Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: HM Treasury
Stuart C McDonald
Main Page: Stuart C McDonald (Scottish National Party - Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East)Department Debates - View all Stuart C McDonald's debates with the HM Treasury
Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Stuart C McDonald Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Holly Lynch
I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 48, page 43, line 17, leave out subsection (7).
Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 57, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 57, page 51, leave out lines 42 and 43.
Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 48, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.
Stuart C. McDonald
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. Last week, I was speculating about how long the Immigration Minister might be in post, but I was still shocked. Seriously, we all pass on our best wishes to him for a speedy recovery. I congratulate the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his temporary promotion.
On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.
Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.
The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?
We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his questions. Basically, he asked whether we are amending the definition of modern slavery, and the straightforward answer is no.
To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.
The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.
Stuart C. McDonald
I thank the Minister for his answer. I have made the point I need to make, which is that it is not appropriate to leave it to regulations to define these two fundamental concepts. I am sure this is something that will be pursued in the House of Lords. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
In the light of the hon. Lady’s comments, we will also consider clause 49 stand part.
Stuart C. McDonald
I will be brief, because I fully endorse what the shadow Minister has said. I absolutely welcome the fact that the measure will be in statute, but I share her concern and astonishment that the Government have decided, for no apparent reason, to reduce the prescribed recovery period to 30 days. Yes, that is consistent with the trafficking convention, but equally so is 45 days. There is nothing in the convention to say that it cannot be done and, for all the reasons she outlined, that was a welcome additional safeguard in the UK’s approach.
What is the Home Office driving at here? What signal does it send by making this change? As the shadow Minister pointed out, it is completely artificial, given where we are with average decision times. In one sense, this is just about sending signals. What a signal it sends—that we want to reduce the support given to folk who are suspected of being victims and survivors of trafficking. I support the amendment and endorse everything that the shadow Minister said.
Craig Whittaker
I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.
The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until
“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”
In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.
With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.
On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.
Holly Lynch
Clause 50, as drafted, should not stand part of the Bill. The amendment would ensure that those exploited as children will not be denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked or if additional periods of trafficking are disclosed. Children, in particular, who make up 47% of those referred to the national referral mechanism, are at serious risk of being trafficked and going missing from care. In 2017, one in four identified trafficked children were reported as going missing. The number of children referred to the NRM is also rising, with last year seeing an almost 10% increase compared with the previous year. The average number of missing incidents for each trafficked child has also increased, from 2.4 to 7.4 between 2014-15 and 2017-18. Therefore, amendment 180 is even more vital, considering the worrying trends we are seeing.
Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK has warned that clause 50
“may severely impact child trafficking survivors”
who are at high risk of going missing and being re-trafficked, particularly when
“they transition to adulthood and require access to support and protection through the NRM.”
To make that point, I want to share a real-world case study provided by ECPAT UK that demonstrates why our amendment is necessary.
Huang was referred to the local authority children's services at age 17, following a police operation in a nail bar. He was also referred as a potential victim of trafficking into the NRM and received a positive reasonable grounds decision. He was accommodated by the local authority. He told his support worker that he had been scared because his family back home were receiving threats to pay back his debt. Shortly after, he went missing. He was found by the police just after his 18th birthday and went on to develop trust with his lawyer, where he disclosed for the first time a significant period of exploitation in Vietnam, across Europe and in the UK, prior to being found in the nail bar. He remains in fear, and while the dangers facing his family back home persist, sadly, there is still a high likelihood that he will go missing again.
Without amendment 180, Huang may be unable to be referred to the NRM again, given the new disclosure of previously unknown periods of exploitation. As he is now 18, he would not be looked after by children’s services. Clause 50, as it stands, will place him at great risk of subsequent re-trafficking in the absence of access to safe accommodation and support through the NRM during his reflection and recovery period.
The increase in the number of British children in the NRM in relation to child criminal exploitation gives us further cause for concern. I recently met officers from the Metropolitan Police Service who are leading the response on trafficking, slavery and exploitation. They told me that it is becoming standard practice that when a child or young person is sent on their first county lines journey, their exploiter will arrange for them to be robbed of the drugs they have been instructed to sell. When they then have to come back and explain what has happened, they are immediately told they have to work off the value of the drugs. That traps them in debt bondage, even though the real criminal will have recovered the drugs, having arranged what can sometimes be a particularly violent mugging in the first place, so in reality there is no debt.
It would not be unusual for children in such vulnerable and exploited positions to be identified by the authorities but then go missing from the NRM because of the risks that persist. They must be treated as a safeguarding concern and not by way of immigration compliance, not least because so many of those children are British nationals. So I ask the Minister again: why are children subject to clause 50, given their particular vulnerabilities? Amendment 180 seeks to right that wrong. I am sure all colleagues will agree that a child rights-centred approach, which ensures children’s safety and their protection, must be a priority. I therefore hope the Minister will reflect on the points we have made and accept Amendment 180.
More broadly, clause 50 has the potential to exclude trafficked children and adults from being identified following re-trafficking, thereby leaving them unable to access the support they should be entitled to. I worry that with this clause the Government are suggesting that making repeat claims of having been trafficked undermines someone’s credibility. However, we also know that traffickers are increasingly coaching those they are exploiting on what to say should they be identified by authorities. An expectation is placed on the victim that they will return to their exploiters due to their perceived debt bondage, in order to avoid consequences for them or often their families.
Re-trafficking has increasingly become a part of a trafficker’s operating model, so why are we not responding to that? The changes negatively affect the victim and not the perpetrator of such crimes. It also appears to contradict the identified need for individual assessment and support, as required under ECAT. The Government have described the clause as necessary
“to prevent the recovery period being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK and to remove unnecessary support and barriers to removal where these are not needed”.
Will the Minister present the evidence to support that claim? That explanation fails, not least, to recognise that the most common nationality of all referrals to the NRM for victims of modern slavery in 2020 was that of UK nationals, primarily referred for criminal exploitation. We know that children make up the lion’s share of those referrals. Does that not make the Government stop and think about what is in the clause?
There is a fear that the NRM is being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK. Without amendment 180, the clause means that we are sending children, both migrant and British, back into the arms of their exploiters. We plead with the Minister to think again about the clause. We cannot see it stand part of the Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
I support the amendment and join the calls for the clause not to stand part of the Bill. I very much echo the comments of the shadow Minister. Like her, and as on previous occasions, I find myself not at all clear why the clause is necessary, and what problem it is driving at. Again, I find myself asking for evidence. I have not seen or heard about an issue with abusive additional trafficking claims sparking extra NRM recovery periods. I recognise that that could absolutely happen in theory, but we need much more by way of evidence before we enact such a clause.
Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.
The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.
Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.
Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.
Craig Whittaker
I would first like to clarify that the clause does not prevent individuals who have been re-trafficked from receiving a further recovery period. Rather, the clause introduces a presumption against multiple recovery periods where an individual has already benefitted from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism and period of support. This is not a blanket disqualification from multiple recovery periods; it is focused on removing the presumption for multiple recovery periods where the period of exploitation happened before the original recovery period was provided.
The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.
Stuart C. McDonald
I put to the hon. Gentleman the suggestion I made towards the end of my contribution: that he reverses the situation so that the presumption is that somebody does need an additional recovery period unless there are specific circumstances that mean it is not appropriate. Is that something he could pass on to his ministerial colleague, for when he takes the Bill forward?
Craig Whittaker
As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.
Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.
The clause will drive more people underground and make it significantly harder for the police and the authorities to investigate the perpetrators of human trafficking. It also sends a clear message to those perpetrators that they are free to exploit someone with a criminal record, knowing that they will be exempt from protection. We agree with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner that securing prosecutions against those who commit those heinous crimes will become harder if the clause stands part, which we do not believe it should.
Stuart C. McDonald
I rise to support the amendment and to make the case for the removal of the clause. The amendment is absolutely right, and excluding any survivors, especially children, from the scope of the clause will alleviate its worst impacts. The whole clause is bad.
Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.
The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.
We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.
After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.
In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.
Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.
Craig Whittaker
Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked whether the clause is incompatible with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. The answer to that question is no, it is not incompatible at all with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a criminal offence, but clause 51 of the Bill is a very separate system. Section 45 is separate from the public order disqualification. A section 45 defence is not applicable to the serious crimes set out in schedule 4 of the Bill. The Government will of course continue to work with local authorities to safeguard children and take their particular vulnerabilities into account on a case-by-case basis.
I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—
Stuart C. McDonald
That wording is absolutely right. It is possible for the recovery period to be withheld, but the convention absolutely does not allow for a decision to be made on public order grounds. It is absolutely contrary to article 10 of the convention. Does the Minister have anything that can help him with that point?
Craig Whittaker
As I have already explained, such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of whether they are children or vulnerable people, it is important that all aspects of the individual’s case are taken into account, such as whether they have been exploited and to what extent.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not want to make life difficult for the Minister, because I know he is in a very difficult situation, but the point is that it will not happen on a case-by-case basis, because decisions will not be made at all. As a result of the clause, people will just be excluded altogether from having a decision made about them. The point is that there is no case-by-case basis. It is an absolute blanket, and huge swathes of people will just not have a decision made about them, with no assessment made of whether they might be a victim of trafficking.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.
Holly Lynch
Amendments 7, 5 and 6 concern the provisions to provide leave to remain for survivors of trafficking. Similar to our amendments to clause 52, amendment 5 seeks to bring the provisions in line with article 14 of ECAT by changing the criterion for providing leave to remain from “recovery” to “personal situation”. The reference to “personal situation” recognises that leave is necessary for a range of reasons. The explanatory report to ECAT states:
“The personal situation requirement takes in a range of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.”
Amendment 6 would remove the criterion for not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country. It is not clear why the Government introduced that criterion, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in his response how he could possibly envisage that working in practice.
Amendment 7 provides a clear minimum timeframe for granting leave to remain, thereby creating more certainty for victims. Under the Home Office’s current guidance on assessing discretionary leave for survivors of modern slavery, leave to remain is granted for a mixture of different time periods—sometimes as little as six months. Those timeframes are short, and the inconsistency can set back recovery.
In 2017, the UK Government issued figures on grants of leave to confirmed modern slavery victims. Some 21% of confirmed victims who were neither UK nor EU nationals were granted asylum in 2015. A group of more than 13 frontline charities that are expert practitioners in providing support to victims of slavery highlighted the problem, stating that:
“The support currently provided to survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery is not meeting recovery needs. Government funded support ends abruptly and too early and there is little information or data as to what happens to survivors in the longer term. The current situation leaves survivors with little realistic opportunity to rebuild their lives, with some ending up destitute, vulnerable to further harm or even being re-exploited.”
The Government may argue that they are already providing support for confirmed victims in England and Wales through the recovery needs assessment. However, under the RNA, victims are not guaranteed long-term support. Victims will receive a minimum of 45 days of move-on support, with the RNA determining how much—if any—extra support is required under the modern slavery victim care contract; that extra support will be for a maximum of six months at time, and may be only a few days or weeks.
Furthermore, Labour believes that victims’ needs are not fully addressed in the RNA. In the 2020 annual report on modern slavery, the support recommended by victim support workers was agreed to in full by the Home Office in only 53% of cases, which raises questions as to whether the process genuinely responds to victims’ needs or is, instead, focused on moving victims out of the service. In summary, amendments 7, 5 and 6 are necessary to address the fundamental challenge facing victims and provide them with far greater certainty.
Amendment 189 is necessary because all child victims must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance. The amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims as per article 14 of ECAT into primary legislation. It will specify that if the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the national referral mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests, giving due consideration to a victim’s need for support and care and a sustainable arrangement.
The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has echoed concerns on the lack of clarity around what the clause would mean in practice for children, with this having been acknowledged in the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation. Dame Sara Thornton states
“it is disappointing that this detail was not included as part of the Bill”,
and we share that frustration. There is no consistent public data available on the outcomes for potential child victims of trafficking, but evidence shows that our current policies are not being implemented adequately.
Every Child Protected Against Trafficking requested data through the Freedom of Information Act on the immigration outcomes for those exploited as children, the response to which showed alarming results in the data. It found that only about 5% of child-related considerations resulted in a positive decision for discretionary leave. The data indicates that discretionary leave is not being granted to children as victims of trafficking, and that in the small number of cases where it is, the average length of grant is short, suggesting that decisions are not being taken with their best interests as a primary consideration, providing minimal stability.
How many child victims of trafficking were subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain under the policy is unknown but, based on those figures, we can estimate that they are few. That is despite the explicit current policy that states the need to consider the length of leave, including a grant of indefinite leave to remain in line with the child’s best interests. That requirement is set out to fulfil the Secretary of State’s statutory obligation under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the wellbeing of children. All child victims of trafficking must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as only standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance.
Stuart C. McDonald
I want to say a few words in support of the amendments, which have the SNP’s full support. Currently, while someone might be in limbo for a long time, they are more secure the day after their referral into the NRM than they are the day after they receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, and that is not right. If they have been accepted as a survivor of trafficking, it makes them less secure. We should move towards a period of automatic leave to remain. The provision of leave is often an absolute prerequisite for meaningful recovery. With some security of status, the ability to seek employment or education and participate in the community builds confidence and stability, and the amendments broaden the number who will achieve that stability.
We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.
The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.
Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.
Craig Whittaker
The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.
In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—
Craig Whittaker
As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.
Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.
With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual
“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.
Stuart C. McDonald
But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.
Craig Whittaker
The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.