Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Second sitting) Debate

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Andy Slaughter Portrait Andy Slaughter
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Thank you very much.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
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Q I do not know whether any of the witnesses are familiar with the recent comments of the Attorney General on these matters, which seem to contradict some of their evidence. She said that, in the last decade or so, there has been

“an increased appetite for political litigation, and, more worryingly, an appetite for putting judges in an invidious position, by asking them to decide essentially political matters on applications for judicial review.”

That also reflects the view of Lord Sumption who, the witnesses will be aware, has commented:

“Allowing judges to circumvent parliamentary legislation, or review the merits of policy decisions for which Ministers are answerable to Parliament … confers vast discretionary powers on a body of people who are not constitutionally accountable for what they do.”

He added that

“if we keep asking judges to answer inherently political questions, we are ignoring the single most important decision maker in our system: the British people.”

There is clearly a problem. We have heard that from other witnesses this morning. The problem needs to be solved. I have some sympathy with the view that the Bill does not go far enough and that we could do more. However, the idea that we should do nothing seems to me to ignore the facts.

Ellie Cumbo: If I may say so, I have not heard facts. I have heard assertion; I have heard the opinions of two people, neither of whom have been recent practitioners. On behalf of the Law Society, I do not think that we would agree that we have seen evidence that there has been an increased politicisation of the courts. In any case, it is not up to the judges to decide what cases come before them. This question is largely about the remedies available in judicial review; that is what the Bill seeks to focus on. Our view is that judicial discretion is what enables a proportionate remedy that correctly responds to the facts of the individual case to be made.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q But you do accept that judicial review should not be a means for perpetuating political debate, that it should be entirely separate from any consideration of policy, where Ministers are held accountable for that policy and it has been made in a proper way.

Ellie Cumbo: Certainly, but, as I say, I have seen no evidence to suggest that that is what is happening.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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I will give you some evidence in a second, but others may want to comment first.

Ellie Cumbo: I was actually going to make a slightly different point that actually enhances the ability of the Bill to protect judges from any assertion that they are in fact dabbling in matters of policy, which is that the provision we were just talking about earlier—to create suspended quashing orders—is not entirely clear on the face of the Bill. What it actually says it may do is allow for conditionality in suspended quashing orders: in other words, you would introduce a quashing order that would take effect only in the event that certain conditions laid down by the courts are or are not met. That is, arguably, inviting judges to pass a view on what an acceptable policy solution in those circumstances would be. We would welcome some clarification on that point of the Bill in order to ensure that it is very clear that judges are not being invited to pass policy.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q Forgive me for saying so, but I am asking questions, not commenting. I agree that there is an argument both for increasing the scope of the Bill and for dealing with some of the issues of process identified in the independent review of administrative law. I agree that the Bill could be tightened and improved, but that is true of all legislation.

To give an example, I understand that a character called Jolyon Maugham—I am inclined to say, wearing my inverted snobbery on my sleeve, that there were not many Jolyons on the council estate that I grew up in—is going to take to judicial review the appointment of the new chair of the Charity Commission, at least according to reports. That is despite the fact that in parliamentary answers it has been made clear that that appointment has been an open and fair competition in line with the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments, as regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Even where the process has been entirely fair and reasonable, the judicial review is being used as a way of asserting—one might go as far as to say campaigning—for political ends.

Ellie Cumbo: I do not want to continue to speak if my colleagues would like to join in. I will just say that I am not familiar with the merits of that case and cannot comment on it. I would return to the point that the Bill is primarily looking at the remedies that should be available in the event that a decision in that case was found to be unlawful. Our view, as stated already, is that remedies should be effective whatever the impugned decision is.

None Portrait The Chair
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Sara or Louise, do you want to join in?

Sara Lomri: Yes, I would love to. The assertion around the increased number of political cases and litigation remains just that; Lord Faulks and the IRAL looked at this and there was no such finding. At PLP, we advocate for and promote evidence-based approaches to policy. We know that there are around 4,000 applications for judicial review every year and around 1,000 get to trial. We know that in the majority of cases defendants win, not claimants.

In terms of the cases that you, Mr Hayes, and the Attorney General are talking about, there are probably a handful over a couple of years. It is understandable why those cases may take up a lot of oxygen, and of course we cannot talk for Jolyon Maugham and what that case is about.

I am a solicitor and I represent individual, marginalised, disadvantaged people who have no option but to use judicial review to hold the state to account. By passing this Bill you are going to make it harder for those people: the vast majority of users of judicial review on a day to day basis. You are going to make it hugely more difficult for them to get access to justice.

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Alex Cunningham Portrait Alex Cunningham
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You have anticipated the rest of my questions. I do not know if either of your colleagues wish to comment. No.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q I want to turn to the issue of proportionality. Witnesses may be aware of the recent judgment that says that

“challenges to legislation on the grounds of discrimination are becoming increasingly common in the UK, usually brought by campaigning organisations which lobbied unsuccessfully against the measure when it was being considered in Parliament, and then act as solicitors for persons affected by the legislation, or otherwise support legal challenges brought in their names, as a means of continuing their campaign.”

They are assisted in that, are they not, by the principle of proportionality, which confers on courts a broad discretionary power that risks undue interference of the courts in the sphere of political choices. That is very bad, is it not, both for a democratic society and for the role and reputation of courts, because the separation of powers—well, I do not need to lecture witnesses on the separation of powers. They know what it means. We have a problem that needs to be solved by legislative means. The Bill is a welcome start in that respect, is it not?

None Portrait The Chair
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Who is the question directed at?

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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I am happy for any or all to take it.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I am happy to respond to that on behalf of Amnesty. With respect, I think that is to misunderstand the role of the courts. The courts manage—indeed, you make a reference to the Supreme Court giving clear direction about its view to all the other courts below it as to how to manage the matters that are brought before it, including matters that raise the issue of proportionality. Proportionality, where it applies, is a question of law on which courts need to rule. That is why we have a judicial system, not for Parliament to try to predetermine how courts should exercise that role and perform their judicial function, in ensuring that administrative bodies act proportionately, according to the law and according to its interpretation as clearly set down now by the Supreme Court.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q To be clear, I was reading out a recent judgment from a court.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: The Supreme Court.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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I was reading out a court judgment, so there are a number of distinguished judges who share the view I articulated, as you know, that proportionality has become a problem and the Supreme Court has interfered in matters of high politics. That is the argument that has been made by the Attorney General, Lord Sumption and others. That is not my view; it is the view of those who want to see the courts doing what they traditionally did. It is a long-established and time-honoured principle that courts do not become involved in matters of high politics and the argument I am making—or reflecting—is that that is now a problem. We saw it in the Miller case and there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would not act as it did in the Miller case again. We need to do more to clarify and make certain the respective roles of those who are chosen by the people and who are accountable to them, and those who are not.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: If I may, I will make two responses to that. First, with respect, you started reading from the Supreme Court’s judgment on the question that you were concerned about, I understood from you, in support of what the Supreme Court had ruled and the direction it has given therefore to all the courts below it as to how judicial proceedings on the matter in question should be performed in future. It seems to me that the matter is addressed by the Supreme Court in black and white in front of you.

As for the wider question, the issue is clear that the Government set out—commissioned—a review of judicial review. It had eminent evidence from many public bodies, including many Government Departments, about whether there were concerns. Its overriding finding on judicial review generally was that there was no problem. Again, for reasons that have also been given earlier, I do not see that there is any need for this interference, frankly, with the way in which courts perform their constitutional function.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q Since we are having this helpful exchange, the change has been the Supreme Court entertaining the idea of proportionality as a general ground for judicial review. That has altered over time. You could argue, as you seem to do, that that is perfectly acceptable and agreeable, but my case is that it is not what judicial review has been about or is supposed to be about.

A good argument for a process of judicial review is that the grounds on which it is exercised have altered. As you know, the Attorney General has made clear her concerns about this, as have a number of senior lawyers, former Supreme Court judges and others. The argument I am making is by no means an unusual or untested one. You will have heard it many times before. I am simply saying are not the Government right at least to address those concerns?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: With respect, all I can do is refer to the previous answers and say that I think the Government are not right. Of course, there were many voices, including judicial voices, that have considered that the situation is satisfactory as it is, including the review that the Government commissioned.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q And that is the end of the matter from your point of view? You think it is perfectly reasonable to continue down this road, even though it is very different from the time-honoured principles that I have briefly articulated.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not accept what you have articulated, but you started by reading from a very recent Supreme Court judgment, which I understood you to agree with. I do not really see what you see as the problem. The Supreme Court has ruled on the matter. It is the highest authority for all the courts that will have to deal with the matter in the future and there is no ruling.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q Because the Supreme Court is taking a more permissive view around proportionality of the grounds for judicial review.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: But it did not in the very matter that you have just read from in its very recent judgment.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q As a generality, the Supreme Court is doing that.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not accept that.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q We will have to agree to differ on that subject. You presumably would agree that there is an argument that the scope of the Bill might be widened. We heard earlier evidence that suggests that there is a case for a more widely drawn review of judicial review, for all kinds of reasons that I will not tire you with, because you can check the evidence we received earlier. If we are going to have a change in judicial review, presumably this is an opportunity to do so comprehensively.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not think I can add any more. I am sure the Government’s review spent considerable time with considerable amounts of evidence—more time than this Committee will have to consider these things, unfortunately—came to a clear conclusion that there was no need essentially to revise the way in which judicial review works. It was working perfectly well—we agree with that.

None Portrait The Chair
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Sir John, my interpretation of what you are saying is that you want to widen the scope of the Bill. The scope of the Bill is already set, so with the indulgence of the Committee, I move to the next questioner, Andy Slaughter.

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None Portrait The Chair
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Very quickly, as we are running short of time and we have a number of questions to come.

Aidan O'Neill: Absolutely. I think the Sewel convention is engaged because, apart from anything else, the reform proposed in the Bill would also require an amendment of section 27B(3) of the Court of Session Act 1988, because that embodies the Cart/Eba test, and that is a statute falling within devolved competence. At the moment, I do not see that the Bill attempts to amend that Act, and I think it needs to do so if it is to apply properly in Scotland. That makes it plain that it is a Sewel convention issue.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q I want to deal with the issue of the courts being used to either resist or counter the Crown and Parliament—both the Executive and the legislature. In the evidence to the independent review of administrative law, which has been raised a number of times today, Sir Stephen Laws wrote:

“Ultimately, law cannot guarantee individual liberties or good governance unless it is supported by a culture of responsible politics”.

He went on to say:

“The risk of too much intervention by the law in politics is that it can undermine the culture on which law itself depends for its effectiveness in relation to other matters…Responsible politics requires incentives to listen to other points of view and to conduct civilised debate to convince others. None of that is necessary if the authority of the law can be enlisted to force the views of one side on the other.”

Inasmuch as this Bill goes some way to redress the balance between that authority and the democratic will of Parliament, is it a helpful and useful step? In what ways might it go further in redressing that imbalance?

Aidan O'Neill: I am happy to speak briefly on that. There is not an imbalance. We are all subject to the rule of law—Parliament as much as the Executive and the courts—and it does involve a mutuality of respect. There is absolutely no doubt about that, but the Parliament has to respect the basic fundamental rights and the procedures by which those have been maintained over centuries in this country without a revolution. It is all a matter of that maintenance of a mutuality of respect, and I have seen absolutely no evidence to suggest in any way that there has been any breach by the courts of those basic fundamental principles in which all three organs of government—courts, Parliament and the legislatures generally, and the Executives of the Union—seek to respect the rule of law and fundamental rights, and the procedures that allow those to be vindicated.

None Portrait The Chair
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Just one follow-up, John, because I am trying to get everybody in.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Q But you would accept that that view is not universally held. It is certainly not the view of the Attorney General. It is not the view of some senior judges or some of those who have contributed to this debate so far. There has been a change in the character of the usage of judicial review. I mentioned in an earlier session the application of proportionality increasingly as a means of effecting that change. Your view is particular and well informed, but by no means the general view.

Aidan O'Neill: I am not sure whether it is the general view. I am certainly speaking from my own experience, having been involved in a number of cases of some import over the past 30 years of my practice. But I am also echoing the views set out in the formal response to the IRAL consultation by the Faculty of Advocates, which generally said that one thing that one ought to avoid in any discussions of the constitution is the notion of absolutism and of the zero-sum game—that if courts say something, that means that somehow the rest of us are—[Inaudible.]

We all benefit from the dialogue that goes on and the maintenance of a balance of powers. Frankly, I would not accept any suggestion that the courts have in any sense in recent years or earlier overstepped the boundaries of their stating what the law is, and the obligations that fall upon all of us to respect it, whichever position we are in. “Be ye never so high, the law is above you”, and that applies of course to lawyers and the courts as well, but it does involve this mutuality of respect, so I am sorry, I am afraid that when one looks at the evidence, there is absolutely no basis for declaring that the courts in recent years or earlier are overstepping any mark.

Andy Slaughter Portrait Andy Slaughter
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Q Given the time, I will ask one broad question in two parts, if I may. First, we have heard some very strong opinions, on both sides, on the provisions for suspended orders and prospective-only orders, on the presumption on Cart per se, and on the use of the ouster. Do you have any particularly strong views either way on those issues?

Secondly, we have heard—particularly this afternoon—about the effect on individual litigants, and that some of the provisions may be a discouragement, whether in mounting a case in the first place or in obtaining a remedy. What is your view on that?

Dr Tomlinson: I have concerns about both provisions. I will summarise my view in headline form.

In relation to clause 1, I would first like to clarify that I do not think it reflects what IRAL proposed; it goes further that what IRAL proposed. The risk with the changes to remedies is that they will leave some individuals without a remedy in their particular case—for instance, where a remedy is prospective only. There will also be a potential chilling effect on claimants. Why would you bring a case if there were a chance that your remedy is not going to apply to you? Why would you take the various risks involved? It is okay, in an academic sense, to separate out the issues of remedies and say, “They come at the end of the case,” but the practical reality is that claimants consider what will potentially come out of a case at the end, so remedies are relevant to that initial analysis on whether to bring a case in the first place.

Clause 1 also potentially puts judges in a position of having more power, in terms of remedies, than they have currently. Given the points that have been made today and in discussion with this panel, I am not quite sure that the way that will operate in practice is what is intended. I think clause 1 will leave some significant uncertainty that might also generate further litigation.

I have already spoken about clause 2, but very briefly, there are two really important points. One is the point of principle: does Parliament want to enact an ouster clause and is that a thing that Parliament should be doing? The second key point is the use of judicial resources: is Cart judicial review a proportionate use of judicial resources? The really basic calculation, to my mind, is that you have a roughly one-in-20 success rate. The cost of those cases is around £364,000 a year according to the MOJ’s figures—not a great deal of money. As I said earlier, the success rate is potentially higher than that.

The financial figures produced by the Ministry of Justice are, I think, a little bit too high in various respects—they include, for instance, the cost of cases won by claimants. Overall, I think there is a question there: is that cost worth it, given the kinds of errors that this Cart system protects against? There can be reasonable disagreements about that. My view would be that the cost of the jurisdiction is worth it because of the errors that it protects against—you have heard case studies of the impacts of those errors today. Those are my concerns in relation to clauses 1 and 2.