carer.

(2) Where an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust ascertains that a patient when discharged will be cared for primarily by a young carer then the NHS trust or NHS foundation trust must give the local authority where the patient lives notice that a young carer will require a needs assessment.

(3) The local authority receiving notice under subsection (2) must carry out a needs assessment, and in doing so must—

(a) ascertain whether it is appropriate for the young carer to provide care, and

(b) identify what support or services need to be in place for safe discharge of the patient.

(4) The needs assessment required by subsection (3) must be conducted before the patient is discharged.’”—(Karin Smyth.)

This new clause would ensure that the needs of young carers are assessed before a patient who they care for can be discharged.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I will not delay the Committee too long on this new clause, but it is an important one to consider. We had a good discussion last week on the needs of carers, although I am not sure we resolved it satisfactorily. Carers do a huge amount of work on behalf of their families. As my hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham so eloquently said, they want to do that work, but many of them essentially keep our services going. Without them, the demands on our services would be so much greater.

[Mr Peter Bone in the Chair]

All of us who have met or who know young carers recognise the particular stresses and strains on them from caring for their relatives. They do astonishing work. Again, as my hon. Friend said, many feel that they are doing it because these are their loved ones; they do not feel like they are carers in many cases, but they are. Often people then do not come forward, if they are not known to the authorities, to make that clear. That is often because of fear of what that might mean for the family set-up they find themselves in.

The new clause draws attention to the needs of young carers, particularly following hospitalisation. It would require trusts and local authorities to be cognisant of who is caring for a person when they are discharged, particularly where young carers are involved. When the issue was first drawn to my attention—particularly the need to highlight the different needs of young carers—I must confess that I thought that these things were routine in good care settings. Obviously, the situation into which someone is being discharged should be fully known and recognised, and their needs met. We had a good discussion about that and we know that that does not happen, but the pressure on young carers is particularly acute. As part of that discussion last week, I almost intervened on the Minister to ask that when we are considering carers more generally, we highlight young carers separately. A hospital needs to know and understand that the person going back home will be in the charge of a young carer, and the local authority needs to make sure that a needs assessment is conducted.

The new clause suggests that should happen before the patient is discharged. Clearly, the Bill is instigating a new process, which will look at post-discharge. We had a good debate about that. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North said from the Front Bench, doing that assessment differently may be better in the long run—we do not know. In particular, when it comes to young carers taking up that role, it is even more acute that it is recognised in the new arrangements.

I will not move the new clause to a vote, but I would like the Minister to be cognisant of young carers and assure us that these needs will be highlighted to hospital trusts and local authorities in the discharge planning process.

Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Bone. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South for introducing the new clause. She set it out very well and she is right to highlight the interplay with the section 78 provisions in the Bill, because there is a risk of some jarring if we do not get this right.

As we know, the 2011 census reported that there are almost 166,000 young carers between the ages of five and 17 in England. However, research carried out by the University of Nottingham and the BBC in 2018 suggested the figure could be much higher, with around 800,000 children providing care. It is estimated that nearly 260,000 of those carers are providing high levels of care, so there is certainly an issue out there.

As we know, being a young carer has a significant impact on children and young people. Caring for other family members inevitably affects school attendance and exam results, with many young carers paying a heavy price for their dedication to their families. It often limits their ability to take up their full academic options. On average, young carers achieve a grade lower than their peers in their GCSEs and are less likely to go to university. Every single classroom in the UK is likely to have at least one young carer.

As my hon. Friend said, the new clause would ensure that arrangements for discharging patients without a care needs assessment do not unduly impact on young carers. Their needs must still be identified when an adult is discharged from hospital. But the new clause goes further than that: it applies to all discharges, so there must always be a check to see if a young carer is involved. One might think that a check ought to done anyway, but evidence shows that it is patchy at best. Before covid, hospitals were struggling with the many issues we have discussed in relation to staffing. It is not always easy for people to do everything they would want to do before discharge. The new clause would put into law what is already being done in the best-practice examples.

There is already, in theory, a general right to an assessment under the Children and Families Act 2014 and the Care Act 2014. The Children and Families Act states that all young carers under the age of 18 have a right to a needs assessment as a responsibility of the local authority, which

“must take reasonable steps to identify… young carers within their area who have needs for support.”

However, Barnardo’s 2017 report “Still Hidden, Still Ignored” identified that young carers were “slipping through the net.” The report led to many recommendations, including Barnardo’s calling for hospital staff to actively ask questions to identify young carers at the point of discharge. Hospital staff are in a key position to ask questions to ensure young people do not slip through the net, and it is clear that more needs to be done in this area. The new clause offers one way of reducing the possibility that young carers slip through the net.

As my hon. Friend said, young people are often reluctant to identify as young carers. They do not want to get their parents into trouble sometimes, and it can be a difficult conversation. The new duty would take a lot of that pressure away because the responsibility would sit with the hospital professionals to ask the patients on discharge. That would stop the young person feeling responsible for involving official services in family life. Of course, we want local authorities to be able to identify these people to ensure the right support is in place.

09:45

Many of us will have come across examples of young carers and the impact that caring has on their lives. I want to give one real-life case study from Barnardo’s to emphasise how important the issue is:

“a young carer told us that despite repeated visits to a GP both for herself, her little brother and her mum, she was never referred to a young carers’ service. The same young carer visited and cared for her mum and her new-born brother in hospital and she would divide her time between caring for both of them. She was very tired and stressed, constantly missed school but felt there was no other option. Upon discharge, there was no assessment from the hospital about what support was needed for either the mother or the new-born brother and the young person became the sole carer for both over the next few years leading to her leaving school and becoming increasingly isolated. It was only when a health visitor for her infant brother picked up the amount of caring she was doing that she was finally referred to Barnardo’s.”

That example sets out very clearly what we hope the new clause will prevent from happening in the future. It is tragic that so many opportunities to give that young person some support were missed.

The new clause would not, of course, resolve all the issues with support for carers and young carers, but it would go some way to plugging a known gap and making sure that there is an opportunity for young carers to be identified in a systemic way that ensures support is delivered.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Mr Bone. The new clause would introduce a requirement for an NHS body to notify the relevant local authority once it had identified that a young carer had primary responsibility for caring for a patient on discharge. The local authority would be required to carry out a young carer’s needs assessment before discharge to establish the appropriateness of the young carer providing care and what support should be in place to enable safe discharge.

I entirely understand the sentiment and intention behind the new clause, which the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Bristol South set out very clearly. We have touched on the importance of this issue in previous debates about carers. Young carers often do not even realise that they are carers. They undertake their caring responsibilities, go to school, come back again and undertake caring responsibilities again. They are arguably some of those most in need of support and identification. These young people are essentially having caring responsibilities for a loved one, family member or friend thrust on to their shoulders at a very early age. However, I am not convinced that the cause is best advanced by the new clause and I will try to explain why. In her response, the hon. Member for Bristol South may agree or say she is unconvinced by my explanation, as is her right.

Existing legislation already requires local authorities to carry out an assessment of need for all young carers on request or on the appearance of need. That assessment must consider whether it is appropriate or excessive for the young carer to provide care for the person in question, in the light of the young carer’s needs, wishes and circumstances. Regulations already provide a detailed framework, including the matters to be considered in such assessments and the skills of the person undertaking it.

As members of the Committee will be aware, the discharge clause in the Bill, which we debated some days ago, revokes the existing requirements for hospitals to issue assessment and discharge notices as part of the discharge process for adults, because they contribute to lengthy discharge delays. The current requirements trigger local authority duties to assess the person’s long-term social care needs, prior to the person’s discharge. We know delayed discharges have a negative impact on patient outcomes.

My concern about the wording of the new clause is that making young carers’ assessments a requirement of discharge would risk reimposing further significant delays, at a time when supporting the safe hospital flow of patients has never been more important. I am also unclear how such an assessment system would be enforced.

Current discharge guidance clearly sets out that, as part of discharge planning, consideration must be given to any young people in the household who have caring responsibilities or may have some on discharge. Guidance states that they may be entitled to a young carer’s needs assessment or to benefit from a referral to a young carers service.

We will work with the Department for Education to ensure that protections for young carers are reflected in new statutory discharge guidance, accepting the sentiment behind the new clause. That will include setting out as part of the discharge planning process how young carers should have a needs assessment arranged, where appropriate, before a patient for whom they provide care is discharged. That is the more appropriate way to capture or operationalise, for want of a better way to put it, the sentiment behind the hon. Lady’s new clause. It is up to her whether she feels that that is sufficient, but I have set out our response to the new clause she proposes.

Karin Smyth

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I do not think that is sufficient. I will not press the matter to a vote, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston said, when it comes to things being on request it is problematic, and that is the crux of the matter, as in the guidance that the Minister read out. I understand the need for hospitals to not have lengthy discharges—and it is not good for the patient—but sorting out the hospital’s problem on the backs of young people and carers is not a good message that we want to send from here.

I appreciate that the Minister in his final comments said that this would be very much part of the thinking about discharges, but we should also remember that these young people have really had the most shocking experiences in the last two years with covid, and are already—again, as my hon. Friend said—falling massively behind. Added to the destruction from covid, many young carers live in some of the most disadvantaged families, really keeping those families together, so they are further left behind.

On the Minister’s exhortations to the service and local government, it would be helpful to further underline the strength of those, and I am sure that most of the Committee feel that. Young carers have had probably the worst of times during covid and for them now to have to shoulder more responsibility because of the discharge problem and the need to get people out quickly would further exacerbate the situation. They need more help, not less, and I hope that that will be communicated back to the service. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 65

Review of the surgical consultant appointment process

“The Secretary of State must review the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and its most recent guidance and, within six months of the passage of this Act, publish a report on the surgical consultant appointment process.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause requires a review of the legislation which governs the NHS surgical consultant appointment process.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Justin Madders

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 70—Appointment of surgical consultants—

“(1) The National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/701) are amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In paragraph (1) of regulation 2, in the entry for ‘relevant college’, in sub-paragraph (d), for ‘and its associated Faculty of Dental Surgery’, substitute ‘, the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and each of their associated Dental Faculties’.”

This new clause would add the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and each of their associated dental faculties to the colleges who may be involved in the appointment of NHS consultants.

Justin Madders

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The proposed new clause was inspired by the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, who made representations about what we think is a lacuna in the current regulations that needs filling. According to the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and subsequent guidance issued by the Department in 2005, only the Royal College of Surgeons of England is permitted to review surgical consultant job descriptions and send a Royal College representative to the advisory appointment committee. Although the process applies only to non-foundation trusts, the 2005 guidance encourages foundation trusts to follow that process as it provides a structured, quality approach to consultant appointments. Given that the 2005 guidance remains the most up-to-date advice available to trusts, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges continues to recommend that foundation trusts follow the process.

The net effect of the regulations and guidance has been to formally exclude the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh from the entire surgical consultant appointment process. Given its size and the distribution of its fellowship throughout England, it is keen to help trusts, whether they are foundation trusts or otherwise, in their ability to appoint and retain senior surgical professionals. I understand the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh has raised this anomaly with the Department on a number of occasions—I can see the Minister nodding—and it has been told that any changes to the regulations or the guidance would require legislative approval, so the opportunity has been taken today to slip the new clause in to try to resolve that.

As we know, we have record waiting lists of some 5.7 million—probably rising. It is clearly an important priority for everyone that the backlog is tackled, and the new clause would go some way to ensuring that the NHS is a resilient and sustainable surgical body to be able to meet the challenge. We see it as a tidying-up exercise that is long overdue.

New clause 70, tabled by the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, goes a little further than new clause 65 in terms of the requirements put on the Department. I hope the Minister understands the sentiment behind our tabling the new clause. This long-standing issue needs legislative remedy, and I hope that this is the opportunity to put it right.

Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I rise to speak to new clause 70 and in support of new clause 65. I agree with the shadow Minister that these are very much technical new clauses to correct an anomaly. There are three royal colleges of surgeons in the UK: the Royal College of Surgeons of England, the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh and the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow. Consultant surgeons may be appointed from among the fellows of any of the three colleges. The exams they sit and the qualifications they carry are considered absolutely equal.

The challenge when recruiting a new consultant, as the shadow Minister highlighted, is that the appointment panel, which must review the job description and take part in the interview, is limited purely to those who have graduated with their fellowship from the English college. The appointment panels have a mix of representatives from local organisations, specialty bodies, if it is a specialty surgical appointment, and the royal colleges, so while fellows of all the royal colleges may be involved in appointments to English trusts as specialty representatives—such as breast cancer, which was my specialty—some are excluded from being college representatives. It is often really challenging to bring these panels and committees together.

The aim of the new clause is simply to widen the pool of assessors available to trusts in England and, indeed, as the shadow Minister highlighted, to foundation trusts. It is simply an anomaly that two of the colleges in the UK are not included. The new clause aims to correct that and to make the appointment of new consultants easier for trusts and foundation trusts in England. I hope that the Minister will accept both the spirit and the detail of new clause 70.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to hon. Members for bringing this issue before the Committee: I think we have all received correspondence on it from the various royal colleges. New clause 65 would amend the Bill so as to require that a review is undertaken of the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and its most recent guidance. It is important that the regulations governing consultants and the accompanying guidance ensure that prospective consultants are highly capable and safe to practise while not hindering effective recruitment.

The current regulations govern the appointment of all consultants to NHS trusts and special health authorities. Reviewing the regulations only in relation to surgeons would risk diminishing consistency in the regulations. We believe the current regulations ensure consistent standards across all specialties. Those regulations are kept under review, and we therefore do not believe that this new clause would improve what already exists under the current policy. Similarly, responsibility for reporting on recruitment practices relating to a specific specialty would fall to the royal colleges rather than the Department. Should the royal colleges recognise an issue with recruitment and appointment to a particular specialty, the Department would expect the relevant royal college to report on that, which we would always consider in detail.

New clause 70, tabled by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, would amend the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 to confer authority on the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and each of their associated dental faculties to sit on the panel concerned with the appointment of consultants in England. I sympathise with that. The Government agree that including those colleges would potentially be significantly advantageous. However, the challenge is that the National Health Service Act 2006 stipulates that consultation with affected parties must be undertaken before any changes to these regulations can be made. As such, our concern is timing: it would go against normal practice and not necessarily be appropriate to make such a change without consulting the relevant parties.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have no objection to the need to consult. The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow would indeed like section 2(1) of the regulations changed so that its members could be involved in the appointment of consultant physicians. I was unable to consult with the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh in time to allow the new clause to include that. I totally recognise that there is a role for consultation in order to get the change to those regulations right. However, surely with such legislation going through, this is the opportunity to agree to correct this anomaly, and therefore make appointments of new consultants in English trusts simpler.

10:00

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think that is where the hon. Lady and I slightly diverge; we do believe that it is right that we follow the normal process of consultation before bringing any changes forward. I hope, in my final paragraphs, I can give her a little reassurance in respect to her intent. I hope that I can reassure her that, although the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh and the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow are not formally named in the regulations as relevant colleges in relation to the appointment process, the regulations do not prevent trusts from seeking alternative members to contribute to the process. That does provide discretion to involve these colleges where appropriate.

My further reassurance, which I hope will go some way towards satisfying the hon. Lady, is that the letters and requests came in relatively late in the Committee’s proceedings: I will undertake to review that request with my officials. I will look at whether what we have already got is sufficient, or whether there is merit there that does not require that consultation and those changes—

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

rose—

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have one sentence to go, so the hon. Lady gets in just in time.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

A trust could include other members of the panel, but they could not be recognised as the Royal College representative. That is often one of the challenging roles, because the panel cannot go ahead if it does not have a Royal College representative.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I hope I can reassure the hon. Lady that in respect of the specific request that the two Royal Colleges have made, I will take that away, look at it and consider whether it works now, or whether there is something we can do. That will be either in this legislation, or following consultation, via another mechanism to address the underlying issue that they have drawn to our attention.

The Chair

- Hansard -

I call Dr Justin Madders.

Justin Madders

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you, Mr Bone, but I am sure you would not want me to attempt any medical procedures.

I have heard what the Minister has said; clearly it is still under active consideration by the Department. As we know, there will be many more legislative opportunities in the coming months and years—I hope we will get an opportunity to crack this. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I accept the Minister’s reassurance that they will finally look at correcting this anomaly; I hope that he will take that forward. It is something that we will be looking for. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 66

Support provided by the NHS to populations at risk of malnutrition

“(1) Each integrated care board must—

(a) assess, or make arrangements for the assessment of, the need for support for patients and/or populations at risk of malnutrition, including social and clinical/disease related malnutrition, using their services;

(b) prepare and publish a strategy for the provision of such support in its area;

(c) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy; and

(d) designate a malnutrition lead.

(2) An integrated care board that publishes a strategy under this section must, in carrying out its functions, give effect to the strategy.

(3) Before publishing a strategy under this section, an integrated care board must consult—

(a) any local authority for an area within the relevant Integrated care board’s area; and

(b) such other persons as the relevant local authority considers appropriate.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), ‘local authority’ means—

(a) a county council or district council in England; or

(b) a London borough council.

(5) An integrated care board that publishes a strategy under this section—

(a) must keep the strategy under review;

(b) may alter or replace the strategy; and

(c) must publish any altered or replacement strategy.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the preparation and publication of strategies under this section.

(7) The power to make regulations under subsection (6) may, in particular, be exercised to make provision about—

(a) the procedure to be followed by an integrated care board in preparing a strategy;

(b) matters to which an integrated care board must have regard in preparing a strategy;

(c) how an integrated care board must publish a strategy;

(d) the date by which an integrated care board must first publish a strategy; and

(e) the frequency with which an integrated care board must review its strategy or any effect of the strategy on the provision of other provision in its area.

(8) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) all integrated care boards; and

(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.” —(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would require integrated care boards to publish a strategy for the provision of support for patients and/or populations at particular risk of malnutrition using their services, and designate a malnutrition lead.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause would put responsibility on integrated care boards to take the lead on tackling malnutrition in their community. We spoke about malnutrition in the context of hospital food standards, and we were not able to move the Minister to extend those hospital food standards to other care settings. I thought that was a shame, and I hope the Government will continue to look at the issue. I want to broaden the conversation on malnutrition to try, via another way, to improve the standing of our communities.

Malnutrition is a serious condition that occurs when a person does not get the energy or vitamins that their body requires to function properly. It affects at least 3 million people every year, and it costs the health and social care system £23.5 billion each year. The condition is particularly common amongst certain groups. Those groups are: older people; hospital patients; people in mental health units and care homes; people living in sheltered housing; and those living with chronic diseases, such as cancer. Malnutrition can seriously threaten patients’ health. Hospitalised malnourished patients are three times more at risk of infection than the well-nourished, while hospital patients at high risk of malnutrition are 12 times more likely to die early than those at no risk. It is a very significant issue. Unfortunately, the figures are not moving in the right direction. The number of adults being admitted to hospital with malnutrition has more than doubled in the last decade—that is the bill for austerity. The evidence is clear that malnutrition impacts a wide range of people in different health settings; again, those are hospitals, mental health units, care homes and sheltered housing. It has a knock-on effect on other conditions.

Earlier this year, the media reported the death of a young disabled woman after a routine operation. Her death was partially caused by malnutrition, and the coroner said there had been a gross failure of care in managing her nutrition. A July 2021 report on malnutrition called it a widespread yet historically overlooked and undertreated issue in the NHS and social care, and attributed that to two factors that block progress—a lack of understanding, and a lack of systematic leadership. The new clause seeks to address that at a local level, which is why we think it is a good one.

The tragic case that I have mentioned shows how important it is to have a clear strategy to tackle malnutrition, to have designated leads and to have targets and co-ordinated policy. The Government say that integrated care boards are about ensuring proper integration between health staff and community services, and this is a really good example of a way in which that could be done. I am keen to hear the Minister’s assessment of the new clause, which should be included in the Bill. We have a significant issue that we are not addressing and that is getting worse, so what are we going to do differently?

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We recognise and know that malnutrition can be a significant problem that can be both a cause and a consequence of ill health. We remain committed to improving the NHS and public health systems, which is helping to improve health and secure early diagnosis of major diseases, tackling some of the root causes of malnutrition. That is backed by the development of the outcomes frameworks covering public health, the NHS and social care, and the development of specific disease outcome strategies.

Individuals, carers and professionals all have a role to play in tackling malnutrition, and there are tools and guidance in place through a range of organisations to help health and social care professionals identify and treat the problem of malnutrition, and to access appropriate training. I note that e-learning modules are currently in place through the Royal College of General Practitioners and the managing adult malnutrition in the community pathway, which was set up by a multidisciplinary group and is widely endorsed by professional bodies aimed at healthcare professionals.

I hope I speak for the whole Committee when I say that we all agree that the NHS can play a vital role in protecting vulnerable people. As part of that, it should have strategies and processes in place for supporting patients and vulnerable people in the community who are at risk of malnutrition. I hope I can reassure the Committee that placing in the Bill a formal duty on ICBs to develop a separate strategy is not strictly necessary, as there is a range of ongoing activity across health and care.

As we have previously discussed, there are already significant existing duties, and duties proposed in the Bill, to prepare plans, including joint local health and wellbeing strategies made at a local authority level by health and wellbeing boards, the integrated care strategy that is to be developed by the integrated care partnership, and the forward plan that is to be developed by the integrated care board. All those plans should be informed by local joint strategic needs assessments, or JSNAs. All the strategies can, where appropriate, consider malnutrition and populations at risk of malnutrition. We have previously debated the range of guidance available to inform thinking on both JSNAs and strategic plans, and we will of course work with NHS England to consider whether it is necessary to include specific references to malnutrition in the guidance.

Should the Bill pass into statute, we expect clinical commissioning groups and ICBs to consider the needs of patients and vulnerable people in their communities, including people who may be at risk of malnutrition. That includes working across health and social care partners to undertake needs assessments on malnutrition, and developing and implementing a work plan to maintain high standards of nutrition through integrated pathways of care. NHSEI’s enhanced health in care homes implementation framework sets out best practice guidance for primary care networks and others in relation to hydration and nutritional support for care home residents. The framework supports the implementation of minimum standards in relation to enhanced health in care homes in the Network Contract Directed Enhanced Service for 2020-21.

The malnutrition task force has also published a series of guides offering expert advice on the prevention of and early intervention in malnutrition in later life, which will support health and care bodies. Alongside that, we have published an independent review of hospital food, which made recommendations for addressing malnutrition in hospitals, and a review of what works in supporting older people in the community to maintain a healthy diet. This “what works” review included a range of examples of good practice at local authority level that others can learn from, and we have provided in the Bill for powers to impose requirements on hospital food standards.

We are helping to raise awareness of malnutrition among individuals and carers through the nhs.uk website, and through the NICE quality standard on malnutrition, which gives a clear and authoritative statement of a quality service. There are ongoing inspection requirements, including for unannounced inspections of health and care settings by the Care Quality Commission, which will continue to ensure expected standards are met.

The new clause would place a requirement on ICBs to have a malnutrition lead. The Bill intentionally allows for flexibility in the make-up of ICBs above the minimum membership requirements that we have previously debated in Committee. They could, if they wished, include condition-specific officers, but we do not want to bind their hands by specifying that they must. That once again returns to the permissive versus prescriptive thread that has run through many of our debates.

However, I do see a huge opportunity for ICPs to consider how best to improve services for people at risk of malnutrition through better partnership and joint working and planning of services, given the complementary services that the NHS and local authorities offer in this context. The new Office for Health Improvement and Disparities is committed to improving the diet of the population and supporting people to maintain a healthy weight.

I hope I have given the Committee some reassurance that we are taking this issue extremely seriously and are committed to enabling the NHS and the wider health and care system to effectively tackle malnutrition.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was a little surprised to hear the Minister defend the status quo. The state of play in this country is not good enough and is getting worse, so I dare say that more of the same will beget more of the same. The Minister said that the new clause was not necessary because of the range of ongoing activity, but I reiterate that what is happening is not sufficient and is not addressing this really important issue.

The two areas for development that were offered were local prioritisation through integrated care strategies and the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities. They are obviously relatively new actors in this space, so it is probably right that we give them time to see whether, as the Minister says, they will prioritise this, choose to make it a top-rated issue and do something about it. I am very sceptical of that, and I suspect that we will be back at this sooner rather than later. However, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 67

Review of the capacity of the dental laboratory sector

“The Secretary of State must within six months of the passage of this Act publish a report assessing the capacity of the dental laboratory sector in the UK to meet the needs of patients.”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the capacity of the UK’s dental laboratory sector.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 68—Access to NHS dentistry—

“The Secretary of State must within one year of the passage of this Act publish a statement setting out what measures the Government is taking to ensure universal access to NHS dentistry.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement of what measures it is taking to ensure universal access to NHS dentistry.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The two new clauses refer to two linked but distinct sectors of the heath service—dental laboratories and dentistry. In each case, we are seeking for the Secretary of State to publish a report about the health of these important sectors.

On new clause 67, the dental laboratory industry manufactures dental appliances to assist in the provision of oral care, such as crowns, bridges and dentures. The British dental laboratory industry plays an important part in the wider oral health landscape, and it is vital for patients, dentists and other registered dental care professionals. This is an unheralded industry, but it touches all our constituencies, and enables our constituents to live without pain. It also provides skilled work in an economy that has too little of it. It is based in communities all over the country, not concentrated in big cities or in London and the south-east. In many ways, it is a towns industry in a country that desperately needs more towns industries.

However, the industry is struggling. It was struggling prior to the pandemic, but it has particularly struggled during it. In the early stages and indeed even today, dentists have rightly—we supported this—been paid full contract for reduced output to reflect the challenging circumstances in which they are operating, but there has never been an obligation to pay this forward to their suppliers. Whereas we might normally expect dental labs to account for 6% to 7% of a dentist’s outgoing, as output has fallen so has that outgoing, so the sector has suffered, but dental labs have needed to stay open to meet need, so they have not been able to completely avail themselves of support.

The messaging around dentistry at a local and national level has also had knock-on impacts for dental laboratories trying to make insurance claims for business disruption, because there has been a misunderstanding, shall we say, about whether they are operating, and how they are operating or not operating.

10:15

The Dental Laboratories Association is a professional body that covers about 80% of dental laboratories in the UK. Last June, it warned of financial ruin for dental laboratories. In recent conversations that I have had with its representatives, they said that demand has increased, but it is not back to its usual levels, particularly regarding NHS services, and the previous impact is still being felt heavily, such that the industry remains in dire straits.

We will lose this sector, or big chunks of it. We will lose British jobs. I know, because I have had conversations with Ministers and the Government on this, that the Government are relaxed about this issue, because they think there will be ample supply from the continent or from China, and in those places, this industry is growing. That is a real mistake, because we would lose control over our understanding of the quality, and particularly the employment and the supply chain. Personally, I think this is an area where we should be once again prioritising buying British, at a time when that seems to be off the Government’s radar, which is really sad.

The new clause is a pretty modest ask in that context. It says that the Secretary of State should enter this space, should have an understanding of what is going on, and should in some way account for it, before we lose this very important industry.

I turn to new clause 68. NHS dentistry also faces significant challenges. Dentistry is now the No.1 issue raised with Healthwatch, which in the context of 35 million lost NHS dental appointments is probably not surprising. However, there are continued access issues, which of course will deepen health inequalities. I would argue that the impact of the pandemic means that these access problems are now on an unprecedented scale in all our communities. Some patients requiring specialist services under sedation are now facing waits for treatment for as long as four years, which is leading us to these horror stories of patients performing DIY dentistry on themselves, or travelling for hours to access the help that they need.

Ahead of last week’s Budget, the British Dental Association warned of a “last-chance saloon” for NHS dentistry, stressing that Government spending on NHS dental services has fallen by a third in real terms over the last decade. Sir Robert Francis QC, the chair of Healthwatch England, who gave evidence to the Committee, joined the BDA in urging the Treasury to commit adequate funding to ensure the recovery and long-term sustainability of our dental services, highlighting that it would take an additional £879 million just to restore resourcing back to 2010 levels. That, of course, was the theme of the Budget, was it not—pretending that the last decade had not happened? Yet in this area there was no new funding, and we have not heard a commitment that a single penny of the billions pledged for the recovery of NHS services will go to dentistry.

Justin Madders

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As my fellow shadow Minister quite rightly points out, this is a huge issue for most constituency MPs. I am not surprised to hear what he said about this being the No.1 complaint to Healthwatch, because behind GP access, dental access is now a huge issue. Before the pandemic, dental services in the Cheshire area were contracted to attend to 55% of the local population’s dental health needs. Clearly, that is insufficient, but the challenges of the pandemic have only made matters worse. I encourage my hon. Friend to continue to raise this very important issue.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for that intervention. It is sobering to hear that 55% was what we started with; we know that it will be less than that now. That rather picks away at the idea of a universal healthcare service.

To finish where I was going with my previous point, if I am wrong about where recovery funding for the NHS is going, and there is to be investment in dentistry, I hope that the Minister will correct me. I would be delighted if that was the case, because the BDA is warning—again, this is something that we will have picked up on in our constituencies—that morale among NHS dentists is at an all-time low. Almost 1,000 dentists in England have stopped providing NHS services in the last financial year. There was the failed contract—I know there is enthusiasm for contract reform in the Department and we will support the Department on that, but we are running out of time to have anything ready for April. In fact, we are probably already too late in that regard. The shambles of the negotiations before Christmas last year that led to the breakdown and the imposition of targets really whittled away at good will and caused a lot of upset.

Almost half of NHS dentists are saying that, unless things change, they intend to hand back their contracts or reduce their NHS commitment. This exodus of dentists from the NHS will have a disastrous and lasting impact on our ability to access NHS dentistry. If 55% is the summit of our ambition, goodness me, where will we go from there? The British Dental Association talks about the last-chance saloon; it is not hyperbole to say that we will not have NHS dentistry in the medium term if we do not have a course change.

More and more people are being pushed into the private sector. That creates market forces that mean that it is almost a self-fulfilling prophecy that dentists—both new ones entering the profession and those who have come to the end of their tether with their NHS contract—go into the private sector. We are seeing significant growth in that space as people living in pain seek drastic action. We will see more pushed on to dental insurance if people do not want to be worried about their finances. That is what privatisation looks like. We will not have NHS dentistry in the medium term unless we do something about this issue—that is the wrong way forward.

New clause 68 makes a very modest ask; it asks the Secretary of State to do what any Secretary of State should want to do: commit to universal access to NHS dentistry and say how it will practically be achieved. At the moment, we have a yawning gap. In that lack of leadership, we will see the drip, drip, drip of the loss of NHS dentistry, until we no longer have it.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I rise to support new clause 68, which is linked to new clause 67. We are aware of the impact of the pandemic, particularly on dentistry. Using a drill on someone’s teeth generates aerosols in their mouth, and that would vastly increase the risk of spreading covid to the dental staff, or to any patient who entered the space soon afterwards. Despite that impact, there has not been significant funding from the UK Government for the dental industry in England to fund the establishment of ventilation and air purification systems. The Scottish Government have committed £5 million specifically for this. As the hon. Member for Nottingham North highlighted, the pandemic impact comes on top of an underlying issue, the core of which is the 2006 dental contract in England and Wales, which breaks provision down into units of dental activity. It does not reward preventive dentistry. It does not reward any practice for taking on someone who already has dental issues, because it will not be properly funded for that.

Out of that comes the failure to focus on child dental health and making sure that this generation of young children grow up with good dental health. Scotland set up Childsmile in 2007, and Wales set up Designed to Smile in 2011. There is plenty of data from both of these programmes to show that providing free dental treatment to children—along with supported tooth brushing at school, fluoride coating and so on—can decrease caries found in children in primary school and at the beginning of secondary school.

Poor dental health has a big impact on general health and self-confidence, yet we hear repeated reports of families and children struggling to access an NHS practice. In the last five years, NHS practice numbers in England have dropped by over 1,250. BDA surveys suggest that almost half of remaining NHS practices are planning to reduce their NHS commitment over the next 12 to 24 months. There was a promise that the contract would be changed by next April, and 100 practices have been trialling a new method of contract. According to the BDA, it has been warned of a return to using units of dental activity from next April. This would be an enormous missed opportunity to improve NHS dental access for everyone, and particularly to take the further step of ensuring that every child in England does not just have access to a dental practice, but is involved, as they grow up, in a programme promoting good dental health.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As ever, I am grateful to hon. Members for highlighting issues relating to new clauses 67 and 68 for debate.

I reassure the Committee that the Government continually assess the capacity of the dental laboratory sector in the UK. It is an important issue, as was highlighted by the shadow Minister, and one we already take seriously. However, it is not necessary to include a specific report requirement, especially as that could focus activity away from addressing the recovery of activity in the sector.

As colleagues will know, and as the hon. Member for Nottingham North set out clearly, dentistry has been significantly impacted throughout the pandemic due to the specific risks associated with aerosol-generating procedures, as the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire set out. The steps we have had to take during the pandemic to ensure the safety of dental patients and staff has led to a reduction in the number of NHS patients who can be seen, although activity continues to grow quarter on quarter. This reduction in NHS dental activity, including for band 3 treatments such as crowns, bridges and dentures, has had a knock-on effect on the laboratory sector. The Government recognise this, and we are already taking steps to secure the capacity of the sector.

First, throughout the pandemic, dental laboratories, where eligible, have been able to access a range of financial support that Her Majesty’s Treasury has made available to private-sector businesses and individuals affected financially by covid-19. Dental laboratories that satisfied the eligibility criteria were able to access financial support through the coronavirus business interruption loan scheme and bounce back loans. In addition, up to September 2021, technicians and lab workers had been able to access the coronavirus job retention scheme, known colloquially as the furlough scheme. The recovery loan scheme, now open until 30 June 2022, supports access to finance for UK businesses as they recover from the pandemic.

During the pandemic, we carefully considered the impact on the sector, including on dental laboratories and their important role, partly through work led by the chief dental officer. We continue to work closely with all relevant parts of the sector. I am happy to confirm that officials from the Department, together with the chief dental officer and others, will be happy to again meet representatives from the dental laboratory sector to better understand their concerns on capacity, what they are seeing in terms of the recovery of their business and trade, and what further action may be needed as we work to recover from the pandemic and safely increase levels of dental activity, for patients, the profession and the industry surrounding it.

Secondly, we are committed to building and maintaining a robust dental workforce and appreciate the important role played by laboratory technicians as part of that. In September, Health Education England released their “Advancing Dental Care” review, which provides recommendations on the reform of education and training for dental care professionals, including dental technicians.

Although this is not directly in my portfolio of responsibilities, I have asked officials to work closely with HEE on the recommendations and actions of this report, including, where it falls into my area of work more broadly, how apprenticeship places for clinical dental technicians are developed, based on an assessment of the role they could play in the delivery of NHS care. The Government are therefore already taking action to help secure the capacity of the dental laboratory sector and ensure it continues to meet the needs of patients in this country.

I turn to new clause 68. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement on measures taken to ensure universal access to NHS dentistry. In addition to the actions I have highlighted, I assure the Committee that this Government are taking action to ensure access to NHS dentistry and, again, I do not consider it necessary to include a requirement to make a statement on this issue on the face of the Bill.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

rose—

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will give way to the hon. Lady—not least so that I can have a glass of water.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is not the least of my reasons for intervening. Rather than just stating that the Government are taking action, does the Minister plan to explain what action they will be taking?

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is psychic, because I was just turning to that.

Dr Whitford

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am only thinking of the Minister’s welfare.

10:30

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very touched by her medical concern for my welfare.

In light of the reduction in activity within dentistry due to the pandemic, dental practices have been asked to deliver as much care as possible, with their first priorities being urgent care, care for vulnerable groups and for children, and then delayed planned care. I put on the record my gratitude to the profession for its hard work and efforts during this time, and I am pleased to note that the levels of urgent care being delivered have now returned to pre-pandemic levels, because of the over 700 urgent care centres established in practices to improve access for people during the pandemic. Throughout the pandemic, we have worked closely with NHS England and NHS Improvement to consider the level of NHS dentistry that can be delivered safely. Activity thresholds for full renumeration are based on data showing what is achievable while maintaining compliance with infection prevention and control measures.

The pandemic has reinforced the fact that transformation in NHS dentistry is essential. As has been alluded to, NHSEI is leading ongoing work on reforming the current dental system, working with a wide range of stakeholders and system partners. We acknowledge that, even before the pandemic and the imposition of limitations that it necessitated, access to NHS dentistry was sometimes a challenge in some areas and for some people. Putting that right will require action to both reform contractual arrangements and ensure that there are trained and qualified dental teams providing NHS services throughout the country.

Since the announcement in March that NHSEI is leading on the next stage of dental system reform, it has continued to work closely with system partners and stakeholders, including the British Dental Association in particular. The NHSEI dental system reform will deliver against a number of fundamental aims, including delivering improved health outcomes, an increased focus on preventive dental work, affordability for patients, and recognising that changes need to be supported by the profession. Making the NHS dental contract more attractive to the profession is a key part of helping with vital recruitment and retention. I know that will be particularly welcome to hon. Members from rural and coastal areas, as it has been highlighted that there is a particular challenge in some of those communities.

A key objective of this work is to improve patient access to NHS care, with a specific focus on addressing inequalities. We will set out our proposals in that area next year, in addition to the provisions in this Bill that will allow the Secretary of State to expand water fluoridation schemes. In addition, Health Education England’s “Advancing Dental Care” programme will, over the next four years, deliver its blueprint for change to reform education and training, develop skills, enable modernised flexible working, and widen access and participation among the workforce.

Together, we believe these measures will address the key challenges that impede the delivery of NHS dentistry, and improve patient access to NHS care. The Government will carry on with this essential work, and will continue co-operating with HEE and external stakeholders on this important issue. For that reason, I ask—possibly in vain—that the hon. Member for Nottingham North considers withdrawing the new clause.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to colleagues for their contributions. I am particularly glad that the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire brought up units of dental activity, which are a Treasury way of understanding activity, not a public health way of understanding oral health. Although they are effective for setting balanced budgets on an annual basis, they are really bad for saving money—in fact, they have cost money. There is broad consensus that UDAs are long out of date, and that after 15 years, it is time to move away from them.

Dealing with new clause 68 first, I was glad to hear the Minister at least suggest that this is an active process, because it was the first sign I have seen that the move away was not just a conceptual one. On that basis, I will not press the new clause to a Division, because we will not prejudge that process. However, I gently say that we really need to get on with this, because lots of dentists are waiting on the outcome of that process before making their judgment as to whether or not NHS dentistry is in their future. I was also glad to hear the Minister acknowledge that the system was not good enough before the pandemic. In response, I would say that removing a third of the real-terms funding was perhaps a significant reason why it was not very good anymore, and in future the answer may lie in tackling that point.

Turning to new clause 67, I was of course glad to hear the Minister say that this issue is being taken seriously. However, I was not clear on what “taken seriously” means beyond the existing support there is for businesses generally, not least because dentists have operated in this half space of still being open but not having the fullest demand on their order books, which has often meant that they have fallen between stools. However, I think the offer of that meeting is better than the new clause and, on that basis, I will pursue the route of that kind offer. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 69

National lead for policy related to allergies

“Within 6 months of the passage of this Act the Secretary of State must direct NHS England to designate a national lead for policy related to allergies.”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause brings in a requirement for the Secretary of State to ensure the appointment of a NHS England allergy lead.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 69 is very important indeed. It requires the Secretary of State to direct NHS England to appoint a tsar to lead on policy related to allergies.

In 2016, 15-year-old Natasha Ednan-Laperouse tragically lost her life after suffering an allergic reaction to a Pret A Manger baguette. Since then, her parents have campaigned tirelessly to ensure that her death was not in vain and to stop other parents and loved ones having to suffer as they are suffering. They set up the Natasha Allergy Research Foundation and their campaigning has already successfully led to Natasha’s law, which was implemented just last month and requires food retailers to display full ingredient and allergen labelling on foods made on premises and prepacked for direct sale. That is a tremendous achievement, and it will make a significant difference to lots of people. I have met the Ednan-Laperouse family, with their MP, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter); they are inspiring people and tremendous campaigners. The new clause is very much in the spirit of their latest campaign—I certainly would not bet against them.

The World Health Organisation has described allergic disease as a “modern epidemic”, while Allergy UK estimates that up to 21 million people in the UK are affected by allergies. Allergic disorders can have a detrimental impact on patients’ quality of life, as they not only have the obvious health effects, but can mean that social interactions that others take for granted—such as eating out, or even going to work—are a major health risk. Allergies can be complex: patients can suffer from several disorders at the same time, each triggered by different allergies.

In the 20 years to 2012, hospital admissions for anaphylaxis rose by 615%. Despite that, allergies are not particularly high up the political agenda for conversation and there is a perception of poor management across the NHS due to a lack of training and expertise. At the root of that is the fact that we have a very small number of consultants in adult or paediatric allergy and the fact that GPs receive basically no training in allergy.

Following the inquest into the death of Shanté Turay-Thomas—another tragic teenage death—the coroner highlighted the lack of a national allergy lead in her prevention of future death report, which was sent to the Department of Health and Social Care. I think today is a chance to make good on that, and I would be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say on those suggestions. Natasha’s foundation, with the support of Shanté’s mother, subsequently made the call for an allergy tsar.

Two weeks ago, the all-party parliamentary group on allergy, in conjunction with the National Allergy Strategy Group, launched its report, “Meeting the challenges of the National Allergy Crisis”. The report

“calls for an influential lead for allergy to be appointed who can implement a new national strategy to help the millions of people”

suffering. There is a real coming together across our communities of people in this space calling for this measure, and this the moment to do it.

Otherwise, as I have suggested, NHS allergy services will continue to get little attention, little prominence and little investment. Care is patchy and we know that people deserve much better support. An allergy tsar would act as a public champion for those with allergies, helping to deliver a national plan to join up GP and hospital services so that patients have a consistent and coherent NHS care pathway, and helping to promote the training of more specialist allergy doctors, consultants and GPs. It would make a difference to millions of people. I hope that the Minister will look upon the new clause favourably and give the answer that millions of people are waiting for.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As the shadow Minister set out, the new clause would place a statutory responsibility on the Secretary of State, requiring him or her to direct NHS England to appoint an allergy lead. The shadow Minister rightly highlighted that tragic case that demonstrated to the country the issues and challenges in this space. I entirely sympathise with the intent of the hon. Gentleman, but I hope I can provide him with some reassurance that the amendment is not necessary, because NHSE is already able to appoint an allergy lead, or allergy tsar—call it what you will.

There is no specific national clinical director or specialty adviser for routine allergy services, but I am advised that NHS England and NHS Improvement keep their clinical leadership, including the national clinical director and national specialty adviser roles, under review to ensure alignment with the strategic priorities of the NHS and need. I am sure that NHSE will reflect carefully on the points made by the hon. Gentleman, and I will undertake to acquire a copy of the Hansard to pass on to NHS England and request that it considers the points he made in this context.

I also recognise that, more broadly, it is vital that NHS England and commissioners receive appropriate clinical advice in this area. That is currently provided by the clinical reference group for specialised immunology and allergy services. The CRG covers specialised treatment of certain immunological and allergic conditions. The allergic conditions include severe, complex and/or rare sub-groups. People with allergies continue to be supported through locally commissioned NHS services but, to support patients with more complex conditions, NHSE also directly commissions some specialist services. To support the implementation of coherent care pathways, NICE has also published guidance on a range of allergy conditions, including food allergy in under-19s, anaphylaxis and drug allergy.

We therefore do not believe that the new clause needs to be included in the Bill. Notwithstanding whether the hon. Gentleman decides to press it to a Division, I undertake to ensure that his comments and the case he makes for the role are passed on directly to NHS England. NHSE already has the power, should it wish to exercise it, to put such a person in post.

Alex Norris

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for that offer. I hope that when NHS England has a chance to consider what has been discussed in Committee, that will generate an offer to meet campaigners to understand what they are after and, we hope, to move positively on it. Beyond that, I am afraid that the Minister’s answer was too much in defence of a status quo that does not work for too many people for me to accept it. In the spirit of elevating the matter up the political agenda and creating that blinking light on someone’s dashboard to generate action, I will press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 45

Ayes: 5

Labour: 5

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

The Chair

- Hansard -

The final question that I must put is that I report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

Edward Argar

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On a point of order, Mr Bone. Craving your indulgence, may I take this opportunity as we complete the lengthy passage of this legislation through Committee to put on the record our gratitude to the Clerks of the Committee, to the Hansard team and to the Doorkeepers? I also thank you and your fellow Chairs, and colleagues on the Committee. It would be remiss of me not to put on the record my gratitude for the amazing work done by my officials in the Department in preparing the Bill and in helping us to be ready to take it through the detailed scrutiny that has rightly happened in Committee. Thank you, Mr Bone.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Thank you for that bogus point of order.

Justin Madders

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Further to that point of order, Mr Bone. I echo the Minister’s thanks, not only to you and the other Chairs, Mrs Murray, Mr McCabe and Ms Elliott, but to the Clerks, who have been described to us as very patient and helpful—great qualities in such a long Bill Committee—and to the other parliamentary staff, the Doorkeepers and the Hansard Reporters. As the Minister said of his officials, we too have a great team—though probably a smaller one—of researchers who have been fantastic in giving us the information that we need to make the arguments. I also thank the Whips—it would be remiss of me not to—without whom none of this runs as smoothly as it does. On that note, I thank the Committee for its indulgence.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

10:46

Committee rose.

Written evidence reported to the House

HCB110 NHS Providers

HCB111 Prof John Wattis

HCB112 The College of Optometrists

HCB113 Sue Ryder

HCB114 Breast Cancer Now

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Subsidy Control Bill (Sixth sitting)

Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Caroline Nokes, Mr Virendra Sharma

† Baynes, Simon (Clwyd South) (Con)

† Benton, Scott (Blackpool South) (Con)

† Blackman, Kirsty (Aberdeen North) (SNP)

† Bowie, Andrew (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)

† Buchan, Felicity (Kensington) (Con)

† Esterson, Bill (Sefton Central) (Lab)

† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)

Flynn, Stephen (Aberdeen South) (SNP)

Hollinrake, Kevin (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Aberavon) (Lab)

† Malhotra, Seema (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)

† Millar, Robin (Aberconwy) (Con)

† Mortimer, Jill (Hartlepool) (Con)

† Scully, Paul (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy)

† Stafford, Alexander (Rother Valley) (Con)

† Tomlinson, Michael (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)

† Whitley, Mick (Birkenhead) (Lab)

Kevin Maddison, Bradley Albrow, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Afternoon)

[Caroline Nokes in the Chair]

Subsidy Control Bill

14:00

The Chair

- Hansard -

Before we restart proceedings, I remind Members about the updated guidance on face coverings and the increased risk in Committee. I encourage you to observe social distancing and to wear a mask when you are not speaking.

Clause 34

Information to be included in the subsidy database

Amendment proposed (this day): 40, in clause 34, page 18, line 9, remove “may” and insert “must”.—(Seema Malhotra.)

This amendment makes the regulations listed in subsection (2) mandatory for entries on the subsidy database.

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

The Chair

- Hansard -

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 19, in clause 34, page 18, line 12, leave out “may, in particular,” and insert “must”.

This amendment seeks to ensure the Secretary of State will include all these measures in the regulations.

Amendment 41, in clause 34, page 18, line 12, leave out from “The” to “particular,” and insert “Regulations made under subsection (1) must”.

This amendment makes it a requirement for subsidies entered into the database to include the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (i) of subsection (2).

Amendment 20, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) any other matter which the Secretary of State deems necessary”.

This amendment is linked to amendment 19.

Amendment 21, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the purpose of the subsidy”.

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to include a requirement in regulations that a public authority’s entry in the database details the purpose of the subsidy.

Amendment 43, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the date the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database.”

This amendment requires the date on which the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database, to be included in entries on the database.

Amendment 42, in clause 34, page 18, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about further information that must be included in a public authority’s entry in the subsidy database in relation to a subsidy or subsidy scheme.”

This amendment allows the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out further information required to be published on the subsidy database.

Amendment 44, in clause 34, page 18, line 34, at end insert—

“(d) the date the public authority confirms the decision to give each subsidy under the scheme;

(e) the duration of each subsidy under the scheme;

(f) any time limits or other conditions attached to the use of each subsidy under the scheme;

(g) the amount of each subsidy or the amount budgeted for each subsidy under the scheme;

(h) the date each subsidy under the scheme was published.”

This amendment requires that the information required to be entered into the subsidy database for subsidy schemes includes much of the same information required for subsidies.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you for chairing the Committee, Ms Nokes. I came back thinking that I had notes, but I have just written two sentences on a bit of paper. Hopefully I will not ramble too much. I want to speak to amendment 19 and amendment 20, which is linked to amendment 19, and amendment 21. I think that is all, but I will speak to other amendments as we come to them.

The logic behind amendment 19 is, unsurprisingly, to try to give us a bit more certainty about what the Secretary of State will require to be included in the subsidy database. It changes “may, in particular” to “must” in subsection (2), to give us certainty that those things will definitely be included. That strengthens the clause and makes it clearer. Amendments 20 and 21 allow the Secretary of State to include anything else that they think is necessary, because if “may” is strengthened to “must”, we need to allow the Secretary of State to have a bit more flexibility to include anything else not listed.

Amendment 21 is about the purpose of the subsidy. We are concerned, having looked at the entry requirements for local authorities—sorry, I mean public authorities; I spent far too many years as a local authority councillor. This amendment has been included because I am not convinced that paragraph (b) on the policy objective of the subsidy scheme adequately covers what we would like to have in that database. People who put things in the subsidy control database need to say why they are giving the subsidy to the organisation. That is important not just for setting the policy objective, particularly in subsidy schemes, but for knowing the point of that individual subsidy—why it is given to that organisation. It will be very helpful if the Minister outlines whether he thinks additional things may be added to this list by the Secretary of State. I hope he can be clear with the Committee that this is not necessarily a prescriptive list and the Secretary of State may include other things in it. I am assuming that is why the language was chosen at the beginning of subsection (2), but if the Minister could state that, it would be helpful for us to understand.

We have discussed at some length the importance of the subsidy control database, and the fact that it is the only way enterprises or public authorities will be able to find out about subsidies that have been made that may distort competition. I agree with the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, that it is very important that we get this right, and that we have as much information as possible, so that people can make pre-action requests and challenge a subsidy.

The subsidy control database is not a tick-box exercise, and I hope that subsidy control is not a tick-box exercise; subsidy control is necessary, and not just so that we can meet our international obligations. Presumably, the Government think that it is a good thing. It is good that we have regulations around subsidies; that is very important. If subsidy control is not to be a tick-box exercise enabling us to meet our obligations, and if we are not saying, “We’re just going to do the bare minimum,” it is key that the Government give some thought to the amendments tabled by Labour and the SNP, and consider whether it is important to strengthen the data on the subsidy control database, as well as the ability to search it and timelines, which we have talked about.

Amendment 21 would require the purpose of the subsidy to be put on the database. That is missing from the list in clause 34. It would be useful for organisations and public authorities to have information on why the subsidy was given. If the Minister believes that

“the policy objective of the subsidy or scheme”

adequately covers the purpose of the subsidy, it would be helpful if he could state that, and say that the Government will request authorities to include the purpose of the subsidy. That would give us comfort about the information that will be on the subsidy control website.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Nokes. I thank hon. Members for their interest in clause 34 and the amendments to it. As we have heard, the clause concerns the technicalities of how we will require public authorities to upload details of subsidies to the database, and allows the Secretary of State to make regulations setting up the information requirements of the database. The regulations will be technical in nature, and Parliament will have the opportunity to review them through the negative procedure.

We have thought really carefully about this, and I would like briefly to take the Committee through our rationale for taking the power. The definitions, rules and processes at the core of the proposed new regime are set out in the Bill. Further technical detail and specificity will be needed on the exact transparency requirements. Our new regime needs to be responsive to market and technological changes and to reflect future trade deals and international obligations. It is also important that it can respond to unforeseen events and developments. We need to be able to act quickly, when necessary, to events such as financial crises, covid-19, and changes in world markets and the global capacity for the production of particular materials.

The list of information that must be uploaded on the database relates to the technical, administrative reporting requirements placed on public authorities, rather than the substantive subsidy control requirements that determine which subsidies are given. For these reasons—the need to change at pace, and the fact that these are simply reporting requirements, not rules about when subsidies can be given—we have provided for the Secretary of State to have the power to make these requirements by regulation, rather than putting them in the Bill.

We share the desire to be as transparent as possible. This is a crucial part of the regime, not a tick-box exercise; I assure the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that we take it very seriously. In order to give Parliament further information about what kind of information may be provided, subsections (2) and (3) provide illustrative lists.

Amendments 19, 20, 41 and 42 concern similar matters, so I will address them together. As I have said, the Government’s intention in providing the list of requirements in subsections (2) and (3) is to illustrate the kind of information requirements that may be included in the regulations. Those regulations are not yet prepared. More work is required to gather evidence and scope out the most appropriate way of setting out the database upload requirements in legislation. These requirements need to be clear and operationally viable, and must ensure appropriate transparency and value for those interested in subsidy award data.

Our intention is to make the regulations as straightforward and concise as possible and to avoid duplication. The amendments would mean that the Secretary of State must include in the regulations all the fields listed in clause 34(2).

Amendment 41 also covers the list in subsection (3)—the lists would no longer be illustrative but would be a minimum that could be added to. The regulations would be required to include information that, on the basis of the information gathered before drafting the regulations, might be surplus to requirements. We want to ensure that the exhaustive work is done beforehand, because we have tried to avoid creating additional, unnecessary reporting requirements for public authorities in the UK’s new subsidy control regime while still being as transparent as possible. Before setting out the requirements, the Government will carry out full analysis to ensure that data fields are useful and appropriate.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Can the Minister give me some comfort that public authorities updating the database and those searching the database will be involved in the consultation, and that the majority of the decisions taken by the Government are likely to be led by consultation responses, rather than if the consultation comes back and states, “We absolutely want paragraph (f); that absolutely has to be there” the Government would be unlikely to decide not to have paragraph (f)?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We will engage with all those bodies—with the public authorities that will have to do the reporting; with the recipients of subsidies; and with people interested in subsidy data and transparency. We have already started that engagement, and it will continue because it is important that the database is as useful as possible and is balanced by a proportionate approach so that we do not duplicate effort. None the less, these will all be taken into account as we gather the evidence.

The data required for the database needs to be available to public authorities without creating large administrative burdens, either on those authorities or on subsidy recipients. It needs to be data that is relevant to all subsidies and schemes, or to be clear in which circumstances it is required, and where it is not. It needs to be presented so that those viewing it can easily access the data available and seek out the information they need.

In addition to getting this right for commencement of the new regime, it is important to remember, as I mentioned earlier, that the requirements may need to change over time. For these reasons, I believe it is right that the lists in subsections (2) and (3) remain illustrative—that is to say, the regulations should not be required to include all types of information listed. The ability to tailor the regulations in future is essential for ensuring that the database does what it needs to do and can allow for different requirements for different types of subsidy.

Amendments 21, 43 and 44 seek to add further categories of information to the illustrative lists. As I have already set out, these lists should be considered illustrative of the technical requirements that the Government expect to bring forward in secondary legislation. As such, any additions are unnecessary.

The illustrative list provided clearly demonstrates that the regulations are intended to cover the information for interested parties to understand the key facts about a subsidy or subsidy scheme, and whether it is likely to harm their interests.

Amendment 40, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, would make it compulsory for the Secretary of State to make regulations under this power. I assure members of the Committee that the Government intend to bring forward these regulations before the commencement of the subsidy control regime. However, I do not believe it is appropriate to consider these regulations essential to the operation of the new subsidy control regime as set out in the Bill, because the regulations are essentially technical.

Kirsty Blackman

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The Minister says that the Government intend to bring forward the regulations before the subsidy regime starts. Can he give us an assurance that it will be not a few days before but long enough for public authorities to understand their obligations and include the correct data?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I can reassure the hon. Lady on two things. First, we want to ensure that we develop this with public authorities—that we engage with them so that they are part of the process. They will be reporting, so we want them to understand what they have to do.

Secondly, as I said in answer to the hon. Lady during a previous sitting, we want to do this in good time and ensure that public authorities, beneficiaries and everyone involved have time to digest it. That is very much the aim ahead of commencement.

The regulations are essentially technical in character and do not fundamentally change the substantive subsidy control requirements. The current practice clearly demonstrates that there is no need to have such specific requirements in force for the database to be operational as it is already up and running, although we can and will improve it.

I therefore request that the amendment be withdrawn.

14:15

Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his remarks and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for speaking to her amendments. I remain concerned that the provision is not nearly robust enough and I was not fully reassured by the Minister’s comments. I take on board some of his remarks. Further work and research may be needed to check that the list is complete or whether more information may be needed on the database. However, I did not understand some parts of the Minister’s response. Which bit of subsection (2)(a) to (i) would he not want included in any subsidy entry? Why are they in the Bill to start with? They all seem eminently sensible.

I would like to push two of our amendments to a vote. The first is amendment 40, which would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to make the provisions by regulation. It would be made mandatory for information to be entered, and that is done by the amendment changing the word “may” to “must” in subsection (1). Although I will not press the other amendments, I would like to push amendment 43 to a vote. For the reasons I outlined, it is fundamental that the date on which the subsidy or scheme was entered on to the database be included in the entries. So much can be hooked on to that date and if it is not, scrutiny becomes much more fragile, as is the ability of interested parties to bring forward cases with clarity. Those are fundamental points if information is to be debated robustly. The system cannot be at all robust if those important elements are missing.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 7

Ayes: 5

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Amendment proposed: 19, in clause 34, page 18, line 12, leave out “may, in particular,” and insert “must”.—(Kirsty Blackman.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 8

Ayes: 5

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Amendment proposed: 43, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the date the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database.”—(Seema Malhotra.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 9

Ayes: 5

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 34, page 18, line 35, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) Regulations to be made under this section for the first time are subject to the affirmative procedure. (5) Any subsequent regulations made under this section are subject to the negative procedure.”

This amendment would have the regulations be considered under the affirmative procedure, in the first instance, and the negative procedure for any future tweaks.

I like to think I am not an unreasonable person. We have debated at some length what needs to be on the subsidy control database, and it was also discussed during our evidence sessions. It is fundamental to the operation of the scheme that the subsidy control database is fit for purpose and that the information that is available on it is agreed in consultation with the public authorities and the enterprises that it will affect. That relates both to what goes on to the database and to the ability to challenge anything that is happening.

When the regulations are first made, there is likely to be some disagreement. We have had plenty of disagreement already about whether a provision should say “may” or “must” and members of the Committee have brought up good points that Ministers may not have heard before. The Minister’s characterisation of some of the consultation responses has been slightly challenged by the shadow Minister on the ground that some of those responses were not as clear as the Minister suggested. For that reason, when we consider for the first time the information to be included on the subsidy control database, it is important that we do so by the affirmative procedure. Any subsequent changes can be done by the negative procedure.

As the Minister has said, this is a framework Bill, but we have not seen this part of the framework. If the scheme is to work, we need to see what it will involve. The Minister said that this section was specifically about what was included on the database and not about the regulation of subsidy because there are rules on whether or not they are awarded. He is right about that, but we will not be able to understand whether subsidies are being given unless they are on the database. We simply will not know whether they exist. The only burden on public authorities is to provide a letter to the business; it does not involve any level of check or anything that enables us to scrutinise what has happened. The affirmative procedure, in the first instance, would be the best way forward, with the negative procedure for future iterations—tweaks to ensure it is operating correctly.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendment 22 concerns the procedure by which the Secretary of State can make regulations to set out the information that public authorities must upload to the transparency database.

As we have discussed in the context of other amendments, these regulations are highly technical. They do not change the substantive subsidy control requirements or the basis on which subsidies can be given. They are also not necessary for the database to function—as demonstrated by the fact that it is already operational.

The negative procedure is most appropriate for a technical issue such as this.  As I mentioned this morning, the Bill proposes the right parliamentary procedure for different types of secondary legislation. I mentioned the powers to amend the exemption thresholds in clause 42(1) being subject to the affirmative procedure because they affect the substantive subsidy control requirements rather than the thresholds or entries on the database that we are discussing.

The regulations will be drafted and published in good time to ensure that public authorities understand what the regulations will require of them.  I therefore request that the amendment be withdrawn.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his statement. It will be interesting to see whether the regulations come forward in the negative or the affirmative.

I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. I say simply that, although the website is operational, it is not very functional. The Minister has admitted that it has shortcomings, a number of which would have been sorted if the intention of the regulations had been made clearer in the Bill or if they would be discussed under the affirmative procedure.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that stipulate what information must be provided by a public authority with respect to a subsidy scheme or subsidy award when it is recorded on the subsidy database.

The regulations will be subject to the negative procedure.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Subsection 2(g) of the clause mentions

“the amount of the subsidy or scheme or the amount budgeted for the subsidy or scheme.”

That directly contradicts what the Minister said in relation to tax measures. He said that tax measures could not be put on to the database in advance of knowing exactly how much the tax measures would be. I suggested that it would be possible to include the budgeted amount on the website. The Minister said that would not be possible—it would be important to have the final amount. This specifically states that in regulations the Government might ask for the budgeted amount—particularly for tax measures, where there is such a long time before a public authority has to upload the information, during which a business might, because of the distortive effects of the subsidy, be in serious financial difficulties and go under. It is bizarre that the argument that the Minister made is directly contradicted by subsection 2(g). It would be helpful to know why the provision is in the Bill if the Government would not even consider using it—which is what he suggested earlier.

14:49

Seema Malhotra

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I am grateful for the opportunity to say a few words in this stand part debate.

We have discussed extensively the considerable concerns about the framing of clause 34. We will not vote against clause stand part, and there is no mechanism for us to abstain. I will make one final comment, on the content of subsection (3). It is extremely important that there is a thorough set of requests from public authorities to make sure that the criteria being used for the calculation of the subsidy are explicit, for all the reasons of transparency that we have talked about. We need to see that embedded through the Bill. To be fit for purpose, there are a number of areas where we believe that needs to be strengthened. We intend to come back to these issues at future stages of the Bill.

Paul Scully

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To answer the question from the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, the criteria used to determine how the figures are arrived at are part of the purpose of the subsidy, which is why that information is in the Bill, but guidance will also be provided, as will regulations on gross cash equivalents.

On the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, that, effectively, is why this is an illustrative list. Budgeted amounts can vary significantly from the final subsidy, so it might not be appropriate for them to be used in all cases, including for tax. None the less, we want to work out these issues on an evidence-led basis, having engaged with the public authorities to see how the database will work in practice. It is important we work with the public authorities to come up with the guidance and final regulations in plenty of time before commencement.

Kirsty Blackman

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It would be very helpful if when the consultation is carried out the Government were to ask enterprises whether they would prefer to see the data earlier, or the final figure. I think the Government have got it wrong on this one.

Paul Scully

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As I said, we will engage with enterprises and public authorities, as well as academic and legal experts, to make sure we get the balance right. We think we have a balanced and proportionate response, but that will be developed in plenty of time before commencement.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Introductory

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

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The Bill sets out a robust but flexible framework for the awarding of subsidies. As part of the regime provides the necessary flexibility for public authorities, certain types of subsidies are exempt from the framework entirely, or from different elements of it, depending on the nature and context of different subsidy decisions. For example, except for the continued application of clauses 16 and 17 in respect of goods, there is no need to apply the subsidy control requirements to lower value subsidies that have minimal distortive impacts, including those given to services of public economic interest.

Although the framework should be flexible enough to allow public authorities to provide the necessary support in emergencies, in other areas, such as monetary policy subsidies, it is entirely inappropriate for them to be within scope of the subsidy control regime. For monetary policy, it is crucial that the subsidy control framework does not undermine the Bank of England’s independence or hinder its role in the macroeconomic framework. Part 3 sets out a number of other exceptions, such as on subsidy schemes established before the regime will be enforced, where there is a need to give certain subsidies or make a subsidy scheme to maintain financial stability, and subsidies given for large cross-border co-operation projects.

Seema Malhotra

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The clause explains this part of the Bill, which sets out where certain subsidies and schemes are to be exempt from the requirements of the regime. We do not have any specific issues with the clause, and are happy to support that it stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Minimal financial assistance

Amendment proposed: 33, in clause 36, page 19, line 17, after “requirements” insert

“with the exception of duties under section 33,”.—(Kirsty Blackman.)

This amendment requires that Minimum financial assistance under £315,000 is subject to the subsidy database requirements in clause 33, despite being exempt from the other control requirements in Part 2.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 10

Ayes: 2

Scottish National Party: 1
Labour: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

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The exemption allows public authorities to award low-value subsidies of up to £315,000 over three years with maximum flexibility and minimal administrative burden. Subsidies given through the minimal financial assistance exemption are very unlikely to have any appreciable distortive impact on international trade and investment, or UK competition and investment, so it is appropriate to exempt them from the substantive requirements of the regime, subject to the value threshold set out in the clause and the relevant procedural requirements set out in clause 37.

Kirsty Blackman

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I continue to believe that subsection (2) of the clause is meaningless and unpoliceable because of the way that the subsidy control database is being put together. I would very much like it if the Minister would, either now or at some future point, in writing preferably, let us know how the Government intend to ensure that public authorities are able to find out whether an organisation has had a subsidy before, what its value was, and whether the subsidy that it will potentially award to that organisation will push it over the £315,000 limit.

There is no point in the clause if there is no way in which it can work because of the Government’s decisions on how the database is run. I am very pleased that a public authority will have to write a letter to an organisation to say, “We’re giving you a subsidy under the minimal financial assistance scheme,” but that does not go far enough. It may be helpful if it had to write a letter to all granting authorities, because then they would all be aware of the subsidy that had been given, and they could take decisions. This is an unfair and not sensible burden to put on granting authorities, because there is no way that they can ensure that they are abiding by the law, or get the transparency data to prove that they have done so.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We will not support clause stand part. My contribution will build on the arguments made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. We debated amendment 33, which I think went part way to covering some of our concerns, but our concerns are broader, in questioning the exemptions from some of the control requirements.

The clause outlines subsidies that are exempt from the subsidy control principles, stating that the principles do not apply to subsidies worth less than £315,000 to one enterprise over three years. We believe that subsidy control principles exist for a reason; we are having these debates and setting up this regime for a reason. Subsidies should help to pursue a specific policy objective. They should be proportionate. They should encourage certain behaviours. They should not fund unnecessary costs. They should not be distortive or cause overwhelmingly negative effects. They should not affect competition and investment within the UK. Those principles should stand regardless of the size of the subsidy.

A subsidy being smaller does not mean that it cannot be disproportionate or bring about negative effects. All subsidies have the power potentially to harm the economy. They should be transparent and subject to scrutiny and the potential for challenge, and therefore all should be required to be in line with the subsidy control principles. I have not heard anything from the Minister, although he may yet persuade me otherwise, about why the clause is needed and why the Bill cannot require all subsidies to be transparent and in line with the subsidy control principles—it is the Subsidy Control Bill.

Paul Scully

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Clause 37, as we will discuss in a second, states that the public authority has to confirm with the enterprise that the subsidy is still below the threshold. That is the right balance for a proper process to confirm that the threshold is respected without applying disproportionate burdens of oversight for small subsidies that are unlikely to be distortive in any way. Although the regime is light touch, it still imposes some obligations, and it is not proportionate to impose them on very small subsidies that are unlikely to have an impact on trade and competition. For that reason, we feel that the balance is right between the transparency required to make sure that the subsidies are made and reported, and that we can understand the effect and distortion they may have, and the administrative burden that will be put on public authorities and those smaller businesses.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I appreciate the case that the shadow Minister made. I am not entirely convinced at this point; I need to think about it a bit more. I will therefore abstain if clause stand part is pushed to a vote, but I reserve the right to change my mind on Report.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We wish to push clause stand part to a vote.

Division 11

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 5

Labour: 5

Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Section 36: procedural requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

14:44

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 36 establishes the minimum financial assistance—or MFA—exemption and the value threshold for awarding subsidies under the exemption. That exemption allows subsidies to be given without having to comply with the subsidy control requirements, and clause 37 sets out the procedural requirements to use that exemption.

Before awarding an MFA subsidy, a public authority has to provide the intended beneficiary with an MFA notification. That must set out that the subsidy is proposed to be awarded as MFA, the value of the prospective subsidy and it must request confirmation that the enterprise will not exceed the MFA threshold. The public authority can only award the subsidy when it has received this confirmation. When awarding an MFA subsidy, the public authority must give the intended beneficiary an MFA confirmation, which is a written statement confirming that the subsidy has been awarded through the MFA exemption, the gross value amount of the subsidy and the date on which the subsidy was awarded. The beneficiary must keep a record of this information for three years, beginning on the date on which the subsidy was awarded.

Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 37 refers to the enterprise needing to keep a written record. How will the public authority know that the enterprise is keeping that written record?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That would be for challenge, should the overall subsidy be challenged in a court through judicial review. The public authority should exercise its statutory obligations.

Stephen Kinnock

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Just to clarify, we are taking it from the enterprise based on trust?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It works both ways. If I were an enterprise receiving a subsidy, such as minimum financial assistance, I would want to make sure that I was doing my own due diligence, and public authorities do. Any businessman would know that there are legal implications and legal requirements of running a business. It should be the case that it works both ways.

There are interlocking elements within the framework that ensure that both public authorities and enterprises are doing their own due diligence. The procedural requirements will make sure that enterprises receive subsidies only through the MFA exemption when they are genuinely entitled to do so, while still minimising the administrative burden associated with awarding a subsidy. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have a few questions about the clause. It would be helpful if the Minister could lay out what he expects the timeline to be for these requirements. The minimal financial assistance notification has to be given in advance of the subsidy being awarded. It is an intention letter that says the body intends to give the subsidy. Presumably that has to happen at any point in advance of the actual cash changing hands or the tax measure taking place.

My second question is about the minimal financial assistance confirmation, which is the written statement confirming that the subsidy has been given, the date it has been given and the gross value of the assistance. The Minister made clear earlier in the debate that it could be up to a year, or even longer, before an enterprise actually knows what the gross value of that assistance is if it is a tax measure. Are the bodies expected to give the confirmation as soon as they give the subsidy, or are they expected to give the confirmation as soon as they know the exact amount, particularly for tax measures? The provision does not seem to add up with the details we were given on the subsidy control database.

The other questions I have are about what “written” means. If a public authority emails these details to an organisation, does that count as written? Clause 37 says that

“the enterprise must keep a written record”.

Does it have to keep these details on a piece of paper in a filing cabinet, or can it be kept in an electronic form? What if the enterprise does not have much in the way of offices? What if it operates largely online? We have seen many enterprises move towards online working. Is an electronic version acceptable? Would the enterprise be fulfilling its duties by keeping an electronic record, or do we need that bit of paper, hanging about somewhere in someone’s house or office or wherever?

If the Minister cannot give exact answers to my specific questions, it would be handy if he could supply the answers at a later date—

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In writing?

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In writing would be absolutely fine—if that is by email, I am happy to receive it electronically. It would be helpful if the Minister could write to us to confirm what “written” means. For people to be able to meet their obligations, he will probably have to make some sort of statement about what the Government intend, either today or at a later stage.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to speak to clause stand part. The Minister could have saved himself a whole debate had he supported our arguments on clause 36, because this clause sets out the procedural requirements attached to subsidies given under the clause 36 exemption.

The clause outlines how public authorities must provide the intended recipient with a notification, stating that they cannot award a subsidy until they have received confirmation from the intended recipient in a number of areas, including that the relevant threshold will not be breached. There are a whole set of debates to be had about what is considered a subsidy and what is not—we have had that on other aspects of the Bill—and about the lack of full clarity on the interface with the freeports policy or on taxation and subsidies. Clear guidance will be needed for interpretation by the enterprise of what it needs to consider when answering the question under subsection (2)(c). I hope that the Minister will set out in his remarks how he intends that to happen, to give surety to the enterprise and to the public authority.

As I said, Labour does not support clause 36. In my view, we have not heard a convincing case for such exemptions, which seem to be beyond what is needed. Our starting principle must be and must remain transparency. Confidence in this regime is all about transparency, to ensure that there is no cronyism or potential fraud. Once we have set up an agile, simple and robust system, which it is surely not beyond our wit to do, it should be straightforward to provide that information.

The Minister said earlier that the MFA notification would not need to be published. Will he clarify whether that is still the intention if an MFA notification goes to an enterprise? Local authorities and public authorities can simply publish on their websites, for example, when they have given some form of notification. That is a common thing to do, and publishing on a website what has been given to an enterprise does not in my view involve any issue of commercial confidentiality or of not being in the public interest; it would simply be transparent.

If we do not win the argument about changing the detail of the regime, there might be a middle way: at least the notifications ought to be published. Will the Minister tell us whether that has been given consideration and, if so, what the conclusion was and why? If it has not been given consideration, perhaps he will take it away and we can look at it as part of ongoing discussions with local authorities and other public authorities on other areas in the Bill, particularly clauses 32, 33 and 34.

Given that clause 36 remains part of the Bill, however, we recognise that the regulations listed under clause 37 will be necessary to bring some procedure to minimal financial assistance. We will therefore not vote against clause stand part.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will cover some of the questions that have been asked. It is fine for written records to be electronic, and we expect to provide guidance on that. Those letters should be sent as soon as possible, based on the value calculation at that point. Small subsidies will be far less complex than some sort of mega tax break or anything like that, which will have a far more uncertain value. As we were discussing this morning, the subsidy will typically crystalise at the time of the tax declaration, because that will be when the value is better known, but essentially it is for public authorities to let people know as soon as possible. I will write to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North to expand on the tax situation and the tax breaks, using electronic means if she is amenable to that, rather than non-verbal communication such as interpretive dance or anything else we talked about earlier. I will get an email to her to clarify the situation.

The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston talked about having a robust situation. The reason why having the ability to grant these smaller exemptions is really key became apparent during the covid pandemic. Although there was a scheme, there were still exemptions that we had to work on really quickly, and I had so many businesses from the hospitality and retail sectors coming to me because they were incredibly hard pressed. We were having to delay what seemed like some of the easiest awards that the Government could make throughout the pandemic because of the bureaucracy of the state aid framework that we had at the time. This is why we are trying to get that proportionate approach, balanced between having something that is agile—that can work with whatever circumstances we face and minimise administrative burdens—and having a robust and appropriate situation that people can look at and address through review by the Competition Appeal Tribunal, should they so wish.

Turning to the issue of publication, if local authorities want to publish these letters, that is up to them. What we are saying is that they should be sending them to the enterprises—the recipients and the beneficiaries—in the first place.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The question I was asking was whether consideration had been given to whether public authorities should publish those letters. Some may and some may not, but there is not necessarily a downside to publishing letters that are already being sent. Has active consideration been given to that question? Has advice been received? Has any consultation been done, and what was the outcome of it, or is this an area that has not yet been considered?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is something that we will continue engaging with local authorities and public authorities on. For local authorities, there are already other spending databases, so subsidies over £500 will already appear on those databases. Again, we will work through that kind of engagement as we come on to the guidance.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister said that the letters are allowed to be sent by electronic means. Can I clarify that the written records kept by enterprises are also allowed to be electronic?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I believe that is the legal definition of what “written” means and therefore how those records are kept, but if it is not, I will clarify that later.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Services of public economic interest assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

15:00

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause establishes an exemption from the subsidy control requirements for subsidies of up to £750,000 awarded for the delivery of services of public economic interest, and this type of subsidy is called SPEI assistance. This exemption operates in a similar way to the exemption for low-value subsidies—minimal financial assistance—in the previous clauses. Services of public economic interest are public services that it is important to deliver but that would not be delivered by enterprises at the necessary level without subsidy. They include, for example, certain rural transport services.

The SPEI assistance exemption operates in a similar way to the MFA exemption, but has a higher value threshold of £725,000 within the current and previous two financial years. That is because of the importance of delivering this category of services, and the fact that SPEI subsidies in general are less likely to be distortive because they are given for services that are not supplied in an appropriate way by the market, or in some cases not supplied at all. Therefore it is appropriate to exempt them from the subsidy control requirements. If it is desired to grant a subsidy above that limit, the general procedure for the award of SPEI subsidies set out in clause 29 must be followed, and such a grant is also subject to a separate transparency threshold set out in clause 41. To ensure that the SPEI assistance threshold is correctly applied, all SPEI assistance subsidies are subject to rules that allow the cumulative total for each enterprise to be calculated.

Clause 42 defines “minimal or SPEI financial assistance”, which effectively encompasses all the different low-value exemptions through which an enterprise could receive support. For example, on MFA, set out under clause 36, aid given under the EU state aid de minimis regulations before the end of the implementation period, and exempt low-value subsidies given in the interim regime under the terms of the trade and co-operation agreement, should all be taken into account. That stops enterprises being able to receive many subsidies that are considered low value in isolation, but cumulatively could create distortions if their combined value exceeds the threshold. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. Subsidies given through the exemption do not have to apply the subsidy control requirements if the amount of assistance received by the beneficiaries totals less than £725,000 over a three-year financial period. Clause 38 sets out that services of public economic interest are exempt from the subsidy control principles. We recognise the force of some of the arguments made by the Minister, that these are generally in relation to services that are not being provided by the market, and that the SPEI assistance is different from other subsidies. There are some areas that we would like to explore further, but overall we are not arguing against this today and therefore we will support the clause.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I said at the beginning that it was £750,000, but I meant £725,000 throughout.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Thank you for that clarification.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Section 38: procedural requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The previous clause establishes the SPEI assistance exemption and the value threshold for awarding subsidies under the exemption. This clause sets out the procedural requirement to use that exemption.

Seema Malhotra

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. He has outlined that clause 39 establishes some of the procedural requirements to be attached to SPEIs. We think, for reasons outlined in previous debates, that these requirements will be important and add necessary procedures to the granting of assistance to SPEIs. However, I think the question whether there is to be publication of notifications is a matter that the Minister might take away and consider in relation to the similar debate that we had on clause 37. I will be grateful for that and will perhaps come back to this issue during the Bill’s future stages, after we have time to further consider it.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Duly noted.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Mergers and acquisitions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause sets out how a subsidy given through the minimal financial assistance and service of public economic interest exemptions is to be treated following a merger or acquisition. It is important for the purposes of compliance with the relevant financial thresholds. These provisions provide clarity and ensure that exemptions cannot be exploited by enterprises restructuring themselves in such a way as to receive more exempt subsidies.

Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Nokes. We have no objections to the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Subsidy database: exemption for SPEI assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Services of public economic interest are vital services that without Government subsidy would not be supplied in the appropriate way by the market, or in some cases would not be supplied at all. It is important that public authorities can support the delivery of vital public services using those subsidies. The clause exempts certain services of public economic interest subsidies from the transparency requirement in clause 33 to upload the subsidy on to the database. There are two categories of exemption.

First, clause 41(1)(a) provides that a subsidy for a service of public economic interest of less than £14.5 million is exempt from the obligation to upload. Secondly, even where the subsidy for a service of public economic interest is £14.5 million or more, it is exempted from transparency obligations if it has been given for certain activities listed in the clause, including hospital care, social housing or airports with fewer than 200,000 passengers annually. Subsection (2) details that, when calculating the value of the subsidy, the gross cash amount should be used, or, if the subsidy is not provided in cash, the gross cash equivalent.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We do not believe that the clause should stand part. That is consistent with our approach to the problems with the lack of content on the database and the lack of transparency. The clause outlines that subsidies of less than £14.5 million given to SPEIs are exempt from having to be published on the database. As my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston laid out in her comments on clause 38, we understand that the subsidies to services of public economic interest should not have to obey the subsidy control requirements, but we cannot see why they should not be published on the database. I also do not think I heard the Minister explain why the £725,000 threshold applies in clause 38. Perhaps he could answer that in his response.

The bigger question on the clause is why the Government have chosen to exclude payments to services of public economic interest from the database at all. The Minister talked about transparency. Why is there no transparency for these payments? The Government’s recent track record is—as the Public Accounts Committee put it—one of enormous sums of money being given with no apparent return in the case of Test and Trace, and hundreds and millions of pounds-worth of contracts going to people with connections to Government Ministers or other connections to Government. In the case of Andrew Mills, who was an adviser to the Board of Trade, a company that he set up last year assisted in the awarding of a £252 million contract to Ayanda Capital, but a significant proportion of the personal protective equipment that it supplied turned out to be unusable. That was very wasteful and inefficient, but the process was very lucrative for individuals with such connections.

That is why transparency is so important. Recent history has given the country the impression that the Government are reluctant to engage in proper transparency. That is not a place in which anybody on this Committee should want to be. It feels at times that the Government fail to grasp that subsidises are financed by public money and that they should therefore be subject to appropriate transparency and scrutiny. We have discussed that a number of times. Subsidies to SPEI enterprises are no exception. Although they may go towards enterprises that differ from other subsidy recipients, they are still financed by public funds and should therefore still be subject to transparency, and the public should still be able to access information about them. These are much larger sums of money.

If that does not happen, subsidies given to SPEIs risk being abused and given to inappropriate recipients—including, as we have seen over the past year and a half, those with connections to the Conservative party. During last week’s evidence session, Professor Rickard told us:

“Through transparency, we can get better compliance and better value for money”.––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 21, Q24.]

Does the Minister disagree with that analysis? Can he tell us what drawbacks he sees to subjecting subsidies given to SPEI enterprises to more transparency?

We agree with Professor Rickard that better transparency reduces corruption, reduces cronyism and leads to better value for money. The clause unnecessarily reduces the transparency for subsidies that could amount to tens of millions of pounds—perhaps more in some cases. As such, the clause should not stand part of the Bill and we will vote against it.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

For the sake of completeness, and with your indulgence, Ms Nokes, I go back to the question about why the threshold in clause 38 is set at £725,000. As part of the consultation response, the Government set out that we would convert the special drawing rights sums in the trade and co-operation agreement to a fixed value in pounds. Setting that exemption threshold at a fixed sterling amount is simpler than having a moving SDR threshold affected by currency fluctuations, and so it was fixed to give certainty for public authorities and recipients.

We have discussed that subsidies granted for public services are unlikely to be unduly distorted. The very reason they are needed is that other providers are unable or unwilling to provide a necessary service—for example, ferry links between Scottish islands, and bus services in rural areas—at a reasonable cost. The lower risk of distortion justifies a higher transparency threshold, which has been set at £14.5 million. SPEI subsidies for less than that amount are unlikely to be distorted.

We are striking a balance between minimising administrative burdens and requiring an appropriate level of transparency. Such services were also exempt from transparency rules under the EU state aid system. We are seeking to minimise administrative burdens where possible, and it would not be appropriate to impose new, unnecessary transparency requirements. Does that mean that they are not transparent? No, it does not. They must be awarded in a transparent manner, as clause 29 stipulates, which means that the subsidy is given through

“a written contract or other legally enforceable arrangement”.

Public authorities would normally publish those contracts, and it is good practice to do so. Indeed, the examples that the hon. Gentleman gave earlier about accusations of and concerns about the perception of cronyism were available because the spending decisions had been made public at a point in time. Spending decisions by councils, including Labour ones, up and down the country, above £500, are available on spreadsheets, which people can go to and drill down.

15:15

Subsidies can be referred to the Competition and Markets Authority—the Bill does not exempt SPEI subsidies in general from referral to the CMA, which would depend on the criteria for subsidies and schemes of particular interest. We will set out the criteria in secondary legislation in due course. None the less, the clause allows for the proportionality to be challengeable before the CMA, while still reducing the administrative burden and allowing subsidies in areas that, frankly, are very unlikely to be distorted, for the reasons I have given.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 12

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 5

Labour: 5

Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Chapter 2: supplementary and interpretative provision

The Chair

- Hansard -

May I clarify whether Ms Malhotra or Mr Esterson is moving the amendment?

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 42, page 23, line 43, at end insert—

“(1A) Before making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

(1B) If consent to the making of the regulations under subsection 11(A) is not given by any of those authorities listed in subsection (1A) within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent.

(1C) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection 1(6B5), the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the Devolved Administrations before making regulations under this section. Where such consent is not given within one month beginning on the day in which it is sought, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent, but must publish a statement explaining their decision.

So much confusion today, in so many ways, in dealing with the Bill and in some of what is going on in the Bill, Ms Nokes, but there we are. It is all set to make the afternoon go by in a more entertaining fashion.

As with many aspects of the Bill, the clause fails to take into consideration the important role that the devolved Administrations have in state aid governance. The ability to impose regulations unilaterally by secondary legislation, without seeking the consent of the devolved Administrations, is inconsistent with the approach that Labour has sought to instil in Committee—to consider the devolved Administrations as public authorities equal in responsibility for state aid to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

Devolved Administrations are on balance more likely to understand what subsidies will be most beneficial for their respective nations than the Secretary of State. That includes such matters as setting the value thresholds for the minimal financial assistance and services of public economic interest assistance exemptions, as well as the transparency exemption for SPEI assistance. Last week, Daniel Greenberg told us in evidence that

‘throughout the Bill, you see “Secretary of State, Secretary of State, Secretary of State”—all powers of HMG—and you think, “Hold on, the devolved institutions are also public authorities. They appear in the list of public authorities in clause 6, so why is it that they do not also share Secretary of State powers?”’––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 61, Q80.]

We of course understand the role of the Westminster Government in the creation and operation of the UK subsidy regime, but preventing the devolved Administrations from creating streamlined schemes undermines their important role in our democratic infrastructure, as well as their responsibilities for their respective nations. We therefore seek to amend clause 42 to allow Welsh Ministers, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department to require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the devolved Administrations before making regulations under the clause. Where such consent is not given within one month, beginning on the day on which it is sought, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without it but must publish a statement explaining the decision. We believe that the amendment would help to increase the effectiveness of subsidies across the UK and respects the role of the devolved Administrations.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Government welcome the ongoing interest that the devolved Administrations have in the Bill, and that the Opposition have in this area. We understand how important it is to set the right thresholds for minimal financial assistance and services of public economic interest assistance, and to set the right reporting threshold for SPEI subsidies. Setting the appropriate thresholds for those categories of subsidy is key to balancing the administrative burden on public authorities, ensuring that proportionate levels of transparency are met and that we remain in line with our international obligations.

The hon. Member for Sefton Central will be aware that in the Government’s response to the consultation on subsidy control we committed to considering whether the threshold at which agricultural subsidies should be classed as minimal financial assistance should be different from that for other subsidies. That decision will be taken after further consideration, before the Bill comes into force. It is right that the regulations under the clause are scrutinised. The Bill provides for that by requiring that they will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will be debated and approved by both Houses in draft before they can be made. The UK Parliament is the right place to scrutinise any regulations made under the clause.

To reassure Members present, I reiterate that we have had numerous discussions with Ministers and officials in the Scottish Government, the Welsh Senedd and the Northern Ireland Executive while drafting the Bill, and since its introduction. We are committed to engaging regularly with the devolved Administrations, taking account of their views, as the Bill progresses through Parliament and in the run-up to its implementation. That includes engagement on the thresholds for those categories of subsidy, both in the round and on a sector-specific basis, so I ask that the hon. Member withdraw the amendment.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have to pick the Minister up on this: he thanks Members for our ongoing interest in the Committee’s deliberations, and the devolved Administrations for their interest. Come on. We are supposed to have a four-nation system. I think it is a bit more than just showing ongoing interest. Perhaps he can tell us the result of the discussions and the consultation feedback on the clause. What was the devolved Administrations’ response? Did they say that they were happy with the clause, or did they want to be in a position to give their consent before the implementation of its provisions? Certainly from what I have seen, they would want the ability to give consent, notwithstanding the importance of the UK-wide system that is in place and the Westminster Government’s role. I would be interested in his response.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think we have established that subsidy control is a reserved matter. It will be subject to debate, but none the less it is a reserved matter, and it is therefore right that subsidy control policy is made and voted for here in Parliament, which is why I talked about the scrutiny. Parliament is the place to do this. We have engaged on a number of occasions on various aspects of the Bill—34 times at official level and 10 at ministerial level. On top of that, in response to the consultation the different devolved Administrations came up with different views on a number of issues. There was no one consistent view in a number of areas. There are provisions in the Bill that engage the legislative consent motion process, and we hope that the devolved Administrations will not only agree that the Bill is important, but give it their legislative consent.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister keeps saying that the UK Parliament is the right place to deal with this, and we actually agree—that is the sentiment behind the amendment. All the amendment asks is that the UK Government adopt a collaborative approach by checking with the other public authorities, but, if the UK Government feel that they should proceed as originally intended, they should go ahead with it within one month. We are not divided on the question of whether the UK Parliament is the right place to do this. What we are saying is that a collaborative approach would deliver better results for everybody. The Minister should not use the argument that the UK Parliament is the best place to do this, because we actually agree with that.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The devolved Administrations remain one of the key areas—perhaps the key area—where the subsidies will be given. We are not substantively changing the spending powers of the devolved Administrations, or indeed of any public authority.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister specifically mentioned agricultural subsidies. Agriculture is devolved to the Scottish Parliament—it is a Scottish parliamentary competency—but he is suggesting that if Westminster intervenes in a devolved competency it is okay for it to not even run it by the Scottish Parliament in any formal way.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We have not committed to changing the agricultural threshold. We intend to analyse carefully the full implications of lowering the threshold before making any final decision. Why would we want to do that? Because it may be desirable to effectively manage UK competition and investment as a whole. However, this was one area in which our analysis showed that there was no one single response to the consultation. I come back to the point that we will continue to engage closely with the devolved Administrations, as with all public authorities.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I disagree with the comments of the hon. Member for Aberavon. Clearly, I think that Scotland should be able to make its own decisions and have its own regime. In fact, I think it should be part of the EU and under the state aid regime, which has worked particularly well in an awful lot of areas.

I do not think that the amendment goes far enough. I am happy to support it if it is pushed to a vote, but I would have gone further in making sure that the Scottish Government, Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Senedd and Northern Irish Departments had even more of a say than that proposed by the amendment. If the amendment is pushed to a vote, I will support it on the basis of it being the minimum that I would expect, but I would prefer it to be even stronger.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Perhaps we could have some clarity as to whether the amendment is to be withdrawn or pushed to a vote.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North have made some powerful points about why it is so important to get this right. I did not get a satisfactory answer from the Minister. He mentioned engagement having taken place 34 times, but he could not tell me what was said about the point addressed by the amendment, and neither did he answer the points made by Daniel Greenberg last week about why the devolved institutions do not share the Secretary of State’s powers.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon has quite rightly said, we are not saying anything different about the role of the UK Government in setting up the subsidy regime. What we are saying is that it would make perfect sense to include and engage properly with the devolved Administrations, not least because they have a much better idea of how to apply subsidies in their areas. We even recognise that there will be times when that would not be possible, which is why we suggest that after a month it would fall to the Secretary of State to make a statement as to why consent had not been sought.

We have done our best to give the Government a way to meet the consultation results and show that they really are serious about a four-nation approach to the new regime. It is a shame that the Minister has not taken that on board, and we will push our amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 13

Ayes: 6

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

15:03

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 42 allows the Government to make certain amendments to the total value thresholds for the exemptions in chapter 2 of part 3, which have been set at the conversion rate between special drawing rights, International Monetary Fund reserved currency, and the pound. The UK-EU trade and co-operation agreement, the TCA, sets the threshold for minimal financial assistance, SPEI assistance, SPEI transparency exemptions and the total value thresholds of SPEI. That means that if the exchange rate changes significantly, the Government may need to amend the thresholds of the Bill to remain compliant with the TCA.

In addition, the EU and the UK may agree to change the special drawing rights amounts set out in the TCA, so the Government must retain the ability to amend the exemption total value thresholds. The Government must have the ability to lower the total value thresholds in response to any new international agreements. Clause 42 also provides a power to specify a lower threshold for minimal SPEI assistance and SPEI transparency exemptions for categories of subsidies. Essentially, these international obligations are why the previous debate is superfluous. Ultimately, the UK Parliament is the right place to discuss changes to thresholds to make sure that we continue to meet our international obligations. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Natural disasters and other exceptional circumstances

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 43, page 25, line 16, at end insert—

“(3A) The Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and a Northern Ireland department may request the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or another exceptional circumstance in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

(3B) If the Secretary of State refuses a request made under section (3A), he must make a statement in the House of Commons outlining the reasons for his refusal.”

This amendment allows the devolved administrations to ask the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or exceptional circumstances, so that the exemptions listed in Clause 43(1) applying to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland may apply. If the Secretary of State refuses a request for exemption, this amendment requires him to make a statement to the House of Commons.

Amendment 46 allows the devolved Administrations to ask the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or exceptional circumstances so that exemptions listed in clause 43(1) applying to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may apply. If the Secretary of State refuses a request for exemption, the amendment requires them to make a statement to the House of Commons. To reiterate the point I made in the last debate, we are determined to ensure that the role for the devolved Administrations in the administration of their own nations is respected and considered. Of course, we agree that the subsidy regime sits with the Westminster Government, because it is a UK-wide system, but on matters as important as states of natural disaster, devolved Administrations should always be consulted.

Members will appreciate that natural disasters are not political by nature. A natural disaster does not discriminate who it targets and where it affects. By that logic, devolved Administrations, which are just as likely as anywhere else to experience natural disaster, should be granted powers to request that the Secretary of State declares a natural disaster or exceptional circumstance so that the exemptions listed in clause 43(1) may apply. We believe the amendment would respect the role of devolved Administrations in managing their response to disasters effectively, while still ensuring the Secretary of State has the final say.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The very nature of natural disasters is that they do not occur across the entirety of the UK in one go. Let us hope a natural disaster does not occur across the whole of the UK in one go! Generally, they are regionally specific; they will happen in a relatively confined geographical area. Whether it be flooding, an earthquake or something of that sort, not everywhere will be affected. Therefore, thinking about how this provision could apply, it makes a huge amount of sense for there to be an actual mechanism through which the devolved Administrations can request for the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster. I would hope that the Secretary of State would be doing so anyway, and would recognise that a disaster in Wales—

Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Surely that is exactly the point. If a natural disaster has occurred, it is almost certain that the Secretary of State would declare a natural disaster. There is nothing that I can see preventing any devolved Administration within the United Kingdom from requesting that the Secretary of State does that in law anyway. I do not think this amendment is required at all.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Gentleman said that it is almost certain—probable, at least—that the Secretary of State would do so, but it is not certain. The amendment allows an actual mechanism for the devolved Administrations to make that request. It also makes it clear that if the Secretary of State refuses a request of this nature, they have to explain why. That is very important for transparency. This transparency issue is also important—

Robin Millar (Aberconwy) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

What would the logic would be if the situation were reversed, so that the UK Government wished to declare a natural emergency, but the devolved Administration did not? Has the hon. Member given that any thought?

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is nothing to do with the subject of this amendment, which is specifically about the devolved Administrations being able to ask. If the Secretary of State wishes to declare a natural disaster, and Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland does not want them to declare it, there is no mechanism for that—we do not have the powers to do that.

On the issue that was raised by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, it is important that the devolved Administrations have this mechanism because, as has been stated earlier, trust is at an all-time low. We have been very clear that some of the relationships between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government are not in a particularly good place right now. Building this provision in means that there is an additional safeguard in place, so that those places that know their areas best and know the effect on those areas better than Westminster does, because they are closer, are able to make that request.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Natural disasters such as floods, fires and other exceptional circumstances can arise that require subsidies to be given at pace, to compensate for the damages caused. The clause allows the Secretary of State to publish a notice to declare that exemptions from the subsidy control requirements apply in respect of a natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence. That will allow public authorities to give subsidies that compensate for the damage in a timely manner.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North is right that not all such emergencies would apply across the whole of the United Kingdom. In many cases, the natural disaster in question would be localised to a specific place or region. Although it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to declare that the exemption applies, subsidies using the exemption may be given by different public authorities, such as UK Government Departments, local authorities, agencies and, of course, the devolved Administrations. Public authorities are empowered to design subsidies in the most appropriate way to address the damage caused for their specific local needs. The Secretary of State does not need to approve the subsidies given under the exemption, once the natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence has been declared. The existing processes in the Bill already ensure that this type of subsidy can be given across the UK, by the devolved Administrations or other devolved authorities.

If a natural disaster or other exceptional circumstance occurred within the area of any of the devolved Administrations, it would of course be open to that Administration to request that the Secretary of State trigger the exemption, if the Secretary of State has not already done so. If the conditions for the exemption were fulfilled, the Secretary of State could then seek to publish a notice as soon as possible.

The clause is limited to very narrow circumstances to avoid creating an over-broad exemption to the domestic subsidy control regime that could damage UK competition and investment, and our ability to fulfil our international obligations. It is therefore appropriate that the Secretary of State has sole responsibility for determining when the criteria for triggering the exemption have been met. The Secretary of State must publish and lay in Parliament a notice to trigger the use of the exemption. That will ensure that the Secretary of State exercises the power in a transparent and accountable way. I request that the hon. Member for Sefton Central withdraws the amendment.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I should point out that the amendment does not seek to give the devolved Administrations the power to declare a state of emergency, which I think was implicit in the Minister’s remarks. They would ask the Secretary of State to use his or her power to do so, not have the power themselves. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North made the point about transparency well. I am satisfied that the point has been made satisfactorily and that the Minister has taken it on board, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 43 enables public authorities to award subsidies to compensate for the damage caused by a specified natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence without having to apply the majority of the subsidy control requirements. The subsidies awarded under the clause would be exempt from the principles, prohibitions and requirements, but the transparency requirements would still apply. Before the exemption can be used, the Secretary of State must publish a notice declaring that a natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence has happened and that this exemption applies, and that notice must be laid in Parliament.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It would be useful to know where the notice is likely to be published. Will the Minister commit to considering whether the notice could be on the subsidy control database in some way? Perhaps on the database people could see a wee link that says, “This is where natural disasters have been declared”—hopefully it will not happen very often. If would be helpful if people could see all that information.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clearly, the notice has to be laid in Parliament, and I hope that I explained in my letter to the hon. Member exactly what that means. Clearly, we will also publish that on the gov.uk website and in other areas. I have forgotten the second part of her question.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It was about whether that information would be on the subsidy control database website.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Well, transparency is not within the exemption. It is very much about whether a public authority is allowed to give the subsidy in the first place, but the transparency rules still apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44

National or global economic emergencies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 44 enables public authorities to award subsidies to remedy a national or global economic emergency without having to apply the subsidy control prohibitions and other restrictions, like the subsidies that were necessary to respond to the 2007 financial crisis. As we saw during that crisis, the support required to respond to such an economic emergency needs to be given quickly and effectively, so the clause provides for such support to be given where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate. Before the exemption can be used, the Secretary of State must again publish a notice declaring that an economic emergency has occurred and that the exemption applies, and that notice must be laid in Parliament.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

National security

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 45 exempts subsidies given for the purpose of safeguarding national security from the subsidy control requirements, in order to protect the UK’s valid security interests. That is in line with the approach of the national security exemptions in other UK legislation, such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 2018.

15:46

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It would be useful to know how widely national security is defined. Are we talking about subsidies specifically relating to, for example, new military equipment, or to much more tangential things, such as for an organisation that provides server capacity for one of the security services? How tangential can something be in order to be covered by the clause? If the Minister cannot answer, I would be grateful for an answer at some point, in writing or through the method of interpretive dance, if that is what he prefers, because it would be helpful for us to understand this. This is a brief clause, but I am concerned that that definition could be drawn too widely. I just do not know because I do not have enough information.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause makes it clear that subsidies given to safeguard national security are not subject to the subsidy control regime. This is an important principle that must be interpreted without prejudice in the light of our international commitments; I am sure the Minister agrees with that. We are pleased to see it in the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In answer to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, national security is a term with a long history in domestic legislation. It covers no more than is required to safeguard the UK’s genuine national security interest in a way that is fully compliant with the UK’s wider international obligations, including trade and co-operation agreements. It is customary in international agreements, such as our free trade agreements, that we reserve the right to protect valid security interests. That is the beginning and end of the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Bank of England monetary policy

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 46 sets out that activities conducted by or on behalf of the Bank of England in pursuit of monetary policy are not subject to the subsidy control regime. Measures implemented by central banks in pursuit of monetary policy have always been considered to be outside the scope of EU state aid rules. The joint declaration of the European Union and the United Kingdom on monetary policies and subsidy control confirmed our mutual understanding that activities conducted by a central bank in pursuit of monetary policies are outside the scope of subsidy control requirements in the TCA. It is important that that position is put beyond doubt and into UK law.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Financial stability

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 47 provides Her Majesty’s Treasury with the power to give financial stability directions that set aside one or more of the subsidy control requirements for specified subsidies or subsidy schemes. This will enable the Treasury and the Bank of England to undertake financial stability interventions at sufficient pace and with the necessary legal certainty to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system and to protect investors, depositors and policy holders.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Legacy and withdrawal agreement subsidies

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 48, page 26, line 42, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1), the reference to the subsidy control requirements, so far as it relates to subsection (1)(a), does not include the requirements as to transparency in Chapter 3 of Part 2, except in relation to—

(a) subsidies given that are subject to the provisions of Part IV or Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture;

(b) subsidies given in relation to trade in fish and fish products;

(c) subsidies given in relation to the audiovisual sector.”

This amendment provides that the transparency requirements in Chapter 3 of Part 2 apply to subsidies under legacy schemes, subject to exemptions relating to agriculture, fish and the audiovisual sector.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to consider Government amendment 2.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendment 1 clarifies that the transparency requirements in chapter 3 of part 2 of the Bill will apply to subsidy awards that are given after the Bill comes into force, but that are provided under legacy schemes. The transparency requirements for this class of subsidy are consistent with those for other in-scheme subsidy awards—that is, there is an obligation on public authorities to upload the details of awards given under published schemes that are of more than £500,000 in value.

The amendment provides legal certainty around the transparency obligations on public authorities, which are set out in the guidance on the UK’s international subsidy control commitments. It will impose no transparency requirements on subsidies given under legacy schemes to those sectors that are excluded from the relevant chapter of the trade and co-operation agreement. Those fall under three categories: agricultural subsidies in the scope of the World Trade Organisation agreement on agriculture, subsidies in relation to the trade of fish and fish products, and subsidies to the audio-visual sector.

Amendment 2 sets out a full definition for the agreement on agriculture, which is referred to in amendment 1. That ensures a clear exemption for subsidies subject to the relevant provision in the agreement on agriculture, which is consistent with the UK’s obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 48, page 27, line 6, at end insert—

“(2A) On the date on which the Act is passed, the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to subsidies given and schemes made by public authorities in each part of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of Article 10 of the NI Protocol on the date on which the Act is passed.

The amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons on the applicability of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol on the date on which the Act is passed. Clause 48 provides that the requirements of the subsidy control regime do not apply to subsidy schemes that are subject to the Northern Ireland protocol. The Minister will suggest, I imagine, that this gives comfort to public authorities and avoids the double jeopardy of both regimes applying to a subsidy scheme—I take that from what he and the Secretary of State said on Second Reading.

If the Minister were to say that, he would be assuming that there is clarity on which subsidies and schemes are subject to the protocol. On this vital question that public authorities will need to interpret, there is no agreement between the UK Government and the European Commission. There is significant uncertainty about the extent of the reach back—that is, where EU state aid rules will continue to apply across the UK. Where a subsidy is applied in Wales, Scotland or England has consequences in Northern Ireland. George Peretz told us in last Tuesday’s evidence session,

“if I am advising a client such as a local authority or a subsidy recipient, my immediate problem is that I have to look at two sets of guidance—one issued by the European Commission and one by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—that in some important respects tell me very different things.”—[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 46, Q64.]

His final assessment was:

“It is all a bit of a mess.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 48, Q67.]

We should all note that the European Union published proposals to address problems with the Northern Ireland protocol a fortnight ago. That is a step in the right direction, although the proposals it put forward do not address the state aid subsidy issue. In contrast, on Second Reading on 22 September, the Secretary of State suggested

“we have proposed the change to the Northern Ireland protocol to bring all subsidies within scope of the domestic regime.”—[Official Report, 22 September 2021; Vol. 701, c. 338.]

Here we are six weeks later, and we are no clearer about the status of the negotiations with the EU. I hope the Minister will set my mind at ease and tell us what the UK proposals are to solve the problem that George Peretz set out so well in evidence last week.

Let us remind ourselves: the Government negotiated the Northern Ireland protocol and signed it, so they now have a duty to make the protocol work, just as they have a duty to make Brexit work. It is no good threatening to rip up an agreement that the Prime Minister himself signed just two years ago, and certainly not without something to put in its place. Perhaps the Minister can confirm when he last discussed these issues with his European counterparts, and the timeline on which he expects there to be clarity on article 10 of the protocol and its impact on the Bill.

The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to provide a statement on

“the applicability of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to subsidies given and schemes made by public authorities in each part of the United Kingdom.”

Public authorities and recipients need and deserve certainty on this issue.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Member for Sefton Central used the quote I was going to use from the Secretary of State, who was really pretty clear that the new subsidy control regime that we are discussing is the one that will apply across the United Kingdom. That was the point the Secretary of State was making—that this is the only subsidy control regime that will apply across the United Kingdom. That seems pretty factually incorrect, not least for Northern Ireland but, as the Opposition Front Bench spokesperson pointed out, for other parts of the UK where that trade will end up going to the EU.

The very least the Government could do is to ensure that a formal statement is made, because if we are relying on what Government Ministers have said in the course of either debates in the House or statements, we do not know the answer. We have been told a number of different conflicting things. I get that this is a movable feast and that there is no final decision on exactly how it will work. That is why the amendment is so reasonable. It specifically says that the applicability statement will need to be made on

“the date on which the Act is passed”.

Presumably, by the date on which the Act is passed we will have some idea of which regimes will apply in Northern Ireland. We have spoken very little about Northern Ireland specifically during the course of this Committee but, when the Minister talks about giving certainty to enterprises and public authorities, it seems to me that Northern Ireland is in a unique position where there is no certainty at all. People literally do not know which regime will apply.

It is all well and good to say, “We will consult with people and ensure that they see the guidelines in advance of having to put them in the subsidy control database,” but the fundamental issue of which regime they are complying with has not yet been answered in a way that would stand up to any kind of scrutiny. The amendment is completely reasonable and, if the Minister does not want to accept it, he should be clear with us and with the organisations concerned, particularly in Northern Ireland, about how he and the Secretary of State will explain to them which regime they will be operating under.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As we have heard, amendment 47 to clause 48 would require the Secretary of State to

“make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to subsidies given and schemes made by public authorities in each part of the United Kingdom”,

on

“the date on which the Act is passed.”

Clause 48 excludes subsidies in the scope of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol from the domestic subsidy control regime, which, as the hon. Member for Sefton Central says, is to avoid double regulation of subsidies. Subsidies that are subject to the protocol and comply with the EU state aid laws will be exempt from the requirements of the new domestic regime.

I should remind hon. Members that the Secretary of State is already required, as a statutory duty, to publish guidance on the practical application of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol under section 48 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. BEIS published that guidance on 31 December 2020. That is intended to help public authorities reach a view on whether article 10 applies to subsidies granted in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, to which they must have regard.

The guidance is based on the EU Commission’s unilateral declaration of 18 December 2020, which made it clear that article 10 would apply in Great Britain if there was a genuine and direct link back to a company in Northern Ireland. That is most likely the case of a subsidised company in Great Britain with a subsidiary in Northern Ireland. The Command Paper on the Northern Ireland protocol published on 21 July 2021 set out the Government’s position that comprehensive and robust commitments are in place on subsidy control in the trade and co-operation agreement, and that those are being further strengthened through the UK’s Subsidy Control Bill, making the existing provisions in article 10 redundant in their current form.

16:00

The Government are in intensive discussions with the EU with the aim of delivering significant changes to the Northern Ireland protocol, including article 10. Although it would be inappropriate to comment on the talks at this time, it is worth pointing out that the status and applicability of article 10 at the time the Bill is passed will depend heavily on them. The guidance on article 10 will keep pace with the outcome of the talks.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the Minister confirm that this legislation cannot be passed by this House until there is clarity on article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol? There seems to be a big gap in understanding on the definition of an at-risk good. Any company headquartered in Great Britain, when deciding whether it might be at risk as regards a good going into the European Union, will be unclear on that point. Until the EU and the UK Government have come to that clarity, this legislation is unworkable.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I disagree. This framework, which is a bare-bones framework, as I have said, has to work with whatever is in the Northern Ireland protocol, whatever is negotiated. That is why, for the reasons I have said, I talked about the reach-back provisions, which are never perfect. We know that the Northern Ireland protocol is not perfect, but it is a negotiated view. That is why, in those intensive discussions, we are looking at delivering significant changes and trying to improve an imperfect situation.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If an enterprise in Northern Ireland is given a subsidy, and that enterprise has competition in or trades with both Scotland and Ireland, which regime does it need to comply with if it gets that subsidy? Does it need to comply with the state aid or subsidy control regime, or both?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It would first depend on what it trades in, and then on what its service is, because those are dealt with in different ways. It would then depend on the framework of the company and what structure it has in GB and Northern Ireland, because it must have genuine reach-back to Northern Ireland to be able to apply to that.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I appreciate the Minister being so indulgent in giving way. Are there any circumstances in which an organisation—an enterprise that is given a subsidy or a public authority giving out a subsidy—will have to comply with both the subsidy control and state aid regimes?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The regime has been specifically worked through so that there is no double jeopardy, as the hon. Member for Sefton Central described at the beginning. They have to deal with one or the other. Clearly, as I said, the one they would deal with depends on the framework of the company, the ownership of the company, and whether it deals in electricity or services, because different rules clearly apply. None the less, as the negotiated provision is constituted, they would only have to apply to apply to one or the other. If it is state aid, they do not then need to worry about domestic subsidy control, and vice versa. The Command Paper clearly stated that we believe that we can bring it under domestic subsidy control, although that is not being negotiated yet, so that is clearly not the situation at this moment in time.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for the Minister’s indulgence. On a point of clarity, clause 48(2) states:

“The subsidy control requirements do not apply to…a subsidy given, or a subsidy scheme made, in accordance with Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol”.

My interpretation of that is that the only show in town is article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol—that that trumps the subsidy control regime. Is that not the case? I thought he said in his introductory remarks that the default position in all this is the state aid regime under the Northern Ireland protocol.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I say, if something comes within state aid, whether it is goods or logistics, it may be the case, but neither one nor the other trumps it. There is no double regulation. Either it comes under state aid or it comes under domestic law—[Interruption.] That is what is there within the protocol, and there are certain things that just do not appear under the protocol.

Clearly, we will continue to keep the House informed of progress made relating to the Northern Ireland protocol. I do not want to go down the rabbit hole of coming out with individual examples that may then be redundant as the talks continue at pace. We want to make sure we continue to keep the House informed and, as such, I consider that section 48 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 already makes provision for a statement of the application of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol by way of statutory guidance—[Interruption.] The Government have already given the guidance and I do not see any need to place an additional requirement on the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol. I request the hon. Gentleman withdraws the amendment.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Before I call the shadow Minister, I remind hon. Members that your phones should be on silent, please.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think the pings you just heard were all the different legal opinions on the application of the subsidy control regime on EU state aid, Ms Nokes. The Minister found a number of different ways of phrasing the same problem: it all depends, it is one or the other, or he cannot give individual examples. I am afraid that is what it all boils down to.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is an absolute shambles.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon uses the word shambles. It is hard to disagree given the Minister’s answer. Until that is addressed, it undermines the operation of the regime, which risks legal challenge.

On the point about individual examples, businesses face the potential of legal challenge if they do not get this right. They are not going to know which regime. We were starting to get an answer there, in that if the subsidy is under the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol, it is state aid. However, even there the Minister could not be entirely clear. It goes back to my initial question: what proposals are the Government putting forward to address this? What is in the Secretary of State’s words on Second Reading, where he was extremely confident that the matter would be addressed, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North and I both said in our opening remarks? What do the Government think is going to work? What is it from their discussions with their EU counterparts that suggests a way forward? We still have not had that from the Minister and that underlines exactly why the amendment is so important in giving the Government until the day on which the Bill passes into law to address exactly how the operation will apply.

To go back to the words of George Peretz, there are two sets of guidance and two sets of legal opinion. He, as a lawyer, could advise on the same situation, with the awarding body on the one hand and the business on the other, on which regime might apply. Until that is addressed, we have a real problem with the legislation and the existence of the two different subsidy regimes will cause a real problem for the effective use of subsidies to support businesses in the regions and nations of our country.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Can I clarify whether the hon. Member will press the amendment?

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 14

Ayes: 5

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Amendment made: 2, in clause 48, page 27, line 9, at end insert—

“(4) In this section ‘the Agreement on Agriculture’ means the Agreement on Agriculture, contained in Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 (read with any adjustments necessary for context).”—(Paul Scully.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1 and provides a definition of the Agreement on Agriculture.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause provides an exemption from the subsidy control requirement for legacy subsidies and subsidy schemes—those granted or established in accordance with the subsidy control rules enforced before the Bill comes into force—and for subsidies and subsidy schemes given in accordance with the EU withdrawal agreement. That objective is to prevent double regulation. Public authorities awarding subsidies under such legacy schemes will have to comply only with the terms and conditions of the legacy scheme, as well as with the relevant guidance on their transparency obligations.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We have heard spectacularly from the Minister the failure of the Government to explain how the regime will operate or to come forward with answers to questions asked during the debate on our amendments. There is little to add to what has been said already.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Briefly, for the record, I am deeply uncomfortable with this part of the legislation. It leaves businesses across the length and breadth of the country in a total state of confusion about which parts of the provisions apply to them and which are under article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol. I genuinely think it would be a dereliction of duty by the Committee to allow the clause as drafted to stand part of the Bill. Whether we press it to a vote does not matter—we lose the votes all anyway—but I want to put it on the record that that would be a dereliction of duty.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I reassure my hon. Friend that we will indeed be pressing clause stand part to a vote. He is right: businesses need certainty. We are coming out of a once-in-100-year global pandemic, and they need all the support that they can get. This regime should give that support, but it cannot do so if there is that massive uncertainty at the heart of it, whether this regime or a different one should apply. The Government have not addressed that and they need to get on and address it—

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We are—

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No—[Interruption.]

The Chair

- Hansard -

Order. If Members wish to intervene on the shadow Minister, they may do so, but we will not have chuntering.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We gave the Government every opportunity with our amendment, but they chose to vote it down. They have left us with what my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon called a dereliction of duty, which is a good way of putting it. The clause does not do justice to businesses, awarding bodies, communities or our constituents. Those are good reasons why we should vote it down.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have not had a chance to think about exactly how not having the clause as part of the Bill would affect the Bill as a whole. I share the concerns, that there are major issues with the clause, but at this point I will abstain on any vote.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns, but there is such a big problem with what is set out, it is right for us to register our objection by voting against the clause.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

All I can say is that we were asked to go through a whole load of examples, which would not be helpful in giving that certainty. What will be helpful is the negotiations that are continuing at the moment. As it happens, the subsidy control framework before us works within either system: the one that we wish to negotiate, the result that we wish to have, or the situation we have at the moment. Subsidies that fall within the scope of the Northern Ireland protocol of the withdrawal agreement and which affect Northern Ireland-EU trade, such as on goods and wholesale electricity markets, will need to comply with EU state aid rules, including on services, otherwise they come under the domestic subsidy control regime. That is about as clear as we can be, but negotiations are happening at the moment.

16:15

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister had the opportunity to accept our amendment, which would have addressed the concern that he has just set out about needing negotiations, because it would have given him time for them. It is regrettable that he did not accept our amendment, but he is now in the position of having to come forward with the answers, and as the responsible Minister, it is up to him to do so.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Division 15

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 4

Labour: 4

Clause 48, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Tax measures

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 49 sets out that the subsidy control requirements do not apply where a subsidy is permissible by virtue of article 413 of the trade and co-operation agreement. That article provides for exceptions for certain obligations in the TCA. The clause ensures that where one of those tax exceptions allows a subsidy to be given, the subsidy control requirements in the Bill do not apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Large cross-border or international cooperation products

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This clause sets specific provisions for large cross-border projects and projects of international co-operation. If a public authority is satisfied that a project that it plans to subsidise qualifies as a large cross-border project or a project of international co-operation, there is no legal requirement to assess the subsidy or subsidy scheme against the subsidy control principles.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Nuclear energy

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This clause establishes that subsidies and subsidy schemes for nuclear projects are not required to be assessed against the additional principles for energy and environmental subsidies that are set out in schedule 2.

Kirsty Blackman

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would just like to ask why.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am interested in the answer to that question as well, given that in the last 11 years of Conservative Government we have not seen the investment in new nuclear that was needed to meet our climate obligations.

Stephen Kinnock

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It was all coming from China.

Bill Esterson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. The role of China in our nuclear industry is a point well made by my hon. Friend. I hope that we will see significant investment in new nuclear as a result of the regulations, if that is what the Government intend. Perhaps the Minister will give an indication of their intentions, because without investment, we will not hit our obligations. Nuclear is, of course, a longer-term project because it takes so long to get going. I remind Members that we have significant targets to hit by 2030, and unless we are talking about small modular reactors, nuclear reaches beyond that timeframe. Can the Minister enlighten us on any plans?

Paul Scully

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Subsidies or subsidy schemes for nuclear energy will be required to assess against the main subsidy control principles in schedule 1. Removing the clause would require those projects to be assessed against the additional energy and environmental subsidy control principles. The clause is in line with our various international obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union.

I do not want to start speculating on what will happen with future nuclear investment, but we have legislation coming forward tomorrow.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Michael Tomlinson.)

16:20

Adjourned till Thursday 4 November at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

SCB03 Anthony Collins Solicitors LLP

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Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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Read Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Roger Gale, Siobhain McDonagh

† Anderson, Stuart (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)

† Baker, Duncan (North Norfolk) (Con)

† Blomfield, Paul (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

† Goodwill, Mr Robert (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

† Gullis, Jonathan (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

† Holmes, Paul (Eastleigh) (Con)

† Howell, Paul (Sedgefield) (Con)

† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Coventry North West) (Lab)

Pursglove, Tom (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Richards, Nicola (West Bromwich East) (Con)

† Whittaker, Craig (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury)

† Wood, Mike (Dudley South) (Con)

Rob Page, Sarah Thatcher, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Sir Roger Gale in the Chair]

Nationality and Borders Bill

Clause 48

Identification of potential victims of slavery or human trafficking

09:25

The Chair

- Hansard -

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert

“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”

This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.

Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.

At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that

“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,

the reasons for which include that there is

“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.

The report also pointed to

“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”

and times at which

“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.

The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

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It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.

Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.

At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.

Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.

As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.

Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

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Craig Whittaker

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I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.

It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

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Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

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I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 48, page 43, line 17, leave out subsection (7).

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 57, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 57, page 51, leave out lines 42 and 43.

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 48, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

Stuart C. McDonald

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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. Last week, I was speculating about how long the Immigration Minister might be in post, but I was still shocked. Seriously, we all pass on our best wishes to him for a speedy recovery. I congratulate the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his temporary promotion.

On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.

Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.

The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?

We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.

Craig Whittaker

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I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his questions. Basically, he asked whether we are amending the definition of modern slavery, and the straightforward answer is no.

To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Division 45

Ayes: 8

Conservative: 8

Noes: 6

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Identified potential victims of slavery or human trafficking: recovery period

Holly Lynch

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I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 49, page 43, line 33, leave out “30” and insert “45”.

This amendment would increase the recovery period for victims of slavery or human trafficking from a minimum of 30 days to a minimum of 45 days.

This amendment would ensure that victims of modern slavery continue to receive a recovery period of at least 45 days, bringing this provision in line with current statutory guidance. We strongly welcome the inclusion in domestic law of a recovery period with support for victims, and we support this decision. However, the reduction of the minimum recovery period during which victims in England and Wales receive support from the current 45 days to 30 days is a worry.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner said in her written correspondence with the Home Secretary that the average length of time it takes for a conclusive grounds decision to be made in 2020 was 465 days. It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government are seeking to reduce the timescale from a target they are already significantly failing to meet. Their focus should be on increasing the efficiency of decision making, rather than reducing the already short recovery time to which victims are entitled.

In its written evidence to the Committee, Hope for Justice highlights that the explanatory report on the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings clearly states that the purpose of the recovery and reflection period is to allow victims to recover and escape the influence of traffickers. A reduction of this period therefore represents a step backwards in our ability to offer effective protection to victims of trafficking.

The assistance and support that should be provided during this recovery period is essential and wide-ranging, and it may include mental health support and counselling, legal advice, secure housing and access to social services. It also allows the police time to gather evidence during their investigation and to establish a working relationship with victims, strengthening their ability to secure a prosecution. It is estimated that there are between 6,000 and 8,000 modern slavery offenders in the UK, yet there were only 91 prosecutions and 13 convictions in England and Wales last year for specific modern slavery offences as a principal offence, and only 267 prosecutions for all related crimes.

Both sides of the Committee can agree on our desire to see more perpetrators of human trafficking and slavery brought to justice. This clause is a disappointing backward step away from the appropriate period necessary to break the bonds of slavery and to allow victims to establish a relationship with the relevant agencies in order to support their recovery and secure a prosecution.

Justice and Care has highlighted that many victims already decline to enter the national referral mechanism. As we have heard, Care UK says that 2,178 adults referred by first responders declined entry into the NRM last year. We have discussed the barriers that some might experience, including not recognising that they are, in fact, a victim, but it can also be because it is not immediately obvious what support the NRM provides for victims. This reduction in the recovery period certainly is not going to help.

I anticipate that the hon. Member for Calder Valley is about to tell me that under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, the current threshold is set at 30 days. However, the minimum of 45 days in the UK, which was established in 2009, was a clear distinction that we could be proud of, and it is unclear why the Government are seeking such a change. Victims in Northern Ireland and Scotland are entitled to longer periods of support—the recovery period in Scotland is actually 90 days. I ask the Minister to outline how the change will have a positive impact for victims in any way. Amendment 1 would ensure that victims are protected and that we do not undermine the progress that has been made so far by reducing the recovery period further.

I will speak to clause 49 more broadly. I draw the Minister’s attention to subsection (2), which states:

“A conclusive grounds decision may not be made in relation to the identified potential victim before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the positive reasonable grounds decision was made.”

I welcome the sentiment, but I wonder whether he could address the concerns raised by Dame Sara Thornton, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, that there are pilot schemes under way to test approaches to devolving national referral mechanism decisions for children to local safeguarding partners. As part of the pilots, conclusive grounds decisions are being taken at the same time as reasonable grounds decisions, where the evidence is strong enough to do so. I hope that the Minister will join me in welcoming that approach, and although I am worried about the clause’s intended consequences, I also hope that he will recognise that this could be an unintended negative consequence, which we can hopefully all agree would be wholly regrettable. The clause is relatively simple and we do not support it standing part of the Bill.

09:45

The Chair

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In the light of the hon. Lady’s comments, we will also consider clause 49 stand part.

Stuart C. McDonald

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I will be brief, because I fully endorse what the shadow Minister has said. I absolutely welcome the fact that the measure will be in statute, but I share her concern and astonishment that the Government have decided, for no apparent reason, to reduce the prescribed recovery period to 30 days. Yes, that is consistent with the trafficking convention, but equally so is 45 days. There is nothing in the convention to say that it cannot be done and, for all the reasons she outlined, that was a welcome additional safeguard in the UK’s approach.

What is the Home Office driving at here? What signal does it send by making this change? As the shadow Minister pointed out, it is completely artificial, given where we are with average decision times. In one sense, this is just about sending signals. What a signal it sends—that we want to reduce the support given to folk who are suspected of being victims and survivors of trafficking. I support the amendment and endorse everything that the shadow Minister said.

Craig Whittaker

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I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.

The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until

“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”

In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.

With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.

On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.

Holly Lynch

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Division 46

Ayes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 47

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

No entitlement to additional recovery period etc

Holly Lynch

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I beg to move amendment 180, in clause 50, page 44, line 4, at end insert—

“(aa) the person was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the first RG decision;”.

This amendment seeks to preclude those exploited as children from being denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked.

The Chair

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In line with what appears to be custom and practice, with this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Holly Lynch

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Clause 50, as drafted, should not stand part of the Bill. The amendment would ensure that those exploited as children will not be denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked or if additional periods of trafficking are disclosed. Children, in particular, who make up 47% of those referred to the national referral mechanism, are at serious risk of being trafficked and going missing from care. In 2017, one in four identified trafficked children were reported as going missing. The number of children referred to the NRM is also rising, with last year seeing an almost 10% increase compared with the previous year. The average number of missing incidents for each trafficked child has also increased, from 2.4 to 7.4 between 2014-15 and 2017-18. Therefore, amendment 180 is even more vital, considering the worrying trends we are seeing.

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK has warned that clause 50

“may severely impact child trafficking survivors”

who are at high risk of going missing and being re-trafficked, particularly when

“they transition to adulthood and require access to support and protection through the NRM.”

To make that point, I want to share a real-world case study provided by ECPAT UK that demonstrates why our amendment is necessary.

Huang was referred to the local authority children's services at age 17, following a police operation in a nail bar. He was also referred as a potential victim of trafficking into the NRM and received a positive reasonable grounds decision. He was accommodated by the local authority. He told his support worker that he had been scared because his family back home were receiving threats to pay back his debt. Shortly after, he went missing. He was found by the police just after his 18th birthday and went on to develop trust with his lawyer, where he disclosed for the first time a significant period of exploitation in Vietnam, across Europe and in the UK, prior to being found in the nail bar. He remains in fear, and while the dangers facing his family back home persist, sadly, there is still a high likelihood that he will go missing again.

Without amendment 180, Huang may be unable to be referred to the NRM again, given the new disclosure of previously unknown periods of exploitation. As he is now 18, he would not be looked after by children’s services. Clause 50, as it stands, will place him at great risk of subsequent re-trafficking in the absence of access to safe accommodation and support through the NRM during his reflection and recovery period.

The increase in the number of British children in the NRM in relation to child criminal exploitation gives us further cause for concern. I recently met officers from the Metropolitan Police Service who are leading the response on trafficking, slavery and exploitation. They told me that it is becoming standard practice that when a child or young person is sent on their first county lines journey, their exploiter will arrange for them to be robbed of the drugs they have been instructed to sell. When they then have to come back and explain what has happened, they are immediately told they have to work off the value of the drugs. That traps them in debt bondage, even though the real criminal will have recovered the drugs, having arranged what can sometimes be a particularly violent mugging in the first place, so in reality there is no debt.

It would not be unusual for children in such vulnerable and exploited positions to be identified by the authorities but then go missing from the NRM because of the risks that persist. They must be treated as a safeguarding concern and not by way of immigration compliance, not least because so many of those children are British nationals. So I ask the Minister again: why are children subject to clause 50, given their particular vulnerabilities? Amendment 180 seeks to right that wrong. I am sure all colleagues will agree that a child rights-centred approach, which ensures children’s safety and their protection, must be a priority. I therefore hope the Minister will reflect on the points we have made and accept Amendment 180.

More broadly, clause 50 has the potential to exclude trafficked children and adults from being identified following re-trafficking, thereby leaving them unable to access the support they should be entitled to. I worry that with this clause the Government are suggesting that making repeat claims of having been trafficked undermines someone’s credibility. However, we also know that traffickers are increasingly coaching those they are exploiting on what to say should they be identified by authorities. An expectation is placed on the victim that they will return to their exploiters due to their perceived debt bondage, in order to avoid consequences for them or often their families.

Re-trafficking has increasingly become a part of a trafficker’s operating model, so why are we not responding to that? The changes negatively affect the victim and not the perpetrator of such crimes. It also appears to contradict the identified need for individual assessment and support, as required under ECAT. The Government have described the clause as necessary

“to prevent the recovery period being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK and to remove unnecessary support and barriers to removal where these are not needed”.

Will the Minister present the evidence to support that claim? That explanation fails, not least, to recognise that the most common nationality of all referrals to the NRM for victims of modern slavery in 2020 was that of UK nationals, primarily referred for criminal exploitation. We know that children make up the lion’s share of those referrals. Does that not make the Government stop and think about what is in the clause?

There is a fear that the NRM is being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK. Without amendment 180, the clause means that we are sending children, both migrant and British, back into the arms of their exploiters. We plead with the Minister to think again about the clause. We cannot see it stand part of the Bill.

10:00

Stuart C. McDonald

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I support the amendment and join the calls for the clause not to stand part of the Bill. I very much echo the comments of the shadow Minister. Like her, and as on previous occasions, I find myself not at all clear why the clause is necessary, and what problem it is driving at. Again, I find myself asking for evidence. I have not seen or heard about an issue with abusive additional trafficking claims sparking extra NRM recovery periods. I recognise that that could absolutely happen in theory, but we need much more by way of evidence before we enact such a clause.

Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.

The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.

Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.

Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.

Craig Whittaker

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I would first like to clarify that the clause does not prevent individuals who have been re-trafficked from receiving a further recovery period. Rather, the clause introduces a presumption against multiple recovery periods where an individual has already benefitted from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism and period of support. This is not a blanket disqualification from multiple recovery periods; it is focused on removing the presumption for multiple recovery periods where the period of exploitation happened before the original recovery period was provided.

The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Craig Whittaker

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As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.

Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Holly Lynch

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Division 48

Ayes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 49

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 164, in clause 51, page 44, line 31, at end insert—

“was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the positive reasonable grounds decision and—”

This amendment would exclude children from the disqualification from protection measures outlined in clause 51.

The Chair

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Holly Lynch

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Thank you for that advice, Sir Roger.

Like a number of our other amendments, amendment 164 seeks to ensure that no child victim of trafficking or modern slavery is denied protection. Clause 51 introduces the following reasons why someone would be disqualified from protection: they are a threat to public order, or they have claimed to be a victim of modern slavery in bad faith. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, says in her letter to the Home Secretary on the Bill:

“I have grave concerns about this clause because it casts a wide net, with the potential to prevent a considerable number of potential victims of modern slavery from being able to access the recovery and reflection period granted through the NRM. Without such support prosecution witnesses will be unable to provide witness evidence and this will severely limit our ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised crime groups.”

She says these changes will make it harder to convict perpetrators and go after organised crime groups. I doubt any of us came into politics to pass laws that work to the advantage of criminals, so why is the clause included in the Bill?

The Children’s Society has emphasised concerns regarding the impact on children who are victims of child criminal exploitation. In 2020, of the 47% of referrals to the NRM that were for children, 51% were for criminal exploitation. According to the National Crime Agency, referrals to the NRM for British children have grown due to an increase in child criminal exploitation, particularly by groups using the county lines model. The average custodial sentence length given to children has increased by more than seven months over the last 10 years, from 11.3 to 18.6 months in 2020.

A case study supplied by the Children’s Society following a serious case review by Waltham Forest Safeguarding Children Board is one of the most depressing of the many case studies we have been sent during our preparations for this Committee. Child C was a vulnerable child who lived in Nottingham. He was regularly excluded from school and was eventually home-schooled. His family noted that he regularly ran away from home. In January 2018, his mother said he was threatened by an older youth, who said that Child C had money for them. The incident was reported to Nottinghamshire police, but the police have no record of it. Also in January, Child C was arrested by police in possession of an air gun, a knife and cannabis. He later informed the youth offending team that an older boy had given him these. The youth offending team worked with Child C on a programme designed to highlight the dangers of carrying weapons. The incident was reported to the multi-agency safeguarding hub, but no further action was taken because of the youth offending team’s involvement.

Child C moved to Waltham Forest in April 2018. In October 2018, he was arrested in Bournemouth in what is known as a cuckoo flat—a person’s home that criminals take over and use to facilitate exploitation. There was significant evidence of drug use and sales in the flat. Child C was found to be in personal possession of 39 wraps of crack cocaine, and was arrested for possession of class A with intent to supply. That was a pivotal moment in providing support to the child. For the first time, the authorities in Waltham Forest had been presented with completely unequivocal evidence that Child C was being criminally exploited. From that point, he had multi-agency involvement and a further conviction for carrying an offensive weapon. The case study ends with Child C being murdered in January 2019.

That is the operating model for county lines gangs. We know that criminally exploited children are driving up referrals to the NRM, meaning that children will be coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation. That is explicit in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. It is unclear what, if any, assessment the Government have made of how children will be affected by changes in clause 51 and the risk to them of remaining in exploitative situations. Disqualifying child victims from protection is incompatible with the duties on local authorities and other public bodies under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. I urge the Minister to adopt amendment 164 and stand with child victims of modern slavery; it will allow him to go after the criminal gangs who will welcome this clause.

Clause 51 is incompatible with the duties on local authorities and the Home Office to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. It fails to take into account that children are at greater risk of exploitation owing to their developing capacity and, under the UN convention on the rights of the child, should never be denied protection. The fact that the Government have decided to ignore those fundamental principles to protect the most vulnerable children is simply shocking. The Government’s equality impact assessment promises to mitigate the adverse impact on vulnerable people but fails to identify any exemptions or specialist support for children in part 4 of the Bill.

10:15

Subsection (3) of clause 51 stipulates that an individual is considered a threat to public order if

“the person has been convicted of any other offence listed in Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015”

Operation Fort, which involved dismantling the UK’s biggest modern slavery network, demonstrated that traffickers

“targeted the most desperate from their homeland, including the homeless, ex-prisoners and alcoholics. ”

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has explained that she has “grave concerns” about clause 51 because it

She also includes a second case study—Operation Elibera:

Dame Sarah goes on to say:

Stuart C. McDonald

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I rise to support the amendment and to make the case for the removal of the clause. The amendment is absolutely right, and excluding any survivors, especially children, from the scope of the clause will alleviate its worst impacts. The whole clause is bad.

Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.

The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.

We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.

After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.

In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.

Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked whether the clause is incompatible with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. The answer to that question is no, it is not incompatible at all with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a criminal defence, but clause 51 of the Bill is a very separate system. Section 45 is separate from the public order disqualification. A section 45 defence is not applicable to the serious crimes set out in schedule 4 of the Bill. The Government will of course continue to work with local authorities to safeguard children and take their particular vulnerabilities into account on a case-by-case basis.

I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—

Stuart C. McDonald

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Craig Whittaker

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Stuart C. McDonald

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Craig Whittaker

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10:30

Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.

The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. As we have heard from the interventions made by hon. Members, the case studies before us mean that we have grave concerns about clause 51. The assurances that the Minister has sought to make do not overcome some of the barriers that clause 51 will put in place.

I look forward to hearing more detail about the Children’s Society projects that the Government are funding and the Look Closer campaign, which I very much welcome, but, as things currently stand, this is much more of a blanket exemption than the Minister has tried to suggest. The very broad public order definitions in the Bill go beyond the intention that he has tried to explain, so once again I am concerned that children will be particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of clause 51 if unamended, so I am minded to press amendment 164 to a division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 50

Ayes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 51

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Identified potential victims in England and Wales: assistance and support

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 52, page 46, line 9, after “50A” insert—

“Meaning of assistance and support

‘(1) For the purposes of guidance issued under section 49(1)(b) and regulations made under section 50, “assistance and support” includes but is not limited to the provision of—

(a) appropriate and safe accommodation;

(b) material assistance, including financial assistance;

(c) medical advice and treatment (including psychological assessment and treatment);

(d) counselling;

(e) a support worker;

(f) appropriate information on any matter of relevance or potential relevance to the particular circumstances of the person;

(g) translation and interpretation services;

(h) assistance in obtaining specialist legal advice or representation (including with regard to access to compensation);

(i) assistance with repatriation, including a full risk assessment.

(2) Assistance and support provided to a person under this section—

(a) must not be conditional on the person’s acting as a witness in any criminal proceedings;

(b) may be provided only with the consent of that person;

(c) must be provided in a manner which takes due account of the needs of that person as regards safety and protection from harm;

(d) must be provided to meet the needs of that person having particular regard to any special needs or vulnerabilities of that person caused by gender, pregnancy, physical or mental illness, disability or being the victim of violence or abuse;

(e) must be provided in accordance with an assistance and support plan which specifies that person’s needs for support and how those needs will be met for the full duration of the period to which that person is entitled to support under this Act.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.

50B”

This amendment would define the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery in England and Wales in line with Article 12 of the European Convention on Actions Against Trafficking in Human Beings; and conditions associated with its provision.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 2, in clause 52, page 46, line 16, leave out from “receiving” to the end of line 19 and insert

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This amendment would define the objective of assistance and support in line with Article 12 of the European Convention Against Human Trafficking 2005.

Amendment 3, in clause 52, page 46, line 16, at end insert—

‘(6A) When a person who is receiving assistance and support under this section receives a positive conclusive grounds decision, the Secretary of State must secure assistance and support for at least 12 months beginning on the day the recovery period ends.”

This amendment would give modern slavery victims in England and Wales with a positive conclusive grounds decision the right to receive support and assistance for at least 12 months.

Clause stand part.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The amendments seek to incorporate our international legal obligations under ECAT within the provisions of support available to victims during the recovery period, as well as extending statutory support for those who have received a positive conclusive grounds decision.

Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to

“make matters worse for victims”.

Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”

and replace it with the requirement to assist a person

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”

Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support

“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.

The British Red Cross has highlighted that

“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.

The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that

“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—

in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.

Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.

Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.

Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.

Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:

“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.

This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that

“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”

Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.

To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.

On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only

“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”

for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.

In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are

“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”

This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will

“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.

It adds that the clause will also

“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”

To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Lady for raising important issues around the support and assistance offered to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Support for potential victims is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by this horrendous crime and reducing the risk of their being re-trafficked. We are agreed on the importance of placing the entitlement to support in legislation, which is what the clause will do. Our intention in our drafting was to provide victims with certainty about the circumstances in which support is provided through the NRM; we know that is imperative in aiding their recovery. To this end, we have sought to put in clause 52 that support will be provided where

“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s

“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.

After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.

10:46

Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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Holly Lynch

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I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for his response. He paints a picture of the NRM that I do not think would be recognised by those working with it on the frontline. We heard testimony from those within the NRM that it was not clear that they were even in it, because it was not clear what provisions or support they were receiving. I wish it was the case that the description and the offer of support that he outlines were there in reality.

The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 52

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 5

Labour: 5

Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

- Hansard -

For future reference, I understand that abstentions are supposed to be recorded by saying, “No vote”, although I am happy to be corrected. I am not always right.

Clause 53

Leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 53, page 47, line 12, after “Kingdom” insert

“for a minimum 12 months”.

This amendment would give modern slavery victims in England and Wales with a positive conclusive grounds decision leave to remain for a minimum of 12 months.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 53, page 47, line 14, leave out from “recovery” to the end of line 16 and insert “personal situation,”.

This amendment would define the criteria of providing leave to remain in line with Article 14 of the European Convention Against Human Trafficking 2005.

Amendment 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.

Amendment 6, in clause 53, page 47, line 22, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

This amendment would remove the criteria of not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendments 7, 5 and 6 concern the provisions to provide leave to remain for survivors of trafficking. Similar to our amendments to clause 52, amendment 5 seeks to bring the provisions in line with article 14 of ECAT by changing the criterion for providing leave to remain from “recovery” to “personal situation”. The reference to “personal situation” recognises that leave is necessary for a range of reasons. The explanatory report to ECAT states:

“The personal situation requirement takes in a range of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.”

Amendment 6 would remove the criterion for not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country. It is not clear why the Government introduced that criterion, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in his response how he could possibly envisage that working in practice.

Amendment 7 provides a clear minimum timeframe for granting leave to remain, thereby creating more certainty for victims. Under the Home Office’s current guidance on assessing discretionary leave for survivors of modern slavery, leave to remain is granted for a mixture of different time periods—sometimes as little as six months. Those timeframes are short, and the inconsistency can set back recovery.

In 2017, the UK Government issued figures on grants of leave to confirmed modern slavery victims. Some 21% of confirmed victims who were neither UK nor EU nationals were granted asylum in 2015. A group of more than 13 frontline charities that are expert practitioners in providing support to victims of slavery highlighted the problem, stating that:

“The support currently provided to survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery is not meeting recovery needs. Government funded support ends abruptly and too early and there is little information or data as to what happens to survivors in the longer term. The current situation leaves survivors with little realistic opportunity to rebuild their lives, with some ending up destitute, vulnerable to further harm or even being re-exploited.”

The Government may argue that they are already providing support for confirmed victims in England and Wales through the recovery needs assessment. However, under the RNA, victims are not guaranteed long-term support. Victims will receive a minimum of 45 days of move-on support, with the RNA determining how much—if any—extra support is required under the modern slavery victim care contract; that extra support will be for a maximum of six months at time, and may be only a few days or weeks.

Furthermore, Labour believes that victims’ needs are not fully addressed in the RNA. In the 2020 annual report on modern slavery, the support recommended by victim support workers was agreed to in full by the Home Office in only 53% of cases, which raises questions as to whether the process genuinely responds to victims’ needs or is, instead, focused on moving victims out of the service. In summary, amendments 7, 5 and 6 are necessary to address the fundamental challenge facing victims and provide them with far greater certainty.

Amendment 189 is necessary because all child victims must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance. The amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims as per article 14 of ECAT into primary legislation. It will specify that if the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the national referral mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests, giving due consideration to a victim’s need for support and care and a sustainable arrangement.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has echoed concerns on the lack of clarity around what the clause would mean in practice for children, with this having been acknowledged in the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation. Dame Sara Thornton states

“it is disappointing that this detail was not included as part of the Bill”,

and we share that frustration. There is no consistent public data available on the outcomes for potential child victims of trafficking, but evidence shows that our current policies are not being implemented adequately.

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking requested data through the Freedom of Information Act on the immigration outcomes for those exploited as children, the response to which showed alarming results in the data. It found that only about 5% of child-related considerations resulted in a positive decision for discretionary leave. The data indicates that discretionary leave is not being granted to children as victims of trafficking, and that in the small number of cases where it is, the average length of grant is short, suggesting that decisions are not being taken with their best interests as a primary consideration, providing minimal stability.

How many child victims of trafficking were subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain under the policy is unknown but, based on those figures, we can estimate that they are few. That is despite the explicit current policy that states the need to consider the length of leave, including a grant of indefinite leave to remain in line with the child’s best interests. That requirement is set out to fulfil the Secretary of State’s statutory obligation under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the wellbeing of children. All child victims of trafficking must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as only standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to say a few words in support of the amendments, which have the SNP’s full support. Currently, while someone might be in limbo for a long time, they are more secure the day after their referral into the NRM than they are the day after they receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, and that is not right. If they have been accepted as a survivor of trafficking, it makes them less secure. We should move towards a period of automatic leave to remain. The provision of leave is often an absolute prerequisite for meaningful recovery. With some security of status, the ability to seek employment or education and participate in the community builds confidence and stability, and the amendments broaden the number who will achieve that stability.

We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.

The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.

Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.

11:00

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.

In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—

Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle

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Shall I try it the other way round?

Craig Whittaker

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You can try it whichever way you like.

The Chair

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Order. I have been trying not to interrupt the Minister, but “you” is me.

Craig Whittaker

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Sorry, Sir Roger.

Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Craig Whittaker

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I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.

The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.

Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as

“the person’s wishes and feelings”,

which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.

We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.

I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.

I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.

For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.

With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 53

Ayes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.

I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.

As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,

“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”

11:15

“crucial enabler to their recovery and assisting the police in prosecuting their exploiters”.

I ask the Minster, where is certainty provided in the clause?

Craig Whittaker

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Holly Lynch

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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Neil Coyle

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Craig Whittaker

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I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.

There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Division 54

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

- Hansard -

11:25

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No.88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Return to start of debate - Return to top of page

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

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Divisions during this debate:
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, † Siobhain McDonagh

† Anderson, Stuart (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)

† Baker, Duncan (North Norfolk) (Con)

† Blomfield, Paul (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

† Goodwill, Mr Robert (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

† Gullis, Jonathan (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

† Holmes, Paul (Eastleigh) (Con)

† Howell, Paul (Sedgefield) (Con)

† Lynch, Holly (Halifax) (Lab)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Coventry North West) (Lab)

Pursglove, Tom (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Richards, Nicola (West Bromwich East) (Con)

† Whittaker, Craig (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury)

† Wood, Mike (Dudley South) (Con)

Rob Page, Sarah Thatcher, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Afternoon)

[Siobhain McDonagh in the Chair]

Nationality and Borders Bill

14:00

The Chair

- Hansard -

I highlight an announcement, given the decision about events in Parliament today. Members are strongly encouraged to wear masks when they are not speaking, in line with current Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please also give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering and leaving the room.

Clause 54

Civil legal aid under section 9 of LASPO: add-on services in relation to the national referral mechanism

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to consider clause 55 stand part, as announced by Sir Roger at the end of the morning sitting.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Identifying and supporting victims at an early stage is a key part of the Bill, and the new one-stop process. To underpin that process, clause 54 provides for legally aided advice on the national referral mechanism to be provided to individuals who are already receiving legally aided advice on an immigration or asylum matter. The additional advice will be free to the individual.

The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.

The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

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It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. Clause 54 amends the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable advice on referral into the NRM to be provided as add-on advice where individuals are in receipt of civil legal services for certain immigration and asylum matters. Although I and many other colleagues welcome the fact that the Government have recognised the importance of legal aid as part of the process, we argue that legislating for it only as an add-on misses the opportunity to extend access to all those who would benefit from it—I include the Home Office as one of the main beneficiaries of people having access to proper advocacy and advice from an early stage.

In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.

It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:

“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”

We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.

It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.

Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.

In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:

“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”

The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

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The trafficking directive—the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims—was adopted by the UK on 5 April 2011. The Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—is the principal international measure designed to combat human trafficking. The trafficking directive is intended, in part, to give effect to ECAT. ECAT’s objective is to prevent and combat trafficking by imposing obligations on member states to investigate and prosecute trafficking as a serious organised crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights.

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.

The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Holly Lynch

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I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,

“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”

There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.

The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.

I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to

“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,

which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”

that were saved cease to apply,

“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”

Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.

The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:

“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”

The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.

Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—

Craig Whittaker

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I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.

Holly Lynch

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his intervention. We are into the thick of the legal technicalities. These points are from some of the leading legal experts on the subject. They are not entirely satisfied that clause 56 is compatible, and that we are not missing some of the protections that have been hard fought for, with good reason.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.

14:15

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 55

Ayes: 8

Conservative: 8

Noes: 6

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Age assessments

Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)

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I beg to move amendment 150, in clause 58, page 52, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the ethical committees of the relevant medical, dental and scientific professional bodies and publish a report on the consultation.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with ethical committees of medical, dental and scientific professions before making regulations in their area, and publish a report on the consultation.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 168.

Government new clause 29—Interpretation of Part etc.

Government new clause 30—Persons subject to immigration control: referral or assessment by local authority etc.

Government new clause 31—Persons subject to immigration control: assessment for immigration purposes.

Government new clause 32—Use of scientific methods in age assessments.

Government new clause 33—Regulations about age assessments.

Government new clause 34—Appeals relating to age assessments.

Government new clause 35—Appeals relating to age assessments: supplementary.

Government new clause 36—New information following age assessment or appeal.

Government new clause 37—Legal aid for appeals.

Paul Blomfield

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand that the Government seek to delete clause 58 and replace it with new clauses 29 to 37, which provide more detail. However, the detail does not offer any reassurance; quite the contrary.

Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that new clause 32 makes amendment 150 superfluous, as it talks about the scientific input into age determination?

Paul Blomfield

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I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but he is completely wrong and I will explain why shortly.

In existing clause 58 and the new Government clauses, the Government want to introduce new regulations and a standard of proof for age assessments, to compel local authorities to assess age, to allow the use of “scientific methods” to assess age, despite widespread concerns from professional bodies about the validity or accuracy of any such methods, and to penalise children for not consenting to these potentially harmful interventions.

Children who come to the UK on their own, from countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Eritrea, face a unique problem when asked to prove their date of birth. The registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world, and many are genuinely unable to show official identity documents, such as passports or birth certificates, because they have never had them in the first place, they have had them taken away from them, they have lost them in the chaos of fleeing, or sometimes they have had to destroy them en route.

Disputes over age can also arise from a lack of understanding of the way in which dates are calculated in other countries and cultures, and associated confusion over what is being said by a child about his or her age. So, one might reasonably ask, why are the Government making so much of this issue?

Mr Goodwill

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The Chair

- Hansard -

I call Robert Goodwill—sorry, I meant Paul Blomfield.

Paul Blomfield

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

He can have another go if he wants.

I hear what the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby is saying. I remember watching a BBC programme recently—I think it was on the BBC—on the Kindertransport. The same debate was had about Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany after Kristallnacht. Some were slightly older than the age restriction of the time. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that this legislation would have been appropriate at that time. We could have turned them around and sent them back to the Nazis.

Paragraph 24 of the explanatory notes states:

“Since 2015, the UK has received, on average, more than 3,000 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children per year. Where age was disputed and resolved from 2016-2020, 54% were found to be adults”.

Clearly, 54% is a big number, but the data in the notes is more than a little selective.

According to Home Office statistics, for the most recent normal year unaffected by the pandemic, which was 2019, there were 4,005 unaccompanied children applications. Of those, 748 had their age disputed and 304 were found to be adults. That is just over 7% of child applicants. The problem is that that is in no way as prolific as purported by the explanatory notes. The actual number is likely to be lower, because the Home Office stats do not include decisions later overturned following advocacy or reviews by judges.

Again, the Government have a problem finding evidence to justify a proposal in the Bill. This is clearly not the first time this has happened. I see that the Home Secretary got herself into trouble with the Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee today by being unable to come up with the facts to justify one of her wilder allegations about those crossing the channel. Nevertheless, the Government are ploughing ahead with their plans to use scientific methods to assess age.

I now turn specifically to new clause 32, which does not offer any of the clarity that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby suggested. Proposed new subsection (2) mentions the

“types of scientific method that may be specified”,

and that the two specified might be included. However, proposed new subsection (9) goes out of its way to state:

“This section does not prevent the use of a scientific method that is not a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment under”

the previous proposed new section,

“if the decision-maker considers it appropriate to do so”.

New clause 32 is therefore saying: “Any scientific method that we can come up with at any time in the future will be legitimate.”

Mr Goodwill

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Paul Blomfield

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I refer the right hon. Gentleman to what my amendment 150 proposes. All it asks is that the Government should be required to take into account relevant scientific and medical evidence, consulting reports of the ethical committees of the appropriate medical and dental professions, on the Government’s planned use of scientific methods for assessing age.

What do the experts think? The British Dental Association called dental X-rays for age assessments “inaccurate and unethical”, which is a theme that relates to the rest of the Bill—it will not do what it says it will do. The Government apparently told some journalists that they do not plan to use dental X-rays anyway, but the Bill leaves that option open, so forgive us if we do not take casual briefings to journalists on the side as a way to determine the Government’s future conduct on this issue.

The Government are apparently planning to use wrist X-rays, which the British Medical Association tells us it has “serious concerns” about because

“they would involve direct harms without any medical benefit to the individual”,

as radiation exposure over a lifetime should be kept as minimal as possible. The BDA agrees:

“The process of radiography is a medical procedure that should be carried out only for medical purposes, and where the patient stands to benefit. Exposing children to radiation when there is no medical benefit is simply wrong.”

The BMA also warns that

“the evidence supporting the accuracy of the process is extremely weak”.

We are back to the same old theme: there is no real evidence to support what the Government are doing. The BMA goes on to say that the process is particularly weak where,

“as in the case of most asylum seekers, there is a shortage of appropriate age and cultural comparators.”

Yet again, Ministers are introducing ineffective proposals without any evidence, making those seeking asylum—in this case, children—part of the narrative of “Let’s assume bad faith, and let’s assume that everybody is trying to play the system.” It will not work, but it is designed to grab headlines and to make it seem as though the Government are talking tough, rather than dealing with the genuine issues on which we agree, such as stopping those who are forced out of desperation to make journeys across the channel. I urge the Minister to accept our amendment or, better still, to just withdraw the clause.

The Chair

- Hansard -

The Public Gallery is becoming a little crowded. I encourage everyone sitting there to spread out as much as possible, to ensure social distancing.

Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would like to speak to clause stand part, and I support everything that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central has already said. We all recognise how important it is to get age assessments right, while acknowledging that it will always be an imperfect process. As he said, what precisely is the nature and scale of the problem that the Government are driving at here? Of course, it is important to ensure as far as possible that adults are not placed in child settings, but the overall tenor of the evidence that we have received is that placing children in adult settings is an even greater risk. If a young adult is placed in a setting designed for older children, there will at least be child-specific safeguarding and other age-appropriate support. If a child is wrongly placed in adult reception and immigration processes, there are no such protections, and such a decision can have profound impacts on and consequences for a child.

First and foremost, we should continue to think about age assessments as a function of the child protection and safeguarding system, not of the immigration system. The responsibility should remain with social workers, whose expertise and experience make them by far the best people to undertake such assessments where support is required. We should preserve the current position, which does not place an evidential burden on a child or young adult but leaves the decision makers to weigh up all the evidence to a reasonable degree of likelihood. The Home Office has quite simply offered no sound reasons for undermining that arrangement and for imposing a higher standard of proof.

14:29

Mr Goodwill

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not have access to that webpage, but the right hon. Gentleman has access to the extensive evidence submitted to the Committee by the BDA. It is a two-sided issue. First, it is not appropriate to subject people to radiation, and in this case there is no informed consent. The evidence is clear. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is clear that an assessment can be no more accurate than two years either side. The British Society for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes is clear that we cannot assess a child’s age just physically or by analysing bones.

In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.

Mr Goodwill

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Stuart C. McDonald

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No, I am not saying that. What I am advocating is the position at present—that the decision maker looks at all the evidence that is available in the round. If somebody is 50, I cannot imagine them needing an invasive scientific procedure to establish that they are over 18. I am not by any stretch of the imagination saying that we just take somebody’s word for it. I am advocating for the status quo. By all means the Government can introduce some sort of advisory board, but that should not supplant and take over the functions of local authorities—but that, unfortunately, is how I see these new clauses working.

The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.

I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.

What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.

Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

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Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)

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The Government have tabled new clauses 29 to 37 to replace clause 58, which was a placeholder clause on age assessments. Colleagues have already made the point about lack of scrutiny. Having received these new clauses so late in the day, we have not had a chance to see proper evidence, because we were not aware of what has been said. Clearly, as part of its role a Committee must have time to scrutinise. I am sure we will do the best we can with the time we have been given, but it really is not best form to have so many Government new clauses so late in the day on such an important issue.

We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.

For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.

New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.

This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.

It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.

K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.

K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.

K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.

In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?

In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments

“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.

14:00

“dentists could find themselves performing an act that is not just inappropriate and unethical, but even constitutes criminal battery.”

Another worrying aspect of the new clause is around consent and damage to credibility. Subsection (7) states that decision makers must take it

“as damaging the age disputed person’s credibility”

Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)

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It will probably not shock Committee members that I support what the Government are doing on age assessments. Ultimately, it is about ensuring that we protect our young people in our United Kingdom. When people say that they are children and will be in a classroom surrounded by people of a similar age, we need to make sure that they are indeed children.

As a former teacher, I understand the importance of this. As a former head of year who had responsibility for safeguarding, covering welfare, attendance and the behaviour of young people, it makes no sense to me why anyone would oppose a measure to make sure that people who claim to be young people are indeed young people. An individual who has nothing to hide should have nothing to fear in this regard. It is absolutely essential that age assessments take place to make sure that people claiming to be of school age are indeed of that ilk, because ultimately other young people could be put in a very vulnerable situation.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Jonathan Gullis

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Of course—absolutely. Young people should not be placed in a situation like that, for safety reasons. As a former teacher, I would not want a 14 or 15-year-old to be somewhere they felt unsafe. The problem is that we have a broken asylum system that needs fixing. Age assessments can be avoided if people do not try to enter the country illegally, but come by safe and legal routes, where we can have documentation.

There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.

Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.

Craig Whittaker

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Let me start with amendment 150. I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that his amendment applies to all aspects of age assessments, not only the use of scientific measures. As such, it is extremely broad, although I do not know if that remains his intention.

The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.

We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

Holly Lynch

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The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

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I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.

One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.

First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.

15:00

Reflecting on the safeguards in the Bill and the pre-existing processes to ensure safe and ethical applications for the various technologies—before I finish, I will give way.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Craig Whittaker

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I will come on to that when I discuss further measures in new clause 32, but our opinion is that the amendment is not necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw it. On the new clauses, clause 58 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses of introduction, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provision on age assessment. New clauses 29 to 37 are intended to replace clause 58 entirely.

Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.

Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.

Anne McLaughlin

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Craig Whittaker

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I suspect that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that how that is assessed will be down to the individual scientific advice given on the individual case at the time. I cannot see a like-for-like comparator for a child from Ethiopia or Sudan, which was mentioned earlier, being a child in this country. That is why the scientific evidence is a much more accurate way of assessing. It can be a great tool in the arsenal of assessing a child when compared with our existing system, which is the Merton assessment by two individual social workers. Given the challenges of assessing an individual’s age, we see no good reason why such technologies should not also be used. In all good faith, this is one of several tools in the arsenal. To further enhance my answer to the question asked by the hon. Lady, the precise scientific method of assessment will be specified in regulation, following scientific advice.

We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.

Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.

The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.

New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.

Stuart C. McDonald

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Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?

Craig Whittaker

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I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.

I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.

New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.

15:15

Paul Blomfield

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Craig Whittaker

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Paul Blomfield

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Division 56

Ayes: 6

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 58 disagreed to.

Clause 59

Processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries

Paul Blomfield

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I beg to move amendment 151, in clause 59, page 52, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State must publish impact assessments on the effect of the provisions in this section on—

(a) nationals from countries falling within subsection (3), and

(b) the United Kingdom’s economy and trade.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish impact assessments with regard to the effect this clause might have on both nationals from countries in subsection (3) and the UK economy and trade.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 80.

Government new clause 9—Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries.

Government new clause 10—Visa penalties: review and revocation.

Paul Blomfield

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The amendment would require the Home Secretary to publish impact assessments on the effect of clause 59 both on nationals from the countries in subsection (3) and on the UK’s economy and trade.

The Government plan to replace clause 59 with Government new clauses 9 and 10. This is a slightly more developed version of the proposal to punish the nationals of countries if the Government consider their Governments to have been unco-operative on returns. The explanatory notes for clause 59 do not explain its purpose—because it was a placeholder clause, there was no detail—so I assume it is to act as an incentive for countries to co-operate with returns, but I hope that the Minister will seek to provide some evidence of that.

The explanatory notes do state that

“a very small number of countries do not cooperate”

with returns, suggesting that penalties would apply only to a limited number of states. However, a report in The Daily Telegraph on 15 October—presumably briefed by the Government, which is the way we seem to get information these days—said that

“Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea and Philippines”

are countries understood not to co-operate with returns. We know that the majority of those on that list have conditions that mean returns are unlikely anyway, as there are strong asylum cases from them, so we know that the deterrents will not work. So, I would like to press the Minister a little bit more on what the Government expect to achieve with these revisions.

Mr Goodwill

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Paul Blomfield

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I hear what the right hon. Member is saying, but the scope of this provision seems to go much wider than that. It seeks to introduce punitive measures, including on visa charges and so on, for individuals who may be applying, and I will develop that point. It is nothing to do with overstaying. This is about countries that are unco-operative on returns in other contexts.

I want to press the Minister on what the Government expect to achieve by this. For example, it is not in our interests to sanction doctors, nurses or engineers who have been recruited to the UK from one country with longer visa processing times or higher charges, and that would be deeply damaging for our diaspora communities. Again, it feels as if we have proposals picked from headlines, which are not in the country’s interests.

Mr Goodwill

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It might help some of these countries if we did not plunder their health professionals, who have trained at the expense of that country, and actually trained our own instead.

Paul Blomfield

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I am interested in that observation, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will lead the charge to persuade the Government to allocate far more resources for the training of health professionals and to tackle the crisis they have created within our health service over the past 11 years.

Amendment 151 will try to ensure that the Government are clear-eyed about the impact of their policy and the trade-offs they are prepared to make, as well as the impact on UK public services, communities and businesses. The amendment would allow the public to examine that trade-off, too. It would ensure that the Government track the impact of their policy, and are transparent with business and trade over the impact any visa penalties might have, either through reduced travel or through deteriorating relationships with those countries.

The Government talk a lot about global Britain, but through our examination of the Bill we have seen many threats to that and a lot of ways in which they plan on sowing discord with other nations around the world, damaging our reputation in the international community. I know that the Minister will not vote for clause 59 stand part, but I would welcome his thoughts on the wider impact of the replacement clauses, along the lines of my amendment. I would appreciate it if he could tell us whether any such impact assessments are being considered.

I have an important point to make about new clauses 9 and 10, to which I hope the Minister can respond. There is significant concern that these clauses will prevent people from joining refugees in the UK through the family reunion route. Let us consider the countries cited in The Daily Telegraph again: Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea and the Philippines. Since the start of 2019, 8,480 people from Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Eritrea have been granted refugee family reunion visas to join loved ones in the UK. That equates to just over half—53%—of all family visas granted over that period. Some 3,584 of those visas were for children and 5,771 for women or girls. The new clause, as drafted, would potentially apply to visas for refugees coming to the UK under one of the Home Office’s resettlement schemes, including the relocation scheme for Afghan nationals who have previously worked with the UK Government or applicants from Hong Kong for British national overseas visas.

So, if the Government are determined to proceed with these new clauses, at the very least new clause 9 needs to be amended to include an exemption for refugee family reunion and other protection routes. I should be grateful if the Minister would indicate whether the Government are willing to do that.

Anne McLaughlin

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We support amendment 151 for the self-explanatory reason that we need to know the impact of these actions. We are not saying that visa penalties should never be imposed in any circumstances, but we share many of the concerns voiced by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central and I will focus on a couple of them.

The Government say this clause will incentivise other countries to co-operate with the UK Government to remove those who have no right to be in the country, but they have presented no evidence that this will be the case. Saying it is one thing, but if they are so confident of it they should do some work and, as the hon. Member for Sheffield Central asks in his amendment, publish a report examining the impact on our relations with other countries.

The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants says that this clause will affect, among others, workers, including key workers. Have not the Brexit restrictions on key workers coming into the country taught us anything? There are also tourists and their massive contribution to our economies; performers; students—who pay thousands of pounds to study at our universities, many of which would struggle to survive without them—and academics, among others, including the family members of British citizens. Again, we are punishing the wrong people.

15:30

Craig Whittaker

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Starting with amendment 151, I reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the penalties are there to encourage countries to co-operate. There is international precedent for countries to have the power to impose penalties on countries that do not co-operate on the matter of returns.

Both the United States and the EU have similar powers to those we are seeking. Recently, the Council of the EU decided to suspend temporarily the application of certain provisions in the visa code to nationals of The Gambia, owing to the country’s lack of co-operation on readmission of third-country nationals illegally staying in the EU. The new powers in the Bill will bring the UK into line with our international partners and ensure that we are no longer lagging behind other countries.

I assure hon. Members that, given talk of penalties and exemption, family reunion will be an exemption to the penalties, as discussed.

Turning to amendment 151, I can assure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the power to impose visa penalties will be exercised only after consideration of the potential economic impact on the UK, and with full agreement across Government. Contrary to the hon. Member’s assertion that there is another Government leak, there is no current list: this will be done on a case-by-case basis, based on the impact across areas such as the economy, but also taking each Department into account. I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to new clauses 9 and 10, which—as we have already touched on—set out those visa provisions in more detail. I feel that this is a fairly straightforward part of the Bill, with no need for the hon. Member’s amendment.

Turning to new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80, a key function of the Home Office is the removal of individuals who have no legal right to be here, either by deportation or administrative removal, usually to the country of which they are nationals. We expect our international partners to work with us, as they expect us to work with them, to remove such individuals, as the UK does where our own nationals in other countries should not be in those countries. This is a critical component of a functioning migration relationship, and the vast majority of countries co-operate with us in this area. However, a small number do not.

As has been said, new clause 9 is designed to give the Government the power to impose visa penalties. Countries should no longer expect to benefit from a normal UK visa service if they are unwilling to co-operate with us on the matter of returning nationals. We will be able to slow down or suspend visa services for that country, and require applicants to pay a surcharge of £190 when they apply for a UK visa. Specifically, new clause 9 sets out when a country may be specified as unco-operative and the factors that will be taken into account when imposing visa penalties. Additionally, the new clause provides detail on the types of penalties that may be applied. It is a critical step in taking back control of our borders.

Briefly turning to new clause 10, visa penalties are intended to be a matter of last resort, and must not be in place longer than necessary. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the application of visa penalties every two months and revoke those penalties if the relevant country is no longer unco-operative. This provision is a safeguard to ensure that any visa penalties applied do not remain in place by default. Government amendment 80 is consequential on new clauses 9 and 10, providing that they will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

I commend new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80 to the Committee, and by your leave, Ms McDonagh, I request that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central withdraw his amendments.

Paul Blomfield

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I was reassured by the commitments on family reunion, and I look forward to the Government’s bringing forward an amendment on that topic, perhaps in the House of Lords. I have taken the Minister’s other comments on board, so I will not press this amendment to a vote at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 59 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 60 disagreed to.

Clause 61

Special Immigration Appeals Commission

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to consider Government new clause 11—Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

Craig Whittaker

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Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

Bambos Charalambous

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New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

15:45

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Bambos Charalambous

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

Craig Whittaker

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Bambos Charalambous

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Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Bambos Charalambous

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My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.

It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.

Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:

“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—

(a) disallow, or

(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,

the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.

Wasted costs are defined as

“any costs incurred by a party—

(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or

(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”

That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made

“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”

In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.

In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant

“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and

(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.

The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include

“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,

(b) any employee of such a person, or

(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.

(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”

However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.

Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:

“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”

No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.

Clause 63 provides that:

“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—

(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”

a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.

According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,

“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”

is

“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,

but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.

16:00

The Chair

- Hansard -

This debate will now include consideration of clause 63.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I echo what the shadow Minister said. This is all really political theatre—a move to get immigration lawyers. As a former immigration lawyer, I cannot let these clauses pass without comment. In my experience, immigration lawyers are a group of people who do an invaluable job, and not one that there is a queue of folk desperate to do. It is a difficult job. Most clients have no resources; legal aid budgets are far from easy; many clients can be communicated with only through interpreters, who are often hard to find; and these lawyers are dealing with facts, circumstances, documents and other evidence from jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The pressures can be enormous. These lawyers are acutely aware that in some cases, if they get things wrong, the client’s life, liberty or human rights are at serious risk.

This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.

The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.

Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.

As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.

Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.

Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill

Division 57

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Tribunal procedure rules to be made in respect of costs orders etc.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 58

Ayes: 9

Conservative: 9

Noes: 7

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Good Faith Requirement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 81.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Bambos Charalambous

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Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

The Chair

- Hansard -

I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 65

Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bambos Charalambous

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Craig Whittaker

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I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

What is taken from that review is perhaps the need for consolidation of immigration legislation, nationality legislation and so on, which I would absolutely support. The challenge with the clause as drafted is that it proposes pretty huge and wide-ranging powers. The Secretary of State can amend pretty much any old Act of Parliament if, in her opinion, it facilitates what is otherwise desirable in connection with the consolidation. It could rewrite citizenship laws, for example, or the entire immigration system. There is a check on it in the sense that the regulations will not come into force until a consolidation Act is passed. There is a broader question about how often Governments tend to help themselves to massive Henry VIII powers when they rewrite all sorts of stuff. I have made that point a million times and nobody listens, so I will leave it at that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Extent

Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—

(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);

(c) section(Liability of carriers)(liability of carriers).

(5) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(c) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 186, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Scotland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Scottish Parliament, bringing it into force in Scotland.

(5) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Northern Ireland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly, bringing it into force in Northern Ireland.”

Under this amendment, Part 4 of the Bill would not enter into force in Scotland or Northern Ireland until the relevant devolved legislatures had given their consent.

I am sorry to have to take the Committee back to part 4 and modern slavery and trafficking. The amendment relates to a similar issue that I raised in connection with age assessments, because I tend to believe that certain provisions in part 4 encroach on devolved competences in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the way that the part 4 is drafted, the Government have recognised that modern slavery and trafficking is a matter that is devolved to both those jurisdictions. That is why certain clauses do not impact on them. However, in this amendment, we are suggesting simply that the Government should go further. For example, in my view, the recovery period is clearly within the competency of the Scottish Government and I think, also, the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, clause 49 interferes with the start and end points of that period. Clauses 46 and 47 trample all over the idea that identification of victims of slavery and trafficking are devolved matters. So too does clause 51. For those reasons, I am prompting the Minister on what engagement there has been and is ongoing and whether a legislative consent motion should be requested from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly before the Bill is passed.

16:15

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Neil Coyle

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The Minister says “almost all” the provisions. Can he outline which are not?

Craig Whittaker

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It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.

Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 70, page 58, line 30, leave out “and (4)” and insert “to (5)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 109.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 70, page 58, line 42, leave out paragraphs (d) and (e).

This amendment is consequential on an Amendment 109.

Amendment 109, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

“(5) Sections 27 to 35 may not be commenced before—

(a) the Secretary of State has consulted with such parties as the Secretary of State considers appropriate on—

(i) the compatibility of each section with the Refugee Convention; and

(ii) the domestic and international implications of the UK adopting each section;

(b) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of that consultation stating which parties were consulted, and stating in respect of each section—

(i) the views of the parties consulted on its compatibility and implications;

(ii) the differences between the interpretation of the Convention provided by the section and any interpretations provided by the higher courts before the passing of this Act;

(iii) the reasons why the Secretary of State concludes that the section should be commenced; and

(c) both Houses of Parliament have considered that report and approved the commencement of each of the sections that is to be commenced.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)—

“interpretation provided by the higher courts” means an interpretation provided by any judgement of the High Court or Court of Appeal in England and Wales, of the Court of Session in Scotland, of the High Court or Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or of the United Kingdom Supreme Court that has not been superseded.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to hold consultations on the compatibility of Clauses 27 to 35 with the Refugee Convention, and to report to Parliament on such consultations, before the relevant Clauses enter into force.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

God loves a tryer, and I do try. The amendments are another attempt to encourage the Government to set out their legal thinking on the compatibility of the clauses cited in amendment 109 with the refugee convention. How do the Government think that the provisions in clauses 27 to 35 can be consistent with the refugee convention?

There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.

On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.

In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of amendments 107 to 109, which I will speak to collectively. I thank hon. Members for moving and tabling them, and I agree that it is important that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations under the refugee convention and other international conventions and treaties.

I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.

There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.

The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.

In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Craig Whittaker

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I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 77, 123, 191, 78 and 167.

Clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendments 76 to 78, which relate to clause 57—interpretation of part 4—will ensure that the regulation-making power in this clause will come into effect at Royal Assent to the Bill rather than two months after Royal Assent. This is to ensure that the regulations that will define “victim of slavery” and “victim of trafficking” have time to progress through Parliament and themselves come into force by the time the remaining clauses relating to modern slavery commence. As currently drafted, clauses 16, 17 and 23 come into force two months after Royal Assent. Amendment 123 ensures that these clauses, which relate to priority removal notices, come into force by commencement regulations aligning with other provisions relating to priority removal notices. This is to ensure that all provisions relating to priority removal notices can commence simultaneously.

Amendment 191 removes the commencement provision regarding clause 42, as the clause is intended to be replaced entirely by new clause 20. Amendment 167 removes the commencement provisions regarding marker clauses 58 to 61—about age assessments, processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries, electronic travel authorisations and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—as these clauses have been removed and replaced by substantive clauses.

Clause 70 sets out the commencement of the clauses in the Bill. As currently drafted, the majority of the provisions in the Bill will be brought into force by regulations on a day appointed by the Secretary of State, with the exception of those in part 6, which commence on Royal Assent, as is usual, and those that come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment 76 agreed to.

Amendment made: 77, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(a) section 57 (interpretation of Part 4), for the purposes of making regulations under that section;” —(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment brings the power to make regulations defining “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” into force on the day on which the Act receives Royal Assent.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move Government amendment 121, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(b) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(1) and (5) to (7) (effect of failure to give notice of pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”

This amendment brings subsections (1) and (5) to (7) of NC19 (concerning the effect of a failure to give notice of a pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The Chair

- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 122.

Government new clause 19—Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship—

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

16:33

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will not say too much, because I need to give new clause 19 further consideration and to speak with stakeholders about it. Circumstances in which service is difficult because a person is out of contact happen pretty regularly in legal disputes that go through the courts. Rather than just shortcutting by having no procedure at all, what happens is that an alternative method is proposed, such as displaying a notice in newspapers. That was back in the old days; I assume that things have moved online since the dim and distant past when I was a practising solicitor. I wonder if there is a better way that does not result in someone being deprived of citizenship—which, as the Minister said, is a very serious matter—without any procedure having been followed at all.

It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.

Amendment 121 agreed to.

Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—

“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.

This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.

This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).

This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.

Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—

“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.

This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 12.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through UK port and border areas for the purposes of determining whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism. Currently, officers may exercise schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area and their presence in such an area is as a result of them entering or leaving the UK.

The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.

New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.

Amendment 79 agreed to.

Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)

This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.

Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);

(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);

(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”

This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.

Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”

This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.

Stuart C. McDonald

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I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“

This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.

The Chair

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With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 38—Time limit on immigration detention—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) who is liable to detention under a relevant detention power.

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 28 days from the relevant time.

(3) If P remains detained under a relevant detention power at the expiry of the period of 28 days then—

(a) P shall be released forthwith; and

(b) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power thereafter, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that there has been a material change of circumstances since P’s release and that the criteria in section [Initial detention: criteria and duration](1) are met.

(4) In this section, “relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—

(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);

(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);

(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal); or

(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).

(5) In this section, “relevant time” means the time at which P is first detained under a relevant detention power.

(6) This section does not apply to a person in respect of whom the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain is or was taken in the interests of national security.”

This new clause would prevent people who are liable to detention under a relevant power from being detained for longer than 28 days.

New clause 39—Initial detention: criteria and duration—

“(1) A person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power other than for the purposes of examination, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that—

(a) P can be shortly removed from the United Kingdom;

(b) detention is strictly necessary to effect P’s deportation or removal from the United Kingdom; and

(c) the detention of P is in all the circumstances proportionate.

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 96 hours from the relevant time, unless—

(a) P has been refused bail at an initial bail hearing in accordance with subsection (5)(b) of section [Bail hearings]; or

(b) the Secretary of State has arranged a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P in accordance with subsection (2)(c) of section [Bail hearings] and that hearing has not yet taken place.

(3) Nothing in subsections (1) or (2) authorises the Secretary of State to detain P under a relevant detention power if such detention would, apart from this section, be unlawful.

(4) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(5) In this section, “relevant detention power” and “relevant time” have the meanings given in section [Time limit on immigration detention].”

This new clause sets out the circumstances in which a person to whom NC38 applies may be held in initial detention, and the maximum duration of such detention.

New clause 40—Bail hearings—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies and who is detained under a relevant detention power.

(2) Before the expiry of a period of 96 hours from the relevant time, the Secretary of State must—

(a) release P;

(b) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(c) arrange a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), when the Secretary of State arranges a reference to the Tribunal under subsection (2)(c), the Tribunal must hold an oral hearing (“an initial bail hearing”) which must commence within 24 hours of the time at which the reference is made.

(4) If the period of 24 hours in subsection (3) ends on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank holiday, the Tribunal must hold an initial bail hearing on the next working day.

(5) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal must—

(a) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(b) refuse to grant immigration bail to P.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Tribunal must grant immigration bail to P at a bail hearing unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] are met and that, in addition—

(a) directions have been given for P’s removal from the United Kingdom and such removal is to take place within 14 days;

(b) a travel document is available for the purposes of P’s removal or deportation; and

(c) there are no outstanding legal barriers to removal.

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] above are met and that there are very exceptional circumstances which justify maintaining detention.

(8) In subsection (6), “a bail hearing” includes—

(a) an initial bail hearing under subsection (2); and

(b) the hearing of an application for immigration bail under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016.

(9) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(10) The Secretary of State shall provide to P or to P’s legal representative, not more than 24 hours after the relevant time, copies of all documents in the Secretary of State’s possession which are relevant to the decision to detain.

(11) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal shall not consider any documents relied upon by the Secretary of State which were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10), unless—

(a) P consents to the documents being considered; or

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal there is a good reason why the documents were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10).

(12) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows—

(a) After paragraph 12(4) of schedule 10 insert—

“(4A) Sub-paragraph (2) above does not apply if the refusal of bail by the First tier Tribunal took place at an initial bail hearing within the meaning of section [Bail hearings] of the Sovereign Borders Act 2021.”.”

In respect of people to whom NC38 applies, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to either release them, grant immigration bail or arrange a reference to the Tribunal within 96 hours.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This group of amendments and new clauses is not new. It was proposed in similar words in the most recent immigration Bill by, I think, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), but I may be wrong. No Bill passes through this Parliament on immigration and nationality law that does not include amendments and debate about immigration detention. Perhaps, after the last couple of years, Members are more than ever acutely aware that the deprivation of people’s freedoms is keenly felt and should not occur without evidence as to its necessity.

We are talking here about the deprivation of liberty not because people have committed a crime but, essentially, for the convenience of the Home Office. The new clauses contain measures to end what is indefinite detention in the UK, whatever the Home Office says to the contrary, and to implement a workable system that ensures detention is used only as a last resort to effect lawful removals from the UK. That is what the situation should be. The existing power to detain without prior judicial authority would be retained but there would be important safeguards: a 28-day time limit, judicial oversight by way of bail hearings after 96 hours with clear criteria for continued detention and re-detention only when there is a material change in status or circumstances.

Immigration detention has declined over the last several years, which is very welcome. Nevertheless, there is no release date for immigration detainees, which is incredibly severe, particularly in terms of mental ill health. Although numbers have been falling, the length of time that people are detained has not fallen. The fact of falling numbers does not reduce the need for a time limit. We are talking about several thousand individuals leaving detention every year who have been detained for longer than 28 days and hundreds who have been detained for more than six months. In a minority of cases, detention lasts for years rather than months.

Why 28 days? It is not a number that has been pulled from thin air. It is already in Home Office guidance, which requires caseworkers to consider whether removal is imminent and goes on to define imminence in the following terms:

“Removal could be said to be imminent where a travel document exists, removal directions are set there are no outstanding legal barriers and removal is likely to take place in the next four weeks.”

This is a recommendation that has been made by many organisations with expertise in the area, including the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Affairs Committee, the Bar Council and the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migration.

Paul Blomfield

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

16:44

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and the other hon. Members involved for their work on that report, which was incredibly thorough. We then had a Backbench Business debate and the Government did not oppose it, because there was clearly a majority in the House of Commons at that time for such a time limit.

Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.

If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Paul Blomfield

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Anne McLaughlin

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the Minister not think that if someone represents a threat to the public, they would be in jail? If they are not in jail, there is no evidence that they represent a threat to the public.

Craig Whittaker

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but we are talking about those who are a threat to the public. We have to have a duty of care. In fact, the first role of the Government is to protect their own citizens.

New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.

New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

Stuart C. McDonald

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not know where to start with that response, although it is very similar to those we have had in previous debates. The bogey card is always that foreign national offenders are a serious risk, yet the Government have the power to deport folk straight from prison. That is the power they should use in those situations.

What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.

The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)

16:53

Adjourned till Thursday 4 November at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

NBB44 Hope for Justice

NBB45 ATLEU (Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit)

NBB46 CARE (Christian Action Research and Education)

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Judicial Review and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021

(3 years ago)

Public Bill Committees

Share Debate

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Mark Hendrick, Andrew Rosindell

† Barker, Paula (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)

† Cartlidge, James (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Crawley, Angela (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)

† Cunningham, Alex (Stockton North) (Lab)

† Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)

† Fletcher, Nick (Don Valley) (Con)

† Hayes, Sir John (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

† Higginbotham, Antony (Burnley) (Con)

† Hunt, Tom (Ipswich) (Con)

† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

† Longhi, Marco (Dudley North) (Con)

† McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

† Mann, Scott (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)

† Marson, Julie (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)

† Moore, Damien (Southport) (Con)

† Slaughter, Andy (Hammersmith) (Lab)

† Twist, Liz (Blaydon) (Lab)

Huw Yardley, Seb Newman, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Witnesses

Sir Stephen Laws KCB, QC, First Parliamentary Counsel 2006 to 2012, Senior Fellow, Policy Exchange 2018 to present

Professor Richard Ekins, Head, Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project

Professor Jason Varuhas, Professor of Law, University of Melbourne

Professor David Feldman, Professor of English Law, University of Cambridge

Dr Jonathan Morgan, Reader in English Law, Cambridge University

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 November 2021

(Morning)

[Sir Mark Hendrick in the Chair]

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

09:25

The Chair

- Hansard -

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. First, if Members wish to remove their jackets, they should feel free to do so, because this room is quite warm. I encourage Members to wear masks when they are not speaking. This is in line with guidance of the House of Commons Commission. Please also give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering and leaving the room.

Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Similarly, officials in the Gallery should communicate electronically with Ministers. Please switch any electronic devices to silent. As many of you will be aware, tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings, but water is provided at most desks.

Today we will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before we commence the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters formally.

Ordered,

That—

1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 2 November) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 2 November;

(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 November;

(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 November;

(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 16 November;

(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 18 November;

(f) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 November;

2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

Date	Time	Witness
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 10.25 am	Sir Stephen Laws, KCB, QC; Professor Jason Varuhas, University of Melbourne; Professor Richard Ekins, University of Oxford
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 11.25 am	Professor David Feldman, University of Cambridge; Dr Jonathan Morgan, University of Cambridge
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 2.45 pm	Richard Leiper QC; André Rebello OBE, Senior Coroner for Liverpool and the Wirral and Hon Secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 3.30 pm	Public Law Project; Law Society; Liberty
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 4.30 pm	Inquest; Justice; Amnesty
Tuesday 2 November	Until no later than 5.00 pm	Dr Joe Tomlinson, University of York; The Law Society of Scotland; Aidan O’Neill QC

3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 15; Schedule 1; Clauses 16 and 17; Schedule 2; Clause 18; Schedule 3; Clauses 19 to 29; Schedule 4; Clauses 30 to 32; Schedule 5; Clauses 33 to 48; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;

4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 23 November.—(James Cartlidge.)

Resolved,

That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(James Cartlidge.)

The Chair

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Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and will be circulated to Members by email.

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(James Cartlidge.)

09:28

The Committee deliberated in private.

Examination of Witnesses

Sir Stephen Laws, Professor Richard Ekins and Professor Jason Varuhas gave evidence.

09:30

The Chair

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Before we hear from the witnesses, please may I have any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill?

Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am a non-practising barrister.

The Chair

- Hansard -

We will now hear from the first panel. We have three witnesses, all are appearing virtually. I thank you all for attending today’s evidence session. We will hear from Sir Stephen Laws QC, senior research fellow at the Policy Exchange and former First Parliamentary Counsel; Professor Jason Varuhas, from the University of Melbourne; and Professor Richard Ekins, from the University of Oxford.

Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters in the scope of the Bill. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. We have until 10.25 am for this session, which gives us just under an hour. Could the witnesses please introduce themselves?

Sir Stephen Laws: My name is Sir Stephen Laws. I spent my career in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, starting in 1976. From 2006 until 2012 I was the First Parliamentary Counsel, head of the office and responsible for the offices of the Government business managers. Since retirement, I have been a senior research fellow at the judicial power project at the Policy Exchange.

Professor Varuhas: Good morning, I am Jason Varuhas. I am a professor of law at the University of Melbourne, where I am also the director for the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies in the law school. My interests lie in public law, private law and the law of remedies.

Professor Ekins: I am from the University of Oxford. I have led Policy Exchange’s judicial power project for the last few years and have written a fair bit about cases involving judicial review that warrant criticism or are problematic. I have made submissions, as have my colleagues, to the independent review of administrative law and in response to the Government consultation, and most recently another paper for Policy Exchange outlining possible amendments that might be made to the Bill.

The Chair

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Thank you. Could I invite the first question? John?

Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I am not particularly choosy about who answers this—indeed, you might all want to, but I am thinking particularly of Professor Ekins. The independent review of administrative law drew attention to other areas that the Bill might address—I am thinking of where abstract principles have been used to counter decisions of Parliament. The sovereignty and the will of Parliament are critical, and the abstract principles—I am referring to the Prorogation case, for example—should surely be addressed by the Bill. Linked to that is the Adams case, with which you will be familiar and which you will be familiar and which the Attorney General spoke about in a powerful speech a week or so ago, which challenges the Carltona principle. Is it not important that the Bill reinforces that principle, which would be good news for anybody who has been a Minister, is a Minister or, indeed, is on the Opposition side of the House and hopes to be one?

Professor Ekins: I will go first, since you directed that at me. It is true that the independent review of administrative law noted a worrying trend in relation to cases in which fairly abstract constitutional principles were used to develop the law in surprising ways. It is true that the review held short of recommending legislation in response, but it attended to this as a problem, and I think it is quite rightly within your field of vision as something that should be attended to. The review noted in particular the perfect legitimacy of Parliament legislating in response to particular cases that it thinks break new ground in problematic ways, which might include the Prorogation judgment or Unison, Evans and other cases. That would also include the Adams case, which the review briefly referred to. It is very true that that case made a significant change that is problematic for our law and government. Sir Stephen and I wrote a paper last year for Policy Exchange noting the shortcomings of the judgment—that it really undermines the Carltona doctrine, which is central to the way in which Parliament confers power on Ministers and how civil servants exercise that power. I think it will be a very good contribution to the rule of law to restore and vindicate that principle.

Sir Stephen Laws: If I can come in, I endorse everything that Professor Ekins said. The Adams case is very disturbing and undoes the assumption on which, for almost three quarters of a century, government has carried on. It needs to be urgently reversed.

On the question of parliamentary sovereignty, one of the great defects of the law as currently applied in proceedings for judicial review is that it does not adequately distinguish between the different sorts of decision making to which it is applied. It assumes that the same or very similar principles, processes and remedies are appropriate for a challenge to what you can call casework decisions by public officials in individual cases as should be applied to challenges to legislative decisions.

It seems to me that courts are deciding what the rules should be in future, hypothetical cases, or what the rules should have been in past cases that are not before them. They need to apply very different principles from those that they apply when they have one case before them and the public official has been doing something very similar—[Interruption.]

The Chair

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Your sound has gone, Sir Stephen.

Professor Varuhas: May I come in while Sir Stephen fixes his audio?

The Chair

- Hansard -

Yes, you can come in while Sir Stephen gets his sound back.

Professor Varuhas: I also agree that there are some concerns that attend the Supreme Court’s increasing attraction to articulating very broad constitutional values and rights. That was something that the independent review of administrative law drew attention to, and particularly the court’s articulation of these norms not revealing any particular principle. The right of access to courts has perhaps unsurprisingly been classed as of fundamental constitutional value, but not the right to life, for example. Moreover, these values have been used at times, it seems, to subvert parliamentary intention in the interpretation of legislation. I think there is a more general need for a reassertion of legislative or parliamentary intention as the touchstone of statutory interpretation, which would help to counter some of these problematic trends.

On the provision for suspended quashing orders in the Bill before the Committee, part of the rationale for suspended relief is that, in cases where controversial constitutional values are invoked or there are controversial interpretations of statute where Parliament’s intention is in question, relief can be suspended as a prompt for Parliament to enter the fray and inject its voice on behalf of the polity into the delineation of constitutional values and norms, and to make clear, where there is any doubt as to its intention, what its intention was in a particular statutory context. The suspended orders in the Bill are in part a response to that jurisprudence, although, as I mentioned, more reforms could of course be introduced to clarify parliamentary intention as the touchstone of statutory interpretation.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Sir Stephen, do you want to come back in, because you were cut short by the sound? [Interruption.] We are still having sound issues, so we will try to come back to you later. I do not know whether it is a technical issue at your end or this end. Sorry about that, Sir Stephen. In the meantime, I will take a question from Andy Slaughter.

Andy Slaughter

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Good morning, gentlemen. I think this is supposed to be a more general session on judicial review, although we also have one eye on what is in the Bill. Lord Faulks, the chair of the independent review, said in this report that,

“overall, the way that judicial review worked was satisfactory”

and that

“any decision to do something about it radically would…be wrong and potentially contrary to the rule of law.”

From some of the answers you have already given, it sounds as though you may not entirely agree with that. Where do you differ from Lord Faulks, if at all? On the contrary view, how do you think judicial review can help to improve decision making by public bodies?

The Chair

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Can I ask who that is directed to first, Andy?

Andy Slaughter

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Any of the witnesses.

The Chair

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Who wants to take that question?

Professor Ekins: I will go first, and then my colleagues can take a turn. I am always happiest when agreeing with Lord Faulks, and I am certainly not willing to propose a radical overhaul of judicial review. It is a central institution of our constitution and there would be dangers in trying to put it entirely on a statutory basis—a course of action that has been thought through but that I think would be fraught with difficulty.

The question is whether it has gone too far in some domains and in some directions, and that conclusion is entirely compatible with the idea that you do not want to overhaul it at large and that no radical reform is necessary. A correction could be made in certain cases, where judicial review is extended into the heart of the political constitution, as you saw in the Prorogation case, which I know Lord Faulks was much exercised about and was highly critical of, and in other cases, where the techniques involved—we have talked about some of them already—are difficult to square with parliamentary sovereignty and the primacy of Government decision making in relation to the public interest, and where, rather than a supervisory jurisdiction being in play, one has intrusion into the merits.

One can make some significant corrections on the margins—if you call it the margins—without undermining the central value of judicial review. In relation to its value, Ministers should clearly be subject to the law; they should not exceed the scope of their statutory powers, or go beyond the scope of prerogative powers for that matter. The courts have a vital role to play in vindicating those legal limits and in correcting deficiencies in process, where decision making might have flouted the requirements of natural justice or in extremis has simply made an irrational decision, although one would expect that to be less common. So there is undoubtedly a very valuable role for judicial review to play, but that is consistent with noting—as do some senior and retired judges—that what has gone on in some significant, major, politically salient cases is unjustifiable and warrants a legislative response.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Can I follow up on that before the other witnesses come in? Are you saying that, if any amendment is needed, the correct response would be a sort of tit-for-tat response—that is, responding to individual judgments rather than something more systemic? You said that

“the Bill’s measures are a carefully considered, limited response to two important Supreme Court judgments.”

Some of the things that the Lord Chancellor has said in the context of human rights have implied the same thing—that, effectively, there will be a second-guessing or a corrective effect on judgments of the superior courts. Is that how you see this working?

Professor Ekins: In part. With respect, I would not say tit for tat, but judgments that put the law in doubt in significant ways, or break new ground in ways that are constitutionally problematic, deserve a response to correct the law. It is not a response to dress down the judges; it is to restore or make the law to that which Parliament wishes it to be. I think that much good can be done by a systematic response to cases where the law has been changed in difficult ways. That would be the central mode of action.

There is a sense sometimes, though, that one should respond to grounds of action. For example, a legislative response to the Adams case—I have drafted a possible response—would not necessarily, and does not, mention that case by name, but it restates the Carltona principle. It makes it clear that the Carltona principle has a central place in our law and constitution—so, partly just a general change but motivated by cases where this has been put in doubt.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I have seen the paper you have written on that. It does appear to imply a sort of ping-pong effect, where you see what the courts do one day and we here do it another day. Obviously, it would be easier if the Government were able to do that by statutory instrument, but it seems like quite a radical departure from the way that we do things normally.

Professor Ekins: With respect, I do not think that it is a radical departure. I think that legislative responses to judgments that put the law in a difficult place were, maybe not routine, but they are certainly unimpeachable constitutionally. In a sense, this is an opportunity, in this Bill, to look back across several decades of legal development, or at the least the last decade or two, and make some changes that are worth making in this context. Whether power should be used by statutory instrument, I would be much less comfortable with, in so far as some of the changes we are talking about involve the meaning and application of a judgment.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Yes, that is the point. We have all been involved in emergency legislation from time to time. It is relatively rare, and it is something of an occasion, so in that sense it marks things out. The danger would be if that were to become routine and there was effectively an office of Government that is there to be corrective of the courts when Governments get it wrong.

Professor Ekins: I would not imagine that it needs to be emergency legislation. Sometimes it will have to be, as was the case after the Ahmed case, where legislation was moved from within a matter of weeks to a number of days, but much more often, we simply need to pay attention and be willing to bring forward legislation in response. Obviously, legislative time is scarce, so that will always be difficult to prioritise, but noting when the law of judicial review has been developed in startling ways that really are not justified in responding is a significant exercise of Parliament’s responsibility.

The Chair

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Does any other panel member want to come in to respond to Andy Slaughter’s question? Sir Stephen, have we got you back yet?

Sir Stephen Laws: I think so; I apologise. I think I detected a problem at this end. There are some systematic approaches that need to be adopted. I think it is right that Parliament should retain its ability to react to individual cases, but that is difficult because time is short and, quite often, by the time the courts have set the framework, they have intervened, in a way, in the political argument.

I would like to come back to the point I was trying to make when I was muted. There are distinctions between intervention by judicial review in casework and intervention by judicial review in legislative actions, because the remedies and principles that are applied to legislative actions are themselves legislative. If the courts are deciding judicial review decisions that set the rules for future hypothetical cases, they are usurping the legislative function. The systematic approach needs to distinguish more clearly between judicial review of legislative actions and system management issues, and judicial review of casework.

Professor Varuhas: Obviously, there are many cases in the judicial review casework of the courts that raise no problems whatsoever, but the IRAL report identified some problematic areas where there were patterns where courts were potentially exceeding the institutional and constitutional limits of their role. It was acknowledged in the conclusion to the IRAL report that there were some instances where the Supreme Court had exceeded the supervisory conception of review. It is also important to note that IRAL acknowledged very clearly that it was legitimate for Parliament to legislate in the field of judicial review, including the response to particular judgments. I note that the modern machinery of judicial review was established by legislative instruments and statute, particularly the Senior Courts Act 1981. The entire modern machinery of review is owed to legislation.

A number of problematic areas have already been mentioned by my colleagues. One is that the courts have turned from scrutinising individual decisions to scrutinising and evaluating entire administrative systems and invalidating them, without an acknowledgement that the courts lack expertise and experience in the field of design of large administrative systems.

Another area is in proportionality—where the courts strike a balance between competing considerations. That tends to supplant the role of the statutory decision maker, whose role is to weigh up all those considerations. Then there are the areas we have already mentioned, where the court has taken upon itself to speak for the polity in articulating constitutional values. One would expect that is a role for Parliament first and foremost. Also, there is where the courts have used those values to interpret legislation in the light of the concerns they consider normative appealing, rather than necessarily to give effect to the legislative intention that sits behind legislation.

What the IRAL process showed is that it can be very difficult to legislate as to the substance of judicial review at an abstract level, but what can be done is that responses can be made to particular judgments. There are plenty of examples through history where Parliament has done so. Also, the rules governing the procedure and remedies of review have always been housed in the Senior Courts Act—they are the product of Parliament; Parliament has updated and amended those procedures and remedies over time. This latest batch of reforms, particularly the remedial reforms, can be seen as a further incremental development of the remedial system.

Remedies can be important, because they can provide an outlet for wider concerns, such as the public interest or interest in good administration, and they can provide a way to modulate the boundaries of review, to ensure that it does not stray beyond ordinary practicalities and infringe upon fundamental principles. Again, I think that is entirely legitimate and there are many examples of Parliament legislating as to remedies.

Andy Slaughter

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Q You are talking on a fairly high level here—I think Professor Ekins mentioned “heart of the constitution” cases, which are obviously very sexy to talk about—whereas most of the submissions we have had are from non-governmental organisations, environmental groups or people dealing with special educational needs, who are concerned that some of the provisions in the Bill may limit the opportunity because either a suspended or a prospective-only order will mean that, for some reason or other, they are unable to get their case before the court. Are you sympathetic to that at all?

Professor Varuhas: These remedies will not prevent anyone from getting in the court door, because they are remedies, which apply after a finding of unlawfulness has been found by a court. I think these remedies are welcome, because they provide for a greater remedial flexibility for courts—for courts to tailor remedies in their discretion, to the exigencies of the particular facts of the case. It is important to bear in mind that these remedies will be discretionary and the courts will take into account a range of relevant considerations in exercising that discretion. Courts are well versed in exercising remedial discretion—courts can be expected to respond to the justice of the particular case. What the Bill does is to give the courts more options.

The most common consequence of a finding of unlawfulness is that the impugned administrative measure is a nullity, which means it never existed. That will suffice in many cases, but in some cases it will be an overly blunt measure that can have very drastic effects. For example, a large infrastructure project may be started and there might be a slight technical or procedural error at the outset.

If the project proceeds and is then nullified as if it never existed, that will have very negative effects on the people who had contracted with the Government and, by being critically disruptive, on the national economic interest, and could lead to significant economic waste. In that sort of case, a suspended order allowing the Government time to respond to the finding of unlawfulness and make relevant provisions to accommodate that finding, or a prospective order that holds that what has gone before remains good and that the nullification takes effect only prospectively, can play an important role in protecting very important public interests, interests of good administration and the interests of third parties who might interact with Government.

Indeed, if something like a large infrastructure project were invalidated, it could undermine the confidence of market players in contracting or working with Government, because the rug could be pulled out from the project at some later point once a lot of money and time has been sunk into it. I think these are very moderate reforms seeking to give the courts greater remedial flexibility to tailor remedial responses to the particular context of the case, in the light of the range of interests implicated.

Sir Stephen Laws: I am sympathetic to people who have a view about what remedies should be granted to litigants in the case in question, but I am not sympathetic to the idea that judicial review should be an extra step in the political debate about whether a piece of legislation should exist or continue to exist. The Unison case provides a startling example of the sort of absurd consequence that you would get from the nullity remedy.

In that case, the courts overturned fees to be charged to people who wanted to take their employment cases to hearing. The result of nullifying the regulations involved a very large amount of money being paid not to the people who were deterred from bringing their cases to employment tribunals, but either to the people who did bring them and lost, or to employers in those litigations who lost and had to pay the fees of the people who had been successful. That was a ridiculous remedy for a mischief that harmed people other than those who got their money back.

Professor Ekins: I agree with my colleagues that clause 1 increases remedial discretion and focuses it to some extent, although one can argue about how it does that. Much of the response to these two clauses has been overstated.

We have not yet spoken about clause 2 and the limitation of review of the relevant decisions of the upper tribunal. Again, that has been a bit misunderstood or framed and received by some groups as though it were an abolition of judicial review at large in some way, but I think it is a restatement of the law that Parliament tried to create in 2007 in the relevant legislation. The Supreme Court sort of glossed that in 2011, and many senior judges have been unhappy with the way that it was decided then and the way it was worked out subsequently.

In limiting review in the way that clause 2 does—with plenty of safeguards, I should add—one is not barring the door to the courtroom, but bringing an end to an otherwise never-ending series of procedural steps. Looking into it, one can always find a benefit from further procedural steps, but it is a perfectly reasonable and proportionate response to limit judicial review in that context, where the decision maker in question is another court. It is not a Minister detaining someone, or something like that; it is the upper tribunal, and as a court, it warrants an immunity from judicial review in that context. People should be much more relaxed than some have been about those two measures.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I have just one more question on clause 2, although not on Cart per se. You will be aware, because it has been quoted quite widely, that the press release that accompanied the introduction of the Bill stated that

“it is expected that the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”

That appears to signal an intent on the Government’s part to use the ouster more commonly in future. Is that how you read it? Do you think that that is a good or bad way of going about things?

The Chair

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Who wants to take that one first?

Professor Ekins: I will, since I was talking about Cart just now.

It is true that they have signalled that. I think that this will be an effective ouster clause because it is a perfectly constitutionally irreproachable response to the Supreme Court’s judgment. It restates Parliament’s intention and is protecting a court’s jurisdiction—not an ordinary court’s, but a specialist court’s, albeit one with pretty wide jurisdiction.

I think that it will work as an ouster clause. I do not think that the courts will view it with disdain or try to undercut it as they have done with some other ouster clauses. To that extent, it will provide a framework, partly because it is limited: it is designed to limit judicial review without ousting it altogether. It is a safeguard in relation to true procedural failure, bad faith and so on, which is fine and proper.

I think that it could be used as a framework for other cases. In the Policy Exchange paper that I published last week, I suggested one such context: the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, another specialist court, which was subject to the protection of an ouster clause enacted in 2000, as David Davis mentioned in his Guardian article last week. That ouster clause was undercut by the Supreme Court in 2019, using some of the problematic techniques that we have talked about—openly departing from legislative intent and distorting the meaning of the statute.

I think that Parliament should enact an ouster clause, modelled on clause 2, that protects the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. There will be pretty sharp limits on how often you want to use the clauses, of course—this one is controversial, and they will all be controversial. Whenever there is a suggestion that there is not a proper context for ouster, the controversy will be higher.

We have talked before about intrusions that judicial review has made on some relationships at the heart of the political constitution. There is a case to be made for ouster, or for limitation of review, in that context. You will be aware of the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, which is making its way through Parliament now. Clause 3 of that Bill is a partial response to the Prorogation judgment, and quite rightly so; it protects the prerogative of Dissolution, when it is restored, from judicial review. I think that that is justified and that you may have to act similarly in relation to Prorogation law or other aspects of the political constitution.

I would not expect the approach to be widely used, but I think that there are contexts in which it is reasonable and justified.

Sir Stephen Laws: I agree with all of that. As a drafter of legislation, whenever I was asked to draft an ouster clause, as I was from time to time, my response was always: “There’s no hope of it ever succeeding, unless you’re presenting a politically and legally justifiable alternative route for people who would otherwise be going to the court.” That, of course, is what the Cart judgment does, for the reasons that Professor Ekins has given: the upper tribunal is a proper court; the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is a proper remedy; and, in the case of the Prorogation judgment, the remedy is political because that is how the constitution is set up. In relation to the major matters of the relationship between Parliament and Government, it is Parliament that has the remedy, ultimately, in being able to pass a vote of no confidence in the Government and require their resignation or a general election.

Professor Varuhas: On clause 2, the first thing that I would say is that it derives from a clear recommendation from the expert independent review of administrative law and has subsequently been subject to a full Government consultation. Former Law Lords have also come out in support of the policy, including Lord Hope, who is the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court, and Lord Carnwath, who—importantly—was the inaugural Senior President of Tribunals and was subsequently a Law Lord on the Supreme Court. He said that the ouster would restore what was always intended: that the upper tribunal should have equal status with the High Court. That was the intention behind its designation as a superior court of record. As colleagues have stressed, that is a really important point: the upper tribunal has equivalent status to the High Court.

There is a further point to be made, which relates to how many bites of the cherry one person might have. It is worth reminding ourselves what a Cart judicial review is. It will have been a claim in the first-tier tribunal that will have been unsuccessful. The claimant will then seek permission to appeal to the upper tribunal. The first-tier tribunal will decline permission, and then the claimant will appeal to the upper tribunal against the declination of permission to appeal to the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal will have declined permission to appeal. It is not clear, given the upper tribunal’s status as a superior court of record, that one then needs a further bite of the cherry by going to the High Court via judicial review, and potentially all the way up the judicial hierarchy.

Whatever the case is more generally, in this instance the clause is justified, and it is a targeted response to a particular problem. Also it is not a pure ouster, because in clause 2(4) the path remains open for claimants to bring a judicial review in the High Court in serious instances of illegality, such as where the upper tribunal acts in bad faith or in fundamental breach of principles of natural justice. That is an important point to bear in mind: there is still a route to the High Court in cases of serious unlawfulness.

The Chair

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A few Members have indicated they wish to ask questions, so I will take them in order.

Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)

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The Chair

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Who wants to take that one? Is it a googly?

Professor Ekins: I will start. Clearly the mandate on which the Government campaign and secure a majority is significant. It is true that page 48 of the Conservative party manifesto makes a commitment to look again at the constitution and to take measures to ensure that judicial review does not become “politics by another means”—a phrase Lord Sumption used in his Reith lectures and also used by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in judgments in 2019. It is also true that the commitment does not spell out what it will involve, and that is partly what the Committee is considering and the Government have been thinking through—as has the independent review of administrative law.

There should be no constitutional question about the entitlement of Parliament to legislate on judicial review. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Burnett, has made that crystal clear in various public statements. The question, of course, is the merits of the proposals—the devil may be in the detail. It would be wrong, as we have discussed, to overhaul judicial review. It would be a mistake—not improper, but a mistake—to try to put it on a statutory footing at large, but changes can be made where problems have arisen.

The political salience of judicial review has clearly risen in the last five years—indeed in the last decade or two. If one can identify the problematic trends and respond to them in a targeted and careful way, one would be acting properly and in accordance with the manifesto, even if I would be cautious myself in connecting any particular proposal to the manifesto because it was not quite that specific.

Sir Stephen Laws: I have nothing particular to add to that, as it all seems right. In my submission to the independent review of administrative law I drew attention to what I thought were the beginnings of a breakdown in trust between the political world and the judiciary, and the political salience of the issues around judicial review is evidence of that. Plainly, there can be no question about Parliament’s right to legislate, and the need to do so has been demonstrated.

Professor Varuhas: I would add that the concerns reflected in the manifesto around the judicial review and whether the courts had in certain contexts overreached were vindicated in the IRAL report, which did pinpoint at multiple times areas of concern. This set of reforms, regarding remedies and the Cart ouster, have been through an incredibly thorough process. An expert independent panel was constituted, the Independent Review of Administrative Law, with five distinguished academic lawyers and others drawn from the profession, chaired by Lord Faulks. The reforms in the Bill derive from that panel’s recommendations.

The panel stressed the need for reforms to emphasise remedial flexibility and it recommended the ouster of Cart judicial reviews. Those recommendations were then put out to general consultation—a Government consultation. At each stage there were a lot of consultation responses, so the reforms we see before us are the product of an incredibly thorough, expert-led process. To my mind it is not a surprise that the reforms are well justified in the end.

The Chair

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Thank you. Are you happy with that, Tom?

Tom Hunt

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indicated assent.

The Chair

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Sir John Hayes.

Sir John Hayes

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The Chair

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Who wants to take that question? Anybody?

Professor Ekins: I will go first. I have been highly critical of the Privacy International judgment, and I share the view that the majority judgment, or Lord Carnwath’s judgment, with which Lady Hale and Lord Kerr agreed, was outrageous. Those three judges are no longer on the Supreme Court, but that judgment is part of the common law and it does warrant a response. There were many other things going on in May 2019, so maybe it is not a surprise that it did not get much public attention, but that judgment did constitute a very serious attack on some fundamentals of the constitution.

Parliamentary sovereignty was openly questioned and the rule of law was set in apparent tension with parliamentary sovereignty, which is deeply wrong, I think. The rule of law requires respect for the law, which includes parliamentary sovereignty and the stability of statute, and the primacy of legislative intent in interpreting statute is one of the fundamental ways in which the rule of law is secured. It is true that the rule of law is often bandied about as though it warrants adventurous judicial action that cannot be squared with the existing constitutional law or with the terms of statute, because we are going to make it better and we are going to impose further controls on the Government or public bodies.

As Lord Hughes, who was on the Supreme Court at the time, said, that is to confuse the rule of law with the rule of courts. You do not see that just with the Privacy International case, we see it in the Evans case, involving the Freedom of Information Act 2000, where a clear statutory power was undone. Three judges interpreted it so that it does not exist any more, and another two judges, also during the majority, attacked its exercise in a different way. This is a worrying trend, and the independent review noted the Evans case.

If Parliament can notice and respond to those judgments, it will both correct the law that has been undone and make clear that the technique is seen and is not tolerated as legitimate. In cases where judicial review breaks new ground and is being carried out in a way that is inconsistent with statute and long-standing principle and rules—the Prorogation judgment is very large here—the litigation is an extension of political argument and a way of getting the courts to weigh in on your side in a controversy. That is destructive of the courts’ reputation and of the political constitution that should be framing those arguments, and it is not vindicating the rule of law but undoing it and undoing the political foundation for our parliamentary democracy.

Sir Stephen Laws: I would agree with that. It seems to me that the fundamental principle that should be upheld as part of the rule of law is the need for legal certainty and predictability. Judicial law making undermines that because it produces new law that nobody was able to expect, and because of the myth that the common law has always existed, it also creates the further injustice of retrospective effect.

If ordinary citizens cannot predict with certainty before they act what conduct will escape censure, that is a serious injustice. If public officials cannot be sure that what the law allows them to do, adherence to the law for them ceases to be a matter of principled compliance and becomes instead a straightforward commercial exercise in risk management, and that is a very bad thing for the management of public affairs generally.

The Chair

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There seems to be consensus on that. I am conscious of time; Jason, would you like to come in on that quickly?

Professor Varuhas: I think the rule of law is an important value, but all too often, it is used to denote what someone thinks is good. It is often invoked without elaboration and as a trump card. The rule of law is an important value, particularly the principle of government and the law, but other values and aspects of the rule of law can be important.

As Sir Stephen alluded to, you can see that with the proposal for prospective orders, for example. You might have a decision-making procedure created by regulation, with many decisions made under that in regard to particular people. If you invalidate that ad initio, the consequence will be that all those decisions in regard to all those individuals would be thrown into doubt. They would have planned their lives on the basis of the decisions that had been rendered in regard to them.

On the one hand, you might say that voiding ad initio and rendering a decision a nullity upholds the rule of law, but it can undermine other aspects of the rule of law, such as certainty, predictability and people’s ability to plan their lives in the light of decisions that have been made in regard to them. The beauty of prospective orders is that they can be calibrated to save those past decisions and provide certainty, finality and confidence in the administration of justice for those individuals, while ensuring that the system complies with legal requirements going forward.

The Chair

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I am conscious of time. As I said earlier, we have to move on to the second panel soon, so this will be the final question. I call Dr Caroline Johnson.

Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

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Q I have a question about the potential for quashing judgments not to be retrospective. To what extent does the legislation provide protection for the individual and balance that with the potential for political activity? How does it make sure that judges have good guidance on when they should and should not use the measures that will become available to them?

Professor Varuhas: One of the motivations for the provisions is to provide the courts with flexibility to adapt remedies to the particular needs of the given case. That is a response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that have held, contrary to long-standing authority, that a funding of unlawfulness automatically voids administrative measures as if they never existed. That has never been the position, because there has always been remedial discretion to modulate the effects of unlawfulness.

The Bill reasserts that remedial flexibility so that remedies can be tailored to the particular needs of relative interests and values implicated in the facts of the case. In proposed new section 29A(8) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, you have a list of factors that will guide courts in exercising their discretion, and those factors are drawn from the common law, so dovetail with pre-existing doctrine. Importantly, they give litigants and the Government fair warning of the factors that will bear on remedial decisions. Subsection (8) requires that

“the court must have regard to”

those factors, which has the benefit that the court will apply the same framework in every case. That provides consistency of principle and ensures transparency, because the court will have to work through those particular factors to reach a conclusion regarding what type of order ought to be given on the facts of the case.

In my view, one problem with subsection (9) is that it erects a presumption. It is a particularly weak presumption, and therefore one might question what the justification for it is, but more generally I am not necessarily in favour of a presumptive approach one way or the other, because that can undermine the court’s capacity to adapt to the particular facts of the case and respond to the particular factors that arise—the public interest in good administration, the interests of third parties and so on. Necessary flexibility is built into the scheme, but there is also fair warning of the factors that will be taken into account pursuant to subsection (8), which is a particularly important provision in that regard.

The Chair

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I am conscious of the time, and I think the Minister will want to ask the final question, so I will take a short response to Dr Johnson’s question from one of you. Then I will move across to the Minister before we close the panel.

Professor Ekins: Briefly, I agree with everything that Jason said. One could add a little more detail perhaps to the factors in subsection (8), tying in with Sir Stephen’s point about the significance of whether something is a legislative act. That seems like something that should be at the forefront of the court’s mind. It is a weak presumption in subsection (9). One could either remove it or tailor it, narrowing it so that the presumption arises only where the decision making in question is legislative in character or on a general policy decision, rather than casework, to use Sir Stephen’s term. At the moment, it is a very broad presumption, and a very weak one, and it might be more useful if it were narrowed and applied in a more focused way.

The Chair

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Quickly, Sir Stephen.

Sir Stephen Laws: I am a legislative drafter. I am used to people asking me to guarantee when a discretion is conferred that it will be exercised in the way that they wish. I think I agree with Professor Ekins that more detail would be desirable.

The Chair

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Thank you. To ask the final question, I call the Minister.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)

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The Chair

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I think we have time for only one response, so who should take it?

James Cartlidge

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It probably has to be Professor Varuhas.

Professor Varuhas: I reiterate what I said before in response to your question. The phrase on the number of bites of the cherry comes from a speech given by Lord Carnwath, who raised this point and considered that it was disproportionate that an applicant in this context should have so many bites of the cherry, given that the upper tribunal has the status of the High Court. It is a judicial body, independent of Government, that is staffed by senior members of the judiciary with specialist expertise. Given the credentials of the institution, it seems disproportionate to allow a further three or four bites of the cherry after an application has proceeded through those stages and been found not to have merit. I think the point is well made.

I will abuse my position to add one further point on the remedies provision. Professor Ekins reminded me that I meant to say that one discretionary factor that should be added under subsection (8) is the public interest, which is a curious omission because the public interest can be seriously prejudiced by decisions on remedies in the interests of the economy, national security and so on. That should be factored into the remedies.

Although I went slightly off topic at the end, I certainly agree—

The Chair

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Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of our time. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence today.

Examination of Witnesses

Professor David Feldman and Dr Jonathan Morgan gave evidence.

10:25

The Chair

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Q We now move on to panel 2. We have one witness present, Dr Jonathan Morgan, and a virtual witness, Professor David Feldman.

We will hear oral evidence from Professor David Feldman and Dr Jonathan Morgan, both of the University of Cambridge, for just under an hour. Without any further ado, I ask them to make their introductory addresses.

Professor Feldman: Thank you, Chair. I am David Feldman, the emeritus Rouse Ball professor of English law at the University of Cambridge and emeritus fellow of Downing College, Cambridge.

I have been working in this field for some 40 years, and I take a great interest in what is going on. In relation to the proposed new provisions set out in clauses 1 and 2, I suggest that one should approach them on the basis of the constitutional background and the importance of judicial review and access to courts.

On the constitutional importance of keeping public officials within the limit of the powers set by Parliament, parliamentary sovereignty requires that there should be independent interpreters and adjudicators to keep the people to whom statute delegates power within the limits set by Parliament. That is complicated by the requirement of the rule of law that requires obedience to law by Government and scrutiny by an independent judiciary on the lawfulness of behaviour.

The combination of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, together with article 6 of the European convention on human rights, where applicable, requires access to independent and impartial courts and tribunals and it requires the availability of effective remedies for violations of law, where those are found to have taken place.

The Chair

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Professor Feldman, may I interrupt before you go any further? We obviously want to use the majority of our time for questions from Members. Although I am happy for you to give a brief presentation, I want to introduce our other witness so that we can open up for questions. If you could bring your opening remarks to a close, I can get Jonathan Morgan to introduce himself. The floor is still yours, but please be conscious of that.

Professor Feldman: The conclusion is that the provisions in clauses 1 and 2 affect access to courts and the effectiveness of remedies and, therefore, should be examined with very great care to make sure they are justified.

The Chair

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Q Thank you. Dr Jonathan Morgan, do you want to say a bit about yourself and your view on the topic? Then we will open up for questions.

Dr Morgan: My name is Jonathan Morgan. I am a reader in English law at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Like any academic, I would be delighted to address you on the sexy subject of constitutional theory, but having heard what my learned friend has experienced, I will not do that now. I will just say a couple of things about the Bill before us.

It seems to me that clause 1 is highly welcome, but it needs two significant amendments to make it perfect. Clause 2, which is on the Cart review, is compatible with the rule of law, but there are some very real costs to doing this, and Parliament needs to confront them. One of the costs is that the very few people who succeed in Cart reviews will not have that avenue in future. I am happy to substantiate those in questions, but I will not enlarge on that now.

Dr Johnson

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Q I have a question for Dr Morgan. I am not a lawyer, so forgive me if this question is insufficiently sophisticated. The Cart review is a judicial review of the upper tribunal in the immigration service. My understanding is that judicial reviews are designed to review the capacity of the Government to make a lawful decision, but we have heard that the upper tribunal is not a Government decision; it is a court decision. Is the Cart judicial review unusual in that respect? Are there other examples, or is it an anomaly that there is a review of a decision by a senior court, rather than a Government decision?

Dr Morgan: I think you have put your finger on it, lawyer or not, because Cart deals with a fairly unusual situation, exactly as you have said. This is to do with the level of appeals within the judiciary. Critics of clause 2, who say that this is doing violence to the rule of law and is setting a bad precedent by immunising the Government from being judicially reviewed, are therefore somewhat missing the point. Clause 2 has its cost, but I do not think it immunises Government decisions from judicial review. It simply says how many reviews or appeals there should be within the judiciary. I was here for the previous panel of witnesses, and in terms of whether you have permission to review within the court system, the number of “bites of the cherry” is a good way to put it.

One overall criticism of the Supreme Court might be that it failed to give proper respect to the tribunal system as a branch of the judiciary. It had a slightly legacy, old-fashioned view of the tribunal system as something that needed to be under the supervision of the High Court, and so on. That is why Lord Carnwath, who, as we have heard, is a former Senior President of Tribunals, has been a critic of the Cart decision. It is important to see clause 2 as to do with arrangements within the judiciary. Yes, there is an ouster clause in clause 2, but it does not immunise administrative or Government decisions. It immunises decisions of what is, in effect, a court by another name—the upper tribunal.

The Chair

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Dr Feldman, do you want to come in on that? I noticed that your volume was quite low. If possible, could you raise your voice a little bit?

Professor Feldman: I beg your pardon; I did not hear that.

The Chair

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Q Would you like to respond to the question? If you do, could you please raise the volume a little? You were very quiet in your opening remarks.

Professor Feldman: Thank you. The only thing I would add to what Dr Morgan has said is that judicial review is seen as a general safety net. One of its functions is certainly to scrutinise Government decision making and action, but it is there as a backstop to deal with unlawful action by any public body. One starts with the presumption that judicial review is available unless there is some specific reason for excluding it. It is clear that the justification for interfering with access to judicial review may be stronger where a body is a judicial body, and where a litigant has already had the chance to have his or her case heard by an impartial and independent tribunal, rather than simply by an administrative body.

Dr Johnson

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Q I have a quick question, and forgive me for not knowing this. The upper tribunal is a superior court of record that, according to my notes, is equivalent to the High Court. Is it normal for High Court decisions to be subject to judicial review?

Professor Feldman: The answer is that the courts held in Cart that being a superior court of record does not immunise a body from being subject to judicial review. For practical purposes, the High Court is immune to judicial review, because it is the High Court that carries out judicial review. It extends, as they used to say, to all inferior courts and tribunals—that is, below the level of the High Court—as well as public officials. It is a matter of basic principle that the upper tribunal was to be subject to this, even if, as Lord Justice Laws said in Cart, the upper tribunal would be seen as the avatar of the High Court.

Dr Morgan: In my view, this is what went wrong in 2007, so apologies to any Members who were in Parliament then. In 2007, Parliament thought that by designating the upper tribunal as a superior court of record, it would immunise it from judicial review. That is what the Government argued in Cart, but they failed to convince the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

To ingratiate myself with Members, I will say that the fault was not only that of Parliament but that of the Leggatt report on tribunals, which said that there should not be judicial review of the upper tribunal and that by designating it a superior court of record, Parliament would immunise it from judicial review. I am afraid that Sir Andrew Leggatt turned out to be wrong on that when it got to the courts. It is true that Leggatt had said that there should be an express ouster clause, which Parliament did not put in. If Parliament in 2007 had gone for the belt-and-braces approach and not relied only on the status of the upper tribunal as a superior court of record, Cart would never have happened and we would not be here today discussing it. In a way, this problem has been 20 years in the making.

Dr Johnson

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Q Just to be clear, it is the equivalent of the High Court but it is not treated as such.

Dr Morgan: More or less. I think Lord Justice Laws called it the alter ego of the High Court, but that is not quite the same thing.

Andy Slaughter

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Q May I clarify whether, at present, a judge can make a quashing order limiting or eliminating its retrospective effects, or suspend the effect of a quashing order? There has been some debate around that, given the proposals in the Bill.

Dr Morgan: I wrote an article about that in 2019 before IRAL was even thought of. It is not like me to be ahead of the trend. In it, I analysed in particular the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed and others v. HM Treasury—the freezing orders case. Ahmed causes enough doubt on the question that legislating to put it beyond question is a worthwhile use of Parliament’s time. There are some precedents the other way—in a case called Liberty, the divisional court suspended a declaration—but on quashing orders, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ahmed (No. 2) suggests that it is just not possible to suspend a quashing order. In my view, that is unfortunate, because judicial review remedies are in every other respect discretionary, so why not here? In the debate on IRAL in the House of Lords, Lord Hope said that he was dismayed to be in a “minority of one” when he dissented in Ahmed on postponing it. He certainly approves of clause 1. It is at least a doubtful point, and sufficiently doubtful that the legislation is worth it.

Andy Slaughter

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Q You are saying there are two separate issues: whether it is a sensible proviso, and whether there is certainty at the moment.

Dr Morgan: Yes. My position is that it is a sensible remedy, and at the moment, it is certainly not clear whether the courts can do it. Clause 1 will, beneficially, clarify that.

Andy Slaughter

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But a court might attempt to impose—

Dr Morgan: For a court below the Supreme Court, the obvious precedent that the applicant would cite would be Ahmed, and it would be very hard for a lower court to get round that, I think.

The Chair

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Q I see Professor Feldman nodding his head. Do you want to comment on that point?

Professor Feldman: I think that is completely right. There is a big distinction between quashing orders and declarations for this purpose. What Ahmed (No. 2) did was to eliminate the difference—a quashing order quashes, whereas a declaration can only declare that a body has a duty or has breached a duty or has not breached a duty, and that is something that is not limited as to time. I also agree with Dr Morgan as to the effect of Ahmed (No. 2) on lower courts. However, I think there is a big distinction to be drawn between the suspending of a quashing order where, as the Bill says, the retrospective impact remains when the quashing order eventually takes effect, and a prospective-only order, which seems to me to raise significantly more problems of principle and of practice.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Clause 1 gives the courts a discretionary power to grant a full remedy to a claimant, but to limit the retrospective effects of the judgment for any other individual who has not issued a claim before the date of judgment. Is that right? If so, are you concerned that it could lead to unjust outcomes for those already impacted by unlawful decisions?

Professor Feldman: One of the difficulties of having a prospective-only remedy is that it is only prospective, and by definition a remedy of this kind would take effect only if the court had already decided that the claimant had been treated unlawfully. To say to a claimant, “This is going to be prospective only” strongly implies it is not going to protect the claimant himself or herself. Some way would have to be found of protecting the claimant, and other people in the position of the claimant, if one did not want to be stuck in the position of saying, “These people were treated unlawfully, but they are not going to have a remedy.”

In clause 1, there is nothing that makes it explicitly clear that a court could say, “I am going to give you a prospective-only remedy, except that it would be retrospective for the purpose of protecting you.” The court might be able to do that, but then you also have the problem of other people in the same position as the claimant—all those people would have been treated unlawfully. It seems strange to me that they should have to suffer unlawfully because the remedy is only prospective.

The language of clause 1, under which proposed new section 29A(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 would state,

“if the impugned act is…upheld”

is very odd. Subsection (5) says,

“it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

That makes it quite difficult to see why one should give a remedy to people who are deemed in that case not to have suffered a legal wrong.

I think it is quite a problem, unless the clause is amended to expressly allow a judge to give a remedy to someone who has obtained a prospective-only order, despite the fact that the law and treatment were to be treated as entirely lawful.

The Chair

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Have you finished, Professor Feldman?

Professor Feldman: Yes, thank you.

The Chair

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Dr Morgan.

Dr Morgan: I agree with what David Feldman said, but perhaps I could suggest a solution. This is an amendment that should be made to clause 1. Proposed new section 29A(2) to the Senior Courts Act 1981 says that the order

“may be made subject to conditions.”

I think the court should have the power to set as a condition of making a prospective-only order or suspending the order that compensation should be paid to the particular applicant. In my view, that would be a way of squaring the circle of postponing the effect of quashing an entire piece of legislation—saying that is not going to happen today, but is going to happen in six months’ time to give the Government time to prepare.

Of course, that would work great injustice on a successful particular applicant who has paid to take their case to court, has won and then does not get any redress at all. However, if the court were empowered to grant compensation, that could be a way of achieving both those things. I am a public lawyer, but I also teach contract and property law. If you get an injunction in a tort case, the court might suspend the injunction for a period of time and, if it does so, it will give compensation during the period of suspension. It is on that sort of model that I think this could work.

You could argue that while proposed new section 29A(2) says orders

“may be made subject to conditions”,

the explanatory notes say that those could be any conditions the court likes. However, given that the courts cannot award compensation for public law wrongs, it is very doubtful whether that implicitly contains a power to award compensation. I think that proposed new section 29A(2) should be amended to say that orders may be “made subject to conditions including, if the court sees fit, compensation.” That might be a way of reconciling those competing objectives.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Do I take that to mean that the way the proposed new section is drafted could dissuade individuals from initiating judicial review proceedings, because they may not obtain a remedy?

Dr Morgan: Yes. That point was made by many Members on Second Reading. It could be a real problem, in particular if it became the norm and the court ordinarily postponed orders. In my view, the court should not ordinarily do that; it should be in exceptional cases only. That takes us on to the presumption in subsection (9) —but perhaps we will come back to that at a separate point. There are two problems with it: first, the presumption; secondly, the absence of a compensation power.

Professor Feldman: May I add two things to what Dr Morgan has said? I agree with what he says in principle.

First, the compensation remedy may not be useful to all claimants. If one is about to be deported as a result of having one’s unlawful decision treated as lawful, for example, compensation is unlikely to be an effective and adequate remedy. There are lots of other types of administrative wrong that lead to people suffering loss or injury that cannot readily be financially compensated.

Secondly, if one is going to compensate, one has to consider all the other people who have been treated unlawfully, who are in a similar position to the claimant, but who are not before the court, so the court cannot order compensation for them. Perhaps one needs to consider whether a court should be empowered to require the provision of a compensation scheme for all those in a similar position to the claimant. That could be a lawful step.

It is also true, as Dr Morgan said, that the administrative law of the English system does not treat financial compensation as a readily available remedy. Therefore, some express permission would have to be made to allow the courts to do it.

Andy Slaughter

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Q I do have one other question on ouster but, Dr Morgan, just before we leave clause 1, you mentioned a presumption. Do I take it from what you have said already that you are concerned about that provision in clause 1? Is that because of the way that it is drafted, or because of the inclusion of a presumption per se, in this context?

Dr Morgan: I would take the presumption out altogether. I think what this clause is doing—certainly what it should be doing—is enlarging the power of the courts to tailor relief in a way that they see fit, and removing the obstacle that the Supreme Court laid in their path in Ahmed v. HM Treasury (No. 2). Thus, I just do not see why it is there. The Government say that it is to encourage the courts to use this remedy, but I do not see why we should try and push the courts in a particular direction.

I also think, if subsection (9) is taken out, subsection (8) could be taken out as well. At the moment there is a need to try and direct the court what to take into account; the drafting is already getting very complicated. I think that probably everyone who has written you a paper has suggested more paragraphs that could be put in subsection (8); I think it is going to end up very long indeed. We are talking here about High Court judges; it is very senior judges who will be making these decisions, and in my view, they can simply be trusted to make the appropriate decision based on the facts. That is my first point—I would take it out.

If we are going to keep it in, it is virtually doing nothing at all. I think the courts will be very reluctant to find that there is an adequate redress, because they will say, “The claimant is not going to get anything, so that is not adequate redress.” I think if the court does find that it is satisfied, they will say, “There is a good reason to make the quashing order immediate and retrospective, because that is what we ordinarily do. It is important to do that to keep the Government within the limits of its powers.” I think that subsection (9) is not going to do anything other than generate needless litigation about this; it will become a question that has to be considered in every case, whether it is really relevant to the facts or not. Therefore, I suggest that subsection (9) should go.

Andy Slaughter

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Professor Feldman, do you agree with that?

Professor Feldman: I do. Subsections (8) and (9) have twin disadvantages. First, they try to create a presumption that something will happen regularly, when we know that it will not, for the reasons that Dr Morgan has given. Secondly, they are unnecessary because the courts are quite capable of making judgements for themselves. Look at subsection (8)(f):

“any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”

This opens up the field very nicely; I do not see anything there that is necessary.

Andy Slaughter

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Q Finally, I will ask the same question that I asked the previous panel about ouster, and the Government’s comment in a press release that the

“text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”

Do you think that is a sensible way to go about legislating?

Professor Feldman: Is that for me?

Andy Slaughter

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For either, or both.

Professor Feldman: I will start then, if I may. I think there is a real difficulty about a provision of this kind being used as a template, because there are two questions that arise. First, is this a situation in which it is justifiable to exclude the High Court supervisory jurisdiction? Secondly, have we drafted a provision that will work and have that effect?

In relation to the first, I think it is important to note that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law generally require that people should have access to courts to determine the lawfulness of action. There is a functional inconsistency between Parliament’s saying that there are limits to the powers of a body or person and, on the other hand, saying that that person or body can decide for themselves, effectively, what those limits are. That is quite apart from the importance of access to courts for the rule of law.

I approach this by asking whether this sort of exclusion of review is justifiable. On balance, I think it is, for a combination of reasons. First, because it excludes review of judicial bodies, not of administrative or executive agencies. Secondly, because the number of people who will suffer, although we can never be quite sure, looks as if it will be relatively small compared with the number of people who would suffer generally if we cut off all judicial review. Somewhere around 3.4% of these cases end up being successful, the Government estimate, compared with 30% to 50% in most other judicial review situations. Bearing in mind the need to use judicial time as efficiently as possible, it may be that this is not a proportionate use of judicial time, in which case one might say—although I say this with great disquiet—that the ouster is justified.

Does it work? Yes, I think it does, for roughly those reasons. Courts will not kick against it, given that the claimant will have had two bites at the cherry already before a judicial tribunal. Is it a template? I am not sure that it will be either necessary or perhaps effective to use this sort of thing in situations in which someone is getting review of other types of decision by other types of agency in different circumstances. For example, I note that in another Bill before the House, the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, there is an attempt to exclude judicial review of decisions concerned with Dissolution of Parliament and purported decisions. Clause 3 of that Bill does not go into any such elaborate provision as are provided here. Presumably, the drafter of that considers that it will work, because of the nature of the decision that is being considered.

Dr Morgan: My position—

The Chair

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Very quickly, because four more people want to ask questions. We are running on time.

Dr Morgan: Very briefly, I broadly agree. I think this will work for Cart. I think the Government are mistaken to see it as any kind of template, and that they can put exactly the same words into another Bill about some other different matter and that it will work, because it is not only about the words that Parliament uses but the entire context. Sir Stephen Laws, himself a parliamentary draftsman, made just that point—that it is not only the literal meaning of the words but the whole context. That is why it will work in Cart, but it may not work in another statute, even if precisely the same words were used. I would not see it as a template or model.

Sir John Hayes

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Q So you are clear that the law needs to be altered, because of what you said about the 2007 circumstance. There is a good argument for greater clarity and certainty around this area of work. Furthermore, there is an argument for going further. For the reason that you just gave, there is an argument for taking a more comprehensive view of how judicial review should be reformed. I am particularly mindful of the points that were made in the earlier evidence session about judicial activism and the challenge that it represents to Lord Bingham’s affirmation. You will remember the Jackson v. Attorney General case about the Crown in Parliament and its supremacy. The need for legislation is clear. The Bill is good in parts but, if anything, the Government need to go further.

Dr Morgan: There was a debate earlier about whether this should be described as tit for tat, which I do not like either, but doing it on a case-by-case basis. If you are not a lawyer and you read through the Cart judgments, you will see that it is all highly technical stuff about the number of appeals you should have within a particular structure. I have never heard anyone suggest that the judges in Cart were guilty of judicial activism. I think it is a relatively technical problem that has created a lot of expense and lots of hopeless judicial reviews, and the Government are taking action to address that.

I will not keep saying “sexier subjects”, but the more egregious examples of muscular judicial review have been mentioned earlier: Privacy International, the Prorogation case, and Evans v. Unison. There is a case for Parliament to reverse them. In my view, it has a constitutional right to do so if it wishes, but they should probably be taken one by one. Maybe we need a different Bill to do that, and the Government can tell us whether that is their intention, but the two clauses here deal with some real problems in a fairly unflashy way. Ouster clauses might be needed if we are to reverse the other cases, but I think that has to be debated separately. It is not really within the scope of the Bill at all.

Sir John Hayes

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Q So in that sense, the Bill is welcome. I take your interesting point about compensation and how clause 1 might be amended as a way to deal with some the challenges associated with the Bill, but essentially the Bill is needed and, inasmuch as it aims to do what you describe, is welcome.

On the issue of judicial activism, is this the right Bill to explore that, or are you suggesting, as you implied just a moment ago, that perhaps another piece of legislation will be introduced to deal with that in the light of the Evans case, the Miller case and the other cases that we have seen prevailing over a number of years? There is a challenge for democratic Government that needs to be addressed.

Dr Morgan: In my view, it would be a shame if the valuable things that are in the current Bill were lost because other things were put in that were frankly much more controversial. I am not the manager of parliamentary time; I do not know how easy it is to get another Bill going through. There is always a temptation—the Minister laughs—to tag things on, so maybe this is an opportunity not to be missed. I have read Richard Ekins’s list of desirable amendments, which would keep Parliament going for about five years, and with heated rows, if all those were put in.

Sir John Hayes

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I will take that as an invitation to table some desirable amendments and probe the Government on exactly that matter. I am grateful.

The Chair

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Professor Feldman, do you want to come in on that?

Professor Feldman: Only to say that I would not want to be thought to agree with the suggestion that there has been a sudden rush of judicial activism. Judicial activism is extremely difficult to define, and people who say there is a lot more judicial activism than there used to be tend to pick on a very small number of fairly high-profile cases over the last few years. It may be that there are more of those than one might have expected in the length of time passing. Having been involved in this subject for over 40 years, as I said before, it seems to me that there has been a process of gradual—it has been gradual—development of principles of administrative law and their application since the 1950s, so we are talking about getting on for 70 years.

Nothing has happened suddenly and things have not all gone in one direction; there has been progress in one direction and then a pushback. I suspect we may be going through a pushback at the moment, within the judiciary itself. Judicial activism is a term that I do not really understand and I would not want it to be the basis of legislation.

Sir John Hayes

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Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)

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Q Returning to quashing orders, the Bill proposes the introduction of suspended quashing orders. They would allow the courts to give public bodies a certain amount of time to correct an unlawful act, instead of immediately striking it down. Could this have any negative implications for claimants in judicial review proceedings?

Dr Morgan: I think I just want to repeat what I said earlier, which is that it certainly could. To adopt Professor Feldman’s example, if the court suspends the effect of its order in an immigration case, you might have been deported by the time the order comes into force. Certainly it could cause serious problems for applicants in particular cases, but there are countervailing advantages, particularly where we are dealing with the general legislative scheme, which the court would otherwise immediately quash with retrospective effect. That could cause enormous difficulties in a very important area.

The Ahmed case was about quashing these freezing orders, made by requirement of the United Nations Security Council on suspected international terrorists. The court said that the whole legislative scheme had to be immediately quashed, as many Members will remember. It required emergency legislation to deal with it. In cases like that it could be beneficial, but it could cause a problem for a particular applicant. My earlier answer suggested how we might try and address it; Professor Feldman was right to say that damages and compensation are not always the answer, but they might be sometimes.

The Chair

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Q Professor Feldman, do you want to comment on that?

Professor Feldman: I will just say that lying behind this there is a difficulty that faces people drafting legislation like this. The onus is to be general and to apply to all kinds of decisions and rules, whereas, in fact, quashing a rule has rather different implications from quashing an individual decision, so the approach to it has to be similarly different.

The Chair

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Are you happy with that, Janet?

Janet Daby

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Yes, that is fine.

Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)

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Q I am glad you mentioned immigration and asylum a few moments ago, because back in 2004 the Labour Government tried to remove judicial review by using a very broadly worded ouster clause. Does this not suggest that removing Cart JR, with a tightly worded ouster clause, is in fact just a moderate and proportionate step?

Dr Morgan: The context was slightly different. You could say the ouster clause before us in clause 2 is less extreme, because it allows for JR on certain very narrow grounds. That is one reason why the courts would be more likely to accept what is now proposed than the Labour proposals back then. Of course, they were never even enacted, let alone reached the courts, so it will be a nice hypothetical question about whether it would have survived scrutiny or not. All it shows is that this particular question of having a huge volume of challenges, very few of which succeed, is not a new problem. It has been there for at least 20 years. Successive Governments have wrestled with it.

Cart was a very noble attempt to hold a balance, but even some of the judges who decided the case—Lord Brown and Lord Hope—have now accepted that their solution has not worked and perhaps a more drastic solution, as in clause 2, is justified. I think if the judges themselves are accepting that they went too far, that is something Parliament should take careful note of.

Marco Longhi

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Thank you. I am glad that you referred to the words “less extreme” in your commentary.

Professor Feldman: I agree with what Dr Morgan said.

James Cartlidge

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Q I was very struck by the point from Professor Feldman about resource and proportionality in relation to the Cart judicial reviews. He made the point about the 3.4% success rate being very low compared with estimates of success. I am not sure that that is necessarily definitive. You suggested 50% for what we might call other JRs. The average number of judge days used on these cases is something like 180 days of what is, after all, the High Court judge’s time, so your point on proportionality is important in terms of resource—albeit the legal considerations are very important as well. Currently, we as a Government, who are accountable for resources, are faced with this covid-related backlog, particularly in the Crown court but in other parts of the courts as well. Given the average number of judge days, would you agree that currently the resource issue is even more important to take into account?

Professor Feldman: That is a perfectly fair point. Success rates in judicial review are extremely difficult to assess. There have been some very good studies. The consensus that has emerged seems to be of between 30% and 50% success rates, which takes account not only of the favourable decisions from judges, but also of the favourable, or more or less favourable, out-of-court settlements of the claims, which allow litigants to withdraw their claims before they get to a full hearing. If it is 3.4% or so, that is, I would say, a significant but not huge figure.

The question for Parliament is: what amount of injustice should be contemplated as acceptable in the face of the shortages of judicial time? As the Supreme Court said in Cart, if you overload judges with a certain type of decision, less time is available for them to deal with other types of claims, which might be equally or more deserving. It is a really difficult question, but I think it is a fair one.

Dr Morgan: This is a deeply political question, because what it requires is a trade-off between expense, court time and the rational use of limited court time against the achievement of justice. We must not forget that sometimes Cart reviews do succeed. That means that there is either a point of law of public importance that the High Court has corrected, or that something has gone very seriously wrong with the facts of a particular case. Again, the High Court has given justice to the particular individual. The kind of cases we are talking about involve very vulnerable individuals. It was put rather well by Andy Slaughter on Second Reading:

“Cart reviews are a last-gasp defence for some of the most vulnerable people in the most desperate situations.”—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 230.]

In order to save money and economise on judicial resources, that is the cost that Parliament faces. In the end, that is why this is probably a question for Parliament, rather than the courts, because Parliament has the public purse, which the courts do not. It is very hard for the courts to make decisions which inevitably influence resource allocation.

That is not a criticism of the Supreme Court and Cart. Lord Dyson in Cart said something very interesting. He suggested that Parliament in 2007 should have addressed this question and failed to do it, and it now fell to the courts to do it instead. That was the suggestion in Cart itself; the courts felt they had been left to deal with some unfinished business in the 2007 Act. Well, the courts gave their answer and, in my view, Parliament is fully entitled to take a different view, but with the costs of it to certain individuals squarely in mind.

James Cartlidge

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Q Thank you very much, that is a fair point. On the matter of resource, it clearly is a political point. It is, after all, the most fundamental role of Parliament historically. You will be aware that we referred to the 2004 Bill—I think it was introduced in 2003—and you have made the point that it is effectively long-running governmental aim, regardless of party to address this. I think I am right that in when the Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill was in Committee, the then Minister, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), said that at that time it was something like 3.6%, so it seemed to be viewed then by a Government of a different colour, on the proportionality issue, disproportionate.

I had the great privilege of attending the Lord Chancellor’s swearing in. One of the things he swears is that he will ensure that resources are provided to the judiciary. This is not just about public money per se; it is about time, which is incredibly precious. Arguably, there is a context which goes back some years which seems to recognise on both sides that this is disproportionate in resource terms.

Dr Morgan: I agree. This does not seem to be a partisan point. It is about how best to deploy the resources of the judiciary. I hope the judges have been consulted on this reform, but retired judges who speak on it in the House of Lords seem to be sympathetic to the objectives.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Dr Morgan, you talked about people in these situations being very vulnerable. Obviously, it is important that we get as many of these decisions correct as possible. Why are the very few appeals that are successful, successful? Are there other ways in which we could reduce the number of people who may have had an erroneous decision? In particular, where there has been a win in the Cart judicial review, is it due to legal technicalities of process and, if so, how much difference would that have had on the actual decision of the upper tribunal if they had followed the process? Would the person have had the same outcome?

Dr Morgan: The answer might be to a slightly different question. I refer the Committee back to some things that were said in Cart itself. Both Baroness Hale and Lord Phillips, two Presidents of the Supreme Court at different times, said the reason why there are so many immigration and asylum challenges is because people are desperate. Lady Hale said:

“There is every incentive to make the road as long as possible, to take every possible point, and make every possible application.”

She went on to say she did not blame people, because people are desperate, and we can hardly blame them for doing this, but she said that that was why there was such a problem. It does create a resource problem for the courts, because in the immigration and asylum system there is bound to be a huge number of applications, even if most of them are doomed to fail. In fact, Lord Phillips seemed to recognise that Cart was sowing the seeds of a great problem. He said:

“The stringency of the criteria that must be demonstrated will not discourage a host of applications in the field”.

He was the judge who came closest to saying we should not have had Cart judicial reviews, as they are now known, at all.

That is one reason why this creates such a problem: people will try every avenue to challenge a decision, even in a fairly hopeless case, for reasons that we can all appreciate. That is why I think an even more stringent approach than Cart is perhaps needed to close down the avenue, if that is what you want to do.

Dr Johnson

- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I guess I was asking about concern about those few people who may have had a change in decision and would argue against that change. I am interested in understanding the reality of those people’s situations. Would the decision of the upper tribunal have been the same had the legal process been followed? Are those decisions based on legal technicality rather than merits of case?

Dr Morgan: The statistics that the Government presented in their response to the consultation used a criterion of success that I think answers your question. A successful Cart judicial review did not just mean that the High Court sent it back to the upper tribunal; you then had to win in the upper tribunal, so you actually had a good case on the facts. The Government came up with a figure of 3.5% success in that sense, so I do not think that they could be written off as legal technicality cases, although some people do successfully get a Cart JR and then fail when it goes back to a substantive hearing, and it could fairly be said that some of those are legal technicalities.

Members in the Second Reading debate referred to various case studies of actual live cases where something had clearly gone badly wrong and it was only a Cart JR that rescued it. I cannot remember whether it was 50 cases per annum or 50 cases in total—it is not a huge number—but in each case, it really matters to someone’s life.

The Chair

- Hansard -

Are there any final questions? We are running short of time, but I will take one more if anybody wants to come in.

There are no further questions from Members, so I thank both witnesses for coming in to give evidence in person. It has been very useful indeed.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

11:21

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

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All 10 Public Bill Committees debates in the Commons on 2nd Nov 2021

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Second sitting)

Subsidy Control Bill (Fifth sitting)

Division 6

Ayes: 7

Noes: 9

Health and Care Bill (Twenty Second sitting)

Division 45

Ayes: 5

Noes: 9

Subsidy Control Bill (Sixth sitting)

Division 7

Ayes: 5

Noes: 9

Division 8

Ayes: 5

Noes: 9

Division 9

Ayes: 5

Noes: 9

Division 10

Ayes: 2

Noes: 9

Division 11

Ayes: 9

Noes: 5

Division 12

Ayes: 9

Noes: 5

Division 13

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Division 14

Ayes: 5

Noes: 9

Division 15

Ayes: 9

Noes: 4

Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Division 45

Ayes: 8

Noes: 6

Division 46

Ayes: 7

Noes: 9

Division 47

Ayes: 9

Noes: 7

Division 48

Ayes: 7

Noes: 9

Division 49

Ayes: 9

Noes: 7

Division 50

Ayes: 7

Noes: 9

Division 51

Ayes: 9

Noes: 7

Division 52

Ayes: 9

Noes: 5

Division 53

Ayes: 7

Noes: 9

Division 54

Ayes: 9

Noes: 7

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Division 55

Ayes: 8

Noes: 6

Division 56

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Division 57