Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

The Government have tabled new clauses 29 to 37 to replace clause 58, which was a placeholder clause on age assessments. Colleagues have already made the point about lack of scrutiny. Having received these new clauses so late in the day, we have not had a chance to see proper evidence, because we were not aware of what has been said. Clearly, as part of its role a Committee must have time to scrutinise. I am sure we will do the best we can with the time we have been given, but it really is not best form to have so many Government new clauses so late in the day on such an important issue.

We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.

For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.

New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.

This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.

It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.

K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.

K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.

K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.

In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?

In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments

“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.

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[Craig Whittaker]

Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

[Bambos Charalambous]

New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

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[Bambos Charalambous]

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

[Craig Whittaker]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.

It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.

Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:

“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—

(a) disallow, or

(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,

the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.

Wasted costs are defined as

“any costs incurred by a party—

(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or

(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”

That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made

“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”

In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.

In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant

“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and

(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.

The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include

“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,

(b) any employee of such a person, or

(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.

(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”

However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.

Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:

“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”

No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.

Clause 63 provides that:

“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—

(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”

a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.

According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,

“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”

is

“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,

but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.

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[Craig Whittaker]

Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

[The Chair]

I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 65

Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous]

This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?