Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting) Debate
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Stuart C McDonald
Main Page: Stuart C McDonald (Scottish National Party - Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)Department Debates - View all Stuart C McDonald's debates with the HM Treasury
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Stuart C McDonald Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Chair
The Public Gallery is becoming a little crowded. I encourage everyone sitting there to spread out as much as possible, to ensure social distancing.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
I would like to speak to clause stand part, and I support everything that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central has already said. We all recognise how important it is to get age assessments right, while acknowledging that it will always be an imperfect process. As he said, what precisely is the nature and scale of the problem that the Government are driving at here? Of course, it is important to ensure as far as possible that adults are not placed in child settings, but the overall tenor of the evidence that we have received is that placing children in adult settings is an even greater risk. If a young adult is placed in a setting designed for older children, there will at least be child-specific safeguarding and other age-appropriate support. If a child is wrongly placed in adult reception and immigration processes, there are no such protections, and such a decision can have profound impacts on and consequences for a child.
First and foremost, we should continue to think about age assessments as a function of the child protection and safeguarding system, not of the immigration system. The responsibility should remain with social workers, whose expertise and experience make them by far the best people to undertake such assessments where support is required. We should preserve the current position, which does not place an evidential burden on a child or young adult but leaves the decision makers to weigh up all the evidence to a reasonable degree of likelihood. The Home Office has quite simply offered no sound reasons for undermining that arrangement and for imposing a higher standard of proof.
New clause 29 and other new clauses almost certainly mean that age assessments will be routine. The Secretary of State is basically helping herself to powers to demand tests whenever she wishes, even where social workers think they are entirely inappropriate. The idea of a national age assessment board could be helpful. As we have seen from both oral and written evidence to the Committee, sharing resources and best practice could bring benefits, but what is proposed by the Government in the new clauses goes way beyond that. We need to know who is going to be on the board, how it will work and how its independence will be secured, particularly given the vast, wide-ranging regulation-making powers that the Secretary of State is helping herself to. The role of any such board should be to support local authorities, not to supplant and overrule them. Unfortunately, the Government’s provisions go far too far, and they need their wings well and truly clipped if we are to support them.
Mr Goodwill
I have just had a look at the NHS website and it says that having an X-ray is equivalent to one or two days of background radiation. If someone takes a short-haul flight, the amount of radiation they are likely to be exposed to is probably more than an X-ray, particularly if it is on a limb and not on the main body.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not have access to that webpage, but the right hon. Gentleman has access to the extensive evidence submitted to the Committee by the BDA. It is a two-sided issue. First, it is not appropriate to subject people to radiation, and in this case there is no informed consent. The evidence is clear. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is clear that an assessment can be no more accurate than two years either side. The British Society for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes is clear that we cannot assess a child’s age just physically or by analysing bones.
In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.
Mr Goodwill
The hon. Member is very generous in giving way. Is he saying, in effect, that in every case we should take the person’s word for how old they are and treat them as children, even if there is scientific evidence that they may be many years older than 18?
Stuart C. McDonald
No, I am not saying that. What I am advocating is the position at present—that the decision maker looks at all the evidence that is available in the round. If somebody is 50, I cannot imagine them needing an invasive scientific procedure to establish that they are over 18. I am not by any stretch of the imagination saying that we just take somebody’s word for it. I am advocating for the status quo. By all means the Government can introduce some sort of advisory board, but that should not supplant and take over the functions of local authorities—but that, unfortunately, is how I see these new clauses working.
The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.
I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.
What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?
Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)
It will probably not shock Committee members that I support what the Government are doing on age assessments. Ultimately, it is about ensuring that we protect our young people in our United Kingdom. When people say that they are children and will be in a classroom surrounded by people of a similar age, we need to make sure that they are indeed children.
As a former teacher, I understand the importance of this. As a former head of year who had responsibility for safeguarding, covering welfare, attendance and the behaviour of young people, it makes no sense to me why anyone would oppose a measure to make sure that people who claim to be young people are indeed young people. An individual who has nothing to hide should have nothing to fear in this regard. It is absolutely essential that age assessments take place to make sure that people claiming to be of school age are indeed of that ilk, because ultimately other young people could be put in a very vulnerable situation.
Stuart C. McDonald
We want age assessments to be as accurate as they can be at the moment, not just through the work of social work groups but with input from outside. Does the hon. Gentleman have any concerns about the impact on children who end up being wrongly placed in adult facilities?
Jonathan Gullis
Of course—absolutely. Young people should not be placed in a situation like that, for safety reasons. As a former teacher, I would not want a 14 or 15-year-old to be somewhere they felt unsafe. The problem is that we have a broken asylum system that needs fixing. Age assessments can be avoided if people do not try to enter the country illegally, but come by safe and legal routes, where we can have documentation.
There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.
Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.
Reflecting on the safeguards in the Bill and the pre-existing processes to ensure safe and ethical applications for the various technologies—before I finish, I will give way.
Stuart C. McDonald
The Minister is outlining what he sees as safeguards. I am unconvinced. New clause 32(9) seems to say that nothing prevents the use of a scientific method, even if it is not specified in regulations and so on, if the decision maker considers it appropriate and, where necessary, consent is given. Given that there are implications if consent is not provided, that surely rides roughshod over all the other protections that the Minister just outlined.
Craig Whittaker
I will come on to that when I discuss further measures in new clause 32, but our opinion is that the amendment is not necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw it. On the new clauses, clause 58 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses of introduction, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provision on age assessment. New clauses 29 and 35 are intended to replace clause 58 entirely.
Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.
Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.
Craig Whittaker
I suspect that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that how that is assessed will be down to the individual scientific advice given on the individual case at the time. I cannot see a like-for-like comparator for a child from Ethiopia or Sudan, which was mentioned earlier, being a child in this country. That is why the scientific evidence is a much more accurate way of assessing. It can be a great tool in the arsenal of assessing a child when compared with our existing system, which is the Merton assessment by two individual social workers. Given the challenges of assessing an individual’s age, we see no good reason why such technologies should not also be used. In all good faith, this is one of several tools in the arsenal. To further enhance my answer to the question asked by the hon. Lady, the precise scientific method of assessment will be specified in regulation, following scientific advice.
We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.
Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.
The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.
New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.
Stuart C. McDonald
Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?
Craig Whittaker
I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.
I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.
New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.
The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.
The Chair
This debate will now include consideration of clause 63.
Stuart C. McDonald
I echo what the shadow Minister said. This is all really political theatre—a move to get immigration lawyers. As a former immigration lawyer, I cannot let these clauses pass without comment. In my experience, immigration lawyers are a group of people who do an invaluable job, and not one that there is a queue of folk desperate to do. It is a difficult job. Most clients have no resources; legal aid budgets are far from easy; many clients can be communicated with only through interpreters, who are often hard to find; and these lawyers are dealing with facts, circumstances, documents and other evidence from jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The pressures can be enormous. These lawyers are acutely aware that in some cases, if they get things wrong, the client’s life, liberty or human rights are at serious risk.
This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.
The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.
Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.
As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.
Craig Whittaker
I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.
Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.
Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill
Craig Whittaker
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
What is taken from that review is perhaps the need for consolidation of immigration legislation, nationality legislation and so on, which I would absolutely support. The challenge with the clause as drafted is that it proposes pretty huge and wide-ranging powers. The Secretary of State can amend pretty much any old Act of Parliament if, in her opinion, it facilitates what is otherwise desirable in connection with the consolidation. It could rewrite citizenship laws, for example, or the entire immigration system. There is a check on it in the sense that the regulations will not come into force until a consolidation Act is passed. There is a broader question about how often Governments tend to help themselves to massive Henry VIII powers when they rewrite all sorts of stuff. I have made that point a million times and nobody listens, so I will leave it at that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 69
Extent
Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—
‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—
(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;
(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);
(c) section(Liability of carriers)(liability of carriers).
(5) Those provisions are—
(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;
(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;
(c) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”—(Craig Whittaker.)
This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 186, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—
‘(4) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Scotland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Scottish Parliament, bringing it into force in Scotland.
(5) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Northern Ireland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly, bringing it into force in Northern Ireland.”
Under this amendment, Part 4 of the Bill would not enter into force in Scotland or Northern Ireland until the relevant devolved legislatures had given their consent.
I am sorry to have to take the Committee back to part 4 and modern slavery and trafficking. The amendment relates to a similar issue that I raised in connection with age assessments, because I tend to believe that certain provisions in part 4 encroach on devolved competences in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the way that the part 4 is drafted, the Government have recognised that modern slavery and trafficking is a matter that is devolved to both those jurisdictions. That is why certain clauses do not impact on them. However, in this amendment, we are suggesting simply that the Government should go further. For example, in my view, the recovery period is clearly within the competency of the Scottish Government and I think, also, the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, clause 49 interferes with the start and end points of that period. Clauses 46 and 47 trample all over the idea that identification of victims of slavery and trafficking are devolved matters. So too does clause 51. For those reasons, I am prompting the Minister on what engagement there has been and is ongoing and whether a legislative consent motion should be requested from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly before the Bill is passed.
Craig Whittaker
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.
Craig Whittaker
It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.
Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for his assurances that engagement has been taking place and is ongoing. I accept that the amendment is not practicable, because it impinges on reserved matters. The other side of the coin is also true and this was about provoking a discussion about which parts of the Bill the Home Office has identified as relating to devolved matters. The Minister has listed some, which is helpful, but I do not think he has completely listed all that would apply and should be described as devolved. For example, age assessments quite clearly relate in some circumstances to devolved functions regarding children. More relevant to this amendment debate is modern slavery, as I said—for example, the length of the recovery and reflection period and various other matters in relation to identification of victims are, absolutely and definitely, devolved. That is why we have separate modern slavery and trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.
I have done what I needed to do, which is to suggest that the Home Office has a look at whether a legislative consent memorandum is required, but I will leave it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 70
Commencement
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 70, page 58, line 30, leave out “and (4)” and insert “to (5)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 109.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 70, page 58, line 42, leave out paragraphs (d) and (e).
This amendment is consequential on an Amendment 109.
Amendment 109, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) Sections 27 to 35 may not be commenced before—
(a) the Secretary of State has consulted with such parties as the Secretary of State considers appropriate on—
(i) the compatibility of each section with the Refugee Convention; and
(ii) the domestic and international implications of the UK adopting each section;
(b) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of that consultation stating which parties were consulted, and stating in respect of each section—
(i) the views of the parties consulted on its compatibility and implications;
(ii) the differences between the interpretation of the Convention provided by the section and any interpretations provided by the higher courts before the passing of this Act;
(iii) the reasons why the Secretary of State concludes that the section should be commenced; and
(c) both Houses of Parliament have considered that report and approved the commencement of each of the sections that is to be commenced.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)—
“interpretation provided by the higher courts” means an interpretation provided by any judgement of the High Court or Court of Appeal in England and Wales, of the Court of Session in Scotland, of the High Court or Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or of the United Kingdom Supreme Court that has not been superseded.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to hold consultations on the compatibility of Clauses 27 to 35 with the Refugee Convention, and to report to Parliament on such consultations, before the relevant Clauses enter into force.
Stuart C. McDonald
God loves a tryer, and I do try. The amendments are another attempt to encourage the Government to set out their legal thinking on the compatibility of the clauses cited in amendment 109 with the refugee convention. How do the Government think that the provisions in clauses 27 to 35 can be consistent with the refugee convention?
There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.
On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.
In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.
Craig Whittaker
We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of amendments 107 to 109, which I will speak to collectively. I thank hon. Members for moving and tabling them, and I agree that it is important that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations under the refugee convention and other international conventions and treaties.
I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.
There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.
The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.
In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.
Stuart C. McDonald
I have not succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to move beyond assertion that there is compliance with the refugee convention and to hear a little more about why the Government think that that is the case. I accept the point that different countries have slightly different interpretations of certain provisions; that is legitimate. But there are clear arguments that what the Government are doing in relation to the evidential threshold, their definition of “particular social group” and, in particular, their total rewriting of article 31 on immunity from penalties is inexcusable and way beyond any margin of appreciation that Governments enjoy. I tried. I failed. I will accept that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Craig Whittaker
I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.
It is important that deprivation orders made before this Bill comes into force remain valid, otherwise individuals who the Home Secretary has already decided should be deprived of their British citizenship because it is conducive to the public good would have their citizenship effectively reinstated and could therefore freely travel in and out of the UK. This could have detrimental consequences for national security. We need amendment 121 so that the relevant provisions of the new clause are enacted at the earliest opportunity.
Stuart C. McDonald
I will not say too much, because I need to give new clause 19 further consideration and to speak with stakeholders about it. Circumstances in which service is difficult because a person is out of contact happen pretty regularly in legal disputes that go through the courts. Rather than just shortcutting by having no procedure at all, what happens is that an alternative method is proposed, such as displaying a notice in newspapers. That was back in the old days; I assume that things have moved online since the dim and distant past when I was a practising solicitor. I wonder if there is a better way that does not result in someone being deprived of citizenship—which, as the Minister said, is a very serious matter—without any procedure having been followed at all.
It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.
Amendment 121 agreed to.
Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—
“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.
This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.
Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—
“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.
This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.
Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).
This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.
Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.
Craig Whittaker
I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—
“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.
This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
Under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through UK port and border areas for the purposes of determining whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism. Currently, officers may exercise schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area and their presence in such an area is as a result of them entering or leaving the UK.
The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.
New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.
Amendment 79 agreed to.
Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)
This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.
Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—
“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);
(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);
(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”
This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.
Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—
“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”
This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.
Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—
‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“
This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 38—Time limit on immigration detention—
“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) who is liable to detention under a relevant detention power.
(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 28 days from the relevant time.
(3) If P remains detained under a relevant detention power at the expiry of the period of 28 days then—
(a) P shall be released forthwith; and
(b) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power thereafter, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that there has been a material change of circumstances since P’s release and that the criteria in section [Initial detention: criteria and duration](1) are met.
(4) In this section, “relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—
(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);
(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);
(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal); or
(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).
(5) In this section, “relevant time” means the time at which P is first detained under a relevant detention power.
(6) This section does not apply to a person in respect of whom the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain is or was taken in the interests of national security.”
This new clause would prevent people who are liable to detention under a relevant power from being detained for longer than 28 days.
New clause 39—Initial detention: criteria and duration—
“(1) A person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power other than for the purposes of examination, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that—
(a) P can be shortly removed from the United Kingdom;
(b) detention is strictly necessary to effect P’s deportation or removal from the United Kingdom; and
(c) the detention of P is in all the circumstances proportionate.
(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 96 hours from the relevant time, unless—
(a) P has been refused bail at an initial bail hearing in accordance with subsection (5)(b) of section [Bail hearings]; or
(b) the Secretary of State has arranged a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P in accordance with subsection (2)(c) of section [Bail hearings] and that hearing has not yet taken place.
(3) Nothing in subsections (1) or (2) authorises the Secretary of State to detain P under a relevant detention power if such detention would, apart from this section, be unlawful.
(4) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.
(5) In this section, “relevant detention power” and “relevant time” have the meanings given in section [Time limit on immigration detention].”
This new clause sets out the circumstances in which a person to whom NC38 applies may be held in initial detention, and the maximum duration of such detention.
New clause 40—Bail hearings—
“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies and who is detained under a relevant detention power.
(2) Before the expiry of a period of 96 hours from the relevant time, the Secretary of State must—
(a) release P;
(b) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or
(c) arrange a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), when the Secretary of State arranges a reference to the Tribunal under subsection (2)(c), the Tribunal must hold an oral hearing (“an initial bail hearing”) which must commence within 24 hours of the time at which the reference is made.
(4) If the period of 24 hours in subsection (3) ends on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank holiday, the Tribunal must hold an initial bail hearing on the next working day.
(5) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal must—
(a) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or
(b) refuse to grant immigration bail to P.
(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Tribunal must grant immigration bail to P at a bail hearing unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] are met and that, in addition—
(a) directions have been given for P’s removal from the United Kingdom and such removal is to take place within 14 days;
(b) a travel document is available for the purposes of P’s removal or deportation; and
(c) there are no outstanding legal barriers to removal.
(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] above are met and that there are very exceptional circumstances which justify maintaining detention.
(8) In subsection (6), “a bail hearing” includes—
(a) an initial bail hearing under subsection (2); and
(b) the hearing of an application for immigration bail under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016.
(9) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.
(10) The Secretary of State shall provide to P or to P’s legal representative, not more than 24 hours after the relevant time, copies of all documents in the Secretary of State’s possession which are relevant to the decision to detain.
(11) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal shall not consider any documents relied upon by the Secretary of State which were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10), unless—
(a) P consents to the documents being considered; or
(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal there is a good reason why the documents were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10).
(12) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows—
(a) After paragraph 12(4) of schedule 10 insert—
“(4A) Sub-paragraph (2) above does not apply if the refusal of bail by the First tier Tribunal took place at an initial bail hearing within the meaning of section [Bail hearings] of the Sovereign Borders Act 2021.”.”
In respect of people to whom NC38 applies, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to either release them, grant immigration bail or arrange a reference to the Tribunal within 96 hours.
Stuart C. McDonald
This group of amendments and new clauses is not new. It was proposed in similar words in the most recent immigration Bill by, I think, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), but I may be wrong. No Bill passes through this Parliament on immigration and nationality law that does not include amendments and debate about immigration detention. Perhaps, after the last couple of years, Members are more than ever acutely aware that the deprivation of people’s freedoms is keenly felt and should not occur without evidence as to its necessity.
We are talking here about the deprivation of liberty not because people have committed a crime but, essentially, for the convenience of the Home Office. The new clauses contain measures to end what is indefinite detention in the UK, whatever the Home Office says to the contrary, and to implement a workable system that ensures detention is used only as a last resort to effect lawful removals from the UK. That is what the situation should be. The existing power to detain without prior judicial authority would be retained but there would be important safeguards: a 28-day time limit, judicial oversight by way of bail hearings after 96 hours with clear criteria for continued detention and re-detention only when there is a material change in status or circumstances.
Immigration detention has declined over the last several years, which is very welcome. Nevertheless, there is no release date for immigration detainees, which is incredibly severe, particularly in terms of mental ill health. Although numbers have been falling, the length of time that people are detained has not fallen. The fact of falling numbers does not reduce the need for a time limit. We are talking about several thousand individuals leaving detention every year who have been detained for longer than 28 days and hundreds who have been detained for more than six months. In a minority of cases, detention lasts for years rather than months.
Why 28 days? It is not a number that has been pulled from thin air. It is already in Home Office guidance, which requires caseworkers to consider whether removal is imminent and goes on to define imminence in the following terms:
“Removal could be said to be imminent where a travel document exists, removal directions are set there are no outstanding legal barriers and removal is likely to take place in the next four weeks.”
This is a recommendation that has been made by many organisations with expertise in the area, including the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Affairs Committee, the Bar Council and the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migration.
Paul Blomfield
As vice-chair of the inquiry to which the hon. Gentleman referred, may I ask whether he will add the House of Commons to the list of those bodies that have endorsed this? When our recommendation was considered on a votable motion in a Backbench Business debate, it was approved by the House.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and the other hon. Members involved for their work on that report, which was incredibly thorough. We then had a Backbench Business debate and the Government did not oppose it, because there was clearly a majority in the House of Commons at that time for such a time limit.
Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.
If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.
Craig Whittaker
I want to be clear from the outset that this Government’s position is that a time limit on detention simply will not work and will not be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be here in the UK leave.
Craig Whittaker
Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Those who have no right to be in the UK should leave voluntarily, but where the opportunities to do so are not taken, we have to operate a system to enable us to enforce removal and deport foreign national offenders who would otherwise remain in the UK.
I also want to be clear that we do not and cannot detain people indefinitely. It is not lawfully possible to do so.
Stuart C. McDonald
The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?
Craig Whittaker
I think what the hon. Member has asked me to do is put a time limit on this, and I have already said clearly that just does not work. We have a duty to those in the immigration system, but we have a duty to protect the public too. The introduction of a 28-day detention time limit would severely limit our ability to remove those who refuse to leave voluntarily, and would encourage and reward abuse, to answer the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, in some cases from individuals who present a genuine threat to the public, which is not the effect I consider the hon. Members intend with new clause 38.
Craig Whittaker
The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but we are talking about those who are a threat to the public. We have to have a duty of care. In fact, the first role of the Government is to protect their own citizens.
New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.
New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not know where to start with that response, although it is very similar to those we have had in previous debates. The bogey card is always that foreign national offenders are a serious risk, yet the Government have the power to deport folk straight from prison. That is the power they should use in those situations.
What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.
The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)
Adjourned till Thursday 4 November at half-past Eleven o’clock.