Low-income Countries: Debt Cancellation
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Westminster HallRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Bambos Charalambous (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab) [R]
I beg to move,
That this House has considered debt cancellation for low-income countries.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the momentous Jubilee 2000 debt campaign brought together people from all walks of life, trade unions, churches, community groups, and even the odd rock star and celebrity, with the sole purpose of demanding debt relief for the world’s poorest countries, which are suffering extreme poverty caused by debt payments. The campaign was a resounding success and resulted in more than $130 billion of debt cancellation for 36 low-income countries, equating to an average 75% debt reduction for each country, allowing them to invest in health, education systems and other public services.
Although the Jubilee 2000 campaign was widely celebrated, and world leaders felt that some good had been achieved, it later became clear that the symptom had been dealt with but not the cause. The current state of affairs is alarming. The World Bank’s latest international debt report stated that developing countries spent a record $1.4 trillion to service foreign debts, and that interest payments alone have soared by nearly a third to $406 billion, leaving many developing countries having to cut vital services, such as health, education and environmental programmes. The pressures are felt most greatly by the poorest and most vulnerable countries, which paid a record $96.2 billion to service their debt in 2023. Of that, $34.6 billion was in interest alone—a staggering fourfold increase on the figure a decade ago. Indermit Gill, the World Bank Group’s chief economist, said:
“In highly indebted poor countries, multilateral development banks are now acting as a lender of last resort, a role they were not designed to serve. That reflects a dysfunctional financing system”.
According to a report on the global debt crisis published recently by the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, 3.3 billion people now live in countries that spend more on debt servicing than on health and education, and the most food-insecure countries have seen the highest increases. Debt servicing is expected to consume 55% of low-income countries’ budgets in sub-Saharan Africa by 2025.
A definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, expecting a different result. When countries such as Ghana and Sri Lanka end up having to receive a 17th International Monetary Fund bail-out package, it is clear that things have to change.
A complicating factor in dealing with debt relief is the role of private creditors, which have exploded on to the international debt scene since the success of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Today, 61% of global sovereign debt is owed to private creditors such as hedge funds, asset managers and investment banks. Private lenders’ terms and conditions are often far more onerous than those of multilateral lenders, leaving low-income countries at the mercy of exorbitant interest rates and quick repayment schemes.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for the work he has done in this incredibly important area over a long time. He talks about the impact of rising interest rates on low-income countries, to which could be added the impact of covid and dealing with climate change, and the private sector operators. Does he agree that when countries such as the UK choose to forgive sovereign debt, speculators and private sector operators should not profit from that but should follow this country’s lead?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I will come to that later in my speech, but she is absolutely right. We need to treat private creditors in the same way we treat bilateral and multilateral creditors.
Private credit schemes are proving to be very lucrative deals for private creditors. In 2023 alone, private creditors received $68 billion more in interest and repayments from low-income countries than they had actually lent to them. That in itself is bad enough; what is worse is that when a defaulting country seeks debt relief there is nothing to compel private creditors to agree to be bound by any agreement reached by multilateral and bilateral creditors. In fact, there is no obligation to compel them to act in good faith or at all.
One stark example is the case of Sri Lanka. In 2022, Sri Lanka defaulted on its sovereign debt, which led to the most serious economic crisis in the country’s history. Sri Lanka sought debt relief from its creditors, with 47% of it owned by private creditors. Despite reaching an agreement with its bilateral creditors, the private creditors refused to accept any debt relief and sued Sri Lanka in the US courts to prioritise their debts. As a result, the private creditors will receive 30% more in debt repayments than the bilateral creditors, while Sri Lanka had to seek a bailout from the IMF. Sri Lanka will have to slash its public sector spending and spend 30% of its Government revenue on debt repayments, which the IMF regards as unsustainable. It is morally repugnant that private creditors behave in such a way, deliberately hampering the ability of a low-income country to get back on its feet at a time of crisis.
Sri Lanka is not alone in its experience at the hands of private lenders. Following the covid pandemic the G20, realising that international debt needed to be urgently dealt with, set up its common framework for debt treatments as the main global framework for dealing with resolving debt crises. The expectation was that all creditors would co-operate in collectively agreeing debt relief for countries that sought relief under the framework. Despite progress being made with bilateral and multilateral creditors, Chad and Zambia, which both sought debt relief under the framework, found that their private creditors would either drag negotiations out or offer debt relief that was significantly less than what was agreed with the bilateral or multilateral creditors.
Chad failed to get any debt relief from its main private creditor, the UK-based company Glencore, and Glencore will be repaid 50% more than Government creditors. Zambia had been negotiating a debt relief agreement for more than four years when it finally reached agreement with bondholders. One of the private companies was paid 13% more than Governments, including the UK, while other private lenders, including UK-based Standard Chartered and Investec, are still to agree debt relief with Zambia. Ethiopia and Ghana have experienced similar behaviour from private creditors.
The behaviour of private creditors is contrary to the spirit of the framework and has resulted in a loss of confidence in the framework’s efficacy among other debtor countries. To date, only four countries have sought relief under the framework. The truth is that private creditors have no incentive to agree to debt relief, because if they hold out, they get the interest payments and principal repayments as agreed. If there is a default, they can sue in the UK or US courts for enforcement action against the defaulting country, which will also be lucrative for them.
For private creditors, it is a win-win situation; for low-income countries, it is lose-lose. Expecting private creditors to voluntarily enter into debt relief arrangements is like telling an alcoholic not to have a drink. Urgent legislation is required to compel private creditors to enter into and be bound by debt relief agreements.
I have talked a lot so far about sums of money, but we must remember the human cost of investment not going to low-income countries as a result of debt re-servicing—for example, the rise in infant mortality due to cuts in health spending. UNICEF has stated that if a country has defaulted on debt repayments that remain unresolved for more than three years, the infant mortality level rises by 11.4% over that same period. Chronic under-investment in education leads to a less skilled, less healthy and less productive workforce, resulting in a lost generation, making it harder for them to escape poverty.
So what needs to be done to resolve the debt crisis? In its excellent 2023 report entitled “Debt relief in low-income countries”, the International Development Committee came up with some recommendations. The first such measure would be the reform of the governance of financial institutions that control international debt, such as the IMF. The conditions imposed by the IMF on debt bail-outs often have dire effects and make things worse for the debtor country by placing more emphasis on the short-term repayment of debt, rather than on the long-term infrastructure development of a country that could provide it with lasting security and protection from indebtedness.
Secondly, there is a need to create a level playing field by passing legislation to compel private creditors to actively participate in the debt relief process by preventing them from suing for more money than they would get if they accepted debt relief on the same terms as other lenders. In 2010, the Labour Government passed the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, which did exactly that for debt that was owed prior to 2004. My ten-minute rule Bill is an updated version of the 2010 Act. As more than 90% of bonds owed by countries eligible for debt relief are issued in the UK, it would have a significant impact on low-income countries and could be transformative in allowing money spent on servicing debt to go into health and education systems and to be spent on the environment. It would cost the Treasury nothing and, at a time when aid spending is seeing little if any increase, it would be a sure way of getting money to the most vulnerable countries. There is no justification for treating private creditors differently from other lenders.
Thirdly, there needs to be a public global debt register to record the details of all global sovereign debt. The need for transparency is urgent, and it would help populations in debtor countries to hold their Governments to account over entering agreements with predatory private creditors.
Fourthly, there should be a framework for the automatic cancellation of debt servicing when highly indebted countries are hit by catastrophic events such as climate-related disasters like Storm Beryl. It cannot be right that while a climate-vulnerable country is struggling to get back on its feet, it is forced to make debt-servicing payments. Instead of making these countries apply to international institutions for debt cancellation, debt cancellation should be automatic. Given that in 2024 the total external debt serviced by all African countries was $104 billion, of which $47 billion was owed to private creditors, and the entire UK aid budget to Africa was £993 million, something needs to change; otherwise we are just servicing the debt owed to private creditors.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way, as well as the excellent points he is making. As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group for Africa, I have noted with concern the language around the increased migration that we have seen over the last few years, and we are all concerned to see the way in which criminal gangs exploit vulnerable migrants. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that by allowing the extraction of so much value from countries in Africa, we are not aiding and supporting economic opportunities for Africans in their own countries and are therefore contributing towards increased migration?
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The lack of investment as a result of debt servicing leads to people seeking opportunities that are not available in their own country, so I totally agree with my hon. Friend on that point.
Before I conclude, I thank CAFOD, Christian Aid, Debt Justice, UNICEF and Save the Children for their excellent briefings ahead of this debate, and for their support in relation to debt cancellation. I conclude with these questions for the Minister. Will the Government support my ten-minute rule Bill to prevent private creditors from being able to sue for enforcement in the UK courts for more than has been agreed in relation to debt relief with bilateral and multilateral lenders? Does the Minister agree that there should be comparable treatment for all creditors? Also, do the Government support a public global debt register for transparency? Does the Minister support the reform of the governance of the institutions, such as the IMF, that set the terms and conditions of bail-outs?
The UK has a unique position in being able to use its global reputation to bring about change on the international stage in relation to debt cancellation, as it did 25 years ago. We led the way then, and it is time to do so again. We cannot afford not to. The global south is looking to us for action, and it is time for us to act.
Esther McVey (in the Chair)
I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called.
Bambos Charalambous
I will be brief. I very much welcome the Minister’s responses, certainly in relation to financial institutions and reforming the IMF, representation, how we look at debt, and transparency. In relation to external shocks, I think we should look at automatic cancellation of debt when a country is facing a climate event, for example. I very much hope that that can be looked into, long term.
On comparable treatment, I know that the Minister has taken that on board and will be looking into it further. I disagree with her on legislation in relation to private creditors. Private creditors have not shown themselves to be responsible in this matter. I have given examples of private creditors who have not engaged in the G20 framework in the way they were expected to. I hope that, if the Minister does have regular meetings with them, she is able to convey this message to them. Until we see changes, I certainly will be pursuing legislation through my private Member’s Bill, the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Bill.
We have had a good discussion today, and I thank all Members for contributing as they have, to show the unanimity on what we would like to see done. I think we all support debt cancellation and would like to see more done to help low-income countries—the most vulnerable ones—to get back on a level footing so that they can develop their economies as we would like to see them develop.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered debt cancellation for low-income countries.
Economic Responsibility and a Plan for Growth
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
It is less than a month since the former Chancellor delivered his “Let’s call it a fiscal event” Budget. The so-called mini-Budget turned out to be a full-on, unmitigated, colossal disaster. To say that that horror show of incompetence spooked investors in the financial markets would be an understatement.
The Government’s unexpected and impulsive tax cut for the richest, withheld from even senior Ministers, plus promises of more reductions to come, were breathtaking in their unfairness and recklessness. Most importantly, none of those crazy plans was costed by the Office for Budget Responsibility, which was also kept in the dark, along with most of us. The Government left a huge un-costed hole in the nation’s finances—no wonder they tipped the City into total panic.
It beggars belief that the Government did not stop to consider for just one minute the consequences of their actions on the global markets and beyond. Despite the Prime Minister’s hero worship of Margaret Thatcher, she clearly paid no heed to her aphorism, “You can’t buck the markets.” It has added insult to injury that the Prime Minister and her Government have repeatedly tried to insist that the chaos they caused has been due to global factors.
In fact, clear data provided by the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor, Sir Jon Cunliffe, shows the direct relationship between the crisis and the then Chancellor’s Commons statement on 23 September. The data shows that the cost of Government borrowing spiked in the immediate aftermath of the mini-Budget and started to come down again only after the Bank made £65 billion available to bail out the UK pensions industry. By contrast, the cost of Government borrowing in America and the EU markets remained relatively flat while Britain’s financial markets went into meltdown.
Let us be completely clear: this is a Tory crisis made in Downing Street. They created it. They own it. But it will be paid for by working people, paying higher mortgages and borrowing costs for years to come. That is the worst aspect of this mess—the very real harm it will do to real people and real lives. People’s life choices have been shredded in the blink of an eye by a kami-Kwasi Budget. An ideological fixation with failed trickle-down economics has caused the Prime Minister to wreck people’s hopes and aspirations. I have heard from young couples who are no longer able to buy their first homes, pensioners who are worried about putting the heating on, and parents who are panicking about how to make ends meet. Rents are soaring and landlords are hastily selling, which creates an even greater shortage of rented accommodation.
In my constituency of Enfield, Southgate, pollsters Survation found that in the aftermath of the mini-Budget, 60% of people are cutting back on their essential groceries and 57% are worried about not being able to pay energy bills. Approximately 11,000 people will also seek to refinance their mortgages in Enfield in 2023. They will face hundreds of pounds in increased costs thanks to the irresponsible ideology of the Prime Minister and her Government. Even now, with the new Chancellor, we are still flying blind with no OBR forecasts and being left in the dark about much of what the latest Chancellor is proposing and its impact.
Exactly a week ago at Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister said that there would be “absolutely” no public spending reductions. Yet that seems to be another broken promise, with signs that every single public service is again at risk. Public services and local government are already on their knees. My constituents frequently tell me how they cannot get GP appointments for less than four weeks away and how their hospital appointments are regularly cancelled.
Not only have the ex-Chancellor and the Prime Minister trashed the economy, but they have managed to trash the UK’s international reputation. With no less than the President of the United States, Joe Biden, declaring that the mini-Budget was a “mistake” and its implosion was “predictable”, we know the damage has been done. The Government’s economic credibility has been ruined and lasting damage has been done to the economy and to our international reputation. The same set of people simply U-turning will not fix it.
The Prime Minister made much of the anti-growth coalition in her speech to her chaotic party conference. If the Government want to understand who the anti-growth coalition truly are, they need only look in the mirror. The effects of the rashness and cult-like following of failed economic dogma over the last seven weeks will be felt for many years to come by ordinary people across the country. Opposition Members will make sure that the public do not forget who caused this chaos and that the blame is placed squarely on the Prime Minister and the Government.
Yazidi Genocide
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(3 years ago)
Westminster HallRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I thank the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara) for securing this important debate. Many horrors, atrocities and human rights abuses have been committed during the war in Syria, but the genocide against the Yazidi people carried out by Daesh between 2014 and 2017 must rank as one of the worst.
Human rights and international law must always be our guiding principles as Members of Parliament. Only by standing up for human rights and the rule of international law can we in the UK have any moral authority in the eyes of the world; only by standing up for those values can we transcend the push and pull of sectarian politics. When it comes to the horrific situation endured by the Yazidi people, the Labour party, including myself, believes that the UK Government must do everything in their power to ensure that there is justice for the victims. The UK Government must recognise their duty to stand up for human rights in this situation.
In an ideal world, the determination of genocide would be made by a competent court with full access to all necessary evidence. Unfortunately, as hon. Members present will appreciate, the world is far from ideal. There are many situations where the international courts are unable to make that determination, either because of questions relating to the jurisdiction of the court or because the process has been blocked by a party to the proceedings. In such cases, when the preferred legal routes to recognising genocide are blocked, it falls to Parliament to take action as a last resort. In this case, that action is to recognise what happened to the Yazidi people as genocide.
The definition of genocide is very important, both as an assertion of the truth and as a crucial step to establishing international mechanisms for accountability. As the hon. Members for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Margaret Ferrier) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon) have mentioned, in 2016, the House of Commons voted 278 to zero that IS, or Daesh, was committing genocide against the Yazidis, Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and Syria; yet the Government did not accept that expression of the will of the House, instead arguing that the matter of genocide should be decided by a competent court. So, while the Government have condemned the atrocities against the Yazidis, they have not done the one thing in their power that could really help the situation.
In fact, I argue that the Government’s long-standing policy that any determination of genocide should be made by competent courts, rather than the Government, is unhelpful to the victims of the genocide and the international pursuit of justice. As my neighbour and hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North (Feryal Clark) stated, recognising the genocide of the Yazidi people would be a practical step in helping the victims.
Without the events of 2014 to 2017 being defined as genocide, Daesh fighters are currently predominantly prosecuted for offences other than genocide, with terror-related offences the primary offence used in prosecutions. It is really important that everyone understands that prosecutions for terror-related offences serve only to undermine the true severity of the crimes perpetrated against the Yazidis. While Daesh fighters can be partially held to account via the mechanism of terror-related offences, a formal recognition of genocide would allow for greater justice for victims of genocide.
We saw moral leadership on this matter in Germany in December 2021 when, for the first time, a Daesh member was convicted of genocide against the Yazidi community. Germany’s use of universal jurisdiction in that case can and should be replicated by other Governments, including our own.
I would like to explain why it was indeed a genocide. As is well known, between 2014 and 2017 Daesh committed the most heinous atrocities against the Yazidi community in Iraq. In 2016, a UN human rights panel and the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, described the actions of IS, or Daesh, against the Yazidis as constituting genocide. In 2021, a further UN investigative team concluded that there was “clear and convincing evidence” of genocide against the Yazidis.
It is worth noting exactly what the UN said in its report and why it chose to use the word genocide.
“ISIS has sought to erase the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community”.
It is now known that around 10,000 Yazidis were either killed or captured in August 2014 alone, out of which 3,100 were murdered by gunshots, beheaded or burned alive. Perhaps one of the most horrific aspects of the Yazidi genocide was the way in which Daesh systematically separated the women to rape, sexually mutilate and sterilise, while many children were sent to training camps. Sexual violence against the Yazidi women captured by Daesh occurred on a horrific scale; it was the systematic use of sexual violence as a tool of genocide. Around 7,000 women were sold as sex slaves, or handed to jihadists as concubines. Girls as young as nine were sold off to Islamic State fighters, routinely raped, and punished with extreme violence when they tried to escape. Children were killed as a means of punishing their mothers for resisting.
There is no doubt that the atrocities perpetrated by Daesh, including massacres, enslavement, conscription and rape, have inflicted communal and individual trauma on the Yazidi people. A study published in 2018 by BMC Medicine found that more than 80% of participants, mainly Yazidi women aged between 17 and 75, met the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. The rates reached nearly 100% for women who had survived captivity.
There is nothing that can undo this unimaginable suffering and the trauma it has caused for the survivors of the Yazidi genocide, but by showing leadership and formally calling the genocide by its name, the UK Government could establish or strengthen international mechanisms for justice. Crucially, it would be an honest and true reflection of the events that occurred on the ground. For the survivors of the genocide, who still live with unimaginable trauma, the recognition of genocide for what it is might perhaps do something to lessen the emotional weight of the injustice.
I would like to conclude by saying that when it comes to human rights, there is no left or right, only right and wrong. I put the following questions to the Minister: first, would he reconsider the Government’s decision not to declare what has happened to the Yazidi people as a genocide; and secondly, will he do all in his power to help those who have suffered, and continue to suffer, from the Yazidi genocide to get justice? The Government must and should recognise the massacre of the Yazidi people at the hands of Daesh. It is morally and ethically the right thing to do. It is genocide.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
The Government have tabled new clauses 29 to 37 to replace clause 58, which was a placeholder clause on age assessments. Colleagues have already made the point about lack of scrutiny. Having received these new clauses so late in the day, we have not had a chance to see proper evidence, because we were not aware of what has been said. Clearly, as part of its role a Committee must have time to scrutinise. I am sure we will do the best we can with the time we have been given, but it really is not best form to have so many Government new clauses so late in the day on such an important issue.
We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.
For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.
New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.
This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.
It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.
K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.
K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.
K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.
In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?
In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments
“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.
The Government’s proposals will give the Home Office powers to compel local authorities to assess the age of a child, as they must provide the Home Office with evidence for why they believe that the child is the age they claim to be. That will put pressure on local authorities, which have already expressed frustration over having to conduct age assessments when Home Office caseworkers challenge their view that they see no reason to doubt a young person’s age. Introducing those changes in new clause 30 will likely undermine the specialist knowledge and experience of those who work in the asylum system, while putting increased pressure from the Home Office on the already stretched resources of local authorities.
Craig Whittaker
Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.
Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.
The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.
Bambos Charalambous
New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.
That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.
The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.
The sector has long expressed concerns about the powers and procedures of SIAC, but the Government are seeking to extend the powers even further. It follows that the wider escalation of the Home Office power in the Bill, which will have a devastating consequence for vulnerable people, will also provide the lead for others to promote and encourage similar draconian measures in their immigration and asylum systems. We are opposed to new clause 11, because it will significantly expand the powers of SIAC and put British citizens—and other people who have or seek an entitlement to enter, reside or remain in the UK—at risk of being excluded from the UK or of being treated as having no right to be here.
Craig Whittaker
Let me address a couple of points. Basically, the hon. Gentleman is asking whether SIAC involves a further erosion of civil liberties. The direct answer to that is no—if anything, it is quite the opposite. New clause 11 allows the specialist court the ability to consider all evidence relied on to ensure that cases may be both brought and properly defended. In addition, the special advocate system, the disclosure procedure used in such hearings and other safeguards are designed to provide individuals with substantial measures of procedural justice in their difficult circumstances when, in the public interest, material cannot be disclosed to them directly.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.
Clause 62
Tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bambos Charalambous
I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.
We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for
“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.
This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.
The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.
Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.
All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.
In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.
In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.
Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.
Craig Whittaker
Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.
Bambos Charalambous
I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.
It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.
Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—
(a) disallow, or
(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,
the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.
Wasted costs are defined as
“any costs incurred by a party—
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”
That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made
“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”
In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.
In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant
“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and
(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.
The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include
“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,
(b) any employee of such a person, or
(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”
However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.
Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:
“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”
No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.
Clause 63 provides that:
“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—
(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”
a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.
According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,
“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”
is
“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,
but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.
The Chair
This debate will now include consideration of clause 63.
Craig Whittaker
Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.
The Chair
I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.
Clause 65
Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bambos Charalambous
This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?
Craig Whittaker
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Bambos Charalambous ExcerptsTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
The Government have tabled new clauses 29 to 37 to replace clause 58, which was a placeholder clause on age assessments. Colleagues have already made the point about lack of scrutiny. Having received these new clauses so late in the day, we have not had a chance to see proper evidence, because we were not aware of what has been said. Clearly, as part of its role a Committee must have time to scrutinise. I am sure we will do the best we can with the time we have been given, but it really is not best form to have so many Government new clauses so late in the day on such an important issue.
We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.
For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.
New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.
This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.
It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.
K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.
K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.
K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.
In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?
In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments
“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.
Craig Whittaker
Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.
Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.
The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.
Bambos Charalambous
New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.
That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.
The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.
Bambos Charalambous
I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.
We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for
“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.
This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.
The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.
Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.
All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.
In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.
In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.
Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.
Craig Whittaker
Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.
Bambos Charalambous
I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.
It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.
Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—
(a) disallow, or
(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,
the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.
Wasted costs are defined as
“any costs incurred by a party—
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”
That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made
“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”
In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.
In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant
“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and
(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.
The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include
“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,
(b) any employee of such a person, or
(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”
However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.
Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:
“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”
No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.
Clause 63 provides that:
“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—
(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”
a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.
According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,
“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”
is
“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,
but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.
Craig Whittaker
Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.
The Chair
I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.
Clause 65
Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bambos Charalambous
This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?
Oral Answers to Questions
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Steve Barclay
I very much agree with my hon. Friend. It is as a result of those measures that unemployment has now fallen for six months in a row and that the OBR is forecasting a peak of 5% to 6%, compared with the previous forecast of 12%. As he rightly says, the peak will be 2 million fewer. It is not just about those who are being helped back into work, however; it is also about the programme of apprenticeships, traineeships, jobs support and the doubling of work coaches that will then help people in work to get into the better jobs that they deserve.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)
Bambos Charalambous
The recent Climate Change Committee progress report showed that the Treasury had not fully met a single one of its recommendations in the past year. Does the Minister think this is good enough, and what steps should be taken to rectify that?
Kemi Badenoch
I am afraid I do not think that is what the report has said. What I will say is that we will be releasing many publications this autumn around net zero, not least the net zero review. This final report will be published in advance of COP26. The report will inform sectoral decarbonisation strategies and the net zero strategy, and work on those will continue to develop at pace across Whitehall.
Oral Answers to Questions
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Jesse Norman)
The Government announced at Budget 2021 that the self-employment income support scheme, or SEISS, will continue until September, with the fourth and then the final fifth grant. This provides certainty to business as the economy reopens, and it means that the SEISS will continue to be one of the most generous schemes for the self-employed in the world, and one of the few where support is committed until September.
Jesse Norman
The hon. Lady will know that the SEISS is one of the most generous schemes of its kind. The range of overall measures that the Government have taken is one of the most comprehensive of its kind in the world. I think she also knows that I personally and my officials have leant in as hard as we can to understand and to work with those groups to see whether we could extend the schemes. It has not been possible, because of features of the design of the tax system, but we have absolutely spent every effort possible to try to make it so.
Bambos Charalambous
More than 900,000 people who were self-employed at the start of the crisis, including many in the creative industries sector, now say that they are having to leave the sector as the crisis comes to an end. Does the Minister agree that the lack of support for the self-employed, who are not covered by the existing schemes, risks damaging the recovery we so desperately need?
Jesse Norman
A very large majority of the self-employed are, of course, covered by the schemes, and therefore I think that the hon. Gentleman’s concern is misplaced. Of course there will always be change in employments of different kinds, and in a dynamic economy such as ours, that is to be expected. If we can get through this desperate crisis—the worst for 300 years—with anything like any of the projected outcomes, that is something we can all, self-employed or not, be profoundly grateful for.
Financial Reward for Government Workers and Key Workers
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(4 years, 2 months ago)
Westminster HallRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) for her excellent speech when opening the debate. In fact, all the speeches that we have heard so far have been outstanding, and I associate myself with all of them.
I want to begin by thanking the 353 constituents of Enfield, Southgate who have signed the two petitions that have led to today’s Westminster Hall debate. I thank our public sector workers, who have provided such an incredible public service in our hospitals and social care sector, our local councils, our communities, our schools, our courts and prisons across the whole justice sector, and our jobcentres. I also thank all those working in the emergency services in every public sector that I have not had time to mention. These have been incredibly strange circumstances, and if it was not for their stepping up to help, we would have been in a much worse situation.
From speaking to public sector workers, I know that working in the sector is a vocation for many people, and they have a real desire to serve. That is despite a decade of cuts and austerity and the huge pressures that have been placed on people just doing their everyday job. I want to explode the myth that public sector workers are paid far more than private sector workers. That is simply not true. According to figures from the Office for National Statistics, after years and years of below inflation pay rises and pay freezes, public sector workers earn 3% less than private sector workers. We need to make sure that that is not forgotten. Rather than reward all public sector workers for their hard work, the Government have chosen to divide and rule, and give some public sector workers a pay rise while giving a slap in the face to others. That is clearly unacceptable.
The Government do not realise the huge amount of good will that public sector workers provide in doing their jobs under the most trying circumstances. Before becoming a Member of Parliament, I worked in local government, with some extraordinary people who would often go far beyond the call of duty, just to get the job done. That was after years of cuts, not only in staffing levels that made their work extremely hard but in resources as well.
In my borough of Enfield, I helped volunteers to deliver food parcels at the start of the pandemic. That was arranged and organised by Enfield Council’s amazing staff, who were not just doing their everyday job. They were seconded to do this as an additional job, to make sure that people who were in dire need got the food that they needed. It was an incredible achievement and they showed that they were stepping up to do that. I ask in all honesty, how can the Government justify not giving these public sector workers a pay increase? When the chips were down, our public sector workers did what they had to do to get us through this. It is only right and proper that they get the reward that they deserve, and not an appalling snub from the Government.
Public Health Restrictions: Government Economic Support
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(4 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Steve Barclay
My hon. Friend raises an important point. There is a strong interplay between the workforce challenges and the financial viability of the care home sector. One of the biggest risk factors is transmission as a result of staff, particularly agency staff, moving between care homes. He will know—and I know from my time as a Health Minister—that the financial pressures of that sector are not new pressures from this covid period; they are of long standing. The first tier of the £3.7 billion package of support that was initially allocated to local authorities was particularly directed at the adult social care sector. My hon. Friend will be aware that we are now on the second tranche of infection control funding to support these sectors. He speaks to a very real issue, which we are monitoring closely, and which is at the heart of how we address staff transfers between care homes and the infection risk that such transfers pose.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
The Government have said that schools will be among the last to close under any covid restrictions or lockdowns. Headteachers in my constituency have told me that they are having to pay additional costs for cleaning to keep schools safe. When will the Government announce additional funding for schools, so that this money does not come out of schools’ budgets, risking deficit for them?
Steve Barclay
As the Minister responsible for Government spending on behalf of the Chancellor, I would want to look closely at why the school in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency is saying that that very significant uplift in funding for schools last year does not appear to be reaching the frontline. The education funding settlement in the 2019 spending round should more than cover the cleaning costs. I will happily look at that, but if he looks at the funding settlement allocated in SR19, I think he will accept that it was a very generous one.
Support for Self-employed and Freelance Workers
Bambos Charalambous Excerpts(4 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
Back in March, at the beginning of lockdown, when announcing some financial support, the Chancellor said that he understood people’s concerns about losing their jobs and paying their rent or mortgage and their food bills, and he added:
“You will not face this alone”.
Since that time it has been clear that a significant section of our community has been abandoned—left to face their financial difficulties without any help from the Government and very much alone. The people I am talking about are the excluded 3 million, made up of freelancers, the self-employed, new starters and many others who, through the misfortune of the way that they were employed, were excluded by the Government from any financial assistance at all.
I have had numerous cases of constituents that illustrate the injustice of this denial of support by the Government. Take the example of my constituent Debbie Hassan. Debbie is a single mother of three and a self-employed picture editor for newspapers and other publications who works shifts. Her income went from £150 a day to zero as a result of lockdown. As she was ineligible for furlough or the self-employed income support scheme, the only support she could access was universal credit, at £94 a week. Or take the case of Anna, who, after being made redundant some years ago, set up her own media consultancy company from her loft. In an email to me, Anna said: “I have been five months without any income or meaningful support. As a sole director, PAYE, of my own company, there was no help. I was forced to furlough on less than half my mortgage and council tax, let alone all other bills, such as utilities and food. I am single, so there was no back-up for me.”
Let us take the case of another constituent, S, who said: “I am self-employed. I work mainly as a British Sign Language deaf-blind communicator guide. I usually find I am turning away work. When lockdown happened, most of my clients started to shield, so my income stopped immediately. I met the 50:50 rule for the self-employed income support scheme for my work, but I get some of my dividends from my husband’s limited company, which made me ineligible.” Her husband’s limited company was in set construction and its work also stopped immediately when lockdown was announced.
I have many other examples, including freelancer musicians who have received nothing while their contemporaries in orchestras and thus on contracts were furloughed on 80% of their pay. The Chancellor said he will do “whatever it takes” to get us through the coronavirus pandemic. He has totally ignored the 3 million excluded, who have fallen through the gaps and been left to sink or swim. All that is being asked for is that the disparity in support for the excluded is remedied and that they be given the financial support that they deserve and need to survive. If the Chancellor truly wants a quick economic recovery after this crisis is over, he needs to start listening and do whatever it takes to support the excluded, and to do it now.